

A SOCIAL OPTION

**SUGGESTIONS FOR AN OVERALL
COMMUNITY SOCIAL PLANNING APPROACH
TO THE PROBLEMS OF NORTHERN IRELAND**

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MARCH, 1975

FOREWORD

by

General Sir John Hackett, GCB, CBE, DSO, MC, BLitt, MA, LL.D.

Every conflict situation is sui generis yet none is wholly unique. In each there are elements springing solely from the circumstances which gave rise to and nurtured this particular conflict situation. At the same time there is in every one elements common to situations past and elsewhere present and to situations bound to occur in the future. We should be able to find at least some help towards recovery in Northern Ireland by looking at what has happened and is happening in other places. If the patient recovers in Northern Ireland lessons will have been learned which can be usefully applied in the treatment of similar maladies elsewhere.

The problem in Northern Ireland is essentially a problem of people. It is in their relations with each other, in the family, the street, the village, the country, the community, in their animosities no less than in their alliances, that this malady must be treated. It is, that is to say, a social condition which cannot be corrected by political and economic means alone. What makes recovery immeasurably more difficult is the erosion within the communities of the social structures which have in the past propped up, for better or for worse, the body politic. It is idle to try to bring the communities together when the social fabric within them, of whatever sort they are, has been so tragically damaged. To seek political solutions without attention to this deep-seated malaise is like treating a smallpox epidemic by applying ointment to the sufferers' spots.

Hitherto there has been so little adequate diagnosis of the condition that confidence in the cures prescribed was unlikely to be high. What is offered now, in these papers produced by my friend and colleague, Richard Hauser,

is a deep diagnosis, with suggestions for therapeutic treatment offered within the context of Social Planning. It is based on intimate experience over the past five years with the social scene in Northern Ireland, in large part arising from the work organized by a group of us (principally by Hauser and myself, with much help from Sir Arthur Drew and the American Jesuit Father Ray Helmick), financed by generous help from the National Westminster Bank, the Esmée Fairbairn Charitable Trust and above all the Wates Foundation, and carried out by many willing helpers on the spot, regardless of creed, political affiliation, social standing or anything else. The Churches have been helpful. Loyalists and Republicans can both be found among our local supporters. There are too many of these helpers to name each one but amongst them it is important to mention the Reverend Brian Smeaton and Sean Cooney in Belfast. We have always been grateful for advice and criticism from Paddy Dougherty of Derry. Our work is done at low levels, among the people who are most hurt by what goes on and whose children are growing up in grievous danger. It is undramatic and if it could claim striking results it would almost certainly be on the wrong track. It is concerned less with finding solutions than with restoring confidence, less with giving people what they need than with helping them to look for it themselves.

Everyone who looks at what has been happening to people in Northern Ireland with real compassion, and who would agree that the final and unforgivable error in this unhappy situation is despair, will be likely to read what Richard Hauser has offered here with interest and with hope.

March, 1975

In presenting these discussion papers or plans I want to express my deeply felt thanks to many direct colleagues, Roman Catholics, Protestants and 'outsiders' alike, who have worked, assisted, criticised, resisted, abused and sometimes laughed with me.

I wish to express particular thanks to Oscar van Leer, President of the Van Leer Foundation of The Hague, and to Willem Welling, Executive Director of the Foundation. They have made it possible for me to be completely independent in this paper as in my work in general, which is primarily concerned with the young, though their problems cannot be separated from those of the world around them.

Richard Hauser

21st March, 1975

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The period since the autumn of 1973 has brought about changes in the situation of the United Kingdom that affect Northern Ireland. Most conspicuous among these changes, the attack by the Arab oil-producing countries on the economic structures of the Western nations has had a traumatising effect. This may well turn out to be the greatest favour anyone could do the West, but as a proximate effect it will cut living standards down by something like 10% or 20% in such countries as Britain.

This crunch has hit Britain particularly hard. It will produce a social reshuffling of living conditions which may be done justly or unjustly, and in the latter more likely case will affect especially the poor, the old and the politically vulnerable. This applies to whatever financing goes to Northern Ireland. Anything spent there is in a politically unpopular cause.

The oil crisis and consequent economic disruption only bring into sharper focus what was already becoming obvious, that people no longer believe the old fragmenting status quo will ever reappear. The Arabs have forced us all to a reconsideration. If the scaling down of expenditures is done well, it could be the greatest blessing for the West. The opportunity is thereby created to substitute, before it is too late, a style of life based on intensity and a value content for the ever growing consumption of luxuries and maintenance of an artificial standard of living which in the end produces boredom instead of happiness.

Northern Ireland, having had to face acute crises earlier than the other European countries, has already begun a step before the rest the rethinking and reevaluation. If Northern Ireland can show the rest of us ways of living that need not be built on artificial and commercialised values, then it is indeed an area of pilot experience. Our own programme there attempts to use the techniques of social planning which we have learned through a long and varied experience, with its sub-sectors of social education (knew-how), social planning proper (knew where and when), social value planning (knew why) and the unlearning process (a dismantling of old stereotypes). Since we also work on similar lines in other areas, in Europe and much further afield, where pilot schemes of the greatest importance are undergoing the test, we bring to our own contribution in Northern Ireland a comparative point of view. Our effort is to build new social structures from the bottom up, not from the top down. We therefore see the experience of Northern Ireland, our own experience of it but far more its people's experience during this testing period, as in its entirety a pilot for other conflict and crisis situations which are based on violence and apathy. If the experience as a whole is off success in confronting the crisis and in building the alternative social structures which will make life full, valuable and intensive in the new day, then the Northern Irish will have produced something of surpassing value for Europe and all these other areas that must expect as much or more conflict, crisis and breakdown of institutions and structure before many years have passed.

The Conflict: Typical and Atypical Elements.

While the Northern Ireland conflict has its deep roots in the past, in centuries of at times discrimination, at times outright oppression, of lack of understanding and the manipulation of men's minds by interested parties, with a genuine nationalism both used and misused, still the bulk of the problems encountered there are not atypical for other areas, either in their basic structure or in the expression the conflict takes.

There are of course atypical and distinctive factors, historical and geographical. There is the intertwining of British and Irish history, the deliberate manipulating of the fears of the working class so that this is the first civil war

in our experience fought by the poor against the poor while generally little happens to the rich. There is an extraordinary spiritual impoverishment of the official structures, Church and other, concerned with values. It is also atypical that the population of Ireland has been halved over the last century from over 8,000,000 to 4,500,000. In the 'normal' course, i.e., if Ireland's development had been roughly like Britain's, the population would have risen to something like 20,000,000 over that time. The Southern Irish revolution and establishment of an independent State has incubated for two and a half generations before coming to a boil in Northern Ireland. In the meantime, Southern Ireland has become a comfortable place to live, still emotionally interested in the North but not ready for any major risks. 'The Irish question' for Britain has become at best a bore, at worst an albatross, and the whole affair is enmeshed in a queer hatred/liking. (The best British generals still seem to come all from Ireland.)

It is atypical in the present situation, too, as compared with previous stages of the Irish conflict, that no outstanding leaders have emerged either on the English or the Irish side, like Lloyd George and Churchill, like O'Connell, Parnell and the revolutionaries of 1916. All the same, other conflicts have similar tendencies even if they do not duplicate the particularity of these local factors. The historical side of conflicts is normally the most poisonous part, particularly if people want to repeat the past history. This is to say, in effect, that even the 'atypical' elements in the Irish conflict have their typical aspect.

It has been necessary for us to learn much from other conflicts to come to an understanding of the current Irish situation from a comparative point of view, and we find the Irish conflict in turn just as instructive for the understanding of others. This conflict should have been settled in the 19th century, or at least by 1920. As we look now at the utility cultures that have taken possession on both sides of the now-defunct Iron Curtain and the irrelevance of such borders as these between Belgium and France or France and Italy, the Americanisation and commercialisation of life (a mirror of the Russianisation of life that makes all High Streets look alike), the way that all television becomes stereotyped in order to sell goods for amusement or living, then the enemy of personal living can be seen elsewhere than in the question of what flag flies over the local Woolworth's or IIT.

There are highly typical elements in the Northern Ireland situation as well. If we look at the larger conflict situation of cities, with its apathy and violence, we see that the violence in Northern Ireland, while overlapping with rural violence, presents us a model of what will happen in the big cities of the future, when confrontations like that between the Tupumaros and the Death Squads become commonplace. Typical too is the difficulty between political and military authority in conflict situations. The military sees itself as the most efficient force around, however simplistic and heavy-handed it may appear to some others, but sees the politicians as bumbling and the bureaucrats as mindless paper-eaters. This sort of conflict between the political and military leadership is as true of the insurgent factions of either side as it is of the official government and its military.

A further atypical element is the survival in Northern Ireland of the neighbourhood and extended family structures. This makes Northern Ireland more comparable to the Third World in this particular than to the major conurbations, where the family has fallen apart and the neighbourhood has become hostile. Yet the similarities to other urban situations and conflicts become more and more accentuated as the conflict goes on. One must take care not to overemphasise either the similarities or the dissimilarities.

The most important single factor is the hopelessness, which has to be

fought, but cannot be properly fought except on the most realistic and genuine basis. Nothing could be more demoralising than a hopeful effort which crashes, or is made to look ridiculous by being right but premature.

It is in this context that we have seen the need to work with both communities, but separately. For outsiders to propose solutions to the historical conflict, common effort across the lines of division or the building of bridges is both premature and preposterous. If bridges are to be built it will be when there is reason for them, and it is for the participants to discern these reasons. We offer no solutions, since these must grow out of new conditions, but rather we offer means by which the new conditions can grow.

A political solution in particular, tinkering with new constitutional settlements, will not work unless something has first happened in the spirit. This is what is sick, and clever architecture of political compromise will not heal it. If instead we can help the people directly concerned to build themselves a new mentality, we will have grim and dangerous but potentially valuable allies who will grow faster than the despair and fanaticism, namely the ambivalence of Protestants who feel abandoned by Britain and Catholics who feel abandoned by the Irish of the South.

In looking for a positive rather than a negative outcome of this ambivalence, we see Cyprus as a major landmark. The breakdown in Cyprus last summer is the handwriting on the wall for Northern Ireland. There are many overlapping features between the two situations, far more than the obvious dissimilarities. The trouble in Cyprus is far from over. It gives the example of a division of territory and population, whether it was planned or unplanned, with tragic results. If a Cyprus is to be avoided in Northern Ireland, we believe it can only be if the new mentality that grows from the present ambivalence in all sectors of the Northern Ireland population, not least in the protagonists of the popular struggle in both communities, is solidly based in the common sense of the people, their shrinking from the abyss that is visibly open before them, and above all their innate sense of justice.

Justice.

There are two types of injustice: one that comes from the top down, an institutionalised kind, and another that proceeds from the bottom up. Even if one side in the struggle starts off very idealistically with the proper ideals of justice superimposed on its prejudices, it remains that when they feel (often rightly) that they are attacked then prejudice becomes king and 'law 'n order' its servant.

On the other hand, those who feel suppressed or unjustly treated, especially if they are a minority (as, in this struggle, both sides are in more than one sense), have little or no opportunity to state their case and win their claims. Even if they can state it, people get used to their complaints and take little notice.

What must be learned in Northern Ireland is that suppression of basic matters of human rights produces conditions dangerous to the fundamental social fabric. The lesson is that the principle of 'letting sleeping dogs lie' leads to attacks ultra vires, in short drives the activists among the suppressed into illegal and eventually violent directions as a mixture of revenge and pressure for change. This is normally answered by suppression and counter-violence which can then escalate to a dangerous degree, as each side wishes to outdo the other

in order to force them to act as they wish. Northern Ireland has shown that this is destructive all round, and the long-range destructiveness of it is not yet clearly visible. It denigrates political democracy since, in this as in most similar cases, it fails to be applied with vigour and justice. It gives both sides an intoxicating whiff of acting undemocratically to impose undemocratic structures, whether this is done openly or under the guise of opposition to political or financial corruption. The cry for the strong, silent, decisive and manly leader who will bring about the wondrous new time is in fact the cry for some form or other of dictatorship, some extreme paternalism of the right or of the left. Here the politicians and the political system are used as scapegoats and treated with undue contempt. The facts are often bad enough, indicating grievous mistakes and weakness and omissions in the political leadership, but they can be distorted. This is why it is essential that all the activists have a full chance to participate in the community again. Apart from the psychopaths (whom the activists themselves best know and can best isolate) they should not be left out in the cold or they will become carriers of disease.

The British Army, by tradition, is perhaps the most democratic of all armies, though armies are by their nature feudal, semi-feudal and autocratic. Excellent military leadership has made the Army an overall success in Northern Ireland. Of course one has heard undertones of contempt for the political machine. That too has to be watched, as it would not be 'the Army' as a whole but some of the soldiers or officers who could easily have learned the wrong lesson, namely that those who hold military power can easily reach overall power. Such an attitude is not limited to the regular military, but is at least as much if not much more a danger in the irregular paramilitary forces of both communal sides. It is quite similar on either side, and could easily produce a festering disease, the results of which may not be very early discernible.

Of the positive factors which should or could arise, we see none as more important than the establishment of local human rights centres, which would be invaluable in giving people on the local level real power, understanding and influence based on positive values rather than ancient grievances, to act and further to see that others act after proper deliberation and with understanding. Such centres would be as much a guarantee against injustice (and therefore, eventually, further violence) smoldering along as ever was the old top-level political structure, which should consequently rely on them heavily. The fact that everyone would have recourse, beyond the local human rights centres, to one or two higher levels of a human rights structure and could even appeal, as a safeguard, to the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, would mean they need not feel concerned that those who are prejudiced against them have ultimate decision over them. None, majority or minority, could impose on the other. The Centres would have this character in addition to other functions in producing constructive answers to problems as the people themselves would formulate them. (See the chapter on a 'Community Programme' within.)

We see the need also for special structures of this sort for women, the young, the elderly, etc., always in conjunction with responsibility, so that there would always be far more people carrying, in conjunction with others, the rights of others than there are those whose rights are concretely in danger. Thus those trying to repress others would have to be aware of the danger of being easily found out and the impossibility of suppressing challenge indefinitely, however powerful they may be. Hence we see these Centres as true and powerful constituent factors in an alternative society. The old society in Northern Ireland (as elsewhere) was indeed based on injustice, insofar as basic human rights and responsibilities were not entrenched in the minds and hearts of people and in the basic workings of institutions. Otherwise the catastrophe of Northern Ireland would never have happened.

Justice is too big a matter to leave to lawyers and politicians. It is the responsibility of everyone, not only to discern injustice but also to know in cases of need what to do about it, how to organise and act against it. Hence our constant concern with know-how and know-why in these papers.

The Problem of Failure.

As one goes further and further into a no-man's-land with regard to social conditions, a serious disadvantage lies in the fact that so many formal structures keep breaking down. This affects people in such manners as serious trouble with their youngsters, marriages breaking down, friendships dissolving unhappily, professional efforts in schools and elsewhere producing failures and much of what people do at any level ending up counterproductive. The result is a tremendous feeling of failure, with an inherent tendency to give up, to blame the people one has failed to help, to accuse those around one, often colleagues and friends, and last not least one's own cause or purpose as being unrealistic, unjust or making people unable to cope. This can spread to cynicism and apathetic withdrawal or to attempts at violence through all the forms of social infantilism; sulking and hating like an overgrown child.

This syndrome is particularly dangerous as it is a natural by-product of our times (not only in Northern Ireland), when old systems crack up and the new are just about to be built, but there is too little solid to grasp right now. This is why, on the one hand, conditions will deteriorate considerably, though ups as well as downs are to be expected. Whatever is part of the old society breaking down will in fact break down. Whatever was healthy and vital in the old society will survive if people work concertedly for the new society, because based on true values that will be accepted in the new society. What is new will also sometimes collapse until one finds the right forms and has enough people about who can share in the action.

The rule in this situation must be that to fail is honourable when one has tried hard. To be a failure is most dishonourable and a tragic waste. 'To fail' here means to have tried, to have come to grief, but then hopefully to try again, learning from each failure how to do better and then edging forward. To be a failure means to accept failure, not pick oneself up and try again but settle down to self-pity and accusations. This is true treason to one's own principles and dignity as well as to others.

One must consequently beware of the ex-idealists who have accepted failure. They will hate those who do go on trying and will try to sabotage them consciously or unconsciously. They will commit treason to their own principles, not because the principles have failed but because they have failed the principles. These people are dangerous and can be socially infectious.

The tough lesson here is that in a breakdown society we will all fail and fail again as the old society is failing altogether. This is why it is so difficult to produce little islands of success in the midst of breakdown still based on the old principles. The biggest failure of all would be to conclude that we are incapable of growing up and need super-daddies, who unfortunately would not know any more either.

The failure of the old society has to be countered by planning and structuring of both the visible and the invisible parts of the new society, as we try to suggest and outline here. It cannot be done on a piecemeal level or by any sort of outside or elitist manipulation, but the people who will have to live with the new society must themselves be enabled to build up major societal structures out of their dissatisfaction with the old patterns and willingness to try new ones.

If it must be on the basis of 5, 10 or 15% of the people bringing about the new structures and bringing the others along with them in time, then it must not be on the basis of undemocratic manipulation and imposition, must not be by bullying but by convincing. Then the door will be open, but even then failure will stalk us as we will not know many of the answers. Only if one really knows that what one is building is a new society will people have confidence that they can overcome failure and bring about in their neighbourhoods and communities a new way of life.

It will be particularly important that those who come forward and carry new ideas be healers and not part of the disease. When they fail they must not poison themselves and others with their failure but go on searching for new ways to succeed and continue until they find them. They can then stand up to the sneers of the true failures who have either never tried or have tried and given up after having become truly infected with the disease of failure.

A Third Option.

Observers have claimed often, and especially in recent days, that if the various private armies have now rejected the option of attempting to implement their policies by violence, the only option remaining to them or to any of the other parties seeking a basic improvement and/or change in the Northern Ireland situation is a political one. But everyone knows by now that the regular politicians have not succeeded very well, and that the activists are notoriously poor at the political game.

What we propose in these papers is actually a third option. The growth of new social forms, we say, has actual priority over the political forms and offers a more genuine hope that there will be the substructures in the community that will make a truly democratic development possible. In this social option we believe the activists could and should have a part, but they ought not dominate it. All the rest of the community then shares a responsibility to pull its weight in the development of the new social forms, so that they will not be controlled by those who can be fanatics.

In such a social option, there are visible and invisible elements. There are plenty of earthmovers about who will attend to the physical rebuilding and the visible structures. Our concern in these papers is with what we regard as the much more important part, the mentality and invisible structures that are far more constitutive of a new society.

Things are far too bad in Northern Ireland for there to be any comfort in the thought of simply quieting things down, stopping the violence and going back to sleep. The only thing that can heal the wounds is that something much better happens, in comparison with which the old grievances will have less importance than the new hopes.

In any planning process it is useful to have what we call ladder plans, projections step by step of how the situation could get better or worse. The ladder makes a good image for this process, especially as it is always a necessity to climb up a ladder one step at a time, but in the descent it is easy to fall down the whole way at once.

The bulk of this series of papers will amount to proposals for a painstaking positive ladder plan for Northern Ireland, so it is well to set at the beginning a negative one. Cyprus gives us the model for such a ladder, in which every rung is a step down, making an eventual falling-down inevitable. We see the steps so:

outbreaks of chaos ~~for~~ the precipitate withdrawal of the British Army).

the daily acts of living disrupted.

the British government getting so much pressure from British public opinion that it goes about its withdrawal much as it did in Palestine or in Aden, or as the Belgians did in the Congo, producing a power void in which the paramilitary bodies would race each other to take the first initiative, undertaking major military action.

the other side precipitated into panic action,

a tragic Cyprus-style situation created, in which people who have heard the cry of 'Wolf' so often that they no longer believe it could be tragically caught.

flight, panic, abandonment of property, running for life.

Like Northern Ireland, Cyprus had long-standing religious, ethnic and nationalist conflicts, and a complex interplay of 'big brothers' on both sides. As in Northern Ireland, the Cypriotes waited a long time for the day of real breakdown, possibly believing it would never come. As already in Northern Ireland, people in Cyprus who were neighbours of long standing turned viciously against one another. In Northern Ireland this reaction and the resulting carnage could be far greater as the juxtaposition of Catholic and Protestant areas and sub-areas is greater, the opportunity to flee to safety smaller.

In Northern Ireland as in Cyprus, atrocities would further embitter the existing hostility. There would be a breakdown of the basic physical services, easier to cope with in the summery climate of Cyprus than in a Northern Ireland winter. In Northern Ireland as in Cyprus the religious element, being in fact a part of the ethnic and political picture, has been no help even at a late stage. They have worked, despite the efforts of a few outstanding Church personalities, on the principle of the negative held, holding onto people by negative factors such as the threat of what terrible things would happen to people without the Churches.

It can be expected in Northern Ireland as in Cyprus that the previous political and military masters would withdraw to a minimum damage area, and not interfere other than by a few histrionic humanitarian gestures. As in Cyprus, the hatreds in Northern Ireland which have been deliberately manipulated in the past would have no chance to settle down but would suddenly erupt, poisoning relations for at least two or three generations more, with prejudice, mutual scapegoating and non-understanding (the only good . . . is a dead . . .).

Like Cyprus, Northern Ireland would be ruined, reduced to penury for years to come. Political rehabilitation would take a great number of years, which might be marked by further and worse outbreaks, forcing mass migration just at a period when foreign labourers are least wanted in Europe and the other labour-importing parts of the world. Temporary arrangements would become permanent and nothing allowed to settle down. Decisions about Northern Ireland would be made elsewhere, with even the vestiges of partial independence gone. There would be far-reaching negative results on the mentality and the economic and social conditions of neighbouring or involved countries, the Republic of Ireland and Britain. And eventually a de facto border would have to be recognised somewhere near a natural border. In Cyprus this was the mountains, in Northern Ireland it would likely be the Bann, though this would not spare the carnage in Belfast. The division would make both parts unviable for a long time, and people would be left asking themselves why this had to happen, why nothing was done to avoid it. If anyone emerged as 'victors,' it would only be in the sense that they would have lost just slightly less. There would be no permanent peace but the spectre of further demands made and not answered would continue to haunt the area. The neighbouring states would be drawn in by a vast intensification of the terror bombings that they have already experienced (this last is one factor that has not yet begun in relation to Cyprus). It is conservative to estimate that tens of thousands would be killed or maimed in the breakdown, far more made homeless, jobless.

Alarmist talk is of course no help in a situation such as Northern Ireland's, and we would think it wrong to indulge ourselves in such a gloomy forecast as this if the rest of this sequence of papers had no positive proposals to make, or could point no better course that would really be within the capacity of the people to take. We think there is small realism, though, in the popular imagination, about the real scope of the downward slide facing Northern Ireland. People have a romantic notion of what would happen when 'we fix them,' 'we show them that we can't be pushed around.' People are more concerned about stiffening their determination to stand with their own on the Armageddon day and think too little of what lies beyond. The course of events in Cyprus since the cynical putsch attempt of last summer, an attempt to 'fix things' once and for all, should be vivid in the imagination of everyone in Northern Ireland as a clear sign of the abyss before which they stand themselves.

There are of course differences between the Cyprus and Northern Ireland situations to set alongside these parallels, but they are not relevant to our description. The degree of similarity is uncomfortable, and even Cyprus may not yet be at the bottom. There are still areas in Athens where the grandchildren of refugees from the fighting with the Turks at the time of the First World War still live in deprivation. The camps of the Palestinian refugees are another sign of how the world observes its responsibilities towards refugees. The Biharis of Bangladesh are still not allowed to settle after three generations. They live not as in a home country but in an unwilling host country.

A positive ladder plan has to be built on elements that do not as yet exist. The elements of the present situation are not necessarily the elements of the future. It is not enough in the present situation, with all its ramifications, to insert a new 'fix-it' structure of political organisation. There is need instead for a growing-up process; a deliberate social planning such as has not to the best of our knowledge been attempted anywhere else. New social structures growing up from within the community could overgrow the conflict. The great question is whether in fact these living in Northern Ireland and influencing the situation prefer to reach the depth of despair with the idea that they can begin to build new things only when everything has been smashed. If there is such a death drive, desiring to hurt the other side even if the damage to one's own side is greater than anyone can imagine today, it results from the existing prototypes and stereotypes. For Roman Catholics in Ireland, Britain is still the wicked stepmother. Both Ireland and the Catholic Church are feminine images, creating considerable overlap and confusion as to which

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is the true mother, or whether they can be kept separate. For Protestants, Britain is a father, the Protestant Churches very vague as a mother-figure and the Catholic Church a hostile and threatening anti-mother. Neither Church has been helpful in any significant way in the conflict, often enough the contrary, and the time is running out.

The real fight then is an appeal to the will to live, to courage and common sense. Is there enough life-drive left in Ireland despite all the effort to destroy, with however much courage and readiness to die for one's cause the destruction has been done? There can be no success unless enough positive factors can be produced in the situation. Northern Ireland cannot just step its conflict; it has to find something much better to do. For this we do see some green shoots as evidence of a will to live that matches the will to die, even if it is less spectacular as yet. We find most people in Northern Ireland still too small for this, hence in need of help with unlearning and growth. The smallness is seen in the apathy of the majority on both sides, the violence of small minorities of each, neither finding other ways of expression.

The helplessness felt in Northern Ireland is shared in Britain and the Republic of Ireland, neither of which has been able to offer more than the proverbial toe-little-toe-late, both hoping for some sort of Messiah to come along and do the trick. (There is no Saint Patrick around, and he was apparently an Englishman anyway.)

We see the answer in a slow, painstaking unfolding of a multi-approach social plan. What we ourselves present we see as a point of departure, a matter for discussion, not a final plan or prescription, since the actual content of the plan must come from the people themselves. By presenting this initial plan or hypothesis we hope to stimulate action and a social polarisation on numerous points. There is no single key point; all are important and it is only on a holistic basis that such planning can proceed. The real key is in the mentality, in people's total outlook, the social climate overgrowing the present helplessness. The mentality must grow as the people themselves grow. No kind of change in the external or constitutional circumstances would do any good if the mentality remained as at present. The finest structures that politicians, lawyers and civil servants could concoct would get nowhere in that case. The new mentality can arise as fundamentally a by-product of the other activity itself as the community holistically plans its future, though we can also approach the mentality itself more directly. As such a new mentality takes hold, we would see it as a measure of the planning process's success that the people who have left Northern Ireland during and as a result of the troubles would want to return. There is no excess of population anywhere in Ireland including the North. We see it as an acceptance of defeat when people ask for some period of years' delay before settling the constitutional question in Northern Ireland as a way of giving substantial segments of the population time to emigrate first. But we would ask for time ourselves too, not for that reason but to build up new social structures and a new and healthy social climate and mentality that will attract people back.

We apologise if this presentation seems to suffer often from a long-winded sketchiness, is overdetailed in some places and vague in others. It is only the invitation to the plan, not the plan itself, a point of departure rather than a point of arrival, and as it will need so much participation by everyone in the community to bring about the real planning process we have been at pains to keep the whole framework of the new mentality (what we call value planning) in the foreground as each point is discussed, even at the cost of much repetition. If such a planning process succeeds, as we expect it can, in Northern Ireland where conditions are difficult, then we and all other participants can be consoled that it will work elsewhere as well in less difficult situations and also

in other places where the difficulty of the task is as demoralising as in Northern Ireland itself to participants, onlookers, and outside forces who are willing to help but find no way to do so.

The growth process is slow and will have its ups and downs. It will produce much frustration and makes no claim to be a panacea. But in seeing the potential in Northern Ireland for another Cyprus-like situation we are convinced that neither the military (official or unofficial) nor politicians can do anything to prevent such a catastrophe, and that a holistic multi-approach at a social level is the only hope.

When we speak of an identity crisis, we mean something induced by a crisis of objective conditions, by the fact that situations have changed, are changing, will change or are feared to change in a way that will place them completely at loggerheads with the familiar. Such a crisis produces a conflict with whatever prototypes and stereotypes come from the past and are of great importance to the groups and society concerned. The resulting factual changes in the situation by no means automatically change the prototypes and stereotypes at the same time. Hence from the crisis in the objective situation perceived as an identity crisis, it may result that the old prototypes and stereotypes act strongly in advance at the very threat of such changes, to prevent them. Or they may remain firmly in place notwithstanding the changes. Or we may find a struggle between the two different realities, old and new; the old mentality and a new situation that has been forced upon it. There will be people of the old mentality, and others who have come to terms with the new conditions and try to produce a new mentality.

One can employ a whole gamut of ways of reacting to the new reality and the potential new mentality negatively:

- a) by pretending nothing has happened;
- b) by saying the change is only temporary and things will switch back to the old situation again;
- c) by working or fighting for a switchback, whether by violence or by non-cooperation or by apathy in the face of the new reality.

The easiest ways to avoid coming to terms with the new reality are:

- a) to find a scapegoat whom we can punish for betrayal;
- b) to make those who try to come to terms into the scapegoats, calling them 'traitors';
- c) to camouflage our own feelings with some slight revision of the old stereotypes, a thin layer of apparent new stereotypes which can be created very quickly, beneath which the old stereotypes remain in fact at full strength.

Short of refusing as totally as this to come to terms with the new reality, one may decide to make full use of the new opportunities brought about by the changed situation, still accepting the old stereotypes superficially, but not knowing what to do, bewildered and full of pain. Alternatively, there may be an acceptance of new stereotypes but with a hankering after the 'good old days.' Or we may find a complete acceptance of a new set of stereotypes, combined with much bitterness towards the representatives of the old, consequently a complete volte face but still based on stereotypes rather than convictions (which would be the elements of genuine personality). Still another variant is a dull or cynical acceptance of the new facts without trying to face the situation (split stereotypes).

In all the four types of response comprehended in this last paragraph we find ambivalence, a double system of values and convictions splitting the person:

- a) between prototypes and stereotypes. This split is not too serious

as it is simply a division between childhood patterns (the prototypes) and adult (the stereotypes), a kind of split that most normal people have to some extent.

b) between old stereotypes deeply felt and basic to one's thinking and new stereotypes diametrically opposed.

c) between stereotypes and personality, i.e. personal views clashing with environmental stereotypes.

The danger is greatest when the archetypes, prototypes and stereotypes alike all demand the same factor, e.g. a strong father figure, and personality is suppressed, e.g. by the strong father figure, a dictator or demagogue who frowns on personality or challenge.

To sum up, all these factors may exist a) separate from, b) in conflict with or c) parallel to factual changes or development. Hence it is necessary to understand two levels in every situation: the factual level and the level of social climate in situations of conflict or of different outlook. If a strong army feels insecure, doubtful of its purpose and its leaders, it is in much greater danger than a small army that has no such problems. The major identity crisis comes when the whole basis of people, groups, communities or societies undergoes radical change. Then ill humour, concern, depression, hostility and the desire for scapegoats can produce either a slow and ongoing or a sudden and brutal explosion, either of them a form of catharsis which precedes unlearning, but which may also be a false dawn, remaining there as a situation of despair. Then it has no constructive function but produces only a chain reaction of deepening catharsis and despair, never rising to the level of unlearning of the old stereotypes because there are no visible answers to give hope.

Vice versa when there is not enough hope to produce a positive solution it is often because people cannot see what can be done. If the leaders are poor, they fear to give premature answers which would be unpopular with those still in catharsis, making themselves into scapegoats in the eyes of those who want to deny the new facts.

A note of caution has to be sounded here, not to neglect genuine values as another factor when there is a new situation. One has to decide whether the change which in fact is coming about leads to a new positive direction or can in any way be brought there. Otherwise we are left assuming that anything new is better whereas it may be morally wrong (as, e.g., when the Nazis overran Germany and produced a new situation and new facts). Then we have to know how not to accept the new facts on a value level while acknowledging them on a factual level, a wholly different case from that when a morally right (or malleable) situation replaces one morally wrong. The new and the better are not synonymous nor the opposite, but depend on the conflict of values.

