

Elite Messaging, Personality, and Political Rhetoric

by

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Abstract:

The reemergence of elite messaging regarding immigration structures the American political landscape and facilitates polarizing populist rhetoric. Previous research explores elite messaging and individual responses, but less attention is paid to individual-level factors, such as personality, that mediate this relationship. Furthermore, previous research considers messaging as an antecedent to individual responses, not as a mutually constitutive relationship wherein the efficacy of messaging is considered by elites, and future stimuli are calibrated to maximize political activation. Drawing on the framing and ‘Big 5’ personality literatures, I contend that an individual’s personality traits condition responses to strategically varied messages. To test this theory, I employ a novel survey experiment to explore the interaction of diverse styles and content of messages, and personality traits, on evaluative responses. This research utilizes a convenience sample of 700 students from the Political Science Research Pool. Respondents were randomly presented with emotive, rationalistic, or authoritative messages regarding the issues of immigration, poverty assistance programs, and privatization, then asked a series of evaluative questions. Using a linear regression model, the findings suggest systematic differences in responses, conditioned by message style, issue content, and personality trait. This research contributes to the extant literature on elite messaging and preference formation by examining the micro-level factors that influence the efficacy of elite messaging. By focusing on an understudied aspect of elite messaging, this research provides valuable insight into both the sources of, and reception to, different styles of political messaging. The results here accentuate the importance of accounting for individual-level characteristics, issue salience, and distinct rhetorical styles when studying the effects of political messaging and elite discourse.

Keywords: Personality, Messaging, Political Communication, Rhetoric, Party System.

Introduction

The single-issue voter continues to stymie rationalist explanations of voter behavior. Even voting against one’s interests, some individuals may choose to place a single-issue dimension above all else and let that factor determine their eventual vote choice. What are the causes of this behavior? Political scientists have offered many explanations for voter behavior including discussions of political messaging by political elites seeking to gain an electoral advantage. Traditional scholarship contends that the relationship between political elites and the voting public is unitary, wherein the public is largely passive and receptive. This conceptualization fails to account for the full complexity of the situation. Elite resources are scarce, and thus they seek to maximize the utility of messaging opportunities. This relatively unobjectionable contention illuminates an unstudied element of the elite-public relationship. Elites tailor their rhetoric, issue and policy positions, and the style in which these are disseminated, to maximize their effect. To accomplish this, elites must consider individual reactions to different messages.

A reason for this varied reaction may not only be the issue under discussion but the manner in which it is presented. The rhetorical style in which different issues are presented may unequally appeal to individuals based on innate personality traits. Far from a passive, unitary process, the actual relationship between political elites and voters is far more dynamic and mutually constitutive than previously considered. This research aims to study the relationship

between the issue content and rhetorical style of political messaging and individual's personality traits, and their effect on the efficacy of political messaging.

This research diverges from previous scholarship in its attempt to incorporate the personality and political communication literature in a unified approach. The concepts of framing, elite messaging, polarizing rhetoric, and issue ownership adopt a top-down, passive view of the electorate, and fail to account for the dualistic nature of elite-public relations. By illuminating a vital component of this relationship, this research offers a more holistic account of the political system and may contribute to our understanding of the use of political rhetoric and wedge issues.

For clarity, in this research I use the terms salience and resonance non-interchangeably, as well as the term stimuli. Here, salience refers to the meaningful impact of rhetoric on personal and practical grounds. Conversely, resonance refers to an affective or emotional reaction to a particular appeal. To use an illustrative example, a rationalistic message about health care policy that directly affects an individual's insurance premiums I consider to be highly salient, as that individual's physical and personal well-being is directly affected by the content of the message. Alternatively, an emotive message regarding the welfare of immigrant children along the Southern Border, to use a topical example, may be highly resonant to an individual: they may have a visceral and non-rational response to this message. These terms are neither mutually exclusive nor interchangeable but will be referred to collectively as messaging efficacy. Stimuli refers to an input on individuals. This most often, but not exclusively, refers to some form of messaging. Other terminology will be explicitly defined where it is utilized. Any terminology not defined is meant in its common usage.

The primary research question under study is: do varied rhetorical styles and issues interact with personality traits to affect individual responses to political messaging?

Literature Review

Elections are often decided by the primary issues along which the campaign is oriented (Petrocik 1996). But these issues, or dimensions, are not normally distributed in their political impact. Moreover, how these issues are portrayed, or messaged, also vary in efficacy. One factor affecting the reception to political messaging is that of framing effects. Framing concerns the manner in which issues, policies, and political topics are phrased or stated. Differential frames affect how individuals perceive and interpret stimuli. The effect of media framing, insofar as how the media portrays a particular issue, is well documented and significantly impacts public opinion (Iyengar & Kinder 1987; Nelson et al. 1997; Druckman 2001; 2004; Iyengar & Hahn 2009). In some instances, framing effects can overwhelm factual arguments in conditioning individual's responses (Druckman & Bolsen 2011). Other factors such as interpersonal interactions and the self-selection of frames, where "individuals hold strong attitudes on the issue at hand," moderate the efficacy of framing effects (Druckman & Nelson 2003; Druckman et al. 2012, 445). Despite these effects, framing is only one way that messages vary in style.

Emotive messaging is a hallmark of political campaigns and as such has generated a great deal of scholarship. Previous research highlights how emotive messaging can overcome rationalism and examines the degree to which political campaigns and advertisements can use emotionally evocative cues to increase the efficacy of messaging (Conover et al. 1986; Brader 2005; Westen 2007). The style of campaign advertisements also affects the efficacy of messaging, where negative political ads have both positive and negative effects on the electorate

(Ansolabehere & Iyengar 1995; Finkel & Geer 1998; Freedman & Goldstein 1999; Kahn & Kenney 1999; Lau et al. 1999). Other outcomes of messaging, such as exposure to campaign advertisements increasing voter information, accentuate the importance of considering stylistic differences between political messages (Ridout et al. 2004; Kaid et al. 2007). But this previous, venerable work primarily examines the stylistic variation of messages and does not consider microlevel factors that condition responses to this variation.

Where previous research has examined the impact of different styles of messaging, other research has examined the impact of various issues on individual responses. Perhaps the most notable is the issue ownership literature, wherein parties are perceived to be ‘better’ on specific issues than the other (Petrocik 1996). Issues that do not neatly fall within the purview of either party, such as religious, racial and moral questions are often used by political elites to gain an electoral advantage (Layman 1999; Hetherington et al. 2016). Other examples of the differential impact of issues, primarily based on party lines, include topics such as the Affordable Care Act and Voter ID laws (Tesler 2012; Wilson & Brewer 2013). In these cases, both the content and style of these messages affected the observed outcomes, namely the level of support for policy proposals.

These issue effects are not limited to the American case, with emerging political parties in Europe utilizing anti-corruption rhetoric and the issue of European integration to gain an electoral foothold in established party systems (Hooghe et al. 2002; Bagenholm & Charron 2014). While this research highlights the differential effects of issues on electoral outcomes, the focus remains at the macro level. I contend that different issues, as well as the rhetorical style of their presentation, vary in their efficacy due to individual characteristics. This is not without precedent, as Bakker et al. (2016) found that individuals high in trait Extraversion showed a greater affinity for emerging political parties and movements (Bakker et al. 2016). It appears likely that both messaging style and content interact with personality traits to produce varied outcomes in efficacy.

The most common way that elites increase the efficacy of messaging is by making it partisan or polarizing. This intersects with the propensity of individuals to self-select information that reinforces their preexisting attitudes and solidifies both their partisan identity and policy preferences (Taber & Lodge 2006; Baum & Groeling 2008; Iyengar & Hahn 2009; Stroud 2010; Bolsen et al. 2014; Davis & Dunaway 2016; Darr & Dunaway 2018). This tactic is a rational calculation by political elites and is an example of individual differences affecting responses to varied messages. The individual factor of partisanship interacts with the content and style of messaging, to produce highly charged reactions, often polarizing the individual and thus the electorate.

While this research accounts for content differences in messaging, it fails to consider the full range of individual differences conditioning receptivity to messaging. A great deal of scholarly attention has been given to individual-level factors that affect the salience of political cleavages such as political sophistication, interest, candidate attributes, and partisanship (Campbell et al. 1960; Rapoport et al. 1989; Luskin 1990; Greene 1999; Sanbonmatsu 2002; Hayes 2005; Converse 2006; Fridkin & Kenney 2011; Lupton et al. 2015; Peterson 2017). Another microlevel factor, personal experience, has been shown to affect how individuals process information (Lerman & McCabe 2017). But while all of these microlevel factors are undoubtedly important, less attention has been given to the more fundamental characteristic of personality. Political interest, personal experience, and most significantly partisanship, certainly

exert a sizable influence on individual responses to both the content and rhetorical style of messaging; it is not my contention that these factors are subordinate to personality. Rather, I contend that personality is an additional and understudied factor affecting this relationship.

Personality, as conceptualized by Psychology, refers to individual differences in orientation, feeling, and attitude towards the world, and its stimuli. Advances in Psychology have allowed Political Scientists to incorporate measures of personality to explain political outcomes (Mondak & Halperin 2008; Verhulst et al. 2010; Gerber et al. 2011; Bakker et al. 2016). Psychology offers numerous conceptual frameworks for analyzing an individual's personality and disposition. The appropriate typology has been the subject of debate within this field for decades, with varied authors offering their preferred model (Myers 1962; Eysenck & Eysenck 1968; McCrae & Costa 1987). Arising from this debate was the "Five-Factor Model of Personality," commonly referred to as the "Big Five Model" (McCrae & Costa 1989). While slight variations exist between the operationalization of these typologies in Psychology, for this study, they are functionally interchangeable. The result of statistical derivation of meta-analyses on previously hypothesized models, McCrae & Costa (1987) identified the five most commonly recurring personality traits, and their composite facets (McCrae & Costa 1987). These personality traits are termed Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness (McCrae & Costa 1989).¹ Although debates within Psychology and Political Science continue, the Big Five Model has become the most commonly used personality inventory in Political Psychology (Mondak & Halperin 2008; Mondak et al. 2010; Gerber et al. 2011; 2012; Bakker et al. 2016; Webster 2018; Bakker and Lelkes 2018).

Many within Political Psychology disagree that the Big Five Model is the best approach, with various authors advocating for the use of the Eysenck model or social cognitive frameworks respectively (Jost et al. 2003; Verhulst et al. 2010; 2012; Motyl et al. 2011; Koleva et al. 2012; Haidt 2012; Crawford et al. 2013; Lai et al. 2014; Clifford et al. 2015). The social cognitive frameworks, such as Haidt's "Moral Foundations Theory," focus on factors such as salient moral attributions and judgments, cognition of threat, and the fear of mortality rather than strictly personality measures (Motyl et al. 2011; Haidt 2012; Koleva et al. 2012; Crawford et al. 2013). Others criticize the Big Five for its supposed oversimplification of traits and exclusion of more appropriate personality domains (Verhulst et al. 2010). At its core, this is a disagreement over methodology and measurement. I will briefly echo the sentiment of Mondak & Halperin (2008) by stating that the imperative to standardize the analytical framework, to enable comparison between research, supersedes these concerns (Mondak & Halperin 2008).

In addition to the need for analytical standardization, the fundamental issues of the authoritarianism literature highlight the need for politically agnostic and objective measures of personality (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1981; for a discussion of the problems with this research program see Martin 2001, Jost et al. 2003 in dissent). Relying on social cognitive

¹ "Each of the five dimensions represents a broad domain comprising a variety of more discrete traits, or facets. *Neuroticism* includes the predisposition to experience negative affects such as anxiety, anger, and depression, and other cognitive and behavioral manifestations of emotional instability. *Extraversion* includes sociability, activity, dominance, and the tendency to experience positive emotions. *Openness to Experience* is seen in imaginativeness, aesthetic sensitivity, depth of feeling, curiosity, and need for variety. *Agreeableness* encompasses sympathy, trust, cooperation, and altruism. *Conscientiousness* includes organization, persistence, scrupulousness, and need for achievement." (McCrae & Costa 1989, 23-24).

models to analyze political outcomes opens the possibility of biased assumptions influencing the results of this research. Moreover, social cognitive models involve more holistic aggregations of personal dispositions and attitudinal orientations rather than the more fundamental personality traits. Furthermore, several authors have illustrated the hypothesized “authoritarian personality,” and its progeny can be explained through the Five Factor Model (Ekehammar et al. 2004; Sibley & Duckitt 2008). The Big Five, as a statistically derived and robustly tested model, appears to be the most promising framework with which to study the political impact of personality traits. This is discussed in greater detail in the data section.

Theory

The political landscape is littered with competing political messages. Messaging inundates individuals from all directions, but these stimuli vary in both their salience and resonance to individuals, henceforth efficacy. As Lipset & Rokkan (1967) state, “Conflicts and controversies can arise out of a great variety of relationships in the social structure, but only a few of these tend to polarize the politics of any given system (Lipset & Rokkan 1967, 6). Beyond the traditionally recognized roles of partisanship and political sophistication, the more recent theories of framing and issue ownership, and the effects of personal experience, the efficacy of messaging may vary due to an interaction effect between the content and style of political messages, and individual’s personality traits. With parsimony as a paramount goal in this discipline, the theory here is straightforward and intuitive: individual responses to political messages will vary due to an interaction effect between message content, style, and individual personality traits.

Political messaging is generally made along broad issue cleavages, or dimensions. Partisan resonance to specific issues, issue ownership, leads political actors to seek to frame the campaign narrative advantageously for themselves or their party. The traditional example is a conservative party centering their party platform on law and order, as the public views right-wing parties as ‘better’ on this issue (Petrocik 1996). However, this view is mainly undifferentiated in terms of the way the issue is presented to the public.

