ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

Congress of the United States Nouse of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 2138 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6216

(202) 225-6906 judiciary.house.gov

January 17, 2024

The Honorable Christopher A. Wray Director Federal Bureau of Investigation 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20535

Dear Director Wray:

The Committee on the Judiciary and the Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government are conducting oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) receipt of information about American citizens from private entities without legal process. To advance our oversight, we are requesting a transcribed interview with Mr. Peter Sullivan, Senior Private Sector Partner for Outreach in the Strategic Partner Engagement Section of the FBI.

The Committee and Select Subcommittee have received testimony indicating that in 2021, the Bank of America (BoA) provided the FBI—voluntarily and without any legal process—with a list of individuals who made transactions in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area using a BoA credit or debit card between January 5 and January 7, 2021.¹ When that list was later brought to the attention of Steve Jensen, the FBI's then-Section Chief of the Domestic Terrorism Operations Section, he acted to "pull" the BoA information from FBI systems because "the leads lacked allegations of federal criminal conduct."² Documents obtained by the Committee and Select Subcommittee also show that FBI personnel, including Mr. Sullivan, made contact with and provided BoA with specific search query terms, indicating that it was "interested in all financial relationships" of BoA customers transacting in Washington D.C. and

¹ Transcribed Interview of Mr. George Hill 74-75 (Feb. 7, 2023) (describing that "Bank of America, with no directive from the FBI, data-mined its customer base. And they data-mined a date range of 5 to 7 January of any BOA customer who used a BOA product"); Transcribed Interview of Mr. Steve Jensen 146 (May 19, 2023) (stating that "one of my unit chiefs . . . advised that a number of leads had gone out regarding Bank of America information of subjects"); Transcribed Interview of Mr. Joseph Bonavolonta 11 (May 4, 2023) ("I am aware of information that was forwarded to us related to a Bank of America lead, yes"); Transcribed Interview of Mr. Steven D'Antuono (Jun. 7, 2023) (recalling that "[he learned that Bank of America provided information] probably through the course of the investigation at some point.").

² Transcribed Interview of Mr. Steve Jensen 152, 166 (May 19, 2023).

The Honorable Christopher A. Wray January 17, 2024 Page 2

customers who had made "ANY historical purchase" of a firearm, or who had purchased a hotel,

From:	@fbi.gov]
Sent:	1/15/2021 12:40:26 PM
To: Subject:	(@bofa.com]; @bofa.com] Re: upcoming SAR product idea/brainstorming and check-in with you both
As always	thanks for the very quick communication/response over the phone this morning.
To recap o	our morning call, we [FBI] are prepared to action [immediately] the following thresholds:
a	CTD/SPES/SEU is interested in all financial relationships that meet the following thresholds:
•	Customers confirmed as transacting, either through bank account [debit card] or credit
card, Was threshold	hington D.C. purchases between 1/5/21 and 1/6/21, with the additional [identifying] targeting s:
• during Ina	Purchases made for hotel/airbnb RSVPs in the DMV area [the day before and uguration Day]since 1/6/21.
• weapons	ANY historical purchase [going back 6 months generally, for weapons or related-vendor purchases].
• surroundi	Secondarily, purchases made for returns to Washington, D.C. and the ng DMV area:
	With Airline travel to DMV area for Inauguration Day
	With no identified airline purchases for the DMV.**
carrying o threat and	tends to capture, with its FI-partner concurrence, all customers who might be more strategic in ut attacks related to CTD interests; travel with weapons by vehicle and [not by] air, given the current aftermath of the 6 Jan Capitol building incidents. The intention by SEU is to identify all potential of threats vs. individual threats to Inauguration Day and beyond.

Airbnb, or airline travel within a given date range.³

In addition, the Committee and Select Subcommittee have obtained documents indicating that FBI personnel in the Office of Private Sector prepared an official report that broadly characterized certain political beliefs as indicative of domestic violent extremism. This report titled, "Domestic Violent Extremists Likely Emboldened in Aftermath of Capitol Breach," was shared with financial institutions for the purpose of "alert[ing] private sector partners that the 6 January 2021 violent breach by suspected domestic violent extremists into the U.S. Capitol Building may serve as a driver for a diverse set of DVEs."⁴ Among other things, the report identified as reasons that could "mobiliz[e] criminal actors and DVEs to violence" to include "increased socio-political pressures" surrounding "firearm legislation, the easing of immigration restrictions" as well as "discontent with renewed measures to mitigate the spread of COVID-19."⁵ Such a sweeping characterization of political beliefs and constitutionally protected speech as

³ BofA-HJUD-0000225 (on file with Committee).

⁴ BofA-HJUD-00000040, 41 (on file with Committee).

⁵ BofA-HJUD-00000041 (on file with Committee).

The Honorable Christopher A. Wray January 17, 2024 Page 3

indicators of domestic violent extremism is reminiscent of how the FBI similarly characterized traditional Catholics as potential terrorists.

From:	(FBI) @fbi.gov]
Sent:	1/18/2021 3:10:47 PM
CC:	(FBI) @fbi.gov]
BCC:	@bofa.com]
Subject:	LIR-TLP GREEN Domestic Violent Extremists Likely Emboldened in Aftermath of Capitol Breach [Sent To: @bankofamerica.com]
Attachments:	LIR-Capitol_Insurrection - 210117002.pdf
Good morni	ng,
	o the daily Overnight News, please find the attached LIR titled "Domestic Violent Extremists Likely I in Aftermath of Capitol Breach."
Regards,	

As the Senior Private Sector Partner for Outreach in the Strategic Partner Engagement Section, Mr. Sullivan's testimony will aid in our oversight. In particular, his testimony will help to inform the Committee and Select Subcommittee about the FBI's mass accumulation and use of Americans' private information without legal process; the FBI's protocols, if any, to safeguard Americans' privacy and constitutional rights in the receipt and use of such information; and the FBI's general engagement with the private sector on law-enforcement matters. We ask that you make Mr. Sullivan available for a transcribed interview with the Committee promptly. Please have your staff contact Committee staff as soon as possible but no later than 5:00 p.m. on January 31, 2024, to schedule his transcribed interview.

The Committee on the Judiciary is authorized to conduct oversight of the FBI pursuant to the Rules of the House of Representatives.⁶ In addition, H. Res. 12 authorized the Committee's Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government to investigate "issues related to the violation of the civil liberties of citizens of the United States."⁷ H. Res. 12 also authorized the Select Subcommittee to investigate "how executive branch agencies work with, obtain information from, and provide information to the private sector, non-profit entities, or other government agencies to facilitate action against American citizens."⁸

Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.

Jim Jordan Chairman

⁶ Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives, R. X (2023).

⁷ H. Res. 12 § 1(b)(1).

⁸ Id.

The Honorable Christopher A. Wray January 17, 2024 Page 4

cc: The Honorable Jerrold L. Nadler, Ranking Member