

**BURGLARY REDUCTION: FINDINGS FROM  
SAFER CITIES SCHEMES**

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### **Police Research Group: Crime Prevention Unit Series**

The Home Office Police Research Group (PRG) was formed in 1992 to carry out and manage research in the social and management sciences relevant to the work of the police service and Home Office policy divisions. One of the major police department divisions which acts as customer for the PRG is the Home Office Crime Prevention Unit which was formed in 1983 to promote preventive action against crime. It has a particular responsibility to disseminate information on crime prevention topics.

The object of the present series of occasional papers is to present research material in a way which should help and inform practitioners, including the police, whose work can help reduce crime.

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## **Foreword**

The Home Office Safer Cities projects have sponsored an enormous range of schemes in their project areas covering a wide diversity of offences.

This report reviews a selection of the relatively more substantial attempts to reduce domestic burglary. The assessment of the schemes was constrained by the availability of data locally. In some areas, for example, the police beat boundaries did not coincide with the scheme boundaries, or 'pre-implementation' data was only partially available. Nevertheless, some useful conclusions have been drawn which testify to the enthusiasm which can be tapped within communities to tackle this most damaging and intrusive offence.

As this report shows, with planning and proper implementation, domestic burglary can be controlled, even in some of the most disadvantaged areas.

I M Burns  
*Deputy Under Secretary of State*  
*Police Department*  
*Home Office*

*February 1994*

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## 1. Introduction

Domestic burglary is one of the largest recorded crime categories in England and Wales, comprising about 11% of all notifiable offenses. The prospect of burglary causes anxiety to residents (Hough and Mayhew, 1985) and the experience of it can be traumatic to victims, causing not only material loss but sometimes long term psychological effects (Maquire 1982). Local burglary rates vary enormously. Table 1 shows that the British Crime Surveys have identified, through the use of ACORN groups, those types of areas where rates are highest (Mayhew et al 1993), though superficially similar areas may mask very different levels of vulnerability (Bottoms et al 1987).

**Table 1: Relative crime rates for residents of different ACORN neighbourhood groups**

	Burglary entry	Burglary attempts	All
<b>LOW RISK</b>			
A. Agricultural areas	30	10	20
K. Better-off retirement areas	70	65	65
B. Modern family housing, higher income areas	60	70	65
J. Affluent Suburban Housing	80	55	70
C. Older housing of intermediate status	70	70	70
<b>MEDIUM RISK</b>			
E. Better-off council estates	100	90	95
D. Older terraced housing	115	110	115
F. Less well-off council estates	130	175	150
<b>HIGH RISK</b>			
H. Mixed inner metropolitan areas	205	150	180
I. High status non-family areas	240	200	220
G. Poorest council estates	255	330	285
Low risk	65	60	65
Medium risk	115	130	120
High risk	235	235	235
Indexed national average	100	100	100

ACORN areas are grouped into low, medium and high risk groups on the basis of the level of all crimes measured in the BCS in the 1984,1988 and 1992 sweeps. Source: 1984, 1988 and 1992 BCS (weighted data)

In the light of the significance of burglary as an offence and its geographical distribution, it is not surprising that in many Safer Cities the Steering Committee and Co-ordinator have decided to devise and implement schemes in an attempt to reduce



rates where they tend to be high and where residents are liable to feel especially vulnerable. This has led to a significant focus on council estates<sup>1</sup>, many of which are in poor repair and tend to house disadvantaged members of the community who are unable to afford to upgrade the security of their homes.

This discussion takes a number of Safer Cities area based burglary reduction schemes and examines their operation and effectiveness. Those which have not been operating long enough for any impact to occur were obviously excluded. We have selected those which have been subject to evaluation studies of some kind, though not all of these were undertaken independently. In several cases we have been able to supplement the data and analysis.

The report is divided into two parts. In Part One we give an overview of all the schemes considered, drawing on the accounts of individual schemes which are to be found in Part Two of the paper. Part One considers choice of sites for work and of methods to try to reduce burglary, management and implementation issues, and the pattern of outcomes achieved. It also indicates those general conclusions which can be drawn from the schemes collectively. Part Two describes each scheme in terms of the area in which it was implemented, the burglary rate prior to the intervention, the background to the scheme, other initiatives operating locally at the same time, the nature of the crime prevention work undertaken, the outcomes which ensued, and the costs of what was done.

It is hoped that the descriptions of individual schemes contained in Part Two, alongside the overall analysis in Part One, will help the practitioner-reader to formulate promising and workable local responses to the problem of domestic burglary. The reader should be forewarned, however, that over two or three years the independent processes of change in individual local authority housing estates and the outworking of interventions interacting with them can be highly complex (Hope and Foster 1992; Foster and Hope 1993), requiring detailed quantitative and qualitative analysis beyond the scope of this discussion or the individual scheme evaluation studies feeding into it. Instead of closely textured accounts what are offered here are thumb nail sketches of quite a wide range of examples of Safer Cities work aiming (sometimes among other things) to address the problem of burglary, alongside efforts to tease out some common lessons deriving from it.

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<sup>1</sup>Of the schemes covered in this report, only Wardleworth in Rochdale (private) and Sunderland (Housing Association) were not sited in local authority housing areas.

**PART ONE: AN OVERVIEW OF SAFER  
CITIES AREA BASED BURGLARY  
REDUCTION SCHEMES**

## 2. Sites selected and prevention methods picked

Given the grounds indicated for Safer Cities Projects to devote efforts to burglary reduction in areas of disadvantage, decisions had to be taken both about which to target, and also about what measures to implement. We turn first to area choice.

### The choice of area

It was not always possible to reconstruct the rationale for choosing one area rather than another. In almost all cases, individual Safer Cities have had at their disposal beat based statistics for various crime categories including burglary. These have played a large part in determining where to establish burglary reduction schemes, though other factors have also been important.

Amongst the influences on area choices were decisions to concentrate Safer Cities efforts on a small number of localities experiencing general crime problems including burglary (for example Tower Hamlets), the impact of police perceptions about areas in which burglary was a particular worry (for example the area in which the Birmingham scheme is located), a preference for trying initiatives in relatively well-bounded geographical areas (for example Bradford, Hull, Sunderland and Rochdale - Belfield and Back O'th'Moss), the desire to locate schemes where there was a high level of police support (for example Bradford), consideration of local knowledge held by professionals working in the area (Sunderland, Birmingham, Rochdale) and the imposition of local political pressure (various).

The size of areas selected was very variable (the smallest was in Birmingham - 175 houses, the largest in Tower Hamlets - 10,004 dwellings). In some cases natural boundaries marked off precise scheme areas, whilst in others they were made to coincide with police beats for which recorded crime data were available (for example Tower Hamlets and Nottingham - St Ann's). In one scheme it was decided to make the area covered large enough to include sufficient burglaries before implementation for there to be a fighting chance that reduced numbers would make the work undertaken cost effective (Nottingham - St Ann's). Where beats were used they did not generally correspond to anything recognisable on the ground or in the perceptions of area membership by residents, though in one case fortuitously they did (Nottingham -The Meadows).

What does seem fairly common in area choice is that schemes have been introduced where local burglary problems are serious but not at their very worst<sup>1</sup>. There are two reasons for this. First, the resources at the disposal of Safer Cities Projects for all their work (£250,000 per annum) are modest compared, for example, to those which might be available to the local authority through Estate Action to pay for improvements

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<sup>1</sup>It will be seen (Figure 1) that this encompasses quite widely varying recorded rates, though all are much higher than that prevailing over the whole of England and Wales (2-3%).

which are likely to include measures to reduce vulnerability to burglary. In connection with this, some felt spending Safer Cities money might even jeopardise future Estate Action bids. It was thus decided not to devote resources where it was thought that other major efforts could be made independently of Safer Cities (for example Hull, Birmingham), even though it was in these very run down estates that multiple problems often included higher rates of burglary. Second, in relation to the size of the problems in some areas, the money which Safer Cities could devote would be so little that the prospects of effectiveness would be poor. That said, occasionally (for example Wolverhampton, Birmingham) Safer Cities efforts have played a major part in leveraging in very considerable additional resources which meant that vulnerability to burglary could be attacked in ways far beyond Safer Cities' own capacity.

The upshot of the decision making processes affecting location of schemes is that area contexts in which schemes have been established are quite variable, as indicated in the summaries contained in Part Two. What has been the commonest pattern, though, is that a self-contained, medium problem, medium sized area has been identified where there is as yet only a moderately serious burglary problem, but where there are signs of local concern over the issue (Bradford; Hull; Rochdale; Sunderland; Wolverhampton). Wilson and Kelling (1982) argued that the neglect of problems caused by poor housing maintenance and general security levels can engender a "nobody cares" attitude in the residents which in turn leads to increased vandalism, the breakdown of community and an escalation of crime. By trying to catch areas at the critical time, crime reduction schemes of the kind delivered here might inhibitor reverse the beginnings of spiraling patterns of decline.

### **Burglary prevention measures adopted**

As will become clear, what has been done within schemes differs quite widely. It has not been possible in all cases to determine how decisions have been made about what interventions to adopt. In one case all reported burglaries during the year prior to the start of the scheme were analysed for modus operandi, day of offence and goods taken; in addition details on the apprehended offenders were collected (Nottingham – St Ann's). This allowed as complete a picture as possible from police sources to be constructed. In several other areas (Bradford, Sunderland, the Rochdale schemes, Nottingham – The Meadows, Wolverhampton) resident surveys were used to supplement information gained through professional sources and to make good some of the shortcomings in reported and recorded crime data. These schemes could make a finer grained analysis of the burglary problem in their area than was possible from crime rates alone, to inform their decisions about which preventative measures to implement.

#### *Target hardening*

Target hardening has formed an element of all the schemes, though its content and method of allocation has varied. Since it rarely if ever achieves fortress like invulner-

ability, target hardening has been included either to make physical entry more difficult or more risky in order to deter or deflect the more opportunistic burglar. The nature of target hardening has in most (but not all) cases been shaped by advice from Crime Prevention Officers. The aim is to bring the physical security of dwellings up to an acceptable standard<sup>1</sup>. In most cases, as we shall see, target hardening has been complemented by various additional measures.

In what follows we begin by discussing target hardening and its allocation, together with the mechanisms through which it may be believed potentially to have an effect. We then go on to discuss other measures introduced alongside target hardening and the mechanisms through which they may in themselves or in conjunction with target hardening affect patterns of burglary. Details of what was provided in each scheme are given in Part Two. A simplified summary overview is given in Figure 1, though this does not include all measures adopted in the more complex schemes.

### *Target hardening victims*

In several schemes target hardening has been offered to all victims of burglary (Tower Hamlets, Nottingham – The Meadows, St Ann's). Target hardening victims is consistent with general findings across a number of types of crime that those already victimised are more vulnerable than those who have not been (Farrell 1992, Farrell and Pease 1993) and that this is so in particular with regard to burglary (Pease 1991, Polvi et al 1990). Here either misery is more evenly distributed by deflecting burglary to what become relatively softer targets (see Barr & Pease 1990) and/or a known opportunity is rendered sufficiently less straightforward that it ceases to attract the purely opportunistic burglar.

Previous research has also shown that victims of burglary are more likely to be reburgled a short time after the first incident (Forrester et al 1988, Polvi et al 1991). Efforts were therefore made to target harden the homes of burglary victims with the least possible delay in order to maximise the potential benefit of the work.

In Nottingham – St Ann's analysis of police records of individual burglaries and interview data from victims revealed that council tenants formed the sub-group within the very large area covered by the scheme who were most vulnerable to reburglary. The limited scheme resources for target hardening were allocated to this sub-group, even though it was subsequently expanded to include other vulnerable

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<sup>1</sup>A decade ago it was found that as many as 95% of households had security levels falling short of the standards defined by the police (Winchester & Jackson 1982). The British Crime Surveys, however, have shown that levels of security in dwellings are increasing significantly – Mayhew et al (1993) note that between 1988 and 1992 the proportion of households with burglar alarms went up from 8% to 13%, those with window locks from 35% to 52% and those with double/deadlocks to door from 57% to 61%. The BCS (Scotland) has identified a consistent pattern in which the better off in terms of income and employment and owner occupiers as against tenants have higher levels of security in their homes (Allen & Payne 1991). The (relatively poor) areas in which the schemes discussed here operated also reveal that there is still plenty of scope for improvements in security.

