

GEOPOLITICAL RISK ANALYSIS

The Weapon Nobody Saw Coming

Biological Warfare, the Lev Berg Incident, and the Macro Risk You Are Not Pricing

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Biosecurity | Macro Finance

Executive Summary

Annie Jacobsen's *Biological War: A Scenario* (Dutton, 2026) is a ticking-clock account of a biological catastrophe that begins with a laboratory accident and cascades into global civilizational collapse. Most readers will encounter this book as compelling speculative nonfiction. They should encounter it as a risk disclosure. This paper places Jacobsen's scenario alongside a far older and far more disturbing data point: the 1971 Aral Sea smallpox incident, in which the Soviet Union — on the best-supported reconstruction of the event — aerosolized and hardened the variola virus, infected a laboratory technician aboard a passing research vessel at a distance of roughly 15 kilometers, and then suppressed the incident for three decades on the direct orders of KGB chief Yuri Andropov. That event is not merely history. It is the strongest documented proof-of-concept for the most dangerous unpriced risk in the global macro portfolio.

Key Findings

- 01** The Lev Berg incident is the strongest documented evidence that hardened, aerosolized smallpox was achievable — at 1971 technology levels.
- 02** The disposition of the weaponized variola strain is unresolved, and its vaccine-susceptibility profile is not publicly established.
- 03** Jacobsen's scenario dramatizes a permanent structural failure: detection arrives after the pathogen does.
- 04** A mass-casualty biological event is simultaneously a financial, governance, and supply-chain collapse.
- 05** No standard portfolio model prices biological warfare as a systematic tail risk. That is the gap.

SECTION 01

The Lev Berg: The Most Important Story Nobody Told

On or about July 30, 1971, according to the testimony of Soviet General Pyotr Burgasov and the epidemiological reconstruction later published by Alan Zelicoff and the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Soviet researchers at the Aralsk-7 biological weapons test facility on Vozrozhdeniya Island conducted an open-air test of weaponized Variola major — the virus that causes smallpox — over the Aral Sea. Burgasov put the

quantity at roughly 400 grams. The island's standard exclusion zone prohibited any vessel from approaching within 40 kilometers. A research vessel of the Aral fleet, the Lev Berg, conducting routine fish-stock surveys, violated that perimeter and passed within 15 kilometers of the island.

On the open top deck of the ship, a 24-year-old female laboratory technician was collecting plankton samples twice daily — standard procedure, unremarkable duty, no protective equipment required for a routine maritime survey. The weaponized smallpox formulation, still viable at 15 kilometers downwind, reached her. She did not know she had been exposed.




Figure 1. Schematic reconstruction of the 30 July 1971 exposure: the Lev Berg passing at 15 km inside a 40 km exclusion zone. Distances and quantity per Burgasov's account; illustrative, not to scale.

When the Lev Berg docked in the port city of Aralsk, in what is now Kazakhstan, it carried, in addition to fish and plankton samples, the smallpox virus. The technician developed fever and rash within days. Over the following weeks she infected nine additional people — adults and children, among them her nine-year-old brother. Three of the ten infected died. All three of the fatal cases were unvaccinated, and all three developed hemorrhagic smallpox, the most lethal presentation of the disease. Notably, seven of the ten infected had been previously vaccinated and contracted the disease anyway. The Soviet Ministry of Health instituted emergency vaccination and ring-isolation protocols. The outbreak was contained. And then it was disappeared.

"I called Andropov, who at that time was chief of the KGB, and informed him of the exclusive recipe of smallpox in use on Vozrozhdeniye Island. He ordered that not another word be said about it. This is a real biological weapon."

— Soviet General Pyotr Burgasov, Chief Sanitary Physician of the USSR

That single phone call initiated three decades of institutional silence. The incident surfaced publicly only in 2001–2002 — first in Burgasov's own interview, then in the Center for Nonproliferation Studies reconstruction that gave it broad international

notice. The clinical records had long since been confiscated by the KGB. The victims' families were told an ambiguous story. The Lev Berg itself continued its surveys. The island continued its testing program for two more decades.

