get around whatever the obligations to the court and the 1 obligations of the forfeiture agreement. And I can't speak 2 to the reasons why it's happening now. I mean, they've been 3 living in that property for the approximately two years while 4 this case has been pending and haven't encountered these 5 issues. In fact, the very same property they want to swap 6 was one we've rejected, previously rejected. So that caused 7 great alarm by us and led to the filing of the motion. 8

MR. GENSON: Your Honor, may I make a point?
THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GENSON: Your Honor, the defendant -- the defendant in this case does not own the house. The wife does. The wife believed that she needed to downsize because she expected that it was just a much too expensive house. She believed that she had permission to sell the house. The house is in her name. She proceeded to try to sell the house, thinking she had permission and that everything was taken care of. Now, there was no jeopardy here in this case to the government because they had already filed a lien. And there was a quit claim deed given to them and a lien was filed. So there was no danger given what really -- that there wasn't any removal of the house being sold. No one is going to buy a house when there is a lien on it and a deed both filed. So there is -- in order to sell the house, she needed the permission. She believed she had the permission

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because of some inadvertent miscommunication. And so the issue is is whether her equity in the house should be forfeited based on what someone else did and what she didn't do. And what I'm asking is, with regard to this motion, no harm was done, the place wasn't sold. It could not have been sold without the removal of the lien and the quit claim deed, which were filed. And as a result, as a result, there was no sale. This was not -- this was not the fault of the -- of the owner of the house. This was not the fault of the wife. She was not trying to breach an agreement that she had signed because she believed that she had permission. And as a result of that -- and I understand -- I understand the prosecutor's concern, and I understand what he did, but I think in the light of all the facts, this should not be held against her and that house.

THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure what the government is actually asking at this point. I can't imagine this -the initial appearance, and all, looked like it was before
Judge Brown. I've known Judge Brown most of my adult life.
I can't imagine that she didn't carefully go over with
Mrs. Allegra what the repercussions could be if she violated
the order. I'm sure there is a transcript some place that
would actually show that. So I don't understand how she can
conceivably have thought she could go ahead and put this on
the market. But -- and I can't imagine her attorneys telling

her that she could do that. But I don't know if the 1 government is actually seeking forfeiture of any assets at 2 this point. 3 MR. OTLEWSKI: Your Honor, what we are asking for 4 is what we asked for at the change of plea hearing, which is 5 that the defendant, his bond be revoked today. 6 THE COURT: Yeah, that's a different story. But 7 we'll talk about that in terms of the sentencing. 8 Let's go on. 9 MR. STEINBACK: Thank you, your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Okay. Who wants to speak? Apparently 11 all of you. 12 One second. Your Honor, one other MR. GENSON: 13 thing, there were two briefs -- mitigation briefs filed on 14 behalf of defendant. 15 THE COURT: Correct. 16 MR. GENSON: With regard to the second brief, the 17 one that was filed by Mr. Steinback and Ms. Gurland, we would 18 wish to withdraw at least the nature -- the nature -- the 19 first part of the brief that talks about the nature of the 20 brief; or perhaps we would withdraw the whole brief. And 21 with regard to those portions that are relevant, we can have 22 Ms. Gurland state that in her -- in her part of the 23 presentation. 24 THE COURT: All right. So you want to withdraw

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done in his life. Jeffrey is going to talk about other aspects of 3553.

But I would point out to your Honor that the facts as set out in the government's brief, and I assume the facts he is going to set out in his argument, are pretty much un-rebutted. He did what he did, and it was a terrible thing he did. It was, in fact, opposite the life that he has led. And what we're trying to show and bring in to your Honor is purview and emphasize the person and the family he has, the circumstances of his family, the blameless record he had. His accomplishment in the community as a pilot, his charity, his charity that set out, as we set out and will be set out by Ms. Gurland, the letters that were offered on his behalf. And all of this we hope will mitigate as best it can be mitigated the offense committed.

This is an exceptional case and exceptional circumstances. Your Honor is going to hear about Mrs. Allegra and her health situation. You are going to hear about the close relationship and the relationship they have with regard to their child, he has with regard to his child. And we hope that, when you hear all this -- and I know a good deal of it was set out in the briefs that were filed. We hope that when you hear all this, your Honor is going to consider -- consider a significant drop in what the guidelines say.

