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### THE ARTICLE

The news articles don't give anyone a very clear picture of what is happening in Northern Ireland these days. There is attention paid to incidents of terror, bombing, shootings, vengeful assassinations. The general picture is conveyed that there is no solution to the conflict going on in that small part of the world, that the situation is quite a hopeless one. This will not be a hopeless article by any means since the author believes that in Northern Ireland the people have, if anything, a surplus of talent with which to meet the crisis facing them and that out of their ordeal is going to come a society much in advance of what we have in the United States or Britain or Europe, a society that will be a model to the rest of us, of how we can live a full human life under modern conditions.

Most commentators speak or write as if the conflict in Northern Ireland were all rooted in the past, a recapitulating of all of the strife of Irish history. Most people, especially those who feel most helpless and hopeless in <sup>the</sup> a situation, within Northern Ireland tend to think in the same way, of all ~~of~~ the accumulated grievance and oppression of centuries past, and this focus on and dwelling in the past acts as the worst obstacle to their seeing or realising their potential for a creative solution that would bear out the optimism of the preceding paragraph. However, since the problem is seen so much in terms of the past we must give an analysis of how the problems of the past burden the present and future in Northern Ireland. Before we go on to put the contemporary face of the conflict more into the context of the total present world situation.

Irish Americans are mostly Catholic and tend to see the present conflict in Northern Ireland in terms of the previous stages of Irish grievance and oppression that have been borne in on them as part of their heritage of memories from the time of the immigrants in their own families. The West of Ireland is a drastically de-populated area today. It was here that the colossal famines of the mid-19th century were worst ~~felt~~ and the brunt of a callous and exploitive administration was felt. It is from ~~the~~ Galway, Cork and the rest of these Western regions that the bulk of the Irish American population has come, bringing with them their indignation and contempt for the traditional oppressors. The people who nowadays put their money in the hat at Gaelic dances, contributing to the Ancient Order of Hibernians "for Ireland", money that goes eventually to support the bombing campaigns in Northern Ireland and elsewhere, still think of Ireland as their grandparents or their great-grandparents knew it at the time of their emigration. The few who are paranoid enough to contribute more consciously through the Northern Aid Society have more awareness that their money is going directly into para-military organisations, but their concept of Ireland and notion of what is going on there is as much tied up in the past.

Within Northern Ireland there is a sense of community deprivation on both sides of inherited sectarian lines of division. Catholics are bitterly aware of a history of oppression, ~~No~~ humiliation or deprivation is forgotten from any part of the eight centuries of British rule. Over the last 50 years, in which the Northern State has existed politically separate from the rest of Ireland, they know that by its definition it was not their State. There are many more specific complaints, of discrimination in housing and employment, of gerrymandering of the vote, of more subtle forms of humiliation, snobbery and a pervasive community distrust, ~~but~~ <sup>but</sup> this fact, that the State ~~was~~ <sup>as</sup> established did not belong to its Catholic citizens but to the Protestants, was the matrix of the whole unhappy situation. The Protestants of Northern Ireland felt equally aggrieved and threatened. This is the thing that it seems more difficult for Americans or outsiders of any sort to understand or believe, that the Protestants of Northern Ireland actually have a sense of grievance and of being threatened, that they are not simply smug oppressors, but they do feel threatened with engulfment by what to them is an alien life-style and culture. It is not at root a religious matter at all, even though it has been tangled up in 17th Century divisive sectarian consciousness, but rather a matter of life-styles, of a sense of cultural identity.

It has to be remembered that the ancient Irish culture was in fact very brutally repressed over a period of centuries. For a long time before the 16th Century Reformation the old Irish culture was able to absorb each new wave of English overlords. There was never during this period a really massive wave of English colonisation in Ireland and each new wave of military enforces of English rule would provide the next generation's corps of Anglo-Irish rebels. In Reformation times a new tactic was tried. The division of feeling between Protestants and Catholics was consciously used as a tool to keep the Protestant ~~mark~~ ruling-class culturally and emotionally divided from the Gaelic subjects. For the first time a large scale "plantation", a wave of poorer immigrants brought in to replace the whole population of areas in much the same way that the English settlers of the "Plymouth and Virginia" plantations displaced the Indian population in the New World, was tried in Ireland. It was made a success on a massive scale ~~mark~~ only in the North East corner of the Island, the area that had always been until then the main hot-bed of rebellion against English rule. But political control by a ruling "Ascendancy" class was established throughout the island, and "Catholic" was used as the rule of thumb to determine what elements of the older Gaelic and Anglo-Irish population had to be repressed as politically dangerous. Through the 17th and 18th centuries and well into the 19th, the Irish peasantry was kept ruthlessly in a miserable state. Educational opportunities were denied. About the same time as the cataclysmic famines of the mid-19th century, the ancient language also practically disappeared, a victim of this cultural repression.