The public-health response — mass vaccination and ring isolation — succeeded in stopping the 1971 outbreak. But the lesson drawn within the Soviet system was not about containment. It was about capability. The test had worked. The formulation had maintained its infectivity over roughly 15 kilometers of open-air dispersion. The aerosolization technology was viable. Biopreparat continued, and expanded.

SECTION 02

What the Soviets Actually Proved

Three findings from the Lev Berg incident deserve standing in any serious biosecurity or risk analysis. They are not historical curiosities. They are data points about real-world capability that remain unresolved today. Each rests on the leading reconstruction of the event — Burgasov's testimony combined with Zelicoff's epidemiological analysis — which is circumstantial but compelling, and which has not been credibly refuted.

Finding One: Weaponized Smallpox as an Aerosol Is Real

The aerosolization and hardening of smallpox — maintaining infectivity across roughly 15 kilometers of open-air dispersion — is not a theoretical projection. It is the best-supported reconstruction of a real event. Natural variola transmission requires sustained close contact, typically within about two meters. A formulation still viable at 15 kilometers therefore operated at a range on the order of several thousand times that of natural transmission ($15\text{ km} \div \sim 2\text{ m} \approx 8,000\times$). That is not a marginal improvement on the pathogen's natural transmission characteristics. It is a categorical transformation of its threat profile — and because the data point was classified for three decades, it has never been formally integrated into unclassified threat frameworks.

Finding Two: The Strain May Have Been Enhanced for Virulence

The 1971 Aralsk outbreak produced a clinically anomalous pattern. Hemorrhagic, or 'black pox,' is the most lethal presentation of variola infection, carrying near-100% case fatality. In naturally occurring historical outbreaks, hemorrhagic cases represent a small minority of infections; in Aralsk, all three deaths took this form. Compounding the anomaly, seven of the ten infected had been vaccinated yet contracted the disease. The question this raises — first posed formally by Alan Zelicoff in 2002 — has never been answered with publicly available evidence: did Soviet scientists select or engineer an especially virulent strain of variola as the candidate weapon? If so, does that strain still exist, and what is its vaccine-susceptibility profile?

Finding Three: The Anthrax Was Remediated — the Smallpox Was Not Accounted For

Aralsk-7 was abandoned in 1992 following the collapse of the Soviet Union; personnel were evacuated within weeks and equipment left in place. Across four decades the site had tested anthrax, plague, tularemia, brucellosis, and smallpox, and large quantities of anthrax were improperly buried across its test zones. Unlike the smallpox question, this hazard was directly addressed. Under a 2001 U.S.-Uzbekistan agreement within the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, a Defense Threat Reduction Agency-led operation in 2002 excavated and chemically neutralized an estimated twelve tons of anthrax across roughly a dozen burial pits. The U.S. government declared the

operation a success; independent scientists were less certain that destruction was complete, and deeper soil contamination was not fully remediated.

Physical containment, meanwhile, collapsed by geography. The draining of the Aral Sea — a consequence of Soviet agricultural diversion — turned Vozrozhdeniya into a peninsula by 2001, connected overland to the mainland. The barrier that once defined the exclusion zone is gone; the site is reachable by land, and the remaining structures were demolished by 2021. The unresolved hazard is therefore not the buried anthrax, which was treated, but the smallpox. The disposition of the Aralsk-7 variola strain — and of Soviet-era smallpox stocks consolidated at the VECTOR institute and other successor facilities — remains a standing intelligence concern. VECTOR is one of only two officially sanctioned smallpox repositories in the world; what is not publicly known is whether the specific weaponized, possibly enhanced Aralsk-7 formulation is among its declared holdings, was destroyed, or persists elsewhere.

The minimum radius of contamination was 15 km. Andropov's order was clear: silence. The record surfaced only when the man who made that call chose to speak, three decades later.

SECTION 03

Jacobsen's Biological War: What It Gets Right

Annie Jacobsen's *Biological War: A Scenario* (Dutton, 2026) is structured in the same ticking-clock format as her 2024 *Nuclear War: A Scenario*: a single triggering event, traced in real time through the institutional response structures that would be activated, to a conclusion that forces the reader to sit with consequences most public discourse avoids. Its publicly stated premise is an accidental laboratory release that cascades into a bio-attack, a global pandemic, and the collapse of human society. The book deserves to be read — and it deserves to be read critically, by people who understand what the sourced record actually contains.