The framing literature does focus on how issues are depicted, and it is certainly venerable (Iyengar 1990; Druckman 2001; Chong & Druckman 2007). But beyond the framing of the issue, the type of appeal being made, specifically how the issue is communicated, will vary in efficacy, conditioned on an individual’s personality. For example, Iyengar (1990) examines the effect of framing poverty in a “thematic” or “episodic” format (Iyengar 1990, 22). Beyond this broad versus specific framing effect, political messaging varies in rhetorical style. Presenting an issue not only along thematic or episodic grounds, but by simultaneously invoking efficacious, emotive, or rationalistic language, will further affect the evaluations made therefrom.

The Ancient Greek’s most basic categorization of rhetoric considered three broad types of appeal: *pathos*, *ethos*, and *logos*. *Pathos* is an appeal to emotion, *ethos* is an appeal to authority or legitimacy, and *logos* is an appeal to logic or reason. These are only the three primary forms of rhetorical styles; the Ancient Greeks identified hundreds of rhetorical devices and flourishes. Political messaging often falls into one of these three broad categories. Messaging regarding the inefficiency of the bureaucracy, the morality of gun control legislation or the veracity of the opinions of climate change experts can be categorized as *logos*, *pathos* and *ethos* centric arguments respectively. Thus, it is not only the cleavage or dimension upon which arguments are being advanced but the *manner* in which these arguments are stated. To use

Petrocik’s (1996) law and order example, arguments could be advanced along the grounds of needing to protect children, a police commissioner describing the failings of the current system, or by reporting increasing crime statistics. All three arguments exist along the same cleavage, but the varied type of appeal will be differentially impactful to individuals conditioned not only on personal experience or partisanship but on individuals’ innate personality traits. An illustration of this theorized relationship can be found below in Figure 1, with a full set found in Appendix A.

Different issues will also vary in efficacy, conditioned on personality. Individuals high in trait Openness to Experience may be more receptive to appeals for increased funding of the arts, as Aesthetics, or aesthetic resonance, is a Facet of trait Openness to Experience. Conversely, increased health care funding for low-income children will be more salient to individuals high in trait Agreeableness, as both Trust and Tender-Mindedness are facets of trait Agreeableness (McCrae & Costa 1987). This is illustrated above in Figure 2. It is beyond the scope of this research to fully parse out and identify the interaction of individual Facets with political messaging, but it is logical to assume that personality differences will condition the salience and resonance of issues beyond the broader traits, due to an innate affinity or aversion to these issues. Despite this lack of specificity, individuals should vary in their evaluations of political messaging based both on message content and rhetorical style.

There is also reason to suspect that regardless of message content or style, some individuals will be more or less receptive to messaging due to their personality traits. For example, individuals high in trait Agreeableness may be more likely to be swayed by political messaging as they are inherently more receptive to arguments, in general (McCrae & Costa 1987; Mondak & Halperin 2008). Conversely, the opinions of individuals high in trait Neuroticism may be less malleable due to an inherent suspicion of the motives and source of the message (McCrae & Costa 1987). Regardless of message content or style, the malleability of opinions varies due to innate personality differences. Despite this differential baseline efficacy of




Figure 1. Theorized Interaction Effect of Message Style and Personality, on Message Efficacy




Figure 2. Theorized Interaction Effect of Message Content and Personality, on Message Efficacy

messaging between personality traits, variance in efficacy within personality traits, given both varied style and content, should affect an individual's evaluative responses.

Hypotheses

The Big Five personality traits are neither mutually exclusive nor zero-sum. Individuals are often conceptualized as being dominant in one trait, but the personality traits of Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Openness to Experience include some level of fluidity in their conceptual boundaries (McCrae & Costa 1987). Higher levels of specific personality traits should increase or decrease the efficacy of particular styles of rhetorical appeals but not in an exclusionary manner, due to these fluid boundaries. If, for example, individuals high in trait Conscientiousness are disproportionately resonant to *logos* appeals, that does not mean that, by necessity, individuals high in Trait Openness will be disproportionately non-resonant to the same *logos* appeal.

Instead, I argue there will be systematic variance in efficacy of the type of rhetorical appeal, not that the personality traits manifest as a zero-sum affiliation to one rhetorical appeal over another. High trait Conscientiousness individuals are more diligent, fastidious, and value competence and order over other values. Thus, rhetoric that appeals on a more rationalistic level should be disproportionately resonant to respondents who are higher in trait Conscientiousness. Also, individuals high in trait Conscientiousness should be less likely to have their opinions changed by appeals to emotion. Individuals high in trait Agreeableness exhibit higher levels of trust, deference and insularity than others, and as such, brute rationality should be less persuasive than appeals to emotion or authoritative rhetorical appeals. The proclivity to value bonds with others, and to value concepts of fairness and charity should lead messaging along these, and similar, dimensions to be disproportionately persuasive for individuals high in trait Agreeableness.

As McCrae & Costa state, individuals high in trait Openness to Experience (Openness) are more inclined towards "original, imaginative, broad interests, and daring" (McCrae & Costa 1987, 87). Individuals high in trait Extraversion, while being gregarious and outgoing, also value novelty, but differently than individuals high in trait Openness. The clearest way to conceptualize this difference is that individuals high in trait Openness will value new ideas and stimuli for their novelty, whereas high trait Extraversion individuals favor stimuli that excites them. This excitement will lead to a greater magnitude of evaluative change than other personality traits. Therefore, individuals high in trait Extraversion should be more willing to change their opinion given an appropriate stimulus, and the magnitude of that change will be greater than other personality traits.

Notably absent is any discussion of trait Neuroticism. Neuroticism is perhaps best described using its inverse, as the absence of emotional stability. This absence of emotional stability makes it difficult to make any prediction as to how individuals high in trait Neuroticism will react to stimuli. These individuals may simultaneously suspect the authenticity of an authoritative appeal while also doubting their own ability to judge the topic when presented with an *ethos* appeal for example. Thus, I do not have any theoretically derived expectations for individuals high in trait Neuroticism.

An additional component of this research is to examine the effect of personality traits on evaluative responses, given varied issue content. This study utilized the issues of immigration, privatization, and poverty assistance to study this effect. Factors such as partisanship, political

interest, and ideology likely exert a preconditioning effect, where an individual's opinions are firmly established before participation. This is especially true when considering the current partisan nature of the immigration debate. Despite this, after controlling for these factors via random assignment, individual's evaluative responses should vary due to both the issue content and rhetorical style of messaging.

Fully parsing out individuated hypotheses for each of the interaction effects between personality traits, issue content, and rhetorical style would be unrealistic. Instead, I adopt a broader focus to examine the fundamental theoretical relationship of this research. The following four hypotheses denote the expectations of this research.

- H₁:** Respondents high in trait Conscientious will exhibit the highest degree of evaluative change when presented with *logos* appeals.
- H₂:** Respondents high in trait Agreeableness will exhibit the highest degree of evaluative change when presented with *ethos* appeals.
- H₃:** Respondents high in trait Openness will exhibit the highest degree of evaluative change when presented with *pathos* appeals.
- H₄:** Respondents high in trait Extraversion will exhibit the highest degree of evaluative change, regardless of appeal style.

Data

The primary focus of this research is the effect of different styles of rhetorical appeals conditioned on individual's personality, on evaluative responses. The secondary but related goal of this research is to illustrate the benefits of using expanded measurement tools, or personality inventories, to study political outcomes. To accomplish both of these goals, it is imperative to first briefly explain the Big Five model and the personality inventories used in this research.

McCrae & Costa (1987) developed what they termed the "neo-personality indicator-revised model" (NEO-PR-I) as an inventory to measure and quantify individual's personality traits, and their composite facets. This inventory is comprised of 240 questions which are designed to elicit responses from individuals based on the five large domains, or traits, and their related facets. As Costa & McCrae (1995) explain, "The Revised NEO Personality Inventory assesses personality at both levels, with six specific facet scales in each of five broad domains." (Costa & McCrae 1995, 21) Although the NEO-PR-I is comprehensive and may be the most accurate means by which to measure personality in the Big Five typology, the format of 240 questions is generally too long to include within political surveys or experiments. Thus, shorter more manageable inventories have been developed and utilized by researchers.

The most prolific abbreviated inventories of the Big Five Model are the Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) and the Big Five Inventory (BFI) (Gosling et al. 2003; Rammstedt & John 2007). The TIPI, as the name implies, uses a ten-question battery to determine individuals' personality traits, and the BFI follows a similar format. The benefit of both the TIPI and BFI is that they can be completed in under one minute and are thus conducive for inclusion in survey questionnaires where personality is not the explicit focus. However, the brevity of the TIPI and BFI are not without cost. Recent research has highlighted issues regarding the internal validity of the BFI, which may be affecting the results drawn therefrom. The previous findings regarding political outcomes linked to personality measures may be fundamentally flawed through their use of insufficient personality inventories. As Bakker & Lelkes (2018) state,

“Turning to the Big Five and ideology literature, we have shown that—with the exception of neuroticism—the association between personality and political dimensions is highly conditional on the measurement of personality. We found that the 50-item IPIP yields associations with ideology that are twice as strong as the associations produced by the BFI. In a few instances, the BFI yields estimates of the opposite sign to those of the 50-item measure... Traits that have largely been dismissed as irrelevant for the study of politics and personality—such as extraversion and agreeableness—are as strongly correlated with our outcome measures as those that are focal to the field. Our study thus shows that relying on a larger Big Five battery would yield different conclusions... We advise against the use of brief measures of the Big Five personality traits such as the 10-item BFI”
(Bakker & Lelkes 2018, 1323-4)

This research continues Bakker & Lelkes (2018) advocacy for longer measures by testing the robustness of a longer personality inventory, the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP), against the TIPI to discern any meaningful differences between the two inventories (Buchanan et al. 2005). This analysis follows the principal analyses of this research and is discussed below.

To study the interaction of personality traits and rhetorical appeals, as well as the comparative benefits of longer personality inventories, I conducted a survey experiment using a convenience sample known as the Political Science Research Pool (PSRP). The PSRP is comprised of Undergraduate Students taking introductory Political Science Courses at Georgia State University (GSU). The students receive extra credit for their courses in exchange for completing surveys, which are constructed by GSU Faculty and graduate students. The PSRP is roughly representative of the student body at GSU, being college-aged with a predominantly Democratic orientation, and majority-minority community. Respondents who took less than 5 minutes to complete the survey were dropped as insincere responses. The mean response time for the survey was 12.48 minutes. The mean age of this sample was 20.19 years old, with 84.87% of respondents self-reporting as some persuasion of Democrat, and 78.78% of respondents of minority ethnicity. Descriptive demographic statistics for this sample are located in Appendix B.

While not representative of the general public, the findings derived from this experiment can be expanded beyond the pool of respondents. As this experiment focused on the interaction of personality traits and types of rhetorical stimuli on evaluations of political objects, neither of which exclusively affect college students, the observed effects are not confined to this sample. Further research will undoubtedly need to verify the external validity of this research, but there is no *prima facie* reason why the results of this research should vary wildly with members of the general public with similar personality, partisan, and demographic characteristics. However, there is plenary reason to suspect that for the underrepresented personality traits and partisan affiliations in this sample that the hypothesized effects may be obscured, and further research would illuminate more significant and consistent effects of different rhetorical appeals; for example, individuals high in trait Conscientiousness, Republicans, and those of older age. The distribution of personality measures can also be found in Appendix B.

Respondents were first shown a combination of the IPIP and the TIPI. The TIPI prompts were randomly distributed within the IPIP to make a personality inventory of 60 questions. As the TIPI takes less than 1 minute to complete, its addition to the IPIP should not bias the results of either inventory nor make the combined inventory so onerous to respondents to engender inaccurate or insincere responses. The combined personality inventory can be found in Appendix C. The combination of these two inventories does not constitute an original measure; the inclusion of both was an attempt to examine the differences in explanatory power by using an

expanded personality inventory. The order in which respondents were shown the personality questions was determined via a random number generator.

Following the combined personality inventory, respondents were asked a series of demographic questions such as age, race, gender, and partisanship, among other factors. Partisanship was measured using the ANES style of a diverging, 2-part question to discern the respondent's strength of partisanship. This measure was operationalized where 1 indicates strong Democrat and 7 indicates strong Republican. Respondents were also asked four general political knowledge questions to gather a measure of political sophistication. Items included "Who is the Secretary of State" and "How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a Presidential Veto?" The responses were combined to create an additive index, with higher values indicating greater political knowledge. Other demographic questions mirrored the ANES question format. Following the personality and demographic questions, respondents were presented with the experimental section of this survey.

The experiment proceeded as follows: students were sequentially shown rhetorical appeals concerning three separate issues. These appeals consisted of a control group with only a definition of terms, or a *pathos*, *ethos*, and *logos* argument, either supporting or opposing the issue under discussion. This resulted in 6 treatment groups (*pathos* pro, *pathos* con, *ethos* pro, *ethos* con, *logos* pro, *logos* con) and a control group, for a total of 7 conditions. This process was repeated between issues, with the first being privatization, then immigration, then poverty assistance programs, for a total of 21 groups, 18 of which being treatment groups. The assignment to these groups was randomized both within and between issues, with the respondent's original treatment not affecting their random assignment to the next issue treatment.

These treatments sought to vary only the verbiage of the rhetorical appeal, while maintaining the structure of the treatments, or vignettes, across issues. This was done to minimize alternative influence on the observed outcomes. Isolating the variance of these treatments to only the type of rhetorical appeal allows for greater confidence that the effects observed between these treatments were due solely to the type of rhetorical appeal (treatment). After reading the short vignette for each issue, respondents were asked to give a series of 5 or 6 evaluative responses on eleven-point Likert scales.