But from about the time of the year of revolutions, 1848, there has been a resurgence of the old Irish culture, which has gathered momentum ever since. It was closely allied from the start with the sense of national resurgence and anti-British agitation for the independence of Ireland. The attempt to revive the language as an ordinary medium of conversation <sup>and</sup> ~~in~~ business has not succeeded except for a small inner club but everyone in the island who identifies with the old Irish culture must brandish his few Gaelic words or phrases as a talisman. Much more successful has been the revival of Gaelic sports, the cultivation of Irish songs and ballads, the lore of the ancient Irish warrior heroes. Overriding all of this though is a sense of identity, of participation in a very self-conscious national and cultural grouping. "Culture" in Ireland tends to be rough and unfinished simply because all the elements of this sense of common identity with a proud and ancient past have to be re-discovered and restored after the long suppression. But there is a sense of cultural revivalism, and naturally enough this revivalist culture is a highly aggressive thing.

There is a curious hiatus in the cultural revival, <sup>Over</sup> the centuries of repression the Irishman's Catholicism was one of his strongest attachments. It was even his main means of identification and self-expression during the time when other cultural means of expression were denied to him. Now that the revivalist Gaelic culture has taken over, Catholicism still remains both a strong attachment and a basic constituent of the Irish sense of identity. But the Catholicism of Ireland has not taken part in the Irish cultural revival. There is little that is distinctively Irish about it, small sense of continuity with the Church of Patrick and the old monastic tradition of Irish Christianity, with the scholarly tradition of Columba and the monks who Evangelised Europe, with the artistic traditions of the Book of <sup>Kells</sup> ~~Kells~~ and the other Irish Christian literature, art and sense of design.

Nevertheless the awareness of this Gaelic revivalism and of Catholicism as an element in this sense of revivalist Gaelic identity was strong with Protestants from the start. We need not speak or think here of the rich or powerful members of the establishment or "Ascendancy", who had their privileges to protect them. We think rather of the ordinary Protestant working man of Belfast or any of the smaller cities of the North East area of Ireland, where industrialisation of a sort was growing up through these same years of the mid-19th century when the Gaelic culture was first being revived. His views of "culture" were unsophisticated. What he knew was that something, a spirit, a sense of Irish identity was growing up around him that he was not, that a demand was being made on him to be something different than he was, that somehow he was not going to be allowed to be himself. Catholic emancipation was becoming a reality in these days, Catholic <sup>politicians</sup> ~~plantations~~ were beginning to come into their own, and the Protestant working man's "Ascendancy" co-religionist had begun to feel a threat to his own monopoly of power, and well knew how to make use of the poor Protestant's traditional distrust of Catholicism to exploit this obscure feeling of cultural threat.

The unsophisticated Protestant could hardly find any other name than "Catholicism" to identify the amorphous thing that threatened him at the roots of his identity. Ascendancy politicians had no scruple to "play the Orange card". The name of William of Orange, the Protestant King who at the end of the 17th Century had been the hero of the "plantation" Protestant community which had then felt threatened by a Catholic restoration, was used, in the Orange Order formed to crystalize Protestant resistance to the Catholic <sup>Gaels.</sup> ~~gales~~. It proved an easy means to stir up and organise the Protestant working man's fear of this aggressive new "Catholic" culture and ally him with the Protestant owners and ruling class against the Catholic working class. By the time the resurgent Irish Nationalist Movement had come to the threshold of having an independent State these working class Protestants of the partially industrialized North East of the island had been roused to a real terror of what they called "Rome Rule", domination by what they regarded as a clerically controlled Irish state. Their choice was for separatism.

It has been the regular complaint of Protestants in Northern Ireland over these last 50 years in which the NORTH HAS existed as a separate State, (of course the Protestants will describe the Southern Irish state as "separatist" from Britain and speak of a "partition" brought about by the Southern Irish, of the whole unit of the British Isles) that the Catholics "have never tried to make the State work." This ignores obviously what we have laid down here as the basic premise of those 50 years, that it was not the Catholics' state. One would have to ask why the Catholics, a third of the population of the separate Northern state should try to make a state work which they were excluded from regarding as their own. Nevertheless, one has to qualify the notion that the Catholics never tried to make the State work by recognising that the Civil Rights movement of the 1960's was exactly what these Protestants claim ~~it~~ <sup>attempted</sup> was never ~~admitted~~, an effort by a significantly large segment of the Catholic community, with help from a large number of Protestant sympathisers, to obtain full Civil Rights, especially in ~~many~~ matters of housing, employment, education and franchise, and become full participants in the State, in short "to make the State work." We will have to return to this, but generally the Catholic population in the North through the 50 years did identify itself quite simply as "Irish" and found its identity politically expressed in the Southern State. Catholic politicians in the North tended either to be absentionists from the Northern Parliamentary system or present only as rather ineffectual <sup>hecklers.</sup> ~~ones~~. Oppression was very real, particularly as the difference in birth rates between Catholics and Protestants (this was the hey-day of big Catholic families) raised the spectre of overturning the 2 : 1 Protestant majority in the population, just as it did during this same period in the Netherlands, and discriminatory housing and employment policy was used quite consciously to encourage Catholic immigration from the North and keep the proportions of the population stable.