Figure 1 The burglary reduction schemes: Contextual characteristics and measures adopted

	Birmingham	Bradford	Hull	Norringham The Meadows	Nottingham St Ann's	Rochdale Back 'C' The Moss	Rochdale Belfield	Rochdale Wardleworth	Sunderland	Tower Hamlets	Wolverhampton
Recorded Burglary Rate Before	21%	9%	5%	4.2%	6.3%	11.4% <sup>1</sup>	12% <sup>1</sup>	13.9% <sup>1</sup>	6.8%	6.8% <sup>1</sup>	12%
No. of Households	175	835	2403	3936	9311	700	668	1100	865	10004	776
Tenure Pattern	LA	LA	LA	Mixed	Mixed	LA	LA	Private	HA	LA	LA
Target Hardening Victims				✓	✓					✓	
Target Hardening Vulnerable				✓						✓	
Target Hardening 'Hot-Spots'					✓	✓	✓	✓			
Target Hardening Area	✓	✓	✓						✓		✓
Property Marking			✓		✓	✓	✓	✓			*
Publicity (Continuous)	✓	✓		✓							
Advice/Support to Victims					✓	✓	✓	✓			✓
Neighbourhood Watch type groups	✓				✓	✓	✓	*			*

<sup>1</sup> Extrapolated to a yearly rate from 6 months figures prior to scheme implementation in Rochdale – Belfield and Back 'C' The Moss; 10 months figures in Rochdale – Wardleworth and 3 months figures in Tower Hamlets.

\* Where measures were planned but only very little implementation took place.

groups. Here rather than assuming all victims are equally susceptible, research was devoted to identifying the most vulnerable to re-victimisation, whose risks it was hoped would be reduced. In addition to finding a need for routine target hardening for those most vulnerable to re-burglary, this research also found that council house front doors furnished an especially easy entry point - the bottom panels could simply be kicked in. This led to a successful campaign for the replacement of doors damaged by burglar entry with new 'vandal proof' alternatives which were assumed to deter or deflect prospective offenders. As the doors were to be fitted city wide, burglary victims in Nottingham - The Meadows may also have benefitted from this initiative.

#### *Target hardening in hot-spots*

In Rochdale, the Safer Cities project funded a scheme allowing residents to have their dwellings target hardened for a nominal fee of £5, concentrating promotion of the scheme in high-risk areas. Project workers for Wardleworth, Back O'Th'Moss and Belfield encouraged take-up of this in their areas. 10.6% of those in Belfield, 16% of those in Wardleworth, and 30.4% of those in Back O'Th'Moss participated in the scheme. It is not clear what proportion of these had recently been burgled. In Nottingham St Ann's in addition to the victim target-hardening already mentioned a few other properties were included in a number of hot-spots. The rationale for targeting hot-spots is that future likely victims can be protected by increasing difficulty of entry in areas in which offenders are currently active. The burglars will either be deterred or driven elsewhere.

#### *Target hardening those deemed at risk*

In some schemes those deemed vulnerable, even if they had not already suffered burglary, were offered target hardening. In one area the carpenter formed his own theories over the course of the scheme about who were most at risk (Nottingham - The Meadows). There are some suggestions that in Rochdale the target hardening scheme was promoted most vigorously amongst those deemed vulnerable (including the elderly and single parents). Again, within Tower Hamlets there was a little attention to those who were vulnerable but who had not yet been victimised. The rationale for targeting vulnerable groups is much the same as that for hot-spots. Also, those deemed vulnerable are typically disadvantaged in other ways and may be less able to cope with burglary either emotionally or financially. There may be some background support for focusing on the vulnerable in the finding that there are sub-populations, notably single parents, which are disproportionately at risk (Mayhew et al 1993).

#### *Whole area target hardening*

In three areas, security upgrading has been offered to all residents (Bradford, Hull, Wolverhampton). These schemes fitted locks and bolts to existing doors and windows. In other areas replacing doors (Sunderland) or doors and windows (Birming-

ham) were for tenants only. In Sunderland, target hardening was tailored to the then prevailing method of entry to the properties on the estate. This entailed fitting solid new doors to thwart the modus operandi to which local offenders had become accustomed. The other schemes mentioned, following specialist Police advice, were more comprehensive, including in particular lock fitting to vulnerable windows. By upgrading the security of whole areas, it might be hoped that these will become less attractive to prospective burglars and/or that purely opportunistic burglars will less frequently come across easy pickings.

It was hoped in most or all of the schemes examined that upgrading the security of dwellings would not only reduce burglary rates but would also help to make the residents feel safer (Maguire 1982).

#### *Measures complementing target hardening*

Some schemes, which were thought of exclusively in terms of target hardening, applied other potentially significant complementary measures in an almost unconscious way. Thus, in Bradford and Birmingham publicity for the schemes has been quite extensive and also continuous beyond the media coverage of the launch. Laycock (1992) found in relation to property marking that publicity was an essential ingredient in persuading prospective burglars that risks to them operating in the target area were increased. In an analogous way the prominent scheme signs at the major entry points to the areas covered in Bradford and Birmingham, together with periodic media attention, may have operated as complements to the upgrading of the physical security of the dwellings. In addition, in Bradford a close eye has been kept on the crime problems on the estate by the Safer Cities Co-ordinator. When there was a spate of burglaries in April 1991 he ascertained that entry was being made through the coal chutes of elderly persons' bungalows. He then arranged with the local authority that they be promptly blocked. As he was a police officer, the Co-ordinator was also well placed to press local colleagues to catch the offenders, which they did. Both directly in regard to this series of offences and symbolically with regard to patterns of policing of the estate this might be expected to inhibit burglary there.

In Hull property marking was offered as a supplement to target hardening. It was taken up by only 36% of residents. The assumption has been that property marking aids recovery or detection through tracing stolen goods and/or making it more difficult to sell them. Property marking is deemed thereby to increase the risk and reduce the reward of burglary, making the property of those covered less attractive.

There are schemes which have used target hardening as but one part of a larger package of preventative measures. In regard to this, the Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project (Forrester et al 1988, 1990) was influential in several, though none of the schemes described in this report could be treated as simple replications<sup>1</sup>. The St Ann's

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<sup>1</sup>Issues concerning replications in general and those of Kirkholt in particular are discussed at length in Tilley (1993).



Burglary Reduction Project in Nottingham began as an effort to transpose Kirkholt's methods and measures to an inner city area, though the burglary rate in St Ann's was only a quarter that of Kirkholt and the demographic features of the estate were dissimilar. In Rochdale, schemes in Belfield, Back O'Th'Moss and Wardleworth were initiated by a multi-agency group as sisters to the local Kirkholt project, though again conditions differed to varying degrees. The emphasis in all these schemes was on promoting crime preventive behaviour and mobilising the community to respond to the problem of crime. All used visits to those who had been burgled as a way not only of offering support to the victims and advising on target hardening and property marking, but also of finding out more details of the offence than police reports could give. In St Ann's the information from burglary victims was included in a data base, whose analysis informed decisions about the allocation of target hardening, the provision of a property marking service, and the drive to form Neighbourhood Watch-type groups. In Rochdale, details from victims were used to analyse emergent patterns of offending on the estates. This allowed the schemes to react to local burglary conditions by focusing target hardening and preventative efforts. The information was also passed regularly to the police to aid detection of offenders and thereby provide further deterrence, presumably through an improved arrest rate.

The Rochdale schemes also visited neighbors of burglary victims, (and new tenants on the council estates of Belfield and Back O'Th'Moss) and carried out property marking as part of their package of burglary reduction measures. In addition to being made aware of target hardening and property marking, the residents were advised to join a Home Watch Scheme. Likewise in Nottingham – St Ann's residents were encouraged to set up Neighbourhood Concern Groups. Thus forms of Neighbourhood Watch were promoted in order that the community could begin to take some responsibility for crime prevention. In another scheme (Birmingham) Neighbourhood Watch was initiated by the police within six months of the target hardening being completed. In this way, what have been found to be relatively short term effects of a target hardening scheme (Cirel et al 1977) might be reinforced and extended by the additional attention to surveillance, which research on (more experienced) burglars has found to be a greater deterrent than strong locks and bolts (Bennett and Wright 1984).

In Wolverhampton a community development approach has been adopted. This includes many specific elements. Burglary prevention was one aim with target hardening measures, alongside the erection of some fencing and the provision of property marking kits, tailored to achieving it. However, the efforts on the estate were conceived very much as a complete package incorporating wider concerns to do with enhancing community safety generally.

Before turning to the outcome effectiveness of the measures adopted we examine the management and implementation of the initiatives, since this too impacts on success.

### **3. Management and implementation**

Even though the choice of area and the theory behind the chosen measures for burglary prevention may be sound, schemes can founder due to failure at the implementation stage (Hope and Murphy, 1983). They can be implemented at the wrong time, or only partially. Difficulties of management and implementation are more likely to occur if the scheme involves multi-agency groups, which have been found to be notoriously problematic to operate in practice (Saulsbury and Bowling 1991, Sampson and Phillips 1993).

The management of the burglary prevention schemes reflected in large part the complexity of their proposed implementation. Some schemes which used target hardening as their only measure had no need of a multi-agency group. Others, where target hardening was part of a package of measures or the burglary reduction scheme was itself part of an overall strategy for the area, involved a group of professionals which met on a regular basis to oversee the work. The management and implementation of schemes using target hardening alone will be examined first, followed by those which operated with a package of measures.

#### **Target hardening alone**

The schemes in Sunderland, Bradford and Hull did not have a management group, the implementation being controlled largely by the organisation which had requested the funding. The schemes for Nottingham – The Meadows, Birmingham and Tower Hamlets were planned by a multi-agency group but this was because the target hardening, although a discrete scheme, was part of a larger strategy for the area. Except for Tower Hamlets, where Safer Cities, the Apex Trust, Victim Support and the police played a part, the schemes themselves were administered by one agency, though progress would be fed back to the multi-agency group.

The agents who administered and managed the target hardening differed. In Birmingham the work was undertaken by the regular council workforce and in Sunderland by a combination of Housing Association workers and a contracted firm. Nottingham – The Meadows employed an individual carpenter. Bradford and Tower Hamlets made use of agencies with trainees. The Trust used by Tower Hamlets included some ex-offenders amongst its work force.

These schemes were straightforward to administer and were implemented with few difficulties. All that was needed was an efficient system of planned work which related to the objectives of the scheme. Thus for example in Sunderland the work started in the part of the estate with the highest burglary problem and in Nottingham – The Meadows, where victims were target hardened, the Police informed the carpenter of burglaries in the area on a daily basis.

## **Burglary prevention packages**

Where packages of measures, including target hardening, were planned, management was necessarily more complex. We begin by looking specifically at the implementation of the target hardening element and then go on to the way schemes were administered overall, starting with multi-agency groups and then turning to the role and supervision of project workers.

### *The implementation of target hardening as part of the package*

Where target hardening was part of a package the agents carrying out the work again varied; it was undertaken by a council administered sub-contractor in Wolverhampton, a training scheme in Rochdale and those on Community Service Orders in Nottingham – St Ann's. Everywhere except in Rochdale the target hardening was offered free of charge.

No disadvantage was found in deploying non-professionals to carry out the work, nor in using ex-offenders, though supervision by a qualified person was obviously crucial. Nottingham – St Ann's was the only scheme to use offenders as part of a deliberate strategy. Although convicted burglars were not used on the target hardening scheme it was hoped that the mainly young people who fulfilled their Community Service Orders in this way would be sensitised through contact with victims and thus be deterred from turning to the crime of domestic burglary.

### *Multi-agency groups*

All the schemes using target hardening as part of a package had multi-agency groups to oversee and direct their progress. Very often the groups had come together in the early stages of the scheme to assess the proposed area and provide formal and informal opinions of the prevailing problems. These groups then continued to meet throughout the life of the scheme. Membership of the multi-agency management groups was fairly consistent in that they all included Safer Cities and the Police, Probation and Housing. Some also included members of Tenants Associations or Neighbourhood Watch Schemes (The Rochdale schemes, Wolverhampton). The involvement of other agencies reflected the interests and local conditions of the particular scheme. Thus we find academics for a research-based scheme (Nottingham-St Ann's); Victim Support for those offering support and advice to victims (Rochdale – Belfield and Back O'Th'Moss); and members from ethnic minority groups where there was a considerable proportion in the community (Rochdale – Wardleworth). In Wolverhampton, a community development consultant stimulated the beginnings of what has become a very wide ranging initiative including 21 elements. This programme has been led by a large Estate Working Party comprising councillors and residents as well as representatives from the private, voluntary and statutory sectors.