In rough terms that are much neater than any of the actual situations we find, but which are yet basically correct, we can say that power leaders produce the new situation and influence establishment leaders produce the new stereotypes. Hence the need found in such new situations for propaganda, re-education, the use or misuse of communication, in some places show trials and torture (the torture in this case not intended to extract information but to threaten others and destroy the will to resist or act, endangering the dignity of those who are tortured and those who are frightened by the spectacle).

When the reaction to a new situation is ambivalence, it involves living two lives. This is at its most dangerous when a fanatic is ambivalent, as he tries to suppress his inner doubt by being more violent. The more genuinely or

with conviction he holds either the governing view of his fanaticism or even the opposite, the more willing he is to hurt or destroy anyone who represents his doubts. Sudden conversions or extremists to some other equally extreme position are a commonplace, and are normally preceded by their becoming more and more extreme in their original views. It is a matter of question how many heroic deaths in the service of causes are actually suicides by people trying to still their inner doubts.

It is quite possible and even easy for people to be in a steady state of catharsis and violence and yet be apparently or really very reasonable in many other ways. When this ambivalence situation and its consequences come to light, people can become aware what is happening to them, and if they will listen may be inoculated against the worst effects of their ambivalence. Yet they may not be able to face it, may explode in self-destruction or react with verbal or physical assassination on those whom they regard as traitors. It is likely enough that the whole attitude towards sin, evil and guilt, and the strong disapproval and readiness to punish the sinner was an effort to deter people's doubt or weaken their courage to act similarly. Those who were the most potentially sinful were most strident in their demand for revenge, retribution, becoming obsessive retributors.

Identity Crises in Northern Ireland.

One of the reasons for the confusion in the Irish situation is that there are a number of identity crises going on simultaneously. Some come directly from the Irish situation itself but the greater number of them come from a wider, transnational and world context: changes in the factual situation and changes in the realm of values, purpose and conviction. One cannot afford to look for solutions to just one of the identity crises or other when every level is in crisis, both the mountains and the molehills, the macrocosm and the microcosm. Since Northern Ireland suffers both from its own internal problems and from the tremors of larger crises, it is no answer to accommodate the local situation only with new political structures that will 'fix it.' One must recognise that the wider crisis that reaches from Belfast to anywhere else we may look can't be cured by pettifogging social aspirin answers or political dream houses in which a few experts may argue on behalf of everyone else. In Northern Ireland there may already be the beginning of some new answers from which everyone else can learn.

When we look for the major conflict situations of the world, Northern Ireland will figure as only one of the smaller. It is at least equally as improbable that the problems of Northern Ireland can be ameliorated without reference to the rest of the world as that the desperation of the Middle East, Cyprus, Asia, Africa, the First, Second, Third and Fourth Worlds can be solved by local political prestidigitation, even if motivated by the finest ideals. This is not to say that the writer desires this should be so, but it is a statement of fact. It is necessary to go further and say that important as the facts of injustice to the majority of people in the world may be, the real difference will come from a transformation of mentality affecting the facts, not vice versa. Hence the need to understand how these new mentality patterns grow. It is obvious to us that the main dangers come from the twin elements of apathy and violence: the apathy that tries only to improve, saying 'Rome wasn't built in a day' when there is no time; or the violence that feels the urge to smash everything and begin a new system only when the Messiah arrives. Our answer instead is one of growth, with people acting out of convictions that are informed, deeply felt and intuitively (i.e. by social intelligence) worked out and understood; in other words, the opposite of stereotypes, the basic items of common sense. We speak not of a brand new scenario but of an understanding that in nature old forms decay and new green shoots grow out of them. Man's spirit will mold the facts as servants with very different value systems and patterns from yesterday's, until our stomachs no longer bother us from hunger

or overfeeding.

Let people think all this bodes an exact science that will give complete answers, we should say that we are all beginners and learners, hardly knowing our way from A to B and with the rest of the alphabet still to go, yet we begin to discern a few outline of what may be. Toynbee speaks of the many false starts in any situation of mutation toward new forms of society, because they are not ready. We are in the same situation, except that now the dangers are greater, especially the danger of being overwhelmed by the situation if we do nothing. Hence the needs are also greater. We believe man has always risen to the challenge of concrete dangers if he has somehow been prepared for them. Hence it is our hope to have some pilot models of ways to meet the challenge ready as the crisis deepens.

The distinct crises in or involving Northern Ireland are:

1. The Protestant majority's identity crisis. They can no longer trust values identified with the Crown, British Protestantism, the Archbishop of Canterbury and the concept 'we are the majority, we are the rulers.' As the Protestants go through this crisis of no longer feeling secure in the protection of Britain, there is a sub-crisis in which the old leadership of landed gentry and businessmen is being replaced by workers' leaders.
2. The Catholic minority in the North is in a similar identity crisis vis-a-vis Dublin and the Irish Republic, where they know they are more feared than wanted, not only by the politicians but by a majority, perhaps a substantial majority of the population. Here too there is a sub-crisis as the Church leadership, whose authority has until now hardly been disputed, is now, because of its vacillating and for the most part barely discernible leadership, in serious disrepair. It should be noted that those few clergy who do give leadership are all the more outstanding, and at the same time all the less liked by the authorities.
3. The identity crisis of the Provisional IRA. They have seen a great deal of their programme come near reality. Yet as even Rory O'Brady now says, they want any withdrawal of the British Army not to be done too quickly. This is an intelligent expression of the twin dangers of the Army staying indefinitely and the Army leaving too suddenly, leaving the Catholic population exposed to a cataclysm. The Provisionals' problem is how to induce their activists to stand down before making sure that their ideas will have a powerful outlet without the guns. They know that otherwise they will bring on a futilely destructive civil war like that of the 1920's. They sink into oblivion if they don't act. If they find no slot into which to grow, they could well accept the civil war situation as offering the only outlet for themselves.
4. The Official IRA has its own more obscure identity crisis. From standing inactive so long a time and having pursued more openly political views, they too must see in all the changes that now produce new situations a threat of losing their own power and influence. This situation is less obvious because of the low profile the Officials have maintained, and it is a matter of conjecture whether they and their identity crisis are easier or more difficult than the Provisionals.
5. The UDA and other Protestant paramilitary bodies are in some bewilderment as they have to come to terms with the restructuring of power in the Protestant community over the past year. Since the autumn there have been increasing signs of fragmentation and breakdown of discipline in their ranks. How can a leadership without a part in the existing political structure stand? The situation is difficult to handle as a purely military situation gives way to a political and social one.

6. The Protestant workers have an identity crisis with regard to their own leadership. Like the Catholic workers they are now bereft ~~of~~ their more middle class leadership, uncertain how much the new leadership of the Workers' Council is capable of and whether deference is still owing to the older political leadership. They may yet find themselves comprehending better their common interest with Catholic workers. (We have always noted the paradox that this is a civil war of the poor against the poor, with the rich left relatively undisturbed.)

7. What is Northern Ireland and what will it be? The Protestant and Catholic populations of Northern Ireland are now finding themselves somewhat like the Protestants and Catholics of East Germany, who have evolved away from their West German counterparts because of the difference in their experience in recent years. Now that Northern Catholics find they have less in common with Southerners and Northern Irish Protestants find less in common with the British, it is an identity crisis to find how much they have in common with each other. If this identity crisis is solved Cyprus style, there will be many thousands dead and a new Protestant/Catholic border will be formed with maximum destruction on both sides. A more attractive alternative would be a Swiss-style development, with the two communities living alongside each other if not together, united against the outside however much they are divided inside. We do not propose this — or anything else — as a solution. Any such thing must come from the people. What we would ask for instead is a period for restructuring and healing prior to finding of any solutions, rather than an effort to force a new mentality to grow up by initiating new ready-made political structures, like putting shoes onto feet they have not been fitted to, either crippling people or making them throw the new institutions away.

8. The British have more than one identity crisis, but we would single out first the fact that Britain has lost an Empire but the British have not yet quite lost it. In this they are much like Austria as a post-imperial State, reduced to a tenth of its former size and with a great and glittering capital city which no longer has an imperial territory to rule. The British imperial mentality has not changed enough, and is bewildered by the existence of the Commonwealth as a substitute, but one that is drying up as a political entity. Imperial Britain having run after the EEC for whatever economic reasons, is further bewildered to find Germany, the old enemy she defeated, the strongest member both politically and financially. At the same time, just when the Commonwealth is becoming irrelevant, the coloured Commonwealth immigrants are there in force requiring to be treated as equals. This occurs at a time when the British are feeling the need for imperial scapegoats for the day-by-day frustrations and annoyance brought about by the breakdown of the cities. Britain does not know its place. The retracting Army and Navy are no longer particularly important. The war-time and post-war 'special relation' with America has been worn out by reality. The British are still used to see themselves in the same power league as the Americans, and humiliated by the signs of their having gone down in the power world of international politics.

9. Britain has a distinct identity crisis vis-a-vis Northern Ireland, bedevilled by many stereotypes on both sides. The Irish, because they have come to speak English, are seen by the British as a species of Englishmen, but funny ones because they do not conform to type. The British and Irish know each other well, know each detail and every weakness, but as often happens in families they don't know each other at all. English experts on Ireland and Irish experts on Britain seem to outsiders to be simply bereft of sense, no matter whether they are friendly or hostile. The lack of understanding is monumental and of many generations' standing. The Irish are basically European in outlook (as a stereotype) whereas the British (as a stereotype) are distinctly non-European or even anti-European. To hear powerful and important people in Britain or Ireland speak of the other side, whether -phile or -phobe, often produces in outsiders a shudder not unlike that of people who have to deal

professionally with husband/wife conflicts. There is ambivalence, whether in recognising that the best British generals and regiments come from Ireland or in the admiration one hears from the Irish for the efficiency of the British Army, even if based on hostility. Complicating factors are the Britishness of Irish law, the partial British structuring of a very different Irish educational system, the easy access of the Irish to live in Britain (six to eight million Irish-descended there). All show the intricate pattern of the worst of all quarrels, a family quarrel in which separation may be the only way to produce a new situation from which new possibilities of inter-relation can grow. The dependency or interdependence of the Northern Irish economy on the British (the Southern Irish as well) creates a considerable problem if the overall structure of the relation is to be changed. In Britain an apparently large majority wants to be rid of Northern Ireland, though this has so far not become a political issue because it affects all parties equally. Even high Church dignitaries express themselves as embarrassed by the situation, which is generally seen as a mess inherited from their grandparents. The identity crisis from the British side of the picture is thus one of dissolution, though the politicians see British honour involved in carrying out the dissolution in a way serviceable to Northern Ireland and which will not produce a sick structure to bedevil Britain ever after in its back yard.

10. Britain's own Irish dimension is another area of identity crisis. British institutions have not stood up well to the Irish conflict and Britain has lost face. That the Mother of Parliaments should pass laws allowing detention without trial is sad and deplored by Britain's friends. It is no help to Britain in living down her colonial past, e.g. in the U.N. and at the European Commission of Human Rights. The relation between Britain and the Irish Republic has so far managed, sometimes even improved, not with any love lost but because of economic necessity, security reasons for both sides and a fear that the inconsidered action of the Irish government might bring a civil war to them. Here again, there is a paucity of ideas and dearth of serious attempts to find real answers other than in political 'solutions' which do not engage the will or imagination of the majority of people to make them a reality. This all shows how badly a social planning dimension is needed.

11. There is, for a host of reasons, an identity crisis of political democracy in Britain and many other countries. Political democracy is in deep water throughout Europe. Italy, with its multi-party system, finds its coalitions breaking down too easily and has lost by now thirty six governments since the war. In France the strong-man government of the President finds no easy balance with the Assembly. Britain is now nearly evenly divided, hence polarised and hardly governable when it comes to long-term decisions (like the Common Market, like socialism). The real underlying crisis is that political democracy on top is too far divided from social democracy from the bottom up. There has been an erosion of bottom-level structures, a dearth of bottom-level leaders as a natural result of the dramatic weakening of neighbourhoods and communities. This produces insecurity and ambivalence towards the top, which itself is too lonely and has too few links back to the middle and bottom. The bureaucracy further weakens the structure in deliberate ways to further the efficiency of its own ^{central} control. E.g., there is the potentially disastrous wiping out of town and county structures to make the system more convenient for purposes of road-building and budgeting, making the local structures serve the needs of the bureaucracy rather than the bureaucracy serve local needs. If the proud city of Windsor, which has had a mayor, council etc. since 1312 and a tradition of strong loyalty from its citizens, is now to become a proud sub-sector of Area 4 of Berkshire, one can only marvel at the instinctlessness of the distinguished writers of the Maud Report in proposing this decomposition of local democracy. The identity crisis thus goes back to the local social structures of democracy and self-government based on caring for one another,

responsibility, etc. They are being replaced by a central bureaucracy and social workers who take over the burdens previously carried by the neighbourhood and family (the extended family and more recently the nuclear). The new medicine offered by the bureaucrats for the new problems becomes more dangerous than the problems themselves, putting people in reliance on the impersonal State rather than enabling them to help each other. Social workers cannot stop the problems they deal with any more than judges can stop crime, clergymen sin or social analysts the problems they study.

12. The British Army too has an identity crisis. It has gained the respect even of its foes for its efficiency in the Northern Ireland situation and has recovered by now from its initial identity crisis at being used for police jobs. There is much to its credit and that of its last two commanders. But whatever the success of the Army there are other methods of approaching the situation. For the first time the strong-hand methods of the Army (and those are what an Army is employed to use) are being at once challenged, hated/admired, and seen by some as an improvement on political democracy. Since in peacetime an army is only a necessary evil, we find it a disease symptom when the question arises in England what we need politicians for. There is pressure on the British Army to take on matters that are not Army concerns but semi- or fully political, a dangerous tilt in the balance, always a delicate one, between the civilian population and the Army, between the Army and its political masters. In Britain it would be ridiculous to overestimate this trend at present, given the long and honourable tradition of the Army in obeying whether they like it or not. But as the Army's role vis-a-vis the British nation changes in the wake of the Empire that formerly gave it its main tasks, it would also be ill advised to overstrain the relationship. Some informed observers already complain that many issues have been left to the Army in past years in Northern Ireland, or not as tidily disposed of between the Army and politics as they might have been. The whole twilight period in which there was virtually no functioning police force at least in Catholic areas could produce a natural politicisation of the Army. Luckily in this context the Irish issue is so atypical and unpopular that those concerned will not see this as a precedent, but the seeds are sown nonetheless.

There is the possibility of two major strains yet to confront the Army:

a) withdrawal from Northern Ireland. A withdrawal is always difficult, especially if it must be piecemeal in order not to create an explosive power vacuum which would be seen as sabotage of the political situation by the Army.

b) if there is trouble in the streets of Britain, whether from Irish or other sources. What would be the role of the Army if the police force were in difficulty? Naturally in Britain the general population would favour the Army, hence there would not be occasion for widespread high-handedness or impatience. Also there is a most efficient police force. However one would have to reckon with the impatience of the public, which always demands instant wonders against such forces as the Tupumaros, etc. This in itself would be an unpleasant heritage from Northern Ireland. Leaving aside here consideration of the Kitsons, the Walkers etc., which show tendencies it would be impolite to talk about in detail, especially if one were to tell the truth, it still remains that there are tendencies here like those very visible in France and Italy, less so in Germany, for very senior Army officers to be active in retirement.

It is an important factor that one can expect common sense to prevail in Britain. The Army has come out of its Northern Ireland involvement as a most efficient body to deal with unforeseen situations and with excellent leadership, but only for clearcut issues. It is the task of politicians to deal with shades of opinion, patterns and variations of conflict, preventing dramatic things from happening. These are less visible and less achievable goals because there is less space to maneuver. It seems to us an oversimplification to see everything in the Irish situation in black and white. There are

many shades of grey. Here lies the strength and weakness of the Army; it is excellent in black and white situations, whereas it is for politicians and bureaucrats to see the colourings in between. If there is too much muddling about in the middle, the Army cannot function. If there is too much black-and-white simplification enforced by the Army, the politicians and bureaucrats cannot function. And the oversimplification could spread back to England just because the Army has been so successful in its technical task under brilliant leadership. We state all this not yet as a full-blown identity crisis, but as a growing danger area in view of the next point.

14. Identity crisis of grass-roots social democracy. An ex-Minister recently said in private that he thinks Britain ungovernable at this time. Similar opinions are commonplace in many other countries as well. There are two main issues, of which this is one: why the political structures are in disarray. (The other is the identity crisis of the young, of which more in the next point.) The crisis is a constantly expanding one. We have our own list of over thirty crises, an illustration list of the numerous crises either wholly new or new in their extent and depth, certainly new in their explosive inter-relatedness, that manifest the underlying dissolution of the overall paternalistic world order. Problems come thick and fast for which the politicians have no precedents, which they must therefore consider without any backlog of real acquired knowledge. Countries, even the largest, and their governments have little room for maneuver but find their hands constantly forced, more often than not to do nothing, lest they precipitate further crises they cannot foresee, further affecting other weak or sickly structures.

This part of the crisis coincides with the lack of grass-roots social democracy. An organic structure of democracy is all essential if there is to be democracy at all. In the past it rose out of the extended family and neighbourhood democracy. To a considerable degree it was self-administered and self-contained. The communities formed by such neighbourhoods, whole towns or rural areas, had an intimacy based on common values, represented by common leaders. They formed the constituent parts of cities and of the country as a whole. Today in Britain like everywhere else there is deliberate destruction of local democracy, replacing it with bureaucracy. In Northern Ireland, as the Community Relations Commission was broken up, it was explained that its officers were not conditioning the community groups they worked with to 'relate to their elected representatives,' as if power in a democracy derived from the elected members themselves and the people's role was that of petitioners, rather than power deriving from the people to such representatives as would be responsive. If the distinguished members of the Maud Committee were sworn enemies of the country they could not have done more fundamental harm than by the deliberate destruction of age-old democratic structures and communities on behalf of a bureaucracy more interested in building roads and administering vast budgets.

The crisis of democracy arises therefore from the fact that natural communities are being undermined/^{and destroyed} instead of being restructured, strengthened and rejuvenated. Political democracy becomes a façade if it functions at the top and not at the bottom. This has produced a crisis which even efficient and conscientious politicians and leaders in good contact with their constituents cannot meet without replacing the lost structures. This is a part of the lack of opportunity for people to express themselves and take responsibility, to have real power and influence not dependent on central authority or imposed on them. The weakness is a disastrous one as it produces a social pyramid formed at the top by experts, top politicians, specialists of all kinds, administrators with their retinues, but standing on its apex, not firmly based on its wide bottom of neighbourhood and community government. For lack of local structures and local leaders, the capacities for original personal and group expression can find only negative outlets, in criticism, complaint, opposition, and are not able to share responsibility for running things. This has produced a pattern of depersonalisation and centralism to which one must find a new answer by a

reafforestation of neighbourhood and local structures. Otherwise we will come to the completely centralised authority of a tiny elite telling everyone else to mind their own business and approve of what they are told. That is unfair even to those in the center who carry all this pressure, because doubtless they will crack up under the burden, with much criticism and ill will as their reward. Already we hear alarming stories of the personal breakdown of social workers and other welfare officers saddled with too many of the burdens they have taken away from local structures. Luckily in Britain, the other part of the picture as this crisis appears in many countries, corruption for the sake of greed and power, is as yet comparatively small.

15. The identity crisis of the young. The young of Belfast, who suffer so much as the psychiatrists and social workers tell us, however true the tragic character of their lives, yet have more interesting and worthwhile lives, if they are part of the battle, than the children of London, New York or Amsterdam, who have no cause that can give them a black and white loyalty. As much as one deplores the content of their loyalty and the actions that rise from it, they will have wonderful stories to tell their grandchildren about how they took part in the struggle. They are united, purposeful, admired by their parents and elders, living in exhilarating danger with tremendous solidarity and expression (worse luck) sometimes over matters of life and death. What is needed there is what James called the 'moral equivalent of war,' in this case of civil war: a positive equivalent of such loyalties, groups and leaders, constructive causes and actions that will be as wonderful to tell to their grandchildren as what they are doing now.

Elsewhere the young live generally with little stimulus of a constructive nature, few opportunities to show their mettle, condemned to live in crowds (in the schools, in universities), imposed upon from the top, worst of all not able to give anything, whether they are rich or poor, but having everything, including duty, imposed on them from above. We find that the only factor that brings maturity is freely chosen responsibility: thoroughly investigated by themselves, based on their own sense of justice and intuition, without seeking compensation and even with the risk of negative compensation.

The young have to go through an identity crisis because the crowds they are forced to live in are never constructive, only destructive forces. There is no way for them in their crowds to contribute to the community, no experience of participating in responsibility, which is withheld from them, no social education, no preparation for today's or tomorrow's problems. They are forced to take too much as too much is given to them, able to give only trouble as they have few other self-expressive skills. Formal education is disastrous in its lack of preparation for life. Hence the ambivalence of the young, seeking yet fearing purpose, trying to see in black and white what is not so simple, charging, retreating, espousing black and white causes, fanatical and yet bores. It is not their fault, but results from the lack of purpose and values especially in the post-war generation that agreed to make its world that of consumerism. Future historians summing up what each generation has given to civilisation will have to register a great cypher for the generation who are parents of today's young. The young themselves do not now even ask 'who are we' but too often only 'who am I'. They are easily manipulable for anyone who can give them identity and identification. Never has there been a finer group of young people than these who are now waiting for purpose and values to live for or at least against. They too suffer the disease of having no power, influence or purpose, instead of which they are offered psychiatric help, cathartic sessions after their football matches, the achievement of meal tickets at the universities, the expression of boredom, unlive life by such means as drugs. To this we must add the family crisis as a further complication, though this is one factor not yet conspicuous in Northern Ireland, however much it is part of the general landscape elsewhere.

16. The overall crisis of values. Guilt, sin, evil and punishment, as the main context of the old value system, are fading out of people's consciousness and imaginations if not yet quite broken down. This is a matter of fact which we can state without having to take sides on whether it is a good development or not, and it has come about without guidance. Guilt as a factor in the authority of father figures is breaking down equally whether in the West or in Communist countries (in different forms). The value carriers -- clergy, teachers, judges etc. -- are left in identity crises as to their relevance to the present situation, which has grown up around them like Topsy. Much heartburning is involved here, much purposelessness and incomprehension. These value carriers often feed the young values which are irrelevant, not even dramatic enough to fight against, spreading the distance between the parent generation and youth even more, making the old value carriers themselves irrelevant and, if extreme in their efforts, slightly ridiculous. The values themselves are thus in crisis, yet another area too woolly to identify with or live by. For many, a new series of value sources makes sense: shame, responsibility, compensation, awareness. But there is as yet no ready access for most people to such answers.

17. An identity crisis of the present stereotypes of consumer society. The consumer society, its values and mentality have been challenged by a most unlikely revolutionary force, the oil sheiks, who have forced people willy-nilly to reconsider what is of value and what is not. Thus an identity crisis of the consumer society has been produced by the oil sheiks and we must all be grateful to them, as this is the healthiest of all the identity crises. People looking for values can no longer be fobbed off with bigger cars and other expensive and irrelevant status symbols into which they have been manipulated.

18. The general crisis of paternalism. For the first time in human history paternalism is threatened not by outside forces but, like the Greek coclonels or the feudalism of the 18th century, by being unable to cope with the problematic it has itself set in motion and the identity crisis of its own values. This identity crisis of the whole of human society, which finds its age-old paternalist structure no longer functional, has as constituent parts the other identity crises we have been listing plus the rest of the list of more than thirty already current crises we have published elsewhere. Paternalist elitism has also poisoned the elite themselves into social ignorance and lack of purpose in the face of tremendous challenge like none mankind has ever before faced. The paternalist system which has been with us for thousands of years, never humane or efficient but always until now still functional, is now at an end. It is necessary to face all the identity crises we have been listing as parts of a general dissolution of paternalism. There is danger of a Hitler-like reaction producing a dark age worse than ever before, with nuclear weapons etc. in the hands of the barbarians, if we do not work to make the best fraternal alternative society now. We believe that man has always been at his best in the face of great challenges but only if he understands.

The Northern Ireland crisis, then, seen in this context, is not a self-contained separate item. It is not to be 'solved,' patched up or put into cold storage by enforced apathy. It needs to be seen as a challenge to build up in this one place new purposes for society not founded on greed nor on gut-less do-gooding. The situation in Northern Ireland is not basically different, for all its distinctive details, from the crisis in much of the rest of the world. It has all the ingredients found elsewhere, with some of them such as violence more accentuated, others like the family crisis less developed than elsewhere. The struggle that has gone on in Northern Ireland will cease to be only the absurd and irrelevant suffering that these people have put themselves through for incomprehensible reasons and become of importance if they and their suffering can make a contribution to finding our way out of the world-wide crisis of identity in which we all live.

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Some may complain that we trot out too many difficulties remote from the Irish crisis. We do not think so, having the benefit of comparing the Northern Ireland crisis with many others, some still layered with paralysing fat, others twisted like Northern Ireland into violence. In the comparative pattern, the similarities are more important than the distinctions. All are part of a general identity crisis in which each country, city, neighbourhood, school, factory, institution, community and family takes part.

One cannot afford in a big crisis to ~~be~~ ~~or~~ ~~to~~ think too small. We seek in the Northern Ireland conflict situation answers which will be of benefit both to the people living there and to others far away. The people in Northern Ireland must not be guinea-pigs and there must be no manipulation of bodies, minds or entities. Even an 'ideal solution' would fail if brought off by imposition or cajolery. Only if one understands the whole true situation, which includes much more than the local events of Northern Ireland, can one hope to be intelligent about it. The magnitude of the problem should not discourage us, as there is no alternative but to face it. We can neither change it by smashing up everything in sight nor by trying to patch things together and make things work by gradual improvements. Instead we must begin growing socially at once, by the reafforestation of the structures of social democracy, of values, of purpose, of responsibility, etc., a process that is painful but which has the advantage that one need not wait for some political messiah to come along and do it for us, or for the great improving social worker. How people go about it in Northern Ireland can give hints to people suffering the same crisis elsewhere in different forms, so long as we realise that we are all leaders.

The whole Northern Ireland question by now becomes a study in ambivalence. Virtually all the prototypes and stereotypes have become questionable or open to doubt. Even those that people hold onto most strongly are in fact undermined by the new realities. Inexorable changes that have taken place during the years of trouble have made the difference.

At times the ruling ambivalence is based in reason, at times in emotion, at times in a sense of justice which is often mixed with a premonition that something is wrong with the old arguments. Sometimes the ambivalence comes from two of these three elements with strong resistance from the third. There is a conflict of these three forces with their traditions and complex prototypes and stereotypes. It is important that there now be formed not new stereotypes but instead new personality factors based on common sense, a group and social personality which will be the product of understanding and will have control of the prototypes and stereotypes.

Any hope we can rely on now is in the growth of personality, not in the imposition of new stereotypes which make people into objects instead of subjects, make them obey rather than think, feel and comprehend out of their own searching and inquiry.

The British are ambivalent. British ambivalence about Northern Ireland includes a basic emotional hostility towards Northern Ireland and the actual and potential impingement of the Irish problem into British life. Reason recognises certain peril for Britain proper if she were unilaterally to cut off a part of her home territory and move out. The stereotype response is that Britain will not be pushed around. The sense of justice insists that Britain owes something to Ireland and Northern Ireland for the sins of the fathers. There is shame that the most democratic of countries cannot handle Northern Ireland democratically. Thus there is a juxtaposition of ambivalence-producing elements. Time is running out and the general public is now firmly against carrying on. Even Lord O'Neill writes recently that he cannot foresee Britain carrying on through another three to five years. The lack of information or understanding of the problem in Britain is amazing, and can only be seen as a part of the ambivalence, a desire not to know. There is still a goodly dose of superiority feelings towards the Irish, most often identifying itself as stereotype in that it is against the Irish as a whole but not against one's friends or their families or the chaps one knew in the war. These differ because one knows them well, whereas minimum contact encourages resentment, and in a situation of open conflict would encourage all degrees of scapegoat treatment. Surprisingly, the feeling towards Protestants per se is not so different from that towards the Irish Catholics. We understand that this is different in Scotland or in places like Liverpool where there is a strong Irish or pro-Irish urban structure. This could easily lead to any open conflict spreading to these towns, quite apart from the bombings in England or other efforts arranged by small groups.

In the Irish Republic, a deep and unquestioned loyalty exists towards the Northern Irish Catholics, but there are still great tensions and forms of ambivalence. Many in the Republic are willing to die for the Northern Ireland Catholics without wishing to live in close proximity with them or in any interdependence. It has taken the Republic fifty years to make itself economically and socially viable. Starting as a desperately poor country still intrinsically dependent on Britain, it now has its own status built on its own efforts. People in the South do not want their foundations shaken by taking on a bankrupt Northern Ireland which they could not help but which might drag them down for at least a generation. Yet pride and honour demand absolute identification while economic reason produces one element of ambivalence and the real fear of civil war spreading to the South produces another.

The protestants in Northern Ireland, if one can see them as a group, which is doubtful, are still absolutely against uniting with the Republic by their whole tradition and philosophy. They are ambivalent, however, because of their disappointment at the London government and the basically unsympathetic attitude of their fellow Protestants in Britain. They have a feeling that Protestants might play a greater part in a combined Ireland than their numbers warrant because they have their position of strength in the North and feel more efficient and energetic. They recognise and do not recognise the grim reality that Britain might leave them.

The Catholics in Northern Ireland are ambivalent because they know rationally that they depend economically on Britain, know that in case of a breakdown they would suffer grievously as the more vulnerable group, and that they would be specially vulnerable if it came to open civil warfare. Their position as a permanent minority of nearly 40% cannot be compensated for in any true military conflict. But they are ambivalent also in their expectations from Britain, the callous step-father who yet will provide; they cannot quite imagine that Britain would not. How far the Catholic community is also ambivalent towards its official spiritual leadership is still a matter for conjecture, or how far it would take advice from this quarter in an open conflict situation. Their disappointment with the Dublin government and the unsympathetic Southern Irish popular opinion is parallel to that of the Protestants with Britain, though not a perfect mirror image. Their relation to Northern Ireland Protestants is far more complex than people seem to realise. We believe that much as East German Catholics are now different from West German Catholics, even if they are fiercely anti-Communist, because they have lived so long separately and under pressure for their views, so there is now a difference between the lean Northern Ireland Catholics and the comfortable Southerners who are secure in their majority. This is the most important of all the ambivalences, which may be decisive for the future if a holocaust does not kill the chance. The de facto living next to each other on a Swiss or Canadian model, accepting that Protestants and Catholics have more in common than before, especially once the grave injustices of the past are over, can lead to a power sharing or power control really making sense in a future when the mentality is ready and when people feel it comes from their ranks and is not British-imposed.

There is thus the possibility of both parts of Northern Ireland going through the same experience, though under different circumstances, as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, namely to have evolved far enough away from the mother country that they no longer share the same mentality with the mother country. This goes for Protestants with relation to Britain and for Catholics with relation to Ireland. They overlap but do not identify their views, accept a marriage de convenience with the other side which can be altered if necessary, but without which neither part as a separate mini-piece is viable.

We have heard and read open statements by Catholics in Northern Ireland that they have more in common with a Protestant from Northern Ireland than, say, a man from Cork, and similar statements from Protestants about Northern Irish Catholics. We have also heard strong avowals from both sides that people would not agree to a political situation that would coerce the other side, their neighbours. If Protestants are a little less forthcoming in such statements, being more dour, their tendency to live with the other side insofar as they find them realists like themselves is obvious. We should make it clear that this is not a change of attitude or stereotype, at least not yet, but comes from disappointment and the consequent weakening of the old stereotype that big brother would risk his own skin to rescue them at any time, which is now known to be untrue. But this could become an accepted stereotype if it is not an

imposition but a common-sense arrangement. We go back to our frequent statement that the Northern Irish do not hate each other but kill each other's stereotypes. There is a strong basic humanity in the Irish character, both Protestant and Catholic, and a goodly dose of common sense, whatever the not-unreasonable cavils that can be made against this as a result of the recent and past bloodshed North and South. For our part, we see it as a sign of the destruction or fading away of the old stereotypes precisely that the hostility is now so great, since this is itself an effect of the ambivalence that is eating away at the stereotypes.

