

FUTURE WAR

Makhmut Gareev and Vladimir Slipchenko



POLIT.RU

With an Introduction by
Jacob W. Kipp

Foreign Military Studies Office
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Cover art: Original triptych, Театр Военных Действий (Theatre of Military Actions), by Yury Shevchik. Used with permission of the artist.

Cover composition by Hommy Rosado, FMSO.

Future War

Makhmut Gareev and Vladimir Slipchenko

**POLIT.RU
O.G.I**

**Moscow
2005**

**With an Introduction by
Jacob W. Kipp
Foreign Military Studies Office
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

February 2007

y

The views expressed in FMSO publications and reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

FMSO is an open-source research and analysis center using foreign language publications and contacts to stay abreast of military developments outside of the USA. FMSO analysts are military and academic linguists with extensive backgrounds in the countries they cover.

Introduction

Future War (Budushchaya voyna), by premier Russian military authors and theorists Vladimir Slipchenko and Makhmut Gareev, is an interesting and curious book.¹ Its interest lies in the topics of the lectures delivered by Slipchenko and Gareev and the commentaries made on each by selected attendees. The lectures were delivered in November 2004 and March 2005. In a recent article on this book, the reviewer wrote of the contrast between the general tendency of warfare in the 20th century to become more global, destructive, and precise in nature under the impact of technological change and the rapid evolution of the current war in Iraq from its high-technology phase into “the phase of the Berdanka,” a reference to the first mass-produced breech-loading rifle issued to the tsarist army in 1870 and used by a wide range of insurgents thereafter.² This contrast between high-tech warfare and insurgency occupies a prominent place in this book. The title of the book is no accident. *Budushchaya voyna* was also the title of a work by the Polish banker and railroad magnate, Jan de Bloch, written over a century ago at the very beginnings of mass, industrial war.³ In the post-Soviet experience of the 1990s, senior Russian military theorists called for a reassessment of Bloch’s predictive efforts as a paradigm for the future development of Russian military science.⁴ In this case, the authors and discussants are trying to deal with warfare in the information age, the place of non-contact warfare and insurgency in the future of warfare, and Russia’s own response to the current international security environment. Unlike Bloch’s work, which contained a warning to statesmen that a general European war fought with industrial means and mass armies could turn into a stalemate that would consume armies and fracture societies, making war the catalyst of revolution, the current essays warn of the complexity of high-technology warfare and debate both the threats before Russia and the nature of the preparations required for future conflicts. There is no common line here, and the authors’ perspectives are quite distinct.

In another review of *Future War*, under the title “Alliance Belarus-Russia: *Future War*,” Arkadiy Medvedev recounts Slipchenko’s argument for the emergence of sixth-generation warfare, “non-contact, long-range, precision warfare,” which Medvedev describes as a product of civilization’s development. He devotes most of his attention to the fact that a state which acts independently in its own interests in world affairs can expect “contradictions and conflicts with other powers.” Here he

agrees with Gareev about the need to cultivate a national will and spirit to defend the country. Recalling Gareev's military service in the Great Patriotic War (GPW) and his reputation as a commander, Medvedev embraces a model of national defense based upon total mobilization, with the sacrifices of the defenders of Brest Fortress of 1941 as a model. "In the 21st century, there must be a connection between the people and the army so that military personnel would not be disconnected from their nation, their relatives, and their land."⁵

Both authors are representatives of an important post-Soviet phenomenon: the emergence of retired senior military officers as commentators and analysts of defense and security issues in Russia. Both men are specialists in military science and connected to the General Staff. Slipchenko, who passed away after giving this lecture, taught at the Academy of the General Staff, and Gareev was head of the Directorate of Military Science of the General Staff. Gareev was born in 1923 and as an eighteen-year-old went off to war in 1941. Slipchenko belonged to the post-war generation of officers who joined the Army under Khrushchev. Slipchenko represents a truly independent voice, one questioning both Soviet solutions and the current anti-military tendencies in Russian society. As the editor points out in the forward to the book, Slipchenko chose to develop a new field in post-Soviet military science, the forecasting of the character of future wars. "When he retired, Vladimir Slipchenko himself chose to be a scholar and a teacher, in order, among other things, to develop the science and be able to publish and to deliver open lectures."⁶ Over the next decade he studied and commented upon the experience of US involvement in local wars as its military perfected the military art of high-technology warfare. Between 1999 and 2002, he published three books refining his analysis of sixth-generation warfare. Gareev, the senior author in age, rank and service, retains special influence with serving senior military officers in the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. As President of the Academy of Military Science, he leads major research projects, conducts conferences, and advises the Ministry. He is what might be called "a ring-road bandit" an analogy to his American compatriots, who from inside the beltway advise the Pentagon from a phalanx of think tanks. In the Russian case, the Academy of Military Science enjoys a prominence that would be the envy of its Washington counterparts in terms of proximity to power, if not access to resources. Although Gareev has written on the nature of future war in the 1990s, his primary focus is what could be called the theory of national defense and military art in the

tradition of Karl von Clausewitz and Aleksandr Svechin.⁷ During the late Cold War, Gareev was an important theorist who adapted Soviet military art to non-linear warfare under the concept of the OMG (Operational Maneuver Group), which some waggish commentators referred to “*Operativnoye myshleniye Gareeva*” (Gareev’s Operational Thought). Both men are part of a circle of leading military specialists, whose works have been referenced and studied by Western scholars and analysts, including this author.

The topic of Slipchenko’s lecture is one familiar to any reader of his many works over the last fifteen years – the technological and military-strategic character of a new “generation” of warfare that he has defined as “non-contact war.” In Slipchenko’s usage, “generation” applies to very fundamental characteristics of the way wars are fought. He sees really only six generations over the last 4000-plus years: edged-weapons (bronze, iron and steel), gunpowder weapons, rifled weapons, automatic and mechanized weapons, nuclear weapons, and precision-strike weapons.

I first heard General-Major Slipchenko make this point in 1991 at a meeting that I helped organize at the US Army War College on the lessons of the just-concluded Gulf War. In this particular case, however, Slipchenko is speaking to a select Russian audience on the implications of such “sixth-generation” warfare for Russia, the organization of its armed forces, its equipment, and the threat to the state and society. Slipchenko’s basic point is that war was not abolished by the end of the Cold War but is only in a process of transformation, a transformation dominated by the shift from industrial to information societies. For Slipchenko, the harbinger of non-contact war was the limited use of cruise missiles in the Falkland War. The Gulf War proved to be only a prototype of “non-contact war” which continued to evolve during the 1990s and first decade of the 21st century. However, not even Iraq is a full-blown manifestation of the new generation of war, because only one side has had the instruments for non-contact war. The Iraqi responses from early collapse of the regular, industrial-age army followed by the emergence of multiple insurgencies represented little more than what American defense theorists had labeled asymmetric warfare in the decade after the Gulf War. Slipchenko, however, is not calling on Russia to prepare for some national form of asymmetric warfare. In his concluding remarks he states: “Russia needs a completely different armed forces. If today our armed forces function in three distinct mediums, air, sea and land, what we need is two

functional branches: strategic attack and strategic defense forces." No tank armies will roll across the Russian border. The future war will involve non-contact precision strikes against the state and military control systems, communications, and economy. Preparing for such a conflict would demand a reorganization of Russian defense industries, research and development capabilities, and the recasting of Russia's armed forces to fight and win non-contact wars. For his part, Slipchenko had predicted that the war in Iraq would be a more advanced form of warfare that the United States has practiced since the Gulf War and in the Balkans. Slipchenko has not confined his observations to just US experience and Russian defense requirements. In his essay, he looks at China's evolving plans for war in case of Taiwan's move for independence. Slipchenko has lectured in China and his book on Sixth Generation Warfare was translated into Chinese.⁸ Here he speaks of the PLA's plans for non-contact warfare across the Taiwan Straits:

It appears that the Chinese are now getting ready for a high-precision non-contact strike against Taiwan's economy. The economic potential is destroyed, the Taiwanese replace Chen Shui-bian with anyone else, the political regime changes, and Taiwan, with a ruined economy, joins China. That is the scenario being considered.⁹

However, he goes on to suggest that China's growing economic power will over time make such a conflict unnecessary, and that money, not weapons, will secure what Beijing desires.

For Russia, the situation is quite different. Slipchenko's concluding point in the general discussion of his lecture returned to the threat to contemporary Russia: "I may be repeating myself by saying that I specifically drew your attention to the perception of remote non-contact warfare as the mechanism of future wars in which Russia may be involved. This is very dangerous for our country. If we are not prepared for it, we will face a great catastrophe."¹⁰

The discussion following Slipchenko's presentation is of interest because of the topics raised by the commentators. Iraq provided the backdrop to these comments. Moderator Vitaly Lebin raised three critical issues. One concerned the persistence of local wars into the current era and the role or absence of precision weapons in such conflicts. The second concerned the

critical issue of bringing about regime change after the non-contact phase of war when occupation becomes the means to ensure such change. Leibin pointed to the experience in Yugoslavia and then identified a second tool needed for victory: “in addition to military technology, political technology was also brought into play that helped to change the regime at the end of the war. High-precision weapons are not going to be of much use here, and there’s no such technology in Iraq. How do we master that technology, if we need to?” The third issue raised was the cost of advanced weapons and whether under Russia’s current situation there was some way to find less-expensive niche technology to counter an opponent armed with the technology for sixth-generation warfare. Slipchenko’s response called for the capacity to wage global warfare as the only means to deter such opponents. He freely admitted Russia’s limited economic capacity but called for rational mobilization to create such capacity over time.

In response to other questions, Slipchenko discussed both the relationship between information warfare and non-contact warfare in the context of a globalized economy. He mentioned the immediate prospects of US strikes against North Korea, noted China’s concern for an emerging US capacity to use such strikes effectively against the Chinese economy in the future, but focused upon Iran as the probable target for a developing US capacity for “protracted non-contact warfare” after 2010. In this context, strategic precision weapons hold out the prospect of replacing nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence.

In response to other questions, Slipchenko directly addressed the problem of terrorism and the utility of precision weapons against that threat. He was not optimistic about their utility or the utility of more conventional means, which he labeled “fighting the aftermath of terrorism.” To fight terrorism, he recommended other means, fighting terrorism by its own methods using Special Services and not the armed forces:

In order to fight terrorism itself, you have to penetrate terrorism’s genetic structure, its DNA. And fight it there, at its inception. We don’t have anyone who can fight terrorism like that. People are afraid of those methods. So we will forever be fighting the consequences of terrorism rather than terrorism itself.

Comments from the audience raised the issue of whether the war on terrorism was not a form of information warfare directed by US special services to suit its national interests and objectives. While Slipchenko spoke of dangers and not threats, some commentators stressed the threats posed by the United States, while others worried about China.

Returning to the issue of Russia's own strategic situation, one commentator, recalling the struggle to achieve and maintain nuclear parity with the United States during the Cold War, doubted whether Russia could achieve such parity with regard to conventional precision-strike weapons. Slipchenko stated that Russia has the research and development capability to pursue the acquisition of such systems and has even used such weapons during the second Chechen War. The question is whether Russia has the financial resources to fund their mass production. Slipchenko stressed the need to pursue such rearmament, even as Russia sought to place international limits on the acquisition of precision-strike weapons.

We do, after all, have certain funds for that, but the money is still going to past-generation warfare weaponry. We must do away with this mechanism. Then we will be prepared. And we will stand our ground in a confrontation with the US with nuclear weapons and whatever remote non-contact weapons [we have]. The Americans are not going to attack us; they are very fearful of even a minimal strike against their territory.

The second issue discussed by Colonel-General Makhmut Gareev is Russia's own preparations for war. Gareev's essay is grounded in an historical interpretation of the conflicts of the 20th century and the persistent reality of Russia's geo-strategic circumstances. Under the circumstances of external threats on many axes, Gareev emphasizes the need for Russia to have the capacity for total mobilization for war. In this, he is close to the current leadership of the Russian military in his emphasis upon the threats to Russia. Gareev's history in this context speaks to Russia's current international situation and the appropriate response to it. While much of which Gareev spoke concerned wars of the 20th century, he did make one historical reference that had contemporary relevance. He noted the wisdom of Prince Alexander Nevsky's decision to make peace with the Golden Horde while he turned his kingdom's energies to war in the West with the Teutonic Knights. As Gareev asserts, the Tartars demanded only tribute and were not a threat to national life – "church,

language, culture or the spiritual life of the Russian people and other nations; nobody encroached on it. But the knights were following the example of the Baltic republics and Germanizing: religion was imposed, spiritual life.”¹¹ Gareev complains that Russian statesmen have historically placed its armed forces in unfavorable circumstances in the initial period of war. Such was the case in the Crimean War, the Russo-Turkish War, the Russo-Japanese War, World War I, World War II, Afghanistan, and in Chechnya in 1994. He accuses Russia’s leaders of failing to foresee the nature of the conflicts upon which they were embarking. “Even nowadays some people in our country still like to engage in political bluster. Yes, war is indeed a continuation of policy by forceful means. Politics predominates, but one should never deny the reverse influence of military strategy on politics. Politics does not exist in pure form at all. Politics works only when it takes economic, ideological, and military-strategic considerations into account.”¹²

In discussing threats to Russia, Gareev admitted the reduced risk of nuclear war and general war in the post-Cold War environment but pointed to other indirect means being applied to achieve contemporary political ends – economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, information warfare – to bring about the internal collapse of opposing states. Under these circumstances, local conflicts could become local wars and potentially escalate into general war. In Russia’s case, the risk of foreign intervention in such conflicts could not be ignored. “There are major armed forces groups of foreign states along all our borders. The number of troops is being reduced slightly, but qualitatively they are undergoing a serious transformation, with high precision weapons and much more that you have heard about.”¹³ These circumstances, according to Gareev, are what define the type of armed forces Russia currently needs. The answer is modern weapons, an advanced military art to employ such weapons, and the national will to use force in defense of the country, in short, a restoration of the link between the nation and the army.¹⁴

His interpretation did not go unchallenged. He was accused of promoting the continuation of a Soviet military system that was a deadly burden on the state and increasingly irrelevant to the needs of the state’s defense. As one of the commentators notes, Gareev’s thesis made the General the primary focus of the ensuing discussion:

When a participant in the Polit.ru forum suggests that the subject of the lecture is Gareev himself rather than military history, he is for the most part correct. March 25 showed us the self-awareness of a man who has every reason to be understood as a representative of the army expressing its problems and an understanding of the present-day situation and its historical background. This awareness may be evaluated in different ways but we suggest that you regard this lecture in precisely this way.¹⁵

The discussion of Gareev's lecture was quite pointed and immediately took on aspects of a generational confrontation. His critics accused him of championing a dying and discredited military order based upon the profligate squandering of Russian lives. Aleksandr Golts, a leading military journalist and the author of *Russia's Army: Eleven Lost Years*, put the issue clearly: ". . . we are witnessing the painful, protracted but irreversible disintegration of the armed forces model that was not even created after 1917 but as a result of the reforms of Peter the Great."¹⁶ That system under tsarist and Soviet power had sacrificed the national economy to the end of creating a mass army of poor professional quality and in war time had cost the state and nation millions of lives: ". . . this principle of expending manpower in the name of lofty goals has become the basis of Russian military culture." Current Russian circumstances have dictated an end of that system. Russia cannot afford to wreck its market economy by wasting labor through conscription, and the nation's demographic crisis has reduced the available pool of young men. Golts concludes that necessity has killed the old system: "the Russian Army simply has to change." What Russia needs is a transformation to a professional armed forces that would embrace advanced technology. Golts identifies information warfare and precision strikes as the answers to Clausewitz' fog and friction, which had made war complex and risky in execution. To Golts, the answer was the retirement of hide-bound officers and their replacement by technocrats. Gareev disputed Golts' interpretation of Russian arms in the 18th century, noting its successes from the Northern War to the Wars of the French Revolution to defend the utility of a mass conscript army. Moreover, he spoke of the need for national will to support the state's defense. Gareev embraced the notion of the Army as the school house of patriotism. Without such will, weapons are useless.

