LEBANON:

FOCUS OF THE

MIDDLE EASTERN CONFLICT

Course-Pak for Th. 335.01
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Introduction

For a number of years I've been having a set of what I call my *Irish Papers* printed up for my Th323.01 course on the *Conflict in Northern Ireland*, originally a set of consultative papers addressed some to the Northern Ireland Office and others to The Republican Movement, arranged as long ago as 1981 with some consistency as a book. In recent years I've added further material to that set, in the form of correspondence with the participants in the conflict, less orderly in arrangement than the original set.

Until this year, I have never made up a course-pak for this Lebanon course, but instead have found myself churning out, sorting and stapling numerous papers and articles on the copy machines myself. The items I have put together here are not as orderly as my original Irish set, but are intended simply to give some context to my own direct involvement with the Middle Eastern conflict.

And Middle Eastern it is, not merely Lebanese. When I first began offering this course, back in 1985, Lebanon was the scene of proxy wars among the other participants in the Middle Eastern conflict, wars fought on Lebanese territory, in which it was Lebanese who did most of the suffering and dying, thus relieving Israelis, Syrians, Palestinians, Iraqis, Saudis, Egyptians, Libyans, Soviets and Americans, the principal real protagonists of those wars, of that unpleasantness. That made Lebanon a convenient mirror through which to look into many much more distant areas of this conflict. Hence the course title in which I describe Lebanon as focus for a wider view of the Middle Eastern Conflict.

Since 1990, this has no longer been true. As part of the price for its participation as a member of the coalition against Iraq in the Gulf War, Syria, which had always a strong interest in power over the Lebanese situation, was permitted by the United States to establish dominant control over Lebanese government and everything that happened in Lebanon. Lebanon since then, even in the Middle East peace process that has run through the Madrid Conference stage to the era of the Oslo agreement, functions only as a sub-set of the Syrian involvement in the conflict.

The course will pay attention to the main arena of the Middle Eastern conflict, namely the Israeli-Palestinian struggle, as well as to the internal turmoil in Lebanon, using Lebanon as the "focus" for as long as it remained so, and hence largely by following the workings of the Palestinian refugee presence in Lebanon, and will then, for the period since 1990, deal with these two forums of the conflict separately. I am conscious that this course has become rather crowded with event in recent years, and probably needs to be separated into more than one course. Having so much to deal with, I will be drawing up as much of the background material as possible into written papers as the course proceeds, so that not too much class time is consumed in going through things that are simply background to what is happening at present. Hence you can still expect to see a stream of supplementary papers appear as the term goes on.

This collection is basically of my own papers and correspondence, beginning with a 1983 report on my own earliest visit to Lebanon, which took place shortly after the Israeli invasion of 1982. Because this paper, with its annexed recommendation of a program in legal anthropology, circulated very widely, not only in Lebanon but elsewhere in the Middle East and Europe, I have included not only its English original but its French and Arabic translations. Following this, I include a letter to the Druze leader, Walid Joumblatt, written at the time of the Shuf war which renewed the fighting between Christians and Druze, September 1983.

One other item of my own is a talk given at the Ninth Annual Symposium of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, April 12, 1984, on the theme *Toward a Viable Lebanon*. The papers of that conference were eventually published under that title by Croome Helm Publishers in 1988, edited by Halim Barakat. That book, until this year a regular course-book for this

course, in now out of print. My own paper, originally titled "Some Maronite and Near-Maronite Views: Ambivalence About Lebanon," was included in the book under the title: "Internal Lebanese Politics: The Lebanese Front and Forces." It deals with political-military structure that gave shape to the civil war. In deference to the Croome-Helm copyright, I include it here in its original form.

In 1988, as the time came for the election of a new Lebanese President, I wrote to the State Department objecting to the Syrian veto that was being exercised, with American approval, over the election. That led to a long correspondence with Raymond Eddé, who would clearly have been elected if the election was held freely, the whole of this correspondence relayed regularly to the White House with added commentary from myself. By 1990, when Syrian hegemony over Lebanon had become complete, Eddé asked my agreement that we should publish the correspondence. This was done as a book, in French only, over my name and under the title *La situation Libanaise selon Raymond Eddé*. There is more to that book than need be included in this selection of papers, and copyright considerations are more complicated inasmuch as half the material is Raymond Eddé's. So I will not have it copied here, but we will go through this episode quite thoroughly in class.

As I started putting this course-pak together, I thought to include a good deal of similar material, i.e., documentation of direct interventions of my own, on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It turned out that there was an unwieldy amount of it, at least 1,500 pages, and selecting only bits of it would have been too superficial. I'm sure I need to make a separate course of that, and will plan to pull that material together for it.

Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.
January 1, 1998

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St. Aloysius Gonzaga Jesuit Community

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March, 1983

REPORT ON VISIT TO LEBANON BY RAYMOND G. HELMICK, S.J.

The visit lasted from December 28, 1982, to January 28, 1983. It was a time when the hostilities of the previous summer had largely ceased, though there was continued communal fighting in Tripoli and in the Shuf. Clearance of ruins and the demining of areas in Beirut was getting underway. The first sessions of the Lebanese-Israeli-American talks were being held.

The purpose of the visit was to gain an understanding of the internal conflict in Lebanon, particularly of the anxieties, frustrations, and ambivalences it might contain, and to initiate a dialogue with the various participants. As a result of the visit, RH feels he now has this initial understanding of the political-social situation of Lebanon. It will have to ripen through much further conversation with Lebanese. This kind of interpretation is not intended simply for publication, as if it were for RH himself to make such an interpretation on his own, but for development through a process in which the many Lebanese partners to the discussion are participants. This present paper, therefore, will be circulated back to those in Lebanon with whom RH spoke, and he hopes for their critical assessment of it. While some publication and public discussion, of a modest and tentative character, might already be possible after this first visit, RH judges it preferable to let such activities wait until those persons have made their response to this report and he has had the opportunity to speak with them again on a second visit.

An added result of the visit is the beginnings of a concrete project in the area of legal anthropology. This is only a concept at this stage and will need much further development before it is clear that there is something viable in it that would be valued by people in Lebanon. But it has been discussed, as a possibility, with a number of significant persons in Lebanon, and has drawn an initially favorable response.

Circle of Contacts.

RH had valuable access to people through the fact that he stayed at the Jesuit Residence attached to the Universite St. Joseph in Beirut. The Jesuits there, both French and Lebanese in origin with a scattering of Americans already known to him, were in several cases themselves significant figures and/or relatives of leading figures, and they were more than helpful in arranging meetings. RH had a letter of introduction from Cardinal Medeiros of Boston to the Maronite Patriarch, Cardinal Khoraiche. The Patriarch granted him a lengthy and most helpful meeting. In addition, RH had introductions to many others who had been of great help to people in the various American aid organizations (Oxfam, International Rescue Committee, etc.) in their effort to understand the

political context, and these opened the way to many further contacts in different communities.

The process was to speak first with a circle of intellectuals, many of them professors at St. Joseph, the American University Beirut, and the Lebanese University, who were perceptive observers of the scene; then with a number of persons who were formative to the ideological positions of the various communities; next to persons active in the political and, in a couple of instances, the military activities of these communities. The U.S. Embassy's political officer made himself available for a useful meeting, having heard from Mr. Nicholas Veliotes that RH would be in Beirut. And once the legal anthropology concept began to take some shape in his mind, RH made a point of seeing law professors and the policy-makers of the universities. A further level of meetings was suggested by several contacts, namely with the heads of the great families who hold leadership in their communities and with the President of the Republic. However, RH judged it better to let these meetings wait for another visit, when these persons would have had the chance to see in writing the results of this first visit, and when the idea of the legal anthropology program would be better explored and set down in a preliminary way on paper.

Understanding of the Lebanese Situation.

RH's still tentative interpretation contains these main elements:

1. The setting, how Lebanon makes sense as a unit.

The first thing those committed to the concept of Lebanon want understood is the meaning of the Lebanese Mountain, Mount Lebanon, and this is little understood outside Lebanon itself. In fact, the mountain is only one of several interdependent areas of the geographical Lebanon, and geography here has an unusually strong influence on the character of the society.

The country consists of a long mountain ridge which, throughout its history, has been a place of refuge for communities under pressure, and the Mediterranean littoral with its port cities. These relate to each other. The mountain refuge has always concentrated population density that needs an outlet. The coastal cities, with their openness to as much world as has been accessible at any given period, have provided that outlet, a high level of commerce, and a technological superiority over neighboring countries at any given time. Along with these there is the valley of the Bekaa, the necessary breadbasket of the country. Attempts to separate these at various times in history have always led to backwardness and intolerable population pressures in the mountain, lack of hinterland for the cities. The cities of the littoral put Lebanon in the position of commercial and cultural link between the Near Eastern region and a wider, primarily European and Western, world, giving it essentially the character of a service area to the region. The refuge character of the mountain has always meant the need to build a plural society, and that has become a most consequential element in Lebanon's value to the rest of the region.

There is more to be said of the geography and the resultant character of Lebanese society. For 2,300 years of its history, Lebanon functioned as part of a larger area, the classical Province of Syria, in which it was joined to the present Syria and the Southern areas of Palestine (present Israel) and Jordan. This political configuration was always maintained for the administrative convenience of larger empires: the conquests of Alexander; the Empires of the Seleucids, the Romans, and the Byzantines; the Ummayad, Abbasid, and Fatimid Caliphates; the Ottoman Empire. A second line of entrepot cities, stretching North-South parallel to the cities of the littoral but inland of the mountain ridges and along the edge of the desert, lived in interdependence with the Lebanese coastal cities at times when a great part of the regional trade travelled in overland caravans. The area of present-day Syria shares with Lebanon, though to a lesser extent, the character of confessional and ethnic diversity that is so special to Lebanon, but has never had the success in building an open and pluralist society that Lebanon has consistently striven for and sporadically approached.

Even in the time of the many successive empires Lebanon tended often to separate out from the rest of the Syrian province, in pursuit of enough independence or autonomy to let it construct such a pluralist society. Occasionally, at times of particular inter-ethnic or inter-confessional tension, the Mountain area, with its special refuge character, has become a fortress, separate even from the littoral and the Bekaa. Such a period, by Ottoman decision, extended from 1842 to the end of the First World War. At the fall of the Ottoman Empire, an aspiration of particularly the Muslim population to construct an independent State in the whole of the classical Syrian province, in service of a pan-Arab nationalism, was frustrated by the conflicting imperial ambitions of Britain and France. The tensions that have led to civil war and devastating internal weakness in Lebanon in recent years stem from the conflicting aspirations of a Lebanese nationalism and a pan-Syrian or pan-Arab nationalism, fueled by a disappointment in the Islamic or more consciously Arab part of the population at the failure of post-Ottoman Lebanese society to deliver on its promises of a genuine pluralism and a service to the wider region.

2. Outside pressures.

Predictably enough, in its time of acute internal weakness, Lebanon has been subjected to maximum pressure from outside interests. The question arises naturally, which is to blame for the present critical state: the internal troubles or the external pressures. The answer has to be that Lebanon lives in a region of many societies which are themselves under extreme pressure, but that Lebanon's particular vulnerability and the fact that it is made the victim of everyone else's troubles stems from its own internal weakness as a society. That society is one of great value in itself and to its neighbors, and deserves a chance to survive. It is most proper, therefore, that the international community do whatever is in its power to ensure the survival and strengthening of Lebanon. But there is no saving Lebanon, or no chance for Lebanon to withstand the pressures put upon it by its troubled neighbors, if the Lebanese do not strengthen the internal fibre of their own society.

Lebanon has been made the excuse of the other Arab countries for their own impotence in the face of the problem of dispossessed Palestinians: they have expected, even required Lebanon to deal with the problem on behalf of all the Arab countries, placed the blame on Lebanon for failure, settled the Palestinians on Lebanon beyond the capacity of Lebanon to host and cope with them. Lebanon is also made the Israelis' excuse to do nothing about the Palestinians at home: Israel claims to deal with the Palestinians abroad, crushing them in Lebanon rather than coming to terms with them at home. These pressures make the handling of the problems native to Lebanon itself all the more difficult, all the more so now that the pressure takes the form of actual military occupation by both Syrians and Israelis. Lebanon needs the opportunity to separate off its own internal problematic from these external pressures, and at the same time will not be able to negotiate with the external forces unless the Lebanese themselves achieve a minimal level of cohesion. To help create such an opportunity for Lebanon would, on the part of the international community, be a service to Israel and the Arab countries as well as to Lebanon itself.

It is important to understand that the most important external pressures being exercised on Lebanon come from the other countries of the region, rather than from the major powers further afield. This is not to make excuses for the major powers or to declare them innocents in the embroiled Middle Eastern conflict. But the pressures of the major powers are exercised on Lebanon's neighbors rather than directly on Lebanon itself. It would be a tragic added injustice if the major powers themselves were now to take advantage of Lebanon's weakness and use Lebanon as a pawn in any power game of their own, but that seems less likely than that Lebanon be still exposed to pressures from the neighboring states.

3. Communal self-understanding.

Lebanon has, officially, seventeen recognized minority confessional communities, each accorded its proportional place in elective offices and civil service posts. Both the justice of the proportional formula and the validity of maintaining such a formula at all have been under challenge throughout the eight years of civil war. The Palestinian refugees, a clearly recognizable community themselves with many confessional differences among them, are not included among those seventeen, and are distinct from the rest in that they have not made a choice to make their life in Lebanon. (Other groups who are refugees from cataclysmic events elsewhere in the region, such as the Armenian refugees from the massacres in Turkey early in the century, or the great proportion of the Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics who fled to Lebanon when the Syrian province of Antioch was handed over to Turkey by the French colonial administration on the eve of World War II, have in fact become thoroughly Lebanese.) While the several communities of Orthodox and Catholic Christians -- Greek, Syrian, Armenian Orthodox and Catholics, Roman Catholics -- are counted separately among the 17 minorities, the few Protestants, of many denominations, are counted together, and there is no distinct counting of the many Shia Muslim sects. For the purposes of this account, the four groups with the main influence in the State -- Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims, and Druze -- will be emphasized, with the other Christians grouped together and the Palestinians seen as a distinct community among themselves.

One perceptive Lebanese observer distinguished the confessional communities into tribal and non-tribal groups. The distinguishing characteristic he pointed to as constituting a tribe was paranoia, and he described as tribal in this sense the Maronites, the Shia Muslims, and the Druze. The Palestinians, coming into Lebanon under massive threat and living under constant pressure, became an instant tribe in this sense. The other communities, described as non-tribal, were given the designation "civic," and among them the Sunni Muslims and the large community of Greek Orthodox were given pride of place. But the events of recent years, this observer felt, were driving even these communities into increasing paranoia and hence a "tribal" pattern. These designations, "tribal" and "civic," were not meant as pejorative or approving judgments, as the threats these groups have perceived to their existence or cultural integrity have been deeply felt. RH, with his interest in the anxieties and ambivalences that contribute to the dynamics of conflicts, found the distinction a helpful one, and hopes to treat these anxieties with sympathy.

a) The Maronite Christians have a strong sense of themselves as the origin and carriers of the concept of a plural society in which all ethnic and religious communities have equal rights and access to the benefits of the State. They express this as the spirit of the Mountain, the traditional place of refuge. Finding themselves now in the strongest position in the State (though under all the burden of military occupation by neighbors), they feel themselves custodians of the Mountain spirit, and tend to distrust all the other communities as potential threats to it. When, under a late stage of Ottoman rule, their Mountain state was separated from the littoral and the Bekaa, they were a great majority in it, sharing power with the smaller Druze community. Now the Maronites have a strong sense of what parts of Lebanon belong to this smaller Mountain state and what parts do not, and tend to distrust especially those from outside the Mountain.

The Maronites feel threatened particularly by Islamization, the reconstituting of their society under Syrian or other Muslim domination that would enforce the Sharia, or Islamic Law, according to which Muslims alone form the basic community (omma) with responsibility for the society as a whole, and the others are only "protected peoples," dhimmi, literally those "on the conscience (dhimma)" of the Islamic community, who have protection rather than rights in the society. The Maronites are quite aware that the Islamic conscience has been rather more delicate, through history, than the consciences of many other peoples toward the communities under their protection, but they are not willing to settle for any such position in the State. In protecting themselves against this expected threat, the Maronites appear to many in the other communities to be establishing a comparable domination of their own. They distrust the other Christian communities in Lebanon as people accustomed to living under the Sharia system, who, they fear, will not put up any adequate resistance to a new attempt to impose it.

The Maronite community has contributed greatly to the emergence of a modern Lebanese society. It was they, in the 18th and 19th centuries, who broke the mold of feudal society, first liberating their peasant class and bringing them to a high level of prosperity, and then building a post-feudal commercial class, which now holds primary power in their community.

This commercial class incurs all the odium attached to "bourgeoisie," especially in a society like Lebanon's that still has enormous social differences, the poor being not Maronites (whose peasant class retains its prosperity), but the Muslims, particularly the Shia of Southern Lebanon and the Bekaa, who never participated in the social liberation of the Maronite areas.

Throughout their history, the Maronites have looked to the Christian West for protectors -- the Byzantines, the Crusaders, eventually the Western colonial powers, especially the French. Now they find themselves, though of basically the same ethnic stock as the other Lebanese, alienated from the Arabic solidarity and aspirations of these other Lebanese. The Maronites feel themselves rightly aggrieved at the refusal of the other Lebanese to recognize or accept the Western values that they have acquired through this history, and which present some of the most important opportunities for the whole of Lebanese society. (Curiously enough, the other Arab countries around them place a much higher value on the Western qualities of the Maronites and the Lebanese State than do those Lebanese who feel themselves smothered by the Maronites.) Their Westernization is a fact, and needs to be accepted by the others, though it is the Maronites themselves, by their conduct toward the others, who must win this acceptance.

It is customary for the Maronite leadership to preach to the rest of the confessional communities that they must be Lebanese, must accept their membership in Lebanese society and not be working to bring it down. The test of the viability of Lebanese society will really be whether or not the Maronites themselves can be Lebanese, and not merely Maronite: can be sharing and trusting members of a Lebanese society, respectful of the Arab character of their fellow Lebanese, and true defenders of the pluralism that it is their profession to uphold.

b) The other Christian communities -- Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic (Melkite), Syrian Orthodox, Syrian Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, the few Roman Catholics and Protestants -- are less numerous than the Maronites, and for the most part are more accustomed through their history to living submissively in Muslim-controlled societies. They value the pluralism and relative freedom they have in Lebanese society, and are more inclined than are the Maronites to see the society created in Lebanon as a model of pluralism offered to the other Arab countries. They would not be willing to return to the Sharia system, but they do tend to keep their heads down in Islamic society. Their confessional communities, unlike that of the Maronites, extend widely through the other Arab countries, and they have strong fears now that the Maronites may over-reach and bring the house down for themselves and all other Near Eastern Christians.

These communities have contributed distinctively to the underlying Lebanese ideal of a free and pluralist society. Particularly the Greek Orthodox, the largest of these groups, have led in the intellectual effort to constitute that ideal society, and the principal intellectual father of this Lebanese ideal was a Roman Catholic, Michel Chiha. The Armenians, a small minority, have established themselves as a particularly effective political force in Beirut, where a surprising number of the small shops are theirs.

Around 1970, in the context of a world-wide atmosphere of nascent ecumenism amond Christians and a general Middle Eastern atmosphere of sympathy for the Palestinian cause, Lebanese Christians undertook what they understood as a crusade: to build up the pluralist society of Lebanon, in close cooperation with the Palestinians, as a model for the secular non-confessional state in all of Palestine that they hoped would replace the Jewish confessional State of Israel. Their essentially generous impulse betrayed them. It threw a sheen of legitimacy over making Lebanon a base for military incursions into Israel by the Palestinians, thus exposing their own people, especially the impoverished Shia Muslims of Southern Lebanon, to crushing Israeli retaliation. It failed to appreciate the peculiar trauma of the Jews, who have too long a history of being the scapegoats and victims of the worst violence in the supposedly pluralist societies of the West. And it diverted Lebanese attention from the civilizational function of such a pluralist society as they aspired to build, which is a service to the whole Middle East. The Maronites distrusted, from the start, any plan that would expose Lebanon to such military retaliation as it has since suffered, and this crusading idea of the other Christians drove a wedge between the Maronites and them. The failure of the enterprise has now left the other Christians bewildered, uncertain of themselves, without a sense of the direction of Lebanese society, and in a general state of anxiety, in which they see dangers wherever they turn: dangers from the Maronites, dangers from the Palestinians, dangers from Israel, dangers from the West. They feel themselves part of Arab society, but have a sense of anger and enmity from the Lebanese Muslim communities and the Arab countries around them.

c) The Druze, like the Maronites, have lived in refuge on the Mountain, whose rugged terrain protected them from the wrath of the Muslims who regarded them as heretics. In the 17th century, under their Emir Fakhreddin II, who built up an important autonomous area much larger than the present Lebanon, the Druze designed and implemented a State that embodied the equality of rights and access that the Maronites understand as the spirit of the Mountain and their own invention. The Druze believe themselves, too, to be the inventors of the Mountain in this political sense, and are bitterly aggrieved to feel themselves shut out from equality in Lebanese society. A minority (though long the ruling minority) even in the smaller state that consisted only of the Mountain, they are a small minority now, but prosperous and with a sense of their dignity and historic importance.

The much admired pluralist State that the Druze leaders built in the 17th century was feudal. The Druze have come out of feudalism in a different way than the Maronites. As people of the Mountain, their peasants shared in the 19th-century liberation of the Maronite peasantry, and as a small, elite warrior society, they enjoyed higher social standing in any case. The great feudal families have remained major factors in Druze society, but have accepted the necessity of holding their place by merit and responsibility rather than by hereditary right. Particularly the Joumblatt family, under the leadership of Kamal Joumblatt (assassinated in 1977), this social responsibility took the form of distribution of the family lands, espousing the cause of the poor and dispossessed (Muslims for the most part, especially the Shia and, of course, the Palestinians), and eventually taking a leading part in the direction of the civil war. The Druze, and the Joumblatts, now live under a cloud in Lebanon, feeling

their very existence threatened, and one of the pockets of continued military insurgency is in the Druze heartland of the Shuf, just South-east of Beirut. The social idealism of the Joumblatts remains one of the great needs of Lebanese society, but they and their community have now a greatly reduced voice.

d) The Shia Muslims descend from groups that have always resisted the centralizing power of the Caliphate and other regionally dominant empires. Syria and Lebanon, as strongly tribal areas, have been the seeding ground for such anti-centralist forces in Islam. Now the Shia sects, living in the Southern Lebanon areas that have been the scene of heavy battles between Palestinians and Israelis especially since 1970, in slum areas of Beirut and in the Bekaa, are the most conspicuously dispossessed group in Lebanon apart from the Palestinians.

Their charismatic leader of the early 1970s, the Imam Musa-al-Sadr, won great affection and the respect of other Lebanese confessional communities as spokesman for the dispossessed. As part of his activity, he built up a substantial paramilitary militia, the Amal, designed not for an attack on Lebanese society but for the defense of the Southern Lebanese villages against Israeli retaliation raids. This militia of course became embroiled in the Lebanese civil war. In the aftermath of the war the Imam, on his way to Rome, by way of Libya, for a meeting with Pope Paul VI, disappeared under mysterious circumstances. His socio-religious movement represented one of the most serious efforts to date to bring the spiritual riches of Islam into the forum of the pressing problems of the contemporary world. Wherever one travels in Shia Muslim areas of Beirut or Southern Lebanon, one sees his picture displayed in windows, on the walls of buildings, in large oil paintings hung above the streets. His people feel orphaned without him and his spirit remains an important force among them.

The Shia of Southern Lebanon are largely tobacco farmers, but in contrast to tobacco farmers anywhere else in the world they present the anomaly of being desperately poor tobacco farmers. They are farmers in the Bekaa valley too, but without land of their own, as the land is held by remarkably few families. The Lebanese political leadership system has been a failure for the Shia, as they had an elected leadership that did not represent their interests, and their Imam and his following were effectively excluded from such leadership. For all these reasons, they are the most disaffected community in Lebanese society. Education is among the benefits largely withheld from them, with the result that their leadership is not strong. With a fairer shake in Lebanese society, theirs could be one of the most significant contributions to its well-being and pluralism.

e) The Sunni Muslims have the self-confident identity of a people who naturally constitute the principal culture of the Middle East. They are used to being the leaders of society. It is consequently a great effort for them to adapt to a society of pluralism, all the more difficult to find themselves a subjected class.

The Sunni are one of the most settled and "civic" communities in Lebanon, with a traditional leadership that inherits the best values of all the Muslim societies that have ruled Lebanon, including that of the Ottoman Empire. This leadership largely lost its control of Sunni

life and aspirations in the context of the civil war. Muslim participation in the war and the formation of Muslim militias took place in spite of the traditional leadership instead of under their direction, and the traditional leaders have had to run hard not to be left behind. Now that the civil war has apparently ended, with the Muslim forces in disarray before the massive military incursion of the Israelis, there appears to be a return to the traditional leadership of the Sunni community, which is of very high quality and has striven with great patience to maintain its balance and its influence. Without losing its sympathy for the dispossessed Palestinians, this leadership now reaffirms its support for the Lebanese experiment in pluralism, and states in its semi-official publications that a serious mistake was made by the Muslim community in allying itself with the armed Palestinian forces in an effort to regain a more dominant place in Lebanese society. They feel they have lost now, and must regroup to find their proper place within the pluralism of that society.

The Lebanese Sunni community has good reason to seek its place within the Lebanese pluralism. Theirs is a talent and a tradition for filling a responsible place in society that needs a proper outlet. They live in Lebanon and are aware now that the Lebanese State will last for a much longer time. The aspiration is widespread in Sunni Muslim society, much further afield than in Lebanon alone, to find the way to live in a pluralist society. Muslims, who have traditionally lived in societies where they were in majority, today live as minorities not only in Lebanon, but in such Western societies as that of Britain, with its large Pakistani minority (more Muslims in Britain than there are Methodists), or the United States; and in the Muslim countries of the Arab world there is generally a constitution that speaks of freedom of religion and equality of citizenship. But in no other country has a Sunni Muslim community as much motive and as many resources to discover, in faithfulness to its religious tradition, its relation as a faith community to a pluralist society. To discover this is a theological task, and it would be a service to the Muslim community everywhere.

f) The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, many still living in camps, are now reduced to great helplessness after the expulsion of their leadership, political and military. Those who have prospered and moved out of the camps over the many years of their stay here are now subjected to massive intimidation, including random murder, by shadowy groups, and are being forced back into already overcrowded camps. In the camps on the Southern edge of Beirut the only protection they can rely on comes from the presence of French and Italian troops of the Multinational Force. The Palestinians generally conceive themselves and are seen as transients, even in this traditional land of refuge. In their camps are now many Lebanese, Shia refugees from the battle areas of the South and other impoverished Lebanese, both Muslims and Christians, who now live under the same terrible danger as the Palestinians themselves just by reason of being in those camps, and many of these appear to have been victims, along with the Palestinians, both of the massive bombardments and destruction of the camps outside Tyre and Sidon during the Israeli invasion and of the massacres in the Beirut camps. For those living in the areas of Tyre and Sidon, under Israeli occupation, there is no security comparable to that provided by the Multinational Force around Beirut. They are reduced to crawling and currying the favor of

Israelis and the Haddad forces, a dangerous sort of humiliation for people to be subjected to.

Practically every faction in Lebanon was at some time the Palestinians' friend. Palestinian leadership in Lebanon was not wise. It pursued fantasies of military reconquest of land from Israel instead of pursuing a political case and legal redress. Many Lebanese claim the Palestinians instigated the civil strife in Lebanon. That interpretation is open to question. But at least the Palestinians insisted on mounting military operations against Israel from Lebanese territory, and by the Cairo agreement of 1969 the other Arab states forced Lebanon to accept the organization of autonomous military forces in Lebanon by the Palestinians. That was more than the Lebanese system could digest. The civil war broke out in its context, and the Palestinian leadership, with much initial reluctance, let its forces be sucked into the civil war, to the destruction of order in Lebanon.

Now, in the aftermath of the destruction of their cities, the devastation of the Southern half of their country, and the deaths, by responsible count, of some 20,000 Lebanese civilians (Lebanese, not counting Palestinians) in the 1982 invasion by Israel, most of the Lebanese communities, including those who have been their allies, have only ill to say of the Palestinian refugees. That the Palestinians "hijacked the State" is a common expression, though sympathy remains for the plight of the Palestinians in the face of Israel. People speak openly of "motivating" the Palestinians -- by deprivation, by terror -- to migrate elsewhere, to other countries.

It is easily intelligible that the Lebanese, the authorities and the whole society, have this massive resentment of the Palestinians. They have the obligations and responsibility of hosts to protect these refugees, long so troublesome and so unruly but now so helpless. It will take a long process of healing before Lebanese authorities and society will themselves implement this responsibility again, especially since, under military occupation by Syrians and Israelis, they have so much trouble in enforcing their authority over anything in their country. Lebanon has, for thirty five hard years, done more for the Palestinians than any other Arab country, and feels its hospitality and protection grievously abused. That excuses nothing of the current brutalities against the Palestinian refugees, but leaves the protection of the Palestinians as a primary responsibility of the international community until a civilized raprochement can be worked out between the refugees and Lebanon.

The Palestinians are half a million, and can become again a dangerous force of disintegration if they are to be deprived indefinitely of livelihood, education, and opportunity. This is very little understood in Lebanon. The standard response to any suggestion that the Palestinians could be a danger to Lebanese society again is that they have been beaten and now pose no further threat. This is to misconceive the self-interest of Lebanon itself. Brutalizing people into submission is no long-term solution to the social problem the refugees pose. Half a million deprived people cannot be held in abject submission without sowing a new whirlwind.

4. What remains of value in the Lebanese system.

Lebanon has regarded itself as an idyll, the ideal lovely country of tolerance, pluralism, and democracy that was a model to all the world. The civil war came within an inch of destroying it all, and exposed depths of inadequacy in the Lebanese system. It was terminated only through external invasion by the Israelis, not by any intrinsic elements that were able to bring the strife to a constructive resolution. But the Lebanese, with great resilience of spirit, have accepted the termination of the fighting as a signal to rebuild their society and be reconciled to one another. Not that the idyll is back: there are still residual excuses and resentments that threaten the rebuilding of the society, and structural defects in the society to which no solutions have yet been found.

One of the common responses to the agony of the last eight years is denial. RH heard it asserted with great vehemence that there had been no civil war, that the eight years of rampant destruction had all been imposed on Lebanon by external forces, with no basis in Lebanese society itself. That is a familiar response that he has heard in many other conflicts. In Northern Ireland, for instance, it is a commonplace for the British and the local Protestants to claim that all their trouble is the work of a mindless clique of violent men, and that if they could be destroyed there would be no trouble left. It is equally common to hear from Catholics there that the whole trouble is the British presence, and that if the British withdrew there would be no trouble in Northern Irish society. On either side, this is a way of refusing to acknowledge that their trouble is with their neighbors and has to be resolved. Everyone in Lebanon is familiar with comparable denials that they have been hearing from Israel for many years: that it is "a land without people for a people without land;" that "there are no Palestinians;" that "there is already a Palestinian State, and its name is Jordan." Lebanese are perhaps less ready to recognize the same denial syndrome when they hear from Palestinians or other Arabs that there are no Israelis, or that Israel is not a reality with which they must eventually come to terms. The simple denial in Lebanon, the statement that there was no civil war, is as self-deceiving as all these other instances.

Something needs to be said about the writing of this report. RH came away from his month in Lebanon, and his careful listening to persons in all the communities, with a sense of optimism in the Lebanese people, and of the means at hand with which they would rebuild their shattered life. Early in February, immediately after his return, he wrote a first draft of this report that reflected that optimism. But he had also, while in Lebanon, purchased every book he could find that promised some enlightenment about the condition of Lebanon, and acquired much more literature after his return. After writing his first draft of this report, he sat down and read through those books, a great many of them published just as the civil war was getting under way and therefore reflecting the tensions out of which the civil war grew. He found himself reduced to a dreadful state of "on the one hands" and "on the other hands," and it has taken this long time before the mass of material could become coherent again and he could draw some conclusions.

The most basic of these conclusions in in response to the question: what is there in Lebanon to work with?

The civil war was the crucible in which the concept of Lebanon was challenged by two competing nationalisms: a Syrian nationalism and a pan-Arab nationalism. The latter was not so much a territorial concept as a spiritual one, a decision that the wider interests of "the Arab nation" took priority over the local interests of Lebanon. This included an inclination to give Lebanon's support for the Palestinians priority over any danger to Lebanon that might result from it, and a sense of grievance that Lebanon, as organized under predominant Maronite influence, paid too scant respect to the Arab identity and solidarity of a great part of its people and heritage. The Syrian nationalism was more territorial in its orientation, a throwback to what had seemed possible or desirable at the time of the breakup of the Ottoman Empire more than to anything that seemed geopolitically attainable in the present day. Like everyone else who was accused of seeking a partition of Lebanon, the Syrian nationalists quickly came round to the position that they opposed partition in any form, and were fighting their war to prevent it. But along with the pan-Arab nationalists they rejected the priorities of the Lebanon in which they found themselves, regarded its emphasis on confessional balance as mere camouflage for a regime of social oppression, and wanted to scrap its institutions and its cumbersome consensus politics in favor of a more centralized State responsive to different priorities of their own. Syria seemed not so much the partner for a territorial merger as the place where their hearts lived, from which they should not have to feel separated.

Now, at the end of the eight years of internal war, there are no other serious contenders on the board for the ordering of the society's priorities except the Lebanon concept itself. It cannot call itself a nationalism except for the Maronites and a few others, as it does not evoke that response from the rest. But there is general consensus that the problems of the territorial area, Lebanon, have to be addressed as the matter of first priority, and that its people must find a way of accomodating each other for that purpose, with the institutional means they actually have at hand. They are not averse to modifying these and redefining the social and political priorities in accordance with newly perceived needs. In fact the idea of a return to the bad old days is one of the specters people warn one another against. But the Lebanon concept remains in place when all its rivals have fallen away.

That concept is of its essence one of a pluralist society. The pluralism is not basically an equality or balance of the confessions, each with its own proportional rights, but an equality of citizenship, with full respect for the cultural identity of all. The National Pact constructed in 1943 among the confessional entities was in fact always meant to be a means toward that end, and one whose necessity would gradually be phased out. Its utility and its necessity have not yet ended, but it has been a liability to the very survival of the Lebanese system that the confessional division of power has been seen as an end rather than as a means.

Among the basic tools available to Lebanon for achieving its admirable social ideal, three stand out: its legislative tradition, the humane thought of Michel Chiha, and the social conscience which had its most eloquent spokesmen in Kamal Joumblatt and Musa al-Sadr. These are not common property to all Lebanese, as the two sides in the civil war took their choice among them and they are identified as partisan rallying cries. All three need to be appreciate and appropriated by all the Lebanese communities if the riches of the Lebanese tradition are to be available now for the rebuilding of the society.

a) The Legislative tradition. The legislature has an extraordinary record of achievement in Lebanon. It is not a foreign implantation from the French colonial period, but a thoroughly Lebanese institution through which the Lebanese accomplished their independence both from the Ottoman Empire and the French Mandate, constructed the package of reforms which made the establishment of Greater Lebanon palatable to the people of Northern and Southern Lebanon, the Bekaa and the coastal cities in 1920, designed and subsequently developed their distinctive constitution, and devised the Lebanese system of consensus politics. It precedes and is not intrinsically dependent on the system of confessional balance.