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Now, the guidelines say on the bottom I think 70 to 84 months, or whatever. But the point of the matter is I think the recommendations of the probation person in this case were initially 60 months when they were higher, and I believe they are at this point 48 months. And I would think that you might -- your Honor will consider even lowering it lower than that.

And I am -- I was tasked with arguing -- when I was told what I was supposed to say with arguing a question of the guidelines. That doesn't matter anymore. The nature of the offense is set out in the case. The fact of the matter is, it's a man who never did a thing wrong in his whole life, who basically got put into the position where he just lost control. And as a result of losing control, he committed a crime here. The crime here that's charged specifically talks to an attempt to bring drugs from one place to another. It never was consummated, but that's what we're charged with. There is going to be, I guess, statements by the government relative to his prior relationship with the people in this case. We recognize that. We understand that we don't -- we don't give you excuses about it, but I think with a man of his age and his situation, with regard to his wife, with regard to his child, that your Honor hopefully will consider those facts in order to go below the recommendation of the probation person.

In light of that, I'm going to have Mr. Steinback and then Ms. Gurland give to your Honor their summaries and their position relative to the case.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. STEINBACK: Your Honor, I'm grateful for the opportunity to address the court. The first issue that I'd like to address is in connection with 3553(a)(6) concerning the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. And while we do not have multiple defendants in this case, we have a related case referenced on Page 2 of the pre-sentence report with respect to an individual by the name of Aurelio. His case is pending before Judge Tharp as a plea of guilty that has been entered. No sentencing has been yet imposed. I'm familiar with the sentencing provisions and recommendations contained in that plea agreement. And I would like to address both that, as well as the government's general comments with respect to the need to avoid unwarranted disparity as they argue it in Pages 4 through 6 of the memo.

Your Honor, in the government's discussion, they have cited the Supreme Court decision in *Gall*, G-a-l-l, for the proposition that, while the guidelines are merely advisory, they still remain the starting point and initial benchmark. And we certainly have no dispute with that. It has become the understood framework for all sentencings in

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the federal system, and certainly in this circuit. The fact, however, is that Gall goes a great deal farther than that in saying that, while they are the initial benchmark, they are by no means presumed to be reasonable, nor may a court presume them to be reasonable. Gall specifically said that, as your Honor is well aware, each court must make an individualized assessment. Each court must, what it was characterized in Gall, undertake the uniform and constant federal judicial tradition for sentencing judges to consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that result in the commission of any given offense. The District Court sentencing in Gall is one of the premiere illustrations of the application of these various principles. And the resulting sentence imposed after that sentencing hearing reflects that individualized assessment. Gall was an individual who participated in an ongoing drug conspiracy. The drug conspiracy that was being distributed was ecstasy. Gall had originally been a long-time user of -- well, continual user of drugs: Ecstasy, cocaine, marijuana. his responsibility in the conspiracy was to pick up quantities of ecstasy from one of the suppliers and distribute them to other co-conspirators, who in turn sold them to consumers. Gall was involved in this conspiracy for about seven months. And he was held accountable under the

guidelines solely for the amount of ecstasy he personally picked up from one place and distributed to another, which was found to be at least 2500 grams. *Gall* had only a minor record. He had a prior possession of marijuana, maybe a speeding ticket, but nothing significant. And his resulting guideline range was 30 to 37 months.

In our case, your Honor, we have a 62, I think soon and at the end of August to be 63-year-old, non-violent first offender who was neither a source for drugs, nor had he been a distributor of them. Now, I make great care to derive the facts that I reference here from documents that were received from the government, arguments made by the government, or the plea agreement itself, in which there are stipulated facts. Also in connection with the safety valve proffer, which I was party to by way of telephone. So those are the sources of my facts.

The connection to drugs that Eddie spoke about briefly, and I have no doubt will be discussed in much more detail by Patrick, arose through individuals, clients, who hired Bob as a pilot to fly them from one point to another. He generally makes his living doing that, and he does so for a fee. In these cases, the people who were involved in drugs came to be known to him as people being involved in drugs, and he had an arrangement with them, as I understand it, and I'm taking this from the government's recitation of facts and

stipulations, that some of the people for whom he flew one place to another were transporting large sums of money, which he -- which he, Bob, knew to constitute drug proceeds. And in those cases, he would hire -- he would charge a flat fee, and there would be some percentage, apparently, six or seven percent, of the amount of money that was transported as his fee. The government says, in a nutshell, Mr. Allegra was a pilot, and this is my paraphrasing from their brief, who helped individuals transport large sums of money and did so on the basis of the amounts charged. In this way, the government makes clear Mr. Allegra assisted others in their narcotics trafficking activities.