The evaluative questions asked did not vary in type between the treatment groups, as to allow comparison across conditions, within issue areas. While the adjectives, such as very or completely, did not change between evaluations, the evaluative object was matched to the question. For example, question '1-ii' asked respondents, "To what extent do you think that the government is efficient or inefficient when compared to private industry?" The points on the Likert scale thus read "completely inefficient" to "completely efficient." All questions were matched in this manner. The evaluative questions did not vary within issue to allow for comparison across treatments, specifically between control and treatment groups. A full set of the treatments and evaluative questions are given in Appendix D, with an example of one Likert scale used.

This survey experiment ran for roughly four months, between October 11th, 2018 and February 28th, 2019. During this time, approximately 800 respondents completed the survey. However, roughly 100 were dropped from the final analysis for failure to complete certain aspects or insincere responses due to implausible response times. This left a sample size of 706

respondents for analysis. The mean response time was 15.8 minutes. The level of analysis for this research is the individual.

Methods

The primary focus of this research is to study the conditioning effect of personality traits on the efficacy of political messaging. It is untenable, for a variety of reasons, to present respondents with a series of messages regarding the same issue, varied in rhetorical style, and attempt to ascertain response variance. Instead, this research explores the hypothesized relationship by examining mean group variation in evaluative response on the basis of the Five Factor personality traits, within treatment condition. This effect was studied by examining the differences in evaluative responses between treatment groups and the control group, for each issue. Therefore, the dependent variable for this analysis is the difference in mean values of evaluative response. Responses on the 11-point Likert Scales provide this measure. The independent variables of this research are the varied levels of personality traits: Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Openness to Experience. These values are taken from the personality inventories that respondents completed at the outset of the survey. The combined personality inventory was separated in analysis into the TIPI and IPIP components. The responses were then used to create additive scales for each of the Big Five personality traits. These scales are continuous, running from 1 to 5, with higher values indicating higher levels of the related personality trait. This analysis used the values taken from the IPIP over the TIPI, for reasons of external validity and interitem reliability, discussed below. These continuous scales constitute the independent variables of this research.

To examine the effect of varied rhetorical styles and personality traits on evaluative responses, this research employs a standard OLS regression model. As both the explanatory and outcome variables of this research are functionally continuous, this is the most appropriate model to use. Evaluative responses, measured on an 11-point Likert Scale, could be considered ordinal in nature but due to the high number of categories are functionally continuous, especially when considering the aggregation discussed below. An argument could be made that this research should adopt an ANOVA model to study the hypothesized effect, as fundamentally this research is concerned with mean variations between groups. This is not unreasonable, but I follow the advice of Gary King when he states, “This inequality between ANOVA and regression only denotes different ways of representing the same underlying relationships. There are no differences in assumptions or empirical interpretation... My view is that for most political science research, regression is a substantially more general model: It incorporates many types of ANOVA in one statistical model” (King 1986, 680-1).

Furthermore, upon running both the linear regression and ANOVA models, there is no meaningful difference between the two. The sample size of approximately 700 respondents allows for treatment groups of 100 each, which satisfies the prerequisites of OLS regression models. Finally, postestimation and robustness tests illuminated no issue with heteroskedasticity, covariance or collinearity, and thus this research uses a series of OLS regression models. The results of these tests are available upon request.

The outcome variables under study are aggregated into single scales to measure the broader affect of respondents towards the three issues. Each of the evaluative responses is designed to gauge a specific facet of orientation towards these issue topics. Responses were measured on 11-point Likert scales. Measuring responses along a single dimension does not

allow for a holistic view of the issue under discussion. Theoretically, an individual's orientation towards immigration policy, for example, can involve aspects of views towards immigrants, the effect on the domestic population, the role of the government, and other related factors. Aggregating these measures provides a substantively and theoretically more appropriate measure of an individual's orientation towards these issues than just a single evaluative dimension.

However, combining responses is not merely a matter of blindly aggregating these responses. Several factors need to be considered when creating these aggregate measures. The most significant of these factors is the degree of covariation between these measures. Aggregating divergent measures is normatively and methodologically inappropriate. Therefore, before aggregation, the level of interitem covariance between response scales was measured using Cronbach's alpha levels. Interitem covariance between evaluative response scales was examined at both the aggregate and individual level, insofar as examining the level of covariance under each experimental and control condition within issue. Aggregation was rejected where the Cronbach's alpha level for either aggregate or individuated scales fell below 0.65 (For a discussion of what alpha measures, and the arbitrariness of 0.7 see Schmitt 1996). With this threshold, several measures are aggregated to form the final outcome variables of this research.

For the Privatization issue group, questions 1-i and 1-iii are aggregated. Question 1-i asks respondents, 'Given what you just read, to what extent do you oppose or support privatization?' and Question 1-iii asks respondents, 'To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement, "Private companies can provide consumers with essential goods more cheaply than government?"' Responses to both questions are coded where higher values indicate a higher degree of support or agreement should correspond to a greater degree of support for privatization. Cronbach's alpha for the response scales is 0.663, which is not ideal, but the benefits of measuring multiple facets of this topic outweigh the relatively low, but not debilitating, degree of interitem covariance.

For the Immigration issue group, Questions 2-i, 2-ii, and 2-iii are combined to form the aggregate outcome variable. These questions read, 'Given what you just read, to what extent do you oppose or support increased immigration?', 'To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement, "Increased immigration is a net benefit for America?"', and 'To what extent do you think that increased immigration improves or reduces the well-being of poor Americans?' Higher responses to these questions all indicate a more positive evaluation of increased immigration but are not conceptually identical. The Cronbach's alpha value for the interitem correlation between these three response scales is 0.80.

Finally, for the Poverty Programs groups, questions 3-i and 3-ii are aggregated. Question 3-i asks respondents 'Given what you just read, to what extent do you think poverty assistance programs are effective or ineffective at reducing poverty?' while question 3-ii asks respondents 'To what extent do you think poverty assistance programs are effective or ineffective at improving the conditions of those enduring poverty?' These two questions capture the most significant facets influencing evaluations of poverty assistance programs. Efficacy in terms of reducing the poverty rate and increasing the living conditions of those who endure it are similar but not identical aspects of this topic. Thus, aggregating the two measures provides a more theoretically comprehensive appraisal of individuals evaluations. The Cronbach's alpha value for the interitem correlation between these two response scales is 0.83.

Results

The theorized relationships were analyzed using a series of linear regression models, having ensured correct model specification and appropriate measurement of the variables of interest. The results are displayed below with Tables 1, 2 and 3. Table 1 presents the estimated effect of varied rhetorical styles and personality traits on evaluative responses concerning the issue of Privatization. The bolded values indicate statistically significant relationships in line with the previously stated hypotheses. For the *pathos* con experimental condition, a one unit increase in the level of Trait Openness corresponds with a 0.523 decrease in support for increased immigration. This may appear to be a relatively small effect size but when considering that the total potential change in personality traits is from a value of 1 to a value of 5, the difference in evaluative response to this issue, between a respondent at trait Openness level 1 and 5, is an approximately 2-unit shift on an 11-point scale. While not monumental, this effect size is not inconsequential and provides some support for the 3rd hypothesis: *pathos* appeals will be disproportionately impactful for respondents high in trait Openness to experience.

Similar support for hypotheses 1 and 2 is illustrated in Table 1. Respondents higher in trait Agreeableness, when presented with an *ethos* pro appeal, account for a statistically significant change in evaluative response. Moving from the minimum to maximum value of trait Agreeableness, this effect results in a 3.2-unit change in evaluative response. Respondents higher in trait Conscientiousness exhibit a statistically significant change when presented with a *logos* pro appeal. Again, when considering the range of potential personality variation, the effect size could account for a roughly 2.4-unit change in evaluative response. With these results, a moderate degree of support for hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 is observed. However, these statistically significant relationships only account for half of those expected. These hypotheses expect that the *pathos* pro, *ethos* con, and *logos* con experimental conditions, for trait Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness respectively, should also be statistically significant and in the direction of the experimental condition. These effects are not observed in this case.

Table 1. Impact of Personality Traits on Evaluative Responses to Privatization Messaging.

| | Control | <i>Pathos</i> Pro | <i>Pathos</i> Con | <i>Ethos</i> Pro | <i>Ethos</i> Con | <i>Logos</i> Pro | <i>Logos</i> Con |
|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|
| Trait | | | | | | | |
| Conscientiousness | -0.350 (0.323) | -0.436 (0.358) | -0.166 (0.359) | -0.192 (0.357) | 0.690** (0.346) | 0.633** (0.305) | -0.358 (0.395) |
| Agreeableness | -0.310 (0.393) | -0.270 (0.457) | -0.083 (0.352) | 0.800** (0.338) | -0.061 (0.417) | 0.014 (0.397) | -0.399 (0.428) |
| Neuroticism | -0.465 (0.309) | -0.689* (0.385) | -0.377 (0.272) | -0.226 (0.317) | 0.475 (0.385) | -0.163 (0.299) | -0.434 (0.301) |
| Openness | -0.847** (0.362) | -0.281 (0.407) | -0.523* (0.300) | -0.100 (0.352) | -0.319 (0.359) | -0.740** (0.339) | -0.007 (0.368) |
| Extraversion | 0.205 (0.278) | 0.219 (0.324) | 0.697** (0.319) | -0.123 (0.258) | 0.096 (0.369) | -0.398* (0.234) | -0.127 (0.310) |
| Constant | 11.672*** (2.432) | 11.516*** (2.832) | 7.260*** (2.258) | 5.867** (2.458) | 3.163 (2.980) | 9.265*** (2.440) | 9.857*** (2.271) |
| N | 97 | 102 | 101 | 102 | 98 | 103 | 103 |
| R ² | 0.096 | 0.058 | 0.089 | 0.073 | 0.050 | 0.132 | 0.040 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding privatization. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. Bolded values correspond to hypothesized relationships. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Curiously, some of the observed statistically significant effects are in the opposite direction of the experimental condition. This raises an issue of negative efficacy or impact, which is discussed in greater detail below.

Moving from the issue group of privatization to immigration, Table 2, presented below, displays the results from the second set of these regression models. Unlike privatization, the results of this experimental issue group provide no support for any of the hypothesized relationships. While there are several observed statistically significant relationships, these coefficients do not correspond with the expected results of this analysis. This may be due to the political salience of this issue, with the recent coverage of walls, caravans, and national emergencies, but this will be discussed in greater detail in the discussion section.

The final issue group examined in this research were stimuli related to poverty assistance programs. The results of the effects of different levels of personality traits, and varied rhetorical appeals, on evaluative responses to these messages, is displayed below in Table 3. For this issue, only hypothesis 3 receives any support. Shown in bold, respondents higher in trait Openness displayed a statistically significant increase in evaluative response when presented with a *pathos* pro prompt. Substantively, this means that for a one unit increase in trait Openness, respondent's evaluative response regarding poverty programs increases by 0.86 units. Again, the magnitude of the observed effect is low to moderate.

Discussion

The results of this research provide hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 a moderate degree of support. There does appear to be some level of systemic variation in evaluative responses based on an interaction effect between personality traits and the style of rhetorical appeals. These findings indirectly grant support to hypothesis 1. There does appear to be a systematic variation in evaluative responses based on personality traits and rhetorical style. Respondents higher in trait Conscientiousness appear to be disproportionately persuaded by *logos* appeals, while

Table 2. Impact of Personality Traits on Evaluative Responses to Immigration Messaging.

| | Control | <i>Pathos</i> Pro | <i>Pathos</i> Con | <i>Ethos</i> Pro | <i>Ethos</i> Con | <i>Logos</i> Pro | <i>Logos</i> Con |
|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| Trait | | | | | | | |
| Conscientiousness | -0.617** (0.271) | -0.283 (0.417) | -0.269 (0.406) | 0.015 (0.337) | -0.475 (0.329) | -0.119 (0.310) | -0.279 (0.336) |
| Agreeableness | 0.237 (0.307) | 0.636 (0.426) | -0.013 (0.566) | 0.354 (0.385) | 0.616 (0.421) | 0.396 (0.347) | 0.045 (0.367) |
| Neuroticism | -0.193 (0.248) | 0.207 (0.395) | -0.113 (0.352) | 0.266 (0.336) | 0.129 (0.311) | 0.607** (0.279) | -0.299 (0.314) |
| Openness | 1.117*** (0.274) | 0.289 (0.397) | 0.664 (0.436) | 1.111*** (0.332) | 0.878** (0.349) | 0.457 (0.327) | 1.160*** (0.357) |
| Extraversion | 0.171 (0.218) | 0.002 (0.320) | -0.442 (0.350) | -0.205 (0.300) | -0.806*** (0.285) | 0.040 (0.267) | -0.578* (0.297) |
| Constant | 4.753** (1.924) | 4.587* (2.715) | 7.005** (2.784) | 1.862 (2.415) | 4.893* (2.652) | 3.011 (2.455) | 5.492** (2.327) |
| N | 101 | 97 | 104 | 100 | 104 | 102 | 99 |
| R ² | 0.207 | 0.036 | 0.036 | 0.132 | 0.210 | 0.086 | 0.123 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding immigration. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. Bolded values correspond to hypothesized relationships, albeit absent. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

respondents higher in trait Agreeableness are disproportionately persuaded by *ethos* appeals, and respondents higher in trait Openness are disproportionately persuaded by *pathos* appeals. While hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 received a moderate degree of support, a great deal of research and analysis is required before these relationships are rigorously substantiated.

Notably absent from the previous section was any discussion of the issue content of appeals, and their effect on evaluative responses. The intent of using the issues of privatization, immigration, and poverty assistance programs was to vary the personal and partisan salience of these topics. As displayed in Appendix B, the sample population of this research is less affluent than the general public. It is thus reasonable to assume that respondent who at some point directly benefitted from these programs, for example Food Stamps, have a more positive and less malleable view of these programs. Conversely, the issue of immigration is highly partisan in nature. The sample population skews heavily Democratic, as displayed in Appendix B, and thus their preconceived partisan perspective on immigration is unlikely to change when presented with a single rhetorical appeal. This is especially true given the predominant and divisive nature of this issue in contemporary politics. It is also reasonable to assume that due to the sample population's composition, a number of respondents may be first- or second-generation immigrants whose views of immigration are conditioned by personal experience. These factors of increased issue salience decrease the likelihood that respondent's evaluations will be altered by rhetorical appeals and political messaging, despite the use of random assignment.