The older iconography of contagion. Whatever the pathogen — plague, anthrax, or smallpox — the structural problem is the same: it hides in the noise of ordinary illness until detection arrives too late.

What Such Scenarios Get Structurally Right

The central insight — confirmed by the Lev Berg incident, the 2001 anthrax letters, and every serious tabletop exercise conducted since — is that the detection-to-decision gap is longer than the pathogen's head start. Consider the class of pathogens these scenarios turn on. Pneumonic plague is real, documented, and genuinely terrifying: untreated, it carries a near-100% fatality rate, and the pneumonic form is directly transmissible between humans through respiratory droplets. Weaponized anthrax and aerosolized smallpox pose the same diagnostic problem. Initial cases of any of them present identically to influenza or community-acquired pneumonia in any emergency department not specifically looking for them. A rural physician is not running *Yersinia pestis* PCR on what presents as a bad chest infection. By the time confirmatory diagnostics trigger the reportable-disease notification chain, the CDC emergency operations center, and the Strategic National Stockpile deployment protocol, the pathogen has had days — not hours — to propagate through a population moving at commercial-aviation speed.

The second structural accuracy is the response-authority problem. A nuclear strike has an unambiguous trigger: the detection of an inbound ballistic missile activates the President's decision cycle on a signal that has no competing interpretation. A biological event — especially one that originates in what appears to be a natural outbreak — instead activates the Department of Health and Human Services as lead agency, with CDC coordination and a decision cycle built for public health rather than crisis action, measured in days to weeks. The National Security Council does not take the lead until attribution to a hostile state actor is established, which, in a deliberate attack designed to look like an accident, may never happen with the confidence required to authorize a military response. The deterrence framework does not engage. The response framework is not built for speed. The pathogen acts in hours.

What the Lev Berg Adds

Writing for a general audience from unclassified sources, Jacobsen cannot fully incorporate the Lev Berg's most destabilizing implication: that hardened, possibly enhanced variola may already exist in an unaccounted-for form, with delivery characteristics that exceed anything in natural transmission history and a virulence profile that may partially defeat existing vaccine stockpiles. Her genre is exactly right. This paper's contribution is to point past the most familiar laboratory-accident scenarios — an accidental plague or anthrax release from a modern facility — to the one with the worst delivery characteristics and the least residual immunity. It is the scenario implied by a question unanswered since 1971: where is the Aralsk-7 smallpox strain, and what would it do to a population in which most people born after 1972 have never been vaccinated?

SECTION 04

The Current Threat Architecture: Three Pathways

Informed by the documented Soviet program, the dispersal of Biopreparat-era scientific expertise, and the falling technical barriers to synthetic biology, the three highest-structural-risk biological pathways — ranked by the product of initiating probability, detection-window failure, and consequence magnitude — are as follows.

Ran k	Pathway	Critical Failure Point	Consequence Horizon
01	H5N1 pandemic-capable reassortant	Diagnostic gap: initial cases indistinguishable from seasonal influenza; detection lags exposure by 3–7 days	Healthcare collapse from simultaneous peak demand; 1918-order case fatality accelerated by modern aviation spread
02	State-sponsored gray-zone release (engineered antibiotic-resistant pathogen)	Attribution paralysis: the confidence threshold for a military response takes weeks; the pathogen acts in hours	Mass casualties plus governance-continuity collapse; no deterrence framework engages in time
03	Non-state synthetic biology: reconstructed or enhanced high-consequence pathogen	No deterrence at all: the return-address problem; an adversary may be ideologically undeterrable	Smallpox-order event in a population with little or no immunity (most people born after ~1972)

What unifies all three pathways — and what separates biological risk from nuclear risk in every policy framework built since 1945 — is the absence of legibility. A nuclear strike is immediately legible: a mushroom cloud, a blast wave, a thermal pulse, near-instantaneous attribution. The deterrence architecture was built around that legibility. Biological use is invisible at the moment it occurs. It hides in the noise of naturally occurring disease during the most critical window of the response timeline, and by the time it becomes legible, the intervention window has closed. This is not a gap that can be closed by a larger stockpile or more military assets. It closes only through biosurveillance infrastructure that can detect the signal in the noise faster than the pathogen propagates. That infrastructure does not currently exist at the scale required.