The current ambivalence may come from a doubt whether all this killing will get anywhere, or it may be a basic intuitive feeling of the inhumanity of killing people for variants of the Christian faith, or it may be a feeling that for lack of anyone outside Northern Ireland who really likes either side they must now stick together, or again because economic disaster is foreseen if this goes on much longer, if at the end of the present phase Northern Ireland is simply to be a pool of foreign labour for Europe, or again simply fear for the safety of loved ones. Any or all of these factors represent a waning of the old stereotypes. But to achieve personality and not merely a substitution of new stereotypes will require that people judge for themselves with social responsibility, clear understanding and a sense of compassion and justice, as a beginning of acceptance of the other side as equal members of the human race, indeed as neighbours even if not loved neighbours. Any such development demands positive factors, constructive new patterns, real opportunity for people who doubt that things can change for the better, so that they may not despair but see hope, as hope is the missing determinant today.

From basically the same ambivalence can come positive or negative effects, or of course a mixed and vacillating bag of effects. If the community recognises it, it can be the basis of positive and constructive steps, short, middle and long range, exciting and challenging ways to deal with the future so that future generations can live in peace. In building up a new entity, social forms can be found which will bind up the wounds and allow a personality to develop in which, whatever the political structures, there will be a sense of parallel life and confederation. The effort should be to integrate groups, not to assimilate individuals. The groups should keep their basic character and identity, which will be a help, not a hindrance, an identity for, not against.

Enthusiasm and the demand that people simply forget the past or present would be disastrous, because beneath all these brave efforts there will still lie the pit of ambivalence. Any way up will not be free of temporary breakdowns. A positive ambivalence means that there is more positive will than there is negative, but the ambivalence is still there and has to be reckoned with. Positive ambivalence as a structure has a mortgage of negative ambivalence still hanging over it. Any step which is not honest intellectually or socially can easily arouse all the old doubts, fears and hostilities. So can secretiveness or new forms of injustice.

To illustrate how the negative effects of ambivalence were and still are more forceful than reality or the sense of justice, we need only see the relation between Catholic and Protestant workers and the spectre of their conflict from the 18th and 19th centuries. It should not be difficult to start there with the help of some real experts in social medicine, like Dr. Robert Murray, the consultant and medical adviser to the TUC, to see how far the split could be reconsidered. While this is not directly his field, he would be neutral, especially if his brief would come from both the British and the Irish TUC, perhaps with international union backing.

To sum up, if real plans could involve everybody in the fight to produce a new situation, going into the no-man's-land of positive development, we would have to beware that the best one can produce is a positively loaded ambivalence, always in danger of being disappointed and breaking down. The essential

point is that ~~one~~ we can plan the new patterns only after having discussed them as broadly as possible. The whole will stand or fall on whether, so far as possible, every man, woman and child in Northern Ireland has been brought into its actual construction and concrete applications. None should be able to stand aside and sneer on the grounds that this was about other people's problems and they had no vested interest in the project. It must not be elitist and managed from the top but must come from the bottom up as well as from the top down. Thus so much will depend on whether such plans as we propose (as a basis for discussion only, knowing that the actual plans of the people themselves will come out differently) are criticised and worked on by everyone.

A second criterion is that the plans really be something new, a matter of pride and hope and the object of the jealousy of other areas and countries that have not dared to do the same but may want to learn from this living example.

A third criterion is the matter of training people for tolerance, to which the bulk of the paper on violence is devoted as it must be a deliberate and planned project, to make doubts respectable, even swear words, but make violent action recognisable as a shameful form of infantilism by those who are jealous and don't know any better.

The fourth criterion, linked both with the tolerance and the participation by all, must be that, as always in such situations, a line must be drawn over the past. Those who participated in violence as a negative expression of their idealism must have a full opportunity to come into the project and show what their positive capacities are worth. This action will soon divide the sheep from the goats: those who tumbled into violence because it is all they can do, so that if one is not careful they will go on in a private capacity as gangsters or find another cause to please their infantilism and brutality, from those others who will be most willing once an amnesty is declared for all, as it is at the end of every civil war, and they can feel free to share.

One must avoid at all costs that these people who can be positive become bitter and hostile outsiders, pushed aside perhaps by the very people who had admired them and sought their protection in the past though they may have little sympathy or interest in them in the future. If their strong negative ambivalence can be made helpful to produce positive forms, it will be an invaluable help for the future. In view of the fact that this whole approach to the conflict in Northern Ireland can also be considered useful in other conflicts, it is essential to state as a demonstrated fact that the 'silent majority' of which so much to-do was made represents nothing but those who cannot be bothered, the very people who did nothing because they were merely inward-looking. It is they particularly who will now have to be helped to become active groups, in fact to stand up to and share the conflict situation, hopefully non-violently. The silent majority is a great disappointment, powerless and gutless masses, self-centred and basically unwilling to change their stereotypes, unwilling also to act on them unless in riot situations that create no personal danger for themselves. This is a bitter lesson to be learned, and it is the reason why activists of whatever sort, who are the bad-weather leaders, have to be particularly cared for and added to by as much as possible of one's efforts going to add social yeast to the uncreative dough of what is called the 'silent majority.' Here we reiterate that the answer lies partly at least in everyone's being encouraged to come into the action, so that there is little or no 'silent majority' left.

We find this a difficult chapter because it must appeal to reason and a system of common sense and fair play, but what it challenges are deeply ingrained prototypes and stereotypes which are the very essence of what people feel as loyalty to their own group, 'community.' Loyalties built on these foundations are deeply satisfying at an emotional level and give whatever sense of security there is in Northern Ireland, a sense of being 'one of us' and not 'one of them.' We often use charts to show the way to evaluate the intensity of feeling for one's own group independent of reason, i.e. using reason only for emotionally dominated rationalisations. There is a joy in belonging, in sticking to 'my country (party, kind, etc.) right or wrong.' The instinct for self-preservation is aroused again and again for oneself and for one's loyalty group or community, showing (a demonstration for the emotions) that a single step away from unquestioning loyalty is the way to immediate perdition. Any weakness shown strengthens the will of the other group to attack and kill. Hence if we do not stay on top at their cost we will be at the bottom. It is easy to see either of the Northern Irish sides reacting this way: the British do it too when they think of any of several emotionally laden symbolic issues like internment. Other instincts such as the will to justice and identification with others suffer. And even implied criticism done by outsiders is seen as a sign of their baseness and hidden treacherous will.

This mentality can co-exist with a tremendous sense of idealism for one's own cause and at the same time an immense layer of fanaticism, though some have more of the one than of the other. An attitude of truly interiorised anxiety and manipulated hostilities juxtaposes very basic prototypes, literally learned at the mother's knee, with stereotypes and quite rational arguments predicated on the prototypes and stereotypes. The consequence is a spiral of ferocity as each side's brutalities are justified by pointing to the inhuman actions of the other side. Each side, through its attitude of sacro egoismo (as Mussolini called it), which provides rationalisation for whatever vicious action is taken for one's cause, gives ample cause, reason and documented argument to the other side, showing the inherent wickedness of their enemies — 'They are animals!'

How could all this come about? One is really forced to admire the brilliant human engineering and tremendous effort that have been invested over so many years and generations to make sure that each side hates the other as much as possible. Many excellent heads on each side have devoted anxious years to making as foolproof as possible the accomplishment of their two vast principal tasks, commanded by their consciences and entrusted to them by destiny: first to make their own side hate the other, and then to do all in their power to destroy them. We think of the dispatches of Chichester at the beginning of the 17th century as he made his progress around Lough Neagh, putting whole villages to the sword. When pregnant women were included in his sweeps, he congratulated himself that he had slaughtered at once 'the devil's dam and her spawn.' Compare the current Protestant emotions over the Catholic birth rate. Or the attitude taken by Catholic authority and required of their subordinates up to quite recently about the proposition 'error has no rights' can be cited as a parallel, with its reflection in the inflexible stance taken by Church officialdom even today on the whole sequence of symbol-issues — separated schooling, birth control, mixed marriages, etc. — that raise the ancient spectre of paternalistic domination of the Catholic community by central authorities and threaten the imposition of the same on others as well.

The clergy of both sides have through the centuries preached the gospel of love for one's fellow man, provided it did not get out of hand and include the other side. The system of enforced rejection and reprobation of the others, suspicion and begrudging of any recognition of good faith, has been so consistent

a part of the training of both religious sides that today it is only with frank incredulity that one hears the standard speech that is made in almost the same words by most of the highest leaders of the several Churches: 'Don't blame us! It is someone else who has done and is doing all these terrible and violent things, not the Churches or the Protestant and Catholic communities but some tiny minority of renegades, wicked men, terrorists, men of violence, who conspire as much against us, the leaders of their Churches to whom they are an embarrassment, as they do against those they openly attack and kill.'

Violence has over the centuries and through recent decades been used in many ways, verbal and psychological as well as physical, both by politicians and by the Churches. In our own view, we would see it as wrong now to blame the Churches that they have taken admittedly only very feeble gestures to help in the ghastly situation before it has become as depressing as now. With a very few honourable and quite outstanding exceptions, the Churches have been occupied in their own routines, the round of administration and ritual chores which the official leaders have seen as in fact more important and have tried to convince their flocks are more important. Occasionally they have expressed regret or even outrage over particularly nasty incidents or episodes, their preoccupation with maintaining the old bastions preventing them from ever getting to the roots of the problem or confessing that at the roots are the old bastions, so laboriously erected, themselves. People, especially outsiders, seem not to realise what a tremendous task has been accomplished by the churchmen that they now do practically nothing rather than actively pushing on the conflict as they did in the past, a great achievement in view of the leading role the Churches have earlier taken in the battle of hate, the mutual contempt and the social engineering of a near perfect segregation system.

It is fact that the segregation exists now as strongly as ever, often more strongly. It is also true to say that the conflict is not religious only: it is ethnic and, as people enjoy saying now, 'tribal.' However it is also true, even though undiplomatic to say so, that it is very much a religious conflict, even if fought out in unreligious terms. At issue, as the Church leaders rightly point out, are no matters of religious doctrine that stand between the various Churches. But instead the power and privilege structures of the different Church structures and establishments are very much at issue. One can say truly that while this is not a religious conflict it is still a conflict between the Churches for their power and privilege positions.

All this should be said with due respect for the other manipulators, especially the anglicised upper-class Protestants in their coalition with the Protestant clergy, which has no equivalent on the Catholic side where the feudal structure was long ago destroyed and the priest left as the only possible representative against an oppressive regime for lack of other leaders. It is clear in Irish history that the old lay leadership, clan or feudal, Irish or Anglo-Irish, was not tolerated if it tried to stand up to the colonialist regime. That this leadership was Catholic did not distinguish it from others up to the time of the Reformation. The thing not tolerated was identification with Irish interests rather than English. If it had not been for the Catholic resistance with its clerical leadership after the feudal leadership had been destroyed or replaced by Protestants, there might have been a purely Protestant Ireland, as was no doubt intended by Elizabeth and Cromwell, or else a subdued and leaderless peasantry, semi-serfs. After its long period of exclusive leadership in the Irish Catholic community, during which the institutional interests of the ecclesiastical establishment always rivalled the interests of the local oppressed peasant community as determinants of action, it could be nothing more than was to be expected if the clergy's and hierarchy's condemnation of the armed activists and suspicion and caginess towards any other lay leadership should be a straightforward reluctance to share power.

Segregation

The Protestants have known, meanwhile, that by sheer numbers the Catholics would suppress them or extinguish their power. Consequently they have consistently gerrymandered, beginning with the partition itself, and used violence and other measures to keep away any migration of Catholic workers from the South. This is the heritage of hate, distrust, above all a basic lack of knowledge of each other. As the experience of Germany under the Nazis has shown, or as has Cyprus, individual friendships, the friendship situation of living side by side peacefully for a long time, are irrelevant. Once the bug of violent scapegoatism is raised the defensive attitude spreads and is manipulated by one's own or the other side or both. Then no moral principles seem to hold up, basic human values are trampled, children and others become killers. There are many situations in which people have done unforgivable things that will haunt some of them for the rest of their lives, whereas others, as the German experience has shown, can shrug it off and become outwardly perfect citizens again, whatever that may mean in people who take no responsibility even for what they have done themselves.

The segregation that exists in Northern Ireland's society can only be understood if one sees this historical background. But the knowledge of history is a dangerous nuisance when it is used for the perpetuation of hate on the one hand and a fatalistic attitude that history repeats itself on the other. Obviously, if the mental situation, the prototypes and the stereotypes do not change, history will repeat itself. In fact it has done so and will continue to do so again and again unless (and this is the whole crux of this report) the mental attitudes and application of social value patterns to one's own side only change.

Again, we must warn that the picture ought not be misunderstood, as if all people had these mentality factors openly, ruthlessly, violently and on the surface, with knives and guns ready to be used at once if given the chance. That would be an infantile picture, unjust and untrue. But in a situation of severe pressure and the threat of apparent catastrophe, these violent factors come out. They are there, implanted and nurtured over the generations, and still carefully though maskedly maintained by the whole 'silent majority' that clings to its stereotypes and the establishment leaders that take them as immutable givens of the situation and claim that anyone, insider or outsider, who is dissatisfied with them 'does not understand us.' It is therefore an injustice to blame the extremists, as so many people including churchmen have done. In fact the 'violent men' whom they see as wicked criminals, while they may well be more fanatic, are also more idealistic in their terrible and bloody ways, seeing no other ways as their whole mentality has been manipulated to look for no other way. Not to recognise this is unjust to them and untrue to history. In the future some of the positive leaders may come from these negative leaders, when (as not only Irish history has shown) the situation recovers enough to allow some to serve positive purposes.

In all this, if one wishes to judge current situations and find the sources of dreadful acts in both earlier and more recent history, one should judge these conditions and not the people conditioned by them, however much one may deplore, reject or resent the things done. They are the visible part of the iceberg of historical manipulation. The fundamental disease could be called non-identification. It is a tale heard so often before: 'I love people, am kind to women and children, but these people are not like us, in fact if you are not careful they will....'

It is a tragic ambivalence that people feel that way, and they may be panicked into acting that way for what are apparent motives of self-preservation for themselves, their families and loved ones, their 'tribe.' There are two allies for a better future. One is the sense of justice, the will to live and let live which we share even with the animals. This set of personality factors,

all in the area of intuition and social intelligence, is the stronger of the two allies, the will to live and let live stronger than the 'tribal' self-preservation instinct if the latter is no longer manipulated as it has been hitherto. The other ally is reason, which shows that perdition is well on its way, economically and socially, quite apart from the physical risks.

Consequently we think that history should not and may not repeat itself if one works at it now with great energy, involving positive and anti-negative factors alike and using the blessed ambivalence which has now sprung up about the old stereotypes and certainties themselves, the sound common sense in people which says that walking over thousands of dead bodies in the noble cause of separation cannot be the way. But here there is no single enemy more dangerous and more ready to buttress the old stereotypes as the pillars of its own power than paternalistic religion that serves other purposes than God, the religion of hate and exclusiveness rather than of the sermon on the mount.

The easiest way to unite people, groups or communities is always against the threat of some external force. It can be on the basis of scapegoatism, directed against a weaker group which in fact may have little or nothing to do with the major group's trouble. Or it can be against a stronger force, always understood to be the source of major trouble or threat. This stronger force can be a new one, i.e. arising out of a new situation, or it can be perennial, even an hereditary one, where the conflict between the one group and the other goes back for generations. This latter is the principle of the arch-enemy. It will have overshadowed the lives of people right back to early childhood patterns and the admonitions never to trust or have anything to do with group 'x,' or whatever particular form the hostility may take.

The situation of conflict has the great advantage that the major issues are perfectly clear. The prototypes and stereotypes see to it that whatever action is taken is seen in black and white; we are right, they are wrong; what may seem wrong in us is preemptive of a pending attack that can be expected at any moment. The Northern Ireland conflict has always allowed all the groups concerned to see very clearly the notes in the eyes of the others and not to see the beams in one's own. It was therefore never necessary to go into any serious positive or responsible action serving all concerned when the conflict has heated up. The manipulators of all these activities were often manipulated themselves by inherited attitudes which they could not and had no intention to shift, as it was a major part of their power base anyway. Apart from certain patchwork improvements in day-to-day circumstances which had to be taken (like the minor and reluctant reforms of the O'Neill and Faulkner administrations), it was always decided not to change basic structures or come to the roots of the problems and injustices, bringing the structures up to date. Each side of course did manoeuvre for better conditions for itself, and this activity itself was a distraction from the fundamental task. The sum total of the long periods of anti-attitudes is that now it is not easy to come to a pro-attitude. An example can be taken from other historical situations, when revolutionaries who had to battle long and fiercely (anti-negatively) finally succeeded in becoming the government. Many found that their real skills were not for positive action but in finding and destroying enemies. Therefore when they met economic or other set-backs they looked not for solutions but for scapegoats; traitors, saboteurs, assassins under the beds, either from the old enemy group and/or from the old comrades-in-arms. Little energy then remains for positive solutions, not least because everyone is frightened to argue with the cockeyed schemes of the dictators. This attitude on the part of the well-trained experts in violent action when they pull on the invisible striped pants of a governing elite often makes them figures of fun at the same time as they are frightening demagogues. They found it all easier in the black and white period

of the past, hate the grey complex of interlocking issues that leave small room for manoeuvre, the details and sensitivities, hard facts and unforeseen crises for which they have neither knowledge nor empathy.

Hence there is often need for a new generation of leaders to replace the old heroic figures. In Northern Ireland the situation is worse, in a state of suspended animation. The mood is still one of pre-holocaust. Anything positive is so far unwelcome and life retains its irreality in which stereotype faces stereotype. These factors are still manipulated by vested interests. Whether the conflict is really religious or not, the dignitaries of all sorts are expert at using religion as a weapon to unite their 'flocks,' sheep towards whom they sedulously maintain the relation of shepherds, superior beings in status and knowledge, both as symbols of the group and as major authorities. This is done not because they are such outstanding personalities or because of any major service provided so far, but simply because they quite believe that without them the people would be leaderless and easily vulnerable. With certain obvious variations between the two camps, there is plenty of evidence of this visible on both sides. The ecclesiastical leadership may personally deplore extreme outrages as going too far, producing a bad image for their establishments, but it is not at all clear how far, while disliking the image of conflict, they dislike the conflict itself.

The questions stand, then, how far the religious power and influence leaders, those who deal with mind and spirit, dislike the conflict as such, whether they want to make peace not simply with their fellow hierarchs and clergy, with whom they can so easily share tea, but with the community of the opposite side, whether in fact they would genuinely fear the loss of their sacred cows, their sway, their power over bodies and influence over minds if the conflict were not maintained. Would a new situation not in fact set up unforeseen patterns in which untouchable taboos would become obsolete? It is only human to understand that people hesitate to find one day that everyone has to wake up and live with a reality that they do not know and which may not like them, when up to now they have been able to manipulate the myths and ride the nightmares. It would be churlish to blame individuals in this situation or produce scapegoats of one's own, however much some authority figures may be obvious captives of this mentality. But just as the activist extremists are the visible part of an iceberg in the conflict, but basically not different from the others except in the degree of their commitment and their willingness to act out their views and prejudices, so these old-fashioned leaders of the Church structures are also as much victims as victimisers, often most honest and convinced people. The problem is that time has passed their ideas by and they are still trying to be midwives of yesterday.

What these divisive leaders have produced and maintained to a surprising degree is a division of living that in many cases goes far beyond that of blacks and whites in the United States. The whole impact of the divisive forces is seen in practically every action; in nurseries, in schools, so that the young hardly ever see each other except across barriers or come to know each other; in religious education so grimly divided that even within the past year Catholic youngsters who went to State schools were being refused Confirmation by their bishop, with a blank refusal to provide alternative access to religious education than through the parochial schools. Similar situations exist on the Protestant side, though more at a community level, where those who have not gone through the ritual expressions of exclusivity are ostracised. In sessions we have held in Belfast that brought together people who seldom otherwise meet, we have been told time and again that no member of the opposite religion had entered people's homes since many years before. Work is often completely separate, or integrated only by tokenism as at Harland and Wolff. Living areas, pubs are separate, even cemeteries not adjoining, segregation maintained in hospitals, old age homes, sport. Even the as yet unseparated trade unions are under great pressure, reduced now to ineffectualness because their headquarters are in Dublin

or in London. No one can say this is merely a harmless tradition. It is clearly manipulated by people with vested interests. The normal public facilities of daily life that exist in other countries, like the police force, are symbols of disunity. Flags and other symbols stand for loyalties to big brothers outside the place. The heroes of each side's history are the villains of the other.

Communications are a particular problem. The Northern Irish have only one ear. They are able to listen only on one side, hear only what they want to hear. There are two aspects to this problem:

a) there is no interchange of knowledge. Each side sticks to its own sources, sure that the others are liars. Hence communication becomes a further divisive force, perhaps one of the most powerful. There are some excellent journalists in the Province, a high proportion for so small an area. They are misused in being one-sided. We do not expect politics to be objective, but the flow of information to either side should not be entirely from just one source that they happen to accept. A potential ally against this problem is the Irish capacity to doubt and sense of humour, which springs up even in moments of dramatic breakdown and crisis, showing their underlying common sense. Journalism of this sort provokes politicians to make outrageous statements for the sake of the headlines in both friendly and unfriendly papers. An intelligent journalism would bring back some common sense by burying this sort of statement on page 5.

b) a conformist violence image is projected especially through TV, also through the American-style comic strips. This is bad enough anywhere, but worse in Northern Ireland circumstances than elsewhere. Discussion of peace and peace-making issues ought to be in the media, not confined to intellectual clergymen who go off to Corrymeela.

We would in no way deny that people are entitled to their loyalties. If people live together they are I parts that must form a V part. Every de facto unit has autonomous parts and common denominators or it cannot be cohesive, will fall apart. We maintain that everything has been done, with few important exceptions, to separate, divide, make hostile, make impossible any cohesion, to blind people to the necessities of the situation, to keep them in ignorance, letting them comfort themselves only by traditional big-brother fantasies that the forces of their patron country would appear at the last moment like the US Cavalry in the cowboy films. This final infantile picture is at the roots and guts of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Good and kindly people, for what they consider loyalty to their values, have misused these loyalties for years, poisoning the minds of the young with fear, hatred and, worst of all, contempt. This is the major reason why it has been possible to break the natural interest of the working class people in uniting. Otherwise it is simply unintelligible. This is why it has never been possible to bring the young together, and why people cooperate in doing everything to avoid cohesiveness.

It is hardly astonishing, therefore, that when the politicians for the best of reasons did attempt a common cohesive structure, beginning at once with the highest level of political constitution, that it was premature. The willingness was not there because of this mentality, because of minds poisoned at the font, conditions maintained over many years that were stronger than the needs of reality. One cannot start at the end with final structures, ignoring this poisoning of minds.

If I may permit myself one final personal remark as one who has had a theoretical or practical interest in a great proportion of the conflicts the world has known since the Second World War, it is this: of all the conflicts I

have come to know, this is the most unnecessary. It is therefore the saddest, but also basically the most hopeful precisely because it has been so artificially contrived and maintained. It is not a natural but a manmade conflict, deliberately and artificially sustained and hence doubly tragic. I find it most dubious that pulling the British Army out of the situation would work any sort of horse-cure to pull people together. The poison has to be removed and unlearned, the stereotypes overgrown with a new growth of socially satisfying structures. This will require some time and much pain. What has never been attempted seriously before in the Province, new habits, new needs and attitudes, will have to be launched. If manipulated these will not last either. They must come as a growth from the bottom up if they are to be the green shoots of a new and creative society.

We write from the context of a general study of the conditions of apathy and violence that characterise almost any city today. Only a comparative study of these signs of the times helps much, since there are as yet no objective measures of the damage being done, and only from comparative measurements can they be made. This is a nuisance on the one hand, a productive situation on the other.

We make use of tables and scales of measurement, copies of which we will gladly make available to anyone interested; for apathy, violence, frustration, social identification, scapegoatism, personal and social age. Further tools are the classification of five ages in man's life, the table of sociopathological symptoms (an effort to understand historical situations in which people use violence) and the theory of un-lived life, uncaring and unloving life. We try to ascertain further how far people act on a scale of rights and duties (a reciprocal bargain relationship) or to what degree they accept or voluntarily assume responsibility, and the dimensions of a-responsibility, anti-responsibility and ir-responsibility. These tools are still not enough, but we find they provide a start towards building a knowledge of the dynamics of apathy and violence, about which there is all too little in the professional literature.

A certain number of points stand as preliminary hypotheses for us, and we should list them at least so that people know our biases as we develop the theme.

1. Apathy and violence are virtually mirror images of one another; apathy frequently (though not always) a frozen form of violence and violence an explosion of the same forces of frustration that produced the apathy. They can therefore interchange quickly. Psychotic murderers are often extremely apathetic for years before a new outbreak of violence.

2. Both apathy and violence are acquired habits. The violent wife-beater may likely be copying his father or the values of his environment, just as the beaten wife's apathy may come from seeing her mother or others treated so. This goes also for groups, apathetic ones like slaves or Concentration Camp victims who take any amount of violence in hopeless apathy, or groups like the overseers or guards who are infected with violence by the cumulative example around them.

3. Apathy is a flight from life, a withdrawal that asks for less and less as the measurements show. Violence is a running away from values. As Dostoevsky put it, 'If God is dead then everything is allowed.' In the alternation of high and low intensity the violence comes as an explosion with no thought of the consequences.

4. The violent outbreaks are closely related to machismo, a substitute assertion of masculinity by those who are profoundly uncertain of it.

5. There is an important difference between the personally expressed and motivated violence which acts against a wife or some other quite distinct person and crowd violence, the disorganised explosion that takes place when a crowd is transformed into a mob.

6. Frustration is fundamental to both the apathy and the violence we find in the urban situations. They occur when frustration reaches such a pitch that people feel nothing matters but to change their unbearable conditions at any cost. It can come from a feeling of grave injustice or a sense of one's own dignity.

7. The worst moment of frustration comes not when everything is completely passive but when things have begun to move but are sluggish or stop again, or simply cannot keep pace with the demand for change. This is similar to the way mental patients are not suicidal at their lowest point of depression so much as they may be when things have just begun to improve even to a considerable degree. It was Machiavelli's dictum that only complete suppression works. Once his Prince gives way at all the whole situation may break down. Suppression is more galling when people feel suppressed. There is a strong emotional element in it. But it is also felt out of a sense of justice, an intuitive element that does not need much training.

8. Violence has its own structure, its own 'beauty' or fascination, its own exhilaration which gives a tremendous sense of power, and its own logic which is always ready to escalate to meet other forms of violence. It is a state of mind that consumes not only the enemy but its own children. Some of course survive and are all right again, but to the extent that they are infected with this exhilaration it is questionable how trustworthy they can be, living in the shadow of the violence they have exercised.

9. The paternalistic State exercises a violence from above, under the guise of law and order, to impose injustice in favour of those to whom it chooses to allot society's benefits. (This is as true of the Fascist Right and the Communist Left, where in almost indistinguishable ways the beneficiaries are a governing dictatorial clique, as in the greed-motivated capitalist Centre, where it is the wealthy.) The worst of these forms of violence is the manipulation of people's minds, making them no longer themselves but the pawns of other people's views, interests and morality, reducing people to the minimum level of intensity in life (in other words, apathy) that paternalism can get away with in the given situation. Persons are thus reduced to objects, life lived through them and for them rather than by them.

10. It can always be seen whether in a conflict one or both sides is paternalistic in this sense. The criterion is that stereotypes are deliberately manipulated to get people under control, in place of any appeal to their reason and critical understanding and sense of justice. An offshoot of this manipulation is the use of the educational system to keep people in their place, by ladling out to them only what is 'good for them to know,' diabolising the enemy and beatifying one's own side. This needs to be seen in terms of psychological warfare against people's minds, directed at them by their own authorities who are supposed to have their interests at heart. It is the most despicable method of government, and not much better if it is directed instead at the minds of the enemy, seeking control by profoundly dishonest means: suppression of falsification of information, corruption, smears, etc.

What are the earliest steps in the violence we describe? It begins with the humiliation of enemies, ^{then} depriving them of power and degrading them. From there it can proceed through a sequence of steps to the killing of one's enemies.

Most of the ways in which one could defend oneself run the risk of infecting us with the same virus of violence. We will return a little later to what we see as the only means of avoiding this, namely social aggression. So long as people make an effort, even in the midst of violence and counter-violence, to keep ~~to aggression~~ rather than violence or to find a way back to it, there remains hope. But those who enjoy violence for its own sake have to be deeply distrusted, as they may always break out in it again. Consequently we divide the people engaged in violence into two basic categories, recognising of course that there is a gradual scale between them. Some while undertaking violence,

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hating the enemy and trying to destroy the stereotype of the other side, do not yet become callous or jubilant. Others sensuously enjoy violence and have an element of sadism in them that makes them dangerous for the future.

Violence has a 'beauty' for those who enjoy it, as showing manliness, machismo, something to do with the sex drive. It is a commonplace to recognise the gun as a phallic symbol. Women are also prone to violence but it is primarily a male pursuit. A woman's frustration can more easily come out in tears. When it comes out in violence, she is taking on a man's role when he is unable to fight his own battles, and she may be expressing a profound dissatisfaction with her own role as woman. Whether this is right or wrong, those who are sexually deeply satisfied are far less prone to violence. To some extent violence is a homosexual activity, mainly between man and man. In any case it is clear that the inclination to violence is a matter that goes far beyond the political issues for which it is supposedly enlisted. It is essential to state this, obvious as it is, because when the political issues are settled the violence will still go on and in fact be deeply infectious.

Many leaders who have come to power through violence become so deeply distrustful even of their own followers, friends and family that they become like Stalin, Shakespearean characters multiplying their demented bloodlust by millions of cases. The death of Michael Collins and other leaders of quite some integrity, in many cases at the hands of others of equal integrity, illustrates how even the devoted and idealistic can be devoured by violence once bitten by the disease.

In post-war Germany, the heaping on of a layer of fat after many years of exhaustion was found to be one way to stop violence. But then, 'the German' is still there if the fat goes. In fact, 'the German' is there anyway everywhere, in all peoples. We consciously use a commonplace stereotype here, as the susceptibility to violence is no more in the German than in others, but can always break out in all our societies into more virulent forms.

If one speaks of the control of violence, paternalism has its own ways to do so:

1. the threat of greater counter-violence by the State, e.g. hanging, enslavement, etc.

2. destroying the dignity of violent people until they become too frightened to move and are forced into apathy. This can be done by threats to their homes, their jobs, their women, etc.

3. catching the violent and using them for ~~vicious~~ purposes on the State's behalf, as hangman soldiers for special acts of terrorism.

4. the scapegoat syndrome: when violence cannot be contained, give it a direction and outlet. The art of controlling scapegoat phenomena, which exist to some degree everywhere and are always easy to escalate through a series of steps from patronising attitudes towards minorities and jokes about them through degrees of resentment and hatred up to genocide, is an important element in psychological warfare. The Romans added spectacle to this by throwing their scapegoats to wild animals or otherwise making their deaths and torture a part of the entertainment in the stadiums, implicating the spectators by their enjoyment of the bloodlust in the violence of the State. Parallels?

5. establish scapegoat behaviour which allows for a certain amount of violence, treating one group with an open violence not allowed towards other groups. Thus there is widespread acceptance of wife-beating or the beating of children in many societies, even if it is officially frowned upon.

A high intensity of life is felt in being violent. It is a source of enjoyment and a reason for taking risks in a basically violent society. All paternalistic societies are in this sense basically violent, since they believe people are evil and have to be kept down by violent means. The non-violent are looked down on as inferior. From this comes the difficulty in peace-making of avoiding the atmosphere of do-gooding, of words without substance.

