

Cybersecurity For the Water Industries



PRESENTER

Jason Rayle

OT Solution Specialist

Intro to IIoT

OVERVIEW

Overview

- Oldsmar Water Plant Hack
- Cybersecurity in Operational Technologies
 Background
 - OT/IT Network Structure Basics
 - Types of attacks
 - Basic
 - Advanced
- Planning a Multilayered Protection

Intro to IloT

Oldsmar, FL Hack



EVENTS

February 5, 2021 / Beawhours Later Operator notices the recorse consideratories the switcher which the singvitgatile gates and estimates that a creen. Subjectivities have estimated by the soldium by stemaide change from 100 to 11100 ppm and realizes that this was not a Supervisor, but someone who was trying to do harm.

Oldsmar, FL Hack



Cybersecurity

Investigation Discoveries

2017 Compilation of breaches included 11 pairs of credentials

Feb 2 Compilation of breaches included 13 pairs of credentials

All computers were unsupported Windows 7 (32 bit) operating software

Team Viewer was the remote access software

All remote access shared the same password

OT Network Basics

Old Infrastructure- Lower Risk

- Isolation
- Manual processes for data collection and operations
- Unique Protocols


New Infrastructure- Higher Risk

- Connected processes
- Increased automation
- Universal Protocols (e.g., Modbus)
- Remote access
- Business integrations

OT Network Basics

Risk Factors

- Connected Systems and Devices
- Common methods of communication
 - Protocols
 - Network Structure and Components
- Increased number of domestic and foreign activity
- Advanced tools for attackers



OT/IT Network Basics

Enterprise System

Enterprise Network / DMZ

Business Operations Network

DMZ

Operations System


Control Room


Local HMI


PLCs and Device Controllers


Field I/O Devices - Instrumentation












SCADA Security Features





Types of Attacks: Basic

Brisitlet Fiont Bed Saccess

- Using autsegriamlesoneteeseptordsect assignmentscool by attionsy of adminance and passwords until
- Accessing access of a system that you do not have permission to be in. Even when you have credentials for a system.

APTs - Advanced Persistent Threats

- State or state sponsored
- Go undetected for extended periods

The Advanced Threat Lifecycle






Spear Phishig

- E-mail or electronic communications attack
- Used to steal data or deliver malware
- Targeting a specific person or organization


SQL Injection


- Interferes with queries by an application
 - Delete or manipulate data



DDoS -Distributed Denial o Service

• Perpetrator makes a machine or application unavailable.





MITM – Man in the Middle

 Attacker makes two parties believe they are talking directly, but the attacker is controlling the conversation to gain intel

Multilayered Protection Plan

Defense in Depth (DiD)


Risk Management

Physical Security

Security Monitoring

Vendor Management

Personnel Readiness and Compliance




Identify Threats: Asset Inventory/Survey

- What asset (information) needs to be protected?
- Why does the asset need to be protected?
- Who has the responsibility for managing and protecting the asset (what are the roles, responsibilities, accountabilities and authorities)?
- If the threat actor compromised the asset, what realistic worst-case scenarios would result?
- What is the value of the asset?
- What is the criticality of the process or information to the business mission?
- What are the protection levels for confidentiality, integrity, and availability?
- What interconnections are required for the systems to perform?
- What methods are currently available for user access?
- What dependencies are present for system functionality?
- How does the information flow through the system, and through what mechanisms?

Identify Threats: Known ICS Threats

- Insider intentional threats disgruntled employees, vendors, systems integrators or anyone else with internal knowledge or access to the ICS
- Internal unintentional threats inappropriate system design, policies, architectures, procedures, technologies or testing
- External nontargeted threats maliciously designed software viruses and worms
- Malicious actors "black hat" hackers, criminals, and nation states

Identify Threats: Determine Affects



Identify Threats: Identify Controls

- Critical process controls
- Controls that affect personnel or public safety





Identify Threats: Implement Security Controls

- Give priority to "High Impact/High Probability" affected assets
- Consider security controls as in integral part of the system life cycle
- Keep from implementing security controls that may create safety issues or collateral damage

Physical Security




- Reduces risk of accidental or deliberate loss or damage to assets including sider physical protection of cyber components and data as part of the
 - Plant equipment
- ntrols to the type of protection needed.
 - Surrounding community
 - Intellectual property
 - Proprietary data (e.g. process settings)

Physical Security: Physical Access

- Facility access controls
- ICS control and server room access
- Multifactor (for example, key card, card-and-personal identification number (PIN),
- or biometric) authentication for physical access
- Facility monitoring using cameras, motion detectors
- Alerting for device manipulation such as power removal, device resets, cabling changes, or the addition/use of removable media devices
- Visitor escort requirements and procedures.

What we are looking for:

- System changes
- Anomalous behaviors
- Attack signatures





Intrusion Detection System (IDS)



- Creates alarms for traffic outside normal operations
- Based on passive monitoring of network traffic


Intrusion Detection System (IDS)

How it works

Rules are written to monitor network traffic including

- IP source and destination
- Protocols
- Lengths of Packets

Host Intrusion Detection System (HIDS)



Intrusion Protection System (IPS)




- Installed in line with firewalls and ICS equipment
- Blocks traffic that does not meet defined rules


Intrusion Protection System (IPS)

An IPS drawback is that it can stop critical processes if not configured properly.






Multilayered Protection Plan: Vendor Security Management



- Many vendors are aware of the importance of cybersecurity
- Many vendors have incorporated security into products and procedures
- Should not assume that all are implementing security
- The organization should present and address requirements early in the relationship

Multilayered Protection Plan: Vendor Security Management

Supply Chain



Cybersecurity

Aighiofinsatot Ritikgate Risk

- Quantifiap to cense a method every texpresentisom different
- Quatifynthærvendathæquaility control
 - Matingoints of contact and exposure lead
 - touhomgbilitin&coquipgnent
- Unauthorized back door software
- Poor procurement agreements and quality control by the vendor

Multilayered Protection Plan: Personnel Readiness and Compliance

Policies

- Clear and actionable
- Create a framework for rigorous security control procedures
- Outline rules
- Sanctions / Consequences for noncompliance

Multilayered Protection Plan: Personnel Readiness and Compliance

Procedures


- State how personnel should conduct a particular process
- Ensure secure functioning and provide a standard, repeatable means to accomplish a task in a safe manner across the OT space



Multilayered Protection Plan: Personnel Readiness and Compliance

Training

- Personnel should be aware of potential loss and safety threats
- How it identify indications of cyber threats
- How to assist the vendor monitoring and controls
- Understanding that feedback as to how the policies and procedures implemented affect operations is critical for the organization's safety strategy



Multilayered Protection Plan: Security Actions

First Steps

4. Interheinfryentialinisikebased selectenese Hinestevottkappmozed hotos socurreng SCS systems and networks.

2. Mandagethe IGG mad supporting exiting moduli reliability for necessary liehver and supporting a for protocols and interconnections.

Closing Remarks

Control systems will grow more connected

Attacks will happen

All organizations should have an OT Cybersecurity Plan

Many measures are common practice and easy to implement





For more information contact:

Jason Rayle jrayle@pteinc.com 330.692.3506