Now, the only instance that I'm aware of from anything that's been provided in which drugs themselves were ever to be contemplated for transportation by Bob Allegra was the instance that is charged here and gives rise to the charge of possessing with intent to distribute. And as I understand it, the source for those drugs was not Bob Allegra or someone Bob independently arranged. And if and when those drugs ever were transported to a location that they were intended, they would be removed and distributed by people that were not arranged by Bob Allegra. But Bob Allegra did, and I give my own understanding of how and why that happened, agree, in that particular instance, while dealing with people that he did not know to be confidential informants or

undercover agents, to distribute an amount of drugs which he believed he was led to believe existed, which never, in fact, existed. And when Eddie says it never happened it's because there were not really any drugs. Mr. Allegra was confronted at the time that he was going to make that flight with, I believe, heavy bags filled with what he perceived to be drugs, which, in fact, were filled with just waste of some sort.

In other words, unlike Brian *Gall*, Bob Allegra had, and I repeat this because I think it is an important distinction, no independent source or sources for drugs. No customers for drugs. And he, himself, was not a drug user. Now, when Brian *Gall* left the conspiracy that he was involved in, he went back to school. The rest of the conspiracy carried on and the co-conspirators carried on, and it was several years later that *Gall* was charged and then later sentenced for his involvement with the ecstasy conspiracy. And in ensuing years, he was found to have led a law-abiding life. He ceased his illegal use of drugs, went on to gainful employment and start his own business and generally demonstrated some significant rehabilitation.

The Supreme Court in *Gall* noted, just like in this situation, that *Gall*, like Bob, was not an organizer, leader or manager; that his offense not involve the use of weapons, nor did it contemplate the use of any violence or the threat

and use of any violence. And, like *Gall*, Bob and Carolyn will address this, I'm not going to repeat those things, has been an individual who worked hard his whole life and who had founded businesses that were not predicated on drug monies but predicated on hard, honest work. Both *Gall* and Bob Allegra have an extraordinary work ethic. And I think the letters that -- and other comments that Carolyn are going to make will address that.

The last similarity between Brian *Gall* and Bob Allegra I wish to raise is the fact that each of them had conversations with the government about their own misconduct, fully acknowledging what they had done. But in the words of the Supreme Court in *Gall's* case, his evidence was not useful because he provided no new information to the agents.

In our pre-sentence report, in Bob's case, in Paragraph 13, Bob participated in a safety valve interview, at which time he admitted his conduct in its entirety with respect to the charged offense, as well as the related matters. I have a copy of the report of that particular interview. It is -- it comports with everything I understand that the government alleges, whether specifically in connection with the days involved in this particular purported delivery, or any of the other background information he acknowledged and admitted to it. But as noted by the probation officer, and also I believe one of the case

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agents, while Bob admitted his conduct in the instant offense, he did not provide any other significant information useful to this investigation. He and Gall were in the same situation. The probation officer further notes that Bob was cooperative with her during the pre-sentence interview.

So there you have the situation between Gall cited by the government and also by us in our brief. And those specific facts which are obviously cited by me because I believe they have a great deal to do --

THE COURT: Wait a minute. I thought you told me I was going to disregard that brief and you were withdrawing it.

MR. STEINBACK: No, not that brief, the previous brief.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STEINBACK: The fact is that we are talking about fairly similar situations. Gall had an argument going for him that he was a young fellow when he got involved in this. Bob, as I say, going to be 63. And there are arguments about the indiscretions of younger people, and there are many arguments that concern the lack of likelihood of recidivism the older one gets. The likelihood that a 63-year-old man who has gone through what Bob has gone through will offend again, while we may have endless disagreements about that, but it's as close to nil as anybody 1 could predict.

THE COURT: Except in this case his crimes took place when he was 60.

MR. STEINBACK: His -- there has been about two years and four months since the last -- since he was confronted, and there has been nothing whatsoever thereafter that remotely relates to drugs or anything like that.