In more recent times, the legislature has been afflicted with an immobilism that has impeded Lebanese social and political development. It is because of this immobilism that the whole Lebanese system came to be stigmatized, by those who were not receiving adequate benefit from it, as a tool for maintaining old socio-economic injustices. Even the building of roads and schools and hospitals, and the other reforms of the Presidency of General Fuad Shihab, were accomplished by ignoring and circumventing the legislature rather than by understanding and using it. It is time to break through the ways the legislative structure can be used for mere obstruction, and make this uniquely Lebanese institution once again an effective instrument for accomplishing Lebanese purposes.

b) Michel Chiha. Even 29 years after his death, no other writings cast more light on the character and opportunities of Lebanon than those of Chiha, who wisely sought to prevent the cataclysm that we have now seen. It should be remembered that Chiha described a dynamic for the evolution of Lebanese society rather than a static picture of it. In the disillusion that brought about the civil war, it became evident that the ideal society Chiha had described was simply not there, and never had been. The consensus system he had urged on Lebanon had been abused to support the immobilism of selfish interests, and when consensus could not be achieved there had seemed no other recourse left but to arms. It is easy, in consequence, to regard Chiha's hoped-for Lebanon as an experiment that failed. A re-reading of his thought now shows a different result: a vision of the opportunities that were missed, and which still remain open today because his observation of the realities of Lebanon was so accurate. His writings should not be treated as a point of stasis for the development of Lebanese society, but as a starting point for new thought.

c) Social conscience. That real urgency about the social inequities in Lebanon should have been expressed predominantly on one side of the Lebanese conflict has had the damaging effect of making it seem a partisan issue. Such ideas have not been foreign to the thought

of Christians in such places as the Kataib party, but Christians have lived more comfortably in Lebanon, due to their successful social programs of the 19th century, at a time when the small Mountain Lebanon was separated from the rest. It is the Muslim populations, both Sunni and Shia, that have borne the brunt of modern poverty in Lebanon, and the chief spokesmen of their plight have been Musa al-Sadr and Kamal Joumblatt. Their voices are a treasure to Lebanon and should be in honor throughout the society.

It should be acknowledged that, for Lebanon to fulfill its role of banker to the Arab world, which is one of its principal services, it needs a particularly free economic system. There have been those who, in the heady rhetoric of the years of conflict, described even this banker's role as an exploitation of the Arab world. This is not the way it has been seen by the Arab countries that have availed themselves of Lebanon as a commercial conduit. They have valued and supported Lebanon in this role.

But that tobacco farmers should be, as they are in Southern Lebanon, poor to the point of destitution is not an effect of free enterprise. It is the result of crass commercial manipulation and exploitation. Nor is it simply by the operation of the free market that land should have been so concentrated in a few hands in the Bekaa.

Radical economic reform and expropriation would doubtless ill suit the needs of Lebanese society, but this does not preclude basic distributive justice and the policing of clear exploitation. There is another way, though, to bring the dispossessed masses of these areas into enjoyment of the benefits of Lebanese society. That is the route of education. These areas have been educationally deprived too, with widespread illiteracy and small access to secondary and higher education. The very few who have made their way from these regions to the universities, which are all in Beirut, have had no inclination to return to their impoverished home areas. Education can be used, of course, as a means of social control, to socialize people into acceptance of their inferior roles in society. But it can be used as well to empower them, and to make the levers of social equity accessible to them. An urgent program to make educational opportunity fully available to these regions would be well within government's power. Combined with serious development programs for the regional economies, this would go a long way toward making a full sharing of Lebanon's prosperity available to these areas and their deprived people, without needlessly radical economic tampering.

5. Cohesion-building tasks.

Lebanon's is a society poised between cultures: the Arab world from which its poeple stem, and the Western world to which it is the door for the Arab countries. It cannot live isolated from either of them. It has its internal tasks to give its people a home and opportunity in their own society, and still their anxieties. It has its external tasks as well, in service to these two cultural worlds, and these happily coincide.

This part of the world has a character highly resistant to externally imposed order. It is well to remember that, after the Hellenistic and Roman-Byzantine systems had held the ancient Province of Syria

(the larger Syria) under a highly developed, sophisticated, prosperous urbanized order for nearly a thousand years, the tribal forces were still so unadapted and vital that, when other tribal forces brought the Islamic conquest, they swept the whole urbanized veneer away almost overnight. When the Ummayad Caliphate of the first Islamic century tried to rescue this urbanized order and hold it in place, these forces brought down the Caliphate itself. Subsequent efforts from the Abassid Caliphate in Bagdad and the Fatimid system in Egypt to build a unified and urban Islamic order again faltered over the resistance of this part of their world. Conclusion: these successive efforts at order all failed through not integrating the cultures and energies of the place, but by trying to impose an artificial system instead. The people of the place have to be respected, and their historical experience leaves them very sceptical of every new imposition. The folk-memory knows they have broken many an empire in their time.

We referred earlier to paranoia as the element that turns an otherwise "civic" modern community into a tribe. That is not, of course, the only definition of a tribe, which is an honorable term. But it is useful as indicating the element that must be exorcised if the communities of Lebanon are to be enabled to live together in a cohesive society, without fear of losing their own cultural identities. Paranoia is a fear based on misapprehension of the other's intentions. Communication in Lebanon is difficult today, and such misapprehensions are common.

The Lebanese call each other by many derogatory names. One of these names, applied to the Maronites at the beginning of the civil war, was "isolationists." It referred to the Maronite penchant for denying Lebanon's Arab character and link with the Arab world and its aspirations. But a second meaning of "isolationist" was read back into the term and attributed to the Maronites. This was that they planned a partition of Lebanon, a secession of their old Mountain stronghold from the rest of the country, holding on to the port area of East Beirut, and leaving the rest of Lebanon to be gobbled up, part by Syria, part by Israel. The Maronites deny, of course, that they ever planned such a thing. RH listened closely to their denials, listened especially to hear if there were any excessive protestation about this, any evidence of something to conceal. He is convinced that they never intended such a partition, and that the whole suspicion therefore falls within the category of paranoia. It is on such suspicions that the society broke down and slid into civil war.

The Maronite fear of an Islamization of Lebanese society, the imposition of the Sharia, is another such instance of paranoia. There is plenty of basis for it in history, and the signs of development in that direction in recent years in Egypt, with its large Coptic community, fuel their alarm. The Muslim community of Lebanon is simply puzzled by this suspicion and distrust. But they have not found the way to communicate to the Maronites their readiness to participate as equals in Lebanese society, without any such ulterior designs. Their concentration has been on the threat of Maronite domination over themselves, and they have not even seen the stilling of this Maronite anxiety as a priority.

Shia Muslims find their community terribly deprived, and fear that they are intended, by the rest of the Lebanese, to be a permanent underclass. When they then find themselves treated with suspicion as potential subverters of Lebanese order (if only as a deprived class

that may seek to rise from its deprivation), and many of their number, in the Hermel area, even denied Lebanese identity cards, their fears turn into paranoia and radical disaffection. Many in the Bekaa are consequently inclined to look to the Syrians as their protectors, though in Southern Lebanon people look to Lebanon as their protection against Israeli incursion.

The Palestinians are in the worst case. Even when Lebanon acted toward them as a phenomenally generous host, they were full of fears and suspicions. That is not surprising, given the traumatic experience of their expulsion from Palestine. Now that they have acted on their paranoia over these many years, their fears have been turned into reality. They have so alienated the Lebanese communities, even those that were most friendly to them, that their protection must now lie, in large part, on the conscience of the international community. That is the way of paranoia, to bring on eventually the things it most dreaded.

To communicate across the barriers of these suspicions and overcome the paranoia in the other communities, it is necessary to build a sense of acceptance of the cultures and the fundamental aspirations of the different Lebanese communities across the whole of Lebanese society. As much as any one community fears the others, it will not do for the Shia community to feel they are not accepted as true Lebanese by the Christians, for the Maronites or the Druze to feel under constant threat from their neighbors, for the Sunni, with their strong civic sense of providing stability in the society, to feel they are under perpetual observation as potential subversives. It is here that the internal tasks of building cohesion in Lebanese society coincide with external service tasks toward the Arab and Western worlds.

Another striking parallel to Northern Ireland occurs here, for in Northern Ireland too there is a problem of conflicting nationalisms, British and Irish. The pluralist solution there is to recognize that both nationalisms are legitimate, and to accomodate them both practically in the whole fabric of the society's life. In Lebanon, there is a conflict between a Western-oriented Lebanese nationalism and an Arab nationalism. There can be no prospect of internal peace or a return of Lebanese society to a functional state if either nationalism is frustrated or denied its proper outlet. Both need to be accomodated in a distinct State, with its special "genius," able to perform real services to both hinterlands. The "genius" in this case is the Lebanese talent and vocation for pluralism and freedom, evidenced in Fakhr-ed-Din II, evidenced in Michel Chiha and many others.

Lebanon has understood well how to perform a commercial service between the Arab and Western worlds as bank. There is more to it than that. Lebanon has spiritual and cultural services to perform toward both worlds as well.

The Maronites have believed they were communicating well to the West, and that they and their Lebanon were understood and appreciated in the Western world. A single instnce shows how mistaken that supposition is. When the Maronites hear horrified Western comment on the massacre in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, they are full of indignation. Why do the Westerners talk only of this massacre? Why don't they talk of Damour, of Zahleh, of Tripoli and Zgartah, of the countless massacres

and counter-massacres that have characterized the civil war? The answer is partly that the catalogue of massacres in unfamiliar places is too complicated for the Westerners to comprehend. But more seriously, the answer is that the Westerners are shocked by Sabra and Shatila not because of Lebanese involvement in it, but because of Israel's. The West has set much of its own moral stock in Israel, and has come to expect and require a standard of morality from Israel. It is consequently shocked at a striking instance of failure in moral responsibility on Israel's part. As for Lebanon and the Lebanese, the West knows little about them. Who are the Lebanese? For Westerners, they are strange people somewhere far off who are always having massacres, and are consequently beyond moral understanding or much moral concern on the Westerners' part. Their concern is only about a moral lapse by the Israelis. That is the measure of how successfully the Maronites have communicated any sense of Lebanon and its moral character to the West.

Better than this needs to be done. The Lebanese, all the Lebanese, need to communicate to the Western world, but not only on their own behalf, rather on behalf of the whole Arab world for which they are the bridge to the West. Lebanon's is the society that comprehends both. And for the Arab world, there is a spiritual and cultural service due from Lebanon as well. It consists in the deepening of its own pluralism, and the communication of it to the Arab world. The Arab world has its own paranoia toward the West, based firmly in bitter experience that began with the Crusades and culminated in the imperialist and neo-colonialist assaults by the West in modern times. The Arab world needs to gain confidence and security in its own assured place and dignity in the wider world, so that it can act comfortably as an equal in international society. And that is an assurance that Lebanon, from its own experience of pluralism and freedom, can mediate to the Arab world. A truly consequential attention to these external tasks will require of Lebanon that it keep its internal Western and Arab loyalties and aspirations in honor as well.

6. The current situation.

The Israeli invasion has, besides devastating the whole country up to Beirut, terminated the factional fighting that has gone on since 1975 and removed the Palestinians as an effective political or military force in Lebanon. The Maronites are left in charge of what there is to be in charge of in Lebanon, but under the terrible burden of both Syrian and Israeli occupation, and the pressures from both these occupying powers to do things that would compromise them and the Lebanese State beyond tolerable bounds. For all this pressure, the Maronites are in the position of having won so total a victory, with respect to other Lebanese groupings, that they face the grave dangers that every political force faces after too sweeping a victory, namely that, with no internal restraints on them, they will squander their victory and lose it all again. The Muslims, both Sunni and Shia, and the Druze, find themselves catastrophically stripped of power, and make some strong efforts, with great difficulty, to accomodate themselves to this turn of events with grace. The other Christian communities, always sensitive to the effect of anything done by Christians in Lebanon on fellow members of their own communities in other Arab countries, evidence great anxiety that the Maronites, in their current position of relative power (subject always to those occupying forces), will over-reach and bring down retribution

on all the Christians of the Middle East. These fears are likely overstated, as there are many very responsible voices among the Maronite establishment, people who are acutely aware of these dangers.

But however perceptive the present government of Lebanon may be, the occupying powers make it most excessively difficult to walk the narrow line that their circumstances call for. The Syrians, and the other Arab states as well, demand things of Lebanonthat would make it impossible to live next to the enormous military power of Israel, or come to any modus vivendi that would induce the Israelis to withdraw their occupying force. The Israelis demand things of Lebanon that would break its link with the Arab world and hence its economically essential role as banker to the Middle East.

The most basic needs are for a State, something strong enough to negotiate its way through these immense external pressures, and for a level of cohesion among the Lebanese that will enable that State to function in the critical period of negotiating its freedom from the occupying powers. The level of cohesion that would constitute a nation is simply out of reach at this stage. The ruling coalition is compromised, in the eyes of many of the citizens, by the degree to which it relied on Israeli assistance through the years of conflict since 1975. But the Lebanese are very forgiving at present. The Maronite community mourns its lost hero, the President-elect Bashir Gemayel who was assassinated in September 1982. The rest of Lebanese society had begun to place its hopes in him prior to the assassination, but it is even easier for them now to see a symbol of hope in his brother, the present President of the Republic, Amin Gemayel, whose face is seen looking out from posters on walls and in windows in all quarters, even most conspicuously in the Palestinian camps.

What can one say to the Maronites now, as they carry the weight of steering the State through this perilous time, under the hopeful but judicial gaze of their fellows in the other Lebanese communities? The Maronites have suffered terribly through the civil war, as have all the others too. They believe themselves the primary representatives of the Christian spirit in the midst of the heartland of Islam, in a land that they experience as hallowed by Jesus himself, who walked there, and by the earliest experiences of the Christian Church. One can only say to them now, in the most brotherly way and with all awareness of the agony they have been through and their present dangers: "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those who curse you, pray for those who abuse you.... If you love those who love you, what credit is that to you? For even sinners love those who love them. And if you do good to those who do good to you, what credit is that to you? For even sinners do the same. And if you lend to those from whom you hope to receive, what credit is that to you? Even sinners lend to sinners, to receive as much again. But love your enemies, and do good, and lend, expecting nothing in return, and your reward will be great, and you will be sons of the Most High; for he is kind to the ungrateful and the selfish. Be merciful, even as your Father is merciful." (Luke 6, 27f., 32-36)

This is a heavy text to invoke on the Maronites. It is done seriously by one who came among them as priest as well as fellow human being in search of their peace. These gospel texts that force us to the edge of paradox often become intelligible only when their teaching is most frightening, but when suddenly they make good secular sense, and point to the way of living meaningfully through our real problems, those that our really experienced life is about, rather than succumbing to them. For the Maronites, not only those in positions of power and responsibility but the whole community, there is no other way to break through the circle of recriminations and vengeance that threaten to overwhelm their society, and give to their whole society, not themselves only but all the Lebanese, the strength to overcome the many external threats that weigh on them. This is not advice against being strong, against establishing order, against insistent demand for justice. But it is advice to treat every part of the Lebanese society with trust.

It is a time for Maronite generosity. That is difficult for a winning force that feels itself dreadfully wounded by its recent experience. The President of the Republic, Amin Gemayel, appears to realize this need for generosity and for building a cohesive society, and it becomes more and more clear that he has in this the support of his powerful father, Shaikh Pierre Gemayel, who carries such importance in the Kataib Party. Other Lebanese have responded with a great readiness to place trust in the President and the government he has formed around him. The opportunity is there, even in so dark an hour for Lebanon as this, to build the society that Lebanon has so long wanted.

7. The utility of this interpretation.

Clearly this report, based on a month's consultation with a great number of persons in all the Lebanese communities, can claim nothing more than the value of an initiation into the troubles of Lebanon. RH has promised copies of what he writes to many persons in Lebanon, and looks forward to their criticism and corrective responses to even this first assessment. His reading of the Lebanese situation will have to go through the maturing that will follow from further discussion with Lebanese. To the extent that this method of analysis brings to light factors which, though well enough known to the participants, have not stood out in this particular sort of relief, it is hoped that this process of interpreting may be of some use to them as well.

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ANNEX TO THE REPORT ON VISIT TO LEBANON BY RAYMOND G. HELMICK, S.J.

A PROJECTED PROGRAM OF LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY.

April, 1983

One conclusion that kept impressing itself on RH through his January visit to Lebanon was that the anxieties felt in the various Lebanese confessional communities are very frequently expressed in terms of fears, in each of several communities, that the whole of Lebanese society will come to be dominated by another community through the medium of its traditional concept of law.

Each of the very different communities that together make up the complex pattern of Lebanese society has its distinctive culture. In each case, a tradition of law constitutes one important expression of that culture, deeply ingrained in the consciousness of the members of that community.

The Maronites, especially, have great anxiety about an eventual "Islamization" of Lebanon, by which the Islamic Law would be established and all other communities than the Muslims reduced to the status of protected peoples. On the basis of this anxiety, they tend to exclude from power not only Muslims but every group, even other Christians who, they fear, might compromise with the Muslims in this regard. The other Christian communities are less vocal about this fear, conscious as they are of their co-religionists in other Arab countries who could be jeopardized if they were seen to treat Muslim sensibilities insensitively, but they share the anxiety and their readiness to share their lives with the other Lebanese communities is affected by it.

For their part, the Muslims point out that other Arab States have constitutions that generally guarantee religious freedom and equality of citizenship, and profess their readiness to live in Lebanese society on a basis of equality.

What is proposed here is a program of legal anthropology through which Lebanese jurists might find the relation of their many traditions of law to the basic civil law that is the expression of the Lebanese plural society, with its native genius of equality.

The model for this proposed program is a program that has been conducted over many years in Sudan. The problem in Sudan was a simpler one. Sudan's civil law was basically British law, brought in during the colonial period and generally very serviceable to the country, but unrelated to the native traditions of law. The legal anthropology program there concerned itself, in one part, with the native traditions as they affected land tenure. The local traditions of law dealt in much less paper than does British law, and an obvious effect was that people tended to lose their title to land as a result of this disparity. The program engaged judges, who took leave of their bench to work with law students in the university, and lawyers who brought through the courts cases that

were designed to establish, through precedent, firmly grounded standing and a home for the native traditions of law in the corpus of Sudanese civil law. In this way, without disruption or discontinuity in the law, civil law in the Sudan was made to this extent Sudanese, and the disparate traditions of law brought into organic unity.

Law in Lebanon is basically the Code Napoleon, established in Lebanon, very usefully, during the French Mandate period, and modified by legislation since. There are, in addition, the Statutes Personelles for each of the confessional communities, which regulate matters of family law, basically marriage, divorce, and inheritance. These have no organic relation to the basic corpus of civil law, and this inorganic state of the law is a mirror of the fragility of Lebanese society.

The area that is of interest is the equality of citizenship, and the way each of the traditions, without losing its integrity, relates to this. It is certainly not proposed to upset the distinctions of the statutes personelles, which clearly work well. But there are three distinguishable levels of law in Lebanon whose interrelation should be sought:

1. There are the areas of law that are governed by uniform public statute.

2. There are the areas that are disparately governed by the statutes personelles of the different communities. This is the part of the different traditions of law that is conscious and public, like that part of an iceberg that is above the surface. The particular traditions of law that are so profoundly an expression of the culture of each of the communities are far more extensive than these areas of family law that are publicly acknowledged in the statutes personelles.

3. There are further areas of the particular traditions of law that are below the surface, without public effect in Lebanese law but with deep cultural effect in the communities.

What should be sought in a program of legal anthropology in Lebanon is that there should be a corpus of civil law in Lebanon, coherent but respectful of differences, admitting distinctions of law where necessary in the traditions of the various communities, allowing for appeal to the disparate traditions in such a way that they would acquire standing and a home in Lebanese law, and yet bringing all of these strands into an organic relation, such that the corpus of Lebanese law would be a true expression of Lebanese society in its unity and its pluralism.

The program would need to be related to more than one University in Lebanon, so that it could adequately reflect and be accessible to the different traditions of law. Very likely it should be based in a distinct institute, which would relate to the different universities, but that is something that would have to be designed by those who would participate in it.

The faculties of law that have charters in Lebanon at present are at the Université St. Joseph, which was the only one until 1963, and at the Lebanese University and the Arab University since that time. A fourth entity that is just about to receive its university charter and

which would be most important to this proposed program is the Maqassed, the basic educational enterprise of the Sunni Muslim community.

This proposition has been put before significant persons in the various confessional communities in Lebanon, and in particular before a number of law professors. The initial response has been cordial, and of course not much can be read from such a response until the proposal is drawn up in articulate form and the relevant persons are able to judge it from a written document. This annex is intended to give them such a written formulation of the proposal, of a very preliminary nature and one intended not to preclude their modification and development of the proposal to suit those needs they would see in the society.

Support for the program should be sought from each of the three major cultural areas that meet in Lebanon: the Arabic-speaking, French-speaking, and English-speaking. Each of their three traditions of law has importance in Lebanon, and the active assent of representative establishments in each would be requisite to the working of this program.

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Mars, 1983

RAPPORT DE LA VISITE AU LIBAN du Père Raymond G. Helmick, s.j.

La visite du Père Helmick a eu lieu du 28 décembre 1982 au 28 janvier 1983.

Les hostilités de l'été précédent avaient alors cessé, en grande partie, bien que des affrontements de caractère communitaire se soient poursuivis à Tripoli et au Chouf. Le déblai des ruines et le déminage étaient en cours dans la région de Beyrouth. Les premières réunions des pourparlers libano-israélo-américains avaient commencé.

La visite avait pour but de parvenir à une première évaluation du conflit interne au Liban, plus particulièrement des inquiètudes, des frustrations et des équivoques qu'il pouvait impliquer, ainsi que d'entamer un dialogue avec les différents parties en cause. A la suite de cette visite le Père estime être arrivé à une meilleure compréhension de la situation politico-sociale au Liban, compréhension qui devra s'approfondir au cours d'autres conversations avec des libanais. Le rapport n'est pas simplement destiné à être publié, comme s'il appartenait au Père de le faire à titre personnel, mais plutôt à évoluer selon un processus de discussion auquel participent les nombreux partenaires libanais. Le présent document est donc destiné à ceux avec lesquels le Père Helmick s'est entretenu, dans l'espoir qu'ils voudront bien lui apporter leurs commentaires et leurs critiques. Bien qu'à la suite de cette premièere visite il soit possible d'amorcer une certaine diffusion et une certaine discussion de ce rapport, -- à titre expérimental et de manière limitée, -- le Père préfère que ses destinataires aient au préalable fait connaître leurs réponses et qu'il ait eu l'occasion de s'entretenir avec eux lors de sa seconde visite.

Un résultat supplémentaire de la visite est la naissance d'un projet concret d'anthropologie juridique. Ce projet peut n'être, à ce stade, qu'un concept initial et réclamer encore une longue évolution jusqu'à apparaître comme réalisable en soi et souhaitable du point de vue des libanais, il a néanmoins été discuté comme étant possible avec nombre de personnes qualifiées et a reçu d'elles un premier accueil favorable.

Les Contacts.

Le Père Helmick a pu avoir des contacts intéressants, étant donné qu'il a séjourné à la Résidence St. Joseph à Beyrouth.

Rapport de la Visite au Liban -- 2

Les Jésuites de la Résidence, français et libanais d'origine, avec quelques américains qu'il connaissait déjà, étaient souvent des personnalités marquantes, et/ou apparentées à des dirigeants du pays, qui ont été à même de lui ménager des contacts. Le Père avait une lettre d'introduction du Cardinal Medeiros de Boston au Patriarche maronite le Cardinal Khoreiche, qui lui a accordé une longue et utile audience. Il avait de surcroît des introductions auprès de nombreuses autres personnes qui avaient rendu service aux membres de diverses organisations d'aide américaines (Oxfam, Comité international de secours etc.) pour les aider à comprendre le contexte politique. Ces contacts ou eux-mêmes été l'occasion d'entrer en rapport avec d'autres personnes des diverses communautés.

Le processus suivi consistait d'abord à s'entretenir avec un groupe d'intellectuels, pour la plupart professeurs à l'Université St. Joseph, à l'Université américaine de Beyrouth et à l'Université libanaise; observateurs réceptifs de la scène politique. Il s'agissait ensuite de rencontrer des personnes ayant contribué à façconner les positions idéologiques des différentes communautés et, enfin, celles qui avaient joué un rôle politique, voire militaire, dans le cadre de ces communautés. Le Conseiller politique de l'Ambassade des Etats-Unis ayant appris par M. Nicolas Veliotes que le Père serait de passage à Beyrouth, lui a accordé un intéressant entretien. Dès lors que le concept d'une anthropologie juridique s'était précisé dans son esprit, il entrepit de rencontrer des professeurs de droit et responsables des universités. Un autre stade de réunions, avec des reponsables des grandes familles, assumant un rôle dirigeant dans leurs communautés respectives, et avec le Président de la république, a été suggéré au cours de certains contacts, mais le Père Helmick a choisi de les laisser à un autre séjour, une fois que ces personnes auraient eu l'occasion de lire les résultats de la première visite et lorsque l'idée d'un programme d'anthropologie juridique aurait été quelque peu mûri et formulé par écrit, fut-ce sous forme d'ébauche.

Interprétation de la situation au Liban.

Cette première interprétation comprend les éléments suivants:

1. Le point de départ. Liban perçu comme entité.

Pour ceux qui sont acquis à l'idée du Liban, il faut comprendre d'abord la signification de la montagne libanaise du Mont-Liban, qui est peu compris en dehors du Liban lui-même. La montagne n'est, en fait, qu'une des régions interdépendantes du Liban géographique, la géographie ayant dans ce pays une influence particulière sur le caractère de la société.

Le Liban comporte une chaîne de montagne longtitudinale qui à été, au cours de l'histoire, un lieu de refuge pour les communautés opprimées, ainsi qu'une bande côtière méditerranéenne avec

ses cités portuaires. Ces deux régions ont une relation propre. Le refuge montagneux a toujours abrité une densité de population ayant besoin d'éxutoire. Les cités portuaires ont offert cet éxutoire sur le monde accessible, aux différentes époques, et présenté en tous temps un haut niveau d'activité commerciale ainsi qu'une supériorité technologique sur les pays voisins. En plus de ces deux régions il y a la plaine de la Békaa, le grenier du pays. Les tentatives faites au cours de l'histoire pour les séparer, ont toujours conduit à une régression et à des pressions démographiques intolérables dans la montagne, en même temps qu'à la fermeture de l'arrière pays pour les villes. Les cités du littoral créent au Liban une fonction de lieu commercial et culturel avec le Proche-Orient ainsi qu'au-delà avec le monde européen et d'une manière générale occidental, lui conferant essentiellement un rôle de service dans le région. Le caractère de refuge de la montagne a toujours entraîné la nécessité d'une société pluraliste, ceci étant dévenu un élément déterminant de ce que représente le Liban par rapport au reste de la région.

Il y a plus de dire de l'influence de la géographie sur le caractère de la société libanaise. Durant les 2.300 ans de son histoire le Liban a vécu en temps que partie d'une région plus vaste, la province classique de Syrie, dans laquelle se trouvaient incluses la Syrie actuelle et les régions de Palestine (actuellemen Israël) et de Jordanie. Cette configuration a toujours été maintenue pour tenir compte des convenances administratives d'empires plus vaste: d'Alexandre, des Séleucides, des Romains et des Byzantins, puis des califats omeyades, abassides et fatimites, enfin de l'Empire ottoman. Une seconde rangée de cités marchandes, s'étiran parallèlement du nord au sud en bordure du désert, vivaient, à une époque où la plus grande part du commerce régional s'effectuait par voie de terre, dans une situation d'interdépendance avec les cités côtières. Le territoir recouvert par l'actuelle Syrie partage avec le Liban, bien qu'à un degré moindre, la diversité religieuse et ethnique si particulière à ce pays. Il n'a cependant jamais eu la chance d'édifier la société ouverte et pluraliste vers laquelle le Liban a tendu et dont il s'est parfois rapproché.

Même au temps des empires successifs, le Liban s'est souvent efforcé de dégager suffisamment d'indépendance ou d'autonomie pour réaliser cette société pluraliste. Occasionnellement, durant les périodes de tension ethnique ou confessionnelle accrue, la Montagne, du fait de son caractère propre de refuge, devenait forteresse, séparée même de la Békaa et du littoral. Cet état a été reconnu par décision du pouvoir ottoman de 1842 à la fin de le première guerre mondiale. A la chute de l'Empire ottoman l'aspiration de la population musulmane, surtout, à établir un Etat indépendant sur l'ensemble de la Syrie classique au service du nationalisme pan arabe a été déçue du fait des ambitions impérialistes de la Grande-Bretagne et de la France. Les tensions qui ont abouti à la guerre civile et à la désastreuse fragilité interne du Liban trouvent leur origine dans les aspirations contraires d'un nationalisme libanais et d'un nationalisme pan syrien

ou pan arabe. Ce dernier a été encouragé par la déception de la fraction islamique, ou plus consciemment arabe, de la population devant les échecs de la société libanaise post-ottomane à tenir sa promesse de réaliser un véritable pluralisme et à se révéler utile à la région.

2. Pressions extérieures.

Comme on pouvait le prévoir, le Liban a été soumis, à ses moments de plus grande faiblesse intérieure, a des pressions extrêmes provoquées par des intérêts extérieurs. La question se pose naturellement de savoir lesquels, des troubles internes ou des pressions externes, sont responsables de la situation critique qui prévaut actuellement. La seule réponse est que le Liban vit dans une région de sociétés diverse elles-mêmes soumises à des très fortes pressions mais que sa vulnérabilité particulière ainsi que le fait qu'il soit victime des conflits des autres vient de sa propre faiblesse interne en tant que société. Cette société est d'une grande valeur intrinsèque, d'une grande valeur pour ses voisins, et elle mérite de survivre. Il est donc tout à fait souhaitable que la communauté internationale fasse tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour assurer la survie et le renforcement du Liban. Il n'y a, cependant, pas de sauvetage du Liban, il n'y a pas de chance pour le Liban de résister aux pressions exercées par ses voisins, si les libanais ne ressèrent pas la trame de leurs tissus socials.

Le Liban a été l'alibi des pays arabes face à leur incapacité à traiter du problème des palestiniens dépossédés. Ils ont attendu du Liban et même exigé de lui qu'il assume ce problème pour leur compte. Ils se sont déchargés sur lui de leur propre échec et installé les Palestiniens sur son sol sans tenir compte de sa capacité d'accueil et de son aptitude à dominer les problèmes posées par cette présence. De même le Liban a constitué pour Israël un alibi pour ne rien faire chez lui à propos des palestiniens. Israël a la prétention de régler le sort des palestiniens hors de ses frontières, les écrasant au Liban plutôt que de s'entendre avec eux sur son propre territoire. Ces pressions rendent d'autant plus difficile la solution du problème intérieur libanais et ce d'autant plus qu'elles prennent la forme d'occupations militaires caractérisées; syrienne et israélienne. Le Liban a besoin de séparer sa problématique interne de ces pressions extérieures. Ceci n'est néanmoins possible qu'autant que les libanais parviennent à un minimum de cohésion entre eux. La communauté internationale rendrait service à Israël et aux pays arabes, en même temps qu'au Liban, en contribuant à créer cette chance.

Il est important de comprendre que les pressions extérieures les plus fortes viennent des pays voisins du Liban, plutôt que des grandes puissances plus éloignées. Ceci n'est pas pour fournir à celles-ci des excuses ou pour les innocenter du conflit embrouillé du Moyen-Orient, mais les pressions des grandes puissances s'exercent sur les voisins du Liban plutôt que sur le Liban lui-même. Ce serait une tragique et supplémentaire injustice si les grandes puissances devaient maintenant profiter de la faiblesse du Liban pour l'utiliser comme un pion dans leur propre jeu. Ceci est moins vraisemblable, cependant, que la poursuite des pressions

des Etats voisins.

3. Entente intercommunitaire.

Le Liban a, officiellement, dix sept communautés confessionnelles reconnues, chacune se voyant attribuée une importance proportionnelle dans les fonctions élues ou nommés. La justice de la formule proprtionnelle et la validité de son maintien ont été contestées tout au long des huit années de guerre civile. Les réfugiés palestiniens constituent par eux-mêmes une communauté distincte comprenant plusieurs confessions religeuses, elle n'est pas comptée parmi les autres, les palestiniens n'ayant pas choisi de vivre au Liban. (D'autres groupes réfugiés à la suite d'événements graves dans la région sont en fait devenus tout à fait libanais tels: les arméniens, réfugiés à la suite des massacres de Turquie au début du siècle, la fort proportion de grecs-orthodoxes et de grecs-catholiques qui ont fui la province syrienne d'Antioche lorsque celle-ci a été remise à la Turquie par l'administration coloniale française, à la veille de la seconde guerre mondiale.) Alors que les diverses communautés de chrétiens orthodoxes et catholiques sont comptées séparément parmi les 17 minorités -- grecs, syriaques, arméniens et latins -- les quelques protestants de diverses confessions sont groupés ensemble. Il n'y a pas, non plus, de dénomination séparée pour les nombreuses sectes chiites. Dans le cadre de ce rapport on considèrera les quatre groupes ayant le plus d'influence dans l'Etat: les chrétiens maronites, les musulmans sunnites, les musulmans chiites et les druzes; les autres chétiens étant groupés ensemble et les palestiniens étant considérés comme une communauté distincte en elle-même.

Un observateur libanais attentif répartit les communautés confessionelles en groupements tribaux et non tribaux. Le critère retenu par lui est la paranoïa et il définit comme tribaux, en ce sens, les maronites, les chiites et les druzes. Les palestiniens venus au Liban sous la menace et y vivant sous pression constante ont constitué très vite aussi un tel groupement. Les autres communautés définies comme non tribales ont reçu le qualificatif de "civiques," parmi elles les sunnites et les grecs-orthodoxes ont une place de choix. Les évènements des dernières années, cependant, ont poussé, selon cet observateur, ces communautés vers la paranoïa et par consequent le modèle "tribal." Ces désignations de "tribales" et "civiques" ne comportent pas de sens péjoratif ou du jugement étant donné que les menaces contre leur existence ou leur intégrité culturelle étaient profondément ressenties par elles. Le Père Helmick a, étant donné l'intérêt qu'il porte aux anxiétés et aux ambivalences comme facteurs de développement des conflits, considèré cette distinction comme utile, et il éspère les traiter ci-après avec sympathie.

a) Les chrétiens maronites ont le sentiment accusés d'être les initiateurs et les véhicules du concept d'une société pluraliste, dans laquelle toutes les communautés ethniques et religeuses auraient un droit et un accès égal aux bienfaits de l'Etat. Ils expriment cela comme étant l'esprit de la Montagne, lieu de refuge traditionnel. Ayant conscience d'occuper actuel-

lement la première place dans l'Etat (bien que subissant tout le poids des occupations étrangères de leurs voisins) ils se sentent les dépositaires de l'esprit de la Montagne et ont tendance à considérer les autres communautés comme une menace éventuelle. Lorsque la Montagne a été séparée du littoral et de la Békaa à la fin de l'Empire ottoman, les maronites y représentaient une large majorité partageant le pouvoir avec une communauté druze de moindre importance numérique. Les maronites distinguent avec acuité les parties du Liban qui ressortent de ce petit Etat de la Montagne de celles qui n'en sont pas et ils ont tendance à se méfier tout particulièrement de ces dernières.

Les maronites se sentent surtout menacés par l'islamisation, la restructuration de leur société sous la domination syrienne ou tout autre domination musulmane qui imposerait la "Charia," ou loi islamique, en vertu de laquelle seuls les musulmans constituent la communauté de base (oumma), responsable de la société dans son ensemble. Les autres peuples, dimmis, littéralement ceux qui sont "en la conscience (dimma)" de la communauté islamique, jouissent dans la société de protection plutôt que de droits. Les maronites réalisent que la conscience islamique a été plus délicate, à travers l'histoire, que celle de bien d'autres peuples dominantes à l'égard de leurs "protégés." Ils refuse cependant un tel statut dans l'Etat. En se défendant contre ce péril eventuel, les maronites peuvent apparaître à d'autres communautés comme visant à instaurer leur propre hégémonie. Ils se défient des autre communautés chétiennes du Liban comme étant habitués à vivre dans le system "charia," et comme n'étant pas en mesure d'opposer une résistance valable à toute nouvelle tentative de l'imposer.

La communauté maronite a grandement contribué à l'éclosion d'une société libanaise moderne. C'est elle qui, aux 18ème et 19ème siècles, a fait éclater le moule de la société féodale, affranchissant d'abord la classe paysanne et la portant à un haut niveau de prospérité, donnant ensuite naissance dans la période post féodale à une classe commerçante qui détient maintenant les leviers de commande. Cette classe commerciale s'attire tout le préjugé d'opprobre qui s'attache à la "bourgeoisie," surtout dans une société comportant d'énormes différences sociales: les pauvres n'étant pas les maronites (dont la classe paysanne conserve sa prospérité) mais les musulmans, plus particulièrement les chiites du sud et de la Békaa, qui n'ont jamais participé de la libération sociale des régions maronites.

Les maronites ont, à travers leur histoire, recherché la protection de l'Occident chrétien: les byzantins, les croisés, voire les puissances coloniales, la France en particulier. Bien qu'essentiellement de la même appartenance ethnique que le reste des libanais ils se trouvent coupés des liens de la solidarité de leur compatriotes non maronites. A raison, les Maronites se sentent blessés par le refus de ceux-ci de reconnaître et d'accepter les valeurs occidentales qu'ils ont acquis au cours de leur histoire et qui représentent l'une des meillures chances de l'avenir de l'ensemble de la société de leur pays. (Il est curieux de con-

stater que les pays arabes avoisinants attachent aux valeurs occidentales représentées par les maronites et l'Etat libanais une importance beaucoup plus grande que les libanais qui se sentent étouffés par leurs concitoyens maronites.) L'occidentalisation des maronites est un fait et doit être accepté comme tel par les autres, mais c'est aux maronites eux-mêmes à savoir convaincre.

Il est d'usage pour les dirigeants maronites de prêcher aux autres communautées religieuses l'attachement au Liban, l'appartenance à la société libanaise et la loyauté à l'égard de ses structures. Le test de viabilité de la société libanaise réside dans l'aptitude des maronites eux-mêmes à être libanais et non seulement maronites; à être des membres de la société capables de faire confiance et de partager, à être respectueux du caractère arabe de leurs compatriotes, à être enfin des défensurs véritables de ce pluralisme qu'il est dans leur vocation de promouvoir.

b) Les autres communautés chrétiennes, grecs-orthodoxes et grecs-catholiques (melkites), syriaques-orthodoxes et syriaques-catholiques, arméniens-orthodoxes et arméniens-catholiques, ainsi que les quelques latins et protestants, sont moins nombreux que les maronites et sont, pour la plupart, habitués à vivre historiquement soumis dans des sociétés dominées par les musulmans. Ils apprécient la système pluraliste et la liberté relative dont ils jouissent au Liban et sont plus disposés que les maronites à voir dans la société créée dans ce pays un modèle de pluralisme offert aux autres pays arabes. Ils ne voudraient pas revenir à la "Charia" mais ils sont prêts à courber la tête dans une société islamique. Leurs communautés confessionelles se retrouvent nobreuses, contrairement aux maronites, dans les autres pays arabes et ils appréhendent vivement que les maronites n'aillent actuellement "trop loin," et ne provoquent des réactions de la nature à tout compromettre à leur encontre et à celle des autres chrétiens du Proche-Orient.

Ces communautés ont contribué de façon notable à l'éclosion de l'idéal libanais de société pluraliste et libre. Les grecs-orthodoxes, particulièrement, le plus nombreux de ces groupes, ont joué un rôle de premier plan dans la réfléxion tendant à l'établissement de cette société idéal. Le premier des "peres" de cet idéal libanais a été un latin, Michel Chiha. Les arméniens, une petite minorité, ont constitué une force politique des plus agissantes à Beyrouth où une proportion surprenante de petits commerces leur appartient.

Vers 1970, dans une contexte mondial d'oeucuménisme naissant parmi les chrétiens et un climat de sympathie pro-palestinienne au Moyen Orient, les libanais chrétiens ont entrepris ce qu'ils entendaient comme une croisade: construire, en étroite coopération avec les palestiniens, une société pluraliste au Liban pouvant servir de modèle à un Etat laîc aconfessionnel pour tout

la Palestine, qui pourrait remplacer l'Etat confessionnel juif d'Israël. Leur élan essentiellement généreux les a trahis. Il a jeté un voile de légitimité sur l'utilisation du Liban par les palestiniens aux fins d'incursions militaires en Israël. Ceci devait exposer du même coup leur propre peuple, surtout les chiites demunis du sud, aux représailles foudroyantes des israéliens. Ceci ignorait aussi le traumatisme particulier des juifs trop longtemps bouc-émissaires ou victimes dans les sociétés prétendüment pluralistes de l'Occident. Cette entreprise devait également détourner les libanais de la finalité civilatrice de cette société ouverte qu'ils aspiraient à édifier et qui devait rendre service à tout le Moyen Orient. Les maronites se sont défiés au départ de tout projet qui exposerait le Liban aux représailles militaires qu'il a subies depuis, cependant que cette idée de croisade creusait un fossé entre eux et les autres chrétiens. Ces chrétiens ont été troublés par l'échec, ils ont perdu le sens de l'orientation de la société libanaise, ils se trouvent dans un état d'anxiété dans lequel ils se voient cernés de dangers: du côté des maronites, des palestiniens, d'Israël, de l'Occident. Ils ont le sentiment de faire partie du monde arabe mais ils se sentent entourés de la rancoeur et de l'hostilité des communautés musulmanes et des pays arabes environnent.

c) Les druzes, comme les maronites, ont vécu en réfugiés dans la Montagne, dont le relief difficile les a protégés des musulmans qui les considèrent comme hérétiques. Au 17ème siècle, sous l'Emir Fakhreddine II, les druzes ont constitué un ensemble autonome beaucoup plus étendu que le Liban actuel, ils ont conçu et établi un Etat dans lequel étaient reconnue l'égalité des droits et des chances que les maronites considèrent comme étant l'esprit de la Montagne et leur invention propre. Les druzes se considèrent aussi comme les inventeurs de la Montagne au sens politique du terme et ressentent amèrement d'être privés d'égalité dans la société libanaise. Ils étaient certes une minorité (qui avait cependant longtemps gouverné le pays) même dans l'Etat restreint limité à la Montagne; ils sont encore aujourd'hui une minorité petite mais prospère et consciente de sa dignité et de son importance historique.

L'Etat pluraliste tant admiré que les druzes ont instauré au 17ème siècle était féodal. Ils sont sortis du féodalisme par d'autres moyens que les maronites. En temps que peuple de la montagne, leur paysans ont été partie prenante à l'affranchissement de la paysannerie maronite, tout en continuant à occuper un rang social supérieur en tant que société militaire d'élite. Les grandes familles féodales sont demeurées des facteurs déterminants dans la société druze, mais elles ont reconnu la nécessité de devoir leurs fonctions au mérite ou à la responsabilité exercée plutôt qu'a l'hérédité. Chez les Joumblatt en particulier, sous l'autorité de Kamal Joumblatt (assassiné en 1977), ce sens social s'est manifesté en distribuant les terres familiales, en épousant la cause des pauvres et des déshérités (musulmans pour la plupart, surtout chiites et bien entendu palestiniens) en tenant aussi un

rôle de premier plan dans la conduite de la guerre civile. Les druzes et les Joumblatt sentent aujourd'hui leur existence même menacée et l'une des poches de la rébellion se trouve au coeur du pays druze, dans le Chouf, au sud-est de Beyrouth. L'idéal social des Joumblatt demeure l'une des besoins majeures de la société libanaise. Mais les Joumblatts et la communauté druze ne peuvent cependant plus se faire entendre avec la même force.

d) Les musulmans chiites descendent de groupes qui ont toujours résisté au pouvoir centralisateur du Califat et d'autres empires dominant dans le région. La Syrie et le Liban ont été, en tant que régions tribales, des terrains de culture pour ces forces décentralisatrices en Islam. Actuellement les chiites vivant dans les régions du Liban sud qui ont été le théâtre des batailles sévères livrées, depuis 1970 surtout, entre palestiniens et israéliens, ainsi que dans les taudis de Beyrouth et de la Békaa, palestiniens mis à part, les gens les plus déshérités du Liban.

Le chef charismatique de ces chiites du début des années 70, l'Imam Moussa el Sadr, avait aussi gagné le coeur et l'estime d'autres communautés religeuses comme porte parole des "déshérités." Il avait, dans le cadre de ses activités, constitué une importante milice paramilitaire, Amal, ayant pour but non pas de s'attaquer à la société libanaise, mais de défendre les villages du sud contre les raids de représaille israéliens. Cette milice a bien entendu été impliquée, par la suite, dans la guerre civile. A la suite de cette guerre l'Imam, se rendant à Rome, via la Lybie, pour y rencontrer le pape Paul VI, a disparu dans des circonstances mystérieuses. Son mouvement socio-religieux représentait l'une des tentatives les plus sérieuses, à cette date, pour introduire les richesses spirituelles de l'Islam dans le débat des problèmes urgents de notre époque. Où que l'on se trouve dans les secteurs chiites de Beyrouth ou du Liban sud, on peut voir son portrait dans les vitrines, sur les murs ou suspendu au-dessus des rues. Son peuple se sent orphelin sans lui et son esprit demeure en eux comme une force importante.

Les chiites du Liban sud sont principalement des planteurs de tabac mais, contrairement oux planteurs de tabac d'autres pays, ils sont extrëmement pauvres. Ils sont aussi fermiers dans la plaine de la Békaa, mais la terre qu'ils cultivent appartient à un petit nombre de propriétaires. Le système de direction politique libanais a été pour les chiites un échec car leurs représentants élus ne représentaient pas leurs intérêts, leur Imam et ses partisans étant exclus de cette représentation. Ils sont, pour toutes ces raisons, une communauté désabusée. Ils sont largement privés des bienfaits de l'éducation et ceci se traduit par une faiblesse accrue de leur direction. Ils pourraient, s'ils participaient plus équitablement aux responsabilités de la société libanaise, être parmi les meilleurs promoteurs de son épanouissement et de sa pluralité.

e) Les musulmans sunnites éprouvent le sentiment de confiance en soi propre à un peuple jouissant de la culture dominante au Moyen-Orient. Ils sont habitués à gouverner, il leur est très difficile de s'adapter à une société pluraliste et plus encore de se retrouver en position de subordonnés.

Les sunnites constituent l'une des communautés les plus stables et les plus "civiques" du Liban, leur direction traditionnelle est représentative des valeurs supérieures propre à toutes les sociétés musulmanes ayant administré le pays, y compris l'Empire ottoman. Cette direction a en grande partie perdu le contrôle de sa communauté et de ses aspirations au context de la guerre civile. La participation à la guerre et la constitution de milices musulmanes ont eu lieu en dépit des dirigeants traditionnels plutôt que sous leur autorité et ils ont dû veiller à n'être pas oubliés et dépassés par elles. Maintenant que la guerre civile semble terminée et que les forces musulmanes sont désorientées face à l'intervention massive des israéliens, les chefs traditionnels exercent à nouveau, apparement, une fonction dirigeante compétente et qui a tendu patiemment à maintenir son équilibre et son influence. Sans cesser d'être sympathisants des palistiniens déshérités, ils affirment à nouveau leur appui à l'expérience pluraliste libanaise et laissent entendre officieusement qu'une grave erreur a été commise par leur communauté en s'alliant aux forces palestiniennes dans le but de reprendre une place plus éminente dans la société libanaise. Ils ont le sentiment d'avoir perdu et d'avoir maintenant à se situer à nouveau dans une société pluraliste.

La communauté sunnite libanaise a de bonnes raisons de chercher ainsi sa place. Elle est apte traditionellement à remplir une rôle dans la société qui soit pour elle le moyen de s'exprimer. Les sunnites savent qu'ils vivent au Liban et reconnaissent que l'Etat libanais durera longtemps encore. L'aspiration à se situer dans une société pluraliste est très répandue parmi les sunnites, au Liban et au delà. Des musulmans qui ont toujours vécu dans des sociétés où ils étaient en majorité vivent aujourd'hui en minoritaires, non seulement au Liban mais dans des sociétés occidentales telles que la Grande-Bretagne, avec son importante communauté pakistanaise (plus nombreuse que les méthodistes) et les Etats-Unis. Dans les pays musulmans du monde arabe il y a, généralement, une constitution qui reconnait la liberté de religion et l'égalité civique. Dans aucun autre pays que le Liban, cependant, les sunnites n'ont autant de raisons de découvrir leur relation avec une société pluraliste, en tant que communauté religieuse et dans la fidélité à leur foi. Dans aucun autre pays ils n'ont autant de motive et de richesse à en retirer. De faire cette découverte est oeuvre de théologien et rendra service à la communauté musulmane partout ailleurs.

f) Les réfugiés palestiniens au Liban, dont beaucoup vivent encore dans des camps, se sentent maintenant réduits à l'impuissance, depuis le départ de leurs responsables politiques et militaires. Ceux qui ont fait fortune et quitté leurs camps

au cours des ans sont maintenant exposés par des groupes occultes à une intimidation généralisée, même au meutre aveugle, et sont ainsi forcés à regagner des camps supeuplés. La seule protection qu'ils puissent attendre, dans les camps de la banlieue sud de Beyrouth, vient des contingents français et italiens de la Force multinationale. Les palestiniens se considèrent générallement dans une situation transitoire, même dans cette terre de refuge traditionnelle. Il se trouve maintenant aussi dans leur camps de nombreux libanais: réfugiés chiites des zones de guerre dans le Sud, et autres libanais pauvres, chrétiens et musulmans, tous exposés aux mêmes terribles dangers que les palestiniens eux-mêmes, à seule raison qu'ils vivent dans les camps. Plusieurs d'entre eux semblent avoir été victimes, avec les palestiniens, des bombardements et des destructions dans les camps autour de Tyr et de Saïda, ainsi que des massacres dans les camps de Beyrouth. Pour ceux qui vivent dans les secteurs de Tyr et de Saïda, sous l'occupation israélienne, il n'existe pas de protection équivalente à celle qui fournit la Force multinationale aux alentours de Beyrouth. Ils en sont réduits à ramper et à rechercher les bonnes grâces des forces israéliennes et du commandant Haddad, une dangereuse humiliation à subir.

Chaque fraction libanaise a été à une moment donné l'amie des palestiniens. Mais la direction palestinienne au Liban n'a pas été avisée. Elle a poursuivi une politique fantaisiste de reconquëte militaire en Israël au lieu de défendre sa cause par des moyens politiques et des recours juridiques. De nombreux libanais ont prétendu que les palestiniens avaient poussé au déclenchement de la guerre civile. Cette interprétation est contestable. Il reste, cependant, que les palestiniens persistaient a monter des opérations militaires contre Israël à partir du territoire libanais en même temps que les pays arabes contraignaient le Liban a accepter, en vertu des accords du Caire, de 1969, l'organisation des forces palestiniennes militaires autonomes. C'était plus que n'en pouvait supporter le système libanaise. La guerre civile était déclenchée dans ce contexte et les chefs palestiniens se laissaient entraîner, bien qu'avec réticence au début, dans l'entreprise de déstabilisation du pays.

Maintenant, au lendemain de la destruction de leurs cités, de la dévastation du sud de leur pays, de la mort, d'après du chiffres crédibles, de quelqus 20.000 civils libanais (sans compter les palestiniens), durant l'invasion de 1982, la plupart des communautés libanaises, dont celles qui étaient alliées aux palestiniens, sont hostiles à ceux-ci. Il est courant d'entendre parler de "détournement" par eux de l'Etat libanais (au sens d'un avion), bien que subsiste la sympathie pour leurs souffrances face à Israël. Certains parlent ouvertement d'inciter les palestiniens à émigrer vers d'autres pays en coupant leurs ressources et en les terrorisant.

Il est compréhensible que les libanais en tant qu'autorité ou collectivité éprouvent un ressentiment généralisé à l'égard des palestiniens. Ils ont, en tant qu'hôtes, les obligations et la responsabilité de protéger ces réfugiés, si longtemps turbulents voire destructives de l'ordre mais maintenant sans appui. Il faudra qu'un long processus de cicatrisation s'écoule avant que les libanais n'assument à nouveau leur rôle en tant qu'hôtes, ils ont suffisament de mal à étendre leur autorité sur une parcelle quelconque de leur pays. Le Liban a la certitude d'avoir plus fait, durant trente cinq dures années, pour les palestiniens, que n'importe quel autre pays arabe; il a aussi celle que son hospitalité et sa protection ont été abusées de manière flagrante. Ceci n'excuse en rien les brutalités exercées à l'encontre des réfugiés palestiniens mais laisse leur protection, au premier plan, à la charge de la communauté internationale jusqu'à ce qu'un rapprochement honnête ait pu s'instaurer entre les réfugiés et le Liban.

Les palestiniens sont un demi million et pourraient à nouveau devenir un agent de déstabilisation s'ils sont indéfiniment privés de moyens d'existence, d'éducation et de possibilités d'avenir. Ceci est peu compris au Liban. La réponse habituelle à toute suggestion que les palestiniens pourraient à nouveau représenter un danger pour la société libanaise est qu'ayant été battus ils ne constituent plus une menace. Ceci meconnait aussi l'intérêt propre du Liban. Brutaliser les gens pour les contraindre à la sujétion n'est pas une solution à long terme du problème posé par les réfugiés. Un demi million de personnes démunies ne peuvent être maintenues dans une servitude avilissante sans donner naissance à un nouvel ouragan.

4. Que reste-il de valable dans le système libanais?

Le Liban s'est considéré comme une idylle en soi, comme le pays aimable de la tolérance et comme un modèle de démocratie pour le monde entier. Il s'en est fallu de peu que la guerre ne détruise tout cela, celle-ci, en tous cas, fait ressortir la profondeur des lacunes du système libanais. C'est une intervention extérieure israélienne qui a mis fin à la guerre, non pas des facteurs intérieures qui ont conduit à sa conclusion positive. Les libanais, cependant, ont accepté avec beaucoup de ressort, que la fin des combats soit le signal de leur réconciliation et de la reconstruction de leur société. Il ne faut pas considérër pour autant que le temps de l'idylle soit revenu: il subsiste des excuses résiduelles et des rancoeurs qui menacent la reconstruction de la société et des défauts structurels auquels aucun remède n'a été trouvé.

L'une des réactions les plus courantes à l'agonie des huit dernières années est le rejet. Le Père Helmick, s'est entendu affirmer avec véhémence qu'il n'y avait pas eu guerre civile, que les huit années de destruction larvée avaient été imposées au Liban par des forces extérieures sans aucune racine

dans la société libanaise elle-même. C'est là une réponse familière propre à bien d'autres conflits. En Irlande du Nord, par example, il est courant d'entendre dans la bouche des Britanniques et des protestants autochthones que tous leurs malheurs étaient le fait d'une poignée d'individus violents et égarés, et qu'il ne se passerait plus rien s'ils pouvaient être éliminés. Il est non moins courant d'entendre des catholiques affirmer que tout le mal vient de la présence britannique et que la société d'Irlande du Nord se retrouverait en paix si cette présence cessait. C'est, par ailleurs, une manière de nier que les problèmes se posent entre voisins et doivent être résolus comme tels. Tout le monde au Liban est accoutumé depuis de nombreuses années à des assertions semblables avancées en Israël: qu'il s'agit "d'une terre sans peuple pour un peuple sans terre;" qu'il "n'y a pas de palestiniens;" qu'il y a "déjà un Etat palestinien qui est la Jordanie." Les libanais sont peut-être moins disposés à reconnaître le même syndrome de rejet lorsqu'ils entendent des palestiniens et d'autres arabes qu'il n'y a pas d'israéliens, ou qu'Israël n'est pas une réalité dont ils auront un jour à tenir compte. La simple assertion, au Liban, qu'il n'y a pas eu de guerre civile est aussi trompeuse que toutes celles énumérées plus haut.

Il y a une remarque à faire à propos de la rédaction de ce rapport. Le Père Helmick est revenu de son sejour d'un mois au Liban durant lequel il a écouté avec attention des personnes appartenant à toutes les communautés avec un sentiment d'optimisme dans le peuple libanais et dans les moyens dont il dispose pour reconstruire leur pays devasté. Il a rédigé un projet de rapport au début de février, aussitôt rentré, qui reflétait cet optimisme. Il avait aussi, au Liban, acheté chaque ouvrage susceptible de l'éclairer sur la situation et bien d'autres après son retour. C'est après avoir rédigé ce premier texte qu'il s'est mis à lire ces livres, dont beaucoup avaient été écrits au début de la guerre civile et reflétaient les tensions qui ont donné naissance à celle-ci. Il s'est alors trouvé acculé à classer ses nouvelles connaissances en "d'une part" et "d'autre part" et il lui a fallu tout ce temps avant de pouvoir apporter une certaine cohésion dans cette masse de données et en tirer quelques conclusions.

La conclusion essentielle est en rapport avec la question: de quoi dispose-t-on pour travailler auLiban?

La guerre civile a été le creuset dans lequel le concept même du Liban a été contesté par deux nationalismes concurrents: le nationalisme syrien et le nationalisme pan arabe. Ce dernier n'est pas tant de nature territoriale que spirituelle et consistait en une opinion faisant passer les intérêts de la nation arabe avant les intérêts locaux du Liban. Ceci supposait que le Liban soutienne les palestiniens quelque soit le risque qui s'ensuivrait pour lui-même. Cela entraînait également le grief que le Liban, organisé sous l'influence prédominante des maronites,

ne tienne pas suffisament compte des sentiments d'identité et de solidarité arabe propres à une grande partie de sa population et de son héritage. Le nationalisme syrien était plus territorial dans son orientation, -- un retour à ce qui avait semblé possible ou souhaitable lors du démembrement de l'Empire ottoman, plutôt qu'un but géopolitiquement accessible dans le présent. Comme tout un chacun accusé de viser au partage du Liban, les nationallistes syriens ont tôt fait de proclammer qu'ils étaient opposés au partage et qu'ils combattaient pour le prévenir; or, ils rejetaient, en même temps que les nationalistes arabes, les priorités du Liban dans lequel ils vivaient. Ils considéraient comme un vulgaire alibi pour un régime social oppresif l'importance donnée à l'équilibre confessionnel et souhaitaient abolir les institutions existantes au profit d'un Etat plus centralisé et plus représentatif de leurs propres priorités. La Syrie n'apparaissait pas tant comme le lieu souhaité d'une fusion territoriale que comme celui dont, sentimentalement, ils n'auraient pas à se sentir séparés.

Actuellement, après huit années de guerre intérieure, il n'existe plus dans la société libanais de contestataires sérieuses du concept même du Liban. It ne peut s'intituler nationalisme sauf pour les maronites et quelques autres car il ne peut trouver cet écho dans les autres communautés. Il y a, cependant, un consensus que les problèmes d'ordre territorial du Liban doivent être traités en premier et que le peuple libanais, dans ses composantes, doit trouver un terrain d'entente en utilisant les moyens institutionnels existants. Ils ne sont pas opposés à amander ceux-ci et à redéfinir les priorités sociales et politiques en fonction des besoins nouveaux tels qu'ils peuvent apparaître. Le retour aux temps passés, de triste mémoire, est en fait l'un des spectres contre lequel les uns et les autres s'adressent des mises en garde. Mais le concept du Liban émerge seul après l'échec de ceux qui l'ont combattu.

Ce concept est par essence celui d'une société pluraliste. Le pluralisme n'est pas, fondamentalement, l'égalité ou l'équilibre des religions, chacune avec ses droits proportionnels, mais une égalité civique, comportant le respect entier de l'identité culturelle de tous. Le Pacte national conclu en 1943 entre les communautés religieuses a en fait toujours été considéré comme un moyen d'atteindre ce but et dont la nécessité s'estomperait progressivement. Son utilité et sa nécessité persistent, mais le partage communitaire du pouvoir pratiqué comme fin plutôt que comme moyen a constitué un handicap pour la service même du système libanais.

Parmi les instruments dont le Liban dispose pour réaliser son admirable idéal social, ces trois sont essentiels: sa tradition parlementaire, la pensée humaine de Michel Chiha, et la conscience sociale dont les plus éloquents porte-paroles ont été Kamal Joumblatt et Moussa el Sadr. Ceux-ci ne sont pas le bien commun de tous les libanais, vu que chacun des adversaires a opéré parmi eux un choix et qu'ils ont constitué pour leurs partisans une banière de ralliement. Ces trois instruments doivent être appréciés et admis par toutes les communautés si les richesses de la tradition libanaise doivent être mises au service de la

reconstruction de la société.

a) La tradition parlementaire. Cette tradition a été remarquablement féconde au Liban. Ce n'est pas un apport de la période coloniale mais une institution proprement libanaise grâce à laquelle les libanais se sont libérés de l'Empire ottoman et du mandat français, ont accompli un ensemble de réformes qui ont rendu en 1920 la création du Grand Liban attirante pour les populations du Nord et du Sud du Liban, de la Békaa et des cités côtières. Cette tradition leur a permis en même temps d'élaborer une constitution qui leur soit propre et de jeter les bases du système libanais de consensus politique. Cette institution a précédé le système d'équilibre confessionnel, elle n'en est nullement dépendante.

Plus récemment, le Parlement a été gagné par un immobilisme qui a entravé le développement politique et social. C'est du fait de cet immobilisme que tout le système libanais a été attaqué comme instrument du maintien des vieilles injustices socio-économiques. La construction même de routes, d'écoles et d'hôpitaux, ainsi que les réformes de la Présidence du Général Fouad Chéhab ont été réalisées en court circuitant les institutions plutôt qu'en les englobant et en passant par elles. Il est temps de cesser d'utiliser le système parlementaire aux fins d'obstruction et d'utiliser cette institution proprement libanaise comme un instrument propre à réaliser les finalités du Liban.

b) Michel Chiha. 29 ans après sa mort il n'est pas d'écrit plus aptes à éclairer le caractère et les potentialités du Liban que ceux de Michel Chiha qui a, sagement, essayé de prévenir la catastrophe à laquelle nous avons assité. Il faut se souvenir que Chiha a décrit une dynamique de l'évolution de la société libanaise plus qu'il n'en a dressé le tableau statique. Il est devenu évident, devant les désillusions qui ont provoqué la guerre civile, que la société idéale décrite par lui n'existait tout simplement pas et n'avait jamais existé. Le système de consensus qu'il avait préconisé pour le Liban a été détourné pour défendre l'immobilisme d'intérêts égoïstes et, des lors que le consensus n'a plus été possible, les armes sont apparues comme le seul recours. Il est facile, en conséquence, de considérer le Liban, dans lequel Michel Chiha a espéré, comme une expérience malheureuse. A relire sa pensée, cependant, on entrevoit plutôt les occasions manquées et qui subsistent, néanmoins, car l'observation qu'il avait faite des réalités libanais était exacte. Ses écrits ne doivent pas être pris comme un point fixe par rapport au développement de la société libanaise mais comme le point de départ d'une pensée nouvelle.

c) Conscience sociale. Le fait qu'un remède aux inégalités sociales ait été ressenti comme une urgence par l'une des partis au conflit, surtout, à eu l'effet regrettable d'en faire une cause partisane. De telles idées n'ont pas été étran-

gères à la pensée de chrétiens, dans les rangs des Kataebs par example, mais les chrétiens ont mieux vécu, grâce à leur évolution sociale du 19ème siècle, lorsque le petit Mont-Liban était séparé des autres régions. Ce sont les populations musulmanes, sunnites et chiites, qui ont supporté le poids de la pauvreté présente au Liban, et leurs principaux porte-paroles ont été Moussa el Sadr et Kamal Joumblatt. Leurs voix représentent un trésor pour le Liban et devraient être honorées dans toute la société libanaise.

Il faut noter que pour s'acquiter de son rôle de banquier du Monde arabe, ce qui est l'une de ses principales fonctions, le Liban a besoin d'une économie particulièrement libre. Certains ont, au cours des affrontements rhétoriques des années de guerre, qualifié ce rôle d'exploitation du monde arabe. Ce n'est pas ainsi, cependant, que l'ont jugé les pays arabes qui se servent du Liban comme canal commercial. Ils ont apprécié et soutenu le Liban en tant que banquier de leur région.

Néanmoins, ce n'est pas par suite du système de libre entreprise que les planteurs de tabac soient, comme c'est le cas dans le sud du pays, réduits à la misère. C'est le résultat d'une exploitation et de manipulations commerciales flagrantes. Ce n'est pas, non plus, un effet de l'économie du marché que la terre dans la Békaa se trouve concentrée entre les mains d'une poignée de propriétaires.

Des réformes économiques radicales et des nationalisations porteraient, incontestablement, tort à l'économie libanaise, mais ceci n'exclut pas une distribution plus équitable et le contrôle d'abus caractérisés. Il y a, cependant, un autre moyen de faire participer les masses démunies de ces régions aux bienfaits de la société libanaise, c'est l'éducation. Ces régions en ont, également, été privées, avec pour conséquence un analphabétisme repandu et un accès limité à l'instruction secondaire et universitaire. Peu nombreux, parmi les éléments qui ont pu parvenir jusqu'aux universités, qui sont toutes à Beyrouth, ceux qui ont été inclins à retourner à leurs pauvres régions. L'éducation peut, certes, servir d'instrument de contrôle social pour orienter les jeunes vers l'acceptation sociale de leur rôle sualterne. Mais elle peut aussi être utilisée pour les rendre à même d'accéder à la justice sociale. Il est à la portée du gouvernement de promouvoir un programme d'éducation au profit de toutes ces régions. Ceci, accompagné de programmes sérieux de développement économique régional, permettrait de mieux faire participer ces régions et leurs populations à la prospérité du Liban, sans, pour autant, faire l'expérience de réformes économiques radicales et superflues.

5. Actions de cohésion sociale.

La société libanaise est située à un carrefour de cultures: le monde arabe dont le peuple libanais est issu et le monde occidental dont il est la porte pour les pays arabes. Il ne peut vivre séparé de l'un ou de l'autre. Il a le devoir d'assurer aux siens un foyer et des chances convenables au sein de leur société, ainsi que d'apaiser leurs anxiétés. Il a, aussi, des devoirs

extérieures au service de ces deux mondes culturels, qui fort heureusement se rejoignent.

Cette partie du monde est particulièrement réfractaire à l'imposition d'un ordre extérieur. Il est bon de se souvenir qu'après une emprise de près de mille ans d'un ordre gréco-romano-byzantin, hautement civilisé et prospère, sur l'ancienne province de Syrie (grande Syrie), les forces tribales étaient encore si vivantes et si peu intégrées que tout le placage urbain impérial a été aussitôt balayé au contact des tribus de la conquête musulmane. Lorsque le Califat ommeyade du 1er siècle de l'Islam a tenté de restaurer cet ordre urbain à son profit, ces forces ont entraîné sa chute. D'autres tentatives des califats, abbaside à Bagdad et fatimide en Egypte, pour reconstruire un ordre islamique urbain et unifié ont buté sur la résistance des populations autochthones. En conclusion, ces entreprises successives en vue de l'établissement d'un ordre stable ont toutes échoué pour n'avoir pu intégrer les cultures et forces locales et avoir, par contre, tenté d'imposer un système artificiel. Les peuples locaux doivent être respectés et leur expérience historique les laisse fort sceptiques de toute nouvelle tentative extérieure. La mémoire populaire sait que plusieurs empires ont échoué dans le passé.

Nous avons plus haut évoqué la paranoïa comme susceptible de transformer une société civique moderne en tribu. Ce n'est pas évidemment la seule définition de la tribu, qui est un terme honorable. Mais il est bon de la mentionner comme devant être "exorcisée" si les communautés libanaises doivent vivre ensemble dans une société cohérente, sans craindre de perdre leur identité culturelle. La paranoïa est une peur basée sur une interprétation erronée des intentions d'autrui. La communication intercommunitaire est aujourd'hui difficile au Liban et de telles incompréhensions sont courantes.

Les libanais se traitent couramment de noms désobligeants. L'un de ces noms est celui "d'isolationistes" appliqué aux maronites au début de la guerre civile. Il visait leur tendance à nier le caractère arabe du Liban ainsi que ses liens avec le monde arabe et ses aspirations. Mais le terme d'isolationiste a aussi été utilisé, à leur encontre, dans le sens de partisans du partage, de la sécession de leur ancien point d'appui de la Montagne du reste du Liban, conservant la zone portuaire de Beyrouth-est et abandonnant les autres régions du pays aux appetits syriens et israéliens. Les maronites nient, évidemment, avoir jamais projeté un tel partage. Le Père Helmick a attentitivement écouté leurs dénégations, pour observer, plus particulièrement, s'il n'y avait rien d'excessif dans leurs protestations, ou une indication qu'ils avaient quelque chose à cacher. Il est convaincu qu'ils n'ont jamais envisagé un partage et que toute l'accusation relève donc de la paranoïa. C'est ce genre de soupçons qui a conduit à l'effondrement des structures sociales et à la guerre civile.

La crainte maronite de l'islamisation et de la soumission à la "Charia" est un autre exemple de paranoïa. Cette crainte est amplement fondée sur des précedents historiques; le développement de cette tendance en Egypte, où se trouve une grande communauté copte, ne peut qu'alimenter leur sentiment. La communauté musulmane libanaise est embarassée et étonnée de cette suspicion mais elle n'a pas trouvé le moyen de convaincre les maronites de leur volonté de contribuer sur une base d'égalité et sans arrière pensées à l'édification de la société libanaise. Ils sont polarisés sur la menace d'une domination maronite et ne perçoivent même pas l'apaisement des craintes maronites comme une priorité.

Les musulmans chiites considèrent leur communauté comme partiulièrement défavorisée et craignent d'être voués, par les autres libanais, à être définitivement une catégorie subalterne de citoyens. Lorsqu'ils se sentent soupçonnés d'être potentiellement des agents subversifs de l'ordre libanais (ne fût-ce qu'en tant que classe défavorisée tendant à sortir de sa pauvreté), alors que beaucoup d'entre eux de la région du Hermel se voient refusés des cartes d'identié libanaises, leurs craintes se transforment en paranoïa, et en désillusion profond. Nombreux sont ceux, dans le Békaa qui, en conséquence, recherchent la protection syrienne bien que, dans le sud, leurs corréligionaires se tournent vers le Liban pour les protéger contre les incursions d'Israël.

Les palestiniens offrent le cas le plus grave. Même lorsque le Liban agissait avec eux comme un hôte exceptionnellement généreux ils étaient remplis de craintes et de suspicions. Ceci n'a rien de surprenant vu l'expérience traumatisante de leur expulsion de Palestine. Maintenant qu'ils se sont laissés guidés par leur paranoïa durant plusieurs années leurs craintes sont devenues réalité. Ils se sont tellement aliénés les autres communautés libanaises, même celles qui étaient les mieux disposées à leur égard, qu'ils doivent mainenant se réclamer de la conscience internationale. C'est là le fait de la paranoïa que d'attirer sur soi ce qu'on a le plus redouté.

Pour traverser ces barrières de suspicion et surmonter la paranoïa des autres communautés il est nécessaire de faire accepter par chaque communauté la culture et les aspirations fondamentales des autres. Le degré de crainte inspiré par une communauté à l'autre ne devrait pas conduire les chiites à sentir cu'ils ne sont pas reconnus par les chrétiens comme de vrais libanais; les maronites ou les druzes, qu'ils sont exposés à la constante menace de leurs voisins; les sunnites, avec leurs sens civique aigu de contribuer à la stabilité de la société, à se sentir constamment épiés comme de possibles agents subversifs. C'est là que la tâche intérieure d'établir la cohésion de la société libanaise rejoint le service extérieure à rendre aux mondes arabe et occidental.