The Protestants through these years felt they had good reason for their fears that unification with the Southern state would in fact mean Rome Rule and the loss of their cultural identity. On the one hand there was the spectacle of a Southern state in which the Catholic Bishops hardly had need ever to interfere in the political management of the State, simply because every Irish politician knew that he could not afford to come into even a semblance of conflict with the Bishops and therefore refrained from any action which he suspected, rightly or wrongly, could conceivably lead him into such a conflict. On the other hand, while there was not any significant hint on actual religious discrimination against Protestants in the Southern state, there was no place accorded in it to a sense of the Protestant and "British" culture as a part of the Irish cultural heritage or a constituent part of the tradition by which Ireland is now itself. Even now it is a common-place to hear Catholics in the Southern state speak of Protestants in a way that recognizes fully their right to be Protestant, but expects that after all this time they ought to "be Irish" in the sense that they should be participants in the revivalist Gaelic culture rather than something distinctive which has an equal place, ~~separately~~ <sup>tradition</sup> established over the centuries of their residence in Ireland, in Irish conditions.

All of this is the depressing part of the Irish situation. We should sum it up this way. It is the preoccupation with the past itself that is boiling away in the current conflict in Northern Ireland. People in Ireland who take sides very distinctly with either Protestants or Catholics are always anxious when they know someone is going to write about their crisis that all the blame should be put on their enemies and it should not be said that there is fault on both sides. And yet there is plenty of fault to go around; there are no clean hands and there are stiff-necked attitudes in both communities rooted in this preoccupation with the past. We have identified them by now. On the Protestant side it is the disastrous choice of a separatism with the concomitant decision that their Northern State should be a private reservation for the Protestant separatists and that the Catholic minority should not have a true part in the State. For the Catholics, both North and South, it has been a stiff-necked refusal to acknowledge that the Protestant and "British" tradition has become an integral part of their own national heritage, deserves acceptance as the people who participate in it deserve acceptance as a part of Ireland without which the Irish tradition itself is impoverished and stultified. In these terms we can say that the Southern Irish State itself is culturally truncated even more than it is territorially by granting no place to this Protestant and "British" part of the Irish tradition. There are, of course, the specific points of irritation between the Protestant and Catholic communities; on the one hand the Civil Rights questions which are a reflection of a subordinate <sup>at</sup> basic denial of a place in the Northern State. On the other hand, questions like that of mixed marriage, separated schools, divorce legislation, birth control, etc. ~~which~~ are indicators to the Protestants of an entrenched power attitude on the part of the Catholic Church Leadership.

But this too is subordinate to an attitude on the part of the Catholic Irish that they are firmly in the driver's seat and need not truckle to Protestant attitudes and fears. We can in fact say that the partition of Ireland was a disastrous choice in the early part of this century. This is in no way to say that it can abruptly be done away with. The Northern State has over 50 years of separate development behind it now, a divergent economic structure, distinct social and political development. The responsibility rests very much on the two communities of the North to find ways of living together that fully respect one another's cultural integrity and the need of each for the other in order that the Irish tradition and historical heritage may be complete.

But to resolve all of these questions as satisfactorily as we may would still not solve the Irish problem. It would still be dealing with questions of the past. The trouble in Ireland is that nothing is happening here and now that is more interesting than this preoccupation with the past.

If we examine what has been happening politically we find that Northern Ireland has been through 50 years of stagnating polarisation. The frozen state of Northern politics has generally produced nothing more than a paralysed apathy on the part of both communities. This sort of apathy is always very close to a flash-point of violence. The violence in Ireland came out periodically in civil riots and in the border raids conducted against customs houses, police stations and military depots by the Irish Republican Army, the embittered "last ditchers" who remained over from the earlier struggle for Irish independence. The last time the I.R.A. had a campaign of this sort, from 1956 to 1962, it revealed that the state of apathy had proceeded so far that it could raise no more popular response from the Catholic community in the North. The I.R.A. in fact drew the appropriate conclusion from this development, ~~and~~ rethought its policies and turned away from its traditional preoccupation with physical force in a political direction. But its thunder was stolen by a Civil Rights movement, based on the model of the Black American Civil Rights Movement, which we have already discussed as the first instance in which the Catholic community of Northern Ireland ~~did~~ actually did try to "make the State work." Government response to this in the North was disastrous. Government chose to regard it as a challenge to the power monopoly and ruthlessly suppressed the marches of the Civil Rights protestors. Freelance vigilantes played their part in suppressing the Civil Rights advocates also, and when it came to a General Election in 1969 the Protestant population, whipped up to a frenzy of fear by demagogues, voted to restore the most repressive policies against the minority. This, with the consequent wild outbursts of civil rioting in the Summer of 1969, was the one thing necessary to bring back the physical force policy of the old I.R.A. militants. Civil disobedience, non-violence and all the other ideological and tactical baggage of the Civil Rights campaign was quickly forgotten in the Catholic community and the old polarisation which had lain frozen for 50 years burst out in new unprecedented levels of growing violence. Government reforms were in fact hastily brought in