So in addition to decades before he ever met these fellows who were in the drug business and the two-and-a-half -- not quite two-and-a-half -- years since he was confronted about his misconduct here, he has a Criminal History I for a very good reason. That's where he properly and appropriately belongs.

He has a ticket, which is the subject of something that was before your Honor and before I was involved in this case. He has nothing that would suggest that he ever again is going to do anything other than keep his nose to the grindstone and continue to work hard.

I think it is important at this point to make clear that because somebody has amassed what others would regard as wealth -- a very substantial house, expensive automobiles and a sizable income -- does not mean that they derived it through illegal means. He bought his businesses through honest, hard work. I, since I have known him, have had to reschedule probably a half dozen meetings because last-minute

calls came in where he needed to drive or fly somebody from one place to another, and he just flat out needed the money. Pre-sentence report in the case reveals an extraordinarily handsome monthly cash flow. You look at this year's income, a combination of word getting around about his situation in the case before your Honor, and other major clients unrelated to these fellows, confidential informants, getting older, not needing his services, just in the natural attrition of certain significant clients, his -- his base business has gone from something that would be the envy of almost all of us to something that is more often in the negative. I don't have the specifics on that, but I saw his year-to-date numbers, and the reversal in his business form is staggeringly negative.

and he has earned significant sums of money and he has invested as wisely as he knows, he built up businesses, should not be a factor held against him any more than someone's poverty should be an excuse for something. We have an issue that we need to deal with with respect to greed and the allegation that this was all purely done for the sake of greed. I want to address that a little bit later. But if you look at the objectives, you say, all right, he has got this wonderful home that maybe would have a million dollars in equity, and he has got these monies in the bank, although

most of those cash amounts have been depleted. But, 1 nonetheless, he has good businesses. He had a very expensive 2 car. I should say to your Honor that that vehicle, a 3 Bentley, I believe, is subject to and will be forfeited. 4 THE COURT: He has a few Mercedes, too, I see. 5 MR. STEINBACK: All of which were -- no one 6 suggests were obtained any -- by any other means but through 7 honest, hard work and legitimate monies. 8 THE COURT: Okay. So you can address the greed 9 10 issue. MR. Steinback: I'm sorry? 11 THE COURT: So you'll address the greed issue, 12 then, since he had all this money? 13 MR. Steinback: Yes, I will. What I wish to say, 14 and I think it important to emphasize, there is no -- there 15 is no lack of drive, effort, or is there any sense of 16 entitlement that Bob Allegra has ever indicated to me. I 17 know that Eddie Genson has known him socially and has the 18 same impression I do. If the phone rings and you have the 19 opportunity to fly somebody from here or there, you take it. 20 You don't know when it's going to ring again. And that's 21 life and that's business. And those are the obligations he 22 has. And there are other things that will weigh into that. 23 But he is a -- I've seen it. I've been privy to it. I guess 24 you could say I've been part of it in the sense that I've had

to reschedule with him because Thursday comes around, we're supposed to meet Friday, he got a call last minute, he is going to take somebody from Newark to Newark and then some place else in Oklahoma, and he is going to be gone the weekend. And that's who he is and how he is. And it's an apology, but, I've got to go.

Now, that's not the behavior of an entitled individual who sits back and says, they come to me, and I charge them whatever I want, and I've got all this -- this money that's sitting around. I don't need to work anymore. Sixty-three, he works as hard as anybody I know.

Now, the prosecution talks again, and I want to go back to unwarranted disparities because the -- they talk about it in terms of the fact that the guidelines provide, in the prosecution's view, the best way to avoid sentencing disparity. They cite Booker in support of that view. We also cite Booker in the original brief, not the one we've withdrawn. And Booker, of course, as everyone knows, practices in this area, is also the very case on which the Supreme Court determined that mandatory application of the guidelines is unconstitutional. And the unwarranted disparity doctrine, which the government speaks of, really begins to look a little bit like contending for a rule that would require extraordinary circumstances to justify a downward departure. And that's something that was explicitly

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rejected in *Gall*. *Gall* said that, to do so, would be to come too close to creating an impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the guideline range.