The experience of the Safer Cities burglary reduction schemes confirms previous findings that there are problematic issues involving multi-agency groups which can undermine successful planning and implementation:

- a) Mistakes were made over the composition of the multi-agency group. Omissions could cause problems, leading to failures to forge a shared understanding of issues. For example, the absence of Victim Support in Nottingham – St Ann’s hampered the development of initiatives aimed at helping burglary victims.
- b) It was difficult to ensure continuity of membership of multi-agency groups. Individual officers found it impossible to guarantee attendance due to work commitments. They were also liable to be moved to another post out of the area. This meant that either an agency’s input was missing or another officer who was not always au fait with the project was substituted and this hindered effective contribution (Police and Housing, Nottingham – St Ann’s). In Rochdale – Belfield it was left to the local beat officer to decide whether to attend with the result that police representation was sporadic at best and even ceased for a time, damaging relations with the public. In the light of these experiences, the need for regular attendance on multi-agency committees and the allocation of time to allow this to happen, is plain.
- c) Strategically placed personnel played a crucial role in the success or failure of implementation. Just as uncommitted and self-interested individuals in key positions can hinder the progress of a scheme (as also stressed in Foster and Hope, 1993) so too can those who are dedicated inspire and direct (Forrester et al, 1988).
- d) Leadership of schemes is important. In Rochdale the Probation Service acted as a lead agency which tended to take the initiative in directing the scheme. This was appropriate as the multi-agency groups contained personnel who had gained experience through the Kirkholt project. The advantage of having a lead agency, or an individual able to take the responsibility for the lead, is that objectives can be followed through more effectively. Where there was not a lead agency the project lacked clear direction (Nottingham – St Ann’s).
- e) Safer Cities Co-ordinators and Assistant Co-ordinators played essential roles in facilitating the development, management and implementation of the more complex burglary reduction schemes. In addition to furnishing advice concerning funding and drawing relevant parties together, they sat on and often chaired the multi-agency meetings. Sometimes they played the part of honest broker in attempting to act as peacemakers and mediators (Birmingham, Nottingham – St Ann’s and The Meadows). In some cases they functioned as the lead agency in ensuring the successful implementation of the scheme (Bradford, Wolverhampton).

### *Project workers*

Project workers played a key part in some schemes. In those in Rochdale and Nottingham – St Ann's they were needed to stimulate formation of Neighbourhood Watch-type groups and to provide support for burglary victims as part of the strategy. In one large scheme (Nottingham – St Ann's) full time secondees from the Police and Probation Service were provided, a Probation Services Assistant and part time Research Assistant were appointed for the duration of the project, and these four were later joined by a full time Property Marker and a Community Safety Development Officer. Other projects covering smaller areas were not as generously staffed. One Project Worker was employed for each of the Rochdale schemes. These were relatively junior posts which did not require any professional qualifications. An Estate Development Officer was employed in relation to the range of community development work undertaken in the Wolverhampton scheme. Birmingham planned to have a project worker who would have covered a large area in addition to that of the target hardening scheme, though in the event the appointment was delayed for a year, thus hindering the implementation of an integrated strategy.

The centrality of the project workers means that the qualities that they bring can be crucial (for example the second project worker at Rochdale – Back O'Th'Moss, and the Estate Development Officer, Wolverhampton, were deemed central to the perceived successes of these schemes). Nevertheless, however able the individual there are management responsibilities attached to employing a worker. Clear and consistent guidance is needed in order that the worker is able to follow the objectives of the scheme without being side tracked by the many demands of working in a community. Lack of consensus over objectives and management can even lead to the demise of a scheme, as in Rochdale – Wardleworth.

The project worker can also need support. Isolation was a problem, especially when the scheme area was sited some distance away from the lone worker's line manager (Rochdale - Back O'Th'Moss). A team approach involving crime prevention workers on some of the Rochdale estates overcame this problem to a large extent. For example, weekly contact was made with colleagues at the crime prevention office in Kirkholt, and the Probation Officer for Back O'Th'Moss held a weekly session at the office where the Project Worker was based. A team approach also provides a structure which allows a scheme to receive back-up from workers familiar with the form of implementation in times of emergency. This is particularly valuable firstly, because it avoids breaks in implementation which might encourage potential offenders and secondly, because a perceived withdrawal can have a disastrous effect on the community (Foster & Hope, 1993).

Although having a number of workers allows greater variety in the range of preventative work which can be provided by the scheme, where there is only one worker it may be that certain tasks will be handed over to the residents sooner than otherwise would have happened. Thus, due to pressure of work, responsibility for property

marking and visits to new tenants were given to Home Watch Co-ordinators in Belfield and Back O'Th'Moss. This was beneficial in giving confidence and a sense of responsibility for burglary prevention to the Home Watch Co-ordinators instead of fostering a sense of dependence on a scheme which in any case is of necessity time and resource limited.

In some of the schemes there were problems in implementing the package of measures which were only partially overcome by the presence of a project worker. In Rochdale - Wardleworth take-up of target hardening only occurred whilst the project worker was in post, although the service was available and advertised before and after the burglary reduction scheme. It would appear that written publicity had no effect on the Bengali speaking residents, whereas a personal approach from someone speaking their own language was effective. Even then there were other implementation problems due to cultural constraints as the women were reluctant to let the male workers into their homes. The Wardleworth experience illustrates the difficulties inherent in reproducing a standard package. It shows that cultural contexts vary in ways crucial to the effectiveness of what is introduced.

Indications have emerged that issues surrounding the management of more complex burglary reduction schemes can have considerable effects on the successful delivery of the implementation measures. If there is a multi-agency steering group it needs a common vision and to be able to allow one agency to take the lead when appropriate. Project workers need competent and consistent management so that they can retain clarity of purpose. Without the foundation of these basic requirements, even in a scheme where the measures have been appropriately tailored to the context, deficiency in management can lead to implementation failure.

## 4. Outcomes

In considering the outcomes of the various burglary prevention schemes, effects other than simple reduction of burglary, important though this is, will be considered. An attempt will also be made to tease out *why* some schemes were apparently more successful at preventing burglary than others, even though the measures used appear to be similar. This will be done by relating the measures and the manner of their implementation to their context, so that we can gauge what has the best chance of working under which conditions.

### The effects of target hardening

In examining burglary rate change outcomes we have tried to obtain twelve months 'before' data and twelve months 'after' data, supplemented by 'during' data where the scheme is essentially time limited. A shorter time scale makes distinguishing 'real' changes from pseudo-random fluctuations and seasonal variations very difficult. Moreover, some schemes may take time to 'bite', where the development of crime inhibiting social institutions is attempted, whilst others may well soon fade in their effects (Berry and Carter 1992), an outcome pattern which cannot be seen from crude before and after comparisons. However, our modest data desiderata were not always met. Sometimes it was not possible to obtain data for a full year following implementation (for example Nottingham – The Meadows, Hull), and on other occasions the 'before' data were not complete for the whole of the year preceding the start of the scheme (for example, parts of Tower Hamlets, Rochdale – Belfield, Back O'Th'Moss, Wardleworth). Beat and division boundaries changed (for example in Rochdale changes in January 1990 and July 1991 meant that consistent data could not be obtained for Belfield, Back O'Th'Moss or Wardleworth). Schemes have often, for good reasons to do with their geographical and social integrity, operated in areas not corresponding to beats (for example Bradford, Hull, Wolverhampton) and here evaluation data have had to be collected specifically for the purpose at hand. This has limited what could be done retrospectively to assemble 'before' data, and also, following the completion of schemes, records have often not been maintained. This clearly seriously compromises the sensitivity of outcome measures. Moreover, even where schemes have coincided with unchanging beats it has not been possible to examine redistribution within them, an outcome found crucial to understand the PEP estates examined by Foster and Hope (1993). In addition, the data we have are almost all to do with changes in 'incidence', the number of burglaries in the scheme areas. We do not have data on changes in the 'prevalence' of burglary - the numbers of addresses which have been victimised. We also lack data on alterations in 'concentration', the degree to which burglary is suffered by a particular group<sup>1</sup>. Finally, we have not been able generally to differentiate attempted from completed burglaries.

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<sup>1</sup>The importance of attending to prevalence, incidence and concentration is stressed in the work of the Quantitative Criminology Group at Manchester University. See, for example, the comments in Farrell and Pease (1993).

Our measures are thus crude, shaped by data availability from individual scheme level evaluations, supplemented where possible with other data Safer Cities co-ordinators were able to make available for us.

In examining the effects of target hardening, we shall follow the distinctions made earlier between different forms of allocation, beginning with victim focused schemes, moving on to schemes aimed at those believed to be vulnerable and finally to whole area schemes.

*Victim focused target hardening schemes (Nottingham – The Meadows, St Ann’s; Tower Hamlets)*

Within all the schemes providing target hardening for victims other initiatives were being implemented. In the case of Nottingham – The Meadows and Tower Hamlets the areas had been identified for concentrated Safer Cities funded activities of various kinds. In Nottingham – St Ann’s as already mentioned the target hardening was part of a package of measures.

We consider here outcome patterns which relate most clearly to security improvements to victims, in relation to which the most useful data are available from Tower Hamlets and Nottingham – The Meadows. Some data, of a less robust nature, are also available for the victim target hardening in Nottingham – St Ann’s.

Within Nottingham – The Meadows whilst the total number of burglaries rose slightly (though not nearly as much as in the city as a whole), the proportion of repeats fell from 22.8% to 13.6% over a period of two years. Moreover, the time period of revictimisation (found to be very short in Kirkholt, Forrester et al 1988) increased during the scheme from an average of 80.5 days to 136.6 days, indicating that the scheme was effective in reducing victims short-term vulnerability to reburglary. Further, suggestive evidence that target hardening should be carried out speedily after victimisation comes from the Nottingham – St Ann’s scheme, where due to administrative problems the target hardening was suspended for a period. Six persons were reburgled whilst waiting for the target hardening to be carried out. In the Tower Hamlets scheme over a fourteen month period there was a reburglary rate of 1.75% for those properties covered by the scheme compared to one of 5.5% for those not included. During three months whilst the scheme was inoperative, there was a rise in the reburglary rate in the scheme area though why it went up as far as 19.4% is unclear. In Nottingham – St Ann’s the reburglary rate for target hardened victims was 10.5% compared with 17% of those not target hardened. The burglary pattern outcomes for these schemes strongly suggest that victim target hardening was successful in reducing vulnerability to repeat burglary<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>These findings are consistent with those for Kirkholt, where it was found that a suite of measures upgrading the security of burgled dwellings led to a reduction in rates of revictimisation (Forrester et al 1988, 1990). Forrester et al’s conclusions have been confirmed independently by Farrington (1992), who reanalysed the data to ensure that the apparent success could not be explained either as a statistical artefact,



The evidence of any effect on the overall burglary rates in the scheme areas is mixed. There may have been a slight impact in some of them. Where the evidence for a general effect is most persuasive, in Nottingham – The Meadows, the presence of a van, prominently painted to make its purpose clear, may have played a significant part in alerting potential burglars to the fact that official efforts were being made to respond actively to the problem, and this may have contributed to general deterrence. In contrast, in Nottingham – St Ann’s a low key operation spread over a large geographical area did not have the same deterrent effect. In Tower Hamlets the overall burglary rates show a mixed pattern. For one of the areas covered by the scheme, that for which we have most data, burglary rates overall fell slightly more than in the police division in which it is located. However, other shorter term data relating to all areas covered shows a slightly greater increase in burglary than in the police divisions within which the scheme heats are located.

The Safer Cities schemes therefore furnish further empirical grounds, complementing Forrester et al (1988), for local authorities to act fast to upgrade the security of those burgled to reduce their vulnerability to re-burglary. Even if area rates do not fall and the result merely reduces the inequality in liability to victimisation, this may be preferable to maintaining the higher risk faced by those already burgled.

#### *Hot spots focused Target Hardening*

In none of the Rochdale schemes where target hardening efforts were concentrated on hot-spots would the data available allow the separate effects on those included in the scheme to be teased out. The work also formed part of larger packages whose overall effects are considered below. In Nottingham – St Ann’s the decision to target harden those living in burglary hot-spots was taken late in the scheme’s lifetime and so there are insufficient data to show if this was effective in moving burglary away from highly victimised areas. Initial findings were not promising; of four properties target hardened in the same street, two were burgled within one month of target hardening and one of these was burgled again less than three months later.

#### *At risk focused target hardening schemes (Nottingham – The Meadows, St Ann’s)*

The efforts in Nottingham - The Meadows to target those deemed to be at special risk did not succeed in making their vulnerability measurably any less than those for which the service was not provided, the burglary rate for these being 4.7%, the same as for the area as a whole. There is some evidence from interviews with residents, especially the elderly, that their fear of burglary was reduced by having their homes target hardened.

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that is, regression to the mean, or as the by-product of a Warm and Dry programme on the estate, which was funded separately by the Department of the Environment. For the Safer Cities schemes, it was not possible to check whether there had been regression to the mean. No alternative explanations beyond programme impact for the precise outcomes reported here have been forthcoming.

### *Whole area target hardening schemes (Birmingham, Bradford, Hull, Sunderland)*

Prior research has found that target hardening whole areas has contained but not reduced the burglary problem (Allatt 1984). As indicated in the outcome pattern discussion in Part Two, this was broadly confirmed in Hull (Table 7, in Part Two).

In Bradford and Birmingham, where we identified other complementary actions – especially publicity – which might enhance the effectiveness of target hardening, different outcome patterns are found. In Bradford a sharp reduction was found in comparison with the neighbouring heat and with the remainder of the beat in which the target estate is located (Tables 4 and 5, in Part Two). The relatively high level of vulnerability before the scheme is turned in the year following the work into relatively low vulnerability, though the effect then fades in the year after that (Table 6, in Part Two). There may have been some displacement, though if so it only temporarily turned what had been a seriously over-burgled area into a somewhat underburgled one. As Barr and Pease (1990) have reminded us, the distribution of offences is not random, but is the result of already operating factors, including household measures, disposing a particular distribution. Even where an overall reduction in burglary rate is not achieved, a more equitable distribution may still be considered a successful outcome.

In Birmingham, like Bradford, the previously highly-victimised small area showed a large decrease in burglary in the six months after implementation (compared to the twelve months before implementation), suffering only three burglaries in total. There was a small decrease in the rest of the beat, a small rise in the neighbouring areas and a larger increase in the sub division. A year to eighteen months after implementation this reduction had been maintained with only a slight increase in vulnerability (see Tables 2 and 3, in Part Two). Here, highly visible and thorough target hardening which included replacement doors and windows, although not eliminating burglary entirely, was effective in substantially reducing risk in an area which had suffered heavily in the past. The rate for the rest of the estate, part of which contained housing of a similar design, was fairly stable with only a very small reduction.

In Sunderland, the estate on which the scheme is based falls into two distinct halves, corresponding closely to two beats<sup>1</sup>. In the half of the estate in which the target hardening has been being undertaken reductions in the burglary rate have been sustained for a longer period than in the non-target hardened half, though throughout the estate (as in other surrounding beats) burglary went down for the first year of the scheme. In all heats surrounding that including the scheme, the initial fall in burglary rate was followed by a sharp increase over the next twelve months. The beat comprising the area that had been target hardened was the only one to maintain a decrease, although this was slight. In the Sunderland scheme, the police have noticed

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<sup>1</sup>The two halves are separated by a four lane dual carriageway. Displacement from one half to the other is thought unlikely.

that the point of entry has changed – it is now typically through the (non target hardened) windows instead of the previously preferred (but now target hardened) doors.

A final if obvious comment on contextual needs for target hardening is worth making here. In Rochdale – Wardleworth the mode of entry for burglaries following target hardening explains why it may fall to reduce vulnerability - in all cases the key had been left in the lock. There is evidence also from both the Nottingham schemes (and anecdotally from others) that the target hardening was not always used, thus providing simple opportunities for the burglar. On the other hand, it was rare for the hardware to fail where it was properly used. There were no cases in Nottingham – St Ann's where the locks and bolts failed, and two cases where the offenders took so long attempting to force locks which had metal keeps that they were seen and reported. That said, a determined burglar could still break in using extreme force; there were examples of this in Nottingham – St Ann's and Birmingham.

It is not known whether in all cases the workmen fitting the security measures gave instruction in crime prevention and the use of the hardware but careful attention to such advice at the time of fitting the security measures would seem important to maximise their crime inhibiting potential. Special consideration may need to be given to the form of advice given to the elderly and it will be important to be sensitive to the particular needs of members of ethnic minority groups.

#### **Packages of burglary reduction measures (Nottingham – St Ann's, Wolverhampton, Rochdale – Belfield, Back O'Th'Moss, Wardleworth)**


All these packages included target hardening and mobilisation of community efforts to respond to crime. They thus took a broader approach to burglary reduction than target hardening alone and were to an extent influenced in their direction and outcome by local conditions. It has not been possible to tease out empirically the separate outcome effects of community mobilisation or other measures built into the packages. We do, however, have some evidence with which to consider what appear to be the overall effects.

Basically, in Nottingham – St Ann's the rise in burglary taking place in the remainder of the division was somewhat greater than that within the scheme area; in Wolverhampton a reduction in burglary was achieved and the Rochdale schemes also showed a reduction. The individual schemes need to be considered separately to make sense of outcome variations.

In the Wolverhampton scheme area, Neighbourhood Watch has not developed significantly, which is not surprising in the light of a history of intimidation there. Instead a virtuous circle of increasing confidence seems to have reversed the early stages of a vicious circle of neighbourhood decline. Figure 2 shows what appear to have been major elements of the vicious circle. As indicated these constituted

conditions in which burglary was likely to thrive. A variety of measures have impacted on several segments of the vicious circle, and these initiatives are evidently feeding one another, leading now to an upward spiral of overall estate improvement. Thus, for example, the emerging virtuous circle is driven in part by physical improvements: these have involved not only target hardening and defensible space creation, which is liable directly to inhibit burglary, but also major refurbishment of many properties, the demolition of a few of the very worst houses, and the erection of some new properties, making the estate more attractive to prospective tenants. It has also been helped by a changed pattern of policing. This has increased public confidence in the police both through high quality community policing and through the arrest and incarceration for periods of time of several of the known major trouble-makers on the

**Figure 2 An embryonic vicious circle of neighbourhood decline in Wolverhampton - The Lunt**



estate. Further assistance has been given by the housing department which has transferred some of the major problem families off the estate. The breather created by the removal of intimidating families has had the effect of increasing the confidence of residents to control their estate. This has been expressed, among other ways, in their participation in the interagency Lunt Estate Working Party, which has itself planned a range of initiatives. Physical changes, service-delivery changes and community changes have all been sparked. They reinforce one another and improvements are set in motion.

The process described here, including specific security upgrades to dwellings on the estate, led to a 43% reduction in the burglary rate between 1988 and 1991 (as against a rise of 9% in the rest of the subdivision).

There is no doubt that the funding and facilitation furnished by Safer Cities both kicked the virtuous circle into life and has enabled spiraling improvement to be maintained. Two early features of the scheme are worth mentioning: first, community consultants were brought in to develop a plan for the estate and were effective midwives to the birth of the scheme; and second, minor early tangible effects of the scheme, notably clearing the highly visible and offensive rubbish, persuaded residents that real benefits could be expected. Some aspects of the context for the scheme may have played a part in its apparent success. First, the estate is small enough to have an identity and for the package to become known; second, the estate had not yet reached a point of terminal decline; and third, luck featured in initiating the scheme at a time where some of the major obstacles to community development were temporarily in prison.

In one part of Nottingham – St Ann's, the type of spiralling decline outlined above, combined with poor design and low levels of maintenance, had produced so much deterioration that it was not believed possible to reverse the pattern, even with quite radical measures. Consistent with recommendations from the scheme the estate has now been demolished – the final solution to a local burglary problem!

More generally, outcome evaluation in St Ann's is made particularly difficult by the number of other initiatives coming into force at the same time as the Safer Cities scheme: one of the deck access blocks was included in DICE (Design Improvement Controlled Experiment)<sup>1</sup>; there was an Estate Action pilot scheme; the local authority adopted a 'vandal proof' door; and the City Challenge bid targeting part of the project area was successful. The St Ann's scheme played a part in developing some of these, notably the vandal proof door and the City Challenge and Estate Action bids. All could have had effects on the burglary pattern of the area though it has not been possible to tease out effects of the separate initiatives with the data at our disposal.

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<sup>1</sup>Funded by the Department of the Environment, DICEs apply Alice Coleman's design principles to problem blocks of flats (Coleman, 1985).

In contrast to Wolverhampton, in Nottingham – St Ann's there was considerable success in seeding 'Neighbourhood Concern Groups'. These were street based Neighbourhood Watches with the broader remit of acting as pressure groups on the council and encouraging mutual support. Twenty eight were set up, covering approximately 18% of the total population. In many cases burglary went down in the groups' areas in the short term, though this effect was not always sustained. It appeared that the higher the rate of burglary victimisation, the shorter the time the reduction was maintained. There were also associated resourcing and management issues surrounding the maintenance of Neighbourhood Concern Groups in the long term especially where these were set up in local authority areas (Webb, 1993). It appears from the St Ann's experience that Neighbourhood Watches in local authority areas are more likely to survive if there are other functions in addition to crime prevention, which may lead to successes reinforcing the interest of members.

Property marking in St Ann's was accompanied by stickers which were placed on the marked property. This was in addition to the more usual strategy of the use of stickers on external doors and windows. Preliminary evaluation of the first six months of the property marking scheme showed that very few houses displaying the stickers were burgled (1.4%) compared with those which did not have them (7.8%). This may, of course, not be because of the property marking per se, but rather because those participating in property marking are those generally inclined to obtain better security for their possessions. Moreover, it is possible that those households marking their property already had a low rate of burglary. It was found though, that where there was a burglary, visibly marked goods were taken in only one case. The Nottingham – St Ann's results provide some evidence that the public display of defensive measures is important for their deterrence of opportunist burglars, although as no streets approached blanket coverage there were plenty of potentially desirable targets nearby. Thus, as with the victim-centred target hardening, individual properties were made less vulnerable.

In St Ann's vulnerability to burglary appears to have been reduced where individual elements of the package were implemented, but this was lost in the overall rate due to the size of the area. There were always plenty of other houses, which had not had target hardening or property marking or were not located in a Neighbourhood Watch Scheme, for the burglar to target. The combined outcome of all the efforts was that the burglary rate, although showing a rise of 42.8% between 1990 and 1991, rose less than in the remaining urban areas in the sub division, which increased by 57.3% over the same period, though this modest success may, of course, have been accomplished through some displacement from St Ann's to the remainder of the area.

Table 8 (in Part Two) shows the trends in the incidence rates for burglary in Belfield and Back O'Th'Moss, alongside those for Rochdale as a whole. Data were available for scheme areas for only six months prior to the start of the schemes in May 1990. In terms of *absolute numbers* of burglaries, we find little effect in Belfield until 1992, though comparing *indexed figures* it is clear that the situation in Belfield is much better

than in Rochdale as a whole. Little effect was felt in Back O'Th'Moss for the first six months of the scheme, but thereafter the effects appear quite marked, both absolutely and in comparison with all Rochdale. On the evidence available it seems clear that the Back O'Th'Moss scheme has had a substantially greater impact than that in Belfield even though both schemes are seen locally to be very similar. In both cases unsurprisingly it took quite a long time for the initiatives to bite. The high impact in Back O'Th'Moss from the beginning of 1991 is probably explained by the arrival of a new project worker, and the very substantial additional staff input made from other local schemes at that time. The overall better performance in Back O'Th'Moss can be understood to follow from two distinct features. The first has to do with implementation - there was a much higher take-up of hot-spot target hardening in Back O'Th'Moss compared to Belfield. The second has to do with context - whilst Back O'Th'Moss comprises one estate Belfield encompasses three, producing additional problems in creating an effective community response to crime.

It is not possible to unpack the effects of the different elements of the schemes in Belfield and Back O'Th'Moss though it is apparent that the residents were mobilized due to the energetic efforts of the project workers. The previous mood of apathy on the estates was turned into one of involvement. As the Home Watch Scheme is so extensive on these two estates (with very near blanket coverage) it is possible that a culture which tells the burglar such behaviour is undesirable was built up. Publicity in the form of a regular newsletter delivered to all homes would have added to this. It remains to be seen whether the Home Watch groups can survive without the support of a project worker in the long term.

In the period immediately following the end of the Belfield and Back O'Th'Moss schemes, they were still being successful. Indeed, in Belfield it is only as the project comes to an end that a significant absolute downward move in burglary is found, presumably reflecting the period taken for some measures effectively to be put in place. Problems did arise after the end of the schemes - the multi-agency committees set up to carry on the crime prevention initiatives collapsed in both areas within a year due to poor agency attendance. The longer term effect of this on burglary rates is unclear.

The Rochdale - Wardleworth scheme did not enjoy the same success in achieving its objectives as the other two Rochdale schemes considered here. The scheme was terminated five months ahead of schedule. This meant that the package of measures was only partially implemented. Production of a newsletter did not go ahead due to problems with translation and printing. This deprived the scheme of positive effects from that source of publicity. Also formal Home Watch schemes did not appeal to the Bengali residents, who culturally seem to have no history of volunteer based involvement. Yet there was still a reduction in the recorded burglary rates, from 9.6% in the seven months during the scheme to 3.5% for the seven months afterwards. However, closer examination of the processes involved shows that it is wise to look beyond police burglary figures before hailing a scheme a success. When the Wardleworth

project worker came into post the number of reported burglaries showed a sudden increase, which then steadied and dropped considerably after the project ceased. This is not explained by simple changes in the crime rate. The Bengali population are evidently reluctant to report burglaries direct to the police. The project worker was used as an intermediary for reporting to them, hence the increase on the worker's arrival. Once he left, in the view of local community leaders it was thus the reporting rate, though not the actual rate, which fell to a low level. What Wardleworth seems to show is that careful attention needs to be paid to the cultural context when deciding on the form of a crime prevention package.

Finally, there was anecdotal evidence from the majority of the schemes that the bulk of the persons carrying out the burglaries came from within the scheme areas. This is not surprising, given previous findings (Davidson, 1984, Maguire, 1982, Forrester et al 1988). However, very few of the schemes described here tackled local offenders directly. Partial exceptions are found in Nottingham - St Ann's and Rochdale. In addition to using those on Community Service orders to carry out target hardening the Nottingham - St Ann's scheme interviewed a sample of burglars. This led to a discussion document and a video for use in sensitising offenders to the consequences of their behaviour. The video however was for general use - there were no specific area based initiatives. The only other area to address this problem was Rochdale, where the group work initiated in Kirkholt was made available city wide. Offenders detected in the Rochdale scheme areas were fed into these groups. We have no evaluation data with which to assess the effectiveness of the offender centred work. It was intended, however, to complement situational measures and to have a longer term effect.



## 5. Conclusions

The following are tentatively suggested on the basis of this review of Safer Cities area based burglary reduction schemes.

### **The effectiveness of crime prevention measures**

1. Whole area target hardening can reduce local burglary rates, certainly in the short term, in the context of continuous publicity which will be received by prospective offenders. Without publicity the effects are simply to contain the problem.
2. Victim-centred target hardening reduces the risk of individual revictimisation, but may not on its own affect area rates.
3. Target hardening those not hitherto victimised but deemed to be vulnerable to burglary appears not to reduce either area rates or individual risks.
4. Area-based packages of measures aimed at reducing burglary rates appear to be successful only where small areas receive fairly high dosage interventions.
5. The social context is important in affecting the success or failure of packages.
6. Comprehensive approaches to target hardening taking advantage of specialist police advice are especially beneficial, avoiding displacement to a changed mode of entry.

### **The implementation of burglary prevention initiatives**

7. Schemes simply providing target hardening, however it is allocated, are straightforward to implement and do not require a multi-agency group.
8. Packages entail multi-agency groups which are complex and in practice often problematic. They can be seriously jeopardised by the non-co-operation of key personnel. Success often turns on the personal qualities of project workers. Without clear leadership multi-agency groups are apt to drift.

### **Evaluation**

9. The evaluation data collected in relation to the schemes examined in this report were partial. Fuller examination of the conditions for successful burglary prevention work requires first, articulation of the crime reducing mechanisms which might be triggered by the measures adopted in the contexts of the schemes; second, specification of those outcome patterns which would then be produced; and third, the collection of before-scheme, during-scheme and after-scheme data to check whether these outcome patterns have been produced.

**PART TWO: AN OUTLINE OF THE  
INDIVIDUAL BURGLARY  
REDUCTION SCHEMES**

## **6. Birmingham: Primrose Estate Anti-Burglary Project**

### **A. THE AREA AND THE COMMUNITY**

The Primrose Estate is part of the Three Estates development on the southern outskirts of Birmingham. It is coterminous with one Police beat. Primrose Estate was built in the 1960s, later than the Pool Farm and before the Hawkesley Estates which adjoin it – only the change in architecture signifies the boundaries between the Three Estates. Primrose consists of two and three storey terraces of houses, some with integral garages, and 7 multi-storey blocks. There is open land at the end of the streets, and alleyways bisect the terraces. Up to three quarters of the households claim housing benefit and a third are headed by single parents. There are a large number of children and young people aged under 19 years. The population is almost entirely white. The scheme area contains 175 houses covering eight streets, and is thus only a small part of Primrose Estate which contains in total 885 dwellings.

### **B. BURGLARY RATE**

In the year before the Anti-Burglary Project (1990) the scheme area had a burglary rate of 21%. This compares with 14.6% for the rest of Primrose Estate and 13% for the rest of the whole of the Three Estates.

### **C. SCHEME BACKGROUND**

The Anti-Burglary Project was the first phase of a much larger initiative planned for The Three Estates. The original impetus came from the Police Community Services Division which brought the Three Estates to the notice of Safer Cities as they saw it as a problem area due to the high incidence of social deprivation, nuisance crimes and vandalism. Beat statistics, housing department evidence and details from the 1981 Census supported their claim. Crime was higher on neighboring Pool Farm, but this estate was earmarked for more radical treatment under an Estate Action Scheme. The Working Group, established late in 1990, consisted of Safer Cities, Police, Recreation and Community Services, Community Education, Housing, Residents Association and, for some of the time, Probation. Delays meant that the Community Safety Worker was not in post until after the end of the Anti-Burglary Project.

### **D. OTHER INITIATIVES IN OPERATION AROUND THE SAME TIME AS THE PROJECT**

The Anti-Burglary project levered money for two further initiatives. One raised the paving at the end of the targeted streets, to try and prevent stolen cars being driven down and onto the grass, the other scheme involved the installation of dispersed concierge systems in six tower blocks.

## E. BURGLARY PREVENTION WORK

The Anti-Burglary Project ran from March to September 1991. The Housing Department carried out a mini survey to determine the work needed at each property. Owner occupiers, and those who had already some security devices, whether installed by their own efforts or the council's, were excluded from the scheme. The Police Architectural Liaison Officer was involved in the design of the improvements. UPVC combination door and window units and high security Pembroke style wooden doors were fitted according to housing design, making a secure porch for the properties with integral garages. Window locks were fitted to metal sliding windows and rear doors were replaced. The improvements were carried out by the council in conjunction with their routine repair work. The project had high initial publicity with press coverage and a one day conference held on the neighbouring Hawkesley Estate. In addition a board was erected giving a permanent reminder that the work was taking place. Originally the plan was to improve 300 properties but only 175 were covered, due to the decision to incorporate a comprehensive target hardening service of a higher quality than that envisaged when the funding application was made.

It had been intended to form Neighbourhood Watch Schemes in all the streets within 6 months of the work being completed. This was achieved in four of the eight streets.

## F. OUTCOMES

There is evidence that the scheme was successful in reducing burglary. The following tables give monthly figures for the targeted houses, the rest of the beat, the rest of the Three Estates and the sub division. Firstly, in Table 2 raw figures are shown. These are converted to monthly rates in Table 3 which also gives the indexed figures with the percentage increase and decrease against the base rate of 1990. The time periods correspond to when the work was being implemented (Jan/Sept 1991); five months afterwards (Oct 91/Feb 92); and 12 months following that (Mar 92/Feb 93). In using these time spans we have been constrained by the periods used for data collection and analysis by the Police in their evaluation of the scheme.

**Table 2: Raw burglary figures for the target area of Primrose Estate Birmingham and comparison areas**

	Targeted houses	Rest of Beat	Rest of Three Estates	Rest of Sub Division
1990	37	104	360	1905
Jan/Sept 91	19	56	247	1350
Oct 91/Feb 92	3	37	162	1020
Mar 92/Feb 93	13	99	328	2641

**Table 3: Monthly indexed burglary rates for the target area of Primrose Estate Birmingham and comparison areas**

	Targeted houses	Rest of Beat	Rest of Three Estates	Rest of Sub. Division
1990	3.1 (100)	8.7 (100)	30 (100)	158.7(100)
Jan/Sept 91	2.1 (-32.3)	6.2 (-28.8)	27.4 (-8.5)	150 (-5)
Oct 91/Feb 92	0.6 (-81.6)	7.4 (-14.9)	32.4 (8)	204.2 (29)
Mar 92/Feb 93	1.1(-64.5)	8.3 (-5.2)	27.3 (-9)	220.1 (39)

The figures show quite clearly that the target hardening had the desired effect of reducing burglary in the previously heavily victimised area.

A satisfaction survey was carried out by the Council. This, although showing the improvements were appreciated, elicited complaints about the length of time it took for the work to be done.

#### G. INFORMATION SOURCES

Information was supplied by the Birmingham Safer Cities Project, the Three Estates Community Safety Worker, the Folds Neighbourhood Office, and West Midlands Police.

#### H. COSTS

Safer Cities	£36,603
City Action Team	£60,130
Housing Department	£15,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>£111,733</b>

## **7. Bradford: The Brackenbank Scheme**

### **A. THE AREA AND THE COMMUNITY**

This is an untidy, post-war, poor but spaciouly set out estate on the edge of Keighley. It comprises 835 dwellings, 70% of which are council owned. Mostly the housing is semi-detached or terraced though there are a few old persons' bungalows. Many are in need of refurbishment, though a few have had UPVC windows fitted. It has a drab looking Community Centre and a few small shops. There are no through routes crossing the estate, and it can only be entered from one road – hence it has clear boundaries. Asians make up only 5% of the population.

### **B. BURGLARY RATE**

In the year prior to the start of the scheme the rate was 9% per annum, moderate by local estate standards.

### **C. SCHEME BACKGROUND**

Bradford Safer Cities wanted to run a burglary reduction scheme. Brackenbank was selected as a self contained estate where there was local police support for the proposed work. A small survey of 49 residents was carried out by special constables of West Yorkshire Police Force in 1989. This uncovered significant fear of burglary and thus informed the decision to implement a lock fitting scheme, alongside other measures to deal with other concerns. Though the police, and the housing and lighting departments have been involved in the Brackenbank initiative, it has been led and managed by Safer Cities itself, rather than involving an interagency group.

### **D. OTHER INITIATIVES IN OPERATION AROUND THE TIME OF THE SCHEME**

Yorkshire Electricity Board and British Gas have been removing prepayment meters in the area since 1989, though the precise numbers on Brackenbank are unknown. Since the scheme began the Local Authority have fitted new windows with integral locks to 125 properties.

### **E. BURGLARY PREVENTION WORK**

Five lever front and back door locks together with downstairs window locks were offered to all on Brackenbank. They were fitted to 680 properties. The work was undertaken very economically by those on the local council's Employment Training scheme. The project has been given extensive publicity, both in the media and through the presence of a prominent sign at the entrance to the estate. When there was a sudden spate of burglaries the Safer Cities Co-ordinator mobilised the police and local authority to respond quickly and effectively to find the offenders and thwart their MO.

## F. OUTCOMES

In the year after the programme of security upgrading, the burglary rate had gone down to 2%. There was some evidence of displacement to an adjoining area, Exley Heath, immediately to the north of Brackenbank, where burglary rates have increased as Brackenbank's have decreased. This is the only part of Keighley where burglary increased in 1989.

Tables 4 to 6 show the burglary rates for two years before the implementation began, during the period of target hardening, and for the two years following its completion. Table 4 gives the raw figures. Table 5 uses these to calculate indices, taking May 1988 to April 1989 as 100. Table 6 shows the burglary rates per 1000 households. In each table the figures given are a) for the beat in which Brackenbank falls (Beat 21), b) for the estate itself only (Brackenbank), c) for the rest of the beat, to which Brackenbank connects and by the major roads into Keighley centre (rest of Beat 21) and d) for the adjoining beat further towards the town centre (Beat 22).

**Table 4: Raw burglary figures for Brackenbank Estate Bradford and comparison areas**

	Years before scheme		During scheme	Years after scheme		
	5/87-4/88	5/88-4/89		1990	1991	1992
Beat 21	100	86	39 (=59pa)	58	69	82
Brackenbank		61	16 (=24pa)	16	32	
Rest of Beat 21		25	23 (=35pa)	42	37	
Beat 22	61	51	42 (=77pa)	79	110	162

**Table 5: Indexed rates for Brackenbank Estate Bradford and comparison areas**

	Years before scheme		During scheme	Years after scheme		
	5/87-4/88	5/88-4/89		1990	1991	1992
Beat 21	116	100	68	67	78	98
Brackenbank		100	39	26	52	
Rest of Beat 21		100	140	168	148	
Beat 22	120	100	150	155	216	317

**Table 6: Burglary rates per 1000 households for Brackenbank Estate Bradford and comparison areas**

	Years before scheme		During scheme	Years after scheme		
	5/87-4/88	5/88-4/89		5-12/89 (pa est)	1990	1991
Beat 21	44	38	26	26	31	36
Brackenbank		73	29	19	38	
Rest of Beat 21		18	25	29	26	
Beat 22	21	18	27	28	38	57

In different ways each of these tables tells the same story. Burglary went down on Brackenbank whilst the scheme was being implemented. It also went down the following year, though it began to rise the year after that. Moreover the rise took place at a higher rate than in the remainder of the scheme beat or its neighbour, though Table 5 shows that relative to the twelve months prior to scheme implementation compared to surrounding areas Brackenbank continued to perform very well. For a brief period, during the scheme implementation, all areas had very similar risk rates. In the following year, having previously experienced much the highest risk rate, Brackenbank's became the lowest only then once more to begin to increase.