under pressure from the British Government in Westminster. But this was too little and too late. British Governments over many generations had preferred always to postpone the Irish problem, to hope it would go away of itself or that stopgap measures would turn out in spite of themselves to be permanent solutions, or that some future Government would be able to think of some better resolution of the agony of Ireland and that things would stay quiet enough so long as they themselves were in power. The granting of the Civil Rights demands in matters of housing, employment, franchise, etc. at this point satisfied neither the Catholics, whose earlier demands for these things had been met with rejection not so much of their demands as of themselves by a recalcitrant provincial Government, nor the Protestants who felt that the British Government, after all its promises through the 50 years, had finally sold them out.

But there was a difference. The new conflict was not simply a replay of the violence that had taken place in Northern Ireland in the 1920's, in the 1930's, and more briefly at other times. It was different in scale and in its long duration. Something more was wrong. The Northern Ireland conflict was caught up in a societal breakdown much wider in significance which raised the level of violence and paralyzed all of the organs of Government, of Church, of healing factors in the community which could have been used either to ameliorate the situation or, by suppressive methods, to stifle the protest. The reforms in housing, franchise, etc. which were written into law in 1969 had never really been tried out since because the whole structure of Government and society has been in a state of breakdown.

We can say that the wider crisis is the death throes of the paternalistic organisation of society, a basic crisis of ~~ex~~ civilisation that is felt as much in America or Britain or Europe as it is in Northern Ireland. In the United States we would recognize a breakdown of credence in Government, in Church organisation, in the system of Education, in all the institutions and structural fabric of society. Even the family, reduced to its narrowest nuclear form by such factors as the mobility of modern life, has been cracked open by an unprecedented kind of generation gap and cultural conflict between parents and children. The cities, which should be the societal strong points of our civilisation, are suffering worse than anything else in the general breakdown, written off as ~~absolute~~ or doomed by the social scientists in a self-fulfilling prophecy. The same crisis can be felt throughout all Western and Western-influenced ~~ex~~ civilisation. In general it produces a state of apathy. We are aware that nothing works, not only in the sense that the ~~Machines~~ breakdown and the mail is not delivered, but that the institutions of society have been reduced to a dysfunctional state. The difference in Northern Ireland is that particular factors have brought this general state of civilisational crisis to a flash point of violence far greater than any violence that the more specialised problem of Ireland's past could produce by itself. In Northern Ireland, as all the other strong points of social organisation have worn down very much as they have elsewhere, the stereotyped views that the two communities, Catholic and

Protestant, have had of each other has provided the spark that brought the rotten fabric of a rundown society to explosion. Two other elements in the structure of Irish society have remained paradoxically strong while the force has been sapped out of the institutions of Government, Church and the ordering elements of Irish life. The family, in its old extended form with strong loyalties, affections and structures of moral support has endured in Ireland after it has been in crisis in most other places. And small local communities have retained strong character as centres of emotional loyalty because of the defensive position they have often found themselves in against their neighbours of the opposite sectarian community. These two factors, family and local community, have provided the medium on which the stereotyped attitudes of hatred could feed to maintain the level of ~~ext~~ violence over these last 4½ years. But the basic situation, a breakdown of societal forms and consequent apathy that can flare up into paroxysms of uncontrollable violence, has more in common with the situation we find in the United States, Britain or Europe or the other parts of the world that have come under the influence of the Western crisis than it has peculiar to itself.

We have called the crisis the breakdown of paternalism and we need not regard this as a fundamentally negative thing. By paternalism we understand a system of social organisation that puts power and influence in the hands of elites and leaves the ordinary person without either. It is not even necessary to pass a judgment, moral or otherwise, on the paternalistic organisation of society in the present situation, though in fact we can see the end of paternalism as an opportunity for human growth. But it is enough at this point to say that whereas the paternalistic organisation of society formerly worked, it is now in a crisis of dissolution and works no longer. Whether or not we were to wish it, the paternalistically organised society cannot now be restored. A new system of social organisation is about to emerge, and it can be either a change in the direction of growth or a change in the direction of shrinking back into inhumanity and brutality. Northern Ireland is experiencing a situation that has brought the more general civilisational crisis to a flashpoint earlier than most other places. Its people are therefore required by their situation to find their way out of the wider civilisational crisis before its full force hits the rest of us. One need not regard them as guinea pigs to recognise this. They surely need to understand the nature of the crisis they are experiencing as they work out their solution, and with the vast amount of creative talent available among these people the rest of us can hope to learn things from them and their action in this crisis that will enrich all our lives and make new structures of society available to us that will be in advance of anything we have experienced ourselves.

