

Israelis and Palestinians, Two Peoples, Three Faiths:

Religion and Ethnicity in the Middle Eastern Conflict

Course-Pak for Th. 352.01

**Volume 1: 1985-1988 Documents
Establishing the U.S./PLO Dialogue**

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FOREWORD, 1998

This collection of papers, supplementary to the course on the Middle Eastern conflict, "**Two Peoples, Three Faiths**," which I give for the first time this year, is a record of my own personal interventions with the various parties since 1985, an exercise in what has been called "second-track" diplomacy, and therefore a footnote to the story, not the main story itself that we will be following in this course.

It is in fact the reason why I have not previously given a course on this conflict at Boston College. Over the earlier years of this effort, too much of the material contained here had to remain confidential, and while I was giving analytic courses on the Northern Ireland and Lebanese conflicts, I was not anxious to get into a situation where I could not talk during a course about the things most of interest to me, and likely to the class I taught. All of this, however, can by now be a matter of public record.

I have divided the papers into two volumes, simply because they were too bulky for one of the Course-Pak books the B.C. Press brings out. A convenient enough breaking point was after 1988, when an official U.S.-PLO dialogue was initiated for the first time.

Up to then, it had been prohibited since 1974 to any U.S. Government official to have any contact with any official of the PLO, a prohibition so absolute that the able U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, had been fired in the Carter years for attending a New York cocktail party at which two officials of the PLO were present. That meant that the unofficial, "second-track" people were the only eyes or ears U.S. policy had on this matter, and that there were no available means of persuasion or dialogue other than threats or distant admonitions. I could not speak *for* U.S. Government in any of this contact, but found that State Department and White House were much interested in what came of it. I had made a point, from the first, of keeping Israeli government apprised of what was occurring in this dialogue as well, discussing it with many friends in the Israeli peace movement and always looking for their suggestions.

Once the official dialogue was instituted at the end of 1988, in the last days of the Reagan Administration, I felt I should get out of the way, and not interfere with first-track diplomacy. That's where the break occurs between volumes 1 and 2 of this collection. Eventually, in June, 1990, I got back in again when the official dialogue had proven itself so limited that PLO people were totally dissatisfied with it and began to put their reliance, instead, on what I regarded as the seductive overtures of Iraq. The documents since that time will make up volume 2.

Since before leaving Washington late in 1984 to come to Boston College, I had been a founding member and Senior Associate of the Conflict Analysis Center, located in Washington, D.C. After an initial letter, December 27, 1985, to Professor John Norton Moore of the University of Virginia Law School, my successor as founding President of the Conflict Analysis Center and at that time just appointed as first Chairman of the Board of the U.S. Institute of Peace, in which I enclosed a copy of my November 26, '85 letter to Yasser Arafat, I had had to keep all this matter confidential even from my colleagues in the Center. Once the U.S.-PLO Dialogue was established and my obligations of silence were made less stringent, I sent them, as a still confidential file, a full documentation of my activity to that date. This first volume represents a somewhat weeded-out version of that documentation. With it I had sent, as a covering memo, a *vade mecum* explanation of its contents. Rather than repeat that exercise, I include that memo, dated March 5, 1989, at the beginning of this collection.

Addendum: Early in 1999, I first learned, from a short *New York Times* article, that Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres had in fact held discussions with the PLO in 1988, contemporary with my talks with them.

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March 5, 1989

Members of the Board and Senior Associates
Conflict Analysis Center

For a long time now I have been distressed to find that the level of confidentiality in my activity with regard to the Middle Eastern conflict prohibited my reporting even to you. In fact, it was not until well along in 1988 that I was permitted by my interlocutors to report even the barest outline of what I was about, as I did then.

Now that the U.S.-P.L.O. dialogue has been established, however shakily, I can at last give you a fuller report, and I thought, rather than make it a summary, I owed it to you to send you the fullest documentation I could. The enclosed file is still confidential, as many of its details would only expose the whole enterprise to sabotage if they were out in public. The documentation here is still not entirely complete, as some parties to the conversations, particularly Israeli and Jordanian, are still, most understandably, anxious to restrict knowledge of this effort and their part in it. I'm glad to be able to resurface within the circle of the Conflict Analysis Center, which is precious to me, to the extent that this report represents. Editing the documentation and constructing this report has occupied me enough to consume this much time since the dialogue decision by the Reagan Administration last December. There is another area of heavy involvement, my continuing role in trying to bring about the free election of a President of Lebanon by the Lebanese Parliament, on which I will send a separate report as soon as I can.

The effort represented in this report has not been merely to bring about the U.S.-P.L.O. dialogue that has now begun, but to bring about Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and facilitate the chance of an overall Arab-Israeli peace. I was quite convinced that the U.S. opening had considerable priority, but I don't see the job as done now. When I observe the slow-motion approach of the Bush Administration to the dialogue, I can't at all fault it, as the next priority is to break through the anxiety of the Israeli public and the Jewish and other American supporters of Israel. This is essentially a task for the Palestinians and their leadership, and I believe they need all the help they can get in pursuing it. The problem, as I explain in some of the later papers in this file, is a stereotype. Israelis and their friends tend to look at the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular and see the Nazis all over again, people bent on the destruction of Israel. From my contacts over these recent years, I have good evidence that this stereotype does not truly represent the Arabs, the Palestinians or the P.L.O. and its leadership, but I know it is nonetheless believed. The stereotype goes right back to the immediate post-World-War-II period, and it has been used, also, as the rationalisation for a great deal of cruelty toward the Palestinians. I plan now, after all these years of keeping this material close under my hat, to publish a

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good bit on the basis of this material. Besides wanting to indicate that the experience of the Palestinian public and their organisations has been different than has been most often represented, and that there really is a Palestinian partner for Israel to talk with, I also want to talk of the shape of an eventual settlement that can really be satisfying both to Israelis and Palestinians. I've outlined it in some of these papers, toward the end of the series, but I don't believe either Israelis, for whom the very thought that there could be a settlement at all is still very disquieting, or the Palestinians have yet seriously envisioned what kind of settlement there could be, and that means they don't yet know what to negotiate about. Since the opening of the official U.S.-P.L.O. dialogue I have been careful not to get in the way of official diplomacy. Non-official go-betweens were all there was until then, and those of us who filled that role could make a great nuisance of ourselves now if we are not careful. This publishing venture, on the Palestinians as partners in a dialogue with the Israelis and on the possible character of a settlement, seems the right way for me to work now. I'd appreciate any help you can give me to that end. Stanley sheinbaum, who figured so prominently in the last stages of bringing about the U.S.-P.L.O. dialogue by organising the group of five American Jews who met Arafat in Stockholm, has made some suggestions and is giving some help with publishing, but I'll need all the help I can get.

Let me give you a bit of vade-mecum through this file. You all had the report of my 1985 visit to several Middle Eastern countries, in company with a group of U.S. Ministers and Rabbis, when I had first met Arafat as well as many other officials, Israeli and Arab, at a somewhat higher level than I was used to. In our group meeting with Arafat, the subject of continuing guerrilla violence had not been raised, and I mentioned my annoyance at that in the report I wrote. After the Achille Lauro affair I wrote directly to Arafat -- first document in this series -- and proposed a meeting to pursue the subject. I didn't have a direct written reply, but a lot of interest was expressed through intermediaries. The P.L.O. people were highly conscious of my role as consultant to Cardinal Law, the Archbishop of Boston, and at first made the request that I bring him with me on a visit. When I scotched that, they asked about my bringing a letter of introduction from him, a proposal that we thought about but eventually rejected.

Just at that time Cardinal Law was also approached by the Israeli Consul-General in Boston, a most impressive and excellent man named Michael Shiloh, with the request that he intervene with the Holy See to urge the recognition -- i.e., establishment of full diplomatic relations -- between Israel and the Holy See. The Cardinal's response then was to ask me why this was not being done, and I wrote him the January '86 memo on the subject included here. That opened several doors that were important throughout the development. I had Michael Shiloh and his wife to dinner here at Boston College, and instituted the practice of putting the documentation of these exchanges in his hands. By summer '86, just before I made my long visit to Israel, Michael was transferred to a post in the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, where he still is. I kept a good relation with his successor in Boston, Consul General Arthur Avnon, but have not really known enough of the next successor in Boston to make him the link. However, I have kept the Israelis informed.

But the fact that both Palestinians and Israelis were coming to the Cardinal for good offices led me to suggest that there be a concentrated, planned effort by the Holy See to provide such good offices to all parties. The suggestion had no very specific content at that point, but it brought Archbishop Pio Laghi, the Apostolic Pro-Nuncio of the Holy See to the U.S., into the picture. Cardinal Law

put my suggestion before him. Archbishop Laghi made a trip to Boston, and he, Cardinal Law and I spent some five hours working over the possibilities in this initiative. It was on Archbishop Laghi's suggestion that we eventually hit on the formula by which I made my subsequent contacts with the P.L.O., with the Israelis, the U.S. government, Jordan and other parties. I would carry no letters of introduction, and make it clear that, having taken the initiative myself, I spoke for no one but myself. But I would also make it clear that I had had these conversations with Cardinal Law and himself, would be reporting to them and that they had strong interest in the results of my meetings. Before I made my March '86 visit to Tunis for three days of talks with Arafat, Cardinal O'Connor of New York was also brought into the circle. I went down to New York and spent considerable time with him and his adviser, Msgr. (now Bishop) John Nolan, and have consistently reported all matters to him since.

In this context, I did not feel myself restricted, when I met Arafat in March '86, to the subject I had raised in my November '85 letter, namely a moratorium on violence, but talked extensively of the acceptance of U.N.S.C. Resolutions 242 and 338 and the recognition of Israel's right to exist as well, with results that you can see in my report of those meetings. The follow-up is clear enough in the file: Cardinals Law and O'Connor met Archbishop Laghi in Washington, and after discussing the report brought it across Mass. Avenue to Vice President Bush. The two Cardinals later brought the report to Donald Regan, then still Chief of Staff, at the White House. And I went to Washington to meet people in the State Department and NSC, as reported in the file. Subsequently, before travelling to the Middle East in the summer, I went with Cardinal Law to spend the 4th of July at Kennebunkport, and had extensive opportunity to discuss the whole matter with Vice-President Bush and Mr. James Baker.

I won't attempt here to summarize the complex outcome of my summer '86 visits to Israel, to the Holy See, Jordan, and eventually back to Mr. Arafat in Tunis, as they are thoroughly covered in the file. I had a lot of help, on that journey, from the Jesuit General Superior, Fr. Kolvenbach, with whom I stayed each time I passed through Rome. I was just too late, at that time, to have the help of Mr. William Wilson, as he had just left his post of U.S. Ambassador to the Holy See, but I had many conversations and a lot of help in interpreting the sequence of events from Mr. Peter Murphy, the Charge d'Affaires who was running that Embassy until the later arrival of Mr. Frank Shakespeare as the new Ambassador. You will see occasional notes to and from Fr. Tom Michel, who is the Jesuit General's adviser on Middle Eastern affairs (Fr. Kolvenbach is himself one of the best authorities on that part of the world, having spent most of his life in Beirut and served as Jesuit Vice Provincial there through the Civil War years.) One other Church authority who surfaces in the file is Bishop Jorge Mejia, the Secretary of the Holy See's Commission on Justice and Peace, an Argentine who is one of the closest personal confidants of Pope John Paul II. I went through the whole development with him and gave him copies of the documentation up to that point when he visited Boston in November '86. That was shortly after my October '86 visit to Arafat in Kuwait, and just as Archbishop Laghi was reporting that visit and its proposals to the Holy See.

The suggested role of the Holy See, acting as a clearing-house for statements of Palestinian, U.S. and Israeli parties, never got off the ground. The officials in the Vatican Secretariate of State were nervous that the Holy See could be subjected to machination by the parties, and fulfilled Archbishop Laghi's prediction that there would be lots of nervousness once the suggestion that the Holy See make its good offices available was given some specific content. However,

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that suggestion did eventually come up again at the end of 1989, when the group of us found we had to have a third-country go-between with its official diplomacy, and turned to the Swedes.

All of this effort went into the doldrums when the Iran-Contra affair broke. The American role in it had so much priority, and it was clearly not feasible for the U.S. administration to act in this matter while it was going through that episode. Other things arose, however, at the beginning of 1987. One was the battle over the Melkite Christian village of Maghdousheh in Lebanon, set in the hills just over Sidon. The Shiite Amal militia had been using the village as a gun platform from which to shell Palestinian refugee camps on the plain below, and the Palestinians broke out of their camps to capture it early in January 1987. I had already many contacts with the Melkites -- their one Archdiocese for the U.S. is centered in Newton (Boston suburb), and I had met and briefed their Patriarch, Maximos V Hakim, when he visited here, and even been invited to stay with him in Damascus on my summer '86 visit (though I spent so long in Israel and Jordan that I never got to Damascus at all on that trip). The Melkite Auxiliary Bishop in Boston, John Elya, comes from Maghdousheh, and appealed to Cardinal Law to do something by way of protest at what was happening to the village. I suggested the form of appeal to the conflicting forces and drafted the statement that was signed by Cardinals Law and O'Connor, Archbishop Joseph Tawil of the Melkites and Bishop Elya, and delivered to Secretary General Perez de Cuellar for transmission to the parties. I sent a copy, with covering letter, however, directly to Arafat, and got a very prompt response in the form of public assurances given by the P.L.O. to the Maghdousheh population and a message transmitted to me through the P.L.O. office in Washington. Meanwhile, Cardinal O'Connor made his visit to Jordan and Israel of early 1987, which became the focus of so much turbulent comment (and had all the more public effect for that). In that context, I drafted the letter to the Pope that Cardinal Law sent in Cardinal O'Connor's support.

Out of that came a mission of Hanna Siniora, Editor of the Al-Fajr daily newspaper in Jerusalem, who visited Cardinal Law in early February '87, and indicated that the P.L.O. was strongly interested in the kind of agreed exchange of statements with the U.S. and Israel that I had been talking about, realised how difficult it was for the Holy See to act as good-offices mediator, and would be happy to cooperate with any other means of accomplishing the same result as well. From that time, I have had as standing arrangement a system of liaison with Arafat through his nephew, Dr. Nasser al-Kidwa, who is on the P.L.O. Observer delegation at the U.N.

The rest of the development should read clearly enough in the file until near the end. It was a long sequence of efforts to communicate the content of this long dialogue to the Reagan administration. For some time I felt that Cardinal Law's instinctive response of appealing to Vice-President Bush was not the right tactic, because by then it was clear that Mr. Bush was running for President and could allow himself no adventures in this realm. I had found, to my chagrin, that the fine men I had been dealing with in the State Department were so frightened of anything that might associate them with an effort of this sort that I could simply not deal with them any longer, and had to go directly to the White House. My effort was consistently through former Ambassador Wilson, who had already been helpful before and on whom I felt I could rely.

Ambassador Wilson made many efforts to arrange meetings, and had several

conversations with President Reagan on the subject himself. Late in the process, he brought Mr. Stanley Sheinbaum into the picture, knowing his intense commitment to making a breakthrough in this matter. I spent a long morning's meeting with Stanley in New York, and got all this documentation to him. We had plans for the three of us -- Ambassador Wilson, Stanley Sheinbaum and myself -- to present all this to President Reagan in a meeting, and if successful in getting his agreement that he would accept and recognize some formula of recognition of Israel and the other preconditions from Arafat, we planned to go on together to Tunis to mediate that with Arafat himself.

Over the Thanksgiving weekend, when the whole Presidential party was out to California, Ambassador Wilson and Stanley Sheinbaum met with the key officials of the President's office, and found that while they were sympathetic to the purpose of such a meeting, they believed it was still too politically dangerous for the President, even that late in his term, to lift even a finger to make it happen. Our conclusion was that, having already found that lower-level officials in the U.S. government could not touch this question, we had now demonstrated that even a lame-duck President at the end of his term could not afford to deal with non-officials like ourselves like ourselves. Stanley Sheinbaum and Ambassador Wilson already had the alternative plan in train. What we needed was someone totally official -- therefore not ourselves -- with whom the Administration could talk -- therefore neither Americans nor Palestinians. (This had been the point, earlier, of my efforts to have the Holy See offer its good offices.) We had to have someone foreign and official, and turned to the Swedes.

With that, I think this file will be basically intelligible. I am glad to be able to account for all this to you after all this time.

Best wishes,

sincerely,

Ray Helmick, S.J.

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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

November 26, 1985

Chairman Yasser Arafat
Palestine Liberation Organisation

Dear Chairman Arafat,

Late in June of this year you were so kind as to receive me as one of a group of ten Americans, two of them -- Eugene Mihaly of Cincinnati and Leonard Beerman of Pasadena -- Rabbis, and others Protestant Ministers, among them Rev. William Sloane Coffin of New York and Rev. George Regas of Los Angeles, as well as Stephen Cary, the Chairman of the American Friends Service Committee, and Ronald Young, whom you had already known as the AFSC representative in the Middle East over the previous three years. We were at the end of our two weeks visit to Jordan, Israel and the West Bank, and Egypt, and had already met many other persons in all camps.

We had a long, wide-ranging and very helpful discussion with you that evening, taking in many aspects of your peace initiative. I pressed over a long while myself, as you may remember, about your policy priorities, citing the interpretation we had been given repeatedly in American Embassies in those countries that the unity of the PLO and the reestablishment of a military base in Lebanon had higher priority for you than the peace initiative. I was very happy to hear your views, which put these matters in a much different perspective than we had been hearing from American diplomats, and I have since been able to cite your own presentation of your priorities to great advantage in speaking with State Department and White House people.

One area which, to my disappointment, we did not touch on in that evening's conversation was the continuing Palestinian military activity during the time of the peace initiative. One of the others of our group had agreed, when a few of us divided up among ourselves the major themes to be raised, to address that matter, and failed to do so. I felt it was wrong of us even at that time to leave that question unasked, because we had been told repeatedly, not only by Israelis but by Jordanians and Egyptians as well, that they found the episode of the Palestinians boats that had been apprehended by the Israelis at sea on their way to attack the Tel Aviv Defense Ministry inconsistent with the peace initiative. Shortly after our visit, when I talked with one of President Reagan's closest NSC advisers, he too raised this matter of the boats of May, and felt that if they had been successful in attacking the Defense Ministry the negative repercussions would have been worse even than the bus hijacking of 1978, which had been the occasion of the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon that year.

For myself, I do not quarrel with the position you and the PLO seem so anxious to assert, that the people of Palestine, under this long military occupation, have a right of resistance. I have read, and approved, the article that Professor Walid Khalidi published recently on this theme in the Boston Globe, and discussed it with him, and I have seen your Cairo Declaration.

I write to you now out of concern that the military activities of the summer have had such a negative effect on the PLO in its peace initiative, on which, like yourself, I have placed high hopes. The boats of May, apprehended at sea by the Israelis, entailing the deaths of all the Palestinians on board, were of a piece with the boat of August, whose mission I do not know, but which was also apprehended at sea, with the internment of all on board. They have doubtless been subjected to far from gentle questioning since. This was followed by the episode of the Israeli yacht in Larnaca harbor, which did great damage to Palestinian credit in the Western world, at a time when that credit was of first importance for the peace initiative. I hear rumors that the three Israelis, one of them a woman, on the yacht were agents monitoring the traffic in boats from Larnaca. That may be true, though I have not the means to confirm it. What is more important is that in the eyes of the world, whether it is true or not, these three were innocent Israeli tourists, and the political effect of their deaths was hurtful to the peace initiative. I share with you your indignation and outrage at the Israeli air raid on Tunis. If there was American complicity in that raid, as seems likely, it shames me deeply. But every political effect of that raid, which had generated new sympathy for the Palestinians, was wiped out by the affair of the Achille Lauro, the result of which has been to set back the Palestinian cause and the effort for a peaceful and just solution in multiple and immeasurable ways, causing grave ruptures with friends and putting the PLO, in its peace initiative, far behind the position it had in June or in February.

Again, there are elements I do not know in this. I hear it asserted, and also denied, that the purpose of the Palestinians on board the Achille Lauro was to raid something in Israel, I know not what, whether a military installation or civilians, after landing at Ashdod. By that interpretation, the plan would be consistent with the abortive boat raids, attempting a passage by a cruise liner after the failure of the boats. Others claim that this was merely an excuse to please the Italians, who have been friendly to the PLO, and that the hijacking of the ship was intended from the start. Whichever is true, the fact that the worst interpretation can be widely believed is what is of greatest and most damaging political importance to the PLO. What actually happened, the ruthless murder of an aged, paralytic civilian in his wheelchair and the dumping of his body in the sea, has had the horrifying effect on the political standing of the PLO and its peace initiative which you know very well. You and your people have been terribly ill served by those who planned/misplanned this incident.

The parallel diplomatic loss, incurred when the meeting of Mohammed Milhem and Bishop Khouri with the British Foreign Minister was aborted with great loss of credit for the PLO, might have been handled successfully if it had not been for the Achille Lauro episode and the consequent outrage. I am much in sympathy with Mr. Milhem, whom I respect most highly, in this incident. It seems to me that, wittingly or unwittingly, the British demanded something it would have been wrong of him to give at that intended meeting. There was a process in train, carefully designed by the PLO, to bring about PLO recognition of the two UN Resolutions, 242 and 338, in return for key recognitions of Palestinian rights and the PLO's rightful role as representative of the Palestinian people, through the Murphy meeting. This was the process which I and the other Americans with whom I met you in June had studied with close attention. The British document short-circuited that very delicate process, asking these two envoys to make, on their own authority, the declaration it was planned should be made under quite other circumstances in return for a most

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arduously negotiated response, a response that could come only from Americans, not the British. Mr. Milhem was quite right in refusing to sign that document without instruction, and it was right that the instruction should be that he refuse. I expect there must have been some very careless liaison in advance of the meeting, with the British and the Jordanians. Otherwise that document would not have come up at the last moment as a surprise. With proper liaison, an appropriate document that took account of the realities of the situation could probably have been negotiated with the British in advance, or barring that, the meeting could have been called off without the public embarrassment of the PLO that actually happened. King Hussein seemed to admit as much, in the public statement he made at the time, when he said there appeared to have been a failure at some level in his own Foreign Office, and regretted that all the participants had not been gathered together in Amman in advance. Nevertheless, when the document did come as a surprise at the last minute, Mr. Milhem was right to refuse to sign. I have given this opinion myself, and argued it carefully, to all my main contacts, official as well as private, Israeli as well as American. But who can be expected to believe it or take it seriously at the time of the Achille Lauro episode and the murder of that helpless old man in his wheelchair? The smell of that infects people's judgment of everything the PLO does and is.

It is in this context that I propose to you now that the PLO should dissociate itself from violent actions during the time of the peace initiative. I do not ask that you make any renunciation of the Palestinian people's right of resistance to the occupation. It gives me no pleasure to recognize that right, as I am not an advocate of any use of violence in disputes, but rather of the means of peace. The deaths of any Jews, Israeli or otherwise, grieve me, as also do the deaths of any Palestinians, or of any human beings whatever. I am a partisan of the safety and peace of Israel, and also of the safety and peace, justice and full right of self-determination of the Palestinian people and nation. My judgment is for the partition of Palestine, and as a practical matter I look to partition on the lines that existed before 1967. The Israel for which I seek peace and safety is one that has those borders, and which would build peace with the Palestinians and other Arab peoples, and a freindship that would allow those borders to be open ones. Nonetheless, I cannot deny the right of resistance of the Palestinians against the military occupation.

I would in fact qualify that right with the observation that the Palestinians still resident in the West Bank and Gaza have, by consistent if not universal choice since 1967, not exercised that right by means of armed resistance. Such resistance has come consistently from the Diaspora community outside. And since, apart from the basically failed efforts of the War of Attrition period and the invasion of 1973, it has not been practicable to wage that resistance from outside against the occupiers in the territory they occupied, it has meant mostly action against civilians, which have always been labelled terrorist attacks.

I have also some clear ideas of what terrorism is and what it is not. I know that the term "terrorism" is usually employed as a rhetoric, to denigrate opponents. There is a well defined ethical tradition, partly even formulated into international law, though not entirely, which defines the rights of resistance and legitimate insurgency. The rhetorical usage of our time has been employing the term "terrorist" indiscriminately to any act of armed

resistance or insurgency, and this is not legitimate. - I would confine the term "terrorist" to those actions of an insurgent force which, if committed by the regular forces of an established country, would be defined as war crimes. Any deliberate attack on civilians comes under that definition, both in ethics and in international law, however little the nations of the world hold themselves or their forces accountable for such acts. I have noted with care your own rejection of terrorism, most recently in your Cairo Declaration, and hope that your definition of the terrorism you rejected is along these lines.

I understand also that, when a people has been deprived of all hope, desperate actions are often undertaken that express their helplessness to undertake any other sort of action. I would never accept or excuse such actions, but I know that the responsibility for them is shared between those who commit such crimes and those who have reduced them to such desperation. These desperate acts, though, are the work of the weak. I understand why they have been undertaken by Palestinians in the time of their greatest weakness. I would have no understanding for them at the present time when it is within the power and the responsibility of the PLO to assert its political strength.

In the sorry state to which the peace initiative of the PLO has been reduced by the Achille Lauro debacle, I read constantly in the American and Western press, and hear from political figures, that now "the peace process" can be carried on without the PLO. I know that this is an illusion, that if the PLO is not fully involved in the quest for a just peace, the Palestinian people itself is not in any true sense represented and there can be no peace. This illusion is willed by many Israelis, even by many who genuinely want a just peace, and it is willed by many of their supporters in the U.S. and other countries as well, many of whom also genuinely want a just peace. I have spent much of my time, in the months since I visited the Middle East in June, trying to counter, especially in my conversations and correspondence with American officials, another illusion, the illusion that there could be any true settlement without Syria. I hope you realise as well as I do that that is an illusion. I have been glad to see the rapprochement of recent weeks between Jordan and Syria, and the new openness, in Israel and the United States, toward an international conference. If now I and others who, like me, see how total an illusion it is to expect a settlement without the PLO are to have any success in countering that illusion, then we need, as you yourselves most urgently need, a new assertion of the PLO's political strength for peace.

The clearest way I would see to accomplish this would be for you to declare a moratorium on the use of force during the time of the peace initiative.

Such a moratorium would not entail a renunciation of the Palestinian people's right of resistance to armed occupation. But such a right does not have to be actually exercised, at particular times or even at all. The decision to exercise it or not is a practical matter of the tactics that will accomplish your goal, which is a just peace.

The exercise of armed resistance has, over the course of this year, been consistently destructive of your most central purpose, which is the peace initiative you so carefully crafted with King Hussein, and which showed such promise until it was heavily discredited by the succession of armed attacks culminating in the Achille Lauro affair. I would contend that, in the present state of your actual military potential, every action you could possibly mount has to go wrong, and be destructive of your deepest purpose, which is peace.

Chairman Arafat, November 26, '85 -- 5

It seems to me that decisions have been made over the year on the basis of other priorities, such as putting up an appearance of military strength for the edification of the PLO rejectionists. You explained to me yourself that these priorities did not rank, for you, ahead of the priority of the peace initiative, and I believe you. Had either of the small guerrilla raids from boats succeeded they would have done immense harm to the peace initiative, while being no more than a pin-prick to the Israelis. The Achille Lauro affair itself simply had to go wrong, though the particular spectacular way it went wrong was wholly unpredictable. The harm it did is basically to your own cause. Even the very localized assassinations of Israelis, within or by groups based in the Occupied Territories, actions which I do not believe happen under your control in any way, are heavily damaging to your cause and that of the Palestinian people. They cause personal grief to families, and fuel the propaganda of the Israeli hard-liners, but they have nothing whatever to offer to your cause.

The moratorium should not be declared as the result of demands or pressure from other Arab governments, but as a sovereign act of authority by the PLO in pursuit of its aims. The governments of Jordan and Egypt have in fact been asking for declarations from you that would amount to renunciation of the right of resistance, which you have properly understood that you should not give. The PLO's declaration of a moratorium should not lend itself to being understood as an act of weakness, which would further undermine the authority of the PLO, already weakened by the series of military debacles. Instead it should clearly be an assertion of the strength of the PLO, and its authority with the Palestinian people in pursuing justice and peace.

The time frame I suggest for the moratorium, "during the time of the peace initiative," is deliberately made flexible. A fixed date for its termination would only oblige you to break it at its end, and create further havoc. A flexible term for it gives you great freedom, and permits you, if there is no response from Americans and Israelis, to declare that the effort simply has not worked. Then you and the PLO have the credit for having genuinely tried. If, as I expect, the declaration of such a moratorium did re-enliven the peace initiative, and begin gradually to produce concrete results, you would be in a position, at each positive step, to declare the moratorium extended.

There is in fact much skepticism in the United States, among officials and the public, about how much authority you have with the Palestinian people, whether in the Occupied Territories or in the Diaspora. The moratorium would give you the opportunity to demonstrate your real authority, by enforcing it. In speaking of the matter with Palestinians, I have heard from them that there is no real training or popularization among them, especially in the hard circumstances of the Diaspora camps, for any other method of dealing with their suffering than armed struggle. If so, that is a great lack. I believe you could, at a stroke, by declaring this moratorium, educate your people to other methods of accomplishing their aims of justice and peace, and thus compensate for that lack, if it exists. Moreover, I believe that among those, both in the Occupied Territories and in the Diaspora, who have greeted your peace initiative with great enthusiasm all this year, the declaration of a moratorium would be thoroughly intelligible and highly popular. It would thus be a way of building and increasing your authority and that of the PLO, as well as a way of building, and restoring after the summer's losses, the PLO's international credibility as a negotiating partner for peace.

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Without doubt there would be acts of provocation by those among the rejectionist Palestinians who would want to sabotage any chance of a real peace settlement and undermine your own authority. It would be necessary for you to establish clearly where you have and where you do not have authority, what is done under that authority and what is subversive of it, and so far as possible to punish those who violate it, at least so far as they come under your authority.

That there has not been more actual organization of the Palestinians of the Occupied Territories has long been a mystery and something of a disappointment to me. Not that I am disappointed that the residents of those territories have generally abstained from armed insurrection and guerrilla activity. Quite the contrary, as I believe it would only have further embittered relations and have had no prospect of success. Suppression of any such armed resistance would have had full popular support in Israel and have been pursued relentlessly, unlike the case of the Shi'ite resistance to the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. But that there has been no civil disobedience campaign comparable to that of the Druze in the Golan, or no strike by the Palestinian work force even in 1982 when the PLO was under Israeli siege in Beirut, amazes me. I do understand the difficulty of organizing for such things under the circumstances that have been imposed by the occupation. And I realise as well how, in the earlier years, the PLO appeared to the residents of the Occupied Territories as more an organization for the Diaspora than for them. But that stage of the PLO's development is long past. I did test for myself, during my June visit, the extent to which the West Bank residents (I have not been in Gaza) recognize you and the PLO as their leadership. The moratorium I propose to you would have the advantage of being a way for the PLO to assert its authority in the Occupied Territories. The frustrations of recent months have led to several acts of angry violence by the West Bank residents. Your peace initiative has so much popularity with them that, I believe, a moratorium declared by you in promotion of it would be spontaneously supported and enforced by the residents in your name.

I must say in conclusion that I write all this in love and support for the people of Israel as well as in love and support for the people of Palestine. I have never accepted and will not accept the distinction, common among many Arabs and others, of friendship for Jews and enmity to "Zionism." I know that there are streams of opinion among some, but not all, Zionists that show no respect for Palestinians or other Arabs, and aspire to do them still further ill. Those I oppose as firmly as you do yourself. But Zionism, such as I see in the great peace advocates of Israel, among them the group represented by "New Outlook" and the movement deriving from the insights of Martin Buber, I regard as the aspiration of the Jewish people for self-determination and a homeland. I respect it and am in sympathy with it, just as I do the aspirations of the Palestinian people for justice, self-determination and a homeland. It is my hope, which I believe you and your people share, that your two peoples can come to live in peace and friendship and a cooperation which will benefit you both. Those Israelis and their supporters, I believe, who think it is good news for them if the PLO, the one force that can really negotiate, in conjunction with other Arabs, a true peaceful settlement with them, is discredited are profoundly mistaken. It is in this spirit that I write this proposal which, I believe, would restore to the PLO the credit lost in recent months.


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Chairman Arafat, November 26, '85 -- 7

For me it was an honor that you received me and my American companions, Jewish and Christian, on our visit to the Middle East last June. I do recognize the rightful place that you and the PLO have as the representatives of the Palestinian people, and the sincerity of your search for a just peace. I was profoundly impressed with the personal courage and witness for peace of Mohammed Milhem and Bishop Elias Khouri, whom I met; with the enthusiasm for the peace initiative we heard from Hani el-Hassan; and I was deeply moved by the stories Khalil Wazir, Abu Jihad, told us from his own experience, in the presence of his wife and beautiful children, of the sufferings of the Palestinian people. As a Catholic priest, conscious of the importance of the Palestinian Christian community in what is for all of us a Holy Land, I have learned an intense respect for the religious and civilizational heritage of Islam, and feel great affinity with its witness of faith. I pray for the day when the three great monotheistic faiths, of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the peoples of the Book, can live in mutual devotion and cherish one another on the soil you hold so dear. I wish you well in your great enterprise of peace.

With the deepest respect, I am

sincerely yours,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

13

December 27, 1985

Professor John Norton Moore
School of Law
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, VA 22901

Dear John,

Congratulations on your new office as Chairman of the Board of the United States Institute of Peace. No better appointment could be made. I feel sure you offer the best chance of the Institute's fulfilling the hope we have placed in it.


I'm enclosing here a copy of a letter I sent last month to Yasser Arafat, following up on my conversation with him last June. He has so badly disgraced his peace initiative, whether by authorizing or simply not having sufficient operational control of PLO activity through the summer. But to my mind he and the substantial part of the PLO and Palestinian community opinion that stays with him are still essential if there is to be a serious peace negotiation.

I sent this on through the PLO's own diplomatic system. Then I waited deliberately before circulating any copies until he should have had time to reflect on it a bit, but just today I've sent a copy to Jock Covey at the White House, asking him to share it with Bill Kirby at State. I didn't want too many copies in circulation. I will let him know as soon as I get any wind of a response, however indirect, from the people through whom I sent it. I thought you should have a copy as soon as anyone else, in case the subject came up when you see people in the White House.

The proposal I make here, of a moratorium on any military action by the PLO during the time of the peace initiative, is still I think the central necessity if Arafat is to have any credibility as a negotiator for peace, as he must if there is to be any peace. The indications are that the Jordanians and Egyptians are now pressing him more on recognition of 242 and 338. I do understand his desire for some reciprocal recognition when he does that, and how he has planned throughout the year to have it happen that way, but now his time may finally be running out. I think another letter may be in order very soon, and plan to write it as soon as I hear some indication how this letter was received. I expect Arafat may now be so pre-occupied with the PLO's own in-fighting that he may have less than a sure grip on priorities.

Best wishes for the New Year.

Sincerely,


Ray Helmick, S.J.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

Memo: Ray Helmick, S.J., to Cardinal Law -- January 14, 1986

Re: Relations Between the Holy See and the State of Israel.

Appeals for an exchange of permanent diplomats between the Holy See and Israel, at the rank of Nuncio and Ambassador, have reached a crescendo over 1985. This has been a consistent Israeli and American Jewish request for many years, and it should be understood that the more intensive campaign at present coincides with the prospects of serious negotiation to resolve the Palestinian question and the borders between Israel and her Arab neighbors that have been in the air since the Jordanian-PLO accord of February 11, 1985. It would be unfair to say that the Israelis want the Vatican in their corner during whatever negotiations take place, though that is the general Arab view of the current campaign. The prospect of serious peace negotiations are very controversial within Israel itself, some (not exclusively in either major political bloc) see the prospect with hope and are working assiduously for a genuine and lasting peace, while others (also to be found within both major power blocs) view it with radical distrust as an obstacle to annexationist plans. Moreover, there is no consensus yet, even among those in Israel who are most committed to peace with the Arabs and the settlement of the Palestinian question, with whom they would negotiate. I think it is fairer to say that both the advocates and the opponents of the negotiations are anxious to have this diplomatic exchange with the Vatican, and for different motives: the advocates for the help the Holy See could bring to the process of negotiation and the opponents as a sort of trump card they could play against the Arabs to avert real negotiations with them.

In this memo, I will argue that this is not an opportune time for the diplomatic exchange, but that a counter-proposal might be made to the Holy See, asking an expansion of the good offices role that the Holy See already plays, and that this might itself lead to the diplomatic exchange under circumstances that would remove the ambiguity mentioned above. Nonetheless, the main burden of the memo will be simply to inform you of the main lines of Vatican policy on the question.

The issue is often stated in terms of Vatican recognition of the State of Israel. This is in fact a misconstruction, as the Holy See, in its statements and actions, does already recognize the State of Israel as legitimate and as having the same rights as any sovereign state, which the Vatican supports. This has not always been the case, as statements in the time of Pope Pius XII regularly avoided the expression "State of Israel," using the circumlocution "the Holy Land" in a way that, for Jews, was reminiscent of the common Arab use of the circumlocution "the Zionist entity." It has, however, been the case since sometime in the pontificate of Pope Paul VI, and there was vague use of the language of recognition even in the time of Pope John XXIII. Visits to the Vatican by Israeli Presidents, Prime Ministers (since the time of Golda Meir) and Foreign Ministers are accorded the status of visits of state. Pope John Paul II in particular has strongly supported the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli treaty (over the opposition of most Arab countries), called in April 1979 for

the promotion of more frequent contacts between the Holy See and Israel (in a statement released after a papal audience with Joseph Itzhak-Chiechanorer of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NC News April 28, '79), and has made many statements endorsing the State of Israel since. (More documented citations follow in the course of this memo.) Still, this has stopped short of the exchange of permanent representatives of ambassadorial rank. An ambiguity remains also about whether this Vatican recognition of Israel is de facto or de jure, as the expression "factual existence" is still used, but the content of the recognition is then expressed in de jure terms. (A notable instance of this is in the address given by Msgr. William Murphy in Boston, on behalf of the Pontifical Commission Justitia et Pax, in April 1983, a copy of which is attached to this memo: par. 4 c!)

Matters of Context.

Catholic and Jewish perceptions in this matter are widely different, and a bit of context is necessary. Jewish understanding of the Catholic attitude is colored by the reply given by Pope Pius X in January 1904, when the founder of the Zionist movement, Theodor Herzl, asked for papal support of the Zionist cause. "We are unable to favor this movement. We cannot prevent the Jews from going to Jerusalem, but we could never sanction it. As head of the Church I cannot answer you otherwise. The Jews have not recognized our Lord. Therefore we cannot recognize the Jewish people, and so, if you come to Palestine and settle your people there, we will be ready with churches and priests to baptize all of you." There were better statements later, notably by Pope Benedict XV, but this statement of Pius X is the one most often cited, and rankles with Jews, who see in it a reversion to the rabid anti-semitism that characterized Saint John Chrysostom or motivated the much later proselytism of Saint John Capistran. It was not until our Catholic metanoia about the Jews at Vatican Council II that we purged these noxious elements from our thinking: Jews as the failed and superseded Covenant, their wandering in diaspora as the witness to our triumph, and the image of the Christ-killer as the lynch-pin of the whole the structure. The legacy of suspicion has still to be overcome. The Holocaust and the establishment of the State of Israel are today the great recent events in Jewish communal experience, and affect deeply their religious understanding of the meaning of their peoplehood. Pius X's statement has succeeded in fastening the dead weight of the whole history of persecution to Catholic responses to the new State.

It is important to see the variety of source from which initiative comes in the Catholic Church. People are still used to thinking of us as the monolith, in which initiative comes only from the Vatican center. It has been more obvious since Vatican Council II that initiative is as likely to come from the local churches at the periphery (though in fact it has always been true), and that the most solid initiatives often come from the interaction of periphery and center. Thus the major action of ~~revising~~ the basic outlook of the Church on Judaism was initiated by the American church (with European help) and brought to the Council, which endorsed it in Most Holy Eucharist, as was also the initiative that led to the Declaration on Religious Freedom at the Council. Your own initiative, also, in raising anew with the Holy See the question of diplomatic relations with the State of Israel is in this category.

Church in the United States

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the V.S. The Vatican, because of its care for the Eastern churches, has all along had distinct and articulate relations with the Arabs and with Islam, as well as its relations with Judaism and the State of Israel. The ~~American~~ Catholic Church has not had any very distinct view of the Arabs and Muslims, though it has had with Jews and Judaism. Even the many urgent statements of the Popes and the Holy See on Islamic and Arab matters have been in the part of the Vatican mailbag that American bishops and our Catholic Conference have largely discarded as having nothing to do with them. But in matters concerning the Jews and Israel, American bishops, with their strong relation to Jews, have quite properly gone far ahead of the Vatican, as in the 1973 and 1975 statements of the NCCB calling explicitly for recognition of Israel "as a sovereign state within secure boundaries," as the first element of any overall resolution. They also spoke in those statements of responding to the real needs of the Palestinians, though at that time, reflecting general American attitudes, they referred to them only as refugees, not as a people or nation with distinct rights of their own. It can well be agreed that the American bishops have a fuller view of the Jews and Israel than the Vatican, but also that the American view is partial, with little insight into the needs and rights of the Palestinians, and that the Vatican's view of both sides is a necessary corrective. The way is wide open for creative exchange.

Another matter of context is the Vatican's preference for separating the matters of inter-religious dialogue, whether with Jews or with Muslims, which have their place in the Dicasteries, and what are called Public Affairs, which are the business of the Secretariate of State, therefore handled by a separate group of people. Oddly, the religious dialogue with Jews comes under the Secretariate for Christian Unity, a fact only intelligible because of the special interest of Cardinals Bea and Willebrands, while the dialogue with Muslims happens under Cardinal Arinze's care in the Secretariate for Non-Christian Religions. This has advantages which Cardinal Arinze in particular appreciates, but also the disadvantage of again separating the personnel who deal with these often related questions. I had the experience last November of meeting a broad representation of those few American Catholics who have serious dealings with Muslims at the Villanova conference on "The Vatican, Islam and the Middle East" (at which both Cardinals Arinze and Cordeiro were participants), and observed the encumbrance that comes from their not being in any kind of dialogue with Jews. The matters the Vatican is so anxious to keep separate, religious dialogue and public affairs, tended to get put on the table together at the conference, as they were combined in the conference's title. And these few American Catholics who speak to Muslims but are defensive about Jews showed their tendency to get the Muslims off in a corner by themselves, describe the Catholics most involved in Christian-Jewish dialogue (in one person's phrase) as "the cheering section for the Jewish lobby," and tell the Muslims: "Never mind what those fellows are saying; we're all on your side." Eventually I made a speech myself, in which I objected to this tendency, and spoke of how necessary it is now for some of the same American Catholics to be speaking to both Jews and Muslims. Over most of their common history, Jews and Muslims were much better able to speak with each other than either of them was able to speak with us. Now they are barely able to speak at all with each other, and the responsibility devolves on us Catholics to talk with both and facilitate their mutual communication. For Catholics, the same group of us, to talk seriously with both would be a way of keeping ourselves honest. And both sides should always know what we are saying to the other (as in fact they do, whether we tell them plainly or not), so that they can judge the honesty of what we are saying. When I said this at Villanova, I found that the Catholics present (American but basically pro-Arab) hardly understood what

I was saying, whereas both the Muslims (many of them of high standing and in some cases very aggressive in their positions) and the three Israelis present understood exactly what I was saying and were, on both sides, highly appreciative.

However, that the Vatican separates the inter-religious dialogue with Jews and the "public affairs" question of the State of Israel flies directly in the face of the Jewish perception that the founding and growth of the State of Israel has religious significance, is the "aliya," or in-gathering of the people, promised by the prophets, connected but not identical with messianic hopes. Theologically, these are matters of much controversy among Jews. Even in Jerusalem itself one finds an extreme group which rejects the whole concept of Zionism and the legitimacy of the State of Israel on the grounds that the Messiah has not yet come, and others secularize the concept of aliya to the point where it is emptied of religious meaning. But most, in varying degrees, identify the restoration of Israel with prophetic promises. The Vatican, understandably, does not want to get mixed up in this infra-Jewish controversy. But the American bishops, in their Nov. 20, 1975 Statement on Catholic-Jewish Relations, put their finger more accurately than the Vatican had up to that time on the weakness of separating the matter of the State of Israel from the inter-religious dialogue: "In dialogue with Christians, Jews have explained that they do not consider themselves as a church, a sect, or a denomination, as is the case among Christian communities, but rather as a peoplehood that is not solely racial, ethnic or religious, but in a sense a composite of all these. It is for such reasons as these that an overwhelming majority of Jews see themselves bound in one way or another to the land of Israel. Most Jews see this tie to the land as essential to their Jewishness. Whatever difficulties Christians may experience in sharing this view they should strive to understand this link between land and people which Jews have expressed in their writings and worship throughout two millenia as a longing for the homeland, holy Zion. Appreciation of this link is not to give assent to any particular religious interpretation of this bond. Nor is this affirmation meant to deny the legitimate rights of other parties in the region, or to adopt any political stance in the controversies over the Middle East, which lie beyond the purview of this statement."

Why the Holy See Has Not Established Diplomatic Relations.

The most comprehensive and systematic presentation of the Holy See's outlook was presented by Msgr. William Murphy, on behalf of the Pontifical Commission Justitia et Pax, at the National Workshop on Christian-Jewish Relations, in Boston, April 1983, and was printed in The Pilot in two parts, in the issues of April 29 and May 6, 1983. The whole address merits reading and is attached to this memo. Its key paragraph on Israel (4 c) has already been cited above. Msgr. Murphy states: "The Holy See would have no problem in principal with establishing diplomatic relations. However there are certain difficulties and problems that the Holy See would first want to have resolved. I might add that it is the common custom of the Holy See not to be the initiator of diplomatic relations with any country although it welcomes and appreciates diplomatic relations."

That the initiative must come from the Israeli side is doubtless well known to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For them, the question is whether they want to raise, in this context, the whole set of "difficulties and problems" that such an initiative would bring to the fore, and of course they would want to know the answers before putting the question formally.

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Neither Israel nor the Holy See would want to go through the embarrassment of a negative response.

The actual reasons are very much what you expected.

1. The uncertainty of the borders of Israel. The Holy See traditionally does not establish diplomatic relations and full recognition of a State while borders are in dispute. The obvious unrelated example of this is Poland, with which the Holy See did not exchange ambassadors while the question of borders with Germany was unsettled. For the same reason there is no exchange of ambassadors with Jordan, though relations there are cordial, as they are with Israel, and the question does not tend to get raised with the same urgency. An Apostolic Delegate resident in Jerusalem deals with the affairs of the Catholic communities in both Israel and Jordan (as well as the occupied territories) without being accredited to either government. This custom of not accrediting diplomats while borders are in dispute applies where the dispute is of the essence of the Holy See's relation to the Catholic communities of the place. It did not hinder diplomatic relations of the Vatican with Chile and Argentina through their long border dispute, in which the Vatican's good offices were eventually the key factor for bringing a peaceful solution.

The matter of borders is a very real and essential concern in the case of Israel and its neighbors, as it can be taken for granted that many, both Jews and Arabs and many supporters of both, would interpret full diplomatic relations with Israel, however much it was denied, as prior endorsement of whatever decision Israel might make about the occupied territories. This includes not only the West Bank (with East Jerusalem) and Gaza, but also the Golan Heights, which Israel has already declared annexed, and it would have serious repercussions for the Christians of Lebanon, the southernmost strip of whose territory remains occupied, with all appearance of permanence, even after Israel has declared the occupation of Lebanon over.

2. The status of Jerusalem and the other holy places. Here there has been a change in the Holy See's position so striking that Msgr. Murphy, in paragraph 4 d of his paper, referred to "the present position of the Holy See." In Pius XII's time the question most earnestly addressed was that of the safety of the holy places, as in the statement Auspicia Quaedam of May 10, 1948, which expressed "keen anxiety" for them and asked for a just resolution of the conflict. Two subsequent encyclicals, In Multiplicibus of October 24, 1948, and Redemptoris Nostri of April 15, 1949, called for "an international character" for Jerusalem, an "international status for the city," and "international guarantees for the right of free access to holy places and freedom of religion and respect for customs and religious traditions." The Holy See then endorsed the UN Resolution of December 9, 1949, which called for internationalization of the city.

Statements by Pope Pius XII and by the Holy See in his time always avoided, as mentioned above, reference to "the State of Israel," and spoke of "the Holy Land" instead. Change in this practice went hand in hand with the change in position on Jerusalem. Two events precipitated these changes. One was Vatican Council II with its reflection on the Jews represented in Nostra Aetate. The other was the Six-Day War of June 1967, by which practically all the holy places came under the factual jurisdiction of Israel. References to Israel, by name, crept into the statements of Pope John XXIII and increasingly into those of Pope Paul VI, warming gradually to a de facto recognition of

Israel as "a country." In Pope John Paul II's statements there is consistency in referring to the Palestinians' need for a "homeland" while referring to Israel as a "nation" or "state." Since the Holy See's welcoming of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli treaty, this language of de facto recognition has taken on the content of de jure recognition, as in Msgr. Murphy's address (par. 4 c once more): "The Holy See recognizes the factual existence of Israel, its right to exist, its right to borders and to all the other rights that a sovereign nation possesses."

In this process of change since the Council and Nostra Aetate, the Holy See has always emphasized the spiritual character of its interest and activity, and eschewed the offering of technical solutions. This is strongly emphasized in two places in Msgr. Murphy's address (paragraphs 3 and 7 c), once as a general statement and once in the specific context of the Middle Eastern problem. The assertion of this spiritual interest, though, is regularly coupled with the offer of diplomatic good offices to assist all parties in finding solutions that respect the dignity of persons, legitimate territorial integrity, freedom and security of peoples and nations, etc.

In the matter of Jerusalem, the Vatican after the 1967 war shifted from seeking full internationalization of the city to more modest goals. Pope Paul VI asked in his allocution of December 23, 1968, for "an internationally generated legal safeguard" for the city's holy places and religiously diverse population. The reference to population was a new element to which this memo will return shortly, and the question was clearly widened to include the other holy places in Israel or under Israeli control in the occupied territories. A further significant step was taken in Pope Paul II's 1984 apostolic letter Redemptiois Anno, one of the central documents, the text of which is attached here in the Latin original and English translation. The Pope then confined himself to the religious realm rather than the political, and emphasized the importance of the city for all three Abrahamic faiths, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. He had specific things to say of the meaning of Jerusalem for each faith. Of the Jewish attachment he said: "Before it was the city of Jesus... Jerusalem was the historic site of the biblical revelation of God, the meeting place, as it were, of heaven and earth, in which more than in any other place in the world the word of God was brought to humanity.... Jews ardently love her, and in every age venerate her memory, abundant as she is in many remains and monuments from the time of David who chose her as the capital, and of Solomon who built the Temple there. Therefore, they turn their minds to her daily, one may say, and point to her as the sign of their nation."

In naming certain documents as of central importance on this issue, two fundamental statements of Pope Paul VI should be mentioned: his Christmas address to the Cardinals in 1973, of which the latter part is about the Middle East (full English text attached), and most important, his Apostolic Exhortation Nobis in Animo, dated March 25, 1974 but released April 6, 1974, of which both Latin original and English translation are attached.

Concern for the Christian population of the land has been a constant theme for many years. The Catholic Near East Welfare Association goes back to 1926, and has since then collected funds in the United States for Catholic communal interests throughout the Middle East. The Pontifical Mission to Palestine dates from 1947, and maintains offices in the several countries where the Palestinian population is concentrated. Schools and other institutions maintained by these agencies have performed significant services for the Muslim population as well. But after the 1967 war and the occupation of further

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territories, the question became not only the welfare of the Christian and Muslim populations but the survival of their communities in the land. As Msgr. Murphy's comprehensive survey of the position of the Holy See in his 1983 address shows, the Vatican now sees three issues concentrated in this matter of the status of Jerusalem and the holy places:

1. the holy places themselves;
2. free access for pilgrims of the three faiths; and
3. the permanence and welfare of the resident populations of Christians and Muslims, i.e., the Palestinians.

The Holy See has had to fear, since 1967, that the Christian holy places would become a museum of stones, with no living Catholic and Christian community there to attest to the life of faith that has persisted in the place since the time of Jesus.

Regarding access to the holy places, the Israeli government has performed admirably, both before the 1967 war for those shrines in Israel proper, and since 1967 for the ones in the occupied territories. Under the Jordanian administration prior to 1967, access was also commendable, though the closed border between Israel and Jordanian-administered Palestine made it problematic to pass between one and the other. But all this concerns only pilgrim access, on which the Holy See's position is detailed in a series of propositions in Msgr. Murphy's paragraph 4 d.

I was told last June by Zalman Abramov, the former Vice President of the Knesset and now a retired elder statesman, of an Israeli proposal to the Holy See to give extraterritorial status to the Christian and Muslim holy places. The Muslim ones are more concentrated, being mainly the Al Aqsa Mosque, of which the Dome of the Rock is an integral part. The problem here would be to find an Islamic authority which would accept the responsibility of agreeing with Israel on such an arrangement short of a general settlement of Arab-Israeli problems. On the Christian side, Abramov told how Israel had approached the Vatican hoping to organize a Christian authority which could administer all the holy places on this extraterritorial basis, each one with a status similar to that of an embassy. He relates that the Vatican replied that it would be impossible to forge an agreement among the many Christian churches with claims, particularly, in the Holy Sepulchre.

The question of the resident Christian community of the country is the most problematic. This community is under tremendous pressure and has rapidly been disappearing into exile, as Msgr. Beltritti, the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, told me in great distress and much detail last June. Part of the problem is that the Catholics have a school system better than that available to most Muslim and Orthodox Palestinians (though they have many Muslim and Orthodox students), so that their children are better qualified to make a life for themselves elsewhere once they have finished school, as the hard circumstances of the occupation incline them to do. By the mid 1970s the Vatican was already urgently concerned about this disappearance of the Christian presence in the places of our Lord's life. Archbishop Pio Laghi, as Apostolic Delegate, did more than any other single person to seek a remedy

for this problem, among other things seeing to the founding of the Church-supported University of Bethlehem, so that Catholics would not have to go abroad for their higher education (with the prospect that they would stay abroad). But nothing short of a resolution of the Palestinian problem will really give more than temporary help.

The Holy See's insistence on full freedom of cult and freedom for each of the three faiths to live and develop in conformity with the life and tenets of that faith is expected by some to be a problem in the negotiation of full diplomatic relations, as such freedom in Israel proper could collide with the policy of the religious parties in Israel and the "anti-missionary law" which was passed by the Knesset in 1978. Others would deny that this should be a problem, especially since there are no Catholic groups presently embarked on any proselytizing among Jews, although the Christian Fundamentalists are at it full swing. Just currently there is intense controversy in Israel over the construction of a campus for the Brigham Young University on Mount Scopus, since the Mormons are expected to proselytize wherever they are. Feelings against it are very high, but one frequently finds letters from Israelis defending it as an exercise of religious freedom in the Jerusalem Post (a couple of samples attached).

3. Concern for the Christian communities in Arab countries. Even at the time of the Council's Nostra Aetate declaration this was felt, by the Holy See and the Eastern Churches, as a danger. It should not be put simply or grossly as physical danger to Christian communities from rabid Islamic regimes, though in places where Christians are suspect of mixed loyalty their position could be jeopardized by any action of their parent church that seemed one-sided in its sympathy. The fact is that Christianity and the Christian interest are seen almost universally within the Arab world as part of l'Occident, a representative of Western interests. Any action that confirms that assessment damages the universal mission and character of the Church. The Arab, and basically the Third World, perspective on Israel has been, increasingly, that the State is a colonial excursion of the West into their lands. This is a problem primarily for Israel itself to overcome, in order to live at peace with Arab neighbors all about. But it is important for the Church not to be seen as one-sided on this question: the support that the Church, and we American Catholics in particular, so much want to lend to Israel should always be such as to overcome this destructive element in Israel's relation to its neighbors, not further entrench it.

4. Concern for the rights of the Palestinians. Here too the Holy See has been at pains, as with the Jews, to separate the inter-religious dialogue from the "public affairs" matter of the Palestinian question, which, however, has been seen as of great concern to Muslims even when the Church has had the fate of native (i.e. Palestinian) Christians heavily on her mind.

The problem reaches the religious level as a question of justice. For many, it has been unclear whether the Holy See's principal concern, in refraining from full diplomatic relations with Israel, has been about the holy places or about the fate of the Palestinians, or even whether; if the Church were once offered a satisfactory deal on the holy places by Israel, the Vatican would forget the Palestinians. Pope Paul VI's many pronouncements on the question, especially Nobis in Animo, attest to the depth of his concern for the Palestinians, but the best answer to the question is in the Press communique released by the Vatican on September 15, 1982, just after Pope John Paul II received Yasser Arafat, the Chairman of the PLO, in private audience, and this is another

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of the most basic documents on the whole question (the text, with several related documents, attached to this memo). It merits full reading rather than just a summary. Its most important passage reads:

"In these weeks, the tragic siege of Beirut having ended, there has been an intense diplomatic work with a flourishing of plans for relaunching negotiations and opening the way for a global solution to the conflict in the Middle East.

"The Holy See is following with most attentive interest these initiatives and appreciates every effort which is made to favor dialogue and negotiation in order to arrive finally at a settlement of the conflict.

"She wants to contribute with the means that conform to her nature and mission on the level of moral principles, facing these with concrete reality to indicate the needs that, in her opinion, must be present in the search for a peaceful solution.

"The Holy See is convinced above all that there will not be able to be true peace without justice; and that there will not be able to be justice if the rights of all the people involved are not recognized and accepted, in a stable mode, fair and equal.

"Among these rights, primordial and irrenounceable, is that of existence and security on one's own territory, in safeguarding the proper identity of each one.

"It is a dilemma which is debated in a bitter manner between two peoples, the Israelis and the Palestinians, who have seen simultaneously or alternately their rights assaulted or denied.

"The pope and the Catholic Church look with sympathy and consideration toward both these peoples, heirs and witnesses of diverse religious, historic and cultural traditions, but both rich in values similarly respectable.

"Several months ago, at the Sunday Angelus of last April 4, I dared to ask this precise question: "Is it unrealistic, after so many disappointments, to hope that one day these two peoples, each accepting the existence and reality of the other, can find a way to a dialogue that makes them arrive at a just solution, in which both live in peace, in their own dignity and liberty, mutually giving each other a commitment of tolerance and reconciliation?" Today I repeat the question with more force, and even in the hope that the painful event that has been experienced in these months can hasten a positive response from both sides, encouraged and sustained by the solidarity of countries friendly to both, and that they may abandon every recourse to war, to violence and to all forms of armed struggle, some of which in the past has been particularly ruthless and inhuman.

"At the end of this laborious road of peace, for the reconciliation and meeting among different peoples, I see the holy city of Jerusalem rising ideally as a glowing light that invites comprehension and love.

"It is the city of God, which he made the object of his satisfaction and where he revealed the great mysteries of his love for man. Jerusalem can also become the city of man, in which believers in the three great monotheistic religions -- Christianity, Judaism and Islam -- live in full liberty and equality with the followers of other religious communities, in the recognized guarantee that the city is the sacred patrimony of all, in order to attend to the activities which ennoble man: the adoration of the one God, meditation and works of brotherhood.

"I pray God and I invite you to do it with me, so that these yearnings for peace and hopes of peace can be verified soon for all the Middle East, and especially for Jerusalem, for the Holy Land and for Lebanon."

I know some background of this audience for Yasser Arafat from the man who arranged it, Dr. Afif Safieh, a Jerusalem-born Catholic, Professor at the Catholic University of Louvain, currently on loan to the Center for International Affairs at Harvard. He had been to the Vatican and received by the Pope in 1980, seeking good offices of the Holy See on behalf of the Palestinians. At that time, when the good offices had been successfully employed, he proposed an audience for Arafat. He was told by Archbishop Silvestrini that the Pope would like to do it but was prevented by the war in Lebanon. He did not accept the position of the Phalangists but felt he could not receive Arafat while the PLO was ranged against what the Maronites felt was their interest. The request was put on hold, and Arafat was then received by the Pope within days of his departure from Beirut in 1982. The statement by the Holy See had been long prepared and is worth close attention.

Recommendations.

Under these circumstances, my own opinion is that an exchange of ambassadors between the Holy See and Israel is not the thing that would reflect credit on the Holy See, be helpful to the peace or to the interests of either Israel or the Palestinian and other Arabs. There are other options that could contribute to all these interests. Basically I would recommend close consultation between American bishops, with the much closer and warmer relation to Jews that you enjoy, and the Vatican, which has the more balanced relation to both Jews and Arabs. This will be mutually enriching. More pressure on the Holy See to "recognize Israel" is not what is needed. It is in any case a misconception not to see that the Vatican actually does recognize Israel.

What remains to be done is a more intensive use of the Vatican's diplomatic good offices to help bring alive again the prospects for peace that seemed so much more hopeful last year than they are now. It is wrong to believe at present that the Middle East is set on a course for negotiations that could result in a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Much more likely, the course set now will lead to another major war within the next year or so between Israel and Syria. This war, if it comes, is more fraught with dangers of super-power involvement, possibly even the use of nuclear weapons against Jerusalem and Tel Aviv and Damascus, than ever before. Without super-power involvement, if that could be avoided, Syria would again be defeated, though at great cost to Israel, and the whole interest of the Palestinians shunted aside indefinitely, which would turn them and many other Arabs to a long and despairing paroxysm...

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of terroristic violence. Far more likely, the superficial cordiality of the super-powers, after the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Geneva, would be ripped aside and threats and recriminations made which it might not be possible to contain.

I don't believe this prospect is really clear to the policy-makers either in Washington or in Israel. They are still playing the chess-game of the peace initiative that originated with Arafat and King Hussein last February. American and Israeli policy fostered the illusion over much of last year that they could proceed on this course without Syria. More recently, since the PLO has blundered through a succession of guerrilla operations (the old Arafat policy of the "gun and the olive branch"), each producing greater disaster for themselves than the preceeding, Americans and Israelis have cultivated the parallel delusion that peace with the Palestinians could be had without the PLO or Arafat. Having lived on these delusions all year, neither of them properly sees the danger in which they stand. It would be wrong now to believe that what existed last year as prospects for peace can be put back together again after so definitively falling apart. All that remains is the genuine desire for a peaceful solution that exists still in Israel, among the Palestinians, in Jordan and in Egypt. Only the crazies in any of those camps want the war that is now in the making, but the carefully crafted plans of last year now have to be replaced with new ones, even more carefully crafted. Even the Syrians, who know better than most the danger of war that now threatens, understand that it is something they should avoid if they can, but are meanwhile lining up their allies against the worst that could happen, and trying to entice Jordan and even Egypt back into the fold.

The Church is the one diplomatic resort that all the parties could turn to for help in communicating with each other and in formulating their options for peace apart from the United States, which is more than ever suspect to the Arab side. This is a central reason for hoping that the Church will do something other than an action, the diplomatic exchange with Israel at this time, which would deprive it of its standing as positive neutral and available for good offices to all.

Some actual content of such a good-offices approach is needed if that recommendation is not to be merely a piety. You already know of the proposal I made late in November in a letter to Yasser Arafat, of a moratorium on all use of force for the duration of the peace initiative. That would have more credibility to him if it were a part of such a good-offices effort by the Church. The involvement, for the Church, of Americans, especially of major figures in the American hierarchy, would offer a so-far insufficiently tapped resource to the Holy See itself, inasmuch as their credibility with the Israelis would be greater than that of the Vatican's offices, and their entering the effort would be an encouragement to the Arabs that Israel's American friends were not blind to them. An effort of this sort could, of course, not be addressed only to Palestinians. There would have to be quite concrete approaches to Israel, and to Syria, which would look with great suspicion on a Church effort that ignored them. If a serious and coordinated effort were to be made, however quietly, the consent of all the parties should be sought in advance.



SHORT-FORM MEMO ON RAYMOND HELMICK'S VISIT TO CHAIRMAN ARAFAT, MARCH 4-6, 1986

The issues raised were the reenlivenment of the P.L.O.'s peace initiative, which had been losing force since the high hopes of last year and been dealt a severe blow by the breach with King Hussein, and to that end a consideration of the moratorium on the use of force by the Palestinians for the duration of the peace initiative (as proposed in Helmick's letter to Arafat of November 26, 1985), and of formulas for the recognition of Israel by the P.L.O. in terms of U.N.S.C. Resolutions 242 and 338.

On the moratorium question, the answer was not a simple negative, but the statement that it was difficult to respond. Such a thing would have to be approved by the complex decision-making organs of the P.L.O., and Arafat over those days was hard pressed to hold the Executive Council to the Jordanian Accord. The idea was firmly planted, and Arafat is very conscious of all its dimensions.

On recognition of Israel, two things happened.

1. Copies of the three proposed texts of recognition that had been given to King Hussein were given to Helmick for transmission to the U.S. government. Their content is the acceptance of 242 and 338, the renunciation of terrorism in the terms of the November '85 Cairo Declaration, in the case of one of the three proposals explicit recognition of the Israeli government as one with which the P.L.O. is willing to negotiate in the setting of an international conference. They also contain a condition, namely that the U.S. government recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including their right to self-determination through a confederation with Jordan as stated in the Jordanian-Palestinian Accord of February 11, 1985. The self-determination formula explicitly avoids an understanding of the term as code-word for an independent and separate state by putting it always in the context of the confederation with Jordan, as proposed by American President Reagan himself in February '83.

2. A formula proposed by Helmick had the oral acceptance of Chairman Arafat and several members of the Executive Council. It states that the P.L.O. has no intention of destroying the State of Israel, because it recognizes the right of self-determination of the Jewish people, expressed in their choice of the State of Israel, on the same basis on which it claims that right of self-determination for the Palestinian people. This is the meaning of the Two-State proposal that the P.L.O. has offered since 1974, having already, in preceding years when it was talking of a Democratic State in which Jews and Arabs would be equals, made it clear that it accepts the Jews as persons having equal rights with themselves.

A full report takes up these matters in detail, and also other matters on which Chairman Arafat was anxious to express his thinking to American officials and authorities of the Catholic Church.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

VISIT BY RAYMOND G. HELMICK, S.J., TO CHAIRMAN YASSER ARAFAT OF THE P.L.O.
IN TUNIS, MARCH 4 - 6, 1986.

The meeting was in three sessions, two hours on Tuesday evening, March 4, a further hour on Wednesday, March 5, and a concluding two hours on Thursday, March 6.

A letter had been sent to Chairman Arafat beforehand, at the end of November, 1985, criticizing the P.L.O.'s continued guerrilla activities over the time of last year's peace initiative as contrary to the priorities the peace initiative professes and discrediting to the P.L.O. in its role as a potential negotiator for a peaceful settlement. The letter proposed a moratorium on all use of force for the duration of the peace initiative, and argued that such an action would also testify to the authority of the P.L.O. with the Palestinian people, both the residents of the occupied territories and the Diaspora.

The other essential theme, recognition of Israel and its right to exist in terms of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, was also extensively discussed during the meetings.

The distinctive approach of these discussions was an attempt to break out of the impasse which has impeded progress on these two issues. In the matter of the use of force, the P.L.O. is not able to renounce the right of the Palestinian people to resist the armed occupation of their country. The moratorium proposal is an effort to end the use of force without impugning that right of resistance. In the matter of recognition of Israel, the P.L.O. feels it is being asked not only to grant recognition of Israel but simultaneously to renounce the rights of its own people, especially the right to self-determination, and feels it cannot do that however much it is prepared to grant the recognition to Israel.

The result of the talks with regard to the use of force, the moratorium proposal, was disappointing. The idea has been planted and argued, and evidently raised with other responsible figures in the P.L.O., which was holding extensive meetings concurrent with these discussions to prepare its response to King Hussein's speech of February 19th. Chairman Arafat's eventual response was not a clear "no" to the moratorium, but a statement that it would be very difficult to give a response. The proposal could clearly not be accepted without being brought through the decision-making bodies of the P.L.O. Chairman Arafat referred to his Cairo Declaration of November 1985, with its clear reiteration of earlier denunciations and rejection of terrorism, and its renunciation of any use of armed force outside the actual area of the occupied territories. He described the blowing up of two P.L.O. boats during February at the shipyard in Messina, Sicily, where they were being repaired, an action which the Italian police had told him was the work of Mossad. He understood this as a provocation calculated to lure him into violating his Cairo Declaration, said he had had to argue long and hard in his Military Council against responding militarily to the blowing up of the boats, but had prevailed on the basis of remaining true to his word in the Cairo Declaration. He offered to bring up the moratorium as an immediate goal to be achieved once an international conference was actually convened.

The discussion of the recognition of Israel in terms of U.N.S.C. Resolutions 242 and 338 went in two distinct, and both important, directions. These were: a) the presentation by Chairman Arafat of the three texts he had actually offered, and still offers, to the United States government, which he had given to King Hussein and now, since he hears Mr. Richard Murphy has said he never received such texts, he wishes to have transmitted to the American government; and b) the acceptance, orally, by Chairman Arafat and several members of the Executive Council who were present, of another formula which had been my own suggestion.

THE THREE AMMAN PROPOSALS: PROCESS OF THEIR SUBMISSION

The Chairman was anxious to have the three formulas of acceptance which he had given to King Hussein transmitted to the United States government, because during his subsequent visit to Turkey he had read a statement by Mr. Richard Murphy saying that he had received no formulas from Arafat. Consequently, Arafat had given one set of the three proposals to President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, a second to President Evren of Turkey, a third to King Hassan of Morocco, and he was now presenting this fourth set for transmission to the American government. An English translation was prepared for me while I was in Tunis to accompany the Arabic originals.

The process Chairman Arafat described was that he had first had a statement prepared, before his meeting with King Hussein, by three of the wealthiest Palestinians, Hassib Sabah, Abdel Majid Shuman and Hikmat al-Masri (brother of the since-assassinated Mayor of Nablus), in association with Professor Walid Khalidi. In a meeting with Jordanian Prime Minister Rifai the evening before he first saw the King, Arafat accepted a minor adjustment the Prime Minister made to the statement, and understood that Rifai had accepted it. On the next day, in a meeting with King Hussein and several of his officials, Rifai told Arafat that the statement was unacceptable.

Finding his first formula rejected, Arafat then suggested to the King that he give an explicit endorsement of the Rose Garden statement which King Hussein had himself made in Washington on May 29, 1985, and which the American authorities had already accepted. In a tete-a-tete meeting with the King, he agreed on a formulation of this statement, and found that the rest of the meeting with the King went on in so good an atmosphere that he was sure it had been a success. On the morning following, the Prime Minister asked him for a confirmation of this second statement. He responded that he needed the authorization of the P.L.O., which he would get in the afternoon. He did get that authorization and brought the confirmation to the King and Prime Minister the next morning. Meanwhile, Arafat had communicated his second formula through an intermediary to the American Embassy, had received back through Prime Minister Rifai the Americans' request that he add a phrase to it including "the Israeli government" among the named parties to negotiations, and had agreed to this addition too (since, he said, "we are not dealing with ghosts"). When he brought the confirmation of this second formula, with the addition, to the Palace, Arafat found to his surprise that the Prime Minister, in the presence of the King, rejected both statements as "overpassed by time." Arafat was offended by a breach of protocol, as he had addressed himself to the King and the Prime Minister broke in to respond instead of the King. He has also often complained of what he sees as an American and Israeli practice of escalating demands, of raising the price higher each time he concedes what had previously

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been demanded, and he saw this description of his acceptance formulas as "overpassed by time" as an instance of that practice.

The third formula was then prepared by a close counsellor to King Hussein, a person unknown to me whose name I heard as Shuregi, at the King's request, was also accepted by Chairman Arafat and the P.L.O., and was rejected with the two previous formulas. It was unclear to Arafat who was doing the rejecting, whether Americans or Jordanians, and he received no explanation from the King of why the formulas were rejected, simply the statement that they were.

Such is Chairman Arafat's account of the genesis of the three formulas and the process by which they were rejected. He clearly felt he had striven genuinely to present acceptable proposals. King Hussein's account of this same exchange, in his speech of February 19, is as follows: "On February 5, 1986, the American side presented a new text containing the approval by the United States to convene an international conference on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, including the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. We met with Yasir Arafat on the same evening at Al-Nadwah Palace and we handed him the new American text. He promised to study it and at the same time gave us three differently worded texts which were the same in substance, reaffirming the same PLO position which we had heard from the start of this round of meetings."

CONTENT OF THE THREE AMMAN PROPOSALS

The three statements (all attached) have in common that they accept U.N.S.C. Resolutions 242 and 338 along with all other U.N. and Security Council Resolutions relevant to the Palestinian problem. All three further contain a denunciation and rejection of terrorism, as already stated in the Cairo Declaration of November 1985. All three agree to negotiate a settlement of the Middle East conflict in the context of an international conference to which the five permanent members of the Security Council and all the Arab parties to the conflict are invited, the P.L.O. itself included as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, on an equal footing. Formula 2, the one based on King Hussein's Rose Garden declaration, adds explicitly "the Israeli government" to the list of those to be invited, as the Americans had requested.

In each of the three statement, this series of points is conditional on ensuring the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" (the American formula), including the right to self-determination (the formula that Americans and Israelis have thus far rejected on the basis that it was a code-word for a separate independent state). However, as it is used in the three statements, "self-determination" never means a separate state, but is always specified as "through a confederation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as stated in the Jordanian-Palestinian Accord of February 11, 1985." The outcome of an act of self-determination is thus already determined, not as a separate state but as the confederation with Jordan, a formula suggested by President Ronald Reagan in February 1983 as a possible outcome of his September 1, 1982 call for a Palestinian entity "in association" with Jordan. The reason for any American rejection of the term "self-determination," therefore, would seem to have been obviated, in that it is never used to designate any expectation

of a separate state for the Palestinians, the specific reason why the American government has refused to accept the term.

Each of the three statements is then followed by a series of three "steps," requesting King Hussein, after the proposal has been submitted to him, to get a written commitment from the United States in support of the right of self-determination as stated in the Jordanian-Palestinian Accord (i.e., through a confederation with Jordan), and calling for simultaneity of the P.L.O. declaration of its acceptance of 242 and the U.S. declaration of its acceptance of self-determination in this sense.

Other points stressed in the three proposals are that the international conference have effective powers to bring about a resolution of the conflict, and that the P.L.O. representation in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the conference be on an equal footing with that of Jordan.

THE ALTERNATIVE FORMULA SUGGESTED BY MYSELF.

Throughout our discussions I had emphasized the serious communication blocks between the P.L.O. and the Americans and Israelis, as a result of the 1975 American commitment not to talk to the P.L.O. until after the essentials had all been decided. American officials I speak to do not comprehend why the P.L.O. understands an acceptance of U.N.S.C. Resolution 242, without any reference to essential Palestinian rights, as an effective abrogation of those rights of their own people. The Israelisee every hesitation in a P.L.O. statement on the recognition of Israel and its right to exist as evidence of an arrière pensée, by which the establishment of a Palestinian state or entity in the Occupied Territories would be only the first phase of a process meant to lead on to the eventual destruction of Israel. The P.L.O. is insistent that that is not its meaning, that its policy is not the destruction of Israel but the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside it, in confederation with Jordan, in the territories occupied by Israel in June 1967. My own contention was that the P.L.O. should permit no room for misunderstanding of its actual policy and intentions on this score. Chairman Arafat and other P.L.O. figures I have met, in Tunis or elsewhere, have consistently said that the Israelis cannot really believe that the P.L.O.'s policy is the destruction of Israel as they claim, but that they are merely using a propaganda technique to avoid recognizing any rights of the Palestinians whatever.

My suggestion, based on a long study of the development of P.L.O. policy and its internal dynamic since the late 1960s, was that the P.L.O. in fact accepted the right of self-determination of Israel and its people, on the same basis as it claimed the same for the Palestinians, and had no intention of impugning, frustrating or contesting the free choice of the Israelis to have their state. It challenged only the right of Israel to take over further land (the territories occupied in 1967) by armed conquest and so to deprive the Palestinians of their rights.

The process has been that the P.L.O. first proposed, in the late 1960s and up to 1974, a solution it called the "Democratic State," a unitary state in the whole territory West of the Jordan River, in which Jews and Arabs would have equal rights as citizens, Jews, Christians and Muslims equal religious liberty.

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There had been long discussion within the P.L.O. during the time the Democratic State concept had been first proposed, then digested and eventually accepted through the complex process of the P.L.O.'s elaborate structure, about which Jews were meant by this policy that essentially was about the acceptance of the Jews. There was talk at first of its meaning only "anti-Zionist" Jews, of which few will be found in Israel, or only such as had been in the land before 1947 or some other such date. Eventually it was clear that the P.L.O. was talking about all the Jews, and accepted all in its Democratic State proposal. Chairman Arafat himself expressed this in the course of our discussion in these terms: "We offered a civilized solution, the Democratic State, but it was refused, by the Israelis and by the Americans."

The rejection is easily understood in Israeli or American terms. The Democratic State proposal meant the dissolution of the separate Jewish State of Israel in favor of a new entity. The Jewish (and American) choice is for the State of Israel, as a Jewish State, and hence the Democratic State is rejected out of hand.

By 1974, the P.L.O. had itself become aware of this as an internal contradiction in its Democratic State policy. The whole was predicated on the inalienable right of self-determination for all peoples, as asserted in the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations and enshrined in international law, and especially in the consistent policy of the United States. If the Jews decisively rejected the proposal of the Democratic State, as they clearly did, then that was their choice, and by the right of self-determination they were fully entitled to it. The Palestinians do not see this as a wise or welcome choice on the part of the Israelis, but they accept it as the choice the Israelis have freely made and persist in, and the P.L.O. will not seek to undermine that choice or that state.

It took some time for the P.L.O. to work its new policy through its internal decision-making process after the first announcement in 1974 that it would be prepared to establish a Palestinian state or entity on any Palestinian territory from which Israel would withdraw its occupation. Eventually it was determined that the P.L.O. was talking about the whole Palestinian territory occupied in 1967 as a result of the June war, as it did not accept (nor did U.N.S.C. Resolution 242) the principle of acquisition of territory by force of conquest. Since the Jordanian-Palestinian Accord of February 11, 1985, the P.L.O. has further established that it does not demand a separate Palestinian State on these territories, but accepts a confederation with Jordan. The basis of the acceptance of Israel and its right to exist implied in this Two-State policy, I suggested, was recognition of the inalienable right of self-determination of the Israelis, precisely the same right the Palestinians claim for themselves (with the proviso that it will be exercised in confederation with Jordan, not in a separate state).