Various other work on the Brackenbank estate appears to have developed in the wake of the scheme. This includes traffic control, increased lighting on 'bus routes, an entryphone system to flats, renewed community policing, new play areas, and the basing of detached youth workers on the estate.

## G. INFORMATION SOURCES

Leda Group Brackenbank Study: Final Report, June 1993.

Additional information supplied by Bradford Safer Cities Project.

## H. COSTS

Lighting improvement £24,000

Lock fitting £21,614

BMX/skateboard track £10,280

Total £55,894



## **8. Hull: The Greatfield Estate Home Security Improvement Project**

### **A. THE AREA AND THE COMMUNITY**

Though described as lying at “the poor end of the social spectrum”, Greatfield is a stable, well maintained, open, pleasant and clean council estate, which sustains its own parade of shops at the centre. There are few visible incivilities. The estate is well bounded to three sides. Where it adjoins other housing it meets some of poor quality reputed to house regular offenders. There are 2403 properties on the estate. Many are terraced, with a lower number of semi-detached houses and flats.

### **B. BURGLARY RATE**

Greatfield’s annual recorded burglary rate prior to the scheme stood at 5%, which was “above average” for Hull as a whole.

### **C. SCHEME BACKGROUND**

In the early days of Hull Safer Cities when some pressure to initiate action was felt, a non profit making training agency, Concept Ltd., approached Safer Cities with a view to undertaking some security upgrading. It was decided to focus on a particular area. Following the experience of Bradford-Brackenbank a relatively self-contained estate was sought. Greatfield fitted the criterion and was selected, not because it experienced the highest recorded crime rate, but because it was not thought a likely candidate for Estate Action which might itself be expected to provide improved security.

### **D. OTHER INITIATIVES IN OPERATION AROUND THE SAME TIME AS THE SCHEME**

None except the establishment, with Safer Cities support, of Oasis, a community club for young people which is located in the estate’s shopping parade.

### **E. BURGLARY PREVENTION WORK**

Target hardening (locks and bolts to ground floor doors and windows) was offered to all residents. There was 84% coverage. Of the 374 non-participants 147 refused, 116 already had UPVC windows and frames and 111 could not be contacted. Property marking was offered at the same time as target hardening but again the take up was low (36%). There were only 97 gas and electricity coin meters at the start of the scheme and though the Boards offered to change them there was little interest. No systematic efforts to give continuing publicity to the work were made. The security work successively concentrated on five zones in the estate, beginning in April 1990 and ending in August 1991. It was undertaken and managed by Concept reporting direct to Safer Cities. There was no significant involvement from other agencies.

## F. OUTCOMES

Data were only available until the end of the scheme for the evaluation undertaken by Norman Davidson, which examined recorded burglaries on the estate. This evaluation was rendered difficult because of a police drive against burglars in East Hull subdivision, which includes Greatfield, in late 1990/early 1991 (Operation Magpie). Through TICs, or admissions whilst in prison an abnormally large number of burglaries were recorded, leading in the final quarter of 1990 to a rate more than double that in any other quarter in the two and a half years for which data were available. This though did not undermine the general finding, which was that though the scheme area had not experienced an actual reduction of crime, it had performed better than either England and Wales or Hull as a whole. Table 7 compares the before and after figures for each one, adjusting the raw figures to remove the affect of national changes in burglary rates (using Apr-Jun 1989 as base figures). The before/after periods vary, as do the populations, so the data have been manipulated to give per thousand household annual rates. None of the changes is statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval. The Greatfield performance would have appeared better but for the anomalous figures noted during Operation Magpie.

**Table 7: Burglary rates per 1000 houses on Greatfield estate, by zone before and after security upgrading.**

	Zone 1	Zone 2	Zone 3	Zone 4	Zone 5
Unadjusted:					
Before	44	48	45	85	69
After	63	51	51	69	N/A
Adjusted:					
Before	37	39	38	61	52
After	40	33	34	47	N/A

There is some evidence of displacement of burglary method towards more forced entries, causing higher damage costs. This is also associated with higher average values of goods stolen.

## G. INFORMATION SOURCES

Norman Davidson *Evaluation Report on the Greatfield Estate Home Security Improvement Project*, November 1992.

Further information supplied by Hull Safer Cities Project.

## H. COSTS

Security upgrading	£142,836
Property marking	£12,075
<b>Total</b>	<b>£154,911</b>

## **9. Nottingham: The Meadows Household Security Project**

### **A. THE AREA AND THE COMMUNITY**

The Meadows is an inner city area of 3,936 households. It covers two police beats. The housing is varied, just under half (1,865) comprising a 1970s low rise council estate, the remainder being older terraced housing. The area has well defined borders provided by major roads and the River Trent. The population is culturally heterogeneous with 20% non-white persons. There are a large number of young people (16.9% aged 16-24) and single persons (60%).

### **B. BURGLARY RATE**

The burglary rate in 1989 was 4.2% per annum. One beat (Meadows West, which is nearest to the City Centre), consistently had a higher burglary rate than Meadows East.

### **C. SCHEME BACKGROUND**

The household security project in the Meadows formed one element of a wider ringing approach to community safety supported by Safer Cities in the area, which was overseen by the multi-agency Meadows Task Group. Other elements included a School project, an Alcohol Awareness project, a Girls and Young Women's project and a Women's project. The Meadows work was informed by a 1990 survey in which among other things it was found that 72% of residents said they were either very or fairly worried about being broken into. It was this that drove the decision to develop a burglary reduction scheme.

### **D. OTHER INITIATIVES IN OPERATION AROUND THE SAME TIME AS THE PROJECT**

Nine, apart from those initiated by the Meadows Task Group and described above.

### **E. BURGLARY PREVENTION WORK**

The Household Security Project ran from April 1991 to April 1993. A carpenter was employed to undertake target hardening to victims of burglary. He was supervised by the police and based at the local police station. The carpenter would check reports of burglaries daily and visit within 48 hours to offer free security upgrading (5 lever locks, mortice or hinge bolts, doorchain, viewer, locks to ground floor and upstairs vulnerable windows) tailored to the individual needs of the property. Of the 55% of victims where work was done, most had had it undertaken within a fortnight (80%), and many on the same day (34%). 187 previously burgled premises received security improvements, a take up rate of 55%. In addition properties informally identified as being at high risk were also target hardened. They tended to fit into the following

categories: to be in an area where burglary was very common at the time; to be adjacent to those already burgled; to comprise households with elderly or disabled residents; or to be households headed by a single parent, 451 properties where the residents were subjectively identified as at risk under these criteria were target hardened. The improved security package was thus aimed at victims of, and those deemed vulnerable to, burglary over the whole area. There was no prioritization of the beat which had the highest burglary rate. The scheme was a visible high profile presence in The Meadows due to the words 'Nottinghamshire Constabulary Inner City Housing Security' on the carpenter's van. Even though the Household Security Project was part of an interagency response to crime in the Meadows, as an individual element it was run and delivered largely by the employed carpenter with some support from the Police.

## F. OUTCOMES

Between 1989 and 1992 there was an increase of 9% in the number of domestic burglaries recorded in the Meadows, whilst the sub-division as a whole experienced an increase of 139%. The percentage of reported attempted burglaries remained fairly constant, varying between 16% and 21%. The proportion of repeat burglaries went down from 22.8% to 20.1% to 13.6% between 1989 and 1991. The time period between revictimisation increased during the project from an average of 80.5 days in 1989 to 136.6 in 1990 to six months in 1991. Those whose security was upgraded because they were judged to be at high risk however, did not subsequently experience any less vulnerability than those not target hardened.

## G. INFORMATION SOURCES

Safe Neighbourhoods Unit *Meadows: Evaluation of Inter-Agency Task Group*, May 1993.

M. Gregson & A. Hocking *An Evaluation of The Meadows Household Security Project*, April 1993.

Additional information supplied by Nottingham Safer Cities Project.

## H. COSTS

Salary	£21,150
Hardware	£30,000
Total	£51,150

## **10. Nottingham: St Ann's Burglary Reduction Project**

### **A. THE AREA AND THE COMMUNITY**

St Ann's is an inner city area and covers four Police beats and 9,311 households (1991 Census). At least half of the area consists of a large local authority estate built in the late 1960s following slum clearance. This estate is built to the Radburn design with open plan gardens and numerous alleyways. There is a diversity of housing surrounding the main estate including one high rise block and two developments of deck access flats. Older council dwellings, large Victorian houses, a 500 dwelling Housing Association estate and small recently built private developments are situated on the periphery. At its southernmost, St Ann's is only separated from a city shopping centre by one road, but at the northern tip it is in suburbia. The area is bounded by main roads but there is no consensus about what is meant by 'St Ann's'. The name popularly refers to the council areas nearest to the city centre, which also form the City Challenge area. The population is multi-racial. Unemployment was around 25% at the start of the project and up to a third of children in the City Challenge area lived in a single parent household.

### **B. BURGLARY RATE**

In 1989 the overall rate was 6.3%, but this masked quite marked local variations. There were two areas where the burglary rate was as high as 30%. In 1990 one of the deck access estates had a rate approaching 50%.

### **C. SCHEME BACKGROUND**

The St Ann's project was conceived as an effort to adapt the Kirkholt approach to an inner city area. In addition to the primary aim of burglary reduction, a secondary one was to encourage inter-agency partnership. There was an Oversight Group comprising members of Safer Cities, the Police, Probation, Nottingham Polytechnic, and City Housing. The project had two full time workers seconded to it, a Police Inspector and a Probation Officer and in addition a Probation Services Assistant and a half-time Research Assistant were appointed. Two local academics assisted with research and provided consultancy to the scheme. There was no lead agency, the project team having nominal parity of membership and authority.

### **D. OTHER INITIATIVES IN OPERATION AROUND THE SAME TIME AS THE PROJECT**

The Estate Action programme started in a pilot area in 1991 on the main council estate. A DICE (Design Improvement Controlled Experiment) began in 1990 in one of the deck-access blocks of flats. St Ann's was part of the City Challenge area with work due to start in April 1992. Police initiatives during the lifetime of the project included the provision of two Permanent Beat Officers and a weekly Police Surgery.

## E. BURGLARY PREVENTION WORK

The Project followed an Action Research model. The first phase of the project consisted of data gathering and analysis: police records of burglary were examined and recent victims of burglary were interviewed. The burglary reduction work following this was thus geared to the problems arising in St Ann's at that particular time. Target hardening was aimed at reducing the chances of revictimisation. The work consisted of five lever mortice locks front and rear, mortice bolts to the secondary exit door, locks to all ground floor and other vulnerable windows and strong bottom wooden panels to the doors where necessary. Initially this was offered only to burgled council tenants, who were found to be the most vulnerable group. Later the criteria were broadened to include all tenants who had been burgled during the lifetime of the project; all tenants who lived in a 'hot spot' that was currently being targeted by burglars; and owner-occupier burglary victims who were on income support. Over 200 houses were target hardened, the work taking place over a large geographical area. Because this was carried out by individuals on Community Service Orders it was decided not to give this part of the scheme's work any initial publicity.

A further part of the burglary prevention work was property marking, including visible stickers for marked items and for windows/doors. This was offered on demand and carried out by a Property Marker employed for the purpose. Often this was tied in with the formation of Neighbourhood Concern Groups, which were street based groups encouraged to address any issues affecting their neighborhood. There were 28 active groups by the end of the project, the majority of which became Neighbourhood Watch Schemes. Crime Prevention advice and 'victim support' were given by the project staff when visiting and interviewing burglary victims. A Help Pack giving a wide range of security advice was distributed to around 250 residents a month. Local agency workers were given crime prevention training. The scheme campaigned successfully for a new security door for burgled council residents city wide. The research also influenced Estate Action and City Challenge proposals.

A small number of offenders were also interviewed. A video was produced to form part of a pack to be used with offenders to sensitize them to the victim's perspective.

The scheme ran from March 1990 – March 1992, although it continued with a wider brief and under a different name (The Safer Communities Project) after this date.

## F. OUTCOMES

Burglary continued to increase and in 1991 the rate was 12.4%. However, the burglary rate in St Ann's rose less than elsewhere in the sub-division (42.8% St Ann's, 57.3% rest of division, excluding rural areas 1990-91). The revictimisation of target hardened properties was 10.5%, compared with 17% for those not target hardened and in none of the incidents was the entry due to hardware failure. The indications were that individual properties were made less likely to be burgled, but the overall area rate was

not affected. This may have been due to the small number of properties being target hardened (221 out of 9311). The pattern was repeated for those taking up the property marking; individually they were less vulnerable but because few (585 at the time of evaluation) had taken advantage of the service the effect was lost over the large area.