The violence in Northern Ireland is part and parcel of the overall frustration on both sides, the feeling that dignity demands an explosion to change conditions. It has not run its full course. Its natural tendency is to affect and infect the other concerned societies in the Irish Republic and Britain, attempting to spread the disease by provoking counter-violence which can then lead to more violence. To keep it local is difficult, as the Palestinian experience has shown. If official action is taken against it, violence moves from hard to soft targets, which often have more propaganda value and cause more terror. The purpose is to influence international opinion and embarrass the 'enemy' government.

We believe the answer to violence is not in peace but in aggression, not an enforced apathy which will blow up later but the finding of alternative outlets for the grievances and intensity of life which the violence represents. Those idealists who have taken to violence for lack of other ways of expression can then be most active, and not merely in making gestures.

Social aggression is a robust, often uninhibited and not necessarily pleasant way to defend against violence. It is a way to fight for causes in the face of the other side's use of both apathy and violence, frustration and the manipulation of minds. It is necessary then to distinguish the forms of this aggression from violence.

Basic to the outlook of the socially aggressive is that violence as such, for its own sake, is not considered a 'noble cause.' Any cause needing violence is seen as weakened by it, not strengthened. The aggressive see not enemies but opponents. Rather than humiliate them, they want to understand them and why they use violence. Their urge is not to kill the people but to change the stereotypes, accepting the dignity of the people on the other side as much as their own. Hence they are not attracted to counter-violence. This is not a way to give way or to be simply non-violent, but an alternative way to marshall the forces. The aggressive will not be arrogant or patronising, but will recognise that their opponents' social ignorance is almost matched by their own, and know how easily they can fall back into violence if their values are not strong. Unjust violence often has a good cause which it serves badly; it has to be shown that aggression can be a better service of the same cause, a way of fighting the battle, defending oneself even against violence itself, by marshalling the wits of people, organising better, using more influence than power, so that public opinion is more strongly expressed. This is a new way of dealing with injustice, not the normal understanding of non-violence which, since Ghandi, has learned to make gestures and half-hearted actions.

Aggression needs to convince better, have better tools than violence, use everything from embarrassment and shame to clarification and planning to get public opinion on its side, counteract brainwashing and produce solutions to the problems that bedevil people out of their own actual resources. It cannot afford to lead people up the garden path, but must rouse more people to participate, share responsibility and be aroused against both the violent who threaten them and the apathetic who run to save their own skins. This aggressive manner of acting can enable the activists, who are idealists, to get out of the disease of violence, separating them from the fanatics who they themselves will know best how to recognise. The aim here is not in any way to

separate the followers from their leaders, but those who act violently because of their idealism from those who are violent as a preferred way of life, who seek out causes to be violent and would be so in any other circumstances. We do not doubt that the first group are the great majority even among the most violent activists, and for them we want to find alternative ways to act in the service of their principles.

We see specific outlets for them in the Northern Ireland situation in bringing them in to help with community discipline, not an attempt to gain power by violence. Those who would participate would be chosen by those who know them, the local community who would have to approve and say who was eligible. This would weed out those whom the community does not really trust. We see this as parallel to the work of the youth organisations, the young being mostly in sympathy with the most active in their communities, where the more mature of the young would do the same among their juniors in conjunction with neighbourhood and community councils. If the activists haven't enough vote-getting power to go into Parliament or Assembly, they should be in the local and regional councils where most of the action will take place, as the future of Northern Ireland depends on the success of neighbourhood structures as well as the forms of industrial democracy. If the second chamber idea is accepted (see paper on political structures) they would have there a share in the control of power though not of political government, which they seem to dislike anyway.

The mutation of violence into aggression would be a major effort towards a constructive buildup of Northern Ireland. It cannot be a namby-pamby effort, but will call for discretion and intelligence, and also for trust. Those who are outstanding outside as activists must have a full chance to come inside and find that there they have more rather than less to say and full scope for their talent, provided that the fanaticism as such is stilled. (We repeat again, they will know better than anyone else who the fanatics are.) If this is accomplished, an important contribution will have been made from Northern Ireland for the meeting of the basic violence/apathy syndrome that is characteristic today of cities everywhere.

Whatever one says of violence and its passive mirror-picture apathy is bedevilled by the fact that one has to go into no-man's-land. There is much material about psychopathy, about the mentally disturbed or handicapped who cannot control their drives to anger, hence are dangerous especially if easily aroused. But little is known of sociopathy, i.e. the situation that alienates the life drive of persons and through them groups. The important senses that have been corrupted or atrophied in these sociopathic situations and need strengthening are the will to live, the will to let live and the sense of justice.

We use the word 'sense' deliberately as it is built into everyone and parallel to the animals who have all three of these at an instinctual level: the will to live and to let live, a readiness to defend lives, their own, their mates', their young, which is an implied sense of justice; we can even see a sense of right and wrong in animals, when a dog is beaten unjustly, just as in small children. When we get to young children of eight or ten the sense of justice can be very strong in a constructive group. We point to the jury system as illustration. It is designed to avoid specialised judgment even by respected and learned judges in favour of twelve people who have never known each other and are chosen completely at random, who will have more common sense and therefore more sense of justice than twelve judges. We see these three inherent manifestations in man, will to live, will to let live and sense of justice, as equally natural with the five senses. They exist and can be further developed. They can also be corrupted, leading away from living and letting live to killing (not for the sake of food but to enjoy the killing), to the human failing of deliberately producing hurt and destroying life. Such corruptions have to be prepared

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for and manipulated to succeed. The preparation can be in an unhappy childhood marked by bullying or its opposite, in short by some imbalance. The manipulation is a deliberate twisting of the facts and factors in mentality (prototypes and stereotypes) and the outlook on life and loyalties, so that people see their lives and those of their loved ones endangered by some others who have consequently to be destroyed. Sometimes the unhappy childhood will be enough with little manipulation, sometimes those with a happy past can be manipulated until they lose direction completely.

From the point of view of rehabilitation, the question is whether there is some basic flaw in people which makes them go on killing as a way of life, so that even if they lose one cause for doing so they will seek another, eventually seeing even their friends as traitors to be destroyed. These are psychopaths, and the social situation has simply brought out their underlying condition. Others, having espoused a cause for which they believed they had to kill, can withdraw from fanaticism with the help of their still existing idealism or common sense.

Against the first group one must protect society even if they 'become respectable citizens.' They may break out again at any time. With the second group there is no such problem. But the real difficulty is that, while all this can be studied in individuals (if one has the white-coated gents to examine each person in a tidy and objective manner), it is extremely complicated when one sees it as a social phenomenon, these individuals corrupting a crowd and turning it into a mob, or much worse organising a strongly paternalistic group which is carried by fanatical belief and goaded by constant danger.

When we speak here of fanaticism, we mean that no doubt is ever allowed. When we speak of fanatic discipline, we mean that any infringement of duties may lead to expulsion and death. Consequently much of the world has to be seen in black and white. While a crowd's fanaticism is disorganised this fanaticism is organised. Further factors are:

1. the element of escalation. By taking certain steps one provokes retaliation, which in turn gives a rationale to the initial fanatical action; others do it too. The escalation then runs through wild incidents and the enjoyment of adulation to a flirtation with martyrdom.

2. superstructure: a religious, nationalistic or ethnic drama gives people the feeling that they are the finger of destiny, making their own deaths worth while.

3. admiration: adulation by followers, giving a heroic stance.

The counterforce to all this is responsibility, freely chosen values, the ability to evaluate coolly any imposed rights and duties, precisely from the point of view of the will to live and let live and the sense of justice, which is where we came in. Unfortunately, these are being weakened in people by a much wider world crisis which has sapped the inner structure of their own values, and the corruption of yet a fourth 'sense' (which we have not mentioned before), the desire to belong to groups and find identity in them. This 'sense' often includes as its corrupting factor the desire to have a father figure. Hence if the leader is corrupted with violence the group will likely be too even in the face of disaster, hypnotised by the charisma of the leader. One can see this in the young SS men who were put to serve first in the concentration camps to see if their sense of duty to Hitler would completely suppress their human responsibilities. But it was not only uneducated or inexperienced youngsters who were susceptible to such treatment and conditioning. The German

General Staff, sophisticated and educated leaders of men, with strong nationalistic consciences, who knew clearly that Hitler was destroying Germany, yet never wavered in action except for one half-hearted attempt, whatever they thought privately. This was a form of desk psychopathy or rather sociopathy, in which they had lost control of their own thinking and will and were paralysed. Their overthrowing of Hitler would have saved the lives of millions and they fully knew it, all but a few psychopaths in the SS knowing that all was lost.

We go into so much detail here in order to find where the major hopes and where the potential dangers are in the future. Even when the crisis is past one must still watch for new symptoms, as the fire brigade does after a fire is apparently out.

In view of the Irish and British/Irish history, one must have compassion but also try to remain objective, seeing not only the oddities and particularities of the situation but also its relation to the problem common to cities, the breakdown in urban life. One must keep one's compassion without taking political sides. These are living people, not some abstract socio-scientific problem that doesn't bleed. Northern Ireland points up an important lesson for all cities and urban-based societies: if people lose their basic values and violence and psychopathy break out, it will only be by the most concentrated planning effort that they will be able to work out what is happening and what they can do, how to find out the other forms of this same sociopathy, like apathy, extreme frustration, resentment at institutions, a feeling of helplessness and inequality, unwillingness to think and act with responsibility. The social aggression we describe can be used as a freeing agent. Catharsis and social aggression are different from violence but disposed to strong action, as counteragents and replacements for violence.

The apocalyptic riders of violence hypnotise and paralyse people, making those once demoralised expect always more. We find nothing more obscene in Northern Ireland than the gleam in the eye with which people tell one another it is not over yet, that more and worse will come, the bloodbath, the catastrophe, with a show of inverted pride and a caricature of courage.

We pause in this chapter, between the more analytic and awareness-orientated papers of the first part of this series and the more concrete papers of proposals that will follow, to elaborate some theory, a schematisation that we have found useful for the planning and assessment of social growth in many situations quite apart from Northern Ireland. After we have explained it in general terms it will be possible either for us or for our readers to apply it to the particular situation, assessing in the process this theoretical structure itself as well as any concrete proposals we or others may make. Any theory is basically a tool for predicting, and can be accounted valid to the extent that predictions and plans made on its basis come out right.

The development of groups or communities, their progress or their decay, follows certain patterns. They are never quite as tidy as in the accompanying sketch. The route will normally have its ups and downs and its sideways motion. The various phases may come in a different order than we have sketched. And there may be returns to the beginning, to square 1, after which it is necessary to start over again. Our experience is that the return to square one is likelier if some one or more of the phases have been omitted or neglected in the planning process, and the main use of this theory and this sketch is to see that obvious omissions of that sort that will mean the collapse of the whole effort be spotted on time and remedied. The phases theory serves a monitoring purpose then, showing some pitfalls to avoid and a sequence of necessary elements that, in our experience, can be neglected only at peril to the whole community planning and growth effort. Its uses are:

- 1) to understand what may otherwise appear illogical, random, haphazard symptoms.
- 2) to have some idea of the progress or otherwise and the general direction.
- 3) to help in planning what else needs to be done, what needs to be done next.
- 4) to understand the symptoms of a phase without becoming panic-stricken when they are unpleasant or may have dangers. The main danger is always that of sliding back to the beginning, the initial phases of apathy and violence, so that everything has been done in vain.
- 5) to give an overview of the situation as a whole, in proof or disproof of the phases theory itself, by one's own knowledge and experience.
- 6) to allow freely a holistic social planning effort by the entire community.

We should make it clear at the outset that this is an extremely rough and ready structure, not grandiose in theory but produced out of considerable experience with groups of many sorts and sizes. Since it is no precision tool it leaves margins for opinion, and the phases and sub-phases may overlap. The direction is important, and the speed of progress or regress. We often picture the totality of social growth or any of the factors of social health as ladders, and point out that when one is climbing up the ladder it is always necessary to make the effort to haul oneself up each step, but in going down the ladder it is easy to fall the whole way at once.

In making a profile of the whole society, whether in Northern Ireland or elsewhere, it will normally be found that different groups and persons are at different phases on the sketch. In Northern Ireland, for instance, there are groups with whom the level of apathy is low, that of violence high. Most people but not all are in the catharsis or the indignation phases, with hostility rather than actual hatred. Awareness is generally poor, the level of grouping and leadership high, action premature since it is coming from the cathartic and indignation phases only for the most part. But that is to anticipate and give the outsider's random impressions, which have nothing like the value of the participants' considered assessments based on this same general theory.

	(10 degrees) <u>Violence</u>	(10 degrees) <u>Apathy</u>
	CATHARSIS	
LIBERATION STAGE	<u>Indignation</u> phase; sense of shame	
	<u>Justice</u> phase; sense of justice, will to live and let live	
	<u>Awareness</u> phase; curiosity and doubt	
	<u>Grouping and Leadership</u> phase; solidarity, belonging	
	<u>Planning</u> phase: what to do for, what against; imagination, creativity	
	ACTION: antinegative, then positive	

SOCI-O-CREATIVE STAGE: <u>freedom</u>		short range	middle range	long range	faith
VALUE STAGE: <u>Human Rights and Responsibilities</u>					
<u>Know How</u> : social education					
<u>Know When and Where</u> : social planning					
<u>Know Why</u> : social value planning					
UNLEARNING: of stereotypes, conformisms, blockages and shrinkages					

We see this sketch as breaking into four stages: 1) apathy and violence, the place from which most people start in our world, and not only in Northern Ireland; 2) liberation, the series of phases with which we are mainly concerned in this paper; 3) the socio-creative stage, in which people act together in an achieved freedom; 4) the value stage, based on the active cultivation of human rights and responsibilities.

1) Apathy and Violence.

We find apathy and violence to be characteristic symptoms of the frustrations found not only in Northern Ireland but commonly in many societies that people feel have gone out of control. We measure the degree of either apathy or violence in the society (or any segment of it) on a scale of ten. Our experience is that apathy and violence are mirror images of one another, symptoms of the same social ailments and open to rapid and arbitrary interchange with one another. Apathy is often, though not always, a frozen form of violence, a variant reaction to the same underlying frustration that produces violence. The violence itself is often an exploding form of the same forces as induce the apathy, and the two can alternate by pendulum swings, as the violent come to an almost catatonic pause through exhaustion and the apathetic, through the accumulation of new defeats, humiliations, indignities, burst into frenzied violent activity.

When once one has considered the character and forms of apathy and violence in a particular situation, like that in Northern Ireland, one must be careful not to settle for an 'average.' Different groups will be at very different degrees. One must have a profile of, e.g., the activists, the authorities, the politicians, those expected to be the value carriers of the society; the police, the army, the bulk of the people and, among them, the depressed, the miserable, the disinherited, the scapegoats. One must further break down the activists and their leadership; this is important because the activists may themselves be in a stage from which they want to lead people or they may be behind or below, disappointed, themselves apathetic, blocked, losing or having lost their place of popularity. Other activists may be so much in advance that they are not acceptable, prophets without honour. The profile is interesting in itself because it will show the ambivalence that exists before catharsis.

If people are below the half-way mark on a scale that would measure the degrees of apathy or violence from one to ten, then the internal or outward elements that block them have first to be overcome, by a cathartic process, before they are ready to go through the phases of a liberative process that will enable them to take concerted positive and anti-negative action. The listing of these ten degrees is a bit arbitrary and will vary according to the concrete particulars of different situations. We find our own lists come out differently in different contexts, and rather than give an arbitrary list here that can be revised without losing its validity in principle, we will speak instead of an underlying factor behind the apathy and violence and the frustration of which they are symptoms, namely the anxiety that leaves people a prey to frustrations and blockages. Of this anxiety we will give a scale of ten degrees, also open to revision, which can be a model for the other scales of ten. Anything from 1 to 5 on the list is hopeful, giving people some initial capacity for positive as well as anti-negative action. Anything below it will require a catharsis before that capacity can be set free, and it is quite sure that the first concerted group actions they can plan and undertake will have to be anti-negative, i.e. opposing some injustice they see being done them, rather than positive or a constructive project of their own choice.

Ten Degrees of Anxiety:

1. Ready and willing to act against, willing to discuss what may later be positive.
2. Preparing for the readiness in degree 1.
3. Willing to act against, only very mildly or theoretically interested in anything for.
4. Only willing to act against, not even interested in discussing action for.
5. Willing to act only against negative forces, but with hope now at a crossroads, to go down even further or begin to climb up again.
6. Only anti-negative, with periods of hopelessness; distress and demoralisation setting in, little hope.
7. Distress as way of life; unable to go through normal acts of daily life without grave difficulty, only limited periods of any hopefulness.
8. Severe distress, paralysing more and more of the daily acts of life, losing hope and knowing it.
9. Beginning of critical distress, having lost hope, feeling one may go to pieces.
10. Gone to pieces, complete despair and dullness; ranging from breakdown to catastrophe.

It is at the transition from this initial stage of apathy and violence to the early phases of the liberation stage that people are most vulnerable to the scapegoat syndrome. We distinguish between the undirected outburst of the catharsis and the indignation phase, that begins to be directed towards the true causes of the blocked and frustrated situation people have found themselves in. Action at the cathartic stage is premature and negatively destructive, and people going through the catharsis are easily manipulable. They may direct their energy and rage at scapegoats through their own inattentiveness to their true condition or through the manipulation of stereotypes by the vested interests in the society. It is rare to find a scapegoat situation without some degree, even a considerable degree, of manipulation. In fact, manipulating a scapegoat situation is the easiest protection for an elitist vested-interest group to prevent people from directing their indignation in any way that will fundamentally change conditions and end their situation of helplessness. It acts like a lightning rod, dissipating their group energy before anything substantial can come of it (apart from the physical damage to the scapegoats themselves). In this it is not unlike encounter therapy for individuals, which releases the energy of their frustrations and renders them harmless again until they build up more steam.

2) Liberation Stage.

The second major stage is an attempt at liberation, a concerted effort at empowerment, enabling people to change conditions. Success here depends on whether the action phase is reached and the situation not aborted early, falling back to the first stage of apathy and violence again. If such an abortive result comes about, it is generally from one or other of two causes: either an effort to move within the same dimension as before, reshuffling, rearranging, improving by reforms of detail that do not affect the basic structure of society or the fundamental conditions of people's lives; or a parallel effort (also a reshuffler's and rearranger's effort) to smash up the whole fabric of an oppressive society, carried out with a negative energy that is all basically at the cathartic level, in the expectation that some sort of messianic situation will develop after all is swept away. Plus ça change.... The improvement course normally falls back to apathy, the smashing up course to violence, going back in each case to square one or worse. Hence equally either of them fails to alter major conditions but simply resets them, normally to the advantage of another elite group, if successful, or to the added advantage of the initial elite group if unsuccessful, securing that it will hold on even further.

To accomplish the real liberative process, a society has to go through the phases of growth, with its occasional explosions, its slow and often painful development. We have to say something first of the catharsis itself, the often ugly and revolting process of clearing and cleansing the soul, an expression of woes, miseries, hurts, bitterness and resentments. It is our observation that most of what has happened in Northern Ireland over these last five years has served little purpose beyond that of catharsis, and that this is consequently where the Northern Irish society on balance lies in the growth process.

There is a difference between a row and a catharsis, in that catharsis is a relieving factor and gives a feeling of unloading frustrations, whereas a row makes people only more anxious. We believe most people are either blocked off by social conditions which do not allow them to grow beyond a certain point, especially if they are on their own or in weak groups only, or they are actually shrinking away from the limiting positions that the blockages allow them to get to. Blockages can affect groups, communities, whole layers of society which have gone as far as they can without meeting resistance and no further. Social shrinkage is a more personal matter, though it can also happen to groups and communities. It means that people do not even get near the social borders that shut them or their peer group in, but shrink back from them and live a much smaller-scaled life than they need to. A third factor besides blockage and shrinkage is the accumulated experience of personal unhappiness, past suffering, etc.

Catharsis has an effect on all three, enabling people to take the first steps towards liberating themselves. It may be different in each of these three cases, but has in common that it is normally crude, overstated, unbalanced, an expression of great misery and hostility. It is important to recognise the necessity of this phenomenon and not be panicked at its unpleasantness or try to suppress or mask its symptoms. There are people who are so blocked off shrunk that their catharsis takes a long time and requires much patience to achieve. It may repeat itself if there is too much. The pressure on people in catharsis is great. They cry, shout, scream, accuse, and behave as in great pain, normally a process that goes on for a while. When one expects an individual catharsis it is good that others should be present, provided that they too experience the catharsis and turn each other on. One must set aside time for it and not interrupt if it is possible. In a social cathartic situation ample time has also to be provided, the situation recognised and understood so that people do not panic, patience exercised and the experience shared. It can

be seen whether this is truly a catharsis and not merely a random outbreak of violence by whether people feel more helpless and frustrated as a result of it or whether they experience a sense of community success and empowerment, as by now both the sectarian segments of Northern Ireland's society have to some extent. This is a critical moment. If the process, the phases of liberation that will enable the community to take concerted action, should not be followed now, the opportunity can be lost and the final state worse than what went before.

The indignation phase involves a hurt sense of justice and dignity about some basic factors on which people feel strongly. Its weaker cousin is irritation, which is superficial. Indignation is a powerful force which if undirected or if manipulated by outsiders or vested interests can do much harm. It can be a part of the catharsis, can precede or follow it. If severely frustrated it can turn into hatred, and vice versa hatred can be turned from a destructive to a constructive force by removing the element of frustration from it, changing it into indignation. This is not an easy task because a strong antinegative or positive motivation is necessary. Indignation can be reached through reason or intuition; hatred cannot.

Indignation provides the main emotional strength that will help people to liberate themselves. When people have suffered intense frustration and had to go through a catharsis before they could break away from the patterns of apathy or violence, an anti-negative directedness is necessary as the first building block of motivation that will enable them to move towards a new and positively directed social value system. To begin with positive plans and directions is unconvincing, Pollyannaish. What is important is that the indignation be directed truly at the real source of the community's distress and not simply be a way of blowing off steam. Unlike catharsis, indignation is strongly directed. It can overlap with catharsis but wants to do something specific and planned.

While indignation gives the emotional motor to a community's or group's liberation effort, it is necessary that reason and the intuitive faculties of social intelligence also be awakened and play their part if the whole process is to be based on common sense. This is the place and the necessity of the basically intuitive phase of the will to live and let live and the sense of justice, and of the rational awareness phase of curiosity and doubt, though it must also be said that there are elements of all three faculties, reason, emotion and social intelligence, in each of these three phases.

The will to live and let live, the sense that one can and must do something to oppose injustice and to build better conditions, is the basis of action and leadership, which may materialise quickly or slowly. We speak of leadership in everyone. There are no born leaders, though there are leaders' leaders who can easily be replaced; in other words, all are born leaders. The key here is an assumption of responsibility, a motion of will to find ways and means of acting as leaders, even if later other and better leaders may emerge. The let-live sense is the beginning of grouping with others. It introduces a stretching-out period of interest in people beyond personal self-interest.

Curiosity and doubt are the main planks of awareness of facts, chances, dangers. Their basis is in the rational, an understanding of the real roots of problems, not their symptoms only. Curiosity is the forward-moving factor, the search for new patterns and elements. Doubt is the debunking force, seeking to find fault.

When we measure the initial attitudes of apathy and violence on our scale of ten degrees, we find that the weakest, most attenuated form of violence is indignation, the weakest form of apathy is curiosity and doubt. This is to say that the only effective antidotes to apathy and violence are apathy and

violence themselves, but in their most attenuated forms, the only forms with any genuine social use. Either indignation or the curiosity and doubt combination is powerless by itself to achieve the liberation of person or society, as they feed upon themselves and become frustrated, indignation turning with frustration into hatred, curiosity and doubt into cynicism. In either case the end result is simply a reversion to apathy and violence, back to square one. The combination of them is needed, in a defrustrated form, and together they will be the basis of the planning process.

The intuitive part, the senses (in a use of the word comparable to its use for the external senses) of the will to live and let live and the sense of justice, as the basis for the formation of groups and leaders, are equally necessary if the liberation process is to be in fact social. It is a common experience when a group has begun its painful way through the liberative process that a few individuals manage to break through but the society at large fails to find its way and falls back to the apathy/violence stage again. The net result is then failure: for the few liberated individuals, alienation from their groups, and for the community demoralisation. Hence it is especially important at this stage of the process to see that the intuitive elements and the formation of groups and leaders are not being neglected and ignored. What we refer to as a social action survey is a technique to see that the initial process of forming hypotheses and eventually action plans and the progressive consultation of the people in widening circles until no one can claim he has had no opportunity to make his impress on the community's plans and action, is done in such a way that the community discovers for itself as the process goes on where its natural leadership is, who will work to make things happen instead of merely preventing action, how the groupings naturally work together and where the creative polarisations are found.

3) Socio-creative Stage.

Concerted action must follow now. If it is to succeed it must be linked up with training throughout, and give scope to imagination and creativity. Initially it is bound to be built on indignation against something, action to liberate, free, be rid of rather than for anything in particular, for new ways, although the anti-negative and the positive action may overlap under certain circumstances. If the group's or the community's activity remains indefinitely at this anti-negative level, however, it will produce only fanaticism.

It is a weakness of many community-empowerment concepts or systems, we find, to believe that popular groups are so dependent on experts that they are incapable of getting beyond short-term anti-negative plans or goals, of making use of the expert assistance without being controlled by it. It is for this reason that we include the following stages of freedom and of human rights and responsibilities. When the liberation process is once achieved and people have acquired freedom to act as participatory social groups, it is necessary that their planning and activity include not only short-range goals but middle and long-range goals as well, even those which are a product of their faith, in a rather secular sense, because their accomplishment will be beyond the lifetime of those who work towards them. To aim at the short-range objects only is to be ultimately mere ineffectual reformers, patching up isolated elements in what has become an inoperable social system, while to aim at the long range only is to dream pipe-dreams if nothing is to be accomplished or seem to be happening in the present. To accomplish this without becoming the victims or tools of its own experts a community, group or society must gain a grasp of the common-sense elements of know-how, know where and when and know-why that are the products of social education, social planning and social value planning. It must also unlearn the stereotypes and other conformity pressures that make them manipulable by elites and establishments.

The importance of the short-range goals and action projects is to create a social climate. There must be, from very early in the process, short-range things happening if people are to believe in their capacity to do anything or feel it as experienced power. The long-range plans and projects, necessary if the whole thing is not to be a con to quiet people down for the convenience of administrators who 'know better,' are always revisable and refinable as the community's experience and values deepen. The middle-range is necessary to stitch together the short and long-range.

What the content of the community's plans and activity is to be, at short, middle or long-range, is not for us to say, as our own role is that of technical advisers on a process. People have to develop the content themselves from their own aspirations. We will never be bashful about throwing up possibilities and proposals, as this entire series of papers does, but they are offered as something for people to chew on, discuss and, we expect, either drastically revise or totally reject in favour of something that comes from themselves. Our offering suggestions even with that expectation is part of the catalyst job.

The inclusion of a fourth dimension, faith, is not meant in the religious sense, though eventually it does have affinities with what the religions talk about. When we speak of faith as a planning phase, we mean planning and working for things whose benefit we will not see, because they are beyond our own lifetime or in other ways inaccessible to us for ourselves. In the long run this is related to the religious experience of faith too (though not identical with it) in being about whether or not we are really optimistic about our own and others' lives, whether we believe our and our communities' lives and histories make any real sense, or whether we think they are just 'one damn thing after another,' meaningless.

In all this process there are a number of common sense or social intelligence factors which can also be measured on a scale of ten if we wish to have a profile of the situation. These are instinct, intuition, the will to live, the will to let live, the sense of justice, leadership, groups and a sense of belonging, intensity of life, hope, the sense of beauty and order, creativity, joy in living or play, adventure and novelty, and finally the concatenation of them as a whole.

To take only those factors which appear on our sketch as the phases of liberation, we can say that if we get to the bottom of the scale of ten and the most negative forms, the indignation phase settles down into hatred at its worst, the sense of justice and the will to live and let live settle to a negative desire to destroy all those seen as connected with injustice, the awareness phase of curiosity and doubt settles to a dullness and a falling back on the poorest stereotypes and prototypes, the formation of groups and leaders settles into the formation of crowds, mobs, bullying groups and negative leaders or demagogues, the planning phase is stymied for lack of imagination. We find it important that a community or group working seriously at a planning process have and understand the use of such measuring tools as these, so that it can make its own self-evaluations constantly and edge its group activities towards the top of all these scales. We have other rough measuring tools as well, not requiring any sort of academic proficiency to apply but quite digestible for a community of ordinary live people, to help them in their internal discernment process, such as a scale of personal and social age, based on the person's or group's growth in responsibility and readiness to identify with the problems and needs of increasingly wider circles of other people.

Throughout the process there is need for continuing training, which should reach the widest possible circle of participants. For this it is essen-

tial that the content of the training not be something academic that would be the property of ourselves or any other social 'experts,' but common-sense things fully accessible to the non-expert, the 'generalist' who has learned how to live in a modern society. We speak often of a leap-frog effect; that each person trained in these common-sense techniques should be able to train others, and that the effectiveness of each person's training should be judged not by what he accomplishes himself, but by what others whom he has trained accomplish.

People need to understand the process they are going through if they are not to be frightened off it. The greater the frustration the greater the dangers inherent in the process itself, but the most threatening of all dangers is that one should be satisfied with mere changes, cosmetic repairs to the still unworkable system, and leave growth stymied or never attempted, the underlying sources of the frustration untouched.

4) Value Stage.

There is a technical exercise that comes into all this training, which we call the Social Action Survey. We will not attempt more than the most summary description of it in this paper. It is not a statistical exercise or even fundamentally an information-gathering kind of survey, but a way of sounding out what people want and enabling them to formulate it, of involving constantly widening circles of people in the action-planning process and locating the real natural leadership.

To do all that the process is disarmingly simple. The first step is to set up, much as this series of papers does, within a relatively small group, an hypothesis about how the community or society could move, come to life, do things, what people might want to accomplish at short, middle and long range. Working up this hypothesis is what we call a pre-survey. The hypothesis is then taken out into the community. People are consulted, not to gather information with which the original group can sell its product or get its way, but to bring a fuller representation of the community into the process of accepting, rejecting, amending or finding alternatives for the original hypothesis. In this early stage of the survey a relatively limited number of people are consulted, some just plain people, others the 'experts,' whether in the formal sense or in the way that, say, a postman or a milkman is an expert on the people in a neighbourhood; in short, all the particular people whose opinions would have to have been heard before the planning process could get anywhere and enough others so that the result does not reflect elitists thinking of any sort. In the course of this the hypothesis will change a lot, and one also finds out who really works to get things done rather than to hold things down, what kinds of leadership quality who in the community has, and whether basically the community is ready to move or not.

What comes out of this early stage of the survey we call the second hypothesis. At this stage of the process there is still a choice of acting or not acting. The next stage is to consult (using the people who have become active through the previous stage) very widely, involving everyone in the community who can possibly be brought in. A new revision of the hypothesis will result from this, but it can now no longer be called hypothesis but is an action plan, not made for the community by anyone outside but coming from the community itself. If the process is to be fully democratic, there should be no excuse for anyone feeling he has been left without opportunity to influence the process, been left out or overridden. The action plan is still capable of development, revision, etc., but there is no longer any going back on action.

A major element in the whole process of social growth in the community is the social value planning, or the know-why. It necessarily runs concurrent with the social education or training process (the know-how) and the social planning process (know when and where) that is accomplished through the social action survey, though the social value planning will more consciously dominate as the community's growth and sense of its democratic capacities deepens.

Social value planning has to do with our thesis (up for acceptance, rejection or modification by the community like anything else we present here, though it is among our deeper convictions) that what is really in crisis in our whole civilisation is the paternalistic order of society, the system of the control of society by elites who 'know better' than ordinary people and keep them in their place actually by using apathy and violence as weapons against them. This order of society is no longer able to deal with the multiple and converging crises that it has itself created with the increasing complexity of civilisation. So there are breakdowns of credibility with all the establishments and institutions, malfunction increasingly of every structural element in the society without exception. Consequently there needs to be replacement, for a reafforestation of what has become a social wasteland. This is why we see a need not for revolution, the deliberate destruction of social institutions in a period when the social fabric is already in catastrophic decay, but for growth.

We see this breakdown of paternalistic order as fact, welcome enough but something that is there rather than something we would simply want to be there. It gives people an opportunity they have never before had in history, to build a fraternal society based on universal responsibility and people's controlling their own lives in solidarity. There is another alternative which could shape the future of our society if we don't manage to build that fraternal society, and that is a panic reaction by people who find everything becoming uncertain around them and looking for a father-figure who will stop everything from happening by knocking all the heads together. This would mean regression to the most primitive and brutal kind of society. The problems an advanced paternalism has been unable to meet because of the growing complexity of our civilisation would be resolved by cutting them down and reducing society to a hard uniformity. It matters very little whether this is done by the political Right or by the Left.

The life-line, as we see it, between the old and the new societies is the concept of and reverence for human rights, the finest accomplishment of the old society and the only guarantee that the new one will be fit for a human life. We link this with the voluntary assumption of responsibility as the thing that will put people in humane control of their whole society's life. Responsibility, we find, is the only factor that really conduces to social growth and maturity in people or communities.

Unlearning is the fourth major phase of the value stage in the growth process. Of itself it is a part of the social value planning, but it always occupies a large and distinctive part of any specific social or conflict situation and so calls for separate consideration. This is a process people have to work out for themselves, not something we or anyone can impose upon them. What have to be unlearned are the stereotypes that have substituted for and excluded reality in people's minds and way of seeing what goes on about them, the conformisms and conformity pressures (these are not the same thing as group or communal or even much wider solidarity, which we would always want to build up), the blockages which prevent people from acting up to their capacity or make them disbelieve in their actual capacity, the shrinkages by which people learn to step back even from the frontier of activity that they know is available to them despite the blockages, and retreat to somewhere more comfortable.

We should point out that the enemy for us is neither Right nor Left, is no sectarian label or group and none of the organisations for any purpose in any part of the Northern Ireland scene, but paternalism. We doubt that we will find any group or organisation in which paternalism is not a constituent and perhaps a major constituent element, particularly in so authoritarian a style of society as is Ireland's and Northern Ireland's. Breaking away from paternalism is new, and the old disease is something we ourselves have to fight in ourselves as much as anyone. Anyone or any group that should look to us for training in social technique and planning has consequently to be as much on guard with us, at just that level, as we will try to enable them to be on guard against the paternalism in themselves and others. We expect paternalism in any group we work with and will not compromise with it in any group, and consequently can expect an uneasy relation with any of them. In this we are all learners alike and together, ourselves as much suspended in the middle of the unlearning process with regard to the stereotypes of paternalism as anyone.

SOME QUESTIONS OF POLITICAL STRUCTURE
Interim Proposals for the Severely Distressed Period.

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If the general focus of a social planning effort is accepted in Northern Ireland, whether helped or hindered by the details of our proposals as the case may be, we would foresee an interim period of perhaps five years marked by a condominium before a more settled constitutional arrangement is agreed upon.

During the first year we would foresee a gradual withdrawal of the bulk of the British Army. By the second year the greater part of the Army would have handed over its policing role to legal Northern Irish forces of a sort and combination acceptable to the various segments of the community, with or without international observers as might prove necessary or desirable. Over the third year the middle term planning action would take place. By the fourth year the beginnings of long term planning would become visible. And in the fifth year, as a result of the previous four years' activities, we could expect a constitutional form for the area to be settled.

For this five-year sequence, one may also read five sub-phases, which might be concentrated into a shorter period than five years. If possible the period should not be allowed to run longer than five years. By the end of the five year period, whatever the constitutional settlement, whether the area be a detached or semi-detached entity, still closely linked with Britain, more closely related to Ireland and in some still undefined federative arrangement, Britain's formal financial obligation towards the area by way of direct subvention or transferred funds would end unless by mutual agreement. (See the paper on the economic future.)

Our proposals here are for a quite temporary interim governmental arrangement during the five-year period. Basically, we would like to see a bicameral assembly, with one directly elected and one community chamber; the first chamber that of government, the second that of community forces.

a) The first chamber, an Assembly or whatever it might be called, would be made up of representatives of the actual political structure elected in the ordinary way already established. Presumably it would be to start with a roughly 60/40 structure, but the lines of division might alter considerably if the situation itself altered one way or another over the period. If power-sharing could be the basis of this Assembly, well and good, but it should not and may not be engineered from the outside. Any such development would depend on both sides feeling secure enough for it.

b) The second chamber; it might be called Great Council or something of the sort, but distinctly not Senate or anything that suggests a house of elder statesmen. To avoid too pompous a name we will for the time being simply call it 'second house.' Protestants should have a numerical majority in this community chamber as well, in proportion both to their majority position in the population and the greater number of community units to be represented. But in such cases as the second house does choose to take up an issue on which it runs contrary to the first house or Assembly, either side, the Catholic or the Protestant bloc, should be able to apply a veto. By its character, this house's normal concerns should be quite different from the Assembly's. Hence its picking up an issue from the Assembly should be a rare event, but an available recourse. It should be made up of representatives of four kinds;

1. neighbourhood leaders chosen by the grass-roots community assemblies or organisations, answerable to them at all times and able to be

recalled by them, so as to produce a contingent close to the grass-roots.

2. youth representatives (if this is accepted, it would be a major step forward) for the 15-18-year olds (these should be 18-year-olds) and for the 18-23-year-olds (drawn from among themselves). They should be selected by their peer group from among a panel of young leaders.

3. women's leaders, chosen in an analogous way.

4. leaders of the over-65 age group.

The people voting for these second-house members would also be voting for lower-house Assembly members in the normal way. The representation in the second house of the three types of peer groups (young, women, old) should be comparatively small, but enough so that their voices are distinctly heard. We would hope that as the business of this second house went on over the several-year period, there would be a crossing of interests over the present dividing lines, that there would be common interests added to the divisive ones. But as the lower-house Assembly would have its representatives chosen in the normal partisan way the actual political situation could not be manipulated, distorted or papered over. Should there then be a practically total stalemate on the whole gamut of issues, the future solution would have to be on the basis of division, but with the realisation that it would leave both parts of minimum size and hardly viable. It is already evident now that an impoverished, smashed part of Northern Ireland joining the southern Republic would upset the political/economic balance that has been created there at the cost of fifty years' effort.

Internal matters of policy should, by process of devolution, be in the hands of the first house. If at the end of the five-year interim period the Province is part of a larger unit (Great Britain or, if it should come to that, Ireland), the larger unit should have control only over foreign affairs and those major matters of economics or finance that vitally affect the larger unit (remembering, however, that the two-chamber system is here recommended only for the five-year interim period itself).

The second house as we have described it is not at all an elder-statesmen's 'upper house' but rather a house for grass-roots social democracy, to balance the political democracy of the Assembly. Political parties should be free to contest seats in both houses, but it should be clear from the nature of the second house that there would be overlapping parties that stood for more local issues or for a different kind of issues, and might be relatively independent of the sort of parties that would dominate the first house. The second house would deal primarily with issues that concerned the daily acts of living and the restructuring of the community. Except for the officers, its members should not be paid more than compensation for earnings lost by their activity in the house.

As a representation of all age groups and of women, the second house should provide that everyone has a say, even those important segments of the community that do not normally have political representation, the small bodies of activists who in times of peace are easily pushed aside, despite their strong views. Their situation may well coincide with that of youth groups, who are normally unrepresented in the political process.

We cannot emphasise enough the importance of these activists not being counted out, and being measured not by their voting power but by their impact power. They should be represented as otherwise democracy will be seen as a place only for nice guys with good manners. The purpose of the political process should not be to suppress activism but to produce intensity, that people should find channels to act out their consciences, their needs, their views. We see this second house as a viable way for all to participate without being forced into the conventionally political arena where the silent majority has its say every four or five years.

The forthcoming Constitutional Convention will be for the formation of the elected chamber. There might also be consideration for the other, second chamber by an informal convention and/or as an informal part of the main Convention, parallel to it, before and after it. Bodies should be represented here which are not political parties but are considered as having an important say in the future. They are to be among the constituent parts of the second house we propose. At the Convention they should be like the Non-Governmental Organisations at the United Nations, i.e. outside bodies with no vote, but with the right to attend as observers, to be brought into special committee meetings where their expertise will be valued even by those who don't agree with them. This applies especially to those groups which have few votes but strong clout, e.g. the paramilitary bodies, which would resent having no voice at all in these talks. They could meet in their own informal convention as well as formally or informally with the politicians in subcommittees. The paramilitaries are important but not the only bodies with this sort of importance. They and other bodies like the youth, the women and the local community bodies should be represented in the Convention stage as a dress rehearsal for the second chamber, and as a criterion to ensure that those who go into the second house should be not only those approved by the powers that be. There should be special subcommittees for various interests. A clerk should be elected who is independent of all the groups, to keep communications open and obtain the best possible advice. This convention should not be a place for old recriminations. People should be assumed to be there for constructive purposes. The presence of representatives of any given party or interest should not be considered as official approval or disapproval of those who come.

As a corollary to this proposal, we would suggest the establishment of assemblies on the Swiss pattern in which local citizens are called together to vote, discuss and appoint. This should reduce the necessity and work of committees to the minimum. It should be linked in turn to the holding of local referenda on new issues, not necessarily of the greatest importance but interesting enough for people to want a say, e.g. building plans etc. These may well mean that people would cross the dividing lines in their interests, as in the case of the motorway.

It is possible that this bicameral system would also help towards resolving one of the most awkward problems of the future, that of the police. We would recommend two police forces, one under the Assembly, the other constituted under the second house in conjunction with neighbourhood leaders and the young. This would produce a balance of power between: a) a professional police force and b) a voluntary local police force, part professional and part paraprofessional, each with its distinct and defined area of responsibility.

We would also like to see the establishment of a conciliation group made up of people who are practical experts in conflict situations, with its own Peace Marshalls, like the U.S. Federal Marshalls, independent of both sides, and unarmed. Their task would be to deal with conflict issues or trouble spots, usually before things come to a head, but also ready to separate groups, if necessary by force. The Peace Marshalls should be paid not by the government or any other body which can be seen as a party to the conflict situation, but by an international body, perhaps European or UN. The interested parties could be contributors to a fund for this purpose administered by the international body, but the peace body must not be seen as dependent on or funded by any one/interested source.

It would be desirable for this conciliation group and peace body to bring in some professional leadership that is neither British nor Irish. Earlier in this paper we mentioned the possibility of bringing in international observers at such time during the five-year period as the policing powers now exercised by the British Army would be handed over to local forces. Here would be their role.

We emphasise once again that these are temporary proposals, intended only for a five-year period during which the snags in this approach to social as well as political democracy would be found. The two major structures proposed (the two houses), with the minor one of the conciliation group, would be mobile enough to give the necessary reassurance to all groups in the community. The second house in which everyone has the chance to be represented would be an ingathering of the outsiders.

Comparative long-term security is needed for political democracy. Hence its elections for periods of time that normally run four or five years. This is the advantage and the disadvantage of the formal political democracy with elected parliamentary representatives. Any recall system for the representatives would make the political democracy chaotic and unworkable, allowing only short-term plans and forbidding any unpopular steps.

On the other hand, the lively hurly-burly of the second house we propose, a rambunctious Grand Council whose members would be recallable by and constantly answerable to the community groups, would allow for an ongoing dialogue and argument, introducing into the process topics closer to the daily acts of living. They should be called upon to deal with the major political questions only when there were major conflicts of view with the other house. It can be hoped that there would be considerable freedom of expression within this house, no whips, and that people would vote according to their conscience rather than according to religion or official leaders.

? All these proposals are made with discomfort, because we believe any structures can freeze the situation and be the agents of manipulation. But we recognise the need for a system at once formal and permissive to deal with both sides. The bureaucracy, the senior judiciary and the senior political leadership are trained to think only in terms of formal structure. It is this that we have sought to counterbalance.

When we wrote of the identity crises of the British in particular, we spoke of the acute embarrassment, shame and frustration of the British public that the Mother of Democracies had not found it possible to deal with the Irish crisis democratically. Internment — or detention or whatever name one may choose to call the imprisonment without due process of law practiced in Northern Ireland — sticks in everyone's craw, British as well as Irish, Protestant as well as Catholic, military as well as civilian, the outside world as well as those enmeshed in the conflict.

It is no good acting as if this were all just concern about the normal procedure of law and hoping that all will be well if, when the situation at last settles down, there is a general amnesty as always after a civil war. It is necessary to find distinctive treatment for those who attack military targets and those who attack 'soft' civilian targets, indiscriminately killing civilians or targets chosen only on sectarian (or 'tribal') grounds. People who fight military targets and in doing so risk their lives are in a different category from those who commit cowardly acts against harmless and helpless civilians.

Law enforcement in the insurgency situation of Northern Ireland is not a purely civil matter. Much of the anguish over the internment problem is that both those on the receiving end and those on the enforcing end have seen or at least treated it as if it were exceptional and unsatisfactory civil law in a civil situation. In a civil situation, the community at large is basically on the side of the law, of 'public order' which is an enabling factor for all the community's purposes. In the fundamental paternalistic situation where an elite is trying to impose its idea of 'The Right' on the community, like it or not, and using the law as a weapon for its purpose, the law is a whore. But at its best, and the more so the more truly democratic the society is, the law can be a socially useful instrument for safeguarding people's rights (rather than 'The Right') and providing the amount of order that sets people free to worry about more constructive things than whether they are going to be stabbed in their beds or shot when they go to answer the front door. In an insurgency situation, however, important segments of the community no longer identify the source of their security and the guarantee of the minimum conditions for their civil life with 'public order' and the forces that maintain it. Then protection of insurgents (read 'support for the men of violence' or 'harbouring of terrorists') as opposed to the reporting of them (read 'informing on them') is the subject of a true conflict of loyalties within persons or parts of the community, and as the police and Army have found in Northern Ireland, evidence against insurgents is just not to be had from witnesses within the community. This is even worse when disaffected parts of the community are appealed to be someone they do not trust to support his concept of 'The Right.' Appeals to support 'the forces of law and order' to the neglect of these deeply felt conflicting loyalties are counterproductive, as even bishops have learned recently in Northern Ireland.

Given the de facto situation of insurgency, the purpose of law should be to subject the insurgency to the rules of war, and thus reduce its indiscriminate savagery. The law does not make an appropriate weapon of war. When it is used so, as a means to thwart or defeat the insurgent side, it is prostituted, becomes partisan, the upholding of one side's understanding of 'The Right,' and can no longer have the superior function of regulating and making more humane the manner of the conflict itself. The purpose of the rules of war is not vengeance but the lessening of the inherent savagery of war. It would be to everyone's advantage that the insurgency should be brought within this kind of regulation: the military forces, both insurgent and counter-insurgent, because their function and their honour could be established both for their own satisfaction and in the eyes of the community and their opponents; and for the non-military and non-paramilitary part of the community, with its internal conflict of real

and deeply felt loyalties, it would be useful to be able to distinguish what measures of 'public order' are even in this situation truly civil and unconnected with the insurgency; public 'civil' authority can then set about the rebuilding of confidence if it regains its functions of maintaining rights and public order and ceases any pretension to be the sole proponent of 'The Right.'

It has been customary, as a matter of international practice, that the status of military forces engaged in warfare has been accorded only to the forces of recognised States. Insurgent and irregular forces have not been credited with it, and as a result they have never been formally subjected to the rules of war applicable in international conflicts. They have been treated and combatted as civilian criminals, leaving them and the military forces arrayed against them in an anomalous situation, which has bedevilled not only Northern Ireland but Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Cyprus, Iraqi Kurdistan, Africa, Latin America, countless areas of the most serious conflicts we witness currently. There are modifications, of course, like the 'Special Category' of prisoners in Northern Ireland who are then understood in popular imagination as in the still more invidious position of 'political prisoners,' or the kid-glove treatment of Palestinian hijackers, whom no government likes to handle because of the danger that others will stage new terror actions to get their release, but these have not changed the basic situation. Why should such forces not have a distinctive status designed to subject them and the forces opposing them to either the internationally agreed laws of war or some analogous adaptation of them to this specific situation, mutually recognised rules designed not to be weapons of war or vengeance but to restrict the savagery? This is one of the many areas in which the Northern Ireland conflict could provide pilot experience that would be useful to many other parts of the world.

By such laws as were applied at Nuremberg, to kill civilians in an unprovoked attack is a war crime, whether ordered by anyone else in authority or not, and just as criminal in the desk criminal who orders it as in the men who carry it out. In fact it is a psychopathic act, as sick and evil in the insurgents as if someone in recognised authority did it. Such people should be seen in the public eye, even of their idealogical supporters, as the deranged and dangerous persons they are. If it could be shown that this kind of activity is as reprehensible as the things Nazi murderers were condemned for and the public imagination caught by it even among those sympathetic to the overall aims of insurgents, then the sanctions against such crime would be at least partially enforced within the insurgent forces themselves. It is important that doers and orderers be held equally responsible, put on the level of the desk murderers of Nazi times, and that the rules be the same for all sides, regulars and irregulars. Such recognition of war crimes should also be extended in its degree to the harassment and hurting of non-combatants.

This sort of activity, criminal even in war, is the pernicious factor most likely to carry over when peace is restored, and can become a recurring and spreading disease as acts of new violence are met with tit for tat retaliation. Half a dozen or a dozen men can produce this terror of civilian murders, bound to raise counter-terror and reprisal in an escalating fury. It is often taken quickly out of the hands of leaders, who if they want to stay on top have to give way.

Certainly one of the steps in this escalating process is the death penalty itself, which is an act and sign of pure revenge without any humanity, only showing that the State is stronger and that 'law and order' can be mis-used for such purposes, more to appease the public than to deal out justice or de-escalate the problem. It makes martyrs of people who have committed heinous crimes. It is a credit to the common sense of the British public and Parliament that after the hysteria that immediately followed the Birmingham bombings enough time was left to cool passions that might have brought about a restoration of this penalty. The real answer is to see that their own community pushes out the perpetrators of such crimes as a blot on the very cause to which they show loyalty,

whatever happens no future community will trust them again or give them any task of social importance, that they will spend their lives haunted by their past deeds. This is the case now with ex-Nazi criminals, even those who have escaped the net or gained the security of statutes of limitation. They must still live in concealment of their identities or their past for shame at their crimes. Often, regrettably enough, this shame even rubs off on their families and associates. But in such a situation as the Irish one, a person executed becomes a glorious martyr and the reason for his execution is soon forgotten. It would be immensely more healthy for society if, in the case of those who have been truly criminal in pursuit of their cause, their own public saw them as psychopathic outcasts, the family so unfortunate as to have such a member pitied. This would involve the partial unlearning of a stereotype by which the enemy is totally devillised and no action against him is seen as a crime. This whole concept is particularly important as it is often not possible, because of the conflict of community loyalties, to catch or convict these war criminals legally, but everyone knows them anyway. Thus it is up to the community not to be tainted by keeping their company or giving them those positions of trust that lie in its grant.

Apart then from these psychopaths, a small minority even among the small minority who are activists, known better as dangerous men to be controlled to the other members of the activist organisations and those in the know in their own communities than to anyone else, there remain the far greater number of those whom the government, with its internment policy, has rightly or wrongly decided were the ones to hold. Here we most strongly commend our distinction on whether what they are charged with is of a military or a civil nature. If the latter, they should be held only a minimum time and then charged or released. If the former, so that for military rather than legitimate civil reasons it makes no sense to release them, then their status and treatment should take full account of their situation, contain compensation for the denial of their civil rights and be maximally humane. It is not quite the same status as regular prisoners of war, such as the regular troops of an established nation captured in uniform and held under the laws of war, but there are analogies. We can see no justification for according the treatment of a criminal to anyone who has not been civilly convicted, with all due process, of a crime.

We would like to see two alternatives made available to them at choice. If they would agree, in the first alternative, to be held in custody and not to flee, the time spent in custody should be reckoned as training time, with facilities provided for professional improvement, a social and mental situation created of such a sort that the time of their imprisonment would not be a waste of their lives. This would require generous facilities for visiting, the maximum of home visits, possibilities to earn money for their own needs so that their families are not obliged to provide. The families should have free travel allowance to visit, and a system of trust inside should be transformed as soon as it can be done into a system of trust outside, which ought not to exclude full participation in their chosen political cause. We would expect such people not to return to society embittered and damaged, unable to do a job or find work.

A second alternative should be available to those who will not agree to this sort of custody, but are suspected of crimes or activity which, only by the nature of the insurgency situation, cannot be proved against them by the procedures of civil law. It is inhuman to keep them in Long Kesh conditions, and questionable whether it helps anyone or any cause. The argument against them is a military one rather than one of civil law, namely that they might be dangerous to civilians or the Army. If they are not willing to sign in under the first alternative outlined above on the first attempt, or if they have made no bones about their intention of running off (or have done so before), a better course than internment might be their expulsion from the Province. Just as suspects in bombing incidents can now be expelled from Great Britain to Northern Ireland or the Republic, Catholics might be expelled from the North to the Irish

Republic, Protestants to Britain. The receiving governments should undertake to see that they do not live near borders or ports, but in some place where their disappearance could be seen on time. Their families should be free to follow, and in view of the limitation being placed on their civil rights (for recognisedly a military rather than a civil reason) adequate financial aid should be provided for the resettling. We see this as a more humane way to overcome the scandal of people being imprisoned without trial and made to live under sub-minimum conditions, with no fixed date for their release, in a situation of boredom, anxiety and hatred. With this alternative these people would have another chance for their life as a result of being through this experience. The investment in generous facilities for both these alternatives would pay off handsomely.

For those convicted of offenses, too, there should be a clear line drawn between those who have committed anti-military or non-bloody offences and those who went out to kill innocent civilians, based on the idea that a brave man is brave even if you don't like what he does, because he risks his life for a cause, whereas the man who kills helpless civilians is a psychopathically acting coward. These latter should not be included for the benefits of the first alternative above or for political amnesty if that comes.

The insurgent groups should be recognised as the paramilitary units they actually are. This in no way shows approval of them by government, but would help establish in their own and the public imagination that they are subject to the laws of honour and of war in the service of their cause. War is a deadly business but even so has rules which men of arms have accepted, a code which has not always stood up to pressure, but within the ranks the man who has violated it is treated with contempt and prosecuted by his own people. It is for this reason that there is a difference between a para-professional gang of indiscriminate murderers and a professional military unit, that there is control over one's own side. From the moment that there is that, they can become partners and representatives in a peace discussion. No one should sit down with the murderers of civilians, especially since it may mean that like some other sharks who have once eaten human flesh they may go on if not stopped by their own people in time, long after the civil war is over. This in turn may not only be dangerous for individuals but may provoke counteraction which may lead to renewed civil war. Such men are marauders not only against individuals but against peace itself. The mistake made by many is to classify all the membership of the irregular or insurgent military units by this stereotype; this only makes it more difficult or even impossible to make the designation stick on those who really deserve it and against whom all of society really needs to be protected. The blanket categorisation of all insurgents with this stereotype is all the more reprehensible if it is done from an interested motive, as a weapon to ensure total victory over them and their cause, to gain their unconditional surrender.

One other category of men who must be considered are those who will be released from the sort of detention that has existed so far. Government has a clear responsibility towards them, and should have a coherent programme to help them for at least six months in their settling back, provide whatever assistance it can that employers should not fear to employ them, and that they have ample opportunities to retrain.

We have then altogether four categories:

- 1) those who go to prison because a case has been established. This has to be classified into military and civil offenses and the military sort further distinguished as to whether or not they are crimes against the laws of war.
- 2) those to be freed from such detention as has existed, and for

whom the government has a responsibility to help in resettlement.

3) those who will sign in to accept a recognised military custody under as humane conditions as can be devised, with training opportunities.

4) those who, having been offered and rejected the previous option, are sent abroad to Britain or the Irish Republic, again with help to resettle with their families. They may well prefer to settle further afield, and should in that case still have this financial assistance. Should they slip back into the Province, that should be reason for their imprisonment. Those who escape under the third category should also be subject to regular imprisonment on conviction.

People who come under category 3 should be eligible, once released and if they receive their own community's approval, for such community duties as local peace officers. People who have committed crimes against civilians should in no case be considered trustworthy, because their demonstrated psychopathy may come out again against their neighbours or against those whom they devilise. If not themselves psychopaths, they have shown the cowardice and social ignorance of making themselves the tools of psychopaths. The same 'war crime' designation should be applied for killing wounded or unarmed soldiers, just as there would be for a regular soldier committing such crimes.

We accept that much of people's lives will be spent in their local community or neighbourhood. Hence the question is how to make the area rich, so that the whole of life goes up and they can inspire and stimulate all the parts. The prerequisite for this is that all in the community should be involved, that the intensity of social purpose and enjoyment in life be heightened throughout the community.

As an interesting sidelight, when we recently held a pre-survey on the dying in Britain, a wide panel of experts, including clergy who were very much concerned professionally with the problem, declared that their greatest difficulty was to know what to say to those who, in dying, were terribly fearful and resentful. This, they said, had nothing to do with their religious views, but often on the contrary: if people's lives had been empty and un-lived their death was awful. The real issue was the maturity of the person, which in turn depended on the degree of responsibility he had developed in his life, the richness of life in the true sense. Death following un-lived life is most painful, a premature end because one leaves nothing behind or only leaves a mess. Life itself is not a matter of just rights and duties, but of responsibility.

How does one make life rich, in the intimacy sphere of the close family, in the extended family, the neighbourhood, community, city, nation and international community? A most important segment of this is that the extended family, neighbourhood and community be sound, have their own rules, own government, their own enjoyment of life, above all the intensity quotient by which one can measure that each person, group and sub-group has a rich, intensive life, not only one group or other or only the activists. Whatever richness there is should be a multi-splendoured thing, not just one thing or another. All parts of life should be provided against the blight of boredom.

Pyramid Structure.

It is not a problem confined to Northern Ireland but one that can be found, often in even more acute form, ^{elsewhere} that people in the ordinary working-class neighbourhoods feel remote from government, even elected local government, powerless and uncared for, without channels to express their needs or get help in the ordinary emergencies. The political democracy, with its high-level leadership pyramid, loses contact with the roots, and even the most well-meaning political figures are unable to contact people on the ground for lack of structures and organisation at the grass-root level that will facilitate it. In some ways people are better off in Northern Ireland than elsewhere in this respect, since the local neighbourhoods are more cohesive and the extended family structure more often intact. But the neighbourhood organisations are so specifically defensive in character that there is still much that persons and groups in the neighbourhoods feel helpless to get or accomplish.

The sort of neighbourhood social infrastructure we would wish to help people create is easily described in terms of a pyramid. We find quite generally, and not only in Northern Ireland, that there are some neighbourhoods where people remain very distant from each other, hardly knowing who lives next door or having more than trivial relations with one another, and others where an easy mixing takes place (much the more frequent in the Northern Ireland neighbourhoods). The difference between the two types of neighbourhood is nearly always a person, for the small areas usually an easily identifiable person, who talks to people, invites them to his or her house for tea, introduces, is generally helpful when people have some problem that can be readily solved with a little help. People know whom they can depend on in the minor emergencies, and the presence of such a person in a neighbourhood is a most important element in the morale of all the neighbours.

Such people are so important a social asset to their fellows that it should be seen, not only by government and official agencies but by their neigh-

beurs themselves, as a matter of priority that they should be trained and given whatever help and equipment they need to make the maximum use of their social talent. When old Mrs. X has not gotten her welfare check and there is no feed in the house, when little Mary has not gotten home on time and the family don't know where to find her, when a wife has been beaten or is being constantly beaten, or a child abused, when there are neighbourhood scrapes and quarrels, these people should be available and be trained and equipped what to do. Equipment could be as little as making a telephone available to them, perhaps a pay phone outside the house so that neighbours would not be taking unfair advantage of them. The training would be partly knowing when to contact, how to get in touch at awkward times. Our name for these people is liaison workers, and we see them as the first step up a pyramid of neighbourhood and community structure. Their selection is of its nature entirely democratic; it is a matter of finding the people others know enough to depend on anyway, and seeing that they have adequate training. If they do not function up to people's expectations, people will always know who else they can depend on instead, and the transfer will be made quite automatically.

If the attempt is made to provide for all these minor emergencies by using paid social workers, the result is eventually an undesirable one. Besides the ever-increasing public expense of such a system as people get to expect more and more to be done for them, their own instinct for self-help and to find the sources of leadership within their own group, building their group cohesiveness, is progressively sapped and the result is apathy and dispiritedness. Fortunately most emergencies happen at night and on the weekend, when the social workers are at home in their own different neighbourhoods and the social agencies are closed; this leaves liaison workers such as we describe a wide open field for their work.


On a further step of the pyramid above these liaison workers there should be, as the neighbourhood communities become more sophisticated in organising themselves, senior liaison workers, more experienced persons who have a responsibility beyond their own most immediate neighbourhoods and are contacts for the other liaison workers. Like the liaison workers themselves, we see them as unpaid volunteers, but having their expenses paid and basic things like a telephone provided them. They would provide a next line of recourse for the liaison workers themselves when they found some situation beyond them. In point of fact, these senior liaison workers would, in the process of the communities' organising themselves, be likely enough the ones who identified and recruited other liaison workers, and would thus naturally enough be the ones to whom they would have recourse.

The next level of the pyramid would be occupied by paraprofessional workers, persons with a far more extensive training in basic social techniques, and particular experience with special groups, such as the young, the unemployed, women, the elderly and their problems. They would thus be more specialised resource persons on whom the liaison workers and senior liaison workers could call. Because their responsibilities would cut into their working time, they would have to be paid part-time salaries in addition to their out-of-pocket expenses. They would be the natural catalyst persons for the community's more extensive planning process.

At the summit of this local pyramid would be the grass-roots professionals, persons not only thoroughly trained themselves in the basic social planning skills but able to train others as well and thus be the supervisors and catalysts for the work of the others. We are still speaking exclusively here of people out of the neighbourhood who continue to live in and be a part of the neighbourhood. Theirs is a full-time job, basically as training officers, and for this they would have to have an appropriate salary. Because they remain in the neighbourhood they will be readily available to everyone as well as sharing the experience of their neighbours, but they can be drawn from various sources; from the local liaison workers and paraprofessionals who show particular capacity for human relations to the local MDs, clergy etc.

Above this entire local pyramid are the professionals in the usually accepted sense as well as whatever form of government will emerge as the process of political democracy from the entire community's consultations. What we intend in making these proposals for the local pyramids is that there should be a form of organisation from the bottom up which can deal with the organisation from the top down. We might call it a social democracy, and would see it as comprehending the actual conditions in which the daily acts of living are carried out, with group forms in which people would have their own grass-roots leadership.

We see it as essential to a new social structure as fabric and as process that people should be enabled to plan and carry out action programs, provided with the social skills to organise themselves into effective structures and units, to discern the quality of leadership and expertise and use it without being manipulated by it, to plan their future on a holistic model at short, middle and long range. It is thus that they will be able to create a new social climate in which, as a side effect, the old inherited issues of communal conflict will be more tractable to solution.



Centres for Human Rights and Responsibilities.

A more proximate system of local organisations will be needed to see that people are enabled to do this social planning on a local level and make it the basic character of their society that it is a caring society, though the location and development of the grass-roots leadership will depend on the implementation of such a programme as the pyramid organisation. (The actual process of the community's planning programme is treated in the paper on the Phases of Social Growth.) We see the form of these local community planning organisations as Centres for Human Rights and Responsibilities.

The purpose of these centres is to develop people's willingness to group themselves (further and better if they have already done so), to develop (further) leadership and to use their inherent sense of justice and 'live and let live;' to recreate social forms where necessary, in certain areas to replace the extended family where it has broken down, to help such endangered groups as one-parent families, to restructure the street, neighbourhood, community, area, city according to principles of responsibility and on lines agreed to and implemented by the people themselves.