Other discussants joined the two sides of this debate. The core issue became a professional versus a mass army. Maxim Shevchenko, a graduate student in history at Moscow State University, supported Gareev's point that the armed forces had to be seen as an organic part of state and society. A professional force made great sense for the United States but not Russia, where a "contract army" could become a tool of competing political-economic elites doing their bidding at the expense of the nation. Moreover, there are limits on the utility of professional forces against some, especially irregular, opponents. Shevchenko described the insurgents in Iraq as practicing "network-centric" warfare, which negates the advantages of precision strike by shifting the center of gravity from deployed units to terrorist cells operating within a society that remains opaque to the invading forces. That is the dilemma, which the Israeli Army has faced in the case of the Palestinian *Intifada*. Shevchenko returned to the Berdanka and guerilla warfare: "A Berdan rifle is a perfectly competent weapon to beat the most high-tech opponent in a modern-day war where the human factor is the main thing. So it seems to me that for now draft or contract-based is a demographic issue."¹⁷ The issue of peacetime deaths in the Army and the relationship of such deaths to conscription became a bone of contention. Gareev tried to put the military's peacetime deaths in the context of other social problems – automobile accidents and deaths from alcoholism. Viktor Litovkin, a long-time correspondent for *Krasnaya zvezda* [*Red Star* – the Russian Defense Ministry newspaper], asserted the state's responsibility for loss of life in the military. Gareev responded that "state and society are responsible for all persons."¹⁸

Litovkin called the entire discussion about conscript vs. contract army an ideological dispute engendered by the inability of the discussants to agree upon what is the threat before Russia. He put the question at the heart of Russian statehood and nature of Russian society:

To return to the subject of our conversation, we need to reflect on why an army is necessary and what are the objectives of the state that is maintaining that army. Can anyone say what kind of state we have now? What is its orientation? It is a social state. Is it, forgive me for asking, building capitalism with a human face or socialism with a capitalist face? No one has said. No one has stated what our state's long-term objectives are. Who will be our friends, who will

oppose us, what will be the threats against us 10, 20 and 30 years from now?¹⁹

Litovkin described the issue of terrorism in much the same terms that Slipchenko had used in his presentation. Terrorists had to be defeated, but military means, while necessary, are insufficient. He spoke of struggle between East and West that pitted a rich America and a rich Europe against the great majority of humanity who see an unjust world order. Terrorists do not attack economic targets but seek to punish and wound. Russia, in its current state, belonged neither to the affluent or the wretched of the earth. The answer to such discontent that spilled over into terrorism is, as was done by European Social Democrats after World War II, to create a global middle class with an interest in bringing about the transformation of the poor areas of the globe. "Until we do this we will face the threat of terrorist wars."²⁰ As to the army which Russia needs, Litovkin responded that it had to be a contract-professional force because high-technology weapons required such a force. Litovkin stressed the absence of imminent threats to Russia but also stressed the need to create a modern army, saying that otherwise within 15 years Russia would have no means with which to fight.

On the issue of the threat of terrorism, Gareev took issue with Litovkin's analysis. Terrorism as a phenomenon does not exist. "It really is, as we say, an instrument." Citing his own experience with the *basmachi*²¹ in Central Asia, Gareev claimed that terror was a weapon exported to Russia from without. The war in Chechnya was 99% the result of foreign intervention. He advocated a demarche against those states he identified as supporting terror in Chechnya – Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and others. In the discussion that followed, it became clear that Gareev assumed Russia was surrounded by a hostile world. As one commentator put it, this issue of worldview divided Gareev's audience and precluded any agreement. Sergei Kotelnikov commented on the very nature of the discourse and the underlying assumption behind Gareev's concerns: "It seems to me that Gareev has been insisting on one simple idea. Guys, we have been under siege for at least 300 years and no one wants to discuss this! Or they think this is some kind of nonsense or are coming across this idea for the first time?"²² This leads Kotelnikov to a second point: such a state of besiegement requires that the state possess the means to mobilize the society. But the issue remains: for what and

against whom? In his final remarks Gareev returns to the issue of state ideology:

First and foremost we should develop a common language. Even though our Constitution says that we should not have a state ideology, not a single society, not a single country can live without a clear-cut idea. So it is up to the leadership of the country, up to our creative intelligentsia, political scientists, and other scholars. It is a task for the public. Soldiers cannot come up with goals by themselves; they live for the benefit of society, or at least that's the way it should be. So that is our common task.²³

Gareev's plea for a "clear-cut idea" should not be seen as a matter of nostalgia for Communism. It speaks to a longer tradition of state-directed political, economic and social development that dates back as far as Peter the Great. Mobilization for the struggle against external and internal threats has been the capital task of the state apparatus. Russian liberal ideas have always had to contend with the impulse for state-directed development, and military necessity has been an inherent part of such an ideology, one that transcends ethno-nationalism to embrace imperial order. The West has been for three centuries the source of the economic impulse for transformation, but the state-building apparatus has seen economic gains as means to national power. Putin certainly sees integration into the global economy as in Russia's interest. But order trumps liberal values outside the realm of economics. President Putin has himself called the end of the Soviet Union a great tragedy and made rebuilding state power a central point of his presidential administration. The issue for Russia since Peter the Great has been the relationship between state and society. Statism and militarism have been common ideological themes under tsarism and communism and always at the expense of the autonomy of civil society. Under the contradictory demands of information warfare and the struggle with terrorism, the answer seems to be to invest in the technologies for non-contact warfare even as the state adapts other means of control to defeat the terrorist threat. The post Cold-War era has ended, and Russia stands now in a pre-war era, uncertain about the opponent and unprepared to wage the war that Slipchenko envisions.

At a time when US military theory and practice have focused on counter-insurgency operations for good and legitimate reasons, it is of value to consider the parameters of this Russian debate. Russian forces have their

own rich and practical experience in conducting a wide range of counter-insurgency operations. A long war in Afghanistan and an equally long war in Chechnya represent only recent examples. But as this debate suggests, Russia has not rejected the prospect of larger war fought with advanced weapons. At least one theorist seems to be suggesting, like Bloch, that past experience with advanced technologies and their applications in military art are only precursors of the truly revolutionary potential of such weapons systems to transform warfare.

Jacob W. Kipp
Foreign Military Studies Office
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
March 2006

NOTES

¹ Vladimir Slipchenko & Makhmut Gareev, *Budushchaya voyna* [Future War], (Moscow: Polit.ru OGI, 2005). There are several curiosities concerning this book, which are worth mentioning. First, the volume is laid out as a pamphlet for a large readership and is described as part of a project of "public lectures" organized by Polit.ru. Second, the volume has an introduction, but no editor is listed. Third, the book is part of a series which the press describes as "a mass-political edition." Fourth, the book contains an incomplete introductory essay to Gareev's lecture (pp. 77-81), which seems designed to reframe Gareev's basic argument and introduce the main themes of the following discussion. Fifth, the back plate of the book contains the claim that the recent wars in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq were launched to test advanced weapons and not their proclaimed objectives.

² "Berdanki protiv vertoletov. Knigi." [Berdan Rifles against Helicopters. Books.] *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye*, (16 December 2005), p. 8. This reference to an ancient rifle relates counter-insurgency to Russia's frontier wars and not terrorism. In Russia's case, whether imperial Russia, the Soviet Union, or modern Russia, the preferred weapon of terrorist attack has been the bomb, or IED, i. e., that combination of high explosive and electrical current to provide safe detonation for the attacker. The consummate technician of such violence was Nikolai Ivanovich Kibalchich, who in the late 1870s organized for the People's Will numerous assassination attempts against Alexander II using dynamite and electric detonators. These attempts blew up the tsar's train and wrecked his dining room in the Winter Palace without killing the sovereign. Another IED was in place to kill the sovereign on 1 March 1881, but Alexander II took another route. The final, successful attack was carried out by a hand-held device with a conventional burning fuse. Current Chechen interest in such explosive devices, including those used in the Nordost and Beslan incidents, are nothing new. The assassination of

Chechen President Akhmed-hadji Kadyrov on 9 May 2004, should be seen as a continuation of a long trend in the Russian experience with terror as a tactic. There are no easy technical solutions, and success depends upon isolating the terrorists from the society in which they operate.

³ I. S. Bliokh, *Budushchaya voyna v tekhnicheskoy, ekonomicheskoy i politicheskoy otnošeniyakh* [Future War in Its Technical, Economic, and Political Relations], six volumes, (St. Petersburg: *Tipografiya I. A. Efrona*, 1898). On Bloch's contribution to the study of future war see: Jacob W. Kipp, "Soldiers and Civilians Confronting Future War: Lev Tolstoy, Jan Bloch and Their Russian Military Critics," in: Stephen D. Chiabotti, ed., *Tooling for War: Military Transformation in the Industrial Age* (Chicago, Imprint Publications, 1996): 189-230.

⁴ V. D. Ryabchuk, "Nauka, obrazovaniye, reforma," [Science, Education, Reform] *Voyennaya mysl'*, No. 2 (February 1994), pp. 39-41.

⁵ Arkadiy Medvedev, "Soyuz Belarus'-Rossiya: Budushchaya voyna," *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, (19 January 2006), <<http://dlib.eastview.com/sources/article.jsp?id=8882626>>, accessed 21 January 2006.

⁶ *Budushchaya voyna*, p. 6.

⁷ On Gareev's study of future war see: M. A. Gareev, *If War Comes Tomorrow: The Contours of Future Armed Conflicts* (London: Frank Cass, 1998).

⁸ V. Slipchenko, *Pinyin: De liu dai zan tsun*. [Sixth Generation Warfare], translated by Chung Tai Hua, (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2004) in: *The World New Military Revolution Series*.

⁹ *Budushchaya voyna*, p. 72.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 92.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 102-104

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 107. On Golts' view of the condition of the Russian Armed Forces see: Aleksandr Golts, *Armiya Rossii: 11 poteryannykh let* [Russia's Army: Eleven Lost Years], (Moscow: Zakharov, 2004).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 122.


¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 125-126.

²¹ *Basmachi* is a Russian term, taken from Turkic, to refer to "bandits" who fought both tsarist and Soviet power in Central Asia between 1916 and 1939. *Basmachestvo* refers to the local resistance movements of the period, which Soviet official history defined as "counter-revolutionary robber bandits."

²² *Ibid.*, p. 135.


²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-138.



Future War

POLIT.RU

**Makhmut Gareev
and
Vladimir Slipchenko**



Future War

POLIT.RU

O.G.I*

**Moscow
2005**

* Translator's Note: *Ob"edinennoye Gumanitarnoye Izdatelstvo* – United Humanitarian Publishers

UDC
BBK 66.3(2Ros)31
C47

Series Design: Ilya Bernstein

V.N. Slipchenko

C47 Future War / Vladimir Slipchenko, Makhmut Gareev. M.:
OGI, 2005. 144 pp. (Polit.ru)

ISBN 5-94282-345-6.

The book contains two lectures which answer the same question –
for what kind of war should our country be prepared.

Lecturers: Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev is regarded as the
foremost authority in the military field and is a fighting general
who has experienced almost all the wars and local conflicts in
which our country has participated; Vladimir Nikolayevich
Slipchenko is a prominent Russian expert on future wars, founder
of a whole area in military science, and a student and colleague of
Makhmut Gareev at the Academy of Military Sciences.

UDC 323
BBK 66.3(2Ros)31

ISBN 5-94282-345-6

© V.N. Slipchenko, 2005

© M.A. Gareev, 2005

© OGI, 2005

Translated into English and reprinted with permission from the
publisher.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Polit.ru Introduction to Future War.....	7
For What Kind of War Must Russia Be Prepared?	9
Discussion of Lecture.....	29
Russia in the Wars of the 20th Century.....	51
Discussion of Lecture.....	69

FUTURE WAR

Polit.ru publishes the transcript of two lectures which answer the same question – for what type of war should our country be prepared. Major General Vladimir Slipchenko gives a technical and military-strategic answer to this question, while Army General Makhmut Gareev gives a historical and ideological answer.


Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev is probably the most authoritative person in the military field, founder and head of the Academy of Military Sciences, a fighting general who has experienced almost all the wars and local conflicts in which our country has participated since the 1940s, the last Soviet soldier to leave Afghanistan, author of numerous books on Russia's military history and military leaders, and a fierce opponent of ideological revision of the outcome of World War II.

Vladimir Nikolayevich Slipchenko is a prominent Russian expert on future wars, founder of a whole area in military science, and a student and colleague of Makhmut Gareev at the Academy of Military Sciences. Vladimir Slipchenko was asked to return to work at General Headquarters. When he retired, Vladimir Slipchenko himself chose to be a scholar and a teacher, in order, among other things, to develop the science and be able to publish and to deliver open lectures. Unfortunately, Vladimir Slipchenko's lecture in Polit.ru was one of his last public appearances. Vladimir Ivanovich died from a sudden severe illness.



**For What Kind of War Must
Russia Be Prepared?**

Vladimir Slipchenko



LECTURE

Vladimir Slipchenko

The lecture was delivered on November 11, 2004, at a club – Bilingua Literary Café – as part of the Polit.ru Public Lectures project.

I thank the organizers for their invitation and I am, of course, pleased to speak here, in this auditorium, following such well-known experts. I do not think that any of the speakers were chosen at random.

My teacher also spoke here – I believe Army General Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev opened this lecture series with a lecture on Russia's military past – “Russia in the Wars of the 20th Century.” Today I will speak on another military subject and address Russia's current military state and military future: where is Russia's military development leading and where does it need to go.

I should point out that it is extremely difficult to study the future, the military future. This is not just a theoretical task but also a matter of national importance. It requires knowledge in many areas - military art, political science, economics, and many other sciences. The military future cannot be predicted with a layman's knowledge. One has to be a properly trained expert.

The organizers have already told you that I am the only one working in this niche. It is indeed a very difficult niche to master.

So, for what kind of war must Russia prepare? This question cannot be answered without first looking at the history of wars.

There have always been wars. Historians estimate that in the 5,500 years of human civilization more than 15,000 wars and armed conflicts have occurred on our planet. And almost a billion lives have been lost in wars over those 5,500 years. We currently have 193 countries registered at the UN. Take note: one-third of those

countries are in a state of war. That is, they are either fighting or have unresolved conflicts with somebody.

Wars on our planet have a future. They do not disappear as history progresses but rather develop along with civilization. Our task today is not to understand the future of wars but the wars of the future: what kind of wars awaits Russia in the future and for what should it prepare.

Unfortunately, official military science does not study this area seriously. If you open Military Thought magazine, which mirrors our military scientific thought, you will not find profound formulations of wars of the future. I'm sorry, but there they mostly beat the dead horse of past generations of wars that took place in the world or in Russia. They rehash everything that is long gone.

And we are now living in a completely different world. And military-wise this world has advanced much further than is being covered in the open press. In 1989 I spoke at a major international conference abroad and first expressed the view that mankind would soon see a generational shift in wars. That is, we are living in one generation and the next generation will soon be here. I stated in very general terms that this generation would be related to new weaponry and new methods of combat.

Of course, not everyone believed me. What is more, there were skeptics who completely rejected the possibility at the time. And the conference ended and we went our separate ways. But take note: a war of the new generation took place exactly two years later.

This was the Persian Gulf War – the first remote, non-contact war conducted by the US. I called this war not a type but the prototype of wars of the future.

Then in 1991, I and other military experts from other countries were invited to a conference in the US on a very interesting topic: "The Persian Gulf War Through the Eyes of Foreign Military Scholars." Once again I spoke there and continued to develop the

idea that I had expressed in '89, this time speaking about the transition as a proven fact. Indeed, those who had heard me earlier were amazed that my prediction had been right and that there had been a generational shift in warfare.

I continued to work in this area. There were wars underway at that time. After '91, a second war took place in Iraq, in '96; it was a small-scale war. Then a new, larger-scale war took place in Iraq in '98. Then the '99 war in Yugoslavia. These wars confirmed my hypotheses regarding where we were heading.

This gave me the chance to publish three books in a row. The first, in '99, was "Wars of the Future" (very small edition). In 2001 I published "Non-Contact Warfare," which had a larger edition of about 10,000 and sold off quickly. And, finally, in 2002 I published a third book called "Sixth Generation Warfare: Weaponry and Military Art of the Future." These books formed the basis for developing a new niche – the theory of non-contact warfare.

As a final word on books, let me say that my new, fourth book is due out in December and will be called "New Generation Warfare: Remote and Non-Contact Warfare." This latest book incorporates everything that has taken place to date, including the war in Iraq, which is still ongoing: the war is outlined up to May first, when Bush declared that it was over.

It is therefore quite clear that the US and several NATO countries are moving to a new generation of warfare, the remote, non-contact generation. I call it warfare of the future.

Those are the types of wars for which Russia must prepare. No one is ever going to come to us by land again. These days it's impossible to imagine armored spearheads crashing across the western, southern and eastern borders. If war reaches us it will reach us via aerospace and the strike will come from precision weapons.

Take note: the strike will not be against the armed forces, if they are still in the old generation, but against the national economy, and that is very serious.

In my books I divided the entire past and future into two periods: the pre-nuclear period, which lasted for 5,500 years, and the nuclear period, which began in 1945 and will be 60 years old next year. These are two epochs that are non-commensurate in length but they make it possible to conclude that the pre-nuclear period saw mostly contact warfare - hand-to-hand, then distance warfare - but an integral element of it was a situation in which the opponents descended on the battlefield and tried to kill each other. And the nuclear period brought remote and non-contact warfare in which a country can strike any other country on our planet.

Not all weapons revolutionized wars. If you have come across the concept of military revolution, you may have seen different interpretations of it. Americans say that a new tank is a military revolution; we say that a new Kalashnikov assault rifle is a military revolution. A new satellite with some sensors is a military revolution. It is like a continuous revolution.