The prosecution's second reason for urging your Honor to consider the guidelines heavily is because the guidelines are a byproduct of empirical study. And I know that to be the case because for two years I sat on a board that was one of the many advisory boards to the guidelines and the sentencing commission. I testified before them on a number of occasions. The rationale that somehow because there is some empirical evidence with respect to most of the guidelines, not all, including the drug guidelines, by the way, pointed out in Gall, but the fact that, for the most part, there is empirical evidence that helps to come up with a rationale is very much like a mathematical formula, which, in fact, the guidelines are. The application of a two-access grid on which an effort is made to try to figure out in relatively tight ranges where an individual should be sentenced. That formula, likewise, in Gall was rejected because it says that it relies on a percentage of a departure as the standard for determining the strength of the justification required for a specific sentence. And that is something that courts should not do.

So while the empirical evidence and objectivity is one factor, it is by no means the factor. 3553(a) and its

various subsections make it perfectly clear that the standard by which one is sentenced is to be sentenced to a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary, which is borrowing and putting into words the rule of lenity, rule of parsimony. When we are talking about liberty, we are talking about erring on the side of caution at all times. And if there was ever a doubt about the lack of empirical evidence, Gall itself says, notably, not all the guidelines are tied to empirical evidence. For example, the sentencing commission departed from the empirical approach when setting the guideline range for drug offenses, the very offense that we're dealing with in this particular case.

And so that empirical study, to the extent it has any sway whatsoever, certainly doesn't have any in drug offenses, where they deferred instead to Congress, doing the best they could to tie their guidelines to the mandatory minimums and to work as hard as they could to keep within those. Not to say, and I know this firsthand, that the commission or all of the commissioners are necessarily happy about that effort. Many of them are not and have been outspoken against it. But, nonetheless, it remains the standard by which drug tables are enacted, not empirical. data.

Now, Gall ultimately received probation. I obviously spent the time I did because it was important to

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find a case we both cite on which we both can find things that work pro and against us, but ultimately in which an individual who knowingly involved himself in the actual distribution on an ongoing basis of a very substantial amount of ecstasy and distributed it to others who then further distributed it to the end users, that individual was deemed to be worthy of and, in fact, received probation. Now, the appellate court disagreed, but the Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the District judge and affirmed the District judge's determination that probation was a reasonable determination in that case.

Now, every case stands on its own bottom. We could debate all day long the nuances between precision of what happened in Gall and what happened here with Bob. And I'm not trying to advocate that there is a one-to-one parallel. I would be wrongheaded to try to do so. But what I am trying to say with respect to Gall is that it happens. It happens in drug cases, that probation-type of a sentence is imposed and deemed appropriate by the Supreme Court of the United States. And no one has questioned the authenticity, validity or strength of the determinations that Supreme Court made in Gall. If anything, they had been furthered and advanced, particularly along the lines of individual sentencing.

Now, one of the most noteworthy aspects in the prosecution's discussion with respect to the need to avoid

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unwarranted disparity is something that wasn't mentioned in their analysis or argument, but something that was discussed at length in *Gall*. And that is this: The prosecutor in *Gall*, the decision cites the transcripts, at least parts of them, where prosecutor is arguing, do not give defendant, *Gall*, probation, your Honor. A co-defendant, who is similarly situated to him in terms of culpability, received a 36-month sentence. And in light of that alone, probation is not an appropriate consideration. And there was more to his argument, but that was the essence of it.

And the sentencing Judge -- the co-defendant in that case name was Jodar (phonetic). The sentencing judge said, well, you might be roughly culpable, but there are other considerations that are involved, one of which is that Gall, the young man, and Gall left the conspiracy to go back to school and then went on to lead a law-abiding life. And those are things which that judge, and ultimately the Supreme Court, embraced and said that, by itself, warrants upholding the reasonableness of the District court's decision.

Reversing the Appellate Court's determination, which was effectively attempting to substitute its judgment for the sentencing judge to say, no, the sentencing judge is well within its discretion to make that determination. And it didn't have to do so on a mathematical, tied-directly-to-the-guideline basis. It did so on the basis

of considering the facts and circumstances of that individual's life. The same thing that Carolyn will point out in more detail to your Honor.

The other thing that I think is worthwhile to discuss is that the -- when we look at what the government is in terms of the agreement, it has not been -- there is no sentencing on it, the plea agreement was entered, and I suppose it has been delayed by agreement so that whatever cooperation Aurelio agreed to enter into would continue and he would be sentenced at the conclusion of whenever that ended. I don't know for certain, but having been on the other side of things, I know that that's generally a policy for people who cooperate. And Aurelio did cooperate.