Our Western society has gone through several analogous crises in its history, transitions from one societal form to another that in fact have differed from the more romanticised "revolutions" and have had far more enduring effect. these have been the transitions from a pastoral to an agricultural society, from an early to a late feudalism and from that to a monarchical abso-

lutism, from that again, to a bourgeois and capitalist form. In each case, the previous forms of social organisation came to a breaking point, proved simply inadequate for the complexity that had developed in society and were replaced by societal forms better adapted to the actual state to which society had developed, through transitional periods that were more or less convulsive as the new forms grew more organically from what already existed or not. But common to all these changes of societal form was the basic paternalistic supposition and a value system implied in it. It has been assumed throughout that a few people, an elite constituted by inheritance or election or privilege or special training, knew best, and that the rest of the world would do better to be obedient to them. The value system has been embodied in the ordinary person's self-concept. He knew he was the good man, the worthwhile member of society who could take pride in himself, if he did what was expected of him, or in the grosser and more dictatorial modes of paternalism, what he was told. There is no need to deny that this value system was serviceable to society through many previous epochs of our history, though in fact it did stifle much creativity in those who were never recognised as belonging to the elites. But it is simply a matter of observable fact that the system no longer functions.

For it is at the level of this fundamental self-concept, what it is that makes the good man or makes it possible for a man to take pride in himself, that the organisation of society has faltered. People, especially younger people but by no means only they, no longer believe that it is by doing what someone else tells them or expects of them that they will have become what they should be or would be proud to be. We can take this through all the institutional and other structures of society and find that, with local variants, people's attitudes toward all of them have altered, that credence has waned in most cases to a near vanishing point, and that the life has consequently gone out of the structural fabric of society. This is true of the natural groupings of family, neighbourhood, district, city or town, nation or international society, all of which are riven by scepticism, a suspicion that the loyalties they demand are all to a greater or lesser extent chauvinistic. It is true to a lesser extent of the peer groupings that cut across the lines of the natural groupings: the young, the retired, the trade unionists, the unemployed, the religiously inclined, the academic community, etc. The common group demands of these groups are known to be self-defeating if they are pursued exclusively, and the same people will be members of a number of such groups, but they remain nevertheless the potential strong points of society however much lethargy they may manifest at present. There is small trust left in the integrity of any of the financial and economic structures that organise and largely control innumerable aspects of our lives: the banks, the insurance systems, the wage structure, the burgeoning international corporations, the system of taxation, even the money system itself as a symbolic language for values of different things and services which all of us, especially the young, have learned are false valuations. Most obviously suffering from a breakdown of credence, what in the United States we have become accustomed to calling a credibility gap, are the whole series of public institutions: government, organised

churches, the educational system, public services such as the police, and all the other visible institutions that have made a claim to decide legitimately how certain aspects of our lives shall be run. But we have also come to have serious suspicions of what we may call the invisible institutions, factors less identifiable and hence more difficult to resist which nevertheless have the same kind of effect as the visible institutions in defining the range of options open to us: among these are the stereotypes, the archetypes and prototypes that have been impressed upon us but whose influence we increasingly query, analyse and resist, the mass media and all the other pressures, from government, family, peer groups or whatever sources, that try to influence us toward conformity. In the general breakdown of all these structural factors in society, the value system itself, the consensus that there are things, a whole mode of behaviour, that are expected of us and that without conforming to it we cannot have self-esteem, goes ~~from~~ flaccid, and the whole of society is pervaded by an overriding apathy, a feeling that nothing works and nothing matters, a frustration that is always on the hair-trigger of violence. Local variations, the relative and atypical strength of one or another or some change pattern of elements in the society, can bring the crisis to a head, and this is what we see happening in Northern Ireland.