In my books I refuted this claim and showed that the times in mankind's history when there is a generational shift in warfare are the only ones that can be regarded as revolutions. And we have had only 6 generations of war throughout the entire existence of civilized humanity.

The first generation was warfare with edged weapons. Spears, arrows, bows, armor, swords. Handy stones and sticks were rejected in favor of edged weapons. And this warfare on our planet continued for around 4,000 years. Weapons changed, material and armor changed, but warfare was still being conducted in the first generation.

And it was only in the 12th-13th centuries of the last millennium when gunpowder was invented in China that an entirely new generation of warfare emerged. Weapons became firearms: small arms, canons. They were not rifled - smooth-bore - but they were entirely different.

I spoke last year at a conference in China and I was told that somewhere in a southern province is a monument depicting a weapon, a rifle, and the date on it is 1117. That is, small firearms appeared in China in 1117. Then gunpowder spread all over, including to Russia, and somewhere around the 13th century warfare switched completely to the new firearms. This was warfare of an entirely different type.

It cannot be said that this took place all at once: there was a long transitional period. But the end of this period meant the start of a new stage which also lasted quite long – about a thousand years.

And the next breakthrough did not occur until the 18th-19th centuries with the advent of rifled weapons. Science made it possible to create weapons with grooved bores. Small firearms, canons. They became multicharge, longer range, and more accurate. The nature of wars changed: they became more massive from the standpoint of the manpower using the weapons; the scale of wars increased drastically. They became trench wars, distance wars, even though they remained contact wars in character.

And finally new weapons – automatic weapons – appeared one hundred years ago, ushering in the fourth generation of warfare. These weapons were mounted on armored vehicles, on aircraft, and on surface craft and submarines. We got wars that used frontline offensive and defensive operations on a strategic scale.

This fourth generation is still alive and well today. Many countries remain in this generation, and Russia is rooted in it.

But nuclear weapons appeared in 1945: atomic, then thermonuclear weapons. This was a down payment on fifth generation warfare. Fortunately, these weapons have not been used since they were twice used at the end of World War II. We hope that our military and political leaders have enough sense to ensure that these weapons are never used in the future.

And now, since 1991, we have had sixth generation warfare. I had to introduce the concept of a “war win formula” in order to

distinguish this generation. Analysis of numerous conflicts shows that only three goals need to be attained in order to win a war:

First, rout the opponent's armed forces; as a rule, on his territory.
Second, destroy the opponent's economic potential.

Third, overthrow or replace the opponent's political system.

If these three components were achieved simultaneously, victory was deemed complete. But if success was lacking in any of the three components (as happened in the Persian Gulf War: Hussein remained in power), victory cannot be complete. I recommend that readers and listeners look for the underlying reasons for a new war: after all, only total victory can signify that a war has ended in keeping with what had been declared. If not everything was achieved, the war must have had other objectives.

So when were high precision weapons first used? We know for sure that this was on May 4, 1982. For the first time in the history of warfare, during the Falklands conflict, when Great Britain decided to go from the islands to Argentina and fight for its territories, it arrived with a powerful fleet and nuclear weapons, and Argentina bought a total of five high precision cruise missiles from France. The French were already making those weapons; they are still making great ones. The Argentineans sank three British ships with those five missiles – a Sheffield destroyer, another destroyer, and another surface craft. Just five missiles - and three sunken ships.

Fifteen years later I was invited to a conference in Great Britain, where the Brits put forward an interesting idea: "If we had known that Argentina had those weapons, we would have begun the war in a completely different way. But if Argentina had had just two dozen cruise missiles, we would have lost both the war and the Falklands." Because each high-precision cruise missile incapacitates a ship: it can stay afloat but is no longer functional.

Development of high precision weapons has intensified since then and they are now more powerful.

What are high precision weapons? They are weapons that are almost hundred percent likely to strike a target at the intercontinental level, even with interference and unfavorable climatic conditions. Launch it and forget about it. The missile itself finds and destroys the target with great accuracy.

These high precision weapons are currently being developed in two versions (three, in some countries): air- and sea-based; some, the French for example, are making land-based missiles.

But that's not enough and the Americans have gone even further. They launch these weapons not just using aircraft and ships but also so-called reconnaissance strike systems. These are intelligence, programming, control, launch, guidance and strike documentation resources gathered into an organizational structure during a war. The Americans have already used these reconnaissance strike systems several times.

Turns out that you can win any war without using ground forces when you have these systems. And the Americans are now cutting back their ground forces. They wanted to do away with them altogether but the war in Iraq necessitated keeping them as the muscle to prop up a puppet regime.

To digress slightly - a little more on high precision weapons. While it took 4,500 sorties (each aircraft returning many times) and about 9,000 aerial bombs to destroy a railroad bridge over a large river during World War II, a bridge like that was destroyed by about 90 aircraft carrying 200 guided aerial bombs during the Vietnam War. And a single aircraft and one cruise missile destroyed such a bridge in Yugoslavia in 1999. You can see how much progress has been made, to the point where high precision weapons are replacing many different forces and devices.

So for what kind of war must Russia prepare? We know that Russia is currently in the fourth generation of warfare. That is, this is the contact warfare of the previous generation, the time of the Great Patriotic War. Meanwhile, the US has been conducting remote non-contact warfare for 13 years.

When the Persian Gulf War started in 1991, Iraq was very well prepared for fourth generation warfare. It had 60 Scud missiles, with a range of up to 400 kilometers. It had powerful aviation: more than 300 combat aircraft. Thirty-five fairly modern air defense missile systems. Numerous shoulder-launched anti-aircraft defense (AAD) mechanisms. They are not aimed; they just find the target themselves. Plus 20 ground force divisions. That was Hussein's army.

And just imagine that this army was never brought into play. All the missiles and the entire AAD system were destroyed at the onset of the war with non-contact resources. But the Americans did not want to waste high precision ammunition on the ground forces because the US had only about 300 cruise missiles in that war and they were all used on the military infrastructure and the economy. And 85% of the economic potential was destroyed using non-contact resources.

I have called this war the prototype of the war of the future. Many have disagreed with this: "No, it's a random occurrence. This can't happen. It's just one incident. It won't happen in subsequent wars." But it has been replicated in subsequent wars.

Furthermore, when they were preparing for the war in 1991, the Americans worried that if Iraq started a ground war first, they themselves would not have time to prepare for the other kind of war and would suffer heavy casualties.

The Americans recruited warfare simulation experts who simulated about 200 different versions of the Iraq war. Twenty-two were selected. Then 3. And, finally, one – the last, which said that if the Americans fought a non-contact war it would be over in 35 days with no casualties and no use of ground forces.

The Americans launched such a war. And sure enough: albeit in 38 and not 35 days, it was virtually over. But in an interview CENTCOM Commander General Schwarzkopf admitted that he had faced a difficult choice. Why had he taken half a million rangers and infantry there if they did not participate in the war?

How could he take them back to the US afterwards when they had not participated at all?

He puts them in tanks and on armored personnel carriers and simulates a desert offensive toward Baghdad, calling the operation “Desert Storm.” They went on the offensive for four days, that is, they just traveled over the desert toward Baghdad, and, as the American experts I met told me, the reason the offensive came to halt was not that the Iraqi army surrendered but that the Iraqi nation surrendered: they simply could not take all the prisoners and were forced to stop.

But the war was deemed to be at an end and all those who had traveled across the desert for four days returned to the US victorious: they were greeted as victors whether or not they had had any part in the victory.

That is why the Persian Gulf War came as a surprise even to the Americans themselves. This was their first experience of such a war and it made them think: and what if we fight that way from now on – remote, non-contact warfare? And they started to do that in all subsequent wars.

And the war in Yugoslavia, which I call the war *type* of the future, was a remote non-contact war.

It can be divided tentatively into two periods: the first six weeks and the second five weeks – a total of 11 weeks, or 78 days.

The first six weeks saw remote non-contact warfare. Approximately 1,500 high precision cruise missiles were used, launched from very far away: not one aircraft or ship entered Yugoslavia’s AAD impact zone. The AAD was itself destroyed in the first days.

Why? It came as a revelation to us, including myself, that the Americans used the fact that all AAD systems in the world, including the Russian system, are based on active radar. You can’t destroy an aircraft if the radar can’t detect it. If other locators do not detect it. If you don’t aim an air defense missile at it.

The Americans used this. They launched several Lacrosse satellites over the theater of combat and picked up each time radar was switched on on the ground. Then they would immediately launch a projectile at the emission source from an air- or sea-based platform, thereby destroying 75% of the AAD systems in one day.

The Serbs were terrified. They had virtually no AAD. They switched off what was left and hid underground. So some of it was preserved but for the most part the air defense system had been destroyed precisely because it was radar-based. I'll jump ahead and say that this is very dangerous for Russia because our AAD is also based on exactly the same system.

High precision cruise missiles were launched from a distance of 80-800 kilometers and struck all targets very accurately. There were 900 economic and military infrastructure targets in Serbia and Kosovo, and the 1,500 high precision cruise missiles sent there were something like 75-80% effective against them all.

The result: there was no theater of combat in this war. When is there one? When the opponent is engaged. But there was no battle here: one side strikes from aerospace and the other cannot repulse the attack; it has nothing with which to repulse it. In my books I call this a "theater of war," which differs from a theater of combat in that one side holds sway, while in a theater of combat both sides are active. The Americans are way ahead of all countries, including Russia: they have theaters of war but no theaters of combat. For the time being, no one can effectively oppose them.

Take note: inasmuch as the Yugoslav armed forces lagged behind the US forces, they were still in the last fourth generation of warfare, which is based on ground troops.

The Americans surprised: they did not attack the troops at all. Over the 78 days, Milosevic's troops in Serbia and Kosovo suffered a total of 524 fatalities, and 37 went missing. Less than one per cent of materiel was put out of action. This was collateral damage; no one went after them specifically. The Americans saved their high precision weapons and only used them against the

economy and military infrastructure. You may have read expert commentary in our military publications that the Americans did not fight well and that Yugoslavia's armed forces were left intact and unharmed. You need to understand that they were left in that state because they were not hit by a high precision strike.

It was not only radars that were destroyed. The electronic warfare systems, computer centers, television, radio stations, and retransmitters – everything related to direct or indirect emission – was destroyed.

What is more – and this was quite a surprise for us - the Americans conducted operations against Yugoslavia's information resources. They even destroyed paper resources in addition to all emitting resources: publishing houses were also destroyed. The public should not be informed about the true course of the war.

The Americans resorted to deception, I would even call it trickery, and delivered a precision strike against the Embassy of China. This was a provocative action. We saw how people protested against the strike. It was incomprehensible why it had been inflicted. The world was in uproar, the Americans apologized and paid China 28 million dollars for the destroyed embassy and the six diplomats that were killed, and the racket died down. But take note: on February 22, 2000, the US shuttle Endeavor lands at a base in Florida and out come six astronauts – all Pentagon cartographers.

The Pentagon had received a billion dollars from the US Congress to correct the supposedly inaccurate maps that were used in the Chinese Embassy strike. They said: "It was an accident: we were working from outdated paper maps that showed a Yugoslav military target there – it had to be destroyed." In point of fact this was insidious guile: they needed to pry a billion dollars out of Congress to create a three-dimensional electronic world map.

Such a map was created. What did they do on the Endeavor? The earth was photographed from two points 60 meters apart. This is a stereoscopic photo. You may remember pictures like those taken with special devices where you could see a person or a place. The

Americans therefore photographed our planet from 56 degrees south latitude to 60 degrees north latitude: all around with a 30 x 30 meter resolution and a three-dimensional electronic image.

In other words, they used the billion dollars that Congress gave them to correct this supposed error to make an electronic map of the world with which they can strike a country, city, building or window. The very high resolution – down to a few centimeters – makes it possible to pinpoint where to send cruise missiles.

This is very dangerous: no one other than the Americans has such a map. I think that they did this not in order to wage war against a specific opponent but against any opponent, regardless of location.

Such were the first six weeks of the war. Many new high precision cruise missiles and other weapons were tested; a sea-air-space operation was conducted - for the first time in human history. We are paying close attention to this operation because it provides new strategies for waging war.

The war shifted gears over the next five weeks. It was as if the Americans returned to fourth generation warfare. They used manned missions to finish off still intact objects. But the second period did not focus on finishing off but rather on putting all the aircrews of the US air force, air force reserve, and several NATO countries through that. The active duty pilots still have 10-15 years to fight, perhaps using the contact method. And they were given a chance to gain experience. They flew to Yugoslavia in civilian clothes, changed, and did 10-15 sorties in a combat aircraft – once with an instructor and then without; they struck targets that had been marked for them.

They often made mistakes. As you will recall, tractor columns, refugees, and hospitals were bombed during the war in Yugoslavia. This was done by those from the reserve who flew in on assignment. It was reservists and not active duty pilots who bombed civilian targets. But on the plus side they had so much practice that for all intents and purposes the US air force now has two pilot contingents: active duty and reserve with combat experience.

I therefore called the war in Yugoslavia the war of the future. This is the kind of war for which we need to prepare.

The ongoing 2003 war in Iraq has a completely different profile. There for the first time the Americans' objective was regime change, so they had to transport over there ground forces that are still fighting, for example in Al-Fallujah.

This war is not going to be conclusive. The Americans are going to lose and they will leave there after suffering enormous casualties. No puppet regime will last there; everything will come full circle.

And they are currently actively preparing for remote non-contact warfare. Take note: the Pentagon makes 50-60 billion dollars in remote non-contact high precision weaponry purchases every year. And this is going to continue until 2010. There is fierce competition between the manufacturers.

But the Pentagon does not buy weapons that have not been combat-tested. Wars are needed to conduct experiments and issue "certificates of quality" for armaments. Bush has retained the presidency and we are going to witness many more conflicts which will be models of remote non-contact warfare. This may be in North Korea, Iran or other countries; they are being portrayed as outlaw countries that need to be attacked.

The Americans have started an intensive build up of their air force and navy. I can say as an exaggeration that the US navy won all the ground theater remote non-contact wars - in Iraq, in Afghanistan - they were all won by the US navy, which was primarily responsible for destroying the opponent's economy and military infrastructure. Not the air force but the navy. That is why the US is actively developing these two branches, and we need to pay attention: we are far behind. There is a covert high precision arms race in which we are as yet lagging behind.

War coordinates have left Earth and gone to aerospace. Earth is no longer a combat theater. Take note: not one US soldier set foot in Yugoslavia. US ground forces had no role in any of these wars.

The US now has a total of only three mechanized divisions, two armored divisions, and one air assault division. They are all currently in Afghanistan or Iraq. There is no one to replace the soldiers from those divisions: the Americans have no more ground forces. There's one more division somewhere but it is obviously being kept for emergencies. That's it.

The Americans have shifted to a totally different armed forces structure. Fundamental concepts such as "front," "rear," and "forward line" are changing. You will recall that these words were on everybody's lips during any war, whether people understood them or not. They are now passé and being replaced by just two phrases: "target" and "non-target" for a high precision remote strike.

And what happens if a war is between countries that belong to different generations – the 6th or 4th? To answer this question, look at the war in Yugoslavia: it's very easy to see what the outcome would be; the example is quite clear.

This is why we need a completely new defense shield. We do not need the AAD we currently have; we need an anti-cruise missile defense system, which we do not have. We need aircraft capable of long-range intercept of missile delivery aircraft before they enter the launch zone. That's where they need to be destroyed. After all, if an aircraft launches 50 high precision cruise missiles, it's impossible to chase each one – and they can travel in the thousands. The delivery aircraft need to be brought down. This is a totally new and unique problem for which we are not prepared. And we are not the only ones.

Perhaps aircraft need to be developed in a completely new way. We need more than air refueling: we need air rearmament; we need unmanned high precision weaponry delivery aircraft. Furthermore, an aircraft spends an average of 10-12% of its life in the air; the rest of time it's on the ground. We need to invert this ratio so that an aircraft spends 90% of its life in the air and only 10% on the ground for maximum efficiency. We are not yet able to build such aircraft.

By the way, Lockheed Martin, which you have probably heard about, is developing these. In 2008 they will put out the F-35, the latest piloted airplane similar to the F-16 or F-17 and, according to them, switch to unmanned aircraft that will deliver high precision missiles to the launch range.

Another American company has announced that it is creating hypersound aircraft with a flight range of up to 22,000 kilometers at a speed of approximately 14,500 kilometers per hour.

These planes can literally deliver high precision projectiles to any continent in 1.5-2 hours.

The role of aerospace defense has been growing. It must be truly reliable in defending a country and its economy.

With respect to Russia: Russia is boundless. Its economic potential is dispersed and grouped by region. It has a powerful economic infrastructure. And all this needs to be safeguarded. Including by an anti-cruise missile defense system.

Last year I spoke at a major international forum in Omsk on dual use technologies. I delivered a report on a subject similar to the one about which I am speaking today. Afterwards I met with the director of a plant and asked him: "Do you know the critical points of your plant, the ones to hit to paralyze the whole enterprise?" He said: "I do. I have eighteen of them." And that is precisely where the eighteen cruise missiles will go. And if the critical points are not safeguarded, the plant will be no more; even though it will stand like a shrine, it will not be operating.