SECTION 05

The Macro Implication: An Unpriced Systemic Risk

The question for investors, policymakers, and anyone responsible for long-horizon institutional resilience is not whether a biological event of the type described here is possible. The Lev Berg incident indicates that state-level capability has existed since 1971. The question is whether the risk is priced — and the answer, with high confidence, is no.

Why Biological Risk Is Systematically Unpriced

Contemporary portfolio risk models — VaR, CVaR, geopolitical scenario frameworks — treat biological events as a subset of pandemic risk, and pandemic risk through the lens of COVID-19: a severe but ultimately recoverable demand-shock event with central-bank policy space to respond. That framing is structurally inadequate for the events described here. A mass-casualty biological event with weaponized pathogen characteristics does not look like COVID-19. It looks like the simultaneous collapse of labor supply, logistics, governance continuity, and institutional authority — across multiple geographies at once, on a timeline that outpaces policy response. Three specific failure modes that financial models do not currently capture:



Figure 2. Institutional risk models price the near slope of the severity distribution. A weaponized-biological event sits far out in the tail, beyond the VaR/CVaR horizon — unmodeled and unpriced.

Healthcare System Collapse. A mass-casualty event with a case-fatality rate above COVID-19's does not produce a manageable surge in ICU demand. It produces simultaneous peak ICU demand across every major population center at once — collapsing not just the healthcare system but every institutional function that depends on a functioning one as a boundary condition.

Supply Chain and Labor Simultaneity. The COVID shock was geographically and temporally staggered, which provided policy space and supply-chain workarounds. An aerosolized weaponized pathogen released at a major aviation hub inside the detection-gap window reaches multiple continents within two incubation cycles. The stagger disappears; every disruption occurs simultaneously and in the same direction.

Governance Continuity and Sovereign Credit. Markets can price a pandemic. They cannot price a scenario in which the executive branch of multiple sovereign governments is simultaneously degraded. The fiscal response that anchored recovery during COVID assumes the institutions capable of executing it remain functional — an assumption not guaranteed under the scenarios described here.

The Economic Sovereignty Dimension

For nations operating critical dual-use technology infrastructure — including the United States and its territories — the biosecurity gap is simultaneously an economic-sovereignty gap. Advanced manufacturing, financial infrastructure, and communications systems are staffed, maintained, and operated by people. A biological event severe enough to degrade that human-capital base does not leave the infrastructure intact for recovery; it degrades the infrastructure and the recovery capacity at the same time. The lesson from Biopreparat is that the Soviet Union understood this well enough to invest the equivalent of billions of dollars and tens of thousands of scientists in developing exactly this capability. The investment in understanding and defending against it has not been proportionate.

SO WHAT

- The Lev Berg is not a Cold War footnote. It is the strongest documented proof-of-concept that hardened, aerosolized smallpox capable of infecting at ~15 km was real in 1971. The disposition of the Aralsk-7 strain remains unknown.
- Jacobsen's Biological War is the first mainstream work to raise biological warfare to the level of public attention nuclear risk already holds. Read it — then read the evidentiary record beneath it, which in the smallpox case runs deeper and older than any single scenario.
- The defining asymmetry of biological risk is temporal: the detection-to-decision gap is always longer than the pathogen's head start. No stockpile, no military asset, and no deterrence framework closes that gap. Only biosurveillance does.
- Biological warfare risk is systematically absent from institutional portfolio models. It belongs in the tail of every scenario framework that prices geopolitical risk — not as a COVID analog, but as a potential simultaneous collapse of the assumptions underlying every other model.
- The 100-year test: the decision to build Biopreparat, suppress the Lev Berg incident, and abandon Aralsk-7 will read, in a century, exactly as reckless as it sounds today. The decision not to price this risk will read the same way.

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