This experiment used random assignment in an attempt to compensate for individual factors such as these. Unfortunately, the sample is not normally distributed in these factors. As illustrated in Appendix B, the convenience sample skews heavily Female, Democratic, young, and lower income. To illustrate the influence of these factor in obscuring the hypothesized effects, I repeated the above regression analyses and included demographic and partisan factors that I felt may affect the results. The results of these models are displayed in Appendix E. Random assignment relies on a relatively equitable distribution of influential factors, and as

Table 3. Impact of Personality Traits on Evaluative Responses to Poverty Assistance Programs Messaging.

| | Control | <i>Pathos</i> Pro | <i>Pathos</i> Con | <i>Ethos</i> Pro | <i>Ethos</i> Con | <i>Logos</i> Pro | <i>Logos</i> Con |
|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| Trait | | | | | | | |
| Conscientiousness | -0.171 (0.439) | -0.067 (0.438) | 0.355 (0.380) | -0.517 (0.379) | 0.141 (0.355) | -0.886** (0.355) | -0.611 (0.370) |
| Agreeableness | 0.019 (0.543) | 0.193 (0.505) | -0.023 (0.420) | 0.470 (0.430) | 0.365 (0.421) | 0.883** (0.396) | 0.444 (0.413) |
| Neuroticism | -0.277 (0.360) | 0.054 (0.336) | 0.558* (0.329) | 0.384 (0.346) | 0.860** (0.350) | 0.311 (0.377) | -0.250 (0.399) |
| Openness | 0.701* (0.400) | 0.860** (0.430) | 0.297 (0.377) | 0.266 (0.373) | 0.559 (0.341) | 0.253 (0.461) | 0.702* (0.384) |
| Extraversion | -0.004 (0.413) | -0.242 (0.354) | 0.529* (0.313) | 0.170 (0.365) | -0.189 (0.274) | 0.402 (0.312) | 0.125 (0.293) |
| Constant | 5.477* (3.247) | 4.225 (2.912) | 1.010 (2.349) | 4.851* (2.764) | 0.869 (2.682) | 4.442 (2.831) | 4.482 (2.768) |
| N | 93 | 99 | 101 | 101 | 107 | 105 | 100 |
| R ² | 0.045 | 0.048 | 0.073 | 0.048 | 0.112 | 0.118 | 0.085 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding privatization. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. Bolded values correspond to hypothesized relationships. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

these factors are not normally distributed, their effects remain influential in the observed analyses. While Gender and Race are less influential in all three issues, Partisanship repeatedly exerts a statistically and substantively significant effect on evaluative responses.

However, the issue of privatization is largely outside the general zeitgeist of American politics. Respondents are unlikely to have an *a priori* opinion of this issue entering the survey experiment, nor should partisanship necessarily condition responses. This issue, with low personal and political salience, is, therefore, the most likely condition of the three issue groups in which to observe the effects of evaluative change due to varied rhetorical stimuli. This is precisely what this research observes; of the three issue groups, prompts relating to privatization garnered the greatest number and magnitude of expected evaluative changes.

Some may argue that the observed evaluative changes are not due to this research's theorized relationship, but rather due to framing effects. Previous research has shown the impact of presenting respondents with unidirectional prompts, regardless of the rhetorical style of the prompt or personality of the respondent (Druckman 2001; 2004). The observed effects may be a result of framing, or more broadly main, effects. To examine this possibility, I combined the treatment conditions into for and against categories for their respective issue, and performed the regression analyses testing only the main effects of presenting respondents with a control, pro, or con stimuli. These results are presented in Appendix F. The results here are less persuasive than those for the theorized relationship. Displayed in Tables 5a, 5b, and 5c, the observed coefficients are all in the correct direction, and statistically significant. However, the magnitude of the effects is minute. Given that the dependent variables are measured on 11-point scales, and the average, absolute effect size is 0.788, the framing or main effect of these prompts is substantially less than the studied interaction effects. This supplemental test does add confidence in the correct construction of the messages, but the primary effects of this research, discussed above, are neither solely nor mainly the result of framing effects.

The issue group of privatization provided a reasonable degree of support for hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, the core of the theorized relationship. By choosing an issue not subject to partisan attributions and preexisting beliefs, the underlying phenomena of varied efficacy of political messaging due to respondent's personality was supported. However, using two other highly salient issues diminished this research's ability to identify personality-based variance in issue resonance. As such, this research cannot make any definitive statements on this subject, and must instead incorporate the lessons learned into future research, and argue that the results here provide some evidence for the theoretical relationship.

Hypothesis 4 stated that respondents high in trait Extraversion would exhibit the highest degree of evaluative change, regardless of appeal type. This was not supported by the findings. Respondents high in trait Extraversion displayed neither a greater number nor magnitude of statistically significant variations from mean evaluative responses in any of the issue groups. The only potential finding is that individuals high in Trait Extraversion may be more resonant to negative appeals. Of the five statistically significant relationships for respondent high in trait Extraversion, four occurred within a negative (con) prompt. This appears to be a promising avenue for future research. But, for our purposes here, hypothesis 4 received no support.

The responses for individuals high in trait Extraversion raise a separate but related issue: negative efficacy. In certain instances, respondents appear to respond inversely to the expected direction. For example, when presented with *logos* appeals higher levels of trait Openness

corresponded with statistically significant deviations from mean evaluative responses in the opposing direction; when presented with a *logos pro* appeal regarding privatization, a one unit increase in trait Openness corresponded with a 0.74 unit decrease in evaluative response. It is plausible that respondents are not only disproportionately resonant to certain types of rhetorical appeals, based on personality, but that they are also disproportionately less resonant to others. This research cannot draw any definitive conclusions at this time, as this was not the focus of this research, but this potential relationship will be the focus of future study.

Abbreviated Inventories, Abbreviated Validity

The format of this study allowed for an examination of a secondary question: are abbreviated personality inventories accurately capturing measures of personality? This research joins the studies that have asked this question, but whose results have largely been overlooked in the continued administration of abbreviated measures (Bakker & Lelkes 2018). This research continues the line of inquiry opened by Bakker & Lelkes (2018) by directly testing inter-item reliability between the Ten Item Personality Index (TIPI; Gosling et al. 2003) and the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP; Goldberg 1999).

Abbreviated measures are, obviously, abbreviated and as such may lose a great deal of analytical power due to this condensed format. The original NEO-PR-I measurement tool developed by McCrae & Costa (1987) included 240 questions designed to gauge not only the broader “Five Factor” personality traits but their constitutive facets. Pragmatically, the NEO-PR-I may be untenable to utilize in research due to its length. Thus, many abbreviated inventories have been developed to measure respondent’s personality. These range in length from single or two questions, for example the Need for Cognition (NfC) measure, to the abbreviated version of the NEO-PR-I which is comprised of 60 questions (Cacioppo & Petty 1982; Costa & McCrae 1992). Bakker & Lelkes (2018) illustrated issues of internal validity when comparing the NfC, and to a lesser extent the BFI, to the IPIP, with inter-item covariance at less than desirable levels. Ideally, all abbreviated inventories would be directly compared to results from the NEO-PR-I, within the same cadre of respondents. To my knowledge, no research has attempted such a test, and indeed any such test would yield questionable results due to sequential biasing and respondent fatigue.

In lieu of this ideal-type test, this research embedded the TIPI within the IPIP to unobtrusively gauge the level of covariance and inter-item reliability between the two personality inventories. Due to the fact that respondent viewed both inventories simultaneously, there is little potential for sequential biasing. Respondent fatigue may be a larger concern but expanding a 50-item battery to 60-items does not place an undue burden on respondents. By increasing the number of observations, by using 50 questions over 10, both the accuracy and confidence of our personality measures should increase.

A valid criticism may be that if one is going to use a less abbreviated personality inventory, such as the IPIP, why then not use the abbreviated NEO-PR-I comprised of 60 measurement questions? This is a valid criticism when considering a single study, but less so when applied to the discipline of Political Science more generally. The IPIP was specifically developed in response to cross-national and cross-cultural difficulties in translating existing personality inventories. Cross-case comparison is essential in the comparative perspective and utilizing a measurement tool that is not bounded to one culture and language is highly desirable, if not essential. More pragmatically, the IPIP is free to use and has a large number of potential

items that can be included in measurement inventories. The flexibility, cross-case comparability, and affordability of the IPIP offers many benefits over other abbreviated personality inventories (For a more detailed discussion of the different personality inventories and related concerns, see McCrae & Costa 1987; Costa & McCrae 1992; Gosling et al. 2003; Goldberg et al. 2006; Rammstedt & John 2007; Bakker & Lelkes 2018).

The secondary focus of this study has practical ramifications for researchers; if the highly abbreviated inventories do not provide a valid measure of personality, the conclusions derived therefrom may be consequentially invalid, or at the very least questionable. This research will examine inter-item reliability between the two inventories to determine if the inclusion of the IPIP over the TIPI is warranted, considering both the cost of increased length against the benefit of more accurate measures. Clearly, individual researchers will need to determine this calculation in light of time and funding restrictions, but there are several reasons to at least theoretically prefer the IPIP as the standard personality measure in Political Science research. Informed by the previous research, I examine the level of internal validity and interitem reliability between the TIPI and IPIP. Specifically, I examine the marginal effects by using each inventory, test the level of covariance between the two, and repeat the above analyses using the TIPI to illuminate any substantive differences.

Previous research has highlighted the effect of personality traits on intelligence and political sophistication. Specifically, Openness to Experience is closely related to measures of intelligence, as the desire to seek out new information will lead to a higher degree of knowledge in many cases (McCrae & Costa 1989). The inspiration for this test is from Bakker & Lelkes (Bakker & Lelkes 2018). Previous research in political science has also examined the effect of personality traits on political sophistication. Mondak & Halperin (2008) observed that Conscientiousness and Extraversion were linked with lower levels of political sophistication, while higher levels of trait Openness covaried with higher levels of political sophistication (Mondak & Halperin 2008).

While not directly related to the primary focus of this research, observing any relationship between political sophistication and personality traits offers a more agnostic test of the benefits expanded personality inventories may offer. Marginal effects plots of trait Agreeableness and Openness on political sophistication are illustrated above in Figure 3, measured with the IPIP in Figures 3a and 3c, and with the TIPI in Figures 3b and 3d. As we can see in Figures 3a and 3b, while unconvincing in magnitude and confidence, the slope coefficient for the effect of trait Agreeableness on political sophistication is essentially null in Figure 3a while negatively sloping in Figure 3b. Only observing the results derived from the TIPI, one may draw a spurious conclusion as to the influence of trait Agreeableness on political sophistication. Neither relationship approaches statistical significance, but it is illustrative of the possible confounding effect of using abbreviated measures of personality.

The marginal effect plots of trait Openness on political sophistication illustrates that the inclusion of more questions measuring personality traits in the expanded inventory reduces the confidence interval of 95%, by increasing the number of observations. Figure 3c is the effect of Openness on political sophistication using the IPIP, while Figure 3d is the effect of Openness on political sophistication using the TIPI. While not monumental in scale, the benefit of using the IPIP over the TIPI can be clearly seen in these graphical illustrations. The effect of personality traits on political sophistication is clearer and observed with a higher degree of confidence when using the longer personality inventory of the IPIP. This is logical, as the IPIP includes five times

more questions than the TIPI, and thus the degree of confidence should necessarily be higher via smaller standard errors. A full set of graphical illustrations testing the effect of personality traits on political sophistication, by inventory type, can be found in Appendix G.

An alternative test of this secondary research question is more directly related to the primary focus of this research. Instead of examining the effect of personality traits on political sophistication, next I examine the effect of personality traits on support for immigration, specifically the evaluations given in response to question 1 in issue 2; “Given what you just read, to what extent do you oppose or support increased immigration?” The treatment under study is the *pathos* con appeal. Again, marginal effect plots are used to illustrate the difference between using personality measures derived from the IPIP and the TIPI.

Figures 4a and 4b show the marginal effect of trait Conscientiousness on support for immigration, while Figures 4c and 4d show the marginal effect of trait Openness on support for immigration. Figures 4a and 4c use the IPIP, while the measures of personality in Figures 4b and 4d use the TIPI. This set of graphical representations more clearly illustrates the benefits of using the expanding IPIP over the abbreviated TIPI. The slope coefficient in Figure 4a is negative, while the coefficient in Figure 4b is slightly positive. Neither relationship is statistically significant, but it is clear that depending on which inventory a researcher potentially used, they would draw contradictory conclusions from the evidence; using the IPIP would lead to the




Figure 3. Marginal Effects of Personality Trait Levels on Political Sophistication

conclusion of a negative relationship, whereas using the TIPI would lead to the conclusion of a positive. Obviously, the canny researcher would not draw any conclusions from either model as the results are not statistically significant. I am not focused on this undifferentiated relationship. This is merely an illustration of the potentially biasing effect of using the abbreviated TIPI.

Moving to Figures 4c and 4d, the benefit of using the expanding personality inventory is again clear, albeit for a separate reason; a greater degree of confidence in our results. The confidence interval in Figure 4c is much smaller than 4d, which is unsurprising given that the IPIP has five times more questions than the TIPI. However, an insignificant positive relationship observed when using the TIPI is found to be both statistically significant and greater in magnitude when using the IPIP. A full set of graphical illustrations of the relationship between personality trait and support for immigration, by inventory type and without specification of the treatment condition, are found in Appendix G.

Although the evidence presented here is far from definitive, it appears that using the expanded IPIP over the TIPI may be beneficial. Not only are analyses made using the expanding personality inventory improved in their level of confidence, but occasionally the direction of the observed relationship is reversed. These benefits may be sufficient justification to researchers for using the expanded personality inventories. The trade-off between taking slightly more time and




Figure 4. Marginal Effects of Personality Trait Levels on Support for Immigration

having a much smaller confidence interval supports the inclusion of personality inventories such as the IPIP over brief inventories such as the TIPI.

The second aspect of this research focus concerns the levels of inter-item correlation between the results of the two personality inventories. If the two inventories capture vastly differing measures of personality, the conclusions derived therefrom are subsequently drawn into question. To examine inter-item covariance, the results of a simple covariance matrix are listed below in Table 4, with Cronbach alpha values displayed in Table 5. The Pearson's correlation coefficients for Conscientiousness and Extraversion are acceptable, at 0.687 and 0.754 respectively. More problematic are the coefficients for traits Agreeableness and Openness. With coefficient values of 0.509 and 0.496 respectively, these are below acceptable levels of interitem covariance. However, these correlation coefficients are only one measure of interitem covariance.

Table 5 displays the Cronbach alpha values for each of the personality traits, between the two personality batteries. These values are much higher than the Pearson's correlation coefficients and, as such, assuage some of the issues highlighted in Table 4. Previously, I justified aggregating evaluative measures at the alpha level threshold of 0.65. It would be highly hypocritical to now conclude that the observed levels here are suboptimal by establishing an alternative threshold. While the Pearson's coefficients leave much desired, we can have a greater degree of faith in the interitem correlation between these two personality batteries given the acceptable Cronbach alpha values.

Levels of inter-item covariance are important as a measure of internal validity but illustrating the substantive impact of using these different inventories offers a more visceral test of this research question. I repeated the regression analyses examining the impact of personality and varied rhetorical appeals on evaluative responses, using the TIPI instead of the IPIP. The full results are presented in Appendix H, but I present several examples below to illustrate the contrasting results due to using these different inventories.

Table 4: Pearson's Correlation Coefficients between the TIPI and the IPIP.

| | TIPI: Conscientiousness | TIPI: Agreeableness | TIPI: Neuroticism | TIPI: Openness | TIPI: Extraversion |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| IPIP: Conscientiousness | 0.687 | 0.201 | -0.270 | 0.079 | 0.137 |
| IPIP: Agreeableness | 0.232 | 0.509 | -0.098 | 0.068 | 0.013 |
| IPIP: Neuroticism | -0.303 | -0.254 | 0.645 | 0.039 | -0.214 |
| IPIP: Openness | 0.198 | 0.049 | 0.040 | 0.496 | 0.127 |
| IPIP: Extraversion | 0.224 | 0.172 | -0.349 | 0.261 | 0.754 |

Note: Bolded values are the interitem correlation values between the two inventories.

Table 5. Cronbach Alpha Values between the TIPI and IPIP.

| | Conscientiousness | Agreeableness | Neuroticism | Openness | Extraversion |
|----------|-------------------|---------------|-------------|----------|--------------|
| α | 0.799 | 0.639 | 0.761 | 0.631 | 0.844 |

Table 6b presents the regression results for the impact of personality traits on evaluative responses regarding privatization, for the *pathos* pro condition. Using the measures derived from the IPIP, neuroticism is the only trait that is statistically significant. However, when using the TIPI measures, both Conscientiousness and Openness exhibit statistical significance. The constant also dramatically changes in magnitude. Table 6f presents the same results but from the *logos* pro condition. In this instance, Openness maintains statistical significance, but Conscientiousness is replaced by Agreeableness as significant when using the TIPI measures.

Presented below, Table 7g displays the regression results for the impact of personality traits on evaluative responses regarding immigration, for the *logos* con condition, and Table 8f presents these results for the *logos* pro condition regarding poverty programs. For Table 7g, when using the TIPI instead of the IPIP, Openness and Extraversion lose their statistical significance while Conscientiousness becomes statistically significant. For Table 8f, Conscientiousness and Agreeableness are no longer statistically significant while Openness is.

Using the abbreviated inventory of the TIPI in lieu of the IPIP, in some cases, inverts the results of these analyses and affects the potential conclusions drawn therefrom. While interitem covariance and Cronbach’s alpha values appear acceptable, the practical ramifications of using abbreviated inventories is to undermine both the confidence of our results and the substantive conclusions drawn therefrom. Researchers studying the effect of personality on attitudes regarding immigration would come to conflicting conclusions depending on the personality inventory they used, Table 7g. The conclusions of the researcher using TIPI derived measures are thus undermined. The majority of political research regarding personality uses the TIPI or the BFI (Mondak et al. 2008; 2010; Gerber et al. 2011; 2012; Webster 2018).

Sacrificing internal validity for shorter completion times is not a worthwhile trade. The results presented here are inconclusive but suggest the adoption of the IPIP over the TIPI.

| Table 6b. Privatization: Pathos Pro Condition | | | Table 6f. Privatization: Logos Pro Condition | | |
|--|----------------------|---------------------|---|---------------------|---------------------|
| | IPIP | TIPI | | IPIP | TIPI |
| Conscientiousness | -0.436 (0.358) | -0.476* (0.284) | Conscientiousness | 0.633** (0.305) | -0.146 (0.239) |
| Agreeableness | -0.270 (0.457) | 0.226 (0.287) | Agreeableness | 0.014 (0.397) | 0.444* (0.231) |
| Neuroticism | -0.689* (0.385) | -0.309 (0.234) | Neuroticism | -0.163 (0.299) | -0.109 (0.207) |
| Openness | -0.281 (0.407) | 0.486* (0.253) | Openness | -0.740** (0.339) | -0.501** (0.227) |
| Extraversion | 0.219 (0.324) | 0.0274 (0.247) | Extraversion | -0.398* (0.234) | -0.195 (0.197) |
| Constant | 11.516*** (2.832) | 6.727*** (1.843) | Constant | 9.265*** (2.440) | 8.657*** (1.679) |
| N | 102 | 102 | N | 103 | 103 |
| R ² | 0.058 | 0.062 | R ² | 0.132 | 0.108 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding privatization. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding privatization. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Previous research using shorter personality inventories such as the TIPI or BFI, and even shorter measures such as the Need for Cognition (NfC) scale which involves only two questions, may need to be reexamined and confirmed using longer personality inventories (Cacioppo & Petty 1982; Bakker and Lelkes 2018). Relying on abbreviated measures of personality, as shown here, has the potential to result in conflicting conclusions. Also, using abbreviated inventories reduces the confidence of our results for primarily statistical reasons. The IPIP also possesses practical advantages over measures such as the TIPI, BFI, or NfC scales. The large number of available questions, their applicability cross-nationally, and their cost-free availability are additional considerations that researchers should weigh when choosing a personality battery. Again, individual researchers will need to make this calculation for themselves, but this research offers suggestive evidence that the use of expanded inventories is justified by the expanded time they take. The most significant contribution that the widespread adoption of the IPIP would have is that it would allow for direct, cross-national comparison of political outcomes based on personality. Even with acceptable alpha values, it is clear that these two batteries do not capture identical measures of the five personality measures. Political Science, both Comparative and Americanist, would greatly benefit from the universal adoption of a measure such as the IPIP, even if that is currently unlikely. For now, I will echo the sentiments of Bakker & Lelkes (2018) when I restate their point that we mustn't "Sell Ourselves Short" (Bakker & Lelkes 2018). When we do, we may undermine the confidence of our conclusions, both normatively and substantively, as shown in Figures 3 and 4, and Tables 6, 7, and 8.

Conclusion

This research provides suggestive evidence and moderate support of an interaction effect between personality traits and different messaging styles. Though neither definitive nor conclusive, some evidence is observed supporting the theoretical contention made herein. The skewed distribution of the sample, in terms of partisanship and demographic factors, may be

| | Table 7g. Immigration: Logos Con Condition | | Table 8f. Poverty Program: Logos Pro Condition | | |
|-------------------|---|---------------------|---|---------------------|---------------------|
| | IPIP | TIPI | IPIP | TIPI | |
| Conscientiousness | -0.279 (0.336) | -0.473* (0.243) | Conscientiousness | -0.886** (0.355) | -0.294 (0.290) |
| Agreeableness | 0.045 (0.367) | 0.000859 (0.265) | Agreeableness | 0.883** (0.396) | 0.221 (0.282) |
| Neuroticism | -0.299 (0.314) | -0.0459 (0.208) | Neuroticism | 0.311 (0.377) | -0.037 (0.262) |
| Openness | 1.160*** (0.357) | 0.222 (0.267) | Openness | 0.253 (0.461) | 0.452* (0.254) |
| Extraversion | -0.578* (0.297) | 0.0198 (0.220) | Extraversion | 0.402 (0.312) | 0.213 (0.248) |
| Constant | 5.492** (2.327) | 7.436*** (1.904) | Constant | 4.442 (2.831) | 5.762*** (2.050) |
| N | 99 | 99 | N | 105 | 105 |
| R ² | 0.123 | 0.043 | R ² | 0.118 | 0.058 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding immigration. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding poverty programs. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

obscuring the full effects of the hypothesized relationship. Further research is required to either illuminate or discredit this relationship. Future iterations of this project will repeat the fundamental research design, modify the experimental messaging conditions, and seek to conduct analysis on a more representative sample in terms of partisanship, personality traits, and demographic factors. I repeat the sentiments of so many previous researchers when faced with suboptimal results by calling for further research. But in this case, future research is not only warranted but required.

Regarding the benefits of expanded personality batteries, this research found strong evidence in favor of using expanded personality inventories. The primary benefit of using the IPIP over the TIPI appears to be a greater degree of confidence in our results. Substantively and statistically significant differences were observed when using the IPIP over the TIPI. Findings relying on personality measurements taken by the TIPI are called into question, and may be fundamentally undermined, by the use of this inventory. The IPIP also remains a more promising measurement tool for use cross-nationally, due the robustness of prompts across languages. Where Bakker and Lelkes (2018) find that the NfC scale and BFI may be too abbreviated to accurately capture personality measures, I find a similar issue with the TIPI.

Finally, returning to the primary focus of this research, the issues of privatization and poverty assistance programs may be too engrained in the partisan psyche of the subject to be conducive to any degree of meaningful change. Regardless of the style of rhetorical appeal or message, years of partisan rhetoric, media coverage, and socialization likely overpower any single exposure to a text-based message. The most promising results of this research were found in the least salient issue; privatization. Privatization currently resides external to the American political zeitgeist. A core facet of my theoretical argument is that the partisan sorting effect, on the basis of personality, occurs during the emergence of an issue onto the political landscape. Where an issue is meaningfully discussed for the first time, law and order for example in the 1960s and 1970s, the parties will experiment with various appeals and arguments along this dimension. Their respective partisans will not only resonate disproportionately to the issue, or not, they will respond differentially to these type of appeals. This has the effect of solidifying both the wedge issue and the manner in which it is discussed into the political landscape.

Taking a sample of college students, raised in an environment where the political landscape has already been established, it is unlikely to observe the theorized relationship on so salient of issues. Immigration and poverty programs constitute a highly difficult test of this theory. The least salient issue therefore provides not only the best evidence, but also the best test, of my theory. Future research may construct messaging based on non-political issues to illuminate any effects obscured by latent partisan beliefs. This is only the first step on a longer research journey, but the results here remain suggestive.

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
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Appendix A: Theorized Interaction Effect of Personality and Rhetorical Styles



Appendix B: Demographic Characteristics of Respondents**Table 1. Gender**

| | Number of Respondents | Percentage of Respondents |
|--------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| Female | 519 | 73.41 |
| Male | 188 | 26.59 |

Table 2. Age

| | Number of Respondents | Percentage of Respondents |
|----------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| 16 or 17 | 12 | 1.75 |
| 18 or 19 | 455 | 66.51 |
| 20-30 | 207 | 30.26 |
| 31+ | 20 | 2.92 |

Table 3. Race

| | Number of Respondents | Percentage of Respondents |
|------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| White | 150 | 21.22 |
| African-American | 274 | 38.76 |
| Hispanic | 77 | 10.89 |
| Asian | 136 | 19.24 |
| Other | 70 | 9.90 |

Table 4. Political Sophistication

| Correct Answers | Number of Respondents | Percentage of Respondents |
|------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| 0 | 91 | 12.87 |
| 1 | 245 | 34.65 |
| 2 | 253 | 35.79 |
| 3 | 118 | 16.69 |

Table 5. Party Identification

| | Number of Respondents | Percentage of Respondents |
|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| Strong Democrat | 121 | 20.51 |
| Moderate Democrat | 288 | 48.81 |
| Leans Democrat | 51 | 8.64 |
| True Independent | 48 | 8.14 |
| Leans Republican | 16 | 2.71 |
| Moderate Republican | 56 | 9.49 |
| Strong Republican | 10 | 1.69 |

Table 6. Income

| | Number of Respondents | Percentage of Respondents |
|------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| Less than \$30,000 | 149 | 21.07 |
| \$30,000 to \$70,000 | 259 | 36.63 |
| \$70,001 to \$100,000 | 129 | 18.25 |
| \$100,001 to \$200,000 | 126 | 17.82 |
| More than \$200,000 | 44 | 6.22 |

Table 7. Personality Distribution of Respondents

| | Conscientiousness | Agreeableness | Neuroticism | Openness | Extraversion |
|------|-------------------|---------------|-------------|----------|--------------|
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 53 | 0 | 8 |
| 2 | 30 | 13 | 238 | 5 | 94 |
| 3 | 274 | 189 | 333 | 165 | 309 |
| 4 | 332 | 443 | 93 | 387 | 249 |
| 5 | 70 | 62 | 8 | 150 | 47 |
| Mean | 3.59 | 3.72 | 2.68 | 3.91 | 3.27 |

Note. Personality measured on a 1-5 scale, where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree, with the measurement prompt. Results above are reported using standard rounding rules. Actual measures are continuous from 1-5, as an additive scale. Results from the IPIP, not the TIPI.