We therefore need non-firing defense of the economy, the critical points, to be precise, where missiles could be targeted. I have named this non-firing defense the civilian armed forces. These points can be defended with camouflage shields and smoke screens; they can literally be defended with fences or electronic noise – whatever. We will have to create these civilian armed forces, perhaps under the Ministry for Emergency Situations, otherwise we will be left without an economy.

The navy needs to be developed in a completely different direction. It must move away from 4th generation contact warfare to remote non-contact warfare. The navy must be Russia's main strike component. It must have its own bases, weapons, surface craft and submarines, and space-based view of the theater situation in order to conduct strike actions.

We will lose our economic potential if we do not have the long arms to reach any opponent, from whatever quarters he threatens us. That is why the navy must be, as I have tentatively called it, both an arsenal and a launching pad in the world's oceans.

What real dangers can I list briefly?

First: Russia is behind in warfare by a generation. We need to catch up with the Americans right away. If we are unable to make any headway in this area, we will only fall further behind.

Second: A massive strike against Russia can come from any side, from anywhere. While we used to defend ourselves from the west, from the east, and from the north, we now need reliable all-around defense against high precision strikes. The opponent is going to have the capability to deliver such an array of high precision missiles that some of them are bound to find their critical points.

I would like to share three statistics with you: In 2010, the US will have about 30,000 high precision cruise missiles and the capability to wage war against any country by launching 1,000 cruise missiles every 24 hours at the opponent's economic targets. By 2020-2030, the US will be able to sustain that kind of war for 60-90 days. And we need to anticipate that because their economic potential will allow them to stockpile enough high precision weaponry to destroy the economy of any country.

We need completely new communications. The danger of the present situation lies in the fact that our communications are largely based on radio links. We need to switch to fiber optic cable, underground cable, satellite communication, and laser communication. Radio will be put out of commission immediately.

We need space forces. We are behind the Americans in space system development. Even though we have long been comfortable in space, we are falling short militarily. We currently have about 90 different satellites for different purposes but we need about 200 to support remote non-contact warfare, and about 400 for global support. First and foremost we need surveillance satellites and optical, TV and radio surveillance. And definitely a global navigation satellite system - GLONASS, which, according to our press reports, is supposedly being developed, and we will have around 18 satellites in 2007, which can, in principle, serve our initial purposes somewhat.

Third: Our military industrial complex is in a past generation weapons loop. The weapons that it manufactures are salable, if anyone is buying them, but they are totally ineffective for non-contact remote warfare. We need completely different weapons. The MIC has to be reorganized.

Fourth: Strange though it may be, we are behind in the training of scientific, pedagogic and military personnel. We are not training personnel for the new generation warfare. Nobody in any military school in the country knows anything about remote non-contact warfare. All our personnel are being trained for the 4th generation trench wars of the past. Yet it would be so simple to at least organize a series of lectures on these subjects.

Fifth: We do not have a network of airfields along the perimeter of the country from which aircraft can take off to intercept long-range delivery carriers. We need a lot of them; this calls for a large investment.

And the final conclusion: Russia needs completely different armed forces. While our armed forces currently operate in the ground-sea-air spheres, we need armed forces made up of two functional types: strategic-strike and strategic-defense forces. We must also definitely have mobile forces, a unified command and control system, and strategic reserves – but not for an infantry war.

We are not going to encounter anything like the wars for which we are still preparing.

Thank you, that concludes my report; I am ready to answer your questions.

DISCUSSION OF LECTURE

Participants:

Vladimir Slipchenko (Lecturer)

Vitaly Leibin (Moderator)

Dmitry Alekseyev

Boris Sklyarenko

Lyudmila Vakhnina

Aleksandra Khavina

Mikhail Roitberg

Vyacheslav Aldonesov

Sergei Sidorov

et al.

Leibin: Vladimir Ivanovich, I would like to clarify whether I understood everything correctly.

First, as I understand it, since the history of warfare has not ended, we need to understand what it will be like in the next generation, even if we don't know who is going to be our opponent. For the simple reason that no one has abolished warfare, its history is ongoing. The second thing that I understood is that this warfare will be of the remote and non-contact type.

It stands to reason that the economy and armed forces can be aligned with that forecast. What I do not understand about the forecast is this:

First, will local wars be used as an instrument of international conflicts in the next generation warfare? We are involved in one at present. Is this period over or not? Then they are not fighting with high precision weapons but managing a conflict that is not taking place on their territory and in which their forces are not engaged.

The second thing I didn't understand: It seems to me that the technology of non-contact warfare does not describe the final stage. How exactly is a regime to be changed? The picture of the remote non-contact warfare in Yugoslavia shows that, in addition to military technology, political technology was also brought into play that helped to change the regime at the end of the war. High precision weapons are not going to be of much use here, and there's no such technology in Iraq. How do we master that technology, if we need to?

And third: Can we economize? Since sixth generation warfare is, by your definition, probably horrendously expensive, can we somehow economize? Imagine a combat scenario where one side is at level six and the other side is working to reach level six or is working on methods to counteract that level. Is it realistic to imagine selecting a strategy that could counter an opponent that is waging a sixth generation war even if we ourselves are not in that generation?

Slipchenko: Thank you. I counted six questions... I will try to answer them one by one.

I would like to point out once again that in remote non-contact warfare you shouldn't be looking for a specific opponent. You need to be prepared for warfare against any opponent, regardless of location. Which is why the armed forces and materiel have to be developed so that they can reach the opponent wherever he is. If we are prepared for such warfare, we will not lose. If we focus on a specific opponent, that will probably be harder.

In any event, the Americans do not focus on any particular opponent when they build their armed forces. They just boost their potential to wage new generation warfare *on our planet*, as evidenced, among other things, by the map.

Second question. Remote non-contact warfare is becoming a standard in wars of the future. These wars are the prerogative of and a priority for all countries. If you focus on and prepare for them you may not lose a war of that kind. If you prepare for a war of the past, looking back at what might still appear in the future, that, in my opinion, is a losing option.

The economy and remote non-contact warfare: Yes, it has to produce huge returns. We discussed this with leading military economists and came to the conclusion that Russia has to spend five gross national products to be prepared for new generation warfare. Not the budgets but everything that Russia possesses has to be added together and then increased fivefold. The cost of preparing for this warfare is very high. So we have to use the current military budget very rationally. It must not be spent on anything that will not be useful in the future.

Sixth generation warfare and local wars. Yes, local wars are still on the agenda; they will be everywhere. But they can be waged in different ways: local border conflicts and others. They can be fought by the old contact method. I have written in this regard that we should not eliminate our ground forces but rather should transfer them to the border guards, to the internal troops. Let them stay there and prepare to repulse aggression in the border region.

First of all, we keep ground troops as a type, and, secondly, they are not part of the army but of other structures. Local border wars can then be fought in the old "Cossack" way.

The Americans have conducted an interested experiment. You didn't ask about this; I just remembered it. They simulated a situation in which peacekeeping functions were carried out without soldiers, without the blue berets, using only high precision weapons.

A dividing line was formed on the terrain between the conflicting sides; high precision weapons were aimed at the line and reconnaissance aircraft flew over on a regular basis. And a warning was issued that anyone who crossed the line with hostile intentions would be destroyed. This means of carrying out peacekeeping functions with high precision weapons is already being developed.

So some local wars will also be waged with high precision weapons.

Of course, remote non-contact warfare requires an enormous number of new technologies. The entire economic process must focus on creating very expensive high precision weaponry. And the generational shift is not going to happen very quickly: we will have to stockpile these weapons very slowly because the manufacturing technology is quite expensive.

And the final question. Of course war is expensive. With respect to the regime in Yugoslavia, the people themselves changed it. The formula for a war victory is still the same one I described. But what did the Americans do: they destroyed 80% of Yugoslavia's economic potential, and the Yugoslav people themselves changed the political regime. The armed forces were unscathed but they fell apart and are now virtually nonexistent because there is no economy. That's a remote war victory for you.

To win a contact war would have required, first of all, defeating the opponent's armed forces then destroying its economic

potential, and then changing the regime. Now that's all done in another way.

Alekseyev: The issue that interests me is this: You already mentioned the information media; as far as I can tell, non-contact warfare is a sign of the globalizing economy. Another sign is the development of information and telecommunications systems and related infrastructure. Hence my two questions.

First: What, in your opinion, is the role of information communication (mobile communication, telecommunications, the Internet) in such warfare? After all, it is common knowledge that the Americans relied a great deal on support from far-flung information networks.

And the second question: What, in your view, are the economic prerequisites for developing any size military conflict using such weapons on a global scale (again, as it relates to using those types of information systems)?

Slipchenko: The US has simultaneously waged an information battle in all the wars it has fought for the past 13 years. That battle is one element of remote non-contact warfare. And I believe that information is one weapon in that warfare. Information has become a destructive weapon just like a bayonet, bullet or projectile.

That is why the US has been creating an information potential that can suppress that of the opponent while still remaining intact. But the Americans have gone further in this respect than anyone else. They have begun to suppress the opponent's information potential using not only information but also firepower. Plus powerful jamming.

The information battle is thus being waged along two lines: the battle of communication media and destruction of the opponent's information centers using firepower.

Second: The US is trying to protect its information media from being hit by those of the opponent. It so happens that currently

they do not have a worthy opponent capable of disrupting the information resources of the United States of America. Indeed, in the information battle as well the US is ahead of all other countries by about a generation of warfare. And precisely because of globalization of production, this information resource is as powerful as a high precision weapon. This is the first attribute of the new warfare.

I can give my assumptions as regards a new major military conflict in the next few years.

First: We could very soon witness such a strike against North Korea, more precisely against its nuclear resources – Yongbyon and other centers; a non-contact strike could also be launched on the remaining military infrastructure centers.

Second: It can be assumed that the next strike will be against Iran, which is developing its own nuclear technology. The Americans can strike Iran in the same way that Israel struck Iraq's nuclear center in Ozirag; that was in 1981.

And, finally, "the first berry I take, the second I look at, and the third I imagine": China could become the third berry in future. It is very worried about a high precision non-contact non-nuclear strike against its economy.

That is the only way to stop China on its way to military and economic hegemony. The Americans have no other methods; they are horrified to see that China is not only catching up with but also overtaking them in some areas. They could decide to gamble, which is why the Chinese are closely studying that which we are discussing here today.

But these are my purely hypothetical assumptions as an observer. I consider North Korea the only real current candidate for a strike. This could happen next year or a year later, while George Bush is president. Everything else is for beyond the next few years.

Maybe this will be in 2010 or later when the Americans will have built out their system to the point of protracted non-contact warfare

with any opponent on our planet. They are not there yet. They are prepared for an experiment but not yet for full-blown remote warfare, for example against Iran.

Sklyarenko: Esteemed lecturer, I have three questions.

First: What do you think of the term “environmental warfare” and are you in favor of it; do you think it is warranted? If so, how do you rate it with respect to contact, remoteness, and so on?

Leibin: What’s that? Could you describe it in two words?

Slipchenko: I understood the question.

Sklyarenko: Then I think the lecturer will respond to you.

Second question. Does the concept of scale exist in historical military science? Not in the cartographical sense but in the sense of proportionality. How in that case does one evaluate, relative to the results of combat, that which you described as the evolution of combat, the shift in the stages of development of warfare?

And the third question. It is common knowledge that in the Middle Ages the attacker understood that a town could not be taken just like that; he often had to resort to a simple technique: since most of the town area was on the coast or on islands or were surrounded by large bodies of water, the attacker would build a dam below and flood the town. Where do such examples fit in within the evolution of wars that you described?

Slipchenko: First, regarding environmental warfare. I think that this term is incorrect if we take just environmental warfare by itself. The environment could become an instrument in another type of war. I wrote in one of my books that this could be the next, seventh generation warfare. I would expand on an idea that was considered here: this will be information warfare where information is in effect a weapon. But this information is used to trigger a seismic cataclysm in specific tectonic faults of the earth’s surface. Genetic methods are used to target a particular race. Or

to destroy the ozone layer or burn oxygen a certain distance from the earth, triggering an environmental cataclysm.

But wars like that are difficult to control. It's impossible to win that war because the other end of the stick will strike the one who used these methods. That is why these methods may be used hypothetically but they won't ever be actually used because they are uncontrollable.

Nikita Nikolayevich Moiseyev, our eminent scientist and academician who has, unfortunately, passed on, came up with a formula (it was created for nuclear weapons but I think it is applicable here as well). He said: "Whoever uses nuclear weapons first will perish second, even if there is no retaliatory strike." Something similar has also been said about environmental warfare.

Scale of warfare. Fourth generation contact warfare used to require a very large scale. Remember how it was conducted: from the Kolsky Peninsula to the Balkans, defensive and offensive operations were taking place virtually simultaneously throughout all of Europe. This was the front of World War II.

Regarding remote non-contact warfare, it can be waged on a very small scale but with very large strategic objectives of wiping an entire national economic system off the face of the earth. And if a nation loses its economy, it ceases to exist as a civilized environment. That is why such wars can be on a smaller scale but with enormous strategic consequences.

I think that the revolution in the military and sixth generation warfare will present us with many different options for using this weapon, for both a specific target and an entire country.

As for the fortress that you suggested should be taken by flooding: I think that this relates to 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th generation contact warfare. In remote non-contact warfare, high precision weapons would blanket the fortress with no need for any flooding. It would be blanketed and each object on its territory would be the target of a high precision strike and cease to exist as a mechanism of war.

Vakhnina: Two questions.

Even though you said that we should think about a high precision strike from any opponent, the reality is that one could only come from the US; there are no other candidates. Hence the question: Do you believe that nuclear weapons have lost their role as a deterrent? And the second question. We are being told that we are already waging a war against terrorism. You did not deal with this issue. That is an entirely different war: high precision weapons are probably powerless against suicide bombers and saboteurs.

Lastly, some people still call China our potential opponent: turns out that threats can be many and varied.

Slipchenko: Thank you. I must say that you need high precision weapons to fight any opponent. If those weapons are unable to hit any opponent on our planet, we don't need them.

And the Americans are developing just such weapons without focusing on any particular opponent. The opponent will appear later and the weapons will be used.

With respect to nuclear weapons: yes, they are still a deterrent. But take note: the Americans are already working on the theory of strategic non-nuclear deterrence. Nuclear weapons can be used to scare but not to deter. If nuclear weapons are used as a deterrent, any deterrence will come to an end because irreversible processes will then ensue.

But strategic high precision non-nuclear weaponry can be used to scare and punish. That is why the US (I was there not long ago at a major conference) is looking closely at strategic non-nuclear deterrence, which can be used more flexibly to strike or punish an aggressor precisely for deterrent purposes.

Now terrorism. High precision weapons can be in some way effective in the war against terrorism. As you will recall, the Americans made high precision strikes against terrorist bases in Saudi Arabia. But they did not achieve their objective since you have to know exactly where the terrorists are located or

concentrated at that moment. High precision weapons can reach anywhere but you have to know exactly where the target is located.

I have written about this, including in my books. Terrorism must be fought with its own methods. While Israel is fighting terrorism with other methods – dispatching tanks and bulldozers and razing the houses where the suicide bombers were born – a hundred other suicide bombers sprout up on the ruins. Israel is not fighting terrorism; it is fighting the aftermath of terrorism.

In order to fight terrorism itself, you have to penetrate terrorism's genetic structure, its DNA. And fight it there, at its inception. We don't have anyone who can fight terrorism like that. People are afraid of those methods. So we will forever be fighting the consequences of terrorism rather than terrorism itself.

As far as high precision weapons are concerned, they may be used from time to time, but I question their effectiveness in the fight against terrorism.

With respect to China, I would venture to say that we should see China as an ally rather than an opponent because we have more in common with China than with the US. So, yes, I agree with you: we should focus on an opponent like the United States of America. I wouldn't focus on China. I would look at China as a partner, and maybe even as an ally as well: the United States of America is going to be as much a threat to China as to us.

Khavina: To go back to terrorism. Can it be seen as a remote warfare option for the poor? And the second question. Do plans to destroy an opponent's economy take into account that principle (that whoever uses nuclear weapons first will perish second)? After all, destroying Iraq also affected oil prices and the value of the dollar. If you destroy Russia's economy, the consequences will also be considerable because the whole world economy depends on Russia's economy in one way or another, even though we account for just 1-2% of the world's gross domestic product. How is this factored in?

Slipchenko: I think that poor countries will, of course, never have the remote non-contact weaponry to wage a modern day war. The world is already divided into two parts: those who will be able to conduct remote non-contact warfare, and those who will never be able to do so.

Poor countries will, of course, remain in the fourth generation, and they are going to try to get other weapons of mass destruction – chemical, biological, and maybe nuclear - by any means possible. I expect that there will be a great interest in creating nuclear arms, especially in countries that will never be able to reach the level of non-contact warfare. That is why the world keeps splintering, and it is going to develop chaotically toward weapons of mass destruction. This is inevitable.