Northern Ireland also confronts us with a scape-goat pattern, and here again we can make some generalisations from other scapegoat situations. There are no minority problems without a majority problem. The most offensive minorities will be left basically undisturbed so long as the majority is actually happy within itself, and conversely the most saintly of minorities will regularly be attacked and accused of the most horrendous offenses when the majority is suffering from internal problems. In Ireland there is the paradoxical problem of the double minority: the Catholics are a minority within the Northern Ireland province, the Protestants a minority within Ireland as a whole. Each feels threatened in its very existence by the power monopoly of the other in their respective statelets, each sees the other as a ~~known~~ fundamentally disloyal and subversive element in terms of the state in which each has the power monopoly. But the frenzy toward the respective minorities reflects far more basic problems internal to the majority society of each state, and this brings us back to the overriding crisis of paternalism from which in different degrees both states, in common with the rest of the Western world, suffer. The violence, mostly confined to the tiny territory of Northern Ireland itself though occasionally spilling over into the Republic of Ireland or Britain, is of far greater intensity and duration, greater than Ireland's "troubles" have caused in their many rounds in the past, than can be explained by the inherited historical struggles of Ireland by themselves.

But as we have said, the dissolution of paternalism can be reason for optimism. The replacement for the paternalistic structure of society can be a far more humane, free and liveable society than we have ever known before. The fact that the Irish, Catholic and Protestant, <sup>with their immense reservoir of talent,</sup> have been given the burden by history of finding the creative alternative to the paternalistic organisation

of society should give us all reason for hope in our own futures. And in the concrete situation of Northern Ireland at present we can find serious reasons to expect the most positive developments.

The alternatives to the paternalistic society are really beyond prediction, and in fact it is the burden of these, the Northern Irish, who have the actual task of deciding on the shape of their own future to decide what the concrete alternative forms will be. However, we can sketch out in broad outline the two most probable mutations that could replace paternalist society, one a mutation of growth, the other a shrinkage into despair.

The positive mutation could be called the fraternalistic society. In the present dissolution state of society the alienated, the disillusioned, the unbelievers in the old established value patterns are left with a vacuum of values, a lack of motivation to do anything beyond the level of a rather hedonistic existence in the affluent society, and the absence of any basis for self-esteem. We foresee as an alternative basis for self-esteem and hence the root of a new value system the voluntary assumption of responsibility. This as a substitute for a self-esteem based on doing what was expected of one would require a widespread learning of techniques by which individuals and communities can gain and keep participatory control of their own lives. We believe these techniques are now at hand and that people who have experienced the current breakdown of the paternalistic order of society are well prepared to make use of them, provided the knowledge of them is made easily available. The techniques themselves are not such as to be the property of experts, which would make them only another means of imposing ~~the~~ paternalistic control ~~by~~ an elite, but of a kind that can be passed on to any person of common sense.

The second and negative mutation, still a very real and dangerous possibility both in Northern Irish and in international society, is a kind of super-paternalism. This would not be identical with or a restoration of the old paternalistic order, which is unrestorable, ~~but~~ The old paternalism has had a value system at its heart which served countless generations. The new super-paternalism would have a vacuum of values, recognising as a value only one thing, the restoration or imposition of order by whatever means. It would be the result of the panic sense of irreversible dissolution brought about by the breakdown of the societal fabric and institutions of the old order. We can find a rough model of both the panic realisation of the brutishness of the unordered society and the equal brutality of the untrammelled dictatorship, void of any values except the preservation of order, in the Leviathan of Thomas Hobbes. Such a society now becomes a real possibility for the first time. We can see the fore-shadowings of this super-paternalism in several places. The extremes of the law-and-order policies in the United States, predicated in fact on a contempt for law insofar as it trammels the arbitrary power of government, or the insensitivity to their own class and economic interests by the New York hard-hats of a few years ago, who could chant "God bless the Establishment" because of their fright at the threat to order, are equally manifestations of it. The governmental repression has its full reflection in the Soviet Union, where government reacts in

total panic to the assumption of immense personal responsibility by individuals like Alexander Solzenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov. The community response of the hard-hats has its parallel too, this time in Northern Ireland, where the Protestant UDA (Ulster Defence Association) was formed as a coalition of neighbourhood vigilante groups out of the same motivations: a panic sense of the dissolution of all order and a determination, divorced from any other value content, to find and punish the enemies of order. But with the UDA we come back to an optimistic view of the future, as that organisation has come to a turnaround point in our view that gives it the potential to become a constructive force.

Of many signs in the current situation that give reason to hope for a constructive and positive development in Northern Ireland, we would select three major indicators. The first is that a much more realistic assessment of the purely political options available to people in the Province has begun to penetrate the wider ranges of public opinion than has been the case for the last four years. The second is a growing level of community activation in the cities, especially in Belfast and Derry, sometimes in separate patterns within the two sectarian communities, sometimes in incipient forms of cooperation. And the third is the encouraging state of the young generation in both communities.