Appendix C: Combined Personality Battery**International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) & Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI):**

Note: Bolded items are additions to the IPIP-FFM, taken from the TIPI.

“The following are a number of statements that may or may not apply to you. Please fill in the degree to which you disagree or agree with each statement. You should rate the extent to which the statement applies to you.”

| | Disagree Strongly | Disagree a Little | Neither Agree nor Disagree | Agree a Little | Agree Strongly |
|---|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| I tend to vote for conservative political candidates. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I have frequent mood swings. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I am not easily bothered by things. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I tend to be lazy. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I suspect hidden motives in others. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I enjoy hearing new ideas. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I believe in the importance of art. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I have a vivid imagination. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I tend to find fault with others. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I am the life of the party. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I am skilled in handling social situations. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I am always prepared. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I make plans and stick to them. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I dislike myself. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I respect others. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I have few artistic interests. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I insult people. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I would describe my experiences as somewhat dull. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I seldom feel blue. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I don't like to draw attention to myself. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I carry out my plans. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

| | | | | | |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| I am not interested in abstract ideas. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I have a sharp tongue. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I get nervous easily. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I make friends easily. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I tend to vote for liberal political candidates. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I know how to captivate people. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I believe that others have good intentions. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I am very pleased with myself. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I do just enough work to get by. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I find it difficult to get down to work. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I am generally trusting. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I carry the conversation to a higher level. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I panic easily. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I avoid philosophical discussions. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I accept people as they are. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I do not enjoy going to art museums. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I pay attention to details. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I keep in the background. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I feel comfortable with myself. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I am outgoing, sociable. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I waste my time | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I tend to be reserved. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I get back at others. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I get chores done right away. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I don't talk a lot. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I tend to be relaxed, handle stress well. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I am often down in the dumps. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I shirk my duties. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

| | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| I do not like art. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I tend to do a thorough job. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I often feel blue. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I cut others to pieces. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I have a good word for everyone. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I have an active imagination. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I don't see things through. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I feel comfortable around people. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I make people feel at ease. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I rarely get irritated. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| I have little to say. | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

(Buchanan et al. 2005; Rammstedt & John 2007)

Appendix D: Experimental Prompts***Treatment 1-a (Control):***

Definition: Privatization is the process by which government owned industries, such as electricity production or railroads, are sold to private companies.

Treatment 1-b (Pathos Pro-Privatization):

Definition: Privatization is the process by which government owned industries, such as electricity production or railroads, are sold to private companies.

Please read the following paragraph:

People who support privatization say private companies are better at providing goods and services than businesses run by the government. They believe that businesses run by the government increase prices of vital goods and services through incompetence. The higher costs of these goods unequally harm the most vulnerable members of society, such as the elderly, young children and those living in poverty. These higher prices may force families to have to choose between water or power. People who support privatization say that private companies, not businesses run by the government, are more capable of providing a steady and affordable supply of vital goods and services.

Treatment 1-c (Pathos Con-Privatization):

Definition: Privatization is the process by which government owned industries, such as electricity production or railroads, are sold to private companies.

Please read the following paragraph:

People who oppose privatization say businesses run by the government are better at providing goods and services than private companies. They believe that private companies increase prices of vital goods and services to maximize profits. The higher costs of these goods unequally harm the most vulnerable members of society, such as the elderly, young children and those living in poverty. These higher prices may force families to have to choose between water or power. People who oppose privatization say that businesses run by the government, not private companies, are more capable of providing a steady and affordable supply of vital goods and services.

Treatment 1-d (Ethos Pro-Privatization):

Definition: Privatization is the process by which government owned industries, such as electricity production or railroads, are sold to private companies.

Please read the following paragraph:

People who support privatization say private companies are better at providing goods and services than businesses run by the government. They argue that businesses run by the government are less efficient than private companies. A recently published Government report stated, "Today, much empirical evidence supports the claim that private companies are more efficient operators than government entities." The report also said that private companies transfer this higher efficiency into lower costs for consumers. This efficiency is due to factors such as managers being rewarded for good performance, more outside investment, and fewer operating regulations (less red tape). The report examined the British electricity industry, where delivery of service was improved, and consumer prices fell. People whose support privatization say that private companies, not businesses run by the government, are more capable of providing a steady and affordable supply of vital goods and services.

Treatment 1-e (Ethos Con-Privatization):

Definition: Privatization is the process by which government owned industries, such as electricity production or railroads, are sold to private companies.

Please read the following paragraph:

People who oppose privatization say businesses run by the government are better at providing goods and services than private companies. A recently published government report stated, "Since privatization was first implemented a great many concerns have been expressed, mainly over the quality and costs of privatized services." The report also said that private companies often concentrate on their most profitable divisions letting others fail, without consideration for the public that relies on these less profitable services. Without a profit motivation, there is little incentive for private companies to provide these essential services. The report examined the British rail industry where less profitable in rural regions were neglected, and eventually abandoned, while urban routes were maintained. People who opposed privatization say that businesses run by the government, not private companies, are more capable of providing a steady and affordable supply of vital goods and services.

Treatment 1-f (Logos Pro-Privatization):

Definition: Privatization is the process by which government owned industries, such as electricity production or railroads, are sold to private companies.

Please read the following paragraph:

People who support privatization say private companies are better at providing goods and services than businesses run by the government. They argue that private companies are more responsive to customers because if private companies raise their prices or have poor service, the customer will take their business elsewhere. Supporters of privatization point to the example of British utilities in the 1990s. During this period, telephone bills decreased by 49 percent and electricity bills decreased by 20 percent following privatization. Supporters of privatization argue that private businesses also are subject to competition from other companies. This competition is what causes lower prices and more reliable service. People who support privatization say that private companies, not businesses run by the government, are more capable of providing a steady and affordable supply of vital goods and services.

Treatment 1-g (Logos Con-Privatization):

Definition: Privatization is the process by which government owned industries, such as electricity production or railroads, are sold to private companies.

Please read the following paragraph:

People who oppose privatization say businesses run by the government are better at providing goods and services than private companies. They argue that private companies are only answerable to their owners, not the customers. This lack of government oversight means these private companies can raise their prices without considering the well-being of the public. Opponents point to the example of British utilities in the 2000s. During this period rail prices increased by 65 percent and electricity bills increased by 20 percent following privatization. They argue that privatized companies are driven to maximize profits for those people that own the company. This results in higher prices and less reliable services at the expense of the customer. People who oppose privatization say that businesses run by the government, not private companies, are more capable of providing a steady and affordable supply of vital goods and services.

Evaluations - Issue 1:

- 1-i.** Given what you just read, to what extent do you oppose or support privatization?
- 1-ii.** To what extent do you think that the government is efficient or inefficient, when compared to private industry?
- 1-iii.** To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement, "Private companies can provide consumers with essential goods more cheaply than government?"
- 1-iv.** To what extent do you agree or disagree that the government should provide power and water to all citizens?
- 1-v.** To what extent do you think private companies are accountable to their customers?
- 1-vi.** To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement, "Impoverished families are better off when goods are provided by government, not private companies?"

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|----------|------------|----------|----------|---------|----------|----------|------------|----------|------------|
| ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- | | | | | | | | | | |
| Completely | Strongly | Moderately | Somewhat | Slightly | Neutral | Slightly | Somewhat | Moderately | Strongly | Completely |
| Disagree | Disagree | Disagree | Disagree | Disagree | | Agree | Agree | Agree | Agree | Agree |
| ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

Treatment 2-a (Control):

Definition: In this instance, increased immigration means an increase of legal immigrant families coming to live and work in the United States.

Treatment 2-b (Pathos Pro-Immigration):

Definition: In this instance, increased immigration means an increase of legal immigrant families coming to live and work in the United States.

Please read the following paragraph:

People who oppose increased immigration say that immigrants indirectly lower the wages of American workers. They argue that immigrants are willing to work for lower wages, which in turn reduces the wages of American workers that are forced to accept lower wages. A recently published Government report stated, "We find that immigration leads to a decrease in native-born wages where a substantial number of immigrant laborers become available. The report also said that significant increases in the supply of immigrant labor has the effect of reducing American applicants to jobs, which further harmed American workers. This means that not only are wages reduced, but unemployed applicants are less likely to find work. The report examined the California agricultural industry, following an increase in immigration in the early 2000s. People who oppose increased immigration say that immigrants lower the wages and increase unemployment of American workers, which is a net negative for all citizens.

Treatment 2-c (Pathos Con-Immigration):

Definition: In this instance, increased immigration means an increase of legal immigrant families coming to live and work in the United States.

Please read the following paragraph:

People who support increased immigration say that immigrants indirectly lower the prices on vital goods. They argue that immigrants are willing to work for lower wages, which in turn lowers the price of goods such as food and clothing. Supporters of increased immigration point to the example of American immigration since 1980. During this period, an increase in immigration of 10 percent led to a 9 percent decrease in the average price of agricultural goods, and a 13 percent decrease in the average price of labor intensive services. This is a period that saw a 400 percent increase in the number of immigrants living and working in America, and a subsequent decline in prices. The lower relative prices of goods, such as food, are largely attributable to the increased labor force of immigrant workers. People who support increased immigration say that immigrants lower the cost of producing vital goods, which is a net benefit to all citizens.

Treatment 2-d (Ethos Pro-Immigration):

Definition: In this instance, increased immigration means an increase of legal immigrant families coming to live and work in the United States.

Please read the following paragraph:

People who oppose increased immigration say that immigrants indirectly lower the wages of existing workers. They argue that because immigrants are willing to work for lower wages, the existing workers also have their wages reduced. Opponents of increased immigration point to the example of American immigration since 1980. During this period, a 10 percent increase in immigrant labor corresponded with a 9 percent reduction of wages and 13 percent increase in unemployment among low-skilled workers. This was a period that saw a 400 percent increase in the numbers of immigrants living and working in America. The lower wages and higher unemployment of all low skilled workers is directly linked to the increased labor force of immigrant workers. People who oppose increased immigration say that immigrants lower the wages and increase unemployment of American workers, which is a net negative for all citizens.

Treatment 2-e (Ethos Con-Immigration):

Definition: In this instance, increased immigration means an increase of legal immigrant families coming to live and work in the United States.

Please read the following paragraph:

People who support increased immigration say that immigrants indirectly lower the prices on vital goods. They believe that as immigrants are willing to work for lower wages, savings in manufacturing are translated into lower costs for goods such as food and clothing. The lower costs of these goods directly benefit the American poor, who rely on low prices to survive. Without immigrant labor, higher prices would cause many poor families to suffer, as they would be unable to afford food, clothing and other such essentials. People who support increase immigration say that immigrants lower the cost of producing vital goods, which is a net benefit for all citizens.

Treatment 2-f (Logos Pro-Immigration):

Definition: In this instance, increased immigration means an increase of legal immigrant families coming to live and work in the United States.

Please read the following paragraph:

People who oppose increased immigration say that immigrants indirectly lower the wages of American workers. They believe that as immigrants are often willing to work for lower wages, wages for all low-skilled workers are decreased, and American workers find it more difficult to find jobs. These lower wages and prospects unequally harm the American poor, which rely on this income to survive. Lower wages will cause many poor families to suffer, as they may be unable to afford food, clothing and other such essentials. People who oppose increased immigration say that immigrants lower the wages and increase unemployment of American workers, which is a net negative for all citizens.

Treatment 2-g (Logos Con-Immigration):

Definition: In this instance, increased immigration means an increase of legal immigrant families coming to live and work in the United States.

Please read the following paragraph:

People who support increased immigration say that immigrants indirectly lower the prices on vital goods. They argue that immigrants are willing to work for lower wages which reduces the prices of goods such as food and clothing. A recently published Government report stated, "Decreased rates of immigrant laborers results in a rise in food prices. Consumers bear a small part of farmers' higher costs and face smaller supplies of products." The report also said that these price increases were likely to persist until a replacement labor force could be found. This means that without immigrant labor, the domestic labor market could not compensate for the loss in cheap labor, and thus prices rose. The report examined the California agricultural industry, following immigration reform in 2006. People who support increased immigration say that immigrants lower the cost of producing vital goods, which a new benefit for all citizens.

Evaluations - Issue 2:

- 2-i.** Given what you just read, to what extent do you oppose or support increased immigration?
- 2-ii.** To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement, "Increased immigration is a net benefit for America?"
- 2-iii.** To what extent do you think that increased immigration improves or reduces the well-being of poor Americans?
- 2-iv.** To what extent do you agree or disagree that the American Government has a moral obligation to accept immigrants from impoverished countries?
- 2-v.** To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement, "All immigrants have a right to come to America?"
-

Treatment 3-a (Control):

Definition: Poverty assistance programs refer to government programs aimed at combating poverty such as Medicaid, Food Stamps and Head Start.

Treatment 3-b (Pathos Pro-Poverty Programs):

Definition: Poverty assistance programs refer to government programs aimed at combating poverty such as Medicaid, Food Stamps and Head Start.

Please read the following paragraph:

People who support an expansion of poverty assistance programs argue that these programs have been successful at reducing poverty. They argue that these programs have been effective in providing the types of services that millions depend on. Supporters of the expansion of poverty assistance programs point to the example of Food Stamps and Head Start since their implementation in the 1960s. During this period, the percentage of Americans suffering from food insecurity has decreased from 21% to 12%, while the percentage of low income students enrolled in college increased from 3 percent to 13 percent. Supporters of expanding poverty assistance programs argue that these programs have made the difference for the millions of people who have risen out of poverty. The ability to maintain a basic standard of living gives people the ability to find meaningful employment and improve the lives of themselves and their families. Supporters of expanding poverty assistance programs argue that these programs are the most effective means by which to alleviate and reduce poverty.