But I ask your Honor to please consider this: That the facts in Aurelio's plea agreement demonstrated that, between approximately 2003 and 2010, Aurelio was involved in continual drug dealings. He didn't just deal cocaine, he also dealt marijuana, and there was one other substance. In fact, there was a fairly complicated determination resorting to the rules of 3(d) in which you make everything equivalent to marijuana, and ultimately the equivalency of marijuana was something like 11,000 plus kilos, or an overall guideline base offense of 36. The guy was also charged additionally with another involvement, I'm not sure because the people are not identified by name, but by either letter or number to an



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additional conspiracy involving additional drugs. And the sum total of the drugs that this individual dealt with throughout his career as a long time, longstanding, substantial drug peddler, importer, dealer with significant sources, caught up in a hard-working investigation into international importations involving, apparently, a Mexican cartel, was that he got arrested, and he did the smart thing with himself, and he determined to cooperate. And I don't know the length, breadth or scope of his cooperation, but I know that entailed Bob Allegra. And he told Bob -- the government the things that he and Bob had done, which were essentially that Bob flew money which Bob understood was drug money, and that he charged a particular fee for that. And it was -- the reason that I bring this up in this fashion because I'm having a hard time getting my arms around the fact that a career drug trafficker, importer, who apparently dealt with some of the higher levels, in huge, mass-accumulated quantities, who, according to the government's plea agreement stipulations controlled transportation, whether it be by plane or by truck, controlled the storing a particular business that the drugs were from time to time stored, and did a variety of other coordinations, although not held accountable as a manager, nonetheless held accountable as someone who is deeply involved. And for this individual, the recommendation,

according to the plea agreement, provided he continues to 1 cooperate, and he would be absolutely out of his mind not to, 2 that he gets 50 percent off the low end of his guideline 3 range, at least in part for cooperating against the pilot 4 that flew some of his money. We know he didn't fly his money 5 from 2003 to 2010, or whenever it was. He didn't, 6 apparently, have much if anything to do or even know of one 7 another then. 8 THE COURT: How did they meet? 9 MR. STEINBACK: I'm sorry? 10 THE COURT: How did they meet? 11 MR. STEINBACK: I think they met -- and I'm not 12 absolutely certain about this. I think they met because Bob 13 is a pilot and Bob meets lots of people. And at some point 14 you come to realize that, hey, these guys are not on the up 15 and up, and then you step over that line, say, I'm going to 16 continue to fly them any way, and I'm going to make some 17 extra money on it. 18

MR. GENSON: Your Honor?

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MR. STEINBACK: And I may be --

MR. GENSON: He met him at an auto dealership that he used to do car sales for.

MR. STEINBACK: Okay. I stand corrected.

MR. GENSON: The auto dealership introduced that man to him, the owner of the auto dealership.

They allege him

MR. STEINBACK: So the point I'm trying to make is 1 this with respect to this, your Honor, the government thinks 2 that a 67-month sentence, 67-and-a-half month sentence, is 3 appropriate for a career drug dealer who they identify, and 4 the defendant there, Aurelio, stipulates, is, in fact, 5 someone who was involved in a seven or eight-year conspiracy 6 and then involved in another two-or-three-year conspiracy and 7 involved in thousands of kilos of different quantities of 8 drugs, buying them from sources, distributing them to other 9 sources, coordinating their importation and their 10 transportation and their storage, and that that's a fair 11 sentence for him. And we've got a guideline sentence of 70 12 to 87 months. And the government is talking in terms of at 13 least your Honor considering a guideline sentence. To me, 14 the staggering aspect of the need to avoid unwarranted 15 disparity is the one that was ultimately pointed out but 16 missed in the government's discussion, which is the avoidance 17 of unwarranted disparity by imposing similar sentences on 18 dissimilarly situated individuals. The belief that because 19 he has got 67 months coming to him that Bob should get 20 something like that. That's apples to oranges, no matter how 21 much I try to give the government credit for the strongest 22 arguments they can make about Bob's wrongdoing. He was not a 23 dope source. He was not a dope distributor. That's not what 24

he did, not what they even allege him to do.

to have assisted drug dealers by knowingly flying their money around. Now, that is not something I expect your Honor to give him any sympathy or credit for. It is why he pled guilty, and he acknowledged it, and why he proffered to the government in his safety valve proffer and acknowledged again his wrongdoing and did so down-the line. And there is not going to be dispute with respect to the facts. They are what they are. And my respect for Patrick is such that, if I have minimized in the slightest, I'm sure he will point it out. I was not involved in this case from the beginning, but I have studied the transcripts, and I have studied the information such as I've been able to master it.