Northern Ireland is a strikingly tiny bit of geography to contain so much violence. There are no places in the Province one cannot drive to within a couple of hours, and the population caught up in the conflict is only about one and a half million. It has become a truism of the Catholic side in the argument to say that the internal political problem of the Province has an "Irish dimension," that because of the cultural and community identification of the Catholic community in the North with Ireland as a whole the internal political situation of the North is inseparable from the rest of Ireland. It is equally true, and for the same reasons as applied to the Protestant population of the Northern Province, to say that the problem has a British dimension, just as impossible to ignore. And with the entry of both Britain and Ireland into the European Economic Community, one has to speak, with only less insistence, of a European dimension as well. Once these various dimensions are recognised, it has to be acknowledged that the Northern Ireland Province represents for all these related powers, the Republic of Ireland, Britain and Europe, mainly an embarrassment. Both governments and public, whether in the Republic of Ireland or Britain, would be far happier if Northern Ireland simply were not there, if the Province were towed out to sea and sunk, and their exasperation is directed primarily to the part of the Northern Irish population that looks to themselves as protectors: the Southern Irish to the Catholics, the British to the Protestants. They are such clients as either would rather do without.

People in the Province naturally react to this with growing disillusionment and resentment of their big brothers. Protestants feel sold out by Britain and left to their own resources, Catholics equally betrayed and abandoned by the Republic of Ireland. In both big-brother countries there have been general elections since the Northern crisis has come to a head, in both there has been

a transfer of power to the opposition parties, and in neither Britain nor the Republic of Ireland has this made any difference other than a further hardening of attitude toward the community, Protestant or Catholic, in Northern Ireland that looked to them as big brothers. The result is that the divided communities of the North find themselves thrown back on one another. The realisation is growing stronger all the time that neither big brother is going to provide a solution to the problem, that neither a united Ireland nor a British-imposed restoration of the status quo ante is anywhere on the program, and that any time in the proximate future the responsibility of finding ways for the two communities to live in peace and complementarity lies inescapably within Northern Ireland itself. The new Assembly can represent this sort of realisation only at the most superficial level, as the politicians and governmental organisation are simply too discredited with both communities to be especially serious factors in the reconstruction of life in the Province. It is more at the levels of local community organisation that both the realisations and the early steps at building a new life in despite of both big brothers are taking place. The common fund of indignation against the respective big brothers and the sense of having been humiliated by the big brothers in the sight of their traditional opponents is the strongest medicine healing the resentments of the two sides toward each other at present.

And in that context there are the beginning stages of community organisation and activation that, with suitable help so that the community can effectively take control of its own life, in orderly patterns of its own devising, give the first hope of serious and constructive new social organisation that has been seen in Europe in many decades. The developments have been of very disparate kinds in Belfast and Londonderry, and are just beginning to cross-fertilise one another. In Derry (footnote: Let's have no obfuscation over the names of this town. The ancient name of the old port city on the Foyle is Derry, the name Londonderry given it in the early 17th century when the charter to redevelop and resettle it -- as Protestant -- was given to the merchants of the City of London. The name Londonderry, its "official" name, is now more used by Protestants, but the older name Derry not exclusively in Catholic use. The official titles, for instance, even of the (Protestant) Church of Ireland diocese are Bishop of Derry, Dean of Derry, etc., and the name Derry is in regular colloquial use by Protestants. One does not, by choosing one or other name, make a political statement as when one decides between "Bolsano" and "Bozen," "Alto Adige" and "Sudtiroel." But for one like the author who has active sympathy with the dilemma of both sides in the Northern Ireland struggle it seems best to keep both names at the tip of the tongue. It would often be easier, if it would identify it, to call Derry simply "that place over in the West.") the Bogside Community Association, in the by now famous Catholic ghetto area of the city, has developed a sense of community cohesiveness and given local people, over the last year, an organism of participation, a strong voice in decisions that affect them and a renewed sense of hope. It is only now beginning to proceed from a few immediate projects and issues that could activate the community consciousness to a recognition of its need to coordinate these with long-range plans for the area. There is no equivalent as yet in the Protestant community of Derry, and this is one of

most urgent needs at present. The Protestant community has more difficulty in organising itself or producing grass-roots leadership, because it is more dispirited, feeling that its traditional way of life is threatened with diminution or extinction. It needs to have the opportunity of asserting itself not in rancour but in its integrity, and to find in its real present situation the motive force for strong grass-roots organisations & taking command of its own life as the Catholics in the Bogside have of theirs.