Treatment 3-c (Pathos Con-Poverty Programs):

Definition: Poverty assistance programs refer to government programs aimed at combating poverty such as Medicaid, Food Stamps and Head Start.

Please read the following paragraph:

People who oppose an expansion of poverty assistance programs say that these programs have been unsuccessful at reducing poverty. They argue that these programs have unintended effects that create a system of dependency that traps people in poverty. A recently published government report stated, "As assistance programs expanded, welfare rolls multiplied, and so did crime, disorder, and dysfunctional schools, while graduation rates declined. The report also said that the poverty rate, economic mobility and educational attainment of impoverished Americans has largely remained static since 1970. This is largely due to the unintended consequences of well-meaning, misguided programs with counterproductive incentives. The report examined the impact of programs such as Head Start, Medicaid and Food Stamps. People who oppose an expansion of poverty assistance programs argue that other means would be more effective at reducing and alleviating poverty.

Treatment 3-d (Ethos Pro-Poverty Programs):

Definition: Poverty assistance programs refer to government programs aimed at combating poverty such as Medicaid, Food Stamps and Head Start.

Please read the following paragraph:

People who support an expansion of poverty assistance programs say that these programs have been successful at reducing poverty. They believe that these programs, such as Food Stamps and Medicaid, have been the difference for millions of families who otherwise would have gone hungry, sick and unsheltered. These programs provide vital support to those who are most in need, giving them the ability to improve their conditions. This support is the main way of improving the living conditions of millions of families that endure poverty. Supporters of expanding poverty assistance programs argue that these programs are the most effective means by which to alleviate and reduce poverty.

Treatment 3-e (Ethos Con-Poverty Programs):

Definition: Poverty assistance programs refer to government programs aimed at combating poverty such as Medicaid, Food Stamps and Head Start.

Please read the following paragraph:

People who oppose an expansion of poverty assistance programs say that these programs have been unsuccessful at reducing poverty. They argue that these programs have been extraordinarily expensive while offering little in return. Opponents of the expansion of poverty assistance programs point to the example of these programs since their implementation in the 1960s. During this period the total cost of these programs was over 15 trillion dollars, with Medicaid alone costing over 500 billion dollars per year. They argue that during this time, the poverty rate has only fallen from 23.4 percent to 20.6 percent, a reduction of only 2.8 percent. These programs do not address the root causes of poverty, such as poor education, and this money would be better spent on alternative measures aimed at reducing, not alleviating, poverty. People who oppose an expansion of poverty assistance programs argue that other means would be more effective at reducing and alleviating poverty.

Treatment 3-f (Logos Pro-Poverty Programs):

Definition: Poverty assistance programs refer to government programs aimed at combating poverty such as Medicaid, Food Stamps and Head Start.

Please read the following paragraph:

People who support an expansion of poverty assistance programs say that these programs have been successful at reducing poverty. They argue that poverty assistance programs have provided food, education and healthcare to millions of impoverished Americans. A recently published Government report stated, "Poverty in America, the sort of material deprivation people knew back in the 1960s, has all but been eliminated." The report also said that the impact of these poverty assistance programs has been to improve the education of low-income children, increase the health of those enrolled in Medicaid, and largely eliminate childhood malnourishment. This is due the impact of poverty assistance programs that address the basic needs of those in poverty. The report examined the impact of programs such as Head Start, Medicaid and Food Stamps. Supporters of expanding poverty assistance programs argue that these programs are the most effective means by which to alleviate and reduce poverty.

Treatment 3-g (Logos Con-Poverty Programs):

Definition: Poverty assistance programs refer to government programs aimed at combating poverty such as Medicaid, Food Stamps and Head Start.

Please read the following paragraph:

People who oppose an expansion of poverty assistance programs say that these programs have not been successful at reducing poverty. They believe that these programs, such as Food Stamps and Medicaid, have failed to reduce the number of people enduring poverty, while trapping people in poverty without a means to improve their economic conditions. These programs only provide the bare minimums, while never giving people the opportunity to improve their economic situation. These poverty assistance programs have condemned generations of people to lives of suffering through their inability to raise families out of poverty. People who oppose an expansion of poverty assistance programs argue that other means would be more effective at reducing and alleviating poverty.

Evaluations - Issue 3:

- 3-i.** Given what you just read, to what extent do you think poverty assistance programs are effective or ineffective at reducing poverty?
- 3-ii.** To what extent do you think poverty assistance programs are effective or ineffective at improving the conditions of those enduring poverty?
- 3-iii.** What is your view on the work ethic of recipients of poverty assistance programs?
- 3-iv.** To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement, “The Government has not done enough to reduce poverty?”
- 3-v.** To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement, “People’s economic situation is largely determined by forces outside of their control?”
- 3-vi.** To what extent do you agree or disagree that government programs do more harm than good?

Appendix E: Impact of Personality Traits on Evaluative Responses, with Demographics**Table 4a.** Impact of Personality Traits, Demographics, & Partisanship, on Privatization Responses

| | Control | Pathos + | Pathos - | Ethos + | Ethos - | Logos + | Logos - |
|-------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Conscientiousness | -0.462 (0.406) | -0.144 (0.484) | -0.103 (0.405) | -0.392 (0.423) | 0.986* (0.502) | 0.734** (0.328) | -0.811 (0.506) |
| Agreeableness | -0.412 (0.494) | -0.797 (0.631) | -0.262 (0.447) | 1.059*** (0.390) | -0.215 (0.519) | 0.129 (0.423) | -0.155 (0.559) |
| Neuroticism | -0.470 (0.382) | -0.630 (0.498) | -0.508 (0.338) | -0.072 (0.389) | 0.379 (0.587) | 0.022 (0.342) | -0.742* (0.394) |
| Openness | -0.784 (0.509) | -0.244 (0.611) | -0.829** (0.343) | -0.063 (0.421) | 0.214 (0.466) | -0.715* (0.394) | 0.116 (0.459) |
| Extraversion | 0.417 (0.338) | 0.223 (0.401) | 0.437 (0.350) | -0.310 (0.293) | -0.019 (0.485) | -0.492* (0.252) | 0.024 (0.399) |
| Democrat | -0.789 (0.784) | -0.616 (0.918) | -0.395 (0.842) | -1.382* (0.785) | -1.832** (0.824) | -1.257* (0.670) | 0.206 (0.733) |
| Female | -0.292 (0.543) | -0.013 (0.824) | 0.637 (0.618) | -0.723 (0.533) | -0.508 (0.596) | 0.177 (0.519) | 0.902 (0.654) |
| White | -0.523 (0.585) | -0.000 (0.827) | 1.200* (0.646) | 0.070 (0.621) | -0.535 (0.618) | 0.113 (0.560) | -0.483 (0.592) |
| Constant | 12.455*** (3.034) | 12.751*** (3.682) | 9.734*** (2.882) | 7.537** (3.053) | 3.191 (4.636) | 9.166*** (2.607) | 9.592*** (2.966) |
| N | 75 | 78 | 73 | 80 | 73 | 87 | 75 |
| R ² | 0.159 | 0.090 | 0.196 | 0.210 | 0.136 | 0.214 | 0.108 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding privatization. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. Democrat, Female, and White are binary variables. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Table 4b. Impact of Personality Traits, Demographics, & Partisanship, on Immigration Responses

| | Control | Pathos + | Pathos - | Ethos + | Ethos - | Logos + | Logos - |
|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| Conscientiousness | -0.668* (0.352) | -0.427 (0.518) | -0.209 (0.436) | -0.551 (0.400) | -0.553 (0.392) | -0.270 (0.376) | -0.377 (0.372) |
| Agreeableness | 0.255 (0.405) | 0.304 (0.500) | -0.621 (0.598) | 0.763* (0.418) | 0.664 (0.456) | 0.649 (0.490) | 0.036 (0.438) |
| Neuroticism | -0.185 (0.312) | 0.440 (0.515) | 0.220 (0.411) | 0.001 (0.382) | 0.077 (0.374) | 0.612* (0.338) | -0.360 (0.381) |
| Openness | 0.934** (0.358) | 0.308 (0.527) | 0.616 (0.436) | 0.885** (0.393) | 0.678 (0.424) | 0.375 (0.442) | 0.662 (0.406) |
| Extraversion | 0.229 (0.265) | 0.052 (0.384) | -0.405 (0.362) | -0.205 (0.321) | -0.780** (0.303) | 0.192 (0.360) | -0.549* (0.314) |
| Democrat | 0.634 (0.683) | -0.185 (0.742) | 2.962*** (0.844) | 1.209 (0.845) | 1.733** (0.734) | 0.941 (0.727) | 3.023*** (0.790) |
| Female | -0.037 (0.452) | -0.024 (0.586) | -0.457 (0.725) | 0.156 (0.558) | 0.214 (0.512) | -0.027 (0.595) | -0.638 (0.652) |
| White | -0.200 (0.505) | -1.261* (0.648) | -0.843 (0.645) | 0.371 (0.641) | 0.341 (0.508) | 0.287 (0.648) | 0.504 (0.693) |
| Constant | 4.905* (2.517) | 6.314* (3.478) | 6.430** (2.921) | 2.856 (2.744) | 4.023 (3.108) | 1.634 (3.371) | 5.766** (2.600) |
| N | 77 | 74 | 76 | 81 | 85 | 77 | 72 |
| R ² | 0.190 | 0.085 | 0.320 | 0.203 | 0.313 | 0.140 | 0.330 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding immigration. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. Democrat, Female, and White are binary variables. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Table 4c. Impact of Personality Traits, Demographics, & Partisanship, on Poverty Program Responses

| | Control | Pathos + | Pathos - | Ethos + | Ethos - | Logos + | Logos - |
|-------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Conscientiousness | -0.080 (0.496) | -0.119 (0.512) | 0.595 (0.426) | -0.153 (0.394) | -0.225 (0.441) | -0.614 (0.418) | -0.518 (0.511) |
| Agreeableness | -0.242 (0.605) | -0.009 (0.603) | -0.588 (0.488) | 0.673 (0.457) | 0.143 (0.559) | 0.501 (0.491) | 0.529 (0.508) |
| Neuroticism | -0.628 (0.429) | 0.202 (0.441) | 0.119 (0.381) | 0.689* (0.376) | 0.731 (0.443) | 0.118 (0.460) | 0.155 (0.556) |
| Openness | -0.123 (0.485) | 0.918 (0.571) | 0.136 (0.440) | -0.400 (0.402) | 0.245 (0.453) | 0.183 (0.521) | 0.707 (0.476) |
| Extraversion | -0.161 (0.470) | -0.012 (0.421) | 0.512 (0.323) | 0.356 (0.355) | -0.122 (0.333) | 0.492 (0.380) | 0.064 (0.330) |
| Democrat | 1.942** (0.944) | 0.486 (0.848) | -0.215 (0.649) | 2.156** (0.847) | 1.080 (0.908) | 1.707* (0.910) | 0.977 (0.965) |
| Female | -0.510 (0.626) | -0.142 (0.745) | 1.438** (0.592) | -0.385 (0.629) | 0.137 (0.631) | 0.543 (0.679) | -0.019 (0.705) |
| White | 0.183 (0.704) | 0.079 (0.743) | 1.451** (0.645) | -0.044 (0.663) | -0.772 (0.800) | -0.073 (0.685) | -1.116* (0.643) |
| Constant | 9.740** (3.885) | 3.449 (3.679) | 2.784 (2.819) | 2.919 (2.850) | 3.700 (3.388) | 3.678 (3.328) | 2.231 (3.554) |
| N | 71 | 77 | 79 | 77 | 78 | 82 | 77 |
| R ² | 0.131 | 0.079 | 0.197 | 0.187 | 0.200 | 0.125 | 0.148 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding poverty programs. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. Democrat, Female, and White are binary variables. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1

Appendix F: Main Effects of Experimental Conditions

Table 5a. Main Effects of Directional Frames, on Privatization Responses

| | Control Condition | Pro Conditions | Con Conditions |
|----------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Control | -0.930*** (0.227) | | |
| Pro | | 1.333*** (0.152) | |
| Con | | | -0.889*** (0.156) |
| Constant | 6.239*** (0.084) | 5.531*** (0.100) | 6.491*** (0.102) |
| N | 706 | 706 | 706 |
| R ² | 0.023 | 0.099 | 0.044 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding privatization. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Control, Pro, and Con are Binary Variables, where 1 denotes the experimental condition. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5b. Main Effects of Directional Frames, on Immigration Responses

| | Control Condition | Pro Conditions | Con Conditions |
|----------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Control | 0.579*** (0.224) | | |
| Pro | | 0.633*** (0.158) | |
| Con | | | -0.917*** (0.155) |
| Constant | 7.180*** (0.085) | 6.995*** (0.102) | 7.661*** (0.102) |
| N | 707 | 707 | 707 |
| R ² | 0.009 | 0.022 | 0.047 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding immigration. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Control, Pro, and Con are Binary Variables, where 1 denotes the experimental condition. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5b. Main Effects of Directional Frames, on Poverty Program Responses

| | Control Condition | Pro Conditions | Con Conditions |
|----------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Control | -0.049 (0.254) | | |
| Pro | | 0.895*** (0.170) | |
| Con | | | -0.870*** (0.170) |
| Constant | 6.990*** (0.092) | 6.597*** (0.112) | 7.363*** (0.112) |
| N | 706 | 706 | 706 |
| R ² | 0.000 | 0.038 | 0.036 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding poverty programs. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. Control, Pro, and Con are Binary Variables, where 1 denotes the experimental condition. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix G: Marginal Effects of Inventory Type






Figure 5. Marginal Effects of Personality on Political Sophistication, by Inventory.