When I first enunciated this position, in the latter part of the evening session on Tuesday, March 4, there was an immediate animated discussion in Arabic among Chairman Arafat and the several members of the Executive Council who by then were present (among them Faruk Kaddumi, Hani al-Hassan and Abdel Rahin Ahmed). The Chairman asked me to repeat the formula and had it carefully translated into Arabic to be sure he and the others had understood it properly. There was further discussion in Arabic, yet another request that I formulate and explain the position exactly and have it translated. Then the Chairman and the Executive Council members present said that this was exactly their

meaning, that they do accept the right of Israel to exist on precisely that basis, the right of self-determination that they also claim for their own people.

Having received this oral endorsement of my formula, from Chairman Arafat and from the Executive Council members present, on the first evening, I carefully checked it out in each of the two succeeding meetings, to be sure there was no misunderstanding on this point and that the oral acceptance of the formula held. It did.

U.N. FORCE TO PROTECT SECURITY OF AN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN BORDER

Palestinians who have made statements about the guarantees of security in the event of the establishment of a Palestinian state or entity in the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza speak often of the acceptability of a U.N. Force to protect the border. Concern is often voiced that the Palestinians might then request the withdrawal of such a force in a crisis, as President Nasser did in 1967. Basing themselves on various statements the P.L.O. has made officially since 1981, some Palestinian spokesmen have said they would accept that any such U.N. Force could not be withdrawn unilaterally or on the request of Israelis or Palestinians (or the authorities of a confederated Jordanian-Palestinian State), but only by the consent of the Security Council of the U.N. It was suggested that I check this formula with Chairman Arafat to see that it was fully accepted by him. He accepted the formula without hesitation, confirming that it is the established policy of the P.L.O., even adding that in fact it was they who needed that protection, not the Israelis.

ATTITUDES AND UNDERSTANDING EXPRESSED BY CHAIRMAN ARAFAT TOWARD ISRAEL, THE UNITED STATES, AND KING HUSSEIN.

Chairman Arafat was anxious that American authorities and Catholic Church figures be aware of the volcano of Fundamentalist Muslim rage that was threatening to erupt, or had already erupted, all over the region. He referred to it also as a typhoon. He felt that while he was in Beirut he had been helpful and successful in moderating and controlling that volcano, and he had predicted, in a statement as he was leaving Beirut, the Fundamentalist rampage that we have all been experiencing since. The Lebanese Shi'ites, he believed, had first been used as tools by the Syrians, but the Syrian regime had not a strong enough political platform to control them. By now it had lost control of the majority in the country.

He pointed to the other eruptions, as in Egypt over recent weeks, in Morocco and Algeria within the last year, in the Sudan, where the change of government was not a military coup but the generals' response to just such a wave of Fundamentalist rage. The Syrian uprising so brutally suppressed at Hama in 1982 was only the tip of an iceberg, he felt, and the Saudi and other regimes also were threatened by the same phenomenon.

The underlying stimulus that generates this agitation in all these countries is very substantially the Palestinian issue, and the whole thing will only increase if no solution to the Palestinian problem is found. Even

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in Iran, the Khomeini forces describe their campaign as their "Way to Jerusalem," and march under banners that portray the Dome of the Rock. Just in the last weeks, Arafat has received pleas from the Iranians that he not go to Bagdad, because by doing so he would make liars of the Iranian forces who want to make the Palestinian cause their own.

We touched on the religious element in this, the holiness of the city of Jerusalem to Muslims as to the other two monotheistic religions, Jewish and Christian. Arafat is a devout man, aware as he is of the dangers of Fundamentalist rage, and was happy to hear my own understanding of the Muslim meaning of Jerusalem, Al-Quds ("the Holy City"), where the Prophet Mohammed had his mystical encounter and conversation with Moses and Jesus, as meaning for all three of the monotheistic religions.

He spoke of the danger of reducing the Palestinians to desperation, a danger all the greater because these are not primitive and uneducated people, but the most educated and competent group among the Arabs, the intellectual and scientific vanguard on whom all the Arab states rely. (E.g., on the Euphrates dam project, there are 600 engineers, of whom 540 are Palestinian and only 60 Syrian.) It is in no one's interest to alienate this talented and creative people and reduce them to nihilism and despair. The price they would exact would be enormous, and they would have with them in their despair the rest of the Arab world.

The American administration, too, Arafat felt, should pay close attention to the way he treats the Palestinian multi-millionaires, e.g., the fact that it was Sabah, Shuman and Masri, working with Professor Khalidi, to whom he turned for his original proposal in his conversations with Hussein. This kind of close cooperation should be seen as a model of his and the P.L.O.'s vision of society in a future Palestine. They do not, like many liberation movements, confine their dealings to the poor, the deprived and angry. It is not true, as the Israelis claim, that a future Palestine would be, under the P.L.O., a proletarian state on the Soviet model.

As we discussed my moratorium proposal. Arafat kept coming back to treating it as a precondition proposal by the Israelis and/or Americans, and I had to assert repeatedly that I was not speaking for either but had made that proposal on my own. It provided a context, however, in which he spoke of his feelings toward Israelis, Americans, and even King Hussein.

The Israelis, he felt, were not entitled to expect one-sided concessions and good-will offerings from him and the P.L.O. They had preferred to deal with him only through agents, sometimes Egyptian, sometimes Jordanian. They treat the Palestinians always as a secondary factor, subordinate to their relation with the Arab states. That leaves popular sentiment among the Palestinians most reluctant to make concessions or to see the P.L.O. make concessions, because the Israelis leave them "nothing to lose." 60% of them are already refugees, the other 40% under hard military occupation, and they see frequent cynical efforts by Israelis and Americans to create division among them, to treat the residents of the Occupied Territories and the Palestinians of the Diaspora as if they were not the same people. Their feeling is increasingly that if the Israelis could return to the land after 2000 years, they will be able to do so in not more than 200. Hence, before asking things of the Palestinians, the Israelis must do something for them.

As for American policy in this administration, Arafat feels it is a great mistake to believe any American promises. He feels he has been several times deceived, and gives three major instances, explaining that this is not the whole list. He declares himself a man of his word, and calls on Philip Habib as witness to that, after their 82 days of hard negotiation in Beirut in 1982.

The first of the major instances in which he feels the American administration broke promises to him is the Reagan Plan of September 1, 1982. Arafat has even a document from Philip Habib in which he was promised a political bonus in return for accepting to depart from Beirut. Even 24 hours before President Reagan's speech announcing the plan on September 1, the draft version included a recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination, Arafat asserts, calling on two witnesses, the then Saudi and Egyptian ambassadors to Washington. At the last moment, this was changed to a right to "participate in deciding their future," which, Arafat feels, reduces the Palestinians' role to that of a mere consultant. He attributes this change in the text to the intervention of Henry Kissinger with President Reagan, and interprets it as meaning that "even in a very short period, this American administration has not had the ability to fulfill its promises."

The Sabra and Shatilla massacre is the second major instance in which Arafat sees broken faith on the part of the American administration. He agreed to evacuate his military forces from Beirut, he says, "because I imagined that when I had an agreement with Habib, the American administration would respect it." That agreement was for the protection of the civilian Palestinian population of the camps. Sabra and Shatilla, he says, was shameful for the Multi-National Force, which had left Beirut. The Reagan Administration had not been willing to respect the honor of its armed forces. Later it saw that there was a high price to pay, when its Embassy was bombed twice, and the Marine barracks blown up, though that was the action of other political forces, not Palestinians, who had also felt themselves betrayed.

The third case in which Arafat sees major deception by the American administration is more recent, and drawn from King Hussein's February 19 speech, in which the King tells how he was first assured by the Americans that all was going smoothly, but then told there was still an Israeli veto over things the United States had already agreed to, so that the offer was not complete.

These three experiences, as he understands them, disincline Arafat to put any confidence in American promises or assurances. It was even a disincentive for Arafat to accept my moratorium proposal that Secretary of State Schulz had asked for something similar last year. When I first fully explained the proposal in my first meeting, Tuesday March 4, Arafat replied by telling the story. Secretary Schulz, while visiting Amman, had relayed a message through King Hussein, asking Arafat why he continued military operations in the Occupied Territories while speaking of peace. Arafat tells how he asked the King whether this was an official message. When told it was, he asked him to convey an official message in return. Didn't Schulz remember that during the four years of peace negotiations on Vietnam both sides, American and Vietnamese, continued their military operations uninterrupted. The same was true of French and Algerians in the negotiations that ended the Algerian war of independence. And now that there are official talks in Geneva between the Afghan government and Pakistan, the U.S. urges the Afghans to carry on their military operations against the Afghan government and the USSR. Why deal with

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the Palestinians through odd shapes and pictures? Why not invite all involved parties to an International Conference without preconditions?

When given this answer, my own response was to admit that the answer is perfectly legitimate, and to accept it. It did not however, I said, much interest me, as I was not concerned with legitimate or illegitimate responses to a preconditioning demand. My interest was instead in discovering something that would work in promoting real peace negotiations.

It was in connection with his assessment of American intentions and reliability that Arafat spoke of King Hussein. He understands well that he must rebuild his relation with Hussein, that Hussein must be in any peace effort on the part of the P.L.O. The Americans, he felt, had forced Hussein into a corner, just as the Begin government in Israel had done to President Sadat. (I was reminded, when I heard this, that during my visit to Jordan last summer every Jordanian official I met was worried, not that Hussein would be compared to his grandfather King Abdallah, as American diplomats seemed to think, but that he would be associated with Sadat.) It was Begin who had killed Sadat. He gave no concessions for the Palestinians, not even what he had promised, to cover Sadat for signing the Camp David agreement. He left Sadat completely naked in the face of his people and the Arabs. Begin lost with the Palestinians: it was a case of David and Goliath. The American administration was now doing the same thing with Hussein, especially when it subjected its commitments to Hussein to Israeli veto.

Arafat feels he has earned some American recognition and gratitude for the way he acted toward them in Beirut. Not only had he constantly afforded protection to the American community, its Embassy and diplomats throughout the years of fighting, but it was only his vehement refusal that had prevented the National Movement leadership of the Lebanese Muslims from holding all the 8000 Americans hostage in Beirut during the 1982 Israeli siege of the city. Instead he had twice organized emergency evacuation of the entire American community in Beirut -- over the mountains in 1976 and by sea in 1982.

He found it unworthy of a super-power that Secretary Schulz should find it the best use of his time recently to tour all the European countries, even Rumania and Yugoslavia, to sow distrust of Arafat and the P.L.O., that President Reagan should have invested all the international prestige of his office in preventing Arafat's attendance at the opening of the 40th anniversary session of the U.N. Chairman Arafat believes he and the P.L.O. are a dam against nihilism and total despair among the Palestinians and even more widely through the Arab world; that their demands, especially that for self-determination in the specifically determined form they have already chosen, i.e., through a confederation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, are just; that they have taken adequate care and given proper acknowledgment of the rights and security of the State of Israel and its people; and that their peace initiative deserves real attention, consideration by the American public and administration as well as by Israelis, and also by the Catholic Church. He was anxious that he might hear, from American Catholic bishops, the same formulas in recognition of the plight and rights of the Palestinians that he heard from the Pope and the organs of the Holy See.

The Chairman referred to the signed statement he had given to U.S. Congressman McCloskey in 1982, explicitly accepting "all U.N. Resolutions

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relevant to the Palestinian question." At the time, the P.L.O. representative to the U.N. had obscured the statement by saying that U.N.S.C. Resolution 242 was not relevant to the Palestinian question, since it referred only to Israel and the established Arab states. The U.N. representative's gloss on his written statement to McCloskey, Arafat said, was not correct. He did explicitly include 242, and 338 as well, among the "Resolutions relevant to the Palestinian question" which he had formally accepted in his signed statement to McCloskey in 1982, and still accepts them. Having explained this fully in our first evening session, on Tuesday March 4, Arafat returned to it several times in our subsequent meetings, confirming that this was his meaning.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX to the memo on Raymond Helmick's visit to Chairman Arafat on March 4-6, 1986. The Italian Judge, Francisco Castellano.

Before leaving on his trip to Tunis, Fr. Helmick had received a request from American Ambassador to the Holy See William Wilson. Francisco Castellano, the Genoese Judge preparing the case against the four hijackers of the Achille Lauro, wanted to interview Chairman Arafat about the case, and had asked Wilson if he could find out whether such an invitation would be extended.

Fr. Helmick raised this question during his last meeting with Arafat, and was immediately told: "Gladly." Chairman Arafat, because of his immunity, could not be subjected to a formal inquiry or cross-examined, but he would be entirely willing to receive the Judge informally and would be helpful to him. He could also arrange for the Judge to see others on a more formal basis if that seemed indicated. Because relations between the P.L.O. and the Italian government are excellent, Arafat asked that application for Judge Castellano's informal visit be made by the Italian government. This response has been relayed to Ambassador Wilson, who will communicate it.

Arafat was anxious to explain that he did not accept P.L.O. responsibility for the Achille Lauro affair, not having authorized any operation by the group involved. That group, the P.L.F. (Palestine Liberation Front), had long been split two ways, and had split four ways shortly before the Achille Lauro incident, with two groups in Syria, one in Beirut and one in Tunisia. If indeed Abul Abbas was involved in mounting the operation, something of which Arafat was not yet sure, he would punish him.

But he felt the P.L.O. had been very badly treated by the Western media and Western governments over the incident. The one activity of the P.L.O. in the affair, he said, had been to rescue the remaining 400 passengers, and to prevent the incident from becoming a massacre like the affairs at Malta or the Rome and Vienna airports. Arafat had personally sent Abul Abbas and Hani al-Hassan to negotiate with the hijackers and bring the episode to an end. He felt it was simply propagandistic use of the media that he and the P.L.O. had received no thanks for this (they had been thanked by the Italian Prime Minister), and that the one death on the ship of Leon Klinghoffer, which he deplored, had been weighed in the scales of opinion out of all proportion to the more than sixty deaths in the bombing of Tunis. He had conveyed his condolences to the Klinghoffer family in an interview on American television and had attempted to communicate them further through an intermediary.

1st Proposal

PROPOSAL FOR A LEGAL FORMULA TO CONVENE THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

If an invitation is extended to the Palestine Liberation Organisation to attend an international conference with effective powers to find a peaceful solution to the Palestinian Question and to resolve the Middle East conflict, in which the permanent members of the Security Council participate and which is attended by the concerned Arab parties, the Palestine Liberation Organisation accepts to participate on an equal footing in this conference, within a joint Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation, on the basis of ensuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people including their right to self-determination through a confederation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as stated in the Jordanian-Palestinian Accord signed in February 1985, and on the basis of U.N. and Security Council resolutions relevant to the Palestinian Question including resolutions 242 and 338.

In this context, the PLO reaffirms its denunciation and rejection of terrorism, which it had confirmed in the Cairo Declaration.

STEPS:

- A. To be handed to H. M. the King.
- B. The P.L.O. requests H. M. to get a written commitment from the United States addressed to him in support of the right of self-determination as stated in the Jordanian-Palestinian Accord.
- C. The declaration by the P.L.O. of its conditional acceptance of 242 is to be simultaneous with the declaration of the U.S. Government of its acceptance of the right of self-determination.

الاقتراح الاول :-

مشروع الميثاق العائلي لمؤتمر دولي للسلام في الشرق الاوسط =====

في حالة توحيد دعوة المنظمة التمهيدية الفلسطينية لمؤتمر دولي
بملاحظات مماثلة لاجراء حل سلمي للعصبة الفلسطينية ومن النزاع الشرق
الاطراف يساهم في الاعضاء الدائمون في مجلس الامن وتحتفظ الاطراف العربية
المتحدة ، فان السلطة توافق على المشاركة في هذا المؤتمر على قدم المساواة
ضمن وفد اردني - فلسطيني مشترك على اساس ضمان الحقوق المشروعة للشعب
الفلسطيني بما فيها حق في تقرير المصير من خلال اتحاد كونفدرالي مع
السلطة الاردنية الهاشمية المنصوص عليه بالاتفاق الاردني - الفلسطيني الموقع
في فبراير سنة / ١٩٨٥ ، وعلى اساس تنفيذ قرارات الامم المتحدة ومجلس الامن
المتعلقة بالنسبة الفلسطينية بما فيها القرار ٢٤٢ ، ٢٢٨ .

وتؤكد المنظمة في هذا المجال تشجيعها ورئيتها للارهاب التي اكدت

في اعلان القاهرة .

المطلوبات :-

أ - يسلم لجلالة الملك

ب - ترحب المنظمة من جلالته الحصول على تعهد خطي من الولايات
المتحدة موجه اليه بدعم حق تقرير المصير كبا نزع عليه الاعاق
الاردني - الفلسطيني .

ج - يتزامن اعلان المنظمة على موافقتها المشروط على ٢٤٢ مع اعلان
مكرونة الولايات المتحدة بتعهداتها باقرار حق تقرير المصير .

1st
proposal

Proposal for a legal Formula
to convene the International
Conference for Peace in the Middle
East.

①
الرقم
التاريخ

If an invitation is extended to the
Palestine Liberation Organization to attend
an international conference with effective
powers to find a peaceful solution
to the Palestinian Question and to resolve
the M. E. conflict in which the permanent
members in the Security Council participate
and which ^{is attended by} the concerned Arab parties,

the PLO accepts to participate on an
equal footing in this conference
within a joint Jordanian Palestinian
Delegation on the basis of ensuring

②

الرقم

التاريخ

the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people including their right to self-determination through a confederation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as stated in the Jordanian Palestinian Accord signed in February 1985, and on the basis of U.N. and Security Council resolutions relevant to the Palestinian Question including resolutions 242, 338.

In this context, the PLO reaffirms its denunciation and rejection of terrorism which it had confirmed in the Cairo Declaration.

Steps

- A - to be handed to H. M. the King.
- B - The PLO requests H. M. to get a written commitment from the United States addressed to him in support of the right of self-determination as stated in the Jordanian Palestinian Accord.
- C - The declaration by the PLO of its conditional acceptance of 242 is to be simultaneous with the declaration of the U.S. Government of its acceptance of the right of self-determination.

2nd Proposal

The Palestine Liberation Organisation (P.L.O.), the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, holds the strong belief that the peace process should lead to a just, comprehensive and durable peace in the Middle East and should secure the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of self-determination within the context of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation.

On the basis of the Jordan-P.L.O. Accord of 11th February 1985, and in view of our genuine desire for peace, we are ready to negotiate within the context of an International Conference with the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council, with the participation of all concerned Arab parties and the Israeli government, a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian problem on the basis of the pertinent United Nations resolutions, including Security Council Resolution 242 and 338.

The P.L.O. declares its rejection and denunciation of terrorism, which has been assured in the Cairo Declaration of November 1985.

STEPS:

A. To be handed to H. M. the King.

B. The P.L.O. requests H. M. to get a written commitment from the United States addressed to him in support of the right of self-determination as stated in the Jordanian-Palestinian Accord.

C. The declaration by the P.L.O. of its conditional acceptance of 242 is to be simultaneous with the declaration of the U.S. Government of its acceptance of the right of self-determination.

مشروع الميثاق القانوني لعقد مؤتمر دولي

للسلام في الشرق الأوسط

=====

تؤكد منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية الشلل الشرقي والوحيد للشعب الفلسطيني
ايمانها القوي بأن مسيرة السلام يجب ان تؤدى الى سلام عادل وشامل وبائس
في الشرق الأوسط . وان تضمن تحقيق الحقوق المشروعة للشعب
الفلسطيني بما فيه حقهم في تقرير مصيرهم ضمن الاتحاد الكونفدرالي الاردني -
الفلسطيني .

• وعلى نحو رغبة العادة في السلام فهي تعرب عن استنادهما
للمفاوض ضمن إطار المؤتمر الدولي الذي تخضره الدول النائية العضوية
في مجلس الأمن مع كافة الاطراف المعنية بما فيها ^{الحكومة} الإسرائيلية بناء
على الاتفاق الاردني - الفلسطيني المبرم في 11 شباط عام / 1980 ، وبما
على قرارات الأمم المتحدة المتعلقة بالقضية الفلسطينية ومن ضمنها قرار
مجلس الأمن 242 و 248 .

وتؤكد المنظمة في هذا المجال ترحيبها بالارهاب الذي اكدت
في اعلان القاهرة نوفمبر / 1980 .

النتائج :-

- أ - يعلم هذا المشروع لجلالة الملك .
- ب - ترجو المنظمة من جلالة الملك المحول على تعهد من الولايات المتحدة
الأمريكية بدعم حق تقرير المصير كما نص عليه الاتفاق الاردني - الفلسطيني .
- ج - يتزامن اعلان المنظمة موافقتها المشروطة على 242 مع اعلان حكومة
الولايات المتحدة بتعهداتها باتقرار حق تقرير المصير للشعب الفلسطيني .

The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people holds the strong belief that the peace process should lead to a just, comprehensive and durable peace in the Middle East and should secure the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including our right to self-determination within the context of a Jordanian - Palestinian confederation.

On the basis of the Jordan - PLO accord of 11th February 1985, and in view of our genuine desire for peace, we are ready to negotiate within the context of an International Conference with the participation of the permanent members of the Security Council, with the participation of all concerned Arab parties and the Israeli government, a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian problem on the basis of the pertinent United Nations resolutions, including Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.

The PLO declares its rejection and denunciation of terrorism, which had been ~~decl~~ ^{been} ~~assumed~~ ^{assumed} in ~~our~~ ^{our} declaration on November 1985

Steps

- A - to be handed to H. M. the King.
- B - The PLO requests H. M. to get a written commitment from the United States addressed to him in support of the right of self-determination as stated in the Jordanian Palestinian Accord.
- C - The declaration by the PLO of its conditional acceptance of 242 is to be simultaneous with the declaration of the U.S. Government of its acceptance of the right of self-determination.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 29, 1985

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
AND
KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN
UPON DEPARTURE

The Rose Garden

1:31 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: I have just concluded a very useful meeting and lunch with King Hussein. We all recognize that the positive atmosphere which has developed in the Middle East recently can be credited in great measure to His Majesty King Hussein. Steps he's taken over the last year gave new momentum to the search for peace.

Our discussions today have provided further evidence of Jordan's commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflicts, which should prompt a sense of gratitude from men of good will everywhere.

The United States has long played a central role in the Middle East peace process. We're proud of what we've helped accomplish. And we look forward to continuing to make meaningful contributions. But we hope that His Majesty's courageous steps forward can lead to direct negotiations between the parties, based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 by the end of this year. And we'll do our part to help bring this about.

Our goal remains a just, lasting and comprehensive peace which will satisfy the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and provide for the security of all states in the region, including Israel.

We recognize Jordan's economic and security needs. And in the spirit of working together, I have told the King that we will be able to count on the United States for assistance in addressing problems which Jordan may face in those areas.

We're pleased and proud to have had His Majesty here with us today.

KING HUSSEIN: Thank you very much, indeed, Mr. President, for your kind words.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have had a full, friendly and useful discussion with the President on all issues of mutual concern.

Regarding the prospects of peace in our area, I have told the President that a just, comprehensive and durable peace in the Middle East should secure the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right of self-determination within the context of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation.

I have also assured the President that on the basis of the Jordan-PLO Accord of 11th February, and as a result of my recent talks with the PLO, and in view of our genuine desire for peace, we are willing to negotiate within the context of an international conference, a peaceful settlement on the basis of the pertinent United Nations resolutions, including Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

We are offering a unique opportunity for peace which

3rd Proposal

PROPOSAL FOR A LEGAL FORMULA TO CONVENE THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

The invitation to convene an international conference to resolve the conflict in the Middle East and to solve the Palestinian Question should be under the aegis of the United Nations because it is the international organisation which was established after World War II to put an end to the sufferings of the peoples, prevent aggression, and maintain justice and respect for Human Rights. The Preamble of the U. N. Charter adopted in 1945 calls for the realisation of international cooperation, resolution of international problems, and realisation of basic human rights and the rights of peoples to self-determination.

Since the Palestinian Question is the quintessence of the Middle East Problem, the call to convene an international conference to resolve the conflict and to establish peace in the region should be to ensure the execution of resolutions and measures, and should include the participation in the conference of the permanent members of the Security Council and be attended by all concerned Arab parties, including the Palestine Liberation Organisation, on an equal footing within a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

In accordance with the U. N. Charter, which reaffirms and confirms the respect for basic human rights and the right of peoples to self-determination, and on the basis of U. N. O. resolutions relevant to the Palestinian Question and the Arab region including resolutions 242 and 338, the P.L.O. will participate in the international peace conference in its capacity as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, which is recognized on the Arab and international levels and has an observer membership status in the U.N.O. since the year 1974.

The participation of the P.L.O. in the international conference will be on the basis of safeguarding the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people including their right to self-determination through a confederation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as stated in the Jordanian-Palestinian Accord signed in February 1985.

In this context, the P.L.O. reaffirms its denunciation and rejection of terrorism, which it had confirmed in the Cairo Declaration.

STEPS:

A. To be handed to H. M. the King.

B. The P.L.O. requests H. M. to get a written commitment from the United States addressed to him in support of the right of self-determination as stated in the Jordanian-Palestinian Accord.

C. The declaration by the P.L.O. of its conditional acceptance of 242 is to be simultaneous with the declaration of the U.S. Government of its acceptance of the right of self-determination. .

مسيرن السجدة الذاتية لمقد مؤتمر دولي للسلام في الشرق الاوسط

ان الدعوة الى عقد مؤتمر دولي لفس النزاع في الشرق الاوسط وحل القضية الفلسطينية ينبغي ان ترمز هيئة الامم المتحدة باعتبارها المؤسسة العالمية التي استت بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية لوسع حد للام الشعوب ، ومن العدوان وصيانة العدالة واحترام حقوق الانسان . وتنس مقدمة ميثاق الامم المتحدة الصادر عام / ١٩٤٥ على تحقيق تعاون دولي في حل المشكلات العالمية واترار الحقوق الانسان الاساسية وحق الشعوب في تقرير مصيرها .

وبما ان القضية الفلسطينية هي لب مشكلة الشرق الاوسط فان الدعوة الى عقد مؤتمر دولي لفس النزاع واخلال السلام في المنطقة ، ولتأمين تنفيذ ما يتخذ من قرارات واجراءات ينبغي ان يسهم في المؤتمر الاعضاء الفاضلون في مجلس الامن وتحتضره الاطراف العربية المعنية بها فيها سلطة التحرير الفلسطينية على قدم المساواة ضمن وفد اردني - فلسطيني مشترك . ويوجب ميثاق الامم المتحدة التي يؤكد وبفر احترام حقوق الانسان الاساسية وحق الشعوب في تقرير مصيرها وعلى اساس قرارات هيئة الامم المتحدة المتعلقة بالقضية الفلسطينية والمنطقة العربية بما فيها القرار ٢٤٢ والقرار ٢٣٨ ننشرك سلطة التحرير الفلسطينية في المؤتمر الدولي لسلام باعتبارها النسل الوحيد للشعب الفلسطيني والمعترف بها عربيا ودوليا ولها صفة عضو مراقب في هيئة الامم منذ عام ١٩٧٤ .

وان مشاركة سلطة التحرير الفلسطينية في المؤتمر الدولي يكون على اساس ضمان الحقوق المشروطة للشعب الفلسطيني بما فيها عقد في تقرير المسير من خلال اتحاد كوندراي مسج المنطقة العربية الفلسطينية المسمى باسمه الاقوامي العربي - الفلسطيني في الدوحة في ٢٤/٢٠٠٠

وتؤكد السلطة في هذا المجال نسبها ورسمها للارهاب التي اكدته في اعلان

القاهرة نوفمبر / ١٩٨٥ .

النتائج :-

- ١ - يتنام هذا الشرع لجلالة الملك .
- ٢ - ترمي السلطة من جلاله الملك المحول على تعهد من الولايات المتحدة الامريكية بدعم حق تقرير المسير كما نص عليه الاتفاق الاقليمي - الفلسطيني .
- ٣ - يراس اعلان السلطة مواضعها المشروطة على ٢٤٢ مع اعلان حكومة الولايات المتحدة بعدها بامرار حق تقرير المسير للشعب الفلسطيني .

3rd
proposal

Proposal for a legal Formula
to convene the International

Conference for Peace in
the Middle East.

الرقم
التاريخ

The invitation to convene an international conference to resolve the conflict in the M.E. and to solve the Palestinian Question should be under the aegis of the United Nations because it is the international organization which was established after World War II to put an end to the sufferings of the peoples, prevent aggression and maintain Justice and respect for Human rights. The Preamble of the U.N. Charter adopted in 1945 calls for the realization of international cooperation.

to resolution^{of} international problems, ² الرقم
التاريخ
the realization of basic human rights
and the rights of peoples to self-
determination.

Since the Palestinian Question is the
quintessence of the M.E. Problem,
the call to convene an international
conference to resolve the conflict and
to establish peace in the region, ^{should} should
ensure the execution of resolutions
and ^{and should include the} measures,
participation in the conference of the permanent
members of the Security Council and
be attended by all concerned Arab
parties, including the Palestine Liberation

Organization on an equal footing ^③ الوقت الرابع
 within a joint Jordanian Palestinian
 delegation.

In accordance with the U.N. Charter
 which reaffirms and confirms the
 respect for basic human rights and
 the right of peoples to self-determination,
 and on the basis of U.N. O. resolutions
 relevant to the Palestinian Question
 and the Arab region including
 resolutions 242 and 338, the PLO
 will participate in the international
 peace conference in its capacity as
 the sole legitimate representative
 of the Palestinian people, which

is recognized on the Arab and (4) international levels and has an observer membership status in the U.N.O. since the year 1974

The participation of the PLO in the international Conference will be on the basis of safeguarding the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people including their right to self-determination through a confederation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as stated in the Jordanian-Palestinian Accord signed in February 1985

In this context, the PLO reaffirms its denunciation and rejection of terrorism which it had confirmed in the Cairo Declaration.

Steps

- A - to be handed to H. M. the King.
- B - The PLO requests H. M. to get a written commitment from the United States addressed to him in support of the right of self-determination as stated in the Jordanian Palestinian Accord.
- C - The declaration by the PLO of its conditional acceptance of 242 is to be simultaneous with the declaration of the U.S. - Government of its acceptance of the right of self-determination.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167-3802

MEMO: Ray Helmick, S.J., to Cardinal Law, April 2, 1986
 RE: Visit to Washington, March 24, 1986
 To report on meetings with Chairman Arafat in Tunis, March 4-6, 1986.
(Retyped, August 2000, as the copy I had used had become difficult to read.)

During the morning of Monday, March 24, I had two and a half hours meeting with Mr. Peter Rodman, of the NSC staff, accompanied by Mr. James Covey, whom I already knew. Following this, I had lunch with the Apostolic Nuncio, Archbishop Pio Laghi, and his staff at the Nunciature. In the afternoon I went to the State Department to see Mr. William Kirby, whom I had seen previously. (Mr. Kirby and Mr. Covey of the NSC regularly accompany Mr. Richard Murphy when he visits the Middle East and are the full-time officers in their respective departments on the matter of Middle East negotiations.) Mr. Kirby brought me immediately to see Mr. Richard Murphy. After spending an hour with Mr. Murphy, Mr. Kirby and I talked for another hour by ourselves.

Each of these meetings was essentially an account of my conversations with Chairman Arafat in Tunis, March 4-6, covering the matters told in my memo of that visit, of which I gave them copies, along with copies of the three proposals that the P.L.O. had submitted to King Hussein. I did not give them copies of the confidential annex to that memo, on the matter of Judge Francesco Castellano interviewing Chairman Arafat, as I did not want to notify them of the name of the person who had asked me to raise that matter. I did, however, tell both Mr. Rodman and Mr. Murphy of my having asked the question, and of Chairman Arafat's full response. Mr. Rodman wanted to know if the message had been transmitted to the Italian Judge and government, and when told it had been transmitted he concluded that there was nothing more the U.S. government was required to do in that case.

In response to Chairman Arafat's account of the three proposals given to King Hussein, the process of their composition and their rejection, as I reported it, Mr. Rodman said the question was not one of precise fine turns of phrase, but something much deeper. It took a while before I could discern just what he meant by that, but it eventually came to a requirement that Arafat and the P.L.O. make an endorsement of U.N.S.C. Resolutions 242 and 338 with no conditioning language at all attached, i.e., no conditioning the Palestinian recognition of Israel (in terms of the U.N.S.C. Resolutions) on reciprocal recognition of Palestinian rights.

There were two other items on the matter of the recognition of Israel and its right to exist besides the three proposals submitted to King Hussein. These were: 1) the acceptance by Arafat and members of the Executive Council of the formula I had proposed, on the P.L.O.'s recognition of the right of self-determination for the Israelis themselves as a thing they would not impugn or try to void (detailed in the memo of the Tunis visit); and 2) Arafat's repeated affirmation that the signed statement he had given to Congressman McCloskey in 1982, accepting "all U.N. and Security Council resolutions relevant to the Palestinian question," did indeed include U.N.S.C. Resolutions 242 and 338, despite any assertions to the contrary (i.e., despite the "clarification" issued at the time by the P.L.O. Observer at the U.N.) to the contrary. These two items were treated as interesting by Mr. Rodman and Mr. Covey, but did not essentially change Mr. Rodman's position that a P.L.O. affirmation of Resolution 242 with no conditions was required, and that "it does not serve Mr. Arafat's interests to introduce any complications." A very simple

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statement endorsing 242 was sought. In return for this, the P.L.O. had been offered a seat at an International Conference, in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, and it was noteworthy that the U.S. position, during the Amman discussion earlier this year, had accepted the formula "readiness to negotiate with the government of Israel" rather than insisting on the harder formula "recognition of Israel's right to exist."

I had already expressed my own understanding of Arafat's and the P.L.O.'s position, that in endorsing Resolution 242 without any reciprocal recognition of Palestinian rights they would equivalently be repudiating those rights of their own people, a thing they were not entitled to do. Mr. Rodman followed this argument carefully, but eventually pronounced it "absurd" that the P.L.O. should find it would disavow Palestinians' own rights by endorsing 242 without any trimmings.

What was being said here was that the P.L.O.'s affirmation of 242 would be *sensu aiente*, not *sensu negante*, that affirming in this way Israel's right to exist was not to exclude the rights of the Palestinians, though the requirement that an American acknowledgment of those Palestinian rights be the condition of the P.L.O.'s endorsement of 242 would not be accepted by the U.S. (This was to be further explained by State Department officials in the afternoon when they spoke of the "two-paragraph" formula the Americans had suggested in Amman. More of this *infra*.)

On the question of where things could proceed now, Mr. Rodman repeated King Hussein's phrase (from his February 19 speech), that now was a "time for reflection." He called it "sad" that things had come once again to such an impasse, thought a great tragedy might be in the making, and regretted that Arafat might have "once more missed the bus." I responded that "sad" would produce no negotiations, and Mr. Rodman's answer was to repeat that it was not in Arafat's or the P.L.O.'s interest to introduce any complication into their endorsement of 242.

Mr. Rodman spoke of the strange interpretation the Palestinians had that they were somehow carrying on their attempts at negotiation with the United States, when in fact it is Israel that is in occupation of the land, and with whom the Palestinians must negotiate. What the U.S. therefore attempted to do, in its indirect discussions, was to ferret out what proposals from the Palestinians might stand some chance of gaining acceptance by the Israelis. In response to this, I pointed out that, while I understood his point well, I could anticipate just what the Palestinian response would be to that proposition, namely that the U.S. was subjecting its own positions and judgments of the rights of the case to Israeli veto.

When I gave the account of Chairman Arafat's reasons for distrusting American promises under this administration (as in the written report of my Tunis visit), Mr. Covey responded that he felt he was hearing a "cartoonization" of events very familiar to him. He had been in Beirut with Philip Habib throughout the negotiations of 1982 leading to the P.L.O. evacuation. He found it incredible that Arafat should have anticipated endorsement of a Palestinian right of self-determination in President Reagan's speech of September 1, 1982, as a "political bonus" for the

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evacuation of Beirut. (On the report of the then Egyptian and Saudi Ambassadors to Washington, that such language had been in the draft version of the speech, both Rodman and Covey were baffled as to how ambassadors would have access to any such information.) And he felt it would have been impossible for the Multi-National Force to have guaranteed the safety of the Palestinian civilians in the refugee camps. The MNF could not have stayed there indefinitely, and could not have been offered as the military guarantee of security for the camps. He was sure that had never been promised. Very conscious of the great tragedy of what actually happened in the Sabra and Shatilla massacres, he spoke of the assurances the Habib team had (things at which he had worked very hard himself) that the Israelis themselves would not occupy West Beirut, and that various other potential threats be held back from the Palestinian camps. But above all, he said, they had constantly emphasized to the P.L.O. that the camp population stood in the greatest danger of destruction if the P.L.O. had not in fact evacuated Beirut.

The account by a highly involved participant was very moving, but the main point, as I indicated, seems to be that American officials do not have, and cannot readily have because of their own policy, any real grasp of what the actual perception of a situation by the P.L.O. and its people may be. To call Arafat's account a "cartoonization" speaks of the perception of what he himself experienced and of Arafat's very different interpretation of it *as understood by Mr. Covey* or someone in an analogous situation. It should not be understood that Arafat was fabricating his account, or misrepresenting his own perception of what had happened. From my own extended discussion with Arafat, I feel sure that what he was telling really was his perception of the events, and no fabrication, genuine in the same way as is Mr. Covey's account. The missing element here is precisely the communication by which each side, Palestinian and in this case American (not to speak of Israeli!) could understand what the other's perception genuinely was.

In the afternoon meeting with Mr. Richard Murphy I was able to do the thing Chairman Arafat had requested, namely to put the three proposals given to King Hussein in Amman in his hands with the information that this had been the Chairman's request. Mr. Murphy accepted them and explained, as I anticipated, that of course he had and knew those proposals, having been given them by King Hussein. But that they were not proposals made to him. Rather, they were proposals made to King Hussein, which by the time they were passed on to him (Murphy) had already been rejected by King Hussein, and were therefore a part of history.

(When I since repeated this answer to Palestinian Professor Walid Khalidi, who according to Arafat's own account was one of the writers of the first of the three proposals, he responded that the texts of the proposals had in fact been communicated to the Americans before their rejection by King Hussein. That corresponds to Arafat's account, by which the first two proposals, at least, were sent to the American Embassy in Amman, and a response asking that "the Israeli government" be explicitly mentioned received. It can be argued back, of course, that this was notification to the Americans of the content of the proposals, not formal presentation, that the formal presentation was to King Hussein, who rejected them and -- formally -- passed them on to the Americans as rejected. By this time, of course, the whole discussion has become a quibble, and attention has been distracted from the actual content of the proposals, and whether they are such as ought to be accepted or not. It is very hard on the Palestinians, however, if they

are without a clear statement from anyone on why their proposals have been rejected, are told by the Jordanians simply that the Americans have rejected them, and hear from the Americans that they have received the proposals only a something already rejected by King Hussein.)

I had the strongest sense, with Mr. Murphy, that here was a person most engaged and committed to bringing a real peace negotiation to a successful conclusion. (I have long had that impression of Mr. Kirby as well.) It was clear that Mr. Murphy found this new blocking of the peace process disappointing and frustrating, that he retained the hope that these parties could eventually negotiate successfully, and felt it was not yet. This was different in feeling from Mr. Rodman's use of King Hussein's expression, that this was a "time for reflection," and that the whole situation was "sad."

With both Rodman and Covey in the morning and Murphy and Kirby in the afternoon, I spoke of my impression that the inclination I had found, during my discussions, to place blame for the breakdown of the talks with Hussein on Prime Minister Rifai, and the eventual P.L.O. response to the King's February 19 speech (issued on March 8, just after I left Tunis) placing the blame on the Americans, were quite deliberate efforts not to put the blame on King Hussein himself. This I saw as positive, indicating Arafat's and the P.L.O.'s awareness of their need to win back the King's cooperation. All four concurred in this judgment, but Mr. Murphy added a wry question: "I assume he did not take any of the blame onto himself."

I recounted to Murphy and Kirby my exchange with Arafat in which (at my second meeting with him) I spoke of the atmosphere of suspicion I so often found, in the various conflicts I have worked with, when one side tries to assess the real intentions of opponents whom they never actually meet. When I heard the Palestinians speculate on the real motives of various American actions and proposals, I heard only suspicion of conspiracy and bad faith. But when I talked with American officials, I just as consistently found people deeply concerned to bring about a just reconciliation of the various rights and interests involved. (I had been thinking particularly of Mr. Kirby when I said this to Arafat, but could cite many others as well, both in the White House and State Department base in Washington and in the American embassies abroad.) Other Palestinians present had come to me after that meeting to say they thought the American officials I had talked to were not telling me the truth, that they really were plotting all kinds of destruction for the Palestinians and were leading me on as a gull. Arafat himself took in what I had said and made no response until the following day, in our last meeting, when he gave me not a blanket denial of *bona fides* in American pronouncements but rather his account of the three instances in which he felt the present administration had failed to make good on its promises to him.

Mr. Murphy explained to me, and Mr. Kirby later expanded in much greater detail, the American proposal that had been suggested during the meetings in Amman. (This was mentioned in King Hussein's speech in the same paragraph in which he groups together the three P.L.O. proposals as handed to him all at once and saying essentially the same thing, the familiar P.L.O. position he had been hearing throughout that round of discussions. The King says he handed the

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American proposal to Arafat, who said he would study it, but that nothing more was ever heard of it.)

The sense of this proposal was that the P.L.O. statement on Resolutions 242 and 338 should be in two paragraphs. Paragraph one should be as simple a statement as possible, simply acceptance of the two resolutions. Paragraph two could then contain any affirmations the P.L.O. wished to include of the rights of the Palestinians, its ultimate effect depending on the realism of those claims. This paragraph would then be accepted by the Americans, in the context of the whole, as a statement of a *position* of the Palestinians in the negotiations, and acknowledged as such. It would have the *same* weight as any comparable statement of position by the Israelis or any other party to the negotiations. But do not, please, make the outcome of the negotiations a precondition to the negotiations themselves, or of the acceptance of 242 and 338.

The purpose of this proposal was to help the Palestinians get around the quandary by which they felt that their endorsement of 242 and 338 without any reciprocal acknowledgment of Palestinian rights would amount to their repudiating (or neglecting) the rights of their own people. The two-paragraph format is seen as a way for the P.L.O. to make its acceptance of 242 and 338 *in the context* of an *affirmation* of Palestinian rights, yet without laying some explicitly defined form of this as a precondition on the other parties to the negotiations, especially Israelis and Americans.

Murphy and Kirby expressed interest in the other two items I brought up from my conversation with Arafat on the question of recognition, namely the formula recognizing the right of self-determination of the Israelis (who had rejected the "Democratic State" formula as a substitute for their Jewish State of Israel), and the affirmation by Arafat of the 1982 signed statement, given to Congressman McCloskey, as including 242 and 338. It was clear that the self-determination-of-the-Israelis formula would require careful weighing, and a snap assessment could not be given, though it was seriously registered as a part of the discussion. With regard to the McCloskey formula, "all U.N. and Security Council resolutions relevant to the Palestinian question," Mr. Murphy spoke of that as including not only such attractive items for the P.L.O. (alongside U.N.S.C. 242 and 338) as the 1974 General Assembly resolution affirming the inalienable right of self-determination of the Palestinian people, but also a number of things the U.S. (and Israel) would certainly not accept, such as the equation of Zionism with racism.

What came through most clearly from this discussion, however, was that Murphy and Kirby did not want to see other formulas become a substitute for their two-paragraph proposal, which they felt had not yet had a response from the Palestinians, which they believed should be able to meet the needs of the P.L.O., and which they earnestly wanted to have considered.

When, in my later conversation with Mr. Kirby alone, I asked for a copy of that American two-paragraph proposal, I got an unexpected bit of information. The written formula, as given to King Hussein and by him to Arafat, was not authorized. It had been made up at the American Embassy in Amman by the Ambassador and Mr. Cluverius. The State Department had some apprehension at the thought that this formula might be seen by the P.L.O. as having come from George Schultz himself, when it had not. And although he felt a final acceptable version

might differ very little from the formula the two Americans, with their good knowledge of State Department policy, had devised in Amman, Kirby did not feel free to release on the world (or hand to me) a formula that did not have more authorization than that one did.

I had mentioned, both in my morning meeting with Rodman and Covey and in my afternoon meeting with Murphy and Kirby, the importance various figures in the P.L.O. attached to two items: a) what they sensed as American efforts (in the perception of some, ever since the Camp David accord) to sow discord between the Palestinians resident in the Occupied Territories and the Diaspora Palestinians outside; and b) an assurance of their parity ("equal footing") with Jordan in negotiations and in a confederation.

On the first point, all were clear that they were not trying to create divisions among the Palestinian people, that the whole was one Palestinian people in their eyes, and they believed American statements had been consistent on that point. It was a surprise to Kirby that the State Department's February 10, '86 statement, a statement generally favorable to Palestinians on which Chairman Arafat had commented, welcoming it, while he was in Egypt, was being faulted on this score because of its final sentence, that "any agreement on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza should receive the prior consent of the inhabitants of those territories." (It is rather indicative of the poor state of communications that even so astute an observer as Kirby should not have known this until I told him on March 24, though I had known it since February.) The whole February statement, Kirby felt, was expected to be welcome to the Palestinians. It was not intended to create divisions and hurdles between the residents of the Occupied Territories and the Diaspora. But if a referendum is to be held, there is no way of consulting all of a people that is scattered everywhere about the globe. Yet it is clear that there must be a vote of the people who live in the place.

On the matter of parity between Palestinian and Jordanian partners in negotiations or in a confederation, all four men separately expressed themselves in very much the same way. It is no part even of the possibilities of American diplomacy to determine the internal power relations among the Arab parties to this conflict, or between the Palestinians and Jordan. Nor is it a thing the Israelis could determine. If, as state, this parity ("equal footing") is an already accepted element of the accord of February 11, 1985, still accepted by King Hussein and the P.L.O., no one is in any position to undermine it except the two parties to that accord themselves, King Hussein and the P.L.O. If anything, they add, King Hussein has the more reason to worry about imbalance in a confederation, because while a restored (West Bank-Gaza) Palestine and Jordan would be technically equals in a confederation, it remains that 60% of the population in the Jordanian party to the confederation is Palestinian. They find it absurd and unjust to think that King Hussein might be cooking up a scheme with the Israelis that, between them, Jordan and Israel should hold the Palestinians down. That is not even a formula by which King Hussein could retain control of Jordan, and is not his inclination.

Kirby had another interesting note to add on the prospect of negotiations with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation "on an equal footing." While the Jordanians, with their acknowledged sovereignty as a State and the prestige of the King, are an important entry card to the conference, they can't themselves enter without the Palestinians. Once the joint delegation is

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seated, what is then of paramount interest to the Israeli and American negotiators is what the Palestinian part of the joint delegation will agree to. That position would be instantly clear to all, and can be foreseen with certainty.

In this connection, both Murphy and Kirby commented approvingly on the line they saw me to have followed throughout my own conversations with Chairman Arafat, looking always for a way to get to negotiations. Whatever the obstacles, whose reality must always be acknowledged or the arguments against points of accommodation, whose legitimacy must often be accepted, none of these must be allowed to preclude negotiations, but ways found around them with the aim, always, of getting to the negotiating table.

I stressed, in my conversations at both White House and State Department, that I found it an unproductive exercise for Israel and, in deference to Israel, the United States to have spent so much of the last year looking for substitute Palestinians they could talk to instead of Arafat and the P.L.O. It amounts to an exercise in seeking representatives of the Palestinians who will not represent them. Ultimately this is merely destructive of any possibility of a real settlement or of peace, which is not the real interest of Israel or the United States.

I understand that a profound repulsion exists in Israel against dealing with Yasser Arafat as a person or the P.L.O. as an organization, not only among those who wish to avoid real negotiations but among some of those who genuinely want to promote a real negotiated settlement. I attribute this to a failure to attend properly to the process that has gone on in the P.L.O., and in Arafat's own thinking, over all the years that have seen both the abortive "Democratic State" proposal and the Two-State proposal that has now culminated in the acceptance of confederation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. My own much more favorable interpretation of that sequence of proposals, according to which the "Democratic State" actually meant, in substance, the acceptance of the Jews, and the Two-State proposal meant actual acknowledgment that their right of self-determination was exercised in the State of Israel, has been acknowledged as expressing their real meaning by Chairman Arafat and significant members of the Executive Council.

The question, as I formulated it both to Rodman and Covey at the White House and to Murphy and Kirby at State, is not whether Arafat is a person, and the P.L.O. an organization with which Israel can negotiate peace, a real peace that will be acknowledged and genuinely accepted by the Palestinians and the other Arabs, but whether the Palestinians are a people with whom Israel can negotiate such a peace. I believe that Arafat's and the P.L.O.'s leadership are the critically necessary elements that enable the Palestinians as a people to negotiate such a peace, as final status and not as a phase in continuing enmity to Israel. I believe that Arafat, in the P.L.O., can and is prepared to negotiate such a peace, and that there is no one else in a position to do so. Hence, in active sympathy and support for both the Israeli and Palestinian peoples, I see it as destructive of their most essential needs for peace that Arafat and the P.L.O. should be undermined, their legitimacy rejected or their opportunity to negotiate that real peace denied. It means losing the possibility of peace for both Israelis and Palestinians, two peoples who have both suffered atrociously in this century, perhaps forever.

And this leads to the final and most obscure point I discussed with Mr. Murphy. I see genuine good will and hard work to produce serious negotiations on the part of both Arafat's

P.L.O. and many Israelis, and strenuous efforts to promote that goal, despite frustrations, in King Hussein, President Mubarak and many others. Obstacles there are in plenty, but the real problem and puzzle, to my mind, is in Syria. I have no answers to that, cannot at present discern the intentions or real needs of Syria in this matter, although I feel sure that the Syrians, with their very rational regime, have no desire to see the war that, in my perception, is now shaping up between Israel and Syria any time over the next year or so. I see it as most important to gain some understanding of this part of the problem and find the way to enlist Syria in the quest for a real settlement that would meet her genuine needs as well.

The Soviets are important in this, as they are tied to the Syrians in a way comparable to the tying of the United States to Israel. Each superpower has a client-ally in the region that will never consider the super-power's own needs as calling for any serious modification of its own regional desires and priorities, and works consistently to involve its super-power patron in situations the super-power would rather avoid. The Soviets and the U.S. have therefore one dominant interest in the region, which is common to both: how to avoid coming, or being dragged by their clients, to a confrontation between themselves. It is simply mistaken to believe this region is one in which confrontation games should be played between the United States and the Russians. The Russian record on Israel has been consistent and dependable: through times of warm and cold relation with Israel, the Soviets have been supportive of the rights of the Palestinians and other Arabs, but have always defended the existence and safety of Israel, and have frequently stopped plans by their Arab friends to attack the basic existence of Israel. The U.S., likewise, despite frequent friction with Syria, has no malign designs on that country and can safely assure the Russians that this is so.

Both American and Soviet governments have assigned much high priority to restoring more constructive relations between themselves, but have found themselves at an impasse over each point of the approaches to each other, as on arms control, space weaponry, etc. I believe the common interest of both to prevent the Middle East tinderbox from engulfing them in an unplanned and unwanted confrontation is so strong that they could seriously cooperate on regional policy in the Middle East, and that this could be the icebreaker in their mutual relations, making it possible to come to cooperative stances in other areas as well.



April 3, 1986

Ambassador William Wilson
Embassy of the United States
to the Holy See
Piazz Citta della Leonina, no. 1
00193 Roma, Italy

Dear Ambassador Wilson,

Thank you for your help during my recent diplomatic forays. I was glad something could be done with regard to Judge Francisco Castellano as well. It seemed appropriate that you should be informed of what was going on in the whole matter.

Hence I enclose rather a mass of documentation here:

1. my letter of last November to Arafat, occasion of the later developments;
2. a memo I did for Cardinal Law on Vatican-Israeli relations, in which I suggested the good offices role of the Holy See in the regional conflict;
3. the report of my visit to Tunis, including a single-page and a more extended form. The confidential annex on my raising the question of the Judge is in the hands of Cardinals Law and O'Connor and Archbishop Laghi, but I did not give it to people in the White House or State. Instead I told them the content, my raising the question and Arafat's full response, without giving the name of the person who asked that the question be raised;
4. the texts (in Arabic, with English translation) of the three proposals submitted to King Hussein;
5. a report of my visit to Washington last week, to see Peter Rodman and Jock Covey at the White House and Richard Murphy and Bill Kirby at State.

As you know, Cardinal Law brought my report on the Tunis visit to Washington with him shortly after my return. He, Cardinal O'Connor and Archbishop Laghi discussed it, and spoke with Vice President Bush, to whom they gave a copy. (Whether the Vice President also has a copy of the confidential annex I do not know. He may have.)

Subsequently, on a second visit to Washington, Cardinals Law and O'Connor both saw Donald Regan and discussed these matters.

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Ambassador William Wilson, April 3, '86 -- 2

When I spoke with you just after my return from Tunis you wondered aloud whether I might not report directly to the President on this. Cardinal Law tells me that subsequently you and he had agreed that the visit by the two Cardinals to Donald Regan took care of all that was needed in that area.

I would be inclined to ponder that a bit more yet. Having the two Cardinals speak of these things at the White House is of incomparable value. At the same time, I am myself already a filter between what Arafat had to say and our own President. If the only report he has is one by Donald Regan, who filters what the Cardinals have told him, they in turn a filter to what I have already filtered, then the President has only a very remote sense of what Arafat was communicating.

All best wishes,

sincerely in Christ,

Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

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April 10. 1986

Rev. Robert Manning, S.J.
Provincial Offices
761 Harrison Avenue
Boston, MA 02118

Dear Bob,

Christ's Peace!

The rest of the essential documentation of my Middle East dealings in here. I did not include the background documentation, of which there was a lot, to my memo for Cardinal Law on Vatican-Israeli relations. If you would like that, I'll fish it out and make you a copy.

As I mentioned, the element of generating a planned program of the Holy See's using its good offices was behind the consultation of Cardinal Law and Archbishop Laghi, and eventually also of Cardinal O'Connor, on my making the trip to Tunis. Their verdict was that I should certainly go, but not as representing any of them, though with the knowledge on Arafat's part that I was consultant to Cardinal Law in the matter, had had the long conversations with the others, and would be reporting to them. Cardinal O'Connor (and John Nolan) had also been anxious that I say explicitly that I did not travel with the knowledge of the Holy See. There had been a first plan that I should go from Tunis to Rome to report to Cardinal Casaroli and Archbishop Silvestrini, but at the last moment, the night before I left, Cardinal Law and Cardinal O'Connor got on the phone together and decided I should not go to Rome, but instead report directly to them. Archbishop Laghi felt, with regard to my recommendation on a wider use of the good offices of the Holy See, that I hadn't yet the necessary motivations to generate such a planned campaign, but that if I cultivated this initiative I might get them.

I did report to Cardinal Law, who brought my written report right down to Washington, where he shared it with Cardinal O'Connor and Archbishop Laghi, and the three of them went right across the street to Vice President Bush, to whom they gave a copy and discussed it with him. That was in the second week of March. The following week, the two Cardinals made another visit to Washington and spent an hour with Donald Regan on the subject. It was after that that I made my own visit to Washington to report to Rodman and Covey, Murphy and Kirby, and had my opportunity to present the copies of the three Amman proposals to Murphy.

I asked Archbishop Laghi that day what to expect next, and his answer was simply that I should wait and that I would soon see.

I'm sending copies of all this material, with the report I gave you yesterday on my June visit, to Tom Michel, with a explanatory letter.

In Christ,



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

April 11, 1986

Mr. William Kirby
Bureau of Near Eastern and Asian Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Kirby,


Thank you for the time you took for that report on my visit to Yasser Arafat in Tunis. I want to thank Mr. Murphy, too, for the time he gave me, and you for bringing me along to him.

I did a written memo of those meeting, along with my morning meeting over at the White House with Peter Rodman and Jock Covey, for Cardinal Law, and thought you should have a copy, which I'm sure you'll share with Mr. Murphy. Actually, you'll recognize easily enough that this is a fairly argumentative memo, designed to be distributable to Cardinal Law and his colleagues Cardinal O'Connor and Archbishop Laghi, to the Palestinians I have dealt with (Hassan Rahman there in Washington, who will surely communicate it back to Tunis, Walid Khalidi, to whom I've given your greetings, Nubar Hovsepian and Afif Safieh), and back to yourself, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Rodman and Mr. Covey. It stays in that circle. You'll notice that I argue pretty strongly, for the Palestinians, further close attention to your two-paragraph formula. I needn't point out where I'm arguing back to yourselves, as I haven't been all that subtle.

Might I remind you of one thing I mentioned. Afif Safieh, who has been particularly helpful to my managing this trip, has been a year at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard, and now has Harvard's approval to spend a second year. He will be applying to the State Department for an extension of his visa, and I hope it will be granted.

All best wishes. I'll let you know of anything else that develops.

Sincerely,



Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

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April 11, 1986

Mr. James Covey
National Security Council
The White House
Washington, D.C.


Dear Mr. Covey,

It was very good of Mr. Rodman and yourself to meet me and devote so much of your time to that report on my visit to Yasser Arafat in Tunis.

I did a memo on that meeting and my afternoon meeting with Mr. Murphy and Mr. Kirby for Cardinal Law, and thought you should have a copy, which is enclosed. I expect you'll let Mr. Rodman know what is in it. I'll send along a copy, too, to Mr. Kirby, for his and Mr. Murphy's information.

All best wishes,

sincerely,



Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

August 3, 1986

REPORT ON VISIT TO ISRAEL, July 10-31, 1986

Raymond G. Helmick, S. J.

The visit was prepared some time in advance, when all pertinent papers and reports on my March visit to Chairman Arafat in Tunis were given to the Israeli Consul General in Boston, Mr. Michael Shiloh, in whom I have great confidence. I requested meetings with Prime Minister Shimon Peres, Foreign Minister Shamir and Defense Minister Rabin. Mr. Shiloh himself was away when the dates for my visit were finally set, having returned to Israel for the funeral of his mother. The Consul in Boston, Mr. Navon, was most helpful, and questions in Israel could be referred to Mr. Shiloh. I was told to contact Mrs. Yael Vered, the Counsellor on Religious Affairs at the Foreign Ministry.

Mrs. Vered informed me when I called that none of those I had asked to see could afford the time for a meeting, but that she would receive me on their behalf. The meeting was on July 14th, and I had an hour with Mrs. Vered herself, followed by nearly another two hours with Mr. Zvi Ne'eman, her assistant, who had also been present for the meeting with Mrs. Vered herself.

In terms of a distinction I had learned in my visit to the region the previous year, between those who told the story of past encounters on either side and those who were proposing the peace, Mrs. Vered was a teller of the story. She and Mr. Ne'eman were thoroughly familiar with the documentation I had sent ahead through Mr. Shiloh. Her account was that Israel had been under attack from all the Arab states since 1948 and even before. She spoke of Nasser in May, 1967, and his promise to wipe out the "Zionist entity;" of physical attacks, to the point of the intended annihilation not only of the State of Israel but of the people as well, and of moral attacks continuously traducing Israel.

Israel had made offers of peace on many occasions, as for instance after the 1967 war. These had been uniformly rejected by the Arabs. None will negotiate, apart from the breakthrough with Egypt under Sadat. Israel is still waiting for an offer to negotiate.

As of now, there is effective peace, an understanding with Syria and Jordan that has grown up over the years. There is no trouble with the Palestinians. There is free passage of people and goods over the river. King Hussein is the one for Israel to deal with on Palestinian matters.

Visit to Israel, July 10-31, '86 -- 2

As for the P.L.O., it is nothing but a terrorist organization. There is no possibility of ever talking with them. The Palestinians must simply produce an alternative leadership. Arafat himself, in her view, was nothing but a deceiver. She instanced last summer's London trip by Mohammed Milhem and Bishop Elias Khouri, when Arafat instructed Milhem not to sign a statement which King Hussein had agreed beforehand, on the basis, Mrs. Vered was certain, that Arafat had promised to accept it. Arafat had "made a liar" of King Hussein. Arafat's account, to me, of his January-February meetings with King Hussein, she said, was also deception. He had "never had a tête-a-tête" with the King.

In support of her contentions about the character of the P.L.O., Mrs. Vered gave me a file of documents on terrorist disruption of academic life in the occupied territories ("Judea-Samaria and Gaza District") in recent years. Attached were pages of a 1986 calendar issued by the Palestinian Youth Committee (Fatah) which commemorated the dates of past terrorist attacks, such as the 1972 murder of Israeli athletes in Munich and the 1974 murder of Israeli high-school pupils in Maalot; posters advocating use of arms against Israel; a page from a pamphlet on "The Art of Confrontation" giving instructions on setting booby-trap devices to blow up bombs while a sapper is working to defuse them; and as principal exhibit, a quiz given to new students at Hebron University by the (Fatah) Student Youth Movement, in which the students were asked to list five clauses from the Palestinian National Covenant, five members of the P.L.O. Executive Committee, and three Palestinian villages in which massacres were carried out by the "Zionists."

I had explained my own position, as speaking for no one but myself but reporting to Cardinal Law, Cardinal O'Connor and Archbishop Laghi, and having made the proposal, which is still only a proposal of my own, that the Holy See make use of its good offices to help resolve the regional conflict. On the prospect of the Holy See using its good offices on behalf of all parties to help toward the peace (not as something offered but as something I was personally interested in exploring), Mrs. Vered said that Israel had used and was always interested in using the Vatican's good offices in humanitarian matters, but that in political matters Israel had no interest in the good offices of anyone who did not "treat Israel as a State," i.e., establish diplomatic relations. She spoke with clear revulsion of the fact that the Apostolic Delegation was listed as being "to Jerusalem and Palestine." Under the circumstances, there was no point in raising any prior concerns of American churchmen before they would recommend to the Holy See the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel.

As for arranging meetings with Prime Minister Peres, Foreign Minister Shamir and Defense Minister Rabin, the original matter on which I had been referred to Mrs. Vered, she was entirely negative, as she had been in our two earlier conversations on the telephone. It was a busy time, and none of the principals could take time to see me. Instead she was deputed by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister to see me

Visit to Israel, July 10-31, '86 -- 3

My meeting with Mrs. Vered was followed by a long session with Mr. Zvi Ne'eman, which I report extensively as it had been very carefully prepared by him. He came equipped with an extensive file of documentation to refute various points raised in my written reports, all marked out and indexed for use in his presentation. Mr. Ne'eman's was a very friendly and outgoing approach, in contrast to the more formal stance of Mrs. Vered. Like her, he insisted on the difference between what the P.L.O. and its officers say to presumably gullible Westerners and what they say in Arabic. As an Arabist he, like she, claimed superior knowledge to anything I as a non-Arabist might have.

The central text of his presentation was the Palestinian National Covenant, founding charter of the P.L.O., which he took as an incontrovertible obligatory doctrinal statement for everyone in the P.L.O. No one is ever permitted to say anything authoritative that contradicts the Covenant. If it can be shown to have been done in any other language Mr. Ne'eman wants to see it published in Arabic. He returned to this requirement often.

On the Covenant's assertion (article 17) that "the Jews are not a nation," he premised the impossibility of the P.L.O.'s ever recognizing the reality or legitimacy of the Israeli State. Hence in the language of the Democratic State proposal, which I had cited as meaning essentially the acceptance of the Jews, he argued that the formula was used only to admit to citizenship the three religious groups. Jews, Christians and Muslims, and that any recognition of the Jews as a distinct people or nation was precluded by the Covenant.

I responded that I did not take the Covenant as so unalterable a holy writ, but saw it as modified by subsequent history and the formal acts of the P.L.O. in its constituent bodies and the solemn decisions of the Palestine National Council. I placed emphasis on three such decisions: the acceptance of the Democratic State proposal, of the Two-State proposal, and of the modification of the Two-State proposal in the February 11, 1985 accord with Jordan, which accepted that self-determination should be exercised through a confederation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. I would myself like to see the original Covenant revoked or radically modified to express the realities that the Palestinians now clearly understand, but I appreciate the difficulty of revoking such a founding charter on which the sense of the people's first coming into solidarity is based.

I cited two parallels. The first was the claim of the English monarchy, from the time of the Hundred Years War to the 19th century, that the English king was also king of France. This did not prevent normal relations between England and France. There were times of war, times of peace and even times of close collaboration. The claim was not rescinded nor was it taken seriously by either party. The second parallel was closer to home. Israel's Herut Party, in its founding document, lays claim to both East and West Banks of the Jordan River as the historic patrimony of the Israeli State. Does this mean that a Herut-led government can be expected to launch a war of conquest on the Kingdom of Jordan? I don't believe so, though there are some

Visit to Israel, July 10-31, '86 -- 4

Arabs who do believe it. Should Mr. Shamir, then, be urged to propose to a Herut Party Convention the revocation or radical alteration of the party's charter? It would please me to be able to go along to Mr. Arafat and say: look what Mr. Shamir just did, and why don't you do the same. I don't really expect or recommend it, though, as such an action by Mr. Shamir would let loose all sorts of ugliness from the crazies in his own party, and it is better for the prospects of any real peace to avoid that.

Mr. Ne'eman did not acknowledge the parallel, because he saw the Palestinian National Covenant as an active document, not a mere remnant of the past. He referred to the sheaf of documents Mrs. Vered had given me and to other references to the Covenant, which occur in plenty both in popular literature and in official documents, as in the first reference to a Palestinian "State or entity" in the June 9, 1974 "Political Programme for the Present Stage of the P.L.O. Drawn up by the P.N.C., Cairo," of which he gave me a copy, citing especially its articles 2, 4 and 8. We came off at a draw on this subject, as Mr. Ne'eman had made his point and I don't look to that level of writing for evidence of the status of the Covenant.

He then went into an exposition of the strategy of stages which he saw behind every P.L.O. proposal for a separate state or entity in a part of the territory, documenting it with the 1974 text cited above, in which such language is prominent especially in articles 2, 3, 4 and 8. I cited the point in my March '86 conversations with Arafat and members of the Executive Council when I had mentioned it as the consistent response of many Israelis I met to speak of the Two-State proposals just as he was doing, as a strategy of stages whose end was the contemplated destruction of Israel. The reaction then, coming first from Mr. Farouk Kaddoumi, who sat beside me, was explosive. It was impossible, Kaddoumi had said, that the Israelis should still believe that after all the demia the P.L.O. had issued over the years. It was not the P.L.O. intention to destroy the State of Israel or to use any Palestinian entity as a stage toward that end. When Israelis claimed this, they could only be making propaganda out of outmoded statements, and they could not really believe what they were saying. Arafat and the others agreed with Kaddoumi's assessment, and this was the launching point for my own interpretation of what the P.L.O.'s experience and development had been through the years of the Democratic State proposal and the Two-State model, eventually modified by the acceptance of the confederation with Jordan. It is not that I would take Kaddoumi's statement as definitive about the actual conviction of Israelis. The Israelis, and not Kaddoumi, are the authority for what they themselves believe. But I would take it that Kaddoumi expressed the real conviction of Palestinians in the subject.

Since all this had been covered in my written report, Mr. Ne'eman was prepared with quotations to substantiate his view. Farouk Kaddoumi had, in a Newsweek interview published March 14, '77, said: "...we have to be flexible, ...and accept at this stage...just a part of our territory.... The first phase is on the '67 line, the second on the '48 lines...and the third stage is the Democratic Palestinian State. We are thus struggling for these three stages." This nine-year-old quotation was buttressed by a quite recent one, May 14, '86, an interview given by Zachariah Abdul Rahin, whom Mr. Ne'eman described as

Visit to Israel, July 10-31, '86 -- 5

a deputy to Kaddoumi, to a Kuwaiti news agency (therefore, because it was in Arabic for an Arab public, a more dependable index to the P.L.O.'s real thinking than anything in another language). The key sentence read: "The fundamental Palestinian issue is not just lands occupied in 1967, but every inch of Palestine occupied by the robbers and on which they have established the Zionist entity." So much for P.L.O. members discrediting their own assurances. I was impressed by how far Mr. Ne'eman had reached in researching a refutation of what I had been told. I don't know what authority the Kuwaiti interview would carry, as compared to the statements of Kaddoumi, Arafat himself and other Executive members two months earlier. I am sure this is worth the attention of the P.L.O., to see what effect such unrealistic statements, in the Arabic press or wherever, have on the whole discussion and possibility of the prospects for peace.

At this point I raised, in discussion, Professor Herbert Kelman's observations on the dual consciousness and perception that one finds in such situations of frustration and near despair as are the Palestinian experience, and made the curious discovery that Kelman and his rich fund of writings and analysis on the Palestinian question are simply unknown in this quarter. Mr. Ne'eman took note of this, but had never heard of Kelman.

He turned then to the McCloskey statement, of which he had a photostat in his file. He pointed out that Arafat had misquoted it to me as speaking of "all U.N. and Security Council Resolutions...." The original read: "Chairman Arafat approves" (on one line, apparently in McCloskey's handwriting; then on two further lines, in another hand that could be Arafat's own) "all U.N. Resolutions Relevant to the Palestinian Question." It is signed with a flourish: "Yasser Arafat," dated and the time given as "6:00 P.M." at the bottom.

Mr. Ne'eman believed that, even apart from U.N. Observer Terzi's subsequent "clarification" in New York, which said Resolution 242 was not included because of its content, Arafat's signed statement was already a subterfuge. He showed me a copy of a typical recent printed agenda for a U.N. General Assembly session, in which the items of discussion are listed in sequence. These items are not, in the course of discussion, to be mixed. The day's proceedings go on from one item to another. "The Question of Palestine" formed one item early on that sample day's agenda, and later items included, as separate topics, "The Situation in the Middle East" and other distinct items regarding, e.g., human rights in the occupied territories, etc. He then produced the 1967 printed register of Security Council Resolutions, in which U.N.S.C. 242 is listed not under the item "Question of Palestine," but rather under the item "Situation in the Middle East." Arafat, Mr. Ne'eman believed, had deliberately deceived McCloskey on this basis, understanding that the Resolution in question had not been itemized under that rubric, and hence was not, in this very recondite sense, "relevant to the Palestinian Question."

I was truly unimpressed by this argument, in the light of what Arafat had told me in March of this year, that he had intended the inclusion of 242 and 338 when he signed the McCloskey statement in 1982, that Terzi's restriction of its scope had been wrong, and that he stands

Visit to Israel, July 10-31, '86 -- 6

by that statement now, affirming all the resolutions including 242 and 338. Mr. Ne'eman insisted then that Arafat could not mean this because it contradicted article 1 of the Palestinian National Covenant. I told him I trusted he was not trying to forbid Arafat to contradict the Covenant, which of course he was not.

It was at this point that we came to the essence of our conversation. I told Mr. Ne'eman I felt we were both similar in our approach in the careful weighing we gave to each statement and document from the P.L.O. The difference lay in this: that he seemed to be looking for the way to show that each effort and statement could not work, whereas my interest was in finding any possible holes in the statement or effort to get them filled in, and make it work.

Possibly Mr. Ne'eman was offended at this, though I think not. At any rate he took the occasion to tell me -- moment of frankness -- that he thought my contacts with the P.L.O. were essentially a disservice, that it gave them credibility they did not merit and encouraged them to continue, that they were people who should not be talked to by anyone, and that the process of peace could really be served only when, politically, they disappeared altogether from the scene.

We differed on this, but with much cordiality and appreciation of the genuineness of one another's opinions. I repeated what I had said earlier at both the State Department and White House in Washington, that to me the question under discussion is not whether the P.L.O. is the organization and Arafat the leader with which Israel could make peace, but whether the Palestinians were a people with whom peace could be made. We were agreed on this, agreed also in the expectation that they were such a people. But whereas he believed the condition of this was that the Palestinians find another leadership, I believed the Palestinians had so identified their aspirations for peace and the recovery of their dignity with the P.L.O. and Arafat's seasoned leadership that that was the leadership Israel had to deal with eventually. He thought the adherence of the Palestinians to the P.L.O.'s leadership substantially the result of intimidation, whereas I find the perception of the Palestinians to be that they are always under the severest pressure, with much intimidation to abandon the leadership of their real choice and submit to the imposition of some other leadership that will not represent them and their aspirations, merely in order that this alternative leadership may be more tractable to the wishes of their adversaries. That way lies no acceptance of whatever agreement might be decided on, and hence no peace. It remains to be seen which of us is listening more attentively to the real aspirations of the Palestinians.

I closed by citing back to him what I had said, in some disappointment, to Arafat at the end of our meetings in March: that if, when I returned home, I left him happy with all I had said, I would not have been telling the truth; and that if I were to leave happy with all he had said, he would not have been telling the truth. I valued much what I had learned in my conversation with Mr. Ne'eman, and appreciated the effort and candor he had put into it.

Visit to Israel, July 10-31, '86 -- 7

The essential in what Mr. Ne'eman had to say was that in everything proposed by Yasser Arafat he sees deniability built in. That, despite the fact that Mr. Ne'eman's distaste for the whole process was so strong that he wanted no messages sent, has to be the message of this meeting.

SUBSEQUENT EVENTS DURING MY STAY IN ISRAEL:

To all appearances I was stopped from any more meaningful contact with Israeli officials. I made a visit to Mr. Chaim Shur, editor of New Outlook magazine in Tel Aviv, and subsequently wrote a substantial version of what had been said on the subject of the recognition of Israel during my meetings with Arafat in March. That article should soon appear in the next issue. Then I went along to Mr. Hanna Siniora, editor of Al Fajr, whom I had met briefly over lunch in Washington. Mr. Siniora immediately contacted Mr. Uri Savir, the Media Consultant to Prime Minister Peres who in fact is one of his closer confidants, to try to arrange a meeting with Mr. Peres. Mr. Savir was ready to be helpful but pointed out that the schedule was difficult and the chances only moderate. At that point we knew nothing of the visit of Mr. Peres to Morocco. The meeting was close to being arranged on the weekend, when Mr. Siniora told me Mr. Savir expected my call immediately. He was not in when I called, and shortly thereafter a total curtain descended on the Prime Minister's office until the announcement was made that he was in flight to Morocco. I had by that time already delayed my intended journey from Israel to Jordan by several days. I was advised by several persons to wait and see Mr. Peres on his return.

Meanwhile, I had seen several Members of the Knesset and made a visit to the American Embassy in Tel Aviv, where I talked with the Political Officer, Mr. Roger Harrison.

The most important meeting was with Mr. Aharon Harel, Labor MK. Harel agreed to call Peres himself (this was before the visit to Morocco) and recommend that it was important for Peres to see me before I went on to Jordan and Syria.

He spoke of the willingness of the Labor Party to meet the P.L.O. on condition of:

1. Mutual recognition. If the P.L.O. would recognize 242/the State of Israel, then the reciprocal recognition would be guaranteed. A statement would be issued within the hour, recognizing:

- a) the national rights of the Palestinians (he referred to Peres' April speech to the Plenum, in which he spoke of recognizing the Palestinians as a nation),

- b) the P.L.O. as legitimate spokesman.

2. Cessation of terrorism (= all force) as of that time. (Harel thought the formula I had earlier suggested, of a moratorium for the duration of peace negotiations, would be the appropriate one.)

Visit to Israel, July 10-31, '86 -- 8

3. It was important to have a reconciliation with King Hussein first. The lack of it terribly constricted Labor's chances to move. In any negotiations it was important to have both Hussein and Arafat. Hussein had two choices: with Arafat or with Syria, but in fact it would not work without Arafat. It would be ideal to have Hussein, Arafat and the Syrians. Labor would welcome that.

If these prior conditions were met, then Israel (under the Peres government) would welcome the P.L.O., with Arafat and his top team, into negotiations without any (further) preconditions, in the full international conference.

Peres is a dove, and wants these negotiations. With him, he has 24 Labor MKs, including Abba Eban, a minority even within Labor, but with them he can still do it. He has held meetings over the last year, in secret, with King Hussein and with spokesmen for the P.L.O. Harel himself had talked last year with Walid Khalidi, explaining these conditions, and had thought there was good hope of progress. He sees it as a mistake on Arafat's part not to have taken advantage of Peres' two years as Prime Minister. The door has been open, and is still, but with much greater difficulty (because of the break between Arafat and Hussein) and much less time left. Once the rotation has taken place, the response of Shamir to anything Arafat might say would be that it was nothing new but had all been heard before.

On the idea that the long-term current of events in the Middle East, over which neither party had real control, was toward war between Syria and Israel, Harel felt another war would be much harder on civilians than any previous war had been, since there were missiles now that would be directed against the cities of both sides. *Every airfield on both sides is also targeted by missiles.*

As for the possibility of having the good offices of the Holy See Harel was strongly interested. Israel cannot afford to let any serious mediation go by untried.

It was particularly because of this conversation with Aharon Harel that I was so anxious to see Prime Minister Peres, and stayed on two weeks beyond my planned departure time, since the things told me by Harel, as the promised Israeli response to a P.L.O. initiative, would be much more convincing coming from Peres than from Harel alone.

Later the same day (July 18) I talked with Elazar Granot, General Secretary of the Mapam Party and MK. When I had told him of my earlier meetings with Arafat and of the P.L.O.'s present desire to have contacts with Israelis, he was fearful of illusion in what I had been told, because of his own disillusioning experience of last November. In preparation for the meeting of the Socialist International in Vienna, of which both Mapam and Labor are members, Granot had prepared what he thought attractive terms for a Palestinian peace proposal. In the aftermath of the bombing of Tunis he had Peres' agreement to co-sponsor these proposals as Labor leader, although in order to secure that agreement he had had to reduce the expression "self-determination" to "legitimate national rights." But after the Achille Lauro incident, Peres had backed off, and even threatened Granot with political punishment back in Israel if he went ahead and made his proposals. Granot made his proposals anyway, and finds

Visit to Israel, July 10-31, '86 -- 9

himself now still waiting for a response from the P.L.O. Hence he is skeptical when he hears that the P.L.O. is anxious for contacts.

Otherwise, he was pleased with the interpretation of the P.L.O.'s experience over the years and its meaning for the recognition of Israel that I had brought back from Tunis, but saw the need for the recognition, in form, of 242 as well, possibly in the two-paragraph form suggested by the Americans, but not without reciprocal recognition. He sees Peres as now an impotent Prime Minister, and Shamir, with murder indictments hanging over him, as the most powerful man in the country. He feels Arafat failed greatly in missing his opportunity with the King, and that little time is now left. The two years of Peres' Prime Ministership were wasted. There are no hopes with Shamir.