There is a human responsibility to provide for others these conditions which enable people to live a full, rich and unendangered life, without undue fear and with real chances for the younger generation to live also in peace and dignity. This responsibility cannot be met without societal forms that enable people to meet it. It is questionable how far there ever was a time in history when the responsibility was met in general terms by and for the society as a whole, but the destruction of many forms of societal life has knocked out most of the props and safeguards which have existed so far, with all their weaknesses. For instance, the 'law and order' forces are less and less in a position to care for people's rights in a society which has its grass-roots endangered and severely interfered with, and even central democratic institutions are not meaningful if they have no equivalent at the grass-roots level. Nor can young people feel secure in their rights and their future when the few inherent values of the society are uncertain, social alienation and 'I couldn't care less' attitudes are perfectly acceptable to the society and a man is seen as a good citizen if he does nothing for his community, 'makes no trouble.' The Greeks called such a man an idiot, idiotes, and the word has become a term of derision; there is something wrong with a man who estranges himself from society.

The result of all this is that the State has taken over many of the functions of the family and community, through 'law and order' forces on the one hand and the welfare bureaucracy on the other. The State has not been able to replace the missing value patterns. Hence for the frightened and the panicky an emotional adherence to the concept of 'law and order,' meaning the use of power against troublemakers (the term can include any innovators) serves in lieu of a value system. The State can only impose from above, whether with 'law and order' or welfare, and rulers tend to use them for what they consider rightful defence of their own power, as well as a substitute for the missing societal forms which they cannot replace.

We regard the Centres for Human Rights and Responsibilities as a case of reafforestation, where necessary, of the missing community forms, although, to keep up the metaphor, the new 'trees' will in many cases be very different from the former ones and so will be the new patterns of the forest. We see it as most important that the moral and social issues be attended to by the people themselves, for themselves, without primary attention going to personal advantage. Even more important are the inherent value patterns, which must be aroused, debated and seen to be applied by all concerned, especially the young who may well be the main carriers of such a scheme.

We see the centres taking up responsibility in their areas at four main levels:

1: survival; to find out whether, in the area in question, there are real dangers for people's survival. Where there is real direct danger to the community as a whole through dramatic or extreme conditions; whether there are any people particularly endangered, e.g. minority groups, especially neglected people; whether scapegoat attitudes exist vis-a-vis some group or other which might explode. Where there are such genuine dangers, the communities' responsibility, exercised through the centres through viable techniques of planning in which the centres would provide training, would treat them as matters of the first priority.

2: existence; this concerns the provision of the minimum conditions for a rich and full life, seeing that people know their rights and duties and have an understanding of their responsibility for the rights of others, being the guarantee within the local community that people actually receive their full basic rights.

3: prevention; the anticipation and planning to provide against such things as physical conditions which are impossible or a hindrance to the basic acts of living, isolation and social blockages which hinder people from forming into groups, the frustration of people's indignation so that it turns into either resignation or hatred. We take it as axiomatic that human rights and responsibilities are being interfered with or neglected, without any doubt, wherever apathy and violence occur as symptoms of this interference or neglect, or conversely that apathy and violence are indices of some fault at the level of human rights and responsibilities, even if the fault is not otherwise visible. This prevention level of the centres' activity involves a great deal of social education, seeing that people have the opportunity to see and understand what forces or factors are endangering them or others.

4: socio-creative activity; the centres should provide people with the tools and techniques for concerted group action so that, even under very difficult circumstances, they can work out for themselves what needs to be done, not having it decided for them by mentors. They should draw up counter-plans with which to enter meaningfully into the planning process which would otherwise be dominated by bureaucratic authorities. Their emphasis should be on self-help, preferably community self-help.

A main concern of the centres should be with the conflict situations that arise within the community, as well as unjust treatment by authority and bureaucracy, through the misuse of legal conditions or legal manipulation, e.g. by landlords and developers. The centres should help people not to resign when an injustice has been done them, but to fight and fight again and go higher and higher in the law until justice has been done them. Thus they should have not only a coordinating system among them and core centres with a wider responsibility than for a local neighbourhood, but also competence and guaranteed access in appealing to the national institutions of legal recourse, and also such international ones as the Commission and Court of Human Rights on the European level, where people can go when they feel they have exhausted the basis of law in their own country.

Besides the local centres, then, there should also be regional ones and one central Human Rights and Responsibilities Centre, always emphasising that both rights and responsibilities must be accepted. The central bureau should help the regional and local ones as resource and also represent them when necessary. Its staffing should come from the resources of the local units below, like them being drawn basically from the local paraprofessionals, in a system that ensures community participation and ultimate control. But there is room here also alongside them for a few such outsiders as would truly have gained the trust of the local communities.

Such a Centre could also provide the neutrals needed if there should be threat of a cataclysmic situation: people neither English nor Irish who would be trusted to see any situation on its merits without bias, both as regards the local centres and the authorities. In times of major difficulty, they could be the nucleus of a peace-making force, whereas so far only peace-keeping has been attempted.

In local conflict, the centres would have a responsibility for clarifying and conciliating, where possible putting pressure on to avoid the expression of apathy or violence, whether it is a man beating his wife or child, warring neighbours, hostility to minority members, or a group of troublesome youngsters who need constructive help as well as some control of their conditions. If the centres help people to their rights, they must also help them to their responsibilities. Otherwise they and their staffs would become just another kind of social work agency, which in the long run is non-creative and counter-productive.

Who would train the trainers for this work of the centres? Having some experience we would gladly offer our own help, though we have no wish to impose ourselves and would hope that many others would be available as well, with whom we would wish to cooperate. The paraprofessionals from the local community who basically would man the centres should, in any case, have all adequate and necessary help from outside professionals, yet in such a way that the professionals are always resource to them, not they merely hands and voices for the professionals to have things their own way.

Local Assemblies and Peer Group Organisations.

Northern Ireland is already forming local community organisations that put it to some extent in the vanguard of experimentation for new social forms, whether they be called community councils, community associations or whatever. We think it essential if these are to be truly expressions of a social democracy and not simply new establishments or instruments for the manipulation of the community by new elites that there be training, training, training, extended to wider and wider groups until the entire community is involved and taking an

educated responsibility for community planning and value planning. To enable this to happen the Centres for Human Rights and Responsibilities should function as resource and training facilities for these local assemblies. We see it as a further guarantee against the local assemblies becoming merely a new form of establishment that the peer groups should have their own organisations, served by the Rights and Responsibilities centres in much the same way, but able to represent their group interests in and to the local assemblies to keep them honest.

Some sort of criteria would have to be established and recognised by which the Rights and Responsibilities Centres or any other counselling or funding organisation could determine that a local community group qualifies to receive aid, whether technical or financial. The local community, we propose, should have undertaken a number of projects (whether welcome or not to the authorities) before getting aid; this is a self-help requirement, and should apply in all but emergency cases. Mere protest should not count as fulfilling this requirement nor considered as adequate qualification if not accompanied by action. The purpose here is not to weaken protest but to strengthen it. Protest activity alone would qualify a community group only for small grants or the technical assistance to get it into more meaningful motion.

The danger to be avoided here is of a body that would discourage or weaken the self-help activity of local groups by substituting the activity of experts for it. Therefore:

a. every agency applying for major funding should know it will be judged by the degree of self-help already undertaken, not only by its pledges for the future.

b. the content of any self-help project should not be subject to approval by authority, since this would mean conformity, which is opposite to the purpose of encouraging responsibility. Hence an appeals machinery outside the authority structure is required.

c. to stimulate self-help prior to a major grant (whether of funds or technical help, training or other necessities), there should be preliminary technical and material help on a small scale, to enable the local group to sharpen its self-help organisation. This preliminary grant should not be seen as any guarantee that the major grant will automatically be made.

d. the purpose being to stimulate and encourage responsibility, the grant-giving bodies should themselves be evaluated at intervals of perhaps every six months on this principle. This inspection should be done on the one hand by senior authority, on the other by a committee of all the self-help bodies themselves, so that they will have participation in the making of policy by the very agency which in turn controls the terms of their grants.

None of these checks and counter-checks of themselves can guarantee the change of spirit and mentality. They can only help. The old bureaucratic mentality to be overcome is that local bodies cannot be trusted or should not be encouraged to act on their own, and that authority must keep a wary eye and have ultimate responsibility over them. The new mentality is that the local self-help bodies' performance should be judged basically on the degree of responsibility they assume.

Youth Democracy.

The young need opportunities for constructive expression. Where these are inhibited, the young peer groups can only be negative, makers of trouble. If the young are accorded no say in the social and political structure, they are

a despised and despising minority, not prepared by living forms of democracy to become citizens. Consequently it becomes necessary to find constructive forms for the young to contribute and have influence in the political and social structures. The same is true of women, and the subjects are too important to be left as subdivisions of this chapter, so we have devoted separate papers in this series to programmes for the young and for women. We would recommend that it be one of the basic criteria in the judgment of funding or technical assistance bodies on whether a local community qualifies for aid that they should have facilitated adequate programmes for and by the young and women. As much can be said of the old, of the unemployed or handicapped and of other groups who are déclassé.

Industrial democracy is another priority, as can be seen in the way the removal of people from their places of work, separating their dormitory living space from the surroundings of their work, has unavoidably negative results, producing a kind of schizophrenia in which people's loyalty is neither to the one nor to the other. It is necessary then to find communal patterns on each level which will be naturally supportive of the other. The entire industrial community, not just the management (though managing personnel should not be excluded or exempted), should take on responsibility for the needs, hopes and aspirations of everyone in the staff and their families. This should positively affect the living community as well. Some sums should be used for this purpose and for outreaching efforts, social, cultural etc. The purpose of the industrial community should be holistic social good of its personnel and its community, not merely making money.

Democracy and 'Law and Order.'

When under attack or in situations of stress and threat, we depend on the political leadership and their democratic wisdom to prevent either:

a) the situation in which the 'law and order' forces (judiciary, police, the military in such circumstances as now exist in Northern Ireland, the government bureaucracy) become the scapegoats of the community or of groups within it when they represent unpopular policy; or

b) the situation in which the 'law and order' forces themselves become contemptuous of and hostile towards particular politicians or lines of political aspiration, particular groups in the community, or in general the 'rebels' or unwashed.

Government has to earn and cultivate public confidence in its democratic wisdom at this level, and the difficulty of regaining it once lost is evident. The loss of that public confidence can be provoked by groups who do not believe in democracy or human rights and responsibilities, or who feel suppressed and start deliberately provoking the 'law and order' forces, especially the military, hoping they will go to the extremes of oppression and thus help the anti-forces. (This was the tactic of the German Communist Party when Hitler took over, as they felt naively confident that after Hitler's fall it would be their turn.)

We find the Northern Ireland conflict situation full of semi-feudal factors, an arrested development that still sticks in the rut of 1922 and a regressive domination by history. If stereotypes are so strong that contemporary fact has less influence on people's minds than the stereotypes themselves, people are not truly living in reality. Hence the situation can arise in which they kill each other without really hating one another, because it is not the people they see themselves as killing but the stereotype (with the exception of a very few personal hostilities).

The craziness of this situation can be seen in the fact that it is a conflict between the poor and the poor, in which the prosperous classes are hardly more than inconvenienced. It is for this reason that we see the emergence of grass-roots leadership from these two distinct and conflicting proletarian communities as the key to an overgrowing of the conflict with new constructive issues, and consequently saw value last year in the emergence of the Ulster Workers' Council, the Protestant workers finally speaking for themselves rather than let it be done for them by the old squirarchy. We would see it as no answer that fatigue should take over and the struggle peter out into apathy, the frozen form of violence that would then surely explode again, perhaps in much worse forms. Nor would we see any merit in a mere patching-up operation, but hope to see arising from Northern Ireland new social forms that will be far in advance of anything that is being done elsewhere in Ireland, Britain or Europe, in which people can take pride. This should be easier in Northern Ireland than elsewhere because of the survival of the extended family and local community cohesiveness and the chance to make decentralised power work.

Hence we see it as necessary that the activists themselves be allowed to come into the peace-making and later be admitted to the peace-keeping role as well. They represent, in both communities, levels of grievance and aspiration that are far more widespread among people who have not adopted their violent methods but have retreated into despondency and apathy instead, losing hope. If they are excluded they will be a festering wound in the country.

Whatever the political form an eventual settlement will take, it will involve ~~in~~ some form of new and more conscious Northern Irish identity, whether it be in a detached or semi-detached entity, still closely linked with Britain, in some closer relation to the Republic of Ireland, or even in some wider federative form still not foreseen. The two communities in Northern Ireland will both have lived away from their 'parent' countries through the difference of their experience in these last years.

We see this community and neighbourhood programme as one of the most essential constituents of a new identity in which all the citizens of Northern Ireland can take pride, the location of a new sense of commitment to the enduring human values that will make Northern Ireland the teacher of Europe in new social forms.

Evidence keeps accumulating more convincingly year by year that the lives of young people and the conditions under which they will live not only during their youth but for the rest of their lives will be immensely different from those of their parents or previous generations. It is therefore most regrettable that the preparation of the young for life, what we call generalist education as opposed to specialised training in professional or academic subjects and disciplines, is now virtually at a standstill or is often done in a counterproductive way, urging the young to shrink from or dissociate themselves from the real conditions in which their lives will be lived rather than come to terms with them and master them. In our own paper on the Thirty one Crises we try to catalogue the wide variety of crises that beset our civilisation and society already, many of them quite new in their degree of severity or scale of occurrence, others wholly without precedent in our historical experience, the whole concatenation of them making a combined impact on the basic fabric of society as we have known it.

This means that comparatively little of the experience of previous generations will really be helpful to the young, who must find new ways of confronting the new problems, and that the traditional wisdom may often even be misleading to them. It does not mean of course that they should not thoroughly know the experience and wisdom of the past, so they will not keep marching down its well charted blind alleys as their parents have done. But it does mean that they will not be able to live from the resources of past wisdom and need to be prepared for a life of inventive and socially creative adaptation. Our list of thirty four socio-somatic symptoms characteristic of our time is intended to show that the manifestations of much disease and breakdown are no longer merely psychosomatic but cut across a wide social swathe and result directly from the disintegration of the social structure. These symptoms may lead to or manifest social inadequacy, social ignorance or social infantilism. Different symptoms affect different people in varied ways, and they are often interchangeable. People may suffer from several of them at the same time. The common denominator is that these crises and socio-somatic symptoms are all problems in their own right but also manifestations of an underlying crisis situation of sick and dying roots in our society. No degree of paternalism, right or left, can stop it or forbid it, any more than King Canute could stop the tide; at best it can only temporarily dam up or lessen particular symptoms.

It is our conviction that we must prepare young people for times characterised by such an underlying crisis. Since the effects of the crisis are unpredictable, we cannot supply young people with answers and must be satisfied to provide them instead the means to find answers, to invent original approaches to the as yet unforeseen problems, to make creative use of the new opportunities opened by new situations rather than being defensive and regressive in the face of them. The means we advocate to develop these skills of adaptation are social education, social planning and social value planning, with a liberal dose too of the unlearning of stereotypes, scapegoating instincts, pressures for conformity of all sorts, to make it possible for new ideas and real ideals either to replace sick and dying old ones or to be added to those that are healthy and sound. It is never the purpose of these generalist disciplines to tell people what they must do or how they must change. They aim rather at a change of attitudes so that people will themselves change the conditions. It is not our purpose either to patch up society with mild improvements to keep it limping along a little longer or to smash it down in a revolutionary whirlwind, but rather to make opportunities by which people can grow up by overcoming their social ignorance, inadequacies and infantilism, things no one can do for them and against which no form of paternalism can protect them for long.

In other parts of the world apathy has been the characteristic reaction to this very general modern situation of underlying crisis. Particularly the old professional authorities have hated the 'bad news' of a new situation, and hence have hated the messengers who told that new forms were needed for progress. Even more the built-in bureaucracies have desired not to see or understand. There is thus a paucity of generalist understanding of the overall situation and the dangers it holds for the young, but plenty of resentment against intellectual or social originality and sabotage of the creative energy which could be put into positive action. We would cite two instances:

a) Teachers are still trained for non-existent conditions by lecturers who do not care or make the effort to find out the real conditions their students will have to face. The probationary teachers come into a classroom situation they have not been prepared for, facing pupils who suffer and manifest all the breakdown symptoms of the society around them. The teachers spend the greatest part of their time in an unsuccessful struggle for 'discipline.' They are condemned and expected to condemn themselves for their failure to maintain it, and the unruly pupils seen as a degenerate species of the breed.

b) The philosophers, theologians and lawyers, supposedly the guardians of values, seem not effectively to have found out that the whole structure of sin, guilt and punishment plays remarkably little role in the lives of the young and many of the not so young, that society has moved from predominantly a guilt culture into predominantly a shame culture. This is a matter of fact whether one likes it or not, and may be as dangerous if not attended to as it may be helpful if used creatively. Time and effort spent deploring the fact is consequently diverted from better employment by the value guardians, and their failure to accept and build upon it as a social fact is a serious default.

There are now two generations of adults since the Second World War, including those now in their thirties and forties, who seem to have left little or nothing behind them which is positive, adding to the treasure house of knowledge, understanding and compassion for future generations. Overall conditions are deteriorating fast beyond any real chance of stopping them even if one wanted to. Therefore it is sad and staggering to see the paucity of those courageous enough to try to find new forms and a new mentality to help the young, who are now alienated from the nation and city and progressively from the community, the extended family (which was the major social educator of the past) and now from even the nuclear family.

Luckily this process has not yet fully taken place in Northern Ireland, where the extended family still survives and the communities, through the conflict, have if anything become stronger though divided. Hence the Northern Irish do not start at the bottom of the scale by any means. Yet it is a tremendous handicap that the divided society that has preserved these basic forms has also left a huge mortgage on future lives to find ways to come to terms with the society's dispute. There is even evidence to suggest that it is the conflict itself that ensures the survival of family and community forms, the family existing largely as a medium for conveying the old hate stereotypes and the community basically as a defensive organisation, to such an extent that they could hardly outlive the conflict itself if it were resolved.

What we are trying to state here, with regret, is that we cannot expect much of the adult world, no doubt with some outstanding exceptions. In this Northern Ireland is not much different from London, Amsterdam or New York, perhaps not from New Delhi or Moscow. We must consequently try to help the young find new ways for their own future society, allow them to develop as they wish without straitjackets, to base their society on their own assumption of responsibility, not on duties imposed by someone else. If the young, who have so little to learn whether in Northern Ireland or elsewhere from the elders who made the mess they

are now ushered into, organise themselves and find leaders and democratic groups in their own world, learn to share responsibility and in so doing learn to get beyond their own stifling borders, then Northern Ireland may have a positive youth situation like no other and be a tremendously important pilot area. One must help them grow beyond the stale situation of today and yesterday.

Social education means to prepare people for what is unforeseeable. It is clear how far we must get away from that kind of instruction based on the foreseeable which in turn is based on previous experience. Here we are all learners, educators and educands alike. It is with this attitude in mind that we make the following proposals to enable the young to live within the adult community but in a coherent and self-formed structure of their own, empowered to disagree when their strength or critical ability show that some youths do not fit previously conceived patterns. We do not mean this only for Northern Ireland, but see the young of Northern Ireland as in a particularly good position to find and develop the strengths and reveal ^{and overcome} the weaknesses of the community and youth of today as a pilot for other parts of the world.

We realise the damage that has been done to the young people of Northern Ireland during the troubles of the last several years. They have been described in vivid detail by many learned professional observers: the dangers, the noises in the night, the tragedies in young people's own immediate or extended families or among their neighbours and close friends, the high tension and the tranquillizer culture, the dreadful happenings that occur before their eyes, the preoccupation with violence and suppression that comes through in their art work and their story-telling.

But we must insist on another side of the coin which is far too little commented on. These children in Northern Ireland are highly stimulated. They are intensely alive, very sure of themselves. They have formed strong peer groups with their own discipline and become profoundly loyal to a cause without any doubt of its righteousness. They have the admiration of their elders, even when the latter are most worried about them. They have been the communication links and even the shock troops for very dangerous actions. The element of living under risk, every boy's day-dream, has been fulfilled for them. They use their cunning and their knowledge of the area. The martyrdom of these of their friends who have suffered or died only makes their cause more dramatic for them and adds to their determination.

These are all positive and valuable experiences for the young, even if experienced and the activities engaged in in the service of a purely negative cause. To say this is not to endorse the negative cause itself, for the young are identically thus in the service of two quite opposed negative causes, and surely both cannot be right; in fact they are the result of the trauma of history, of stereotypes and scapegoat behaviour as we have seen. But a measure of the quality of the experience as such, quite apart from the merits of the causes, is that these young people will have wonderful stories to tell their grandchildren. One can note the recruitment posters for the UDA, which ask whether, when asked by their own children what they did during the troubles, they would rather say they took part in the paramilitary organisation or that they stayed home and watched it all on television. One must find the moral equivalent of all this, in the William James phrase 'the moral equivalent of war' or in this case of civil war. What is needed is not the cessation of activity but ways of providing constructive, socio-creative opportunities for these and other young people which will be as gripping to their imaginations, as worth doing and telling to their grandchildren as these activities. The young in Northern Ireland do things, undertake functions which, in what we consider 'normal' societies, no one would dream of giving them. The grass-roots leaders of their activities are often themselves very young, proving what young people can do if the challenge arises and the middle-age mentality does not denigrate or discourage them. One has only to compare this with the demoralised state of these 'well-behaved' contemporaries of

theirs who are held under a kind of discipline designed to make them docile and submissive, acquiescent to establishment direction. We read some time back, for instance, of the 16-year-old English Public School boy who was sent home on an exam day and forced to miss his O-level exam because the headmaster insisted that he change his coloured shirt for a white one (cf. London Times, 5 July, '73), a depressing incident of a recognisable and familiar type. This is an instance of the teacher who wants to teach but does not himself want to learn anything, but of more concern is the boy himself, who if he learns to submit to this kind of authority or absurdity is personally damaged and rendered less fit for real life.

Young people need a challenge to grow, and freely chosen responsibility, a sense of values and purpose and at the same time a certain minimum of routine rights and duties. This latter is not too important or central if it is functioning, but dangerous if it is not. The young have need for an image of themselves and their peer group which gives them significance and some sense of pride and achievement according to their own values, which may or may not be the same as those of older society. If they have a life shrinking from values and any real purpose it is boring and insignificant. If they do not yet have a cause, however primitive and brutal, they are much worse off than the children of Belfast, whether they live on the primitive level of the highly unsuccessful and basically defeated, like the granny-bashers and gang-rapists who indulge in random violence for thrills, or whether they are bored bourgeois youth who use dangerous drugs, who can only explode into opposition and complaint for its own sake (or sometimes for a good reason), producing forms of protest futile to any cause, or any other of the violent or apathetic forms of escape known to society which sidestep real life and social growth. It all represents a lack of intensive social life.

Hence our main thesis is this: however desperate the situation in Belfast, the children and young people there are better off than children in the East End of London, the Bedford-Stuyvesant neighbourhood of New York, in Amsterdam or Detroit or the dispiriting suburbs of Long Island. The great tragedy for the young is that they are never allowed to give anything, that society treats them with patronising superiority, insisting that they should only receive, so that all they can give is trouble. On the very simple violence scale we use, measuring its intensity from 1 to 10, we might say that the potentiality for violence among the youth of Northern Ireland is 6 to 7, sometimes 8, which is extremely dangerous (10 being the maximum), but that the potential in London or Nottingham, or for that matter in Barnstable or Devon, is 4 to 5. Lest anyone make the mistake of underestimating the seriousness of the severe forms of apathy which affect the majority of children and young people in England and other countries, we consider apathy a frozen form of violence, and see that the translation from apathy to violence can always come with lightning swiftness, as a flashpoint, the thunderclap in a blue sky, the sudden tornado cutting across the heat of a summer day. (The parents and teachers always seem to think: 'My boy is a good boy. He could never have done this. He was never interested in anything much.') Should the so-called 'normal' society of places outside Northern Ireland or other obvious trouble spots follow the pattern of the United States, the piecemeal mess of youngsters in isolation or in pointless bands or senseless protest which they cannot follow up even from their own point of view, the crisis in the supposedly peaceful areas will not be far away though it is still camouflaged and buffered by apathy.

The situation in Northern Ireland is thus different from what it would be anywhere that the young people have not carried such responsibilities as the young people of Northern Ireland have carried. The young elsewhere have not been trusted by their elders. When we make up a menu of what things ought to be entrusted to them, where they should be granted responsibility, it is different than where we are dealing with young people who have actually carried the heavy responsibilities that Northern Ireland young people have. The young who have

done that cannot be fobbed off with responsibilities for play and entertainment, children's programmes and good-deed gestures, the harmless things, while leaving the serious business of society firmly in older hands. Nowhere else must we produce more forms for the young to convince them that they do have a truly important part to play, sharing in the whole restructuring of society.

All the long series of elections in Northern Ireland recently have been elections by 'old' people, as part of the previous tradition in Ireland. The young, many of whom have borne the brunt of the actual conflict, are left unrepresented, without participation or opportunity to show their dedication and sense of responsibility. Adult society, however well-meaning towards their grown children, still feels superior and competitive, believes the young have no brains before they are twenty or maybe thirty, and gives evidence of it by withholding opportunities for responsibility, for participation in decision-making. This can become a self-fulfilling prophecy, ensuring that the young will, in fact, show no responsibility, and that those who side with the young will be considered cranks or unbalanced. There are in fact two ways to reduce young people to infantilism. One is to treat them not as individuals but as a mass, with no leadership or voluntary group formation of their own, only artificially adult-stimulated groups under adult leadership, direction and control. The other is to treat them as incapable of looking after their own shirts or length of hair with impunity or self-expression (like the English headmaster we cited above). Even the former, seemingly less debasing, of these methods leaves the young as individuals very vulnerable vis-a-vis the highly organised adult world and society, but can also make the mass into a mob on even ridiculous provocation. While it is then easy to deal with individual 'offenders,' the real discipline comes only from fear as a controlling force, and when this controlling fear is not there in the environment or the mind at a given point they can give full expression to their accumulated resentment and hostility.

Partnership between young and old can only exist when there is strong youth civilisation in the country, strong structures formed by the young so that groups of old and young can meet as groups for separate purposes as well as for combined ones. These young people have already had, during the period of the conflict, scope for their courage, their sense of responsibility, for the formation of strong groupings. Now they are coming into a situation in which they could once again be reduced to nothing (nothing but trouble), or could find the adult world attempting to reduce them to nothing or to subservience, transforming the violence they have been practicing once again into apathy, the frozen form of violence which could at any time open up again.

On the basis of all these considerations we would propose:

1: Youth assemblies parallel to the local community associations and with their own structure of communication and elected officers to provide common leadership for coalitions of the local groups. These assemblies should have responsibility for the activities of the young in their areas, amenities, sport, educational and technical training opportunities, unemployment and the provision of alternative employment for school-leavers. They should also have a serious voice in the more general problems and planning efforts of the whole local community. For this purpose spokesmen for the youth assemblies should have a distinctive place in the local community associations and in any coalitions of them. These youth assemblies should be articulated into various age groups according to the capacity of young people of various ages to contribute on these wider community concerns, making the older groups responsible for the younger, especially for their training in social skills.

2: Representation of these local youth assemblies in the proposed second house, as mentioned in the paper on a provisional political structure

for the transitional period in the Province. This representation need not be large, but its existence would be a touchstone of the seriousness with which the adult society regarded the contribution of the young to the overall restructuring of the Province.

3: A concentrated programme of generalist education, both within the school system and through a system of Youth Worker paraprofessionals in the various neighbourhoods. For brevity, we refer here to the several papers descriptive of the social education programme which our own colleagues have conducted over the last two and a half years in the Ashmeunt School Project in London's Islington section as a source of pilot experience. For the neighbourhood programme, we note simply that it will preferably be connected with the Centres for Human Rights and Responsibilities proposed for each neighbourhood and community area, as described in the paper on the Neighbourhood Programme, and that all aspects of the proposed training in responsibility should be tied in with concrete action programmes undertaken by the young, not simply an abstract presentation or discussion, the young taking actual responsibility for the defence of the rights of others and prevention of man's inhumanity to man in local, regional and yet wider areas. In particular we propose that each school should have, as compensation for the education received, projects of social responsibility chosen and voluntarily assumed by the young themselves, one with regard to the immediate area of the school, another involving matters of city-wide importance, or Province-wide, a third somewhere outside of the country altogether.

4: A voluntary Public Service Corps. Here we envisage a major public works programme, somewhat on the lines of the American Peace Corps or VISTA, with an internally democratic pattern. The aim should be the rebuilding of the community, not on commercial lines but through plans and efforts aimed at social rehabilitation. Young people should be free to decide where or whether to work in this programme or corps, but once enrolled in it should be under discipline, not of an even remotely military sort but a discipline that included and even required critical participation in the planning effort, and for a set period of time. A generous proportion of the time and effort invested should be devoted to social purposes and not merely physical reconstruction, and emphasis should be placed on the acquisition, in job situations, of social skills. The corps should become a school of positive social education to prepare people for living in cities, and we would expect it to be the major resource for providing the trained, socially skilled personnel who could be catalysts and leaders in the whole community's continuing planning programme.

Payment in this corps should be competitive with the rest of the labour market. It is important to absorb into it the will of the young to work for their own rights and those of others, providing a stimulating factor. Part of the time should be given over to study, learning and other purposes to ensure that heads are involved in the work as much as hands. Full collaboration and criticism by all participants are needed to make this a successful pilot scheme with value far beyond the confines of the Northern Ireland province. We would expect this programme quite soon to be a magnet for young people from other countries who would want to come to Northern Ireland for a training period in the Public Service Corps to bring its benefits back to their own homelands.

Whether Protestant or Catholic, the women in Northern Ireland live in a man's world. Their participation is small despite the prevailing conditions of conflict giving them a better chance than they have normally had in peacetime. Housebound, childbound, especially in the working class neighbourhoods, 'minding their own business,' leaving the politics to the men.

This removes one of the main civilising factors from the forum in which the outcome of the Northern Ireland conflict will be decided. With a different attitude towards machismo, there would never have been such a conflict in the first place. Women are much more involved than men in producing life, bringing up children. If not completely brainwashed they cannot accept the squandering of this life.

In sad fact, though, the women have been sufficiently brainwashed to form an essential though passive link in the chain that transmits the recurring cycle of hates and dehumanised views of neighbours. It is at the mother's knee that the child absorbs the early prototypes up to the age of four, five or six, and these are far more impervious to change or unlearning than the stereotype views that are later imposed or manipulated by the various political power interests. Hence the urgency, if the women themselves are ever to break out of this cycle, that women be stimulated, brought together to form their own organisations at all structural levels. We would assign a high priority to the communities' facilitating women's organisations and planning projects as one of the preconditions for any technical assistance or grants to the communities at large.

At present there is no major women's organisation in the Province that has a truly active voice, despite the efforts made in the early days of 'Women Together' to make it such a voice. We often hear the claim that the older women or mother figures have a strong influence in the family, but find this a dangerous half-truth. The woman's influence is purely on internal matters of family interest. In the external forum she is left with no say. Yet if brought together and sensitised to their real potential the women could be a major force.

Men in Northern Ireland do not need to court their women once they are married, or treat them as partners to their thinking. The women consequently have no opportunity to function as their husbands' equals of a fundamentally different outlook. It is said as a commonplace that Northern Irish men would rather be in a pub with their male friends than at home with their wives. They are preoccupied with male pursuits — politics, fighting, pub — putting the family into the category of a women's world of food and nappies, with low status both for the woman and for the family itself. This keeps women in a very traditional role as servants to men, a situation many women elsewhere have either escaped or are not trying to escape, with many men as their allies, sharing the desire for their equality.

We believe women have a tremendous part to play as organisers of and participants in a system of neighbourhood and community structures. It is not that women have less prototypes and stereotypes than men, but once aroused the women may grow beyond the stage their men get to, be quicker to constructive action and more imaginative in setting their goals, simply because by participating at all and producing their first demand for equality they will already have accomplished so much.

It is for the women both as wives and mothers to assert themselves against what they don't accept or agree with, and they can best do this united, not as individuals. The whole system of education would be profoundly different if the women no longer teach fear and hatred. The women may also be quicker off the mark than men to come together with women of the other side, with whom

they have no real conflict but rather the same basic interests. One issue will effectively illuminate this, whether and when the women manage to free themselves from the control of father figures in the clergy who wish not to convince but to impose their views, e.g. regarding separate education, the permanent separation of the children from their peers.

It can be hoped that the mutual scapegoat syndrome of Catholics and Protestants will not prove so strong with women, that the will to live will be stronger. There is hope too that this higher expectation of life will make itself felt in the fight for better neighbourhood conditions, a better outlook for their children. It is also possible that they will be interested in the kindlier forms of cultural life. These and other developments may lead males of both sides (reaching this time deeply into the middle class) to find their wives becoming partners rather than servants, whether they want them so or not. At that point there will be a dramatic decrease in wife-beating, and wives and children will cease to be the scapegoats of male boredom and drunkenness. (All these symptoms of the segregated male society still persist in Britain and other countries too, though slightly less so.)

For these reasons we look for new forms of women organising themselves, as liaison workers, paraprofessionals and professionals, with their own structures, their own women's representatives in the second parliamentary house we have proposed, to whom the politicians would be obliged to listen. They are after all a minority of 51%. If people say that it is simply a part of the traditional Northern Ireland way of life that women of either religious sector be subordinates, we have the less respect for them for that. If people are to fight for better conditions and equality at any level, then equality begins at home.

The women's problems we speak of here are not at all limited to Northern Ireland, even if they are more extreme there than in most countries. If there is to be any rebuilding of the neighbourhood and community life, the women simply have to play a part which is impossible to them without a basic improvement in their role, equality vis-a-vis men. This means that Northern Ireland has the opportunity here too to offer a pilot plan and experience to the rest of the world. The women in Northern Ireland have much too serious problems to get side-tracked into the detestation of themselves as women that distorts many feminist movements in more placid places, but every reason to demand and achieve full personal equality as women.

Women are often brave in Northern Ireland's conflict situation. They have often acted when men could not act, as British soldiers have often wryly remarked. Women and children have been more endangered than men economically and socially if not physically. The piecemeal falling apart of the extended family hits them harder. This makes it all the more necessary for them to work for the preservation of the extended family structure in Northern Ireland, one of the few industrialised places where it is still substantially intact, not wait for it to fall apart as in England.

What is important is not that the women fight the man but that they stimulate the man to produce a fuller life and instill it in their children.

An element in Irish history that seems curiously neglected is the remarkably effective women in the Ireland of the early twentieth century. In all the political activity and cultural growth that led up to the 1916 rebellion and subsequent events, women of all classes and of both religions played any number of significant roles. It is always rather baffling to find these women mentioned in the history books, uninhibited as they took their equal part in social, cultural and political life alongside men who seem to have been unsurprised to find them there. Understandably, history books written in a later

Ireland in which women had somehow once again been reduced to the servant role never comment on this anomalous activity that the women of the early part of the century carried on. But it remains visible to anyone who cares to look that there is an effective tradition of women functioning as the equals of men at all levels of social, cultural and political life in Ireland, even if it may have been largely confined to Dublin at the time.

What we hear reported now as the most constant worry of women in Northern Ireland is concern for the women left alone to cope with the problems of a family, whether because their men have had to work abroad or at sea in peacetime, visiting home only at long intervals, or in the conflict period because their men are interned, on the run or lost. That these women, trained only to be servants of their husbands, are left to fend so completely for themselves, is rightly recognised as the weakest point in women's position in Northern Ireland and in the structure of the family. It should be seized upon to become their greatest strength. What is said by and for them, and the way the rest of the women in the community act in solidarity with them, can be the point of departure for an overall strengthening of women's position and equality, and thus for a much wider restructuring and renovation of Northern Irish society.

The Christian Churches, in either part of Ireland or anywhere else in the world for that matter, are terribly embarrassed by the prominence of sectarian labels and affiliations in the Northern Ireland conflict. Apologists for the Churches in Ireland are aggressively quick to extract from anyone who comments on or comes to observe the conflict situation a ritual statement that it is not a 'war of religion,' that the two sides are not fighting or attacking each other for reasons of religion or faith, that any doctrinal issues are entirely irrelevant to the struggle. We think there is both truth in these statements and a quite impermissible untruth, especially as they are demanded as a prior absolution of the Churches from any responsibility. The most frequent speech one hears from even the highest Church leaders in Ireland or in their defensive appearances abroad can be summarised thus: 'Don't blame us! It is not the hierarchical leaders, or the Church community, or the 'X' (Catholic or Protestant) people who are doing these terrible things, but a small band of wicked and violent men whose actions we deplore. They besmirch our noble cause.' Not to assent, or not to be impressed by this line is one of the unforgivable sins in Ireland.

We are not in fact much impressed and regard these questions whether the battle is about religion or whether the activists are motivated by loyalty to their sectarian communities as such as not terribly important. The real problem in the world of the Churches in Northern Ireland is not one of their divisiveness or even of the remarkably low profile they have kept, but one of the lack of values which is inherent in the situation as a whole.

The Churches certainly have it as their function to be the carriers of basic and ultimate values in the society. No one can question the important position the Churches have in Irish life, though there is indeed a difference between Protestants and Catholics in this respect. The Protestants are not much church-goers, and the ministers and Church leadership are consequently in a relatively powerless position. Nevertheless the primary group identity of these people is as 'the Protestant people of Northern Ireland' and they retain a strong sense of representing a long and nobly defended tradition of religious and political freedom, even if their main responses are of resistance to what threatens the freedoms rather than a positive cultivation of the tradition. The Catholics both attend and listen to their Church on a massive scale, and immense power, moral, psychological, social and political, resides in the fact that the disapproval or sanctions invoked by the clergy or hierarchy are tremendously to be feared in the Catholic community.

Given this strong position, in different ways, of the various Churches, one has to ask why they are so ineffectual at the level of promoting and carrying basic values in the society. Had there been living values the situation of violence would not have occurred in Northern Ireland or there would have been at least a strong counter-force in the public mind. It is this flaccidity of the Churches, sign of a radical ill-health in the spirit, that is much the more serious issue. The Church leaders' denials of responsibility for the conflict seem more and more like a fig-leaf with very little behind it.

It would be worse than churlish in saying this not to acknowledge the many fine persons in the several Churches for whom one must have admiration, who would be outstanding in any community. Surely the group of clergymen who took the recent cease-fire initiative, at the personal risk of not only misunderstanding and rejection but of basic respect and even safety in their own communities, acted out of the deepest commitment to and representation of the values they profess. There are other admirable clergymen who are in some cases repressed or even silenced by their own superiors, who though they outrank them do not excel them in value,

having nothing comparable of their own to contribute. There is much washing of hands and much wringing of hands. One can understand it if the clergy feel that they may not be too far in advance of their people (or 'charges') if they are not to alienate them, with the result that their credibility would suffer and they themselves be isolated without any impact. One always has to question whether this is an ethical or a political consideration, whether the motive is to retain (rightly) moral leadership or to protect vested institutional interests of power or privilege, which have nothing to do with moral leadership or religious profession.

But this impotence of the Churches at the moral and spiritual level of values is a matter of profound concern not only to themselves and their leadership, as power or privilege establishments, but to the whole community. People in Ireland, more than elsewhere, see in the Churches the incorporation of their cherished values. If the Churches then fail so signally as carriers of these values, if respect for human life, for the rights and liberties of others fade out of public consciousness or conviction, if near neighbours are easily excluded from the circle of people's identification and solidarity and sense of justice, and if hatred is cultivated as a virtue, not necessarily by the teaching of the Churches but by their default as a serious counter-force, then the whole community is intolerably deprived and lives at a more primitive, backwards, spiritually debased level. Given the importance unquestioningly conferred on the Churches, the community cannot afford their impotence in matters of values.

What is to be done? It always sounds presumptuous, and is usually denounced as such, when any mere humans urge the majestic spiritual authorities of the Church to be or become spiritual. Yet there is a strong tendency about in Northern Ireland, among both Protestants and Catholics, to regard the Churches as irrelevant for the future in any positive sense, even though recognising, quite rightly, that they can be difficult in a negative sense. We think one cannot so lightly dismiss or condemn the great traditional incorporations of the community's moral and spiritual value sense. All of Irish society would be impoverished if these institutional representations of its ideals were to fade out of the picture, and a value system, even a good alternative value system without any such institutional representation, would be excessively vulnerable during these critical times of transition. Two things are necessary then, as we see it.

First, one must hope that the more courageous of the clergy, who feel most strongly the failure of the Churches, will make an effort within the Churches to find new ways. There will be a day of atonement when all who had a near or a distant concern for the conflict must know that they have been failing constantly, and the writer includes himself in this. The co-responsibility for the tragedy is a matter of shame. Once there is awareness and acceptance of the shame and a resolve to compensate, the real basic values which unite people can develop. The active and constructive elements within the Churches and the clergy will then have their opportunity to be in the van of this new development of values, if not successfully frustrated by those with a vested interest in the corrupt old ways. When the fog lifts and people see that the worst casualty has been the old status quo, these excellent men will be in any case among those who help to establish the values based on time-honoured patterns which must speak for the conditions of people even in new situations. The great values are always the same though they have to be newly seen. It will be for these more value-oriented churchmen to bring the values and the new techniques into the Churches, which have become such arid ground. We do indeed recognise the tremendous importance of people's need for the Churches as carriers of the traditional values of western and of Irish civilisation.

But in the meantime, since it is unlikely in the present situation that the Churches will be a place of origin for a renewed sense of values, a second thing is needed, namely an alternative underpinning of the minimum standards of values in Northern Irish society. While the Churches for their own transcendent reasons will have to take stock, eventually, of their low spiritual state and have a renewal of values, the rest of society cannot afford in its critical state to wait for the Churches, which are likelier to move, if at all, on their own time scale, which is unrelated to the crisis Northern Ireland's society has been experiencing. The new methods and new techniques for the establishment of minimum values are the most important single element in the hope that Northern Ireland, rather than going into total spiritual collapse, will find the alternative social possibilities and institutions which will help both itself and other societies in the new age. One simply cannot expect that these necessary spiritual elements will flow from the Churches in their current condition and must provide them otherwise, with the hope that the best elements within the Churches will then be able to bring them back into the Churches.

Maximum and Minimum Values.

We make a distinction, important as we see it, between the minimum structures of values in society and the maximum structures. There is a minimum structure of basic human values on which all men can agree, whether Catholics or Protestants, whether Christians or Jews, or Muslims or Hindus, whether religious or not religious. We need only mention the value of human life, the values of survival, of the minimum levels of existence that make a truly human life possible, of the prevention of those things that will reduce people below these minimums, of the socio-creative activities and opportunities that bring people's lives to fulfillment. These constitute an outlook on the totality of human life which can be a matter of consensus among all men whatever the differences in the structures that express and support their values.

Besides this minimum, there are maximum structures of values. These are also total outlooks on life, but they are the specific outlooks of groups that have basic value orientations expressed in religious belief and faith. The most basic values, we believe, are not separate, but the structures are. The values are permanent, enduring, but must be expressed through a culture, through a civilisation, through structures of faith.

There are thus separate value structures and uniting value structures. It is the separate ones that are or can become divisive. Hence there is a need for clear recognition of the minimum values, identification values as the uniting structure, which must yet not interfere in those separate value structures which are not divisive but give a group a personality of its own.

We may make a comparison with the situation in Russia, where maximum values are proclaimed, but the minimum ones do not exist. The scale is tipped to equality at the price of liberty, and one might say that in the West the opposite occurs.

That the minimum and basic values have come down to a lower level in Northern Irish society can be seen in the way people write others off, saying my side right or wrong. An occasional tut-tut of magisterial teaching does not make any difference and is not expected to do so. In other parts of the world the Northern Ireland conflict is seen as a reason for leaving the Churches. This is clearly a matter of concern both to the Churches within Ireland, who are embarrassed to see their image tarnished so, and to the Churches internationally, who see their already eroded position being further damaged by this running sore in Ireland. It is obvious for people to draw these conclusions when they see that

maximum-value structures have gotten to contradict the basic minimum values. They show themselves false, at least in their concrete application, and must therefore be reconsidered. This situation can only arise if the insistence, out of a weak sense of the meaning of the value structure by those who are officially its custodians, is on only a selective few elements in the maximum value structure to the neglect of the basics. When this happens, one must always be open to the possibility, even probability, that the selection is made on the basis of which less-than-basic value elements will best reinforce the power or privilege position of those at the top of the structure, making the structure top heavy. The values system is the common denominator in any situation. In Northern Ireland it is not working. There cannot be two basic value systems. Where there are theoretically two, neither one of them works.

But then we come to the further anomaly that, particularly at the higher levels of the clergy, ecumenism is all the rage, that the bishops and Church leaders meet frequently over tea, discuss matters of doctrine and inter-church relation, produce common protestations against the violence, and while denying responsibility of their own for the violence absolve one another of responsibility as well. It is not even that they would personally deny the matters of basic value; only that they consider more peripheral things, the preservation of privilege, more interesting and important, and have been unsuccessful in propagating what are ostensibly their basic values in their communities. The sacrament of ecumenical tea, celebrated by bishops or even coming down to the level of pastors, though seldom lower, does not automatically effect what it signifies or promises.

It is quite right that the clergy and Church leaders should speak up for their own side, defending their people from injustice, deprivation or loss of status and identity, protesting when offenses are committed against them. But they have not stood up for real new relations with the other side, giving up some part of their fortress-like stance, showing willingness to teach tolerance by a deep search for the real roots of the conflict in order to remove them. This does not mean that one should not differ in defending structures of maximum values as they are understood and traditional (therefore constitutive of community) within one or another denomination, so long as there are enough common denominators on the minimum levels. What happens in fact is that those of the two major religious factions often agree on the maximum values, finding (often through the experience of Churches elsewhere which are more genuinely ecumenical) their differences in dogmatic definition and polity far less alarming than expected. These are the very things over which the bishops can so easily share tea. But the community they ostensibly lead and which pays them such elaborate deference is brought to no common agreement on the minimum values. Only lip service is paid to these, if that.

Reactive Policies.

What the Churches in fact do in the Northern Ireland situation is to condemn the violence and protest the injustices, particularly (and rightly) to their own community. In both cases, these are activities dictated by each day's passing events, without serious effect on the underlying conditions of injustice and inhumanity.

In the first case, an exclusive preoccupation with the condemnation of violence, as distinguished from the active promotion of social goals and education in responsibility, puts the Churches in the class of peace-keepers rather than peace-makers. These are quite distinct activities, both necessary enough but it is not possible for the same people normally to do both. Peace-keeping is basically the function of the police and the military; in smaller family or

neighbourhood circumstances, of whoever wields the stick or the strong right arm. Peace-making or exhortations to reconciliation come unconvincingly from these sources. At their best, when there is no occasion to complain of misconduct or overreaction from these peace-keeping forces, their role is fundamentally the negative one of preventing something from happening, preventing the breach of law and order.

The peace-maker, the reconciler, is inept when his activity is primarily at this level of preventing violence or breach of order, and this is our criticism of the greater part of the Churches' activity in response to the conflict. It has been, almost without exception, at the level of deploring either the injustices or the violence, or of trying to bring groups of people, whether clergy or neighbourhood people or youngsters or even in exceptional cases the hard-line people themselves, together across the dividing lines to meet each other and see that 'they don't have two heads.' So far as their activity can be summed up as 'deploring,' they have the undignified position (much like that of the Dublin and Westminster governments) of wringing their hands over the militants of their own communities and giving their highest approval to their least active and least effective people (who 'make no trouble'). The Catholic bishops are most embarrassed by the IRA, the Protestant Church leaders by the most extreme Protestant activists. Worse than the indignity of it, the hand-wringing posture duplicates the peace-keeping task of military and police, puts the Churches in an alignment with them that, at least on the Catholic side, can be compromising in the eyes of their own people, and is yet almost entirely ineffectual as a peace-keeping operation. The armed soldier or policeman is better at this task; the churchman, if his primary task has not got to do with justice, merely a whiner who will quite rightly be ignored. If on the other hand the exercise is to bring people together across the dividing lines, it is still a purely reactive activity, its content still dictated by the conflict situation rather than being ahead of the situation, and it is again aimed negatively (peace keeping rather than peace-making) at preventing the two groups from doing harm to each other out of misunderstanding; a plea for in-activity.

In the case of the Churches protesting the injustices against their own communities, they are initially on much more solid ground, acting in solidarity with their people as they should. Only if people of whichever historic community are proud and confident in their own traditions and background can they begin to see that the other side is not all that different. However, there can be no bona fides in this show of solidarity if the Churches (through their leadership) do not at the same time come to terms with the moral bankruptcy of the last years, taking steps themselves to grow socially and showing willingness to remove the main divisive forces. The first of these, historically, has been religion itself, and the Church leaders still, even in their friendliest meetings among themselves, condone and profit from this historic division. A second is the feeling of the poor that other poor will want to take away their work and dominate them, and to cope with this demands highly creative and imaginative effort. A third is the division of the daily acts of living, so that people do not really meet one another. Obviously to live among only Catholics or only Protestants in the given situation cannot be helped if one is poor, though it does not matter much if one is rich. The biggest single factor in this separation is the separated schools, which impregnate the minds of the young with this divisiveness, preventing them from meeting others, leaving them open to all sorts of negative stories about the other side. The division at work is important too, with only token integration. Of course women are also divided and kept apart, though they have much in common, even more than the men, since they have the same kinds of problems, worries and fears. Sport and leisure are also important. A very deliberate plan is needed to change the situation of segregation in all of these activities in time, but the Churches have been and still show signs of being a main force to maintain these divisions and oppose any effort to plan integration, basically out of fear that such a de-segregation would challenge their own internal power structure.

Lest there seem to be a contradiction between our low estimate of the ritual occasions for 'bringing people together' and our blaming the Churches for not getting at the roots of divisiveness, let it be said that what we oppose is gesture. Gestures are miserable and the *fata morgana* of good will, either not meant or unable to stand up to pressure. The peace rallies, the expensive holidays abroad for children of mixed denominations, or those much publicised tea ceremonies among bishops are occasions for complacency and self-congratulation, disguises for the fact that the Churches are the main source of excuses for separatism and deadly hostility, that they have been unable or uninterested to give a real lead and have condoned the situation, condemning only its inevitable consequences in violence.

Tradition and Contemporaneity.

Since Churches, anywhere in the world, are as much in transition and under challenge as any other institution, we have all gotten used to hearing of the contentions and often strained relations of traditionalists and progressives within any one of the Churches, and it has become a commonplace that their differences are often of more contemporary significance than the classic points of difference among the Christian denominations. We hear quite consistently, though, from both Protestant and Catholic theologians and men of experience that their criteria for the healthy state of 'the Church' or of any particular Church, at any time in its long history or, judging it at the present time, of any particular local Church is this: that it be in deep and effective contact both with its tradition in the fullest sense, the roots of its existence and the whole of its historical experience, and with the contemporary situation in which it finds itself. The Church, in any time or place, that is exclusively or predominantly preoccupied with only one or other of these, either introverted upon itself or so distracted by the contemporary scene that it forgets its own character, is always riding for a heavy fall. If we accept this criterion, which has much better authority than our own for it, we get an alarming picture of the Churches in Ireland, especially in the North. So far, we have diagnosed the Churches as suffering acute spiritual debility in Northern Ireland mainly by their effects -- 'by their fruits...' -- in not having succeeded as representative or carriers of basic human values. This criterion gives us a more internal view.

The case is different with the Catholic and Protestant Churches, largely because the Catholic Church is so strongly under the control of its hierarchical and clerical leadership, whereas the basic mentality of Protestants in Northern Ireland is far more independent of that of their clergy, often enough quite different. But while we have to look at the two separately there are eventually strong similarities.

The striking thing about the Catholic Church in Ireland, and especially in the North, as it appears to independent observers, is that it is not particularly Irish. The Irish tradition in the Church is a very strong and distinctive one, but we look in vain for any serious link in the contemporary Catholic Church in Ireland with the monastic Church of Patrick and Columban, with the learned tradition of the early Celtic Church, with the artistic tradition seen in the Book of Kells. This is a truly curious fact in a population which has made such a cult of its Irishness, been so revivalistic in its Gaelicism in every other feature of its cultural life, and where Catholicism itself has been the strongest single talisman of Irish nationalist identity for so long. This calls for some explanation which it is not our business to give here, but we can note that it represents a drastic cutting off of this Church from its roots.

There has obviously been a period of what we might call a cultural interruption, when it was at peril that anything distinctively Irish was cultivated

in the land. But this has not prevented the revival of every conceivable link with traditional Irishness in other aspects of life, and in fact the careful preservation of the people's Catholic affiliation through the centuries of repression was itself the cultivation of something seen as distinctively Irish (distinguished from the religious affiliation of the English overlords). Education of the clergy in particular had to be done abroad, mainly in France, and this is what gives us a clue, for it is a French style, nothing even particularly Roman or from any other source that might be seen as a link with deeper roots, that characterises Irish Catholicism in its peculiar non-Irishness.

An old canard speaks of the Irish Catholic Church as Jansenist, as having picked up the humanly repressive outlook of Jansenism from French 18th-century seminary training. We do not find this particularly true, though there is a dour and almost Protestantly puritanical streak in Irish Catholicism. (Sometimes one wonders why the equally puritanical Irish Protestants are not more pleased with their variety of Catholicism.) Instead we would identify the Church style of Catholicism in Ireland, and more in the North than elsewhere, with France of the middle years of the 19th century: post-Jansenist, deeply conservative and clerically controlled, insulated against even Catholic influences from outside (including Rome); highly parochial in its interests and in the independent authoritarianism of bishops and pastors; deeply pious but extraordinarily perfunctory in the central worship and liturgy of the Church while concentrated instead on peripheral paraliturgies (characteristically for its 19th-century French origins, these are rosaries, scapulars, pilgrimages to Lourdes); by turns heavy and formalistic or perfunctory to the point of neglect in its preaching; introverted in its emphasis on submission to authority and on ritual practice (predominantly the peripheral rituals) at the expense of any religiously motivated activism.

While this quite clearly dated French style (quite different from the contemporary French Church) effectively insulates Irish Catholicism from its own traditional roots, it also insulates it quite as well from the contemporary world, including even the experiences of the rest of Catholicism and the rest of Irish life. One of the most curious phenomena in the whole Irish Catholic picture is that of the disappearing missionaries. One might call it the greatest single exception to our observation that current Irish Catholicism is without links to the ancient Irish Church tradition that modern Ireland does, like ancient Ireland, send extraordinary numbers of missionary priests and nuns to third-world countries (much as do the Dutch and Spanish Catholic Churches), were it not for this phenomenon. These missionaries should surely be a wide-open window on the world and the rest of the Church. Great numbers of them have returned to Ireland after excellent and creative work abroad, but when one looks for traces of their influence or the wider and more contemporary view that they have been exposed to or have even expounded elsewhere in the world, one finds nothing whatever: they have vanished, been swallowed up and left wholly voiceless beneath the unruffled 19th-century French surface of Irish Catholicism.

In estimating this Church's contemporaneity, however, the main measuring rods are its relation to the world-wide reassessment and revitalisation in the Catholic Church which reached its watershed in the Second Vatican Council, and its degree of determination in coming to terms with the main question on its own doorstep, that of relations with Protestants in Ireland. On the first measurement, the Church in Ireland is carefully isolated from the strong currents of renewal going on in the rest of Catholicism. The dykes are up. Lip service is paid to the actual documents of the Council taken in their most restrictive sense, if only to provide authority with a hold over them to prevent their being taken more seriously, but at root the whole contemporary aggiornamento of Catholicism is regarded by the authorities of Irish Catholicism as a temporary aberration among foreigners,

from which Ireland has been blessedly spared. This is far truer in the North than elsewhere in Ireland. As for resolute action on the home-grown problem of relations with Protestants, the Church looks at the cities burning around it and has found nothing better to say thus far than to disclaim responsibility and condemn the tiny minority of violent men who, not being like or doing to the churchmen themselves, are therefore bad.

There are exceptions, obviously, many persons clerical and lay who do not accept this style of Catholicism and try to change it or dissociate themselves from it. But they are still, particularly in the North, in the position of rebels, not a voice that is recognised as having standing and respected by the authorities. Most ordinary people are too timid to be associated with them, even though the authorities themselves become less credible to their 'flock' through their impotence to influence the conflict situation and particular arbitrary acts of power over the last few years. The strange time-lock that binds Irish Catholic life to a foreign style of an alien period serves as effective insulation of the Church either from its roots in Irish or more universally Christian tradition or from the actual world, at home or abroad, in which it lives at present. One must conclude that there is something in the 19th-century French ecclesiastical style more interesting and important to the authorities of Irish Catholicism than anything in the faith or values which they profess to uphold.

On the Protestant side both the period and the style are different. There is no such authoritarian hold over the minds of Protestants by the clergy as one finds among Ireland's Catholics. One result of this is that there are not such lofty cries of blasphemy if one tells hard truths about Northern Irish Protestantism and the picture has been more commented on before. With relatively few people regular church-goers, there is little excitement over niceties of Protestant doctrine, though a very evangelical brand of religious practice is influential within a minority, often very touchingly but in ways that seldom spill over into public or social life. The real touchstones of Protestant consciousness are Protestant liberties as they were fought for in the 17th century and deliverance from Roman or bishops' domination. This is anti-negative and very isolated from the contemporary world. The mentality identifies with its high moment in the Irish campaigns of William III, but the emotional roots of its stereotypes are rather earlier in the 17th century. This is all rather remote from the normal concerns of Protestant clergy anywhere else than in Ireland and provides rather little to chew on as a full-time occupation. Consequently the clergy have tended to go a different way, occupying themselves with the theological interests of more recent times. They are not terribly up-to-date, since there is no great urgency for them in these matters that interest their people so little. It is not unlike the situation in a religiously indifferent culture where the clergy, as an established element in the general society, plies its traditional pursuits and spends its spare time on hobbies that can equally well be contemporary theology or ancient Christian (or non-Christian) inscriptions, becoming mild-mannered and pale; except that in the Northern Irish Protestant culture the other interest of the people (other than what the clergy are interested in) is not money or pleasure but The Protestant Cause in all its thunder.

Since The Cause is not what the Protestant Churches are there to advance, Protestants caught up in it have to have another organisation that represents straightforwardly their anti-negative cause. The great mass of them not associated with any paramilitary activism finds this in the Orange Order. This leaves a great deal of responsibility in the hands of the leaders and officers of this Order, as the primary organ of identification for the Protestant people. If the steam goes out of the threat of 'Rome Rule' and their people's abhorrence of it no longer occupies so much of their consciousness, what more have they to offer? Are they capable of being a focus for their people's commitment to positive or

even to alternative anti-negative purposes and even of leading a renewal of values in Church and society, or do they lose ground then and leave their people without a focus of their identity and therefore at a disadvantage?

There are exceptions to this picture too, even more exceptions than to the Catholic picture since the Protestant one is less distinct. There are those obvious clergymen who preach a distinctly 17th-century line, with howls of rage at Catholic perfidy and denunciations of the Whore of Babylon, but these are for the most part political rather than pastoral clergy, their 17th-century rhetoric actually a code for expressing working-class distress among their people. There are the outstandingly courageous clergy too, as there are on the Catholic side, less likely than their Catholic counterparts to be pilloried by Church authorities but in just as dangerously isolated positions when they risk their careers or reputations to initiate creative peace-making steps. For the most part, though, there is an encapsulation of the popular Protestant mentality in a 17th-century defensive position that isolates it just as effectively as the Catholics' 19th-century French style from either the deeper roots of Protestant Christian tradition or the real contemporary world of Ireland or the rest of world Protestantism. The clergy, apart from the relatively few exceptions, remain remote from this trauma of their people, observing well enough which things they are expected to keep quiet about, ensconced in a slightly dusty (early-20th-century) fundamentalism which they tend quietly in the few church-goers, motoring off occasionally to Corrymeela where they pray together for peace and entertain Catholic and Protestant children alike.

In sum, both Catholic and Protestant Churches are in ultimately similar positions, wrapped up in worlds of unreality related to specific periods of their past experience, cut off from both tradition and contemporaneity. This accounts for the spiritual debility we had already remarked in both, their inability to exercise serious influence for basic human values in the period of societal crisis, their passive acceptance of the lowering of minimum standards, their floundering about in disclaimers, self-justifications, self-righteousness. The sort of encapsulation both the Catholic Church structure and the popular Protestant mentality maintain can only be kept intact as a total ideology, in which every detail of ritual or deference or habit is equally important with the most fundamental points of conviction. This sort of total ideology is terrible vulnerable, as the removal or destruction of any detail brings the whole structure down in collapse and there is nothing left behind except ruins and confusion.

Power.

If the influence of the Churches as to values is regrettably very little visible, then one comes to terms with the power question. As long as the Churches are so deeply involved with hostile power structures of each side, a part of the conflict and not healers, chaplains to the power forces and often much in their councils, this is basically a medieval situation, a throwback to previous centuries. It allows the Church leadership structures to pin their hopes on the most respectable of the power forces, disapproving of the more activist and non-respectable ones. We recall Heine's line: 'Mein schönes Kind, grüsse mich nicht Unter den Linden./ Wenn wir erst zu Hause sind wirst du alles finden.' (Don't speak to me, lovely child, in the public street -- Unter den Linden, main street of Berlin --; it's only when we're at home alone that you'll find out all about it.) The Churches still play a great role, and it is still effectively as political forces in the power struggle, played mainly in the government power establishment's court. In this game there is never any concession that the Churches have had the greatest historical part in building and maintaining the segregation system and

still profit from it. It is truly hard to tell whether there is any real passion about the issue of divisiveness in the Churches, whether they are making use of the conflict to maintain their own strength or whether they are being used by the conflicting groups that fight under the name of their faith. One can allow oneself to be used informally without quite approving; thus one has the worst of both worlds.

And meanwhile there is the power of the internal governing structure, which is truly at the heart of the conflict in important ways, the ways that make it ultimately most untrue to say this is not a war about religion however uninterested the actual contenders are in religious doctrine. The Protestant Church leaders are distinctly at an advantage here, as their power has long since been stripped or has fallen away from them. This has in fact freed the exceptional clergymen of great positive conviction to act firmly for peace-making purposes, using their influence, which each has to acquire by the evidence of his own integrity, rather than power. On the Catholic side, though, the picture is rather dismal. The one thing Protestants most fear, the root of their abhorrence for the Southern Irish State, what they sum up under the name 'Rome Rule,' is domination of the whole of life, public and private, by the Catholic bishops acting through their clergy. One can dismiss this as a canard, but there is too much evidence that in public or private life in the South or in the Catholic areas of the North the clergy have at least the negative power that anyone hesitates long and hard before doing or saying anything that might offend or draw rebuke from the bishops or priests. Negative power of this sort can be even more sweeping than positive power of command, since it may be understood/misunderstood as forbidding even things the clergy would not in fact want to forbid, if people merely thought they might want to forbid it. Even the least dominating or aggressive priests have ultimate decision-making power thrust upon them in quite irresistible ways by simple folk-custom, as the second-last word in discussions that cover all aspects of the community's life is, 'What do you think, Father?'

There are clergy who resist this system to the best of their ability; there are others who regret or actively disapprove it, but find it hard to fight. But there are others who defend it tooth and nail, resisting or suppressing any sign of lay or outside initiative as a challenge to this traditional power position, and these especially substantiate the worst fears of the Protestant popular mentality. Most unfortunately, some of the highest-ranking and most powerful figures in the Catholic leadership in the North promote and cling to every feature of what the Protestants most fear to the point of caricature, apparently unaware even as they join in the ecclesiastical chorus of condemnation for the 'men of violence' that they, their attitudes and their actions lie more truly and more perniciously at the roots of the violence than any of the activist groups. There are honest efforts made in the Irish Catholic Church to overcome this disease of dictatorial and total paternalism, but from the seats of power the most vigorous efforts are made to suppress any questioning of this kind of regime. What this represents is the value-carriers still using the techniques of an ancient paternalism at a time when paternalism itself is the greatest enemy of a high level of common minimum values in the society. Because there have been no adequate tools, only these antiquated ones, people have not been enabled to think in terms of values, and since they had inherited hostilities (for which the Churches were largely responsible), they used religion itself as the killer force that it should have been the business of the Churches to prevent. The obvious peace-making force in the situation should have been the clergy (such of them as believed in it and were not themselves promoters of the division and conflict), but they were unable to be peace-makers for lack of technique, of adequate or modern tools, of know-how. Of those who tried, many got stuck in gestures instead and worked like the politicians who led from behind, not knowing how to lead from in front.