IPIP


TIPI




(a) Trait Conscientiousness




(b) Trait Conscientiousness




(c) Trait Agreeableness




(d) Trait Agreeableness




(e) Trait Neuroticism




(f) Trait Neuroticism




(g) Trait Openness



(h) Trait Openness



(i) Trait Extraversion



(j) Trait Extraversion

Figure 6. Marginal Effects of Personality on Support for Immigration, by Inventory.

Appendix H: Variance in Regression Models, by Inventory Used

| Table 6a. Privatization: Control Condition | | | Table 6b. Privatization: Pathos Pro Condition | | |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|--|----------------------|---------------------|
| | IPIP | TIPI | | IPIP | TIPI |
| Conscientiousness | -0.350 (0.323) | 0.0248 (0.225) | Conscientiousness | -0.436 (0.358) | -0.476* (0.284) |
| Agreeableness | -0.310 (0.393) | -0.328 (0.248) | Agreeableness | -0.270 (0.457) | 0.226 (0.287) |
| Neuroticism | -0.465 (0.309) | -0.628*** (0.206) | Neuroticism | -0.689* (0.385) | -0.309 (0.234) |
| Openness | -0.847** (0.362) | -0.366 (0.223) | Openness | -0.281 (0.407) | 0.486* (0.253) |
| Extraversion | 0.205 (0.278) | -0.0370 (0.201) | Extraversion | 0.219 (0.324) | 0.0274 (0.247) |
| Constant | 11.672*** (2.432) | 9.770*** (1.499) | Constant | 11.516*** (2.832) | 6.727*** (1.843) |
| N | 97 | 97 | N | 102 | 102 |
| R ² | 0.096 | 0.119 | R ² | 0.058 | 0.062 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding privatization. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding privatization. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

| Table 6c. Privatization: Pathos Con Condition | | | Table 6d. Privatization: Ethos Pro Condition | | |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|---|--------------------|---------------------|
| | IPIP | TIPI | | IPIP | TIPI |
| Conscientiousness | -0.166 (0.359) | -0.0364 (0.241) | Conscientiousness | -0.192 (0.357) | -0.0677 (0.259) |
| Agreeableness | -0.083 (0.352) | -0.107 (0.249) | Agreeableness | 0.800** (0.338) | 0.455** (0.219) |
| Neuroticism | -0.377 (0.272) | -0.182 (0.205) | Neuroticism | -0.226 (0.317) | 0.0634 (0.203) |
| Openness | -0.523* (0.300) | -0.140 (0.227) | Openness | -0.100 (0.352) | 0.0382 (0.220) |
| Extraversion | 0.697** (0.319) | 0.586*** (0.219) | Extraversion | -0.123 (0.258) | -0.124 (0.190) |
| Constant | 7.260*** (2.258) | 5.425*** (1.491) | Constant | 5.867** (2.458) | 5.462*** (1.518) |
| N | 101 | 101 | N | 102 | 102 |
| R ² | 0.089 | 0.101 | R ² | 0.073 | 0.049 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding privatization. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding privatization. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

| Table 6e. Privatization: Ethos Con Condition | | | Table 6f. Privatization: Logos Pro Condition | | |
|---|--------------------|--------------------|---|---------------------|---------------------|
| | IPIP | TIPI | | IPIP | TIPI |
| Conscientiousness | 0.690** (0.346) | 0.146 (0.229) | Conscientiousness | 0.633** (0.305) | -0.146 (0.239) |
| Agreeableness | -0.061 (0.417) | 0.274 (0.248) | Agreeableness | 0.014 (0.397) | 0.444* (0.231) |
| Neuroticism | 0.475 (0.385) | 0.0108 (0.201) | Neuroticism | -0.163 (0.299) | -0.109 (0.207) |
| Openness | -0.319 (0.359) | 0.185 (0.230) | Openness | -0.740** (0.339) | -0.501** (0.227) |
| Extraversion | 0.096 (0.369) | -0.327 (0.222) | Extraversion | -0.398* (0.234) | -0.195 (0.197) |
| Constant | 3.163 (2.980) | 4.558** (1.860) | Constant | 9.265*** (2.440) | 8.657*** (1.679) |
| N | 98 | 98 | N | 103 | 103 |
| R ² | 0.050 | 0.052 | R ² | 0.132 | 0.108 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding privatization. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding privatization. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

| Table 6g. Privatization: Logos Con Condition | | |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|
| | IPIP | TIPI |
| Conscientiousness | -0.358 (0.395) | 0.163 (0.252) |
| Agreeableness | -0.399 (0.428) | -0.430 (0.264) |
| Neuroticism | -0.434 (0.301) | 0.143 (0.214) |
| Openness | -0.007 (0.368) | -0.192 (0.237) |
| Extraversion | -0.127 (0.310) | -0.0936 (0.225) |
| Constant | 9.857*** (2.271) | 6.943*** (1.741) |
| N | 103 | 103 |
| R ² | 0.040 | 0.043 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding privatization. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7a. Immigration: Control Condition

| | IPIP | TIPI |
|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Conscientiousness | -0.617** (0.271) | -0.138 (0.217) |
| Agreeableness | 0.237 (0.307) | 0.233 (0.224) |
| Neuroticism | -0.193 (0.248) | 0.202 (0.178) |
| Openness | 1.117*** (0.274) | 0.241 (0.212) |
| Extraversion | 0.171 (0.218) | 0.0728 (0.190) |
| Constant | 4.753** (1.924) | 5.680*** (1.300) |
| N | 101 | 101 |
| R ² | 0.207 | 0.046 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding immigration. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7b. Immigration: Pathos Pro Condition

| | IPIP | TIPI |
|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| Conscientiousness | -0.283 (0.417) | 0.190 (0.273) |
| Agreeableness | 0.636 (0.426) | 0.319 (0.257) |
| Neuroticism | 0.207 (0.395) | 0.119 (0.238) |
| Openness | 0.289 (0.397) | -0.452 (0.274) |
| Extraversion | 0.002 (0.320) | 0.0317 (0.245) |
| Constant | 4.587* (2.715) | 6.932*** (1.946) |
| N | 97 | 97 |
| R ² | 0.036 | 0.067 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding immigration. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7c. Immigration: Pathos Con Condition

| | IPIP | TIPI |
|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Conscientiousness | -0.269 (0.406) | 0.183 (0.316) |
| Agreeableness | -0.013 (0.566) | 0.250 (0.284) |
| Neuroticism | -0.113 (0.352) | 0.362 (0.256) |
| Openness | 0.664 (0.436) | 0.0599 (0.254) |
| Extraversion | -0.442 (0.350) | -0.153 (0.234) |
| Constant | 7.005** (2.784) | 4.469** (2.096) |
| N | 104 | 104 |
| R ² | 0.036 | 0.034 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding immigration. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7d. Immigration: Ethos Pro Condition

| | IPIP | TIPI |
|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Conscientiousness | 0.015 (0.337) | -0.347 (0.257) |
| Agreeableness | 0.354 (0.385) | -0.0778 (0.301) |
| Neuroticism | 0.266 (0.336) | 0.0876 (0.218) |
| Openness | 1.111*** (0.332) | 0.319 (0.234) |
| Extraversion | -0.205 (0.300) | -0.051 (0.218) |
| Constant | 1.862 (2.415) | 7.969*** (1.707) |
| N | 100 | 100 |
| R ² | 0.132 | 0.041 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding immigration. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7e. Immigration: Ethos Con Condition

| | IPIP | TIPI |
|-------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| Conscientiousness | -0.475 (0.329) | -0.0244 (0.256) |
| Agreeableness | 0.616 (0.421) | 0.194 (0.223) |
| Neuroticism | 0.129 (0.311) | 0.368* (0.217) |
| Openness | 0.878** (0.349) | 0.298 (0.219) |
| Extraversion | -0.806*** (0.285) | -0.172 (0.232) |
| Constant | 4.893* (2.652) | 4.473** (1.737) |
| N | 104 | 104 |
| R ² | 0.210 | 0.066 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding immigration. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7f. Immigration: Logos Pro Condition

| | IPIP | TIPI |
|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| Conscientiousness | -0.119 (0.310) | -0.159 (0.215) |
| Agreeableness | 0.396 (0.347) | 0.127 (0.257) |
| Neuroticism | 0.607** (0.279) | 0.321 (0.195) |
| Openness | 0.457 (0.327) | 0.173 (0.213) |
| Extraversion | 0.040 (0.267) | -0.0369 (0.206) |
| Constant | 3.011 (2.455) | 6.219*** (1.523) |
| N | 102 | 102 |
| R ² | 0.086 | 0.055 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding immigration. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7g. Immigration: Logos Con Condition

| | IPIP | TIPI |
|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Conscientiousness | -0.279 (0.336) | -0.473* (0.243) |
| Agreeableness | 0.045 (0.367) | 0.000859 (0.265) |
| Neuroticism | -0.299 (0.314) | -0.0459 (0.208) |
| Openness | 1.160*** (0.357) | 0.222 (0.267) |
| Extraversion | -0.578* (0.297) | 0.0198 (0.220) |
| Constant | 5.492** (2.327) | 7.436*** (1.904) |
| N | 99 | 99 |
| R ² | 0.123 | 0.043 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding immigration. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8a. Poverty Program: Control Condition

| | IPIP | TIPI |
|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Conscientiousness | -0.617** (0.271) | -0.138 (0.217) |
| Agreeableness | 0.237 (0.307) | 0.233 (0.224) |
| Neuroticism | -0.193 (0.248) | 0.202 (0.178) |
| Openness | 1.117*** (0.274) | 0.241 (0.212) |
| Extraversion | 0.171 (0.218) | 0.0728 (0.190) |
| Constant | 4.753** (1.924) | 5.680*** (1.300) |
| N | 101 | 101 |
| R ² | 0.207 | 0.046 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding poverty programs. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8b. Poverty Program: Pathos Pro Condition

| | IPIP | TIPI |
|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| Conscientiousness | -0.067 (0.438) | -0.065 (0.267) |
| Agreeableness | 0.193 (0.505) | -0.168 (0.289) |
| Neuroticism | 0.054 (0.336) | 0.260 (0.232) |
| Openness | 0.860** (0.430) | 0.166 (0.297) |
| Extraversion | -0.242 (0.354) | 0.160 (0.260) |
| Constant | 4.225 (2.912) | 6.282*** (2.043) |
| N | 99 | 99 |
| R ² | 0.048 | 0.026 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding poverty programs. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8c. Poverty Program: Pathos Con Condition

| | IPIP | TIPI |
|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| Conscientiousness | 0.355 (0.380) | 0.205 (0.272) |
| Agreeableness | -0.023 (0.420) | 0.293 (0.235) |
| Neuroticism | 0.558* (0.329) | 0.266 (0.213) |
| Openness | 0.297 (0.377) | 0.190 (0.246) |
| Extraversion | 0.529* (0.313) | 0.252 (0.237) |
| Constant | 1.010 (2.349) | 2.526 (1.582) |
| N | 101 | 101 |
| R ² | 0.073 | 0.071 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding poverty programs. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8d. Poverty Program: Ethos Pro Condition

| | IPIP | TIPI |
|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| Conscientiousness | -0.517 (0.379) | -0.070 (0.269) |
| Agreeableness | 0.470 (0.430) | 0.146 (0.319) |
| Neuroticism | 0.384 (0.346) | 0.200 (0.231) |
| Openness | 0.266 (0.373) | -0.157 (0.264) |
| Extraversion | 0.170 (0.365) | 0.247 (0.272) |
| Constant | 4.851* (2.764) | 6.282*** (1.907) |
| N | 101 | 101 |
| R ² | 0.048 | 0.020 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding poverty programs. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8e. Poverty Program: Ethos Con Condition

| | IPIP | TIPI |
|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Conscientiousness | 0.141 (0.355) | -0.162 (0.233) |
| Agreeableness | 0.365 (0.421) | 0.392 (0.257) |
| Neuroticism | 0.860** (0.350) | 0.333 (0.226) |
| Openness | 0.559 (0.341) | 0.082 (0.245) |
| Extraversion | -0.189 (0.274) | -0.002 (0.209) |
| Constant | 0.869 (2.682) | 4.376** (1.837) |
| N | 107 | 107 |
| R ² | 0.112 | 0.051 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding poverty programs. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8f. Poverty Program: Logos Pro Condition

| | IPIP | TIPI |
|-------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Conscientiousness | -0.886** (0.355) | -0.294 (0.290) |
| Agreeableness | 0.883** (0.396) | 0.221 (0.282) |
| Neuroticism | 0.311 (0.377) | -0.037 (0.262) |
| Openness | 0.253 (0.461) | 0.452* (0.254) |
| Extraversion | 0.402 (0.312) | 0.213 (0.248) |
| Constant | 4.442 (2.831) | 5.762*** (2.050) |
| N | 105 | 105 |
| R ² | 0.118 | 0.058 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding poverty programs. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8g. Poverty Program: Logos Con Condition

| | IPIP | TIPI |
|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| Conscientiousness | -0.611 (0.370) | -0.548* (0.278) |
| Agreeableness | 0.444 (0.413) | 0.302 (0.259) |
| Neuroticism | -0.250 (0.399) | -0.575** (0.240) |
| Openness | 0.702* (0.384) | 0.663*** (0.226) |
| Extraversion | 0.125 (0.293) | -0.104 (0.210) |
| Constant | 4.482 (2.768) | 7.051*** (1.722) |
| N | 100 | 100 |
| R ² | 0.085 | 0.151 |

Note. Dependent variable is evaluative response regarding poverty programs. Range (1,11). Coefficients shown are linear regression estimates, standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1