Il existe un autre rapprochement frappant avec l'Irlande du Nord où s'affrontent aussi deux nationalismes, le britannique et l'irlandais. La solution pluraliste, dans ce cas, consiste

à reconnaître les deux comme légitime et de leur assurer, en pratique, une place dans le contexte social existant. Au Liban il y a un conflit entre un nationalisme libanais tourné vers l'Occident et un nationalisme arabe. On ne peut envisager de paix intérieure ou de possibilité pour les rouages de la société libanaise de fonctionner normalement si l'un de ces nationalismes se sent frustré ou se voit refuser son débouché. L'un et l'autre doivent trouver leur place dans un Etat original avec son "génie" propre et capable d'être utile à l'un et l'autre hinterland. Le "génie", en l'occurence c'est le don et la vocation du pays pour ce qui est du pluralisme et de la liberté, démontrés par Fakhreddine II, par Michel Chiha et bien d'autres.

Le Liban a su concevoir son rôle de banquier entre le monde arabe et l'Occident. Il a plus, cependant, à accomplir. Il se doit aussi d'assurer une fonction de service culturel et spirituel par rapport à ces deux mondes.

Les maronites pensaient communiquer avec l'Ouest de manière satisfaisante, ils pensaient aussi être compris et apprécié dans le monde occidental. Une seule circonstance montre à quel point ils se trompaient. Ils sont indignés d'entendre les commentaires occidentaux relatifs au massacre dans les camps de réfugiés de Sabra et de Chatila. Pourquoi ignorent-ils Damour, Zahleh, Tripoli et Zghorta ou les innombrables massacres et contre massacres qui ont marqué la guerre civile? La réponse en est en partie que la liste des massacres en des lieux peu familiers ne permet pas aux occidentaux de les assimiler. Elle réside, cependant, davantage dans le fait qu'ils sont davantage choqués de l'implication des israéliens que de celle des libanais. L'Occident attribue largement à Israël ses propres valeurs et attend donc d'Israël un comportement répondant à ses critères. Il est, par suite, traumatisé par le manquement flagrant d'Israël à ses responsabilités morales. Pour ce qui est du Liban et des libanais, l'Occident les connait mal. Qui sont les libanais? Pour les occidentaux il s'agit d'un peuple singulier, lointain, chez lequel ont toujours lieu des massacres, difficile à comprendre moralement et se situant, par conséquent, en dehors de ses préoccupations propres. Les occidentaux ne sont interressés que par la défaillance morale des israéliens. Ceci donne la mesure de l'échec des maronites à communiquer à l'Occident une idée valable du Liban et de sa valeur morale.

Il y a donc mieux à faire. Les libanais, tous les libanais, doivent communiquer avec l'Occident, non seulement pour leur propre compte mais pour celui de tout le monde arabe dont ils sont le pont jeté vers l'Ouest. La société libanaise renferme ces deux mondes et le monde arabe attend d'elle un service culturel et spirituel qui consiste à approfondir son propre pluralisme et à le transmettre au monde arabe. Celui-ci souffre de sa propre paranoïa à l'égard de l'Occident, ancrée dans l'expérience amère entamée du temps des croisés et couronnée par les agressions impérialistes et néo colonialistes occidentales de notre temps. Le monde arabe a besoin de se sentir assuré de sa

dignité et de sa place dans le monde, de manière à pouvoir jouer aisément son rôle dans la communauté internationale. Ceci est une garantie que le Liban peut, à partir de sa propre expérience dans le domaine du pluralisme et de la liberté, jouer un rôle de médiateur. D'assumer ses fonctions extérieurës suppose en conséquence que le Liban maintient également au plan interne ses orientations et aspirations arabes et occidentales.

6. La situation présente.

L'invasion israélienne, en dehors du fait qu'elle a dévasté tout le pays jusqu'à Beyrouth, a mis fin aux combats qui se déroulaient entre fractions diverses, depuis 1975, tout en éliminant les palestiniens en tant que force politique et militaire effective au Liban. Les maronites ont, certes la responsabilité de ce qui reste à prendre en charge au Liban mais ceci sous le redoutable fardeau de la double occupation syrienne et israélienne, ainsi que sous les pressions de ces deux occupants d'accepter des mesures qui compromettraient l'Etat libanais et eux-mêmes au-delà de ce qui serait supportable. Malgré ces réserves les maronites jouissent d'une telle victoire, par rapport aux autres composantes libanaises, qu'ils courent le risque de toute force politique ne rencontrant pas d'opposition, celui de la gaspiller et de tout reperdre. Les musulmans, sunnites et chiites, ainsi que les druzes se trouvent, catastrophiquement, dépouillés de pouvoir. Ils font des efforts méritoires et laborieux pour s'accomoder, de bonne grâce, de cette situation nouvelle. Les autres communautés chrétiennes, toujours sensible aux répercussions possibles, sur leur corréligionaires d'autre pays arabes, des actes des chrétiens au Liban, sont fort inquiets que les maronites, forts de leur position de force relative (voire sous le fardeau des occupations), ne commetent des excès et ne provoquent une réaction à l'encontre de tous les chrétiens du Moyen-Orient. Ces craintes sont, sans doute, exagérées car nombreux sont les dirigeants maronites qui sont sensibles à ces dangers.

Aussi conscient, cependant, que soit l'actuel gouvernement libanais de ces difficultés, les puissances occupantes lui rendent particulièrement difficile de suivre la voie étroite que lui commandent les circonstances. Les syriens et les autres pays arabes exigent du Liban ce qui rendrait son existence impossible à coté de l'énorme appareil militaire israélien, impossible aussi le modus vivendi pouvant inciter ceux-ci au retrait de leur troupes. Les israéliens, pour leur part, exigent du Liban ce qui entrainerait la rupture de ses liens avec le monde arabe et compromettait, par suite, son rôle capital de banquier du Moyen-Orient.

Le premier besoin réside dans un Etat suffisament fort pour négocier au milieu de ces pressions extérieures accablantes. Ceci suppose aussi entre libanais un degré de cohésion suffisant pour permettre à l'Etat d'agir, durant dette période critique, en vue de la libération de son territoire des forces occupantes. Le degré de cohésion correspondant à l'existence d'une nation est, actuellement, impossible à atteindre. La formation politique au pouvoir est compromise, aux yeux de beaucoup de citoyens, du fait de l'appui reçu d'Israël, depuis 1975, durant les années de conflit.

Néanmoins les libanais sont, en ce moment, disposés à pardonner. La communauté maronite porte le deuil de son héros, le Président élu, Bashir Gemayel, assassiné en septembre 1982. Les autres communautés libanaises avaient commencé à croire en lui dès avant son assassinat; il leur est plus facile encore de trouver en son frère, l'actuel président Amine Gemayel, un symbole d'espoir, lui dont les portraits figurent sur tous les murs, dans les vitrines de tous les quartiers et jusque dans les camps palestiniens.

Que peut-on conseiller aux maronites en ces temps périleux où ils ont la charge de l'Etat sous les regards confiants mais attentifs des autres communautés? Certes, ils ont terriblement souffert durant la guerre civile, tout comme les autres communautés. Ils se considèrent comme les premiers représentants de l'esprit chrétien au coeur de l'Islam, sur une terre qu'ils savent marquée par les pas mêmes de Jésus et par les premiers temps de l'Eglise. On ne peut que leur dire le plus fraternellement et sans oublier leurs épreuves passées et les dangers actuels: "Aimez vos ennemis, faites du bien à ceux que vous haïssent, bénissez ceux qui vous maudissent, priez pour ceux qui vous maltraitent.... Que si vous aimez ceux qui vous aiment, quel gré vous en saura-t-on? Car même les pécheurs aiment ceux qui les aiment. Et si vous faites du bien à ceux qui vous en font, quel gré vous en saura-t-on? Même les pécheurs en font autant. Et si vous prêtez à ceux dont vous espérez recevoir, quel gré vous en saura-t-on? Même les pécheurs prêtent à des pécheurs pour en recevoir l'équivalent. Au contraire, aimez vos ennemis, faites du bien et prêtez sans rien attendre en retour. Votre récompense alors sera grande, et vous serez les fils du Très Haut, car il est bon, Lui, pour les ingrates et les méchants. Montrez-vous miséricordieux, comme votre Père est miséricordieux." (Luc 6. 27s., 32-36.)

Il est dur d'invoquer ce text auprès des maronites. Mais c'est un prêtre, autant qu'un homme venu à la recherche d'un paix, qui le suggère. Ces textes de l'Evangile qui nous portent aux limites du paradoxe ne deviennent intelligibles, souvent, qu'au moment où leur enseignement nous effraie le plus et lorsque, brusquement, ils prennent un sens temporel. Ils nous indiquent alors la voie au milieu de nos vrais problèmes, ceux qui concern notre existence, plutôt que de nous laisser dominer par eux. Les maronites, dirigeants et communauté, n'ont pas d'autre moyen, d'une part de sortir du cycle des récriminations et de la vengeance qui menace d'engloutir leur société, d'autre part de donner à celle-ci, à tous les libanais, la force de surmonter les nombreuses menaces extérieures qui pèsent sur eux. Ceci n'est pas un conseil de faiblesse contredisant le rétablissement de l'ordre ou celui d'une justice ardemment réclamée. C'est un conseil de traiter chaque fraction de la société avec confiance.

C'est pour les maronites le temps de la générosité. Ceci est difficile à mettre en pratique pour une force victorieuse

mais profondément meurtrie par ses épreuves récentes. Le Président de la République, Amine Gemayel, semble comprendre la nécessité de cette générosité et celle de construire une société cohérente. Il est clair aussi qu'il dispose, pour ce faire, de l'appui influent de son père, Cheikh Pierre Gemayel, qui exerce une si grande influence dans le parti Kataëb. D'autres libanais ont répondu volontiers à l'appel du Président et de son gouvernement. Si sombres soient les heures présentes, c'est là que reside la chance du Liban de construire la société à laquelle il aspire.

7. Utilité de cette interprétation.

Ce rapport, basé sur un mois de consultations avec un grand nombre de personnes appartenant à toutes les communautés libanaises, ne peut à l'évidence, être autre chose qu'une initiation à l'étude des troubles du Liban. Le Père Helmick a promis des copies de ce qu'il écrirait à beaucoup de personnes dont il attend des réponses critiques et correctives à cette première ébauche. Son interprétation de la situation au Liban devra être mûrie à la lumière de discussions à venir. Il espère, enfin, que la méthode utilisée sera de quelqu' utilité à un lecteur qui est, sans doute, au courant des facteurs composant cette étude mais qui les voit présentées ici avec un relief particulier.

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ANNEXE AU RAPPORT DE LA VISITE AU LIBAN DU PERE RAYMOND G. HELMICK, S.J.: PROJET D'ANTHROPOLOGIE JURIDIQUE.

April, 1983

L'une des conclusions qui s'est imposés au Père Helmick durant sa visite du mois de janvier au Liban, a été que les anxiétés ressentiés par les diverses communautés libanaises se manifestent souvent sous forme de crainte que la société dans son ensemble ne finitra par se voir imposer le concept juridique traditionnel de l'une d'entre elles.

En effet, chacune des communautés, très différentes l'une de l'autre, qui forment le tissu complexe de la société libanaise possède sa culture propre. A chacue correspond une tradition juridique qui exprime l'une des aspects majeurs de cette culture, profondement enracinée dans la conscience de ses membres.

Les maronites, plus spécialement, éprouvent la hantise d'une "islamisation" possible du Liban entrainant l'instauration d'unordre juridique islamique à l'intérieur duquel toutes les autres communautés réligieuses seraient réduits à l'état des protégées. Du fait de cette crainte ils tendent à cacher du pouvoir, non seulement les musulmans, mais tous les non maronites, chrétiens compris, qui pourraient transiger avec les musulmans à cet égard. En effet, les autres communautés chrétiennes sont plus discrètes sur cette crainte car elles sont conscientes de ce que leur corréligionaires dans les autres pays arabes pourraient se trouver compromis si elles semblaient provoquer la sensibilité musulmane. Ils partagent, cependant, l'anxiété des maronites et ceci affecte leur disposition à vivre avec les autres communautés libanaises sur un pied d'égalité.

Les musulmans, pour leur part, font remarquer que les autres pays arabes ont adopté des constitutions garantissant, en général, la liberté individuelle et l'égalite des droits civiques. Ils proclament de même leur désir de vivre dans la société libanaise sur une base d'égalité.

Ce qui suit est un projet fondé sur le princip d'anthropologie juridique qui permettrait aux juristes libanaises de dégager la rélation de leurs mutiples traditions juridiques avec la législation de base qui est l'expression de la société libanais pluraliste, avec son génie naturel d'égalité.

Le modèle qui a servi à établir ce projet a été un projet en oeuvre depuis plusieurs années au Soudan. Le problème du Soudan était, cependant, plus simple. La loi civile soudanaise est fondamentalement la loi anglaise instaurée à l'époque colonial. Elle est, d'une manière générale, très utile au pays, mais sans rapport avec les traditions juridiques indigènes. Le

projet amenait des magistrats, qui étaient détachés de leur siège à cet effet, à travailler avec des étudiants en droit et des avocats qui présentaient aux tribunaux des causes visant à établir, en invoquant des précédents, une base solide et une place pour les traditions juridiques locales au sein de la législation civile soudanaise. C'est ainsi que sans rupture ni discontinuité, la loi civile a été, dans ce domaine, soudanisée.

Au Liban la législation, très opportunément instaurée sous le Mandat français et amendée depuis, est fondamentalement basée sur la Code Napoléon. Il existe, un plus, les Statuts personnels de chaque communauté qui réglementent le droit familial, principalement le mariage, le divorce, les successions. Ces statuts n'ont pas de relation organiqe avec la loi civile commune, et cet état inorganique de la loi reflète la fragilité même de la société libanaise.

Le domaine visé par le projet est l'égalité civique et le moyen d'y rattacher chacune des traditions particulières sans lui faire perdre son caractère propre. Il n'est pas envisagé, bien sûr, de bouleverser les particularismes des statuts personnels, qui répondent aux besoins; mais il y a au Liban trois plans au sujet desquels on devrait établir la relation sus-mentionnée:

1. Les domaines de la loi régis par le droit applicable à tous.

2. Les domaines séparément régis par les statuts personnels des différentes communautés. Il s'agit là de la fraction de ces traditions respectives qui est connu et publique, telle la parti visible d'un iceberg. Ces traditions, qui représentent si profondement la culture de chaque communauté, débordent, enfait, largement les domaines du droit familial dont connaissent, formellement, les statuts personnels.

3. Il existe d'autres domaines des traditions juridiques particulières qui ne sont par visibles et qui n'ont pas un impact formel sur la loi libanaise, mais qui n'en exercent par moins, en profondeur, sur les communautés un effet culturel profond.

Le but à atteindre au Liban, à travers un projet d'anthropologie juridique, est la constitution d'un ensemble de dispositions civiles, cohérent mais respectueux des particularismes, admettant des exceptions lorsque celles-ci sont en rapport avec la tradition des diffé rentes communautés et permettant le recours à ces traditions de telle sorte qu'elles se voient reconnus une place dans le système juridique. Ceci aurait pour effet d'établir un lieu organiqe entre ces sources du droit, créant ainsi un ensemble juridique qui soit l'expression de l'unité de la société libanais et de son pluralisme.

Annexe: Projet d'anthropologie juridique -- 3

Ce projet devrait dépendre de plusieurs universités à fin qu'il puisse refléter les différentes traditions. Il devrait relever d'un institut ad hoc rattaché aux dites universités. Ceci, néanmoins, devrait été précisé par ceux qui auront la responsabilité de réaliser le projet.

Les facultés de droit ayant une licence sont elles de l'Université St. Joseph, la seule jusqu'à 1963, ainsi qu'elles, depuis cette date, de l'Université libanaise et de l'Université arabe. Une quatrième université, sur le point de recevoir sa licence, sera d'un particulier intérêt pour la promotion de ce projet, ça sera celle de Maqassed, organe éducationel de base de la communauté sunnite.

Ce projet a été soumis à des personnalités représentatives des différentes communautés libanaises, notament des professeurs du droit. Leur première réaction a été favorable, mais on ne peur pas en tirer vraiment de conclusion avant que le projet n'ait été formulé et que les personnes compétentes n'aient pas connaissance dans un document écrit. C'est l'objet de ce document de leur fournir une formulation écrite, de caractère préliminaire et ne préjugeant pas de la modification et de dévelopement du projet en fonction des besoins de la société qu'ils seraient amenés à relever.

Il faudrait que le projet reçoive l'appui de chacune des trois grands groupes culturels du pays: arabophone, francophone et anglophone. Chacune de leurs traditions respectives a son importance au Liban et l'approbation explicite de leurs institutions représentatives est une condition préalable de la réalisation du projet.

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N. 12

«التضامن» تنفرد بنشر تقرير - وثيقة حول النظرة الكاثوليكية للوضع في لبنان

□ التقرير وضع بعد زيارتين قامت بهما الى لبنان بعثة تمثل جمعية ذات نفوذ في الكنيسة الكاثوليكية الاميركية ولدى صانعي القرار في واشنطن.

تنفرد «التضامن» هنا بنشر تقرير حول زيارتين قامت بهما بعثة «جمعية القديس الوسيوس غونزاغا» الاميركية برئاسة الاب ريمون هيلميك الى لبنان، نظرا لاهميته ولما تتمتع به الجمعية من نفوذ في الكنيسة الكاثوليكية في اميركا ولدى صانعي القرار في واشنطن.

وتأتي اهمية هذا التقرير - الوثيقة من كونه يعكس النظرة الكاثوليكية للاوضاع في لبنان ويلقي اضواء كاشفة على الدور الذي يضطلع به الفاتيكان تجاه الاوضاع العربية عموما وقضية لبنان بصفة خاصة، كذلك تأتي اهمية انفراد «التضامن» بنشره من حيث انه لم يتسرب الى النشر ولم يطلع عليه إلا نخبة قليلة من صناع القرار في واشنطن ومن القائمين على الكنيسة الكاثوليكية ذات النفوذ الواسع في الولايات المتحدة. وفيما يلي نص التقرير.

استمرت الزيارة من ٢٨ كانون الاول (ديسمبر) ١٩٨٢ وحتى ٢٨ كانون الثاني (يناير) ١٩٨٣. وكان ذلك في وقت توقفت فيه، والى حد كبير، عداوات الصيف السابق، رغم ان الاقتتال الطائفي استمر في مناطق طرابلس والشوف، وايضا في وقت تواصلت فيه عمليات ازالة الانقاض والالغام من بيروت، وبدأت فيه الجلسات الاولى من المحادثات اللبنانية - الاسرائيلية - الاميركية.

الغرض من الزيارة كان محاولة تفهم الصراع الداخلي في لبنان والقلق والاحباط والتناقضات التي يسببها ويحتويها هذا الصراع. وكذلك محاولة بدء حوار مع اطراف النزاع المختلفة. وكنتيجة للزيارة فان الاب هيلميك يشعر بأنه قد بدأ يتفهم الوضع السياسي والاجتماعي في لبنان. وسينضج هذا التفهم عبر المزيد من الحديث مع اللبنانيين. وهذا النوع من التفسير ليس الغرض منه هو النشر كما لو انه كان تفسيرا قام به الاب هيلميك لوحده، وانما الغرض تطويره عبر عملية تشارك فيها كل الاطراف اللبنانية المساهمة في النقاش. وعلى هذا الاساس، فان هذه الوثيقة ستوزع على كل الذين تحدث معهم الاب هيلميك في لبنان ويأمل في ان يحصل منهم على تقييم نقدي لها (للوثيقة).

وعلى رغم ان النشر والنقاش العام، بدرجة معتدلة وبصورة مركزة، قد اصبح ممكنا بعد هذه الزيارة الاولى، الا ان الاب هيلميك يرى ان من الافضل ترك مثل هذا الامر ينتظر حتى يقدم اولئك الاشخاص ردود فعلهم على التقرير، وحتى يتمكن هو من التحدث اليهم خلال زيارة ثانية.

ومن النتائج الاخرى للزيارة البدء في مشروع متكامل في مجال الانثروبولوجيا القانونية (الدراسة القانونية للمجتمعات). وهذا المجال لا يعدو ان يكون مجرد مصطلح في المرحلة الحالية وسيحتاج الى المزيد من التطوير قبل ان يتضح وجود شيء مفيد فيه يجعله يحصل على تقدير اللبنانيين. ولكن الامر نوقش - كاحتمال قابل للتطبيق - مع عدد من الشخصيات الهامة في لبنان، التي ابدت حماسة للامر.

دائرة الاتصالات

تمكن الاب هيلميك من الاتصال مع الناس بسهولة من خلال اقامته في الدار اليسوعية الملحقة بالجامعة اليسوعية.. فاليسوعيون هناك من ذوي الاصول الفرنسية واللبنانية، بالاضافة الى بعض الاميركيين، كانوا في اغلب الاحيان من الشخصيات الهامة او اقارب الشخصيات البارزة.. ولذلك ساعدوا بشدة في ترتيب اللقاءات.

وقد جاء هيلميك بخطاب تعريفي من الكاردينال ميديروس (Medeiros) في بوسطن الى الكاردينال خريش بطريرك الطائفة المارونية، وبمقتضاه تمكن هيلميك من عقد اجتماع مطول ومفيد مع البطريرك. وبالاضافة الى ذلك فقد كان هيلميك يحمل عدة خطابات تعريفية موجهة الى شخصيات اخرى عديدة كانت قد ساعدت منظمات الاغاثة الاميركية (اوكسفهام، ولجنة الانقاذ العالمية وغيرها) في مساعيها لتفهم الاطار السياسي للوضع. هذه الخطابات فتحت الطريق امام المزيد من الاتصالات مع الطوائف المختلفة.

وقد نظمت العملية على اساس التفاهم اولا مع مجموعة من المثقفين ومعظمهم اساتذة في الجامعة اليسوعية والجامعة الاميركية ببيروت والجامعة اللبنانية ومن المطلعين جيدا على الوضع.. ثم التحدث بعد ذلك الى اشخاص من اولئك المكونين للمواقف الايدولوجية في الفئات والطوائف المختلفة.. ويلي ذلك الاشخاص الذين يلعبون دوراً في الانشطة السياسية او العسكرية لهذه الفئات.

المسؤول السياسي بالسفارة الاميركية فرغ نفسه لاجتماع مفيد بعد ان سمع من السيد نيكولاس قيلوتيس ان ريمون هيلميك سيصل الى بيروت. وبمجرد ان بدأت معالم مصطلح الانثروبولوجيا القانونية تتضح في ذهن هيلميك اجتهد في مقابلة اساتذة القانون ومسؤولي الجامعات في لبنان. واقترحت عدة مصادر عقد اجتماعات اخرى مع عمداء العائلات الكبيرة الذين يحتفظون بالزعامة في طوائفهم، بالاضافة الى اجتماع مع رئيس الجمهورية. الا ان هيلميك رأى ان من الافضل تأجيل هذه الاجتماعات الى زيارة اخرى، وعندما تكون هذه الشخصيات قد اطلعت على شيء مكتوب عن نتائج هذه الزيارة الاولى، وعندما تكون فكرة برنامج الانثروبولوجيا القانونية قد درست جيداً ووضعت مبدئياً على الورق.

فهم الوضع اللبناني

التقرير المبدئي التالي للأب ريمون هيلميك يحتوي على هذه العناصر الرئيسية:

١ - كيف يكون لبنان وحدة واحدة:

أول شيء يريد الملتزمون بمصطلح لبنان ان يوضحوه هو المعنى الجغرافي لجبل لبنان، وهو معنى غير مفهوم تماما خارج لبنان. فالواقع ان الجبل لا يمثل سوى منطقة واحدة متداخلة في لبنان، حيث تملك الجغرافيا تأثيرا قويا على شخصية المجتمع.

ان البلد يتكون من سلسلة جبلية طويلة (كانت على مدار التاريخ ملجأ للطوائف التي تتعرض للضغط) ومناطق على ساحل البحر الابيض المتوسط حيث توجد الموانيء. وترتبط هذه الحقائق ببعضها بشدة من حيث ان الملاجيء الجبلية ذات الكثافة السكانية العالية، تحتاج دائما الى منفذ... هذا المنفذ كان يتمثل في المدن الساحلية المفتوحة على العالم الخارجي، بما يعني ذلك من تجارة وتفوق تكنولوجي على الدول المجاورة.

إلى جانب هذه المناطق (السلسلة الجبلية والمناطق الساحلية) يوجد وادي البقاع الذي يعتبر بمثابة «سلة الخبز» الضرورية للبلد. وقد ادت المحاولات، التي حدثت في فترات متقطعة خلال التاريخ، لفصل هذه المناطق عن بعضها.. أدت الى التخلف والى ضغط سكاني غير محتمل في الجبل، والى قطع المدن عن الريف. فالمدن الساحلية

تضع لبنان في مركز الحلقة التجارية والثقافية للوصل بين منطقة الشرق الادنى وعالم ارحب هو في الاساس أوروبي وغربي. اما مسألة الجبال كمنطقة للجوء فقد جعلت من الضروري بناء مجتمع متعدد الطوائف، الامر الذي شكل عنصراً اساسياً من عناصر اهمية وقيمة لبنان بالنسبة لبقية المنطقة.

وهناك المزيد الذي يمكن قوله عن جغرافية المنطقة وأثرها في طبيعة المجتمع اللبناني. فخلال اكثر من ٢٣٠٠ سنة من تاريخه، ظل لبنان يعمل كجزء من منطقة اكبر هي سوريا الكبرى، حيث كان مرتبطا ومتصلا بسوريا بشكلها الحالي والمناطق الجنوبية من فلسطين (حاليا اسرائيل) والاردن. وهذا التشكيل السياسي ظل مستمراً طوال تلك الفترة بسبب الحاجة الادارية للامبراطوريات الكبرى: مثل فتوحات الاسكندر، وامبراطوريات السلاجقة والرومان، والبيزنطيين والامويين والعباسيين والفاطميين والامبراطورية العثمانية.

هناك خط آخر من المدن «المستودعية» الممتدة من الشمال الى الجنوب على خط مواز لمدن الساحل ـ ولكن الى الداخل من السلسلة الجبلية وعلى امتداد حافة الصحراء... هذه المدن عاشت معتمدة على المدن اللبنانية الساحلية في اوقات كان فيها القسم الاكبر من التجارة الاقليمية ينقل بواسطة القوافل المسافرة براً. اما المنطقة التي توجد فيها الان سوريا، فهي تتقاسم مع لبنان ـ وان كان بدرجة اقل ـ ظاهرة التعددية العرقية والدينية والتي اصبحت صفة خاصة جدا للبنان. وعلى رغم ذلك فان هذه المنطقة لم تنجح ابدا في بناء المجتمع التعددي والمفتوح الذي كان لبنان دائما يتطلع اليه ويختلف حوله.

وحتى في زمن الامبراطوريات المتعاقبة كان لبنان يميل في كثير من الاحيان الى الانفصال عن بقية سوريا الكبرى، ساعيا الى استقلال او حكم ذاتي يتيح له انشاء مثل ذلك المجتمع المتعدد الطوائف... احيانا، وفي اوقات التوتر العرقي او الديني، تحولت منطقة الجبل ـ بطبيعتها كمنطقة للجوء ـ الى منطقة منعزلة حتى عن الساحل والبقاع. وبأمر من الامبراطورية العثمانية امتدت احدى هذه الفترات (فترات الانعزال للجبل) من ١٨٢٤ وحتى نهاية الحرب العالمية الاولى. وبعد سقوط الامبراطورية العثمانية احبط تطلع السكان خصوصاً المسلمين، لانشاء دولة مستقلة في سوريا الكبرى تخدم اهداف القومية العربية. وقد احبطت المحاولة بسبب الطموحات الاستعمارية المتضاربة لكل من بريطانيا وفرنسا.

من هنا فان التوترات التي ادت الى الحرب الاهلية والضعف الداخلي المدمر في لبنان خلال السنوات الاخيرة، تنبع من التطلعات المتضاربة لكل من القومية اللبنانية والقومية السورية أو القومية العربية، والتي غزتها مشاعر خيبة الامل في اوساط السكان المسلمين او العرب الاكثر وعيا، ازاء فشل المجتمع اللبناني في تنفيذ وعوده بشأن التعددية الصادقة وخدمة منطقة اكبر.

٢ ـ الضغوط الخارجية:

مثلما هو متوقع فانه في اوقات الضعف الداخلي الشديد كان لبنان يخضع لضغوط قصوى من المصالح الخارجية. والسؤال الذي يطرح هنا هو: على من يقع اللوم في الحالة الخطيرة الراهنة... على المشاكل الداخلية ام على الضغوط الخارجية؟ والجواب لابد ان يكون هو ان لبنان يعيش في منطقة تتعدد فيها المجتمعات التي تعاني بدورها من ضغوط شديدة. ولكن وهن لبنان وكونه اصبح ضحية لمشاكل الاخرين، فأمر ينبع من ضعفه الداخلي كمجتمع... وهذا المجتمع يعتبر هاما في حد ذاته وبالنسبة لجيرانه، ولذلك يستحق ان يمنح فرصة للبقاء. وعلى هذا الاساس فانه من المهم ان يفعل المجتمع الدولي كل ما يستطيعه، لضمان بقاء لبنان وتقويته. ولكن لبنان لن ينجو، (اولن يتمكن من الصمود امام الضغوط التي يضعها عليه جيرانه المتأزمون) اذا لم يعمل اللبنانيون على تعزيز وتقوية البنية الداخلية لمجتمعهم.

ان لبنان اصبح بمثابة العذر الذي تتذرع به الدول العربية الاخرى لتبرير عجزها امام مشكلة الفلسطينيين المشردين.. فقد توقعوا، بل طلبوا، من لبنان ان يعالج هذه المشكلة (مشكلة الفلسطينيين) نيابة عن كل الدول العربية، ووضعوا عليه مسؤولية الفشل، ثم جعلوا الفلسطينيين يستقرون فيه الى درجة لم يكن لبنان معها قادراً على استضافتهم او تحملهم. وبالاضافة الى ذلك اصبح لبنان هو عذر الاسرائيليين في عدم القيام بأي شيء نحو الفلسطينيين في الداخل... فاسرائيل تزعم انها تواجه الفلسطينيين في الخارج وتسحقهم في لبنان، بدلا من ان تتعايش مع حقيقة وجودهم في الداخل (داخل اسرائيل).

كل هذه الضغوط تجعل التعامل مع مشاكل لبنان الداخلية والمتأصلة، مسألة اكثر صعوبة خاصة بعد ان اتخذت الضغوط شكل الاحتلال الفعلي للبنان من جانب الاسرائيليين والسوريين.. ولذلك فان لبنان يحتاج الى فرصة لفصل مشاكله الداخلية عن هذه الضغوط الخارجية.. ولكنه لن يستطيع التفاوض مع القوى الخارجية الا اذا تمكن اللبنانيون انفسهم من تحقيق قدر ادنى من التماسك والتوحد. واذا قام المجتمع الدولي بمساعدة لبنان على خلق هذه الفرصة، فان ذلك سيخدم اسرائيل والدول العربية ولبنان نفسه.

ومن الضروري ان نفهم ان اهم الضغوط الخارجية على لبنان، تأتي من الدول الاخرى البعيدة. وليس الغرض هنا هو تبرئة القوى الكبرى او ايجاد أعذار لها في نزاع الشرق الاوسط، فضغوط الدول الكبرى تمارس في الواقع على جيران لبنان وليس على لبنان ذاته. وسوف يكون ظلماً جديداً على لبنان اذا قررت القوى الكبرى استغلال ضعف لبنان لكي تستخدمه كدمية في صراعاتها الخاصة. الا ان هذا الامر يظل اقل احتمالا من امكانية استمرار تعرضه للضغوط من الدول المجاورة.

٣ ـ التفهم الذاتي الجماعي

توجد في لبنان رسمياً ١٧ طائفة دينية من الاقليات المعترف بها، تتمتع كل واحدة منها بتمثيل نسبي في تقسيم المناصب بالمكاتب المنتخبة او بالخدمة المدنية. وطوال اعوام الحرب الثمانية تعرضت مسألة عدالة هذه الصيغة النسبية وجدوى استمرارها، الى تحد مستمر.

وبالنسبة للاجئين الفلسطينيين وهم فئة بارزة تعاني ايضا من خلافاتها الدينية الخاصة فانهم لا يدخلون ضمن السبع عشرة طائفة ويتميزون عنها بأنهم لم يختاروا بأنفسهم الحياة والاستقرار في لبنان. (المجموعات الاخرى التي جاءت لاجئة وهاربة من الكوارث في اجزاء اخرى من المنطقة، مثل اللاجئين الارمن الذين هربوا من المذابح في تركيا في اوائل هذا القرن، او النسبة الكبيرة من الاغريق الارثوذكس أو الاغريق الكاثوليك الذين لجأوا الى لبنان عندما قامت الادارة الاستعمارية الفرنسية بتسليم اقليم انطاكية السوري الى تركيا عشية الحرب العالمية الثانية... هذه المجموعات اللاجئة وافرادها اصبحوا في الواقع لبنانيين كلية).

وبينما تحسب طوائف المسيحيين الارثوذكس والكاثوليك (من اغريق وسوريين وأرمن اوروم كاثوليك) منفصلة ضمن الطوائف السبع عشرة، فان البروتستانت القلائل بمذاهبهم المختلفة، يحسبون كمجموعة واحدة.. وكذلك الامر بالنسبة للطوائف الشيعية المسلمة والمتعددة. ولاهداف هذا التعداد الطائفي فان التجمعات الاربعة ذات التأثير الرئيسي في الدولة ـ الموارنة والسنة والشيعة والدروز ـ سينظر اليهم، بالاضافة الى التجمعات المسيحية الاخرى، على اساس انهم تجمع واحد بينما سينظر الى الفلسطينيين كفئة متميزة قائمة بذاتها.

ولقد ميز احد اللبنانيين المفكرين والمهتمين بالموضوع المجتمعات والطوائف الكتابية (ذات الكتاب المقدس والمنزل كالقرآن والانجيل والتوراة) الى مجموعات قبيلة وغير قبلية. وتعتبر الاشارة الى هذه الصفة المميزة التي اعتبرها هي الاساس في تكوين القبيلة نوعاً من جنون العظمة. وقت اعتبر في هذا الصدد، المارونيين والمسلمين «الشيعة» والدروز ضمن هذا التصنيف القبلي. وقد أصبح الفلسطينيون، الذين جاؤوا للعيش في لبنان تحت ضغوط التهديد الكبير والمستمر، كقبيلة في ظل هذا التفسير. وقد تم اعتبار المجتمعات والطوائف الاخرى التي اعتبرت أو التي تم وصفها بانها غير قبليه واضفى عليها صفة «التحضر» المسلمين «السنة» والطائفة الكبيرة للاغريق الارثوذكس الذين اخذوا الصدارة في هذا الخصوص. ويسترسل هذا المراقب اللبناني للاحداث ويشعر بان احداث السنين الاخيرة قد دفعت هذه المجتمعات والطوائف الى المزيد من التعصب والتأقلم داخل القوالب القبلية. ولم يقصد بهذه التقسيمات «القبلية» و«الحضارية» بانها تفسيرات او مصطلحات ناقصة او متفق عليها حيث اخذ يتعمق لدى هذه المجموعات الشعور بالخطر المتزايد الذي اخذ يهدد وجودها اووحدتها التراثية. ولقد وجد ريمون هيلميك، ان التمييز هذا عامل مساعد له بما عرف عنه من الاهتمام والتعلق الذي كان يساوره والتي كانت تساهم في تفاعلات وديناميكية الصراعات كان يأمل في ان يعالج هذه المخاوف بشيء من التعاطف.

أ ـ ويتصف المسيحيون المارونيون باعتدادهم بأنفسهم باعتبارهم الاصل وحاملي فكرة المجتمع المتعدد الطوائف الذي تتمتع فيه كافة الطوائف والاجناس الدينية بالحقوق المتساوية وبالفوائد التي تقدمها الدول. ويعبرون على هذا باعتبارها روح الجبل الذين يعتبرونها المكان التقليدي للجوء. ونظراً لانهم يعتبرون انفسهم الان في اقوى مركز في الدولة (على الرغم من انهم يعانون من عبء الاحتلال من جيرانهم) فانهم يشعرون بانهم حراس الروح الجبلية، ويميلون الى عدم الثقة في كافة الطوائف الاخرى ويعتبرونها خطراً يهددهم. وعندما تم فصل دولتهم المارنية ـ تحت حكم

العثمانيين خلال المرحلة الاخيرة من هذا الحكم ـ عن الساحل والبقاع فانهم كانوا يشكلون الاكثرية والغالبية في هذه الدولة ويشاركون الطائفة الدرزية الصغيرة في السلطة.

ولدى المارونيين الان شعور قوي حول الاجزاء التي تعود الى هذه الدولة المارونية الصغيرة من لبنان والاجزاء التي لا تعود اليها وانها تميل الى عدم الائتمان الى تلك العناصر التي تقع خارج الجبل.

ويشعر المارونيون بانهم مهددون بشكل خاص في احتوائهم من قبل المسلمين واعادة بناء وتركيب مجتمعهم تحت السيطرة السورية او العناصر المسلمة الاخرى التي ستقوم بغرض تطبيق الشريعة او القانون الاسلامي حيث ان المسلمين لوحدهم فقط يشكلون الطائفة الاساسية (الامة) مع المسؤولية تجاه المجتمع ككل اما باقي الطوائف (جماعة على الذمة) فانها ستكون محمية على ذمة الطائفة المسلمة الذين (جماعة على الذمة) سيتمتعون بالحماية وليس بالحقوق في ذلك المجتمع.

وان المارونيين يعرفون حق المعرفة بأن العجز الاسلامي كان موضوعاً حساساً خلال عصور التاريخ مقارنة بضمائر الاجناس الاخرى تجاه الطوائف التي تحت حمايتهم، الا انهم «المارونيون» غير مستعدين للقبول بهذا الوضع في الدولة. وكمحاولة لحماية أنفسهم من هذا التهديد المتوقع فانه يبدو بالنسبة لباقي الطوائف ان المارونيين يحاولون ايجاد وخلق سيطرة خاصة بهم ومشابهة (لما يتمتع به المسلمون). كما انهم لا يثقون بالطوائف المسيحية الاخرى في لبنان ويعتبرونهم جماعات اعتادت على العيش في ظل نظام الشريعة، حيث يخافون الا تقوم مثل هذه الجماعات والطوائف بابداء المقاومة اللازمة لمواجهة أي محاولة جديدة تفرض عليهم.

لقد ساهمت الطائفة المارونية في قيام المجتمع اللبناني العصري تماماً وبشكل كبير. حيث كانت الطائفة المارونية هي التي حطمت القالب الاقطاعي للمجتمع في القرن الثامن والتاسع عشر من خلال قيامهم بتحرير طبقتها الفلاحية وتحقيق مستوى عالٍ من الازدهار لهم وبناء مجتمع تجاري بعد ذلك، حيث تسيطر هذه الطبقة على زمام الامور في طائفتها في الوقت الحاضر. وتتصف هذه الطبقة بكل صفات البرجوازية وخاصة في مجتمع مثل لبنان الذي لازالت الفوارق الاجتماعية فيه كبيرة، حيث ان الطبقة الفقيرة فيه ليس المارونيون بل المسلمون وخاصة «شيعة الجنوب» والبقاع الذين لم يساهموا في التحرر الاجتماعي للمناطق المارونية.

ومن خلال عصور التاريخ كان المارونيون ينظرون الى مسيحيي الغرب لحمايتهم ـ البيزنطيون، الصليبيون، واخيراً قوى الاستعمار الغربي وخاصة الفرنسيين. حيث وجدوا انفسهم الان، على الرغم من انهم من نفس الطينة الاجتماعية اسوة باللبنانيين الاخرين، منعزلين عن التضامن العربي، وعن تطلعات اللبنانيين الاخرين.

ويشعر اللبنانيون بانهم قد لحق بهم الاجحاف والظلم تماماً نتيجة لرفض باقي اللبنانيين الاعتراف والقبول بالقيم الغربية التي حصلوا عليها خلال عصور التاريخ هذه التي تقدم أهم الفرص لكافة طوائف المجتمع اللبناني.

ومن الغرابة ان نجد الدول العربية الاخرى المحيطة بلبنان تضع اهمية كبيرة على الصفات الغربية للمارونيين وللدولة اللبنانية بشكل أكبر مما يشعر به هؤلاء اللبنانيون الذن يعتبرون أنفسهم مهددين من قبل هؤلاء. وقد أصبحت صفة تأقلمهم الغربي حقيقة واقعة، والتي تتطلب القبول بها من قبل الاخرين على الرغم من ان ذلك يتوقف على المارونيين وكيفية كسبهم الى جانبهم ـ وذلك من خلال تصرفاتهم نحو الاخرين ـ.

وانه لمن المعتاد بالنسبة للقيادة المارونية ان توعظ وتنصح باقي الطوائف الكتائبة بانهم يجب ان يصبحوا لبنانيين وان يقبلوا بمشاركتهم وانهم جزء من المجتمع اللبناني والا يعملوا على تهديم هذا المجتمع. وسيكون المقياس والاختبار لنجاح المجتمع اللبناني هو مدى مقدرة المارونيين على ان يعتبروا انفسهم لبنانيين وليس مجرد مارونيين واستعدادهم لمشاركة باقي طوائف المجتمع اللبناني والثقة بهم واحترام الخواص العربية لاقرانهم من اللبنانيين والمدافعين الحقيقيين عن التركيب المتعدد الطوائف للمجتمع اللبناني حيث ستكون هذه مهمتهم الاولى.

ب ـ الطوائف المسيحية الاخرى: ـ الاغريق الارثوذكس، الاغريق الكاثوليك، السريان الارثوذكس، السريان الكاثوليك، الارمن الارثوذكس، الارمن الكاثوليك، بعض الرومان الكاثوليك والبروتستانت ـ وهؤلا هم اقل عدداً من المارونيين. حيث اعتاد هؤلاء من خلال تاريخهم العيش بخنوع وتحت سيطرة الطوائف الاسلامية. وانهم يقدرون التعدد الطائفي للمجتمع اللبناني والحرية النسبية التي يتمتعون بها وانهم مستعدون بشكل اكبر من المارونيين لان يجدوا المجتمع اللبناني مثالا للمجتمع المتعدد الطوائف وكنموذج يقدمونه للدول العربية الاخرى. وانهم غير مستعدين للعودة الى نظام (الشريعة الاسلامية) الا انهم يميلون الى خفض رؤوسهم في المجتمع الاسلامي. وقد امتدت طوائفهم الاخرى الكتابية، بعكس المارونيين، الى الدول العربية الاخرى وانهم يخافون تماماً من ان يتجاوز المارونيون حدودهم ويسببوا الهلاك لأنفسهم ولكل الطوائف المسيحية الاخرى في الشرق الادنى.

وقد ساهمت هذه الجماعات بشكل بارز في تأكيد الفكرة اللبنانية المثالية القائمة على المجتمع المتعدد الطوائف والحر. كما ساهم بشكل رئيسي صاحب الفكرة اللبنانية المثالية الذي نادى بهذا المبدأ المفكر ميشيل شيحا، ذو المذهب الروماني الكاثوليكي. وساهمت مجموعة الاغريق الكاثوليك، اكبر هذه المجموعات، بجهود كبيرة لقيام مثل هذا المجتمع المثالي. وقد تمكن الأرمن، وهم أقلية صغيرة، من تثبيت أنفسهم كقوة سياسية فعالة في بيروت حيث انهم يمتلكون عدداً كبيراً من المخازن الصغيرة هناك.

وفي حوالي السبعينات اعتبر اللبنانيون المسيحيون ضمن ما فهموه على اساس انه حملة صليبية ـ ضمن سياق المفهوم المسيحي العالمي بين المسيحيين والاطار الشرق الاوسطي العام حول موضوع التعاطف مع القضية الفلسطينية: ـ بناء المجتمع المتعدد الطوائف اللبناني بالتعاون الوثيق مع الفلسطينيين كنموذج للدولة العلمانية غير الكتابية في كافة أرجاء فلسطين على أمل انها ستقوم وتحل محل الدولة الدينية اليهودية ـ اسرائيل ـ الا ان مشاعرهم خانتهم. اذ أصبحت لبنان قاعدة للغزوات العسكرية للفلسطينيين ضد اسرائيل، حيث تعرض شعبهم (اللبناني) وخاصة المسلمين الشيعة في جنوب لبنان الى العمليات الانتقامية الاسرائيلية العنيفة. ولم يتمكنوا ان يعرفوا حقيقة وغرابة المصيبة اليهودية. الذين كانون ضحية أسوأ اعمال العنف وكبش الفداء على مر العصور في المجتمعات المتعددة الطوائف في الغرب. وبذلك حولت انظار اللبنانيين من مهمة التفرغ للبناء الحضاري لمثل هذا المجتمع المتعدد الطوائف الذين كانوا يأملون ببنائه، التي تعتبر خدمة بحد ذاتها لمنطقة الشرق الاوسط ككل. ولم يثق المارونيون منذ البداية بأي مخططات تعرض لبنان الى مثل هذا الانتقام العسكري كما عانت منذ ذلك الوقت. وقد ادت فكرة الحملة الصليبية هذه الى شق الصفوف والخلاف بين المارونيين والطوائف المسيحية الاخرى. وقد أدى فشل هذه الفكرة الى حيرة الطوائف المسيحية الاخرى واصبحوا غير متأكدين من أنفسهم ولا يعرفون باي اتجاه يسير المجتمع اللبناني، وفي وضع قلق شامل حيث انهم اصبحوا يجابهون الخطر اينما يتجهون: مخاطر من المارونيين، مخاطر من الفلسطينيين، مخاطر من اسرائيل، ومخاطر من الغرب. اذ انهم يشعرون بانهم جزء من المجتمع العربي الا انهم يشعرون بان الطوائف المسلمة والدول العربية المحيطة بهم تحقد عليهم وتناصبهم العداء.

ج ـ الدروز: ـ ووضعهم يشابه وضع المارونيين حيث عاشوا في اللجوء في الجبل الذي اصبح يحميهم بطبيعته المتوعرة من انتقام المسلمين الذي يعتبرونهم منشقين عنهم. حيث تمكن الدروز في القرن السابع عشر بقيادة زعيمهم «فخر الدين الثاني» من بناء منطقة تتمتع بالحكم الذاتي بشكل ومقياس أكبر مما هم عليهم الان في لبنان. حيث قام الدروز بتأسيس دولة تجسم المساواة في الحقوق بشكل يفهمه المارونيون بانها تمثل روح الجبل وانها من ابتكار انفسهم. ويعتقد الدروز بانهم هم الذين ابتكروا فكرة الجبل في هذا المفهوم السياسي وانهم يشعرون بالغبن والاجحاف في ان يجدوا انفسهم مشتتين ومبعدين من حق المساواة في المجتمع اللبناني. وعلى الرغم من انهم اقلية (ولو انهم كانوا اقلية حاكمة لفترة طويلة) في دولة صغيرة التي تضم الجبل فقط، فانهم اقلية الان أيضاً الا انهم طائفة مزدهرة وفخورون باهميتهم التاريخية وبكرامتهم.

وكان شكل الدولة التي بناها الزعماء الدروز في القرن السابع عشر، اقطاعياً. وقد خرج الدروز من عهد الاقطاع ليأخذوا طابعاً مختلفاً عن المارونيين. وباعتبارهم طبقة، فلاحية فانهم ساهموا في حركة تحرير الفلاحين المارونية التي قامت في القرن التاسع عشر ولكونهم نخبة مقاتلة، على الرغم من صغر حجمها، فانهم اصبحوا ذا مكانة متميزة في المجتمع. وقد بقيت العوائل الدرزية الاقطاعية محافظة على وضعها كعامل رئيسي في المجتمع الدرزي الا انها قبلت بالاحتفاظ بمراكزها استناداً الى الفوائد والمزايا التي تتمتع بها وليس استناداً الى الحقوق المتوارثة. فمثلا المسؤولية الاجتماعية في عائلة جنبلاط، بقيادة كمال جنبلاط (اغتيل سنة ١٩٧٧) اخذت صفة وشكل توزيع اراضي العائلة ومساعدة الفقراء والمحرومين (اكثرهم من المسلمين وخاصة الشيعة والفلسطينيين ايضاً، حيث ساهمت هذه العائلة بشكل كبير في توجيه الحرب الاهلية.

ويشعر الدروز والجنبلاطيون، الذين يعيشون الان في لبنان، بان الخطر يهدد وجودهم حيث مازال هناك جيب من جيوب المقاومة والتمرد العسكري داخل مركز الاراضي الدرزية في الشوف، الواقعة جنوب شرقي بيروت.

وتبقى الفكرة الاشتراكية لعائلة جنبلاط واحدة من أهم الاحتياجات الملحة للمجتمع اللبناني، الا ان هذه العائلة والطائفة ككل قد تقلص وتأثر مركزها ونفوذها تماماً وبشكل كبير.

الشيعة

د ـ المسلمون الشيعة: ـ منحدرون من أصول مجموعات طالما قاومت السلطات المركزية للخلفاء والامبراطوريات المحلية الاخرى. وكانت سوريا ولبنان، كمناطق قبلية، مراكز لهذه القوى المعادية للسلطات المركزية. والان تعد طوائف الشيعة القاطنة في الجنوب اللبناني، والتي كانت في مرمى النيران في القتال الدائر بين الفلسطينيين واسرائيل منذ عام ١٩٧٠، وفي مناطق معدمة في بيروت والبقاع، تعد افقر المجموعات السكانية في لبنان ـ فيما عدا الفلسطينيون.

وكسب زعيمهم الشهير في اوائل السبعينات، الامام موسى الصدر، احترام التجمعات والطوائف الاخرى في لبنان كمتحدث عن المظلومين. وكجزء من نشاطاته بنى الامام الصدر ميليشيا عسكرية تعرف باسم «أمل»، لا من أجل الهجوم على المجتمع اللبناني بل من اجل الدفاع عن قرى جنوب لبنان ضد غارات اسرائيل الانتقامية. واندمجت هذه الميلشيا بالطبع في الحرب الاهلية. وبعد الحرب اختفى الامام وهو في الطريق الى روما قادماً من ليبيا، متوجها لمقابلة البابا بولس السادس، وذلك في ظروف غامضة. وتعرض حركته الاجتماعية الدينية واحدا من الجهود العديدة لاخضاع الثراء الروحي للاسلام لمشاكل وحاجات العصر الحديث. وحينما يسافر المرء في مناطق الشيعة ببيروت أو جنوب لبنان يرى صور الامام في النوافذ وعلى الجدران، وفي رسوم زيتية هائلة معلقة في الشوارع. ويشعر أهله باليتم من دونه، ولكن روحه باقية كقوة هامة بينهم.

ومعظم الشيعة في جنوب لبنان هم من زارعي التبغ، ولكن خلافا لزارعي التبغ من أي مكان آخر بالعالم، فهم فقراء للغاية. وهم ايضا مزارعون من وادي البقاع، ولكن من دون اراض يملكونها، فالاراضي تملكها مجموعة قليلة من العائلات. والنظام السياسي اللبناني كان فاشلا فيما يتعلق بالشيعة المسلمين، فالسلطة المنتخبة لا تمثل مصالحهم، كما أن الامام كان معزولا عن الزعامة السياسية. ولكل هذه الاسباب فان الشيعة هم اقل الفئات تأثرا بمجريات المجتمع اللبناني. والتعليم هو من بين المنافع المحرومين منها، ومن نتائج ذلك عدم قوة قيادتهم السياسية. ومع هزة عادلة في المجتمع اللبناني فان تلك الفئة من الممكن ان تكون اكثر اهمية وعطاء من اجل مجتمع علماني متجانس.

السنيون

هـ ـ المسلمون السُنة: ـ يمتلكون الثقة في كونهم فئة تمثل الثقافة الاساسية في الشرق الاوسط. وهم متعودون على القيادة في المجتمع. ولذلك فهو جهد خارق ان يتعودوا على مجتمع علماني، وهو جهد اكثر من خارق ان يجد هؤلاء انفسهم طبقة محكومة. والسنيون يشكلون احدى المجموعات المستقرة و«المتمدنة» في لبنان، مع قيادات تقليدية ورثت احسن القيم من المجتمعات الاسلامية التي حكمت لبنان، بما في ذلك الامبراطورية العثمانية. وهذه القيادات فقدت سيطرتها على الحياة والامال السنية في غمار الحرب الاهلية. والمشاركة المسلمة في الحرب وتكوين ميليشيات اسلامية وقع على الرغم من القيادات التقليدية وليس بتوجيهها واضطرت القيادات الى اللحاق بسرعة بالاحداث كي لا تفقد مواقعها.

والان وبعد النهاية الظاهرة للحرب الاهلية، ومع الاضطراب النسبي في صفوف القوات الاسلامية قبيل الغزو الاسرائيلي الشامل، يبدو ان هناك عودة الى القيادات التقليدية في المجتمع السني الذي يتميز بالخصائص الحسنة والصبر من دون ان يفقد هذا المجتمع تعاطفه مع الفلسطينيين، فان قياداته تكرر دعمها الان للمجتمع العلماني في التجربة اللبنانية، وتعلن بين الحين والاخر من المطبوعات شبه الرسمية ان هناك اخطاء وقعت في التحالف الذي جرى مع القوات المسلحة الفلسطينية بغرض كسب موقع مسيطر في المجتمع اللبناني. وهم يشعرون بانهم خسروا، ويجب عليهم تجميع قواهم لايجاد المكان المناسب لهم في المجتمع العلماني.

ولدى المجتمع السني أسباب جيدة للبحث عن مكانة في العلمانية اللبنانية. فلديهم موهبة وخبرة في شغل المكان المسؤول في المجتمع الذي يحتاج اليهم. وهم يعيشون في لبنان ويعرفون ان الدولة اللبنانية سوف تستمر الى وقت طويل. والتطلع ظاهرة منتشرة في المجتمع السني لكي يعيش في مجتمع علماني. فالمسلمون الذين تعودوا العيش في مجتمعات هم فيها الاغلبية، وجدوا انفسهم يعيشون من موقع الاقلية، ليس فقط في لبنان بل ايضا في المجتمعات الغربية مثل بريطانيا (ولديها اقلية باكستانية مسلمة ضخمة)، أو الولايات المتحدة. ولا يوجد في بلد آخر اقلية سنية لديها من الدوافع الدينية والخبرات التي يجب اكتشافها مثل الاقلية السنية في لبنان.

الفلسطينيون

و ـ اللاجئون الفلسطينيون في لبنان: ـ ومعظمهم مازال يعيش في معسكرات، تحولوا الان الى مجموعات مستضعفة بعد طرد قياداتهم وقواتهم المسلحة. وهؤلاء الذين ازدهروا وخرجوا من معسكراتهم خلال السنوات الاخيرة يتعرضون الان لحملات ارهاب، بما في ذلك القتل العشوائي من مجموعات مشكوك في امرها، وهم يجبرون في بعض الاحيان على العودة مرة أخرى الى المعسكرات المكتظة. وفي المعسكرات المقامة على مشارف بيروت، تعد الحماية الوحيدة لهؤلاء تواجد القوات متعددة الجنسية من الايطاليين والفرنسيين. ويعتقد الفلسطينيون انهم في حالة مؤقتة، كما ينظر اليهم من هذا المعيار حتى في هذه الارض التي بقوا فيها سنوات طويلة. وفي معسكراتهم توجد الان مجموعات اخرى من اللبنانيين والشيعة الذين نزحوا بعد معارك الجنوب، وهم مجموعات من المسيحيين والمسلمين الذي يواجهون خطرا عظيماً بالتواجد في هذه المعسكرات ومعظمهم يقع ضحية، تماما مثل الفلسطينيين خلال عمليات القصف الوحشي وتدمير المعسكرات خارج صور وصيدا واثناء الغزو الاسرائيلي. كما ذبحوا ايضاً في معسكرات بيروت.

ولهؤلاء الذين يعيشون في معسكرات صور وصيدا تحت الاحتلال الاسرائيلي لا يجدون مأمنا مثل القوات الدولية. وهم مجبرون على الخضوع والاستسلام لقوات اسرائيل وسعد حداد. وهو نوع من الخضوع الخطورة بمكان لاي انسان ان يتعرض له.

وعمليا كانت كل فئة في لبنان صديقا للفلسطينيين في وقت ما. ولم تكن القيادة الفلسطينية في لبنان حكيمة. فقد اتبعت خيالات استعبادة الارض عسكرياً من اسرائيل بدلا من اتباع طريق تقديم قضيتهم كقضية انسانية وسياسية. ويدعي بعض اللبنانيين ان الفلسطينيين هم أول من حرضوا على الحرب الاهلية في لبنان، وهو إدعاء يحتاج الى دليل. ولكن على الاقل أصر الفلسطينيون على شن العمليات العسكرية ضد اسرائيل من اراضي لبنان، ومن خلال اتفاق القاهرة عام ١٩٦٩ اجبرت الدول العربية لبنان على قبول الفلسطينيين كقوة عسكرية مستقلة في لبنان.

وكان هذا اكبر من ان يستطيع النظام اللبناني ان يهضمه. وانفجرت الحرب الاهلية في هذه الفترة وبعد فترة تردد أولية سمحت القيادات الفلسطينية ـ على مضض ـ لقواتها بان تدخل الى الصراع، الذي حطم المجتمع اللبناني.

والان وبعد تحطم مدنهم ووقع نصف بلادهم الجنوبي تحت الاحتلال، ومقتل اكثر من ٢٠ ألف لبناني من المدنيين خلال الغزو الاسرائيلي (من دون ادخال عدد القتلى الفلسطينيين) فان العناصر اللبنانية المختلفة لا تجد الا الصفات المهينة لكي تصف بها اللاجئين الفلسطينيين. وهناك تعبير شائع هو ان الفلسطينيين «خطفوا دولة»، ومع ذلك يبقى التعاطف مع الفلسطينيين في بلائهم ضد اسرائيل. ويتحدث الناس جهارا عن «دفع» الفلسطينيين الى الرحيل الى مكان آخر بالحرمان، وبالرعب.

وليس من الصعب معرفة اسباب ضيق اللبنانيين والسلطات، والمجتمع كله بالفلسطينيين. فهم مضطرون لتحمل مسؤولية ضيافة اللاجئين، الذين كانوا متعبين ومسلحين في يوم ما، ولكنهم الان ضعفاء. وسوف يحتاج الامر الى سلسلة طويلة من العلاج حتى يستطيع اللبنانيون تحقيق هذه المسؤولية مرة اخرى. فهم تحت احتلال عسكري من السوريين والاسرائيليين، ولديهم متاعب جمة في فرض سلطاتهم على بلادهم. ولبنان قدمت، خلال ٣٥ عاما قاسية، الى الفلسطينيين اكثر مما قدم اليهم اي بلد عربي آخر وهو يشعر ان ضيافته وحمايته قد أسيئا الاستخدام. وهذا بالطبع لا يدافع عن اي من الاعتداءات البربرية على الفلسطينيين اللاجئين، ولكنه يترك حماية

الفلسطينيين كمسئولية اساسية للمجتمع الدولي الى ان يتم تدبير اتفاق ما بين اللاجئين ولبنان.

ويبلغ عدد الفلسطينيين نصف مليون، وهم يستطيعون ان يكونوا عنصر تفكك خطير اذا تم حرمانهم طويلا من معيشة آدمية وتعليم وفرص كريمة. ولا أحد يفهم ذلك في لبنان. والرد التقليدي على مقولة ان الفلسطينيين قد يمثلون خطرا في المستقبل هو انهم قد هزموا ولا يمثلون اية تهديدات. وهذا خداع ليس في صالح لبنان. فتهديد البشر وفرض الاستسلام عليهم لا يعد حلا على المدى الطويل للمشكلة الاجتماعية للاجئين. فلا يمكن فرض الاستسلام على نصف مليون انسان من دون توقع ظهور دوامات جديدة.

٤ ـ ما يبقى ذو فائدة في النظام اللبناني:

ظلّ لبنان ينظر الى نفسه كمثال للدولة الحديثة المبنية على التسامح والعلمانية والديمقراطية، وكنموذج يحتذى للعالم اجمع. واقتربت الحرب الاهلية من تدمير كل هذا من اساسه، وكشفت اعماق الصدع والضعف في النظام اللبناني. ولم تنته الحرب الا بالغزو الاسرائيلي للبنان، وليس من أية جهة داخلية استطاعت انهاء النزاع بحلول بناءة. ولكن اللبنانيين، بروح مرنة، قبلوا نهاية التحارب كبداية لبناء مجتمعهم وللتصالح العام. ولكن المثال لم يعد له وجود، ومازالت هناك بعض الاحقاد الباقية التي تهدد اعادة بناء المجتمع، وهناك تصدع في الاساسات لا توجد له حلول بعد.

وأحد ردود الفعل المعهودة لآلام السنوات الثماني الماضية هو نكرانها ـ وقد سمعها ريمون هيلميك مؤكدة ومشددة، انه لم تكن هناك حرب أهلية في لبنان، وان سنوات التحطيم الثماني قد تم فرضها على لبنان من قوى خارجية، بلا قواعد في المجتمع اللبناني. وهو رد فعل تقليدي سمعه في حروب اخرى مشابهة. ففي ايرلندا الشمالية مثلا نجد ان التعليل العام من البريطانيين والبروتستانت في ايرلندا ان كل المصائب التي حلت هي بسبب عصبة من الرجال الاشرار الذين ليس لهم اخلاق ولا مبادىء. كما ان التعليل من الجانب الكاثوليكي هو تواجد البريطانيين في ايرلندا. وفي كلا الحالتين نجد ان المشكلة هي بين الجار وجاره.

ويعرف كل لبناني ايضا ما تشيعه اسرائيل طوال السنوات الماضية مثل «ارض بلا شعب لشعب بلا ارض»، و«لا يوجد فلسطينيون»، و«هناك بالفعل دولة فلسطينية اسمها الاردن». واللبنانيون غير مستعدين لسماع اقوال مشابهة من العرب بانه لا يوجد اسرائيليون، أو ان اسرائيل ليست كيانا قائما وفعلياً ويجب التعامل معه. والنفي اللبناني البسيط بانه ليست هناك حرب أهلية هو خداع لا يقل خطورة عن الامثلة السابقة.

وهناك شيء لا بد من قوله عند كتابه هذا التقرير. فبعد عودة هيلميك من شهر في لبنان وسماعه لاطراف كثيرة من كل الفئات، من اناس لديهم تفاؤل بالمستقبل كلهم استعدادا لاعادة بناء بلادهم. وفي اوائل شباط (فبراير) لدى عودته كتب مذكرة أولية طرح فيها هذا التفاؤل. ولكنه ايضا اثناء وجوده في لبنان اشترى كل ما استطاع الوصول اليه من كتب يمكن ان تمده بمعلومات فور عودته. وبعد كتابة تقريره الاول بدأ قراءة هذه الكتب، ومعظمها نشر بعد بداية الحرب الاهلية، ولذلك جاءت معبرة عن الاضطراب الذي ترعرت من خلاله الحرب، فوجد نفسه غارقا في عبارات «من ناحية» و«من ناحية اخرى» ولذلك اضطر لاستغراق كل هذا الوقت لكي يصل الى نتائج محددة ويكتب هذا التقرير النهائي.

تحدي بين قوميتين

واحدى النتائج الاساسية هي اجابة التساؤل: ماذا هناك في لبنان يمكن البناء عليه؟

والحرب الاهلية كانت البوتقة التي تحدت فيها قوميتان بعضهما البعض داخل لبنان: القومية السورية، والقومية العربية. والاخيرة لم تكن فكرة ذات اقليم جغرافي بقدر ما كانت اعتقاداً روحياً، وقرارا بان المصالح العليا للوطن العربي أهم وأشد الحاحاً من مصالح لبنان. وهذا تضمن الاعتقاد بأولوية منح لبنان كامل دعمه للفلسطينيين بغض النظر عن الاخطار الناتجة. وايضا مسحة من الحزن ان لبنان محكوم بنفوذ ماروني لم يحترم بما فيه الكفاية الشخصية العربية وتضامن جزء هام من شعبه وتراثه. اما القومية السورية فكانت جغرافية اكثر في حدودها، رجوعا لما كان مطلوبا وممكناً في اعقاب الامبراطورية العثمانية، اكثر مما يتعلق بأي شيء يمكن الحصول عليه في ظل الظروف الجغرافية السياسية السائدة حالياً.

ومثل الاطراف الاخرى التي كانت موضع اتهام انها تسعى الى انتزاع قطعة من لبنان، سارع القوميون السوريون الى التصريح بانهم معادون تماما لتقسيم لبنان، وانهم يحاربون لمنع وقوعه. ولكنهم، مع القوميين العرب، رفضوا الاولويات التي طرحها لبنان والتي وجدوا فيها انفسهم مجرد تمويه على نظام لا يطبق العدالة الاجتماعية في نظرهم.

والان وفي نهاية ثمانية اعوام من الحرب الداخلية، ليس هناك منافسون جادون لتنظيم اولويات المجتمع فيما عدا فكرة لبنان نفسه، ولا تستطيع الفكرة ان تسمي نفسها فكرة قومية، الا للمارونيين واقلية آخرين، لانها لا تثير الاحساس نفسه في الاخرين. ولكن هناك تفاهماً عاماً بان المشكلة الاقليمية في لبنان يجب ان تعالج كأولوية مطلقة، وان مجموعات هذه المنطقة يجب ان تتعايش مع بعضها البعض بالوسائل الدستورية المتاحة لهم حاليا. وهم ليسوا معترضين على تغيير هذه الوسائل او تعديلها واعادة ترتيب الاولويات السياسية والاجتماعية بحيث تناسب الحاجات الجديدة. بل ان العودة الى الايام القديمة لا تروق لاحد. ومع ذلك تبقى فكرة لبنان ثابتة في مكانها بينما سقطت كل الافكار المنافسة. وهذه الفكرة في جوهرها هي لمجتمع علماني. والعلمانية في اساسها ليست مساواة أو موازنة المذاهب، كل بنسبة معينة من الحقوق، بل هي مساواة في الجنسية او المواطنة، مع احترام متبادل للشخصية الثقافية للجميع.

والحلف الوطني الذي اقيم في عام ١٩٤٣ ضمن الفعاليات الدينية كان وسيلة من اجل هذه الغاية، وكنموذج تندثر اهميته النسبية بالتدريج. ولكن اهميته وفعاليته لم تنته بعد لان تقسيم النظام اللبناني للقوة السياسية بالنسبية كان غاية وليس وسيلة.

وضمن الوسائل المتاحة للبنان لكي يحقق احلامه الاجتماعية المثالية هناك ثلاث وسائل تتفوق على البقية: التراث التشريعي، والفكر الانساني لميشيل شيحا، والضمير الاجتماعي، والذي يعد كمال جنبلاط وموسى الصدر اثنين من المعبرين الصادقين عنه. وليست هذه الوسائل ملكا شائعا لكل اللبنانيين، وحينما اختارت الفئات المتحاربة بعضها، فانها تحولت الى نداءات منحازة متفرقة. والوسائل الثلاث لا بد لها وان تقدر وتفهم من جميع الفئات اللبنانية، اذا كان للزخم اللبناني العريق ان يعيد بناء هذا المجتمع.

أ ـ التراث التشريعي: للتشريع سجل غير عادي في لبنان. فهو ليس تطبيقا او نقلا عن التشريع الفرنسي منذ عصر الاحتلال، ولكنه مؤسسة لبنانية خالصة حقق من خلالها اللبنانيون استقلالهم عن الامبراطورية العثمانية ثم الانتداب الفرنسي. وحققوا ايضا الاصلاحات التي جعلت من الممكن قيام لبنان الاكبر بدعم اهل الشمال واهل الجنوب، ومناطق البقاع والمدن الساحلية في عام ١٩٢٠. ثم صمموا وطوروا دستورهم الفريد، ثم استنبطوا النظام السياسي. وهو يسبق ولا يعتمد على نظام التوازن الطائفي.

وفي العصور الحديثة ثم اثقال النظام التشريعي اللبناني بعوامل معطلة عرقلت التطور السياسي والاجتماعي في لبنان. وكان بسبب هذه العوامل ان النظام اللبناني بأكمله وقع تحت تشهير فئات لم تحصل على حقوقها الكاملة من خلاله. واتهم النظام بانه اداة للحفاظ على الظلم الاجتماعي والاقتصادي القائم. وحتى بناء الطرق والمدارس والمستشفيات والاصلاحات الاخرى التي جرت اثناء رئاسة فؤاد شهاب تمت بالتغاضي عنه وعرقلة التشريع بدلا من فهمه واستخدامه. وقد حان الوقت لاستخدام التشريع كاداة فعالة لتحقيق الاهداف اللبنانية.

ب ـ ميشيل شيحا: بعد ٢٩ عاما على وفاته، لا تكشف كتابات اخرى النقاب عن الشخصية اللبنانية والفرص المتاحة في لبنان اكثر من تلك التي كتبها شيحا والذي اراد بحكمه ان يمنع الكارثة التي شاهدناها. ولا بد من التذكر ان شيحا وصف حركة تطور المجتمع اللبناني، بدلا من رسم صورة ثابتة له.

وفي الظروف التي جلبت الحرب الاهلية، اصبح من المؤكد ان المجتمع المثالي الذي وصفه شيحا لا وجود له، ولم يكن له وجود. والنظام التآلفي الذي نادى به أسيء استخدامه لدعم الجمود والمصالح الشخصية. وحينما اصبح من العسير تحقيق التآلف لم يكن هناك خيار آخر الا السلاح. ومن السهل، نتيجة لذلك اعتبار لبنان النموذج كما تخيله شيحا تجربة فاشلة. واعادة القراءة في افكاره حاليا تؤتي بنتائج مغايرة: رؤية للفرص التي اهدرت، والتي مازالت متاحة اليوم، لان ملاحظاته حول

الواقع اللبناني كانت صادقة للغاية. ولا بد لكتاباته الا تعالج على انها نقطة ثابتة لتطوير المجتمع اللبناني بل نقطة بداية لفكر جديد.

ج ـ الضمير الاجتماعي: ان العجلة الحقيقية حول ما يتعلق بانعدام العدالة الاجتماعية والتي عبر عنها احد اطراف الصراع جعلها تظهر وكأنها قضية طائفية او منحازة. وهذه الافكار ليست غريبة عما يدور في خلد مسيحيين في مواقع مثل حزب الكتائب. ولكن المسيحيين عاشوا حياة أفضل في لبنان نتيجة لبرنامجهم الاجتماعي منذ القرن التاسع عشر، في وقت كان لبنان الجبل معزولا عن باقي المناطق. انه التعداد المسلم، من السنة والشيعة، تحمل عبء الفقر في لبنان. والمتحدث عن هؤلاء هما موسى الصدر وكمال جنبلاط. وصوتاهما يعد اكنزا ثمناً للبنان ويجب ان يمنحا التكريم اللائق بهما في كل لبنان.

ويجب التعريف بانه اذا ارادت لبنان ان تحقق طموحها لكن تكون مصرّفا للوطن العربي، فانها تحتاج الى نظام اقتصادي حر. ولقد ظهر هؤلاء الذين وصفوا، اثناء صراع الحرب، الدور المصرفي اللبناني وكأنه استغلال للوطن العربي. ولكن الوطن العربي لم يفكر مطلقا بهذا في التعامل التجاري مع لبنان بل انه دعم وساند لبنان في هذا الدور.

وليس فقر مزارعي الدخان في جنوب لبنان نتيجة للاقتصاد الحر، ولكنه نتيجة التلاعب التجاري الطبقي والاستغلال. فلم يكن الاقتصاد الحر مسؤولا عن تركيز ملكية الاراضي في ايدي اسر قليلة في البقاع.

والاصلاح الاقتصادي الجذري والمصادرة ربما لا تكون مناسبة لاحتياجات المجتمع اللبناني، ولكن هذا لا يمنع العدالة التوزيعية الاساسية والحفاظ على الحقوق من الاغتصاب. وهناك طريق اخرى لكي تتمتع هذه الاقليات المحرومة في لبنان بحقوقها. وهو طريق التعليم. فهذه المناطق ظلت طويلا محرومة من التعليم. فانتشرت الامية وتضاءلت فرص الالتحاق بالمدارس الثانوية والجامعات ـ وكلها في بيروت. وهؤلاء الذين ذهبوا الى بيروت لم يعودوا مرة اخرى الى البقاع.

والتعليم يمكن استخدامه بالطبع كنوع من التحكم الاجتماعي، لاجبار قطاعات كاملة على قبول مكانتها المنخفضة في المجتمع. ولكنه يمكن استخدامه ايضا لتقويتهم، ومنحهم قواعد العدالة الاجتماعية. والحكومة قادرة على تنفيذ برنامج تعليمي عاجل لمنح هؤلاء فرصة عادلة. وحينما يمتزج ذلك مع خطة اقتصادية جادة للاقتصاديات المحلية، فان الاثار ستكون بعيدة المدى في تحقيق مشاركة هؤلاء المحرومين في نهضة لبنان دونما الحاجة الى التدخل المتطرف في الاقتصاد.

٥ ـ مسؤوليات إيجاد التماسك

لبنان مجتمع واقع بين حضارتين: العالم العربي حيث ينتمي شعبه اليه والعالم الغربي الذي هو مدخل الدول العربية اليه. وهو لا يستطيع الحياة منعزلا عنهما. ولبنان مسؤوليته الداخلية بتقديم وطن الى شعبه وفرص في مجتمعه. ولديه مسؤوليته الخارجية ايضا بتقديم الخدمات الى الحضارتين.

وهذا الجزء من العالم لديه شخصية تقاوم تماما اية محاولات خارجية للسيطرة عليه. وعلينا ان نتذكر انه بعد ان سيطر النظام الاغريقي والدولة البيزنطية الرومانية فيما بعد على اقليم سوريا القديم (سوريا الكبرى) في اطار غاية في التقدم والتعقيد والرخاء والتمدن لحوالي الف سنة، كانت قوة القبائل قوية وحيوية الى درجة انه عندما جاءت قوة قبلية اخرى بالغزو الاسلامي اجتاحت المناطق الحضارية في لمح البصر. وعندما حاولت الخلافة الاموية في القرن الاول الاسلامي انقاذ النظام الحضري والعمل على استمراره اسقطت هذه القوى القبلية الخلافة ذاتها. وتعثرت المحاولات المتعاقبة للخلافة العباسية في بغداد، والخلافة الفاطمية في القاهرة لبناء نظام اسلامي موحد وحضري بسبب مقاومة هذا الجزء من عالمهم. والخلاصة ان هذه المحاولات المتعاقبة فشلت ليس لعدم توحيد ثقافات وطاقات تلك المنطقة، ولكن لمحاولة فرض نظام مصطنع. ويجب احترام شعوب المنطقة، فقد ادت خبراتهم التاريخية الى الشك الحاد في كل محاولة فرض. وتعي الذاكرة الشعبية تماما لهؤلاء الشعوب انهم حطموا اكثر من امبراطورية.

وقد اشرنا من قبل الى الذعر (بارانويا) باعتباره العنصر الذي يحول مجتمع حضري متمدن الى قبيلة. وهذا بالطبع ليس التعريف الوحيد الى القبيلة والتي هي تعبير محترم. ولكنه مفيد باعتباره العنصر الذي يجب التخلص منه اذا امكن للفئات اللبنانية ان تعيش في مجتمع متماسك بلا خوف من فقدان هويتهم الثقافية. ان البارانويا هي خوف قائم على سوء تقدير نوايا الاخرين. ان الاتصال بين الفئات في لبنان صعبة الان وسوء التقدير شيء عادي.

ويطلق اللبنانيون الكثير من التسميات المهنية على بعضهم البعض ومن بين هذه التسميات التي اطلقت على الموارنة في بداية الحرب الاهلية هي «الانعزاليون» وهي تشير الى ميل الموارنة الى انكار شخصية لبنان العربية وارتباطه بالعالم العربي واماله.

ولكن هناك معنى ثانياً «للانعزاليين» نسب الى الموارنة وهو انهم يخططون الى تقسيم لبنان، بفصل مواقع نفوذهم القديمة في الجبل عن باقي البلد، والاحتفاظ بمنطقة شرق بيروت، تاركين باقي لبنان لكي تبتلعه سوريا واسرائيل. وينفي الموارنة بالطبع انهم خططوا لمثل هذا الشيء. واستمع ريمون هيلميك بدقة الى نفيهم لكي يرى عما اذا كان هناك احتجاج مبالغ فيه حول ذلك، او اي دليل على اشياء يحاولون سترها. وهو على قناعة بانهم لم يسعوا الى مثل هذا التقسيم، وان الشك يقع باكمله في اطار البارانويا. ومثل هذه الشكوك هي التي ادت الى انهيار المجتمع والانزلاق نحو الحرب الاهلية.

ومن الامثلة الاخرى على مثل هذه البارانويا هي خوف الموارنة من اسلمة المجتمع اللبناني، وفرض الشريعة.

وهناك ادلة متعددة على ذلك في التاريخ. ويؤكد خوفهم التطورات الواقعة نحو هذا الاتجاه في السنوات الاخيرة في مصر بمجتمعها القبطي الكبير. وتشعر الطائفة الاسلامية في لبنان بالدهشة من هذا الشك وعدم الثقة. الا انهم لم يجدوا الطريق ليظهروا للموارنة استعدادهم للمشاركة كند في المجتمع اللبناني، من دون اية خطط خفية. وتركز جل اهتمامهم على التهديد بالسيطرة المارونية عليهم، ولم يستطيعوا حتى ان يروا قيمة المخاوف المارونية كأولوية.

ويجد المسلمون الشيعة مجتمعهم يعاني من الحرمان الشديد ويخافون من ان باقي لبنان ينوي ابقاءهم على ما هم عليه. وعندما يجدون انهم يعاملون بشك باعتبارهم عناصر تخريبية محتملة للنظام اللبناني (حتى ولو باعتبارهم طبقة محرومة تسعى للتخلص من حرمانها) وتحرم مجموعات كبيرة منهم في منطقة الهرمل حتى من بطاقات الهوية اللبنانية، فان مخاوفهم تتحاول الى بارانويا، ورفض راديكالي. ويميل العديد في سهل البقاع بالتالي الى النظر الى السوريين باعتبارهم حماتهم وان كان الناس في الجنوب ينظرون الى لبنان باعتباره الحامي من التغلغل الاسرائيلي.

ان الفلسطينيين أسوأ حالا. فقد كانوا يشعرون بالخوف والشك حتى عندما عاملهم لبنان كمضياف كريم بطريقة غير طبيعية. وهذا ليس عجيبا في ضوء التجربة الرهيبة بطردهم من فلسطين. والان وقد تصرفوا انطلاقا من البارانويا التي شعروا بها فان مخاوفهم تحولت الى واقع. وقد استعدوا الفئات اللبنانية حتى اقرب اصدقائهم الى درجة ان حمايتهم. يجب ان نقع الان بدرجة كبيرة على عاتق ضمير المجتمع الدولي. وهذا هو معنى البارانويا ان تتحقق الاشياء التي تخشاها.

ومن الضروري لكي يمكن التفاهم والاتصال عبر عوائق هذه الشكوك، والتغلب على البارانويا في الفئات الاخرى، ان ينمو احساس بقبول حضارات والامال الاساسية للفئات اللبنانية المختلفة عبر المجتمع اللبناني بأكمله. ومادام هناك فئة تخاف من الاخرى فلن يكفي ان تشعر الطائفة الشيعية بأن المسيحيين لا ينظرون اليهم بأعتبارهم لبنانيين حقيقيين، ولن يكفي ان يشعر الموارنة او الدروز بانهم يتعرضون لتهديد دائم من جيرانهم، ولن يكفي السنة، بأحساسهم الحضري بأنهم يساهمون في استقرار المجتمع، بأنهم تحت المراقبة الدائمة باعتبارهم عنصراً تخريبياً محتملا. وهذه هي النقطة التي تلتقي فيها المسؤولية الداخلية ببناء مجتمع لبناني متماسك والمسؤولية الخارجية تجاه العالم العربي والغربي.

ويقع هنا تشابه اخر ملفت للنظر مع ايرلندا الشمالية. ففي ايرلندا الشمالية ايضا توجد مشكلة القومية المتصارعة: البريطانية والايرلندية. والحل الجماعي هناك هو للاعتراف بان القوميتين شرعيتان، وضرورة الملاءمة بينهما بطريقة عملية في حياة المجتمع.

وفي لبنان يوجد صراع بين قومية لبنانية متوجهة نحو الغرب وقومية عربية. ولا يوجد اي امل بتحقيق سلام داخلي او اعادة المجتمع اللبناني الى وضع عملي اذا شعرت أي من القوميتين بالاحباط او حرمت من منافذها الطبيعية. ويجب صهر القوميتين في دولة متميزة، بعبقريتها الخاصة، قادرة على اداء خدمات حقيقية كل منهما للآخر. والعبقرية في تلك الحالة هو الموهبة اللبنانية من اجل التعددية والحرية، والواضحة في فخر الدين الثاني وميشال شيخا وغيرهم.

وتعلم لبنان جيدا كيف يقوم بالخدمات التجارية بين العالم العربي والغربي، وليس

هذا هو كل ما في الامر فلبنان يستطيع تقديم خدمات روحية وثقافية للعالمين.

ويعتقد الموارنة انهم على اتصال جيد بالغرب، وان العالم الغربي يقدر ويفهم لبنانهم. الان ان مثالا واحداً يكفي لكي يظهر لنا خطأ هذا الاعتقاد، فعندما سمع الموارنة التعليقات الرهيبة في اجهزة الاعلام الغربية حول مذبحة صبرا وشاتيلا شعروا بالسخط. فلماذا يتحدث الغربيون فقط عن هذه المذبحة، لماذا لم يتحدثوا عن الدامور وزحلة وطرابلس وزغرتا، ولا عن المذابح والمذابح المتعددة والتي اتسمت بها الحرب الاهلية؟ والاجابة جزئيا هي ان قائمة المذابح في اماكن غير عادية معقدة للغاية بحيث يصعب على العربي ان يعيها. ولكن الاجابة الاهم هو ان الغربيين صدموا لهذه المذبحة ليس لتورط اللبنانيين فيها، ولكن لدور اسرائيل فيها. لقد وضع الغرب الكثير من مفاهيمه الاخلاقية في اسرائيل ويتوقع بل ويطلب مستوى اخلاقيا معينا منها. ولذلك فقد صدم لفشل المسؤولية الاخلاقية لاسرائيل. وبالنسبة للبنان واللبنانيين فان الغرب يعلم القليل عنهما. من هم اللبنانيون؟ بالنسبة للغربي هم شعب غريب لديه مذابح دائمة، وبالتالي فهم بعيدون عن المفهوم الاخلاقي للغربي. واهتمام الغرب يتركز فقط على اختفاء الوازع الاخلاقي الاسرائيلي. وهذا هو مقياس نجاح الموارنة في ايصال مفهوم لبنان وشخصيته الاخلاقية الى الغرب.

ويجب القيام بأفضل من ذلك، فعلى اللبنانيين، كل اللبنانيين التواصل مع العالم الغربي، ليس فقط باسم لبنان بل باسم العالم العربي باعتبارهم جسره الى الغرب. فلبنان هو المجتمع الذي يستوعب الاثنين. وبالنسبة للعالم العربي فهناك خدمات ثقافية وروحية يمكن للبنان ان يقدمها. وتلك الخدمة هي تعميق تعدده ونقل ذلك الى العالم العربي. فالعالم العربي يعاني هو الاخر من البارانويا تجاه الغرب بسبب خبراته المريرة التي بدأت بالحملات الصليبية وانتهت بهجمات الاستعمار والاستعمار الجديد في العصر الحديث. والعالم العربي في حاجة الى اكتساب الثقة والاحساس بالامن في ارضه والاحترام في العالم، لكي يستطيع ان يتصرف كندٍ في المجتمع الدولي. وهذا ضمان بان لبنان بحكم خبرته في التعددية والحرية يمكن ان يتوسط للعالم العربي.

والنتيجة الحتمية لهذه المهمة الخارجية هو ضرورة احتفاظ لبنان بولائه واماله الغربية والعربية.

لقد أدى الغزو الاسرائيلي، بالاضافة الى تدمير البلاد حتى بيروت، الى إنهاء المعارك الطائفية المستمرة منذ عام ١٩٧٥، وقضى على الفلسطينيين باعتبارهم قوة سياسية أو عسكرية فعالة في لبنان. واصبح الموارنة مسؤولين عما تبقى في لبنان، ولكن تحت الوطأة الرهيبة للاحتلال السوري والاسرائيلي، والضغوط التي يتعرضون لها من قوتي الاحتلال للتساوم معهم والدولة اللبنانية. ولكل هذه الضغوط فان الموارنة في موقف حققوا فيه انتصارا شاملا، بالنسبة للتجمعات اللبنانية الاخرى، الى درجة انهم يواجهون الخطر الذي تتعرض له اي جانب يحقق انتصارا ساحقا، وهو تبديد هذا الانتصار في غياب اية قيود داخلية. ويجد المسلمون سواء الشيعة اوالسنة والدروز انفسهم وقد جردوا من قوتهم ويجادلون بذل بعض الجهد بصعوبة بالغة في التأقلم مع الاوضاع الجديدة. اما الطوائف المسيحية الاخرى، والتي تشعر بحساسية دائمة تجاه تأثير ما يفعلونه على باقي المسيحيين في العالم العربي، فأنهم يشعرون بقلق بالغ من ان الموارنة بحكم وضعهم الحالي القوي نسبيا سيمضون الى اخر الطريق، وسيؤدي ذلك الى الحاق الضرر بباقي المسيحيين في الشرق الاوسط. وهذه المخاوف مبالغ فيها فهناك اصوات مسؤولة متعددة بين الموارنة، على وعي بهذه المخاطر.

ومهما كانت سعة ادراك الحكومة الحالية في لبنان فان قوى الاحتلال تجعل من الصعب عليها السير في الطريق الضيق الذي تفرضه ظروفهم عليه. ان السوريين والدول العربية الاخرى، يطالبون لبنان بأشياء تجعل من المستحيل عليها الحياة بجوار القوة العسكرية الهائلة لاسرائيل، او التوصل الى اية حلول تقنع اسرائيل بسحب قواتها. واسرائيل تطلب اشياء من لبنان يمكن ان تؤدي الى قطع علاقاتها بالعالم العربي، وبالتالي دورها الاقتصادي الحيوي كمصرف للشرق الاوسط.

ان المطلب الاساسي هو وجود دولة قوية الى درجة تمكنها من مواجهة الضغوط الداخلية، والى درجة من التماسك بين اللبنانيين بحيث تمكن الدولة من العمل في الفترة الحرجة الخاصة على التخلص من قوات الاحتلال. ومستوى التماسك الذي يمكن ان يكون دولة هو ببساطة امر صعب للغاية في هذه المرحلة. ان التحالف الحاكم هو في نظر الكثير من المواطنين نظام مساوم بسبب اعتماده على المساعدة الاسرائيلية منذ عام ١٩٧٥ الا ان اللبنانيين متسامحون الان.. والطائفة المارونية تبكي بطلها الرئيس المنتخب بشير الجميل الذي اغتيل في سبتمبر عام ١٩٨٢، بعد ان وضع باقي اللبنانيون املهم عليه. الا انه من الاسهل عليهم الآن ان يروا شعاعا من الامل في شقيقه الرئيس الحالي للجمهورية امين الجميل، والذي تشاهد صورته معلقة على الحيطان والنوافذ في جميع الاحياء وحتى في المخيمات الفلسطينية.

وماذا يمكن ان يقوله المرء للموارنة الان، وهم يتحملون مسؤولية توجيه دفة الدولة في هذا الوقت العصيب، تحت النظرات الاملة والشرعية لابناء الطوائف اللبنانية الاخرى؟. لقد عانى الموارنة معاناة شديدة خلال الحرب الاهلية، كما عانى الاخرون، وهم يعتبرون انفسهم الممثل الاول للروح المسيحية في وسط ارض الاسلام. ارض قدسها المسيح ذاته الذي سار هناك، والتي شهدت بدايات الكنيسة المسيحية. ان المرء يستطيع ان يقول لهم الان بطريقة اخوية وبوعي تام بالالام التي مروا بها والاخطار الحالية المحدقة بهم وفقاً لما جاء في الكتاب المقدس:

«بادل اعداءك المحبة، وافعل الخير لمن يكرهونك، وبارك اولئك الذين يصبون عليك اللعنة، وصل من أجل اولئك الذين يسيئون اليك...».

إن دعوة كهذه تبدو صعبة على الموارنة وقد دعاهم اليها بجدية شخص قدم اليهم كقسيس وكانسان يبحث عن سلامهم. ان هذه النصوص الانجيلية التي تقودنا الى حافة التناقض تصبح في العادة سهلة الهضم عندما تصبح تعاليمها اكثر فزعاً، ولكن عندما يصبح لها فجأة مدلول علماني، وتشير الى طريق الحياة ذات المعاني من خلال مشاكلنا الحقيقية، فان هذا هو معنى الخبرات الحياتية. وبالنسبة للموارنة، ليس فقط اصحاب المراكز والمسؤوليات بل المجتمع ككل، فليس هناك بديل لكسر دائرة الانتقام وتبادل الاتهامات ولتقديم القوة لمجتمعهم، مجتمع كل اللبنانيين، للتغلب على التهديدات الخارجية التي تواجههم. ان هذه ليست نصيحة ضد كونك قويا او ضد فرض النظام، وضد الاصرار على العدالة، ولكنها نصيحة لمعاملة كل اجزاء المجتمع اللبناني بثقة.

ان الوقت قد حان للكرم الماروني. وهذا صعب لقوة منتصرة تشعر بانها عانت في الماضي. ان رئيس الجمهورية امين الجميل يشعر بالحاجة الى الكرم والى بناء مجتمع متماسك، ويتضح الامر اكثر واكثر انه يتمتع بتأييد والده القوي الشيخ بيير الجميل الذي يتحمل مسؤولية كبيرة في حزب الكتائب. لقد ابدى لبنانيون اخرون الاستعداد لوضع الثقة في الرئيس والحكومة التي شكلها. ان الفرصة قائمة حتى في مثل هذه الساعات المظلمة لبناء المجتمع الذي سعى اليه لبنان منذ زمن بعيد.

فائدة هذا التفسير ان مثل هذا التقرير والمعتمد على مشاورات استغرقت شهرا مع العديد من الاشخاص من جميع الطوائف اللبنانية ليس الا تقريرا مبدئيا عن مشاكل لبنان. ان ريمون هيلميك تعهد بارسال نسخ مما كتبه الى اشخاص عديدين في لبنان، ويترقب نقدهم وتصحيحهم لهذا التقييم الاول.

ان اطلاعه على الموقف اللبناني في حاجة الى مزيد من المناقشات مع اللبنانيين بحيث يؤدي اسلوب التحليل هذا الى توضيح عوامل، على الرغم من انها معروفة الى المعنيين، لم تظهر في هذا التقرير ونأمل ان يكون لهذه الطريقة في التفسير فائدة لتلك العوامل ايضا.

ملحق التقرير

انطباع او استنتاج وحيد ظل يؤكد نفسه عند ريمون هيلميك خلال زيارته للبنان في شهر كانون الثاني (يناير) وهو القلق الذي تشعر به الطوائف الكتابية اللبنانية المختلفة والذي كثيراً ما كان يعبَّر عنه بالخوف، لدى كل طائفة وهو ان يصبح المجتمع اللبناني كله محكوماً من قبل طائفة واحدة تطبق عليه مفهومها التقليدي الخاص بها للقانون.

فكل طائفة من هذه الطوائف التي يتألف منها المجتمع اللبناني لها ثقافتها المتميزة. وفي كل منها يشكل القانون التقليدي تعبيراً اساسياً عن هذه الثقافة يتجذر عميقاً في ضمير أفراد الطائفة.

الموارنة، على وجه الخصوص، يتملكهم خوف شديد من «اسلمة» لبنان في نهاية الامر، حيث يتم تطبيق الشريعة الاسلامية مما سيؤدي ببقية الطوائف الاخرى غير

الاسلامية الى ان تصبح «أهل ذمة» وعلى أساس من هذا الخوف فإنهم يسعون لا الى ابعاد المسلمين وحدهم عن السلطة بل كل الطوائف الاخرى بما في ذلك المسيحيين الآخرين الذين قد يقبلون بتسوية مع المسلمين في هذا الشأن، ذلك ان الطوائف المسيحية الاخرى من غير الموارنة اقل خوفاً في هذا الشأن نظراً لتعاطفهم مع ابناء طوائفهم في البلاد العربية الاخرى، الذين قد يتعرضون للاذى اذا ما تبين أنهم لم يتعاملوا مع حساسيات المسلمين بلا احساس. مع ذلك فهم يشتركون في الخوف والاستعداد للتعايش مع الطوائف اللبنانية الاخرى المتأثرة.

المسلمون اللبنانيون من ناحيتهم يشيرون الى الدول العربية الاخرى حيث لديها دساتير تضمن بشكل عام الحرية الدينية والمساواة بين المواطنين ويعربون عن استعدادهم للعيش في مجتمع لبناني على أسس من المساواة.

والمطلوب هنا هو برنامج لعلم الاجناس يستطيع من خلاله المشترعون اللبنانيون ايجاد العلاقة بين تراثاتهم المتعددة في القانون والقانون الاساسي المدني والذي هو التعبير عن المجتمع اللبناني التعددي وروح المساواة بين مواطنيه.

والنموذج لهذا البرنامج المقترح هو برنامج اتبع في السودان لسنوات عديدة. المشكلة في السودان كانت اكثر بساطة.

القانون المدني السوداني كان اساساً قانوناً بريطانياً. تم العمل بموجبه في فترة الاستعمار وكان ناجحاً لكنه لم يكن يمت الى التقاليد الوطنية بصلة.

والبرنامج الانثروبولوجي القانوني هناك كان خاصاً بنفسه، فمن جهة ان التقاليد المحلية اثرت في حيازة الارض، فان التقاليد المحلية كانت تتعامل وفق العرف بدلا من القوانين المكتوبة.

والاثر الواضح لذلك ان الناس اصبحوا مستعدين لخسارة ملكيتهم للارض كنتيجة لهذا التباين.

والبرنامج استخدم القضاة الذين تركوا كراسيهم للعمل مع طلبة القانون في الجامعات، والمحامين الذين احضروا الى قاعات المحاكم قضايا قصد منها تأسيس سوابق.

وبهذه الطريقة ومن دون احداث تعطل اووقف لاستمرارية القانون فقد تمت صياغة القانون المدني في السودان ليكون سودانياً الى هذا المدى وتم جمع تقاليد القانون المتضاربة في وحدة عضوية.

والقانون في لبنان هو القانون الفرنسي بشكل أساسي، وتم تطبيقه في لبنان بشكل مفيد للغاية إبان فترة الانتداب الفرنسي وعدله التشريع منذ ذلك الحين. وهناك بالاضافة الى هذا قانون الاحوال الشخصية لكل مجتمع من الكتابيين. وهو ينظم أمور القوانين الاسرية وبشكل رئيسي الزواج والطلاق والورثة. وليس لهذه علاقة عضوية بمجمل احكام القانون المدني وهذه الحالة العضوية للقانون تعكس هشاشة المجتمع اللبناني.

والمجال الذي يثير الاهتمام هو المساواة في المواطنة والطريقة التي يرتبط بها كل من تلك التقاليد بهذا المفهوم من دون ان يخسر تماسكه. وحتماً فهو ليس مقترحاً لزعزعة مميزات قانون الاحوال الشخصية الذي يبدو واضحاً انه ملائم. ولكن هناك ثلاثة مستويات مميزة في القانون اللبناني والتي يجب البحث في علاقاتها مع بعضها البعض وهي:

١ ـ المجالات التي يحكمها التشريع العام الموحد.

٢ ـ المجالات التي تحكم ـ تباينياً بواسطة قانون الاحوال الشخصية للمجتمعات المختلفة، وهذا هو الجزء من التقاليد القانونية المختلفة الذي يتسم بوعيه بهذا وبعموميته. وتقاليد القانون المعينة التي تمثل تعبيراً قوياً عن ثقافة كل مجتمع شمولية بشكل يتفوق كثيراً على المجالات في القوانين الاسرية المعترف بها علانية في قانون الاحوال الشخصية.

٣ ـ مجالات أبعد من ذلك وهي التقاليد القانونية الكامنة تحت السطح والتي ليس لها اثر على حياة الناس في القانون اللبناني ولكن لها أثر ثقافي عميق في المجتمعات المختلفة.

ان ما يجب البحث فيه في برنامج انثروبولوجي قانوني في لبنان هو انه يجب وجود قانون مدني محسوس ينسجم ويحترم الاختلافات الاجتماعية ويقر بمميزات القانون حيث يجب ذلك في تقاليد المجتمعات المتعددة ويسمح بايجاد مجال لاختلاف تلك التقاليد بشكل يؤهله لايجاد مكان له والاستمرار في القانون اللبناني، كما ان عليه ان يجد صيغة لكل الاختلافات يكون لها بموجبها علاقات عضوية ببعضها البعض وبحيث يصبح مجمل القانون اللبناني تعبيراً حقيقياً عن المجتمع اللبناني في وحدته وجماعيته.

ويجب ان يكون البرنامج مرتبطاً بأكثر من جامعة واحدة في لبنان بحيث يستطيع عكس التقاليد المختلفة للقانون وان يجعل من نفسه في متناول تلك التقاليد. ويجب ان يدرس في معهد معين يكون مرتبطاً بجامعات مختلفة غير ان هذا شيء يجب ان يخطط له اولئك الذين سيشتركون فيه.

ان كليات القانون التي لديها نظم داخلية تحكمها في لبنان موجودة في جامعة سانت جوزيف وكانت هي كلية القانون الوحيدة حتى عام ١٩٦٣، وفي الجامعة اللبنانية والجامعة العربية. أما الجهة الرابعة التي سيكون لها نظام جامعي داخلي والتي ستكون أهم جهة بالنظر الى البرنامج الانثروبولوجي القانوني المقترح هي جمعية المقاصد وهي الجهاز التعليمي للسنيين.

لقد طُرح هذا الاقتراح أمام عدد من الشخصيات البارزة في مختلف المجتمعات الكتابية في لبنان وبشكل خاص أمام عدد من محاضري القانون. وجاء رد الفعل الأولي مرحباً بحرارة، وبالطبع لا يمكن استقراء الكثير من ذلك الى ان تتم صياغة البرنامج بشكل اكثر وضوحاً وان يحكم عليه اولئك الاشخاص بعد قراءته. ويهدف هذا الملحق الى اعطائهم ملخصاً مكتوباً للبرنامج في شكل ابتدائي في طبيعته، وليست هناك النية في الحيلولة دون اجرائهم للتعديلات فيه وتطويره بحيث يتواءم مع الاحتياجات التي يرون ضرورتها للمجتمع. كما يجب البحث عن دعم البرنامج من قبل كل من المناحي الثقافية الثلاثة التي يجمعها لبنان وهي الثقافات الناطقة بالعربية والناطقة بالفرنسية والناطقة بالانكليزية. فلكل من تقاليدها القانونية أهمية في لبنان، وموافقة المؤسسات الممثلة لكل منها ضرورية لوضع هذا البرنامج موضع التنفيذ.

St. Aloysius Gonzaga Jesuit Community

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ANNEX TO THE REPORT ON VISIT TO LEBANON BY RAYMOND G. HELMICK, S.J.

A PROJECTED PROGRAM OF LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY.

St. Aloysius Gonzaga Jesuit Community

19 Eye Street, N.W. / Washington, D.C. 20001 / (202) 842-1650

March, 1983

REPORT ON VISIT TO LEBANON BY RAYMOND G. HELMICK, S.J.

The visit lasted from December 28, 1982, to January 28, 1983. It was a time when the hostilities of the previous summer had largely ceased, though there was continued communal fighting in Tripoli and in the Shuf. Clearance of ruins and the demining of areas in Beirut was getting underway. The first sessions of the Lebanese-Israeli-American talks were being held.

The purpose of the visit was to gain an understanding of the internal conflict in Lebanon, particularly of the anxieties, frustrations, and ambivalences it might contain, and to initiate a dialogue with the various participants. As a result of the visit, RH feels he now has this initial understanding of the political-social situation of Lebanon. It will have to ripen through much further conversation with Lebanese. This kind of interpretation is not intended simply for publication, as if it were for RH himself to make such an interpretation on his own, but for development through a process in which the many Lebanese partners to the discussion are participants. This present paper, therefore, will be circulated back to those in Lebanon with whom RH spoke, and he hopes for their critical assessment of it. While some publication and public discussion, of a modest and tentative character, might already be possible after this first visit, RH judges it preferable to let such activities wait until those persons have made their response to this report and he has had the opportunity to speak with them again on a second visit.

An added result of the visit is the beginnings of a concrete project in the area of legal anthropology. This is only a concept at this stage and will need much further development before it is clear that there is something viable in it that would be valued by people in Lebanon. But it has been discussed, as a possibility, with a number of significant persons in Lebanon, and has drawn an initially favorable response.

Circle of Contacts.

RH had valuable access to people through the fact that he stayed at the Jesuit Residence attached to the Université St. Joseph in Beirut. The Jesuits there, both French and Lebanese in origin with a scattering of Americans already known to him, were in several cases themselves significant figures and/or relatives of leading figures, and they were more than helpful in arranging meetings. RH had a letter of introduction from Cardinal Medeiros of Boston to the Maronite Patriarch, Cardinal Khoraiche. The Patriarch granted him a lengthy and most helpful meeting. In addition, RH had introductions to many others who had been of great help to people in the various American aid organizations (Oxfam, International Rescue Committee, etc.) in their effort to understand the

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St. Aloysius Gonzaga Jesuit Community

19 Eye Street, N.W. / Washington, D.C. 20001 / (202) 842-1650

20 September, 1983

Sheikh Walid Joumblatt
Moukhtara
Lebanon

Dear Sheikh Joumblatt,

May I first apologize for the length of this letter, and the consequent demand it makes on your time at so critical a juncture. I had hoped I might actually see and speak with you, as you had so generously made it possible for me to do last January, and it was for that reason that I wrote to you earlier care of Mr. Hamade. The outbreak of fighting prevented that.

In fact, I have pursued that as my main objective over the last two weeks and more. Since it was impossible to fly to Beirut at the beginning of September as I had planned, I flew to Damascus instead, principally in the hope that I might meet you there. My friends, the Jesuit Fathers in Damascus, advised me strongly against approaching you there. Since it had been said repeatedly that you were likely to be in Rome in response to Mr. Craxi's invitation, I went there and saw to it that I would be in a position to contact you if you came. Only after it seemed clear that you would not get to Rome did I return to the United States and decide to write to you instead.

For what I wanted to discuss with you, a face to face meeting would have been more satisfactory. I will try to lay it out with clarity and also anticipate, when I can, the points you might have needed to raise in discussion. I hope you have the patience to manage so schematized a form of discourse. I will write, in a first section, of what I perceive as the interests and needs of the Druze in Lebanon, of Lebanon itself as a whole, of Syria, and of the Palestinians. This section is essentially a presenting of credentials, so that you know whether I understand what I'm talking about, and hence you may want to leave it to your assistants. Then in a second section I will come to proposals.

PART I: INTERESTS AND NEEDS.

A. The Druze in Lebanon.

As I interpret it, there are two fundamental rules that govern Druze policy, and they are so self-evident and reasonable that no one should quarrel with them. They are:

1. The primary Druze interest must always be in the survival of the Druze community. It is a small community, highly accomplished in all ways, but of its nature not open to growth or the addition of new members. It has always been embattled, in danger from all its neighbors, and needing the most explicit guarantees from them of its safety.

2. The Druze have a permanent interest in Lebanon, its safety, its integrity, its independence, and this for two reasons:

a) because Lebanon is one of the most valuable guarantees of the safety of the Druze community, provided only that Lebanon itself, as it has for the most significant parts of its history, recognizes that one of its principal reasons for existing is to guarantee the safety of the Druze;

b) because Lebanon, as the pluralist society that guarantees the equality and safety of its various member communities, is an invention of the Druze, one of the Druze community's principal gifts to world society, a model of liberal civilization.

That reading of the fundamental interests of Druze society leaves me totally unbelieving of any interpretation of present events that makes the Druze, or you yourself, the enemy of Lebanon, or of the integrity and independance of the Lebanese State and its society. It just does not figure. I have, of course, met many people who did not perceive their own interest, who let immediate emotional responses govern their perception of their interests, or who looked only to the immediate without seeing their longer-term interests. That is even the norm among many, if not most, of those charged with the government of the world. But from our meeting last January, I esteem you as much more perceptive than that, and I reject any idea that you do not know what your interests are. Hence, in spelling out here my understanding of Druze interests, I do not mean to argue anything, but simply to explain how much I see, on the assumption that, unless I am mistaken in my analysis, you see these things as well and we will be in agreement.

It has been my perception that the Druze community, for all its apparent internal differences, coordinates its policy carefully, so that those who are associated with the camps of various external interests are in accord over these basic Druze interests and actually consult with one another to be sure that the Druze community as a whole has friends everywhere that it is necessary to have them. This is consistent with what I have seen as the first rule of Druze policy, that the survival of the community is the first priority and that, in doubtful circumstances, there must be important elements of the Druze leadership with each of the major parties contending over Lebanon so that, whoever wins, the Druze community will survive. This is not in contradiction to the interest of the Druze in Lebanon, its integrity and independence, as the strongest eventual guarantee of Druze security. I find this a consistent factor in the history of Lebanon and the Druze, and felt it was confirmed by recent events in which the various elements of the Druze community well understood the parts they were to play. If I am right about that, I am encouraged to find it so.

In the light of that, it is neither surprizing nor alarming to me to find you yourself so closely aligned with the interests of Syria. As you will see, I do not choose to interpret Syrian actions or interests as anti-Lebanese, and it seems to me accordingly an appropriate courtesy to Syria that you should be as deferential as you are to Syrian policy. I feel sure that the fundamental interests of the Druze community, which include the safety and integrity of Lebanon, have full standing in your own policy, in which I expect that the opinions of other parts of the Druze leadership will have been carefully heard.

I know, too, that because the survival of the Druze as such is so fundamental an interest, for which the safety and integrity of Lebanon as a whole has to serve as an instrumentality, that the Druze must have an untouchable degree of control over their own territory in the Mountain. This has never impeded a hospitable Druze welcome to Christian communities in the Shuf, but it has always meant the exclusion of rival military incursions or control. The Druze must be equals and cannot afford to be subordinated in their own area. I note that, even while the Joumblatts have been among those most friendly and supportive to the Palestinians, neither your father nor you yourself have ever allowed Palestinian military units the freedom of the Shuf.

The Israelis very heavyhandedly, whether by error or as a deliberate mischief-making enterprise, introduced Kataeb militia units into this traditionally sacred Druze area. Even the local Maronites of the Shuf appear to have recognized the untenable character of that action and realized that it is at the heart of all the misery of this last year in the area, culminating in the present heavy fighting. My impression is that your objection to the presence of the Lebanese Army in the area is directed less to the presence of national army units as such than to the failure of the Army to date to establish to your satisfaction its independence from the private aims of the Kataeb militia.

B. Lebanon as a Whole.

As you know from the paper I wrote earlier in the year, I have given a lot of attention to the relation of the various Lebanese communities, and the possibility or impossibility of their making up one national society. I started, in fact, with the statement made by Moshe Sharett, then Israeli Foreign Minister, in 1952, that Lebanon is a fiction. That was a hypothesis which, if I were to let myself be involved with Lebanon, I had to see proven or disproven. Many others, and not only the Israelis, have acted on that hypothesis. My testing of it went in two stages. First I found, in speaking to people in various confessional communities, including Druze, that there was in fact a very widespread desire to have a Lebanese society. That of course is no proof that such a society is really possible, and had to be followed by a second stage, asking if the necessary conditions were there. To that question, I came up with a very qualified "Yes, if..." response, which I tried to express in that paper.

Since then I spent the month of June in Lebanon and learned far more than I had known when I wrote that paper. One of the most unmistakable things I learned was that, however important the relations of Christians and Muslims may be, giving the country its character as the meeting-place of these two civilizations and religious cultures and hence its international importance, there is yet no Lebanon if this Christian-Muslim relation is not preceded by a firm entente between the Maronites and the Druze. It is on this that Lebanon is built, whether we see Lebanon as the secure Mountain refuge of endangered peoples or as the historic invention of a pluralist society (an invention, as I well know by now, of the Druze). Without the entente of Maronites and Druze, one may work as hard as one will at Christian-Muslim relations and there is no Lebanon, only the fiction seen by Moshe Sharett.

The Gemayel government has not given recognition to or acted upon that fundamental of Lebanese life. I don't particularly blame President Amin Gemayel or those around him for that, since it has been the consistent fault of all the last 150 years to ignore this necessity for Druze-Christian accord as the basis of Lebanon. This government, like all those since 1920, has been playing a game of numbers, of majorities and minorities, a game in which today the Lebanese Christian communities clearly have to juggle hard in order to maintain the position in Lebanese society which they, too, see as necessary to their safety. Advice coming from American and European governments and the public opinion of those countries has encouraged this Lebanese government to believe that only the larger numbers counted, and that the Druze, not having these, could with impunity be ignored. None of those countries has known a close-knit feudal community in many centuries. In fact, from having spoken of these matters with American diplomatic personnel, I know that they have become aware of the special character of the Druze community and the need to accomodate it in other terms than simply in relation to its numbers. This is wisdom acquired rather late in the day, but it does seem to have been learned.

I suppose, as a Westerner, an American, I should be expected to look on feudalism as an obsolescent form of society. In my paper earlier this year, which you have, I wrote of the way the Maronites had broken out of their feudalism. Of course, they and the other Lebanese communities have their strong-men and chieftains still, through whom everyone has to go to get jobs or influence. This is often described as residual feudalism, but is in fact something else, a rather sinister form of exploitation and protection racket which Lebanese society needs to overcome. I wrote in that paper that the Druze community had come out of feudalism in a different way, through realizing a requirement that the traditional feudal leadership families prove and acquire their authority anew by merit.

You, like your father before you, have vindicated your position in your community as the valorous Prince, and I honor you for that. I think it must have been clear when we met in January that, even in the short hour or so we had to talk, you had gained my respect. During my June visit to Lebanon I met Emir Magid Arslane and understood something of how he, in his long life, has fulfilled (differently!) this social expectation among his people, and how little his sons were prepared to follow him in that role.

I have a different concept of democracy than that of numbers and majority rule. A very important model for me is the one I have learned from Northern Irish Protestants, that it means the preservation of the rights of dissenting non-conformist minorities. In Lebanon, democracy means something distinctive again, and it includes both the equality of individuals (as persons, not as members of any given community) and the equality of communities, regardless of their numbers. The Druze community has been a principal contributor to the development of that Lebanese democracy, such as it is and so far as it has yet been able to develop. The right of each community to its own internal institutional structure is certainly an essential part of that democracy. That the Druze community's preferred forms are feudal in the sense they are (i.e., when and only when there is such competence in the traditional leaders as to merit it) reflects, as I see it, no backwardness but rather the true needs and condition of the Druze as they find themselves in Lebanese and Near Eastern society today.

The Druze of the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries acted on the principal that their opportunity for a secure communal existence lay in an entente with the Maronite Christians of Mount Lebanon. They were influenced in this by their observation of the international support (Florentine, French, etc.) that was available to the Maronites for the preservation of the relative autonomy of Lebanon under the Ottoman system, as this was clearly a Druze interest too. The generosity and political foresight of the Druze led them to extend this entente with the Maronites further, to include the Sunnite and Shiite Muslim communities and the other Christian groups. But it was the initial entente with the Maronites which made possible that widely pluralist Lebanese society, a Druze invention

That entente was broken in the 19th century through the calculated machinations of outside colonial powers, Mohammed Ali's Egyptians, the Ottomans, and then the British and French, who saw in the breach between these two communities, their opportunity to dominate both and to parcel out the whole of Lebanon. My own reading of 19th-century Lebanese history is that the long reign of the Emir Bashir II contained a sequence of fundamental and deadly errors that brought to an end the traditional Lebanese society: first, from the start of his reign, he played games with the regional international politics that must inevitably have left so small a country as Lebanon the plaything of the other regional powers; then he invited into the local scene European powers whose activity now revealed itself as colonialist in a sense and to an extent that it had not been before; then he engineered the breach between himself and the other Bashir, your ancestor Sheikh Bashir Joumblatt, thus placing the fortunes of Lebanon in the hands of the colonializing outside powers instead of in the joined hands of the two most basic Lebanese communities, Druze and Maronite. The colonialist wolves seized the opportunity this foolish conduct of Bashir II opened to them, and in the torn and dependent state to which Lebanese affairs were reduced for the next century it was the Druze who were the most endangered victims, despite the several times when it suited Ottoman policy to expose the Christian communities to agonizing trials. When, in the 20th century, the effort was made, principally by the Maronites and often enough with arrière pensée, to rebuild the pluralist society of a "Greater Lebanon," it was done in the more "modern" way, counting as a principal element the numbers in each community, and therefore turning principally to the Muslims, Sunnite and Shiite, to the neglect of the Druze.

I can well understand that it may be tempting now for the Druze to build their security basically on an alliance with the Muslims of Lebanon, to the prejudice of the Christians. The rebuff of the 19th century and of Lebanon's subsequent history has been a rebuff of the Christians to the Druze, not of the Druze to the Christians. I won't try to argue this, as you will have made your calculations and will not now be turned from them by arguments of mine. I can only hope that you already agree with my assessment. Simply to state my conclusions, I believe the security of the Druze community, which is fundamentally tied to a genuine (not fiction) and independent Lebanese State, is best guaranteed by a multiple accordnow, prejudicial neither to Christians nor Muslims, but embracing equally the Christians, the Sunnites and the Shiites. In the wider "Arab Nation" alone, without the special guarantees that Lebanese independence brings for the Druze, I would not think the Druze have the safety you require. And to rely on the Christians alone (or even primarily, as was the case in the time of the Emirs), to the prejudice of the two Muslim communities, would be to ignore the unimpressive way the Christians have behaved this last century and more, putting their trust in foreign, colonializing powers rather than in friendship with their neighbors in Lebanon, easily victims

of a paranoia toward those neighbors. (When I speak of paranoia in this way as a social phenomenon, I don't imply at all that people are crazy, as I had to explain to many Christian Lebanese after they read my paper earlier this year. I mean a consistent readiness to believe only the worst of their neighbors: these suspicions can be properly labeled "paranoid" if in fact they are false.) The paranoia of the Lebanese Christians has been crystallized in these last eight years by a conception of what was happening in the civil war to which they attach the label: "The Lebanese Resistance," meaning the resistance of an embattled Near Eastern Christian community (nation) against the concerted attempt of a Muslim sea to overwhelm them. They simply did not notice what else was being fought about.

That leaves the central question, whether you can find in that Christian, and especially Maronite community enough readiness, enough capacity to act other than on the basis of paranoia toward the other communities of Lebanon, to build a society with them. That is the question I was trying to answer, as well as I then could, in the paper I wrote last March, based on my meeting people in January of this year. My answer was a very qualified "Yes, if..." After my second visit, for the month of June, in which I spoke with a great number of people in this community, including much of the leadership, and that after they had read my paper and hence knew what they were responding to, I feel still much more encouraged in giving a positive answer to that question, even in spite of a much better knowledge of the reservations that are necessary. This, again, is not a matter on which I should argue. You have your own ways of assessing this question, and will already have decided whether you draw this or the opposite conclusion. My impression from watching your campaign is that you are aiming for a positive accomodation with the Christian community, and hence I conclude that you have judged this matter much as I do.

The more specific question is about the present government, and the Presidency of Amin Gemayel. Now that I am back in the United States, I see reports in American newspapers of statements by local Druze militia commanders who, angry at American incomprehension of the issues at stake in Lebanon, speak of President Amin Gemayel as head simply of "a fascist political party." The origins of Pierre Gemayel's Phalange movement, first militia and then political party, in admiration of the Italian and Spanish fascists is familiar. I do in fact find much more creditable ambitions in the subsequent Kataeb party, and in the Front Libanais (including other than Kataeb leaders), along with much of the paranoia I have mentioned. But the question is really whether President Amin Gemayel himself is simply and merely a front-man for the Kataeb, and the leading edge of a Kataeb effort to monopolize the State, or whether he is something other, a President capable of representing entente among the various Lebanese communities. In this question, and in your worries about the direction of the Gemayel Presidency, you have concerns in common with the other Lebanese communities, most conspicuously with the Amal movement and many other elements of the Shiite and Sunnite communities, but in fact with everyone in Lebanon who is not Kataeb.

It must not be my concern in this letter to defend President Amin Gemayel. My personal concern is for Lebanese society, not for any particular government or person in the leadership. However, I should say that my judgment of Amin Gemayel (whom I have not yet met) is positive. I do not judge him by his failure to have perceived on time the special character and needs of the Druze community, since he shares that failure with everyone else who has been in government in Lebanon since 1920, and was encouraged in it by all his foreign advisers. I know that the question American policy-makers had about

him as of late August (when I last talked with them) was whether he had the capacity to control the Kataeb elements (party and militia) about him. They did not question his own commitment to the wider Lebanese society. In this I agreed with their assessment. You and your Druze militia have given everyone, Amin Gemayel and his government, their American counsellors and myself too, a salutary and needed lesson in how essential the Druze are to Lebanon. Without being partisan to the person or government of President Amin Gemayel, though he has my good will, I would feel that it is a very drastic thing, damaging as a precedent, to cashier a Lebanese President, and that having now thoroughly instructed Amin Gemayel on the subject of the importance of the Druze, you could do much worse than to come to such settlement as you will come to with him rather than with another.

It remains to sepak of dependence on foreigners. It impresses me, as I read Lebanese history, that dependence on outside powers to regulate the relations of the communities inside Lebanon, and give one of them some edge over the others, has always been a disaster. The only outside support that has ever been worth Lebanon's having has been protection against yet fuller domination by some other foreign power, as when both Druze and Christian relied on the support (still pre-colonial) of the European powers to retain their relative autonomy within the Ottoman system. Even that proved dangerous once the Europeans discovered that the delights of colonialism, which they had already been enjoying elsewhere in the world, could be indulged in in the Near East too. Not only distant "great powers" are a danger to Lebanon, but near neighbors as well if Lebanon tries to play a power game among them. (That is the great lesson of the calamitous riegn of Bashir II, illustrated further at many other times of Lebanon's history.) The only relatively safe course for Lebanon is in regional neutrality in any quarrels among Arab States.

I know that Lebanon cannot be neutral in the one greatest quarrel of the region, that which pits Israel against the Palestinian inhabitants of and refugees from the land it occupies, and hence against the whole Arab nation which regards the Palestinians as wounded member of itself. Lebanon has, however, already played and overplayed and outplayed its military role in this quarrel. Militarily Lebanon has nothing more to offer the Palestinians, and her support can only be diplomatic. That, as I hope to show in the proposals section of this letter, can be important. If Lebanon does not settle its own affairs amicably and make itself master of its own house, it has nothing to offer the Palestinians or anyone else diplomatically or in any other way, and the game is simply lost.

My own eventual hope is for a wider neutrality, a neutralisation, on the Austrian model, of the whole Near Eastern/Middle Eastern region with regard to the superpower geopolitical struggle of the US and USSR. That is a remote possibility now, as the absolute presupposition for it is the full resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian-Arab conflict, and no one is yet doing anything practical toward that goal. In the meantime, the regional neutrality of Lebanon, recognized by all its neighbors as a value to themselves, is the one most necessary element in Lebanon's safety.

C. Syria.

It would be, to my mind, a grave error if my own country, the United States, were to regard or treat Syria as an enemy. On the one hand, the US is asking things of Syria which it is in Syria's grant to give or not to give. Hence it would make no sense at all to request these things in an atmosphere of insult. On the other hand, Syria's policies, both toward Lebanon and toward the region, are capable of a far more benevolent interpretation than has been given in American media reporting. It is much more reasonable for the US to build its approaches to Syria on this more favorable interpretation of Syrian actions and intentions, with all due regard to the less promising possibilities. As for the media reporting, I trust that you are familiar with the way American reporting is beyond government policy control, even if it is often subject to control by monopolistic commercial or other interests. Having lived your life in Lebanon, you will not be surprised to find in that reporting touches of paranoia, i.e., the preference for the most unfavorable possible interpretation of events and of the intentions of others. I hope that actual American policy, and official American public statements, are not tainted with the same paranoia.

Whether or not Syria ever wants or is willing to withdraw its troops from Lebanon, making possible Lebanese independence, I do not know. If Syria does not want to go, no one is going to make her: not the US surely, not the Lebanese, not the Israelis. For lack of real information on Syrian intentions, I can only rely on my intuition, which is that the hard Syrian statements about troop withdrawal, about the Lebanese-Israeli accord, and about Syria's own interests in Lebanon, are a negotiating position, not the firm slamming of a door. In this intuition of mine, I find myself supported by the opinions -- more intuitions -- of others whose understanding of the region I respect.

Syria first sent her troops into Lebanon, under the title of peacekeeping force, on the invitation of a Lebanese government, of the other Arab States, and tacitly of the United States and even of Israel. She has good reason to believe that when she entered she saved the Lebanese Christian forces from being overwhelmed at a critical juncture, and that subsequently she performed the same service for the Muslim forces at an equally critical juncture. There are many Lebanese who dispute Syrian bona fides on both these points, but they are too often people anxious to blame Syria on any score. How could it be otherwise if Syria's action has, at one time or another, prevented each side in the civil war from near total victory over the other? At present, if Syria is to retire her troops from Lebanon, she feels quite understandably that this should be done with thanks rather than with reproaches and insult from the several parties that invited Syria in in the first place.

My own perception is that it is hard for Syria to find the grounds on which it is possible to withdraw its troops with dignity. Those who want that result, the withdrawal of Syrian troops, should therefore be helping Syria to find those grounds.

Syria has an internal political problem regarding any such withdrawal. There must be something to show for the eight years of effort, for the Syrian lives lost and the many trials and humiliations Syria has been put to in the course of that time. Syria would like, of course, to have the Golan back, but knows that will not happen as yet. The price for the Golan is different:

a full and genuine peace with Israel, and that cannot happen until Israel resolves the Palestinian situation to the satisfaction of the Palestinians and the other Arab States, something not at all in sight yet. It would doubtless be welcome to Syria to have some further American recognition of Syrian claims to the Golan, but this would not suffice to make the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon palatable.

It is very desirable that whatever Syria gains or has to show for her withdrawal should come from the United States. I quite agree with President Assad's assessment that the United States has failed to deliver on too many promises or assurances given to Syria and other Arab States, to the extent that American promises now ring very hollow to Arab ears. What is required, therefore, is that the United States actually deliver some real benefit to Syria and the Arabs, not simply promise something for the future. This would have the further advantage to Syria (and for that matter to the United States as well) that it would make possible a warmer relation between Syria and the Western countries afterwards, with trade openings and assistance of various kinds that would not smell of colonialism, and would also not disrupt Syria's relation of friendship and cooperation with the USSR.

What would really suit Syria's needs, as something to show for all her effort in Lebanon that would be seen as a gain for all the Arab world, would be to put the question of Palestine and the Palestinians back at the center of the negotiating table as the central business of the region. This is necessary because so many distractions have been thrown up to turn world and regional attention away from the matter of Palestine. The entire Lebanese mess of these past fifteen years and more has been a great escalating distraction deliberately created to turn attention away from the centrality of the Palestinian problem.

To accomplish this concentration of attention on Palestine, it is necessary to gain United States recognition, by action and not merely by words of promise, that this is the central question and that it is a vital American interest to resolve it. For this purpose, if one is to gain the thing itself -- real satisfaction for the Palestinians -- and not merely some ephemeral propaganda victory, one must take into account the reality and depth of the American commitment to the survival and safety of Israel, and design steps that the United States can actually take rather than demand those that it is known the US cannot take. I will leave this theme to be developed more concretely in the proposals section of this letter. It is the central point of what I have to suggest.

There are clearly financial considerations that affect Syria's decision as well. Syria is a poor country. While she has her troops in Lebanon as a recognized peace-keeping force, Syria has all those young men collecting salaries which she does not have to pay herself. They are paid by the other Arab States. If these troops are going to retire from Lebanon, Syria has to know where the equivalent money is going to come from. I often hear this referred to in Lebanon with cynicism, as if Syria were waiting to be bribed before withdrawing her troops from Lebanon. It is no cynical matter at all, but a very practical one to which Syria has to have an answer.

And of course, there is a political consideration internal to Lebanon which Syria must consider. It is the same question of Lebanon's reality to which Moshe Sharett answered in 1952 that Lebanon is a fiction. Is there any government or State in Lebanon that can command the loyalty and be seen

to be at the service of all the communities of Lebanon? You are fighting an internal war now over that question. Syria understands very well that the Israelis, with their partial withdrawal to the Awali line, moved very calculatedly to compound a chaotic situation in the Shuf that was largely of their creation in the first place. The Israeli leadership had tried and failed to make of Lebanon a compliant satellite. Unable to have that, they prefer to have a weakened and impotent neighbor on their Northern border. I am writing on the assumption that Syria is not herself in the game of turning Lebanon into a satellite, or subjecting Lebanon to permanent military occupation. Syria must then know that there is accord among the Lebanese communities and that she can withdraw without creating further turmoil and civil war before she can responsibly recall her troops.

The importance of some clear political gain and accomplishment for Syria as a result of her years in Lebanon was already clear to me from knowing the minority status of the Syrian government. It became all the clearer when I visited Damascus for a week earlier this month. Once I found that I could not pursue my original purpose, which had been to see you there, my visit was thoroughly non-political. I could not help observing, though, even when I visited the tourist sites of Damascus or walked the streets, that a large part of every crowd on the streets was made up of young men in military uniform but without guns, not really engaged in any military duties, but meeting and talking in the streets. That inevitably means continual political-social ferment in Syria. I found in the Syrians I met a great timidity about mixing in any way in political questions, but despite this a feeling that they had more freedom and opportunity and fairness than could be found in other Arab States. The regime, in this way, seems to have a real popularity. Yet in such a matter as its military and political actions in Lebanon and as regards the question of Palestine, it must clearly demonstrate to its people its competence and some real accomplishments.

D. The Palestinians.

Traumatic events have poured in upon the Palestinians so heavily and with such frequency for so long a time as to disorient them and make it far more difficult for them than for any other actors in the Near Eastern tragedy to identify and follow their true interests. Hence it is not surprising if they, more often than others, act irrationally and against their own interests in pursuit of some immediate emotional satisfaction, even that they often play right into the hands of their Israeli enemies and serve their interests, as the Israelis have been skilled in psychological warfare and have understood how to manipulate the emotions of both the Palestinians and the rest of the Arabs to their own advantage in the campaign to take over Palestinian land.

For a long time, after many preceding years of drift, lack of policy and fatally wrong choices by the Palestinians, the Al Fatah leadership of the PLO served the Palestinians' interests relatively well, in that they built up among them a sense first of peoplehood and then of nationhood that was very necessary to them if they are ever to regain a homeland. In recent years and especially in the last year that leadership has been helpless and rudderless. Yassir Arafat's long-successful policy of building consensus and de-emphasizing dissension has left him frozen and unable to make decisions once there were doors open before the Palestinians. Overall Palestinian policy for the last year has been adrift, manipulated to their own advantage by all the other

parties on the scene, especially by the skilled Israeli provocateurs.

Lest there be any mistaken impression here, I should make it clear that I write from a position very freindly to the Israelis. The Israelis are there, have their State and their society, and to destroy it would be a tragedy comparable to the tragedy they themselves have inflicted on the Palestinians. I share myself in the commitment of so many Americans and other Westerners (not only Jews or people dominated by Jewish opinion-builders and interests) to the safety of this people, who have suffered their two millenia of persecution at our Western and Christian hands. I know quite well the Arab argument that, if we Westerners are to expiate our sins against the Jews by giving them a land, it should be a land that is ours to give and not someone else's, the Palestinians', and I acknowledge its force. The fact that remains irreducibly against that argument is that the Israelis are there, living, breathing, loving, brawling, hugging their children much as do Arab parents, and that to remove them would be an appalling tragedy and new injustice.

I know just as well the tragedy and injustice inflicted on the Palestinians, and their right to satisfaction and a land. Hence, quite simply, I am for a partition of Palestine, with two independent and sovereign states, Israel and Palestine.

It is quite clear to me that there are two rival concepts of the State of Israel. One is a place of safety, freedom, and a cultural renaissance for the Jews. That State has to have fixed and known borders that are no threat to its neighbors, and can only survive at long term in genuine friendship and cooperation with its neighbors. The other concept of the State of Israel is the constantly expanding one, whose borders are not known and not defined, the fortress Israel that sets all its Arab neighbors at defianceand periodically siezes new territories to add to its fortress defences. I have no brief for that expanding fortress State of Israel. I am convinced that it is entirely contrary to the interests of my own country, the US, to support the expanding fortress State of Israel (though it remains, to my mind, a moral responsibility of the US and other Western countries to support the Israel of refuge and creativity for the Jews, with its known borders). And I am quite prepared, on the American scene, to make that distinction between the two concepts of Israel, the one which I defend and see a proper American interest in defending and the other which I oppose and see no American interest in defending. I am convinced that, if the Israelis persist in the expanding fortress concept of their State, which means continuing aggression and injustice toward all their Arab neighbors, they will eventually be destroyed, and in my friendliness to them I would find that a great disaster.

That said, I should state where I see the real interests of the Palestinians. There are two fundamental things:

1. actually regaining a homeland, presumably the West Bank and Gaza, under their own sovereignty; and

2. the safety of their population, both the Palestinians living under cruel repression in the Israeli-occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza, and especially the terribly endangered Palestinian refugees living in the camps in Lebanon.

The first of these interests, the regaining of a homeland in Palestine under their own sovereignty, has often been subordinated to ephemeral propaganda coups or to the power struggles of various factions within the Palestinian resistance or among its supposed supporters, or to expressions of undying hatred toward the Israelis or other enemies. Chances to have or to make progress toward the real thing, the land, have been fumbled and lost, squandered, for these petty reasons again and again. The interest is in gaining the partition of the land, a proper part of it under Palestinian sovereignty, not in regaining the whole and driving the Jews into the sea, as in fact most of the Palestinians and other Arabs have long since learned. Otherwise the Palestinians, by taking part in a genocide, would join the criminal societies of the world, which it is not their desire to do. (Of course, much of Western opinion has long been convinced that the Palestinians, because of their isolated acts of terrorism, are a criminal society. But that is merely a base triumph of propaganda for the Israelis, who have on a much larger and more consistent scale terrorized the Palestinian population and all their Arab neighbors throughout this time.)

The second of the interests, in the safety of their own civilian population, has also been ignored too often by the Palestinian political and military leadership, who have used the suffering people of occupied Palestine and the refugees of the camps as political pawns, partly in the struggle to regain the homeland, partly in the internal feuds and power struggles. That is unworthy of the Palestinian movement, and if continued would forfeit any moral right to the leadership of the Palestinians. It is a political detail which is open to dispute whether the Palestinian leadership would not have done better long ago to have declared itself a government in exile. I have nothing very cogent to offer for or against that proposition. But whether it is called a government in exile or not, the Palestinian leadership has the responsibility of a government for the safety and good condition of its people. It has performed very poorly and very carelessly in that regard.

Just now the Palestinians in the Lebanese camps are in the most terrible danger, from Lebanese factions (and not the Phalange only) who were once their friends and are now thirsting for vengeance on them. For that reason, I strongly support the presence of the Multinational Force in Beirut -- the American Marines, the French and Italians and the few British -- not to be supporting one side in a civil war or exchanging fire and insults with your Druze militia, but to protect those Palestinian camps, the original reason the Multinational Force was sent there. In the absence of their own political and military leadership, the Palestinians of the camps have no other security than that provided by the French and Italians among them, and the largely moral backing those French and Italians have from the Americans and the few British. You and your Druze militia could not provide the equivalent protection for them, nor could Nabieh Berri and his Amal, because that would simply reduce the safety of the Palestinians to a factional question in Lebanese politics and expose them to new danger. Nor would it be any solution to reintroduce the armed PLO to Sabra and Shatilah to protect them, as they are seen by all the Lebanese enemies of the Palestinians as the cause of the trouble, and their presence would simply attract new attacks, not least from the Israelis themselves. Only when there is a concerted agreement among the Lebanese communities about Lebanese responsibility for the safety of these refugee guests (and that presupposes accord among the Lebanese communities on other matters as well), and the Lebanese no longer see the Palestinian refugees as bringing the danger of constant armed Israeli vengeance on Lebanon, will the refugees be safe in Lebanese hands and the Multinational Force no

longer necessary. Consequently, I have told the American State Department people (I don't speak for them, but I do speak to them whenever I have the occasion) that I would write or argue in public or testify before American Congressional committees at any time in favor of keeping the Multinational Force and its American contingent there for that purpose.

Last year two significant things happened to the Palestinians. They were beaten militarily by the Israelis and they won politically. The Palestinian leadership has since then wasted an entire year, because they did not draw the consequences from either of those plain facts. That means not merely postponement of opportunity, but loss of a great deal of it.

Militarily, the Palestinians are finished in Lebanon. They can do marginal things to influence local Lebanese politics in those parts of Lebanon where Syrian control allows them to do so. They can break into factions and do some amount of damage to one another. They can occasionally infiltrate a small group into the Israeli-occupied part of Lebanon to do pin-prick damage to the Israelis. (I expect there are enough Lebanese willing and able to do that for them.) But they can do nothing whatever militarily from Lebanon that has any bearing on the regaining of their homeland or the safety of their population, their two fundamental interests. Militarily, the value of Lebanon to the Palestinians, or of their own use of Lebanon as a military base, is zero.

Rather than recognize this and draw the consequences, the Palestinian military have squabbled among themselves all year about whether and how to continue the armed struggle. Clearly, if Lebanon is no military base for them, Libya or Tunisia or Yemen is no substitute. Syria is not about to make itself a military base for them, or to risk a war of its own with Israel for their sakes. They are without a military base, and therefore called upon to assess what other than military resources they have.

It is hard to discern just what Syria has in mind with the Palestinians. She encourages the rebellion against Arafat by factions who find their feelings hurt by the realization of this actual military defeat. I suspect that, once he has taken control of the PLO through the bruised feelings of these disappointed Palestinian soldiers, President Assad would have the wit to do the political things to which Arafat has been unable to bring himself over this past year. But I do not see it as really to Syria's advantage to reduce the PLO to a front for itself, like the Saiqa. That would rob the PLO of much of its legitimacy as leadership of the Palestinians. A relation of cooperative understanding with a genuine Palestinian leadership would seem to be much more in Syria's interest.

The Palestinians won politically in last year's war: split Israeli opinion, split American opinion, and won world sympathy on a colossal scale for the first time. These are the non-military resources that the PLO leadership should be assessing and using. Instead they have gone a full year without even examining the nature of these new resources.

You are familiar with my liking for parallels in other political situations. I see a very strong one in the Philippines. The Israelis, having lost so heavily in the political arena last year, are reduced to an operation of damage control. They will go unchallenged in that political arena so long as the Palestinians ~~have~~ only counter them only with worthless military bragadoccio. Hence it is to the Israelis' advantage constantly to provoke

the Palestinians and their friends to military responses, certain that they will always be on a scale that the Israelis can handle easily and will give them excuse for reprisals. Similarly in the Philippines, as I read that situation, President Marcos calculated that he would lose if he allowed his opposition leader, Benigno Aquino, to challenge him politically. He therefore made a quite cold-blooded assessment that he could contain a violent uprising by outright represssion, and would have American help in doing so, and had Aquino murdered. The Filipinos have not yet quite risen to the bait and given Marcos what he counts on getting from them. The Palestinians, confronted with comparable provocation, fall for it every time. That is a sweeping enough judgment of President Marcos, but it is my own estimate of the probabilities.

PART II: PROPOSALS.

My proposal is essentially that you yourself, Sheikh Walid Joumblatt, should help the Syrians to the conditions that will make possible their withdrawal from Lebanon. I propose this to you because you are the person better placed than any other to do so, and because I believe it is the way you can best serve the interests of the Druze community in Lebanon.

I have nothing specific to propose with regard to the internal civil war in Lebanon. That situation has become too remote for me to judge, and changes too quickly to be the subject of a letter. It has taken me a few days to write this letter since the date, September 20, when I began it, and even as I write I hear the announcement of a cease-fire in the internal Lebanese fighting. At this distance I cannot judge the meaning or permanence of that cease-fire.

In their approach to Syria on the subject of withdrawal of troops, the American government and the Lebanese government acting on the assumption of American support have had only two distinct things to say to the Syrians. One is "Please," and the other is "You must." (One of several American diplomats to whom I proposed this interpretation wanted to add that there was a third thing: a search to find a variety of common interests between Syria and the US. But I do not find that distinct enough to be counted as a third item on the list.) Syria is not likely to be impressed by either of those. It is not true that she must. She need withdraw her troops only if she chooses. And the "Please" is no inducement.

You yourself could not safely say to Syria, in your present situation, either "Please" or "You must." You could, however, say a different thing: that such and such an attainable inducement might make it worth while for Syria to withdraw her troops, and give her the opportunity to do so if she is looking for such an opportunity.

The key to such a proposition, as I outlined above (p. 9), is that in the very act of agreeing to withdraw her troops, Syria succeed in putting the question of Palestine back at the center of the regional negotiating table. I believe the means to do that is for Syria to demand and get a degree of American recognition of the PLO that it is within the capacity of the US to give.

I take as model the accord that was signed in May between Lebanon and

Israel for the withdrawal of Israeli troops. I don't want to go into judgment over the content of that accord here. Quite possibly it will have to be voided or revised, and I can see both inclination and the means for the Lebanese government to do that. What interests me is the form of the accord: signatures of the representatives of Lebanon and Israel with a third signature representing the United States as witness.

Sooner or later, if there is going to be a Syrian troop withdrawal (conceding that the Syrians are in Lebanon under a different formality, as invited peace-keeping troops rather than as invading forces), there should be another such written accord, this time signed by representatives of Lebanon and Syria, with once again a third signature representing the United States as witness.

My proposal is that there should be a third such accord, and that it be a condition demanded by Syria that there should be such a third accord if she is to agree to withdraw her own troops; this accord between Lebanon and the PLO regarding the withdrawal of PLO troops from Lebanon, and signed by representatives of Lebanon and the PLO with a third signature representing the United States as witness.

Such a document would constitute a degree of US recognition of the PLO that has never been attained before. I believe it is the level of recognition that would put the question of Palestine back at the center of the table where it belongs. I also believe it is a step the United States can actually take, not a thing which, once demanded, will necessarily be refused. The US has bound itself, to my mind unwisely but none the less really, not to give recognition to the PLO or deal with it in any way with regard to the question of Palestine itself without the PLO's making a prior recognition of the State of Israel. That, even while disagreeing with it, I recognize as a fact which must be acknowledged. Out of it has come a negotiating impasse of many years standing. But this is a different question, a question of PLO agreement with Lebanon, which already fully recognises the PLO as the sole legitimate leadership of the Palestinians, on the withdrawal of troops it actually has on Lebanese soil. There is no problem in the Lebanese government's signing such an agreement with the PLO, and I believe the US government could also set its witness signature to that accord between Lebanon and the PLO. The United States, you will note, has sustained a great many failures in its Near Eastern policy over the last year, and badly needs a success. It has to be willing to do something more (but something possible, not something politically impossible) to gain that success.

As I have explained this proposition to various persons in the American diplomatic service over these last several months, including some very high in that service, I have never been told this was an impossibility or not worth exploring. Instead I have consistently been wished good luck in my exploration of the proposition. That is no promise of acceptance of the proposition (I will repeat here my observation that I do not speak for the American State Department, though I do speak to them whenever I have occasion to do so), but it does indicate that the demand may be worth making.

If you examine the way this proposition affects the interests of various parties, I believe you will find that it suits Syrian interests if in fact Syria wants or is willing to withdraw her troops from Lebanon. It suits Lebanese interests if, and only if, there is a Lebanon, that is to say, if the Lebanese communities have come to an accord among themselves. It suits

American interests if it succeeds in producing an intact and independent Lebanon which is not a distraction from the main business of the region, the question of Palestine, and brings that business closer to a resolution that the US can find honorable, i.e., one that leaves Israel intact within secure and known borders agreed by its neighbors. It suits Palestinian interests, as it trades off a Palestinian military position which is in fact entirely useless to them for a political advantage of great value toward their goal of actually regaining their homeland. It has a further advantage to the Palestinians, as it would end the fear in Lebanon that the Palestinian refugee camps were seedbeds of renewed military activity, and thus take a great deal of dangerous pressure away from those camps.

The Israelis would doubtless object strenuously, but it is by their choice that the negotiations for their troop withdrawal and that of the Syrians and Palestinians are entirely separate, so their objections could be ignored. What was done by the United States in this case would be quite within the rights and interests of the United States.

The proposal, you will realize, is not one that can be made by the United States, or by anyone speaking for the United States. It would have to be demanded by Syria, as something to which the United States would have to respond.

I propose that you, Sheikh Walid Joumblatt, should suggest this possibility to Syria, as the one person in the best position to do so. I believe it is appropriate that you do so in the interest of the Druze community and the Druze interest in the good of Lebanon as a whole.

You have, in this September's fighting, demonstrated for all to see, including the Lebanese government and all the other Lebanese communities, how essential the Druze are to the viability of Lebanon. You have called the bluff of all those who, since 1920, have tried to govern Lebanon without paying much attention to the Druze. It is different from what happened in your father's time, when the Druze were one element of a wider uprising and stood out within the coalition simply by the quality of your father's leadership. This time, though there were others fighting alongside you, it was basically about the Druze and the consequences of not allotting them their proper place.

You are in a position now to demand and force things from the Lebanese government. I assume you understand quite well the consequences if you do. That will create bad blood, and the desire to be revenged and to take back from the Druze what you have won in another round of fighting. This could easily become just another episode in the rift between Christian and Druze that was created so artificially by outside powers a century and a half ago, but this one would increase the bitterness exponentially because the events of these last weeks have been so important.

Everything is turned around and you transform the negatives into positives if now, having so clearly established that a Lebanese government may not trifle with the Druze, you create a reason for all the Lebanese communities (not the Christians only, but all) to be grateful to you and the Druze. That is the basis for a true reconciliation and a new entente among all the communities of Lebanon. And that is what you accomplish if you are the one who gets the Syrians, the Palestinians and the Israelis to withdraw their troops from Lebanon and makes Lebanese independence possible.

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You note that Syria, having come into Lebanon not as an invader but to sustain a minimum of order in the midst of civil war, needs to see this new order and reconciliation in Lebanon before she can decently retire. My proposal on the third troop-withdrawal accord, one between Lebanon and the PLO with a United States witness signature, is aimed at:

1. gaining the Palestinians and their leadership a feasible form of recognition by the US that would give a new impetus to their claims to a homeland;

2. getting Syria the credit for having returned the question of Palestine to the center of regional discussion;

3. making it possible by that fact for the Syrians and the Palestinians to withdraw their occupying troops from Lebanon, thus depriving the Israelis of any remaining excuse for remaining in Lebanon themselves; and

4. relieving the Palestinian civilian refugees in the Lebanese camps from the danger they stand in from Lebanese factions who see them as the probable source of new Palestinian military attacks on Israel from Lebanese soil and consequent armed retaliation by Israel on Lebanon.

So far as Syria is concerned, this gives her something to show for the years of effort she has expended in Lebanon. But Syria must also have evidence that her withdrawal will leave Lebanon strong and in peace. Thus the sort of accord among communities that could be built from your initiating this process on behalf of the Druze would also be an essential condition of Syria's withdrawal.

I write all this to you, Sheikh Walid Joumblatt, with much formality and deference, as to a Prince who has established his merit in his community. I write also with personal confidence and in friendship to a man I know. I was very disappointed not to be able to see you face to face in these last weeks, despite my efforts to do so by travelling first to Damascus and then to Rome. Perhaps it is better to have spelled out these ideas more amply, as I have done, on paper. If you would like to discuss them further, I am sure we could find the time and plce. I will gladly travel to anywhere convenient to you to meet you.

With all best wishes, and the highest respect, I am

sincerely yours,

Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

SOME MARONITE AND NEAR-MARONITE VIEWS: AMBIVALENCE ABOUT LEBANON.

Address to the Ninth Annual Symposium, "Toward a Viable Lebanon," Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, April 12, 1984. Raymond G. Helmick, S.J., Senior Associate, Conflict Analysis Center, Washington, D.C.

A commonplace observation about the Lebanese conflict is that the Maronite and, to a lesser extent, the other Christians share a Lebanon-centered nationalism, while the Muslim communities embrace an Arab-centered nationalism. That may describe the sentiment accurately enough, but paradoxically it is from within the Maronite community that the strongest internal challenge comes to very existence of a Lebanese nation or State. Challenges or dangers to the integrity, independence or internal coherence of Lebanon come from many external sources, notably from Israel, from Syria and from the Palestinians in Lebanon, and too many Lebanese are inclined to blame all their society's troubles on these foreigners, seeing nothing of their own role in bringing their country to its knees. But among the internal opponents of a strong and cohesive Lebanese society, I would see a faction of Maronites as the principal source of obstacles, and would trace their opposition to an ambivalence about whether the pluralist society of Lebanon can be trusted to provide them safety.

A year ago I wrote, in a paper widely circulated in Lebanon,[1] that "the test of the viability of Lebanese society will really be whether or not the Maronites themselves can be Lebanese, and not merely Maronite: can be sharing and trusting members of a Lebanese society, respectful of the Arab character of their fellow Lebanese, and true defenders of the pluralism that it is their profession to uphold." That statement drew some of the warmer reactions to my paper, whether anger from those who found their self-image pricked, or the assertion, from Maronites who did not share the ambivalence but recognized the syndrome, that they are among those Maronites who are in fact Lebanese. The ambivalence should not be attributed to all the Maronites, but to a section of the community only. Whether that section is the mainstream of Maronite opinion, or whether the ambivalence is dominant in their thinking, is important if we are to know whether the Maronites, with the other Christian communities, can play their part in making a pluralist Lebanese society viable.

As a mark against which to measure this ambivalent Maronite response to Lebanon as an object of hope or loyalty, it is worth noting briefly the dominant attitudes in the other principal Lebanese communities. Lebanon's Shiites, with only a fringe element of dissent, have placed their hopes and aspirations in an independent Lebanon. This is as true of the Amal movement as of the Shiite Majlis organized about Sheikh Shams-ed-dine, and of the secular politicians. The influence and heritage of Imam Musa-el-Sadr has far wider appeal in the community than the external currents from Iran, so much so that it is only from the frustration Lebanese Shiites experience in pursuing their goals of political and social equality that the handful of Iranian Revolutionary Guards resident in the country gain any allies. The Druze have a consistent long-term interest in Lebanon. They are the inventors of its pluralist public life, and as an always-threatened small minority of dissidents from the religious mainstream, they have always found Lebanon their best protection. Whenever there has been contention over Lebanon, as there is at present or as there was in the 1830s or at other times in history, the Druze have had some major clan or faction allied with each of the contending parties, internal and external, and this is a necessity for them, so that whoever wins the Druze community itself may be safe. But behind that facade of dissension, now as in the past, Druze policy is carefully coordinated and fundamentally defensive of the integrity and independence of Lebanon. The Lebanese Sunni have close affinity and commitment to the wider Islamic *omma* and to their close Sunni relatives, especially in Syria. Yet they have shown their full willingness to invest their effort and loyalty in Lebanon.

The Greek Orthodox, largest Christian community after the Maronites themselves, have very individual political convictions rather than any distinctly communal position. Relatively few of them share the Maronites' anxieties. The Armenians, both Orthodox and Catholic, have tried to insulate themselves from the political upheaval. The Greek Catholics, a smaller group, tend to share rather much the same spectrum of opinions as the Maronites themselves.

For the Maronites, there is a fundamental question to be answered, whether the Muslims can be trusted: a) not to impose upon Lebanon's Christians, if they have the chance, the inferior status of *dhimmi*, protected rather than responsible people, under Islamic law; or, if they are still more

frightened of the Muslims, even paranoid, b) whether they can be trusted not to destroy the Christian communities altogether. People have been badly frightened by their experiences of the last nine war-torn years, and many do raise the stakes, and believe Muslims will go on a rampage cutting Christian throats, this despite all the evidence of times during those years when it has been the Christians themselves who initiated orgies of massacre of Muslims. I have used the term paranoid in describing these fear reactions, and should, by way of definition, specify that such expectations are paranoid only if, in fact, they are not true, or if they so offend the Muslims they impinge upon that they become self-fulfilling prophecies.

For the Maronites who believe or even suspect such intentions on the part of the Muslims, the open pluralist society they profess to love is a trap, and they are tempted to buy out of it in one way or another even while professing their loyalty to it. But this profession of loyalty is really a statement about themselves, and what sort of people they are: self-image rather than considered policy statement. It is subordinated to an absolute priority, the preservation of the Christian communities, in life and freedom. The name given this pattern of thinking is "The Lebanese Resistance." Having said all that, and recognized both the honesty and anxiety of those who feel this way, let us also remember that alongside those genuinely panicked are others who exploit their fears for the sake of preserving personal or family privilege, to maintain property claims, or because the war or the hashish trade that thrives mutually with it, or the arms bazaar are profitable to them.

The response to these fears from those Maronites who are more ambivalent about the possibilities of a truly pluralist society in Lebanon, who are the ones we have heard more from, has been of two varieties. One has been to hedge their bets, to make the traditional assertions of Lebanese pluralism but at the same time try to keep the Muslims actually subordinate. This has been the dominant response through much of Lebanon's history since 1920. The other is to try to set up a separate canton. This has been denied on all sides until recently, widely professed as an aim only since the reverses suffered by the Christian militias in the Shuf in September 1983.

However, if we follow the course of the actual fighting since June of 1976 we find a consistent pattern, its purpose often not admitted even to themselves by those who pursued it, of setting up a contiguous, definable territory under the separate authority of Christian militias which could, at need, constitute a distinct Christian entity. The date is chosen from the siege of Tel al-Zaatar, the first event in the civil war aimed at breaking the ring around East Beirut and opening the predominantly Christian-occupied part of the city to the Northern coast and Mountain.

Whether those who made these decisions, masked as they were in ambivalence, could claim to represent the Maronite community as a whole has to be open to the most serious question. They surely did not represent the whole Christian community, with its many other confessional groups, although there are some non-Maronites within the structure, those whom I have called near-Maronites in my title. I hear it very confidently asserted that the Maronite mainstream still believes in the pluralist vision of Lebanon and has confidence in its Muslim neighbors. I believe they are right to have that confidence, but that is the matter for another paper. But people have been so much frightened that, for lack of scientific survey material, I could not say whether the mainstream still has that confidence or not, or whether those firmly opposed to the canton response would be as genuinely against a screen of pluralism that masked an actual subordination of the Muslims. What can be clearly seen is serious leadership for those Maronites and others who really support a pluralist Lebanon, whether in the old National Bloc still steadfastly grouped around the exiled Raymond Edde or among those Christians and Maronites, clerical and lay, who work with the Patriarch, Cardinal Koreiche, and the other confessional leaders to build intercommunal cooperation, the chief of those being Dr. Manuel Younes.

The decisions that surrounded the Tel al-Zaatar siege in June 1976 were made by a narrower leadership group than the Maronite community as a whole, and from them have come the Lebanese Forces and Lebanese Front, the two most important organized units in the Maronite community. If life were neat we could now label these two units the ambivalent elements in the community, but it is not. Hence we need to examine what these two units represent in terms of ambivalence or commitment to Lebanon, in terms of

values, and in terms of solidity, whether they are in fact united or split.

On the face of it, what was needed for the Tel al-Zaatar siege was simply a coordinating structure for the various Christian private militias. Military action up to that point in the war had been mainly defensive of particular areas or of a scale that could be carried out by a particular militia. This siege called for a unified command structure. But what came out of it was more than a coalition of parties or militias. The apparent dominance within the Lebanese Forces of the Kataeb is deceptive, as is the apparently distinctive voice of the Chamounist National Liberal Party. The Lebanese Forces have an internal structure that supersedes any of the original constituent parties or militias. It was in fact, to begin with, a way for the young Bashir Gemayel to develop independence of the aged Phalange party structure.

It is not simply a militia, but also a political organization and in many respects a substitute and rival State structure. It has its Foreign Affairs department, with representations in major world capitals. A Public Services department has not simply proposals for government action but a policy implemented through the civilian Popular Committees in villages and urban neighborhoods throughout the territory militarily controlled by the Forces. These Popular Committees provide for public transport, water-electricity-telephone, policing so effective that the crime rate in the territory they control is only a small fraction of what it is elsewhere in the country, the regulation of consumer prices, all of which are posted weekly in newspapers and radio broadcasts controlled by the Forces, the prevention of such particular consumer frauds as the dilution of gasoline with diesel oil, rehabilitation services for war-traumatized children, etc., a most impressive range of services. There is a communications department, with Arabic and French press (Amal, Le Reveil), radio and TV (Voice of Lebanon, Radio Free Lebanon and Middle East TV); a planning department, which operates a computer center at the House of the Future above Jounieh, including a menacing file of personal data but also serious social-economic-political programs; and careful oversight departments that keep all this work, and its financing, accountable both to the movement's leadership <u>and to its public</u>.

So much of this is clearly of value that it is important to know how much of it is independent of the militia aspect of the Lebanese Forces or sustainable without it. The private military structure of the Forces must count as one of the most threatening dangers to the integrity and viability of the Lebanese State as such. And yet here within its structure, at once military and civil, at once political party and surrogate State, is a kind of leadership Lebanon has not seen before, men in their early 30s, allied for the provision of basic services with the broad range of competent and professional people of their community, and with a vision of government at the service of the governed rather than for the benefit of the governers. In among its leadership are the people who have engineered horrendous massacres, who have tortured and maimed, some reputedly building up collections of ears or finger joints of their victims, until many other Lebanese and Maronites who have witnessed their depredations cannot conceive of any other response to them but to treat them as permanent pariahs, as we do ex-Nazis. I hope readers are not surprised to find these horror-stories and war crimes among such a group as the Lebanese Forces, as it is a consistent trait of the ambivalent, in any conflict, to indulge in such violence and atrocities as these. But the Forces have included much more besides, the whole élan of a defensive communal commitment, nearly of a separate nationalism (though this is just where the ambivalence has been). If it is all to be painted with one brush, we devalue a kind of leadership that Lebanon can ill spare.

It is when we look to see how far this organized movement actually represents or shares in the ambivalence about Lebanon that led to its founding that we need to sort out the differences between the Lebanese Forces and the Lebanese Front.

At first, in 1976, there was a single directorate of the whole movement. It included on the one hand the traditional older leaders of the parties (Pierre Gemayel, Camille Chamoun, Suleyman Frangieh, and Abbot Charbel Kassis of the Maronite Monks) and the heads of the militias (Kataeb, Tigers, Tanzim, Guardians of the Cedars, etc.). Early in 1977, at a retreat given this leadership by the Maronite Monks at the monastery of Sayyaditna Bir (Our Lady of the Well), the Lebanese Front directorate was separated

from the Lebanese Forces, forming a sort of council of elders, and the militia heads set up their own Joint Command Council. The expectation was that the old men would keep the inner-circle power in their own hands, but in fact the power flowed the other way, to the Lebanese Forces, whose Joint Command Council became the functioning executive for both Lebanese Forces and Lebanese Front. Sulayman Frangieh defected from the Front in May 1978 in protest against its growing alliance with the Israelis. This was followed in July of that year by the murder of his son Tony, with his wife and child and many followers, in an attack by the Lebanese Forces on his Marada militia.

The Lebanese Front since then consists of a six-man directorate. Three are political figures: Pierre Gemayel, founder-head of the Kataeb party, ex-President Camille Chamoun, and the new Abbot Boulos Naaman, who has replaced Fr. Charbel Kassis at the head of the Maronite Monks. The other three are intellectuals: Charles Malik, Fuad Boustani and Edouard Honein (of the old National Bloc). From my own observation, I would locate most of the ambivalence, and what I have described as paranoia, about Muslims in this circle, the Front directorate, but would see great distinctions even within it.

Charles Malik, former Foreign Minister, former Ambassador to the United Nations and United States and President of the U.N. General Assembly, long-time distinguished Professor at the American University Beirut, is perhaps the most appealing person of these six, and has the kind of intellectual grasp that enables him to represent both sides of this chasm, the ambivalence about Christian-Muslim relations and a full measure of the traditional commitment to Lebanese pluralism. He sees his country as a place of communication between the Christian and Muslim cultures, civilizations, and faith communities. He harbors great respect and understanding for such figures as Kamal Joumblatt and Musa al-Sadr. He is fully aware of the tragedy and present plight of the civilian Palestinian population now in Lebanon. But at the same time he is consumed with distrust of Muslim intentions, convinced that the safety of the Christian communities must be an absolute priority. The idealistic statements in the Lebanese Front program[2], with its wary and conditioned readiness to work out a new national settlement, represents him especially.

Fuad Boustani, historian and one-time President of the Lebanese University, is so distrustful of the Muslims that he regards the whole effort since 1920 to build the "Greater Lebanon" as a mistake.[3] He wants no part in any effort at Christian-Muslim relations. If, he says, the Vatican or anyone else wants to impose a role of communication between Muslims and Christians on the Lebanese Christian community, the Lebanese will throw it back in their face. He is fond of telling the story of his solicitude for the survival of the ancient Christian communities of the Near East, which he sees as threatened with extinction, as others are dedicated to the saving of endangered animal species. For all his rejection of the pluralist pattern, he still insists on having the entire Lebanese territory (the 10,542 km^2 of which one so often hears in Lebanon) for the Christians alone. He expects disaster for the Christians of Syria, of Jordan, of every Arab or Muslim country, and believes that in the near future all those Christians will be fleeing to Lebanon. The result he awaits and seeks: that by simple pressure of population the Christians will drive all the Muslims out of Lebanon and have it for themselves. It takes no great exercise of the imagination to understand that this is a teaching of genocide. Boustani little understands that it would incur the lasting militant enmity of all the Arab States and would consequently be the one policy to ensure the extinction of those ancient Christian communities of the Near East that he holds so dear.

Boulos Naaman, the present Abbot, is the most important spokesman for the Lebanese Front in the sense that he is the one most often echoed by the Lebanese Forces leadership, particularly by the Commander of the Forces, Fadi Frem. Fr. Naaman, as theologian, writes impressively and distinctively of the Christian concept of incarnation. Within the context of the Lebanese Front he speaks, as did his predecessor, not only for the spiritual and doctrinal concerns of the monks, but for their secular interests as well, and that is a matter of property, some of it threatened by the upheaval. His outlook on Muslims is summed up in the phrase "false religion," and politically-socially he regards them with radical distrust. The assertion is made by responsible Maronite leaders that the property interest of the Monks determined much of the fighting along the coastal route up from Karantina to the North back in Fr. Kassis' time as Abbot,

and in August 1983 this same property interest had a great part to play in the insistence of the Lebanese Forces, eventually enforced instead by the Lebanese Army, on ridding West Beirut properties of Shiite squatters, largely refugees who had been driven out of their homes in Southern Lebanon by years of Israeli retaliation raids and eventually by the Israeli invasion of 1982. From that action against the squatters came the discrediting of the Lebanese Army and the U.S. Marines in Shiite eyes, and eventually the Shiite rebellion and takeover of West Beirut.

It should be noted here that there is a sharp difference, on these questions of communal relations, respect for and cooperation with Muslims, between the Maronite Patriarch, his bishops and secular clergy on the one hand, and the monks on the other. It is so pronounced that Fuad Boustani speaks of a "trahison des clercs," and will trust no other clergy than the monks. Yet the Patriarch and his clergy speak for another strong Maronite public, not frightened of Muslims and seeking the ways to restore their relation with them as neighbors.

Pierre Gemayel, father of the President, founder of the Kataeb party and militia back in the 1930s, was a primary deciding voice for the 1943 National Pact, which divided power between Christians (effectively Maronites) and Muslims (effectively Sunni). Consequently he regards himself as a man of consensus and of Christian-Muslim cooperation, though always with the reservation that there must be a Christian edge in power. He can control the Kataeb Party, and has done so very effectively in the context of the collapse of his son's authority over the Lebanese Army in February 1984. But he cannot control the Lebanese Forces or even the Lebanese Front. Right now, having tragically lost his son Bashir, the President-elect assassinated in September 1982, he has another concern which supersedes all others: the fate of his son Amin and his Presidency.

Camille Chamoun, ex-President against whom was raised the civil war of 1958, is pragmatist and power-man, and a politician of acute sensitivity. He was against the adventurous penetration into the Druze country in the Shuf, knowing from the time the Israelis first introduced them there in the wake of their 1982 invasion that this could only produce

fighting where there was none before, and could end only in misery and death for the substantial Maronite population of the Shuf. At the same time, he has been for the reliance of the Lebanese Forces on the Israelis, but now has the sense to hedge his bets on the Syrian-inspired negotiations.

Edouard Honein is brought onto the Lebanese Front directorate basically in order to give it some coloration of Raymond Edde's long-established National Bloc. But Edde himself and his following will go nowhere near it. The National Bloc has always stood for close and confident interaction with the Muslims for the good of Lebanon. It is at least of interest and encouraging that the Lebanese Front wants to have some appearance of that.

On the side of the Lebanese Forces, the Joint Command Council is drawn from a completely different age group, their thinking and experience worlds away from the old men of the Lebanese Front. They are not of the old zaama families nor tied into the old feudal pattern. They reflect the ideas of the Lebanese Front directors only when it suits them.

There are serious sources of internal conflict among them. One is that they are not settled on whether they trust Muslims sufficiently to try to build a joint society with them or not. For many of the leaders this is still a matter of personal ambivalence: they haven't decided. The question touches policy directly, as they have aspirations both to function as a national political movement (for Muslims as well as Christians) and to preserve the prerogatives of Christians.

They have far more acquaintance than have the Lebanese Front leaders with the actual thinking of their Muslim contemporaries. They debate among themselves the relative merits of a separate canton for Christians, in the territory they actually control now, and an apparently plural system in which the Christians would have real control. The ambivalence is so deep that they are serious about wanting to provide leadership for Muslims as well as Christians, however little encouragement they receive for this from the Muslims. Much like the Rev. Ian Paisley in Northern Ireland, who takes great pains to be a good representative of his Catholic as well

his Protestant constituents in his capacity as Member of Parliament, the Lebanese Forces, in the public services they provide through their Popular Committees, take special care for the Muslims resident in areas they control militarily. They do have ideas, and such as are worthy of much respect, for the promotion and well-being of the whole society. But it is all muddied by their defence of Christian power.

Those looking for settlement with the Muslims know they have to compromise, but are inclined to bargain hard. This is a bit of the conventional wisdom that it is hard for any of us to break away from, that we should always bargain hard and be sure that every concession is paid for dearly, though in fact we all come to know sooner or later the reality that the concessions then come too late. This has been the experience of the Lebanese Forces now, as it has so often been of others before them.

Much more venomous and fraught with danger of internal violence among the leadership is the second source of conflict, doubts about the long alliance with Israel. This somewhat overlaps with the doubts about relation with the Muslims, as those most inclined to attempt reconciliation with the Muslims feel a sense of having betrayed the basic interest of Arabs in their traffic with the Israelis, yet the two sources of conflict are not entirely coterminous. One influential group within the leadership constantly reaffirms the Israeli alliance, hopes for the return to power of a Sharon, and seeks to expand the alliance even further. A second group, the largest by far, has a bad conscience about it, a feeling of having subordinated the interests of Lebanese society as a whole to a foreign interest, all the more galling now that the Israelis have shown such disinterest in the Lebanese Forces and their fate, though still taking occasional advantage of their access to them. This group, in which I would include Fadi Frem, the Commander, is defensive about the Israeli alliance, tends to see it as in the past and behind them, and is anxious to downplay it in terms of their present plans and direction. But the whole issue is made dangerous through the reaction of a third group, bitter about the alliance, and ready for a purge of those most associated with Israel.

The Lebanese Forces have several functions of a surrogate government in the territory they control, and this, even more than their character as a rival military power to the national Army, is what makes them an immediate challenge to, and directly subversive of, the State. The most important of these quasi-governmental functions are:

1) that the Forces are now no longer merely a coalition of parties and private militias, but a unified surrogate army that transcends any of its original constituent parts. Since 1978 units have been formed that are independent of any of the earlier private or family militias. These now give their basic character to the Forces, and the command structure too is far removed from any subordination to the political parties or leadership that first gave rise to the movement. The scope of this unitary organization, its prior claim over any of the earlier sectional loyalties, and its preparation for the eventual cooperation in the 1982 invasion, was shown by the massacre of some 500 people, a great proportion of them civilians or innocent bystanders, on July 7, 1980, which gave the Forces control over the remnants of the Chamounist "Tiger" militia. This was blandly accepted as "the July 7th Corrective Movement," a way of rationalizing the structure, and even Camille Chamoun himself had no choice but simply to submit.

2) conscription. This is no volunteer force. Compulsory service in the Lebanese Forces has been effective ever since 1978, not only for Maronites but also for all the other Christian confessions. Both men and women are universally given military training beginning with their last two years of secondary school. One effect of this was to put the Forces in direct competition with the recruiting drives for the Lebanese Army. It meant that the national Army could get few Christians for the ranks, and that its Christian officers could serve only through an understanding with the Forces, to the great outrage and suspicion of the Muslims in the Army.

3) tax power, as always and everywhere one of the most fundamental prerogatives of government. The Forces impose a household tax throughout the territory they control. They have had the discretion to

keep it small (unlike such comparable organizations as Northern Ireland's Ulster Defence Association, which let itself get greedy), knowing that an excessive tax could alienate their base of support. It is for the most part merely an assertion of their right to tax. Most of the taxes that produce the more substantial part of their revenue are indirect, and are supplemented by a large income from the ports (both collection of import duties and smuggling profits) and subsidies from the Israelis.

On all three counts the Forces, as a surrogate government, are a cancer to the State, more so than the private militias of the other communities inasmuch as they operate in direct alliance with the national President. I have myself argued for some time the necessity for President Amin Gemayel, for the sake of his own legitimacy, to dissociate himself definitively from the Lebanese Forces as militia, because this association of the national President with a private militia is irreducibly destructive to the State. I believe his compromising the Lebanese Army with this association, through him, with the Lebanese Forces is what brought about the Army's downfall in February of this year. Some time during November of 1983 President Reagan, still defending the presence of American Marines in Beirut, said that they would be withdrawn only in the event of a total breakdown of the Lebanese government's authority. I wrote to the American State Department shortly after that that the breakdown would come not in the form of the U.S. Congress interfering with the mandate of the Marines, nor of some intervention by the Syrians or any other non-Lebanese force, but instead would come on some day that the Lebanese Army was ordered out against the Shiite suburbs of Beirut and its Shiite members would simply decide to go home.

Did President Amin Gemayel lose his legitimacy as President of all the Lebanese the day this eventually happened? I thought so at the time, and am left with crumbs, but only crumbs, of hope for him since. It seemed at the time that, having lost his Army, and that by neglect, he would have only two remaining choices, to resign or to align himself so exclusively with the Lebanese Forces as to return the country to the situation of 1975. He has avoided that, just barely, and has had the good sense to turn to the good offices of the Syrians (much better offices than the more paranoid of

his ~~his~~ following had suspected). However, the price of his retaining his position has been to operate with such reduced authority as to deprive his country of an essential dimension of the constitutional structure it needs to function healthily. If he can now manage to rebuild the position, once handed to him gratis when he was first elected in 1982, of consensus President of all the Lebanese, he may yet serve his country well. If he does not, and is eventually forced to resign, it is not the end of the world for Lebanon, but the occasion for a new election in the Lebanese Parliament. A President unencumbered by any such association with a private army and surrogate State could quite rapidly and confidently draw upon the ready loyalties of all the basic Lebanese communities.

There is an Achilles Heel for the Lebanese Forces in their conscription policy. Whether it is Amin Gemayel or another Maronite President who eventually comes to deal with their direct challenge, as private militia, to the legitimacy of the State, they can be dealt with exactly as Nabieh Berri did with the Shiites in the Lebanese Army: by an appeal to the ranks. I would expect the mainstream opinion even of the Maronite conscripts to be with a President who would finally assert the sovereignty of the State on behalf of all its citizens. Certainly the still larger proportion of non-Maronite Christian conscripts in the Lebanese Forces would go over to a President under those circumstances, and he could rely on the positive response too of the other communities: Shiite, Sunni and Druze.

In doing so, as I believe a President must do sooner or later it Lebanon is not to be divided permanently or indefinitely into Syrian-occupied and Israeli-occupied areas with a near-separate Christian canton, it is important to recognize the real values in the political-social parts of the Lebanese Forces program, and in their new generation of leadership in the Maronite community. There are criminal elements somewhere in that structure, whom any State with a claim to be a society ordered by law must bring to justice, but they are not the whole story, by far.

The Popular Committees, in particular, are a highly structured and effective civilian arm of the Public Services department of the Lebanese Forces. Theirs are significant services, and they are a challenge to the

government departments to carry out their own responsibilities. At the same time they are an opportunity for citizens to hold government accountable, one of the great needs in Lebanon. The Popular Committees are an object of great suspicion to Muslims so long as they seem a way of bringing them under local Christian control. The Muslim militias, Amal or the organized street-gangs of Mourabitoun, have nothing like this civilian public-service structure. Since the Popular Committees, within the Lebanese Forces' structure, include the people from the Maronite and other Christian communities least tainted with ambivalence or paranoia about Muslims, they offer the best opportunity for healing communication between these organized elements of the Christian and Muslim communities. Conversation in the summer of 1983 with the leadership of the Popular Committees revealed that in fact there had been approaches from both Amal and Mourabitoun, anxious to know the intentions of the Popular Committees structure and to have access to their skills and experience for the benefit of their own communities. But the Popular Committees had made no response whatever, because they did not know how to respond. The Committees can be a valuable way for the young generation of Christian leadership to build a bridge to the Muslim communities on condition that the experience and skills be shared, something that the Muslims can have themselves too, on a basis of equality. It is most important that the Committees' leadership be in constructive and cooperative discussion with the right levels of leadership in the other communities.

The direct observation of the Lebanese Forces and their associated groups on which this paper is based all took place up through the summer of 1983, before the military humiliation of the Lebanese Forces during and to a great extent since that year's September fighting in the Shuf. What can be expected of them since?

I have tried, in as sympathetic a way as possible, to show that the ambivalence about Lebanon in whose context the Lebanese Forces came into being does not in fact define them or wholly characterize them; that the old men's club of the Lebanese Front, which has become an isolated backwater of the movement's leadership, has become the more normal home of at least the more paranoid extremes of that ambivalence; and that it is a matter of

continuing debate and uncertainty within the Lebanese Forces' leadership itself. One effect of the September military reverses has been to strip the Lebanese Forces of one layer of their ambivalence, namely the expectation that they could publicly profess the traditional Lebanese pluralism and actually retain effective control of the country and its Muslim populations by constitutional manipulation and military might. They are therefore left with only one resort for their ambivalence: if they cannot muster enough trust for their Muslim fellow-citizens to build a truly equal and pluralist society with them, they can only fall back on a Christian canton. They do speak openly of this now, as they did not before that September. It is the supposition, too, behind the rumor they have frequently floated that the candidate to replace President Amin Gemayel, if he were to resign his office, would be Dany Chamoun, son of the ex-President and one-time chief of his private militia. That is a solution that would never gain the multi-confessional assent of the Lebanese Parliament, and can only be premised on the idea of a separate Christian canton electing its own President.

However, the fundamental ambivalence, an indecision about whether Lebanon, as a free and pluralist society in the whole of its historic territory, can be safe for Christians or not, remains alive within the movement and its leadership. This sort of ambivalence is familiar to me from several other conflicts I have studied closely,[4] and I would like to conclude with some observations on what can be anticipated from it and what can be done with it.

It is the essential characteristic of this sort of ambivalence that it is the inadmissible thing. There is a difference between what is perceived normatively as the way things must be, the accepted standard which is of such importance to the community and its members that it becomes their badge of identity, their way of understanding and expressing themselves, and the contrasting perception of a more empirical reality that just does not square with the norm. People suffering from such dissonance in their perception feel it as a betrayal of their identity group to admit to seeing what they see. Their doubt expresses itself as guilt, and they go to great lengths to still it, in themselves and in others whom they suspect of feeling it or expressing it. Most

commonly this repression takes the form of actual violence, and it has been my own observation, in Northern Ireland and in many other conflicts where I have studied the phenomenon, that the true fanatics are not the people most genuinely convinced of the principles for which they strive but these doubters, the ambivalent ones who must still their doubts in violence toward others. The victims of their attacks are not only their obvious opponents in another community or identity-group, but more likely still those of their own side who express or are suspected of harboring the doubts they cannot bear to admit in themselves. I have even known cases of apparently heroic deaths which I have been sure are actually suicidal efforts to kill such doubts in oneself.

The ambivalence and inadmissible doubts can be expected, then, in the case of the Lebanese Forces as in others who have gone through the same syndrome, to produce violence and fanaticism, but only so long as the doubts remain smothered and unadmitted. People in the Lebanese Forces have been prone to assert, with equal dogmatism, both sides of these contradictory absolutes: that their Lebanese society is in fact the home of a genuine religious and cultural pluralism, and that the Muslims of their society cannot in any way be trusted. They can suffer the ambivalence and inadmissible doubt from both sides of that divide, from either of these incompatible assertions and their inability to square it with reality. Their response is bound to be violent, and yet the hopeful part of this is the very extreme incompatibility of their assertions itself, which makes it easier than usual to bring their inadmissible doubts up to the surface, where they can be admitted and discussed and in that way become an agent of healing for them. Their reaction to any suggestion of this sort is likely to be stormy, but to put it all before them plainly is in fact a principal motive for the writing of this paper.

There is another recognizable and predictable effect of the sort of incompatible maze of doubt and anxiety to which not only the Lebanese Forces but a much wider element of the Maronite and other Christian communities of Lebanon have been subject, and that is paralysis of will. This has been particularly the study of psychologist Dr. Rona Fields, who over many years has worked with people suffering war trauma in Northern

Ireland, the Middle East and other areas of conflict.[5] She sees it as characteristic of people under this sort of stress to see what result they would like to achieve, know the means to do it, but be filled with dread that using the means will upset what little equilibrium there is about them, make them "sick," entail unfathomable further catastrophes. That paralysis of will appears to affect the many people in the Maronite and other Christian communities who see and understand the ambivalence, whether in the Lebanese Forces or elsewhere in their communities, but hold back from taking the healing steps that are plain to them.

The non-paranoid Maronites and other Christians have great resources with which to build a reconciled society with their Muslim counterparts. One of the first to recognize this and begin to apply it, when at least a pause came in the long war in 1982, was the then leader of the Lebanese Forces and President-elect, Bashir Gemayel, who saw clearly, once he was elected, that he could be President only as he made himself representative of all the Lebanese communities, not as the man of paranoia determined to assert coercive Christian control over the rest of the population. When he was murdered, his brother Amin was expected to act as reconciler, and it was understood from the start that only so could he succeed. Great hopes were placed in him by all the battered confessional groups. All of that is now terribly damaged but its availability has been demonstrated. Other leadership resources remain, untarnished, in the traditional consensus group of the National Bloc and other impressive available leaders. It is important that the young leadership we have been describing here not be overlooked, as they are of great value also. It has to be sifted out, its pathological elements removed, its paranoia assuaged, but its skills and promise recognized. We are not dealing here with a black-and-white situation. Dividing the cast of characters into the angels and devils will not help at all in sorting out the viability of Lebanon.

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Notes:

[1]Report on Visit to Lebanon by Raymond G. Helmick, S.J., March 1983. The report circulated widely in English and French versions. It has been published in Arabic translation in At-Tadamon, July 2, 1983; in English (in two parts) in The Month, August and September issues, 1983; in French (with commentaries) in Revue du Liban, 1983; and in Flemish (in two parts) in Skreven, October and November issues, 1983.

[2]The Lebanon We Want to Build, issued December 1980 at Deir Aoukar, revision of a statement issued after the Sayyaditna Bir retreat in January 1977.

[3]Le Problème du Liban, Fouad E. Boustani, 2nd edition, C.R.-Kaslik, 1978, ch. VI (pp. 32-35), "De l'erreur du 'Grand-Liban.'"

[4]Chapter: "Ambivalence," in A Social Option: Suggestions for an Overall Community Social Planning Approach to the Problems of Northern Ireland, London, Centre for Human Rights and Responsibilities, 1975, jointly authored by Richard Hauser and Raymond G. Helmick; "Church Structure and Violence in Northern Ireland," The Month, August 1977; "Israel and the Palestinians," The Month, July, 1979; "Protestantse vrees voor roomse overheersing is begrijpelijk," De Tijd (Amsterdam), 28 September, 1979; "Breaking the Anxieties the Rule the Middle Eastern Conflict," address to the Tenth Annual Scientific Meeting of the American Association of Social Psychiatrists, Washington, D.C., November 1982; "Psychodynamics of Communal Conflict in Northern Ireland and the Middle East," address to the Third International Conference on Psychological Stress and Adjustment in Times of War and Peace, Tel Aviv, January 1983.

[5]A Society on the Run: A Psychology of Northern Ireland, Penguin, 1973; Northern Ireland: Society Under Siege, Transaction Books, 1980; these observations on Lebanon from personal interview and a still unpublished ms., "Personal Profile of Lebanese Christians," December 1982.