

# Analysis Tools


- Logic Tree
- 5 Whys
- Fishbone




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
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
## What is HOP?

#	HOP* Core Principles
1	People make mistakes
2	Blame fixes nothing
3	Context drives behavior
4	Learning is vital
5	Response matters

HOP = Human and Organizational Performance

5

## HOP\* and the 'Blue Line'




\* HOP = Human & Organizational Performance

6

## Drifting Into Complacency... "Forgetting to be Afraid"

Normalization of Deviance  
(short-cuts turn into practice)



7



### Quick Exercise: Thought for the Day...

*"The single greatest impediment to error prevention in the medical community is that we **punish people for making mistakes.**"*

- Dr. Lucian Leape, Professor, Harvard School of Public Health, in testimony before Congress on health care quality improvement.

8

## RCA Methodologies vs Tools



Source: Pixabay.com

9

## RCA Methods vs Tools

	Description	Example Approaches/ Tools
<b>RCA Methods</b>	Process flows that outline the steps to successfully apply a specific RCA Method.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Sologic</li> <li>2. ThinkReliability</li> <li>3. Apollo</li> <li>4. Taproot</li> <li>5. PROACT</li> </ol>
<b>RCA Tools</b>	These are common tools that aid in effectively executing the above-mentioned RCA methods. They are typically graphical expressions of logic using specific rules associated with an RCA methodology.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. 5-Whys</li> <li>2. Fishbone Diagram</li> <li>3. Causal Factor Trees</li> <li>4. Logic Trees</li> <li>5. Fault Trees</li> <li>6. Bow Ties</li> </ol>

10

## Are All RCA Tools Created Equal?



Source: Pixabay.com

11

## Using the Right Tool for the Analysis at Hand



12

## RCA Preference Poll

What is your preferred RCA Approach?


- 5 Whys
- Fishbone Diagram
- Logic Tree/Causal Factor Type Tree
- Other




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## Exploring the 3 Most Common RCA Tools


### 5-WHYS



### Fishbone Diagram




### Logic Tree



14

## 5 Whys




The "5 Whys" technique is a problem-solving and root cause analysis method aimed at uncovering the underlying reasons for an issue by repeatedly asking "why" questions.

Pros	Cons
Simple execution	Uses linear logic
Quick results	Concludes with 1 root cause
Individual and/or Team Based	'Why' questioning is limited
Limited data/evidence collection required	Seeks opinions
Reactive and proactive application	Lacks technical capability to explore multiple paths of failure
Big contributor to Defect Elimination (DE) Efforts	Often concludes with replacing parts and/or blaming decision-makers

15

## 5 Whys Example



16

## Fishbone Diagram

A **Fishbone Diagram**, also known as an Ishikawa Diagram or Cause-and-Effect Diagram, is a visual tool used for problem-solving and root cause analysis. It is named "Fishbone" because of its shape, which resembles a fish's skeleton. The Fishbone Diagram helps teams and individuals identify and categorize the potential causes contributing to a specific problem or effect. It is a structured way to visualize the relationship between various factors and their impact on a particular issue.

Pros	Cons
Simple execution	Categorical RCA tool
Quick results	Brainstorms within cause categories
Doesn't always require evidence to support opinion	Doesn't always require evidence to support opinion
Typically, team-based	Non-uniform cause categories (fishbones)
Reactive and proactive application	Tool is as good as the analyst

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17

17

## Fishbone Diagram Example


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18

18

## Logic Tree (aka Causal Factor Tree)



An RCA Logic Tree, or Root Cause Analysis Logic Tree, is a structured and hierarchical method for organizing and visually representing the causes and effects related to a specific problem or issue. It is a visual tool used in the context of Root Cause Analysis (RCA) to systematically explore and analyze the various causes (physical, human and latent) and contributing factors behind a problem. This tool helps in understanding the cause-and-effect relationships and will lead to the identification of root causes.

Pros	Cons
Very disciplined	Time consuming
Requires extensive data collection	Requires extensive data collection
Requires diversity of team members	Requires SMEs as needed
Requires unbiased facilitator	Requires accountable team
Reactive and proactive application	Requires management support
Explores multiple, simultaneous paths to failure	
Explores how mgmt systems influence decision making	
Can explore Human and Organizational Performance (HOP) Issues	




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19

19

## Basic Logic Tree Elements Used for Event Reconstruction




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
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# Group Exercise – Building a Logic Tree



21

## The Root Cause Analysis (RCA) Approach Dissecting the Logic Tree/Causal Factor Tree (Synonyms 😊)



22

## 1. Stating the Event

On 11.1.2X at 2a ET we experienced an unexpected outage lasting 4 hours, and resulting in \$525k of total aggregate losses

Example

### Considerations When Stating the Event

The most important node on the logic tree. It is a direct link to leadership about the business impact of the Event, and why they should be interested in the RCA.

Should reflect the key elements of the team's Problem Statement.

At its core, the Event is the 'reason you care' enough to do an RCA.

Least acceptable consequence

The Event description **MUST ONLY CONTAIN FACTS!!!!**



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23

23

## 2. Stating the Mode(s)

Critical Pump (P-100)  
Bearing Failure

Example

### Considerations When Stating the Mode(s)

Often the Mode is mistakenly identified as the Event.

The Mode(s) are the observable failure mechanisms.

The Mode(s) are anomalies that need to be explained.

There can be more than 1 Mode on any given RCA.

All Modes **MUST ONLY CONTAIN FACTS.**



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24

24

### 3. Exploring the Hypotheses

Hypothesis

#### Considerations When Exploring Hypotheses

Hypotheses are “educated guesses”.

When coming off facts (from the parent nodes), these are the potential answers to the question ‘How Could?’ and ‘Why?’. We will explore when it is appropriate to ask which questions in a few minutes.

The statement should reflect some type of deficiency (i.e. – lubrication vs. lubricant contamination, or frequency was less than adequate)



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25

25



### 3. Exploring the Hypotheses

Erosion

Corrosion

Fatigue

Overload



#### How Material Failure Occurs

Material Loss	Material is Overpowered
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➢ Erosion (Wear)</li> <li>➢ Corrosion</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>➢ Fatigue</li> <li>➢ Overload</li> </ul>

And many combinations of these four mechanisms!

“How Could P-100 Bearing Have Failed?”



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26

26

## 4. Identifying Physical Roots


Excessive  
Vibration

### Considerations When Labeling a Physical Root (PR)

Physical roots are often the primary, observable consequences of decisions.

A decision often triggered this condition to become observable (i.e. – I chose to put in more lubricant than was specified, in the hopes I would not have to come back as often to do my rounds – Physical Root: Too Much Lubricant).

There can be multiple Physical roots in any given RCA.



27

## 5. Identifying Human Roots



**“Today we are going to decide who to blame.”**

28

## 5. Identifying Human Roots

P-101 Bearing  
Not Aligned  
Properly



### Considerations When Labeling a Human Root (HR)

Human roots are the choices/decisions people make, that trigger observable consequences.

Human roots are acts of decision-making that are typically based on good intent, and often common business practices.

Human roots are NOT the end of an analysis, they are often the beginning of the analysis.

Unless there is malice with intent (sabotage), **BLAMING SOMEONE WILL RESULT IN A SHALLOW CAUSE ANALYSIS, NOT A ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS!!**



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29

29

## 6. Identifying Latent/Organizational System Roots

Less Than Adequate (LTA)  
Oversight of Field  
Qualifications

Field Tech Not Properly  
Trained in Latest  
Alignment Best Practices



### Considerations When Labeling a Latent Root

Latent roots represent the human reasoning for a decision error.

These are the answers to 'WHY?' people made the decisions they did, that day.

Latent roots are often the flawed organizational systems that decision-makers relied on, to make their decision.

Such organizational systems could be inadequate, insufficient, or non-existent.

Latent roots can encompass varying levels of depth, that may or may not include socio-technical factors (i.e. – external factors like regulatory and insurance influences) as well as cultural norms (i.e. – we've always done it that way).



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Image provided by Ludeca

30

30

## 7. Identifying Contributing Factors

On 1.28.86, at Launch of Mission 51-L it was 36F at Cape Canaveral FL



### Considerations When Labeling a Contributing Factor

Conditions that existed the day of the Event, but may not be in the control of the organization to change (i.e. – it was freezing that day, which was uncharacteristic for the region)


May more may not be actionable, must be explored (i.e. – a lightning strike triggered an automated shutdown, but was the facility properly grounded [mitigation exploration])

## Human Error Defined

“Error will be taken as a generic term to encompass all those occasions in which a planned sequence of mental and physical activities fails to achieve its intended outcome, and when these failures cannot be attributed to some chance agency.”

- J.T. Reasons

University of Manchester



33

Term	Definition
<b>Unintended Actions</b>	Actions that deviate from intended action fall into two classes; those that nevertheless achieve the goal, and those that do not.
<b>Slips</b>	Are potentially observable as externalized actions-not-as-planned (i.e. – slips of the tongue).
<b>Lapses</b>	Are generally more covert errors and involve failures of memory.
<b>Intended Actions</b>	Even when the intended actions proceed as planned, they can still be judged as erroneous if they fail to achieve their intended outcome. In this case, the problem resides in the adequacy of the plan rather than conformity of its actions to some prior intention. If the intention is not appropriate, it is a mistake.
<b>Mistakes</b>	Are defined as deficiencies or failures in the judgmental and/or inferential processes involved in the selection of an objective or in the specification of the means to achieve it, irrespective of whether or not the actions directed by this decision-scheme run according to the plan.

Source: Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents (Reason)

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34

## Why Do Mix-Ups Occur?

### Human Factors in Design – Medication Labeling and Procedure Writing

#### Procedure Writing – Mixed Case:

The attending surgeon shall record in the medical record the correct side for and name of the surgical procedure

#### Procedure Writing – All Upper Case:

THE ATTENDING SURGEON SHALL RECORD IN THE MEDICAL RECORD THE CORRECT SIDE FOR AND NAME OF THE SURGICAL PROCEDURE

**Medication**


Unique  
Pattern

**MEDICATION**

Generic Pattern

35

## Human Factors in Design – Brain Processing Capability



Of all the signals that reach our sensory register, we focus on a few that seem important (normal capacity is about seven “chunks” of information).

**Source:** Making Connections: Teaching and the Human Brain (Caine and Caine 1991)

36

## What Do You See? The Mind is a Mysterious Thing (#1)

**A bird in the  
the hand is  
worth two in  
the bush**

Perceptions are mental models developed in the brain to interpret incoming information the way it SHOULD BE versus the way that it IS.



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37

37

## What Do You See? The Mind is a Mysterious Thing (#2)

I cdnuolt blveiee taht I cluod aulacly uesdnatnrd  
waht I was rdanieg. The phaonmneal pweor of  
the hmuan mnid Aoccdrnig to a rscheearch at  
Cmabrigde Uinervtisy, it deson't mttar in waht  
oredr the ltteers in a wrod are, the olny iprmoatnt  
tihng is taht the frist and lsat ltteer be in the rghit  
pclae. The rset can be a taotl mses and you can  
sitll raed it wouthit a porbelm. Tihs is bcuseae  
the huamn mnid deos not raed ervey lteter by  
istlef, but the wrod as a wlohe. Amzanig huh?




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
38

## Sample of Common Logic Tree Branches




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## Sample of Common Logic Tree Branches




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## Sample of Common Logic Tree Branches




41

## Sample of Common Logic Tree Branches



42

## Top Box – Definition



Thick Stock Pump – Top Box

## Logic Tree Facilitation Tips & Tricks



## Logic Tree Facilitation – Tips and Tricks




### Considerations When Labeling a Latent Root

- The 'Broad and All-Inclusive' Test
- Managing the FACT Line
- Maintaining the Verification Log (VL)
- Node Confidence Factors (0 – 5 Scale, 5=True and 0 = Not True)
- Beware Conventional Wisdom
- Draw a Sketch of the Event Being Analyzed
- Construct a Timeline of the Event

46

## Logic Tree Facilitation – Tips and Tricks




**The Test:** Is the only the V-belt could have failed, from: breaking, slipping and/or falling off?

47

# Logic Tree Facilitation – Tips and Tricks



Managing the FACT Line



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
48

48

# Logic Tree Facilitation – Tips and Tricks



Managing the FACT Line



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49

49

## Logic Tree Facilitation – Tips and Tricks



Hypotheses	Verification Method	Resp.	Due Date	Completion Date	Verification Outcome
High Vibration on CP-235 Outboard Bearing	Review Vibration Alarm Limits and Histories	KCL	10.31.23	11.1.23	Review of Alarm Limits and Histories Reveals a Trending of Increased Vibration Starting on 9.23.23


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## RCA Verification Techniques

### Visual Techniques

- Metallurgical Analysis
- High Speed Photography
- Video Cameras
- Borescopes
- Human Observation
- Strobe Lights

51



52

## Overload Failures

- Ductile
- Brittle



Example of a Ductile Overload


A Brittle Overload would not be deformed and would be fractured

53


## Fatigue Failures

- Bending
- Torsion
- Tension


Beach marks show different level of stress over time. If the pattern of the marks is different than different stresses have been applied over time



## Fatigue Failures




# Fatigue Failures




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
# Reference Books




Practical Plant Failure Analysis  
 ISBN: 0849333768



Decoding Mechanical Failures  
 ISBN: 1777157609



How Components Fail  
 ISBN: 0871701898



Steel Isn't Hard (to Learn)  
 ISBN: 978-1777157616



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57

## RCA Verification Techniques

### NDT (Non-Destructive Testing)

- Laser Alignment
- Vibration Monitoring & Analysis
- Ultrasonics
- Infrared Thermography
- Lubrication Sampling/Analysis
- Scanning Electron Microscopy
- Experimental Stress Analysis
- Motion Amplification



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58

## Analyze RCA Verification Techniques

### Data Analysis

- Trend Analysis
- **Weibull Analysis**
- Modeling (Reliability Block Diagram)



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59

## Reliability Data Analysis

### Statistical analysis

- Distribution analysis
  - Normal
  - LogNormal
  - **Weibull** (used **95%** of the time for reliability analysis)
- Trend Tests
  - Army Material Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA)



## Reliability Data Analysis

### Why use statistical analysis?

- To identify a failure pattern
- Provides capability to assess failure risk
- Provides accurate estimation of MTBF
- Helps make general assumptions about seemingly unrelated data



# Can you explain these calculations?

10      Oscillatory Motion    Chap. 1

Another example is the free vibration of a multidegree-of-freedom system, to which the vibrations at each natural frequency contribute. Such vibrations result in a complex waveform, which is repeated periodically as shown in Fig. 1.2-1.

The French mathematician J. Fourier (1768-1830) showed that any periodic motion can be represented by a series of sines and cosines that are harmonically related. If  $x(t)$  is a periodic function of the period  $\tau$ , it is represented by the Fourier series

$$x(t) = \frac{a_0}{2} + a_1 \cos \omega_1 t + a_2 \cos \omega_2 t + \dots + b_1 \sin \omega_1 t + b_2 \sin \omega_2 t + \dots \quad (1.2-1)$$

where

$$\omega_1 = \frac{2\pi}{\tau}$$

$$\omega_n = n\omega_1$$

To determine the coefficients  $a_n$  and  $b_n$ , we multiply both sides of Eq. (1.2-1) by  $\cos \omega_m t$  or  $\sin \omega_m t$  and integrate each term over the period  $\tau$ . Recognizing the following relations,

$$\int_{-\tau/2}^{\tau/2} \cos \omega_m t \cos \omega_n t dt = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } m \neq n \\ \tau/2 & \text{if } m = n \end{cases}$$

$$\int_{-\tau/2}^{\tau/2} \sin \omega_m t \sin \omega_n t dt = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } m \neq n \\ \tau/2 & \text{if } m = n \end{cases} \quad (1.2-2)$$

$$\int_{-\tau/2}^{\tau/2} \cos \omega_m t \sin \omega_n t dt = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } m \neq n \\ 0 & \text{if } m = n \end{cases}$$

all terms except one on the right side of the equation will be zero, and we obtain the result

$$a_n = \frac{2}{\tau} \int_{-\tau/2}^{\tau/2} x(t) \cos \omega_n t dt \quad (1.2-3)$$

$$b_n = \frac{2}{\tau} \int_{-\tau/2}^{\tau/2} x(t) \sin \omega_n t dt$$

The Fourier series can also be represented in terms of the exponential function. Substituting

$$\cos \omega_n t = \frac{1}{2}(e^{i\omega_n t} + e^{-i\omega_n t})$$

$$\sin \omega_n t = -\frac{1}{2i}(e^{i\omega_n t} - e^{-i\omega_n t})$$

Chap. 1.2    Periodic Motion    11

in Eq. (1.2-1), we obtain

$$x(t) = \frac{a_0}{2} + \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \left[ \frac{1}{2}(a_n - ib_n)e^{i\omega_n t} + \frac{1}{2}(a_n + ib_n)e^{-i\omega_n t} \right]$$

$$= \frac{a_0}{2} + \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \left[ c_n e^{i\omega_n t} + c_n^* e^{-i\omega_n t} \right] \quad (1.2-4)$$

where

$$c_n = \frac{1}{2}a_n$$

$$c_n = \frac{1}{2i}(a_n - ib_n) \quad (1.2-5)$$

Substituting for  $a_n$  and  $b_n$  from Eq. (1.2-3), we find  $c_n$  to be

$$c_n = \frac{1}{\tau} \int_{-\tau/2}^{\tau/2} x(t) (\cos \omega_n t - i \sin \omega_n t) dt \quad (1.2-6)$$

$$= \frac{1}{\tau} \int_{-\tau/2}^{\tau/2} x(t) e^{-i\omega_n t} dt$$

Some computational effort can be minimized when the function  $x(t)$  is recognizable in terms of the even and odd functions

$$x(t) = E(t) + O(t) \quad (1.2-7)$$

An even function  $E(t)$  is symmetric about the origin so that  $E(t) = E(-t)$ , i.e.,  $\cos \omega t = \cos(-\omega t)$ . An odd function satisfies the relationship  $O(t) = -O(-t)$ , i.e.,  $\sin \omega t = -\sin(-\omega t)$ . The following integrals are then helpful:

$$\int_{-\tau/2}^{\tau/2} E(t) \sin \omega_n t dt = 0$$

$$\int_{-\tau/2}^{\tau/2} O(t) \cos \omega_n t dt = 0 \quad (1.2-8)$$

When the coefficients of the Fourier series are plotted against frequency  $\omega_n$ , the result is a series of discrete lines called the *Fourier spectrum*. Generally plotted are the absolute values  $|2c_n| = \sqrt{a_n^2 + b_n^2}$  and the phase  $\phi_n = \tan^{-1} b_n/a_n$ , an example of which is shown in Fig. 1.2-2.

With the aid of the digital computer, harmonic analysis today is efficiently carried out. A computer algorithm known as the *fast Fourier transform* (FFT) is commonly used to minimize the computation time.

\*See J. S. Bendat & A. G. Piersol, *Random Data* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971), pp. 305-306.

# Can you interpret this graph?




Figure 5.5 Spectrum of imbalance created in a tabletop demonstration machine turning at 1500 rpm (25 Hz).


## What's the point?

- You don't have to know the FFT theory to benefit from Vibration Analysis.
- Likewise, you don't have to know statistical methods theory to benefit from statistical analysis of failure data.
- You just need know how to apply the methods and interpret the results!




## Our First Introduction to Statistics!

<i>Grades</i>	
Student	Score
Jack	45
Beth	55
Joe	60
Mike	60
Lisa	55
Fred	50
Lynn	50
Jason	75
Sara	55
Tina	55
Chris	65



# Distribution Analysis

## Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF)




$$MTBF = \frac{TTF1 + TTF2 + TTF3 + TTF4 + TTF5 + TTF6}{6}$$




# Normal Distribution

Asset ID	TTF
Asset101	26
Asset101	28
Asset101	33
Asset101	33
Asset101	27
Asset101	30
Asset101	32
Asset101	34
Asset101	28
Asset101	29
Asset101	30
Asset101	32
Asset101	27
Asset101	28
Asset101	30
Asset101	31
Asset101	29
Asset101	31
Asset101	31
Asset101	29
Asset101	30
Asset101	32
Asset101	30
Asset101	29
Asset101	31


TTF	n
26	1
27	2
28	3
29	4
30	5
31	4
32	3
33	2
34	1



## Normal Distribution




PDF =  $f(t)$   
Probability Density Function



68

## Interpreting MTBF Results




PDF =  $f(t)$

If you solve the **PDF** at points **a** and **b**, and you get the same results ... showing the probability of failing at points **a** or **b** ...

...But nothing about how many failures have occurred before points a or b!

69


## How does this distribution indicate reliability?



70


## Weibull Distribution

Probability of failure = Area under the curve



71

# Weibull Distribution




**P=F(t)** is commonly known as the Cumulative Distribution Function or **CDF**

$$CDF = F(t)$$




# Weibull Distribution




**Failure Rate Plot**



## Weibull Distribution



A straight-line results when the CDF is plotted on log paper.



74


## Weibull Distribution

### Two Parameters:

- **$\beta$  (Beta)** = Shape Factor
  - Indicates failure pattern
  - Slope of probability plot
- **$\eta$  (Eta)** = Characteristic Life
  - Indicates expected life
  - Point where 63.2% of population has failed

75

## Beta and the Bathtub Curve




76

## Weibull Distribution

### General Rules for Beta:

- $\beta < 1$  Indicates infant mortality
- $\beta = 1$  Indicates random failure
- $1 < \beta < 4$  Indicates early wear-out failure
- $\beta > 4$  Indicates rapid wear-out failure

77



78

## Weibull Distribution

- Extremely applicable to most every failure mode
- Will produce good results even with a small amount of data
- Best starting point for reliability analysis
- **95%** of the time, Weibull is the best tool
- Requires quality data for meaningful results

**Weibull Distributions can only be used on one failure mode at a time**

79

## Risk Manager

- Allows you to estimate probability of failure
- Good for short-term planning
- Helps predict which machines will make it to the next scheduled maintenance



80

## Risk Manager

Q201 Failures  
 Last modified by Kenneth.Latino@contractor.p66.com on Wednesday, December 13, 2023 12:36 PM

Report Site: RB01

Future Age Future Probability

ASSET ID	INSTALLATION DATE	LAST REPLACEMENT	PRESENT AGE	FUTURE AGE	PRESENT FAILURE PROBABILITY	FUTURE FAILURE PROBABILITY
RB01-COK0050-67-Q201		2023-06-22T17:04:47.000	68.0948	268.0948	12.3582	21.1840



81

## Logic Tree Facilitation – Tips and Tricks



Node Confidence Factors (0 – 5  
Scale, 5=True and 0 = Not True)

V-Belt Breaks

[5]

**Confidence Factor:** Confidence that we have, that with the verification data available, the Node is either True, Not True or shades of gray in between. Shades of gray result when the evidence available cannot be totally conclusive.

82

## Logic Tree Facilitation – Tips and Tricks



Beware Conventional  
Wisdom/Confirmation Bias

- We don't need this team; I know what the problem is because I've been here 22 years!!
- We've tried that before
- It's old equipment
- We don't have time to do an RCA on this failure


**Conventional Wisdom:** Beware of the above as they are most often 'Assumptions' and not facts. A successful RCA will NOT allow hearsay to fly as FACT!!

83

## Logic Tree Facilitation – Tips and Tricks



Draw a Sketch of the Event Being Analyzed



Source: <https://chemicalengineeringworld.com/process-flow-diagram-pfd/>



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84

84

## Logic Tree Facilitation – Tips and Tricks



Construct a Timeline of the Event

NASA  
Johnson Space Center

### STS 51-L Incident Investigation Integrated Events Timeline

CAMERA	PHOTOGRAPHIC EVENT	NET SEC	NET SEC	INSTRUMENTATION EVENT	DATA SOURCE
			66	66.764 START ET LH <sub>2</sub> ULLAGE PRESSURE DEVIATIONS	T41P1700C
			65	65.524 LHOB ELEVON ACTUATOR DELTA P CHANGE	V58P0866C
			65	65.404 END VEHICLE PITCH RATE CHANGE	V90R2525C L
E204	BRIGHT SUSTAINED GLOW ON +Z AND -Z SIDES OF ET	64.705	64	64.937 START NE LARGE PITCH VARIATIONS	V58H1100A
E204	ABRUPT CHANGE IN ANOMALOUS PLUME SHAPE, FIRST INDICATION OF LH <sub>2</sub> LEAK NEAR ET 2058 RING FRAME	64.660	64	64.604 START VEHICLE PITCH RATE CHANGE	V90R2525C L
E207	FIRST EVIDENCE OF PLUME DEFLECTION CONTINUOUS	60.988	63	63.924 RHOB ELEVON ACTUATOR DELTA P CHANGE	V58P0966C
E203	FIRST EVIDENCE OF ANOMALOUS SRB PLUME ATTACHING TO THE ET 2058 RING FRAME	60.248	62	62.484 RHOB ELEV ACT HINGE MOMENT SPIKE	V58P0966C
E207	FIRST EVIDENCE OF PLUME DEFLECTION - INTERMITTANT	60.238	61	62.094 START L SRB TVC ROCK ACT SPIKE	B58H1150C
E204	VISUAL EVIDENCE OF FLAME FROM R SRB IN +Z DIRECTION, NEAR ET ATTACH RING (SEEN FROM SOUTH SIDE)	55.763	60		
E207	CONTINUOUS WELL-DEFINED PLUME ON R SRB IN +Z, -Y COORDINATES	59.262	59	60.004 SRB CHAMBER PRESS DIVERGENCE RH VS LH	B47P2302C R B47P1302C L
E207	FLICKERING DYNAMIC PLUME ON R SRB	TBD	59		
E207	FIRST EVIDENCE OF FLAME ON R SRB	58.788	58	59.000 RECONSTRUCTED MAX Q 720 PSF	JSC DATA

[Ref. 3/21-29]



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
85

85

## Logic Tree Facilitation – Tips and Tricks



Biggest Bang for Your Buck –  
Path Forward



86

## Additional Cases

- [Cooling Tower Fan #2 Motor Failure](#)
- [Lubrication Degradation Mechanisms RCA](#)
- [Industry Example](#)
- [RCA on RCA](#)

87

## Let's Try an Equivalency Test...


**Case Study Background:** XYZ Company was receiving numerous complaints from a particular customer about contamination of their delivered product (solvent), which had visible black 'specks'. This was unacceptable and the delivery was refused and returned by the client.

Let's review this case and apply the 5-Whys, Fishbone and Logic Tree Approaches. This was actually done as a test with this particular client using 3 different teams. These were the results.

Source: Latino, Latino & Latino.2019.Root Cause Analysis: Improving Performance for Bottom-Line Results.5<sup>th</sup> Ed.CRC Press. Boca Raton, FL.


88

## The 5-Whys Team



89

# The Fishbone Team (Using the 4 M's)




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90

90

# The Logic Tree Team




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91

91

# Logic Tree Exploration (1)




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92

92

# Logic Tree Exploration (2)




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93

93

### Logic Tree Exploration (3)




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94

94

### Logic Tree Exploration (4)



95

95


# Are All RCA Tools Created Equal?

Root Causes Identified	5-Whys	Fishbone	Logic Tree RCA
No Filter in Process Line	X	X	X
Ineffective Filtering		X	X
Purchasing Error		X	Evidence proves this not to be true
Understaffed		X	X
Financial Constraints Made		X	Evidence proves this not to be true
Purchasing Filters Not a High Priority			
Cartridge was Wrong Type for Small Particles		X	X
Process Changed and Cartridges Not Updated			X
No MOC to Ensure Specs Change When Process Modifications Implemented			X
Cartridges Dirty			X
Cartridges Not Changed			X
No Cartridge Inspection Scheduled			X
Lack of Proper PM Scheduling Program			X
Transfer Truck Not Cleaned			X
Cleaner Did Not Follow Procedure			X
No Check Step By Truck Cleaning Firm			X
Specs Missing During Inspection of Truck			X
Inspector Hurried from the Backlog of Trucks			X
Trucks Not Scheduled Properly			X
Inspectors Work Hours Cut Back			X
Decision to Cut Costs			X



96

# Remember Our RCA Process Flow Diagram...



97

## Root Cause Analysis Exercise

**Instructions:** Break into teams of 3-5 members. Organize into work teams where each team has at least one member who is **NOT** familiar with the event being analyzed. Follow the steps below and be prepared to report your analysis and findings to the other teams. 60 minutes

**Step 1:** Identify Event to Analyze

**Step 2:** Calculate the Annual Losses Associated with Event

**Step 3:** Sketch Out the Event for Team (Basic)

**Step 4:** Construct a Basic Timeline

**Step 5:** Begin Logic Tree Construction

**Step 6:** Validate Hypotheses Using Data Previously Collected (Virtually)

**Step 7:** Continue Down Logic Tree Until Latent/System Roots are Identified. Properly Identify Physical, Human, and Latent Root Causes.

**Step 8:** Propose Corrective Actions for Actionable Root Causes

**Step 9:** Present Case Study to Leadership (Rest of Class)



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98

## Online Case Studies



**Thermo-Compressor Cone Failures**  
(~ 18 minutes)



**Turbine Driven Boiler Feed Pump Failure**  
(~16 minutes)




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99

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
# Case #1 Thick Stock Pump Analysis




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
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
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
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
103




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
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
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
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
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
109



110



111



112