The Belfast developments have been on quite different lines. Here the thing that has activated local communities has been the prospect of new sources of employment coming into their areas. It was clear that there had to be inducements before any business or industrial corporation would settle in what they knew as troubled areas, and these not only the financial inducements that government could offer but assurances of the safety of their investment, that could only come from the local people themselves. From last November when proposals of this sort were first made, coalitions of neighbourhood community associations have been established, crossing the lines between the Protestant and Catholic communities, in order to provide such assurances. The work was first done in North Belfast, and from the first the militant organisations of each side, IRA and UDA, cooperated to the extent of providing safe-conducts for the people building these new coalitions. The fact that the focus of common interest was so narrowly defined made it possible for many mutually suspicious neighbourhood and militant associations to act in concert, and in the process many local areas, both Catholic and Protestant, that had not previously had any form of organisation besides the paramilitary groups themselves, were activated for the first time. Now a wide network of organisations covers most of North and West Belfast. Actual involvement in the whole range of community issues has not progressed as far as in the Bogside area of Londonderry, but the organisms are there by which this can be accomplished in both Protestant and Catholic communities. While it is necessary at this early stage that the common organisations including both Catholics and Protestants not be strained beyond the narrowly defined purposes that have made their cooperation possible and that the first steps of a more comprehensive approach to the social problems of their own life be made within the pattern of loyalties already existing in Protestant and Catholic neighbourhoods, the umbrella organisations do still provide ideal facilities for liaison and coordination of the local efforts, and should prevent the parallel development from becoming a source of rivalry or new suspicions. The ancient problems of the stereotypes that have divided the two communities will have to be resolved, but they do not really have precedence over the more genuine interests of people in both communities in having control of their own lives and social patterns. We believe that when there is real life and growth in the two communities and the ancient stereotypes no longer occupy the whole stage for lack of anything else of interest happening in the land that could be a source of pride and optimism, that they can be resolved far more amicably, and that the scapegoat patterns that exacerbate the old conflicts will fade as the two communities find new satisfaction in their own internal life.

The position of the UDA in this development is most significant, as they

have been a group formed to the model of the second mutation we described above, subordinating all other possible values to the defense of order in a chaotic situation. There has surely been a strong suspicion among UDA members that the whole opposing (Catholic) community was composed of enemies of order. In participating over this year in the activities of these new community associations, even on the narrowly defined grounds that have made inter-community cooperation possible, they have found partners in the pursuit of a common interest not only within the community that has been so suspected, but even in the militant organisations that are the actual threats to the order they have banded together to defend, and whose participation in the aims these new associations have pursued was as necessary as that of the UDA itself. This represents a turnaround point in their own internal development, and makes them now available in future for work as a constructive social force. The same analysis cannot be made of the two (bitterly divided) branches of the IRA, as they have not been in such an extreme position as the UDA, representative of the second mutation situation, but have been more conventional revolutionary groups. But that they have assented to constructive initiatives at the behest of the community whose interests they claim to represent should stand beyond question.

While these developments, in general political consciousness of the available options and in local community activation, can be readily recognised as signs of hope, the prospects of the younger generation are generally taken to be reason for alarm. It is all true enough, that the young people and children of Northern Ireland have been exposed to experiences of terror, indoctrination in hatred, brutalisation and continued emotional stress. But this is not the only significant part of their story and another side should be as clearly seen. The young people of both sides in Northern Ireland have more sense of being alive and having purpose in their lives than their peers in Bedford-Stuyvesant or East London. They have no need to take refuge in drugs or apathy from the frustrations or senselessness of their lives. While it has been for the most negative purposes, they have carried an actual level of responsibility that one would normally not dream of imposing on people of their age. The brunt of the fighting has been on them, and even the leadership in the private armies, on both sides, has rested largely with people hardly older than themselves. They have had the admiration of their elders, even when the elders were most frightened for them, in an age when the young elsewhere are patronised and their thought and activity held in contempt. There is a sense of exhilaration among them, and the death or injury of a number of their peers only increases their own sense of high purpose and resolve. For however mistaken reasons (and the young on the two opposing sides can certainly not both be right) they have put their whole lives entirely at the disposal and service of their communities, and done so voluntarily, under no compulsion and with no expectation of gain.

Here is a generation of young people already activated to the most intensive and selfless assumption of responsibility. They will all, for whatever reason they are participating in the fighting at present, have

wonderful stories to tell their grandchildren. What must be ensured now is that when the fighting stops it is not merely in exhaustion, but that there should be a moral equivalent of the civil war. What constructive things are done with the peace should be just as well worth telling to the grandchildren, the sense of full life and purpose be as strong as it is during the fighting itself. But if in fact, as we expect, the outcome of the conflict situation in Northern Ireland is the creation of new social institutions in advance of what we have elsewhere and an enrichment of all our lives elsewhere as well, we can depend upon it that the younger generation in Northern Ireland is fully prepared and activated to take its part in the process.

Ireland in ancient days was the source of Christian evangelisation, of civilisation and scholarship for all of Europe North of the Alps. She has been much reduced since then, in cultural status, in world importance, in the sense of integral continuity with her own best traditions. Ages of oppression have played the major part in that reduction, and the responsibility lies with the British, who controlled Ireland for so many centuries after their conquest, to facilitate in every possible way the new forces that can come from a resurgent community consciousness in Ireland. But it is still within the Northern community that the best hope exists right now for the development of alternative societal forms. If and when that happens, Ireland will be again the model and the envy of all the rest of the civilised world.