The war prospect is worse than at any time before, but as bad as another war would be for Israelis and Syrians (including civilians this time), it would be worst for the Palestinians. They would be driven, this time, from the West Bank and Gaza into Jordan, and thus would lose their claim to the occupied territories after that. It would be disaster for all, but especially for them. He thought the threat of superpower involvement, even so, not real: the superpowers would stop the war, not become involved.

If the Holy See could help prevent that through a good-offices intervention, it would be most commendable. If anyone is brave enough to offer such a service, it is most welcome.

As I was leaving, he described me as a "man of religion," and hence such as he, a secular man, seldom meets. With that he wished that God be with me.

The third of these meetings, on July 20th, was with Mr. Mordechai Virshubski, Shinui MK. His stress was on internal Israeli politics. When Shamir takes over, his first act, even in his first week, will be to press the settlements policy, even if for lack of cash he can do it only on paper. This would accelerate the drift toward the possibility of war. Virshubski, Granot and Aharon Harel had been among five MKs who met a group of five Palestinians (including Walid Khalidi) in Boston two years ago, and had emphasized the need to use Peres' term well. He thought it important for me to see some Right-Wing Israeli figures, suggesting Ehud Olmert as a good person to contact. (I understood well the wisdom of this, but over the rather long remaining time I was in Israel, it was important to stay near the phone, not going out except when unavoidable, so that I could not be told that a meeting had been available with Peres but I was not there.)

At first Virshubski thought the moment for a good-offices service by the Holy See, if it were to occur, would be after the rotation, probably after the hopeless period of a Shamir term in office, which might mean a two-year wait. When he heard my thoughts on what possibilities there might be of a Hussein-Arafat reconciliation and a breakthrough on the recognition question, he wanted such intervention within the remaining three months (less some days) of the Peres term. Peres would still respond most positively, with reciprocal recognition, whereas Shamir would make no response at all. Get this

Visit to Israel, July 10-31, '86 -- 10

established on the record while there is still time.

He recognized that King Hussein's search for an alternative to the P.L.O. was a failure from the start, but saw some wisdom in his position. Hussein had acted forcibly, but not too much so, using great restraint. Prime Minister Rifai's statements of the preceeding day had indicated how much Jordan still recognized that the P.L.O. had the essential role in representing the Palestinians. Hussein's aim had been to assert that he is boss in his own country, not to the prejudice of the P.L.O. in the West Bank and Gaza.

He understood well the dilemma the P.L.O. faces if it were to accept 242 without reciprocity: that this would amount to renouncing Palestinian rights by the same action. He sees the combination of two things -- my "interpretation" formula of the Palestinian experience through the years of Arafat's leadership and a recognition of 242 in something like the two-paragraph form, that would not involve any such renunciation of Palestinian rights -- as a possible way of solving the dilemma.

Internal politics is of as great importance with the Israelis as Arafat finds it with the Palestinians. If a solution, in terms of the land-for-peace formula of 242, is offered in the form of a confederation with Jordan, 60-70% of the Israelis will approve it. If it were in the form of an independant Palestinian State, there would only be 10-15%.

EVENTUAL RESULT OF THE TIME SPENT IN ISRAEL.

My wait for Prime Minister Peres to get back from Morocco was followed, after he had spent a few days reporting to various Israelis on that trip, by a further wait while the visit of Vice President Bush went on. I had been anxious to have my meeting with Peres over and be off to Jordan before Bush arrived, knowing that after that the Vice President would be off to Jordan, keeping King Hussein occupied during the days I wanted to see him as well. When I heard, from prominent Palestinians, that there was strong resistance among the Palestinian hard-liners to the prospect of any Palestinians meeting with Bush, I made urgent representations to them that a very important opportunity would be lost if they failed to meet the Vice President.

Eventually I had a meeting with Mr. Uri Savir on Sunday July 27. Savir was fully cognisant of everything that had been in my written reports, including that from last year's group trip, and said that Aharon Harel had also given Peres a full and cordial report of my meeting with him. Savir said that the Israeli government had two alternative ways of reacting to everything regarding Arafat and the P.L.O. One was that the one most necessary thing was to contact and come to an understanding with them. The other was that Arafat and the P.L.O. were hopeless cases, and that Israel had to wait for them to go away and be replaced with some alternative leadership. He understood my belief that contact was needed, and said this had been attempted in all good will by many others before, sometimes by people of higher rank.

Visit to Israel, July 10-31, '86 -- 11

If the other hypothesis was correct, that Arafat and his organization were hopeless cases, then my effort was not a real service but was keeping them alive when they should be fading from the scene. I responded that I had indeed listened carefully every time I heard Israelis tell me that they believed there was some other address to turn to than the P.L.O. I had never yet heard any reason for their belief in another address than that they didn't like the address they were given, and had concluded that this was self-deception. Savir said he would report our conversation back to Peres and let me know whether there would be a meeting. It was not, he said, a matter of time. Peres understood the importance of the matter, and would have time if he thought a meeting appropriate. But he might not want it.

The answer came in two stages. I was not contacted directly, but the response sent by Hanna Siniora, who continued to pursue the matter. It was that, if I had something concrete to report (hence after meetings with the Arab parties), Peres would be glad to see me, but as of then he did not want to encourage what I was doing. This phrasing, I felt, called for careful interpretation. I do not take it as meaning that Peres would not be happy to see my effort succeed, but rather that he is not in a position (as a matter of internal Israeli politics) to take any direct part in this himself. That I can understand.

Siniora asked me to stop by his office the following day before going on to Rome. (By this time I had waited too long to go directly on to Jordan. My departure was on the night of July 31st, and I had to get to Rome if I were not to find people in the Secretariate of State gone on their vacations. Hence I was postponing the Jordan and Syria parts of my trip until after I had been to Rome.) At that meeting, he gave me messages that both the Israelis and the Americans in Vice President Bush's entourage had asked that I should pass on when I met Arafat.

What I had been told by Aharon Harel, and had been so anxious to have confirmed by Peres, had been reported very fully to Peres, I was told, and had met no objection. It could not be attributed directly to him as a proposition.

Uri Savir had passed on to Siniora a proposal for a meeting preparatory to the International Conference. This was to be understood as a sounding, not an offer. The proposal was for a meeting of Americans, Russians, Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians; the Americans to be represented by Richard Murphy, the Russians by Polyakov, the Israelis by Kimche and Tamir, the Palestinians by persons from the occupied territories acceptable to the P.L.O. but not identified as its officers, and two Jordanians of the same level (i.e., less than Ministers). Chairmanship to be jointly by the U.S. and USSR. The purpose, to discuss differences, narrow them (such matters as 242, territories, self-determination). There would be no preconditions (i.e., P.L.O. acceptance of 242 and cessation of violence would not be preconditions in this format). The pre-conference is intended to lead on to the full International Conference.

The American proposal had been passed on to Siniora in a

Visit to Israel, July 10-31, '86 -- 12

group of people from the U.S. State Department who had been at the Bush meeting with Palestinians, with the understanding that I would carry it on to Arafat. ~~Richard~~ Murphy was one of the group, but the talking was done by Mr. Wat Cluverius. The proposal was similar to what I had been told, for the Israelis, by Aharon Harel. If Arafat, using the two-paragraph formula suggested by the Americans in Amman or in whatever way he could, would recognize 242/338 without condition, he is guaranteed an American reciprocal statement within one hour. The Americans agree to sit down in advance with Palestinians from the occupied territories acceptable to the P.L.O. to discuss the language of this reciprocal statement of recognition. It will be in terms favoring self-determination in the context of the confederation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as proposed in the February 11, '85 accord. They will also discuss in advance the form for presenting these two statements. Their insistence on having the P.L.O. statement one hour in advance of theirs is a matter of the long history of distrust, as they fear the P.L.O. would renege on its statement if the two were intended to be simultaneous.

If more explanation of either of these proposals, Israeli or American, is required, Mr. Siniora will be glad to come and give it himself.

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SECRETARIATUS PRO NON CHRISTIANIS

E Civitate Vaticana, die 4 August

Dear Ray,

I talked with Msgr. Gatti this morning and then called you back several times, but you were out, apparently at the Iraqi embassy. He was very pleased with your talk and definitely wants a copy of your report. He said that Archbishop Silvestrini had to cancel all of his appointments today in order to go to Card. Gonfaleri's funeral, and is pushing the others around in order to get in all his appointments before he leaves. Gatti said that it doesn't look good that Silvestrini will be able to see you but he will call you in case there is a possibility. He said that he thinks you are going about the whole thing in the right way, as a private initiative, letting everyone know that you will be informing the Vatican of what

transpires. He hopes you will also keep Pio Laghi informed of developments, and Laghi can keep in contact with the people at the Sec. of State.

Ray, I will be gone this afternoon and tomorrow I leave for a week of vacation. In case I don't see you, I thank you for letting me know about your conscientious and creative initiatives, and my prayers are with you as you strive to be an agent of peace in that complex situation.

In the Love,
Car. Michel, SJ



August 5, 1986
(recopied, August 2004)

Rev. Msgr. Gatti
Segreteria di Stato

Dear Msgr. Gatti,

Christ's Peace!

Thank you for receiving me last Friday, August 2. I enclose here the written report on my visit to Israel (done, I'm afraid, on an unfamiliar typewriter) of which Fr. Michel told you. I hope I may yet see Archbishop Silvestrini before he leaves, tomorrow, on his vacation, as it is for that purpose that I made this extra trip from Israel to Rome before going on myself, tomorrow, to see Mr. Arafat in Baghdad.

The essence is this. I bring to Mr. Arafat the two things he needs in order to make the long-delayed recognition of UNSC 242 and 338 without conditions, namely:

1. the two-paragraph formula suggested by the U.S. State Department, which delivers Arafat from the dilemma of having to renounce the rights of Palestinians in the act of accepting 242/338;
2. a reliable commitment on the part of the Americans, and a probable commitment on the part of the Israelis (what I was told by MK Aharon Harel), to make a statement of reciprocal recognition of the Palestinians within one hour after Arafat formalizes his acceptance of 242/338, the text of this reciprocal recognition by the Americans and the manner and place of depositing the documents to be agreed beforehand with authorized representatives of Arafat.

This means that, within a very short time, there is a distinct possibility that three documents of reciprocal recognition, one Palestinian, one American and one Israeli, will need to be deposited with a suitable international diplomatic authority. My own recommendation to Arafat, who will have the primary choosing of that depository, will be that the documents be placed with the Holy See. What I therefore need, and the reason for my having come to Rome to see Archbishop Silvestrini, is an answer to this precise question:

If the Holy See receives this request, that the documents be deposited with its offices, what will be its reply? Will it answer yes, or will it say to go elsewhere?

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Msgr. Gatti, August 5, '86 - 2


I see advantages were the Holy See to agree to be the depository of such documents of reciprocal recognition, if indeed they are forthcoming.

It would earn the Holy See the gratitude of all the parties for its good offices. It would also ensure that, in whatever negotiations followed from this development, the Holy See would have a prominent role, giving it the scope to take adequate care of such questions as the status of Jerusalem, the Holy Places, and the Christian community in the Holy Land. Quite probably, it would also help toward resolving the vexed question of diplomatic relations both with Israel and the legitimate representatives of the Palestinians.

I hope I will be able to bring a clear answer to this question when I travel, tomorrow, to Baghdad to assay the whole matter with Mr. Arafat.

With all best wishes, I am

Yours in Christ



Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

Presently at the
Curia Generalizia S.J.
Borgo S. Spirito, 5
Tel. 656-9811



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

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August 27, 1986

Chairman Yasser Arafat
Palestine Liberation Organisation

Dear Chairman Arafat,

In the negotiations earlier this year in Amman, the Americans suggested a two-paragraph formula for handling Resolutions 242 and 338. The first paragraph would recognise them, without conditions. The second paragraph would set out Palestinian rights, as in the General Assembly resolutions, but this would be understood as position of the P.L.O., not condition. The purpose is to put the P.L.O.'s acceptance of 242 and 338 in the context of an affirmation of Palestinian rights, not the implicit renunciation that would be the effect if you simply recognised them with no reciprocal recognition from the Israelis and Americans.

I have visited both Israeli and American officials, and now have their reliable assurance that, if the P.L.O. will make such a recognition of 242 and 338 in that form, without condition but with a stated position, they guarantee to deliver reciprocal statements of recognition within one hour.

MK Aharon Harel, speaking with the authority of Prime Minister Shimon Peres, guaranteed to me that, within one hour of such a statement by the P.L.O., Peres would issue a statement:

- a) recognizing the national rights of the Palestinian people;
- b) recognizing the P.L.O. as their legitimate spokesman;
- c) inviting the P.L.O. to take part, within a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, in the full international conference, with the five permanent members of the Security Council and all the Arab parties. This

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Chairman Arufat, August 27, 1986 -- 2

does not mean representatives of the Palestinians who are not publicly P.L.O., but means yourself and your principal officers. There will be no further preconditions to the conference, but there are two further expectations of the Israelis to the mutual recognition:

1) that there be a moratorium on acts of force from the time of this mutual recognition.

2) that there be a reconciliation between King Hussein and the P.L.O.

The Americans who accompanied Vice President Bush on his visit to Israel (Mr. Wat Cluverius speaking officially in the presence of Mr. Richard Murphy and other State Department officials) promise that, if the P.L.O. makes the recognition statement, unconditionally, in the two-paragraph form that states a position on Palestinian rights, they will, within one hour, issue a statement that recognizes:

a) the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people, to be achieved through a confederation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as agreed in the Jordanian-Palestinian Accord of February 11, 1985;

b) the P.L.O. as the legitimate spokesman for the Palestinian people, to be included necessarily in any negotiations that arise from this mutual recognition.

The Americans also agree to meet in advance with representatives designated by the P.L.O. who are not themselves publicly identified P.L.O. members to discuss the exact wording of the American reciprocal statement and the place and time of its publication.

This American offer was conveyed not directly to me, but to Mr. Hanna Siniora, with the understanding that I would carry it to you.



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Chairman Arafat, August 27, 1986 -- 3

The Israelis also had an alternative idea, which was offered by Mr. Uri Savir speaking for Prime Minister Peres, not as a proposal but as a sounding. (Mr. Savir also spoke to Mr. Siniora rather than directly to me, with the understanding that I would bring this to you.)


It is for a pre-conference to the international conference, with U.S., U.S.S.R., Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian participation, under U.S./U.S.S.S. joint chairmanship. Prior recognition by the P.L.O. of 242 and 338 is not a precondition for this pre-conference. But the Palestinian representation would be by persons from the Occupied Territories, designated but not publicly members of the P.L.O. The others suggested were Richard Murphy for the Americans, Polyakov for the Russians, Kimche and Tamir for the Israelis, and non-Ministers for the Jordanians.

The purpose of the pre-conference would be to try to narrow the differences on such issues as 242, the territories, and self-determination, in order to lead up to the full international conference.

Personally, I have less confidence in this alternative proposal, as it seems to me that its purpose is eventually to create division between the P.L.O., and these designated representatives from the Occupied Territories.

It should be emphasized that both these Israeli suggestions are attainable only while Mr. Peres is still Prime Minister, before the October 7 rotation which will make Mr. Shamir Prime Minister. If the mutual recognition is then done, it is an accomplished fact.

It is my own hope that, with the reliable promise of reciprocal statements of recognition both from the Israelis and the Americans, you will find yourself able to make the recognition of 242 and 338, without condition but with a statement of position as suggested in the American two-paragraph proposal. If that comes to pass, I would suggest that you designate the Holy See as the recipient of the statements of mutual recognition.


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

90 (The lack of pp. 86-89 is merely an error of pagination. Nothing missing.)

١٩٨٦/٨/٢٧

السيد الرئيس ياسر عرفات

منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية

المفوضية الرئيس عرفات

في المناقشات التي جرت لوائح هذه السنة في عمان، اقترح الاميركيون صيغة من
تقرئينه لمعالجة مشكلة قرار ٢٤٤ و ٢٤٨. الفقرة الاولى تنص على الاعتراف بهذه القرارات دون اية شروط.
وتنطوي الفقرة الثانية على الحق الفلسطيني كما نصت على قرارات الجمعية العمومية بموجب الملتحق، على ان يُنضم
ان هذا هو موقف منظمة التحرير وليس شرطاً. والهدف هو ان يوضع قبول المنظمة لقراري ٢٤٤ و ٢٤٨ في إطار
تأكيد الحقوق الفلسطينية، لا التخلي عنها، كما قد يُفهم ذلك. لو انتم اعترفتم بهذه القرارات دون اعتراف قبيل
من قبل الاسرائيلية والاميركية.

لقد قابلت المسؤولين الاسرائيليين والاميركيين، وجميعهم لديهم تأكيد موثوق. وفي ان اعترفتم المنظمة بهذه
القراري ٢٤٤ و ٢٤٨ بهذه الصيغة دون شروط ولكن باعلان موقف ثابت، فهم يضمنون حدوث بيانات اعتراف قبيل
في ظرف ساعة من الزمان.

لقد كنت لي بعضا كنيست لهارون هايزل الناظر باسم رئيس الوزراء شيمون بيريز، انه في ظرف ساعة من حدوث بيان
المنظمة سيصدر بيريز بياناً يعلن فيه: (أ) الاعتراف بالحقوق الوطنية للشعب الفلسطيني. (ب) بان منظمة التحرير
الفلسطينية الناظر الشرعي باسم هذا الشعب. (ج) دعوة المنظمة رسمياً للاشتراك ضمن وفد اردني فلسطيني في المؤتمر
الدولي مع الاعضاء الخمسة للدول المائمه العربيين في مجلس الامن والاطراف العربية الاخرى. وهذا يعني انتم كنتم
التحري لوقت مستطعم تستبدونهم لتمثيلكم. ولست هناك شروط اخرى لاشتراك في هذا المؤتمر.
على ان هناك امرين تتوقعهما اسرائيل نتيجة الاعتراف المتبادل: (أ) ان يعبر وقت (مؤتمر يوم) لاجل العنف
دولة (توقيع الاتفاق ٢٠) ان تجري ومالهم بين الملوكيين والمنظمة.

والاميركيون الذين رافقوا نائب الرئيس بوش في زيارته لاسرائيل (السيد دوت كلافنديه تحدث بمحضر السيد
ريشارد مودني وغيره من راسمي وزارة الخارجية) وعدوا على انه في حاله حدوث بيان الاعتراف من قبل المنظمة
دون شروط، بل في صيغة الفقرة التي تنص على تأكيد موقف ثابت من الحقوق الفلسطينية، انهم في ظرف ساعة
سيصدرون بياناً يعلنون فيه الاعتراف بحق الشعب الفلسطيني في تقرير مصيره على اساس الاتحاد الكونفدرالي مع صوردنا
كما نصت عليه الوثائق الاميركية-الفلسطينية المتوقعة في ١١ شباط ١٩٨٥.

وقد وفق الاميركيون ايضا على ان يجتمعوا مع ممثلين قعسهم المنظمة (على ان لا يكونوا معروفين) معنا انهم ابناء
في المشاهدة) لمناقشة الصيغة الدقيقة المطلوبة للبيان الاميركي وتحديد الشائخ والمكان لنشره.

لقد اذاعوا الاميركيون لم يقدم الي باشره انما الى السيد هنا سنوره على ان افعل اننا الى سيادكم.
ان لدى الاسرائيليين فكرة بديلة اخرى تقدم بها ستر اوري ساثير المتحدث الرسمى باسم رئيس الوزراء
بيريز وهذه الذكرة ليست اقترافاً بل استكشاف وضع (تحدث بها ساثير الى السيد - زيوراد الى راي
على اننا ان افعل اننا الى سيادكم).
وهذا الاستكشاف اذاً يقدم على عقد مؤتمر ومؤتمر يسبق المؤتمر الدولي، تحضره وفود من الديانات للتحية

والاتحاد السوفياتي واسرائيل والفلسطينيون والاردن تحت رئاسة ايريكسم - سوفياتيه مشتركه ولا يطلب
فيها من المنظم الاعتراف المسبق بقرار ٢٤٤ و ٢٢٨ كشرط لظهور المؤتمر انما يقتصر التمثيل الفلسطيني
على شخصيات من الدوافي المحتلمه فيعتبر المنظم ولكن لا يكونون اعضاء رسميه في (و عن ايردا اقترح
السيد ريتشارد مورفي ومن الاتحاد السوفياتي السيد بولياكوف وكيمجي وتامير عن اسرائيل ومن الاردن شخصيات
دعاه مرتبه وزير .

والهدف من هذا المؤتمر المصغر هو محاوله تضييق الخلافات فيما يتعلق بقرار ٢٤٤، ومكلمه الدوافي
وحق تقرير للصير بغية تهيئه الجو الى المؤتمر الدولي التامل الشروط .

رانا شخصياً ضعيف الثقه بهذا الاقتراح البديل اذ يبدو لي ان الهدف منه خلق انقسام وخلاف بين
المنظم وهو وهذه الشخصيات المعينه من الدوافي المحتلمه .

وتجدر الاشارة الى ان هذه الاقتراحات يمكن تحقيقها فقط ما دام بيريز رئيساً للونداه وقبل حلول
الايام من تشرين الثاني حيث يخلفه شامير في رئاسة الوزراء . فان تم الاعتراف المتبادل قبل ذلكه بسجده
شامير نفسه امام العصر الواقع .

واني عظيم الامل بانتم مع العهد المؤتمم بصمود بيانات الاعتراف المتبادل من قبل الاسرائيليين والعبرانيين
تجدون نفسك قادرين على اعلان بيان الاعتراف بقرار ٢٤٤ و ٢٢٨ دون شروط ولكن متضمن اعلان موقف
ثابت كما جاء في الاقتراح الايريكسي .

فان تم هذا فانا اقترح ان تعينوا الكرسي الرسولي الملائم المناسب لاستلام بيانات الاعتراف المتبادل .

الرب يعززه جميعاً يسوع

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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

August 28, 1986

His Majesty
King Hussein

Your Majesty,

Thank you for so graciously receiving me, along with my Jesuit colleague Fr. Joseph Ryan of the Pontifical Mission for Palestine, on Wednesday evening, August 27. Your keen sense of the urgency of reaching peace for the region increases my own.

As I mentioned during the audience, there is a good deal of documentation which I had wished to leave with you, but as we were away from Fr. Ryan's house when we received the call to the Palace, I did not have it with me. I enclose it with this letter. Included are:

a) my letter of last November 28 to Mr. Arafat;

b) the report of my March meetings with him in Tunis. This report was brought, in the second week of March, by Cardinal Bernard Law of Boston, Cardinal John O'Connor of New York, and Archbishop Pio Laghi, the Pro-Nuntio of the Holy See to the United States, to Vice President Bush, and discussed with him at length. The two Cardinals, Law and O'Connor, went again to Washington in the third week of March, and had an hour's discussion of the matter with Mr. Donald Regan, President Reagan's White House Chief of Staff. Cardinal Law and I subsequently spent most of the 4th of July holiday with Vice President Bush, discussing the matter in much detail.

c) the report, in the form of a memo to Cardinal Law, of my own meetings in Washington with White House and State Department staff.

This much material went to all the concerned parties, namely Cardinals Law and O'Connor and Archbishop Laghi; all the Washington officials directly consulted; and Chairman Arafat and the representatives through whom I dealt with him. You will easily recognize how much the memo to Cardinal Law on my Washington meetings argues the case with all these recipients, and in particular how it argues for the American proposal (which you had yourself delivered to Mr. Arafat in Amman) to the P.L.O. I also submitted all this material to the Israelis, through the Consul General of Israel in Boston, Mr. Michael Shiloh. The next document in the series, then, (d) is the report on my visit to Israel, written in Rome while I was reporting to the Vatican Secretariate of State, and seen so far only by them.


An aspect of my entire effort, upon which we did not even touch during my audience with you, is a proposal I have been making all this year, that the Holy See use its good offices, in a systematic way, with all the parties to this conflict, in an effort to foster the possibilities of peace.

His Majesty, King Hussein, August 28, 1986 -- 2

This is still my own proposal only, not yet accepted by the Holy See, but I have Archbishop Laghi's strong encouragement to pursue this line, and seek the openings by which the Holy See might be put in a position to give concrete help. If, in fact, Mr. Arafat accepts, as I hope, my urging, already communicated to him, that he adopt the American formula proposed for the P.L.O.'s recognition of 242/338 in return for the reliable assurance of both Israelis and Americans that they will make reciprocal statements of recognition within one hour, then I will recommend to Mr. Arafat that he designate the Holy See as the depository where all these three documents of mutual recognition, P.L.O., American and Israeli, should be lodged.

My prayers for Your Majesty's good health, long rule, and the success of your courageous and tenacious efforts for peace and the well-being of your people. May God, the all-Merciful whom we both worship and to whom we seek, as our life's work, to be faithful, enfold you ever in His most special love.

Sincerely,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE HOLY SEE

Rome Italy

September 3, 1986

Rev. Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.
Jesuit Curia
Borgo S. Spirito, 5
Roma

Dear Father Helmick,

Attached is your copy of the Arabic translation of your letter. Unfortunately I could find no one who would be able to compare the original English text with the Arabic translation.

All the best on your important mission and I look forward to seeing you on your return to Rome.

With warm best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Peter K. Murphy'.

Peter K. Murphy
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

Encl: As Stated



September 14, 1986

REPORT TO ARCHBISHOP PIO LAGHI
ON A MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN YASSER ARAFAT
IN TUNIS, SEPTEMBER 9, 1986,
BY RAYMOND G. HELMICK, S.J.

The meeting took place the day after Chairman Arafat had returned to Tunis from the Harare Conference of the Non-Aligned States. He left plenty of time for it. We talked for three and a half hours, and broke off only when I indicated the importance of my catching a flight back to Rome that after-noon so that I could report our meeting to the Holy See. It was clear to Arafat that I was not acting for the Holy See or any of the others (Cardinal Law, Cardinal O'Connor and yourself) to whom I was reporting, but that I was myself proposing to all of these ways in which they might help the process of fostering peace negotiations.

The Chairman had already received my written report, dated August 3, on my visit to Israel, which it was evident he had studied in great detail. He had also with that report the more concise statement of the three messages that had been transmitted to me, from Israelis and Americans, in my letter to him of August 27, with the Arabic translation that had been prepared by Msgr. Ibrahim Ayyad. All this had been brought to him in Zimbabwe on August 28 from Amman.

The Chairman insisted that this be an entirely private meeting between him and me, with not even a translator present or anyone besides ourselves to take notes, and in other ways indicated the importance with which he took this meeting and how high the stakes were.

Mr. Arafat first wanted to impress upon me how unsatisfactory Resolution 242, by itself, was to the Palestinians. Not only did it make no mention of the Palestinians other than its affirmation (2b) of the necessity "for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem," but even this reference to "the refugee problem" was tainted by the subsequent agreement, of October 3, 1977, between U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, which interpreted the reference to "the refugee problem" in 242 as meaning all Arab and Jewish refugees for the entire Middle Eastern region. This agreement of Vance and Dayan had occurred just after the October 1, 1977, meeting of Vance and Gromyko, from which had come a joint statement convening the Geneva Conference under US/USSR joint chairmanship. Dayan described his October 3 meeting with Vance as his "six-hour battle," and it was followed on October 4 by a Carter address to the UN General Assembly that withdrew from the US/USSR joint statement of October 1. The substance of the Vance-Dayan agreement of October 3, 1977, was to establish an equivalence of the Arab refugees, not even described as Palestinian, and the Jewish emigrants to Israel from all Arab countries, an "exchange of populations," so that the specific Palestinian refugee problem, as a distinct concern, was simply wiped off the books. It should not be imagined, Arafat believed, that this was the actual intention of the Security Council when it passed, on November 22, 1967, Resolution 242. But this Vance-Dayan interpretation was now the official policy of the U.S. and Israel. What was to prevent, then, even if Arafat and the P.L.O. got to an actual international conference on the basis of 242/338 alone, that the U.S. and Israel would not say: "Why are you here? Since you have accepted 242, which we

Archbishop Pio Laghi, Sept. 14, '86 -- 2

interpret so, everything is already settled, and the status quo is now established as the final solution."

Nevertheless, Arafat had determined that 242 and 338 are a part of what he calls "international legality," the lawful determinations of the international community which have the force of international law, and as such he accepts them without qualification or condition. Many had argued, he said, particularly Iran, Libya and dissident Palestinian factions, that he could not or should not recognize 242 and 338, but nothing could prevent him from recognizing them as a part of this international legality. Consequently, he said, he had infact already formally and definitively accepted 242 and 338, by name, in his address to the Harare Conference on September 5, 1986.

That address, he affirmed, was misinterpreted if it was taken, as it had been in much of the press, as only a conditioned acceptance of 242 and 338, the condition being the international conference he had called for in the same address.

I represented to him, at this point, that other Palestinians, even members of his staff with whom I had spoken during the days I waited for him in Tunis, had argued to me that the September 5 address was not an unconditional acceptance of 242/338, and that they had referred to a statement by Mr. Farouk Kaddoumi in Harare denying that the recognition was unconditioned. They were mistaken, said Arafat. The Arabic full text of his address, which is authoritative, would show that there is no condition attached to his acceptance of 242 and 338. That and the other items he spoke of in his Harare address, such as his call for the international conference and his recognition of the other resolutions of the UN and Security Council, were distinct and not conditioned upon one another.

It was not, he said, a condition imposed on him if he was asked to recognize all the solemn resolutions of the UN as constituting international legality on this question. That they do so is a fact of international law. But to demand that he affirm these two resolutions and not others is a precondition. Nevertheless, he had done so, without qualification of his acceptance or conditioning it on any other factor, because in themselves they are a part of this international legality.

I pointed out to him, as reason for the special emphasis on 242, that for the Israelis 242 has special even symbolic importance, because in their eyes it constitutes the international community's acceptance of their legitimacy as a State. He accepted this, and said that it was not the intention of the P.L.O. to take away from the Israelis their State, and that this was an element in his explicit acceptance of 242 and 338. Nevertheless, he said, the Israelis were mistaken to see only in 242 the international community's acceptance of their legitimacy as a State. The true basis was Resolution 181 of the General Assembly on November 29, 1947, by which the UN had provided for the establishment of the State of Israel and also of an Arab State of Palestine, a resolution of which only one part has been fulfilled.

The Ceaucescu Agreement.

With regard to his Harare address, Chairman Arafat told me in confidence that he had acted on an agreement made during his recent visit to Romania with President Ceaucescu. President Ceaucescu had previously conferred with the Israeli government and had their promise of a reciprocal action if Arafat would make a public statement containing five points:

- 1) acceptance of an international conference, with the five permanent members of the Security Council and all the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict (so designated, with the mention of Israel, and not designated as "the Middle East conflict" or some similar phrase that failed to mention Israel by name), to negotiate a comprehensive settlement.
- 2) acceptance of a preparatory conference along the lines proposed by French President Mitterand and Soviet First Secretary Gorbachev.
- 3) acceptance of open dialogue and discussion between all the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflicts.
- 4) acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 by name.
- 5) acceptance of international guarantees for all parties.

Arafat had chosen to use his address at the Harare Conference for this purpose. He stressed the seriousness of the commitment this choice of Harare represented, in so important a forum; with the express opposition there of the Iranians, Syrians and Libyans, his address coming after the speeches of President Khadafy.

He did not tell me the content of the Israeli promises to President Ceaucescu of reciprocal action if he fulfilled his agreement with Ceaucescu. We discussed at length the initial Israeli responses to his address. He intended, he said, on that same afternoon, after we had concluded our meeting, to contact President Ceaucescu and inquire about the fulfillment of the Israeli commitment. He stressed, also, the confidentiality of this information about his agreement with President Ceaucescu, as it had not yet been given even to his closest lieutenants in the P.L.O., but he agreed that I should report it in full to the Holy See and the U.S. government, as quickly as possible. (I have in fact reported it to Mr. Peter Murphy of the U.S. Embassy to the Holy See, agreeing to report if further to government officials in Washington, and have also reported it to Msgr. Jean-Louis Tauran in the Vatican's Secretariate of State, informing him that a full written report would be submitted, for the Holy See, to yourself, Archbishop Laghi, in Washington.)

American and Israeli Proposals.

Because the Ceaucescu initiative and the Harare address have to be allowed time to play themselves out, Chairman Arafat felt he needed an additional ten days before he could take up, separately, the matters that had been communicated to me by Israel and Americans. In view of this fact, I agreed to return to Tunis to see him again after that time.

Archbishop Pio Laghi, Sept. 14, '86 -- 4

Arafat was therefore not in a position to give a formal answer as yet to the question whether, in the light of the offers of reciprocal statements from Israelis and Americans, he would make the type of statement I was seeking. I spelled out carefully for him again the content of the statement sought, and eventually wrote down on a sheet of paper that I left with him the three elements it would properly contain. First were the two paragraphs of the proposed statement that had been suggested by the American delegation at the Amman talks early in the year, and presented to him by King Hussein:

- 1) a recognition and acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338, without conditions attached;
- 2) a paragraph that would state the position of the P.L.O. on the rights of the Palestinians;
- 3) a renunciation of the use of force, in any event for the duration of the peace effort.

I reminded him of what King Hussein had said when, in my meeting with him, I had referred to the American proposal, as had been my habit since I heard of it at the State Department late in March, as "the two-paragraph formula." King Hussein had at once interjected: "Remember; there are three items," referring to the requirement that there be a statement on the use of force.

The two-paragraph formula itself, Arafat assures me, is no longer a difficulty for him, as his acceptance of 242 and 338 is without conditions, seen as part and parcel of his acceptance of international legality. By the same token he sees all the other resolutions of the UN as equally part and parcel of international legality, and that accounts for the second paragraph of the two-paragraph formula, but the two assertions are not conditioned one on the other. Both are the position of the P.L.O.

The third item, cessation of force, is still very much of a problem. Arafat reaffirmed his absolute stand against terrorism, i.e., by definition, acts against civilians and all other acts unlawful in war, as he had affirmed it last year in his Cairo Declaration, and his limitation, as in that declaration, of any acts of armed resistance to military occupation to the actual occupied territories. He expanded at great length on his rejection of the two recent acts of terrorism: the Karachi hijacking (he was glad the hijackers were caught) and the Istanbul synagogue attack (a "horrible crime," and "outrage," "totally contrary to everything the P.L.O. stands for"), and saw both these acts, and other terrorist attacks since his Cairo Declaration, as fundamentally sabotage against the peace effort he and the P.L.O. have been mounting over all this time. He mentioned also Israeli attacks, which have been insistently extended outside Israel since his Cairo Declaration, in order, as he sees it, to provoke him to repudiate the Cairo Declaration. In this context he mentioned the destruction of the two P.L.O. boats in a Sicilian repair yard, which he had described to me when I saw him in March, and the subsequent Israeli destruction of two further P.L.O. boats in Algeria. To go beyond the Cairo Declaration's terms, however, to a general cessation of violence, even in the form of a moratorium for the duration of the peace effort, was something for which he was not authorized by the full leadership of the P.L.O.

We had much discussion of this matter. I reminded him of our conversations in March of this year, when I had strongly urged the moratorium, and how he had argued then that he had too few "pressure tools" or "cards" with which to go into negotiation, and could not afford, in responsibility to the Palestinian people, whom he represented, to play them carelessly. I accepted this, and pointed out to him that as of now he has two main cards: the acceptance of 242/338, which in fact he had just already played in his Harare address, and this matter of armed resistance. While it was true that he had to make a responsible judgment of when to play them for what result, it was equally true that if he hoarded his cards for a situation that would never arise, if in fact he saved up this card of the armed resistance for an international conference when instead his failure to play it beforehand would prevent the conference from ever taking place, then he would have wasted the card. With this analysis he explicitly agreed. I urged him to count his cards. While, in his present situation, he has only these weak cards in his hands, it remains that if he can once accomplish his aim of achieving mutual recognition with Israel and the U.S., and comes to an international conference in which the body of the international community will be adequately represented, then all the other UN resolutions will be cards in his hands.

I made a suggestion for handling the cessation of violence as third item in a P.L.O. statement: that in the context of his statement of P.L.O. positions accepting 242/338 (paragraph one) and also the rest of the UN and Security Council resolutions (paragraph two), he issue an invitation to the Israelis for a mutual cessation of violence for the duration of the peace effort. We discussed the many clear advantages of his doing this, and he agreed to consult the rest of the leadership of the P.L.O. on the question before the time we had agreed for our next meeting (i.e., after the ten days he needed to let the Ceausescu/Harare initiative play itself out). But even when I handed him the sheet of paper on which I had written down the three items that would be looked for in a statement from him (the two paragraphs plus the statement on use of force), he pointedly said that this last item is not yet even under discussion. He pointed out, as he had in our March meetings, that such a condition had not been imposed on the Algerians, the Vietnamese and others at the time they entered into negotiations with their adversaries, so that this was the imposition of novel conditions on the Palestinians. I pointed out the difference in their situation: those others had, at the time of the negotiations, real military prospects of gain from the continuation of military operations, whereas the P.L.O. have, at present, none.

Possibility of a Role for the Holy See in this Process.

I was at pains, with Arafat as with everyone else I spoke with, to point out that I was in no way speaking for the Holy See or for any of the others I would report to in the American Catholic Church, that the Holy See itself was making no proposals, that my proposal (already written in my letter to him of August 27) that the Holy See be considered as the depository where the three documents (P.L.O., Israeli and American) of mutual recognition could be lodged, was still only a proposal of mine to the Holy See, not anything the Holy See had yet accepted. I described to him the nervousness I had perceived in the reception of this idea at the Secretariate of State, especially the statement made to me that my proposal was a hypothetical question only until such time as the three statements should actually be offered, and that the

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Holy See would be interested in responding, one way or the other, only if it should become a practical question. I did know, I told him, a hypothetical question when I asked one, but had been anxious that, if the question should become practical, it would not then come as an unexpected surprise to the Holy See. I had also been forewarned to expect such nervousness at the Holy See if at any time the more general proposition I had made earlier in the year, namely that the Holy See be prepared to use its good offices with all parties to the conflict, should take practical form, and told to expect, in that case, that the eventual decision, for or against, would then be taken in all serenity by the Pope. I pointed out also that my suggestion of using the good offices of the Holy See in this way was extraneous to the content of the proposals communicated to me by Israelis and Americans, no intrinsic part of either of them.

For Arafat, the prospect of the Holy See acting as the clearing house for these three statements had an appeal that went to the essence of the possibility of the statements being made. It was clear to him that both Aharon Harel and the Americans (Mr. Wat Cluverius speaking in the presence of Mr. Richard Murphy and other State Department officials) who had spoken to Mr. Hanna Siniora had specified the one hour difference in time after the publication of a P.L.O. statement before their reciprocal statements would be issued, because they feared Arafat would avoid issuing his statement if all three were expected to be issued simultaneously. Arafat, of course, has the same problem. He cited instances in which he feels the Israelis have refused to honor commitments fairly made, and added that if they failed now to honor the commitment made to President Ceausescu to make a reciprocal action after his Harare address he would have all the less reason to trust them. In the case of the Americans, he cited again two of the three instances he had mentioned to me in March of failure to honor commitments: the commitment to safeguard the civilian residents of the Palestinian camps in Beirut, on the basis of which he had agreed to the P.L.O. military evacuation of Beirut in 1982, and the signed promise of a "political dividend" in return for his cooperation in that same evacuation that he had from Mr. Philip Habib. He was most anxious to call Mr. Habib as witness that he and the P.L.O. have in fact honored scrupulously every commitment they have made to the U.S.

The Holy See's acting as a clearing-house for the three statements, or even for two statements (P.L.O. and American) if it should prove that the Israeli offer could not be relied upon, would be the critical factor that could make it possible for Arafat and the P.L.O. to act in the way proposed. He had complete trust, Arafat said, in the actions of the Holy See. If the three statements, in strictest confidence and secrecy, were in the hands of the Holy See, then all the parties could be fully assured that there were no tricks, and that no one was being deceived; that he himself, in particular, was not about to be left naked after submitting his statement and finding that the American and Israeli commitments would not be honored. This would make it, he said, a "package deal," and for that he would be fully prepared.

Other Matters.

Arafat wanted the Americans to know that he had, apart from his major address, played a significant role at the Harare Conference. The proposal had been made there that the next full biennial conference of the Non-Aligned Nations be held in North Korea, and there was a stampeding movement organized and much

intimidation used to force this decision. Mr. Mugabe had enlisted Arafat's help to head off this development when he realized that thirty national delegations (out of 108) were already committed to the proposal. Arafat himself believed this was a destructive proposal, as it would mean that the Non-Aligned bloc was not truly non-aligned. He had cooperated with President Mugabe and the presidents of Zambia and Tanzania in defeating the proposal, and Arafat himself had brokered a compromise by which an interim meeting on North-South economic questions will be held in Pyongyang, and the next full meeting in two years will take place in Cyprus. Arafat had also produced this alternative site for the meeting. Intimidation was being used to prevent any other state than North Korea from offering to host the conference. But no one suspected that Cyprus would offer, because everyone knew Cyprus could not afford the costs of such a conference. Arafat had procured President Kyprianou's agreement, and persuaded some Arab states to guarantee him the funding to finance it.

On the subject of King Hussein's rejection, early in the year, of the three P.L.O. proposals offered at that time, Arafat had a surprising opinion. He had followed closely the proceedings of Congressman Lee Hamilton's Foreign Affairs committee, where Mr. Richard Murphy had testified that the proposals had only come to him from King Hussein as already dead, rejected by King Hussein. Arafat was convinced by now that it was King Hussein, and not the Americans, who had rejected them. His belief was that President Assad of Syria had assured King Hussein that he would accept the situation if King Hussein were to break with the P.L.O. and go into negotiations with Israel accompanied only by West Bank Palestinians who would go along with him, and that Assad would keep the Palestinian extremists in Damascus in line if that happened. This proposition of President Assad's, Arafat believed, was on the instigation of Americans. It was moreover, he believed, altogether cynical on the part of President Assad, who had no intention of fulfilling it, and in fact understood quite well that the occasion would not arise, as there would be no West Bank Palestinians of real standing who would go along with such a proposition. King Hussein himself, Arafat thought, had made a grave miscalculation, as it indeed proved to be the case that the West Bankers refused to accept his break with the P.L.O., and continued to recognize it as their legitimate leadership. Arafat was quite ready for a reconciliation with King Hussein, in fact very much desired it. But he did not wish again to get into the situation, as in January and February, where all communication, in either direction, between him and the Americans had to go exclusively through Jordanian channels, where Jordanian officials, as he thought, had been able to manipulate both the King and him.

It is difficult to assess this opinion of Arafat's on the reason for the break. One possibility is that it illustrates the bad effect of the lack of direct and official communication, which fosters conspiracy theory. There were other instances of this lack of communication. For instance, when Arafat cited the testimony of Mr. Richard Murphy before the Lee Hamilton committee, I told him something I had been told at the State Department early in July: that even if the three Amman proposals had been accepted by King Hussein, they would have been rejected by the Americans because of the three steps appended to each of them. This Arafat had not heard "officially," he told me. The hunger for official and open communication was clear. He cited also statements in the last year in which President Reagan, Vice-President Bush and Secretary of State George Schultz had each demanded his recognition of 242/338 as condition for speaking with him, and believed none had specified that his acceptance of 242 had to be without condition. This seemed to be a misperception of the American official position, attributable to the lack of open and official communication.

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As we closed our meeting, I mentioned to Mr. Arafat that an effort he had made ever since becoming Chairman in 1969, to develop a political negotiation approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict, had now reached a critical stage, in which it was make or break within a very short time. I commended to him the examples of two holy men, both soldiers like himself, who in their time had been, like him, the hope of the Arabs and of the Islamic people: Nur-ed-Din before Damascus, and Salah-ed-Din before Aleppo. Arafat understood the reference at once, and supplied the explanation: "They showed how to treat an enemy as not an enemy, and so win from him the peace."



September 15, 1986

MEMO: TO ARCHBISHOP PIO LAGHI
FROM RAYMOND G. HELMICK, S.J.,
ASSESSING OUTCOME OF MIDDLE EAST AND ROMAN VISITS
OF JULY 8 - SEPTEMBER 12, 1986.

After my meetings, in March of this year, with Chairman Arafat in Tunis, the most important result was a new understanding, confirmed by Arafat and several members of his Executive Council, of the P.L.O.'s attitudes and intentions toward the State of Israel. This and other results of those meetings were thoroughly discussed here in the United States, made known to the Holy See, and the results of that discussion fed back to the P.L.O. I had also communicated all the material to the Israeli government, through Mr. Michael Shiloh, Consul General here in Boston, and undertook this summer's journey to sound out Israeli, Jordanian and, I had hoped, Syrian response to those developments (in fact, I never got to Syria), report that to the Holy See, and see Arafat again with these results.

My estimate then was that Arafat's March account of the attitude of Palestinians toward Israel should be reassuring to the Israelis, whose understanding of the Palestinians is so colored by anxieties, but that besides that better understanding an explicit P.L.O. acceptance of 242 and 338 would be required as well before the obstacle to negotiation could be broken. I was prepared to argue to Arafat the two-paragraph proposal which the Americans had suggested during the Amman meetings early in the year, understanding that it would solve the dilemma by which any acknowledgment of 242 by him or the P.L.O. would otherwise be an implicit but real renunciation of Palestinian rights.

I knew that, even with the two-paragraph formula, the question would remain why Arafat should do this, what the Palestinians would get for it. The Israeli and American communications to me while I was in Jerusalem answered that question, and were quite unexpected by me. Both Israel and the U.S. would make reciprocal statements of recognition within one hour of such a P.L.O. statement. The Israelis added a separate proposal (to be sounded rather than offered), of a preparatory conference to which non-P.L.O. figures designated by the P.L.O. would be invited without meeting the preconditions.

The primary questions here were to assess the trustworthiness of the proposals. I waited two extra weeks in Israel to have Prime Minister Peres' own confirmation of what I was told by MK Aharon Harel. Everything was kept carefully in place by the Israelis regarding what Harel had told me, while Peres carefully avoided involving himself directly in the offer. I could only conclude that, if Arafat and the P.L.O. were willing, I should at once contact Aharon Harel for assurance that the reciprocal action would follow. On the American side, I had more confidence in the proposal. It had been given to me indirectly, through Hanna Siniora, editor of Al Fajr, but Mr. Siniora is a most considerable personage, with whom Peres meets frequently as his best contact with P.L.O. and Palestinian thinking. I took the precaution of communicating everything, each time I was in Rome, to Mr. Peter Murphy at the American Embassy to the Holy See, and checked that he was reporting it all back to the State

Archbishop Laghi, Sept. 15, '86 -- 2

Department, so that I should get immediately any breath of contradiction from Washington.

Further checking on the reliability of offers from each source is needed, and goes beyond my personal resources by this time. From the Israeli side it can only come confidentially from Mr. Peres, as it would encounter sabotage from opposing Israeli factions if it went through the Foreign Ministry. Aharon Harel remains the right contact if I were to check this myself, and if I had already gotten an answer from Arafat while there was still time for me to return to Israel I would have gone directly to him in person, but that has gotten beyond my managing now. For the Americans, Mr. Cluverius, who spoke to Mr. Siniora in Jerusalem (in the presence of Mr. Richard Murphy and others), should be my first contact, unless the State Department wishes to handle it otherwise. Mr. Peter Murphy in Rome cabled Cluverius, but reported to me that I should make the contact first through Mr. William Kirby at the State Department, whom I already know well. Cardinal Law feels I should make any U.S. contacts through you, and that makes sense to me, unless of course you felt that would involve the Holy See to an extent it does not wish to be involved.

Since I have agreed to meet Arafat again next week (I told him I would get to Tunis on Wednesday, September 24), my time for doing this is rigorously limited. With my teaching commitments here in Boston, I have Wednesday (Sept. 17) and Friday (Sept. 19) of this week to be in Washington, and need to be back in Boston to teach on the Thursday. Since I have missed visiting Syria on this trip, it seems important to me that I visit the Syrian Embassy while I am in Washington and fill them in, so that there will be no feeling of my having gone behind their backs.

The suggestion I have made that the Holy See agree to receive the statements by the P.L.O., the Israelis and the U.S., if they are forthcoming, is extraneous to the proposals for mutual recognition themselves. It is however one of the most attractive elements for Arafat, who would otherwise be hard pressed to know if he could trust the American and Israeli assurances that a response would come within one hour of his statement.


I pick up the nervousness at the Holy See in several ways. There was Msgr. Gatti's statement that my proposal is a hypothetical question. There were the inquiries by Archbishop Silvestrini to Cardinal Law and Mr. Peter Murphy, and I expect to yourself as well, and his avoidance of any meeting with me. I had asked Mr. Peter Murphy his opinion whether it was better that I see people at the Holy See after my meeting with Arafat last week, or wait to report only through yourself. Peter Murphy thought at first that it would be better to report through you, but told me that Msgr. Tauran had asked him whether I was back in Rome yet. So it seemed best to give him a short oral briefing and chance to ask questions, and tell him the formal written report would be made to you. When I saw him, Msgr. Tauran told me the Holy See was upset, didn't like to get involved, never acted precipitately, etc. As everything was negative, I asked him directly whether I was hearing a definitive negative response, and he said no, I should not take it that anything has been refused.

Msgr. Gatti had told Peter Murphy that he wished all this could be done by an official Vatican diplomat, but understood that it could not be. I went over that with Msgr. Tauran and he agreed it was so. For the next meeting with Arafat, though, I offered, through Msgr. Tauran, to handle it in any of three ways. 1) I could go myself, as previously agreed with Arafat. 2) Someone from the Holy See could go in my place, if that were the wish of the Holy See. Or 3) I would be glad to accompany someone from the Holy See. I realize, of course, that the Holy See might prefer not to be involved at all.

If the Holy See were to let itself be involved in the actual exchange of these still highly hypothetical recognition statements, it could be in either of two ways (as I also explained to Msgr. Tauran): as the public way in which the announcement of the statements was made, or quite confidentially and secretly as the clearing house in which each of the statements was seen in advance and all parties assured that there were no tricks.

I hope I may see you in Washington as quickly as all these developments call for. With all best wishes,

in Christ,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

SHORT FORM REPORT (September 19, 1986)

Middle East Visit by Raymond G. Helmick, S.J., July 8 - September 12, 1986

The purpose of the visit was to discuss with leaders in Israel, Jordan and Syria the results of my March, '86, meetings with Chairman Yasser Arafat, and the account given by him and his colleagues of the actual intentions of the P.L.O. and the Palestinian people toward the State of Israel and the negotiation of a peace settlement. My intention was, after these meetings, to report to the Holy See in Rome, and then in a further meeting with Chairman Arafat, to argue with him the advantages of the two-paragraph proposal he had received, through King Hussein, from the State Department last January-February, to which he had not yet replied.

I had communicated all the written material on the March visit to the Israelis through the Consul-General of Israel in Boston, Mr. Michael Shiloh, and requested, through him, meetings with Prime Minister Shimon Peres, Foreign Minister Yitzakh Shamir and Defense Minister Yitzakh Rabin. These documents all went through the Foreign Ministry, and I was informed that none of the principal figures had time to see me, and referred to Mrs. Yael Vered, religious affairs consultant to the Foreign Minister, and her assistant, Mr. Zvi Ne'eman, for a lecture on the undependability of anything the Palestinians had told me. It was clear that the documentation I had sent had received close attention, and as I subsequently learned was known fully to Mr. Peres and his close counsellors, but I seemed to have reached a full block on my efforts to speak with anyone who had decision-making power.

That impasse was quickly reversed, however, when Mr. Hanna Siniora, Palestinian editor of the daily newspaper Al-Fajr and the person through whom Mr. Peres and Mr. Arafat regularly maintain as much contact as either is able to have, contacted Mr. Uri Savir, who under the title of Media Consultant to the Prime Minister is an immediate adviser to Mr. Peres. Mr. Savir, while saying that the times were very busy, gave strong encouragement to believe I would see Mr. Peres after all.

While waiting for that meeting, I prepared a detailed article on my meetings with Arafat for the Israeli monthly New Outlook (I expect to see it in the September issue), and met members of the Knesset from several parties. A meeting with Labor MK Aharon Harel, leader of the Labor Party's peace wing and a close confidant of the Prime Minister, produced the first of three surprise requests that I convey information to Chairman Arafat.

Mr. Harel told me, on the authority of Mr. Peres, that if the P.L.O. would give unconditional recognition to Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, combining this with a cessation of armed actions and effecting a reconciliation with King Hussein, the Israeli government would, within an hour, issue a statement which would:

- 1) recognize the national rights of the Palestinian people (Harel referred to Peres' April '86 speech in which he had already spoken of the Palestinians as "a nation;")

2) recognize the P.L.O. as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people; and

3) invite the P.L.O. (i.e., Arafat himself and his top leadership) to an international conference, as part of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

Mr. Harel assured me of Mr. Peres' genuine desire to enter negotiations on this basis, describing him as a "dove" in the Israeli camp, and said he would report on our conversation to Peres and recommend strongly that Peres see me himself. As I heard subsequently from independent sources, he did these things.

I waited a long time, two weeks beyond my schedule, to meet Mr. Peres and have him personally confirm what Mr. Harel had told me. That meeting was held up first by Peres' Morocco visit and then by the visit to Israel of Vice President Bush. Eventually Mr. Uri Savir saw me and discussed at length all I had heard from Arafat and proposed myself. He said there was no problem of lack of time, that the Prime Minister was precisely aware of all I was doing and knew its importance, but might not want to see me himself for the purpose he knew I had in seeking the meeting, to get his personal confirmation of what Mr. Harel had told me.

Eventually the message came back from Savir, through the mediation of Mr. Hanna Siniora (who had first contacted him about me), that the Prime Minister would be glad to see me if I brought back something concrete from Chairman Arafat or King Hussein, but in the meantime "did not want to encourage" me in what I was doing. As I understood that message, it does not say that Peres would not be glad of my success, only that he does not wish at this time to have a direct personal involvement in the effort.

However, Savir added (still through Mr. Siniora, with the understanding that I would carry the message) a further message from Mr. Peres, which was not to be "offered" but only "sounded." It was for a pre-conference to the international conference, with Americans (Richard Murphy), Russians (Polyakov), Israelis (Kimche, Zamir), Palestinians (West Bank figures designated by the P.L.O. but not publicly identified as P.L.O.) and Jordanians (at a level below Ministers), under joint U.S./USSR chairmanship. Prior recognition of 242/338 would not be required as a condition of this pre-conference. It was intended to narrow the differences over 242, the territories, self-determination and such other major topics.

This was the second of the three surprise requests that I convey information to Chairman Arafat. The third was from Americans, and also came through the mediation of Mr. Siniora.

As the Bush visit approached, I had been aware of the intense Palestinian resistance to attending any meeting with him, and had urged on the West Bank leaders that it would be a great mistake not to go. (When I later related this to Arafat, he told me he had heard of my urgings, and had himself telephoned instructions an hour before the meeting to Elias Freij, Mayor of Bethlehem, that he and other Palestinian leaders should attend.) After that meeting, Mr. Siniora told me, he had a conversation with a circle of State Department officials, of which Mr. Richard Murphy was a member, though the talking was done by Mr. Wat Cluverius. Cluverius asked that the offer be conveyed to Mr. Arafat (understanding that it would be done by me) that, if he issued a statement accepting 242 and 338

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unconditionally (the two-paragraph statement recommended by the Americans early in the year), the U.S. would issue a reciprocal statement within one hour, in which they would:

- 1) "favor" the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people through a confederation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan;
- 2) recognize the P.L.O. as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, to be included in any negotiations that would develop.

This American proposal made no mention of an international conference. It did include an offer that American officials would meet in advance, not with P.L.O. officials but with others designated by the P.L.O., to discuss the wording of the American reciprocal statement and the time, place and circumstances of its publication.

The one hour difference demanded by both Israelis and Americans between the publication of the P.L.O. statement and their own was explained, in both cases, as a matter of distrust, a fear that, if the statements were expected at the same time, Arafat would not deliver.

Before going to see Chairman Arafat with these three unexpected messages, I went to Rome to report to the Holy See. (The time for my planned visits to Jordan and Syria had passed by now, and I had been recommended by Archbishop Laghi to get to Archbishop Silvestrini in good time before he left for his vacation on August 5. I arrived in Rome in the early morning hours of August 1, and was at the Holy See that morning.) I made my report to Msgr. Luigi Gatti, sent him then a full written report that I wrote while in Rome, and included a specific inquiry of the Holy See. I had been suggesting since January that the Holy See somehow make its good offices available to all parties to the conflict. Now I saw a concrete act that the Holy See could do. If these three statements, P.L.O., Israeli and American, were in fact forthcoming, my question was whether the Holy See would act as the place where they should be lodged. Archbishop Silvestrini never saw me about this, before or after his vacation. Msgr. Gatti gave me his answer, that my question was hypothetical, and that the Holy See would be interested in giving an answer when the question became a practical one.

There were other signs that various persons at the Holy See were very nervous about this proposition, including inquiries to Cardinal Law and to Mr. Peter Murphy of the U.S. Embassy to the Holy See. I felt reassured, in any case, that I had made the proposition, hypothetical as it was, known in good time to the Holy See, so that if it did become practical it would not come as a surprise. It should be noted, of course, that my suggestion of such an action by the Holy See is quite extraneous to the three messages I was carrying, or to what still remained my own primary message to Arafat, to urge upon him the recognition of 242/338 in the format of the two-paragraph statement.

I had also gone to Mr. Peter Murphy as soon as I got to Rome, reported everything about my visit to Israel to him, giving him the written report, and checked that he reported all this on to Washington so that I should get any breath of contradiction immediately. Mr. Murphy was always most helpful, and I saw him again on each of my two later stops in Rome, preferring to work through him rather than go to American Embassies in the other countries I visited.

Getting to see Chairman Arafat was delayed while I made, on his request, a fruitless visit to Baghdad, arriving after he had left, and had to wait while he visited Romania and a number of African countries, and eventually played his part in the Harare conference of the Non-Aligned Nations. I did in the meantime see King Hussein in Jordan, gave him all this information, and had from him strong encouragement to persist in this endeavor and wishes for its success. He was, however, very careful never to give me a statement that I could take as any sort of friendly message to Arafat. He did assent when I repeated to him what I had said to the Israelis, my reasons for believing there is no substitute representation of the Palestinians other than the P.L.O. When I spoke, as has been my habit since I first heard of it at the State Department in late March, of "the two-paragraph formula," the King at once interjected that I should remember that there were three elements: the third being the cessation of the use of force. Because it took two weeks before I saw King Hussein (I had arrived in Jordan just at the beginning of the major Muslim feast concluding the month of the Pilgrimage), I had finally to recognize that there was no longer time to make my planned visit to Syria, to my great regret.

I saw Arafat in Tunis on September 9, after a further stay in Rome. He had had the written report of my Israeli visit, brought to him from Amman on August 28 as he was arriving in Harare, and with it a more concise statement of the three proposals, the latter accompanied by an exact translation by Msgr. Ibrahim Ayyad. Arafat was precisely familiar with both documents, recognized them as important, and chose that our conversation, of three and a half hours, should be entirely in private, without even a translator or anyone other than ourselves to take notes.

When, in his Harare address, he told me, he explicitly recognized Resolutions 242 and 338 by name, he made no qualification or attached no condition to them at all. The press was mistaken to interpret his speech as though he had conditioned his acceptance of 242/338 on the international conference. He appealed to the Arabic text, and gave me both that and an English translation. Resolutions 242 and 338, he says, are a part of international legality, as are also the other resolutions of the UN and Security Council. His acceptance of them and of the other resolutions is not conditioned the one on the other. Both acceptance of 242/338 and acceptance of the other resolutions are the position of the P.L.O. This, in essence, is the basis of the two-paragraph formula.

He had taken this position, Arafat said, despite his grave suspicion that the Israelis and Americans would interpret 242 as agreed by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan on October 3, 1977. Taking the reference to "the refugee problem" in 242 as meaning "all Arab and Jewish refugees" in the entire Middle Eastern region, Vance and Dayan had set up an equivalence of the Arab (not even Palestinian) refugees and the Jewish immigrants to Israel from all Arab countries, making it an "exchange of populations" and so wiping the problem of the Palestinians, even as refugees, off the books. If an international conference were held only on the basis of 242, he said, even with the P.L.O. present, what would prevent the Americans and Israelis from asking: "Why are you here? You have accepted 242, which we interpret so, and the entire matter is thus already settled, the status quo established as the ultimate solution."

Chairman Arafat was intensely interested in the Israeli and American offers of reciprocal statements if he made such a statement as suggested. Before he could take this up, however, he first had to let another initiative, already taken, play itself out.

This was the really confidential information because of which he kept our meeting private between ourselves, as he had not yet told this even to his closest lieutenants. When he visited Romania in August, Arafat agreed with President Ceaucescu to make a five-point public statement, in return for which the Israeli government had promised Ceaucescu that they would take some reciprocal action, what I was not told. The five points were:

- 1) acceptance of an international conference, with all the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict (naming it so, and not "the Middle Eastern conflict" or some other phrase that would omit mention of Israel);
- 2) acceptance of the preparatory conference (as proposed by President Mitterand and Soviet First Secretary Gorbachev);
- 3) acceptance of open dialogue and discussion among all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict;
- 4) recognition of 242 and 338 by name; and
- 5) international guarantees for all parties.

Arafat had chosen his Harare address as the occasion for fulfilling this agreement with Ceaucescu. Later in the afternoon after our meeting he intended to contact Ceaucescu to ask about the fulfillment of the Israeli commitment to a reciprocal action. He needed ten days to let this Ceaucescu/Harare initiative run its course before he could take up the different initiatives of which I had informed him. For this reason I agreed to return to Tunis to see him again after that time.

While the two-paragraph formula -- unconditional P.L.O. acceptance of 242-338 in one paragraph and a P.L.O. position equally recognizing all other UN resolutions as a part of international legality in a second paragraph -- is no longer a problem after Arafat's definitive acceptance of that position at Harare, the other condition -- a cessation of all use of force -- is still very much a problem. Arafat tells me he is not presently authorized to offer that. He reaffirmed his total rejection of terrorism and his limitation of any acts of armed resistance to the military occupation to the actual occupied territories, as in his Cairo Declaration of last year. I suggested, as a formula for handling a declaration that would go beyond Cairo, that in the context of the two-paragraph formula Arafat should issue an invitation to the Israelis to join in a mutual cessation of all violence. Arafat promised he would consult his executive on this formula before I make my return visit to him (suggested date, September 24, next Wednesday), but when I handed him a piece of paper on which I had written down the three points looked for in a statement from him (the two paragraphs plus this statement on violence), he pointedly told me that this last point is not yet under discussion.

This suggestion of an invitation to the Israelis for a mutual ceasefire was my own, as was the suggestion that the Holy See be the depository for the

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three statements of mutual recognition, if they were forthcoming. It was clear to Chairman Arafat that I was speaking in this for no one but myself, and that the Holy See was not making any proposals at all.

The idea of the Holy See receiving the three documents, however, or even two (P.L.O. and U.S.), if the Israeli commitment were not reliable, had such great appeal to Arafat that it would be a critical factor in his willingness to make such a statement himself. Just as the Israelis and Americans wanted Arafat's statement one hour before theirs, because they did not trust him to make it otherwise, so Arafat has precisely the same problem, that he could be left naked if he made his statement and the other failed to reciprocate. He has complete trust in the Holy See, he assured me, and would be entirely prepared to make his statement if the Holy See were acting as a clearing-house, to see that there are no tricks and that no one is being deceived. That would make it a package deal.

When I reported all this to Msgr. Jean-Louis Tauran at the Holy See, he had so many negatives ("the Holy See is not happy...", "does not like to be involved...", "never acts precipitately" etc.) that I finally asked him directly whether he was giving me a definitive negative answer to what I had suggested, that the Holy See was saying no. He backed away instantly from this, and assured me that no one was saying no to any part of what I was suggesting.

I told him then that if the Holy See were to act in this situation, there were two alternative choices: it could be as a public announcement of the three statements by the Holy See, or it could be a confidential and secret matter of the Holy See acting as clearing-house for three statements the parties would announce in their own way. As for the further meeting (on September 24) with Arafat to which I had agreed, since I was told Msgr. Gatti had expressed the wish that all this could be done by an official Vatican diplomat, I told Msgr. Tauran that I would gladly accept any of three scenarios: a) that a Vatican diplomat should go in my place; b) that I should accompany a Vatican diplomat; or c) that I go myself if that were preferred by the Holy See.

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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

MEMO: for Cardinal Law from Raymond G. Helmick, S.J., October 11, 1986.

Report on a meeting with Chairman Yasser Arafat, Kuwait, October 8, 1986.

The meeting was held at a government guest house in Kuwait, where Chairman Arafat was making a state visit. It was concerned with the question of the P.L.O.'s making a clear statement endorsing Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, involving recognition of Israel as a State. The outcome of the discussion was that Chairman Arafat would make such a statement if he could know in advance that there would be an adequate response from the United States. He requested that His Holiness, Pope John Paul II, try to ascertain, quietly, what that U.S. response would be.

This meeting was a follow-up to my meeting with Chairman Arafat in Tunis, September 9, '86. At that time he had said that pursuit of my proposal for a statement on Resolutions 242 and 338 should wait on the working out of an initiative he had taken with President Ceaucescu of Romania, which was embodied in the address he had given to the conference of Non-Aligned States at Harare on September 5. (Cf. previous report of my September 9 conversation with Arafat.) He had agreed then that I should return to see him again after he had been able to assess the effect of his Harare statement.

We met first in a large company of his advisers, members of the P.L.O. Executive Council and the P.L.O.'s diplomatic representatives to various Middle Eastern and European countries, who had come together to accompany the Chairman on his Kuwait visit. I told Arafat at once that I came with less than when I had last seen him in Tunis. He indicated that we would have time for conversation after dinner, which was served to the whole company.

When we went aside to another room for what proved to be nearly three hours of conversation, Arafat brought with him two counsellors, who took part in the whole session: Executive Council member Hani al-Hassan (principal negotiator for the P.L.O. during the 1982 discussion leading to the withdrawal from Beirut, who had been a leading architect of the February 11, '85, accord with King Hussein, and who had been present for two of the three sessions of my March meetings with Arafat), and the former P.L.O. diplomatic representative to Libya, recently expelled from that country, Abu Tariq.

I began by reporting what I had been told at the American State Department the week before, in three points.

- 1) They had denied the report that Mr. Hanna Siniora had given me in Jerusalem at the end of July, to the effect that the U.S. government would make a reciprocal statement of recognition if the P.L.O. would formally and unconditionally recognize Resolutions 242 and 338.

- 2) They had explained that for U.S. government officials to convey such a message or in fact any message at all to the P.L.O., even through intermediaries, was contrary to an American statute which forbids even indirect communication by U.S. officials with the P.L.O. They had been very worried by my written report of my July visit to Israel, because

it contained the names of two American officials and connected them with such an indirect communication.

3) They had said that Chairman Arafat, by making a statement unconditionally accepting 242/338, was in a position to compel a reciprocal American recognition.

I explained to Chairman Arafat that my own knowledge of any American offer made in Jerusalem was only through Mr. Siniora, as my written report had said. That my writing it down would provoke this negative reaction from the State Department was something I ought to have known and did not. Hence I may have spoiled an opportunity by writing that report.

The most important element in what I had heard, though, was that Arafat was in a position, by his own action, to compel a favorable American response. This is consistent with what has been the constantly reiterated American position for many years, that the Americans will talk to him if he unconditionally recognizes 242/338.

This was then the theme for the bulk of our discussion. I argued that it was worth while for Arafat to issue a clear, simple statement that would, first, recognize Resolutions 242 and 338 as a part of international legality, and second, state as the P.L.O.'s position that all the other U.N. and Security Council resolutions on the question of Palestine and the Middle East are equally a part of international legality.

In his September 5 address at Harare, Arafat had already explicitly recognized Resolutions 242 and 338 as a part of international legality. In that speech he had also spoken of the other resolutions as equally a part of international legality, and called for an international conference to resolve comprehensively the whole Arab-Israeli conflict. These had been among the points he had agreed with President Ceaucescu during his August visit to Bucharest, all of which he had stated in his Harare address. (The explicit mention of Israel as party to the conflict had been an essential part of that agreement.) The Western media had generally interpreted the Harare address as making the recognition of 242/338 conditional on the international conference. Arafat himself, when I had seen him on September 9, had insisted that this was a misinterpretation, and that the recognition of 242/338 was unconditional, appealing to the Arabic text of his address. My own reading of the text accords with Arafat's claim, but both Israeli and American official responses have been that the recognition of 242/338 there is conditional. When I had asked in Washington how American officials assessed the Harare address, I was told it showed that Arafat had not the authority in the P.L.O. to make a statement that would meet their terms.

Chairman Arafat had agreed with President Ceaucescu to make the statement he made at Harare, and Ceaucescu in turn had already spoken with Israelis (as Arafat told me on September 9) and Americans (as he told me only at this October 8 meeting), both of whom had agreed to take reciprocal action if Arafat said what was asked. President Ceaucescu had since assured Arafat that his Harare statement had said all that the Israelis and Americans had asked, but the Israelis and Americans have not taken the reciprocal actions to which, as

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Arafat understands from President Ceaucescu, they agreed.

That is the context in which I proposed a simpler statement, whose clarity would be beyond any possibility of distortion or misunderstanding. When I first spoke of the claim, by the Western media and the Israeli and American governments, that Arafat's Harare endorsement of 242/338 was conditional on the international conference, he wanted to know why it should not be. He did indeed want an international conference at which the whole conflict could be resolved politically by negotiation.

My response to that was in two parts. First, the Harare statement does not in fact, as I read it and as Arafat himself says is its real meaning, condition the recognition of 242/338 on the international conference. Second, if the recognition were conditioned on the conference, this would be a new condition, a novelty. I had often enough heard Arafat himself speak of his sense that Israel and the U.S. set conditions for the P.L.O., and when these conditions are met set new ones. He calls this the "striptease." I have told him that I thought he was mistaken if he thought that was the case in the matter of making his recognition of 242/338 the condition for the Americans to talk with him. Whether or not that American position is wise, I believe it has been consistent for more than ten years. The price has not changed. But if he were now to set a novel condition, the international conference, for his recognition of 242/338, this would be the striptease in reverse.

Why should he make another statement, Arafat wanted to know. The Israeli and American refusal to acknowledge that he had already given unconditional recognition to 242/338 in his Harare address was, he believed, deliberate distortion and a sign of bad faith. My response was that a new, simpler statement was useful for two reasons: for clarity, so that no one could reasonably claim to misunderstand it (as they would with a long, complex statement such as he had made at Harare); and in order to get to the negotiating table. His Harare statement had not brought him to the negotiating table, despite whatever commitments Israel and the U.S. may have made to President Ceaucescu. Israelis and Americans have been able to misunderstand, whether truly or pretendedly, what was said there. A simpler statement would remove this excuse.

I took this as the meaning of the formula I had heard in Washington, that Arafat by his own action was able to compel a favorable American response. That, of course, is not as reassuring as the offer Mr. Siniora had reported to me in July, and I understood Arafat's hesitation to rely on vague hints of what would be the American response to his actions when much more explicit commitments, as he understands them in the case of the agreement with President Ceaucescu, have not been honored. It is, as I said repeatedly, my own considered expectation that a truly appropriate American response would be made to such a statement as I was proposing, but I understand Arafat's need to weigh this with great care.

I had a counter-question for Arafat. What could be lost by making this simpler and clearer statement, even if the Israelis and Americans still made no response? Nothing new would in fact have been said, as all parts of the statement I was proposing were already in the Harare address, even if not recognized, or if recognized not acknowledged, by Israel and the U.S. Clarity was all to his advantage, as this was a critical time in a diplomatic-political effort to come to a resolution of the conflict which he had been pursuing ever since he first became Chairman of the P.L.O.

Arafat's answer was that he could ill afford to be seen by his own Palestinian following as constantly pursuing the U.S. and Israel with more and more concessions and getting nothing at all in return. I can myself vouch for the reality of this concern, as I have heard this sentiment expressed often by Palestinians, official and quite humble, within the occupied territories and outside. I urged, in response to Arafat, that even though Israel and the U.S. were able to misinterpret the unconditional character of his Harare statement, every Palestinian surely knew exactly what he had said at Harare and its full import, and so would recognize that there was nothing in the simpler, clearer statement I proposed that had not already been said at Harare.

The question of any intervention or provision of good offices by the Holy See had not arisen at all up to this point near the end of our long conversation. It had arisen previously, in my September 9 meeting, as a suggestion of my own that the three parties, Israel, the U.S. and the P.L.O., if they wished to make mutual statements of recognition, might ask the Holy See to act as a clearing-house for these three statements (it being understood that the Holy See was not offering or suggesting anything, and that this suggestion was only my own). In this October 8 meeting, that did not come into question, as the U.S. was not proposing to have a reciprocal statement on its part brokered with the P.L.O., and American officials were now saying that it was contrary to U.S. law for any of their officials to communicate, even indirectly, with the P.L.O.

However, at this late stage of our discussion on October 8 (actually in the small hours of the following morning), Chairman Arafat said that he would make the statement I was proposing -- the simple, clear affirmation, without conditions, a) that Resolutions 242 and 338 are accepted by the P.L.O. as a part of international legality, and b) that the P.L.O. also recognizes all the other U.N. and Security Council resolutions as equally part of international legality -- if His Holiness the Pope would ascertain what the American response to this statement would be and could assure him that it was satisfactory. This is a formal request to the Holy See, and I told Chairman Arafat that it would be reported exactly.

It is noteworthy that the question of Israeli response to such a P.L.O. statement was not a part of this concern. Arafat is unwilling to be rushed to hasty action by the prospect of the rotation in the Israeli government, Mr. Shamir replacing Mr. Peres as Prime Minister. He believes that Peres will retain significant power as Foreign Minister, and that even after the rotation a failure by Shamir to follow through on peace possibilities that Peres and Labor recognized would bring down the government and bring about elections on the issue of the peace. He also repeated his preference for negotiating with Likud rather than Labor, on the basis that Likud's harsh statements can be believed more readily than the more moderate but ultimately deniable statements by Labor -- he spoke of contending with the wolf by preference to the fox. Hence the October 14 rotation in the Israeli government has no terrors for him.

Also worth noting is the presence, a very active participation throughout our meeting, of the two counsellors, Hani al-Hassan and Abu Tariq. Each of them had much to say, assessing both Arafat's and my arguments, neither of them one-sidedly endorsing or rejecting my proposal but rather helping Arafat to deliberate on it. When I saw him on September 9, Arafat had insisted on an entirely private meeting between the two of us, because even his closest lieutenants were not aware of all we discussed. Arafat himself told Hani al-

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Hassan of what had been covered in our September 9 conversation at the start of this meeting (Abu Tariq evidently knew of it already). So the presence of these two means that Arafat is now able to carry on the deliberation among his counsellors, and is thus freer to act among the rest of the leadership of the P.L.O. than he was in September.



November 3, 1986

His Excellency
Bishop Jorje Mejia

Dear Bishop Mejia,

Christ's Peace!

Enclosed are the various reports and memos on the matter we spoke of this morning. It appals me to see how voluminous it has become. If you start at the back of the pile you get the more recent matters.

I have included here, for your personal information, even the most confidential of the papers, among which I would count the confidential annex to the March report on my Tunis visit, and the mention, on the last page of the report on this summer's visit to Israel, of names of Americans who spoke to Hanna Siniora in Jerusalem. The State Department was alarmed to see those names on a piece of paper, and formally denied the content of what they were reported to have said, pointing out that it would be contrary to a statute for any American officials to send a message, even indirectly, to the P.L.O. The most recent memos, on my meetings in Tunis and Kuwait in September and October, also clearly contain much material still highly confidential, and the last of those memos is only being brought to the attention of the Holy See by Archbishop Laghi these very days.

I would not want to undercut anything that Archbishop Laghi is doing in this matter by giving the material to you. It is possible that you might even find him still in Rome on your return. It seemed, though, that you should be as thoroughly informed in the matter as possible.

I wish you a safe journey back to Rome, and thank you for your kind reception this morning.

In Christ,

Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.
Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

December 1, 1986

Chairman Yasser Arafat
Palestine Liberation Organization

Dear Chairman Arafat,

Since Dr. Afif Safieh will be seeing you soon, I take this opportunity to send my warm greetings and the little news I have, to date, since I last saw you on October 8th.

The whole matter is now in the capable hands of Archbishop Pio Laghi. I gave him, through Cardinal Law, a detailed written report on our conversation, and your direct request that His Holiness the Pope try to ascertain what the American President would do if you made the sort of statement we discussed, one saying no more than was said in your Harare Address about the U.N. resolutions but stated briefly and simply enough so that no one could misunderstand it.

Archbishop Laghi and I agreed that, since the October date of the governmental rotation in Israel had no terrors for you and you believed, I think quite rightly, that you should not be rushed in this matter in order to meet that date, it was equally reasonable to wait until the Congressional elections in the United States were behind us, so that any response by President Reagan would not be colored by the politics of those elections. Archbishop Laghi preferred not to send my written report along to the Vatican in the diplomatic post, but to wait until he visited Rome himself and could take up the issues in person with those concerned. He has since done that, late in November, but I do not yet have a report from him. He and I also agreed that we would do well to consult the former U.S. Ambassador to the Holy See, Mr. Wilson, in trying to bring about the communication we are looking for. Archbishop Laghi thought it would be useful, also to wait until the new Ambassador, Mr. Shakespeare, is in place. I will let you know, as soon as I know myself, what comes of this.

Meanwhile, the great complication that affects this matter, as it does all others, on the American scene is the President's trouble over Iran and the Contras. I fear that President Reagan's prestige may be so badly affected that he would have less freedom than before to respond as we hope to an initiative from yourself. I am working to try to provide a favorable climate for the kind of response from him that would make the P.L.O. a recognized partner to real negotiations. What I see as necessary is a guaranteed American Jewish support for such an action on his part under those circumstances. With the group of American clergy, Christian and Jewish, in whose company I first met you in June of last year, I have been preparing the way for such a response. This has had to be done without letting people know what is actually going on. I have in fact been very careful with reporting our last conversation. Only Cardinals Law and O'Connor and Archbishop Laghi have my written report, and I have not even orally briefed the State Department or any other U.S. governmental agencies so as not to risk having the effort sabotaged.

Chairman Arafat, December 1, '86 -- 2


The Jewish-Christian group I am working with numbers several rabbis and other prominent figures whose word in support of an action by President Reagan would prevent its being torn down by furious right-wing opinion in Israel and/or the United States. Through this group, I hope to have access to former Presidents Carter and Ford also, both of whom take an active and sympathetic interest in these matters, and have their support for such an action by President Reagan also, if it turns out that we can hope for such an action. Any actual information on what precisely could happen will have to be withheld until the last moment, but it could be useful in presenting the matter to President Reagan to let it be known that such support could be counted on.

I wish you well. I understand that achieving a true and lasting peace settlement is truly the priority of the P.L.O. and of yourself, and that the obstacles are enormous. I hope this initiative will help to establish open and constructive communication between you and the American and Israeli parties to the conflict.

Sincerely,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

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CARDINAL'S RESIDENCE
2101 COMMONWEALTH AVENUE
BRIGHTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02135

December 6, 1986

His Excellency
Javier Perez de Cuellar
Secretary General of the United Nations

Your Excellency:

We have the honor to present to you the enclosed statement of concern about the fighting in Lebanon.


We entrust it to you in the confidence that you will make use of it in whatever ways you deem fit to help toward the promotion of peace in that beleaguered country.

Bernard Cardinal Law
Archbishop of Boston

John Cardinal O'Connor
Archbishop of New York,
President of the Catholic Near East
Welfare Association

+ Joseph E. Tami
Archbishop-Eparch of Newton
for the Melkite-Greek Catholics
in the United States

+ John A. Uya
Auxiliary Bishop of Newton
(Native of Maghdousheh)



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CARDINAL'S RESIDENCE
2101 COMMONWEALTH AVENUE
BRIGHTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02135

Through all the years of fighting in Lebanon, we have felt strong concern for all the suffering people in that country, especially for civilians caught between the opposing forces. In recent days the people of the village of Maghdousheh, who throughout the war have maintained peace with all their neighbors, have been exposed to the full brunt of the fighting through no action of their own, merely by being in the path of war.

We appeal to all the combatants to show humanitarian concern for these civilian victims. The combatants can do so by providing a truce which will allow non-combatants to escape from the fighting if they wish to do so. The combatants should also commit themselves to the protection of these people's property from looting and seizure during their absence, and to the return of this population to their homes as soon as possible.

We would hope that, in dealing with one another in this way, characterized by mercy and compassion for third parties caught in the midst of their fighting, the opposing sides would themselves be helped to come to a composure of their differences.

We appeal also to the voluntary agencies in the United States and other countries, and to all others who are able, to assist these people of Maghdousheh to restore their homes, their lives and their peaceful relations with all their neighbors.

December 6, 1986


Renald Cardinal Law
Archbishop of Boston

John Cardinal O'Connor
Archbishop of New York,
President of the Catholic Near East
Welfare Association

+ *John A. Ely*
Archbishop-Eparch of Newton for
the Melkite-Greek Catholics in
the United States

+ *John A. Ely*
Auxiliary Bishop of Newton
(Native of Maghdousheh)

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CARDINAL'S RESIDENCE
2101 COMMONWEALTH AVENUE
BRIGHTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02135

January 4, 1987

Most Holy Father,

Cardinal O'Connor's visit to Jordan and Israel, in my considered opinion, creates opportunities for a serious contribution by the Catholic Church to the work of peace in the Middle East. These possibilities are obscured by the understandable attempts of all the interested parties to wrest advantage from this important visit and, I am sorry to see, by the far from understandable statements by some unnamed officials of the Holy See and one named official spokesman denigrating Cardinal O'Connor.

These issues are of such importance to the Holy See that I hasten this memo to Your Holiness in the hope that you will have the opportunity to see it before you meet with Cardinal O'Connor on his arrival in Rome. With it I enclose a file of the press coverage of the Cardinal's visit which appeared in the New York Times and the Boston Globe.

What Cardinal O'Connor has accomplished is to establish himself as a credible and valued friend of both Jews and Muslims, Israelis and Arabs, while dealing plainly with the delicate matters that are of most intense concern to them. Speaking as a known and acknowledged friend of Israel, he has insisted on the need both for a homeland and for self-determination for the Palestinians. This is language used regularly by the Holy See, but rarely and only with difficulty by Bishops in the United States. Only a person so publicly identified with the struggle against anti-Semitism as Cardinal O'Connor could have done this so effectively.

As you are well aware, the relations of United States Catholics with Jews are especially cordial. Cardinal Lustiger, when he visited Boston last year, was very surprised to find here a degree of friendship and understanding between Catholics and Jews which he would not experience in Paris. Cardinal O'Connor is one of the major figures in this warm inter-faith relationship. He is also one of the relatively few Catholics in the United States who does what I strive to do myself, that is, to speak with both Jews and Muslims. We Catholics can do this and we have a responsibility to do so at this time when Jews and Muslims, who for so long were more cordial with each other than either could be with us, find it so difficult to speak with one another.

You know how I was myself accompanied by leaders of the Boston Jewish community to the Consistory at which I was made a Cardinal, and again on my visit to Auschwitz. I want to visit the Holy Land, accompanied once again by these Jewish leaders from my own city, but I fear that I will be embarrassed there, as I will probably receive the same invitations as Cardinal O'Connor has received.

There may well have been mistakes made in the setting of appointments to see Israeli officials in their Jerusalem offices. Cardinal O'Connor has accepted this and very gracefully taken all responsibility for it. Without being able to judge the merits of this for myself, I am puzzled by the decision to deal with the situation in a way which was so embarrassing to the Cardinal, and which brought the position of the Holy See under world-wide attack. There were many other ways to reaffirm the position of the Holy See in these circumstances. I note that other countries which refuse to acknowledge the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem have no problem with visits to these offices, all in West Jerusalem which has been Israeli since 1948. The Vice President of the United States, Mr. George Bush, for example, confirmed to me that he had visited these offices without hesitation on his visit last July, without any sense of accepting the Israeli position on Jerusalem, and that the United

States Ambassador to Israel, whose Embassy is kept in Tel Aviv to emphasize this very point, routinely visits these offices also. I would not suggest that this is a norm for the Holy See, but it seems there are other ways of making the same point.

In the remarks made concerning this visit of Cardinal O'Connor to the Middle East, three significant themes stand out. The first is the effort to portray this incident as further proof of the Holy See's alleged negative attitude toward the Church in the United States. Ludicrous as it may be, Cardinal O'Connor has even been linked with Archbishop Hunthausen and Father Curran as a victim of this negative attitude. A more subtle expression of this view is in the New York Times editorial for Saturday, January 3. Needless to say, it is not helpful to have this false impression further strengthened.

The second theme, already alluded to above, is the portrayal of the Cardinal as somehow incompetent in this matter. Although he has graciously accepted full responsibility for the misunderstanding, some of the statements attributed to spokesmen for the Holy See are far from helpful. Given the role of the Cardinal in defending the Holy See at a critical moment in the Church's history in the United States, these statements are incomprehensible to me. Particularly is this so when some other solution could have been found that would not have compromised the position of the Holy See.

The third theme is reflected in some of the Israeli reaction. There is the refrain, taken up by many of the Israeli leaders and their spokesmen, that there is nothing wrong or unfriendly to Israel in Cardinal O'Connor, but that all the trouble is with the Holy See, with "Vatican politics." This, I believe, is a very mistaken line for Israeli leaders to take, as if they should burn their bridges to the Vatican, or, in other words, abandon their efforts to communicate with the Holy See, and put their confidence only in United States Bishops or other special Catholic friends.

In moving beyond this moment, Cardinal O'Connor has suggested,

as a possibility, that the Holy See might play the role of convening an eventual international conference to negotiate a settlement of the Middle Eastern conflict. I have made the same suggestion privately to Your Holiness myself. The entities usually mentioned to convene such a conference are the five permanent members of the Security Council or even the two superpowers alone. When the time comes for such a conference, if, as I pray, it does, I believe the Holy See would in fact be more welcome and credible as a convener than any other possible party, and could in this way contribute of its spiritual riches to the outcome.

But before any such proposal could be made, it would obviously be necessary to know what answer the question would receive when it is asked, as neither the Holy See nor any nation or world institution would want to risk an unanticipated answer.

The likelihood is that Israel would not want to accept the Holy See as convener of the conference unless the Holy See were to establish full diplomatic relations with her. That is a prospect which people in the Secretariate of State have anticipated in other contexts. I fully understand that it would be destructive, and not a contribution to the peace, to establish such diplomatic relations under present circumstances. Last year I requested a memo on this subject of relations between the Holy See and Israel. I have asked the writer of that memo to bring it up to date on a few points and enclose a copy here for Your Holiness. It would seem to me that, at some appropriate time in the future, such relations will be called for, and it may well be that the context of the State of Israel's agreeing to enter into real negotiations for the peace of the region might indicate the right time for this step.

I am aware that some others are reluctant in principle that the Holy See should ever enter into full diplomatic relations with Israel, on the grounds that this would imply that the Holy See took a theological position on the right of Jews to this land which the Holy See should avoid. I strongly disagree with that argument, and

do not believe that any such theological position need be implied or understood. But I would like to know whether in fact the Holy See refuses ever to consider establishing full diplomatic relations with Israel, or whether it simply finds them inopportune under present circumstances.

In the meantime, the priority question is the establishment of mutual recognition among the parties to the conflict, as there can be no prospect of negotiations if the real parties refuse to speak to one another. Most centrally, this is a question of the proper representation of the Palestinian people.

All of this is for me to offer my counsel to Your Holiness in isolation from other high responsible voices in the Church who are concerned with this issue. I have one other suggestion, that Your Holiness bring together the small group of us who have the most intense concern for this question. I would think of Cardinal Lustiger, Cardinal Macharski, Cardinal O'Connor and myself, and would expect that there may be other names you would want to add to the list. To convoke such a meeting, to discuss strategy for the Church's efforts toward peace in this region, would imply acceptance of the proposal that there should in fact be such a strategy. I do not find it in evidence at present. I believe that the Catholic Church has better opportunities and credentials to be of service, in love, to all the parties of this bitter dispute than any other nation or institution in the world.

With sentiments of highest esteem, and with the assurance of my prayers for God's blessing on your work for the Church and for the world, I remain

Obediently yours in Christ

Bernard Cardinal Law
Archbishop of Boston

Western Union Interna

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13608 CHOFF TN

FROM : DR. SAMI MUSALLAM / CHAIRMAN'S OFFICE / TUNIS
TO : BR. HASSAN ABDUL RAHMAN / P.L.O. / WASHINGTON
DATE : 29/12/1986

I AM WRITING YOU THIS LETTER UPON INSTRUCTIONS OF
CHAIRMAN ARAFAT.

THE CHAIRMAN WAS APPRIZED OF THE CONTENTS OF THE
LETTER SENT TO YOU ON 8 DECEMBER 1986 BY FATHER RAYMOND G.
HELMICK, S. J. AND ITS ENCLOSURES : (1) THE LETTER
SENT TO UN SING. BY CARDINAL LAW, CARDINAL O'CONNOR AND BISHOP
ELYA DATED 6 DEC. 1986. (2) THIS STATEMENT OF 6 DEC. 1986 ON
THE SITUATION ON MAGHDOUSHEH.

CHAIRMAN ARAFAT HAS INSTRUCTED ME TO CLARIFY THE
FOLLOWING POINTS WHICH I HOPE YOU WOULD CONVEY AND EXPLAIN
TO HTE FATHER HELMICK AND TO CARDINALS LAW AND O'CONNOR AS
WELL TO BISHOP ILYA.

1- KINDLY INFORM THEM OF OUR STATEMENTS REGARDING MAGHDOUSHEH
ESPECIALLY THOSE MADE BY BROTHER ABU JIHAD ON 15 DEC 1986 AND
18 DEC 1986 ALL OF WHICH YOU HAVE GOT ON THE " FAX " MASHINE

Western Union International

Western Union International

128

Western Union International, Inc.

Inc

Western Union International

2- OUR INSISTANCE THAT THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF THE TOWN BE ALL OWED TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES .

3- OUR DECLARATION THAT THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF MAGHDOUSHEH WILL BE PAID COMPENSATIONS (TA'WIDAT) LIKE THE PALESTINIAN CIVILIANS .

4- WALID JUMBLAT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE ABOVE MENTIONED SITUATION .

5- WE REJECT AND REFUSE THAT AMAL BE ALL/ ALLOWED BACK TO THIS AREA .

KINDLY INFORM ME OF YOUR CONTACTS .

BEST REGARDS AND HAPPY NEW YEAR .
13608 CHOFF TND
PALINFO 64542

VIA WUI A



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

129

January 8, 1987

His Eminence
Bernard Cardinal Law
Archbishop of Boston
2101 Commonwealth Avenue
Brighton, MA 02135

Your Eminence,


The appeal that you, Cardinal O'Connor, Archbishop Tawil and Bishop Elya sent to the Secretary General of the U.N. regarding the town of Maghdousheh went directly to Chairman Arafat of the P.L.O. by Fax machine when I sent a copy along to Mr. Hassan Rahman of the P.L.O.'s office in Washington. Mr. Rahman now sends me a copy of the enclosed Telex sent to him from Arafat's secretariate, which he first read to me over the phone the day he got it.

The Telex refers to statements made by Abu Jihad, the military chief of the P.L.O., on 15 and 18 December, which were responses to your appeal. I understand they even picked up the language of your appeal, especially the reference to mercy and compassion, as explanation of why the P.L.O. was taking the position it did on Maghdousheh, the return of its population to their homes, and compensation for any damage done. I am not able to report fully until I have actual copies of these Abu Jihad statements, which I do not have as yet, but which are promised me.

In my letter to Mr. Rahman enclosing your appeal, I mentioned that the suggestion, which I twice saw mentioned in the American press, that the P.L.O. hand the village over to the Druze forces, intended as a way to get it into the hands of a neutral third party instead of either Palestinians or Amal, was more frightening to the resident population than any other possibility, because of the history of Druze-Christian clashes and mutual massacres in recent years. That accounts for the 4th item on the Telex's list, that Walid Jumblat (the Druze leader) has nothing to do with this. I understand that conversations have been held with Jumblat by P.L.O. officials, explaining the situation and agreeing that there should be no Druze role.

I will write again when I have the copies of Abu Jihad's statements.

In Christ,


Ray Helmick, S.J.

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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

January 8, 1987

His Eminence
John Cardinal O'Connor
Archbishop of New York
460 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022

Your Eminence,

The appeal that you, Cardinal Law, Archbishop Tawil and Bishop Elya sent to the Secretary General of the U.N. regarding the town of Maghdousheh went directly to Chairman Arafat of the P.L.O. by Fax machine when I sent a copy along to Mr. Hassan Rahman of the P.L.O.'s office in Washington. Mr. Rahman now sends me a copy of the enclosed Telex sent to him from Arafat's secretariate, which he first read to me over the phone the day he got it.

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In Christ,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

131

January 8, 1987

The Most Reverend Eparch
Archbishop Joseph Tawil
19 Dartmouth Street
West Newton, MA 02165

Dear Archbishop Tawil,


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In Christ,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

January 8, 1987

Right Reverend Archimandrite
Bishop John A. Elya
Annunciation Melkite-Greek Catholic Cathedral
7 Venterans of Foreign Wars Parkway
Roslindale, MA 02131-1098


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
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In Christ,

Ray Helmick, S.J.



133
DIOCESE OF NEWTON
Melkite Greek Catholic
19 Dartmouth Street
Newton, Massachusetts 02165

January 16, 1987

Rev. Raymond Helmick, S.J.
Jesuit Community
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167

Reverend and Dear Father Helmick:

I have received your letter of January 8, 1987, concerning our appeal for Maghdouche. Long before I received it, I was struck by the rapidity of the P.L.O. response and the similarity to the language that we utilized in our appeal, namely what you have noted: compassion, protection of the civilians and of their properties during their absence, etc.

Although there have not been many casualties among the civilians, it seems that all of them have fled their homes, which presumably have been looted. More recently we learned that the mother of Archbishop Michel Hakim, the Melkite Eparch of Canada, has been murdered. She was over 90 years old.

Let us hope for a complete cessation of hostilities, and for peace and general reconciliation among the various factions, things possible only to God.

Thanking you again for keeping me informed, and with best wishes, I am

Sincerely

+ Joseph Tawil

Archbishop Joseph Tawil
Eparch of Newton

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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

January 21, 1987

Mr. Hasan Abdul Rahman
818 18th Street, N.W.
Suite 620
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. Rahman,

Thank you for sending on the copy of the 29 December Telex from Mr. Sami Musallam of the Chairman's Office relating to the appeal of the two Cardinals and the Melkite bishops about Maghdousheh, which you had already read to me on the phone.

I sent further copies of the telex and your covering note to all four signers of the appeal: Cardinal Law, Cardinal O'Connor, Archbishop Tawil (the Eparch for all the Melkites in the U.S.) and Bishop John Elya (Archbishop Tawil's Auxiliary Bishop for the Boston area and the one who, as a native of Maghdousheh, first instigated that appeal).

I enclose here the letter I had from Archbishop Tawil in response. I had already spoken by phone to Bishop Elya, and know that he was greatly relieved to have these assurances about the village. He was still worried about what the Amal forces would do in response to the same appeal, as nothing had yet been heard from them.

From Cardinal O'Connor I have not yet heard. He was still away on his visit to the Middle East at the time I sent it, and has been kept busy with the aftermath of that visit since. I'm sure I will have a response from him and will send it to you when I get it.

Cardinal Law was pleased beyond measure at the Palestinian response. For him, it is more difficult to grasp the details without actually seeing the statements that were issued by Abu Jihad on December 15 and 18. I take it that the Melkites, Archbishop Tawil and Bishop Elya, have seen either the statements or reports of them. I have not seen them myself yet, and wrote to the two Cardinals that I was unable yet to report fully to them on the result of their appeal until I could send them copies of those statements. I hope you will search out the statements from your own file and get them to me for that purpose. What is most important for your purposes, which I assume are to have the two Cardinals understand how cooperative and helpful the P.L.O. has been in this matter in response to their appeal, is that they have as full a grasp of what has been done as possible. The Melkite bishops' understanding of it will have less effect of that kind than a report I can give them myself with the full documentation.

Mr. Hasan Rahman, Jan. 21, '87 -- 2

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Cardinal Law told me he was especially concerned that the Secretary General of the U.N., Mr. Perez de Cuellar, should understand what had happened as a result of the appeal, and how well the P.L.O. had responded. Mr. Perez de Cuellar had sent a letter back to the Cardinal, thanking him somewhat in form-letter terms, and not seeming to recognize that this appeal had any real significance. What he actually did with it I do not know, though I suspect he may have sent copies of it along to various delegations at the U.N., including the P.L.O.'s. I take it that the Chairman's receiving an immediate copy over the Fax machine through you, as quickly as the Secretary General of the U.N. had it himself, was as influential in bringing this prompt and generous response as the communication of the appeal by the Secretary General. We would be glad if Mr. Perez de Cuellar were informed, by the P.L.O. delegation to the U.N., of how promptly the request was met.

I will let you know any other response I have from the signers of the appeal. All of them I have spoken to, of course, are following with the greatest interest what actually happens on the ground in Maghdousheh.

Best wishes, and I hope you will send my greetings and thanks to the Chairman,

sincerely,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

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1011 FIRST AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10022

January 16, 1987

Dear Ray,

Upon my return from my pastoral visit to the Middle East and Rome, I received your letter of January 8th. I appreciate the thoroughness with which you have handled this complex and sensitive situation. I look forward to the complete report which I understand will not be possible until all the documentation is in hand.

With every good wish and assurance of prayers throughout the new year, I am,

Faithfully in Christ,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "John Cardinal O'Connor".

Archbishop of New York

Rev. Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.
Jesuit Community
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167



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February 25, 1987

His Eminence
John Cardinal O'Connor
Archbishop of New York
460 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022

Your Eminence,

Professor Walid Khalidi approached me recently and asked that I try to arrange for him and a small delegation of Palestinian-Americans to see you. They would like to thank you for what you accomplished on your recent visit to the Middle East. They are sharply aware of the deterioration of relations between Americans and Arabs, and think that the Catholic Church is the best possible channel to try to mend those relations. Hence they would like to talk with you about ways that might be accomplished.

I expect you may know of Professor Khalidi. He has been the last eleven years resident in this country, teaching political science at Harvard. People at the American State Department and in the academic community have learned long since that Walid's is one of the most responsible voices among Palestinians. He is always heard with interest and respect by Yasser Arafat and others in the political leadership of Palestinians. He does not belong to any of the Palestinian parties, but was the one to convey to the Jordanian Prime Minister, last year, the proposals for formulas of recognition of Israel that the PLO was prepared to accept during the Amman negotiations, and he had had much to do with composing the first of those formulas. I have always found Dr. Khalidi one of the best-informed and most admirable of my own Palestinian friends, and have valued his counsel. I spoke of Walid's request for a meeting with you on the phone with Msgr. Nolan yesterday. John knows Walid quite well, and can fill you in on him.

Walid would like to bring a small delegation with him. He thinks of two other academics: Professor Edward Said, who teaches comparative literature at Columbia and is another important Palestinian spokesman in this country, and Professor Hisham Sharabi of Georgetown. Walid thought there should be some prominent Palestinian-American businessmen present too. He named Mr. Jacob Saliba, who runs Katy Industries here in Boston, and said he would ask Saliba himself for suggestions of one or two others who should come.

I would very much recommend that you have such a meeting. I consider Dr. Khalidi the very top man to speak for Palestinians in this country in appreciation of your work in visiting their part of the world. He was most appreciative of the way you established yourself as friend to both peoples, Israeli and Palestinian, and thought it quite unique that, as a major American Catholic visitor, you had gone into the refugee camps and held people's hands. I think you would have a most fruitful meeting with him and his friends.

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Dr. Khalidi himself will be out of the country from March 12 to the end of March. Unless the meeting could be arranged all in a hurry before that date, which seems rather improbable, a date early in April would probably be best. I would be very glad if you could let me know if the meeting would take place and when it would be most convenient for you, and especially if you could give me that information early enough to tell Walid before he leaves on his travels to the Middle East on March 12.

With all best wishes,

in Christ,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

MEMO: Ray Helmick, S.J., to Cardinal Law
Re: follow-up to the meeting with Mr. Hanna Siniora

March 11, 1987

The suggestion was made during the meeting with Mr. Siniora that it might be possible to explore contact between the two parties without having to work through the Holy See as a third party, and that the third-party route might then be explored only as it might be necessary.

The response that came back after Hanna Siniora discussed this with Chairman Arafat himself was that they would be most pleased if you would explore this possibility. There was need, as you discussed with Hanna Siniora, for a contact man. They propose that he should be Mr. Nasser Quedwa, who is in New York as the P.L.O.'s Alternate Observer at the U.N. He is also a nephew of Chairman Arafat, and in constant direct phone conversation with him at least a couple of times a week.

This message came back to me through Afif Safieh, as Hanna Siniora had told me it would. I pointed out to Afif that having a P.L.O. official as the contact would mean that U.S. Government officials themselves would not be able to have contact with him, but that it would have to be done altogether through non-officials. Afif acknowledged that, and thought that at the point where there needed to be a direct Palestinian contact with U.S. Government officials it would likely be Hanna Siniora who would make such contact. He asked that I phone Mr. Quedwa at once to acknowledge the message, and gave me his phone numbers: (212) 288-8500 as his office number at the U.N.; and (212) 213-6186 at home. I did that, and told Mr. Quedwa I would report the matter to you.

The next step would presumably be a conversation with Mr. Quedwa himself, which you might want to have yourself or might prefer me to have. This is not matter that can be discussed freely over telephones. I would be glad to go down to New York to see him, or if you wanted to see him yourself we could invite him to Boston.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

May 19, 1987

MEMO: Ray Helmick, S.J., to Cardinal Law.

RE: Meeting with Dr. M. Nasser al-Kidwa, Alternate Permanent Observer for the Palestine Liberation Organization to the United Nations, at UN Headquarters, New York, May 18, 1987.

This meeting was at my request, in order to find out whether, after the April meeting in Algiers of the Palestine National Council, the same elements of a peace initiative from the P.L.O. were present as we had been familiar with before the P.N.C.

Your Eminence will recall the visit you received from Mr. Hanna Siniora late in February, at which he delivered to you a message from the leadership of the P.L.O. He indicated their readiness, as Mr. Arafat himself had told me early in October of last year, to issue a statement clearly and unambiguously recognizing U.N.S.C. Resolutions 242 and 338, without conditions, as they also recognize all other U.N. Resolutions related to the Palestine and Middle East regional problem, i.e., as parts of international legality regulating the problem. Their concern was to know what sort of response, if any, such a statement would receive from the United States government.

Mr. Arafat had told me in October that he would willingly issue the statement if His Holiness the Pope, as a third party making available his good offices, could assure him that the U.S. response would be such as would warrant it. In your meeting with Mr. Siniora in February, Your Eminence asked whether such third party good offices would be essential to the process, or whether it might be done without the third party. Mr. Siniora referred that question back to Mr. Arafat, and the reply was that either method, with or without the third party assistance, would be welcome, whichever would best contribute to making possible this action which the P.L.O. was truly anxious to take. At that time Mr. al-Kidwa, nephew to Mr. Arafat and in regular telephone contact with him, was named as the person for us to contact on any matter related to this initiative.

Your Eminence related this message by phone to a high level contact in Washington early in March, and Msgr. William Murphy and I spoke with a member of his staff about whether U.S. government officials would want a fuller report on the meeting and proposal. When we heard nothing, Msgr. Murphy contacted this staff person again. He was told that the matter had been referred to the NSC staff, and no response had come from them, but that a response would be sought. There has been no contact since.

Reflecting on this lack of response from the U.S. government official and his staff, I can speculate on one reason related to the P.L.O. why there should have been this unresponsiveness. That is that the meeting of the Palestine National Council was to be held in Algiers in April. The various U.S. government agencies that became cognizant of this initiative may well have felt it was better to wait until after the P.N.C. meeting to see if things still looked the same. I waited some weeks after the P.N.C. meeting for its results to be sorted out before contacting Mr. al-Kidwa and suggesting that it was time we should meet.

As you know, I had been invited very cordially to attend the P.N.C. as an observer, had felt honored by the invitation and believed there was an appropriateness in my attending, especially on the grounds given by those who invited me, that having so strongly advocated conciliation with the State of Israel in meetings with Mr. Arafat and his most immediate colleagues over the last two years, I should represent the same point of view to the many more people I would meet at the P.N.C. Nonetheless, I stayed away for the reason that I would, by attending the P.N.C., complicate my access to the many Americans and Israelis, officials and others, with whom it was just as important that I should be talking. I was anxious that this reason be well understood, and that my refusal of the invitation not be the occasion of offense.

In meeting Mr. al-Kidwa, I found he was well briefed in all my earlier contacts with Mr. Arafat, but I took the time to review the whole development so that I could be sure we understood one another properly. I had then a series of questions which we discussed, beginning with an overall account of the P.N.C. meeting and Mr. al-Kidwa's assurance that he would send me all the basic documentation of it. As I expressed it to him, a meeting of the P.N.C. is like the flooding of the Nile: the ground is enriched by it but the landscape is changed in many ways. The topics we discussed:

1. The Standing of This P.N.C. and its Relation to the November 1984 Meeting of the P.N.C. in Amman.

The Algiers meeting was designated the 18th Palestine National Council. Those who had wanted to challenge the legitimacy of the Amman meeting, which had been designated the 17th P.N.C., wished either to call this Algiers meeting the 17th P.N.C. or to leave it unnumbered. Their proposals were rejected. This decision was understood as an acceptance and endorsement of the Amman P.N.C. despite the absence from Amman of some of the constituent bodies of the P.L.O. that were now present in Algiers. Both 17th and 18th P.N.C.s are accepted as expressions of the unity and steadfastness of the Palestinian people, both in the occupied territories and in the camps of the diaspora.

The ten members of the Executive Committee of the P.L.O. elected at the Amman P.N.C. (eleven had originally been elected at that meeting, but one, Mr. Kawasmeh, had subsequently been assassinated) continued in office and were recognized as such by the 18th P.N.C., which went on to elect five additional members representative of the bodies which had been absent from the 17th P.N.C.

The outstanding feature of this Algiers P.N.C. was the return to the unity of the P.L.O. of constituent groups that had stood apart from the Arafat leadership and been absent from the Amman P.N.C.: the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The PFLP, under the leadership of Mr. George Habash, has the reputation of advocating more military activity and opposing diplomatic initiatives. It is the largest and most important constituent body of the P.L.O. after Mr. Arafat's Fatah organization, which is by far the largest element and tends to predominate in the P.L.O. The DFLP, under Mr. Nayef Hawatmeh, is a Communist organization closely attentive to the policies of the Soviet Union. This has in fact meant, over the years, that the PFLP, following the Soviet lead, has most often anticipated the rest of the P.L.O., and even Mr. Arafat's Fatah organization, in each step that tended toward establishing eventual peace with Israel. Nevertheless, Mr. Hawatmeh had broken with Mr. Arafat's leadership and been aligned with Syria. The outstanding question left by this 18th P.N.C. is whether these returning

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dissident organizations would make the more conciliatory initiatives and diplomatic orientation of the P.L.O. impossible in future, or whether instead they have been brought in as parties to the peace initiatives Mr. Arafat has inaugurated in recent years.

There were in fact three proposals made at the P.N.C. that would have encumbered the operation of the Executive Committee and made it an obstacle to the political and diplomatic flexibility that Mr. Arafat has developed in these last years. All these proposals were rejected, and the Executive Committee was simply asked to have rules of procedure.

2. The Accord of February 11, 1985, with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

This is important not merely because the confederation of a Palestinian state with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as agreed in the Accord, is regarded as significant by Israel and the United States, but also because the American press and media have given the impression that a rejection of the Accord was a major victory of the hard-line factions of the P.L.O. at the Algiers P.N.C. and constituted a repudiation of the 17th P.N.C. and the peace initiatives conducted by the P.L.O. since that time.

The actual outcome was different. The P.N.C. did not deal with the February '85 Accord at all. There is no reference to it in the proceedings. What did happen instead was that, in the preparations before the P.N.C. met, the Executive Committee, on April 19 (i.e., the ten-member Executive Committee that existed before new members were added by the 18th P.N.C.), issued a statement considering the Accord with King Hussein cancelled. This was not to be understood as an action by the P.L.O. or its Executive cancelling the Accord, but rather as a recognition that the Accord had been cancelled since King Hussein repudiated it unilaterally in February of 1986. Some members of the P.L.O., like Mr. al-Kidwa himself, had felt that such a statement recognizing the cancellation of the Accord should have been made earlier, even immediately after King Hussein's action. The reason that was not done, Mr. al-Kidwa believed, was so that the declaration could be made at a later and appropriate time for its political effect. But the substantive effect, he argues, was nothing beyond what was done by the King a year earlier. Making the recognition now was a minimal price to pay for the renewed unity of the P.L.O.

As to the substance of the Accord, however, the Algiers P.N.C. stressed the importance of the Jordanian-Palestinian issue, and confirmed explicitly that the relation should be a confederation. I pursued this for two reasons. One was that I had been assured in Israel last year, by persons whose opinions I respect, that the Israeli public would likely be prepared to accept a Palestinian state in confederation with Jordan, but wholly unprepared to accept an independent Palestinian state. The other was my impression that any possible U.S. preparedness to recognize a Palestinian right of self-determination would be related to a confederation with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. It was consequently important to find that the P.L.O.'s acceptance of the confederation proposal is still intact. The loss of the personal understanding and formal accord with King Hussein, which the P.L.O. sees as resulting not from their action but from the King's, complicates the P.L.O. intention to form a confederation, without at all negating it.

3. Relations with Egypt.

The Arafat leadership of the P.L.O. is concerned to maintain the good relations it has had with Egypt, and is conscious of the help President Mubarak has given in the development of P.L.O. peace efforts over recent years, for which it is grateful. The issue of the Camp David Accord and the separate peace treaty is still a thorny one among the P.L.O. factions, as it is among other Arab countries. The Arafat leadership made great efforts to secure the Egyptian friendship, taking the pragmatic view that Egypt should be enlisted in a general Arab effort to bring the regional problem to peaceful resolution. First, it invited a full and official Egyptian delegation to the Algiers P.N.C. When the Algerian President objected to this procedure, which neither Algeria nor most Arab states would take, and threatened to prohibit the Egyptian delegation's entrance into Algeria for the meeting, Arafat personally intervened to insist that any such prohibition would be an unacceptable interference in the internal affairs of the P.L.O. The Egyptian delegation remained seated until they left, on their own initiative, on the last day of the P.N.C., when the resolution critical of Egypt was brought to the floor.

Several resolutions demanding a break between the P.L.O. and Egypt were rejected by the P.N.C. It had seemed to the Arafat leadership that they had prevented any such result until, in a parliamentary maneuver on the last day, the forces critical of Egypt succeeded in bringing the matter to the floor again. Even so, the resulting resolution was toned down to the point that it had no new accusations against Egypt or prohibition of relations with Egypt, but only references to actions of the 16th P.N.V. (Algiers, 1983). The Palestinian feeling now is that the Egyptians overreacted to this resolution, that relations with Egypt, though damaged, are reparable, and that their repair is a priority for the P.L.O., which values and is grateful for President Mubarak's help.

4. The Resolution on the International Conference.

Far from backing away from the idea of a negotiated settlement with Israel of the Palestinian and the whole regional problem, the P.N.C. has explicitly endorsed it and it remains the principal element of P.L.O. policy. Attention focussed on the wording of this resolution calling for an international conference, and whether it took a hard line that made collaboration and joint representation with Jordan impossible and hence made the conference itself and the negotiating process less probable. In fact, the Political Committee of the P.N.C. had finished its work and reported out a resolution which insisted that the P.L.O. be represented at any such conference "independently, separately and on an equal footing." This formula was reported in some parts of the American media, which failed to follow up with the revised formula that followed. Breaking with normal procedure, Chairman Arafat called the Political Committee back into session, and proposed a new formula. It deleted the words "independently" and "separately," and left only the expression "on an equal footing." This was accepted after some discussion, and is the form of the resolution that was eventually adopted by the full P.N.C. By reason of this revision, the P.L.O.'s policy still remains open to representation at an international conference in a joint delegation with Jordan, though on an equal footing.

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5. U.N.S.C. Resolutions 242 and 338.

The 18th P.N.C. affirmed again, as earlier P.N.C.s have done, that Resolution 242 is inadequate as a basis for a political settlement of the Palestinian problem because it does not deal with the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people. This is not to say that 242 is not acceptable in conjunction with other resolutions of the U.N. and Security Council that do deal with those rights, as all these resolutions stand as parts of international legality.

6. Chairman Arafat's Harare Address of September 5, 1986, Affirming Explicit P.L.O. Acceptance of U.N.S.C. 242 and 338, as Well as of All Other U.N. Resolutions Dealing with the Palestinian and Regional Problems.

I wanted to know if the 18th P.N.C. had left the Chairman's Harare position intact, or whether it had been withdrawn, modified or watered down. This was a traditional question about the P.L.O., whether when it had substantial unity of its constituent bodies it was deprived of the flexibility to negotiate seriously for peace, or whether in this case it had achieved that unity while retaining its political flexibility. Had the returning dissident factions ended the P.L.O.'s peace initiative, or had they been brought into it? Clearly a P.L.O. peace settlement that included Dr. Habbash's PFLP would be more valuable than one that did not.

The Chairman's Harare address has to be properly understood. When it was given, it attracted wide attention in Europe and the Middle East, as the first time Mr. Arafat had explicitly cited Resolutions 242 and 338 as accepted by him and the P.L.O. The address was long and complex, touching other subjects besides 242 and 338, among them the proposal for an international conference. The European press widely interpreted the Chairman's endorsement of 242 and 338 as a conditional endorsement, the condition being the international conference itself. I had occasion to talk at length with Mr. Arafat a few days after his address, on September 9, and challenged him on this interpretation. He insisted that there was no condition on his endorsement, that the international conference was also called for elsewhere in the address, but neither that nor anything else was set as a condition for the P.L.O.'s recognition of 242 and 338. He gave me copies of the address, in Arabic and English translation, which I have studied closely, and I have confirmed his reading, that there is no condition. (I cannot, as Your Eminence knows, read the Arabic myself, but have been able to have Arabic scholars confirm the reading of key passages.)

This important development was not acknowledged officially either by Israel or the United States. The Israeli official reaction was essentially in two responses. One was that the Harare address was "nothing new," presumably on the grounds that the Chairman had already endorsed "all U.N. resolutions relevant to the Palestinian problem" (the formula of the statement signed for U.S. Rep. Paul McCloskey in 1982, and often repeated since). Though there had been confusion (largely caused from within the P.L.O.) and doubt that the Chairman's 1982 signed statement included 242 and 338, it was not now acknowledged that the explicit inclusion of 242 and 338 was anything new. The other Israeli response was that, if the Chairman really wanted to say something new, he would have recognized 242 and 338 while disavowing or at least omitting all other U.N. resolutions. This, as ignoring substantive parts of international legality with regard to the problem, is as unacceptable to the Palestinians as ignoring or

omitting 242 and 338 would be to the other parties.

The American response, when I asked for it myself at the State Department last September, was that the Harare address showed that Chairman Arafat still had not sufficient authority in the P.L.O. to do something new. This was not an interpretation but a reaction based on a misinterpretation. (It is interesting that, in U.S. public reporting, the New York Times, with its reputation as newspaper of record, never carried any mention of the address, even of the fact that Mr. Arafat had spoken at Harare. The Times had a reporter there to report the conference of Non-Aligned Nations, but for the most part the coverage was confined to reports of gaffes by Colonel Khadafy that amused the reporter or his superiors. Arafat's important speech was simply not covered.)

Since the whole substance of the Harare address is left either explicitly confirmed or unaffected by the 18th P.N.C., it follows that Mr. Arafat is free to reaffirm or emphasize any part of it.

7. My Kuwait Proposal and the Continuing Validity of Chairman Arafat's Response.

The most essential thing I needed to know was whether the proposal I had made to Mr. Arafat in Kuwait last October, and his response, to which he had authorized Mr. Siniora to call Your Eminence's attention again in February of this year, was still a workable proposition now in the wake of the 18th P.N.C.

The context of the proposal was that, after Mr. Arafat had explicitly and unconditionally recognized U.N.S.C. Resolutions 242 and 338 in his Harare address, there had been no official acknowledgement or recognition by Israel or the United States, although there had been a consistent U.S. position since 1975 that this unconditional recognition of 242 and 338 by the P.L.O. would be followed by U.S. readiness to treat directly with the P.L.O. about the Palestinian question. This was all the more disappointing, Mr. Arafat told me, to the P.L.O. because the Harare address had been predated by a mediatory effort by President Ceausescu of Romania. Both the United States and Israel, by Mr. Arafat's testimony, had promised President Ceausescu that there would be specific responses if Mr. Arafat would say the things that he subsequently did say at Harare.

Various persons in the U.S., Israel and Europe, of course, interpreted the Harare address as not saying these things. Mr. Arafat contended that these persons were misinterpreting him. He believed that this was done wilfully in order to ignore the very important step he had taken. He considered that the U.S. and Israel had failed to deliver on specific promises to President Ceausescu as well as the general assurances the U.S. had been making consistently since 1975, and that this was further reason to distrust their word or their bona fides. His available responses to this situation were to back away from this diplomatic effort or to try again.

I had contended that the Harare statement was complex enough so that it lent itself to misinterpretation, whether genuine or deliberate, including the common European perception that the Harare recognition of 242/338 was conditioned on the international conference. Mr. Arafat wanted to know, in that October

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meeting, why he should not make the international conference a condition (the sense of his question being whether or not he and his people deserved anything in return for such a major concession). My response was that there were two reasons. First was that he had already given recognition to 242 and 338 without condition (at Harare) and should not now retreat from what he had already done. Second was that the international conference, if he set it up as a condition for his acceptance of 242/338, would be a novel condition. I had heard him complain of what he called a "striptease" policy of the U.S. and Israel: that they made demands on him and, when he met these demands with concessions, demanded still more. I had told him already that I thought he was mistaken to see such a striptease policy in the case of the U.S. demand for his recognition of 242/338. I personally believed that the U.S. policy of refusing to talk to the P.L.O. until this was done was poor policy, but it had in fact been consistent since 1975. However, if he were to adopt a novel condition now himself, it would be a case of striptease policy on his own part.

My proposal was that Mr. Arafat make a further statement, saying in fact no more than both he and I believe he has already said at Harare, but in so simple and unencumbered a form that it would leave no room for misinterpretation, wilful or otherwise, and could not easily be ignored. The Chairman argued that he is too often perceived by the Palestinians as making concession after concession without ever getting any reciprocal benefits for them. He was reluctant to be seen pleading with the U.S. and Israel to hear and understand what he had already said. I argued that there was no danger of Palestinians believing that he was saying more than before, as there could be no Palestinian who did not understand exactly what he had said at Harare. The outcome was Mr. Arafat's agreement that he would make the statement if His Holiness the Pope could assure him that the U.S. response would be such as to warrant his taking that further step. Mr. Siniora's visit to Your Eminence to reenliven that initiative in February, the agreement, in response to your question, that the effort should be made with or without the third-party role of the Holy Father, and the designation of Mr. al-Kidwa as the person to whom we should refer any questions followed.

By this point in the conversation with Mr. al-Kidwa, it was clear that Mr. Arafat had retained his freedom to pursue this initiative through the events of the 18th P.N.C. Mr. al-Kidwa assured me that Chairman Arafat still wanted to urge this initiative on, with appropriate approaches to U.S. authorities and, if need be, to the Holy Sec. I asked whether Mr. Arafat and the P.L.O. had a preference to seek the third-party help of the Holy See or not. Mr. al-Kidwa replied that the Palestinians would prefer to have the Holy Father's assurance. The proposal made last summer had been that the Holy See be active in this matter only if requested to be so by all three parties: themselves, the Israelis and the U.S. Now that only they and the U.S. would be involved, the Palestinians would fully understand that the Holy See might feel it would incur the anger of the Israelis, and would not want to be involved for that reason.

There was a further point I had been anxious to urge on the P.L.O. This was to emphasize the importance of what is going on in Israeli society just now, where Mr. Peres is trying to force an election on the issue of Israel's taking part in an international conference. This, if Mr. Peres succeeds, will be the first time Israel has ever had an election on the question of the peace and the Palestinian problem. Every other election has always been about some other issue -- the economy or whatever -- with the peace issue, if present at all, reduced to a marginal question. I have often enough found Arabs who believed

that all matters of internal Israeli politics were meaningless shadow-boxing, as both political blocs in Israel were equally intent on the destruction of the Palestinians, Likud merely more forthright about it than Labor. I wanted to be sure that Mr. Arafat knew how important Mr. Peres' effort was, and that, in my own opinion, it was incumbent on the Palestinians now to be forthcoming and present the Israeli public with a genuine and recognizable prospect of peace. I found I had wasted my homily, as Mr. al-Kidwa was able to assure me that Mr. Arafat and the P.L.O. were already conscious and convinced of this. A specific point of mine was also well understood, namely that if Mr. Peres succeeded in forcing an election on the question of the international conference, yet it were allowed to appear that this could happen without the involvement of the P.L.O., then the Israeli public would once again have been presented with a false alternative, and the election would bring no real prospect of peace to Israel, the Palestinians or the region.

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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE to the Memo, Ray Helmick, S.J., to Cardinal Law, May 19, '87

In the main body of the memo, I mentioned one reason related to the P.L.O. that helps me understand why there was no response from Vice President Bush and his staff to Your Eminence's approach in early March, namely that they would have foreseen the P.N.C. meeting and wanted to see if the proposal were still alive after it.

There are two other reasons why the lack of response was no surprise, these related to the route we used in trying to communicate the proposal to the U.S. administration at a policy-making level.

The first is that this entire issue is so hot a potato in American politics that it is a great burden to impose on any figure, such as Vice President Bush, who is actively a candidate for the presidency.

The second is that Vice President Bush, as an official with a substantial staff, is in the sort of position where he has normally to refer matters down to his advisory staff (it is of the nature of his office to do this as precaution), who in turn refer them to mid-level staff of other agencies. In this case it was to NSC staff, possibly others as well. I had already found last summer that mid-level and even higher level staff in the State Department and NSC were embarrassed by having to deal with this politically sensitive issue, actually frightened to have any piece of paper around that dealt with it, and consequently I had concluded that it was inadvisable to bring any reports of it to their level. To do so is a way of referring it away from any decision rather than toward it, of feeding it into the system at the level where there is paralysis.

I would recommend, if the initiative is to be communicated again to the administration, that a route be sought through someone able to speak on a familiar basis and regularly with the President himself and the policy-making people about him. This is not to say that the Vice President ought not be kept thoroughly informed, as his opinion and advice would be very valuable. But it is too much to expect anyone in his position to be the active person carrying the communication further.

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May 21, 1987

His Excellency
Archbishop Pio Laghi
Apostolic Pro-Nunzio to the United States
3339 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008-3687

Dear Archbishop Laghi,

Christ's Peace!

Enclosed is the memo I have written for Cardinal Law on my recent conversation with Mr. Nasser al-Kidwa, the Alternate Permanent Observer at the U.N. for the P.L.O., Chairman Yasser Arafat's nephew and the person designated as the one to consult on any questions when Chairman Arafat sent a message to Cardinal Law through Mr. Hanna Siniora last February. I believe you should be informed of what develops in this quarter, and will send a copy of this memo to Cardinal O'Connor, for his information, as well.


I would call your attention to the supplementary note at the end, in which I recommend, effectively, that Mr. Wilson be approached in this matter. Cardinal Law's instinct, after Mr. Siniora's February visit, was to go to Vice President Bush, and I thought even then that this was not the sort of thing that the Vice President should be asked to carry further, as valuable as his advice would be.

Cardinal Law had also made a point, in speaking with Mr. Siniora, of asking whether it might be possible simply to dispense with the good offices of the Holy See as third party in this matter, and received the reply, relayed by telephone from Chairman Arafat himself, that the P.L.O. would be happy to see the proposal implemented in whatever way it could be, with or without the help of a third party.

I don't know myself what the Roman climate is on this matter. Last October you mentioned to me yourself on the phone that you preferred not to send the written report on my October meeting with Arafat through the post to the Holy See, but would take it up in person when you visited Rome in November, as I assume you did. I have no further information since that time.

With all best wishes

in Christ,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

May 21, 1987

His Eminence
John Cardinal O'Connor
Archbishop of New York
460 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022

Your Eminence,

Christ's Peace!

Last Monday I was down to New York to speak with Mr. Nasser al-Kidwa, Chairman Arafat's nephew and the Alternate Permanent Observer for the P.L.O. at the United Nations. Mr. al-Kidwa had been named as the person for us to contact on any questions relative to the proposals I had been making to Mr. Arafat, of which you have been kept informed.

I thought you should have a copy of the enclosed memo, which I drew up for Cardinal Law, for your information on the state of the whole initiative. Arafat had authorized Mr. Hanna Siniora, the editor of the Palestinians' Al-Fajr newspaper in Jerusalem and a major West Bank figure, to visit Cardinal Law last February and raise once again the proposal I had discussed with him in Kuwait last October. Since then the Palestinians have had their P.N.C. meeting in Algiers in April. It turns out, from my conversation with Mr. al-Kidwa, that the whole proposal and initiative is still alive and well.

With all best wishes, I am

yours in Christ,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

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APOSTOLIC NUNCIATURE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

3339 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008-3687

No. 2394/87/5

May 27, 1987

This No. Should Be Prefixed to the Answer

Rev. Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.
Jesuit Community Boston College
Chesnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167

Dear Father Helmick:

I wish to gratefully acknowledge receipt of your letter of May 21st, and the information you enclosed therein.

Please be assured of my continual interest in this delicate matter, and my appreciation for your courtesy in sharing these observations.

You are of course aware of the Holy See's sensitivity in this area. As you mentioned, I did brief my superiors in Rome on the entire matter during my visit in November, but have received no further comment.

Mr. Frank Shakespeare has now replaced Mr. Wilson as the Ambassador of the United States of America to the Holy See, and I recommend that you address your concerns to him, possibly through Cardinal Law, who is a good friend of Ambassador Shakespeare.

With prayerful good wishes, I am

Sincerely yours in Christ,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Ric Laphi".

Apostolic Pro-Nuncio

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CARDINAL'S OFFICE
1011 FIRST AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10022

May 29, 1987

Dear Father Helmick,

With thanks as well for your covering letter of May 21, I thank you for sharing with me your very interesting memo to His Eminence, Cardinal Law, in connection with your Middle East activities.

The memo will be very helpful, I am sure.

With all personal best wishes,

Faithfully in Christ,

John Cardinal O'Connor
Archbishop of New York

Reverend Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.
Jesuit Community
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167

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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

June 10, 1987

His Excellency
Most Reverend Pio Laghi
Apostolic Pro-Nuncio
3339 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008-3687

Dear Archbishop Laghi,

Christ's Peace!

Thank you for your kind letter of May 27 (2394/87/5), on the memo I had sent Cardinal Law after my conversation with Mr. al-Kidwa in New York.

I appreciate your allusion to the sensitivity of all this matter for the Holy See, and your recommendation that I address my concerns to Mr. Frank Shakespeare. I gave a copy of your letter to Cardinal Law, but have not yet heard any comment from him on that suggestion.

I do still wonder, though, whether it is advisable that I inform Mr. Wilson of the state of the matter. Mr. Shakespear, of course, would be much involved in the handling of any formal approaches if this should come so far, and his understanding of it all would be of great help. However, as present Ambassador of the U.S. to the Holy See, he could bring to the Holy See only what he was formally directed to convey by his superiors.

Last year, when all this matter was at a different stage, I found eventually that there was one serious misunderstanding of what was being suggested on the part of the Holy See's Secretariate of State. They thought the proposal was that they should be holding out a basket for the three parties to deposit statements in, and very rightly foresaw troubling consequences if they were to do that. In fact, however, that was not the proposal, which was instead that the Holy See should be willing to act as clearing-house for the various statements which might be forthcoming only if invited or requested to do so by the parties themselves.

In the present situation, I would not expect or recommend that the Holy See should come looking for an American position on the matter at hand without a direct request from the U.S. government itself. For the Holy See to raise the matter would only elicit the standard negative response, and there is no virtue in laying oneself open to that.

What I have done myself, though, to this date, is to approach the actual policy makers, Palestinian, Israeli, and even in a small way King Hussein of Jordan, and present material for a better understanding of one another's positions and the possibilities of reconciling them. I have on several occasions spoken with lower-level U.S. officials, but have found

Archbishop Pio Laghi, June 10, '87 -- 2

them, as I wrote before, embarrassed by the very raising of this issue, despite great good will on their part, and unable to act on it because of restrictive regulations that surround them. It seems that, having communicated as extensively as I have with the other parties, I should communicate this to the level of U.S. government that can in fact assess it and deal with it. There may be a number of ways to do this, and I well realise that it is up to me, and not the Church or the Holy See, to carry the burden of it. I can only ask counsel, not direction of yourself or Cardinal Law. The one obvious way I know of putting this matter before the President of the U.S. is through Mr. Wilson, who is already familiar with the sequence of events up to Spring of 1986, and would be well prepared to understand the sequel. I think of him not as Ambassador of the Holy See, which he is no longer, but as a person able to communicate directly and familiarly with President Reagan, who is also familiar with practice and procedure at the Holy See. I suspect that I should perhaps make the contact with Mr. Wilson myself, if it is to be done. But as I hear you and Cardinal Law both suggesting other persons rather than Mr. Wilson, I wonder if there is some reason specifically to avoid approaching him, and am reluctant to go ahead without knowing that.

As I see it, the Holy See would be involved in this matter only if there were a favorable response from the U.S. government and a consequent request to the Holy See from that quarter (the request is already at hand from the Palestinians) that the Holy See act as clearing-house for statements by both parties. My thought in looking for as direct an approach to President Reagan as Mr. Wilson could provide if he thought fit, is not of course to preclude the President's seeking expert advice, but rather to engage his attention for the matter and have him initiate the request for advice. The reason for this is my discovery over the last year of the paralysis that affects lower-level U.S. officials if an initiative on this matter is directed through them.

With all best wishes

in Christ,

Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.
Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

July 14, 1987

His Beatitude
Patriarch Maximos V Hakim

Dear Patriarch Maximos, Your Beatitude,

Christ's Peace!

Last summer at this time I was most aware of your kind services in Syria. I was in Jerusalem and consequently hard pressed to communicate with anyone in the Arab world. Everything took much longer than I had planned, so much that what I had planned as a three weeks' visit to the region ran to nearly three months, with a further visit in mid-October to follow it up. I relayed several telephone calls to you, calling the Pontifical Mission office in Rome from Jerusalem and asking that they call you in turn. I still hoped then that my visit to Damascus was merely postponed, rather than out of sight. But after I had been some part of August in Rome, then on to Bagdad and back to Amman, I found that my business in Jordan again stretched out unpredictably to three weeks, and the chance of my getting to Damascus receded.

I always hesitate to put anything of substance in the mail to you. Bishop John's visit now gives me the long-awaited opportunity to write. Even so, I will only sketch out the material I would like to communicate to you, and will talk it through thoroughly with Bishop John so that he can fill in the details.

My main business over all that time in the region was with the proper representation of the Palestinians in any negotiations that might occur in an international context for the settlement of the regional problems. I already talked with you last year of the conversations I had had with Palestinian and Israeli leadership on those questions, and with American officials. In writing, I can say only that the process that started then is still very active.

You were anxious last year, when I had the happiness of meeting you at Archbishop Tawil's house, that I give more of my attention to Lebanon. As it happened, when I got back from my summer's travels I found waiting for me a letter from President Amin Gemayel, who had just come across a copy of my March 1983 report on my impressions of Lebanon. He expressed his appreciation of several points in the report, detailed his own intentions for conciliation and sharing of power among the Lebanese communities, and offered his help in advancing the program in legal anthropology that I had proposed.

The President's letter presented me with a quandary, inasmuch as the only proper answer was to say when I would be there. But I still find that the kidnapping phenomenon in Lebanon, including since then the kidnapping of my old friend Terry Waite, makes it simply an imprudence to go there. I don't believe any level of violence has ever kept me away from a conflict area before, but with the kidnapping tactic a person like myself becomes the problem rather than any help. I've talked this through with the Lebanese Ambassador here, Mr.

Patriarch Maximos V Hakim, July 14, '87 -- 2

Bouhabib, and so conveyed that problem back to President Gemayel. As the Ambassador tells me, it would be no real trouble to get a dispensation from U.S. government prohibitions on travel to Lebanon. He tells me I could securely enough visit East Beirut and many other parts of Lebanon. However, it is of the essence of my way of operating in such a situation that I talk with people of all factions, move about freely with everyone's understanding of what I am about, and do so without any association with guns or guards.

I still persist in seeing internal community reconciliation as the primary necessity for Lebanon. As I understand it, Lebanon's vulnerability to all the various forms of interference to which it has been subjected is in strict proportion to its internal disunity. The Lebanese have, in the best periods of their history, shown talent in asserting their control of their own destinies, yet always and only at the price of reconciling their great differences in a truly pluralistic fashion. Right now I believe that such reconciliation has come to depend more than anything else on presidential and Christian firmness, cooperating with the other communities, in bringing to justice the murderers of Prime Minister Karame.

I'm sure you already have full knowledge of all that any of us tried to do in the matter of Maghdousheh. Archbishop Tawil and Bishop John were so much at the center of that matter that they can fill in any missing detail. At the time, it was relatively easy to bring an appeal to the attention of the Palestinians, who then occupied the village, and they in turn had good reason, out of their own experience of dislocation, not to inflict on the people of Maghdousheh what had happened to themselves. There was no such easy access to Amal, except as the appeal could be communicated at the high level of the U.N. Secretary General, and that does not seem to have made the same impression. I would be interested in any ideas as to how a comparable appeal could be made.

It would also be a great help to me if you could suggest any ways around the problems that keep me out of Lebanon. I will surely hope to talk with Archbishop Tawil and Bishop John as soon as they return from their visit. My most cordial greeting to you and my prayers for the relief and happiness of your people.

In Christ,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

168 (pagination error - nothing is missing
between 157 and 168.)



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

August 5, 1987

Ambassador William Wilson
10475 Bellagio Road
Los Angeles, CA 90077

Dear Ambassador Wilson,

Christ's Peace!

The last time I spoke to you was just after my visit to Tunis in March of '86. When I went on to visit Israel last summer, and then to Rome to report it to the Holy See, you had already left the Embassy. Peter Murphy, holding the fort until the succession of Frank Shakespeare, was a pillar of strength and wisdom for me as I trekked about the Middle East, checking in to Rome repeatedly after further trips to Iraq and Jordan and back again to Tunis.

You had my report on the March '86 meetings with Mr. Arafat in Tunis and the follow-up. I enclose copies of the material from that period in case you no longer have them and need to refresh your recollection. I send these along with subsequent materials because I now find myself sitting on information about Palestinian intentions, and about P.L.O. readiness and capacity for serious peace negotiation, which I believe is much better than any otherwise available to the U.S. government, and find it difficult to get the information through to those who could best use it. I am looking for your advice and, if you should think it good, assistance in this matter.

Last year, besides going to people in the State Department and NSC about my March meetings with Arafat, I also went, with the full panoply of written reports, to the Israelis, working through the excellent then Consul General of Israel in Boston, Michael Shiloh. (Michael has since returned to a posting in the Foreign Ministry office in Jerusalem, where he was one of those most constructively involved with Cardinal O'Connor's visit earlier this year. I do have a good relation also with his successor in the Boston consulate, Arthur Avnon.) Through Michael, I asked that I see the principal Israeli figures: Peres, Shamir and Rabin, on my visit in July of '86. A report of that visit is among the enclosures here. I did not get to see the three persons named. Instead it was planned that I should be stopped at the level of Mrs. Yael Vered, religious affairs adviser in the Foreign Ministry. I did find, however, that both Shamir and Peres had read and given careful attention to the written reports I had sent (specifically to my November '85 letter to Arafat, the report on my March '86 meetings with him, and on my subsequent Washington meetings). Mrs. Vered's assistant, Zvi Neeman, put in a long session with me, using an extensive portfolio of materials prepared with care to refute everything I had been told by the Palestinians. That refutation was not especially successful, as you can see.

Despite the effort to shut me off, however, I did get to see people close to then Prime Minister Peres, particularly MK Aharon Harel, who was able to give me messages with the authority of Peres, and Uri Savir of Peres' office, who was able to tell me quite in detail of Peres' reactions to my reports and the work I was doing, let me know that Peres saw it as important and something that he would find any time for that was needed, but that he might not want to actually meet me or let himself be associated with what I was doing. That turned out to be the case. Savir let me know, not directly but through Hanna Siniora as intermediary, that Peres chose not to meet me unless I were to come back to Israel after a meeting with King Hussein, bringing additional news. I did, however, leave Israel with good indications of how both the Israeli and U.S. governments would respond if there were an adequate statement in recognition of Israel by Arafat and the P.L.O.

At this point I ran into complications with messages. I had two messages from the Israelis. One, given to me by Aharon Harel with the authority of Peres, dealt with Israeli response if the P.L.O. would meet the familiar preconditions for dealing with them. The other, dealing with Palestinian participation in a meeting preparatory to an international conference, even without the P.L.O.'s meeting the preconditions, had been conveyed to me by Uri Savir, not directly but through Hanna Siniora as intermediary. The Aharon Harel message was both more important in substance and more reliable, but both needed to be brought to Arafat.

I had a third account, this one from U.S. officials, of what the U.S. government would do if Arafat and the P.L.O. met the preconditions. But this also was given to me through Hanna Siniora as intermediary. It would need to be checked, and for that I needed a U.S. official who, I could be sure, would not route the inquiries through channels, both U.S. and Israeli, that would take the opportunity to derail anything that might be in progress. It was for this that I turned to Peter Murphy as soon as I got to Rome at the beginning of August. I couldn't ask for more explicit confirmation, if the choice was to give the message with so much indirection in the first place. But I asked Peter to get it, without detours, directly to the U.S. officials immediately concerned, and get a denial if they wished to give one.

A denial was in fact given, but not until much later, at the end of September, after I had reported the message, with all its problems of indirection, to Arafat. And then the denial was in a complex three-part formula that appeared to take back the denial even as it was spoken. The issue, for the State Department figure I spoke to in September, was less the content of the message than the fact that my written report contained the names of two U.S. officials. The exact terms of the denial were:

1) the denial itself: what had been reported to me by Hanna Siniora had not been said by the U.S. officials.

2) a reason for the denial: I was told that the officials could not have said what was reported because there is a statute explicitly prohibiting all U.S. officials from making even indirect communication with the P.L.O. Such a statute, I was told, had not existed at the time when Andrew Young was fired for talking to a P.L.O. official. Only direct communication had been prohibited then, but now the indirect communication is forbidden as well.

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Ambassador William Wilson, Aug. 5, '87 -- 3

3) a reinstatement of the content of the communication: it is entirely within Arafat's power, I was told, to compel such a U.S. response if he will meet the preconditions.

I went back, of course, to Arafat, meeting him again in October in Kuwait, to report the denial exactly as it was given, and to argue again, as I had each time I've met him, for his meeting the preconditions. His response is the main burden of the information I need to bring to U.S. government attention now. But I am left with the realization that I can no longer deal with the mid-level officials of the State Department to whom I have reported before. For them, this whole matter is too hot a potato. Any piece of paper or information relating to it is an embarrassment to them. If it comes to the attention of Israelis who don't want anything positive to happen (and that is by no means all the Israelis, as there are many of them entirely devoted to finding a solution of this problem), anything the U.S. officials have done and any piece of paper associated with them will be used to the detriment of their careers. The only safe response for these U.S. officials is to shunt the matter aside and not deal with it. Consequently, I don't report to that level of U.S. government any more, and need another way to report to more responsible levels. P.L.O. officials in the U.S., by the way, to whom I have mentioned that statute explicitly prohibiting even indirect communication by U.S. officials with them, have consistently reacted with surprise, saying they know of no such statute, and would expect to know of it if it existed.

The real substance of what I know now, though, is about Arafat's and the P.L.O.'s intentions and capabilities with regard to a peace settlement. Here I do believe that my information is better than that of anyone not in the sort of communication I have had.

When I saw Arafat last September, it was just three days after he had given his September 5th speech to the meeting of non-aligned countries in Harare, in which, among other things, he had explicitly endorsed UNSC 242 and 338, along with other U.N. resolutions related to the Palestinian question. I proposed to him at that time that he issue a shorter and simpler statement, following unmistakably the lines of the proposal which U.S. officials had given to King Hussein during the Amman meetings of early 1986. I had been proposing, since early in 1986, to Cardinals Law and O'Connor and to Archbishop Laghi, that the Holy See use its good offices, in a planned and programmatic way, to help all parties toward a solution of this problem. Since I now understood that there was a possibility of the U.S. and Israel making reciprocal statements in response to the P.L.O.'s meeting the preconditions, but that all three parties suspected that the others might cheat, I then proposed that the Holy See be prepared, if requested by all the parties, to act as a clearing house for statements, so that all parties could know there were no tricks.

Arafat found both proposals welcome. He was indeed prepared to meet the preconditions, as you can see in the enclosed report on that meeting. There was reason to delay for a short period, however, because his Harare speech had been designed to meet a similar proposal mediated by President Ceausescu of Romania. Ceausescu had talked, Arafat told me, with both Israeli and U.S. authorities, and had been promised some explicit response by each if Arafat would make a stipulated set of statements in public, all of which he included in his Harare speech. Knowing that the European press and media had interpreted the Harare speech as more restricted than he claimed, I argued that interpretation

through with him point by point, and was assured eventually, both by his argument and by the text of the speech, which I received both in the original Arabic and in English translation, that it was as he said. Before initiating another separate approach, Arafat felt, he should allow some time (he said ten days) to measure the response to the initiative Ceausescu had mediated. I suggested that I return in two weeks, and in fact it was a month before I got back to see him again, in Kuwait, on October 9th.

A report of that meeting is enclosed here too. We argued for several hours the merits of Arafat's making the sort of statement I proposed, especially after he had said all of this, in substance, in the course of his Harare speech, and it had not been acknowledged by the U.S. or Israel. Eventually he agreed to issue such a statement if His Holiness the Pope could assure him that there would be some adequate U.S. response. I said I would report that, and I did so to Cardinals Law and O'Connor and Archbishop Laghi.

The matter needed more to be taken up with a properly responsible level of U.S. government than to be taken up with the Holy See, and at that time, in October and November, it did not move. In February of this year, Hanna Siniora came through Boston, met Cardinal Law, and brought the proposal back to life. Cardinal Law wanted to know if the third-party role of the Pope would be an essential of the proposal, or if Arafat would be prepared to make the statement if it could be agreed without the third-party intervention. That was conveyed to Arafat, and he assured us through his representatives here that he would be happy to make the statement if he knew there would be an adequate response, with or without the third-party role of the Holy See. He also appointed a person to handle communication on the subject with me: his nephew, Mr. Nasir al-Kidwa, who is the Number Two in the P.L.O. Observer office at the U.N., and is in regular contact with Arafat himself.

Cardinal Law communicated all this to Vice President Bush, but again it did not move. My own feeling was that, as good a man as the Vice President is, and as valuable as his advice, he is not the right man to turn to in this matter. For one thing, he is already running for President, and hence more politically vulnerable than most others. It is unreasonable, even if he is willing, to ask him to act in this area now. More important, he is equipped with a staff, competent professional advisers who have, like himself, no real areas of responsibility. He must consult them in such a matter, and they in turn must consult exactly those strata of middle management in the government that, as I had already discovered, cannot respond to anything in this matter except with paralysis. That in fact was what happened. Bill Murphy and I both talked with a man on Bush's staff, who went off on a trip to another part of the world with the message that he would contact us when he heard anything. We did the contacting ourselves to ask if he had heard, and he said he had referred it to the NSC staff, and would let us know if he heard any response from them. Not surprisingly, nothing more happened.

It would be understandable to me that everyone should want to wait and see what came out of the Algiers P.N.C. meeting; whether Arafat was still able to make such promises, take such action or carry out such policies after it. I refused an invitation to attend the P.N.C. as an observer, but after a decent interval to let the results of the meeting be sorted out I went to New York to talk it all through with Mr. al-Kidwa. A report of that meeting is enclosed here too. Al-Kidwa was authorized to renew the offer, on behalf

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Ambassador William Wilson, Aug. 5, '87 -- 5

of Arafat, in exactly the same terms, and gave me an account of the P.N.C. and its outcome. I have other good information as well to assure me that Arafat, far from knuckling under to hard-liners at the P.N.C., carried the whole substance of his peace-seeking policy through the P.N.C., won the acquiescence of Habash and the other hard-liners to it, and now remains fully in control of P.L.O. policy, which he has designed for these ends, in the day-to-day operation of P.L.O. headquarters in Tunis. I've had this since from a former member of Arafat's secretariate staff who visited Tunis last month and sat in on practically all Arafat's meetings over a ten-day period.

So what to propose? I think the substance of this information should be put before the President. I'm sure care would have to be taken in presenting it, because most public reporting has been in the form of propaganda, and the U.S. government has no sources for direct information. I don't mean, at all, to do an end run around the President's professional advisers. But I am sure that, to get anywhere, a quest for advice to him on this matter will have to come from him, since I have become convinced that anything that is referred initially to staff will stop right there.

I look for your advice on this matter. I could be wrong in my assessment of what should be done. If you think I am right, I would like your help. I could be wrong in my reading of what is going on in the P.L.O. as well, but to get to better information than I have been able to muster by my direct contacts, the thing the government lacks, would take resources unavailable to me but which the government could command. If something is to come of this proposal, it would doubtless be necessary for both parties to know just what would be in the other's statement so that neither would embarrass the other. I would be happy to assist in that or to leave it to others as might be best.

With all best wishes, I am yours,

in Christ,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



JEWISH COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL, MASSACHUSETTS 02167

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October 12, 1987

Ambassador William Wilson
10475 Bellagio Road
Los Angeles, California 90077

Dear Mr. Wilson,

Christ's Peace!

Thank you for your call a while back. I am encouraged to know you are working on my communicating those matters to the right people.


I expect you have seen the news in Tom Friedman's article in today's New York Times (copy enclosed). You may have known of these events as a factor in bringing my information along to the Administration. I've known much of it, but couldn't confirm what Friedman says of Rabin being the one who sabotaged the effort.

It does confirm, though, several things I've been convinced of these last two years. One is that it will take a U.S. initiative to put this matter, quite legitimately, before the Israeli public. The other, less obvious and hence all the more interesting, is that there is a readiness in the Likud to take part in whatever negotiating process actually gets going, despite a lot of contrary emotion and disposition to frustrate any such negotiations. The final line is that Likud doesn't want to be left out on the sidelines, throwing rocks and not having a real voice. And while Amirav will be punished this time for having stuck his neck out, Shamir, who surely knew all that was going on, was quite aware that it was Arafat and the real PLO that had to be the partner to real negotiations.

As I see it, Arafat has already said the essential things, though somewhat obscurely, in his Harare speech last year. He said them more clearly, as I had asked him to, recently in Geneva, though that speech, like the one in Harare, has gone virtually unreported in our media. The Israeli response to the Geneva speech was that his explicit acceptance of 242/338 was not enough and nothing new: that he had to renounce all other actions of the UN before they would accept his position. That is not a legitimate demand. I think that, with a procedure that can be mutually agreed on, it will be time now for the U.S. simply to deliver on the promise it has made consistently ever since 1975, that when the conditions are met we will take the steps to which we have committed ourselves.

I will consult again with my contact in New York, to see that everything I've been told over the last year still holds in the light of this process that has gone on between Israelis and Palestinians in recent months. I think it looks very promising, and hope I will have the chance to bring this to the right quarters soon.

In Christ,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

Mideast Peace Bid Ends; Hope and One Arm Hurt

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, Oct. 11 — During the last few months, Israel and Yasir Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization may have come a little closer to peace negotiations than at any time since their conflict began.

Surprisingly, it was a member of the ruling central committee of Israel's hard-line Likud bloc, Moshe Amirav, who was behind the effort to bring Israel to talks with Mr. Arafat and West Bank Palestinians loyal to him.

In the end, the secret contacts led to little. They resulted in a broken arm and a gashed forehead for Prof. Sari Nusseibeh, one of the Palestinians who was involved in the preparatory discussions and who was beaten up by extremist Palestinians for his efforts.

The talks also led to the decision last Monday by the Jerusalem branch of the Herut Party, which makes up the core of the Likud bloc, to put Mr. Amirav on party trial preparatory to expulsion from the party.

The results show
the difficulty in
breaking the
deadlock.

But maybe the most lasting impact of these stillborn peace talks is the proof they provide of just how difficult it is for pragmatic Palestinian and Jewish nationalists to put together a negotiating format that might break the Arab-Israeli deadlock.

The dialogue began last July when Mr. Amirav asked a left-wing Israeli peace campaigner, David Ish-Shalom, to put him in touch with prominent pro-P.L.O. Palestinians in the West Bank.

Mr. Ish-Shalom said he got in touch with Professor Nusseibeh, who teaches philosophy at Bir Zeit University in the West Bank, and that Mr. Nusseibeh asked Salah Zuharka, an editor of Al Shaab, an Arabic newspaper, to join him in talks with Mr. Amirav.

Later, Mr. Nusseibeh also enlisted a Palestinian intellectual, Faisal Husseini, probably the most prominent pro-Arafat West Bank resident.

Two Draft Papers

The talks, which began in Mr. Amirav's Jerusalem home, opened with the official of the Likud bloc presenting two draft papers, Mr. Nusseibeh said in an interview.

One paper dealt with general principles for negotiations, which included

recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination and the right of the P.L.O. to represent Palestinians, provided it accepted Israel's existence and security.

The other paper dealt with the outline for an "interim agreement" lasting for three to five years, before negotiations for a final settlement. The interim solution called for granting the 1.2 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip a high degree of self-rule. They would have their own administrative headquarters in Arab East Jerusalem, along with their own flag, anthem, stamps and currency.

Israel, however, would retain overall sovereignty in the occupied territories and Jerusalem.

Alternative to Labor Plan

Mr. Nusseibeh said Mr. Amirav explained to the Palestinians that "his objective was to eventually bring us into a dialogue with a wide circle within the Likud Party, and he hinted that Prime Minister Shamir might be interested in such a bold initiative."

The Amirav plan had the potential to give the Likud a real alternative to the Labor Party's proposal for international peace talks focused on Israel and Jordan, which Likud opposes. Likud's leaders, however, have denied that Mr. Amirav was acting on their behalf or with their knowledge.

"I believe that Mr. Shamir was fully aware that these contacts were going on," Mr. Ish-Shalom said in an interview. "He may not have approved of them, but I think he wanted to see what they might produce."

Between July and early September Mr. Amirav and the pro-Arafat Palestinians met 10 times to refine the Amirav proposals. In the later stages, the negotiations got serious enough for Mr. Amirav to go into another room and make phone calls to unnamed senior Likud officials to check on specific wording, Mr. Nusseibeh said.

Eventually a two-page working paper was agreed upon. Mr. Amirav planned to go to Geneva on Sept. 6 to present the plan to Mr. Arafat.

Three Key Principles

Mr. Amirav reportedly planned to seek Mr. Arafat's agreement to three principles — an immediate cessation of hostilities, mutual Israeli and P.L.O. recognition, and a halt to new Israeli settlement building — as a basis for negotiating the interim accord.

But on the eve of the trip, Israeli Air Force jets bombed the Palestinian refugee district at Ain Hilweh in southern Lebanon, reportedly killing 50 pro-Arafat Palestinians. Moreover, Mr. Husseini was suddenly arrested for "pro-P.L.O. activities" and jailed without trial.

Mr. Ish-Shalom said he believed these actions occurred because De-

NY Times, Mon., Sept. 12, 1987



Reuters

Israeli Troops Clash With Palestinian Protesters in Jerusalem

Soldier firing tear gas into crowd of demonstrators a group of right-wing Jewish extremists who were at the Temple Mount, a shrine revered by both Jews demanding Israeli control over the mount. Seven people were injured and 12 protesters were arrested.

fense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, a Labor Party member who favors negotiations with King Hussein of Jordan and not with pro-P.L.O. Palestinians from the West Bank, wanted to scuttle the Amirav initiative.

Nonetheless, Mr. Nusseibeh agreed to accompany Mr. Amirav to the meeting with Mr. Arafat. But, on the eve of their departure for Geneva, Mr. Amirav himself backed out.

A Shift by Arafat

Mr. Ish-Shalom went to Geneva in his place Sept. 8 and, accompanied by a left-wing Israeli member of Parliament, Charlie Biton, presented the Amirav document to Mr. Arafat. But

Mr. Arafat told them, according to Mr. Nusseibeh, that he would only "respond" to an official Israeli Government overture.

Somehow Mr. Biton took this to be a positive answer and immediately broadcast it to the Israeli press, creating a brief stir and, according to Israeli officials, greatly disturbing King Hussein. The King thought he had an understanding with Israel to promote an international conference and to quash pro-P.L.O. Palestinians.

On Sept. 18, Mr. Amirav decided to make the whole dialogue public. The reaction was swift. On Sept. 21, Mr. Nusseibeh was clubbed by four masked men on the Bir Zeit campus. Mr. Hus-

seini was arrested by Israel a second time and jailed without trial.

The day Mr. Nusseibeh was beaten, hard-line Hequl members moved to expel Mr. Amirav from the party.

Last Monday, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir decided to meet publicly with pro-Jordanian West Bank Palestinians to repeat that he wanted direct peace talks with King Hussein.

The whole affair, concluded Mr. Nusseibeh, raised serious questions "about the extent to which people can explore alternatives that are not part of the political dogma in both communities." "These dogmas," he said, "have become like a religion, and anyone who deviates from them is a heretic."

Iraq Hits 3 Tankers; An Iranian Missile Goes Off in Baghdad

MANAMA, Bahrain, Oct. 11 (AP) — Iraq staged aerial attacks on Iranian oil targets today, and an Iranian surface-to-surface missile exploded in Baghdad, the Iraqi capital.

The attacks on shipping included one that severely damaged a Liberian-flag supertanker, the 239,435-ton Rova, on which two crewmen were reported killed and four others missing.

According to shipping executives based in the Persian Gulf area, two Exocet missiles from Iraqi jets crashed into the engine room of the Rova, setting the ship ablaze.

It was one of three raids announced by Iraq against tankers along the Iranian coast since Saturday morning.

Minor Damage on Second Tanker

Shipping executives identified another target as the Merlin, a 215,925-ton Cypriot-flag tanker under charter to Iran. An Exocet missile crashed into the ship but did not explode, and damage was minor, they said.

The identity of the third ship was not known.

The Rova is one of 26 tankers owned or under charter by Iran to shuttle oil from the big Kharg Island oil terminal in the north to other loading centers to the south, away from the war zone. The shipping executives said the tanker was sailing empty and had been "destroyed" by the Exocets that struck the engine room.

They said most crew members had leaped into the water and had been rescued, but two were known dead and four others were unaccounted for. The nationality of the crew was not known. The Rova was managed by World Carriers, a Greek shipping company based in London.

IN MY recent talks with the PLO supporting Palestinians, which aroused a storm among the Israeli public and shocked the Likud, there was one statement by them that I cannot forget: "The Alignment can make war, but only the Likud can make peace."

From their point of view, the logic of that statement lies in Israel's political constellation: no peace agreement is possible without the Likud's agreement, and the Alignment would never oppose an agreement acceptable to the Likud.

From my point of view, the logic of the statement goes much deeper and goes to the roots of the philosophy of Revisionist Zionism. These roots were unknown to my interlocutors, and I must confess that they are known to only a small minority of my own movement - the Likud.

The central principle that I presented to the Palestinians was that of "a partnership in Greater Eretz Yisrael." This principle stands in opposition to all the solutions that call for a separation of the two peoples and the partition of the land. From this principle we can derive political solutions that are more flexible and more just than any imposed partition solution of one type or another.

As against the minimalist Zionist stand that proposed territorial concessions which would appease the Arabs, the Revisionist movement presented three principles: the integrity of the land, a Jewish majority, and a Hebrew state.

The leader of this movement, Ze'ev Jabotinsky, was courageous enough to say this to the Arabs

How Likud could achieve peace

Moshe Amirav, in hot water with his Herut party for talking to PLO backers, explains his stand



Moshe Amirav



Ze'ev Jabotinsky

straight out, in contrast to the other Zionist leaders, who ignored the Arab problem. It was Jabotinsky who asserted that the Arabs of this country constitute "a separate national entity...and they will not agree to anything less than national rule...with respect to communities, education and culture, and political representation."

Jabotinsky was the first to propose a distinction between national

that this area - the West Bank and Gaza - is your homeland, while we say that it is the land of our fathers and that it is vital for our security. Let us rule over it together - in accordance with Jabotinsky's principles!"

I presented to them a detailed proposal consisting of three parts:

(a) A peace agreement with representatives of the Palestinian people (and if they preferred the PLO, I would accept that on condition that it ended its terror and recognized the State of Israel).

(b) Partnership in the rule over Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, the formal arrangement being broad autonomy in which Israel has sovereignty and an army, while the Palestinians possess all other ruling authority and its national symbols (flag, anthem, stamps, and currency).

(c) In historic Eretz Yisrael on both sides of the Jordan there would be established an Israeli-Arab confederation, with the Palestinians, who constitute a majority in Jordan, having the option of regarding it as their homeland or of contenting themselves with having broad ruling authority in Judea and Samaria. "The day will come," I told them, "when you will achieve both: sovereignty in Jordan and self-rule on the West Bank."

With respect to Jerusalem, we agreed that the city would remain united under Israeli sovereignty, and that the administrative capital of expanded autonomy would be established in East Jerusalem.

We agreed that the PLO would cease to be a terror organization,

disband its military frameworks, and become an organization along the lines of the World Zionist Organization, with branches and emissaries all over the world.

The advantages of such an arrangement to the Palestinians are clear: this is the maximum that they can get in an arrangement with Israel, and it does not require them to renounce the idea of one day establishing a Palestinian state on the West Bank.

As for Israel, the proposal enables it to retain the two options of security and settlement. It is also a long-term solution to the demographic problem, since we cannot indefinitely deny the Palestinians civil rights. The granting of such rights would mean a bi-national

'We agreed the PLO ... would become an organization along the lines of the World Zionist organization'

state with a population in Eretz Yisrael in the year 2000 (according to projections of the Central Bureau of Statistics) of 3.8 million Arabs and 4.3 million Jews.

There is one more advantage to my plan. It appears to me to be the only one today that stands a chance of being accepted by the Likud, the Alignment, and the Palestinians. In my talks with the latter, they did not reject it out of hand - and that gives me new hope for peace.

WILLIAM A. WILSON

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Reverend Father Raymond G. Helmick, S. J.
Jesuit Community
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167

Dear Father Helmick:

No, although I now subscribe to the New York Times, I had not seen the article which accompanied your recent letter. It is indeed very interesting and informative. Written by Mr. Friedman, I give it a great deal more credence than most articles written by the staff writers. I have learned over recent years to read all news media with a very critical eye.

Frankly, I am not very hopeful that anything of substance will result from Mr. Schultz' current trip to the Middle East, although there is always the prospect of some hopeful results. Should the Russians be included in a multinational meeting on the subject of the Middle East? I really don't know. I have a great deal of respect for the King of Jordan, but on the other hand he is caught in a squeeze play. Is there any chance that even with a good P.R. program in this country that the Jews and Israel could be brought to the understanding that in the long run it is to their best interests to solve the Palistinian problem? I really don't think so.

I have had some experience in the manner in which they think, i.e., in the issue of Vatican-Israel diplomatic relations!

For those who try to bridge that immense gap of mistrust between the two principles and principals in the issue, my deep feeling of gratitude. But is it worth risking one's life to try? Only those involved can answer that.

What is it that the Palestinians want? Is it just the West Bank or is it a great deal more? I guess only the radicals and the moderates can answer that and I would guess that even they do not agree. What is it that the Israelis want? Here again, there are several different factions that do not agree on the issue.

Would giving the West Bank to the Palestinians under the conditions outlined in Mr. Friedman's article satisfy them? Probably for a while, but would it only be the nose of the camel?

Knowing what I do about our State Department and knowing as I do the policy of the State Department toward the Israel-Arab world, I would not look for much if any help from that quarter. Things are going along just fine as far as they are concerned, I think. At some point in the history of the world, I would think that the Israelis might do some hard and fast thinking about how they are perceived by the rest of the world. I surely hope they are not setting themselves up for another holocaust.

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I am always pleased to hear from you. The last time we talked was just prior to the trip of Perez de Cuellar. I thought at that time, "let's wait and see how his trip turns out, maybe he is the man for Father Helmick to consider." Well the trip didn't turn out that well, so I have not made that suggestion to you.....But I am still thinking.

May God continue to bless you and your work. I look forward to hearing that you have been responsible for a major breakthrough on this most difficult problem.

With every good wish

Bill

October 17, 1987



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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

January 5, 1988

Ambassador William Wilson
10475 Bellagio Road
Los Angeles, California 90077

Dear Mr. Wilson,

Christ's Peace!

It was kind of you to write at such length and so reflectively on October 17th. I had been looking, as you'll understand, for some more immediate contact with the Administration on these Israeli-Palestinian matters. I did understand, though, that you were asking me, with good reason, to reflect my way right back through the whole matter before taking further steps, and I concluded that I should give myself time to do that thoroughly, even that I should wait for the Gorbachev meeting to be over and done with so as to see how that might affect things.

I was most encouraged at the end of your letter, when you hoped you might hear that I had made some major breakthrough on this Israeli-Palestinian problem. My feeling is that a major breakthrough has already happened, to some extent through work I've done over this last two years, that more is quite within reach, but that I really need help to get through to the Administration and have some realization and practical acknowledgement of what has already been done before the rest can be expected.

However, you had a series of serious questions that you wanted me to think my way back through. I won't take them in the order you gave them, since you started with the question of whether the Jews and Israel could be brought to the understanding that "in the long run it is to their best interests to solve the Palestinian problem." I've learned a lot of things about that, and am inclined to think it can be done, and is being done in many ways, but I'll leave that question to the latter part of the reflection.

Your question on what the Palestinians want: whether just the West Bank (and of course Gaza) or a great deal more. Surely this has been illuminated a great deal by the events of this last month, but I think it is most clarified by the dealings I have had with Arafat and his leadership circle over this last two years.

There are certainly Palestinians who want to see the whole State of Israel disappear. Even with the hatred manifested during the Gaza and West Bank riots recently, I don't think this is the desire to do hurt to the Israelis or the Jews: it is rather to get something terribly oppressive off their backs. The clearest message (a cry of despair) during the riots was, to me, when the youngsters in the Palestinian streets chanted "Kill us all, or get out." This was a cry against the occupation, and had to do with the Occupied Territories. That was clearly understood even by the young demonstrators themselves.

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Camel's nose under the tent, you ask? And as you observe, there are different opinions: the radicals, the moderates. I've read comments over these last weeks that the fathers' generation had been ready to compromise but the teenagers were not, so that the Israelis had lost their chance for the peace. I think that's hogwash. The fathers' generation has been through a long process of education for which the PLO leadership is responsible, and they are still able to make the peace that they have been preparing for all this time. The teenagers are impatient --all they have ever known is military occupation, and whatever smokescreen is laid over it, that has been brutal. But they are teenagers, and they will accept the settlement their fathers make, provided it is truly decent. If a trick is played on them, of course, and some sort of fake settlement imposed, the fight will simply go on as before.

But that puts the burden on the PLO leadership and its standing with the vast majority of the Palestinians, within the Occupied Territories and outside. This is what I've been exploring and trying to bring to more practical terms over this period of my dealings with them, and I believe they are really ready to deal seriously.

There is first the matter of what the Arafat leadership of the PLO has educated Palestinian public opinion to over these last twenty years. As I went through it with Arafat and several members of his Executive in March '86, the "Democratic State" proposal, while it got nowhere with Israelis and Americans, was in essence a Palestinian acceptance of the Jews, as citizens with equal rights and a religious community with equal freedom. Arafat educated his people to this over a period of years, and it is accepted now, other than by a few extremists or people suffering radical frustration (frustration which can be relieved, with the result that these people will not be permanently irreconcilable with the Jews). The proposal was rejected, for the proper reason that it meant the end of the separate Jewish State of Israel and the merging of its citizens into a single state in which they would share citizenship with the Palestinians. As I told Arafat and his colleagues, I reject it too for that reason. And in the period since 1974, Arafat and his PLO leadership have themselves educated their public, once again, to a new proposal: the two-state solution, or, as was established during the 1984-1986 period of rapprochement between Arafat and King Hussein, a confederation between a Palestinian State and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. There is insistence, in this matter, that the Palestinian member of this confederation be internally self-governing, under the sovereignty of the King, and not simply reduced to a province of Jordan under the non-democratic system that obtains on the East Bank. The Palestinians have genuinely acquired the habits of democracy, even under the most difficult and improbable condition of being a hunted movement of exiles, with every propaganda weapon in the world used against them, and they do not propose to do without a democratic life.)

I gave the interpretation, during those March '86 conversations with Arafat and his colleagues, that this two-state proposal was, in essence, a recognition that the earlier Democratic State proposal had had an internal contradiction in it that had to be corrected. The Israelis rejected the Democratic State proposal, because their preference is for a separate Jewish State of Israel, and in doing so they have carried out as clear an act of self-determination as anyone could ever look for. Consequently, what the PLO's two-state proposal recognises is that the Israelis, these Jewish people whom they have, in the Democratic State proposal, definitively accepted as having equal rights with themselves, are entitled to their state (Israel) on

exactly the same legal basis as that on which the Palestinians make their own claim, namely the right of self-determination. As I have described this to you before, this interpretation of mine was new language to Arafat and the others I was speaking to, but not a new proposal. It was rather an interpretation of what was the essential meaning of their experience over the whole time of Arafat's Chairmanship of the PLO. They discussed this interpretation very urgently and animatedly at the time, and all of them -- Arafat himself, Farouk Kaddoumi, Hani al-Hassan and Abdul Rahin Ahmed -- asserted that that interpretation of mine was in fact exactly what their experience, their decisions over those years and their actions meant. That is the first part of what I see as so important an actual breakthrough in the course of these dealings with the PLO. It truly means that these leaders of the PLO understand the policy they have educated their people to over the years, and to which Palestinian public opinion really adheres, as including the formal right of the State of Israel to exist by reason of self-determination.

I felt at the time that, while this was important, and not at all understood by most Israelis and Americans, it was not enough, but had to be supplemented by the formality of explicit PLO acceptance of UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. Over a series of subsequent contacts with Arafat I argued that, in person, in writing and by message through third parties. You have the whole record of those contacts. What actually happened was that Arafat, speaking formally for the PLO, twice did give the explicit recognition and acceptance of 242 and 338. I'm enclosing the texts of those two statements. The first was at the conference of Non-Aligned nations in Harare, in September of 1986. My text is from the Telex sent out by the PLO offices on September 5th, the day after the address. Unfortunately, I have lost the concluding piece of the Telex with the last passage of the speech (I have the Arabic text in full). The missing piece is a reproach to the Iranians, whom Arafat recognized as being, along with the Libyans, the most dangerous opposition to his making the statement he did, for their lack of cooperation. I have marked the pertinent passage, on pages 11 and 12.

I've mentioned to you my astonishment at finding that this speech was never even mentioned in the New York Times, and I gather very little if at all noticed anywhere in the American media. The European media all covered it, as did the Israelis. But few Americans know it was ever given.

The explicit and unconditional acceptance of 242 and 338 was given a good public time, in an Arafat address on behalf of the PLO, at the UN's international NGO meeting on the question of Palestine this last September, 1987, at Geneva. Again, I've marked the pertinent paragraph, which comes at the end of the speech, p. 15.

In both these speeches, the burden of the text is Israeli occupation of the territories, aggression, violation of the human rights of the Palestinians, racism, etc., and American support for the Israelis in precisely those matters. That makes an unwelcoming context for the statements of acceptance of 242 and 338.

There is a second problem with both statements. The European press took it in 1986 that the statement conditioned the acceptance of 242 and 338 on the international conference. I argued that one through with Arafat just a few days after he gave the speech, and he insists that the international conference is not a condition, but that the acceptance of 242 and 338 is absolute, unconditional, in the text and in his understanding. The actual phrasing is that the PLO insists

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on the international conference, in conformity with UN General Assembly Resolution 18/58 C, ... on the basis of all the resolutions of the UN and the Security Council related to the question of Palestine and the Middle East, including resolutions 242, 338, 465 and 471. All of these are equated with international legality, i.e., all belong to the legal disposition of the question made by the world community and accepted by the PLO as such. I understand why the Europeans took that as conditioning the acceptance of the resolutions on the international conference, but I agree with Arafat's interpretation, which goes for the text and his intention: that the acceptance of the resolutions is unconditional. In the second statement, the one in Geneva this last September, the same formula is held to very strictly, and I believe the interpretation must be the same.

As you know, I asked Arafat, when I saw him in Kuwait in October '86, to make a simpler and more direct statement, one not burdened with all those references to the sins of Israelis and Americans or any other rhetorical freight, nor with any linking of the acceptance of UN resolutions to the international conference. Arafat needed a reason to do that, and eventually agreed that he would make such a statement if the Holy Father could assure him that there would be an adequate response from the U.S. Subsequently, through Hanna Siniora in February of 1987 and again through his nephew, Nasser al-Kidwa, who is the number 2 on the PLO's Observer delegation at the UN and is designated now as my normal contact with Arafat, he has assured me (and Cardinal Law) that he does not insist on any role of the Holy See as third party if the thing can be arranged more directly with the U.S.. I have checked back regularly with al-Kidwa to be sure, over the long time this has gone on, that everything previously promised still holds with the changing of circumstances, and I am assured that it does.

What is needed at this point is the contact with the Administration for which I've appealed to you, so that there can be a process by which the U.S. readiness to respond to the PLO's acceptance of Israel's right to exist in the form of acceptance of 242 and 338, in the way the U.S. has promised ever since Kissinger made his agreement with the Israelis not to recognize or deal with the PLO until they took that step, can be manifested.

There is a further problem about the PLO acceptance of 242 and 338. The Israeli response to both the 1986 Harare statement and the 1987 Geneva statement was that they were ~~not new~~ new, and that the PLO would have to recognize only 242 and 338, ~~renouncing the rest of what the UN has resolved in the matter.~~ The PLO's position is that all the UN resolutions have the standing, from having been resolved by the world community, of international legality. I don't see the Israeli position as a tenable one myself, and I hope it is not, even surreptitiously, U.S. policy. Of course, I know that the resolution that sticks in Israeli and American throats is G.A. Resolution 3379 of 1975, which determines that Zionism is a form of racism. There is a trick to that, inasmuch as that is the resolution to which formal objection is made, but under cover of that objection there is a hidden objection to the UN's many resolutions condemning the occupation of the lands conquered in 1967. Granted that, however, the formula that Zionism is racism has a delegitimizing force, not only for Israelis but for nearly all Jews, who identify themselves strongly as Zionist. (Again, I do so myself, and hold the Zionist ideal as something quite sacred.) I'd like to come back to that a bit later in this reflection, as I think it is something I can do something about with Arafat, but only on the basis that there is something happening, on the part of the U.S., as a result of his statements already given at Harare and Geneva and his readiness to make a more direct and straightforward

statement of acceptance of Israel if he knows that it will not simply be ignored.

The last of the problems I want to deal with regarding the Palestinians is whether Arafat could deliver the genuine acceptance by the Palestinian people of a settlement on the lines he has so clearly been preparing. For this I would point first to the PNC meeting of last April in Algiers. This was reported by our American media, very scantily and with quite shameful distortions of what was happening there. The essence of the meeting was that the Habash PFLP and the Jibril group came back into the main PLO camp led by Arafat, not on the basis of his renouncing the peace-seeking policies he had developed but on the basis of their accepting those policies. I'm quite convinced that Arafat is now in the position to deliver on a genuine agreement, which can be made permanent and irreversible by PLO decision and gain the consent of the Palestinian public as such. This is the condition of any such agreement's not being the camel's nose under the tent flap. There is a lot of propaganda circulating about the damage done to Arafat's standing by various things: by the Iranian question having been primary at the Amman conference, by the fact that the Palestinians living in Gaza and the West Bank took the initiative away from the PLO last month, even by the PNC in Algiers itself, interpreted as concession by Arafat to the hard-liners. This propaganda is untrue, and elicited by the fact that Arafat is truly in so strong a position among the Palestinians. It is the hard-liners who have made the concessions to him, accepting his negotiating policy, not the reverse. The Amman meeting was organized by his Arab opponents, particularly by King Hussein and President Assad, to undercut him. But his strength is built not on them but on the Palestinians. And the events of the last month, which the Palestinians have been calling "the uprising," while they stemmed from circumstances, largely accidental, inside the occupied territories (and of course from a twenty-year history of frustration), have given people there the confidence that they can come to some settlement under his leadership.

Time I got to some of your other questions.

You asked whether the Russians should be included in a multinational meeting on the subject of the Middle East. I would say yes, with a number of observations.

It has been at the core of American policy ever since Kissinger's time to keep the Russians out of the Middle Eastern and Israeli-Palestinian questions. I understand the reasons for that -- the feeling that the Russians can be trusted about nothing, that they are fundamentally anti-Israeli, that they are still trying, as the Czars were in centuries past, for the warm-water ports to the South, etc. I am not in sympathy with these reasons. But I do see an advantage for the United States if the inclusion of the Russians in the resolution of these problems were on our invitation and consequently by our definition. I see that as attainable if the question gets into play by a U.S. initiative at this time. Not to include the Russians at all seems to me self-defeating, as they have a clear interest in the region: it is their back yard, not ours. I think they would have reason to defeat any initiative of ours that did not include them, as it would have to be contrary to their interests.

The common wisdom in the U.S. is that the Russians have been the enemy of Israel since shortly after the time they were among Israel's main sponsors in 1947-49. I find that untrue. The Russians have supported Arab and Palestinian grievance against Israel, particularly since 1967, but they have never supported,

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given any license (to their clients in the area) or endorsed the destruction of Israel, and have in many instances dissuaded or even actively prevented (by the denial of arms or support) their Arab clients or friends from any such action. I've been over Soviet policy from many angles and many sources, but I would recommend a very fine Westview Press study, Israel and the Soviet Union, by Arthur Jay Klinghoffer (I don't know if he is related to the Klinghoffer of the Achille Lauro) and Judith Apter, brought out in 1985.

That the inclusion of the Russians should be our doing, not something that happened (as it otherwise would, inevitably) over our heads, would give us a degree of control and a basis to look for their genuine cooperation. Before the arms-control meetings began to get somewhere, I used to argue regularly that the Middle Eastern question was one where the U.S. and USSR had a genuine common interest, so that it could be the ice-breaker between us at a time when we met only frustration in trying to come to agreements with them on anything else. Now there is a growth of some positive relation, carefully monitored by both of us but making progress. I think cooperation on the Middle Eastern problems can still be a way of building properly attested confidence between us.

As for the community of interest, as I see it the greatest danger of the U.S. and USSR becoming embroiled, against our wills as it would be, in a war between us, stems from the Middle East. I don't believe there will be a war of aggression over Europe, or that any other of the trouble spots (African, Central or South American, Asian) has anything like the potential for drawing our two countries into war with each other that the Middle East does. Hence the urgent interest of both of us is to see that we do not become embroiled with each other there. Each of us does have in itself a monster of suspicion and anxiety about the other. Our vital interest is to keep, each of us, our monsters in our caves, and not let them out. I believe that situation is at its most acute with regard to the Middle East. And I think we have eventually a common positive interest, to neutralise the whole region as regards any competition between ourselves.

At this point, I understand the alarm that Israel and, possibly less consciously but none the less really, the Arab countries have at the prospect of our two super-powers banding together to settle their problems for them. That means that restraint is necessary on our and the Russians' part. I don't believe anything will happen without U.S. initiative -- the Russians have no opening to take the initiative without us -- but once there is a real process in train, I think the brooding presence of our two superpowers about the table would be the most excellent motive imaginable for the local parties to deal seriously with each other and not let the determination of essential matters be left to us, the superpowers.

And then the Israelis, and the Jews, meaning the American Jewish community (which, among other things, will vote in and influence the next American election). Your question was whether there was any chance, even with a good P.R. program in this country, that the Jews and Israel could be brought to the understanding that in the long run it is their best interest to solve the Palestinian problem, and you thought not.

Once again, I'm very conscious of divisions of opinion among Jews in both places, here and in Israel. I am in very close contact with a lot of people in both places, perhaps more frequent and cordially with the Jewish peace camp in Israel and the U.S., but often and very openly in discussion with more hawkish types here and in Israel, and with Israeli officialdom through the Consul General here in Boston, who is guarded, as he must be, in stating positions of his own,

but has been a very open channel of communication for n

On this side of the water, there is of course Tom Dyne and his AIPAC, who have a formidable hold on congressmen and senators. That's the main thing that makes the fabled lobby so frightening to our political figures. I haven't heard an AIPAC position on the Gaza/West Bank situation of this last month. The last I was very conscious of was their campaign to close the PLO office in Washington and the Observer mission at the UN in New York. Nasser al-Kidwa was terribly anxious that I get into the act myself and mobilize friends to head that move off, and I told him I didn't care to get distracted from more important things I feel I am doing and so would keep out of that business. It is a silliness that overcomes our politicians around election times, and we'll see a lot more related silliness before the election is over. I do know and cooperate closely with a group that gives me much greater hope for American Jewish opinion, a grouping of American Christian, Jewish and Muslim clergy and other persons close to the religious communities who will be making the rounds of candidates through the election period to try to head off the sillier positions that candidates are inclined to take in this season and prepare the way for a cooperative inter-religious approach to a peace settlement in the Middle East. I find that there are a lot of American Jews dissenting from the AIPAC view of Israeli-Arab relations, and that over the last year that dissent, from being a submerged and often clandestine grass-roots phenomenon, has risen to the level of the leadership of major Jewish organizations. The Schindlers and the Klutznicks, the Kelmans and the Mendelssohns have had their reputations out on the line and their positions clearly in public for many years now, and no one dare portray any of them as other than ardent friends of Israel. This turbulence of the last month must surely be having profound effect on Jewish opinion in this country. A P.R. campaign -- surely it is a bit of self-deprecation to call a serious program on this subject "P.R." at this stage -- could appeal to them if well calculated. The essence of it would have to be that peace is a real possibility, not a Trojan horse, and that the Palestinian leadership that really counts, namely the PLO, is truly prepared to make a settlement that would not be the camel's nose but permanent. PLO cooperation in that would be necessary, and I believe actually available. As I see it, the PLO has for the last few years been urging peace initiatives and has simply been ignored, quite deliberately. The essence of what Arafat is now offering, in his statements to me, is that he will take positions and actions truly calculated to build confidence in peace overtures provided he has assurance that they will not simply be ignored or distorted. I think we have a Jewish public in the U.S. quite capable of understanding and appreciating that. It brings up what will surely be the "bottom-line" political question in this country about responding to a PLO initiative for a genuine peace settlement: what will be its effect on Jewish opinion, on other pro-Israeli American opinion, and on the next election? Speaking of the Palestinian public opinion above, I said I thought they would be ready to go along with a real peace settlement that their accepted (PLO) leadership negotiates, while they would simply carry on the fight as before if the settlement were a trick or a fake. The same holds with the American public and the American Jewish community which would have the deciding interpretative voice in responding to such an action by our government. We are not dealing with a loutish or unsophisticated public among American Jews, able to be pushed around by the Tom Dynes as easily as is our rather craven Congress. People know the issues now, have had them spectacularly clarified over the disturbing events of this last month, and will be able to judge them rationally and humanely. The one thing that really stands to the credit of the unlucky Carter administration is the great accomplishment of Camp

William Wilson, Jan. 5, '88 -- 8

David and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. I think that President Reagan could gain great public credit as having contributed far more seriously and substantially to the peace in that region of the world if he brought about the genuine meeting of the real protagonists in the central theatre of the conflict, and that the American Jewish community as well as the rest of the American public would be cheering for him. You remember how we all responded to Sadat. Arafat is really there, in my opinion, though he can't accept a fraudulent settlement. Neither can we or the Israelis accept a fraudulent settlement from him, but I don't believe that is what's offered.

The Israelis and their capacity to respond are a separate question. There are people in Israel who don't want to concede anything; people like Rabbi Kahane, his Kach following (including, if the 1985 Van Leer Foundation poll can be believed, over 40% of the high-school generation) and very likely most of the Gush Emunim settlers movement, who are prepared for a mass expulsion of the remaining Palestinians, in other words a genocide; people in the Herut part of Likud, and hidden away in many parts of Labor, who want to make no territorial concessions, talk Jordanian solutions of a bewildering variety of kinds and swear up and down that they will never talk to terrorists, the term by which they describe the PLO and the whole Palestinian resistance movement. (That includes the inventor of the car-bomb, who happens currently to be Prime Minister of Israel.)

My perception is that there is an ambivalence even in the wildest of these Israeli hawks. I pointed out to you, in October, the action of the Likud politicians in contacting Arafat, which I take as a sign that Likud leaders, right up to Prime Minister Shamir, are quite aware that if they are to talk to Palestinians (i.e., if they can't avoid it altogether), then the Palestinian leadership they must address is the PLO. People on the Israeli right have, as I read it, a sense that there must be a settlement, but a wariness and actual paranoia that smother that sense. Similarly, among the Israeli peace camp, which is also considerable, there is a wariness which keeps all but the wettest of them clear-eyed.

The U.S. commitment, made by Kissinger, not to deal with the PLO unless they first formally accept the right of Israel to exist through the acceptance of UNSC 242 and 338, is a kind of shield to Israel. I've often said, to you and others, that I don't believe that is a wise U.S. policy although I constantly urge on the PLO that it is the real policy and the one to which they must respond. The policy, I believe, has two effects: one is to put pressure on the PLO to act in a certain way, to the advantage of Israel -- legitimate enough, as Israel is our ally, but always in danger of being a source of real injustice to the Palestinians, which does us no credit. The issue about 242, as I have written in various forms that you know, is not, for the Palestinians, the right of Israel to exist, but rather a renunciation of their own rights. The trick of getting a recognition of 242 from the Palestinians is to make it possible for them to recognize it without renouncing their own rights.

But the other effect of the U.S. policy of not dealing with the PLO without their fulfilling this condition is to let the Israelis off the hook of having to deal with the Palestinians at all, and thus to give a decisive upper hand to those in Israel who deliberately choose to do nothing toward a solution while pushing the settlement policy -- "creating" preemptive "facts" -- instead.

This is a genuine and terribly destructive obstacle to peace, dreadfully contrary to our own interests and to the real interest of Israel as well. It is the reason why an American initiative, and precisely this initiative, is needed if peace negotiations are to be made possible at all. It is simply untrue for us to say that the responsibility is all Israel's and all questions must be addressed to Israel, not to ourselves. It is this policy that makes us the co-responsible party, responsible for the negative things that are happening and responsible to make more positive things possible in the future.

Now we are in the position of having the Palestinians actually fulfilling our condition, thus vindicating the more legitimate aspect of our non-recognition policy, and of ourselves and the Israelis simply denying that we are hearing what we are hearing from Arafat and the PLO, his Harare and Geneva statements.

I grant that these statements, while I believe they formally meet our precondition, aren't satisfactory. What they don't do, as yet, is to genuinely reassure the Israeli and American Jewish publics, and our policy-makers, that this is really the opportunity for a just and peaceful solution of the problem, and that Arafat and the PLO are the ones with whom that solution can be reached. It should be an embarrassment for us and the Israelis to continue pretending that the PLO is not the real representation of the Palestinians, but for want of another policy we continue to pretend we are looking for some other address, others who can speak for the Palestinians who do not in fact represent them. That's the way either to postpone indefinitely anything happening at all or to push for a fake solution.

I think I know where the critical point is that could turn all this into genuine reassurance of the Israelis and all of us, Jewish and other Americans, who are their friends. It is the delegitimizing, by each side, Israelis and Palestinians, of the other. The form this takes is the Palestinian-Arab-UN position that Zionism is racism, and the Israeli-American position that the PLO is terrorism. In both cases this takes aim at the one most important thing with which the respective group, Jews and Palestinians, identifies. In the case of the Jews, Israeli or not, Zionism means us, and equivalently, for the Palestinians, the PLO means us. Both reject and are terribly offended by the delegitimizing judgment, and both are inhibited from dealing in any open way with those who profess such unjust judgments about them.

If there were an exchange between the U.S. government and the PLO that made clear the PLO acceptance, on behalf of the Palestinians, of Israel (without, it is essential to add, renunciation of Palestinian rights), and U.S. recognition that the PLO is the genuine spokesman for the Palestinians, it would eo ipso address the delegitimizing judgment that the PLO (and hence the Palestinians whom it represents) are terrorist. What more is required is that the PLO itself, and Arafat, address the other delegitimizing judgment, that Zionism is racism. I have been through that, in forms of which you have read in detail, with Arafat himself: the many things that Zionism can mean to various people, including understandings that express contempt and dismissal of other peoples; but the essential meaning of Zionism as self-determination for the Jewish people, a people that deserves it certainly no less than any other. I believe I can get the essential public recognitions of this from the PLO, but not without some acknowledgement from the U.S. government of what has already developed so far.

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
William Wilson, Jan. 5, '88 -- 10

There is simply no future in my continuing the interaction I have developed with Arafat and the central leadership of the PLO if I cannot get to the U.S. government. I've explained, when I wrote to you in the summer, how that has to mean getting to the center of the Administration, to the President himself though not without the advisers to whom he needs to look, but that an approach through the ordinary channels of State Department is useless, as is any approach through staff people.

All this has a particular timeliness just now, not only because the rioting of the Palestinians in December, and still now in January, has put their plight on the world's breakfast table, but because the PLO itself is on the verge of establishing a government in exile and, in that process, making what it promises will be serious peace overtures to Israel. The U.S. can be in a position to foster and influence such peace overtures, to ensure that they are such as really to engage the Israelis, if it explores the avenue that I have been keeping open all this time.

My best wishes,

sincerely in Christ,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

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January 15. 1988

His Eminence
Bernard Cardinal Law

Your Eminence,

Christ's Peace!

This is to bring you up to date on my work relating to Israelis and Palestinians. It approaches a critical point now, and you should have all the documentation.

Last August I finally wrote to Ambassador William Wilson, to let him know of what Hanna Siniora had brought to us in February and what Nasser al-Kidwa had had to say in April. It took Mr. Wilson a while, but he got back to me by phone in late September, suggesting at the time that I should talk to Mr. Carlucci, then still National Security Adviser, and to Ambassador Vernon Walters, and indicating that he would try to set up those meetings. Just a couple of weeks later, in mid-October, I spotted the New York Times article on the Moshe Amirav initiative of the summer, and sent a copy along to Mr. Wilson with a covering note. Just about that same time I was down to New York to talk again with Nasser al-Kidwa, and confirm that Mr. Arafat (his uncle) was still offering everything he had offered when I spoke with him in Kuwait in October '86. All of that was confirmed, Mr. al-Kidwa speaking quite officially for his uncle, and he keeps the confirmation up to date since, through all the turmoil of these last months.

Mr. Wilson wrote back right after receiving my letter with the Times clipping. His answer might possibly have been interpreted as a request that I get off his back. I took it as the likelier reading that he was asking me to rethink from the start so volatile a proposal as this, and I felt I should give that good time, and in particular that I should wait until all the excitements of the Gorbachev visit to Washington were over. I wrote to him again just over a week ago. The whole correspondence is here in copy.

In Christ,

Ray Helmick, S.J.
Ray Helmick, S.J.

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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

January 15, 1988

His Eminence
John Cardinal O'Connor
Archbishop of New York
460 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022

Your Eminence,


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Ray Helmick, S.J.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

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January 15, 1988

His Excellency
Archbishop Pio Laghi
Apostolic Pro-Nunzio to the United States
3339 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008-3687


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In Christ,

Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

January 16, 1988

Rev. Robert E. Manning, S.J.
Provincial Offices
761 Harrison Avenue
Boston, MA 02118

Dear Bob,

Christ's Peace!

Here at last is the great heap of paper to bring you up to date on all this work relating to the Israeli-Palestinian question. I waited to have written the long letter to William Wilson that concludes this batch, and which brings the matter now to a critical point. It is fortuitous but I think good that it coincides with the great upheaval in the Occupied Territories since early December.

I start with the covering letter I sent to Tom Michel just this morning, giving him a vade mecum to understand the progression of the papers. His pile was a little smaller, since he already had all the things I had written over there in the summer of '86 -- i.e., the August 3, '86, report on the visit to Israel, the letter I wrote to Msgr. Gatti August 5th, and the shorter presentation I had written in Amman on August 27th, with the Arabic translation provided by Fr. Ibrahim Ayyad, to accompany a copy of the August 3 report that went on to Arafat before the Harare meeting.

I'll phone in, once you've had a chance to look through this material, and arrange a time to come by your office and talk about it. All the best,

in Christ,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Ray Heimick, S.J.". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "R" and "H".
Ray Heimick, S.J.



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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

January 16, 1988

Rev. Thomas Michel, S.J.
Curia Generalizia S.J.
Casella Postale 6139
00195 Roma, Italy

Dear Tom,

Christ's Peace!

This bundle is to bring you, and Fr. Kolvenbach, up to date on the work I've been doing with relation to the Israeli-Palestinian question, picking it up after I left Rome in September '86, i.e. after the last written reports you already have.

I've been under a very tight wrap of confidentiality on this matter, and have kept all the paper very close. The reason for that, apart from the obvious, is fairly complex. The State Department response to my summer '86 journey was one of a great deal of alarm. They were particularly frightened to see, in the August 3 '86 report that I wrote over there in Rome (and which you have), the names of two State Department figures involved in the conversation reported to me by Hanna Siniora. They told me three things that I have established since were not true. One was to say that what had been said to Hanna Siniora in Jerusalem had not been said. I've checked this through and I have every reason to believe Hanna rather than them, although that sort of denial is fairly commonplace and understandable. It was accompanied, in fact, as you'll see in the documents, by a reaffirmation of the same points in a non-attributable form. The second thing was that they said it was a matter of statute in the United States, a statute strengthened since the time of the dismissal of U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young for talking to the PLO Observer at the UN, that no official of the U.S. could have even indirect communication with the PLO. That, I find, is simply untrue, but it does reflect the level of fear these middle-level U.S. officials live under. The third thing was their interpretation of the Arafat address to the Harare meeting of Non-Aligned countries in September '86. That was deliberately distorted and misleading. I drew two conclusions from that: first that I could no longer deal with officials, though I could still recognize their basic good will, at that middle level of the bureaucracy in the U.S., but had to work only at a higher level of the Administration in Washington; and second, that I had to keep all the paper as closely confidential as I have been doing since. It is worth noting that the August 3, '86, report that so frightened them because of the names it included, I had sent to the State Department itself by the one safest channel I knew, namely Peter Murphy at the U.S. Embassy to the Holy See, who was able to get it directly to those involved without its getting into those State Department Xerox machines that they are all so alarmed about. It has never turned up in any of the hands they were afraid it would get to.


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Tom Michel, Jan. 16, '86 -- 2

Once I'd drawn those conclusions, and decided I had to get directly to the center of the Administration in any dealings I had with Washington, the Administration developed the little case of leprosy that you've all heard about, and there was really nothing could be done with it until it was officially declared cleansed of its leprosy sometime during the summer. At that point, I took the matter up with William Wilson, as you'll see in the documentation. That venture has moved very slowly, but it is still in motion and now approaching a critical point, which is why I thought now was the time when I must make sure that you and Fr. General are fully informed. The Palestinians, as you'll see, have kept it alive very sedulously all this time, sending Hanna Siniora to see me last February -- I saw to it that he had a session with Cardinal Law, and that produced a flurry of activity, but at the wrong time, while the leprosy attack was still on, and in the wrong direction, to Vice President Bush, who can't really act on anything in this area -- and then appointing Dr. Nasser al-Kidwa, Arafat's nephew and the number-two in the PLO Observer delegation at the U.N., as a steady standing contact for me with his uncle. As part of the confidentiality jag I've been on, I never have anything of substance to say to Dr. al-Kidwa in writing or on the phone, but simply tell him periodically by phone that I need to see him, and then drive down to New York to speak to him directly.

With that much background information, I'm sure you'll find your way through the documentation and see the picture as it has developed and as it stands now. All best wishes,

in Christ,


Ray Helmick, S.J.

WILLIAM A. WILSON

10475 Bellagio Road
Los Angeles, California 90077
Telephone 270-3181

January 19, 1988

Father Raymond G. Helmick, S. J.
Jesuit Community Boston College
Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167

Dear Father:

In response to your letter of January 5, 1988, I thought you might be interested in the two articles which appeared in yesterday's Los Angeles Times if they were not already printed in the New York or Boston papers. I would normally be inclined to go along with Jean Kirkpatrick rather than George Ball, but in this case the reverse is true. This is somewhat of a dilemma for me since I have great respect for Jean Kirkpatrick.

I have read and reread your letter and have been doing a great deal of thinking about how to get you in touch with the most effective people in the Administration. Although I am not an expert in this area, the ideal would be to get Howard Baker, General Colin Powell, and Bill Webster in one place at the same time. Failing this, I think the next best thing would be to talk to each of them individually.

I think you have pursued this matter for such a long time and you know so much about it that the time is probably at hand that the issue should be presented to the Administration for whatever action or lack of action it deems appropriate.

You have pointed out in your letter one of the primary problems and that is the basic problem involving the State Department. How far anyone in the White House or in the Cabinet would want to go on the Palestinian issue without policy input from the State Department is anybody's guess but unfortunately, since the Iran affair, it is my observation that if anything, the State Department has strengthened its position with respect to foreign policy issues.

Congress is also a body to be considered in this matter and it is worth recognizing at this moment that Congress under the influence of the Jewish community of the United States is demanding the closure of the PLO observer office at the United Nations. It has already successfully closed the PLO information office in Washington. The problem here of course is obvious, namely that the Administration is more sensitive to the wishes of Congress than it was before the Iran affair and

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Father Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

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January 18, 1988

of course this condition will continue through the balance of this year.

The next question is whether you wish to approach the people whose names I have mentioned and if you do, then the follow on question is how best to do it. I would be happy to help in any way that I can, but I think some thought should be given to the prestige that both Cardinal Law and Cardinal O'Connor have in Washington. Perhaps the next step might be to discuss the issue with Cardinal Law and see if he has any suggestions. Betty and I plan to be in New York from February 2 to February 7 and if you wish to give me a call at that time, I will be at the Waldorf Towers.

Let me again take a moment to tell you how deeply I appreciate the work that you have done in order to try to bring peace to the Middle East and to tell you that I agree completely with the thesis that you have developed with respect to the formula for achieving peace there. The major stumbling block is still not Israel itself, rather the Jewish community here in the United States. Israel cannot survive without continued massive U.S. support.

With every good wish,



W. A. Wilson

WAW/sf
Enclosures

Los Angeles Times

Palestinians Must Speak for Themselves

By JEANE KIRKPATRICK

Day after day, young Palestinians assemble to burn tires, throw stones and threaten motorists, and not-so-young Israelis finally resort to live ammunition. More than 30 Palestinians have already died. The price for Israel is also high in terms of international disapproval of its policies.

It is a classic late-20th-Century confrontation between not-so-civil disobedience and a not-so-iron fist. Each time Israel uses lethal force to fight off stone-throwers (in this region where stoning is a mode of execution), Israel loses and the demonstrators know it. The media make the difference and the media know it. This has gone on for almost six weeks. No end is in sight.

"It needs time," Israel's defense minister, Yitzhak Rabin, explains. Some of Rabin's colleagues in Israel's divided cabinet complain that the government only reacts, that it is not in charge. Rabin is forced to agree. The problem is more difficult than anyone originally believed, he avows. The hostility of the Arab population is more widespread than most Israelis understood.

David Krivine of the Jerusalem Post asks: "What benefit is there in being saddled with a huge subject population who hate our guts, knife our soldiers, throw rocks at our vehicles, and force our troops to shoot at them, thus acquiring a halo of martyrdom which arouses sympathy all over the Middle East and all over the world?" That is a question arising in the minds of more and more Israelis.

The longer a problem lasts, the harder it is to remember what it is about. Since the Arab-Israeli problem is now 40 years old, it is hard for Americans and others to remember that Israel's Arab neighbors still refuse to accept Israel's existence.

It seems incredible that many Arab diplomats still will not speak the name *Israel*. It seems incredible that Arab states do not show Israel on their maps; only recently Egypt's education minister barred from his country's schools a world map that

punishment for making peace with Israel. Egypt was the subject of a total diplomatic boycott by the Arab world (a boycott that ended only this year). It seems incredible that two Arab heads of state—Anwar Sadat and Bashir Gemayel—were assassinated for the crime of making peace, and incredible that Palestinians in and out of the Palestine Liberation Organization have been murdered for speaking about speaking with Israeli officials. But all these things are true.

*

It is important now, when Israel is being reproached on all sides for 20 years of military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, to recall that this occupation did not begin with Israeli aggression, but with aggression against Israel. Who remembers that from 1948 to 1967 Egypt was responsible for the administration of Gaza and proposed no constructive solutions? Or that Israel's occupation of the territories came in 1967 after Israel's Arab neighbors had, for the second time, launched a war designed to eliminate the new state from the region as well as from its maps?

Who remembers that the occupation has continued ever since because Israel's neighbors have doggedly refused to enter negotiations that would provide secure borders for all, as called for by U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (passed in 1967 and 1973 respectively)? Again and again Israel has offered to exchange "land for peace" and proved its good faith by returning the Sinai to Egypt in the wake of the Camp David accords. Who understands that those same neighbors who will not make peace have been willing to sacrifice a generation of Palestinians in their vendetta against Israel?

The United Nations has participated in this human sacrifice through its management of the camps that are filled today with second- and third-generation refugees. The United Nations thus becomes an accomplice. Its refugee program is the only one that seeks not to resettle its displaced persons, but to keep them in camps for decades. America contributes more than \$60 million annually to this "refugee" policy that sacrifices Palestinians to the politics of "return" to a "homeland" from which the majority never came.

What would a constructive solution to the Palestinian problem look like? Many Palestinians in the region support the "Jordanian option"—a homeland in confederation with Jordan. But the PLO and its supporters have created the myth that the PLO is the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." And the immediate goal of the PLO is a PLO state whose existence is no more compatible with the stability of Jordan than of Israel. To further complicate the matter, Jordan's King Hussein, whose country already has a Palestinian majority, declines to discuss the question except in the context of a "international conference" that would bring into the negotiations the Soviet Union and its Syrian agenda.

Obviously, Israel must find a solution consistent with its democratic values and cannot indefinitely rule by force a rebellious population. Yet neither can Israel permit the development on its borders of a state dedicated to its destruction and to destabilization of the region.

It seems more and more clear that Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza (many of whom would become refugees again from a PLO state) need to speak for themselves about Palestinian aspirations.

They now have the world's attention. We are all listening carefully for what they have to say.

Jeane Kirkpatrick writes a syndicated column in Washington.

Peace for Israel Hinges on a State for Palestinians

By George Ball

PRINCETON, N.J.

Almost as regrettable as the loss of life during the recent violence in the Gaza Strip and West Bank has been the Israeli government's failure to acknowledge the nature of its predicament. Instead of confronting its fundamental dilemma, Israel is merely asserting, in tones of bluster, that resistance will disappear if the outside world just keeps quiet while Israel's army applies the iron fist even more harshly.

But no one should expect the Palestinians to sit by as their military overlords progressively preempt their remaining lands with Israeli settlements. Since 1967, Israel has, in violation of the Geneva Convention, seized more than 53% of West Bank land from 800,000 Palestinian inhabitants for the benefit of 50,000 Jewish settlers—6% of the population.

In the Gaza Strip it has seized one-third of the land for 1,300 Jewish settlers—compressing the 400,000 Palestinian inhabitants into a fetid slum with a population density approaching that of Calcutta. At the same time, Israel has prevented Palestinian residents from efficiently cultivating their dwindling remnants of agricultural acreage, while making them dependent on Israel to do low-wage menial jobs shunned by Israelis.

Since the West Bank and Gaza Strip were first overrun by Israel's army in 1967, a Palestinian generation has grown up under the domination of occupation troops. Because three out of four Gazans are under the age of 25, they have never tasted self-rule and increasingly despair of doing so. It was inevitable that their bitterness would ultimately take the form of reckless resistance. In this new outbreak, the nearly 800,000 Palestinians in Israel proper have for the first time joined in by calling a paralyzing strike—signaling the Israeli government they are tired of being treated as second-class citizens.

Were any nation other than Israel behaving in such a harsh manner, the United States would threaten to curtail aid and impose sanctions. But even while Congress and the Administration painfully cut domestic programs to reduce the

budget deficit, the United States continues its annual subsidy to Israel—a rate now equivalent to \$1,400 for every Jewish man, woman and child in the country.

Like it or not, the United States has major responsibility for this distorted state of affairs. By failing to act incisively we are undercutting those farsighted and deeply worried Israelis who see their nation's current course leading dangerously toward disaster.


Meanwhile, the United States disregards principles of international law it has long enjoined on others. It dismisses the right of Palestinians to exercise self-determination guaranteed by the U.N. Charter. Although we piously deny the right of nations to acquire territory by force, we hypocritically block any U.N. resolution compelling Israel to bargain in good faith to exchange territory for peace as provided in Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.

Why does the United States betray its basic principles so cavalierly? The sad answer is that U.S. politicians have become so programmed to respond to the pressure of Israel's American friends that they uncritically accept the myths hard-line Israelis have devised to evade facing their country's problems.

The first myth is that Israel should not negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization until it renounces terrorism and key elements of its charter. But Israel is no more entitled to demand such preconditions for peace talks than the Palestinians are to insist in advance on an Israeli assurance that negotiations will provide them with lands to build their own state. Who can expect the Palestinians to come to the table when Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir repeatedly proclaims that Israel will never give up a single acre of the West Bank?

To appease Israel's friends, U.S. officials seek to dodge the issue in a charade of arranging conversations between Israel and Jordan. This tactic reflects a curious delusion, for the Palestinian people vehemently disavow Jordan's right to speak for them. The Palestinians fiercely oppose any deal in which Israel would trade Jordan part of its occupied territory for a peace settlement. They made that clear in West Bank polls that show only 3%-6% of resident Palestinians favor a return to Jordanian rule, while 90%-94% declare the PLO to be their only legitimate

George Ball, who served as under secretary of state from 1961 to 1966, is working on a book about the U.S. relationship with Israel.



BARBARA D. CUMMINGS / for The Times

spokesman. Thus for the United States to impose the "Jordanian solution" on unwilling Palestinians would almost certainly recreate the chronic disorder that characterized the West Bank when Jordan ruled it prior to 1967. The addition of 800,000 West Bank Palestinians (possibly combined with 400,000 more from Gaza) to the 80% of Jordanians of Palestinian origin could probably overwhelm the pacifically inclined Hashemite regime, resulting in the creation of a radical, militant Palestinian state. Such a state, with the fanatical backing of its Palestinian majority who cherish deeply felt irredentist claims to all the Holy Land, would pose a far greater menace to Israel than a rump Palestinian state in the West Bank.

A second Israeli myth is that an independent state in the occupied areas poses an unacceptable danger to Israel's security. In view of its powerful armed forces, Israel's security worries could be largely met by writing stringent, enforceable safeguards into a formal treaty, denying the new state any armed force of its own and limiting the numbers and kinds of weapons available to its police. As

a further safeguard, the settlement could require installation of surveillance posts larger, more numerous and more effective than those now functioning in the Sinai under Israel's peace agreement with Egypt.

The current outbreak brings into relief the problems Israel acquired with the occupied areas in the 1967 Six-Day War. The acquisition of territories that now contain about 1.5 million Palestinians confronted Israel with a colonialist dilemma it has never resolved. It must decide whether to continue insisting on being an exclusively Jewish state or abandon its pretension to democracy. Those two positions cannot be reconciled.

Israel can make that choice by selecting one of four options. The first is to try maintaining its military occupation by suppressing the people with increasing brutality, even though such apartheid practices would contradict the idealistic element in Zionism. The second is to expel Palestinians into neighboring states—a course of action advocated by Gen. Ariel Sharon, for one.

The third option is formal annexation of the occupied territories, which would

convert Israel into a binational state, 40% Palestinian and 60% Jewish—a situation Zionists rejected from the start.

The reasonable option is to apply the principles set forth in U.N. Resolution 242: Accord the Palestinians the right of self-determination and make peace with the Arab world by agreeing to a Palestinian state in the West Bank.

Since the last option is the only proper course for a self-respecting Israel true to its traditions, what can the United States do to help expedite that choice? The U.S. government must demonstrate will and leadership, while recognizing that our country can only act effectively if it adopts a posture of objectivity essential to a mediator. Today the hatreds, suspicions and political chaos are such that, left to their own devices, the Israelis and Palestinians (reinforced by Arab allies), will never settle affairs by themselves.

This is a matter of urgency, for if the United States does not seriously seek to bring the parties together, the communal warfare in the Holy Land will spread and intensify; sooner or later, the neighboring Arab states—even Egypt—will be dragged into the maelstrom. □

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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

January 25, 1988

His Eminence
Bernard Cardinal Law
Archbishop of Boston

Dear Cardinal Law,

Christ's Peace!

Here is a copy of the letter I received just today from Ambassador William Wilson, responding to the one I sent him January 5, of which you have a copy. I think we need to talk about this quite soon if you are free to do so. Ambassador Wilson suggests my seeing Howard Baker, General Colin Powell and William Webster, if possible all together at one time, barring that separately, and he both offers to help with that himself and suggests that you and Cardinal O'Connor would want to help and what suggestions you might have. All the earlier material is already in Cardinal O'Connor's hands.

My own thought, given the choice of seeing these three persons all together or separately (if indeed either can be arranged), is that the best option is both: see them separately and then in a meeting together. I entirely accept Ambassador Wilson's suggestion that these are the right people.

As for his question on the State Department, and my discovery some time back that I cannot work through the people I had seen before, I am a bit more optimistic than he. It is not that these people are obstructive, but that they are afraid of having any piece of paper dealing with this issue connected with them. I find that those I have dealt with -- Bill Krby and William Murphy -- are personally very committed to finding ways of resolving these problems, but frightened that they could be expelled from having any further influence if even rumors about them got back to the more vengeful people in the Israeli government or in AIPAC. I've discovered another thing, that even the more peace-minded Israeli officials share the same fears, that their efforts can be sabotaged and their influence ended if any word of them gets to the people, seeded all through the State Department and Pentagon, who would report back to these more hawkish and obstructive forces in the Israeli system. This is no problem if one is dealing with the White House at a high enough level that confidentiality can actually be ensured. In fact, I would find more obstruction and sabotage in the middle-ranking NSC staff than in the State Department people. Hence I don't think it is necessary to leave the White House people without State Department advice. Secretary Schulz himself, I expect, would be a helpful figure if consulted on that basis.

All the best,

in Christ



JESUIT COMMUNITY POSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

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January 25, 1988

His Eminence
John Cardinal O'Connor
Archbishop of New York
460 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022


Your Eminence,

Christ's Peace!

Just ten days ago I sent you a copy of the letter I had written to Ambassador William Wilson and other pertinent material to bring you up to date on my work on the Middle East. I had Ambassador Wilson's response in today's mail, and brought a copy of it along to Cardinal Law. Since Mr. Wilson mentions you by name as a possible source of some help I thought you should have this right away.

All best wishes,

in Christ,


Ray Helmick, S.J.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

January 25, 1988

His Excellency
Archbishop Pio Laghi
Apostolic Pro-Nunzio to the United States
3339 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008-3687

Dear Archbishop Laghi,

Christ's Peace!

Today's mail contained Ambassador William Wilson's reply to the letter I had sent him earlier in the month, of which I sent you a copy. I brought a copy of this reply right along to Cardinal Law's house, but he is away for the moment. I sent it along to Cardinal O'Connor also, and thought you should have it right away.

With all best wishes,

in Christ,

Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



3339 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008-3687

APOSTOLIC NUNCIATURE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 332/88/5
.....

January 26, 1988

This No. Should Be Prefixed to the Answer

Rev. Raymond G. Helmick
Jesuit Community
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167

Dear Father Helmick:

I have read with sincere interest your informative letter of January 15, 1988, and have given careful attention to the documentation you so thoughtfully enclosed. As I have mentioned to you in the past, I appreciate your kindness in keeping me advised as to your progress in this sensitive area.

Recent developments in the middle east have made the constant solicitude of the Holy See toward that troubled region even more fervent, and made your efforts more timely and significant. Indeed, any possibility for peace and understanding should be fully explored.

With prayerful best wishes, I am,

Sincerely yours in Christ,

Apostolic Pro-Nuncio

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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167-3802

TRANSCRIPT. My copy of this letter, from a malfunctioning copy machine, is too faint to reproduce.

January 30, 1988

Ambassador William A. Wilson
Waldorf Towers Hotel
New York, N.Y. 10022

Dear Mr. Wilson,

Christ's Peace!

Your letter was a great encouragement. Yes, surely let's get on the phone while you are in New York. I agree entirely that the three persons you suggest would be the right ones to see at this juncture. Whether they should be seen all together or one at a time, if indeed they can be seen at all: my inclination would be to choose, ideally, both -- to see them together after having briefed them separately, though I see the distinct advantage of speaking to them together.

But I understand that the occasion of your trip to New York is your fiftieth wedding anniversary. That is such a wonderful thing, and so rare now. That a couple should develop the rapport and love that sustains a real lifetime marriage is indescribably beautiful. I congratulate you both, and will pray and offer my Mass that day in thanksgiving for the great blessing you have been to one another and many others, and for your happiness together for many years to come.

I wanted to write a note, besides talking on the phone, so that you would have down on paper my reaction to a couple of points in your January 10 letter.

One is the matter of administration people being willing to act in this matter without policy input from the State Department. I don't think that is quite the problem it might be. I had, as you've noted, the experience that convinced me I couldn't deal with the middle level bureaucracy people I had been seeing, because they simply found it too dangerous to their careers to have their names associable with anything of substance in this area. That is despite what I perceive as real good will on the part of many individuals I've dealt with. That surely means nothing can be initiated through them, or sent up the chain in any way that involves them. It doesn't mean that their advice and thought can't be had on something that is initiated from the right level above them, just so there are no pieces of paper left around that they would worry about. I don't know anything about George Schulz himself beyond what I read in the newspapers, but my hunch is that he might be quite sympathetic and have well informed opinions about this if it were brought to him from the people you suggest. You and they would know that better, of course, but I don't see the State Department as cut out unless it were in fact the expected source of

Ambassador Wilson, Jan. 30, '85 -- 2

disruption.

I've had a bit of parallel experience now with Israeli officials, with some stronger and some weaker readiness to associate their effort with peace initiatives like this. What I've found is that they are just as nervous as the Americans in State or Defense, who know that any pieces of paper left lying about will be picked up, delivered directly to AIPAC and from there to the quarters in the Israeli system that would be most inclined to sabotage anything to do with peace prospects. People right up to the level of Shimon Peres are in terror of that, and are circumspect and greatly hampered in their effectiveness by it. So I don't take the weakness I see in American officials at any vulnerable level as a sign of bad faith. There are people who can be consulted provided there is proper discretion.

We'll talk this next week. Best wishes,

in Christ,

Ray Helmick, S.J.

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APOSTOLIC NUNCIATURE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

3339 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008-3687

No. 406/88/5

February 1, 1988

This No. Should Be Prefixed to the Answer

Rev. Raymond G. Helmick
Jesuit Community/Boston College
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167

Dear Father Helmick:

I have received your correspondence on January 25, 1988, and have given Ambassador Wilson's response to you a careful study. Please be assured that I share in the ambassador's appreciation of your efforts, and promise you my prayerful support as you continue to promote peace in this tense situation.

With every good wish, I am,

Sincerely yours in Christ,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "R. Laph", written in a cursive style.

Apostolic Pro-Nuncio



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

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February 27, 1988

Ambassador William A. Wilson
10475 Bellagio Road
Los Angeles, California 90077

Dear Ambassador Wilson,

Christ's Peace!

The wait eventually makes me nervous as I wonder what is happening about the meetings we spoke of.

It does occur to me that the delay may be to let Mr. Schultz have his run in the Middle East and see what comes of it. Even as I write this I have the radio on to hear what response he is getting. I listen very respectfully as I believe he has made an important effort, and I'm glad to hear him saying so clearly that the present situation is the least stable and must change in the direction of territorial decisions and affirmation of legitimate rights of Palestinians. That accentuates the split between Peres and Shamir, but it remains true that Shamir knows Schulz is telling the truth and enunciating the dilemmas Shamir himself has to face. So Schulz and the United States remain essential to Shamir, even for extrication from his own problems, however little enthusiasm he has for the international conference or yielding of any territory.

The great obstacle for the Schulz mission, I believe, is not Shamir but his own effort to get to a resolution without the PLO. That of course has been the Labor position for a long time. While Likud has been saying Israel could stall of negotiation forever until it had the territories for itself without opposition, Labor has been saying that they could not be kept forever, but that Israel could stall until the Palestinians came up with a tamer leadership or some other Arabs (meaning Hussein) would offer to negotiate for them as a substitute.

As I hear it, the clearest message to Schulz has been the basic chant of the Palestinian demonstrators during his visit: no peace without the PLO. That has been firm popular position despite all efforts to portray the new internal Palestinian leadership as rival to the PLO, and despite actual greater intransigence of this new leadership. The internal leadership in the territories remains willing to let the PLO negotiate a settlement more accepting toward the Israelis than they would make themselves, and to accept its legitimacy because it would be made by the PLO, and they are insistent on the legitimacy of the PLO as the proper representation.

All these Palestinian parties -- PLO, the Hanna Sinioras and Fayez Abu Rahmes, the new underground leadership of the uprising -- are in fact most anxious to communicate to the United States and to have active U.S participation in a process that would be the means of guaranteeing rights and safety to both

Ambassador Wilson, Feb. 27, '88 -- 2

the Israelis and themselves. But they insist that the U.S. speak to the appropriate party, and will not, may not, go along with a procedure that is in itself a repudiation of their own PLO leadership. That would be suicidal for their cause. There is an effort made, by Schulz and the Labor propagandists, to create guilt feelings among the Palestinians for not showing up at the American Colony Hotel, but they are right to insist that they will not let themselves be taken as substitutes for the leadership their people regards as legitimate. Siniora, Abu Rahme and the few others can make the approaches to U.S. officials, as they did when they came to Washington, so long as it is understood that they speak for that legitimate leadership, but know they must never let themselves be the means of pushing aside the leadership they themselves accept. In Washington last month, at a meeting I chaired, Hanna Siniora was asked about the legitimacy of PLO leadership, and after stating his own recognition of that leadership as the legitimate one, handed over the floor to Hassan Rahman to state the PLO's official position with regard to recognition of Israel, which in fact was very forthcoming. (This was the meeting of the American Christian/Jewish/Muslim clergy at Washington Cathedral.)

The critical point of the Schulz visit comes today (Saturday), with his stop in Amman. On my radio I hear the American and Israeli commentators (the only ones we hear) commenting on the resistance Schulz is meeting in Jordan, and trying to put it in terms of King Hussein's need of the Russians and Syrians to support him in meeting the Israelis, but what comes through is Hussein's recognition that he cannot offer himself as a substitute for the Palestinians' own leadership, however much he has problems with that leadership himself. I'm hoping that Hussein will stick to his convictions in this matter, and not let himself be browbeaten into acting as a patsy. Hussein is one of the most admirable persons in the region, as I see it. He has acted honorably, and is doing so in this matter now. It is perfectly true that he is an indispensable player in the whole affair, but he cannot act as surrogate for the Palestinians and has been saying so all along, in the face of all sorts of American and Israeli efforts to jolly him into that position or claim that is only some face-saving formula he needs to disguise a willingness to do that. He does not run a type of government that the Palestinians could live with in their own territories, and has not the liberty to institute an actually democratic system in his kingdom, at least not in present circumstances. But he is decent in his administration of such government as he can manage. My reading is that he will tell Schulz once again what he has always told the Israelis and Americans, that he is anxious to help but will not substitute himself for the Palestinians, and that their effort to make him do so is the greatest single threat to his own position or capacity to work for peace in the region. That will mean that Schulz comes home empty-handed again, to the accompaniment of efforts in the American and Israeli media to throw the blame on Palestinians who would not come to meetings or on Hussein who would not take necessary risks.

And that will leave the stage in need of such an effort as we have been discussing, to bring about PLO plain and intelligible recognition of Israel, and United States recognition of that fact.

There is a risk here, that U.S. acceptance of the PLO would simply get the Israelis' backs up. I could argue that it is simply justice to the Palestinians that, if their leadership meets the preconditions the U.S. has been making since 1974, we do what we have always said we would do at that point. I know that doesn't meet the needs of people making policy, as they have to take the

Israeli anxieties and potential backlash reactions seriously.

My reading is in fact more sophisticated than that. The Israelis have an election coming up. It has to be this year, may be pushed forward if the political crisis keeps deepening (as of course it will), and the election will now surely be over the issues of the peace: whether to negotiate at all, whether to yield territory, under what circumstances and in return for what guarantees. And as I've remarked often before, it will be the first time in Israel's history that an election will have been held over those issues, the very ones that are the key to Israel's future. The Israelis will not break the impasse about dealing with the PLO themselves, neither political bloc will, nor can they, and the election will be run on false premises if that impasse has not been broken.

The United States holds the key. We can have, from the PLO leadership, not only the formality of recognising Israel's right to exist in the language of 242 and 338 -- as I've been saying, that has already been done in September '86 in Arafat's Harare speech, in last year's Arafat interview in the New York Review of Books, and in the September '87 Arafat speech to the UN NGOs in Geneva, though we have been calculatedly deaf to what was being said, seeing it as inconvenient. We can have a plain and unmistakable peace initiative coming from the PLO leadership, one that will be intelligible and increasingly urgent to the Israeli voting public as the election campaign goes on. This will be welcome to the Palestinians, both the Siniora/Abu Rahme/Freij/Nusseibeh types and the new uprising leadership. It will in fact be the key to alleviating the insurgency in the territories, because it would mean that people there have genuine reason for hope from something more positive than the insurgency. And the PLO's action in proposing a genuine peace settlement would have the acceptance of the uprising leadership, because the PLO represent legitimacy to them.

I see it as urgent to get moving on this. I understand well enough that it may have been necessary to go through Schulz's efforts of this week first, although I do believe that the U.S. squanders a bit more of its waning credit in the region by yet another effort to go behind the backs of the Palestinians' real leadership. But I don't rely on the PLO leadership to keep their heads indefinitely. They are also in a new situation, with new pressures. So far they have, in my opinion, generally acted with reasonable modesty and restraint. They came up with the idea of the ship, which I thought quite a good move: a non-violent demonstration of a moral point, congruent with their recognition that, in Arafat's expression, "the stone is a jewel," much better for their cause now than guns. I know, from Fayez Abu Rahme, that there was an actual instruction from the PLO, from the earliest days of the uprising in December, that no guns were to be used nor any Israelis killed. When the three organisers of the ship were murdered in Cyprus and the ship itself sabotaged, Arafat nearly lost his head, with threats to revoke his Cairo declaration of 1985. Others around him, and Arab leaders elsewhere, prevailed on him to keep cool, but he hadn't sufficient understanding of the new situation to realise that he was winning, even without the ship sailing, so long as he had comment and speculation about it up in that upper right-hand column of the American newspapers day by day. He let the thing slip and disappear from the news. Day by day there is risk that these people no longer keep their heads, and then the opportunity is lost. That may be welcome to the people who would prefer not to have any negotiations nor any settlement, whether within the Israeli or the American government and public.

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
Ambassador Wilson, Feb. 27, '88 -- 4

We will be left with only these ploys that we know will not produce any settlement, and a lot of recriminations as every faction tries to blame others. That is really what we gave George Schulz one more chance to try this week. The Israelis as well as the Palestinians, and of course we Americans as well, will have a heavy price to pay if that is the outcome.

So you see, all these things are still turning over in my mind as I wait for things to happen. I appreciate that you must be meeting frustrations too as you work at this. Let's hope that the circumstances will come together quickly now to take advantage of the breakthrough that is available before it goes away.

All best wishes,

in Christ.


Ray Helmick, S.J.



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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

May 12, 1988

His Beatitude
Patriarch Maximos V Hakim

Your Beatitude,


Christ's Peace!

For some time I've wanted to get the rest of the documentation on my Middle Eastern efforts to you, bringing it up to date from what I gave you in June of 1986. I think you will recognize that, with the first of the enclosed reports, the whole matter went to a new level of confidentiality. I haven't wanted to put these documents in any other hands than your own, and trust that you will recognize their sensitivity.

It was most distressing to me that I did not get to Damascus on that visit of 1986. You will see why as you read these reports of the summer's work. It was quite simply that everything took more time, that I had to stay much longer in Jerusalem than planned, later had to spend a good three weeks in Amman, and the opportunity to get to Damascus simply kept receding. By now I am glad that it worked as it did. My aim in wishing to visit Damascus had been to explore the possibilities of reconciliation, when the time came for real negotiation, between President Assad and Chairman Arafat. Now that has all happened without my intervention, and my concentration has been, by good fortune, on those matters that still most urgently need work.

My prayers and best wishes,

sincerely in Christ,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

Arafat's Aide, on Israel

The following is excerpted from a statement distributed at the Arab summit meeting held from June 7 through June 9 in Algiers. Its author is press spokesman for Yasir Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization. In Beirut yesterday, five Palestinian guerrilla organizations denounced the statement, calling the author a traitor and demanding that he be brought to trial before a Palestinian court.

By Bassam Abu Sharif

Everything that has been said about the Middle East conflict has focused on the differences between Palestinians and Israelis and ignored the points on which they are in almost total agreement.

Israel's objectives are lasting peace and security. Lasting peace and security are also the objectives of the Palestinian people. No one can understand the Jewish people's centuries of suffering more than the Palestinians. We know what it means to be stateless and the object of the fear and prejudice of the nations. Thanks to the various Israeli and other governments that have had the power to determine the course of our people's lives, we know what it feels like when human beings are considered somehow less human than others and denied basic rights that most people take for granted.

The Palestinians want that kind of lasting peace and security for themselves and the Israelis because no one can build his own future on the ruins of another's. We are confident that this desire and this realization are shared by all but an insignificant minority in Israel.

The means by which the Israelis want to achieve lasting peace and security is direct talks, with no attempt by any outside party to impose or veto a settlement. The Palestinians agree. We see no way for any dispute to be settled without direct talks between the parties to that dispute, and we feel that any settlement imposed by an outside power will not stand the test of time.

The key to a settlement lies in talks between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The Palestinians would be deluding themselves if they thought their problems with the Israelis could be solved in negotiations with non-Israelis, including the United States. By the same token, the Israelis — and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, who has been shuttling to the Middle East for discussions on his peace proposals — would be deluding them-

selves if they thought that Israel's problems with the Palestinians could be solved in negotiations with non-Palestinians, including Jordan.

The Palestinians would like to choose their Israeli interlocutor. We have little doubt that we could reach a satisfactory settlement with the Peace Now movement in a month. We know, however, that an agreement with Peace Now would not be an agreement with Israel, and since an agreement with Israel is what we are after, we are ready to talk to Shimon Peres' Labor Alignment, or to Yitzhak Shamir's Likud Bloc or anyone else the Israelis choose.

The Israelis and Mr. Shultz would also prefer to deal with Palestinians of their own choosing. But it would be as futile for them as for us to talk to people who have no mandate to negotiate. If it is a settlement with the Palestinians that they seek, as we assume it is, then it is with the representatives of that people that they must negotiate, and the Palestinian people, by the only means that they have at their disposal, have chosen their representatives. Every Palestinian questioned by diplomats and newsmen of the international community has stated unequivocally that his representative is the Palestine Liberation Organization.

If that is regarded as an unreliable expression of the Palestinians' free will, then give the Palestinians the chance to express their free will in a manner that will convince all doubters: Arrange for an internationally supervised referendum in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and allow the population to choose between the P.L.O. and any other group of Palestinians that Israel or the United States or the international community wishes to nominate. The P.L.O. is ready to abide by the outcome and step aside for an alternative leadership, should the people choose one.

The P.L.O. *raison d'être* is not the undoing of Israel but the salvation of the Palestinian people and their rights, including their right to democratic self-expression and national self-determination.

The P.L.O. accepts [United Nations Security Council] Resolutions 242 and 338. What prevents it from saying so unconditionally is not what is in the resolutions but what is not in them: Neither resolution says anything about the national rights of the Palestinian people, including their democratic right to self-expression and their national right to self-determination. For that reason alone, we have repeatedly said that we accept Resolutions 242 and 338 in the context of the other U.N. resolutions,

'We are ready to talk.'

which do recognize the national rights of the Palestinian people.

As for the fear that a Palestinian state would threaten its neighbor, the Palestinians would be open to the idea of a brief, mutually acceptable transitional period during which an international mandate would guide the occupied territories to democratic Palestinian statehood.

Beyond that, the Palestinians would accept — indeed, insist on — international guarantees for the security of all states in the region.

The Palestinians feel that they have much more to fear from Israel, with its mighty war machine and its nuclear arsenal, than Israel has to fear from them. They would therefore welcome any reasonable measure that would promote the security of their state and its neighbors, including the deployment of a U.N. buffer force on the Palestinian side of the Israeli-Palestinian border.

Time, sometimes the great healer, is often the great spoiler. Many Israelis no doubt realize this and are trying to communicate it to the rest of their people. As for us, we are ready for peace now, and we can deliver it. It is our hope that the opportunity that presents itself today will not be missed. □

"Last Nov. 12, Mr. Savimbi boasted to reporters at his bush headquarters in Jamba that his men had just won their most important victory... To Mr. Savimbi's embarrassment, South Africa's Defense Minister, Gen. Magnus Malan, announced on the same



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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167-3802

Transcript because of the poor quality of my own copy, made on a defective copy machine.

July 14, 1988

Ambassador William Wilson
10475 Bellagio Road
Los Angeles, CA 90077

Dear Ambassador Wilson,

Christ's Peace!

Yesterday I saw, once again, Mr. Nasser al-Kidwa, Chairman Arafat's nephew on the PLO UN Observer delegation. I had kept away from him as I had mentioned I would when it looked likely that there would be some meetings with Administration people earlier in the year. But this seemed an appropriate time to renew the contact and see if there was more to be said.

I take it that, since I last talked with you and wrote, you must have asked people to meet me on this business and been told no. A good deal more has happened since then, most notably the Bassam Abu Sharif statement (a copy enclosed, though I assume it is very familiar to you). This so much interested many authoritative Americans and Israelis, and leading figures in the American Jewish community too, that I thought it might be the right time to test the water again in the Administration. Those of the Israelis and the more alarmed of the American Jews to whom any prospect of peace with the PLO is unwelcome have, of course, been busily saying that the Abu Sharif statement means nothing, says nothing new, or has been contradicted by other important Palestinians, and that the episode is past without result. (I enclose, too, a cartoon, from the current Middle East International, that seemed to me to express that situation especially well.)

What I find from my visit to al-Kidwa is, first, that the PLO wants to confirm and reassert all the things they have been trying to communicate through my mediation before, that they are very ready to agree on formulas that they intend to meet all the legitimate needs of the Israelis, want to be flexible and to work for real solution, etc., exactly as I have written before, and as Arafat and others have told me before. Nothing is retracted.

What is new is indicated by the Abu Sharif statement. Abu Sharif, while he is the one who eventually attached his name to the document (it was without a person's name, presented simply as a PLO position paper, when first circulated at the Arab summit meeting in Algiers in May), is not the origin of it. Arafat is the origin of it, as his nephew assures me on Arafat's own authority. The Chairman, furthermore, is ready to elaborate further on these themes in mediated contacts with the American Administration, and to be flexible in meeting the concerns that will be expressed. It is settled policy in the PLO now to try to see and understand these matters from the viewpoint of Israeli needs and fears as well as from their own Palestinian interests. What they look for is to secure the very existence of their own people.

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They have a further suggestion, which is authoritative as coming from the Chairman through his nephew. This is that Abu Sharif himself meet with American mediators who will be accepted by the Administration or named by it, and discuss these themes further. He would be empowered to deal on them, and would be in contact with those more authoritative than himself. It is acceptable to the PLO whether those he meets are official (even at a lower level) or not, just so they are people it would not be a waste of his time to see.


I raised the matter of the coupling of the recognition of 242/338 with a renunciation of violence. As you recall, I had a proposal to make to Arafat on this score when I met him in March, '86, which he considered carefully and did not accede to. I understand his reasons for not acceding to it then, and would like to put the proposal before him again, but I asked more specifically that any response to such a request, if it is not positive, not be a rejection out of hand, but rather a way of keeping the question in discussion and on the way toward agreement. I was told the PLO would be careful to maintain its flexibility on this issue as well; that it would be anxious to see reciprocity - it is, after all, the Palestinians who have one or two of their young people killed nearly every day by Israelis, and the Israelis who empower even their civilian settlers to shoot down Palestinians under terribly ill-defined circumstances.

It seems to me there is reason to renew my request to communicate these matters to high Administration officials and eventually to the President. As earlier, I think it should be first to White House advisers to the President rather than to the State Department, for the same reason that everything in the State Department is leaked at once to people who will sabotage any such effort, and that even those in the Department who are looking for progress in these matters run in fear of such leaks.

There is now a clearer political dimension in our own country than there was before, simply because the election is so much closer. Personally, I think it would be politically positive to have made something that could be understood as important progress on this issue. I don't really know whether it can still be done before the election. The nearer our election gets, the more it would look like merely a political ploy, and that would discredit the progress made. I think it is worth trying still, if only to shape the discussion that will happen with the arrival of a new administration later. But in the meantime there is such a human need to be addressed among the Palestinians, and such need by the Israelis to have the issues clear and not obfuscated by the time of their own election. There is still time now to have the PLO engaged in a publicly recognizable peace campaign by that time, which the Israeli as well as the American publics would be able to judge on its own merits.

My best wishes, as always,

In Christ,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

August 18, 1988


His Excellency
Ambassador Clovis Maksoud
Arab League Delegation
United Nations
New York, N.Y. 10017

Dear Ambassador Maksoud,

Excuse me for using your office as a way of transmitting something to another. I am enclosing here a letter for Dr. Nasser al-Kidwa of the PLO Observer Delegation. I have always realised that anything sent to him in the mail was likely to be seen by other eyes than his, and so avoided writing to him or even saying anything of substance on the phone. In this case, however, I quite need to get something to him by post, and I thought I could rely on it that a letter to you would not be subject to the same tampering as one to him.

I would highly appreciate it if you would get the enclosed letter to Dr. al_Kidwa. My best regards to you. I hope I may see you again on one of my visits to New York.

Sincerely yours


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

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August 18, 1988

Dr. Nasser al-Kidwa
PLO Observer Delegation
United Nations
New York, N.Y. 10017


Dear Dr. al-Kidwa,

The enclosed letter is for Chairman Arafat. I am sure you will know how to get it to him as quickly as possible. As you know, I give a lot of thought to these matters, and wanted to get these ideas before the Chairman as soon as I could while the preparations are still going on for next month's PNC meeting.

Normally I avoid sending anything through the U.S. mail to you, or even saying anything of substance on the telephone. In this case I asked Ambassador Clovis Maksoud to get this to you, hoping that a letter addressed to him would not be as subject to interference as one addressed directly to yourself.

Warmest regards. I hope I may see you soon again in New York.

Sincerely,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



August 17, 1988

Chairman Yasser Arafat
Palestine Liberation Organization

Dear Chairman Arafat,

Up to this date, my efforts to contact directly people at the top of the Reagan Administration and inform them of our discussions have been unsuccessful. Dr. Nasser al-Kidwa will have kept you informed, even of my recent renewed approach last month. I suspect these endeavors may now be superseded by events, King Hussein's renunciation of any claim to the West Bank and the anticipations around next month's meeting of the PNC. It may yet be that the Administration will call me at the last moment before the PNC, in an effort to assess what might be coming. If so, I will tell them exactly what we have discussed and confer urgently with Dr. al-Kidwa.

I write, however, because of my own anticipations of the PNC. I think this is a time of hope for the Palestinian people, despite all their sufferings. If what I hear about a possible or even probable Declaration of Independence is correct, I would welcome it. You have always been clearly aware, since the beginning of our communication, that I speak to you also as a committed friend of the State of Israel, though not a supporter of any injustice committed in its name. I am most anxious now that this critical moment of the PNC contribute to the peace and satisfaction and justice for both peoples, Palestinian and Israeli. Consequently I presume on your attention to detail my concerns for the careful use of this opportunity.

A. The Purpose of a Declaration of Independence: to Establish a Real Palestinian State.

What has been won by the intifada is a real opportunity to demand genuine Palestinian self-determination. It is clear enough that the people's will is for their own independent state, whatever practical associations it may enter into later. King Hussein's move, even if it creates awkward problems, clears away an important obstacle to that will of the people. It would be very easy to lose or squander this opportunity. It is too precious, and won by too much sacrifice on the part of the people, to let that happen.

Accordingly, I wish to emphasize something that should be very obvious, but which might be obscured by passion in the course of the PNC. Any Declaration of Independence, if it is made, any policy, any action should be aimed at accomplishing things that have now become real possibilities through the heroic efforts of your people.

The probable temptations that may arise from many parties during the PNC are:

- 1) to do or say things, or formulate solemn declarations, not for the

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establishment of a real Palestinian State, but for the emotional satisfaction of spiting the Israelis. I hope it will be clear in your own mind and in that of the responsible leadership, as you guide the debate, that such emotional satisfactions contribute nothing, in themselves, to the goal of establishing a real state; and that things said or done or solemnly declared in order to express hatred or rejection to the Israelis or their State, may in fact be a real hindrance to the goal of establishing a Palestinian State.

2) to ask for, or demand, more than you actually expect or even want to get. I realize that there is a legitimacy, when one is approaching negotiations as you are, to stating opening positions which you expect to modify in negotiation. But the fundamental situation, now that the Palestinian people has so forcefully and successfully impressed all the world, including the Israelis, with its rejection of occupation and demand for its full right of self-determination, is that you need to win the Israelis and their friends, to let them know that you, the Palestinian people, can be lived with, and that granting you justice is not suicidal for the Israelis themselves.

I happen to know quite well that the destruction of the Israelis or their State is not the intention of the PLO or the Palestinians and other Arab peoples. Many Israelis and many of their friends do not know that, and are full of fear. Even if their fears are paranoid, they need to learn that friendship and full respect for Palestinian rights, on their part, will be met with friendship and full respect for their rights by the Palestinians. Just as the Israelis cannot live indefinitely at enmity with the Palestinians (and the rest of the Arabs), so you cannot live forever at enmity with them. Neither you nor they have the prospect of a real life except in eventual friendship and full mutual respect of one another's rights.

Conveying that knowledge, I believe, should be one very conscious goal of the coming PNC. You will want to put the Israelis in the wrong, of course, and demand the end of injustices and oppression of the Palestinian people, the end of occupation. But you must, I feel, accomplish this by the patent justice of your demands. You are, in reality, in a competition with the Israelis now to show which of you is in pursuit of a really attainable peace, and more determined to remove any obstacles to such a peace. If both you and they win that contest, so much the better. You at least must win it.

Consequently, any supposed "victory" for the Palestinians that consists only in scoring propaganda points against the Israelis will be cheap victory, wasted and hollow. There are real issues to be raised, the ones that mean the true liberation of your people, on which you must be entirely unyielding. Your people have now successfully put these on the world agenda, and on the Israelis agenda. There is no need for specious propaganda points.

You need the friendship and aid of the friends of Israel too. The European countries have been able to befriend the Palestinians and support your rights while retaining their friendship for Israel. They will be less effective as your needed friends if they have any suspicion that your aim is the destruction of Israel. United States policy, despite some fair words and a now growing awareness among our public of the injustices suffered by Palestinians, has been (in my own opinion) ignorantly and sometimes maliciously biased against you. I don't blame U.S. policy for being protective of Israel, as I am that myself. But I do blame it for its neglect of Palestinian rights. Nevertheless, you and your people

are right always to have cultivated and sought the help and understanding of the United States, however little the effort has brought you, and this simply because you so much need it. The United States by itself, with all the world except the Israelis opposed, has been able to frustrate all your hopes and your rights these many years. You cannot defeat the U.S., at least not in war. You can only win its support by a campaign of peace.

B. More Specific Issues.

That is the substance of what I wanted to write to you before this important PNC. It is simply that the goal of establishing a real Palestinian State has now become so achievable that care must now be taken not to squander the opportunity on any self-indulgent gestures. I have kept it all non-specific in order not to obscure this substantive point. Nevertheless, there are a few more specific matters on which I want to express my opinion to you before the PNC.

I. Boundaries of the Palestinian State.

You have now made it the accepted policy of the PLO (since the last PNC) that you accept all the pertinent UN resolutions, including 242 and 338, as part of international legality. After trying for a long time to ignore the fact that you are saying this, the Israelis and the U.S. now acknowledge it, however grudgingly, and urge you to accept 242 and 338 only, ignoring or abandoning all the rest. It is they who defy international legality at this point, and you have no reason to do their bidding. However, Resolution 242, which you accept, does speak of "secure and recognized boundaries", for Israel as well as all other states of the region. Accepting 242, as you do, in good faith, I think it important that you make the borders, in any Declaration of Independence, those of 1949-1967.

I read of an inclination to declare independence with the borders of the 1947 Partition Plan (G.A. Resolution 181). Even though those have standing in the earlier U.N. Resolution, you won't get those borders. You have a real opportunity to get the 1949-1967 borders, and I believe those would suffice. Surely those are the borders to which Resolution 242 looks. This is one of the points on which I believe that the PLO position, in declaring independence, should remain unyieldingly set. If, by setting up talk of the 1947 borders, you open yourselves up to haggling over the borders, like merchants in the souk, you will find the Israelis pushing various versions of the Allon plan at every point, and you will likely be pushed to things you should not ever concede. I think you should speak from the start of the borders you intend to get, those of 1949-1967, and stick with them adamantly on the basis of "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" (Res. 242) and Article 2 of the UN Charter.

There will doubtless also be voices, more among the "dissident" factions in Damascus than among the serious PLO, who will want to declare independence or in some fashion set their claim for the whole of Palestine, leaving no place for a State of Israel, or to leave the borders undetermined (as the Israelis themselves do), so as to leave open a claim to the whole territory later. To do either of these things would negate all you have accomplished, and make your stated acceptance of all the pertinent UN resolutions (including G.A. 181 and S.C. 242) unworthy of trust. It may be that deliberate vagueness, leaving the borders unstated, would be the most dangerous of these bad options, as it would be most destructive of confidence in the word of the PLO.

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II. Citizenship of the Newly Declared State.

I think this is the moment to counter the Israeli Law of Return. The Constitution or Declaration of Independence of a new Palestinian State should not only grant its citizenship to the residents of the Occupied Territories, but also offer it (as a matter of choice) to the Arab-Palestinian citizens of pre-1967 Israel (the Israeli Arabs) and, of course, to all those who fled or were driven (or whose ancestors fled or were driven) from Palestine. Return to Palestine should not be a condition for receiving this citizenship, but all should be free and invited to return.

I make a point of this because of what I understand as the shape that a real settlement must eventually take. You are probably more aware of Palestinian than of Israeli needs and requirements for a peace. I am conscious of three fundamental needs for the Israelis, of which practically all the Israelis themselves are aware. They must have: 1) the safety of their State (to be achieved, I believe, by friendship with you rather than by making themselves a fortress against you); 2) a Jewish state (so as not to be again, as in their diaspora, in subjection to others than themselves); and 3) a democratic society (although the Kahane and Sharon forces now treat this requirement with contempt). There is a fourth requirement too, though it has not been given the same consideration in Israeli society (possibly because the idea that there will or must be a real partition has not yet acquired reality in their minds). There must be an open border, not again the closed and militarized border that existed before 1967. I believe this is to your advantage and to theirs as well. It means that, after the establishment of a real Palestinian State, it must be possible still for Jews to live in Hebron or elsewhere in the territory of the Palestinian State. This is of great importance to them, as you have abundantly seen. Those who do so should be free to retain and opt for their Israeli citizenship, if they wish, and to vote in Israeli elections, but as residents in Palestinian territory they should be fully subject to Palestinian law.

There is a reciprocal right involved in this, that Palestinians should also be free to live in or return to Jaffa or Haifa or wherever else in Israeli territory. They too should be free to hold Palestinian citizenship, vote in Palestinian elections, but they too, as residents on Israeli territory, should be fully subject to Israeli law. This option should be made available, too, to all those Palestinians who remained in the Israeli State and have received Israeli citizenship. It should be declared, as their option (not imposed on them without their free choice) at the declaration of a Palestinian State, and made available again, as an option they would then be more free to accept, when that State achieves full recognition and the Israelis end their occupation of it.

What this means is that, in the eventual settlement, both Palestinians and Israelis would have their own state territory, with fully recognized borders, accepted and guaranteed by each to the other and with the full sanction of international law and the international community. But when it came to a place to live, each people, Palestinians and Israelis, would in this way have the whole of it. In this way, too, each people would be the guarantee to the other of its peace.

That is the eventual settlement I would want to see envisioned and given support by the citizenship clause of a Palestinian Declaration of Independence.

III. Provisional Government or Government in Exile,

I see this as a matter of discussion among Palestinians in the current news reports. If the choice is for a Provisional Government, with some of its authorities actually resident in the Occupied Territories, I would want to opt for emphasis on the democracy which is so precious to the PLO and the Palestinian people, that the rest of the world so little believes or understands about you, and which it is to your advantage to demonstrate.

This can be done in two ways. One is to recognize the authority of all elected officials, which in practice means the mayors elected in 1969. Most of these have been subsequently deposed by the Israelis, some murdered or victims of crippling attacks, some deported (like Mohammed Milhem), some still in office and serving their people with great loyalty (like Elias Freij). Any of those still resident in the Occupied Territories would be put under tremendous personal pressure, likely imprisoned by the Israelis if he would not renounce his office, perhaps deported. Palestinians of all sorts have willingly suffered much, even death, or imprisonment and torture, during the intifada. I have great admiration when I see a man like Faisal Husseini, a great risk-taking advocate of peace, loyal to his people and their chosen PLO, going repeatedly to prison and refusing to be held back from his task. If the elected mayors were to be put under this spotlight, marking them out particularly for the Israeli repression system by having their authority recognized and confirmed by a proclaimed new Palestinian State, I would think they should have some sort of prior, personal and private warning so that those who chose could, without shame, get out before the Israelis came for them. The cause of all these mayors would be a helpful focus of international attention.

The second way to emphasize the democracy of the Palestinian State, even under occupation, would be to give statutory authority to all the popular committees that have grown up or, if they existed before, have found their feet during the intifada. These are too numerous for the Israeli occupying forces to arrest all of them. Their membership is generally secret, and if some are arrested the leadership can be replenished by a truly popular and democratic process.

IV. Zionism as Racism.

You and the PLO have gained enormously in stature before the international community, as responsible champions of a lawful society, by your acceptance of all UN resolutions relevant to the Palestinian question as part of international legality. That position gives you a manifest moral superiority over all those who do less for the maintenance of international order.

However, there is one UN resolution that most deeply offends the sensibility and self-esteem of Israelis and their friends in the United States and elsewhere, so much that it puts at risk much that you attain by your position in support of international legality. That is G.A. Resolution 3379 (Nov. 10, 1975), which equates Zionism with racism and racial discrimination.

I hesitate to bring this up in the immediate context of a Palestinian Declaration of Independence, as that may not be the context in which this matter should be addressed. (Again, there may be advantage to addressing it in precisely this context, though perhaps not in the declaration itself but in another forum.) But sooner or later, it will have to be addressed if you want real peace with the

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Israelis. Hence I raise it with you at this time.

The charge of racism is not like the condemnation of such Israeli actions as the annexation of Jerusalem or the Golan, the invasion of Lebanon, or failure to implement human rights in the Occupied Territories. This equation of Zionism with racism rejects and denigrates what Israelis and many other Jews regard as their personal and communal identity. I can only compare it with the damage Palestinians feel to their personal and communal identity when they as a people, or the PLO as the organization with which they identify themselves and their aspirations as a people, are written off as terrorists. It is a damage that neither side should do to the other's identity, and that both must eventually retract. That this equation of Zionism with racism takes the form of a resolution of the General Assembly detracts, in practice, in the eyes of those to whom it is primarily addressed, from the majesty and authority of the UN itself, the international community and its resolutions.

Clearly, there are some understandings of Zionism, or of the behavior of some who regard themselves as Zionist, that are undeniably racist. The feeling, so manifest among many Israelis in the present circumstances, that the lives and deaths of Palestinians do not matter as much as Israeli or other Jewish lives and deaths is unmistakably racist, and there are innumerable other manifestations of the same mean and ugly spirit. The language of a General Eitan (that Palestinians are like cockroaches in a bottle that he can shake up to make them mad) or of Prime Minister Shamir (locusts) has disgusted us all, as have the practices of collective punishment of families whose houses are blown up or villages like Beita or Beit Sahur. I don't believe these are of the essence of Zionism.

There is a more serious aspect of Zionism that has terrified Palestinians since they first heard it, namely the belief that every Jew has the right to live in Palestine/Israel, the belief codified as the Law of Return. That raises the specter of ever more Jewish immigrants into Israel, requiring the expansion of the territory of Israel (whose boundaries are so undefined), and the displacement of more and more Arabs (as if they were people whose right to live in their homeland is less than that of the Jewish newcomers). This has been tragic reality for the Palestinians over the last century. It was believed by many Jews and others at the beginning of the Zionist enterprise that this could be done without injury to the rights of the Palestinians. The great Martin Buber believed this was possible. That it was not so done, but that it was done instead with ruthless disregard for the rights and lives of the Palestinians, treating them as a sort of Untermenschen, can be put down to racism on the part of many implementors of the Zionist dream. It was very much like the action of European settlers who assaulted the very existence of the Native American population in my own country, a game of cowboys and Indians, as many Palestinians have remarked.

An argument can be made that the racist aspects of this Zionist settlement were also not of the essence of Zionism. I would understand it that many Palestinians would not be convinced by such an argument. I think it more to the point to say that the waves of Jewish immigration into Israel and the growth of its population are over now. Even if Russian Jews are denied their desire to emigrate to other countries and forced to choose only between going to Israel or staying where they are, they are not going to stay in Israel, and no one else is emigrating there in significant numbers, now or in the foreseeable future.

I have written to you before, Mr. Chairman, on this subject (my letter of Nov. 26, '85, p. 6, last paragraph), and discussed with you and several members of your Executive, at length, in March of 1986, the idea that the PLO's policy (initiated in 1974) of seeking a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian problem was premised on a concept of Zionism as, in its essence, self-determination for the Jews. That, self-determination for the Jews, is the definition of Zionism given by Martin Buber himself, and held by Simha Flapan, whom Buber had chosen to edit the monthly New Outlook. It remains the understanding of Zionism of the New Outlook group (my dearest friends among Israelis) since, under the editorship of Chaim Shur. Simha Flapan once told me that this understanding of Zionism, and their consequent attitude toward Palestinians, made his group the only sane Zionist. It is of this sense of Zionism that I consider myself an advocate, although I reject as much as you do any understanding of Zionism that is in fact racist. I would commend to your attention, also, the many statements and writings of the American Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg, whom I also regard as a good friend, describing Zionism as a form of affirmative action (like that we recommend for Black Americans to compensate for their long experience of discrimination), an effort to reverse a history of centuries of deprivation of the most basic human rights for the Jews.

What I am recommending here, in substance, is that you and the PLO clarify, in your own thinking, what of Zionism or Zionist practice is racist and what is not. It is going to be necessary for you, as you move toward settlement, peace and friendship for the Israelis, that you back away from a condemnatory labelling of what Israelis and other Zionist Jews regard as the very core of their identity. The Israelis too are going to have to back off from a similar labelling of the Palestinians. Perhaps it would be helpful for some of us outsiders to do the preliminary exploration of this theme, in writing, before you, the PLO and Palestinians generally have to take it up. But I would want to emphasize that G.A. Resolution 3379, as it stands, is an obstacle rather than a help to your gaining acceptance, from Israel and the United States (the very ones whose acceptance you most need), of everything else that the UN has decided in your favor. The context in which that is true is your present one, in which the PLO seeks the support of the international community for the independent life of a Palestinian State.

In all I write here I am very conscious of indebtedness to the thinking of Jerome Segal, in his article on strategy for achieving Palestinian independence. I am sure that is very familiar to you. I don't necessarily accept every feature of his thinking (though I am at a loss to find fault with it). I am sure that you and the PLO have thought his strategy through, and have striven to have a strategy that is of your own making.

I would, however, assert my own full endorsement of a key point in Segal's strategy. If the PLO is to declare Palestine independent, it should also and simultaneously declare it at peace with the State of Israel, whose existence it recognizes within defined boundaries, and demand the end of occupation. The strategy is a whole, as Segal says. Details can be defined in terms that will be your own, but the integrity of the whole design, that it should be a declaration of independence in peace with Israel, should not be compromised.

My warmest best wishes to you, Mr. Chairman, your colleagues and your people.

Sincerely,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

behind the news

A strategy for Palestinian statehood

by Jerome M. Segal

What are the alternative strategies for achieving an independent Palestinian state? At one point two alternatives were posed, armed struggle vs. negotiations. In the PLO Covenant armed struggle is stated to be "the only way to liberate Palestine." During the late '60s and early '70s there were ample denunciations of any efforts to bring a state into being through negotiations. Starting in the mid '70s negotiations gained acceptance. The 13th PNC in 1976 continued to reject recognition of Israel but stressed the right of the Palestinians to participate in a Geneva Conference. Today no responsible person can believe that a Palestinian state can be attained through armed struggle. At most, and I reject even this, armed struggle could be viewed as a limited adjunct to negotiations.

Thus, almost by default the Palestinian strategy has become one of negotiations. There is some debate over whether this needs to happen within the context of an international conference or whether direct bilateral or trilateral negotiations might also be feasible. But these are secondary issues. The main point is that the PLO has adopted a strategy of negotiations, and it has arrived at this point because the only other historical option, armed struggle, has been seen to be impossible. (This of course does not mean that the right to armed struggle has been abandoned, nor that the PLO has abandoned specific acts of violence; only that armed struggle has for some time not been the general strategic approach.)

But is it reasonable to believe that the Palestinians can negotiate their way to a state? Surely it is fantasy to believe that the United States has the political will to impose a Palestinian state on a resistant Israel. If negotiations do get started, and if the PLO is represented in its own right, and even if the basis of the nego-

Almost by default the Palestinian strategy has become one of negotiations

tiations is Resolution 242 plus Palestinian self-determination, it is highly likely that the negotiations will go on interminably or ultimately break down. What then?

The most likely result will be random violence against Israeli soldiers and settlers in the territories, a spiral of violence and counter-violence, and ultimately the creation of an environment in which the Israeli government will use the full weight of its military power to dictate a solution. "Transfer" need not be taken literally; it stands for any of a variety of draconian options open to the Israelis if the restraints on the full use of military force break down.

Is it really the case that there is no other alternative strategy than this weak reed of negotiations? Perhaps it is time to reconsider the basic premise of the reliance on negotiations: that Israeli permission is necessary before a Palestinian state can emerge.

Consider what the Israelis did. Following the 1947 Partition Resolution, they neither sought nor gained Palestinian permission. They did three things:

1. They unilaterally declared the existence of their state.
2. They gained international recognition and support.

3. They gained effective control of territory through force of arms.

The Palestinians can do the same thing, with one big difference: they will have to gain effective control of the territory through tactics other than military force. This can be done, but it requires an approach based on an understanding of the political, economic, diplomatic and moral forces that potentially are available. It requires a liberation from old paradigms, and a confidence in the unity and determination of the Palestinians living in the occupied territories. Most of all, it will require a new sense of potency and self-confidence. The *intifada* (uprising) has generated this new sense of empowerment. The strategy delineated below builds upon this new psychological reality. Here is how the Palestinians might proceed:

1. The PLO issues a Declaration of Independence and Statehood, announcing the existence of the State of Palestine in the West Bank and Gaza. Simultaneously the Declaration of Independence and Statehood is announced throughout the occupied territories.
2. The PLO proclaims, as its final act, its transformation into the Provisional Government of the State of Palestine. The Palestine National Council (PNC) is transformed into the legislative body of the Provisional Government. All government positions are declared provisional pending the possibility of free elections by the Palestinian people.
3. The new government issues Law 1 (or a constitution) which proclaims:
The State of Palestine declares itself at peace with the State of Israel.
The State of Palestine (like Costa Rica) will by its constitution, not maintain an army.
4. The new government offers Israel the exchange of ambassadors and mutual recognition.
5. Law 2 is issued, forbidding all acts of terrorism and announcing penalties for any violations.
6. Worldwide recognition:
a worldwide diplomatic offensive is declared seeking:
a) recognition of the new state
b) admission to the United Nations
7. Boundaries
The Provisional Government calls for direct negotiations to set boundaries with Israel and to establish a permanent Israel-Palestine peace treaty.
8. Israeli withdrawal
Withdrawal becomes the central demand, internationally and within the territories. All energies are now concentrated on this single demand. Whereas Israel was occupying territory, it is now occupying a foreign country which has declared itself at peace.
To promote withdrawal and to eliminate any excuses for a continued military presence, the Provisional Government announces a ban on all lethally violent attacks on Israeli soldiers. No violence is allowed against settlers except in clear self-defence.

The Palestinian people are called to enter into only symbolic activity directed against Israeli soldiers in the territories. Stone throwing is permitted, but only insofar as it is undertaken symbolically, (i.e. with no lethal intent). Use of petrol bombs is forbidden.

If diplomatic efforts fail to secure either negotiations or withdrawal, an intensified campaign of international economic pressure is undertaken.

9. Building the fabric of statehood

In some parts of the territories, the soldiers will be totally ignored; treated as if invisible. The real focus of energies will be on building the inner sinews of national life and statehood:

Secret local elections are held.

Economic self-reliance is advanced.

Social services are expanded on a village level.

A national anthem is proclaimed. The anthem should emphasise peace.

10. Currency

With the assistance of the Arab states the Provisional Government should issue a new Palestinian currency.

To insure its use and value even during the period of occupation, its conversion into dollars should be guaranteed. Within the territories a small gold coin should be introduced. The inherent value of the coin will insure that it will be taken seriously even by Israelis. Every time a transaction is paid using this coin, Palestinian statehood will be affirmed.

11. Passports

The new government, to symbolise the end to statelessness, should promptly issue passports. These should be made available to any Palestinian in the world who desires one. An announcement should be made that the State of Palestine will allow dual citizenship. Palestinians who are citizens of other states should be encouraged to apply for and travel on Palestinian passports.

12. Democracy

The Provisional Government and the new Constitution should proclaim that Palestine shall be a democracy with an independent judiciary and a Bill of Rights to protect individual liberties.

The United Nations will be asked to supervise the first possible national elections.

These elements may be thought of as falling into four categories: 1) The unilateral Declaration of Statehood and the creation of the Provisional Government; 2) The Peace Offensive; 3) The campaign of internal and external pressure for negotiations or troop withdrawal; 4) The building of the sinews of the State.

It is absolutely critical that these four elements be viewed as a package. Most important, the peace offensive cannot be dissociated from the package. It is the peace offensive which will enable the Provisional Government to build the international pressures for Israeli withdrawal; it is the peace offensive which will create a powerful movement inside Israel in favour of either negotiations or withdrawal, and it is the peace offensive which will strengthen the political and moral constraints which thus far have limited the Israeli use of force against the Palestinians. To proclaim the state, without the peace offensive, will be to enrage the Israelis and to be defenceless in front of that rage.

It may be pointed out that many of the elements in the peace offensive call upon the Palestinians to take unilateral steps which they have resisted taking until now. Since the PLO has objected to "playing its cards prior to negotiations" why should they do so

now? The answer is this: once the paradigm of statehood-through-Israeli-consent is abandoned, these unilateral acts are no longer "cards" (if they ever were). There is no longer a card game. Statehood does not depend on mutuality. Rather, the elements of the peace offensive are further unilateral acts whereby the Palestinians will call into being forces which will make a reality out of the Unilateral Declaration of the State.

The strategy turns on an essential conceptual point. Having a state is not a matter of having guns; the existence of a state is a complex human relationship which occurs when a people recognises some entity as its rule-giver. Implicitly this has been understood by the *intifada*. Thus the struggle with Israeli soldiers over whether or not shops will remain open or closed is a struggle over who rules in the territories. To force shops open with lock clippers or at gun point is not to rule; government rules on the basis of its implicit power or authority. Thus civil disobedience inside the territories is not a mere tactic, it is the very act whereby the Israeli military ceases to be a government. At the same time, in foetal form, a provisional government has begun to emerge.

*Liberation is not a matter of territory;
it is a psycho-socio relationship*

Without calling itself such, that is exactly what the underground command is. It issues directives which are law-like in structure, and it commands and receives the obedience of the population, largely on the basis of a shared perception of it as the legitimate rulemaker.

It must be remembered that no existing state has full control over its territory. The rampant criminality present in the major American cities is a common example. The United States has been unable to prevent either illegal aliens or illegal drugs from entering the country. From the point of view of Palestinian society and increasingly from the point of view of the international community, the status of the Israeli troops can be transformed into that of armed bands that for the time being are present in a foreign country called Palestine, and are obeyed only insofar as they have people directly under the gun. But the Israelis cannot hold a gun on 1.5 million Palestinians; as soon as they move to another location, the alternative government re-emerges.

While this may sound remote and philosophical, in fact it is something that Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza feel intuitively: it is for this reason that even today they speak of liberated villages. In the military-struggle paradigm a liberated village was a piece of territory into which the enemy could not go, one within which the revolutionary army was dominant. But in the new paradigm, liberation is not a matter of territory; it is a psycho-socio relationship. Every Palestinian is liberated the moment he stops regarding the Israelis as rule-givers within the territories. And every village is a liberated village the moment the Israeli army jeep turns the corner.

It is this combination of a Declaration of Statehood coming from Tunis and the living affirmation of that Declaration in the identities and the behaviour of the Palestinian people which is the crucial point. Gaining Israeli troop withdrawal will come slowly, perhaps incrementally. But if the Palestinians create their state and make their peace with Israel, it is within their power to bring about withdrawal and thus impose the two-state solution on Israel whether it likes it or not.

Jerome M. Segal is a Research Scholar at the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland. He is a founder of the Jewish Committee for Israeli-Palestinian Peace.

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WILLIAM A. WILSON

10475 Bellagio Road
Los Angeles, California 90077
Telephone 270-3181

September 14, 1988

Father Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.
Jesuit Community Boston College
Chesnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167

Dear Father Helmick:

I apologize for being so long in responding to your letter of July 14, but soon after I received it things began to happen that put a completely new complexion on the situation with respect to the Palestinians. It was shortly after I received your letter that King Hussein decided to terminate his support of the Palestinians living in the West Bank and that was followed by what appears to be a change in the policy position with respect to the PLO and it's recognition of Israel. In addition to this, I see a change coming in world opinion with respect to the many, many wars that have been taking place around the world and I have in mind the winding down of the Afghan situation, the efforts to find a solution to the Angola matter, the apparent settlement of the Western Sahara war and of course the apparent winding down of the Iran/Iraq war. With all of this happening it will have the effect of focusing world attention even more on the Israeli/Palestinian matter and I think it is predictable that world opinion is going to put even more pressure on Israel to be less intransigent on this issue. Not that we can depend on our State Department to change it's position with respect to the Israel/Arab situation, but with other countries looking towards peace in the world pressure can be exerted through the United Nations which seems to be quite effective in several of the above mentioned disputes. Several weekends back I had the opportunity of spending an hour and a half on horseback with the President at his ranch in Santa Barbara County during which time I had the opportunity to discuss this matter with him, and although I don't think I quite persuaded him to try to have our State Department take a more balanced position in the Middle East at least I tried to make him aware of the imbalance of our policy in that area. Knowing the personalities involved I am not sure my comments had a great deal of impact.

I guess the bottom line here is to ask you for an update on your analysis of the situation and see what the next step might be.

Another variable which has been introduced into the formula is the fact that both the Republican and the Democratic Conventions are now behind us and we have a full-fledged Presidential Campaign under way. This means that Vice President Bush is developing his own agenda for dealing with the Middle East situation, which if he wins the election will undoubtedly be implemented under a new Secretary of State. At the same time despite the fact that the Reagan administration is approaching the end of its term and one would normally think it would be winding down the opposite effect may be true, namely that the administration but more particularly the Secretary of State might be in a mode to try to get a new treaty or a new agreement into effect in the Middle East before leaving office. The problem would be if this is the case that in an effort to get an agreement within a certain time frame there is often the result that the agreement is often a poor one and one which should not have been made in the first place, since the poor agreement is usually worse than non at all.

I hear something like this may have happened in Afghanistan, I feel quite certain this may have happened in Nicaragua and I think we stand a good chance of it happening in Angola.

I certainly commend you for your efforts in attempting to resolve the problem concerning Israel and the Palestinians and I am sure there must be a solution to that problem, however it will be difficult if not impossible to find the solution if either side refuses to talk or to negotiate the issue.

Yours sincerely,



William A. Wilson

WAW/lr

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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

September 26, 1988

Ambassador William A. Wilson
10475 Bellagio Road
Los Angeles, California 90077

Dear Mr. Wilson,

Christ's Peace!

I could breathe much the easier for having received your good letter of September 14th. I appreciate the care you put into reflecting on this Israeli-Palestinian matter since I'd last written, and your conversation with the President. I had come, myself, to the conclusion that events might be overtaking all the efforts I had been making myself. My last letter to you, July 14th, had been prompted by the Abu Sharif statement, but since then things had taken on a distinctively different momentum, as you observe, with King Hussein's renunciation of authority in the West Bank and the PLO's growing discussion of a declaration of independence. In fact, I had written directly to Chairman Arafat about these things on August 17, and I think it best that you have a copy of that letter, which I enclose. I'll enclose one other item also, which I'm sure you know of but may not have a copy at hand: the Jerome Segal memo recommending the declaration of independence as a strategy, which first appeared in Arabic in the Jerusalem newspaper Al Quds, and then in English in the 27 July issue of Middle East International (the publication, of course, after much private discussion by Segal with Arafat and other PLO officials). I'll point out, by way of underlining the confidentiality of my letter to Arafat, that I have sent or shown it so far to no one other than Arafat himself and his nephew in New York, through whom I sent it, Dr. Nasser al-Kidwa of the PLO Observer Delegation to the UN.

Having received your letter, I jotted down notes on my own current view of the situation, which I will type up here, and then made another of my trips to New York to get more accurate information from al-Kidwa on how things stand now within the PLO. So my letter will fall into two parts, as I give you these two things successively.

First of all, I entirely agree with what you write of the dangers of rushing for a treaty without sufficient time for careful process and reflection. That this may be happening in the Afghan situation, in the Gulf war and in Central America is likely enough. Let's be clear that this should not be done in the Israeli-Palestinian matter: an effort at a treaty within the remaining time of President Reagan's administration would be foolhardy and produce a bad solution.

It remains true that events have changed the U.S. and world public perspective on this conflict. Winding down of other conflicts will, as you observe, concentrate attention on this one. The Palestinian uprising has also made these people and their plight visible and sympathetic to an American and European public in a way they have not been before. There will be a reaction in their favor, and strong enough so that a future U.S. administration, of whichever party, will have to respond to it; I hope that will be without an admixture of anti-semitism or of faltering in our commitment to the safety and future of Israel.

I see these remaining months of the Reagan administration, all the same, as an important time for fostering a breakthrough in understanding, both in this country and in Israel. As you observe, we can already see this occurring. I would see another sign of it in Foreign Minister Peres' remarks, quoted in this morning's New York Times, that he will not attach attention to the "biographies" of the Palestinians he will negotiate with, so long as they meet the preconditions, in other words that he does not at all preclude talking with the real PLO. For their part, I see the Palestinians as working urgently now for a breakthrough to genuine negotiations with the State of Israel.

I take this situation largely from the point of view of the future and safety of Israel itself, which is surely a major consideration of any American administration and of our public. If the opportunity is not seized now, I think the future safety of Israel will be really jeopardized. Hence I see it as an imperative responsibility of our U.S. government, at this crucial time, to promote a growth of understanding that will make more constructive negotiation possible at somewhat longer term, in a more considered atmosphere, in the next administration.

For the understanding I speak of, the elections are a critical date, and even more the Israel elections (Nov. 1) than our American ones. The Israelis will be voting about the Palestinian issue and the future of their own State in relation to it, and this will be the first time an election has been about this subject in Israel. If it is held on false premises, that will be a great loss.

I see illusions/stereotypes as controlling the public view of the question in Israeli eyes, and of the many illusions, two, both of long term, stand out as particularly mischievous. The first, earlier even than 1948, is the idea that the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular are the Nazis all over again, bent on the destruction of the State of Israel and the Jews. This has been a paranoia, and it has also been the rationalization excusing enormous cruelty and callousness toward the Palestinians that goes back as far as the illusion itself. Nevertheless, it remains about this illusion/stereotype that: a) Israelis actually believe it; and b) it is not in fact true.

The second illusion/stereotype is that "there is no one to talk to." This also is long-term as an Israeli concept, though more of a tactical maneuver than is the idea that the Arabs are the Nazis returned, and as a tactical maneuver held in relatively bad conscience, a knowledge that it is not really true. But while it is illusory, unjust, and a rationalization of behavior unresponsive to the real situation, it still, especially as it relates to the illusion about the Palestinians being Nazis, holds its place stubbornly in people's minds.

The critical importance of this short time period before us is that there is the opportunity for the Palestinians to demonstrate, to the Israelis especially but also to us Americans and to themselves (who of course are always under pressure to conform to the stereotypes their enemies hold of them), that these two premises are false. This needs to happen, not later, after the elections and when new administrations are in place in the U.S. and Israel, but now, before the Israeli election, and as a way of ensuring that a more productive negotiation can take place on a time scale that allows for more mature consideration.

The steps toward such a development? There are first the famous preconditions (recognition of Israel, termination of violence). But what do the Palestinians get out of that? It is for this reason that they are thinking of a declaration

Ambassador Wilson, Sept. 26, 1988 -- 3

of independence (that would at the same time be a declaration of peace with Israel), so that by their own action, not in dependence on anyone else about whose response they can have no confidence, they can reap political gain from their meeting the preconditions. Can't the U.S., even very privately and confidentially, give some assurances of what will be the response if the Palestinians take steps toward meeting the preconditions? If not, it will be understood as a case of the U.S. showing its intention to frustrate and obstruct a genuine peace effort. What then if the effort is not genuine, but a trap? It seems to me that the U.S. can design its response in such a way that precisely that would then be demonstrated.

If there is no such effort by the U.S., isn't the Palestinian leadership put in the position where it may be left high and dry, with no response, if it takes these steps, and judged by its own people to have betrayed them? To whose advantage is that? Not to any real Israeli advantage, only to the advantage of Israel's darkest spirits, who would squander and even suppress any opportunity for the resolution of Israel's greatest actual problem and need, who would bring destruction on Israel and great harm, including the danger of a general war, to U.S. interests.

For the U.S. itself, this is a question:

a) of real interests of our own;

b) of justice. Our interest in and engagement of our society for Israel has been, at a profound level, a justice commitment, even if we have gone at it with only an understanding of one side's need for justice and not the other's, of Jewish rights and needs but not those of the Arab or Palestinian. We should in no way abandon that commitment to Israel, but our justice commitment must be to the Palestinians as well, and American public perception and opinion is tending that way. The standard retaliatory tactic is to denigrate the Arabs and Palestinians: the stereotype of the Palestinian as Nazi all over again is an example. This doesn't really differ from the standard tactics of anti-Semitism.

So much my thoughts prior to my meeting last Saturday, September 24, with Dr. al-Kidwa. I felt I needed to talk with him, after receiving your letter, to find out: 1) the best possible information, in confidence, on Palestinian intentions and such dilemmas as they face; and 2) some knowledge, not, I hoped, of demands, but of what actions by the U.S. would help to forward a real peace process.

I found that al-Kidwa's formulation of a response didn't follow my two questions, but went in a different direction.

The delay about calling a PNC and issuing a declaration of independence, he tells me, is not a matter of trying to compose internal disputes at all. What has been reported in the press about that has been distorted. Arafat and his close advisers are keeping their counsel, hence the press is printing what it can get, groundless rumors and the chit-chat of marginal people who are talking without knowledge. Arafat, he says, has never been stronger. He will bring his considered policy to the PNC.

Details of this policy? I got nothing authoritative about the shape a PNC proposal might take. Al-Kidwa himself is not in favor of a provisional government, but others are. He pointed out, as evidence of Arafat's strength, the

repeated mention of him by name (a thing that has not happened before) in the recent leaflet #25 of the Unified Command of the Intifada, with its endorsement of Arafat's Strassburg message. George Habash had been quoted in that day's New York Times as advocating a rather watered-down declaration of independence that did not include explicit recognition of the State of Israel. But al-Kidwa himself had had a conversation with Habash and a couple of members of his Politburo recently. Habash told him: if you people (Arafat and his group) see that you can really gain from doing these things (i.e., any of the things among Arafat's options), go ahead and do them. I won't go along with you, at least not right away. But I also will not oppose, nor will I leave you.

Instead, the delay is a waiting to see if there is another option, i.e., meeting the American concerns (al-Kidwa didn't want to use the expression "pre-conditions," but left no doubt that it was these he meant) through contact with the American administration. This is what President Mubarak of Egypt was urging on Arafat during the Chairman's visit to Egypt, and it is noteworthy that Habash's interview contained no criticism of that visit or its content. If such contact with the U.S. can't be accomplished over the next two or three weeks, then the unilateral action of a declaration of independence at the PNC will be the next recourse. It will be the declaration of the independence of a country at peace with Israel, and recognizing Israel.

Arafat's statement at Strassburg -- apart from his wishing the Israelis "Shana tova" -- was ill-reported in the American press, which generally reported a) below and not b), but its content must be known to the U.S. government. Besides repeating his now familiar recognition of all the UN resolutions relevant to the Palestinian problem, including explicitly SC242 and 338, Arafat offered that he would be prepared to negotiate with the Israelis (and Americans) on the political basis of: either:

- a) all the UN resolutions relevant, including 242 and 338; or
- b) 242 and 338 by themselves, along with recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination.

However, if the PLO has to go to a unilateral declaration of independence, for lack of any prior U.S. help in getting to negotiations, then recognition of the right of self-determination will not be sufficient as a formula any longer, but it will be recognition of the independence of the State.

Al-Kidwa was anxious to emphasize, in his discussion of pre-conditions and steps unilateral and otherwise by the various parties, the unilateral actions that are plainly and publicly discussed and advocated by Prime Minister Shamir, many members of his cabinet and high Israeli military officials. When they speak of the permanent and irrevocable possession by Israel of the Occupied Territories (Judea and Samaria) or substantial parts of them, they are saying that they will simply dismiss all the international community's (and Resolution 242's) insistence on land for peace, or the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force. And what the same Israelis call by the euphemism "transfer," it should be recognized, is a genocide of the Palestinians. He accepted my counter-argument that emphasis on these things, clearly true as they are, as leading ideas for Palestinian policy would be to reduce the discussion to reasons for doing nothing, which of course would not get them where they want to go. It is important, though, that others like ourselves understand that this is what these frequently employed Israeli euphemisms mean, and that American policy response and public opinion not blandly take it for granted that these are normal things for Israelis to propose.

Ambassador Wilson, Sept. 26, '88 -- 5

He observed that, if the Palestinian procedure is a declaration of independence at the PNC, then there will need to be a constitutional document. He himself favors setting out a legal basis for the declaration, which would consist of:

- Article 22 of the League of Nations Charter, which, prior to establishing the mandate system for a limited period of time, declares their provisional independence, "subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone."
- G.A. Resolution 181 (the 1947 partition decision establishing the two states, one Jewish, one Arab). Al-Kidwa does not see this resolution as relevant for determining the borders of the two states, but for determining instead the legal existence of both.
- S.C. Resolutions 242 and 338, with special reference to the citation of Article 2 of the UN Charter, with its prohibition of the acquisition of territory by force.

This legal argument is distinct from the political basis of negotiation with the Israelis, which al-Kidwa sees, in line with the second option Arafat offered in his Strassburg statement, as consisting of 242/338 along with the principle of self-determination, with its clear basis in international law.

He favored handing over responsibility for the country to the Executive Council of the PLO rather than setting up a provisional government, but there is a variety of opinions on this subject, and Arafat himself is keeping his counsel.

With regard to the Palestine National Covenant, which the Israelis so often cite, al-Kidwa says it has in fact been dead since 1974, when the 12th PNC adopted the goal of a national authority. How, he asked, can one now speak of any continued adherence of the PLO, PNC or any of the Palestinian organs to the Covenant, when the Covenant explicitly rejects G.A. Res. 181 as invalid, and the subsequent official statements of Arafat, PLO Executive and PNC cite 181 as legal basis of their independence? Their feeling about this -- and also about the other issue I had raised in my August 17 letter to Arafat, of the "Zionism is Racism" resolution--is that these are dead issues of a past history, and that they will have to be cleaned up as debris of the past in a future settlement, but that the task for now is not this preoccupation with the past but rather dealing with present issues, which have left the past behind.

Essential in the meeting with al-Kidwa was the PLO's preference for meeting "the American concerns" through contacts with the U.S. government rather than through the unilateral action of a declaration of independence at the PNC. They see the Israelis as so supported in their intransigence, and in their violation of the Palestinians in every way, by the U.S., that contact with the U.S. has priority. They hope also for the help of the Europeans and the Soviet Union in coming to a just solution, which they know and accept must be just and satisfying to Israel as to themselves. But if the U.S. government finally begins to talk some sense on this issue, the Europeans will have understood these things long since and will simply applaud the U.S. action, and the Soviets will offer their cooperation in genuinely good offices for both sides.

The Palestinians still debate among themselves whether a declaration of independence, if that is the route, for lack of any American help, that they must go, should be some weeks before the Israeli election (i.e., by mid-October) or after the election. They understand the perspective, which would be my own, that puts great real trust in Jewish openness to moral ideals of justice, and would want to appeal to this before the election. At the same time, they keep hearing from various people that, if Shamir's Likud is elected, they can forget their intifada, that all hopes or prospects for it will be over, and they know this is not true. Whoever is elected, whether Shamir or not, will have to deal with the intifada. And in fact, neither Israeli political bloc will be able to do it alone. They will have to do it together.

As for the U.S., they sense the change of atmosphere, sense that American public opinion is now aware of their plight, their needs, their rights, the oppression they suffer, and will side with them increasingly, though without becoming anti-Israeli or abandoning support for Israel. Hence they are sure that a new U.S. administration, of whichever party, will have to adjust to this shift of public opinion, and they will have American help. They hope the Reagan administration, in its last months, will set the course for this, and they believe it can.

Those are my thoughts, and that is the information I bring back from my meeting Saturday with al-Kidwa. What can be done as a next step? I think a good understanding of all this should be put before the President at this stage, to see if he would want to encourage the Palestinians to fulfill the pre-conditions without having to go through the unilateral step of a declaration of independence.

All best wishes,

in Christ,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

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APOSTOLIC NUNCIATURE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

3339 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008-3687

No. 4301/88/5

October 3, 1988

This No. Should Be Prefixed to the Answer

Rev. Raymond S. Helmick, SJ
Jesuit Community
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167

Dear Father Helmick:

I have received your correspondence of September 27, 1988, and, as always, have reviewed it with interest. Your consideration in keeping me apprised of your activities is appreciated.

With prayerful good wishes, I am,

Sincerely yours in Christ,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J. Pio Lapini".

Apostolic Pro-Nuncio



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

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October 10, 1988

Mr. Stanley K. Sheinbaum
345 North Rockingham Avenue
Los Angeles, California 90049

Dear Stanley,

Shalom!

What a good thing it is to know you. Quite apart from the importance of what we talked about the other day, the meeting was a delight: mind and compassion able to work with a freedom I seldom find.

I warned you this heap of paper would be formidable. I tried not to throw in the kitchen sink, but did start with the report (which I made sure I wrote myself) on the 1985 trip that I shared with Len Beerman and a number of others, because it was my first actual meeting with Arafat (pp. 12-13 are the account of this). Pretty much all of this is my own material, except that after my January 5, '88 letter to Bill Wilson I included the two texts of long Arafat speeches to which I had referred in that letter (with an indication of where the crucial passages are in each: pp. 11-12 of his September 1986 Harare speech, p. 15 of his September '87 Geneva speech). And then at the last minute I included two earlier pieces to give you my own mind-set on the regional questions: a talk I gave in January '83 to a conference in Tel Aviv on the psychological dynamic of the Israeli-Arab conflict (I could do this so much better by now!), and the report of my first 1983 visit to Lebanon. These two I stuck, out of sequence, at the back of the pile, as they are only background material.

Up at the front I have put two newspaper pages. I misled you in speaking of the New York Times as the source of what I saw Friday (Oct. 7) on a truce between Hamas and the intifada leadership. It was in the Boston Globe, and given little prominence for the importance it held in that day's news. The New York Times had it the day we spoke (Saturday, Oct. 8), and in a less encouraging form. The submission of Hamas to the unified leadership is followed by news of the dissonance of the two movements over goals, with the Hamas people still talking the destruction of Israel. That means that once the PLO makes definitive moves, this rivalry will break out again.

And that's where we seem to be now, with the rather immediate prospect of the PLO making definitive moves. What was on the radio Monday morning (today) and will be in Tuesday's papers is that the Executive Council, meeting in Tunis, has given its approval now to a declaration of independence, on the legal basis of GA Resolution 181, and with a declaration of sovereignty over territory occupied in the 1967 war. A meeting of the PNC to discuss this is expected late this month or early in November. Are they anticipating or waiting out the Israeli election? Or ours? It seems to me I need to get the further letter off to Arafat on the racism resolution very quickly, and that we need to be looking closely again at our timing of whatever intervention we are going to make in Washington, so that we and the U.S. don't get left behind. If we don't get what we can offer in in


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Stanley Sheinbaum, Oct. 10, '88 -- 2

good time, we might leave a little more chance that an otherwise valuable initiative could become a debacle. I'm sure, at any time like this, that we should also be very careful not to let ourselves be rushed into something inadequately planned, but the time frame does need close watching.

I trust we will be seeing and hearing much more of each other. All
best wishes,

sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Ray Helmick". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "R" and a long, sweeping underline.

Ray Helmick, S.J.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

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November 5, 1988

Ambassador William Wilson
10475 Bellagio Road
Los Angeles, California 90077

Dear Ambasaador Wilson,

Christ's Peace!

Thanks for setting up that meeting with Stanley Sheinbaum. I was most impressed with him, and welcome his sharing in this peace enterprise. I showed him that recent letter I had sent to Arafat when we met, which you had hesitated to put in front of him yourself. And afterwards, as I have great hope in his sharing this, I sent him a very full dossier of all my dealings in the matter, with the Israelis and Americans as well as with the Palestinians, so that there could be no surprises or feeling afterwards that he hadn't known about any part of it. Stanley is splendid.

My feeling is that the time has come now to make this presentation to the President. You will most likely receive this note on our Election Day. When I talked with Stanley, I was still rather inclined to all the arguments I had written to you about the desirability of urging a breakthrough on the Palestinians before even the Israeli election last week. We rather agreed that it was by then awfully late, and that an effort to touch the psychology of the election at that stage was too unpredictable. The unthinking, apparently without any political sophistication, types who fire-bombed that bus in Jericho on the Sunday before the election did very likely have a serious effect on the psychology of the electorate, though it was the surge in the religious-party vote that was the key to that election. Stanley and I also talked, though, of whether any action that might come from our intervention would likely come before or after our own election. We had already spoken of the need to be sure we didn't expose this effort to the knowledge of political saboteurs, even among the most immediate entourage of the President. When I raised this question of the timing, before or after the U.S. election, Stanley's response had been that that choice would not be made by us, but by Republican political strategists, and I realised at once that we couldn't afford that: that to bring that rather disparate group into the planning and process would surely expose it to saboteurs, and we had to wait until after the election.

Looking around the political landscape now, I rather assume that Shamir will form a government without Labor. That still isn't entirely clear, as the terms set by the religious parties are awfully steep. I notice Peres saying that it is he who will not accept a renewed National Unity coalition with Likud, not making it an absolute, but saying instead that he will join in coalition with no party that does not have a plan for peace. I take it that's the right pressure, if it should happen that Shamir can't swallow what the religious parties demand for a coalition. It wouldn't be beyond the range of negotiation that Peres should recognize that Likud has a plan for peace, even if not in much agreement with his

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own. If Shamir does form a government without Labor, the immediate results will, I fear, be very ugly: a renewed surge of settlements, in the most provocative places; very likely Sharon as Defense Minister, with unbridled violence against the Palestinians; multiplied alienation of the Palestinians, scenes of such brutality appearing on our TV screens as we have not seen as yet, and as a result the alienation of far more of Israel's friends in this country. That is not to say that the intifada will be ended or suppressed. It would be reinvigorated. I'd hope the leadership would maintain enough discipline so that it would not turn to the armed violence that has been avoided from their side so far. A break in that would be the single really dangerous thing that could happen to their movement. The two fire-bombing incidents of last week, before and on the election day, are serious violations of that discipline -- vigorously condemned, you notice, by the PLO leadership as well as the internal intifada leadership -- but not a breakdown.

I'd have been as much disappointed by an outright Labor win, ability of Peres to form a government without Shamir, as by a Shamir government without Peres. Shamir will have to come to terms with the Palestinians, much as he hates it, and when he does, he will bring the Israeli peace camp with him to the settlement. If Peres were to have the responsibility of negotiating a settlement by himself, he would bring only his own following. The result at worst could be an infra-Israeli civil war, but more likely simply a sullen non-acceptance by the Israeli right wing, and endless conspiracies over succeeding years to overturn the settlement. The ideal is another grand coalition, to my mind. The one for the last four years has been the condition for stalemate, but that is because the Likud people could always cite the agreement on which the coalition was founded: it was for the ending of the Lebanon adventure and the resolution of the economic crisis, but contained no agreement to lay a finger on the Palestinian question. A new coalition agreement would have to be different, and would allow both perspectives to have their say in the negotiations that would necessarily take place.

As for the Palestinians, I'm sure you've seen Arafat's interview in the last Time Magazine, and heard of the formula for a declaration of independence that was published yesterday in Al-Fajr (with the permission of the Israeli censors and all). Both were disappointing in various respects. The formula in Al-Fajr did not explicitly recognize Israel (implicitly of course in the basing of the declaration on GA 181, further in the global recognition of all other UN resolutions, but we all know that isn't enough). I trust you saw Mohammed Milhem's statement that the formula printed in Al-Fajr was only one of several under consideration. I would hope that this one is the least attractive, published to show how little might be in the declaration if there is no further encouragement to do better. Milhem's statement was the the PLO was waiting to hear, by the date of the PNC meeting, what "the rest of the world" (so this morning's New York Times) demanded of the Palestinians. I take it that is asking us to get moving.

The Arafat interview in Time also lacked the explicitness we look for in the recognition of Israel, though it did stress the acceptance of 242/338 (along with all the other resolutions), and expressed impatience at people's not recognizing that this has long since been done. I wouldn't really expect a statement to Time to go beyond previous public statements just now, before the PNC. I notice Arafat did reaffirm that he would negotiate on the basis of 242, 338 and self-determination, without reference to the other resolutions, as he had said in his Strassburg talk last month. What was disappointing in the Time interview was: a) that he spoke of the rejection of "terrorism" outside the area of Israel and the Occupied Territories, without pledging himself against it inside; and b) that

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he raised again the term "Zionism"-- his context was that he was not against the existence of Israel, but against a Zionist state, as Zionism is a racist movement, according to the UN resolution.

I thought I had talked the terrorism question through so thoroughly with Arafat long since that I was appalled at this statement in the interview. I am very ready, myself, to distinguish the action of resistance from Terrorism, and would certainly see such actions as these fire-bombings of vehicles as terrorist acts. I note that Arafat himself condemned them unmistakably, and for that reason. He has had this territorial distinction in his pattern of pronouncements since the December 1985 Cairo Declaration, that he condemned and rejected terrorism anywhere, and rejected use of force anywhere outside the occupied territories (you remember how, when I saw him in March '86, he declined to specify whether occupied territory meant the green line or all of Israel for the purposes of that declaration). He has had the distinction between lawful resistance (including in that a recognition, made to me in March '86 and since acted out in practice in the disciplined restriction of the intifada to stone-throwing and -- treading more dangerously on the edge -- non-lethal use of Molotov cocktails, with no use of guns, recognition in short that armed force as the chosen means of resistance was counter-productive for the Palestinians) and on the other hand terrorism, understood as actions by irregular fighting forces that would merit condemnation as war crimes if committed by the regular armed forces of a state. That was what we clearly agreed on in March '86. It seems to me he needs to sharpen his language. If he is not prepared, prior to a break in the situation, to call off the stone-throwing intifada, as I can well understand, then he should be able to make his rejection of all terrorism -- he does, in fact, within the terms of my definition -- while still approving the intifada's type of actions. I believe he should also be ready to offer a stop in the intifada's stone-throwing confrontation in return for the mutual recognition he is looking for, and a leash on the beatings, killings, destruction of houses and trees as collective punishment, and deportations that have characterised the Israeli response. I believe that is all within the ambit of the intervention we are considering ourselves.

Stanley was anxious that I should, even as of the time we met in New York, restate and reinforce what I had already written to Arafat in August about backing off the "Zionism is racism" statement. I gave it some reflection, and decided that I had stated my case so clearly in that letter that I should hold off until an actual meeting with him, so that I would not become simply a scold on the issue and lose the ability to speak effectively. I do want, in a meeting with Arafat that I expect should come of our intervention if we go forward with it now, to get from him a clear statement of what, in Israeli behavior toward Palestinians, he regards as having been racist (I know there is plenty there), and get it clearly distinguished in his mind (and statements) from the concept "Zionism" with which most Jews, in or out of Israel, identify themselves and their best aspirations. I note that what Arafat did, in his use of the term "Zionist" in the Time interview, was to say he was not for the elimination of Israel. (This, in fact, was a discussion of the Palestine National Covenant of 1964, and he was interpreting even that in the sense that it did not call for the elimination of Israel.)

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So where does all that leave us?


I think we're hearing a cry for help from the PLO that we, the international community, particularly the U.S., do some enabling to make it possible for them to present the most forthcoming positions to the Israelis in their PNC. This is precisely what all our discussion has been leading to. With the American election, which I'd come to understand had to be waited out, behind us now, this is the time to make the approach to the President.

The idea that you, Stanley and I should make that approach together has my fullest approval.

Stanley and I spoke of how any outcome, especially a positive outcome such as I really hope for, of that meeting with the President should be conveyed to Arafat afterwards, and we were agreed that it might well be in order for all three of us to go to Tunis together, if that meets your approval at that time. Stanley is very familiar with what we discussed on that score, and you can talk it through with him. I'm sure there may be alternatives to that. What is needed is that a secure conviction that what he is told is reliable has to be conveyed then to Arafat, and that it still can't be done by anyone who is at present an official of the U.S. government.

I've been almost on the point of phoning you many times over these last weeks. Better that I let you steer on this. All best wishes,

in Christ,


Ray Helmick, S.J.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

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November 5, 1988


Mr. Stanley K. Sheinbaum
345 North Rockingham Avenue
Los Angeles, California 90049

Dear Stanley,

Shalom!

A copy of this for you right away so there is no delay in communication.

All the best,



Ray Helmick, S.J.

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WILLIAM A. WILSON

10475 Bellagio Road
Los Angeles, California 90077
Telephone: (213) 270-3181
Fax: (213) 879-9225

November 29, 1988

Father Raymond Helmick
Jesuit Community Boston College
Chesnut Hill, Massachusetts 02167

Dear Father Helmick:

This will respond to your recent letter, a copy which was sent to my friend Stanley Sheinbaum, and which he and I discussed at length before his most recent trip to Sweden. I am quite sure he told you about the trip to Sweden, although I have not talked to him person since he returned. He did call me from Geneva after he left Switzerland, but we were limited in what we felt safe in talking about over the telephone; so I am still awaiting his arrival back here in Los Angeles so we can get together in person and discuss the results of his meeting over there. Much has changed since the PNC meeting in Algiers and based on the fax message that Stanley sent me from Geneva, either the Palestinians are changing their position after the Algiers meeting or the results of the Algiers meeting were not reported accurately in the press. What he sent me from Geneva is a much stronger statement on the part of the Palestinians than what was reported in the press. By this I mean that the Algerians allege that they have taken a very positive position with respect to resolutions 242, and 338, and that they have forcefully rejected terrorism in any form. That is not the way it came out in the press, and as a matter of fact I recall Mr. Redmon, the State Department spokesman, commenting to the effect that the State Department did not like where the statement was positioned in the overall release. That seem to me to be the ultimate in knit picking but given the State Department penchant for using bad judgement does not come as any surprise.

It is my personal opinion that nothing is going to be done to encourage the Israeli and the Palestinians to get together and discuss the issue during the present administration and I must say that here again it is my opinion that Jim Baker will make a far better Secretary of State than his predecessor.

I am sure Stanley told you about our meeting with Ken Duberstein and General Powell with the ultimate out come of this meeting being thoroughly predictable, but at the same time rather disappointing. Given the total bias toward

Israel in our State Department (and in other locations in Washington) today I feel certain that nothing will happen until the next administration is up and running. I have every hope that the next administration will have a much more balanced view of the Middle East situation, and I am hopeful that sometime within the next year or two the effort which you have made will result in major steps towards a peaceful solution in the Middle East.

Yours sincerely,

Bill

William A. Wilson

WAW/lr

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December 5, 1988


His Excellency
Ambassador Clovis Maksoud
Arab League Delegation
United Nations
New York, N.Y. 10017

Dear Ambassador Maksoud,

Once again I find I must ask you to hand on a letter to Dr. Nasser al-Kidwa, of the P.L.O. Observer Mission, as I did once before in August. I feel anything addressed directly to him would too probably be looked at by other eyes before it got to him.

I would most appreciate it if you would get this along to Dr. al-Kidwa or, if he should be away from his office, to someone in the P.L.O. delegation who could get it along to the Chairman as rapidly as possible.

Sincerely yours,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

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December 5, 1988

Dr. Nasser al-Kidwa
P.L.O. Observer Delegation
United Nations

Dear Dr. al-Kidwa,

Enclosed you will find a letter for Chairman Arafat which I hope you can transmit to him early enough so that it can be some help in his reflections before he addresses the General Assembly in Geneva.

I hadn't meant to use this means of communication, through the courtesy of Ambassador Maksoud, more than once, as too much use of it would destroy its usefulness as a way of circumventing the people who must watch your own mail. However, this letter was too urgent to wait for any other way of getting it to you.

Best wishes,

sincerely,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

December 3, 1988

Chairman Yasser Arafat
Palestine Liberation Organisation

Dear Chairman Arafat,

The rejection of your request for a visa to address the U.N. General Assembly in New York disappoints me as I know it does you. I do take offense at the gratuitous insult given to you and your people, and just at the time when you have been working so genuinely for a peaceful resolution of your long conflict with the Israelis. But at the same time, my distress is more for the wooden-headedness that has been so embarrassingly revealed in our leading U.S. officials, and the potential harm that can be done to relations between my own country and the U.N. when the General Assembly moves to Geneva to hear you. For you and the cause of the Palestinian people, there is great advantage in having the General Assembly meet for the debate on Palestine in Geneva.

That is my reason for writing to you now. What you say in Geneva will be the major speech of your life, and one of the most significant events in the long saga of the Palestinian people's quest for its rights. If handled well, your speech and this General Assembly debate could put you far ahead on the way to a restored Palestine. And if mishandled, it could mean the loss of a great opportunity. It is a time for greatness and magnanimity. As of now, you are winning, even against odds as great as the opposition of the U.S. government.

I hope you will not think me presumptuous to offer advice at this point. I'm sure you have grown accustomed to my offering it, whether solicited or not. And you understand well that I look from a different perspective. My solicitude is for the Israelis as well as for you and your people. And even when I disagree with policy decisions of my own U.S. government, I listen respectfully and attentively to what is said and thought here, and am attuned to it in ways that others of your advisers are not.

I too had my disappointments with the Algiers P.N.C., though I regard it as having accomplished important positive things. As you are well aware, I have been making strenuous efforts to contact the U.S. Administration, working with persons who have genuine access. What I hoped for was an indication, with the authority of the Administration, of what formulae and action by you and the P.N.C. would carry assurance of being accepted by the U.S. government as adequate to establish communications between you and them and recognition that you and the P.L.O. are the true spokesmen for the Palestinians. Up to the last moment when it was still possible to bring such information to you before the P.N.C., my friends who were making these approaches reported to me that the response to their urgent efforts was "inconclusive." I greatly regret that, as knowledge of what the U.S. Administration would really accept would have helped you and the P.N.C. Even now, since I have had this present letter drafted but not yet typed, I am told that my friends have contacted the most immediate assistants to the President, and been assured by them again that U.S. recognition would follow if the traditional preconditions were regarded as met. But my friends came away

Chairman Arafat, December 3, '88 -- 2

certain that these advisers themselves would make sure that the President did not give even a private and confidential prior assurance. Their fear is clearly that any such private assurance might somehow come out in public, with political consequences that they are not willing to countenance.

All I can say, then, of the recommendations I will give in this letter is that I have discussed them with these friends, persons much more closely in touch with the thinking of the Administration than I am myself, and I have asked them if I would be misleading you when I ask the things I do ask, whether I would be asking you to include things in your speech that could be dismissed by American policy as inadequate, the way the resolutions of the P.N.C. have been. It was their opinion, expressed with great good will to you and with intimate knowledge of the Administration, that what I have to say in this letter is sound advice to give you at this point.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE ALGEIRS P.N.C.

We have seen what the P.N.C. actually did. Many of my friends, and certainly the U.S. government, regret that you declared the independent State of Palestine, saying that this should not be done by unilateral action. I don't agree with their objection, and I welcome your having taken this step. Basing it as you do on G.A. Resolution 181, you do not take a new unilateral step, but recognize and accept what the U.N. did in 1947, authorizing the two states as a matter of international legality. It is regrettable to me that the P.N.C. did not, precisely at that point, formally and explicitly recognize the State of Israel as well, on the same legal basis. That would have brought you enormous gains in international credibility.

The declaration did not, of course, establish the reality of an independent State on the ground, but it staked out your claim. This is, to my mind, quite proper, as you are faced with the unilateral action of the Israeli and U.S. governments all the time, as they declare their unwillingness to accept an independent Palestinian State under any circumstances. True, this will be a matter to settle by negotiation, but now your claim is stated as resolutely as theirs, and not more so.

The explicit recognition of S.C. Resolutions 242 and 338, also, was a very positive accomplishment. Palestinians have so long feared that they would have played their last card when this was done. I see no loss in it, only gain. The Palestinian people have made explicit by this action something that I believe has long been true, that they have decided to accept a part of the land and not demand the whole for themselves alone. This is such an important watershed in the whole development of this encounter between the two peoples that world opinion has been right to credit it as a great advance on the part of the Palestinians. U.S. State Department sources did describe this as a positive development. It is clear that, when the official U.S. response is that you said it but you didn't say it right, that is a deliberate effort not to accept what you have to say, however positive and accommodating you may be. And it is difficult, when that is the attitude, to close off all the exits so that they will be compelled to recognize the justice of what you say. All the same, it is imperative that the P.L.O. examine the U.S. responses carefully to see how it can reply without compromising its people's vital interests. I recognize that many officials of the U.S. and Israel would like to see you give away everything, so that there would be nothing left for your people, before declaring your statements acceptable to them.

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In no way do I advocate your doing that. But I believe you can refute their objections without such compromises of vital interests.

The anti-terrorism statement of the P.N.C. was an important gain too. The U.S. and Israel do certainly treat you by a double standard in this matter. Both of them deal familiarly with terrorists in many circumstances, and welcome them at the U.N. and in their capitals, and there are the familiar charges that both of them actually practice terrorism as well. It is of great importance, though, for the P.L.O. and its leadership to free themselves of the imputation of terrorism. Your formula is a good one, relying as it does on U.N. resolutions condemning and prohibiting terrorism, all of which explicitly distinguish between acts of terrorism and legitimate acts of resistance against various forms of oppression. It is unfair that the U.S. and Israeli governments and much of their press act as though your affirmation of that right of resistance were a contradiction to your rejection of terrorism in all its forms, and a declaration of your intention to continue acts of terrorism within the confines of Israeli and occupied territory.

Terrorist acts are those that are prohibited as war crimes: attacks on innocents and civilians, use of torture or inhuman treatment, use of prohibited weapons such as chemical and biological agents, etc. The fire-bombing of the bus in Jericho two days before the Israeli elections was a terrorist act. This was not a P.L.O. action. You and the P.L.O. rejected and condemned it. The rolling of hand grenades into a crowd of shoppers in Haifa some time earlier was another terrorist act. That one had an address, a rejectionist organisation that has no present standing to represent the P.L.O., and which in fact did this basically in order to embarrass the P.L.O. and challenge your policy. That action also was rejected and condemned by you and the P.L.O. And there are other instances, notably the one that the American press is so fond of citing just now: the hijacking of the Achille Lauro some years ago. The distinction between such acts and legitimate resistance to the military occupation of your country should be publicly clarified, and no room left for confusion between them.

As you know, I have long advocated to you further steps to take the violence out of this situation without compromise of those vital interests of the Palestinians to which I referred above. But surely, the misrepresentation of what the P.N.C. has already done in its anti-terrorism resolution should not be allowed to stand.

YOUR SPEECH AT THE U.N.

To return to your speech at the U.N., may I repeat first what I wrote to you on August 17 of this year with reference to the P.N.C. What needs to be accomplished is the liberation of Palestine, not any sort of vengeance, even rhetorical, on your enemies. And the accomplishment of such rhetorical revenge can easily be to the detriment of your cause. The action of the U.S. government in refusing to grant you a visa was petulant and childish, unworthy of a great power. The representatives of the world's nations who will be there in Geneva to hear you have already expressed their disapproval of that U.S. action by their votes in New York, and will be further affirming it by their very presence at the Geneva meeting. It is not what you will be in Geneva to talk about, and is hardly worth your mention. Recriminations about it will be a waste of your good credit.

Similarly, as I wrote to you in August, recriminations and rhetorical

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victories over Israel will represent only loss to your purpose, which is to show yourself, the P.L.O. and the Palestinian people as determined on peace with Israel in enjoyment of your own rights as a people.

The truth of the matter is that Israelis believe, and have believed since even before 1948, that the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular are the Nazis all over again, bent on the destruction of the State of Israel and the Jews. You know, and I know, quite well that this is untrue, a paranoid delusion. It has also been the rationalisation excusing enormous cruelty and callousness toward the Palestinians that goes back as far as the illusion itself. Nevertheless, it remains about this illusion/stereotype that: a) Israelis actually believe it; and b) it is not true.

That, I believe, is the most important single thing to be kept in mind in the preparation of your Geneva speech. Anything that you say that confirms that illusion, any expression of hatred or rejection of the Jews or of their Israeli State, will work against you, against the credibility of the Palestinian people or the P.L.O. as you express your desire to live alongside the Israelis in peace. That above all must be the central impression of your speech, that you come seeking and offering peace -- demanding justice, of course, but seeking and offering peace. If that is not what the delegates carry away with them from your speech, it will have made the liberation of Palestine less likely rather than more so. I cannot urge this too strongly on your attention. That stereotype, unjust as it is, must be challenged and broken, and the Palestinian people seen for the humane and civilized people and prospective neighbor that it is in fact.

The major arguments of the U.S. and Israeli governments, claiming that the P.N.C.'s accomplishments were inadequate, should be addressed in your speech. There are three of them: 1) that your recognition and acceptance of S.C. Resolutions 242 and 338 was ambiguous, because placed in a context that implied conditions; 2) that there was only an implied, no explicit recognition of the right of the State of Israel to exist; and 3) that the rejection of terrorism was incomplete and unconvincing.

1. The conditional or unconditional acceptance of 242 and 338.

You and I, Mr. Chairman, have had a discussion of this before. After your Harare statement of September 1986, I spoke to you of the impression I had read in the European press that your acceptance of the two resolutions was conditional on the convocation of an international conference. You convinced me then, and I remain convinced, that your acceptance of 242 and 338 was a separate item, not conditional. You recognized those resolutions as a part of international legality. You recognized also all the other U.N. resolutions relevant to the Palestine question, as parts of international legality also. Each is a separate item, each a part of international legality in its own right. You called for the international conference, this also a separate item.

In fact, the statement you made in Harare, like the one you made to the U.N.N.G.O conference in Geneva a year later, took the form of a demand for the international conference to be convened on the basis of 242, 338 and all other pertinent U.N. resolutions as parts of international legality. I can easily understand the misunderstanding this engendered, and the impression of many parties that this was only a conditional acceptance of 242 and 338, even while I accept your interpretation that your acceptance was unconditional.

Chairman Arafat, December 3, '88 -- 5

I recognize, also, that you have made a great advance in your readiness for accomodation in saying that the political basis for negotiating with the Israelis need not be all the U.N. resolutions as one package, but may alternatively be 242 and 338 plus recognition of the political rights of the Palestinian people, among which the right of self-determination is preeminent. This is a concession I had not expected you to make. I have spoken and written to you several times of the damage done by insistence on the 1975 "Zionism is racism" resolution. This formula of yours is a most creative and constructive way to circumvent that impasse, and I congratulate you on it. Your statement of it at Strassburg was much clearer than the P.N.C. resolution, as the Algiers formula went on to associate it once again with all the resolutions. Having put this proposal on the table, I would think you would want not to take it away or let it be obscured. I understand well the difference between what you recognize as valid in international legality (all the resolutions) and what you propose as the political basis of negotiations (242/338 plus self-determination).

However, this same formula has been siezed upon as the U.S. State Department's reason for saying that the P.N.C.'s acceptance of 242/338 is ambiguous and inadequate, because it is presented only in the context of a simultaneous recognition of the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people (and also, perhaps, because of the intricacy of the formula, all the other resolutions as well).

I would strongly recommend that, in addressing the General Assembly, you make the point that the recognition and acceptance of the U.N.'s resolutions is of each one as a distinct unit, that none is merely conditional on the acceptance of others, but that the acceptance of 242 and 338 is unconditional in itself. The truth is that the P.L.O. accepts all of them, and for a definable legal reason, that the U.N., for all those who accept its charter, has the authority to give its resolutions the character of international legality. That, and not the arbitrary will of powerful forces that can enforce their will by violence, is the reason for accepting the actions of the international community carried out through the offices of the U.N. You are then in a position to challenge the legal reasoning of Israel and the U.S. in their acceptance of some and not other U.N. resolutions. Has it a legal basis at all? And what an irony that Israel should question the legality of the very resolution, G.A. 181, on which its own legal status as a nation among nations rests.

I would urge you, too, in endorsing S.C. 242, to stress the elements in it that require return of territory by Israel. The annexationist movement in Israel has succeeded, since Menachem Begin's time as Prime Minister, in pressing its claim that the demand for return of territories in 242 was satisfied by the return of the Sinai to Egypt, and they have drawn the official U.S. position and the opinion of many others to this interpretation of 242. Their argument is about the phrasing (section 1, i, of 242): "Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." They claim that the lack of a "the" before "territories" means that the requirement can be met by withdrawal from some territories rather than from all territories occupied in the 1967 war. This argument has been much too easily conceded, since the French text, "retrait des forces armees israeliennes des territoires occupees lors du recent conflit," does contain the contested article, and the English and French versions are equally authoritative. (Report of the Security Council 16 July 1967-15 July 1968, 23 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 2 at 13-23, U.N. Doc. A/7202, 1968.)

Much more important, however, is the prefatory language of S.C. 242: "The Security Council, ... Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war..., Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter...." It is this reference to Article 2 of the Charter that most decisively requires the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all the territories occupied in the 1967 war. Mr. Begin understood that well, and it was his reason, in 1967, for rejecting S.C. 242. His later interpretation, twisting the meaning of the "territories/des territoires" phrase in a direction not meant by the Security Council when it passed the resolution and ignoring the reference to Article 2 of the Charter, is a pretext and does not deserve acceptance by anyone.

It still has to be conceded, though, that Israel can argue a right, on the basis of 242, not to annex or colonize the occupied territories, but to continue the occupation itself, until there are guarantees, especially from the P.L.O. and the Palestinian people, of Israeli "territorial inviolability and political independence: (section 2,c), and the right of the State of Israel, like every other State in the area, "to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force" (section 1, ii). That is the importance of the P.L.O.'s, and the P.N.C.'s, acceptance of S.C. 242. That is the way the international legality of 242, to which you appeal, actually works.

2. Explicit recognition of the right of Israel to exist.

I was, in fact, profoundly disappointed that the P.N.C. resolutions avoided any explicit drawing of this conclusion, which so clearly follows from what it actually did in endorsing S.C. 242 and, especially, G.A. 181, which it rightly made the legal basis for its declaration of independence.

I know quite well that a P.N.C. meeting is a political process in which you have to bring along with you a majority of votes from people of disparate opinions, and that it was the result of strenuous efforts by yourself that the acceptance of 242 and 181 was brought about, even without an explicit drawing of the obvious conclusion about Israel. You must read my criticism with impatience, knowing that I have not been through the long argumentative sessions that you worked through. Nonetheless, the U.S. and Israeli propagandists against you were handed a weapon which they need not have had when Mr. Habash, after the P.N.C., said that recognition of Israel had not been made, and you yourself studiously avoided answering the question. They were able to say: "Look, they didn't mean it after all." The U.S. press and official statements of the State Department have been licensed to say that P.L.O. acceptance of Israel is merely "implied," and the New York Times, the famous newspaper of record which has been so transparently biased in its whole treatment of the matter of Palestine, could headline that the P.N.C. resolution merely "hints at" recognition of Israel. An immeasurable part of the hoped-for effect of the P.N.C.'s actions on the American government and public went for nothing as a result.

This is too timid a procedure. I understand how much you had to fight for everything you got from the P.N.C. But the intifada, which has not been at all timid, calls for resolute and realistic action to bring about the freedom and self-determination of Palestine, and is fully prepared, as I read the situation, to endorse this move, the unvarnished permanent recognition of Israel alongside a Palestinian State, as a necessary step to provide a homeland for the Palestinian people.

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On this matter, too, you and I have had conversations, Mr. Chairman, in our meeting of March 1986, in the first of which several members of the Executive also took part. We discussed the way the Israelis, whenever they heard of P.L.O. refusal to recognize the right of their State to exist, or S.C. 242, assumed that your statements about a two-state resolution of the conflict represented only a strategy of phases, and that the establishment of a Palestinian State in the occupied territories would be merely the first step toward the destruction of Israel. Mr. Faruk Kaddumi, who took part in the conversation, was angered at this, and said that the Israelis could no longer really believe that in good faith, after all the years it had been denied. My response was that it was actually believed, and that therefore communication by the P.L.O. to the Israelis must have been inadequate.

I then gave my own interpretation of what the experience of the P.L.O. and of the Palestinians had actually been in the whole period of your chairmanship. This was not an attempt to propose anything new in P.L.O. policy, but instead merely to interpret, from the different perspective I have, what had already been your experience over that time. I started with the proposal of the Democratic State, which you had brought with you to the P.L.O. chairmanship from your earlier thinking as leader only of Fatah. The essence of the Democratic State proposal, once it had become the firm policy of the whole P.L.O., was the acceptance of the Jewish people as entitled to equal civil rights with Arabs in the state, as entitled also to equal religious liberty with Christians and Muslims in the state. All of you agreed that this was the true meaning of the Democratic State proposal, and you yourself, Mr. Chairman, then added: "We proposed a civilized solution, the Democratic State, and it was rejected, by the Israelis and by the Americans."

I responded then that I rejected it myself, for the same reasons as the Israelis and the generality of Americans, because it entailed the destruction of the separate Jewish State of Israel, and there were reasons to protect that separate Jewish state. The Democratic State proposal, in fact, never got anywhere politically in the world, and was important mainly for the internal thinking and development of the Palestinian people themselves, a formulation of their actual acceptance of the Jewish people.

But the next stage of the Palestinian thinking under your chairmanship was much the more interesting. The two-state proposal, first given tentative formulation in 1974 and evolving over a period of years after that, essentially recognized that there had been an internal contradiction in the Democratic State proposal. If the Palestinian people explicitly accepted the Jews as having equal rights, civil and religious, with themselves, as they did in accepting the Democratic State proposal, and the Jews then stated just as explicitly their rejection of the Democratic State proposal and preferred the choice of their separate State of Israel, then it followed that they had carried out an act of self-determination than which nothing could be more clear. The practical and essential meaning of the P.L.O.'s two-state proposal, then, was to recognize this act of self-determination on the part of the Israelis, and thus to recognize and accept the existence of the State of Israel on precisely the same legal grounds as formed the basis for your own Palestinian claim: the right of self-determination.

At the time we had this conversation, March of 1986, you and your colleagues in the Executive were much struck by the unfamiliarity of the formula, and carried on a considerable conversation among yourselves in Arabic, examining whether the formula in fact corresponded to your real experience over the whole time of your chairmanship. You returned to me repeatedly to have my interpretation reformulated

and expanded upon. At the conclusion, you and your three colleagues on the Executive, Mr. Kaddumi, Mr. Hani al-Hassan and Mr. Abdel Rahin Ahmed, all accepted that the interpretation did indeed express the meaning of what you had done over those years.

I have often been tempted since to publish an account of that meeting. I did take care to confirm that we had understood each other properly in each of our subsequent meetings on those days, March 4-6, 1986. And I did report it to the U.S. and Israeli governments, discussing it at length with officials of both. But I always felt it would be better if you eventually used that formula yourself rather than that I publish it in my name, and I thought the occasion might well arise on which you might do so.

Now, with your speech to the General Assembly before you, after the P.N.C. has been all but clear, yet not explicit, on its acceptance of Israel, I think it is right that you should draw the conclusion before the United Nations.

I think you should first ask what other meaning there can be to the P.N.C.'s explicit acceptance of G.A. 181, which had previously been rejected by the P.N.C. in its 1968 Palestine National Charter (Article 19), its recognition of it as a part of international legality, and its use of G.A. 181 as the legal basis for its own declaration of the independence of the State of Palestine, than that the P.N.C. and the Palestinian people accept the legal existence of both states authorized by G.A. 181, Israel and Palestine. I think you should then ask what other meaning there can be to the P.N.C.'s explicit acceptance of S.C. 242 and 338 than the recognition of the right of the State of Israel to "live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force," as stated in section 1, ii of S.C. 242.

Then I would recommend that you use my formula: summarising the actual experience of the Palestinians and their organisation as they went through the Democratic State proposal; their consternation at the rebuff they received, from Israel and the U.S., when it was rejected; their further reflection, recognizing the internal contradiction of their proposing a solution for people whose rights they accepted but who in turn rejected the particular solution as not meeting their free choice; and eventually proposing the two states on the basis of the self-determination of each of these two peoples.

That, I believe, not only truly reflects the actual experience and choice of the Palestinian people, but would carry great conviction with the General Assembly and with world opinion, including even Israeli and U.S. opinion; that you had not only taken the legal steps and provided a basis in international legality for your recognition of Israel (through acceptance of G.A. 181 and S.C. 242), but that this action also corresponded to the true experience and development of Palestinian thinking throughout this critical period of your chairmanship.

Should all this, the explicit acknowledgement of the State of Israel which is already so strongly implied in the actions of the P.N.C., be done at the General Assembly meeting? I know how problematic it is for you. At the P.N.C. you broke with a past practice of passing resolutions only by consensus and instead took a vote to determine a majority opinion. The people who did not like the acceptance of 242, with its implied recognition of Israel, voted against it, even as it stood, shrouded by this last bit of vagueness. But they then accepted the decision of the majority.

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The decision now, whether you should explicitly draw this obvious conclusion from what has already been done, is to my mind a choice between pleasing those who have not understood the realities well enough and working for the liberation of Palestine. It is not worth losing Palestine for the satisfaction of those who have been too slow, and the people of the intifada will have no patience with that.

The advantage of doing it through the formula I suggest, recognition of the self-determination of both peoples, is exactly what I looked for when I first presented it to you early in 1986. It is not the proposal of anything new, not a way of asking the Palestinian people to make some new concession, to give away something more. Instead it is a way of explaining what their experience has already and really been, and of asking the Israeli (and American) public to understand better what has already happened before their eyes.

3. The rejection of terrorism.

The P.N.C., in its resolution rejecting terrorism in all its forms, and you in your leadership of the P.L.O. over these recent years, have done much better than has been acknowledged by comment in the U.S. and Israel, both official and in the press: That your reservation, in line with all the pertinent U.N. resolutions against terrorism, of the right to resist oppression and military occupation is equated with a declared intention to continue terrorist actions inside the borders of Israel and the occupied territories can only be described as a distortion, I believe a deliberate one.

I think it can be answered in several ways, and my urging is that you answer it in all the ways I will list.

There is first the way of definition. You are on very solid ground in citing the U.N. condemnations of terrorism, which always include a defence of the right of resistance. There can be terrorist actions, worthy of condemnation, in the course of a resistance, attacks on the innocent or civilians or many other types of prohibited act. But there are also legitimate acts of resistance that are not terrorist, as the U.N.'s definition clearly indicates. Among the things that have been done by Palestinians during this year of the intifada, some, a very small number, have been distinctly terrorist, like the fire-bombing of the bus or the hand grenades rolled among the shoppers in Haifa. These are not actions of the P.L.O., and in fact have been repudiated and condemned by the P.L.O. and by Palestinian public opinion.

In fact, the P.L.O. has maintained a discipline over the intifada that has greatly reduced the violence from what it might have been. The resistance has largely been throwing of stones. The use of guns or bombs has been wisely prohibited by the P.L.O. from the beginning. The fire bombs have been another matter, very commonly used and always carrying the risk of loss of life, though the intifada has been lucky in avoiding that most of the time. The fire-bombed bus in Jericho, where the Israeli woman and her three small children died, was the accident waiting to happen, that would have trapped the Palestinian resistance at any time and which had very destructive political consequences for the intifada when it came. It was not actually the first such incident, as two people had been burned to death in a fire-bombed car some months earlier, but they, by accident, happened to be Palestinians themselves. It would be useful, to my mind, for the P.L.O. to draw the line at non-lethal force.

But more and more the intifada is carried on neither by rock-throwing nor by fire bombs, but by strikes and civil disobedience and non-cooperation, and by the organisation of alternative structures for more and more of the ordinary acts of living in the occupied territories. All this should lend credibility to the P.L.O.'s claim to have rejected terrorism.

You recall that, in March of 1986, I suggested to you that the P.L.O. declare a moratorium on violence, even while maintaining its right of resistance. You had cogent reasons not to do that at the time, but to all practical purposes you have already done it since, in exercising the discipline you have on the means used by the intifada. Without making any such announcement of a unilateral moratorium now, I think you should explain to the General Assembly that this discipline has actually been exercised, and get the credit for it.

Nothing could be more evident than that it is Palestinians who are being killed, their bones broken, brutality of every sort exercised upon them, and that it is not merely the Israeli army that does these things, but that undisciplined and often fanatical settlers have free license and encouragement from the Israeli state to maraud and murder and destroy, with only the most negligible possibility of any retribution or accountability. Obvious though all this is, it is obscured for many (not for all) Israelis and Americans by their paranoid fear of the danger that the intifada or any gain whatever for the Palestinians represents to Israel. This also should be told to the General Assembly. And at this point I would recommend that you make the offer of a mutual cessation of violence, putting the onus on the Israelis to accept it or reject it. What the Palestinians are actually doing now, and what the P.L.O. permits under the title of the people's exercising its right of resistance, can in no way be described as terrorist activity, while the things being done both by the Israeli army and by the settlers is entirely open to the charges of terrorism, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, the Israelis are desperately anxious to see the shower of stones stop. It would be a powerful sign to the world community, and an index of how far the Palestinian movement has distanced itself from terrorism, if you now offered the mutual cessation of all acts of violence.

I know there is an inclination to make such an offer conditional on an international conference, or, as you told me in March 1986, to make it the first item to be negotiated in an international conference. I would make it independent of the international conference. Cessation of Palestinian violence should be for Israeli cessation of violence, not for something else. It should be clear that any use of force countenanced by the P.L.O. in the Palestinians' resistance to occupation is of a non-terroristic kind in any case, in contrast to what the Israelis are doing. But the thing to keep in mind is that the intifada has by now invented and institutionalised so many non-violent ways of expressing its rejection of the occupation that, if the Israelis were to agree to a mutual cessation of violence, the end of rock-throwing would in no way be the end of the intifada itself.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS.

There are a few other matters I would like to bring to your attention as you prepare for your Geneva address.

One is the U.S. State Department's grounding of its refusal of your visa in a series of specific charges that you have known of, condoned and lent support

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to acts of terrorism. I find these charges so specious that I would want to see you avoid getting into any point-by-point refutation. Journalists will probably want to draw you into such a situation, and I would like to see you carefully prepared to dismiss the whole catalogue together in a way that would not appear evasive.

Basically, I think the way is for you to control the agenda of the questioning by your positive proposals. But I would point out that the State Department has not accused you of being a terrorist yourself, and that is an advance on its earlier positions. They speak only of knowledge, condoning and lending support. You have an impressive record of having repudiated and condemned the acts of terrorism the State Department cites, and are entitled to point that out.

Nevertheless, I want to comment on the matter of Abul Abbas. It was only too predictable that, with him in his front row seat and once photographed giving you the kiss of greeting, many parts of the U.S. and Israeli press and media, the New York Times in the lead, would present the whole of the P.N.C. as essentially the meeting of Chairman Arafat and Abul Abbas in Algiers.

You may recall the time I brought you the request of the Italian judge, Francisco Castellano, that he be able to visit you and discuss the hijacking of the Achille Lauro. You very graciously and readily agreed to this, so long as it would be on an informal basis and requested by the Italian government. At the time, you told me that you rejected and condemned what had happened on the Achille Lauro as an act of terrorism, that you were not convinced of the responsibility of Abul Abbas for this episode, but that you would investigate it, and if he were guilty he would be punished.

What went on in your investigation I do not know. I can construct scenarios in which Abbas was not responsible, at least for the particular disastrous ways in which that enterprise went wrong, even though so hare-brained a scheme was bound somehow to go wrong from the start. And I know there is a political dimension to this, that Abbas is the head of a member organisation and is consequently sent by that organisation as their member of the Executive, very likely a matter beyond your control.

But what of Abbas himself? Is he so callous about the Palestinian people and so disinterested in their liberation that he will risk all that for the sake of his personal ego and prestige? I find his insistence on attending the P.N.C. and his parading himself there as he did beneath my contempt. Is there no one in the P.L.O. who can persuade him to show more respect than that for the Palestinian people and their cause?

Zionism/Pacism.

I would like to return to a matter I developed at length in my August 17 letter, before the P.N.C., and urge you against the refrain of identifying Zionism with racism. The 1975 U.N. resolution to that effect, G.A. 3379, has the effect, as I wrote to you then, of detracting from the authority of the whole body of U.N. resolutions. The reason is that Zionism is understood by nearly all Jews as an expression of their identity as persons and as a community. If it is denigrated, equated with something as truly hateful to them as racism, it is their very souls that they feel attacked and denigrated. It is very similar, as I explained in my August letter, to the way Palestinians, who identify themselves with the P.L.O.,

feel themselves denigrated when the P.L.O. is dismissed as synonymous with terrorism. There is much irony, of course, when the former leaders and operatives of Irgun and the Stern Gang discuss people as unclean because they are classified as terrorists. But Palestinians know that, behind this grim comedy, there is the paramoid Israeli assumption, referred to earlier in this letter, that they are really the Nazis all over again, and that denigration is wounding to the very soul.

Since I wrote all this to you in August, I have talked with Dr. al-Kidwa about it, and found that he regarded it as a kind of issue to be postponed to a later date. In my own estimate, it is too important an issue to be so postponed. And I find references identifying Zionism with racism in such places as your Time magazine interview, and passages in the documents of the P.N.C.

I come of a country, the U.S., with a distinctive nationalism, based on its idealistic founding documents and a great deal of idealism subsequently derived or developed from them. I have a hatred of chauvinism that is perhaps uncharacteristic of my countrymen, a habit of identifying myself with humanity and not a nationalism. Religiously, I identify with all those who, I know, are the object of God's love, and that is why I devote so much of my concern both to your people and to the Israelis. Yet these American national ideals are something I always recognize as a moral resource, and of course an instrument for critical appraisal of my country and its society.

In the name of that American nationalism, giving the corrupt formulation of "manifest destiny," one of the great racist genocides of history was committed, the murder of the American Indians. Am I to believe that American nationalism and its ideals are to be defined exhaustively by that crime? In no way. Similarly, for all the evidence of racism toward Palestinians that disgraces Israeli society, I don't believe the Zionist ideal in its pure form, as self-determination for the Jews, can be exhaustively defined by the racial depredations carried out in its name.

So I would urge you, out of the seriousness of the task you have of making peace with this people and society, and of showing that the Palestinians are people of peace, that when you identify and denounce instances of racism in Israeli society, as you must, you not identify them with Zionism, as if they defined its essential character. Early in this letter, and throughout my August letter, I urged that this task of showing yourselves the peacemakers was central to your purpose, at the P.N.C. and in your coming address to the General Assembly, and that recriminations, language of hatred or dismissal, or rhetorical victories over the Israelis could only do harm to this essential purpose. Nowhere is this more true than in this matter of the identification of Zionism with racism.

Recently you will have seen how vehemently the American Jewish community, few of whom are Orthodox Jews, is aroused at the threat of an Orthodox test being applied, in Israel, to the definition of who is a Jew. Here is a people touched and feeling monstrously denigrated at the very heart of their sense of their own identity. It is very like what it means when the Zionist is identified with racist, or the Palestinian with terrorist. If you could bring yourself to talk of this subject openly, this insight would probably give you a rapport with American Jews that could not be had otherwise. That may be too much to ask of you, though, and I would be content if, when you discuss the many racist ways that Palestinians are treated in Israel and the occupied territories, you would refrain from equating it with Zionism.

Chairman Arafat, December 3, '88 -- 13

Bassam Abu Sharif.

Another strong suggestion. Early in the year your spokesman, Bassam Abu Sharif, issued a statement, circulated at the Algiers Arab summit simply as a P.L.O. background document but since associated with his name. In their first remarks about the Algiers P.N.C., the U.S. State Department spokesmen referred explicitly to this Abu Sharif document as the sort of thing they had been most impressed with as coming from the P.L.O. over the year, and wished it might have your own endorsement.

Knowing you as well as I have come to know you in the course of our several meetings, I expect that you were in fact the initiating force behind Abu Sharif's statement, though he will have formulated it in his own distinctive way. We have all come to know Bassam now, from that statement and from his many other public pronouncements, and though he too was once regarded as the "terrorist" by the few Israelis who knew of him then, it is now understood by Americans and Israelis, even those who once tried to murder him, what a thoroughly good man Bassam Abu Sharif is, and what a serious force for the peace. I think it would be of value for you either to endorse the original Abu Sharif statement of early in the year, or if that is too explicit in some ways, to let it be known that behind the initiatives of Abu Sharif the originator is yourself. I am sure that is actually the truth.

Whom are you addressing? Jews and their character.

A final thought. I hear occasional discussion about whom you should be addressing in your speech before the General Assembly, or in general in all your efforts to bring about a peace settlement. Israelis, of course, and many American Jewish speakers are anxious to say that you must address everything to Israel; that getting a prize -- recognition -- from the U.S. is no substitute for approaching the Israelis directly, as it is they who hold the land whose restoration you seek. The most intelligent part of this sort of commentary points out that the State of Israel has never made a serious move, in its approach to any Arab party, if it did not have the solid assent of the general Israeli public.

As I hear all this, I want to say to you that your appeals to the U.S. government -- not the only thing you are doing, but an important part -- is right. The Israeli governing class is not dealing with you in good faith, and governments of either major party bloc are not likely to do so without pressure from outside. The U.S. government has not dealt with you in good faith either, but it is more subject to the opinion of the world community than is the government of Israel. The Israelis are accountable only to the Americans, who treat them so indulgently, and shelter them from the opinion of the rest of the world. In fact, concerned as I always am for the good and the safety of Israel, I particularly resent the fact that the Israeli politicians have let their country become so dependent on the U.S., financially and politically, that Israel is not really a serious country any longer, merely an appendage of U.S. policy. The U.S. government, too, besides being more exposed to international opinion, is also very much subject to domestic public opinion, which is now far more understanding of the Palestinians' plight than it ever was before. So the U.S. is, at least in part, the proper address for your appeal.

All the same, I want to commend to you that you put a good part of your appeal, and your confidence, on Jewish opinion, in Israel and the U.S., and the very impressively inculturated inclination toward justice and compassion that is

Chairman Arafat, December 3, '88 -- 14

characteristic of Jews. I realize that, in your position, that is not the first thing you are likely to think of in relation to Jews, and that you are probably more preoccupied with the murderous religious fundamentalists of the settler movements. But I am sure you will also have had the experience, often, of Jews who have come to you, seeking just solution of the Israeli-Palestinian problem, who have drawn, deeply, on their Jewishness itself as source of a passion for justice for you as well as their own people. That instinct is very widespread, even among those in whom it is obscured temporarily by their fears. Anyone like myself who has worked a lifetime at the issues of justice for the poor and oppressed has long ago learned that the people on whom we can normally most rely, for real help and not merely for kind words and evasion, are Jews. The heritage of the great Jewish prophets, with their concern for all who are in need, is vibrantly alive, even in the most secular Jews, for whom it is a proud tradition, both in Israel and in the U.S. I think you should always be aware of this, and appeal to it most consciously and directly, both in your Geneva address and in all your quest for justice for the Palestinian people.

I have done a great deal of very plain speaking on many subjects in this letter, Mr. Chairman. I hope you realize the great respect for you and the genuine concern for your people out of which I write with all this directness. These are times of great hazard and great opportunity, in which nothing else will serve.

You will be not only in my heart but in my prayers as you prepare and deliver your tremendously important address to the General Assembly.

With all best wishes,

sincerely,



Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

December 5, 1988

His Eminence
Cardinal Law

Dear Cardinal Law,


Christ's Peace!

Enclosed is the letter I sent off to Chairman Arafat, aimed at the preparation of his address to the General Assembly in Geneva.

Ambassador Wilson wrote me (copy enclosed), and then gave me much detail on the phone of his meeting, accompanied by Stanley Sheinbaum, with Kenneth Duberstein and General Powell while the presidential party was out in California for Thanksgiving. I also had the chance, then, to go through this letter to Arafat with Ambassador Wilson in great detail while it was still scribbles on a yellow pad, and incorporate some suggestions of his, while assuring myself that what I suggested to Arafat would not be leading him down the garden path.

Best wishes,

in Christ,


Ray Helmick, S.J.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

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December 5, 1988

His Excellency
Archbishop Lio Laghi
Apostolic Nunciature
3339 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008-3687

Dear Archbishop Laghi,

Christ's Peace!


As promised, here is a copy of the letter I sent off to Chairman Arafat, as free advice before he gives his address to the General Assembly in Geneva. Other copies of it are with Cardinal Law, Ambassador Wilson and Stanley Sheinbaum.

Ambassador Wilson and Stanley Sheinbaum did, in fact, have a rather long meeting, while the presidential party was out in California for Thanksgiving, with Kenneth Duberstein and General Powell. They were told basically the standard line, that recognition of the P.L.O. and contact with it by the U.S. government would follow if the preconditions were met. Both presidential aides, however, were wholly against any assurance, however private and confidential, from the President on what sort of formula would be judged acceptable by the United States. Wilson and Sheinbaum came away very disappointed. I understand well enough what the Administration people are frightened of, that any assurance, the lifting of a finger to help the Palestinians, however private and confidential, might somehow come out in public. And they are unwilling to bear the political consequences of that. Not exactly the portrait in courage, but about the equivalent of what I had two summers back from then Prime Minister Shimon Peres while I was in Jerusalem.

In any case, I think it is really up to Arafat to do it with no assistance from U.S. government. Hence this letter to help him prepare his Geneva speech.

All best wishes,

in Christ,


Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.



JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

December 5, 1988

Ambassador William Wilson
10475 Bellagio Road
Los Angeles, California 90077

Dear Ambassador Wilson,

Christ's Peace!

I was more than glad to have a chance to talk to you the other day -- in fact I had been planning to call you anyway once I had this letter ready to send to Arafat -- and talk through details of the enclosed letter while it was still scribbles on a yellow pad. As I told you, it turned out to be one of my more monumental letters, but I've found that Arafat does in fact read these with attention. I spared him nothing this time.

Your letter came in the day after I spoke with you. I know the feeling of frustration it represents, as I've had the same experience many times. I've some understanding, all the same, of the kind of panic this represents in the Administration. A couple of summers back, when I was my three weeks in Jerusalem trying to get in to see Shimon Peres, then still Prime Minister, I found that I could have long, very cordial conversation with Uri Savir, who was at that point closer to Peres than anyone else, and with Labor Knesset members who were most anxious that the work I was doing should succeed (Mapam and Shinui people also). But eventually the message came back from Peres that he "did not want to encourage" what I was doing. It was clear to me from what all his associates were telling me that Peres did indeed hope I would succeed, but was afraid to let himself or any turning of a finger on his own part be associated with the effort. Not quite the portrait in courage that Jack Kennedy used to write about, but I understand the panic.

In any case, it is now up to Arafat to do it right when he speaks in Geneva. He is not the most deft of speakers, especially for a Western audience, but I feel he has acted, over quite a long period, in genuine good faith, and hope that will stand him in good stead now. If our crowd is absolutely determined, whatever Arafat says, to answer: "You didn't say it right," then they will continue to do so. But there is a limit to how far the gullibility of world or even American and Israeli opinion will be conned by that.

All best wishes,

Other copies of the letter to Arafat
went to Stanley, to Archbishop Laghi
and Cardinal Law.

in Christ,

Ray Helmick, S.J.



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JESUIT COMMUNITY BOSTON COLLEGE CHESTNUT HILL MASSACHUSETTS 02167

December 5, 1988

Stanley K. Sheinbaum
345 Nirth Rockingham Avenue
Los Angeles, California 90049

Dear Stanley,

Shalom!

I understand you've had an interesting trip over to Geneva and up to Sweden since I talked with you, and as I listen to the radio today I begin to get some idea of what that must be all about. I'm glad that meeting is going on, and hope I may hear something of what happens there.

I'm enclosing a copy of the letter I just sent off to Arafat. I had the chance to talk it through in a lot of detail with Bill Wilson a few days ago, when it was still scribbles on a yellow pad, and used some ideas I had from him when I typed it up.

As of now, I think nothing is going to come from the Administration, so it is more important to speak to Arafat and ask that he not blow the grand opportunity he is given at the Geneva session.

All the best,

sincerely,

Ray Helmick, S.J.

Other copies of this Arafat letter have gone to Bill Wilson, of course, to Cardinal Law here in Boston and to Archbishop Pio Laghi, the Holy See's Pronuncio in Washington.

Appendix I

INTERFAITH DELEGATION TO THE MIDDLE EAST.

A Report by Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.

From June 9 to 23, 1985, an interfaith delegation of American Jews and Christians travelled to Jordan, the West Bank, Israel and Egypt to make a firsthand assessment of the prospects for peace in the Middle East. Members of the delegation were:

Rabbi Leonard Beerman
Leo Baeck Temple
1300 N. Sepulveda Blvd.
Los Angeles, CA 90049

Stephen Cary
Chairman, American Friends Service Committee
760 College Avenue
Haverford, PA 19041

William Sloane Coffin, Minister
Riverside Church
Riverside Drive
New York, NY 10025

Raymond G. Helmick, S.J.
Senior Associate, Conflict Analysis Center
Jesuit Community
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167

Rabbi Eugene Mihaly
Executive Dean, Hebrew Union College
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Samuel G. Pogue
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Dr. George Regas, Rector
All Saints Episcopal Church
132 N. Euclid
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Joanne Ruby

American Friends Service Committee
407 S. Dearborn
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Mylion Waite, Executive
Interchurch Council of Greater Cleveland
2230 Euclid Avenue
Cleveland, OH

Ronald Young
American Friends Service Committee
1501 Cherry Street
Philadelphia, PA 19102

The delegation met with more than fifty persons, representing a wide range of views, including His Royal Highness, Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan, Dr. Boutros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, MKs Simcha Dinitz and Abba Eban, senior Labor Party Leaders of Israel, and Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO. Our aim was to test out the meaning and seriousness of the peace proposals being made by King Hussein and Yasser Arafat since their accord of February 11, '85, and the possibilities of response to those proposals on the part of Israel and the United States, as well as other Arab countries. We had hoped to visit Syria but did not receive visas to enter that country. We were told, with cordiality, that there had not been time, in the month since we had applied for visas, to process the application.

What follows will summarize what we heard in each of the countries visited.

WHAT WE HEARD IN JORDAN.

We spoke with both Jordanians and Palestinians, official and non-official. The Jordanians included Crown Prince Hassan, Information Minister Mohammed Khatib, Director of Information in the Prime Minister's office Peter Saleh, and Mrewood E-Tal, currently a special adviser in the Prime Minister's office. Palestinian officials included Khalil Wazir (Abu Jihad), the Deputy Chairman of the PLO, Hani al-Hassan, Chief Political Officer to Chairman Arafat, and Mohammed Milhem, the exiled Mayor of Halhoul in the West Bank, recently elected Member of the Executive Committee of the PLO. On our return to Jordan after our visits to Israel and Egypt we saw Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO, with Mr. Milhem again present, and had a brief conversation with

Bishop Elias Khouri, Suffragan Bishop of the Anglican Diocese of Jerusalem and also a recently elected member of the Executive Committee of the PLO, in the company of the Anglican Bishop of Jerusalem, Rt. Rev. Samir Kasity. Outstanding among the non-official Palestinians we met were Dr. Hanna Nasser, deported President of Bir Zeit University in the West Bank, and Rami Khouri, Senior Editor of the Jordan Times, and his wife Ellen.

Principal Topics:

1. Substance and Seriousness of the Peace Proposals Arising from the February 11, '85, Accord between King Hussein and Yasser Arafat.

To both Jordanians and Palestinians we spoke with, the peace initiative was of the utmost seriousness. Both parties, King Hussein and the PLO leadership, have invested so much of their prestige and legitimacy with their followings in the initiative that they stand to lose heavily if it should fail. A sense of elation was visible because, for the first time, the Israelis had been morally compelled to respond to a proposal for peace originating from Arabs in full coordination with the Palestinian leadership. Many of the Jordanians we met, including the Crown Prince, Information Minister Khatib and Peter Saleh, seemed primarily aware of the great risk that King Hussein had taken in moving forward this way, and some ordinary citizens of "East Bank" Bedouin background whom we met in Jordan were very apprehensive on this score. Palestinians, official and non-official, had generally a cautious sense of optimism that this time a proposal had been made that had genuine chances of success, and Hani al-Hassan, the PLO's political analyst, seemed optimistic to the point of euphoria, prompting some of our delegation to worry that his enthusiasm might be leading him beyond caution.

Both Jordanians and Palestinians felt that the proposal had been crafted with skill to make negotiation really possible and not merely stake out positions. The key problem it had addressed was the difficulty all previous attempts at negotiation have met in reconciling any formal PLO recognition of the State of Israel with the Palestinians' need for reciprocal recognition. A staged process (treated below) to arrive at such mutual recognition with American help had been designed. The Palestinians felt they had made major concessions, accepting partition of the land, renouncing the prospect of an independent Palestinian State in favor of confederation with Jordan, and agreeing

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that the spokesmen for the first stage of the process should be Palestinians not publicly associated with the PLO. All these concessions, both Palestinians and Jordanians assured us, were solid, accepted not only by the leadership of the PLO around Arafat but by the Palestinian population as well, whether in the Occupied Territories, in Jordan, or elsewhere in the Diaspora, even those in camps dominated by Syria.

2. Syrian Participation in the Process, and the International Conference Including the Soviet Union.

King Hussein's often reiterated call for an International Conference as an integral part of his proposal is one of its most important features, the one that receives the most negative response both from the United States and Israel, and perhaps the least understood feature of the whole initiative. We heard inconsistent things on this subject and it is necessary to sort out the relative credibility and importance of different versions we heard.

American officials we spoke with, both at the State Department in Washington before our departure and in the Embassies in Amman, Tel Aviv and Cairo, as well as the many Israelis we saw, generally acknowledged the importance of the International Conference for King Hussein, but had a variety of versions on how important, necessary or feasible for him was the participation of Russians and Syrians. The lack of clarity on this subject extended to our Jordanian meetings as well. There was consistency from them in that all asserted the importance of having Russians and Syrians invited, whether they accepted the invitations or not, but the explanations differed. That the King needed some kind of international "umbrella" (a term used by most people we saw) was agreed. But while our American, Israeli and even our Egyptian informants saw this in terms of his not being identified with the kind of action that had led to the assassination of his grandfather, King Abdallah, the Jordanians quite consistently put it in terms of his not being seen as President Sadat, making a separate peace without the sanction and participation of the Palestinians and the other Arab States. This was very serious for them.

The outstanding question was whether Russians and Syrians were a necessary part of this international umbrella or not. If not, the American authorities seemed inclined to offer, with some show of reluctance, some other international umbrella without Syrians or Russians, while the Israelis, even more than the Americans, seemed anxious

to exclude extra parties so far as possible, with the clear apprehension that additional parties to the negotiations would only add complication and make a solution less likely. But all the Jordanians we saw were insistent that a partial solution, like Sadat's, bilateral between Israel and Jordan or with only a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation (especially if the legitimacy of the Palestinians on the delegation was questionable) would be inadequate. They wanted a comprehensive negotiation on the regional problems. One of our group consistently put the question whether it would not be contrary to Jordanian (and Palestinian) interests to ask in parties who might be there as spoilers, and quite regularly got responses that affirmed the need for a comprehensive settlement, always with that note that King Hussein must not be seen to do what had been done by Sadat, separating himself from the general Arab interest.

The Information Minister, Mohammed Khatib, gave us an explanation of the need to invite both Syrians and Russians that seemed almost scholastic in its legalism, and failed to impress us with any great urgency. He made a distinction between the results of the 1967 war and that of the war of 1948-49. In 1967, territory had been taken from Jordan, which was therefore the responsible party to deal with the territorial effects of that war — granted that the Jordanians recognized the sole legitimacy of the PLO to speak for the Palestinians and would act only in conjunction with them. But for the 1948-49 war, the responsible party was the United Nations, which had sanctioned the partition. He saw no virtue in having the UN Security Council attempt a regulation, because that would involve veto powers by the permanent members of the Council, but proposed that the five permanent members (US, USSR, Britain, France and China) all be invited to the negotiations to represent the responsibility of the UN for the original situation. He argued that the U.S. and Israel should not be apprehensive of Russian obstructionism in that setting, because the two European powers certainly and most likely China as well would side with the American position against the Soviets at every point. As for the Syrians and other Arab states, he saw them as interested parties who had to be invited for any comprehensive settlement.

When it came, however, to Syrian and Russian acceptance of the invitations, Khatib was magisterially indifferent. They could accept or not accept, and then would have to live with the choice they had made. The conference would go on with or without them. Peter Saleh, the Director of Information in the Prime Minister's office,

had essentially the same to say on the acceptance of the invitations: that it was then Jordan's business to go ahead even if the Syrians and/or Russians did not accept. He seemed even to expect that they would not.

A very different reading was given by Hani al-Hassan, Political Officer to Arafat. Asked whether it were not really against the PLO's interest to bring in the Syrians and Russians, he answered that they were essential to the process, since otherwise there would be a fight in the region, and the Russians would support the Syrians.

The most distinctive voice, and one that I myself would take most seriously of any we heard on this subject, was that of Mrewood E-Tal, veteran of many positions in Jordanian cabinets, now special adviser to the Prime Minister. We went to E-Tal partly out of our frustration at not getting to Syria, knowing that E-Tal would be most familiar with Syrian positions. He is also personally close to King Hussein, and believes he understands the King's own thinking more than do most others around him. Because Jordan is a true monarchy in which the King himself is the ultimate source of all decision, subject to dangerously volatile public opinion but always the exclusive source of any authority anyone in his government holds, E-Tal feels the King hears generally from his ministers only what they think he wants to hear or what will keep them in their jobs. He has great affection for the King, and has made it his life course to say what he thinks, often contrary to official policy, and to quit his jobs whenever this free speech requires. The King has valued this openness and kept placing him in new positions. E-Tal has resisted both Russian and American pressures on Jordan, Soviet pressures to industrialize and American pressures to turn the agricultural economy to cash crops. He quit his position as palace adviser in the time of Kissinger and Sadat because he felt Jordan was being made a cover for things he did not approve. The Prime Minister of the time, Rifai, disagreed with him then, but has since come to agree that he was right. That Rifai has now been made Prime Minister again during this time of the Hussein-Arafat peace initiative is significant, because Rifai is regarded as close to the Syrians. His having the office appears to be the preparation of a fall-back position should the initiative fail. Mrewood E-Tal's position as special adviser fits with that prognosis.

E-Tal believes the whole current peace initiative is a mistake, that it will get nowhere essentially because the

Israelis and the Americans will not do enough in response, and that consequently the King's initiative has placed him and his throne, and the peace of the whole region, in new danger. One can only hope that he is wrong in this opinion, while looking apprehensively at the number of times he has been right in the past when holding opinions unpopular in Jordan. But while he may well be wrong about what Israel and the United States will do, he is a much better authority on what King Hussein will or will not do. E-Tal is convinced that the King will not go forward with his peace initiative if the Syrians do not come into it, that he will have lost heavily in prestige and authority by what he has already done in the initiative should the whole thing fall apart, but that he will not risk the destruction of his kingdom and the drastic destabilisation of the whole region, to the detriment of all regional states including Israel, that would result if he tried to move forward without Syria.

This reading of the prospects by a specially qualified source seems to me one of the most serious things we heard on our visit. It is important that this be known and weighed by American authorities so that the U.S. not make a serious miscalculation about the whole process.

The importance of having the Russians in the process, in E-Tal's view, would be quite simply that the Syrians are unlikely to come otherwise. This is a view we have heard contradicted from some other sources (to be summarized in relation to the Israeli and Egyptian parts of this visit), who thought the Syrians would want to have their part if it were once clear that the peace process was going to accomplish real things. Generally the people who thought that way found it impractical to try to exclude the Soviets entirely or permanently from any settlement, as they have a clear interest in the region and can disrupt anything they have no stake in. But it seemed possible to some that the Russians could be brought in on the later phases of a process rather than from the beginning.

3. The Four Stages: A Process Designed to Establish Direct U.S., and Israeli, Communication with the PLO, on the Basis of Mutual Recognition and the Explicit Acceptance of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338.

The technical crux of the Hussein-Arafat proposal lies in this plan to arrive at direct conversations between Israel and the PLO on a mutually satisfactory basis. With no such direct contact, in the view of all the Arabs we met

without exception, in Jordan, among Palestinians or in Egypt, there is no authority that can speak legitimately for the Palestinians or be able to make decisions that would bind them.

The Palestinians agree, in a first stage of the discussions, to be represented by persons not publicly associated with the PLO, in recognition of the American and Israeli position that they will speak with the PLO only after a formal recognition of the U.N. resolutions. These first-stage talks are to be between Americans and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. It is expected that this part of the process can be accomplished on Mr. Murphy's forthcoming visit to the Middle East. Its purpose, in the Jordanian and Palestinian view, is to arrive at a mutual recognition, of Israel's right to exist in the terms of U.N. resolutions 242 and 338 on the one hand, and of the PLO's legitimacy as representative of the Palestinians on the other. Essential to the legitimacy of the non-PLO representatives, however, is that they should be acceptable to, and even named by, the PLO. Both Palestinians and Jordanians were encouraged by Shimon Peres' statements to the effect that he would accept members of the Palestinian National Council in some instances, and that he would not be looking into the minds of the representatives, only looking to see if they came with a gun in their pockets.

Rather promptly, then, the Jordanians and Palestinians expect to arrive at a second stage of the discussions, in which formally recognized spokesmen for the PLO will be included in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation speaking with the United States. This is not seen as an effort to go behind the Israelis' backs to the U.S. for recognition, but as a process in which the U.S. uses its good offices to help both Israelis and Palestinians through an impasse. It is recognized that it is in the Israeli interest to get into this process as early as possible, and that in fact Shimon Peres seems to be taking steps to regain the initiative in this way rather than wait for the Americans to go through these preliminaries before he enters the process himself.

The third and fourth stages of the process are, for this reason, less distinct. The third stage would be meetings of the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, including the PLO representatives who would already have met with American officials, with Israeli representatives, granting that this might have been anticipated if the Israelis had already inserted themselves into the process. The fourth stage would be the International Conference.

4. Popular Acceptance of the Peace Initiative, Palestinian and Jordanian.

From American diplomats, particularly in Jordan, we heard a distinction between the "East Bankers," or Jordanians, and the "West Bankers," or Palestinians who had fled to Jordan from across the river. The distinction has a cogency about it, inasmuch as some 60% of the population of Jordan has come from West of the river, and there is a basic difference of interest between them and the largely Bedouin population of Jordan, whose concern is primarily for their traditional society led by the King. It has its limits, though, inasmuch as the Diaspora Palestinians in Jordan or elsewhere are not generally from the West Bank (the territory first occupied by Israel in 1967). They come from such places as Haifa and Jaffa, in the territory that has been Israel's before 1967. This in fact has been the great difficulty for Arafat and the PLO leadership as they have progressed, since 1974, toward a political rather than a military solution, which necessarily means the recognition of the State of Israel and its legitimacy in clearly defined borders. This is satisfying to the Palestinians actually living in the West Bank occupied territories, but for the Diaspora Palestinians in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and elsewhere, the West Bank is not the home they fled, which is in areas that would thereby be recognized as Israeli.

Hence the logical question is whether this Diaspora population would accept such a solution as the Hussein-Arafat initiative sets out to reach: acceptance of the partition and a West Bank Palestine, and even that not as an independent State but in a confederation with Jordan.

The response we got from Palestinians in Jordan on this question was that the Diaspora Palestinians were now no longer looking for the whole land back, that they had realistically assessed their chances and wanted - some Palestine, the West Bank and Gaza, before all of Palestine was gone, permanently denied to them. We heard this not only from official PLO people, (very strongly from Arafat himself, independently from Mohammed Milhem and others) but from non-official people, including such keen and trustworthy observers as journalist Rami Khouri and his wife.

Arafat, pressed on the unity of the PLO and its capacity to represent Diaspora Palestinians in such places as Lebanon and Syria, spoke of greater popular unity now than at any time in the PLO's history. He has obviously an

interested motive in asserting that, but was able to point to consistent strong support for his leadership in the camps in Lebanon, and of rebellions in the Palestinian camps in Syria against attempts to impose a different leadership on them, specifically in this context of his current peace initiative, involving the recognition of Israel in its pre-1967 borders. In Aleppo, he told us, the Syrians had put down a rebellion among the Palestinians on this issue at the cost of 40 Palestinian dead and 140 wounded. He spoke further of defections from the leadership of the Syrian-dominated groups, such people turning up daily at the PLO offices in Amman and Tunis to declare their loyalty to the PLO as led by Arafat and recognized by the PNC.

These were assertions beyond our testing, but deserving of assessment by those with access to better information.

Jordanians, official and unofficial, were anxious to see the success of their King's initiative, rather frightened of danger to him and their society should it fail, but conscious of the strains put upon their society by the presence of a majority of refugees from Palestine in their land. The Ariel Sharon thesis that there is already a Palestinian State and its name is Jordan receives no echo in Jordan, where people are sharply aware of the distinct character of their society in contrast to that of Palestine, and do not want to see it jeopardized or forfeit.

5. Consequences of Failure.

People were apocalyptic in their view of what would happen if the Hussein-Arafat initiative failed. Many earlier initiatives have, of course, been called last chances, but it was felt that the course already begun by King Hussein and Arafat would entail destructive consequences to themselves and all the moderation in their respective followings that their action embodied if the outcome were failure. That was why Mrewood E-Tal wished the initiative had not been taken at all. He recognized that permanent stalemate would also have its consequences eventually in the dissolution of Middle Eastern societies as they have been, but felt still that the moment for initiative has not come, from his conviction that neither Israel nor the United States will make any serious response to it, and so believed that no action, for the present, is better than any action at all.

The apocalyptic consequences foreseen were a takeover of Jordan and all the other Arab societies, even such as Syria, by the combined (even if in many ways antithetical) forces of Islamic fundamentalism and Marxism, constant bitter and violent strife between these two polar extremes that would keep the Arab societies in turmoil, and a degree of hopelessness and desperation among Palestinians both in the Occupied Territories and in the Diaspora that would subject Israel to unending wars and terrorism.

6. The Role of the United States.

All our informants, Palestinian and Jordanian alike, were convinced that no successful peace initiative was possible without an active role by the U.S. The fundamental technical design of the initiative as such, the four-stage process, was premised on the willingness of the U.S. to act as mediator between Palestinians and Israel, helping to break an impasse that it was in the interest of both to break. It is noteworthy that no Arab we met, Palestinian or otherwise, in Jordan, the West Bank or Egypt, ever asked that the U.S. cease to be the friend and defender of Israel, only that the U.S. use its good offices to help produce peace between Israel and its enemies. The best formulas we heard were that the U.S. role should be to break the barriers of distrust that kept the two sides from talking directly to one another. No one believed that the U.S. could accomplish this by taking a distant or uninvolved stance.

Hani al-Hassan was particularly interesting on this subject. When we saw him, he was awaiting the return of King Hussein so he could go through the minutes of his American meetings, to see if the U.S. would go through the Stage 1 conversations. The PLO was ready to cooperate if the U.S. would accept Palestinians who admitted to being named by the PLO as members of the delegation, even though they were not publicly associated with the PLO themselves. This because he recognized the need to win over the Americans by cooperation and flexibility. Of the five permanent Security Council members whom he wanted to see at the International Conference, he felt China was the best friend the PLO had, because of its recognition of the PLO position, felt nearly as much confidence in Britain and France, but still felt that the United States was the most important. No one in the Arab world, he said, wanted to be Communist, least of all the Palestinians. Communism as a system, he believed, was in decline, and the American system in the ascendent.

Strong statements of the need for American participation at an active level came also from Mohammed Khatib, from Peter Saleh, from Crown Prince Hassan and, colored by his basic skepticism, from Mrewood E-Tal.

7. The Yasser Arafat Meeting: Impressions.

Chairman Arafat held, through much of our meeting, to his own sequence of presentation, and it was only toward the latter part of the session that our questions began to shape the course of the exchange. Hence it is more important to assess impressions of the person, his readiness and capacity to negotiate seriously.

His recitation through the earlier part of the meeting had to do with occasions he had shown himself reasonable and ready for negotiation before. These included his U.N. appearance, with citation of the reference to the gun and the olive branch, his part in promoting the Fahd proposal which eventually became the Fez plan, proposals for negotiation at the time of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and many others. A concluding clause recurred with each episode of this history as he related it: "and they would not listen." This was so habitual that even when describing current initiatives Arafat several times used the same expression, "but they would not listen," to describe things that had not yet come to their conclusion, as if to express his expectations of an unfavorable outcome. This was, to my listening, a disturbing element in his discourse. but seemed at the same time not to exclude a contrary expectation that this time the effort would or might succeed.

Mohammed Milhem was present for our meeting with Arafat, and we had spoken with him at length some week before. His manner in the meeting with Arafat was different, deferential at all times, echoing the Chairman's words, anticipating things that Arafat was accustomed to say, attributing the best insight always to the Chairman. Arafat in turn was always full of courtesy to us as his guests and to Milhem, whom he addressed as Brother. This is a set of cultural habits which there is no reason to fault, but it presented a picture of a Chairman who might be too little challenged by his lieutenants and officers. There is no way for me to know if the conversation goes in this bland way when there are not strangers like ourselves present to hear, but if it does Arafat must be deprived of a lot of useful critical input.

For a period during the conversation we pressed Arafat quite hard with the assessment of him and his priorities that we had been hearing from American diplomats in the embassies we visited in each country, namely that his first priority was the reestablishment of a base (military and/or political) in the Palestinian camps of Lebanon, his second priority the unity of the PLO, and the peace initiative only his third priority. Arafat's response to this was quite warm, and it is in this context that he made the assessment of the unity of the Palestinians cited above. He was at pains to assert the primacy of the peace initiative in his own plans, and interpreted other things in terms of that priority. What happened in the attacks on the camps in Beirut had to be a matter of his concern, he said, because "those are my people" who were coming under attack, and he had responsibility for them. But he interpreted the attack on them basically as a Syrian response to his peace initiative as such.

Similarly interpreted as Syrian response to the peace proposals was the murder of Mayor Kawasmeh shortly after his election to the Executive Council. Arafat saw the election of the three new members of the Executive Council with recent West Bank experience and a record as advocates of a political rather than a military solution, Kawasmeh, Milhem and Bishop Elias Khouri, as signs of a fundamental priority in the PLO for the peace campaign.

8. Bishop Elias Khouri as Member of the Executive Council of the PLO.

The presence of a Bishop of the Anglican Church on the Executive Council of the PLO is beyond reckoning for American concepts that understand the PLO in no other way than as a terrorist organization. This gentle man greeted the three of our American group who went to meet him with his regrets that he could no longer obtain a visa to visit the United States because he was now declared, by reason of his membership on the Council, a "terrorist." Bishop Khouri is Suffragan Bishop of Jerusalem, and the Bishop of Jerusalem, Right Rev. Samir Kasity, was with him for our meeting.

We responded that the lack of a visa to the U.S. was one of Bishop Khouri's small troubles, and that there must be much more daunting problems arising from his acceptance of the seat on the Council, which the Anglican Church must have considered deeply in authorizing his acceptance. We

had the idea that Bishop Kasity might enter this discussion, but he left the response to Bishop Khouri, whose answer was interesting.

Bishop Khouri was away, in England, at the time of his election to the Executive Council. He would much have preferred not to accept the position, feeling, for one thing, that he could have much more influence for peace and for the cause of his people without it. He felt himself one of the chief architects of a policy that had been decided for the local Anglican Church, that no clergyman should serve in a political office, and he deeply believed in that policy. Nevertheless, when he returned to the Middle East after his election and wanted to refuse the position, he received urgent pleas from King Hussein, from Crown Prince Hassan and from every Palestinian he could think of that he should accept the election and serve on the Executive Council, precisely because his election, Milhem's and Kawasmeh's, were the most visible signs of a change in the PLO from military to political and diplomatic means, and of the seriousness and primacy of the peace initiative.

9. Palestinian Comprehension/Incomprehension of Jewish Aspirations in the Israeli State.

A significant exchange developed during our meeting with PLO Political Officer Hani al-Hassan at the home of Khalil Wazir (Abu Jihad). In the euphoria on which we commented earlier of his optimistic expectations from the peace initiative, Hani al-Hassan was drawn to speculate on what the more distant future would hold, for Israelis and Arabs, after a full resolution of the conflict. His view was that Israel as a separate State would eventually succumb to friendship, and that as a result a general democratic area would develop over the whole Middle East/Arab World, in some sort of federation, with Jews welcome and contented in Damascus and Aleppo and elsewhere. The presentation was a bit obscure, as al-Hassan apparently picked up some shock waves among our group at this picture and began editing his version even as he described it. He clearly shared the general Arab illusion that the Jews living under Muslim rule had always been content.

Rabbi Leonard Beerman, often the most eloquent of our group, interposed with a statement that the future Hani al-Hassan described provided no solace to Jews, that it meant no real future for Judaism or the society which all Jews aspired to see established in the State of Israel.

This exchange was important to our group, many seeing in it a devastating Palestinian *arrière pensee* of eventually overcoming Israel by kindness. My own view was that Hani al-Hassan had spoken in the context of genuine good will, and in the process shown an ignorance, incomprehension, born of a lack of adequate communication between these two peoples. What Len Beerman had to say — my summary is radically inadequate to it, and there is a recording of the meeting on tape — was seriously heard, and more such real communication can only be to the good.

10. Western Incomprehension of Islam as an Element in the Middle East Impasse.

A comparable, perhaps much deeper incomprehension by Westerners of Islam, its importance and its spirituality, plagues the whole exchange. For most Westerners, Islam is synonymous with fundamentalism and fanaticism, and the very word "Muslim" is usually heard as if it were "radical Islamic extremist." The ignorance of and indifference to Islam in the Western nations, especially in the United States, where more Islam is thought of simply as more trouble, profoundly insults all Muslims and makes it infinitely more difficult for Westerners to contribute anything of value to the pursuit of peace or the development of civilization and culture in this region.

This is a question far beyond the range of this report, but it was one we raised with many of our respondents in Jordan and elsewhere, in Jordan especially with Peter Saleh and with Crown Prince Hassan. It is a matter of great concern to them, and our raising it was simply a way to request their help in efforts to overcome this recognizable chasm in the knowledge and awareness of our own country. Crown Prince Hassan heads an Institute studying Islam and its relation to the other world religions. He described Islam as essentially a centrist religion, and gave us copies of the address he had delivered to the Muslim-Christian Consultation at Windsor in November of 1984.

WHAT WE HEARD IN ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK.

The Israeli part of the visit was from Friday, June 14, when we crossed the Allenby Bridge into the West Bank

and on to Jerusalem, stopping first at Mount Nebo, to Wednesday, June 19, when we flew from Tel Aviv to Cairo.

On our first evening we attended Reform Jewish services at the Har-El Synagogue, with Rabbi Tuvya Ben Churin. We were received by elder statesman Zalman Abramov, the former Vice President of the Knesset, by Abba Eban, Chairman of the Security and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Knesset, by Simcha Dinitz, Labor Party MK and foreign policy adviser to Prime Minister Shimon Peres, by Ratz MKs Shulamit Aloni and Mordechai Bar On, and by Mayor Shlomo Lahat of Tel Aviv. Minister without Portfolio Ezer Weizman had scheduled a meeting with us which was put off because of the hijacking crisis that went on during our visit. Ezra Speisshandler was of frequent help to us and joined us for several conversations, as did Dr. Michael Klein, Dean of the Hebrew Union College in Jerusalem. Dr. Naomi Chazan, Professor of Political Science at the Truman Institute of the Hebrew University, gave us a thorough briefing on the current internal political situation in Israel. We visited the Tantur Ecumenical Center, where we met Dr. William Klassen and the resident visiting scholars, and saw David Shaham at the International Center for Peace in the Middle East. Rabbi David Hartmann received us at his Shalom Hartmann Institute. Israel Harel, Chairman of the Council of Jewish Settlements, came in from Ofra to give us a session at our hotel in Jerusalem. And a number of people associated with the various Israeli peace movements joined us for a dinner one evening. We saw many Palestinians also, including several distinguished professionals and notables, but as a rule of thumb, with no disrespect for Israeli authorities, it seems always better not to cite by name people living under a military occupation.

Topics:

1. The current Jordanian-Palestinian initiative provides an appropriate occasion for the United States to act.

At least lip service was paid to this proposition by everyone we saw. Mayor Shlomo Lahat of Tel Aviv, Liberal Party but a strong advocate of the land for peace principle and of pursuing the peace process, was especially urgent on the need for U.S. action. Abba Eban stressed that the U.S. role was indispensable, as without mediation there would be no peace, and there was no other candidate for mediator but the U.S. The two Ratz MKs we saw, Shulamit Aloni and Mordechai Bar On, saw no chance without U.S. help. Simcha

Dinitz, Labor MK and adviser to Shimon Peres, gave us a more qualified endorsement of the proposition, emphasizing that it must not be a case of the U.S. substituting itself for Israel or trying to impose terms, but rather assistance in bringing the parties directly concerned to negotiate with each other. David Shaham, Director of the International Center for Peace in the Middle East, had a different qualification, asking that U.S. intervention be massive but subtle. Naomi Chazan's account of apathy toward the peace process in Israeli public opinion should also be taken as a strong qualification.

2. Attitudes toward the Staged Process designed by the Jordanians and Palestinians to bring about U.S. talk with the PLO.

Dinitz would not say no, but was clearly intent on raising as many hurdles as possible. Abba Eban was very positive about the U.S. following through this proposed process, in the expectation that it would likely have success. He believed that if the U.S. could break through the barriers to talking directly with the PLO, under acceptable conditions, this would be decisive for at least the Labor part of the Government. Aloni and Bar On were urging that the U.S. should talk to the PLO, finding a process by which to arrive at that goal. Bar On felt that the 1977 Kissinger agreement excluding U.S. conversation with the PLO had been mistaken policy all along. Mayor Lahat was also anxious to see the U.S. take the lead in talking directly to the PLO, believing that the Israeli parties would follow. Both he and Abba Eban repeated, in this connection, the saying we had heard from many persons, that one should negotiate with one's enemies, not one's friends.

3. Inclusion of the Syrians in the Process, the International Conference Proposed by King Hussein.

Basically, the answer we heard from Israelis in authority was no. Both Dinitz and Abba Eban used the phrase that they needed the International Conference "like a hole in the head (Loch im Kopf)." Zalman Abramov was also very negative about it. The view was that the presence of multiple parties beyond the immediate ones would only make agreement more complicated, and that the presence of Russians in particular would put pressure on first the Syrians and then in consequence on all the Arabs to take the most obstructionist possible position. Pressed in

discussion, many of these Israeli authorities would fall back to the position that the Russians should be in on the conclusion of the process, not the beginning. As for the Syrians, most Israelis thought the Syrians would come in on the process if they once found that it was making progress, and that the other Arabs were coming round to it. The view we had heard from some of our Jordanian contacts, to the effect that the Syrians were seen by King Hussein as most important and quite able to disrupt any process in which they had no part, even that King Hussein would not move if the Syrians were not included, seemed not to have been heard among these Israelis.

4. Will the Israelis Move on Land for Peace?

This was one of the most important questions that needed to be answered after our several meetings in Jordan, as it is effectively a question whether King Hussein and the Palestinian leadership have gotten themselves out on a hopeless limb and their initiative was really a big mistake. The answer from Israelis was indistinct. Naomi Chazan's comment about the apathy in the Israeli public about the peace process deserves repeated mention here. She and many others (Eban, Shaham, Lahat, the Ratz people) emphasized repeatedly that nothing would happen without U.S. help, breaking down the mutual distrust and spreading reassurance.

Worthy of mention here is the statement by most of those we saw that Israel cannot afford to incorporate the West Bank-Gaza Palestinian population in the State without losing the Jewish character that they see as essential to it (most notably Dinitz and Eban). Israel Harel, Chairman of the Council of Jewish Settlements, was the only person to tell us that Israel could incorporate all these Palestinians within the State, but that was on the basis that huge new waves of Jewish immigration would still be coming, with the result that this Palestinian population would be swamped.

David Hartmann, Orthodox Rabbi and head of the Shalom Hartmann Institute, was the most optimistic about the Israeli readiness to exchange land for peace, saying that the country was ready for it, but only with leadership, from the U.S. as well as internal.

5. The Taba Talks. A Key Issue?

Abba Eban told us that if there is no movement on Taba there will be none on the Palestinians. This was widely enough recognized that, when the Likud members of Cabinet refused to accept Shimon Peres' decision to send the Taba issue to arbitration (despite Shamir's urging that they do so), it was seen as a kind of issue on which the Unity Government could fall. This was a kind of ephemeral point on which we heard several opinions, some thinking it would likely break on the issue, David Shaham saying it was too small a matter to bring down the Government, but recognizing that the Likud opposition on it might be an indication that Likud was uninterested in preserving the coalition, Abba Eban thinking it a possible cause of a breakup.

6. Will the Coalition of Labor with Likud actually have to break up in order to proceed with a peace initiative?

Abba Eban was again the most pithy commentator on this question. He said Labor and Likud may reconcile their procedures, but never their vision.

Most Israelis, like most of the Jordanians we had seen, expected that the Unity Government would in fact split over the peace initiative if in fact the process went forward. Naomi Chazan, while expecting this, actually saw the coalition government as having more flexibility than a narrowly based coalition, because both Likud and Labor were so set on maintaining the longevity of the government and avoiding that it should be their party that split it. We heard more often, from Israelis, of Peres forming a narrow coalition than (as we had heard from Jordanians) of his calling new elections. Many felt he would have to form a narrow coalition as an interim measure to show some real progress in the peace process before calling an election. Naomi Chazan, on this matter, was our most analytic commentator. She saw the religious parties as ready to enter a coalition with Labor now, despite their having refused after the last election, because they have not been getting any concessions from the government during the time of the Unity coalition.

It was the commonplace of these discussions to point out the limited time Peres had to act on the peace initiative coming from King Hussein and the Palestinians, as the rotation in the Prime Minister's office would give the job to Shamir in October '86. People generally felt that Peres would become lame duck long before that time, and gave us various versions of how short the time of opportunity might be.

Unstated, but in the air of some discussions we had (notably with Shlomo Lahat and Israel Harel),- was the possibility that, if the peace process were really moving, Likud might find it to its advantage to stay in the process, rather than leaving the government and sulking on the sidelines, where they would have no effective say. Their basic interest then would be to preserve the opportunity for Jews to live, at peace and with open borders, in such places as Hebron and elsewhere in what they always refer to as Judaea and Samaria, even if the West Bank come again under Arab authority. Religiously motivated people (David Hartmann, Yehezkel Landau) saw this as a goal to be attained, and people so diverse as Israel Harel and Zalman Abramov told us it was a quite obtainable goal. Abramov went so far as to contradict the common assessment that the settlements are an undifferentiated obstacle to pursuit of the land-for-peace goal, and described them as actually an incentive. All of our group recognized that it was a weakness of the visit that we were unable to meet more representative figures from the Likud, though we understood reasons that had prevented that. It would have been especially valuable to have been able to test this ground with the central Likud figures.

7. The Spiritual Corruption of Israel as an Occupying Power.

From every Israeli we spoke to, with the single exception of Israel Harel, we heard statements of great distress at the threat the occupation constitutes to the moral condition and democratic character of the State of Israel. Examples could be multiplied, as it is a most fundamental concern. We heard from several people of the recent poll taken by the Van Leer Foundation, according to which over 40% of high school students now adhere to the ideas of Kahane. The Likud (Liberal Party) Mayor of Tel Aviv, Shlomo Lahat, made perhaps the strongest statement on this score, mourning what it did to the country that all its young men, without exception, were trained to go about with guns in occupied territory, enforcing a hated rule.

8. The Palestinian Voice.

On one of our first meetings in Israel after our several days in Jordan, when we attended Sabbath service at Har El Synagogue, we were told: "You have heard one side of the story. Now you need to hear the other." The obvious

reply to this was: Yes, we have indeed heard one side of a story, and wish to hear the other, although neither story is altogether new to us. But we have also heard one side of a proposal for peace, and are now very anxious to hear the response.

From the Palestinians we met in the West Bank, it is fair to say that we heard much more story than proposing of the peace, far less proposing of the ways to peace, at any rate, than we had heard from both Palestinians and Jordanians while we were in Jordan. The recitation of grievances, pain and frustration was often overwhelming. An explanation of this is properly to be sought, and is most probably to be found in the lack of opportunity to express themselves among West Bank Palestinians.

The list of grievances was familiar, and centered on the sense of being deprived of an identity, of having their land taken from them. A feeling of hopelessness was engendered by their being treated either as invisible or as terrorists. Of the specific grievances we were told, three stood out in strongest relief:

1. economic grievances, regarding confiscation of land, lack of development or opportunity. E.g., we were told that produce raised in the West Bank cannot be sold in Israel, but only consumed locally within the West Bank or sold to Jordan. (We saw, the day we crossed the Allenby Bridge, the trucks of produce going into Jordan, and the empty trucks returning. In Jerusalem, we saw West Bank produce on sale in the streets, particularly on the West side, but were given to understand that this could only be done on a small scale, as practically a smuggling operation. We heard, too, of Israelis driving over to the West Bank markets to shop more cheaply.) In the granting of permits for building, or developing industries or infrastructure of any sort, we were told, preference was given only to ventures that would enrich private individuals, and it was all but impossible to get permits for anything that would give fabric to West Bank society.

2. Since the West Bank universities have begun turning out graduates, we were told that there are now some 12,000 unemployed graduates in the area, with no prospect of getting jobs or developing opportunity there. University education had become very popular, we heard, partly because it kept young people occupied and off the labor market for four years, in a situation of widespread unemployment, but mostly because people had had the repeated and continuous

experience of everything they had being taken from them by one stratagem or another, and had concluded that education was the most durable acquisition they could have, something they would still have if all else was taken from them and they had to start over again.

3. Lack of legal due process. This was spelled out to us in great detail, but the summary of it is that law is consistently used, with regard to the Palestinians, only as a means of harassment, not as an instrument of justice. From this springs a frustration that has to issue in contempt for law and all the defiances that accompany it.

9. The PLO as the Legitimate, Chosen Voice of the Palestinians?

This was universally stated by every Palestinian we saw, even by a seminary rector. There was no sense whatever that this was an assent given out of intimidation. In terms of the peace initiative being taken by King Hussein and the PLO, Palestinians in the West Bank felt that a great concession had been made in agreeing that the "first stage" representatives of the Palestinians should be those not publicly or officially connected with the PLO structure. They were clear that the condition of legitimacy for this group would be that they had the acceptance of the PLO, were even named by the PLO. Otherwise they would have no authority with which to come to any kind of agreements on behalf of the Palestinian people, or to bind the community to any agreements once made. This universal acceptance of the PLO as the one legitimate voice of the Palestinians reflected what we had been told just as universally by Palestinians in Jordan. One person there, when asked what proportion of the Palestinians, both within the Occupied Territories and in the Diaspora, were with Yasser Arafat, had replied: at least 85%, perhaps 90%. Asked then who the rest were with, she had replied: those are the ones with the more extreme groups.

10. Conditions for Talks/No Conditions for Talks.

Everyone solemnly intones that peace talks will be unconditional. That said, they then tell us the conditions.

Simcha Dinitz was the most important voice on this topic. He cited the example of President Anwar Sadat, when he made his visit to Jerusalem and, in his speech, gave an

extensive list of his negotiating positions, but made it clear that they were positions, not conditions. Dinitz went on to list the three essential things that Israel must have as features of any peace settlement that is made:

1. security for Israel (for Dinitz himself, this was largely a matter of geography, secure borders, but his requirement of security for Israel would be reflected as much by those who saw Israel's security coming from the friendship of reconciled neighbors);
2. the Jewish character of the State (which precluded, for him and for many others, the absorption of the West Bank Palestinians into an Israeli State); and
3. preservation of the democratic institutions (thus precluding also, for him, any attempt to force the emigration of the Palestinian population from the occupied territories, which would be a permanent and unendurable stain on Israeli democracy).

Dinitz described these three items, in the language of Sadat, as positions, not conditions. It was quite clear, however, that in the essence of these three requirements he spoke for a wide Israeli public, and that these were things without which Israelis will not buy any peace that is offered.

Another item often raised in such a way that it amounted to a condition, not merely a position, was that there should not be an independent Palestinian State. The refusal to use the expression "self-determination" stems from that, as the term is associated with demands for an independent State. However, this has, in the context of the current initiative, become far less a stumbling block than anyone could have imagined as recently as a year ago, since the Hussein-PLO proposal has already accepted in principle that there should be a confederation, which most Palestinians we spoke to, both in Jordan and in the West Bank, believed would quickly develop into a full federation. (Some ambiguity was left, when we spoke with PLO officials, on whether this confederal arrangement with Jordan would be the immediate solution, or would follow on the creation of an independent State.) We had heard, in speaking with American officials, that the U.S. did not want an independent Palestinian State, would not advocate it in a negotiating process, would in fact oppose it, but would not veto it. On the Israeli side, too, we could discern that this position against an independent State, while much more a condition than a position, was not absolute.

11. Political and Military Faces of the PLO.

A position often put to us, often quite specifically, was that the PLO, when first founded, had been essentially a political body from 1964 to 1967, that after the Six Day War in '67 it had turned into a predominantly military body (with terror tactics), but that it was now turning into an essentially political body once again.

12. Should there be a Statement of Principles Issued Before the Beginning of Actual Negotiations?

This question was in the air among our group from the beginning of the visit, but was brought to the fore by the very specific proposal of David Shaham (Director of the International Center for Peace in the Middle East). He believed more progress could be made initially on these matters of substance than on matters of procedure, such as who would represent the Palestinians. Such a statement should issue, he thought, not from either the Israelis or the Palestinians and other Arabs, but from the United States, since its coming from either side would be a reason for the other side to reject it. Items he saw as belonging on the list were the territory-for peace principle (which is Resolution 242), the end of terrorism, mutual recognition, the goal of having two entities with open borders between them. He was anxious not to use the expression "self-determination," as it is a code term, in many people's minds, for an independent Palestinian State, but to have some such equivalent, shorn of that association, as "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" (the Camp David formula) or some more acceptable expression.

Shaham's proposal became afterwards a part of our agenda, in the sense that it was a question asked in many subsequent meetings in Israel and in Egypt. We found quite generally that there were two stages to the response. When the idea of concentrating first on such a statement of agreed principles instead of on procedure was presented as an abstraction, our respondents reacted very negatively, that this would be a contentious procedure that would hinder progress toward negotiation. But when the list of principles was then recited, the response was generally positive, as these are matters that can be found, at least implicitly and most often expressly, in the actual statements of both sides. As for the U.S. being the proponent of such a list of agreed principles, people we talked to — Israeli, Palestinian and Egyptian — thought

this would be of value so long as it was not able to be seen as the U.S. dictating terms of agreement. That left us with the possibility of the U.S. offering a two-track list of such principles:

a) principles that are already stated common ground, even if only by inference, from all parties; and

b) what ought to be explored further as possible consensus points.

13. Complexity of Israeli Society.

Many Israelis and some Palestinians as well were anxious that we should take note of the complex pattern of ethnic (Sephardi-Ashkenazi), religious (Orthodox and secular), class and ideological groupings in Israeli society. On the actual issue of pursuing the possibilities of peace opened by the Hussein-Palestinian initiative, our Israeli respondents gave us readings that ranged from 40% for it, 40% against it, 20% indifferent (Naomi Chazan) to equal thirds for, against and indifferent (Zalman Abramov). They agreed in the reading that the country was pretty evenly divided over the issue, and that leadership, both from the Israeli political establishment and from the U.S., would make the difference between progress and no progress, between opportunity taken and opportunity missed.

14. What Will Come of All This.

A principal question with which we had come from our meetings in Jordan to Israel was whether there would be any real response from Israel to the initiative King Hussein and the Palestinians had made. Why should the Israelis respond? The Arab initiative is made, after all, from weakness, from the realization that, if they cannot now produce a peaceful settlement, the authority of moderate leadership both in Jordan and in the PLO will be eroded, and their regimes replaced by much more extreme and violent leadership (both from the Islamic Fundamentalist side and from the Marxists, who will have common interests despite their great differences), to the accompaniment of great suffering for all their peoples. Many in Israel, those who prefer keeping the occupied territory to having peace, or who would like the peace but without any compromise, are likely to think that would be to Israel's advantage, that Israel would see its enemies brought low and could afford to be indifferent

to the new extremes of Arab suffering that are likely to follow from failure in the peace endeavor now. Other Israelis will see that such a deterioration of Arab societies, particularly of the Jordanian and Palestinian societies, would bring new and endless violence to Israel itself, and that it is Israel's advantage to deal now with Arab and Palestinian leaders who have come to desire and actively work for an equitable peace. Israeli leaders who are of that mind will realize that their backs are badly exposed to the hard-liners, and will proceed with a caution that may serve them ill, as well as with the residue of distrust from their previous dealings with their Arab and Palestinian adversaries.

That leaves the question of what the U.S. will do, as proven friend of Israel. Will American authorities try merely to keep from getting their fingers burned, or will they work actively to heal distrust and assist the process of negotiation between the parties? A consensus among the Israelis we saw says that no progress will happen without such an active role by the U.S.

WHAT WE HEARD IN EGYPT.

We flew from Tel Aviv to Cairo on June 19, from there to Amman on June 22 for our return flight to New York. The days in Cairo were less intense than those in Jordan or Israel, both because of Egypt's greater distance from the proposed negotiations and because our visit coincided with the feast days following Ramadan, making it impossible to see officials in their offices until the Saturday morning, June 22. We were received at his home by Ashraf Ghorbal, just retired after 16 years in Washington, the last 11 as Egypt's Ambassador, and still a key figure in government counsels. Professor Saad al-Din Ibrahim, long a personal friend and counsellor to President Anwar Sadat, came to our hotel to brief us on the current Egyptian situation and the Islamic resurgence throughout the region. We had, as in the other countries, a thorough briefing by American Embassy staff. And on our last morning we had meetings at the Foreign Ministry with Ambassador Abd-el-Halim Badawi, who is carrying on the Taba negotiations on behalf of Egypt, and Minister of State Dr. Boutros Ghali. Much of our time in Egypt was devoted to meetings of our own group to discuss our findings.

A different reporting format would be useful here, summarizing the main concerns of each of our respondents.

Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal.

The Ambassador began with Taba. He felt the Israelis knew the border when they left the Sinai, but it was only after the peace treaty was signed that Egypt discovered they were building at Taba. Ariel Sharon said they knew what they were doing, and the Egyptians should get off their backs. The Americans insisted for a while, but then gave up when they got nowhere. The Israelis claimed they could not find the markers. When the Egyptians did a survey and did find the markers, the Israelis at first acknowledged it, but Sharon called the next day to say the admission had been a mistake. A question arose then of one marker that was missing. It had evidently been moved, and Ghorbal asked rhetorically who might have done that in the period since 1967. Eventually an Egyptian surveyor found the stone, thrown over but not removed far enough to be lost. Sharon at this point threatened that if Egypt insisted on Taba the whole deal was off. Only a direct appeal to Begin prevented that.

Ghorbal felt the Israelis had been bargaining all along for a price for the Camp David agreement. They had wanted it in the West Bank, but the Egyptians could not grant that as it was not theirs to give. On the Taba issue, they find themselves bargaining now even to get to the process of arbitration, when negotiation has already been exhausted. Nevertheless the Egyptians, while knowing what is going on, do not want to make things difficult for Peres. They are trying to cool off the Taba question, and are not daily hammering it. Still, it has to be understood that Taba is a national issue for Egypt. You can't bargain your territory away. The treaty has been brokered by a friend. You can't respect it in some ways and not in others. If the Egyptians let the rope go on this question, it would become a hot popular issue. It is the worst advertisement Israel could make for itself with regard to its willingness to negotiate with Arab countries.

On the more crucial matter of the peace initiative by King Hussein and Arafat, Ghorbal told how he had, for the last year, been advocating in Washington that 1985 would be a year of high opportunities. He went around the Congress, when the Jerusalem Bill was under discussion, telling of the

Hussein-Arafat feelers and asking people not to complicate the situation just at that time. Arafat, he said, now accepted the package. He himself had not said Resolution 242, but it was in the package and he had done nothing to exclude it. The mutual recognition idea, by which Arafat wanted to have recognition of the Palestinians as the price for explicit recognition of Israel in the terms of 242, had been pushed by the Egyptians.

This constituted an opportunity for Israel. Peres and his group were anxious to trade land for peace. When you do that, said Ghorbal, you are really talking about security. Once you assure Israel that it can have security with minimum corrections of the border, then the peace possibilities become real. It is no time to get into a religious quarrel about "Judea and Samaria."

What is the connection of the peace initiative with Taba? Egypt will not hold up the Hussein peace initiative over the Taba issue. If once you can improve the atmosphere over the West Bank, all the other issues become easier, including Taba.

As for the international conference element in Hussein's plan, Ghorbal asked us to put ourselves in Hussein's shoes. Why should he eliminate the Soviets when he has no guarantee from the U.S.? So far he has received from the U.S. only a hearing, not any meaningful support. This was a different explanation for the inclusion of the Soviets than either of the two we had been hearing in Jordan: Hussein's need for some kind of international umbrella (which, as American diplomats were reading it, could mean either the Soviets or some sort of substitute), or the essential need for Syrian participation, which neither Hani al-Hassan nor Mrewood E-Tal had felt could be secured without Soviet participation. Ghorbal was instead suggesting that Hussein's insistence on the Soviets was a bargaining card with the U.S., to get some more meaningful support. That, of course, need not be to the exclusion of the other reasons.

There had been a hint of help on this issue from George Schulz, but as soon as Peres spoke against it Schulz had backed off at once. Hussein should not give up on the International Conference. Nevertheless, President Mubarak says that the International Conference should come at the end of the process, not at the beginning.

In the Middle East, if things do not go forward they go backward. Sharon did the worst possible thing for Israel in invading Lebanon. He did not know he was opening a worse can of worms for his country, but now how is one to get them back in the can? The Shias are out, acting in a Kamikaze mode. Ghorbal cited the Sam Lewis interview to show the bad faith in which Sharon had acted.

What are the most important steps for the U.S. to take? Peres must be helped, and he has a time limit. In 17 months he delivers the control of government to Shamir. The closer he comes to that, the less he can do. He has only 9 months to work, a year if you push it. The U.S. has a leading role.

1. It keeps telling the region not to cater to the Soviets, using them either as broker or umbrella. The U.S. cannot then fail to be active as broker itself.

2. The area is pro-American, but it can't stomach indifference to the basic rights of its people.

3. The U.S. acted as broker before, can't leave an unfinished edifice of peace.

4. Most important of all, there is now a big move in Israel, not only by the Peace Now group, but the whole people is tired of war after being led down a blind alley in Lebanon. Israel has suffered 654 deaths in Lebanon, and there are still another 500 in Lebanon who remain targets, splitting Israel down the middle.

It is disappointing to find Schulz still saying nothing can happen until the region is ready. There is no leadership coming from Washington. The region can't rally around the big guy when he isn't ready.

How did Carter and his administration communicate their readiness? By being involved. The Secretary of State needs to be involved, and the President too. Having Mr. Murphy involved is a way to get perhaps 10% of what the U.S., the Arab moderates, and the Israeli moderates as well, like Peres, are looking for, but cannot obtain without U.S. help. Having Schulz involved is a way to get 50%. Having President Reagan involved himself is a way to get perhaps 95%.

Professor Saad al-Din Ibrahim.

Professor Ibrahim is a sociologist teaching at the American University of Cairo, Cairo University and the Al Ahrum Center on Egyptian and Arab issues. He is Director of the Center for Human Rights in the Arab World instituted by the Tunis Conference. His books are published by Westview Press and others.

We requested that Professor Ibrahim speak of the Islamic resurgence. He commented first on the added confusion that stands in the way of understanding if Westerners identify this phenomenon first with recent events in Iran. The main stress there is the anti-Western element. There is such an element, but the resurgence is far more complex. It contains many movements, which vary from country to country and within countries, though all claim to have the same aim.

The resurgence began in the aftermath of the 1967 defeat. Western-style liberals, socialists and nationalist regimes were all discredited then. In the effort to respond to this otherwise incomprehensible event, two extreme answers surfaced: a Habash-style Marxist response and the Islamic response. The first received most attention in the late '60s, with its hijackings etc. Only after 1973 did outside observers much notice the Islamic attempt to provide answers and a way out, salvation, which had been developing alongside the radical efforts all along. From that time their impact has taken shape and strength.

There are subcategories:

1. militants.
2. establishment Islam, as at Al-Azhar University, which is in tune with the ruling regimes.
3. Sufi Islam, the least threatening to the ruling regimes, as it seeks salvation by purifying individuals, pursuing communion with God, withdrawal. The political regimes welcome it as an alternative to the other varieties and a way to tone down or check the militants.

It was militant Islam that assassinated Sadat, and had had many confrontations before, some bloody. It has carried on, too, the suicide attacks in Lebanon, the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, confrontations in Tunisia, etc. It is hostile to the regimes and to the West, but equally to the Soviet Union. Afghanistan shows this most clearly. One hears of it also in the USSR, but it is

difficult to verify the second-hand information on this that comes from militant Islamic sources. The Soviets are nervous at religious language in the Middle East, would prefer Kissinger language.

The numbers of militants are perhaps just hundreds of thousands in an Islamic world of 1,000,000,000, but they have an unlimited pool among the many unorganized fundamentalists (a different thing), anxious to get back to the ways of the Koran and the Sunna, who could easily be converted and trained in militant language and action. Most fundamentalists are not organized to act out their longings, but the line between them and the militants is thin. In Egypt, after every showdown with Sadat, there were new recruits and more deadly tactics. Most militants are young, in their 20s and 30s.

The resurgence appeared when it did because of the dismal performance of the Arab regimes:

- a) in the '67 war;
- b) on the social and economic issues dealing with the strains of modernization. They failed to live up to the expectations fanned in the early days of independence, instituting the required reforms, fulfilling the dreams they raised.

Nonetheless, like the similar fundamentalism found today in American Christianity (Moral Majority etc.) and in Israel, which seems to have roots wider than economic causes, this Islamic alternative has always been there ready to be awakened. It was called for in the latter part of the 19th century, when there were three concurrent reactions to Western encroachment:

- 1. to imitate the West and achieve parity;
- 2. to reject the West — the Islamic alternative of the 1870s, the 1940s, the 1970s;
- 3. to reconcile the best in Islamic and Western civilizations.

Coming to the search for a peace settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Professor Ibrahim told us the initial reaction to Sadat's initiative had been a good deal of acceptance in Egypt. The rest of the Arab world took a wait-and-see attitude while the two extreme fringes, Marxist and Islamic militant, rejected it, believing that Sadat had

sold out. For the militants, the Palestinians had been sold out for love of the West. For the Marxists, Zionism was a species of settler-colonialism, which must be the object of an armed struggle to establish the secular state. The one was for liberating the Dar-es-Islam, the other secularist. The bulk of the people were between the extremes, but their position was eroded over the subsequent years. Egyptians had a nagging pain when they were accused of abandoning the Palestinians. Public acceptance of Sadat's position was discredited by two Israeli actions: the bombing of the Iraqi reactor in 1981 and the invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Some political parties that had first supported Sadat's action withdrew because of these events. Sadat had met Begin just two days before the bombing of Iraq. Hence he was seen as either a traitor, if he knew what was coming, or a fool if he did not.

Sadat struck back at his opposition by jailing all his enemies: Islamic fundamentalists, Christians, socialists, etc., the extreme Left and the extreme Right, to the number of about 3,000,000. People who were not jailed found they had to apologize. The bulk of the prisoners were fundamentalists. Nevertheless there were enough of them left outside to kill the President, and even to engage the security forces in bloody confrontation two days later, even though all the first echelon leaders were in jail. The militants had proved themselves. While the leftists and many others wanted to be rid of Sadat, it was they who had done it. It is the same in Lebanon. The Shiite militants are the ones who got rid of the Israelis. It makes for a very clear, simplistic vision, daring, appealing to the young. The States are unable to match them in growth or performance.

The moderate regimes, especially if pro-Western, are under pressure since Sadat's death. They must perform in key areas:

1. on the Arab-Israeli conflict;
2. on development;
3. on social and economic justice;
4. on democratization.

King Hussein is especially under pressure to deliver. Hence his reconvening of the Parliament in Jordan. The economy is the most difficult thing for him to attack,

with declining oil revenues and remittances. Syria is a problem for him and all moderate regimes.

The rapprochement between the PLO and Hussein, with the acquiescence of the other moderate Arab regimes, is seen as dramatic in the Arab world, but not in the West. Western reception has been cool, and there is danger of missing another opportunity, as has been typical of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Ibrahim saw the value of our own group as warning against missing the opportunity.

Israel has a shaky coalition, unable to stand a major step toward negotiation. The U.S. is needed to pave the way for dialogue, as it is a stronger government that can act. Public opinion in Israel is moving toward it, as also in the PLO. The moderates are running out of time. The U.S. is the key to bringing about an equitable settlement. The Jewish community in the U.S., in particular, must take the lead, as it is the only community so intensely concerned, and the only one that can speak to Congress without intimidation and accusations of anti-Semitism. This is a heavy burden, but achieving peace in the Middle East is not an easy task. Others, like Sadat, have given their lives for it.

Sadat, after 1977, had the acceptance of the Egyptian public, and a wait-and-see license from the rest of the Arab world. The rejection of his action was by the Arab regimes. The wait-and-see people wanted to see what Sadat could deliver, but the yield was very meager from the point of view of the Egyptians and other Arabs. Israeli actions undercut Sadat. Hussein, Arafat and Mubarak feel that if the present drive succeeds they can isolate the extremists (who will still be there).

In Arab opinion, there are three groups:

1. for coexistence with an Israel in the pre-1967 borders;
2. the Sadat view, for real mutual recognition and acceptance;
3. a residue of fundamentalists still adamant against Israel,
 - a) on religious grounds,
 - b) out of grievance.

This last is a minority view, but it is growing, and is the most fascinating, especially to the young. It needs to be headed off before it grows out of hand.

As a personal friend of Sadat, Professor Ibrahim described the President's discouragement, which he saw at a meeting with him a month before his death. Sadat had just experienced the bombing of Iraq and his meeting with the President Reagan. He said it had taken President Ford a year to understand the complexities of the Middle East; that President Carter had understood it in six months, but the President Reagan would not understand it in ten years.

Syria, Ibrahim thought, has a very rational regime. It will be prepared to go along if given the right incentives: the Golan, the end of belligerency, a Palestinian homeland (whether as a separate State or in a confederation), under the umbrella of an international conference. Syria may deal with Israel and the U.S. bilaterally, but the final arrangement must be under a Geneva-style international umbrella. The Syrians believe they can spoil anything. If Egypt tried and they could isolate it, they can do the same with any other peace drive of which they are no part.

Anwar Sadat could have been the hero of the Arab world, as the peacemaker. But the U.S. and Israel let him down. Other Arab leaders want the peace, but do not want to share the fate of Sadat.

Ambassador Abd-el-Halim Badawi.

Ambassador Badawi is the Egyptian negotiator on the Taba issue, and began with that question. He saw Taba as an issue that needed to be removed from the agenda as quickly as possible. How to do it? The Israelis want a conciliation process. The Egyptians want mandatory arbitration. His reading was much like Ambassador Ghorbal's. When the tensions in Israel, between Likud and Labor, over Taba were mentioned, he responded that there were serious tensions in Egypt too. Asked whether the issue was worth the breaking up of the Unity government in Israel, he spoke of the two objectives for which the coalition had been formed: to get out of Lebanon, which is already done, and to settle the economy, a long-range issue on which little progress has been made. It was difficult to choose the issue on which the coalition would break. A prompt solution to the Taba problem was necessary in order to

remove obstacles to normal relations for the sake of the peace process. Why drag in small extraneous issues?

The U.S. position on Taba was not clear, but had not really been asked in any clear-cut way. The U.S. had agreed to help it the matter became too sticky. Asked if the Israelis might run the hotel at Taba if Egypt had the land, he preferred to keep the two issues, possession of the land and its use, separate. They could get to the matter of who would run the hotel after the land question was settled.

Asked about the squabble in Israel over Ezer Weizmann's visit to Egypt, Badawi saw the factionalism in the Israeli cabinet split four ways:

1. the hawks around Sharon;
2. Weizmann with the "absolute doves;"
3. Peres, and such people as Eban, in between;
4. the Rabbinate.

Referring to a discussion we had had with Professor Ibrahim on whether the Palestinian question really caught the imagination of the Egyptian public, with all the domestic problems of poverty and development it faced, we asked how far the Egyptians were really excited about Taba. Badawi responded that the imagination of Egyptians had become truly engaged about Taba, as people saw it as a question of the permissibility of negotiating away their own land. The Palestinian problem, by comparison, is both more remote and more serious. Egyptians want to see it solved, in a way satisfactory to all parties. The Syrians wish simply that the Palestinian problem would vanish. It was never, for them, a matter of the Palestinians as a people, but of Greater Syria. Egyptians want to solve it for the sake of the Palestinians themselves.

We raised the common comment that Sadat had put Egypt first, subordinating the Palestinians. Badawi spoke of Sadat as a realist. At the time Sadat travelled to Jerusalem the issues were two: a) occupied land (Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian), and b) the Palestinians. With the regaining of their own territory, the Egyptians had more freedom of action. It is not easy for Egypt to have its actions dictated by the whims and fancies of other countries. Syria has a different outlook. But without Sadat's action we would still be back in the condition of 1967.

It was shortsighted, Badawi thought, to see U.S. inaction as a sellout of Sadat. There were two aspects to Camp David:

a) the bilateral part; and

b) the wider settlement involving other parties.

A five-year program was envisaged, to which the other parties did not contribute. The two main parties who had to be in, the Palestinians and Jordan, had hung back.

Jordan's position was delicate. It can't move as easily as Egypt. At the time of Camp David, Jordan would have preferred to have support from the other Arab countries. The Saudis hung back, and Jordan could not fight at once the Syrians, the Israelis and the Saudis. Asked where the Saudis stood now, Badawi wished the Saudis knew themselves. Only one thing worries the Saudis: the safety of their own regime.

Asked about Islamic fundamentalism, the Ambassador said the issue was exaggerated and overblown, especially in the Western press. The whole area is fundamentally religious and it is not unknown to have this sort of revival when all goes wrong. Where does one turn to then if not back to religion? The troubles in Lebanon are with the Shias, who are always more likely than Sunni to have acute reactions. The Sunni would not be so extremist. Reminded that the fundamentalists in Egypt are Sunni, he did not take up the question.

We asked whether Jordan would act in the peace process without Syria (the question Mrewood E-Tal had raised for us in Jordan). Badawi's answer was that it depended on the safety of the regime, comparing it to the situation of the Saudis. Ibn Saud could once make all the decisions himself, but now there was an inner and an outer circle of princes, all making their claims, and the Saudis also feared the physical elimination of the whole family regime. Hussein wants a political settlement, but he needs the International Conference. His position is so precarious that the International Conference is the only leg he can stand on. Then no one can tell him that he has reneged, and he will not be attacked when he enters the conference.

Asked whether bringing in Syria and the Soviets does not negate Hussein's own purposes, Badawi replied that Hussein wants to talk to the Russians, not the Syrians (in outright contradiction of E-Tal's reading). The Russians

are most serious when something touches their own interest with respect to the other superpower. The Middle East is so serious for them that no one can fool around.

We questioned whether the Russians really wanted a settlement, or whether they might not prefer a "controlled instability" in the Middle East. Badawi said not to believe the Russians had any interest in instability in the region. The Soviets cannot be involved in too many areas. The Middle East has become, for them, a drain and a nuisance. Have they had any success in settling their Afghanistan problem? No, and they have many other such unsettled problems.

We raised the matter of Western incomprehension of Islam as an obstacle to progress in the Middle East, as we had in many other interviews. Badawi spoke of the need not only for coexistence in this sphere, but for getting to understand the real concerns of one another. Jihad had become a nightmare term for the West. It has a deep meaning for Muslims, as the struggle for righteousness. Those who are preaching Jihad don't themselves understand what it is, and they frighten Westerners who don't understand it either.

The main action now should be carried on by Palestinians, Jordanians, Syrians, and Israelis. Egypt and the U.S. should be helping out in the background. The current initiative is the first time we have Arafat's signature on something. It is a first step, and like all first steps ambiguous. There are plenty of crazies around. The Israelis, as the main actor, should be the ones to react to the Jordanian-Palestinian initiative. The U.S. at that stage should be more involved than it is now. Hence the U.S. ought to participate in the dialogue with the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and act as a catalyst at various stages.

Boutros Ghali, Minister of State in the Foreign Office.

Mr. Ghali was just back from New York, where he had taken part in a Security Council meeting on Namibia. There he had met with American Jewish leaders and with the Security Council delegations — 18 foreign ministers were at the meeting. They had discussed the Middle East, and the proposals made by President Mubarak a few months ago in Washington.

The present initiative comes from Jordan and the PLO. Egypt was encouraging both to make a second step.

When Sadat made his initiative, he asked no guarantees from the U.S. He simply threw himself into the waters and tried. Jordan is not Egypt, and cannot take the risk of new initiatives without some support as a prerequisite. The same holds for the PLO, which is not a state, but needs and deserves help. The success of the Sadat initiative cannot be measured by his recovering of Egyptian territory, but has to be based on what happened to the Palestinians as well. The Palestinians are worse off now. There has been an erosion of their quality of life. The perception is about that the present American Administration is less interested than preceding ones. It has other priorities: the USSR, Central America, Europe etc., and the Palestinian problem is relegated to the back burner. One cannot compare the attitude of President Carter at Camp David with President Reagan's attitude.

There are certain prerequisites from the U.S. before we in the Middle East can take risks. If there is help from Europe, that is fine, but it is the U.S. that counts. The initiative to have contact between the U.S. and the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation was an Egyptian government idea, presented by President Mubarak.

The Jewish leaders in New York opposed the initiative, and said Hussein was too weak to succeed at it. Hence the effect of their counsel was to reinforce the PLO, giving them alone the mandate for everything that could be done. Because of the Kissinger no-contact agreement, which still ruled in American policy, this meant continuing with a total stalemate. Ghali's response to this American Jewish opposition was that even if there is only a 5% chance it should be taken. There is a need for a new initiative. Egypt is entirely behind the February 11 agreement and all that follows from it. Now it is up to the Americans to push the process.

The American Jewish leaders had wanted to know why Egypt was in such a hurry. The problem was with the Fundamentalists in the region. Egypt now has its own equivalent of Gush Emunim. Look at Iran, and at the Shias in Lebanon. Now is the time to reinforce the moderates, who have to have a real accomplishment if they are to disarm the appeal of the extremists.

Ghali spoke of the human degradation of the Palestinians, and of even Israeli accounts of the human rights violations. It is necessary to preserve the Palestinians, because as a group they represent moderation.

He distinguished various groups of Palestinians (in Lebanon, in Syria, in Israel, in the West Bank and Gaza, in a few other places) and said he was speaking primarily of the West Bank-Gaza Palestinians.

Syrian policy is to keep the Palestinians a Lumpenproletariat. Egypt is keen to create a new peace process and give it some dynamic. The Palestinians and the PLO have their own fish to fry. Jordan is timid. It is Egypt that sees the need to push for peace now. Otherwise the new American Congressional elections and other delays will intervene. The moderates of the Middle East will be continually weakened and the extremists will grow. If now there were a formal or practical annexation of the West Bank it would be a great blow, because of the land for peace principle.

In the last years, the moderates have failed and the extremists (among the PLO, in Iran and Libya) have been winning. Gush Emunim wants to oppress the Arabs and the Islamic Fundamentalists want to oppress Jews. The Egyptians had talked with the Israelis around this very table (in the Foreign Ministry, where we were sitting) and know how it is done.

The New York Jewish leaders had seen Fundamentalism as a Middle Eastern problem and none of their business. Ghali saw that as tragically short-sighted. If we want to hear what guarantees are needed for the peace process to move, ask the Jordanians. But the U.S. role is essential. There is incomprehension and indifference in the U.S. about the Middle East. Pay more attention, and not just when U.S. Marines are being blown up. The Middle Easterners need to know that they have the big brother behind them, that he is there. Give them time. President Carter gave two weeks at Camp David. If the American government is distracted, looking elsewhere, Jordan and the PLO cannot move. The same goes for the Israelis, who don't trust the PLO. It is the task of the Americans to overcome the distrust.

We asked if the Schulz and Murphy visits were not enough sign of American interest. Ghali responded that it was better than nothing, describing this as the Jordanian and Palestinian perception. But the Arabs believe this peace process is no priority for the U.S., that the U.S. is content to let the stalemate go on for years more.

Asked about the International Conference part of the Hussein-Arafat proposal, Ghali said he had no prescriptions

on the matter. The International Conference is called for by Security Council Resolution 338, but it would be a mistake to do nothing while waiting for an International Conference. The priority for the U.S. should be to reinforce the moderates. Then we could bring in the International Conference and the USSR. There will not be an International Conference until there is some rapprochement between the superpowers. The US/USSR relation is global, including Afghanistan, Nicaragua etc. If the Camp David agreement had been signed in Tashkent it would be another story.

Nevertheless, the Russians will certainly oppose any settlement in which they are not involved. The U.N. recognized this in Resolutions 242 and 338, and it was accepted, at first, by the Carter administration. What is important is that we moderates first show our arms, our tools. Otherwise the radicals will be able to ask: what are you doing all this time, while we are preparing for the next confrontation?

One of our group spoke of an eagerness the Labor Party in Israel has shown to enter negotiations on the land for peace principle. How can we strengthen Labor's hand? Ghali answered that this was his own personal position at the time Sadat made his initiative, that reliance should be placed on Labor. The position was tolerated only, even then. Now the Mubarak administration insists on saying that there will be no interference in the internal situation of Israel, and takes the view that there is no difference between Labor and Likud in their desirability as negotiating partners. Ghali is in favor personally of helping Labor, but this is not the government position. Even if there were only 1% of Israelis in favor of peace he would want to help them. As a matter of history, Sadat trusted Likud more than Labor, as Labor was divided but Likud could deliver.

In concluding, Ghali confirmed the observation we had all made as we saw the swarming millions crowding Cairo and the poverty. Walk the streets of Cairo, he said. You will see our problems. We can never solve them if we do not have peace.

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Appendix II

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TO : PLO LONDON/SWEDEN AND ALL PLO OFFICES
FROM: DR SAMI MUSALLAM - PLO - HARARE
DATE: 5 SEPTEMBER 1986

THIS IS THE FINAL COPY OF CHAIRMAN YASSER ARAFAT'S ADDRESS TO BE DISTRIBUTED. PLEASE DESTROY THE PREVIOUS COPY SENT TO YOU, THAT YOU TRANSMITTED TO ALL OFFICES WITH A NOTE THAT THIS IS THE SPEECH THE CHAIRMAN DELIVERED AT THE SUMMIT ON 4TH SEPTEMBER 1986 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:-

ADDRESS OF BROTHER YASSER ARAFAT
CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION

TO THE EIGHTH CONFERENCE OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT
HARARE SEPTEMBER 1 TO 7 1986

DELIVERED ON 4TH SEPTEMBER 1986

HIS EXCELLENCY BROTHER PRIME MINISTER ROBERT MUGABE
CHAIRMAN OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

BROTHERS HEAD OF DELEGATIONS

BROTHERS, GUESTS OF THE CONFERENCE

REVOLUTIONNARY GREETINGS,

IT GIVES ME PLEASURE TO EXTEND OUR GREETINGS AND HEARTFELT FELICITATIONS TO THE MILITANT BROTHER CHAIRMAN ROBERT MUGABE WHO CHAIRS OUR MOVEMENT AND WHO WAS ABLE TO LEAD THE HEROIC PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE UNITED ON THE ROAD OF VICTORY AND INDEPENDENCE THROUGH THE CONTINUOUS STRUGGLE AND THE GREAT SACRIFICES OFFERED BY THE FRIENDLY PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE STRUGGLING AGAINST THE SAVAGERY, BRUTALITY AND TERRORISM OF SETTLER COLONIALISM FROM WHICH ZIMBABWE AND THE MILITANT PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE HAVE SUFFERED FOR THREE CENTURIES

IT IS ALSO MY PLEASURE TO CONVEY TO YOU, DEAR FRIENDLY LEADERS THE GREETINGS AND THE HIGH ESTEEM OF OUR ARAB PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THE GRATITUDE OF OUR PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION AND THEIR WISHES FOR THE SUCCESS OF OUR CONFERENCE.

THE CONVENING OF THIS CONFERENCE IN THIS IMPORTANT PHASE AND IN FRATERNAL ZIMBABWE, IS THE PROOF OF THE VITALITY OF OUR NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT WHICH HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY GREAT LEADERS WHO HAD A HISTORIC VISION.

THIS IS WHY IN THESE HISTORIC MOMENTS WHEN WE CELEBRATE THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OUR NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT WE REMEMBER THESE GREAT LEADERS WHO HAVE OFFERED THEIR LIVES FOR THE FUTURE OF THEIR PEOPLES AND OF THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD AND WHO HAVE CONTRIBUTED WITH ALL THEIR EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OUR MOVEMENT AND FOR THE VICTORY OF OUR STRUGGLING PEOPLES STRUGGLING AGAINST IMPERIALISM AND COLONIALISM. WE REMEMBER THOSE LEADERS WHO HAVE INSPIRED THE SPIRIT OF BANDUNG FOR FREEDOM AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE PEOPLES OF ASIA, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA.

WE REMEMBER THE LEADERS JOSEPH BROZ TITO, JAWAHARLAL NEHRU, CAMAL ABDEL NASSER, KWAMI NEKRUMA, AHMAD SUKARNO, AHMAD SEKOU TOURE, MAKARIOS AND INDIRA GHANDI.

I SALUTE ALSO A NUMBER OF THE GREAT LEADERS WHOSE WISDOM AND EXPERIENCE WE MISS HERE TODAY IN THIS CONFERENCE AND WE EXPRESS TO THEM OUR ESTEEM AND APPRECIATION AND PLEDGE TO CONTINUE ON THE PATH THAT THEY HAVE STARTED.

IT IS MY PLEASURE TO EXTEND OUR PROFOUND GRATITUDE TO BROTHER CHAIRMAN RAJIV GHANDI WHO HAS CHAIRED OUR MOVEMENT AFTER THE MARTYRDOM OF OUR LATE CHAIRPERSON, THE LEADER INDIRA GHANDI AND BORE THE RESPONSIBILITY WITH WISDOM AND COURAGE IN THE MOST DIFFICULT OF CIRCUMSTANCES.

WE EXPRESS TO HIM OUR GRATITUDE, APPRECIATION AND ESTEEM.

YOUR EXCELLENCY BROTHER CHAIRMAN

DEAR BROTHERS, DEAR PRESIDENTS,

OUR NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT IS PASSING THROUGH ONE OF ITS MOST CRITICAL PHASES AND THIS HAS A DIRECT REPERCUSSION ON OUR PEOPLES AND ON THE WHOLE WORLD.

OUR MOVEMENT, HAS, FOR THE PAST YEARS FACED A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE INFLUENCED ITS EFFICACY AND AFTER THE GREAT SUCCESSSES ACHIEVED BY THIS MOVEMENT IN THE LATE FIFTIES AND SIXTIES AGAINST COLONIZATION AND THE INCREASE OF ITS RANKS BY THE ADHERENCE OF TENS OF INDEPENDANT STATES, OUR COUNTRIES HAVE STARTED TO LEAD MUCH FIERCER BATTLES THAN IN THE PAST, PARTICULARLY IN THE CONFRONTATION OF THE LEFT-OVERS OF THE CENTURIES OF OLD COLONIALISM. IN ADDITION TO THE PRESSURES AND IMPERIALIST PLANS OF COLONIALISM IN ITS NEW FORM.

A SIMPLE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE AMOUNT OF THE DEBTS WHICH BEFALL THE ECONOMIES OF A NUMBER OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AND BETWEEN THE VOLUME OF THE RICHES WHICH HAVE BEEN LOOTED AND STILL ARE BEING LOOTED BY THE COLONIALISTS IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT ECONOMIC FORMULAS, CLARIFIES THE DIMENSION OF THE TYRANY AND CRIMINALITY WHICH IMPERIALISM IS STILL PERPETRATING AGAINST OUR PEOPLES THROUGH THE ECONOMIC POLICIES IMPOSED AGAINST OUR COUNTRIES AND OUR PEOPLES BY MEANS OF WHAT HAS NOW BECOME KNOWN AS THE CRISIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT WHICH IS IN FACT THE CRISIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER WHICH IS BEING IMPOSED BY THE IMPERIALIST COUNTRIES TO SATISFY THEIR INTERESTS AT THE EXPENCE OF OUR PEOPLES AND OUR LIVES.

THE COLONIALISTS HAVE PILLAGED THE RICHES OF OUR COUNTRIES FOR CENTURIES AND WHEN THESE COLONIALISTS LEFT, THEY LEFT THESE COUNTRIES WITHOUT ANY STRUCTURES OR INSTITUTIONS TO HELP THEM IN THEIR NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BECAUSE THEY ONLY CONSIDERED THEM AS A CENTER FOR THE LOOTING OF THEIR RICHES AND RAW-MATERIALS AND THEY STILL DEAL WITH THEM IN THIS SAME MANNER.

WHEN THE WORLD BANK STARTS DISCUSSING THE PROBLEM OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT, IT SEEKS MEANS WHICH WILL ALLOW IT TO PURSUE THE EXPLOITATION AND THE PLUNDERING AND FURTHER IMPOSE STIFFLING CONSTRICTIONS AGAINST OUR COUNTRIES AND OUR PEOPLES.

IT IS NO SECRET THAT MOST OF THE LOANS OFFERED BY THE BIG STATES NOW OR BY THE INTERNATIONAL BANKS ONLY AIM AT SERVICING THE PREVIOUS DEBTS AND AT ENCOURAGING AND DEVELOPING THE INVESTMENTS OF THE MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES, IN OTHER WORDS, THE DEEPENING OF THE CRISIS OF THE WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER AND KEEPING THE POOR COUNTRIES THE WAY THEY ARE, THAT IS, FURTHER THE POVERTY OF THE POOR AND FURTHER THE FORTUNE OF THE RICH.

THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES HAVE TO CONFRONT THIS HEAVY BURDEN BY THIGHTENING THEIR RANKS, THEIR COMPLEMENTARITY AND THEIR CO-ORDINATION FOR THE SAKE OF AN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WITH GREATER SELF-RELIANCE AND PROTECT THE PRICES OF THEIR RAW MATERIAL AND PROTECT THEIR NATURAL RESOURCES FROM EXPLOITATION AND DRAINING.

THERE IS AN UNDENIABLE NEED FOR A UNITED STAND FROM THE NON-ALIGNED STATES TO CONFRONT THE IMPERIALIST STATES AND THEIR HARSH CONDITIONS AS WELL AS THE CONFRONTATION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE UNJUST AND HOSTILE ACCUMULATED DEBTS.

IT IS UNFAIR FOR OUR PEOPLES TO REMAIN PRISONNERS OF THE PRESENT WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER WITH ALL THE DANGEROUS ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS IT HAS ON OUR PEOPLES AND ON THE FUTURE OF OUR COMING GENERATIONS. WE HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY TO CONFRONT THIS SITUATION IN A FIRM REVOLUTIONNARY MANNER WHICH WILL PUT AN END TO THE PRESENT ORDER WHICH BEFALLS OUR PEOPLES AND OUR COUNTRIES BY WHICH WE WOULD PUT AN END TO THE PRESSURES AND CONFRONT THE CHALLENGES BY MEANS OF A JOINT STAND WHICH WILL PREVENT THE ISOLATION OF ANY OF OUR COUNTRIES..

DEAR BROTHERS

DEAR LEADERS,

SELF DEVELOPMENT AND TRUE AND FIRM ECONOMIC COOPERATION AMONG OUR COUNTRIES REPRESENT OUR MEANS TOWARDS PROGRESS AND TRUE INDEPENDANCE IN A SITUATION SUCH AS THE ONE WE CONFRONT. JUST AS THE STRENGTHENING OF RELATIONS AMONG THE STATES OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT WILL LEAD TO THE PROGRESS OF DEVELOPMENT AWAY FROM INTERNATIONAL CONTROL. AND IF WE DID MOBILIZE OUR POTENTIALS WE WOULD PUSH FORWARD IMMENSELY OUR COUNTRIES AND OUR PEOPLES TOWARDS PROGRESS.

YOUR EXCELLENCY BROTHER CHAIRMAN

DEAR BROTHERS

DEAR PRESIDENTS

THE CONFERENCE OF THE FRIENDLY STATES OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT CONVENES IN THE HEART OF AFRICA, THIS CONTINENT WHICH HAS SUFFERED AND STILL SUFFERS FROM THE PROBLEMS OF OLD AND NEO COLONIALISM WHICH ARE A COMBINATION OF THE TWO MOST DANGEROUS POINTS OF TENSION WHICH THREATEN INTERNATIONAL PEACE.

IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE CONTINENT THE RACIST REGIME OF PRETORIA DEFIES THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND IMPOSES THE HARSHTEST POSSIBLE FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND APARTHEID AND THE HARSHTEST MEANS OF REPRESSION AGAINST THE PEOPLES OF SOUTH AFRICA. THIS RACIST REGIME ALSO PURSUES ITS OCCUPATION OF THE TERRITORY OF NAMIBIA AND DENIES ITS PEOPLE THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHTS AS ADOPTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL BODIES AND FOR WHICH THE HEROIC PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA ARE STRUGGLING.

THE RACIST REGIME OF PRETORIA REFUSES TO IMPLEMENT ALSO THE INTERNATIONAL RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS, INCLUDING RESOLUTION 435 WHICH CALLS FOR THE INDEPENDANCE OF NAMIBIA. THIS IS WHY THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA AND THEIR MILITANT LEADERSHIP SWAPO WILL CONTINUE THEIR STRUGGLE AND THEIR SACRIFICES UNTIL THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THEIR VICTORY AND INDEPENDANCE.

~~THE GREATEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT WHICH WE CAN OFFER TO THIS MILITANT~~
PEOPLE IN THEIR SACRED BATTLE IS TO TRANSFORM OUR SUPPORT INTO DIRECT ASSISTANCE TO HELP THEM TO BEAR THE BURDENS OF STRUGGLE. IN ADDITION TO THE CONTINUATION OF THE EXHERTION OF PRESSURES BY ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT IN ORDER TO RESTORE THE BALANCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. TO PRESSURE SOUTH AFRICA AND FORCE IT TO WITHDRAW FROM NAMIBIA AND GRANT IT ITS COMPLETE AND UNCONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE.

THE PAST MONTHS HAVE WITNESSED A HEROIC INTENSIFICATION OF THE STRUGGLE OF THE PEOPLES OF SOUTH AFRICA AGAINST THE POLICY OF APARTHEID AND AGAINST THE MEASURE OF REPRESSION AND TERRORISM PERPETRATED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF PRETORIA.

IN SPITE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT TO THIS STRUGGLE, THE GOVERNMENT OF PRETORIA CONTINUES TO DEFEY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY BY CONTINUING ITS POLICY OF DISCRIMINATION, THE DETENTION OF THE MILITANTS AND THE CONFRONTATION OF THE DEMONSTRATORS BY THE WORSE FASCIST MEANS OF REPRESSION AND ITS INSISTENCE ON DENYING THE PEOPLE FROM THEIR LEADERSHIP TO WHICH THEY ADHERE.

WE DECLARE OUR SUPPORT AND SOLIDARITY WITH THE STRUGGLE OF THIS MILITANT PEOPLE AND THEIR MILITANT LEADERSHIP. I EXTEND MY SALUTE TO THE MILITANT AFRICAN LEADERS INTERNED IN THE PRISONS OF THE PRETORIA REGIME INCLUDING THE HEROIC LEADER NELSON MANDELA WHO IS STANDING IN HEROIC STEADFASTNESS IN THE PRISONS OF THE RACISTS.

I SALUTE ALSO THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA IN THEIR VICTORIOUS STRUGGLE AGAINST THE FASCISTS AND THE RACISTS.

IT IS REGRETFUL THAT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND BRITAIN TOGETHER WITH CERTAIN IMPERIALIST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES PROTECT THE FASCIST RACIST REGIME OF PRETORIA AND DRAW OBSTACLES AND REFUSE TO SIGN THE IMPOSITION OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST IT. THIS HAS LED THIS REGIME TO INCREASE ITS HOSTILITY AND ENCOURAGED IT TO COMMIT MILITARY AGGRESSIONS AGAINST THE AFRICAN FRONT-LINE STATES USING ITS ARMED FORCES ITS AIR FORCE AND ITS AGENTS AGAINST ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE, ZAMBIA, BOTSWANA AND ZIMBABWE.

I DECLARE FROM THIS ROSTRUM THE STAND OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION AT THE SIDE OF THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THEIR LEADERSHIP IN THEIR JUST STRUGGLE, AS WELL AS AT THE SIDE OF THE PEOPLE OF NAMIBIA AND THEIR LEADERSHIP UNTIL THEY FULFILL THEIR INDEPENDANCE.

WE DELCARE OUR STAND AT THE SIDE OF ALL THE AFRICAN FRONT-LINE STATES AND WE PUT OURSELVES AND OUR LIVES AS WELL AS OUR HUMBLE DE CAPABILITIES AT THEIR DISPOSAL IN EVERY FIELD AND IN EVERY PLACE WHERE WE CAN CONTRIBUTE IN OUR HUMBLE WAY IN THEIR JUST STRUGGLE AGAINST COLONIALISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, IMPERIALISM AND ZIONISM.

ON THE NORTH EASTERN SIDE OF THE AFRICAN CONTINENT AND IN THE MIDDLE EAST THERE IS ANOTHER RACIST STATE WHICH IS THE STATE OF ISRAEL WHICH EXERCISES TERRORISM AND THE SAME RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST THE OWNERS OF THE LAND AND ITS INHABITANTS, THE ARAB PALESTINIAN PEOPLE ~~DISCLOSES THEM FROM THEIR HOMETLAND~~ PALESTINE AND DENIES THEM THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHTS WHICH HAVE BEEN ADOPTED BY THE WHOLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR THEIR RETURN TO THEIR HOMETLAND, AND THE EXERCISE OF THEIR RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THEIR INDEPENDANT STATE WITH JERUSALEM AS ITS CAPITAL.

THIS RACIST ZIONIST STATE DID NOT LIMIT ITSELF TO ITS ACTIONS IN OUR HOMELAND PALESTINE BUT IT ALSO ATTACKED THE NEIGHBOURING ARAB COUNTRIES AND OCCUPIED PART OF THEIR TERRITORY, IN SOUTHERN LEBANON IN THE GOLAN.

IGNORING ALL THE INTERNATIONAL RESOLUTIONS AND REFUSING TO IMPLEMENT THEM AND RELYING ON THE ILLIMITED MILITARY ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL POLITICAL DIPLOMATIC AND INFORMATIONAL AMERICAN SUPPORT. IN ADDITION TO THIS IT CO-ORDINATES ITS STEPS WITH THE RACIST REGIME OF SOUTH AFRICA IN ALL THE FIELDS INCLUDING THE MILITARY CO-ORDINATION, THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND ALSO IN THE FIELD OF NEUCLEAR ARMAMENT AND THE INTRODUCTION OF THIS ARMAMENT INTO THE AFRICAN CONTINENT.

THE COORDINATION BETWEEN THESE TWO RACIST PARTIES HAS APPEARED CLEARLY IN THEIR JOINT EFFORTS TO INFILTRATE THE OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES, THE LOOTING OF THEIR RICHES AND THE AGGRESSION AGAINST THEIR SOVEREIGNTY AND

4638 PLOETHE COORDINATION BETWEEN THESE TWO RACIST PARTIES HAS APPEARED CLEARLY IN THEIR JOINT EFFORTS TO INFILTRATE THE OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES, THE LOOTING OF THEIR RICHES, AND THE AGGRESSION AGAINST THEIR SOVEREIGNTY AND THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS INSIDE THESE COUNTRIES, AND THE GATHERING OF INFORMATION AND SPYING ON THEIR ACTIVITIES IN THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER EUROPEAN IMPERIALIST STATES. IT HAS BECOME IMPOSSIBLE TO HIDE THESE ROLES ANYMORE, PARTICULARLY SINCE IT HAS BEEN OFFICIALLY MADE PUBLIC THROUGH WHAT IS CALLED THE AGREEMENT OF STRATEGIC UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES AND THROUGH WHICH ISRAEL HAS BEEN GIVEN THE ROLE OF BEING THE BASE OF SPYING AND THE LAUNCHING PAD TO CONTROL ALL THE STATES OF THE AREA.

THE FORMER ISRAELI MINISTER OF WAR HAS UNHASKED THIS PLAN WHEN HE DECLARED THAT THE VITAL AREAS OF ISRAEL SPREAD FROM THE WEST IN AFRICA TO THE EAST IN PAKISTAN, THUS GRANTING HIS RACIST STATE THE RIGHT OF AGGRESSION WHENEVER IT WANTS AND WHENEVER IT DECIDES. THIS IS THE SAME PROCEDURE WHICH IS BEING FOLLOWED BY THE RACIST REGIME OF SOUTH AFRICA TOWARDS THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES OF THE CONTINENT, WITH AN IMPERIALIST AMERICAN COVER, BY MEANS OF THE SO CALLED HOT PURSUIT AND SCORCHED EARTH, AND OPERATES LAND AND AIR AGGRESSIONS AGAINST THE AFRICAN FRONT-LINE STATES, THUS PROVING THAT RACISM HAS TWO UNITED FACES WHICH ARE INTERNAL REPRESSION AND EXTERNAL AGGRESSION. AT THE SAME TIME, ISRAEL, THE SECOND AMERICAN TOOL IN OUR AREA UNDERTAKES THE SAME ACTION AGAINST THE ARAB STATES SUCH AS THE BOMBARDMENT OF THE IRAQI NUCLEAR REACTOR, HIJACKING OF AIRPLANES INCLUDING RECENTLY THE HIJACKING OF THE LYBIAN PLANE, THE OCCUPATION OF PARTS OF THE TERRITORY OF THE ARAB STATES IN THE GOLAN, SOUTH LEBANON, THE ATTACK AGAINST TUNISIA, AND EVEN THE EXERCUTION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SEA PORTS IN ITALY AND NORTH AFRICA, AND THE PARTICIPATION IN THE GLOBAL PROJECT OF STAR WARS AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES WITH PULVERIZED AND SOUTHERN GOLAN.

YOUR EXCELLENCY BROTHER CHAIRMAN

HONOURABLE LEADERS,

ONE OF THE LOGICAL RESULTS OF THIS GLOBAL AMERICAN SUPPORT WAS THE CONTINUATION OF THE ARROGANT OBSTINACY AND AGGRESSION OF THE PRETORIA REGIME AND FOR THE ISRAELI AGGRESSORS TO INCREASE THEIR OBSTINACY AND TERRORISM AND CONTINUE THEIR OCCUPATION OF OUR ARAB AND PALESTINIAN LANDS. A SIMILARITY IN THE POLICY OF THE ARROGANCE OF POWER AND THE POLICIES OF AGGRESSION AND CONTROL AMONG BOTH THOSE REGIMES.

THE PAST YEARS HAVE WITNESSED SERIOUS INTENSIFICATION OF SAVAGE REPRESSIVE ACTIONS LAUNCHED BY THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES AGAINST OUR ARAB PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IN OUR OCCUPIED HOMELAND. THE SITUATION DID NOT REMAIN LIMITED TO WHAT WAS ALREADY KNOWN AND CONDEMNED SUCH AS, THE EXPROPRIATION OF LANDS, THE DETENTION AND THE DEPORTATION OF THOUSANDS OF INHABITANTS THE TOTAL DESTRUCTION OF TOWNS AND VILLAGES, THE NUMBER OF WHICH HAS REACHED MORE THAN 500 TOWNS AND VILLAGES AS WELL AS THE AGGRESSION AGAINST THE ISLAMIC AND CHRISTIAN WORSHIP SITES, THE FIRING AGAINST DEMONSTRATORS AND THE PARALYSIS OF THE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, SOCIAL BODIES AND STRUCTURES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE DEMOGRAPHY OF THE LAND AND ITS IDENTITY AND THE EXPULSION OF THE LEADERS FROM THEIR LAND.

BUT IN THE PAST FEW YEARS THE TERRORIST OPERATIONS STARTED IN A SAVAGE FORM AND WERE PERPETRATED BY GROUPS OF RACIST FANATICS LED BY HIGH RANKING OFFICIALS OF THIS RACIST ENTITY WHO KILLED IN COLD-BLOOD IN A WAY WHICH WAS NEVER KNOWN BEFORE IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY. THE ZIONIST SETTLERS OPENED FIRE ON THE CIVILIANS, DEMOLISHED THE HOUSES, THEY DESTROYED AGRICULTURE AND PRACTICED THE WORSE FORMS OF STATE AND ORGANIZED TERRORISM AGAINST OUR VILLAGES AND OUR REFUGEE CAMPS AND THIS REACHED THE STAGE OF PREVENTING THE FLOW OF WATER FROM ENTIRE AREAS WITH THE AIM OF FORCING THE EXILE OF OUR PEOPLE OUT OF THEIR HOMELAND IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THEIR CONTROL OVER OUR HOMELAND AND THE TOTAL ANNIHILATION OF THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE.

THE AGGRESSION EXTENDED TO REACH OUR PEOPLE OUTSIDE OUR OCCUPIED HOMELAND, AND YOU ALL RECALL THE AMERICAN ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON AGAINST OUR LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, WITH THE MOST MODERN AMERICAN WEAPONS INCLUDING THOSE INTERNATIONALLY PROHIBITED. THE SIEGE OF BEIRUT WHICH CLAIMED THE LIVES AND INJURY OF 72,000 VICTIMS AMONG THE LEBANESE AND THE PALESTINIANS AS WELL AS THE SABRA AND SHATILLA MASSACRES AND THE WAR OF ATTRITION IN THE SOUTH OF LEBANON AND THE ISRAELI AIR NAVAL AND LAND RAIDS AGAINST OUR REFUGEE CAMPS AND AGAINST THE LEBANESE VILLAGES AND TOWNS WHICH ARE STILL GOING ON AND THE OCCUPATION OF PARTS OF SOUTH LEBANON, AND THE STEALING OF THE WATERS OF THE LITANY RIVER, OF THE WAZANI AND OF THE HASBANI IN LEBANON.

THE CHAPTERS OF THE DRAMA CONTINUED TO UNFOLD WHEN THE ISRAELI-AMERICAN WAR PLANES, WITH THE OFFICIAL ASSISTANCE OF THE AMERICAN NAVY AND WITH PRE-AMERICAN APPROVAL FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN, BOMBARDED THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION IN TUNISIA; CLAIMING TENS OF PALESTINIAN AND TUNISIAN CIVILIAN VICTIMS BETWEEN MARTYRS AND INJURED AND DESTROYED THE WHOLE AREA OF HAMMAM AL SHATT, AS WELL AS THE ATTACK ON AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY, NAMELY TUNISIA.

THE ISRAELI PLANES AND UP TO THIS DAY CONTINUE THEIR AIR RAIDS AGAINST OUR REFUGEE CAMPS IN SOUTHERN LEBANON AND IN THE BEQUAA VALLEY, AT A TIME WHEN THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN BEIRUT ARE EXPOSED TO ~~YET ANOTHER ORDEAL OF AGGRESSION AND SIEGE BY CERTAIN AGENT-~~ FORCES AND FACE THE CONTINUATION OF THE MASSACRES AND FOR THE THIRD TIME IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS OF SABRA, SHATILLA AND BURJ AL BARAJNEH.

WHAT LEBANON AND THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON, TOGETHER WITH THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE RESIDING THERE ARE WITNESSING TODAY, IS YET ANOTHER ORDEAL. WE, HERE, SUPPORT AND ACT FOR THE UNITY OF LEBANON AND INSIST ON THE FACT THAT A SOLUTION IN LEBANON COMES FIRSTLY ON THE BASIS OF THE LEBANESE NATIONAL UNITY, OF THE UNITY OF ITS PEOPLE AND ITS TERRITORY WITHOUT ANY INTERFERENCE IN THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS, BY ANY PARTY, BECAUSE THE CONSPIRACY WHICH IS STILL BEING PURSUED IN LEBANON TODAY IS AN ATTEMPT TO PARTITION IT IN A SECTARIAN MANNER ON BOTH THE LEVELS OF THE TERRITORY AND OF THE PEOPLE AS PART OF THE BALKANIZATION PLAN OF THE MIDDLE EAST AREA AS A WHOLE AND ITS DIVISION INTO SECTARIAN MINI STATES, AND SPHERES OF INFLUENCE FOR THE BENEFIT OF INTERNATIONAL IMPERIALISM WHERE THE ~~UNITED STATES PLAY THE MAJOR DANGEROUS ROLE OF IMPOSING ITS~~ INFLUENCE AND ITS HEGEMONY OVER IT, USING THE ISRAELI WAR-MACHINE AND THEIR AGENTS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DIABOLICAL ROLE.

IT IS NOT THEREFORE BY MERE COINCIDENCE THAT THIS STRATEGIC AMERICAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT CAME INTO BEING AND WHICH STIPULATES THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN LAND TO STOCK NEUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND RECENTLY THE AMERICAN FORCES, AS WELL AS BEING THE SPY-EYE AND MORE RECENTLY THE BASE FOR ANTI-SOVIET BROADCASTING.

THE VISIT OF AMERICAN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING THE RECENT VISIT OF VICE PRESIDENT BUSH TO ISRAEL, HAS UNVEILED THE DANGER OF THE AMERICAN-ISRAELI RELATION, NOT ONLY AGAINST THE PALESTINIAN EPOPLE, BUT AGAINST ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE AREA AND ITS CONNECTION WITH THE POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL WORLD TENSION WHICH IS BEING INTENSIFIED BY THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION IN A NUMBER OF AREAS IN THE WORLD INCLUDING THE MIDDLE EAST AREA.

COMRADE CHAIRMAN

LEADERS AND PRESIDENTS,

THE CONTINUATION OF THE IRAQ IRAN WAR REPRESENTS PRESENTLY THE MOST DANGEROUS POINT OF EXPLOSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IT IS A WAR AGAINST THE IRANIAN PEOPLE, THE IRAQI PEOPLE AND AGAINST ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE AREA.

THE FIRST VICTIMS OF THIS SAVAGE WAR WHICH IS NOW ENTERING IN ITS SIXTH YEAR, ARE THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE, FOR IT CONTRIBUTES TOWARDS INCREASING THE ARROGANCE OF THE ZIONIST ENEMY AND THE PURSUANCE OF THE OCCUPATION OF THE ARAB AND PALESTINIAN LAND, INCLUDING HOLY JERUSALEM, THE PLACE OF THE RECTURNAL JOURNEY OF PROPHET MUHAMMED AND THE PLACE OF NATIVITY OF JESUS CHRIST.

A RAPID LOOK AT ONE OF THE ASPECTS OF THIS WAR ARE THE EXPENDITURES IT HAS COST UP TO NOW AND WHICH HAVE EXCEEDED 250 BILLION DOLLARS, IN ADDITION TO THE MATERIAL AND HUMAN LOSSES. THIS GIVES AN IDEA OF THE GRAVITY WHICH THE CONTINUATION OF THIS WAR REPRESENTS AND WHICH HAS DRAINED NOT ONLY IRAN AND NOT ONLY IRAQ BUT REPRESENTS A LOSS FOR ALL THE COUNTRIES OF THE THIRD WORLD, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE DEMAND OF THE U.S.A. AND OF ISRAEL IS FOR THIS WAR TO CONTINUE AS DECLARED BY AMERICAN AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS.

THEREFORE, I APPEAL FROM HERE TO THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP PLEADING WITH THEM, IN THE NAME OF ALL HOLY MATTERS WHICH BIND US, TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSED PEACE INITIATIVES, WHETHER THEY BE INITIATIVES PRESENTED BY THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, OR ISLAMIC INITIATIVES OR SPECIFIC INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES, PUT FORWARD TO YOU BY STATES OR BY THE UNITED NATIONS ESPECIALLY THAT IRAQ HAS DECLARED ITS WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THESE INITIATIVES AS YOU HAVE HEARD YESTERDAY FROM THE HEAD OF THE IRAQI DELEGATION.

COMRADE CHAIRMAN

LEADERS AND PRESIDENTS,

THE PURSUANCE OF THE POLICY OF THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION OF "THE BRINK OF WAR" SITUATION AND THE INTERFERENCE IT EXERCISES IN NICARAGUA, EL SALVADOR, PROTORICO AND ANGOLA, BY SUPPORTING AND ARMING THE CONTRAS FORCES, IN ORDER TO CREATE CENTERS OF DANGEROUS TENSIONS IN THE AREA OF CENTRAL AMERICA AND AFRICA. ITS OCCUPATION OF THE ISLAND OF GRENADA, THE RAID AGAINST FRATERNAL LYBIA, ITS VIOLATION OF ARI SPACE AND THE HIJACKING OF THE EGYPTIAN PLANE AND WHAT IS HAPPENING IN CYPRUS WITH WHOSE PEOPLE WE STAND, ARE THE OTHER FACE OF THE ABHORED AMERICAN POLICY WHICH IS PART OF THE POLICY OF INTENSIFICATION OF TENSION IN THE WORLD.

IN ADDITION TO THIS IS ITS STRATEGIC NEUCLEAR POLICY WHICH WAS DECLARED BY THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT NOT TO ABIDE BY THE AGREEMENTS OF DISARMEMENT AND HIS DECLARATION TO THE WORLD OF A WAR OF A NEW KIND WHICH HE CALLED "THE STAR WARS" BY WHICH HE LAUNCHED THE ARMS RACE AND THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE, THUS EXPOSING THE WHOLE WORLD NOT ONLY TO THE DANGERS OF DECLARED OR INTENDED WAR BUT TO THE EFFECTS AND POSSIBILITIES OF ERROR OR TRAGIC COINCIDENCE WHICH ALWAYS ACCOMPANY EVERY NEW SCIENTIFIC TECHNOLOGY. THEREFORE, I SALUTE THE INITIATIVE OF COMRADE GORBACHEV TO STOP UNILATERALLY NUCLEAR TESTS

IT IS DEMANDED FROM OUR MOVEMENT TO ACT WITH ALL ITS FORCE IN ORDER TO PREVENT THE FUTILE USE OF WHAT IS THE PROPERTY OF ALL HUMANITY SUCH AS SPACE AND OCEANS, IN ORDER TO PREVENT ANY FORCE FROM TAKING INTO ITS HANDS AND TO FREELY DISPOSE OF IT OR EXPOSE ITS SECURITY TO DANGER.

COMRADE CHAIRMAN

LEADERS AND PRESIDENTS,

OUR ARAB PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WHICH SUFFER TODAY UNDER THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF THEIR HOMELAND AND FROM THE SITUATION OF REFUGEE AND OF EXILE FROM THEIR HOMELAND ARE EXPOSED TO THE UGLIEST OF CONSPIRACIES TO WHICH ANY PEOPLE HAVE BEEN CONFRONTED AT ANY TIME IN THE CONTEMPORARY ERA.

IT IS SUFFICIENT TO RECALL THAT THE REFUGEE CAMPS OF SABRA AND SHATILLA HAVE BEEN EXPOSED TO THREE MASSACRES IN THE COURSE OF FOUR YEARS.

THIS IS ONE OF THE WORSE EXAMPLES OF TYRANNY TO WHICH OUR MASSES, WOMEN AND CHILDREN ARE BEING EXPOSED.

AND IN SPITE OF ALL, THE ATTEMPTS OF PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL ANNIHILATION TO WHICH OUR PEOPLE; REVOLUTIONNAIRES AND MILITANTS ARE EXPOSED, OUR MASSES STOOD IN STEADFASTNESS AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO, IN ALL THEIR PLACES OF RESIDENCE, DEFENDING THE EXISTENCE, THE SURVIVAL AND THE BEING OF OUR PEOPLE.

THE CONSPIRACY TO WHICH OUR PEOPLE ARE CONFRONTED IS TREMENDOUS AND AIMS AT THE LIQUIDATION OF THEIR JUST CAUSE AND THEIR NATIONAL EXISTENCE AND THIS, THROUGH THE AMERICAN-ZIONIST PLAN, SO CALLED THE PLAN OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AND FUNCTIONAL PARTITION IN THE DENSELY POPULATED AREAS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. THIS IS A DISTORTED FORM OF BANTUSTANIZATION IN SOUTH AFRICA.

AMERICA AFTER HAVING FAILED TO CREATE AN ALTERNATIVE LEADERSHIP, IS USING ALL MEANS OF EXPATRIATION AND INTIMIDATION, INCLUDING THE FRAUDULENT PLANS OF DEVELOPMENT, AND DUBIOUS PROJECTS. BUT OUR PEOPLE HAVE REFUSED THE CONSPIRACY OF PARTITION AMONG THE PEOPLE INSIDE THE OCCUPIED HOMELAND AND THE PEOPLE OUTSIDE THE OCCUPIED HOMELAND AND THEY TOOK A ONE-MAN STAND IN THE MOST NOBLE NATIONAL UNITY, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION, THEIR SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE AND THE LEADER OF THEIR STRUGGLE. ALL ATTEMPTS TO PARTITION OUR PEOPLE IN-AND OUTSIDE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES HAVE FAILED.

I WISH TO EXTEND MY THANKS TO BROTHER PRESIDENT CHADI BEN JEDID FOR HIS INITIATIVE TO STRENGTHEN OUR NATIONAL UNITY AND FOR THE POSITIVE EFFORTS PRESENTLY DEPLOYED BY ALGERIA IN THIS REGARD.

THE ATTEMPTS OF BUSH AND MURPHY FOLLOWED BY THATCHER AND EVEN BY CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, TO TEAR APART THE UNITY OF OUR PEOPLE AND IMPAIR THEIR WILL HAVE FAILED IN FRONT OF THE DETERMINATION OF OUR PEOPLE.

OUR PEOPLE REMAIN FIRM IN THEIR VARIOUS FORMS OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRUGGLE, INTENSIFYING THEIR ARMED RESISTANCE AGAINST THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION, ITS TERRORISM AND ITS AGGRESSION INSIDE THE OCCUPIED HOMELAND AND IN SOUTHERN LEBANON WHERE THEY LEAD TOGETHER WITH THE LEBANESE PEOPLE, SINCE THE SIEGE OF BEIRUT IN 1982, AND FOR THE 4TH CONSECUTIVE YEAR A GLORIOUS WAR OF ATTRITION AGAINST THE FORCES OF THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION AND THEY STAND IN STEADFASTNESS IN THEIR REFUGEE CAMPS IN BEIRUT AND IN SOUTH LEBANON AND CONTINUE TO CONFRONT THE ISRAELI AIR-RAIDS AGAINST THE LEBANESE TOWNS AND VILLAGES KILLING WOMEN AND CHILDREN AND DEMOLISHING HOMES, PLACES OF RESIDENTS AND INSTITUTIONS.

BROTHER COMRADE CHAIRMAN

LEADERS AND PRESIDENTS,

JERUSALEM HAS A SPECIAL STAND IN OUR CAUSE. IT IS THE CAPITAL OF OUR HOMELAND AND THIS, EVER SINCE THE DAWN OF HISTORY. IT IS THE CRADLE OF THE REVEALED RELIGIONS AND THE SYMBOL OF OUR NATIONAL IDENTITY.

THIS IS WHY IT IS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE FANATICAL ISRAELI AGGRESSORS.

THEY HAVE ANNOUNCED PREVIOUSLY ITS ANNEXATION AND PROCEEDED TO CHANGE ITS DEMOGRAPHIC AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND LET LOOSE THE GANGS OF FANATICS TO DESACRATE OUR ISLAMIC AND CHRISTIAN HOLY PLACES, THUS DEFYING ALL THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THIS REGARD.

THE ISLAMIC AND ARAB NATION AS WELL AS THE WHOLE OF THE CHRISTIAN WORLD WILL NOT FORGIVE THOSE WHO ENCOURAGE ISRAEL IN PURSUING THE OCCUPATION OF JERUSALEM OR ITS ANNEXATION OR CHANGE IN ITS IDENTITY. JERUSALEM WILL REMAIN THE SYMBOL OF PEACE, JUSTICE AND THE RELIGIONS AN IDENTITY, A HOLY SANCTUARY WHICH WILL FOREVER REMAIN IN OUR HEARTS.

BROTHER COMRADE CHAIRMAN

LEADERS AND PRESIDENTS,

THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION HAS OFFERED ALL WHAT IT CAN POSSIBLY OFFER IN ORDER TO REACH A JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT WHICH PROTECTS THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS OF OUR PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AS DECIDED UPON BY THE INTERNATIONAL RESOLUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY INCLUDING THEIR RIGHT TO RETURN, TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND TO ESTABLISH THEIR INDEPENDENT STATE WITH JERUSALEM AS ITS CAPITAL. WE HAVE INSISTED ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN CONFORMITY WITH RESOLUTION 18/58 C OF THE UNITED NATION GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THROUGH WHICH A LASTING, GLOBAL AND JUST PEACE CAN BE ACHIEVED IN THE AREA WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBER STATES OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS WELL AS ALL THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT, INCLUDING THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION, ON THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL LEGALITY, AND ON THE BASIS OF ALL THE RESOLUTIONS OF UNITED NATIONS AND OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RELATED TO THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE AND THE MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING RESOLUTIONS 242, 338 465 AND 471.

IT IS MY PLEASURE TO WELCOME THE INITIATIVE DECLARED IN MOSCOW AFTER THE MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT MITTERAND AND COMRADE GORBACHEV TO CONVENE THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.

WE SUPPORT EH INITIATIVE WHICH HAS BEEN MADE PUBLIC IN MOSCOW AFTER THIS MEETING, TO FORM A PREPARATORY COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF THE PERMANENT MEMBER STATES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND FROM ALL THE PARTIES TO THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT, THE CONCERNED ARAB STATES, AND THE OTHER PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT IN THE REGION TO STUDY ALL THE PREROGATIVES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, THE CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION IN THIS CONFERENCE, ITS AGENDA AND ITS PROCEEDINGS. (en

THEREFORE, WE CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT THAT THE RESULTS OF THIS INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE CAUSE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE BE BASED ON INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES FROM THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

IT HAS BECOME CLEAR TO ALL NOW WHO BEARS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CONTINUATION OF TENSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AREA AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS WHICH EXPOSE WORLD PEACE TO DANGER.

THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION BELIEVES THAT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE AND JUST SOLUTION TO THE CAUSE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE IN THE AREA WILL BE REFLECTED POSITIVELY IN THE INTEREST OF ALL THE PEOPLES AND STATES OF THE AREA AS WELL AS IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE AND SECURITY AND DETENTE IN THE WHOLE WORLD.

OUR PALESTINIAN PEOPLE WILL CONTINUE THEIR JUST STRUGGLE BY ALL THE LEGITIMATE MEANS TO REGAIN THEIR NATIONAL INALIENABLE RIGHTS AND PUT AN END TO THE ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF OUR HOMELAND AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OUR INDEPENDANT STATE WITH JERUSALEM AS ITS CAPITAL.

IN OUR LONG AND ARDUOUS STRUGGLE WE ARE SUSTAINED BY THIS INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT AND SOLIDARITY FROM OUR MOVEMENT OF THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES AND FROM ALL THE FREEDOM PEACE AND JUSTICE LOVING PEOPLES OF THE WORLD, IN AFRICA, ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA, FROM THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HEADED BY THE FRIENDLY SOVIET UNION AND FROM FRIENDLY CHINA AND FROM ALL THE OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD WHO STAND AGAINST COLONIALISM AND RACISM AND AT THE SIDE OF THE JUST CAUSES AND THE FREEDOM OF THE PEOPLES, INCLUDING VAST SECTORS OF THE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION IN THE WESTERN COUNTRIES AND EVEN IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA THEMSELVES.

IN THIS REGARD OUR PEOPLE ALSO RECALL WITH GRATITUDE AND APPRECIATION THE GENEROUS HOSPITALITY, SUPPORT AND SOLIDARITY WITH OUR JUST CAUSE WHICH I HAVE FOUND, WITNESSED AND FELT DURING MY VISITS TO FRIENDLY AND FRATERNAL AFRICA.

MILITANT BROTHER PRESIDENT

MILITANT BROTHERS, LEADERS AND PRESIDENTS,

I THANK YOU AND I EXTEND TO YOU ALL MY SALUTE FOR ALL YOUR POSITIONS OF SUPPORT AND SOLIDARITY TOWARDS OUR CAUSE, OUR PEOPLE AND OUR REVOLUTIONNARIES AND TOWARDS THE CAUSES OF THE MILITANT PEOPLES STRUGGLING AGAINST IMPERIALISM, COLONIALISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND ZIONISM, IN AFRICA, ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA.

I EXTEND MY PROFOUND GRATITUDE TO THE PEOPLE, GOVERNMENT AND THE LEADERS OF ZIMBABWE FOR THEIR GENEROUS HOSTING AND HOSPITALITY TOWARDS THIS CONFERENCE.

I THANK ALL THOSE WHO HAVE WORKED HERE FOR THE SUCCESS OF THIS CONFERENCE.

I WISH OUR CONFERENCE SUCCESS AT THE SERVICE OF THE CAUSE OF THE PEOPLES, FOR THE REALIZATION OF PEACE IN THIS YEAR, THE YEAR OF PEACE ON THE LAND OF PEACE, THE LAND OF HOLY PALESTINE.

BROTHER CHAIRMAN,

CONCERNING WHAT HAS BEEN SAID ON THE EFFORTS OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANISATION TO PUT AN END TO THE WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ WHICH HAS BEEN DECLARED BY SOME BROTHERS, HERE, I WOULD LIKE TO CLARIFY CERTAIN POINTS AND CERTAIN FACTS:

THE ISRAELI ARMY IS AN AMERICAN FORCE WHICH HAS BEEN MADE IN THE FIRST PLACE, TO CONFRONT THE ARAB ARMIES, EXACTLY, AS THE SOUTH AFRICAN ARMY HAS BEEN CREATED TO CONFRONT THE AFRICAN FRONT-LINE STATES.

AT THE SIEGE OF BEIRUT THE ISRAELIES DEPLOYED EIGHT AND A HALF DIVISIONS OUT OF A TOTAL OF ELEVEN DIVISIONS WHICH FORM THE ISRAELI ARMY.

IN ADDITION THEY DEPLOYED THEIR WHOLE AIRFORCE AND NAVY. THIS MEANS THAT ONLY THREE DIVISIONS WERE LEFT INSIDE OUR OCCUPIED HOMELAND. THIS ALSO MEANS THAT ANY OTHER SMALL FORCE WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO LIBERATE HOLY JERUSALEM.

AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SIEGE OF BEIRUT I SENT MESSAGES TO ALL HEADS OF STATES OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, THE ISLAMIC STATES, THE AFRICAN STATES, THE ARAB STATES AND THE FRIENDLY STATES. I RECEIVED MANY ANSWERS FROM THESE BROTHERS. AMONG THE MESSAGES I RECEIVED WAS ONE FROM THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP ON 13 JUNE 1982 IN WHICH THEY INFORMED ME OF THEIR DECISION TO WITHDRAW THE IRAQI FORCES FROM ALL IRANIAN TERRITORY, AND OF THEIR APPROVAL TO STOP THE WAR IF THE IRANIAN SIDE AGREED TO DO THE SAME. FURTHER-MORE THEY SAID IN THEIR ANSWER THAT THEY WILL DISPATCH A MILITARY FORCE, THEREUPON, TO THE FRONT WITH ISRAEL TO BREAK THE SIEGE AROUND BEIRUT. THEREUPON, THE AMBASSADOR OF IRAN IN BEIRUT CAME TO ME AND INFORMED ME OF THE APPROVAL OF THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP TO STOP THE FIGHTING AND THAT THEY ARE REQUESTING ME TO INTERVENE WITH THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP TO GET THE PERMISSION FOR AN IRANIAN MILITARY BRIGADE TO BE DISPATCHED THROUGH IRAQI TERRITORY TO BREAK THE SIEGE AROUND US AND THE OTHER FORCES. THEY HAVE ASKED US TO BE STEADFAST UNTIL THESE SUPPORT FORCES ARRIVE.

WE HAVE STOOD STEADFAST ALONE WITH OUR ALLIES FOR 89 DAYS.

I HAVE, WITH MY BROTHERS IN THE JOINT LEBANESE-PALESTINIAN COMMAND, IMAGINED, THAT THE HOUR OF REDEMPTION HAS NEARED AND THAT PRAYING IN JERUSALEM HAS BECOME VERY CLOSE.

THREE DAYS LATER, WE WERE SURPRISED BY A DECLARATION MADE IN TEHRAN REJECTING TO STOP THE FIGHTING AND DECLARING THAT IRAN IS FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR. WHEN I CALLED THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR TO ME ASKING FOR A CLARIFICATION OF WHAT HAD BEEN DECLARED IN TEHRAN HE SAID "THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP SEES THIS WAR AS A TRICK EMPLOYED AGAINST THEM TO STOP THE WAR IN ORDER TO SAVE THE REGIME IN IRAQ." THAT'S WHY. THE AMBASSADOR CONTINUED, THEY DECIDED THAT THE WAR WHICH IS GOING ON IN LEBANON IS NOT THEIR WAR AND SO THEY WILL CONTINUE THEIR OWN WAR AGAINST IRAQ TO BRING ABOUT THE DOWNFALL OF THE IRAQI REGIME.

AS PLO, I HAVE STARTED FROM THE FIRST MOMENT IN WHICH FIGHTING BROKE OUT TO ACT AND TO EXERT ALL EFFORTS, AND I PERSONALLY HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THESE EFFORTS TO STOP THIS WAR. MY BROTHER PRESIDENT KHAMENEI IS THE FIRST TO KNOW T

*Broken off
at this point
as an old Xerox machine
ran out of paper.*

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Appendix III

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FOURTH UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL NGO MEETING
ON THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE
7-9 September 1987
Palais des Nations, Geneva

STATEMENT BY H.E. MR. YASSER ARAFAT
CHAIRMAN OF THE EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE OF THE PALESTINE
LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

H.E. Chairman of the U.N. Committee for the Exercise
of the Inalienable National Rights of the Palestinian
People,

Mr. Chairman of the Conference ,

Dear Representatives of the NGOs ,

It is my pleasure and pride to stand before you in the
Palais des Nations in Geneva over which flutters the flag of the United
Nations, the flag of peace among nations and peoples, to convey to you
the greetings of our steadfast Palestinian people, the greetings of the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) for the success of your efforts
to convene the Fourth International NGOs Conference on the Question of
Palestine under the banner, auspices and support of the United Nations.

Despite the harsh circumstances through which our Palestinian
people passes at the present moment, I have seen that it is my duty to
come here to address you and to convey to you the message of peace and
of freedom of our people. I want to convey to you my deep belief in the
message of the United Nations and in its role in solidifying peace under-
standing and cooperation among the peoples of our planet. I want to
convey to you as well my deep belief in the vanguard and pioneering
role which the NGOs play in the circles of international public opinion
for strengthening the pillars of peace to remove injustice from the
peoples facing occupation and oppression.

Because our Palestinian people is a people loving just
peace and fighting for freedom, the twin-sister of peace, it is
looking for the United Nations in the first place and for the forces
of international public opinion and all peace- and freedom-loving
forces for the realization of just and durable peace in the Middle

East which can remove from the shoulder of this people Zionist aggression, occupation and organized official terrorism and the Israeli military and fascist racism and so that we would be able to provide our children, like the children of the world, with dignified and free life.

Mr. Chairman,

Dear Members ,

The decision of the international Coordinating Committee for NGOs on the Question of Palestine to consider the year 1987 to be "The Year of the Palestinian People " is an expression of your noble aspiration to make the year 1987 the year of the Palestinian people. During this year we will commemorate the Seventieth Anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, the Fourtieth Anniversary of the U.N. resolution on the Partition of Palestine, the Twentieth Anniversary of June Aggression, the occupation of all the Palestinian and other Arab Lands by the Israeli forces and the Fifth Anniversary of the Invasion of Lebanon and Sabra And Shatila Massacres.

These are black pages haunting international conscience urging it to maintain its constituent components, not due to the hideousness of the barbaric crimes committed by the Zionist forces, with the support of the USA-Imperialist enemy is still addicted to committing crimes and massacres, without any self- and international deterrence despite the flow of international resolutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly and Security Council - resolutions which call upon the Israeli aggressors to stop their aggressions and to put an end to their occupation of the Palestinian and other Arab lands.

A history which is full of disasters; blood , innocent victims and heavy sacrifices , is bound by these connected circles

of permanent aggression against our people, in a mending attempt to burry alive the Palestinian Homeland, its land, people, history and culture. The Palestinian people have had no other alternative but to insist on life and survival whatever the price might be. The Palestinian people had no other alternative other than to resist heroically in defence of freedom and the olive branch in the homeland of the prophets, martyrs and olive trees, in the face of the aggression, settlements, the confiscation of lands and the establishment of settlements, the importing of settlers, collective detention of our masses and militants, the bulldozing operations of homes and villages, and the continuous dismissal of our people, cadres and individuals.

In addition, there are the operations of demographic changes, and the judaization, desecration of Islamic and Christian holy places, the robbery of historical heritage, the closure of the centers of science and the institutions, and even of hospitals, the destruction of agricultural lands including the robbery of water and cause the villages and their inhabitants to thirst. In fact there was no choice in front of our small people except to declare their firm militant and human will in the face of the most modern and destructive American weaponry so that the human flesh will be victorious over and over the hellish military machines.

American made airplanes and tanks are not yet satisfied with the human flesh of our children, women, elderly people and men. The hands of the Israeli leaders and their conscience are stained with the blood of innocent Palestinians whose flesh has been turned into an experimental field for the technology of death for no reason other than being Palestinians who are resolute on defending their life and survival in the face of a haughty enemy whose existence preconditions the absence, even the extermination of others, an enemy who

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adopts the law of the jungle, aggression and sheer power against our people as the sole condition for his existence and presence. This enemy uses advanced American military technology in order to "advance" backwards, back to the dark ages, pulling us all along back to that obsolete era of colonialism, racism and fascism, while pushing an area of extreme strategic significance to the brink of a nuclear abyss. This Israeli armed gang has not learned from its own experiences or the experiences of others; it ignores the Massada, the Nazi crimes, the massacres of Sabra and Shatila and the crimes perpetrated by terrorists like Levinger, Sharon and Kahane .

Mr. Chairman,

Dear Participants ,

Three months ago passed the twentieth anniversary of the June Aggression and the occupation of the whole Palestinian land. The bullets of the Israeli occupiers were mawing the sons of the Palestinian people who, on this occasion declared, as they have always done, their rejection of occupation and settlement and declared their staunch determination on exercising their legitimate rights of self-determination and the establishment of their independent Palestinian state on the territory of their homeland under the leadership of the PLO.

During these same hours, our sons in the steadfast and besieged Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon were holding out in the face of siege and massacres continuing now for the last five years. By this steadfastness they reaffirm to the whole world ,that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the Year 1982 and all the consequent conspiracies and the massacres perpetrated by the Israeli invaders and their agents of sectarian groups have not and will never annihilate the Palestinian people as the invaders, their

During the invasion of Lebanon and the siege of Beirut in 1982, the Israeli and American leaders have imagined that blind and stupid force is capable of smashing our people and destroying their will. Thus they destroyed the refugee camps and committed crimes and massacres including the Sabra and Shatila massacres. We have lost more than 72 thousand Lebanese and Palestinian martyrs and injured. The will of our people, however, and their resolution to live and survive have confronted the Israeli aggressors, was steadfast and was able to confront them in the largest Arab-Israeli war in the 1982 and in the most successful wars of attrition ever since, from which the Israeli society is still suffering the psychological repercussions on its present and future. Many voices from Israel are being heard today which publicly concede the failure of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon of 1982 in the face of the strength of our people and their allies in Lebanon, the strength of our sons and brothers who have made an example in heroism in defending life, freedom and peace in the face of the forces of death, war and darkness.

At the same time and on this anniversary, our people inside the occupied territories are making legendary steadfastness and showing unswerving determination to resist the Israeli occupiers. Thus our people inside and outside the occupied territories, were able, through their united will and the unity of our generous masses, to crush the bets of the Israeli, American and collaborationist forces to strike at the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. All of this was crowned with the unity of the instrument of the revolution inside our Palestine National Council in its 18th session in Algiers, with the adoption of our political programme which enjoys the national consensus of our people inside and outside our occupied territories, that programme of freedom, liberation and peace. The

wager to break down the P.L.O. which had been pending since 1982 ; has been lost, the PLO stoodfast with all its structures, institutions, its potential and its capacity for action in the military, political, organizational and popular fields and on the local, national and international levels. The PLO stoodfast in the face of most intensive forms of Israeli-American aggressors and against all sieges imposed on it. This situation has bestowed the PLO with more courage and power to consolidate its resistance to occupation, and its confrontation with the occupier and his masters through new methods, with renewed energy and strengthening faith and determination.

Mr. Chairman ,

Dear Participants and Guests,

The fire which burns our people inside our Palestinian occupied land, is the same fire that burns our Palestinian people in Lebanon. Israel, which failed in 1982 to liquidate the Palestinian people and the PLO and which was forced to withdraw from large areas of Lebanon because of the heroic war of attrition waged by our Palestinian and Lebanese masses and their joint forces, is responsible primarily for the continuation of the siege laid on the Palestinian refugee camps by some sectarian and collaborationist forces which rotate within the orbit of Israeli policies which are based on hellish scheme directed not only against Palestine and the Palestinians but also against Lebanon and the Lebanese people, and to be carried out by the conspiracy of fragmenting the unity of the Lebanese people on sectarian basis, the division of Lebanon into sectarian cantons, the destruction of its economy, impoverishing it, striking at the Lebanese Palestinian unity through the continuation of the siege and the bombardment of the Palestinian refugee

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camps in order to expell the Palestinians out of Lebanon.. Where to??..
Into the sea, into the Unknown.

From this place I call upon you to raise high you voices
and to work with all available means for lifting the siege laid on our
refugee camps in Beirut and Southern Lebanon, for putting an end for the conti-
nuous and barbaric Israeli naval and air raids against the Palestinian refugee camps
and Lebanese villages and for putting an end for the naval blockade
laid against them by the Israeli Navy.

I call upon you to work immediately to make available the
basic conditions of livelihood for our besieged refugee camps, and to
enable the International Red Cross to function and help their remaining
inhabitants, to allow them to reconstruct what has been destroyed by
the shells and bombs especially the Shatila camp, besieged more than
two years ago and deprived of water, medicine, food and the primary
elements of life, the camp which has witnessed this far four massacres
repeated in the same place and in the same body. How many times had
it to happen for the same body? How many times?? How many times does
the monster have to live and for how long does the tasting of the blood
of our children continue??

Infront of you, we would like to tell those who are
committing follies against Lebanon and its people, against the
Palestinian refugees and their refugee camps, that the Palestinian
people will stand on the side of the fraternal Lebanese people, on the
side of their unity, territorial unity, national independence and
security. We will support its stability and its livelihood.

The conspiracy being carried out in Lebanon aims at Lebanon
as it aims at Palestine, as it also aims at dividing the Middle East

region and balkanizing it in order to dominate it and its riches and to bring it with its peoples under the domination of international monopolies.

I have said, Brothers and Sisters, when I left Beirut in 1982, that the Hurricane and the volcano which broke out in Beirut during the Israeli-American invasion will not stop. Few people paid attention to this statement. Now we see the hurricane engulfing the whole area. It will damage many interests in the area and will cause the explosion of many things in that spot.

Mr. Chairman,

Dear Participants and Friends,

The Arab Gulf region is witnessing dangerous developments because of the Iraqi-Iranian war and the consequent massing and heavy presence of the navies, especially the US Navy. There, the US-Israeli alliance is playing an ugly role by escalating the mode of the war, and expanding it, and by encouraging its continuation in a region, the stability of which, represents one of the main elements of international peace.

Israel is playing a role supplementary to the American schemes which are obstructing any effort being made for international peace and security, whether in Palestine or in the Arab Gulf region.

I cannot here but express my deepest concern for the increase in tension and navies in the Gulf region, as well as for the definite dangers this increase and presence represents for international peace.

In this regard, I would like to join my voice to those many voices in our world, which call for putting an immediate end to the Iraqi-Iranian war and for solving the conflict by peaceful means and for accepting the peaceful initiatives, including the latest Security council resolution which was accepted by Iraq but not by Iran.

We have to exert every possible effort to decrease the dangerous tension in this important region of the world before fire extends to other areas and the hurricane expands and thus destruction follows.

Mr. Chairman ,

Dear Friends ,

The United Nations General Assembly has already passed many resolutions by which it adopted the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. Then the U.N. General Assembly reached an agreement on the means to arrive at the realization of a durable peace in the Middle East, which guarantees the realization of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. U.N. resolution 38/58 C and 41/43 B reaffirmed the necessity of convening the international conference for peace in the Middle East within the framework of the United Nations and under its auspices, with the participation of the permanent member states in the Security Council and with the participation of all concerned parties to the conflict in the area, including the PLO on an equal footing with the other parties. The United Nations General Assembly called for the quick formation of the Preparatory Committee for this International Conference.

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The same resolutions were adopted at the Non-Aligned Movement Summit held in Harare, the Islamic Summit Conference held in Kuwait, the Summit Conference of the Organization of African Unity in Adis Ababa and the Arab Summit conferences. These resolutions were also strongly supported by the socialist states. The EEC countries in their latest Brussels Declaration called also for the convening of the International Conference on the basis of the Venice Declaration which is founded on the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people and the participation of the PLO.

All the permanent member states of the Security Council responded positively to this call except the USA. Also all the parties concerned in the conflict accepted all these initiatives except the Israeli side.

Once more, the Israeli-American alliance thus stands as an obstacle in the face of progress on the path of peace which represents one of the fundamental and important bases for international peace. They are determined to move in counter-trend to the course of human history, and imbued with the madness and arrogance of force and its doctrinaire rigidity, they are seeking to create the impossible and the absurd. They are determined to transform the Jews, victims of Nazism into a new Nazi force directed against the Palestinian people whom they wish to annihilate from existence and life. In this context I would like to express our greetings to the Israeli peace forces who have courageously stood up against the fascist decisions and against the invasion of Lebanon, and who are standing today on the side of the realization of the national rights of the Palestinian people on their land, Palestine.

All through the past years we have reiterated that peace in Palestine is an indivisible part of international peace and that non-realization of peace in Palestine exposes to dangers the peace and security of the world. We reiterate this today. War starts from Palestine and peace also begins in Palestine.

Mr. Chairman ,

Dear Participants ,

The only and fundamental obstacle that stands in the face of just , permanent and durable peace in palestine and the Middle East is the American-Israeli stumbling block. Frankly, I say that the American policy in the Middle East is the main obstacle which is supplying what is known as the Israeli intransigence with insolent overbearing against the international will. Washington stands on the side of aggression and occupation, against peace and against justice in Palestine. The consecutive American administrations continue to pay yearly huge amounts of billions of dollars and tons of the most modern and sophisticated weaponry even those internationally prohibited, to Israel which enable it to continue its aggression and occupation of the Palestinian and Arab lands and its challenge to the interests of humanity in safeguarding its civilisational achievements. The American Administration is the one which has concluded a strategic and military alliance with Israel in order to form the spearhead of American neo-colonialism in the area. It is the one which supplies Israel with total protection at the United Nations and its agencies, at the Security Council by using its veto power to block the resolutions of the international legality which call for putting an end to occupation and aggression against the Palestinian people. It is important to underline at this point, that Israel, as you all know, with the help of the United States of America and some European countries, has introduced nuclear weapons in the Middle East and has several times threatened to use them. Israel has also been helped to produce a rocket names "Jericho" with multiple nuclear war heads and capable of reaching targets in the Soviet territory as well as distant Arab territory.

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Mr. Chairman ,

Brothers and Friends ,

Making the facts of the Palestine issue known and realizing the open-minded Palestinian message which is contrary to the closed message of racist Zionism is, at the same time, a warning to the whole of humanity against the increasing dangers to international peace. Therefore, any support to the just Palestinian struggle is support for the struggle for international peace.

The NGOs are undoubtedly capable of giving and of direct action in support of the steadfastness of our people on their land in order to alleviate their sufferings in their endangered and besieged refugee camps. Many of you have made great efforts in support of our people, and our just struggle, to alleviate the plight of our children and women in many places and on many occasions. In the name of this people we extend our thanks and appreciation. Your presence here today is an important part of this support which our people need.

Mr. Chairman

Brothers and Friends,

What is happening today in our world especially the attempts at escalating international tensions in more than one spot and on many levels in particular the insistence of the U.S. Government to follow up the competition in star wars, the nuclear acceleration which represent a direct and total danger to the whole of humanity on our planet . This planet has in fact been drowned with nuclear weapons which are at the disposal of the most powerful as well as other smaller parties, and to such an extent so that any error, or adventurous action, or sudden attack of madness or

disfunction due to the predominance of machines and electronic systems could lead to total loss of control and devastation. This requires that all states and governments make a collective human effort. Therefore we are looking forward for the attempts at detente to remove medium range missiles from Europe being one of the most dangerous and hot issues in the world including the Middle East region, Latin and Central America, South East Asia and in the South African continent, the people and states of which, are facing the racist fascist Pretoria regime allied with the Zionist racist Tel Aviv regime. These two regimes are two faces of the same coin of neo-colonialism in the South of the African Continent and in the North East of the continent. They are the bridge head of neo-colonialism in our countries and the spearhead of international imperialist monopolies.

In this regard, we stand strongly on the side of the people of Namibia and the SWAPO leadership. We stand with the people of South Africa and their militant national forces. From here we send our greetings to the militant Nelson Mandela who is in prison.

We strongly stand with the African front line states which are facing the aggression of the Pretoria regime and its agents made of gangs and mercenaries professionals in killing and aggressive wars.

In the name of our people, we declare also that we stand with all freedom-loving peoples and revolutionaries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. We renew our firm stand on the side of the peoples of Central America in facing the American aggression against them. We highly appreciate the agreement which the Summit of Central

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American Heads of State meeting in Guatemala has adopted to defuse war and establish peace there.

Mr. Chairman ,

Brothers and Friends ,

The world is approaching at a complicated era and intertwined economically and technologically. There is no way for huamnity except to eliminate the sources of danger and to rid the aggressors violators from weapons of destruction. Otherwise, destruction will prevail all over the world. there is no way to thwart this from happening unless the peoples get their rights, freedom and complete independence, politically and economically.

Our Palestinian people will continue in their resolute to realize just, durable and comprehensive peace in Palestine and in the Middle East area, so that they will be able to live freely and securely in their free land and to contribute with all the other peoples of the world in making international peace. No just peace will be attained in Palestine unless the Israeli occupation forces withdraw from all the occupied Arab territories of Palestine, Lebanon and Syria and unless the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people are realized including their right to return, to exercise their right to self-determination and to establish their national independent state on their national soil, Palestine.

From here, we declare, infront of you, our acceptance of all international initiatives for realizing just and durable peace in the Middle East at the top of which is the convening of the international conference. Israel is insisting on challenging the international will and it rejects the convening of this conference.

Dear Friends

We insist on convening this International Conference under the auspices of the United Nations and on the basis of international legality as well as the international resolutions approved by the United Nations relevant to the Palestinian cause and the Middle East Crisis and the resolutions of the Security Council including resolutions 242 and 338, in order to put an end to the Israeli occupation in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and other occupied Arab territories, and that is what places the actual Palestinian reality in a state of complementarity and positive interaction with international contemporary reality.

I wish your meeting success and your organizations progress and prosperity. It is an era begotten with hopes when the efforts of the NGOs integrate with those of the first international organization namely the United Nations. More voices are thus raised for peace and freedom and more pillars are consolidated for a better future.

Thank You

Revolution Until Victory

Yasser Arafat
Chairman of the Executive Committee of
the Palestine Liberation Organization
Commander in Chief of the Forces of
the Palestinian Revolution

Israelis Disclose '88 P.L.O. Talks

By The New York Times

JERUSALEM, Feb. 11 —

The newspaper Haaretz reported today that Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres held secret talks with the P.L.O. in 1988, well before the 1993 Oslo accord, when they were in the Government of Yitzhak Shamir, the rightist Prime Minister from the Likud Party.

The unattributed account, apparently leaked by a participant in the talks, in Paris, said that Mr. Rabin and Mr. Peres negotiated when they were Defense and Foreign Ministers in Mr. Shamir's unity Government, composed of the Likud and Labor Parties.

The report said a member of Parliament from the Labor Party, Ephraim Sneh, represented Mr. Rabin and Mr. Peres.

Mr. Sneh told Haaretz that he had heard from Mr. Rabin that Mr. Shamir had approved the talks. Mr. Peres maintains that Mr. Shamir was content with reports that the talks were about missing Israeli soldiers and took no further interest. Mr. Shamir contends that the talks were held without his knowledge or approval.

A curious footnote to the matters dealt with in this volume, the report, first surfacing in February '99, that there had actually been contact between Israeli government and PLO in 1988, the climactic part of the time during which these efforts of mine were under way. Government at that time was shared between the Labor and Likud parties after an election that had divided almost equally between them, Shimon Peres taking the Prime Minister's position in 1985 through September of 1986, then Yitzhak Shamir getting it by "rotation" until the next election late in 1988. This contact with the PLO would therefore have happened when Shamir was Prime Minister, Peres Foreign Minister and Rabin Defence Minister. Ephraim Sneh, Labor member of the Knesset, could act for Peres and Rabin, and Shamir was reportedly informed of the contact, but allowed to think it was only about the release of captured Israeli soldiers, not about anything else in Israeli-Palestinian relations.

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