If an economy is undermined, as was the case in Yugoslavia, this is what will happen: the Americans allocated five billion dollars in aid for the defeated Yugoslavia. Of this, four were collected for earlier debts. How can one billion dollars rebuild an economy that has been 80% destroyed?

The country is, of course, in a very difficult situation. The economy is not going to be rebuilt any time soon. It will take even longer to rebuild the armed forces. Yugoslavia ceased to exist as a country; it fell apart into numerous small states...

Danger is a situation in which there is a major possibility of a strike, and the relevant designs and tests have been done, and a threat is when a particular opponent has the capability to strike our country.

That is why I did not base my lecture on threats but rather on the dangers that currently exist for our country, on the assumption that somebody somewhere is developing something that we do not have.

Now again the matter of communications. Yes, I think that information resources are weapons. And high precision weapons cannot by themselves destroy targets if they do not use information resources. Information is the most powerful means of using high

precision weapons. With information you can destroy a target; without information, the weapon is just not usable. That is why information resources must be created in parallel with high precision weapons. They should exist as a unit.

I have a written question: "*Your thoughts on the objectives of the Iraq war are just speculation.*"

No, this is incorrect. I recommend that you read my book, which will be out in December of this year. I prove everything there: I just don't have the chance to explain everything in detail now. **My conclusions are not based on speculation but on arguments and facts which suggest that all these wars were started in order to test high precision weapons and not to achieve some declared objectives, which didn't happen.**

Roitberg: Thank you very much, Vladimir Ivanovich, and the organizers for this fine lecture.

I have two questions and they are both fairly big.

First question. The current situation is reminiscent of the situation in 1945 when only the US had the bomb. And it was clear then what our people did: they stole that bomb then made the H-bomb and developed delivery vehicles, resulting in deterrence, in parity.

Parity was maintained until the 50s-60s – you know better. I have a strong suspicion that, based on what you told us, we will never achieve parity. Forgive my pessimism: I am deliberately overstating. Knowing our technological level and the level of the American economy, I don't see any hope of achieving parity.

The question arises as to what is a realistic objective for us in this situation.

Second question, second topic.

I would like to go back to two terms which have definite negative connotations. One is "arms race" and the other is "new thinking."

To follow your logic, we should start an arms race, which we already did once before with results that are known to everyone. Maybe I'm mistaken but I get the feeling that the Soviet Union simply fell apart trying to catch up with the US. This is like a path to nowhere.

The alternative to that was détente and what was called new thinking, that is, an attempt to draw up contractual relations to achieve weapons deterrence through non-military means.

What you told us indicates one thing: the Americans have become too aggressive and are using war as a testing ground. All in all, murk and absolute amorality. Is there any real potential for politicians to bring moral pressure to bear, to use what is known as popular diplomacy, and so on?

So the second topic is a question as to whether there is any potential in diplomacy, or are we living in an extremely pragmatic world: if you have a stick, we'll talk to you; if you don't have a stick, we won't.

Slipchenko: I won't deal with what you said about how we borrowed the atomic bomb and reached parity: that is indeed so.

I'll say this: Strange though it may be, very effective high precision weapons have been developed and tested in our country. Very effective. You even saw these tests at the beginning of the second Chechen campaign when we struck targets in Chechnya with high precision weapons in exactly the same way as the Americans did: "X" the target and off goes a cruise missile.

We have a very powerful potential of such developed systems in our country. I don't know how much that missile costs here but an American high precision cruise missile costs one million dollars. They need 30 billion dollars for a 30-day war. How much our missile costs, I don't know, but some of our designs are far superior to the Americans' in effectiveness and applications. I can assure you of that. I know: I have met with experts who said this.

But, first of all, we do not have the financial resources to mass-produce them.

Secondly, the military industrial complex in our country does not, unfortunately, operate as it did in Soviet times (when it was told what to do, and did it); it now operates according to this formula: "We give the armed forces what they need and not what they ask for." This is a distorted formula. Even though the MIC is capable of producing beautiful powerful weapons, it is still schlepping together what brings in revenue because the complex has switched to business mode. And the state is not yet in a position to mass-produce what has been designed.

I agree that we were successful in contractual relations on nuclear arms. We have START-1, START-2 and START-3. The United Nations is involved; all countries are involved in reducing and blocking nuclear arms.

But as far as high precision weapons are concerned, there is not a single agreement in the world. I spoke at the United Nations on January 25, 2002, about the fact that not one agreement has been reached to ban high precision weaponry. There are no agreements to stop the manufacture, testing and use of high precision weapons in wars and conflicts. The Americans will never agree to reduce or block their high precision weapons.

They can agree to unilateral reduction of their nuclear arms because you don't need a lot of nuclear weapons to deter an aggressor. You just need to have them. But you have to have very many high precision weapons to fight a remote non-contact war so it's highly unlikely that any agreement is ever going to be reached to reduce these types of arms. I think conflicts are brewing here and future arms reduction talks are going to be about blocking high precision weaponry: there are likely to be problems.

Question from the Floor: Good evening; thank you for the lecture – it was very interesting. However, I would still like to return to a topic which, not you, but the people who asked you questions touched on briefly today.

Terrorism. Everything that you say about high precision weapons could come about in future. But still the main problem in our life today is terrorism. You mentioned this in passing but still: do you have any thoughts on how terrorism can be combated, specifically by Russia?

Take the United States again: You said that they are head and shoulders above all other countries, that they have high precision weaponry; but I'm afraid that they are going to get another September 11 very soon. This could be something quite unexpected – a chemical attack or some such thing. The same for Russia. We are going to be having all kinds of terrorist acts for a very long time and all that is now much more frightening than all these global and star wars that you are talking about. Do you have any thoughts on what to do about terrorism?

Slipchenko: Thank you. I think that if you link terrorism and the capability of blocking it with high precision weaponry and remote non-contact warfare, I have already said that this is ineffective. What is more, I think that the war against terrorism is not a function of the armed forces but of the special services – Federal Security Service (FSB), Ministry of the Interior, intelligence, and financial intelligence. And that's it. The armed forces are not meant to fight terrorism.

We declare, as the Minister of Defense stated recently, that the armed forces should fight terrorism. I don't think this is a function of the armed forces. Experts using specialist methods should fight terrorism. The armed forces are not trained to fight terrorism. They do not operate by those methods. They can use tanks, artillery, and aviation – but that is not combating terrorism; it is rather combating its consequences. That is why I don't think that it is the task of the armed forces to fight terrorism.

We could only smile when NATO presumed to say that it was going to fight international terrorism. NATO is not the right instrument, the right mechanism to fight terrorism. They can fight against forces that are just like them; they can wage contact and non-contact war. But terrorism is everywhere and nowhere. Its streams – financial, weapons – are of a completely different kind.

That is why terrorism must be fought using the methods of the special services and not those of the Ministry of Defense.

I think that terrorism is indeed a dreadful phenomenon for Russia as well. But it is the experts who must combat it. And we only compromise the armed forces when we throw them into a battle which they cannot win. That is in effect profanation.

Aldonesov: I would like to expand on what the esteemed lecturer has said by answering the previous question on international terrorism.

There are many myths on this issue. We held a round table this year at the Academy of Geopolitical Problems where seventy people from the armed services tried to answer the same question: what is terrorism? Many people spoke and the session lasted five hours, but no definition of terrorism was given that was balanced, synthetic, and legally valid. I spoke at the end and I can now briefly recap what I said then.

This year Colonel General Mylnikov, who was appointed director of the Commonwealth of Independent States' anti-terrorism center, said the following in an interview with a journalist: "I don't know what terrorism is or what terror is." This is the director of the center! "But I am not the only one who doesn't know. Not even the United Nations Security Council's anti-terrorist committee knows." They are currently preparing a memorandum which, God willing, will be published in 2005 and will attempt to define terrorism.

Why I brought up myths. In 2003, the UN published a report giving statistics on the victims of international terrorism (with no clear understanding of what terrorism is). The report reached Bush's desk and a scandal broke out. They were astounded when they saw the number of victims of international terrorism: turns out that in 2003 about 357 people perished at the hands of international terrorism throughout the entire world. Approximately twice that number were wounded.

The scandal was enormous: prior to this they had spent tens of millions of dollars and set up countless various organizations, including the Department of Homeland Security headed by Ridge, who resigned two or three days ago, which is symptomatic, given Bush's recent election. This was wildly incongruous. A mountain gave birth to a mouse.

The report was amended in the wake of the scandal. Guess what: the figures doubled, that is, the casualties were now around 685 killed and about 900 wounded.

But what are we talking about? If 35,000 people are killed every year in car accidents in our country alone, and throughout the world, even if you double the figure, about 700 people are killed as a result of incomprehensible acts that have not even been clearly defined – what are we talking about?

This is a classic version of information warfare. The events of September 11 were mentioned here. An information bomb was used. What happened on the day that these tragic events occurred in New York? The main American TV networks were squealing out the numbers: CNN, CBS, ABC, NBC, Fox News. By the way, none of our TV companies were there so we watched the events only through American eyepieces and telescopic lenses. Remember the psychological attack waged against the entire world.

First announcement: "New York has been sunken by terrorists." After five minutes, it's only Manhattan that that has been sunken. Fifteen more minutes and Manhattan is alive and well and only the World Trade Center had been hit.

"Two hundred thousand people have perished in the World Trade Center." After some time, it's not 200,000 but 50,000. Why 50,000? That's the total number of employees in both skyscrapers, the north and south towers. And then: the more you look, the less you find. And finally we get these figures: a total of about 2,750 people, including 350 firefighters, perished.

According to UN reports, 2001 was the absolute champion, and approximately 3,700 people were killed in terrorist attacks. But if you subtract the number that died during the terrorist attack in New York and the 175 who died in the Pentagon, you get a quite laughable figure on average.

That is, what are we talking about? If we recall how many are dying of AIDS, how many are dying from drug abuse, how many are dying of alcohol syndromes, how many of diabetes, etc... - what place would international terrorism take?

It is wildly incongruous. As soon as they can grab a microphone, all the world's presidents start to recite international terrorism, international terrorism, international terrorism like "Our Father." And where is it, this international terrorism?

This is a very serious issue. Until we have a precise, clear, and legally valid definition of international terrorism that is accepted by all international authorities, we are going to be talking about myths. There is a myth about bin Laden, and there is a myth about Hussein, whose whereabouts no one knows. That is, we are being fooled.

On the issue of high precision weapons orientation and international terrorism: these are two perpendicular things; they have nothing to do with each other.

Sergei Vasilyevich Sidorov: First question. What kind of explosives do the Americans use in their remote non-contact weapons?

And the second question. There was a report in the mass media, which not everyone noticed, that one of the goals which the Chinese communists set for themselves at their last congress was to retake Taiwan within the next five years. Everybody knows that the US is the guarantor of Taiwan's political sovereignty. If this is true, we are going to see yet another non-contact war in five years. Or is this just wild speculation?

Slipchenko: Thank you. With respect to the explosives in high precision weapons –explosives are now fairly powerful. Detonation power is currently about 30-50 times greater than during World War II.

They have started to use fuel-air detonation explosives. When they explode they first diffuse a substance, and then the substance explodes, and there is a thermobaric explosion that can destroy targets located, for example, in caves by rebounding off the walls. Everything in the cave perishes. The destruction is much more effective than it was in prior generation warfare.

On China. They had several scenarios for taking Taiwan. The first scenario is an assault landing. This is no longer being worked on. The second scenario is a small nuclear strike. Incidentally, China's doctrine says that it has the right to use nuclear weapons on its territory and Taiwan is considered its province: it is our territory, we do as we please. That's how they want to avoid an international atomic war. Now that, too, has gone.

It appears that the Chinese are now getting ready for a high precision non-contact strike against Taiwan's economy. The economic potential is destroyed, the Taiwanese replace Chen Shui-bian with anyone else, the political regime changes, and Taiwan, with a ruined economy, joins China. That is the scenario being considered.

But I think that that's not it. In reality the Chinese, like all Asians, have been using to their advantage all talks-related situations, so the process will more than likely turn in the direction of contractual relations. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that there will be no war between China and Taiwan because Taiwan has already invested forty billion US dollars in China's economy. Taiwan has bought a lot in China. It would be counterproductive for economic development.

Now even the Chinese are inclined to invest similar amounts in Taiwan. And an exchange of warfare will stop as soon as there is an exchange of money. The dollar will eventually swallow both

these countries and they will become a single whole. Through money but not through war.

Leibin: Unfortunately, we have to round it up here. I would like to summarize.

I understood from this presentation that the military's area of responsibility is sixth generation warfare; that neither the Duma nor the UN knows anything about terrorism, and this is not a military matter. In addition, as I understand it, there are outstanding diplomatic issues: it is not clear whether we can economize on an arms race.


Vladimir Ivanovich, perhaps you would conclude by commenting on our meeting today?

Slipchenko: Thank you. I may be repeating myself by saying that I specifically drew your attention to the perception of remote non-contact warfare as the mechanism of future wars in which Russia may be involved. This is very dangerous for our country. If we are not prepared for it, we will face a great catastrophe.

We should use the UN, of course. Unfortunately, this is not a strong mechanism that can resolve all issues, but we must start the quest for non-use of high precision weapons at the UN. If we can at least reach some contractual agreements there, we will be able to abandon rapid rearmament and actually economize by not having to do it quickly. But we will still have to move in the direction of remote non-contact warfare and I think that we simply have to know how to do it.

We do, after all, have certain funds for that but the money is still going to past generation warfare weaponry. We must do away with this mechanism. Then we will be prepared. And we will stand our ground in a confrontation with the US with nuclear weapons and whatever remote non-contact weapons [we have]. The Americans are not going to attack us; they are very fearful of even a minimal strike against their territory.

In conclusion I would like to thank the audience, which showed such interest in issues that I deal with academically. I understand that this is of concern to you as well. And if we have understood the dangers emerging on our path, that is already a good thing. I think that the purpose of this club is to have the audience leave with an understanding of what was discussed. Come with questions and leave with an understanding. That is when these lectures will be a good way for you to know what is happening in our country.



Russia in the Wars of the 20th Century

Makhmut Gareev



[Partial Summary of Gareev Lecture -- see footnote.]**

[...]objectives – is up to “the leadership of the country, creative intelligentsia, and scientists” (these are Gareev’s words; Polit.ru would say – up to its political class).

The need for a “national idea,” the task of developing a common language in which this can be discussed as a task – such is the primary thrust of Gareev’s lecture. And he asserts that the army is the institution that is generally entitled to participate in this discussion because ignoring the Russian, Soviet, and then once again Russian armed forces has already cost our country untold human lives (start of the Great Patriotic War and the war in Afghanistan).

But, says Gareev, since the political leadership is not setting goals and does not want to discuss this, I will do so. I will do it as best I can (“May I speak as a soldier?” is his main refrain) because someone has to do it. Gareev reflects on the goals using Russian military history as a starting point, and his main fixation, which was justifiably pointed out in the discussion, is that Russia has been under siege for at least 300 years. And still is.

All of Gareev’s facts serve to illustrate this thesis. The lecturer generally sees Russian history and the progression of the whole country as essentially the legacy of these very same external threats.

It is not possible to respond to these threats and wage a major war without mobilization (total mobilization, as philosopher Ernest Junger, who fought with Gareev in World War II, would have said). According to Gareev, the capability to mobilize in a timely manner is the primary criterion for all military reform plans. All other arguments are secondary.

For Gareev, the issue of whether to have a contract- or draft-based system, which came up in the discussion, should be based on these criteria. It is not a matter of abolishing or preserving the draft;

** Translator’s Note: The first part of this summary is missing from the original Russian edition.

there needs to be an understanding of how and how quickly we can train reservists who could, if necessary, be called up right away and would be able to handle modern weapons. For example, Gareev did not assert that this would take two years (as it does now) or that the Russian military system is able to accomplish that in its present state.

Perhaps Gareev and his opponents could have reached agreement on this but, unfortunately, the discussion took a different course.

When a participant in the Polit.ru forum suggests that the subject of the lecture is Gareev himself rather than military history, he is for the most part correct. March 25 showed us the self-awareness of a man who has every reason to be understood as a representative of the army expressing its problems and an understanding of the present-day situation and its historical background. This awareness may be evaluated in different ways, but we suggest that you regard this lecture in precisely this way.

LECTURE

Makhmut Gareev

The lecture and subsequent discussion took place on March 25, 2005, at the Bilingua Club as part of the Polit.ru Public Lectures project. It has been slightly abbreviated

The twentieth century was, unfortunately, very tense and chock-full of various wars and military conflicts. It suffices to say that the Russo-Japanese war took place at the very beginning of the twentieth century, followed by two world wars. Just in major conflicts alone the 20th century saw 450 local wars and armed conflicts. Agreements and treaties were concluded after each war and nations and governments hoped for lasting peace. There was no shortage of declarations and exhortations against wars and for sustained peace. But, unfortunately, wars broke out again and again.