Conclusions, Proposals.

We are more than ordinarily diffident here about making proposals for their own reform to the Churches, especially as we fear already to be swallowed up in the pit of brimstone for daring to say that the value-carriers have been naked of values. We do speak with great affection for the Churches, and a conviction that the people need their structures to incorporate their highest values, both the highest minimum values that they share in common and the lofty structures of maximum values that are the properties of each Church. Without such structures even the most idealistically conceived high level of minimum values would stand small chance in an Irish society in crisis.

For the tragic internal situation, cut off from both tradition and contemporary reality, of each Church, we can only recommend first that they break their isolation, entering into renewed contact with their international affiliates. There are ways out of their encapsulations in strange moments of their pasts. Contemporary Protestants in most places apart from Ireland are so far removed from the fortress mentality of the 17th century that the clergy even in Ireland, who have to make a full-time job of their Protestantism, cannot find enough of interest in the Battle-of-the-Boyne preoccupation to keep them busy. These other Churches have become vitally contributory to the modern world not by abandoning their Protestant tradition but by cultivating and developing it. There must be much to learn for the Irish Protestant Churches from openness to them. French Catholicism, too, was a dreadfully unattractive and introverted thing in the mid 19th century when the style still dominant in Ireland was in vogue there. But French Catholicism has become far more attractive and relevant by now, in communication with the rest of the world such as the Irish Church has not allowed. This proves at least that there is a way between then and now, and that the rest of the world, Catholic and otherwise, could bring much of value back into the Irish Catholic Church. Hopefully, learning from more recent French experience, the Catholic Church in Ireland would not have to go through a Dreyfus case and the loss of its proletariate before getting out of the capsule.

It is unappealing, though, just to be told to catch up with the others after having one's knuckles rapped and being called the lout of the class. There is a way for the Churches in Ireland to get ahead and be in advance of their brother Churches elsewhere in the world, having something of value to teach them. They have already their heroes to show; we think of the bravery of the present Catholic Bishop of Derry on Bloody Sunday, or the valiant effort of the Church of Ireland Bishop of Connor, the General Secretary of the Presbyterian Church, officials of the Irish Council of Churches and others to bring about a ceasefire. There are so many clergy in Northern Ireland that even under different leaderships they ought to be a considerable peace-making and creative leadership force. Northern Ireland is, after all, as we are convinced, only a few years ahead of the rest of the world in facing a societal breakdown situation that others will before long experience as well. The Churches, as value-carriers in the society, should be in the van of the society's institutions in developing the new techniques and ways of dealing with these largely unprecedented troubles.

What is needed most basically is training for the clergy as peace-makers. Without it, their value as challengers to violence or apathy must be doubted, not only in conflict itself but in the preparations that lead to it. The responsibility for the current debacle of the Churches as value-carriers lies largely with those who have failed to enable and prepare them to do a different job (and of course those who have actively hindered them from it). This results from all the years in which the clergy have fought their own cause alone and not been interested in the whole, Protestants not seeing the injustice done to Catholics, Catholics not seeing how Protestants were being antagonised, especially by the

conditions of Southern Ireland which they saw as oppressive and priest-ridden. A training for responsibility is the one thing we would see as most essential, and this means enabling the clergy themselves to be trainers in the assumption of responsibility, rather than taking responsibility from people and concentrating it in themselves. If the responsibility comes to a sudden halt and goes no further, accepting borders which are the equivalent of a nationalism, it becomes a sacro egoismo, to appropriate Mussolini's favourite phrase to describe one's own cause as so sacred it takes away any sacredness or even humanity from the other's cause.

What we are asking is that the visible structures of the Churches and their loyal troops (including those most loyal ones who have been regarded as an embarrassment by the power elites in the Church establishments) should be strengthened by invisible structures, not as competition but as service. Our own concern is entirely with these invisible structures, that they be new and constructive, a matter of mutual goodwill, not of sentimentality, starting from the mentality the people actually have but not satisfied to stay there. We have no doubt that the dedicated and value-conscious of the clergy in Northern Ireland could then use new methods to overgrow this conflict, nor that their experience could then be of great use to others in the Middle East, in the Philippines, in Africa, in Cyprus and elsewhere. We see the values of religion as tragically misused, knowing that after all more people have been killed on behalf of religion than for most other causes one could name, using the potentially peace-making and value-carrying force of religion as excuse for political, national, ethnic and other conflicts which are an insult to the 20th century.

At the same time we have to warn anyone else interested in values in Northern Ireland that it is highly unlikely the the restoration of basic values in their society is to come from the Churches. Their institutional and power interests may well be in conflict with them, and there are within them strong forces, even among clergy including some of the highest leadership, who are forces of hatred disguised as self-defence. There is an essential difference to be observed in the institutions which have responsibility as value-carriers between the professio and the confessio, between what is claimed and what is actually lived. If as we see it the official and publicly responsible value carriers are not in fact carrying the values of society, so far as they are being carried at all and not simply sliding, it is necessary to see who are the true value carriers, who the people who bring forth new answers to the new problems. How far do public or governmental programmes really deal with people living in socially dangerous or unsatisfactory conditions? How was it possible in the past that people put up with unsatisfactory conditions? How does one identify the local forces of injustice, hatred, scapegoatism? By what measurements are scapegoats and heroic figures established in the popular imagination and how intensive is the feeling for or against them? The question who are the value carriers is in fact the question who is doing something about these issues. Who are those who carry little burden and ask too much? Who carry the greater burdens yet ask and receive too little?

There is the question of equal chances for men and women, and for children. There are the ramifications of living in area X instead of area Y. If one area is worse than another, why so? What can be done about it?

If the most needed of all commodities in Northern Ireland, values, cannot be expected from the Churches, as we believe, at an early enough stage if at all, it is up to others to supply them. A society in as desperate a plight as Northern Ireland's cannot afford to wait for the Churches to have a change of soul before having one itself. We see the Human Rights and Responsibilities Centres in local neighbourhoods and throughout the community as the main tool for accomplishing this, as described in the paper on local communities. It is in them that social

value planning could be done, finding the roots of the positive factors in the society, to feed into the young and others the tools and techniques that can use once they have found out what to do, once they have found that values are living matter to be discussed and developed. Their concern for values will then become not only local but national and international, growing out into wider and wider areas.

Paternalism has taught people how powerless they are, how dependent on their leaders. It faces people with only two choices: between violence if they want to change anything or acquiescence into apathy. The social planning we propose is designed to add a third possibility, to show that a small group starting from the grass-roots can have power and influence if determined, clear in its goals and with a plan based on values. Such a group stimulating and working with others can move mountains, and if there are some dedicated clergymen or laymen among them can perhaps even move the Churches, restoring them to their function as value carriers.

Northern Ireland has long taken special pride in its relative prosperity as compared with the Republic of Ireland. To some extent this has resulted from the social services of the British Welfare State since the Second World War, but even more, as Protestants particularly will point out, the long-standing industrialisation, the thrift and hard work of its citizens, their skills, talent and great personal effort have produced it. Belfast especially has become an important city and major built-up area because of its industries.

These industries, especially the fundamental ones on which the economy has traditionally been built, have now run into trouble, not merely or even primarily because of the prolonged conflict situation but more seriously because of the general world economic situation. The linen industry, long one of the two basic pillars of the Province's prosperity, has been skillfully at first supplemented and eventually nearly displaced by the manufacture of plastic fibers, but after all the effort put into this adaptation over a goodly number of years the plastic fiber industry itself now stands under the long-term threat of scarcity and soaring prices of oil. The shipyards, the other pillar on which Northern Ireland's prosperity has rested, exist now only through massive subsidies, kept alive by British choice. We have even heard them described as costly occupational therapy for people who would otherwise be unemployed.

For a number of years, government has sought to diversify the Province's industrial economy by encouraging investment by foreign companies, not unlike the policy over these same years by the Republic of Ireland to the South. That policy has registered its successes, not only in providing employment but also in breaking down some of the old discrimination in employment through the constant movement it created on the job market. Its weaknesses and dangers are becoming increasingly apparent now, however, with the growing world economic crisis and the unregulated political and economic power of the vast transnational corporations. Quite apart from the threat of political control and tampering by these corporations where they have a dominant position in a local economy, one has to remember that Northern Ireland is a very small place. In any international economic fluctuations, one has to expect that the foreign companies will respond unfailingly in terms of their wider economic interests rather than to the local needs of this Province, pulling out of their Northern Irish plants just at the time when the employment they provide is most needed for local economic stability.

But far more fundamentally than this, we regard it as a basic point de départ for any planning of the future economic situation of Northern Ireland that the economic and industrial position of Belfast has depended to an increasing extent on special British favour, but that an indefinite continuation of that special favour cannot now be counted on to sustain Belfast's economy. We do not want to anticipate or prejudge what the political future will hold for Northern Ireland, whether it will retain its British link intact, choose some detached or semi-detached status or form some sort of Irish or perhaps far wider association. We would say rather that because of the world economic situation far more than because of the current conflict or any political uncertainty, the new distinctive fact in Northern Ireland's economic life is this: that it is no longer in the interest of Britain and will not be in the interest of the Republic of Ireland to maintain the industrial position of Belfast, whatever the political future of the Province. In economic respects particularly, the Province is going to be more on its own. To maintain Belfast as a built-up area with sufficient employment and prosperity for its citizens, the economic planners have to replace that special British favour which the Province has until now enjoyed with a new basic stabilising element that will not leave the Province dependent on London, or as a substitute on Dublin, for subsidies or artificial support.

When we speak of special British favour in the history of the Northern and Belfast industrial economies, we do not at all deny the high talent and great personal and community dedication throughout the period of their development. We only point out that it is not only because of these qualities that, since sometime in the 18th century, such industrial development as there has been in Ireland has concentrated in the North and Belfast. It was in the British interest to encourage the linen industry (itself an artificial substitute for the woollen industry which would have been a more natural development but which, according to the Mercantilist economic principles then in vogue, British policy preferred to keep at home in England) and shipbuilding there rather than elsewhere. Whether by simple Mercantilist decision that such and such an industry would be permitted here rather than there or by patronage of favoured industries through an old-boys' network or, eventually, the maintenance of Belfast and Northern Irish industry by massive subventions, the practical replacement of the linen trade with artificial fibers and the far less successful effort to supplement the shipbuilding industry with an aircraft manufacturing industry, this kind of artificial encouragement from Britain has been a constant feature in the economics of Northern Ireland. This era now rapidly approaches its end. Britain has all it can do to keep Midlands English industry afloat. Whatever comes politically out of the present situation, Northern Ireland cannot reckon in future that either Westminster or Dublin will interest itself in maintaining artificially the concentration of industry in Belfast. Hence a first aim of any overall economic planning for the Province must be to provide a quite new basis for maintaining the employment and prosperity of Belfast as a traditional built-up area and hopefully to enliven what has up to now been a dull social and cultural context in the process.

Put with little delicacy, we are saying that Belfast is at the point of losing its economic raison d'être. That raison d'être has been British policy, and that is no longer a reason to maintain it. We have seen elaborate papers by the economists speculating on the shifting of the burden of 'transferred funds' from London to Dublin in the event of any 'federal solution' to the Irish dispute. The papers' drift was that the Republic could not afford to subsidise the Province in the state to which it is accustomed, but this is from the start an unreal proposition. It is not in the general Irish interest to maintain the economic concentration in and around Belfast, but rather that such industry as develops in Ireland should be concentrated around Dublin. Hence the Province and the city need to develop a situation of enduring prosperity that will not conflict with and will not depend on the interests of Westminster and Dublin. Simply to depend on the indigenous talent and personal industry of the Province and such natural resources as there are (basically the ports and the good water supply) will, we believe, surely not be enough to save the population of Belfast from becoming underpaid Gastarbeiter in Europe, and in that case leaving a devastated city behind them. Our proposals that follow seek to provide at least talking points towards the construction of such a secure and independent economic situation, but we really must emphasise first these core observations: that the economic concentration has had its basis in an artificial encouragement rather than only in the natural (and undoubted) qualities of the place and its people; that the concentration needs to be maintained beyond the possible or even probable end of that artificial situation; and that consequently a new basic underpinning of the economic concentration, the one we suggest or another, has to be found.

As in so many other matters we have taken up in these papers, the economic prospects of Northern Ireland are so depressing in themselves that it will not suffice merely to hold the line, repair the situation so far as possible and keep the current wolf from the door. Something better has to happen instead, a turning of the situation around so that the prospects will be most basically of hope and opportunity to do something new rather than of anxiety for a threatened and obsolescent status quo.

Five-Year Dowry from Britain.

Time to build the new economic underpinning is the first requirement, both for British and Northern Irish interests. Statisticians and economists have shown how deeply interwoven are Northern Irish and British industry and their economies, what enormous proportion of Northern Irish capital and the budget comes from the British taxpayer. A Green Paper has spelled it all out, but since the whole used to function as one unit a great deal of dispute and confusion went into establishing what and where were the subventions. Whatever the future of Northern Ireland may be economically, the Province needs a guarantee of five full years of a dowry from Great Britain so that it will not lose the benefit of the long-time British economic connection should there be some change in the relation. It is essential that Northern Ireland should not be handicapped by an impossible breakdown over these five years. A sudden change in this matter would be much more deadly even than if the Army were pulled out precipitately, though the victims might not be as visible. We can hope that over the course of the five years efforts could be made to help Northern Ireland balance its accounts from other sources, so that economically it could be relatively independent. This could not happen without a plan, consciously and freely developed and implemented with determination. It is not easy to plan beyond those five years without recognising Northern Ireland as a part of Europe.

Freeport.

The advantages of Northern Ireland as a small territory needing to carve out its economic future are in its population, which has long demonstrated its energy and capacity for highly skilled craftsmanship, its several fine ports and inland water system, its ample fresh water supply for industry and agriculture and, most centrally, its geographical position at the gates of Europe and consequently its capacity to develop as a free port.

The writer had the experience as a youth of working with his father in establishing the freeport situation of Trieste and Fiume. What establishes a freeport depends on what one wants it to be. Basically it is more or less of an extraterritorial area as far as customs duties are concerned, where many goods are off-loaded, in some cases are divided up or collected together to be sent on to other destinations. The freeport could have assembly plants for cars or various other sorts of machinery. It could have manufacturing units where raw products could be finished. It could go in for packaging, including especially the use of container ships.

The attraction of a freeport is that it brings with it a demand for manpower, both skilled and unskilled, brings in firms and organisations of all sorts on such terms that the freeport area and its facilities are a valuable resource for them in fair and foul economic weather alike. Foreign firms are thus no longer the distant benefactors providing local employment on terms that they dictate and liable to pull up their shallow local roots in times of economic recession. The control of the freeport's facilities can remain firmly in the hands of the local community. A freeport also stimulates the local cultural and economic life, making the city interesting to live in, a cosmopolitan centre whose character has to be bright. There are plenty of good houses in and around Belfast, left from its peak period, and plenty of space to build. The splendid port is the city's greatest resource, and if need be the ports of Derry and other places with good water access could be drawn into the plan as mini-freeports, satellites of the main complex in Belfast. In this way there would be good hope that part of the Atlantic trade that presently makes Rotterdam the world's greatest port could be attracted to Belfast. Even a comparatively small part would be of great value.

The disadvantage of Belfast as against a mainland port is that it has virtually no hinterland. Its advantage is that it is as well placed as any port for reloading to and from smaller vessels or vessels going in different directions, so that one main load can be scattered to twenty or more destinations from Belfast, together with other goods.

Also an advantage for Belfast in the eyes of international trade concerns is the fact that any commercial conflicts would be dealt with by British-based law, which would be considered especially trustworthy. A further great advantage is that the local manpower is excellently skilled. Such manpower is in short supply elsewhere.

We consider this freeport concept as of such importance for Belfast that, if accepted, it would be the hinge on which a holistic economic development plan for Northern Ireland could swing, providing the replacement for the special economic encouragement that the Province has hitherto had from Britain but can no longer count on from either Britain or Ireland. The concept would relate Northern Ireland and its economy to Europe, making the Province a net contributor to the economic well-being of Europe rather than a poor relation, making maximum use of its actual resources and a strength of its small and remote situation without a hinterland other than Europe, not disrupting or conflicting with either British or Irish interests but leaving the Northern Ireland community master in its own house.

Marine Industries.

The development of a freeport would itself give new stimulus to the Harland and Wolff shipyards. The shipbuilding industry in Belfast needs, in any case and whatever more basic arrangements are made for the economic future of the Province, to be put into a different category than that of expensively subsidised employment, where the output per man is said to be below that of similar establishments elsewhere. It could be helpful if Harland and Wolff and a part of the Belfast port became a centre for oil exploration, within the freeport concept or independently with freeport elements of its own. For this, investment could be sought from the oil money the Arab countries have been accumulating. Belfast would be well located for the building and repair of oil rigs and exploration ships as well as tankers, etc. It could be hoped that with enough orders of this sort the insecurity which exists among Harland and Wolff's highly qualified work force would be relieved. The same could be said of other marine industries which exist in Belfast or which would be attracted there under these conditions.

One part of this development might be the establishment of a major fishing fleet. Recently in Holland a whole new fishing fleet was developed including a church-cum-hospital ship to enable the crews to stay out of port for as long as possible. These Dutch ships often go to areas much closer to Northern Ireland than to Holland, yet for some traditional reason Northern Ireland has never yet taken advantage of its obvious opportunity to build a great fishing industry. The Province could easily build up not only a deep-sea fishing industry but inshore sea farms for sea-foods as well as fresh-water fish farms in the water-rich areas in the centre of Northern Ireland. The Lough Neagh eel fisheries are a good prognosis of what could be done.

Overall Economic Development Plan.

Other major segments of Northern Ireland's economy can also be brought into a community-controlled organic development plan whose elements would complement the basic freeport idea and can also be seen as having independent validity of their own. Before proposing our thoughts on this subject we should explain how we understand the underlying situation.

Ireland, North and South, is drastically underpopulated. At the time when Britain had a population of twenty million Ireland had eight million. In the intervening century and a half Britain's population has risen to fifty million, proportionate to the general population increase throughout Europe, but Ireland's has been nearly halved to just over four million, the only area in Europe where the population has shrunk, for reasons that are well known. That leaves a few industrial centres without a hinterland, in the sense that there is no substantial local market, such as is often essential to make the rest of any country's (export) production competitive. Even in recent years much talent has emigrated. E.g., in Britain engineers (in the widest sense) constitute 23-28% of the work force but in Northern Ireland the proportion has fallen in recent years to 18% and is still falling.

The still more threatening aspect of the situation is that any weakening of British economic ties, if not otherwise compensated, could force the male population to emigrate again, and that even this might be difficult in a time of world economic depression affecting what have been the worker-hungry countries. Germany, for instance, has recently cut down the intake of Gastarbeiter from Turkey to a minimum. The EEC agreement would still make such worker emigration possible but language differences and other difficulties (e.g., a reputation of the Northern Irish in Europe as violent religious bigots) would make for low status even if jobs were available. That a country already so depopulated as Northern Ireland should become the source of a migrant labour force for Europe would surely be a massive tragedy. Even if arrangements are made for the five-year dowry we suggest from Britain to Northern Ireland and intelligent long-range arrangements are reached with both Britain and the Republic of Ireland, the spectre of mass unemployment remains with all its dangers. In a world-wide economic crisis, Britain and the Republic of Ireland will both cut down on any costs. Thus in one way or another these problems will catch Northern Ireland. By reason of the overall world economy, even if all goes well in Northern Ireland it will only be a question of degree. The economic situation of Northern Ireland is not viable, whether the crisis is extreme or kept under control. The objective darkness of the economic situation is made worse by the political damage done.

It is essential that the Northern Irish realise that their economic situation is a dependent one. A large proportion of the produce still goes to Britain and they depend in turn on Britain and the Republic of Ireland for many consumer goods. Their capital market is mainly an annex to that of Britain. So far they have little in the way of primary resources, excepting the water, some lithium and of course farm produce. Their advantages are a) the sea, b) the intelligent work force, c) pleasant living and working conditions (as distinguished from Rotterdam), d) a reasonably low cost of living, e) ample space and f) their potentially excellent opportunities for a major port in view of their geographical position. Their disadvantages are in their dependency on both Great Britain and Ireland (the necessity that their budget be supplemented by other than local sources, specifically by the taxes paid in Britain and potentially in the Republic of Ireland) and their lack of a hinterland.

It is in this context that we make our freeport proposal, as one that would compensate for the disadvantages by providing a hinterland (Europe) and a relation of interdependence (mutually beneficial) with Europe in place of the suppliant dependence on Britain, while making the best use of the Province's actual advantages and resources. The other marine industry proposals we have made above relate most directly to this freeport concept: the development of the shipyards as an oil-exploration centre, the fishing industry. Three other main areas remain to be treated: the manufacturing industries, agriculture and tourism.

Manufacturing Industries.

Since the freeport arrangement would already give the Province's economy solid links to world commerce, on terms as advantageous to the foreign and mainly European users of the facility as to the Province itself, it would seem far healthier that local manufacturing industry should not be excessively dependent on foreign ownership and capital, especially by the large transnational corporations whose power is far greater, economically and politically, than any local government in the Northern Irish Province would ever be. Such dependence on foreign investment would serve only to make local industry and employment more susceptible to the fluctuations of the international economy.

Far better would be a basic emphasis on locally owned and developed industries that would make the most of the available skilled craftsmanship. This would mean concentrating on highly specialised craftsmanly products which could be prestige exports, the most rational sort of product for a small and highly skilled labour force. Training emphases should then be placed on the development of such skills and maximum adaptability to meet changing demands. Where possible the cooperative ownership approach should be used, as it has already proven its popularity in Ireland and much experience in its use has been gained.

Special attention should be paid to the allocation of manpower resources. In view of the current demonstrated trend for skilled manpower to emigrate, a special board should be established for this allocation. We understand that Harland and Wolff is now overloaded with highly skilled workers who are under-used, but whose skills are actually needed in other jobs in the Province.

Agriculture.

Not only Ireland but every industrialised nation has seen a decline of rural population, a decline in the need of manpower for agriculture and a consequent shrinkage of population to the impoverishment of the general culture. One need only see the numbers that have left the land in Britain or the United States over the last century. The chances of using the surplus manpower of the cities in existing forms of agriculture are very poor, but further depopulation of the land is a social blight we ought to plan against, and the forms of agro-business that, in the United States, have replaced and driven out traditional farming produce an environmental devastation that should never be allowed to happen in Northern Ireland.

Ireland and especially the Northern Province is so small a place that, if it is to have agricultural products for export, it has to do very specialised farming. Through the 19th century the whole island was run pretty much as an extensive cattle farm, raising beef and of course dairy products for the luxury trade in Britain. Irish cattle was normally shipped live for slaughter in Britain to provide fresh meat, while the imports from Argentina and New Zealand came salted. Since refrigeration made that pattern obsolete it has been sustained only by the inertia of established markets. Nowadays we see the picketing of Irish cattle imports at the Welsh ports. This means a new specialty trade needs to be planned and developed, the expertise accumulated and communicated and of course the people directly involved, whether farmers or economic planners, drawn into an understanding of the problematic and the planning to meet it.

That Northern Ireland should again be the producer of agricultural products that just cannot be had from elsewhere is an improbable thought. It does have, like Scotland, a peculiarly good climate for such things as seed potatoes, since its cool northern summers keep the aphids from attacking the plants. And the extensive moorland and hillsides make good sheep grazings, turning grass cheaply, at the present economical price of ewes, into lamb and wool. Curiously the quality woollen manufactures, long kept out of Ireland by Mercantilist policy, have developed more in Donegal than in the Northern Ireland territory. Rising transport charges for agricultural products both cut the

potential for exports and give added scope for local market-gardening production.

It is for these reasons that we propose organic farming as a possible specialty that might be viable in an area as small as Northern Ireland. The rural community of Northern Ireland, distinguished by their educational level and their capacity for venturesome undertakings, could become leaders in producing pilot experience in this kind of farming for Europe and elsewhere. With the declining availability of petroleum-based fertilisers, the cumulative denaturalisation of food by artificial additives and supplements and the immense environmental crisis brought about by the agricultural methods of recent years, such experience would be of great potential value to the international farming community. It would be in keeping with much of the other planning and concept of the future that we foresee for Northern Ireland that its farms should become a teaching and training facility for new techniques that would attract people from abroad. The Province itself could, in the process, be made far more self-sufficient in food. The common diet of meat and potatoes, bread and tea current in the Province now is nutritionally poor. A great increase in the local production and consumption of fruit and vegetables would benefit the health of the Province as well.

Tourism.

The Province has many natural beauties, its show-pieces like the Giant's Causeway or Glens of Antrim, the potential for lively and attractive cities if Belfast and Derry should function as freeports, plenty of open space and a mild climate; plenty of attractions to make up for a bit of rain. An emphasis on tourist development in a modest to moderate price range would turn these advantages to the service of the economy without turning the countryside into Kitsch and the population of the tourist areas into a servant class (as would a more expensively aimed tourist development). We would envision the sort of tourist accommodation all along the sea-coast and through rural areas and small towns that would attract pensioners during the off season at reasonable rates. This happens in some English resorts, and the pensioners manage to visit their families or firends during the tourist season when the rates go up.

As a part of this tourist trade, and parallel to the use of these accommodations by pensioners, we would foresee extensive use of such tourist facilities in the off season as student digs for the many trainees in social, industrial and agricultural skills that would be attracted to Northern Ireland year by year if it did become the pilot area and educator of Europe that it has the opportunity to become. The Public Service Corps which we have described in our paper on a youth programme for Northern Ireland would provide further demand for these accommodations.

Transitional Period.

We have no doubt that if this whole proposal is taken seriously enough to become the basis for discussion and planning, catching the imagination of people in Northern Ireland, what results from their assimilation, critical evaluation and personal involvement in the planning process will eventually be rather different from the way we have proposed it here. We make no pretence to offer more than a basis for discussion and action planning that must eventually be the Northern Ireland people's own. We see the freeport concept as important enough that, if it were rejected or proved impractical or unattainable, the underlying premise should still be recognised, namely that a replacement raison d'être for the Belfast economy must be found, and some other scheme offered in its place. The other elements proposed here, in the marine industries, in manufacturing, agriculture and tourism, or whatever the people of the place would decide on in the planning process as better alternatives, must stand on their own merits and at the same time harmonise with the overall plan.

But what is pre-condition for the success of this or any plan, without which this or any planning proposal for the economic future of Northern Ireland is a pipe-dream, is that there should be a period of guaranteed stability in which the changeover can be achieved. Hence our proposal that the British government, which has acquired large responsibilities for the welfare of the Province over the long history of Anglo-Irish relations, guarantee a five-year 'dowry' of the transferred funds on which Northern Ireland has been living for so many years now, to provide a period in which plans for the Province's economic self-sufficiency could be made and implemented without massive dislocations. This period would then have to be utilised intensively if, even so, the spectre of mass unemployment with consequent emigration of a great part of the working population, a sort of earthquake brought about in part by the impending world economic crisis, were not to overwhelm the Province.

In the meantime, during the five-year grace period, these are times of crisis and every source of income that could bolster the economy of the Province during its major transition should be utilised. This could include such things as a lottery bond scheme, to be sold in Europe and the United States, with as prize an Irish castle or mansion; making the Province and its ports a centre for a flag of convenience; setting a very low death-duty so as to attract capital into the Province; or setting up a world conference and exhibition centre. These should be seen as makeshifts and not confused with the more substantial matters of holistic economic planning. Care should be taken that these makeshifts do not establish or reinforce an unjust order of society, but schemes of the sort should be welcome during the transitional struggle to find income for a country without a hinterland. The main thrust throughout is for an alternative society.

Alternative Society.

This alternative society ought never to be lost sight of as the underlying element; a new style of operation, new socio-economic patterns for living. The bane of industrial conditions has been the depersonalisation of work, the weakening of solidarity links when it came to the advantage of particular groups, the one-sided interest of workers' groups or trade unions regardless of the effect on the community, the slow poisoning by inflation as an immoral way of running a country to the advantage of those who can manipulate their finances accordingly and the disadvantage of those who are not economically strong.

The shock of the oil crisis has not yet been digested. Britain, for instance, still produces two trade budgets, one that includes the oil prices and one that leaves them out, as if it did not really matter. The question is whether the oil prices will simply hit the poorest while the strong find ways to counter their effects on themselves. The poor would then get not only the effect of the objective deterioration but would also carry the additional burden of those who saved their own bacon.

Hence the importance in building a new socio-economic situation in Northern Ireland to make it a pilot project in its own right which will have applicability elsewhere, to safeguard against the injustices for the many which are inherent in the present economic system and to give structure to new forms where feasible. We would like to mention as possible illustrations of the kind of thing that can be accomplished two developments, one in a socialist setting and the other in the setting of the foundation that controls the capital of a major industrial corporation.

In Yugoslavia, by a system that functions quite independently of the idealogical structures, every factory is expected to plow its profits back into the community in which it exists, including schools, hospitals and other new

economic efforts. The system depends on the local industrial enterprise being profitable enough to have a surplus that can go into social institutions, hence on the satisfying of customers. The work force and community have thus a motivation to improve the productivity and quality of goods provided. The State's responsibility is then to provide the minimum conditions in schools, hospitals and other amenities for an area, while the local industrial units are responsible to provide more than the minimum, to raise the level of local services to the maximum level that the community will set as its goal.

Foundations are the familiar capitalist parallel, another way of making industrial profits serve a public and social purpose while at the same time serving wealthy individuals or corporations as a tax haven. The Van Leer Industries of Holland control forty eight major industrial plants in thirty four countries, all owned outright by the Bernard Van Leer Foundation. Under the guidance of Oscar Van Leer and the executive direction of William Welling this has become a model among foundations, its grants and programmes among the most efficient and thoughtful of any under this kind of control. Their effort is to mould new forms into patterns of social value in the industrial field on a pre-socialist and post-capitalist level.

In both cases, what is illustrated is a conviction that the place of work must be put at the service not only of those who work in it and those who without working there profit from it, but also of the social interests of the wider community, at least on an area basis; that the work therefore go beyond the self-interest of those who profit directly from the enterprise. Not excluded are the families of the workers as a link between these two entities, who should share in the form of social amenities, food cooperatives, restaurants, the care of those who have had accidents, of the unemployed, etc., laying the foundation for further constructive work opportunities.

Not excluded would be a theoretical third form, an industrial community association in which, after salaries and normal costs have been paid, profits should be put into community purposes. This would eliminate the paternalistic element of ultimate control lying either with the State apparatus or the wealthy entrepreneur who endows and controls the policy of a foundation. It would be a proper development of the functions of cooperatives or associations of cooperatives and could be brought into consonance with the other forms of community association that develop within the society. For this there should be a hierarchy of purposes: 1) the inward purpose of self-interest; 2) the outward purpose for others not directly involved; and 3) a value purpose defined through a planning process extended throughout the community, neither from self-interest nor as a matter of charitable gestures but as an involvement in the wholeness of the society in which one shares, joining the inward purpose in solidarity and the outward purpose in identification, the motivating power going beyond rights and duties to embrace responsibility for society. Our factories and industrial enterprises today have basically only an inward purpose, the profit motive, with a light veneer of outward-purpose for public-relations reasons. If there is to be any heightening of social interest and overall intensity, reasons must be supplied and they must be freely chosen, not imposed. Hence our hope that these proposals for a holistic approach to the planning of an economic future for Northern Ireland will be at a level that provides for such community cohesion as we envision in our proposals on schools, on the care of the young, on security and on other subjects.