Although there were problems in maintaining the enthusiasm of the members, the Neighbourhood Concern Groups had become an active and valued voice in the community, especially with the advent of Estate Action and City Challenge.

## G. INFORMATION SOURCES

M. Gregson et al *St Ann's Burglary Reduction Project Report March 1990 - March 1992*.

J. Webb *Interim Property Marking Report*, December 1990.

Additional information supplied by Nottingham Safer Cities Project.

## H. COSTS

Start up	£38,853
- including Research Assistant and Probation Services Assistant	
Property Marking Scheme	£15,369
Target Hardening Scheme	
- from Safer Cities	£4,958
- from Probation Service	£4,958
- from City Action Team	£29,009
Total	£93,147

In addition the police seconded a full time Inspector and the probation service a full time Probation Officer.



## **11. Rochdale: The Belfield and Back O'Th'Moss Safe and Sound Projects**

### **A. THE AREAS AND THE COMMUNITIES**

Belfield covers 668 dwellings and is made up of three local authority estates: Clover Hall, Belshill and Mayfield. The estates are situated approximately two miles from the centre of Rochdale. They are all incorporated in one Police beat, which since July 1991 has also included 200-300 other dwellings. The estates consist mainly of 1930s semi-detached and terraced housing, with post war properties on the Mayfield estate. The three estates are separated by roads, which form a psychological as well as a physical boundary. Although the estates are surrounded by waste ground, they are joined to the rest of Rochdale by two main roads. There is a Community Centre and a Children's Play Area on the edge of Clover Hall. The only other amenities are the Neighbourhood Housing Office and a couple of shops. The 1991 census shows 19.1% of the population of the whole beat to be Asian. In 1990 the estimated unemployment figures were 35% on Clover Hall and 60% on Belshill and Mayfield. Clover Hall has had a Tenants Co-operative manage the estate since 1981.

Back O'Th'Moss is a local authority estate located on the northern outskirts of Heywood. It is a well defined area surrounded by open space and joined to neighbouring districts by two roads. Since July 1991 it has formed one beat in the Middleton Sub-Division. There are 566 council dwellings together with one street which has been sold to a Housing Association for refurbishment and subsequent sale, and also a small private development of low cost housing, giving a total of approximately 700 properties. The housing is arranged in terraces with some semi-detached properties. Compared with the Belfield estates, this area has a more run down appearance. Back O'Th'Moss has a Community Centre but very few other facilities. The population is almost entirely white, and the unemployment rate was 20.4%, at the time of the 1991 census.

### **B. BURGLARY RATE**

It has proved very difficult to determine burglary rates due to beat boundary changes in January 1990 and July 1991 which affected both areas.

The figures given in the Belfield Project Report are for the project area only, and for the six months prior to scheme implementation there were 40 burglaries which extrapolates to a figure of 12% per annum.

In Back O'Th'Moss, there were also 40 burglaries in the six months before scheme implementation, which gives an extrapolated yearly rate of 11.4%.

## C. SCHEME BACKGROUND

The project was set up by a multi-agency group who were looking for two sites in which to adopt a Kirkholt type approach to community crime prevention. Burglary was seen as an “intractable problem” and vandalism rates were also high on Belfield. Back O’Th’Moss showed similar problems but was sited in a different area of Rochdale so politically was deemed a suitable site. The Probation Service were the lead agency, identifying the estates as high crime areas initially and providing strong leadership and direction for the projects throughout, chairing and convening the steering group meetings. The multi-agency steering committees for each estate consisted of Police, Probation, Victim Support, Housing, Safer Cities, and later on, Tenants and Residents. In addition, the Back O’Th’Moss committee had a local councillor and representation from the Community Centre.

## D. OTHER INITIATIVES IN OPERATION AROUND THE SAME TIME AS THE SAFER CITIES SCHEMES

Belfield had been designated an inner Area and Task Force priority area. A Task Force lock fitting service had been available prior to, and the Safer Cities funded target hardening service was in operation during, the lifetime of the Safe and Sound Project. In addition, Clover Hall was subject to some improvements starting in 1989 which included cladding, porches and some fencing. Belshill had similar work including roofing, security improvements and environmental works as part of an Estate Action scheme two years after Clover Hall.

The council properties in Back O’Th’Moss had been fully modernised under Estate Action and HIP funding. This included internal and external works and was completed in 1990-91.

## E BURGLARY PREVENTION WORK

The Belfield project ran from 21st May 1990 until 30th April 1992. Back O’Th’Moss ran from 28th May 1990 until 31st July 1991. The objectives set for the Project Worker were identical for the two schemes:- to conduct a fear of crime survey; visit victims of crime; produce crime stats on a monthly basis; liaise with residents/agencies; establish Home Watch Schemes; visit new tenants; and to create a newsletter. Support from the agencies came in the form of part time assistance from probation officers, the analysis, of crime data and the services of special constables for survey work from the police and the provision of office accommodation from the council.

The package of initiatives used were also substantially the same in both schemes. The Safer Cities funded Specialised Technical Services (STS) target hardening scheme, which was available throughout Rochdale for a nominal fee of £5 per dwelling and used Employment Trainees, was offered on an area basis where burglary was currently set as being a problem. 71 households in Belfield and 213 in Back O’Th’Moss took

advantage of the scheme from June 1990 to May 1991, the only dates where data is easily available. A modified version of the Kirkholt questionnaire was used to discover changing patterns of burglary on the estates. The results were fed to the local constable on a weekly basis, thus giving the total offending pattern on the estate. The neighbour questionnaire was not used, although the tactics used in Kirkholt to involve neighbours in cocooning the victim and hence stimulating interest in Home Watch were employed. New tenants were visited and Property marking and a security survey were offered.

The formation of Home Watches was a priority. In Belfield, there was one Home Watch scheme at the outset of the project, and by March 1992 every street except one was covered by a Scheme. Back O'Th'Moss suffered a set back when the Project Worker resigned in November 1990 with only four Home Watches created in addition to the three existing before the start of the project. A new Project Worker took up the post at the end of January 1991, and her zealous attitude coupled with support from the Belfield and Kirkholt Project Workers ensured that 31 Home Watch Schemes had been created by the end of the project's life six months later. Tasks such as visiting new tenants and property marking were handed over to the Home Watch Coordinators.

Other initiatives were bike coding sessions, work with the local primary school, a Family Fun Day at Back O'Th'Moss and highly successful Clean Up Campaigns in both areas. Towards the end of both projects a prime objective was the setting up of a Community Crime Prevention Committee made up of residents and agencies, who would continue the work after the Project Worker's involvement ceased.

## F. OUTCOMES

Great success is claimed for the schemes, both for reducing crime and as an example of Crime Prevention work. Table 8 shows raw recorded burglary figures and indexed figures using six months before scheme implementation as a base measure. Figures are given for both schemes and the Rochdale Division.

This table shows clearly that burglary reduction was achieved on both of the estates. Burglaries remained at a low rate on Back O'Th'Moss, and apart from one half year remained at or below the initial rate in Belfield, whereas over the same period in Rochdale as a whole incidence of burglary more than doubled.

Three annual surveys in Belfield showed that fear of crime remained constant between 1990 and 1992. A slight (5%) increase in those feeling very secure in their homes is attributed to the STS target hardening scheme. There have been problems with maintaining interest in the steering committees and more recently with the Community Crime Prevention Group. The Police dropped out of the Belfield steering group in November 1990, which damaged relationships between them and the residents, and their attendance has been sporadic since. The Community Crime

**Table 8: Raw and indexed burglary figures for Belfield, Back O’Th’Moss and Rochdale**

	Belfield		Back O’Th’Moss		Rochdale	
	Number	Index	Number	Index	Number	Index
Jan-Jun '90 <sup>1</sup>	40	100	40	100	1205	100
Jul-Dec '90	40	100	35 <sup>2</sup>	86	1352	112
Jan-Jun '91	36	90	11 <sup>3</sup>	28	1914	158
Jul-Dec '91	60	150	23	56	2846	236
Jan-Jun '92	25	63	19	48	2935	244
Jul-Dec '92	29	73	19	48	2895	240

1 Although both schemes started at the end of May 1990, implementation cannot be expected to 'bite' immediately and no effect would be expected therefore in June 1990.

2 The December 1990 Back O’Th’Moss police figures are missing, so this figure is an extrapolation from the previous five months recorded burglary figures.

3 This is the six month period where there was an increased injection of crime prevention activity on the estate.

Prevention Groups seemed unable to be sustained without the presence of a Project Worker. The Belfield Group met for only three months after the end of the project, as lack of Police representation made continuation impossible. The Back O’Th’Moss Group survived for 18 months before non attendance made the Senior Probation Officer decide not to call any further meetings.

## G. INFORMATION SOURCES

Reports:

*Belfield: Year One Report 21st May 1990-30th April 1991:* Phil Kelly, Senior Probation Officer, May 1991.

*Belfield: Year Two Report 1st May 1991-30th April 1992* Phil Kelly, Senior Probation Officer, July 1992.

*Back O’Th’Moss: Project Report 28th May 1990-31st July 1991:* Peter Hawley, Senior Probation Officer, September 1991

*Target Hardening Survey June 1990-May 1991:* J D Daly, Probation Officer (retired) January 1992.

*Belfield and Back O’Th’Moss Update on Crime Prevention Projects in Relation to Initial Objectives:* David Eastwood, Crime Prevention Probation Officer, July 1993.

Additional information supplied by Rochdale Safer Cities Project, the Probation Service, and the Housing Department.

## H. COSTS

Belfield: £31,395 for Project Worker salary and associated costs.

Back O'Th'Moss: £14,250 for Project Worker salary and associated costs.

The Specialised Technical Services target hardening scheme funding totalled £36,350.75, but the amount spent on the Belfield and Back O'Th'Moss Project Areas is not known.

## **12. Rochdale: Wardleworth Community Safety Scheme**

### **A. THE AREA AND THE COMMUNITY**

Wardleworth is a clearly defined area of old terraced housing lying between two main roads near the centre of Rochdale and contained within one police beat. There are built up areas on three sides, with open waste ground and the River Roth on the fourth. There are approximately 1,100 dwellings. The area had a 84.6% Asian (mostly Bengali) population at the time of the 1991 census. 65% of the houses are privately owned but although the external woodwork of the houses is brightly painted the area has an air of poverty with a lot of litter, some derelict houses and untidy waste ground. A few recently built Housing Association properties are situated on one border of the area. There are two mosques, a Community Centre, a Women's Project, the Bangladesh Community Project and a few shops. The unemployment rate at the time of the 1991 census was 32.6%.

### **B. BURGLARY RATE**

For the 10 months preceding the appointment of the project worker the recorded burglary rate was 11.6%. A survey of 69 residents found that eight (11.6%) had been burgled in the previous 12 months. There was a 55% increase in recorded burglary rates in 1989-90 in the electoral ward of Smallbridge and Wardleworth, most of which had taken place in the Wardleworth area.

### **C. SCHEME BACKGROUND**

The high burglary rate and the BCS (1988) findings that ethnic minorities were more likely to be victims of crime pointed to Wardleworth as an area where preventative measures needed to be taken. There was also a strong (but unproven) feeling that crime was abnormally under-reported. The survey of 69 residents highlighted burglary as a source of a great deal of anxiety. Incivilities were also seen as a major problem. The results of the survey were presented to the management of the Bangladesh Community Project who then applied to Safer Cities for funding to provide a worker. A Steering Group was set up consisting of residents, officials of the Bangladesh Community Project, Police, Probation, and representatives of local agencies. There were disagreements within the group over the target population; it was eventually decided to concentrate on a locality rather than the ethnic community. The Project Worker was in post in November 1991.

### **D. OTHER INITIATIVES IN OPERATION AROUND THE SAME TIME AS THE PROJECT**

The area had not been subject to any major improvement works but had been targeted by Task Force for lock fitting prior to the start of the project. It is not known how many had taken advantage of the scheme, but the survey results showed that although 68% had double or deadlocks on their doors, 'very few' had window locks.

## E. BURGLARY PREVENTION WORK

The objectives of the scheme were to establish and support the following crime prevention initiatives:- to visit victims; take steps to improve security; liaise with agencies; develop Home Watch Schemes; visit new tenants, and produce a newsletter for the dissemination of information. The Steering Group acted as a pressure group in gaining specific objectives such as a more visible police presence rather than providing a leadership role. Target hardening was carried out on 180 houses; areas were targeted according to patterns of victimisation and the £5 Employment Training Specialised Technical Services scheme offered. There was a problem promoting and delivering the scheme to the Asian speaking communities due to cultural differences. Victim Support passed on the names of burglary victims for the Project Worker to visit and 79 were visited. A questionnaire was used and the results fed back to the steering committee. Emotional support to burglary victims was given and property marking offered. Neighbours of victims were visited and cocoons similar to those in Kirkholt were initiated, but the Bangladesh Community were resistant to formal Home Watches. A Saturday morning police surgery was set up. It was not possible to start a newsletter due to translation difficulties. The Project Worker, who had been experiencing difficulties due to a clash of priorities and lack of clerical support, left in May 1992. It proved impossible to reach an agreement on supervision for a further worker, and so the Project came to an end.

## F. OUTCOMES

Initial data showed a steep rise in burglaries in the first three months after the project worker took up post. This was believed to be a combination of a well known offender moving into the area and the heightened confidence of the residents in reporting incidents to the police through the Project Worker. The burglary rate for the seven months the worker was in post was 9.6% and for the seven months after the project finished, 3.5%. On the surface it appears that the project was a success in reducing burglary. According to Community leaders, however, it seems that burglary is still a major problem but since the Project Worker left the reluctance to report to the police has returned.

## G. INFORMATION SOURCES

A Moseley *The Wardleworth Community Safety Scheme*, Sept 1992.

Additional information supplied by Rochdale Safer Cities Project and the Bangladesh Community Project.

## H. COSTS

£11,700 for Project Worker's salary and associated costs

## **13. Sunderland: Plains Farm Estate Target Hardening Scheme**

### **A. THE AREA AND THE COMMUNITY**

Plains Farm is a Housing Association estate of 865 dwellings, of which 771 are owned by the landlord. The estate was built in 1938 and is situated on the outskirts of Sunderland. It is bisected by a four lane carriageway. One half of the estate consists of two bedroomed semi detached and terraced housing, and covers one Police beat. The population of this half of the estate tends to be less stable and contains increasing numbers of single parent families. The other half of the estate comprises mainly three bedroomed houses, is considered more desirable and consequently has a more stable population. The police beat in which this part of the estate is situated also includes a few other streets. The population is almost entirely white. There are no facilities on the estate except for a little used Boy's Club.

### **B. BURGLARY RATE**

In the 12 months before the project (April 1990-March 1991) the burglary rate was 6.8%. Although the estate had an acknowledged burglary problem, it was never at the top of the rankings for the Sub Division.

### **C. SCHEME BACKGROUND**

The scheme arose from the residents making complaints to the police about young people on the estate and their associated fear of a rise in burglary and incivilities. The police approached the Housing Association, who then approached Safer Cities for a grant to improve the security of the houses. The Housing Association saw the situation as an opportunity to revive the Tenants Association, who organised a Domestic Security Survey. The police had found the MO for burglary on the estate was consistently entry through the door, and the results of the survey indicated resident dissatisfaction with door security. This scheme was devised therefore by the residents, the Police and the Housing Association, with the Housing Association taking over as the lead agency for the implementation.

### **D. OTHER INITIATIVES IN OPERATION AROUND THE SAME TIME AS THE PROJECT**

None.

### **E. BURGLARY PREVENTION WORK**

The scheme started in April 1991 and is continuing beyond Safer Cities funding which ended with the year 1992/93. The scheme is due for completion in 1994, by which time all the Housing Association owned properties on the estate will have new



hardwood 'Carolina' style front and rear doors, together with 'appropriate' locks, spyholes and door chains. Windows were not target hardened, as the research findings had not shown window entry to be a problem. The work started at the end of the estate which had the highest crime rate and proceeded street by street at a rate of 10 houses per week. The Housing Association maintenance staff prepared the doors which were then fitted by contractors. 377 properties had been completed by the end of Safer Cities involvement in March 1993.

## F. OUTCOMES

There has been a decrease in the number of burglaries on the part of the estate which has been target hardened, showing a 28% fall in the first twelve months of the work and 35% in the following twelve months. The part of the estate still awaiting work and the adjoining beats had fluctuating rates with a decrease over the first twelve months, followed by an increase. The Sub-Divisional rate showed a rise, increasing by 16% and 57% over the two year period. The Police Officer noticed that the MO changed from door co window entry. The Housing Association is to incorporate window locks in its proposed target hardening schemes on its other estates. The improvements had the desired effect of reviving the Tenants Association and encouraging them to work up further improvement schemes.

## G. INFORMATION SOURCES

*Plains Farm Target Hardening: Final report March 1993* (author not given).

Additional information supplied by Sunderland Safer Cities and North Housing Association.

## H. COSTS

£350 per house.

Safer Cities funding: £47,451.

Total cost estimated to be £330,000. Safer Cities input was 14.38%, the remainder came from North Housing Association's surplus fund from the Older Housing Programme.

## **14. Tower Hamlets - The Multi Victimisation Scheme**

### **A. THE AREA AND THE COMMUNITY**

Four non-contiguous police beats were covered by the scheme. All are within the poorest parts of the Borough. They suffered high overall crime rates. Significant physical boundaries do not mark the scheme areas from those surrounding them, though they are identifiable. The beats approximate Local Authority wards. The scheme areas included in all 10,004 households.

### **B. BURGLARY RATE**

Figures for a full year prior to implementation are available for only one of the four police beats covered by the scheme. Here the incidence rate was 5.16% in the twelve months before the scheme was implemented in February 1991. For three months prior to scheme implementation (November 1990 to January 1991) data are available for all four beats – there were 171 burglaries in this period.

### **C. SCHEME BACKGROUND**

According to the Tower Hamlets Safer Cities Action plan, the scheme was based on the national finding that those already victimised are 3 times more likely to be re-victimised than those who have not been previously. It was located in those areas with the largest crime problem. Bar a few administrative hitches the project was managed without significant difficulty by a multi-agency team consisting of Police, Safer Cities, the APEX Trust and Victim Support. There was no Project Worker, the work being carried out by representatives of the agencies on the management team. the scheme was suspended in March 1992, when the Apex Trust went into administration. Its operation was resumed in November 1992.

### **D. OTHER INITIATIVES IN OPERATION AROUND THE SAME TIME AS THE SCHEME**

Apart from some Borough wide work Tower Hamlets Safer Cities project has concentrated most of its efforts on the four beats focused on in this scheme. It has thus received quite a wide range of crime prevention attention which could have impacted on burglary.

### **E. BURGLARY PREVENTION WORK**

The scheme offered target hardening to victims of burglary, attempted burglary and to those threatened with burglary or forced entry (such as racial or domestic circumstances). Victim Support wrote to burglary victims explaining about the scheme and Crime Prevention Officers visited them to assess what security upgrading was needed. About a quarter (23.4%) could not be contacted, just under half (47.4%) eventually

benefitting from the target hardening service. The work was undertaken by APEX trust, some being by ex-offenders which caused no complaint.

## F. OUTCOMES

From February 1991 to March 1992 the burglary rate of 1.75% for secured homes is reported (that is 3 dwellings of the 170 covered were revictimised). This compares with a re-burglary rate of 5.5% over the same period for those homes in the scheme areas which were not target hardened. From March to May 1992, during which the scheme was inoperative, a re-burglary rate of 19.4% for the relevant areas is noted. In the twelve months following the scheme's initial implementation, in the beat for which twelve months before data are available, the overall number of recorded burglaries fell from 130 to 107. This is equivalent to a fall in rate from 5.16% to 4.25%. The rate for the remainder of the sub-division, however, fell also, though slightly less – from 4.33% to 4%. Comparing November 1990 to January 1991, for which data on all participating beats are available, with the corresponding period the following year (November 1991 to January 1992) we find a small overall rise of 4.09%, from 171 to 178. For the divisions in which the beats are located the rise for the corresponding periods is slightly less, at 3.42% – from 708 to 732 incidents.

From 1990-1992/3 during which Tower Hamlets has concentrated work of various kinds in the four beats in which the Multi-Victimisation Scheme has operated, the Safer Cities Project notes a 9% reduction in the overall incidence rates for burglaries.

## G. INFORMATION SOURCES

S Wheeler *The Prevention of Multi Victimisation (APEX)*. February 1993.

Additional information supplied by Tower Hamlets Safer Cities Project.

## H. COSTS

Locksmith consultation	£1,000
Salary and on costs	£30,000
Security materials	£9,200
Graffiti removal equipment	£3,500
Part time Admin £2,833 Transport costs	£2,000
Tool sets	£1,200
Total	£49,733

## **15. Wolverhampton: The Lunt Estate Multi-agency Project**

### **A. THE AREA AND THE COMMUNITY**

There are 776 dwellings on the estate, 72.3% of which are council owned. The estate comprises mostly three bedroomed houses. It was built in the 1930s, and modernised in the early 1980s. It has been described as the second most deprived estate of the 18 in the Bilston area. The main problems were vandalism of void properties, litter, rubbish dumping and dilapidation, making the estate difficult to let. It had also been seen as a dumping ground for difficult tenants. Two separate areas can be identified, one part being much worse than the other. At 12% unemployment is a problem, especially amongst young males. 69% of the population receives some sort of state benefit. The estate is mainly white (87.9%). The number of single parents on the estate almost trebled between the 1981 and 1991 census. The estate has a main road on one boundary, and an open area on the other. It adjoins another area and only its housing gives it a clear definition.

### **B. BURGLARY RATE**

In 1988, prior to the scheme, the burglary rate stood at 12%.

### **C. SCHEME BACKGROUND**

The impetus for targeting this estate came from the Wolverhampton Safer Cities Project in their Action Plan 1989/90. A firm of Community Development Specialists were commissioned to carry out a consultancy, of which crime reduction was only one part of their brief. Involvement in the consultation led to the formation of the multi-agency group known as the Lunt Estate Working Party, which consisted of 17 agencies (including a Tenants Association and Neighbourhood Watch Scheme). Apart from sporadic attendance from Social Services and Education this is considered to have been successful in helping the agencies to work in a proactive manner.

### **D. OTHER INITIATIVES IN OPERATION AROUND THE SAME TIME AS THE PROJECT**

The Lunt has been the focus of a wide range of initiatives aimed at improving the quality of life of the community. In addition to work most explicitly concerned with burglary reduction, developments include Estate Action (heating and insulation, some UPVC window fitting, new doors, fencing separating houses etc); appointment of an effective Estate Development Officer; Domestic Violence Drop-in; Void Property Management; Assertiveness Training; Drop-in Club for Parents and Toddlers; Community House; New Community Centre; New housing Development; Mediation; Estate Promotion; demolition of some properties, notably housing known high rate offenders; and some rehousing of problem tenants. The police also changed their approach during this period. A more proactive role was adopted, leading

to the removal for periods of members of a small group of very high rare offenders (known as the Magnificent Seven and The Lunt Police), who intimidated other residents and undermined their capacity for social organisation. Also, the local beat officer visits the Community House on a regular basis.

## E. BURGLARY PREVENTION WORK

Safer Cities have been central in mobilising the wide range of activities on the Lunt which are hoped to improve Community Safety generally as well as providing funds for some specific elements including contributions to efforts directed specifically at burglary reduction. Though the findings of the survey carried out as part of the consultation showed that the residents had a keen interest in Neighbourhood Watch and wanted heavier front doors these did not follow. Instead, target hardening was carried out on 600 dwellings, a further grant under Estate Action covering the rest of the properties. Fencing was also provided by Safer Cities to the rear of 60 dwellings to provide defensible space and alter the rear access. Victim Support and Crime Prevention advice was given at the Community House. There were two Crime Prevention days which involved Neighbourhood Watch as well as the Police. Property making kits were given out at the Crime Prevention days, but it is not known if they were used. A Detached Youth team comprising four part time workers involved themselves with the youth on the estate.

## F. OUTCOMES

Burglary fell by 43% between 1988 and 1991, with a reduction each year, whereas in the rest of the subdivision it rose by 9%. The rate was therefore 5% in 1991. Burglary of industrial units and car crime rose during this period.

## G. INFORMATION SOURCES

N. Smith *An Evaluation of a Multi-Agency Approach to Crime on a Wolverhampton Estate*, April 1993, Coventry University BA (Hons) Dissertation.

Additional information supplied by Wolverhampton Safer Cities Project.

## H. COSTS

Those identifiably relating distinctly to Burglary Reduction:-

Fencing Scheme	£20,500
Domestic Security	£24,500
Survey	£1,000
Crime Prevention Days	£500

all funded by the Safer Cities Programme.

A further £215,000 for Domestic Security was provided under the Estate Action Scheme for one part of the area.

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