Each war had its causes. There were, of course, also common causes that boiled down to territorial claims. But speaking generally, even when you go farther back in history, for example the Crusades in the Middle East, many wars were cloaked in ideological and religious causes but, as a rule, they had deep economic roots.

World War I began between two coalitions; initially it involved eight countries; towards the end - 35. A total of 10 million people perished in World War I, and it involved countries with a population numbering almost 1.5 billion. The war lasted four years and you know that it ended with the victory of the Triple Entente. The countries which were most enriched by the war were the United States of America, France, and Great Britain. And the worst situation was in the defeated countries, primarily Germany.

Enormous indemnity was imposed on Germany and the country's internal circles played upon it a great deal. For example, in the twenties the price of beer, wine or bread sold in stores was always posted as, say, 10 marks, with 5 or 6 marks going toward

indemnity. This made the population feel and perceive that the only reason they were living poorly was that the Treaty of Versailles had imposed heavy indemnity on the country. Unemployment was huge. The economy was in a terrible state and the nationalist forces played upon this, which eventually facilitated the rise of fascism to power. Hitler wrote in *Mein Kampf* in the twenties that Germany's primordial dream and primordial plan was a crusade to the east.

Could a second world war have been prevented? Perhaps, if the western countries and the Soviet Union had been more consistent in restraining the aggressor and had formed a united front against the imminent aggression – perhaps something could have been done. But, on the whole, the situation from today's viewpoint shows that the drive and expansion to the east in fascism and in Hitler were so deeply embedded in German politics that it was virtually impossible to prevent this expansion.

This was made worse by the fact that, following the October Revolution, and also because of the calls for worldwide revolution and the overthrow of capitalism in all countries, the West adopted a very hostile and wary attitude to the Soviet republic and did everything to push Hitler toward the East while remaining on the sidelines. The mood of the times was strongly manifest in a statement by Truman, who was vice-president of the United States of America by the beginning of the war. He stated as early as 1941, when Hitler attacked us, that if Germany is winning the US should be helping the Soviet Union, and if the Soviet Union is winning, it should be helping Germany; let them kill each other off as much as possible so that the US, along with other western countries, becomes the arbiter of the world's fate.

Much has been said and very many books have been written in both the West and our fatherland about the Soviet Union's culpability. An objective assessment shows that our country had no interest in unleashing World War II. And its leadership made every effort to delay the war and, at the very least, to keep our country from being drawn into it.

Our country did, of course, make mistakes. Inflexibility, especially vis-à-vis England and France; relations with the old democratic parties of Germany – many mistakes of all kinds were made. But still, objectively, our country had no interest in that war and, not wanting to provoke a war, Stalin concluded a non-aggression agreement with Germany in August 1939. And even on June 21 when it was obvious that Hitler would attack, he still thought that it was possible to stay the war and so did not make the troops combat ready. The Red Army regiments were in peacetime mode in forty-one. On the 22nd the Supreme High Command Headquarters issued an order to repulse the aggression but not to cross the border under any circumstances.

There have been a lot of misrepresentations claiming that the Soviet Union itself was preparing to attack and that Hitler thwarted that. How can a leader who wants to attack issue an order on the first day of a war to repulse aggression but not cross the border?!

World War II had very distinctive features that made it unlike many wars, including World War I. Take the Russo-Japanese war. They say that we lost this war, yet the Russians certainly did not lose it to the Japanese. We lost a number of battles, and even those were nominal losses: as soon as it was flanked by Japanese troops, the Russian army would retreat, even before being defeated. This was the kind of defective strategy that there was. But Russia was fully capable of fighting Japan. Why did Russia discontinue the war? Several countries pushed it into doing so; France and England pressured Russia so that it would become involved in a war in the east and weaken its positions in the west. Germany was especially persistent in this regard.

France and England fought World War I for Alsace and Lorraine, and Russia said that it was for the straits, i.e. each country could lose or gain a piece of territory in this war.

In contrast, a feature of World War II, especially as it pertained to our side and the Great Patriotic War, was that it was not about individual territories or any private interests. It was not even about life and death of statehood alone. After all, if you take the Ost Plan developed by Rosenberg, Gehring and others and approved by

Hitler, it states plainly (and this was a secret report and not some kind of propaganda piece): "Destroy 30-40 million Jews and Slavic and other nations."

30-40 million – a plan! It says that no one in the captured territories should have higher than a grade four education. A few not-so-bright people have been saying in the newspapers that it would have been better if Hitler had won because we would be drinking beer and living better than we do now. If those who dream of this had remained alive, they would at best have been swine herders for the Germans. And the vast majority of people would have perished altogether. So it was not about some territory but, I repeat, about the life and death of our state and all our nationalities. That is why the war was fought to surmount the enemy at any cost – there was no other option.

Recognition of the danger of fascism led to the anti-Hitler coalition of England, France and the United States of America. This was of critical importance and was largely responsible for preventing the preponderance of forces and victory in World War II.

The western countries saw limited combat initially. You know that the war started in '39, Hitler attacked us in '41, and the Normandy Invasion and second front in Europe were only launched in June 1944.

But to give the United States its due, it did help us a lot under Lend-Lease. They gave us about 22,000 aircraft, which was 18% of our aircraft production, because we manufactured more than 120,000 aircraft during the war. Lend-Lease gave us about 14% of the tanks that we had; in toto it gave us approximately 4% of our gross national product throughout the war. This was a big help. I'll say that the vehicles came in especially handy – we received 427,000 fine vehicles like Studebaker, Willis, and Jeep. They could handle any terrain and greatly increased our troops' mobility. And the offensive operations in '43, '44, and '45 were mobile and successful thanks mainly to our having such a large number of vehicles.

Leibin: Makhmut Akhmetovich, as I understand it, there are two ways of reasoning: one – a war of salvation when the life and integrity of the homeland are in jeopardy. And there is another way of reasoning when a country's long-term objectives and interests come into play. From the standpoint of objectives and interests, did one and the same line run through World Wars I and II? And does that line still exist today? To put it crudely, can the wars of the 20th century be seen as one war from the standpoint of the objectives of the adversaries and allies?

Gareev: May I speak frankly as a soldier? Or do you usually engage in diplomatic talk here?

Leibin: No, we are as frank as can be here.

Gareev: Well, good, I'll jump ahead. It was said that the Soviet Union posed a threat after World War II. That's what was said – there is a Soviet military threat. NATO was created in response. They were primarily worried about communist ideology and the quest for world revolution, even though our country's leadership had renounced the idea of world revolution back in the '30s.

As far back as the '30s, Stalin's policy was to create a strong national state. It is now being said that with the outbreak of war Stalin recalled Alexander Nevsky, Kutuzov, and Suvorov and began to appeal to the church; but that is not true. We were alive back then and I know; and you can find out about this from books: movies about Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great and Alexander Nevsky were made in the '30s. There was no longer talk of world revolution. It is not for nothing that the Comintern was disbanded during the war.

Now recall the perestroika years; the cold war formally ended. They tell us that we lost the cold war. But let's think about it – what kind of loss was it? The Warsaw Pact is dissolved, troops are pulled out of Germany and other regions, and we liquidate our bases. Did anybody give us an ultimatum? Did anybody demand that we do that?

Our leaders were profoundly mistaken. Maybe some of them did think in their hearts that if we took those steps the West would take reciprocal steps. NATO, for example, would transform itself into a political rather than a military organization. Somebody believed that if we liquidated our bases in Cuba, the American base at Guantanamo would also be liquidated. There were hopes of that. We renounced communist ideology and did what even the West was not expecting.

And in 1994 when the 50th anniversary of the Normandy Invasion was being commemorated, all countries, including Australia, Poland, and Luxemburg were invited, but not one person was officially invited from Russia, the new democratic Russia.

I'll answer your question: Ill will towards Russia has been so deeply rooted in the West since days of yore that they can make correct pronouncements but this tendency is gradually making itself felt. Alexander Nevsky was a very wise man in this respect when he traveled to the Golden Horde to conclude an agreement and directed all efforts to waging war against the Prussian knights. Why? The only thing they demanded there, in the east, was tribute. Nobody touched the church, language, culture or the spiritual life of the Russian people and other nations; nobody encroached on it. But the knights were following the example of the Baltic republics and Germanizing: religion was imposed, spiritual life.

That is why Alexander Nevsky believed that the primary danger emanated from the West. I don't think I need to go overboard here. Maybe I'm not right about everything but there are so many such facts of ill will towards Russia – not on the part of everyone in the West, of course, but on the part of certain circles – that, like it or not, we have to reflect on it.

Allow me to return to World War II and say that its aftermath was even more serious. Ten million people were mobilized and 55 million perished worldwide, 26.5 million of them Soviet people, citizens of our country. And the Soviet Union, our country, bore the brunt of the war.

Since the topic of my lecture includes the experience and lessons of the wars, one of the lessons is the following. **From the Crimean War to the present day (a total of 150 years), politicians have placed the country and its armed forces in an untenable situation.** You will recall that the defeat of Russia and its armed forces in the Crimean War was predetermined politically and through foreign policy. There's nothing to be said about the Russo-Japanese War. In World War I we were dependent on France, England and other countries and were in essence fighting for alien interests.

Now look at how the war started for us in 1941. In his efforts to use political methods to delay war, Stalin ignored military-strategic considerations.

Even nowadays some people in our country still like to engage in political bluster. Yes, war is indeed a continuation of policy by forceful means. Politics predominates but one should never deny the reverse influence of military strategy on politics. Politics does not exist in pure form at all. Politics works only when it takes economic, ideological, and military-strategic considerations into account. And at the start of the war alone we lost 3.5 million people and ended up in a very difficult situation essentially because the armed forces had been placed in a completely untenable situation politically. I don't think any army in the world could have endured that.

Take Afghanistan. Some big shots are still saying: "We were not planning to seize anything in Afghanistan; we wanted to be garrisons and stand fast there." Sorry but that's nonsense. If you go into a country where there's civil war and take sides, say with the government, who is going to leave you alone? And we had to intervene in the situation from the very early days.

There was an uprising in Gerat, the entire local government was overthrown, and it had to be defended! Incidentally, Marshal Sokolov held a meeting there and said: "I warn you that our army has not come here to fight; do not get involved in any fighting." On the second day the vice-president comes to him: "There's an uprising in Gerat; our ordnance has been seized; and the local

leaders have been arrested. What should we do?" Sokolov says: "Well, OK, we'll give you a battalion" – and so it went. Surely this could have been foreseen; is it really enough not to want to be involved in fighting? You will be dragged into the fighting.

We had every chance to avoid war in Chechnya in '94. Many problems could have been resolved politically. But no, we were easily dragged into a war. And the interesting thing is that we have been there for almost 10 years but not only has war not been declared, there isn't even a state of emergency or marshal law. After all, the soldiers and officers have to fight; they must carry out their tasks and defend themselves when they are attacked, but a lot of their actions, especially the use of arms, are becoming difficult. Let politics be in the saddle but it must be held accountable.

I just want to tell you that young people in the audience often ask: "Some say this, others say that, and they are all academicians. Who are we to believe?" Believe yourselves, first and foremost. Study the facts, study history, compare events and facts, and draw your own conclusions, then no one will mislead you. Take Afghanistan back when some people were still trying to justify sending our troops there by saying that if we did not go there the Americans would. Everybody scoffed at that: "What are the Americans going to do there?" And it really was a bit funny back then. And look at how things turned out: the Americans are in Afghanistan. That is why such questions should not be dismissed out of hand.

Jumping ahead I will say that it was a mistake to send troops to Afghanistan. A political mistake. Other ways could have been found. Tread on the Americans' toes in Angola and other places and keep out Afghanistan's affairs.

By the way, when the Politburo was discussing whether to send troops to Afghanistan, the only person who spoke resolutely against doing so was Chief of Staff Marshal Ogarkov. Andropov interrupted him right away: "You business is to carry out military tasks; we have people to deal with policy." And you know the results of that kind of political arrogance. We

should not have sent troops there; we could have provided assistance, camouflaged some actions as actions of volunteers – like the Chinese did in Korea. Different forms could have been found. But going in directly was a mistake.

I will tell you why. Any military intervention is extremely significant in politics. The political fallout is the same whether you send a platoon or an army into another country – you have placed troops on foreign territory. The rest doesn't mean anything. That is why we told Marshal Ogarkov that if we're going in, we should do so with 30-40 divisions. Get there, close the border with Iran immediately and close the border with Pakistan so that no assistance can come from there, and we would be able to withdraw our troops from there in 2-3 years.

The worst decisions in politics are inconsistent and half-hearted ones. Even if you have already made a mistake and are taking a political step, that step should be decisive, consistent and carried out by the most forceful means possible; there will be fewer casualties and errors will be fixed more rapidly.

Like me, you probably believe that World War II ended with our victory. Although people like Yakovlev, Afanasyev at the Russian State University for the Humanities (RGGU), and many others write that this was a shameful war, that we were defeated, etc. Let us think about why. We are often told that it was a defeat because we had huge casualties. Solzhenitzyn says 60 million; there are “scribes” who say 20, 30 million – hence the defeat. This is all under the guise of humanity.

But how has history always determined defeat or victory? This has always been determined by the objectives that each side was pursuing. Hitler's objective was to destroy our country, seize the territory, subjugate our peoples, and so on. What happened? And what was our objective? To defend our country, defend our people, and help the other peoples that fascism had enslaved. What happened? All of Hitler's plans crumbled. It was not Hitler's troops that reached Moscow and Leningrad but our troops that reached Berlin; and the allies reached Rome and Tokyo. What

sort of defeat is that? High casualties, unfortunately. We lost 26.5 million people.

But our military casualties would have been fewer – I can say to this to you with authority: I was chairman of a state commission to determine and update the casualties. We worked on this for four years, finishing in 1985. We went to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) and our government on several occasions to suggest that the updated figures be published so that there would be no speculation about them. When I left for Afghanistan in 1989, the report reached the CC at last. Look at *Istochnik* (Source) magazine; it says who came up with what resolutions. Gorbachev wrote: “Study and make suggestions.” What did Yakovlev write? “Wait; we still need to include civilian demographers.” Yet the commission already had 45 people – the most prominent civilian and military demographers had worked on it.

What were the actual casualties in the Great Patriotic War? Our military losses were 8.6 million. The remaining 18 million were civilians killed on the occupied territories by fascist atrocities. Six million Jews were killed. Are these troops? These are civilians.

The Germans and their allies lost 7.2 million people. The difference between our losses is approximately 1-1.5 million. What is behind this difference? The Germans themselves write, and this has been proven, that about 5 million of our people were taken prisoner. They returned around two million to us. We are within our rights to ask where are the 3 million of our people who were held in captivity Germany. Fascist crimes caused the death of the 3 million in captivity. We had about 2.5 million Germans in captivity. We returned approximately 2 million after the war.

And to speak like a soldier: When we reached Germany in 1945 and the entire German army was surrendering – if you wanted to see who could kill the most, it would have been no problem to kill as many civilians and military as we needed. But after 3-4 days we began to release German troops from captivity, with the exception of the SS men. To be frank, so that we wouldn't have to feed them. Our people and our army could never kill people just for the

sake of it after we had achieved victory. Now they want to turn even our people's humanity against us – that is simply sacrilegious. That is simply a great sin before those people who fought. A sin you often condone by spreading such false rumors and all kinds of abracadabra.

All in all, I have to say, friends, that **the history of the Great Patriotic War is being falsified**. The results of World War II are all being overridden. All kinds of tall tales are being spread. On the eve of the 60th anniversary of the Battle of Kursk, Izvestia newspaper writes that the Germans lost 5 tanks in the battle. According to Izvestia, we lost 334 tanks. As I have told you, compare the facts and decide for yourselves who is right. Can it be that the Germans really lost only 5 tanks and took off running along the Dnepr River instead of going toward Moscow? And that our people lost 300 tanks but for some reason pressed ahead and did not retreat? Could that really be so?

They say that our fighting was mediocre and that our generals and lieutenants were worthless, unlike the old, educated and literate Russian gentleman officers. Georgy Vladimov wrote the book "A General and His Army" about Vlasov. We have no novels whatsoever about Zhukov or Rokossovsky, but we already have several books glorifying Vlasov. But people should be judged by their deeds. After all, every war for 150-200 years after the Patriotic War of 1812 ended in defeat. The Great Patriotic War was the first supreme war in which we achieved a supreme victory. The white generals blew even the civil war, by the way.

Nowadays, for example, they want to glorify Kolchak and Wrangel. Give them their due, they say – they also fought for Russia. But you should always remember the one difference: Frunze and Chapayev fought against interventionists as well as white guards. Wrangel, Kolchak and others were supported by interventionists; they fought against Russia on the side of foreigners. There is perhaps a difference for those people who respect their country.

There are people who tell us every day that nowadays there are no threats to Russia. No threats, nobody is threatening us, we are the only ones threatening ourselves.