So the need to avoid unwarranted disparity thrusts both ways. It is both the need to avoid unwarranted disparity where someone gets a hefty sentence and someone gets a very light sentence, and the need to avoid unwarranted disparity where people get similar sentences for very different conduct.

Now, the other thing that I'd like to discuss, and I think is important, it has to do, your Honor, with an argument made by the government, which is that there are, in the government's words, I'm quoting here from their brief at Page 7, their sentencing memorandum, "There are no explanations or mitigating factors for defendant's Bob's behavior that would allow this court to sentence him to a

below guideline sentence."

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I read that many times. And I kept, wound up -- I kept scratching my head. There is no mitigating circumstances? He is not a non-violent, 63-year-old first offender? He is not someone who has worked his whole life from nothing to something based on honest, hard-working ethic? He is not somebody who has done the hundreds of decent and kind things that he has done that reflect on his character? The thing that is missing from that particular conclusion is that we do not just sentence crimes, we sentence the people who commit them. And that has been translated directly into the statute, 3553(a), to say courts shall consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the offender, and one is not promoted above the other. They stand side-by-side in the statute. And the strength of the history and circumstances of an individual in simplest terms can trump the nature and circumstances of the offense. And the case that I want to just briefly reference in relationship to that is case of United States vs. Warner, Ty Warner. Two years ago --

THE COURT: I know about that case.

MR. STEINBACK: Your Honor knows that case. And in that case the -- and the Seventh Circuit observed this, the sole basis for the departure from 46 to 57 months was the

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nature of the individual's charitable good works. no mitigation in the sense the government references in that case either. The defendant was a multibillionaire who got caught using a shell corporation to siphon off several millions of dollars, and without penalties or interest, wound up owing \$5.6 million. And, by the way, I've read that decision a number of times. I can't find a single explanation as to why that happened. It's not in there. May well have existed and been understood in the case, but it didn't seem to drive the issue. The issue was this individual, for a good portion of his life, had done charitable good works, many of them anonymously, not seeking attention, with the good fortune that he made in his business life and that that made him, in the court's mind, unique in that respect. And it was solely by virtue of his generosity that the panel opinion said, we are going to affirm the sentence of probation that was imposed on that individual and did not get sidetracked by saying, what's a billionaire doing -- using a Swiss bank account to cheat on his taxes? And I make that point not because your Honor is unfamiliar but because of the startling bright, neon light shining on the issue of history and characteristics and the strength of the mitigation that can emanate therefrom, notwithstanding a serious offense and one that the Seventh Circuit found to be not unreasonable.

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So now I think it important to tie in my discussion concerning relative perceptions of wealth and what happened. And this is my own take on it. I've talked to Bob Allegra. I've talked to Lisa Allegra. I tried to understand what made him cross that line, sink below the Plimsoll line and agree to this proposal by Aurelio to transport these drugs. What was it?

THE COURT: What about the money before? I mean, it's not like this was the one and only time.

MR. STEINBACK: No, and that's -- to the extent that there was an implication of that and other things in that brief that we withdrew, that's out. That's not -that's not what we contend here. What we're contending here is that, yes, he did bad things when he made that decision. Sort of say, look, that's your business. If I can make some extra money on it, I'm going to. That was wrong. And it's serious. (But it's not drug trafficking.) Without the individuals who are flying with him, he doesn't know how to set up sources or where to distribute these drugs. And the government doesn't allege that he does. And there is a quantum leap in the levels of misconduct between assisting others in doing something that's very wrong and in the process doing something very wrong yourself and being the force behind it generating that wrongdoing and that opportunity. He wasn't the generator of that opportunity.

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He took advantage of it. He was wrong to do so. That's his crime.

He did it on a number of occasions. I don't know exactly how many. The government says five or six, I think. Maybe there is more, maybe there is an approximation. So I'm not saying this is a one-off. I'm not saying that at all. I'm not saying he shouldn't face consequences for what he determined to do. And I'm certainly not saying that he hasn't already.

