# Intelligence On Chain

Investigation Report - Anonymised. For Education purposes only Completed by JP

Blockchain	Avalanche
Transaction Hash	https://snowtrace.io/tx/0xead749051dca91fd8b80016a72d629bbbe60e7ac5231ad4 add39720c4333cb93
Victim Address	0x80ea59690d1e903f5ecf732e7b311856cdb8c113
Attacker Address	0xb7F1c4c7bD985B1F034Bb166f92e3d93D2DA91bd
Date of Exploit	2022-05-17 08:23 (UTC)- 298 AVAX stolen worth \$10,233 at the time

### 1. Introduction - Intelligence On Chain

Established in January 2022, Intelligence On Chain, commenced operations as a provider of impartial research on DeFi projects. Presently, we offer professional inquiries to our clients and members, complemented with educational material that seeks to enhance decision-making processes based on risk assessment. Please note that our investigation services do not provide any assurances regarding the recovery of funds. Our comprehensive service entails a written report that details the exploit's trajectory and the current location of funds at the time of issuance.

Visit <u>intelligenceonchain.com</u> for more information

### 2. Suspect Details - Anonymised

The Suspect is a developer at AnonymisedAddress.com. Here are some of his details:

Discord Name: Anonymised

Twitter: **Anonymised**Twitter ID: **Anonymised** 

Suspended Reddit: **Anonymised** Github Repository: **Anonymised** 

Github: **Anonymised** 


Unconfirmed: Snapchat: Anonymised

### Tweet provides some form of association with Michigan




**Anonymised** - This spotify was linked to **Anonymised** account. We used it to look for further information (its archived so it can't be deleted). The information retrieved here was a full name including a middle name!

**Be cautious -** Was this Spotify account the actual suspect's account of a friends?? Be open minded and don't disclose any information publicly until you are absolutely sure




Having then searched for this person, we identified another online persona or alias, closely associated with the individual. You'll see this represented as @Pum\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

### Anonymised Youtube Channel - Reveals a link to an email!



### **Anonymised** Xbox Gamer Pass


Anonymised Ask FM - Revealed a link to a name!




**Anonymised -** Instagram Account that shows the link between Full Name, Alias and provides images of the suspect.

NOTE: As a sleuth, you can never be sure that your understanding of the context is accurate. For example, The Spotify account that was linked to the suspect's Discord account, may have been a friend or family's Spotify account. Therefore your role is to gather as much information as possible and hand it over to the authorities!

**Anonymised** Steam - Links to Grand Haven, Michigan - Important because this links this person, alias to the other alias used on Discord! In other words, we're starting to connect the dots




Once we have connected the dots, we can then go looking for personal information that can be provided to law enforcement, enabling them to cross-reference these names and aliases to centralised accounts that we find during our on-chain sleuthing.



### 3. Events leading up to the theft

The image below shows activity happening within the victim's wallet. A swap from Avalanche's \$AVAX token to 10,233 \$USDC. Following that funds are sent out of the victim's wallet via a test transaction and then the remainder.

### This screenshot shows DeBank and the visualisation of swaps and sends




During this investigation, we will follow this money to determine its exit point from the blockchain, or to an account on a centralised exchange whereby, this report can be handed over to the authorities, by the victim, in order to obtain information about the account/s.

Prior to this theft happening on the 17th May, there was a chain of events that took place that may or may not explain what happened to the victim's wallet. It is during this investigation, that we will look for further evidence to build an accurate narrative either proving this theory is correct or incorrect.

### Conversations between the Victim and Suspect:

On the 6th of February, the victim was persuaded to give up their private key to their wallet, essentially giving full control of that wallet to someone else, in this case,

### Anonymised



As you can see, **Anonymised** fostered "trust" by providing his own private key, in order to persuade the victim that it is ok to share. The victim shared his private key on the 6th of February 2022 at 10:42pm local time.

This was shared one more time on 3rd of March at 14:41 local time, with Anonymised

#### 4. Following the funds

We have drawn out the exploit using MetaSleuth. The link for the map is here: <a href="https://metasleuth.io/result/avalanche/0x782f924e420aA88A9318Bed827a9e1e210619f00">https://metasleuth.io/result/avalanche/0x782f924e420aA88A9318Bed827a9e1e210619f00</a>? <a href="mailto:source=8785a374-75b0-44e8-a350-f491774fdeed">source=8785a374-75b0-44e8-a350-f491774fdeed</a> which is valid until 19-10-2023

The three transactions that occur are (oldest to newest):

- 1. Oxadd226ba15818460f0cc941744d775aac09cdea39ff053e7045329a82c9b05ee
  - a. 1 AVAX, tester transaction
- 2. <u>0x4f715137042c5662be4cddf0b324f06947e5cc195202d4f1889b7c79aeb1837c</u>
  - a. 322.66 AVAX, full amount
- 3. 0x62dca2b84a543e1bd08453284722a35a9202a90a64396417e60dd2cb5d343826

#### a. 0.009 AVAX to remove final amounts

After reviewing these transactions manually and looking at the call logs on <u>Tenderly</u>, we can confirm that no contracts were used in this theft. The 'call' was made from the wallet indicating that either the seed phrase, private key or the victim's device is compromised.

Main theft transaction Tenderly <u>link</u> Test transaction Tenderly <u>link</u>

The image below shows the 3 transactions in Metasleuth. The total amount stolen was 322.669 AVAX




All funds head to this wallet: <a href="https://ox782f924e420aa88a9318bed827a9e1e210619f00">ox782f924e420aa88a9318bed827a9e1e210619f00</a> and from there, we're able to identify a number of swaps before heading out to a centralised exchange. Following receiving the funds, the attacker wallet then swaps the AVAX coins for USDC tokens. This is shown in this <a href="mailto:transaction">transaction</a>.

From there 2,250 \$USDC is sent to Attacker wallet 2, shown in these transactions:

- 0xe2ae519c23e0acc5204da129ceeb83e4053ff392cafa0236a15b95789c7f2d62
- 0x324977a8c04dae32bb9ee0d4c4ac4c83f3cccb94aa5186b272071317bd70641b
- 0x9b155cd30fcf6233866e4dee8ddaadb04da91afeba13482944eeb2674f8656f3
- 0x718ac3ecc9fb76884e52d4fa80924988debf0ae4d966293ae9d67f2628d88d1d
- 0xf16d42c08baf9dec1869289e24c90660d1aecbb5caf4244f1b20e5218384ab4a

•



Some funds were then converted back to AVAX:


- 0x2ac425c874e47d8d061d335275d4d19a6b1c7b6b5891e706a8724fc84c650246
- 0xe98a30e81220cf6321c391619e3a95486ea06ccc38004743c20da30438588509

1000 \$USDC was sent to Attacker Wallet 3:

• 0x17e22c2da0761114e1bcc638a396c4208305dab9c4aa5793f220a8c115a92ba6 All of the above transactions are shown here




In Attack <u>Wallet 3</u>, all of the funds are eventually converted to AVAX and sent back to Attack Wallet 2 in this <u>transaction</u>. This is also shown in the diagram below



In total, 70 AVAX was deposited to Tornado Cash shown <a href="here">here</a>




Tornado Cash is a mixer, allowing people to mix their funds with others' essentially reducing the risk of exposing where the funds are withdrawn to. Typically Tornado cash analysis isn't included in our basic investigations, however, the attacker made the mistake of withdrawing the funds to <a href="https://example.com/Attacker-wallet-4">Attacker wallet-4</a>, which is directly linked to both



**One of the more important transactions** is when Attacker Wallet 1 sends funds directly to Crypto.com Deposit wallet 0x04cd6, shown in the following transactions:


- 0x963d4ab91663e9da9c135bfe3489789ab2168b4d9a98669de872caf3f099f652
- <u>0x2c4f3b96d9378e7f246ccfea6092018e3f236f341a6298bce52a4294b1f2046a</u>
- 0x5354d720c8f7fb2c84af8ae68cda8365af1564e8886bf1d2f6d7e0a9fc493c14
- <u>0xe4fe5ff6da4e6031dfa6fd79c05bd4b2fa1adff6ad5d4d717e6b9e261fe47394</u>
- 0xf09cdcf77d962e4a2277d030d1a61a833f919a22785c15b67351b93f427ee0e9

251.7 AVAX was sent directly to <u>Crypto.com Deposit wallet</u>. This is indicated as a crypto.com wallet on Arkham Intelligence (shown below)



This investigation then opens up a number of different transactions and wallets which may lead to identification of the attacker. The map below shows the transactions we discussed prior in RED.

In BLUE, you will see the transactions and wallets that I will list below. Each one of them presents an opportunity to identify an account owner. The Orange wallet (at the top) identified as <a href="Att. Feed Cryptocom">Att. Feed Cryptocom</a> is the wallet that feeds the crypto.com deposit address. This is crucial as it is the very first transaction to take place in that wallet and is likely to be the same person. All BLUE wallets are linked back to Att. Feed Cryptocom



# 5. Important Addresses and Transactions for Law Enforcement to request Subpoenas, in order to identify the attackers.

It is important to recognise that these accounts are attributed to the attacker. You must use the information obtained by Law Enforcement, from the centralised exchanges involved in order to compare them with the know team wallets of the suspected individual

### Crypto.com

<u>Cryptocom DepositWallet\_0x04\_</u> - 0x04cd6b9679d8868ed46070a6fd33499f654c1b54

**Exchange wallet:** 0x7aad7840f119f3876ee3569e488c7c4135f695fa

### Transactions to the Crypto.com exchange:

Tx1 (205.999475 AVAX):

https://snowtrace.io/tx/0xba62ac56d65ba31faf25b60849ff1498e70ab649a9b87865555ea 4b4df7d74a2

Tx2 (0.009475 AVAX):

https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x922ad8e43224a5eb3187056f4fc2d22d81112069cccc52bf053b3f4

Tx3 (27.199475 AVAX):

https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x21d9b883473081b151c2c46f89b0d13081d3134903f364630be9e26d7e4e3d6d

Tx4 (18.499475 AVAX):

https://snowtrace.io/tx/0xd7153bde74ca21827e63975cb830a91531755be2eb90e16acc3ed5 0ac89d773d

Tx5 (124.918975 AVAX):

https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x42b5c532be3398c0f3c558724dbae333a2c9la5f766e6c687b0l0e065360d286

Tx6 (9.98814 AVAX):


https://snowtrace.io/tx/0xff67cf5add0c26f9abe551093a49a17cf2bcc2a5b0f2029b6cb9bd842d871712



#### **Binance Wallet to Feeder Wallet**

Tx1 (0.16372196 AVAX):

https://snowtrace.io/tx/0xbb8c75e0fe6cc2eb889434918a76c165c95ee2e8695c6d099ce5




### **Binance Deposit Wallet -**

https://snowtrace.io/address/0x7e3b244dcdc34972317b5d9fb214e02d51593166

### Transaction from KuCoin to Binance Deposit Wallet

Tx1 (23.9237 AVAX):

https://snowtrace.io/tx/0x36a8eca38c3da010a6f0de4a00cecd19653d2b30108a1ccac23ea 0a697fa5170



**Transactions from Binance Deposit Wallet to the Binance Hot Wallets** (NOTE: These happened in 2021 but are indirectly tied to the attacker wallet by other wallets with minimal transactions on them. These funds are not stolen from this victim)

Tx1 (8.52023133 AVAX):

0xcc930ae2ca4e00abf16a5931983b5cc8b3f2eadd893dd280f5d93cfdbcb70af8 Tx2 (3.4994749 AVAX):

0x9b9af9f065f1262ba52ecde9fed8febf07a22fad60cf186e2b3af1084bb91eb7 Tx3 (2.3974749 AVAX):

0x8f5ba16da80bb5ae42e7493cc57acaf1c9408bd4ac34ef3852e30a820d966076 Tx4 (3.99827359 AVAX):

0xe8ef517f871493223d38c19d504d39586b3e7e5ebd5756ba954f5dfedc0c50f0 Tx5 (6.29829769 AVAX):

0x02aae72fb9cab5ba291a46e21158d29c44304be808bf3018bac1c498b9441778

Tx6 (62.62021984 AVAX):

0x53140951de1cbd1b3251d1cc3e17da53fc30c1acffed53a1cb690852d2c58e9a

Tx7 (23.92217286 AVAX):

0x6e786ba6ca08b3873fb6c75la4adaf0ll0939dl3ea08b6e3ad07045alaa97eel

### 6. Contact Details

If you require further support from us, please contact us using the information below:

Twitter: <a href="https://twitter.com/Intell\_on\_Chain">https://twitter.com/Intell\_on\_Chain</a>

Telegram: JP\_IntelligenceOnChain

Discord: JP\_IOC