What determines whether there is a threat? This depends on the policy you are pursuing. **If you are pursuing an independent and autonomous policy, it can always collide with the policy of other countries. Then you could have an escalation, threats, maybe even an attack. If you cede everything and don't champion your national interests, there are indeed no threats.** If you cede everything, what threats can there be? What can happen except that you'll lose everything?

Unfortunately, **current threats** are very serious; if you compress them, there are three.

First. The large-scale nuclear war for which we were preparing several decades ago is highly unlikely in the current situation. And any large-scale war is highly unlikely, which is why other ways of achieving political objectives have been devised: economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and information warfare. One country after another can be bent into submission using subversive activity from within. And you don't have to take the risk, for a major war could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. They have found other methods, not the least of which is money, as was the case in Iraq, where almost everyone was bought out. That is why the high priority task of the armed forces is to prepare for local wars and conflicts and perhaps to prepare to a certain extent for a major war if the minor conflicts escalate.

Second. There are nuclear regimes and the nuclear weapons of them all are aimed at our country. France, England, the US. China has nuclear weapons; where else is it going to use them? Chinese nuclear weapons can't reach the US in any case, so they are aimed at our country. This is a serious threat; it is less than it was 10-15 years ago but it exists and cannot be avoided.

Third. There are major armed forces groups of foreign states along all our borders. The number of troops is being reduced slightly but qualitatively they are undergoing a serious

transformation, with high precision weapons and much more that you have heard about.

So what kind of army do we need in this situation? They tell us: a mobile, strong, well equipped one, but the first problem is arms. Our weapons are getting old, military industry is in decline, and we are not able to produce enough and supply our army and navy with the latest weaponry. That's to put it mildly.

The second problem is the art of war and the way we conduct warfare. Along with reliable scientific information there is also a lot of disinformation whereby it is impressed on us that war would be one-sided, and it would be pointless to resist and better to surrender and capitulate given the types of weapons that the opponent has.

Incidentally, an American general speaking at the German Military Academy in Hamburg recently said: "The school of Clausewitz, Moltke, Zhukov and Foch is now dead; there's only one school, the American one, which you must all study, then you will win." They say that the Soviet, the Russian school was buried in Iraq.

You can say whatever you like, but think about it – did anybody use our school in Iraq? Remember how Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad were defended: barricades, barriers, trenches, and people fought for every house. Did this happen anywhere in Iraq? And the whole secret is that you have to have great moral strength to use our Soviet, Russian school. You need the appropriate morale. Some people in Russia think that this just occurs by itself. But moral strength, this human capital, has to be constantly accumulated, and when you impress on people that defense is not needed, that military service is not mandatory, we not only stop accumulating but also lose this moral potential.

Remember the Brest Fortress. What happened there is that no troops at all were to stay behind to defend the fortress – they retreated to their positions, leaving behind people who had returned from vacation, the sick, and military families. They immediately got together and began to defend the fortress. No one asked them to defend the fortress; the Germans were already close

to Minsk, and they fight for a whole month. Today we must not forget how and under what circumstances our army and people developed that attitude. Now look at how they are saying that it is hard to serve so the draft should be abolished and military service should be contract-based. But our guys, from our country, where it is so hard to serve, are leaving for Israel and are happy to serve three years there, where service is even more difficult than here. It all depends on a person's attitude to his country. You should remember that also.

And the last issue related to army recruitment. We are currently on a course towards creating a predominantly contract-based army. But that army is no better; it is no accident that Israel is not going down that road. Vietnam showed the Americans that contract soldiers serve well in peacetime. But a person who is facing death needs neither money nor preferential admission to institutions of higher learning. That is why the Germans are not abolishing the draft either. You do need a link between the people and the army so that servicemen do not lose touch with their people, their relatives, their homeland. It is very important to have the draft, especially in wartime.

Why do they want to switch to contract-based service? Because in 2007-2008 our demographic situation will mean that there will be no one to draft. If we don't start training and recruiting contract soldiers now, we will have no army left at all. That is why we should combine this contract-based system and the draft while shortening the call-up period to at least one year. An army is created not by officers and generals alone but by the whole people, and this you know from our entire history.

DISCUSSION OF LECTURE

Participants:

Makhmut Gareev (Lecturer)

Vitaly Leibin (Moderator)

Alexander Golts

Viktor Litovkin

Maxim Shevchenko

Sergei Kotelnikov

et al.



Golts: First of all, I would like to start with the last issue: what to do with this army. In my opinion, we are witnessing the painful, protracted but irreversible disintegration of the armed forces model that was not even created after 1917 but as a result of Peter the Great's reforms. We are a unique state and I have to agree with Makhmut Akhmetovich here.

Pavel Milyutin wrote about this superbly in his work "Russia's Economy in the First Quarter of the 18th Century." Peter the Great's reforms – what actually created the Russian state – emerged out of necessity, the specific necessity of the Northern War. Peter did not set out to build a state; he set out to win that war. It happened that Peter adapted recruitment as a principle of mobilization from the main opponent, the Swedes. And it needs to be said that a western detractor wrote that the combination of autocracy and backwardness gave the Russian tsars a weapon that is comparable to atomic weapons today. While their opponents were scratching their heads and wondering how to support an army, with a single move and a single stroke of the pen Peter and his successors mobilized an enormous mass of people.

I am not going to question or cast doubt on that brilliant golden age of Russian military strategy, Russian military history, which began with victory over Karl, continued with victory over Frederick the Great, and culminated in victory over Napoleon. But we need to realize that the basis for these victories (Makhmut Akhmetovich will disagree with me) was the ability to mobilize and expend enormous masses of people. There is a classic example: when Alexander dispatched Count Balashov to negotiate with Napoleon, Napoleon said to him: "I know that you have been mobilizing and are planning to train new recruits. Take it from an old soldier that it will take several years for them to become real warriors." Period. Another author says further: "Napoleon could not conceive that they would be thrown into battle in a month and perish in large numbers without reaching the Russian-German border." I am certainly not questioning Kutuzov's brilliant generalship.

It is paradoxical that defeat in war was always somewhat of an impetus for reform in Russia's history. I suspect that defeat in the

cold war, and it was a defeat, did to a certain extent provide the impetus for present-day Russian reforms. Moving on to the present day, I have to say that this principle of expending manpower in the name of lofty goals has become the basis of Russian military culture.

And we are now experiencing the disintegration of an army built in that way. You cannot avoid the fact that under market-based relations mass mobilization and the draft will always clash with the need to boost production. If they say that we are going to make every effort to preserve the draft, what does this mean? It means that at a time when Russia, God willing, will be having an upswing in the economy, we are going to be removing a large number of people from the production process and using them in a certain way. They are not going to produce anything or learn to produce anything.

Second. The demographic gap means that we will not be returning to the draft; you may or may not consider this a good thing. But some generals reckon that with various expedients – partial shift to contracts while preserving the draft – we can survive 2006-2012 because after that it will be better. But Russia is a country with a falling birth rate; there's no getting away from that. And so the Russian army simply has to change.

And my last comment is that the military sphere is perhaps the only one in which scientific and technical progress is manifested linearly. It radically changes the strategy and structure of the armed forces. One does not have to look far for examples: gunpowder and the abandonment of cavalry knights, the advent of railroads and the steam engine – and the ability to mobilize huge masses of the population and the advent of enormous, multi-million man armies.

I suspect, along with US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, that we are at the very beginning of a revolution that is going to radically change our views on war and combat methods.

What we saw in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq is just the beginning. We are at the very beginning of what will be

information warfare, what will be new high precision weapons warfare. You will recall that Clausewitz said that the fog of war accompanies all armed action since a military leader can never be sure that he has precisely calculated an opponent's maneuver. Modern day intelligence resources are dispersing the fog of war. There are unique ways to defeat the opponent. The US now has the most powerful army in the world, the best army, more than likely. Overcoming the resistance of its generals by retiring them, the US has been breaking the structure of its fine, well functioning military machine in order to meet the requirements of this very scientific and technological revolution. Unfortunately, I get the feeling that even if the reforms which we have planned are carried through, we will end up with the kind of cavalry [that we had] at the beginning of World War II.

It should be said that some western detractors claim that two groups, which they call the technologists and the magicians, are constantly at odds among the Russian army brass. The former say that we need to win on the battlefield with weapons while the latter say that certain special qualities of the Russian soldier will always ensure victory. General Dragomirov talked about blind courage and Marshal Budenny spoke about guts and dedication to communist ideas. I must say that we have approached every war without adapting the fruits of the scientific and technological revolution.

Let us recall the Crimean War: It was not only the mistakes of the politicians but also the lack of rifles and steam engine which played a part; reserves could not be deployed because there were no railroads. World War I: no machine guns and one rifle for three. World War II, and so on... I think that we need to hope that Russia does not have unresolved conflicts with major world powers because we are totally unprepared for war with them, no matter how much we pretend otherwise. That's all I wanted to say.

Leibin: Alexander, on the issue of recruiting combat units – is this one issue among many, or a critical one that is directly related to the history of the country and its military?

Golts: I am among the minority of analysts in this country who believe that a draft-based military cannot be reformed in principle. Such an army presupposes large casualties and death in the first battle of large numbers of people and constant replacement of the dead with new draftees and conscripts. This model brought victory over the Germans in World War II but it is no longer viable for several reasons. Because the demographics run counter. It is not for nothing that our Chief of Staff Anatoly Vasilyevich Kvashnin begins every one of his speeches with the statement that women are not having enough babies. This is the main problem for our generals these days.

I am adamant in my conviction that draftees called up for one year are cannon fodder in a modern-day war. They are not able to become professional soldiers and even if, by a great miracle, the Russian army somehow obtained high precision weaponry, computers, and the capability to receive satellite intelligence at the platoon level, the question is, who would use this technology.

Gareev: The scenario that Alexander Golts outlined is a valid one that calls for reflection. But these are the historical facts: after recruitment was put in place, the Russian army had an enormous advantage in the 18th and for most of the 19th century. Why did Frederick the Second create linear battle formations and so forth? His primary concern was that this soldier, a mercenary who was willing to serve in any army, did not run away. The armies that had recruitment had the advantage of being able to use tents, scatter formation, and columns. This is also what accounted for the strength of Napoleon's army as well. And all battles for two centuries demonstrated the advantage of that system. Here they are saying that this system is not right; well, then it means that the Russian army did not win victory the right way. That doesn't happen. They also say this about the Great Patriotic War. That can't be so.

Now look at the situation during World War II. England had no draft, and the US also had a small army, meaning that it was not draft-based per se. But once World War II started you couldn't name a single army or a single country that would fight with contract troops. All had the draft. This is a historical fact. It's not

good times that brought this about; if they could have gotten by with a contract-based army they would have. By the way, a compilation has been published of our well-known Russian generals - Golovin, Klado, and others, who, as early as the '30s, said that we should have a professional army without the draft. Just think - in '41 the Germans had a 10 million strong army, and we would have been left with a contract-based army of 500,000, as was the case immediately after the civil war. They would have just crushed us.

In 1991 the Americans were fighting in the Persian Gulf; even though it hadn't turned into a major war they were forced to call up 30,000 reservists. With the Iraq war, 30,000 reservists were called up and Poles, Ukrainians and others are being mobilized to go there. Life demonstrates that a so-called professional army is good for one-two weeks of serious warfare.

Plus you have to consider our country's economic potential, for we are unfortunately not so rich. Contract soldiers, for example in the 42nd division in Chechnya, are paid 16,000. Officers currently studying at the FSB academy are paid less than contract soldiers in Chechnya. What's the point of being an officer?

We have soldiers in cargo guard and escort detachments and among the missile troops who just guard these installations. If you are, say, the head of the government, if you are the Minister of Finance, why pay 15,000 to a contract soldier when a draftee could serve as long as we are poor? It's just not rational. You have to take a business-like and rational approach based on our limited resources rather than an ideological approach, which we've had plenty of.

They say that we do not have modern weaponry so we can't counter the leading NATO countries. Are you making a mockery of us? I will never accept that point of view. I would rather be like a fellah in northern Iraq. Grab a Berdan rifle from the days of the Boer War and shoot down the most modern Apache helicopter. The Varyag opposed and fought against 14 ships in 1904. I think that our merit lies in not surrendering at any time. We must find a solution and defend our country.

Leibin: For me the issue of draft or contract is a specific one because I do not understand what the objective of the fighting will be whether a person is a draftee or a contract soldier. It seemed to me that the lecturer had ideological reasons for what he said about this. During the Great Patriotic War people at least knew why they were going [to war]. But now I don't know what we are fighting for. So for me the draft issue is secondary. I would move away from historical analysis to identifying political objectives and possibilities.

Gareev: Let us suppose that the state of Georgia in the United States of America decided to break away, to secede from the US. Will the US fight for its integrity?

Leibin: I think so.

Gareev: And aren't we as good as they are?

Shevchenko: I would like to support Makhmut Akhmetovich; perhaps many of you do not understand what General Gareev means. An army is not a technological device that is automatically superimposed on this territory or that, but a continuation of a state's political core. For the United States, a contract-based army is largely a continuation of its republican nature, where power is not usurped by a narrow group of elites but is distributed over the entire political landscape, and the army to some extent expresses the political will of the American people and not that of President Bush, Clinton, Eisenhower, Truman, and so on.

That is the source of the US's enormous mobilization base, which the US demonstrated in World War II. The US went into Pearl Harbor as a country of carnivals and festivals that was totally unprepared for war, taking the fundamental position of non-participation in European matters, but ended the war as the greatest power in the world. The Soviet Union and its aviation were largely dependent on US supplies; you are aware of that.

Second point: present-day Russia and a draft or contract-based army. Let us determine what is power and what is the state in

today's Russia. A contract army in today's Russia has every prospect of acting as political gendarmes to suppress conflicts designated by the ruling elite, say separatist or other conflicts. A contract-based army could become a rapid response corps that will do Berezovsky's bidding today, Putin's tomorrow, Voloshin's the day after tomorrow, and three days from now – someone else's, carrying out the tasks of the grouping that is in power. When Russia has real vertical democracy, a contract-based army may in some sense express the people's interests and the question will not arise as to what they are fighting for in Chechnya. Right now there is very good reason for raising the Chechnya question.

And about technology again. It seems to me that the Iraq war shows that occupation of the opponent's territory and the tearing down of the political structures, which Clausewitz said was one means of achieving victory, no longer works. Modern-day war is for the most part a network-centric war. We are now seeing that the Americans have occupied Iraq and destroyed Saddam Hussein's political structures, but the war is just starting for them. I would say that the problem is that nowadays terrorist organizations, or organizations that are called terrorist, can hold out against modern armies. What is more, the Israeli army, which would demolish any opponent in a technological war, is losing and is going to lose an indirect, guerilla war.

A Berdan rifle is a perfectly competent weapon to beat the most high-tech opponent in a modern-day war where the human factor is the main thing. So it seems to me that for now draft or contract-based is a demagogic matter. Thank you.

Golts: I am in complete agreement with my colleague when he says that the armed forces system should match the system that exists in the state. It is right on the mark. And I must say that Russia, with its rather wild but market economy, Russia with its dubious but still extant rights and freedoms of citizens, does not at all fit the model for the Soviet-style draft army that still exists but is half the size and not working. The Soviet army was an army that the entire state supported. There was not a single sector of the economy that did not work for defense and to support the armed forces. That's the first thing.

Second, I don't agree with all this talk of fellah and Berdan rifles. This is a classic example of approaching war as if it is magic. At a holiday reception hosted by then Minister of Defense Igor Rodionov, he said: "Who needs an army when you have a defense spirit. After all, if we have a defense spirit, we will beat all enemies with sticks."

It was precisely this "beat with sticks" that lost us millions [of people] in various wars. I am deeply convinced that a draft army is now a social problem for Russia. Think about it, for God's sake: according to official statistics, in 2002, 532 people were killed as a result of so-called incidents and crimes in the armed forces. A battalion. A battalion of kids that the state took and did not return, not due to battlefield casualties but to barrack brawls and hazing. The draft has become Russia's social illness; the generals are quite right who complain that the army gets those who are not the brightest intellectually and are physically undeveloped.

In the Taman division, which was a model in Soviet times, 350 of the penultimate draftees had served prison sentences. But there's nobody else. Others avoid the army with truths and untruths. And if you eliminate deferment tomorrow, you can be sure that there will be more bribes for those who can issue the deferments that have not been eliminated. Society will not accept this form. And this is one of the main problems with our draft army. We truly have a decomposing creature; it has survived a heroic, brutal period but that army is now dead; it exists for the sole purpose of prolonging the existence of those people who cannot build and cannot imagine a different army.

Gareev: Why isn't Israel giving up its draft army?

Golts: Israel isn't giving up its draft army because Israel's pitifully small population is surrounded by neighbors that outnumber it many times over.

Gareev: But we might also be in that situation – look at China.

There is no army in the world that has fought with a contract-based army. They all fought with draftees.