Now, you say about a wealthy man. Well, you lose a Bentley, buy another one. What's the big deal? Well, that Bentley, for example, because it's a part of this case, is to be forfeited, it's worthy of some discussion. That Bentley was pretty much leveraged to the hilt. Didn't have much equity in it, the subject of seizure two years and four months ago. And Bob has taken the responsibility to maintain the asset every month for the last 28 months, some astronomical sum per month, knowing that the car is not his. Knowing the responsibility is his to maintain it until ultimately it's forfeited. Knowing that he doesn't have the ability to drive it or have it, you've got to pay for it. And a person who works hard can drive whatever they want. They have that right. Personally, I think all cars are just hunks of tin to get you from A to B. But I know a whole lot of friends who feel very differently about that.

Bentleys. 2

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THE COURT: Probably most of them aren't driving

MR. STEINBACK: No, but most of them hadn't worked as hard or hadn't been as successful in business as Bob Allegra. And he bought this Bentley because, in part, many of the high-line people who he legitimately flew from Points A to B were big deals, relatively speaking. Socialites and major athletes and people who have some name recognition. And you impress those people by showing up in such things. And it was worthwhile for him to pay that to purvey that image, going first class with a first class guy. That was the whole idea behind it. It wasn't: Everybody is going to see how wealthy I am by driving this thing. Those people who were important to maintain his business were going to see that. He has lost that, and he has lost a whole lot more besides it. He has lost an immeasurable amount of business. And I'm not saying it's not self-inflicted, but it doesn't make the loss sting any less.

And now I need your Honor to get to the point with respect to what it is that occurred in Bob's life that ultimately I think, in my view, led to this decision which brought him here to your Honor, which was the agreement, ultimately, to transport what he was led to believe was a large quantity of drugs.

There are statements that I've pulled out of

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letters that I've asked Bob to put together for me, or statements that Bob has shared with me, or that Lisa Allegra had shared with me. And they relate to something that involves money but isn't entirely about how much money one can make, but whether one's life is being turned around by virtue of what it is that they've done. Now, I ought to be specific.

Mrs. Allegra, in her own right, had been an extraordinarily successful woman. A trader who made a lot of money and had done well. They met late in life. Bob married for the first time at the age of, I think, 52 and waited until he found what he perceived to be the perfect woman in every way. Companion, wife, hopefully mother of a child one day, however late in life. And a series of bad luck, bad timing, bad health, combined in a way that uniquely cost Lisa Allegra her bearings in life, her equilibrium. And this is a quote from Robert. "I was watching my wife have a nervous breakdown. She lost her job. She didn't know how or why or where she was going to be able to take care of her son. She lost her identity. She had always been independent and capable, and suddenly it was just lost."

Another comment: I would rather be dead than watch my wife crying and shaking like she was. I have no idea why I ultimately agreed to fly the drugs. I knew that -- summarizing -- was a bad guy and this was wrong thing to do.

But maybe I could say that I had a sale of an airplane. 1 Because he brokered airplanes, and he made money doing so 2 legitimately. Maybe I could come back from this illegal deal 3 and say I had a legal deal and look, honey, we have a 4 success, just made 180,000 on this sale and things are 5 better, they really are. We're going to be better. 6 bath we took down in Florida with that property and all that 7 money we lost in 2008, things are going to turn around. 8 Business is going to pick up for you. You're going to make 9 it in the real estate area. Your health is going to improve. 10 Her diabetes is the most severe kind, and it's almost 11 uncontrollable. No matter how hard doctors work at trying to 12 find a balance in her pancreas, they're not successful in 13 being able to do so, to the point where she is susceptible of 14 passing out just about anywhere. And that is a frightening 15 reality to live with. And it has only gotten worse over 16 time. You wouldn't know it by looking at her, but it is a 17 cruel, harsh reality. Health is the most precious thing we 18 have. And I'm here to tell you, when it starts to leave, it 19 hurts, and it scares you. And all sorts of other things can 20 happen: Depression, anxiety. Just all-and-all fear. 21 And Lisa Allegra was scared all the time. She was 22 angry all the time. Angry at herself. Misplaced anger 23

directed at her husband. If he was out there succeeding,

that meant she was failing. Couldn't see it in any other