Golts: That's quite right, but Great Britain eliminated the draft immediately after World War II ended. Great Britain has had a draft only twice in its history: during World Wars I and II. That is precisely why in Russia military service is considered the toughest and hardest duty. But in Great Britain military service is considered a profession, and that's the big difference.

Gareev: Fifty thousand people die of alcoholism in Russia every year. We have many problems in Russia; if you start to lay it on thick, you can go to extremes and discourage anyone from serving. You say that people in the army die in vain. That means that our army is the same as our society. We need to think together about how to make things better. Plus, you can't contrast moral obligation and weapons. Who doesn't understand that it's better to have good high precision weapons? Who is coming out against this? But that does not mean that you should surrender if you don't have weapons. You should still think about how to defend your country.

Litovkin: Makhmut Akhmetovich, people who die of alcoholism and drugs and in road accidents are people who die because of their own stupidity or the stupidity of those who kill them on the road. The state is responsible for those who die in the army.

Gareev: The society and the state should be responsible for all people.

Litovkin: This is true, but when the state drafts someone into the army it is responsible for him. Society is a concept that is not as structured as the state. This is a slight disagreement. I want to say, in general, that issues of the armed forces and issues of war are always ideological issues, even though there are always economic objectives within. Here I have to agree with Makhmut Akhmetovich – there's nothing to disagree with. And our discussion today is also ideological.

When they say that the American army is the best in the world, that is a bit of a falsehood, to put it mildly, maybe even a major falsehood. Because the American army is far from the best in the world. And if you recall, 10 years ago this best army in the world hitched up its trousers and took to its heels out of Somalia. Not to mention other wars where the Americans lost. And you will notice that the wars in which the Americans have won in recent times have been against weakened Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan. The Americans don't have anything except Kabul. And there they are protected by the local mujahideen, who are allegedly supporting Karzai. There are a lot of other armies that are much more competent and more battle ready than the American army.

Litovkin: To return to the subject of our conversation, we need to reflect on why an army is necessary and what are the objectives of the state that is maintaining that army. Can anyone say what kind of state we have now? What is its orientation? It is a social state. Is it, forgive me for asking, building capitalism with a human face or socialism with a capitalist face? No one has said. No one has stated what our state's long-term objectives are. Who will be our friends, who will oppose us, what will be the threats against us 10, 20 and 30 years from now?

Right now we are hiding from the threat of terrorism. You know, I was recently speaking with some Lithuanian generals in the Lithuanian army and asked them: "What are your guys doing in Afghanistan?" They responded that they are fighting there so that the terrorists don't come to where they live. You see, when our guys fight in Chechnya, they are fighting so that our homes in Moscow are not blown up, our homes in Arkhangelsk are not blown up, and so on. Because the terrorists do not always have economic objectives; they are not always aiming to profit; their objective is to intimidate everybody, to make people tremble at the very mention of their names, titles or appearance. And the war against terrorism does not always have an ultimate goal. I mean that when we are combating terrorism we are beating the tail end. We need to not only fight terrorism militarily, not only dunk them in the toilet, even though you should do that as well; you also have to fight the terrorists economically.

What do we have today? An unjust world, which the East perceives precisely as unjust: rich America, rich Europe; they don't consider Russia very rich but they still believe we should share. That is why they blow up trade centers; they are retaliating against America for being rich while they are poor. That is why I think that in order to fight the terrorists you have to do what social democracy did in Europe after World War II and even after World War I, when it created a middle class. The world public, the world elite should invest money there: in Iraq, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and all countries from which the wretched, reviled and poor are trying to take revenge for their situation. We are going to have the threat of terrorist wars until we do that.

And the old peeves will certainly still be there: Europe's misgivings about Russia, Russia's misgivings about Europe and NATO, general misgivings about China – a threat that does exist. Because who can say what kind of leadership China is going to have in 10, 15 or 20 years and where it will direct its expansionist ambitions? Today they are trying to go south, to keep Taiwan and other south Asian states in their sphere of influence, but tomorrow they could direct their boots toward Siberia. They are already taking it over little by little. We have to see this for what it is.

And finally: What kind of army do we need – contract-based or draft? Today we need a contract-based army because draftees cannot man a high-tech army. But in creating a contract-based army we must remember that a contract-based army has to be backed up by reservists. Wherein lies the strength of the American army that is fighting in Iraq? They can call up reservists at any time, people that have been trained and are technically literate, with at least a secondary technical education, who can handle the equipment they are given. We, unfortunately, do not have such reservists; the state has not invested the money to train them, as it has not invested the money to train a contract-based army.

Today the government understands that there are no serious threats at the present time and so it is putting off the creation of a Russian army until tomorrow. But if we do not lay some kind of technical, ideological and organizational foundation today, then in 10, 15

years – I'm in complete agreement with Makhmut Akhmetovich here – we will have no one and nothing to fight with.

Leibin: Thank you very much, Viktor. It seemed to me very important that the topic has returned to historical objectives and the politics that gives rise to them. Although I don't really understand how terrorism can be a threat from which something can be built.

Gareev: I would like to support your statement that terrorism does not exist as a separate phenomenon. It is indeed an instrument, as you say. **Before the war I was an apprentice in a cavalry regiment. And our regiment was constantly fighting the Basmachi¹ in Central Asia.**

In early 1941 I started at the Tashkent military school. And every month 2-3 squadrons went to fight the Basmachi. War was declared on June 22 and no one went after the Basmachi anymore. They were just gone.

Why? The English in Afghanistan were training the Basmachi and sending them to Central Asia. When Hitler declared war on the Soviet Union it was no longer in their interests to weaken the Soviet Union. They stopped doing this. And they went away – the Basmachi. Chechnya is 99% from the outside. We can stop the outside interference if we deal with this problem properly by making diplomatic demarches to countries like Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia and others.

The thing is that there is no consistency. We talk about terrorists. **I encountered bin Laden near Jelalabad. He had brought a lot of money and was paying 200-300 a day and sending people to storm Jelalabad who had been trained by American special services. And who trained the terrorists in Kosovo and Albania? The Americans and NATO special services trained all of them. We say we are fighting terrorism and at the same time we are training them.**

¹ Translator's Note: Russian name for partisans against the Red Army in Central Asia in the '20s and early '30s.

We talk about “poverty” – does it really encourage terrorism? Take the pilots who carried out the terrorist act in America on September 11, 2001. They were from wealthy families. Not poor at all. So there must be other reasons. They are to be found in complex world politics.

Shevchenko: Let us recall that the Basmachi in Central Asia went away after the Great Patriotic War at a time when these unemployed people were being driven into collective farms; they started to dig canals, grow cotton, and so on.

The English had an interest in sending Basmachi to us even after World War II. The Basmachi went away when 10 million people in Central Asia had been killed. When Budenny and Frunze went across Central Asia and slaughtered 40% of the male population.

Gareev: Young man, I treated what you said earlier with respect. It's not your fault that TV and newspapers bombard you with gossip every day. What Budenny? He never fought there at all.

Shevchenko: He didn't fight in Kazakhstan, Makhmut Akhmetovich?

Gareev: He was in northern Kazakhstan but Budenny played no role there. Ten million – that's Solzhenitsyn's number.

Shevchenko: Is he lying?

Gareev: Just making it up – he has his reasons. But this does not match reality.

Shevchenko: Thank you.

Leibin: Now we will open the discussion to the floor. You may voice an opinion or ask the lecturer a question.

Zagidullin: I would like to voice an opinion.

First. The army has been needed for purposes other than fighting for the last 30 or 50 years. And everything that takes place there in

the form of combat is incidental and has nothing to do with the army's tasks. I mean not only the soldiers but also industry and scientific, educational and other institutions that are involved in maintaining the army.

Second. If you talk about the Soviet army, it carried out three functions inside the country for at least the last 30 years or so of the USSR. The first was to provide employment for the social group that was most on edge – 18-20 year olds who were not integrated into the social structure, who were aimless but had the energy and strength to do something. This is always a potentially hotheaded group for revolutions and civil wars. So the first function of the army was to keep them occupied. Second, in the Soviet Union the army had an organizational function vis-à-vis the entire economy.

And the army's third task, in a broad sense, was to recreate power; and in a narrow sense – to preserve the integrity of the state and its borders. After at least 1991 the first two functions began to break down. The army ceased to be the only place where the male population between 18 and 30 could be shoved to give them something to do that wouldn't disturb the country. Other focuses and groups emerged that were interested in this population. For example, criminality.

Secondly, the function of organizing the economy disappeared; the army stopped organizing the economy.

And third. Maybe the army is still preserving the integrity of the country's borders and recreating the power of the elite. This task is still on the agenda but is not as urgent.

We now have an unwieldy hulk of an army that is decaying from within. The generalship itself has been privatizing a part of it. Privatizing in the economic sense, i.e. it is beginning to carry out tasks that are alien to it.

And, lastly, I think that throughout the discussion about what kind of army we need, whom it should defend and where the money is to come from, we should always separate the ideological talk of

people whose real interests are to preserve the army's existing condition from the opinions of people in power. The latter now have the enormous problem of what to do so that the economy does not end up in a mess and available resources, or what's left of them, can be used. And these two types of opinions should at least be separated from each other, and that is a big problem. That's all with respect to the army inside the country.

With respect to the army outside the country, everything depends on having nuclear weapons. And in this sense the army is still not there to fight but to be a symbolic resource and promote recognition of the country as a player in world politics.

Gareev: I place responsibility for all that you have said not on you but rather on those who have inculcated all this in you. **I can only say one thing: the Soviet Union had nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapons are still there but there is no union. That means that nuclear weapons are not universal, they cannot defend us under all circumstances. That is why nuclear weapons are still needed in the world in which we live, but the main thing all the same is people and their attitude to their country, to its defense and so on. What you said about some functions is like with Kuprin – remember? An officer asks a soldier why a sentry is placed at his post. Not to smoke, not to sit – that's not why he's there. I don't believe that you don't understand why we need an army.**

Leibin: I believe that in answering the question about the history of wars in the 20th century, Zagidullin thinks that they have ended. I am no sure about that.

Kotelnikov: I am not an expert on either military matters or military issues in general; I worked at a cultural science research facility. I would like to start by commenting not on the content but on the style of the observations. They are sharply divided into two different types - those of Makhmut Akhmetovich and all the rest. And in this regard it seems to me that I am beginning to understand the lecturer's terrible anxiety as to whether or not he will manage to convey the main idea that for some reason you don't want to

understand. Whether you don't want to or can't, it's still completely beyond me as to why.

First of all, I would like to assess not the lecturer's comments but all other comments. All of them – both those in favor and those against the lecturer – are comments on what now exists. But these comments are deficient. War and battlefield clashes in general are collective actions that occur with incomplete information that will never be complete. And you can't make head or tail of it if you only comment on what exists.

And against this background I am still trying to understand what is different about the style in which Makhmut Akhmetovich speaks. He speaks about a limiting framework from which we can discuss what exists and what should be, among other things. And for some reason this framework is not being discussed. Our esteemed moderator is constantly trying to nudge us towards answering the question as to what our goals are, but this has not happened. But it can't even be asked like that. We will never get an answer to the question as to what our goals are until we set them.

What is Makhmut Akhmetovich saying and what makes his reflections so fine? The fact that he has logic to which he strictly adheres. He does not cite facts for the sake of argument but to illustrate his own logic. Information and facts are nothing; they will never be complete and we will never have any information if we do not rely on some kind of logic. **It seems to me that Gareev has been insisting on one simple idea. Guys, we have been under siege for at least 300 years and no one wants to discuss this! Or they think this is some kind of nonsense or are coming across this idea for the first time? Three hundred years under siege.**

I would formulate the first challenger's objections in this way: For the only time in the history of Russia, Peter I had the goals for a military organization. I would even say that, from this point of view, he did not have the goals but at least he had a defensive framework. He needed to break into Europe and that was that.

Our country was under siege; it could not trade with anyone and was constantly being pushed from the Baltics and from the south. This was the only way to maintain a presence in Europe; with the military, Peter “showed everybody” and after that we came under siege for 300 years. At least.

That’s the only framework in which Makhmut Akhmetovich has been holding discourse. Certainly, this now needs to be somehow substantiated and proven. For some reason no one has been doing this. No one has introduced the concept of mobilization. **What is mobilization? It is when we need to be prepared at any moment to mobilize a part of the population. Because we are under siege and we don’t know when the next attack will take place. It automatically follows from this that the troops should be positioned in such a way that they are always mobilizable. Not called up, but mobilizable.** It seems to me that on the issue of what kind of army we should have, the conclusions follow directly from this premise upon which the lecturer has been insistent.

Gareev: A few days ago I read a piece in an Austrian magazine. A 92-year-old Austrian was called up for training in error instead of a 25-year-old guy with the same name. He packed his things and showed up, saying: “I am used to doing my duty.” They apologized, paid him and let him go. I am on the side of this Austrian, do you understand?

Kotelnikov: So I surmised your meaning correctly.

Sofia: Mention was made of Russia’s goals both social, and political and military. The problem lies precisely in the fact that too often the ruling minority has not understood Russia’s goals, as demonstrated by our country’s history. Take Peter I – he had definite goals but his followers, who simply wanted to adopt western standards, did not understand this goal; they did not see it; they just mechanically adopted external models.

Gareev: It is very true that **in order to answer the question of what kind of army we need, we need to answer the question of who we are, where we are going, and what our objectives are.**

Bush flew to Iraq and tells his soldiers: “We are defending democracy throughout the world and US national interests.” A soldier can understand that. What did Kasyanov say? “The main goal of all law enforcement agencies is to protect private property.” I, for one, am not going to go protect private property. I need to have other goals. So what Sofia says is quite right – we need to determine where we are going and what our goals are.

First and foremost we should develop a common language. Even though our Constitution says that we should not have a state ideology, not a single society, not a single country can live without a clear-cut idea. So it is up to the leadership of the country, up to our creative intelligentsia, political scientists, and other scholars. It is a task for the public. Soldiers cannot come up with goals by themselves; they live for the benefit of society, or at least that’s the way it should be. So that is our common task.

Mass Political Edition

Vladimir Nikolayevich Slipchenko
Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev

Future War

Layout: I. Bernstein
Proofreader: E. Feoktistova

Ob"edinennoye Gumanitarnoye Izdatelstvo

26 Petrovka Ul., Bldg. 8, Moscow 103051
Fax: (095) 924-5761
Telephone: (095) 744-3170
e-mail: info@ogi.ru

Sent to print
from prepared transparencies on 5.18.2005
Format 70x90¹/₃₂. Font CharterC.
Paper – Newsprint. Letterpress printing from photopolymer plates.
Size – 4.5 quires. Edition – 3,000. Order 1524.

In partnership with Plopress LLC.
23 Krasnaya Ul., Ste. 43, Minsk 220600, Republic of Belarus
License No. 02330/0056969 dated 4.30.04

Ya. Kolas Poligrafkombinat Open Stock Company
23 Krasnaya Ul., Minsk 220600

OGI books are available at:

Bilingua Kafe
10 Krivokolenny Pereulok, Bld. 5
Chistye Prudy Subway Station

OGI Proyect Club
8/12 Potapovsky Pereulok, Bld. 2
Chistye Prudy Subway Station

Pirogi Caf 

19/21 Nikolskaya Ul.
Ploshchad Revolyutsii/Lubyanka Subway Station

12/1 Bolshaya Dmitrovka Ul., Bld. 1
Okhotny Ryad/Teatralnaya Subway Station

5/12 Zeleny Prospekt
Perovo Subway Station

To order OGI books:

Telephone: (095) 744-3171
e-mail: info@ogi.ru

Wholesale:


Telephone: (095) 744-3171
e-mail: info@ogi.ru

For orders outside Russia:

www.esterum.com

**BILINGUA
BOOKSTORE-CAF **

bilingua



Large bookstore
with over 10,000 titles,
including rare editions
and the latest Russian/European publications

Concerts, Parties, Lectures,
Literary Presentations,
Sunday Morning Children's Shows

10 Krivokolenny Pereulok, Bld. 5
Moscow 100100
Bookstore: (095) 923-6683
Café: (095) 923-9660

Published in the OGI Polit.ru Series:

Vitaly Naishul
REVOLUTION AND JUSTICE

Alexei Miller
NATIONALISM AND EMPIRE

Gleb Pavlosky
POWER AND OPPOSITION

Published in the OGI Polit.ru Series:

TO KILL MASKHADOV

Mikhail Berg


LETTERS TO THE PRESIDENT

Konstantin Sutyagin

PATRIOTIC ALPHABET:

RUSSIANS IN ALPHABETIC ORDER

[UPC reads: "Slipchenko – Future War Price 84 rub KTK: 031"]





Makhmut Gareev, Jacob Kipp and Vladimir Slipchenko.

FMSO is an open-source research and analysis center using foreign language publications and contacts to stay abreast of military developments outside of the USA. FMSO analysts are military and academic linguists with extensive backgrounds in the countries they cover.



Foreign Military Studies Office
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas