DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF JEFFERSON
STATE OF COLORADO
100 Jefferson County Parkway
Golden, Colorado 80401

DATE FILED: February 25, 2019 5:13 PM

Plaintiff:

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO

٧.

Defendant:

ERIC JAMES ST. GEORGE

^FOR COURT USE ONLY^

Case No. 16CR2509 Division 1

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

The Jury Trial in the above-entitled matter recommenced on February 9, 2018, before THE HONORABLE LILY OEFFLER, Judge of the District Court.

This is a full and complete transcript of the proceedings had on this date in the aforementioned matter.

APPEARANCES

For the People:

MIKE FREEMAN, DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY KATHARINE DECKER, DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY District Attorney's Office First Judicial District 500 Jefferson County Parkway Golden, Colorado 80401

For the Defendant:

ERIC ST. GEORGE, PRO SE

For the Defendant (Advisory Counsel):
PETER MENGES, P.C.
The Law Offices of Peter D. Menges, P.C.
140 East 19th Avenue
Suite 300
Denver, Colorado 80203

PROCEEDINGS, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2018, 8:05 A.M.

THE COURT: Let's go on the record. All right. So we have concluded closings. We're at the point where I generally read the last instruction and I will read the jury verdict sheets to the jury. So at the end of yesterday we had the issue of unanimity with reference to illegal discharge of a firearm, and so I'll hear any discussion about that.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Your Honor, this charge needs to be dismissed in its entirety. The DA was never clear in this trial as to which shot they were referring to. They told the jury they could just pick one of two different shots, neither of which was the shot they bound over on in the preliminary hearing, you know, therefore, I was denied due process.

I prepared the trial based on a different shot entirely and, you know, they can't make a change in the middle of trial. Neither of the theories the DA is now relying on is the one they elected at the preliminary hearing. It's too late for us to fix this because there's no way to unring a bell. I'm moving for the dismissal of that charge in its entirety.

THE COURT: Response?

MR. FREEMAN: Judge, I cited a case yesterday that we're relying on, also the notes that are in the

unanimity instruction in COLJI. Those support the denial of the defense motion. He has cited no statutory or case law authority in support of his position, and I'm not aware of any that says that we have to specify at a preliminary hearing what we're doing. That simply is a probable cause finding so his request is not supported by anything other than just a desire to have one count dismissed, so we would oppose it.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Your Honor, I cite *People v*Greer, this would be 262 P.3d 920 and an accused has the right to a jury trial and a unanimous jury verdict, U.S. Constitution. The trial court is responsible for ensuring that the jury is properly instructed on the law and that a conviction on any count is the result of a unanimous verdict.

When evidence of many acts is presented, any one of which could constitute the offense charged, the trial court must take one of two actions to ensure jury unanimity, require the prosecution to elect the transaction on which it relies on the conviction or if there is not evidence to differentiate between the acts and there is a reasonable likelihood that jurors may disagree on the act the defendant committed, instruct the jury that to convict it must agree unanimously that the defendant committed the same act or that the defendant

committed all of the acts excluded within the period charged.

THE COURT: Okay. So from the People, tell me the acts the People feel support the illegal discharge of the firearm.

MR. FREEMAN: Judge, I'd have to pull up my argument, but I think what I argued was that --

THE COURT: And you can go ahead and pull it up if you'd like.

MR. FREEMAN: I'm just waiting for my computer to start up.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FREEMAN: I believe what I argued to the jury was that the acts of shooting up into the breezeway, firing the shotgun that -- the pellets that hit the Building Number 6 to the east or the pellets that entered Ms. Bal's window, I believe I said any of those would support the unlawful discharge of a firearm.

THE COURT: Okay. And so there's an agreement that that was what was presented to jury in closing, correct?

MR. ST. GEORGE: Yes, Your Honor, that's what he presented in closing.

THE COURT: Okay. So initially I had the argument that in the preliminary hearing, the People

presented a specific shooting to substantiate their claim in the case and that was claim that was where probable cause was found.

Again, I don't have in preliminary hearing in front of me. I was not the judge who undertook the preliminary hearing. I didn't make the findings of probable cause, and so I don't know why the judge found probable cause for that.

What I did was go ahead and look at the case as presented here over this week and a half and found that there was more than sufficient evidence under the standard that I need to apply to support that charge and did not dismiss it.

So the argument is is that there needs to be a unanimity instruction to ensure the jurors are all looking at the same specific instance. Sometimes there's a requirement of unanimity instruction, sometimes not.

Sometimes in a continuing course of conduct, there is or there is not. We oftentimes see unanimity instructions and I think the case cited by the People, that case has to do with sexual assault and different instances with undefined periods of time, and so then the Court may require a unanimity instruction.

There was no -- this issue was brought before the Court at the stage where the People rested and there

was no request for a unanimity instruction then nor was there while the Court looked at jury instructions.

This came -- we were almost a minute or two away from the conclusion of the People's primary closing where there was an objection as to time, and the Court excused the jury and then Mr. St George said, and by the way, I need a unanimity instruction and the Court couldn't hear it then. I wasn't certain what we were talking about.

Okay. So, yes, I think this is very late. I think this could have and was presented earlier in the case and could have been resolved. In abundance of caution in this case, I'll simply do this: I'll provide a unanimity instruction now to confirm that the jurors are all together on this and that they look at the instances. So I need some specificity about the shooting into the breezeway, the pellets in the building to the east and the pellets that entered the window of the one witness.

So the general unanimity instruction starts out, In order to convict the defendant -- I'm assuming you didn't prepare a unanimity instruction, Mr. St George?

MR. ST. GEORGE: I have not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So the standard starts out with, In order to convict the defendant, and here it would be, illegal discharge of a firearm, you must either unanimously agree that the defendant committed the same

act or acts of discharging a firearm or that he committed all of the acts alleged.

And so let's list them. So shooting into the breezeway, and that was the early morning hours of August 1st or July 31st or both those times because we're uncertain which date?

MR. FREEMAN: Judge, I think it should say on or between July 31st and August 1st.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Your Honor, the district attorney has moved to amend that charge, did they ever amend that charge?

THE COURT: I granted the amendment at the beginning.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Okay.

THE COURT: And then we had, B. The district attorney said they were going to follow-up with a written amendment so that we would have something permanent on the record rather than the minute order, but the Court granted the amendment and that's how all the charges were read.

MR. ST. GEORGE: So they've amended as to that count?

THE COURT: It was all the counts, it was my understanding.

MR. MENGES: It was -- sorry.

MR. ST. GEORGE: It was not all the counts.

THE COURT: Okay. A response from the People?

MR. FREEMAN: On what issue, Judge?

THE COURT: Mr. St George alleges that there was not an amendment of the dates on all the counts, and so I think what he's saying is that this count was not amended to reflect on or between July 31st.

MR. FREEMAN: Judge, I believe we asked to amend all the counts. We can file the written one. The Court granted it, I'm not sure why we're relitigating this.

THE COURT: Well, because the allegation is that the Court did not grant it, that the Court only granted it for certain counts.

MR. FREEMAN: I mean, we'd have to go back and look at the transcript then or the Court's notes. I thought we did.

THE COURT: What did the People ask for?

MR. FREEMAN: Judge, I believe that we asked that the dates reflect on or between July 31st and August 1st.

THE COURT: So I am going to -- the Court did go ahead and grant the amendment to the dates, and I'm going to continue with that. So on or between July 31st and August 1st, defendant shot into the breezeway. The third instance would be regarding the pellets to building to the east and how on or between July 31st and August 1st the

defendant shot pellets into the building to the east. If someone has a more artful way of saying that.

MR. FREEMAN: Judge, I'm looking at my closing and what I said is that evidence that shotgun pellets struck the building to the east of defendant's unit, and I said, and evidence that shotgun pellets entered the window of Ms. Bal's unit through the window screen.

THE COURT: Window of Ms. Bal's through the window screen.

MR. FREEMAN: And then I said evidence that defendant fired a round into the ceiling of the common breezeway area of the residence upstairs, and in parenthesis, I had Ms. Malmsberry's name.

THE COURT: Okay. So let's look at this. I had shooting into the ceiling of the common breezeway with the resident upstairs, then I have -- give me the language again about shot pellets into Building Number 6.

MR. FREEMAN: I just said it struck the building to the east of defendant's unit.

THE COURT: Okay. Shot pellets into the building to the east of defendant's unit. And, C, shot pellets through the window screen of Ms. Bal's unit.

MR. FREEMAN: Yes, that's fine.

THE COURT: So those are the three instances that are alleged. There's a unanimity instruction being

requested.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Three?

Your Honor, we were talking about two just a moment ago and now we're talking about three?

THE COURT: Well, there were three -- the district attorney indicated that there were three instances that he referenced in his closing that the jury could consider on this. And that's when you objected and said that you were unaware that the district attorney was going to argue those and so at this point you needed a unanimity instruction because you had not understood or you were concerned that jurors wouldn't all agree on one instance.

MR. ST. GEORGE: So, Your Honor, we've scoured through this preliminary hearing transcript and there is absolutely no mention of shotgun pellets entering through anyone's window in the preliminary hearing.

At the time of the preliminary hearing, the district attorney was still apparently operating under the idea that the breezeway was a first shot in the air with Ms. Elliott. That was what they alleged in their preliminary hearing, that is the -- that is the case that I prepared my trial based upon. I'm entitled to a preliminary hearing. They can't just simply change the -- because they've been proven bald-faced that that

was not the case that that breezeway shot was the first shot in the air against Ms. Elliott, they know that very clearly now.

If they wanted to make this about some shotgun pellets in a neighbor's window, they should have presented that case at the preliminary hearing, which they did not. I'm entitled to due process. I'm entitled to a preliminary hearing. And in this case, I certainly have not had those things.

THE COURT: Response?

MR. FREEMAN: Judge, I appreciate that the defendant thinks that this is unfair and he thinks that whatever we presented and argued at the preliminary hearing has to be argued at the trial. And I realize that he wishes that's the way things were, but that's simply not the way things are.

And we don't have to rely upon the same theories that we relied upon at the probable cause hearing because it's a different hearing for different purpose. And I know the he wishes that's the way things were, but that's just not the way things are and there's no case or statute that requires us to have the exact same theories of the case at trial as we had at prelim. And I understand that he feels like that's unfair, but that's just not the law.

THE COURT: Okay. So we're going to craft this

unanimity instruction. Certainly, I have to say that my understanding of the illegal discharge -- since, again, I was hearing the case for the first time other than what I heard during motions hearing. I heard specifically evidence regarding the breezeway, the ceiling, it was a common area, and the upstairs neighbor testified.

My thought was that was why she testified. But, again, I'm hearing the case for the first time. I thought perhaps that this was why Ms. Bal testified that the pellets went through her window. Certainly they all heard a noise, noises and then some were able to identify police. So my notes reflect these instances and considering whether or not probable cause has been supported for this charge, I went ahead and did that.

We also were presented with shots or pellets into the building to the east of defendant's unit and I think I differentiated buildings by their numbers in my notes. But I can't say that there was not evidence presented for each instance, and, in fact, I think some of that was brought out by Mr. St George in his presentation to talk about pellets and blood trails and the crime scene to support his particular position.

But this is what I'm going to do, I'll give the unanimity instruction because we have three distinct incidents that are alleged, and we're going to say you

must either unanimously agree that the defendant committed the same acts or acts of discharging a firearm or that he committed all of the acts alleged. And so we are going to put in the shooting into the ceiling of the common area breezeway; and then, B -- and, again, they're all going to read on or between July 31st and August 1st -- then defendant shot -- defendant allegedly shot into the ceiling of the common area breezeway; B, on or between July 31st and August 12th, defendant allegedly shot shotgun pellets into the building to the east of defendant's unit; and, C, on same date and time, defendant allegedly shot pellets through the window screen of Ms. Bal's unit and that's how we'll differentiate them.

We are going to put --

MR. ST. GEORGE: Judge -- Judge, those two, B and C, that's the same event. Ms. Malmsberry belonged to a building that was south of Building 7.

THE COURT: Okay. So tell me -- I had the C being Ms. Bal's unit is what the district attorney just told me.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Yeah, the window, the screen, that's Ms. Bal's unit.

THE COURT: Okay. So the window -- so we have the window -- this says the window of Ms. Bal's unit.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Right.

THE COURT: Okay. So what are the three instances that the defendant is representing that he presented to the jury -- I mean, the prosecution is representing?

MR. FREEMAN: Judge, I already stated them and we had --

THE COURT: You, did now the argument is B and C is the same. Could you please explain?

MR. FREEMAN: Judge, this is the problem --

THE COURT: We do need a unanimity instruction.

I understand that this is late but I've ruled so now we have to craft it.

MR. FREEMAN: Okay. And I'm saying this is highlighting the reason why when it comes after the trial, you really can't go back and do this because of all the reasons that the defendant is standing up and saying this.

So do you want me to restate the three reasons?

THE COURT: I have the three reasons. I want
you to respond to the defendant's argument, please.

MR. FREEMAN: Judge, there was photographs showing pellet strikes all over the side of that building to the east. Ms. Bal identified her unit as the unit in the corner of that, but there were bullet strikes to the units to the south of that. So I don't know what else to say.

We can't be arguing this now. I understand the Court's giving a unanimity instruction. I'm asking that it says what it says, the three different indents which were supported by the evidence.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Your Honor, nowhere, anywhere in this trial has anyone mentioned bullet strikes or pellet strikes or anything in a building to the south.

THE COURT: This was to the east.

MR. FREEMAN: No, I said to the south of
Ms. Bal's unit. She described when she pointed out her
unit was in if northwest corner of Building 6. But you
can see from the photographs that we admitted that there's
bullet strikes or pellet strikes in the building to the
south of her unit.

THE COURT: Okay. So I have differentiated this as B, building to the east of defendant's unit, and then shot pellets through Ms. Bal's window screen. Were there pellet strikes in the building to the east of defendant's unit?

MR. FREEMAN: So the building to the east --

THE COURT: Is Ms. Bal's building?

MR. FREEMAN: Right. But her unit doesn't take up the whole building.

THE COURT: Understood.

MR. FREEMAN: Her unit is just in the northwest

corner, and the photographs that we showed, shows pellet strikes to other parts of that building besides her unit.

THE COURT: Okay. So those are the three discreet incidents I'm going to do. They may not accept that pellets went through Ms. Bal's unit, but they may accept that pellets struck through the entirety of the building, again, all of those things, and so that's the way we'll do it and differentiate it.

MR. ST. GEORGE: All right. So, Your Honor, we're going to ask for an interrogatory regarding which of these alleged shots that the jury has chosen, if they --

THE COURT: We're going to write out the unanimity instruction so that we know they all agree on one of these instances to support.

You're free to provide me with a unanimity instruction that you would like.

Okay. This is my plan. We're going to finish writing this up. I'll give everyone a copy of it. I'm going to say that this wasn't read yesterday in response to the charge. I'll read the instruction, and then I'll read the last instruction to them and then I'm going to review the jury verdict sheets with them, which is just reading them to them. And then they'll go back to deliberate.

(Pause in the proceedings.)

THE COURT: Okay. We're handing you copies of the instruction I'm going to read, and this will be 25A.

Our jurors are here. So I will read them the illegal discharge of a firearm elemental along with the unanimity instruction that goes with it. I'm going to tell them that they need to consider this along with all of the other instructions, none of which -- they must be read together as a whole. And then I'll read them the concluding one and we'll go ahead and read the last instruction.

We're ready for the jury. Is everybody ready?

MR. FREEMAN: Yeah, we're ready, Judge.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. We're ready for the jury.

(Pause in the proceedings.)

THE COURT: And there are jury verdict sheets
Counts 1 through 10?

MR. FREEMAN: Yes.

(The jury entered the courtroom.)

THE COURT: Good morning, everyone. Please be seated. Welcome back.

So, ladies and gentlemen, as you recall I read you jury instructions yesterday. We neglected to add one of the instructions. I want to tell you that I don't want to highlight any instructions, that the instructions must

be read together as a whole. No one instruction is more important than any other instruction, and, again, they should be read together as a whole.

But with reference to this instruction to put it in context, I'm going to reread to you the elements of the crime of illegal discharge of a firearm as charged in Count 9 are: One, that the defendant; two, in the state of Colorado at or about the date and place charged; three, knowingly or recklessly; four, discharged a firearm in any dwelling or any other building or occupied structure or into any motor vehicle occupied by any person; five, and the defendant's conduct was not legally authorized by the affirmative defense in the previous instruction.

After considering all the evidence, if you decide the prosecution has proven each of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty of illegal discharge of a firearm.

After considering all the evidence, if you decide the prosecution is failed to prove any one or more of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty of illegal discharge of a firearm.

In order to convict the defendant of illegal discharge of a firearm, you must either unanimously agree that the defendant committed the same act or acts of

discharging a firearm or that he committed all of the acts alleged. A, on or between July 31, 2016 and August 1, 2016, defendant allegedly shot into the ceiling of the common area breezeway with a resident upstairs; B, on or between July 31, 2016 and August 1, 2016, defendant allegedly shot shotgun pellet into the building to the east; and, C, on or between July 31, 2016 and August 1, 2016, defendant allegedly shot pellets through the window screen of Ms. Bal's unit. You must unanimously agree that the defendant committed A, B, or C, or all of the acts alleged.

All right. So, ladies and gentlemen, the bailiff is now going to escort you to the jury room where you will select one of your members to be your foreperson. Your foreperson will preside over your deliberation and shall sign any verdict forms that you may agree on according to the rules I am about to explain.

The verdict for each charge must represent the considered judgment of each juror and it must be unanimous. In other words, all of you must agree to all parts of it. This requirement also applies to any determinations that you make in response to verdict questions which you should include and should be answered.

Only one verdict shall be returned signed for each count. The verdict forms, verdict question forms and

these instructions shall remain in the possession of your foreperson until I ask for them in open court.

Upon reaching a verdict and answering any verdict questions, you will inform the bailiff who will, in turn, notify me and you'll remain in the jury room until I call you into the courtroom.

You will be provided with ten verdict forms in this case. You will also be provided with verdict question forms with directions that explain under what circumstances you should complete these forms. When you have unanimously agreed upon your verdicts, you will select the option on each form which reflects your verdict and the foreperson will sign the verdict forms as I have stated.

Similarly, if you conclude that verdict questions should be answered, you will select the option on each verdict question form which reflects your unanimous decision and the foreperson will sign the verdict question form as I have stated.

I will now read to you the verdicts along with questions. You must not draw any inferences based on the order in which I read them. These forms read as follows: Jury Verdict Count 1, again, ladies and gentlemen, you will have the jury verdict forms in the jury room to look at.

Jury Verdict Count 1, charge of criminal attempt murder in the first-degree, Agent Trimmer. People of the State of Colorado versus Eric James St. George. One, We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, not guilty of criminal attempt murder in the first-degree.

Two, we the, the jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, guilty of criminal attempt murder in the first-degree or criminal attempt murder in the second-degree.

The questions, We, the Jury, unanimously find the defendant used or possessed and threatened the use of a deadly weapon; namely, a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of the offense. Or, We, the Jury, do not unanimously find the defendant used or possessed and threatened the use of a deadly weapon during the commission or attempted commission of the offense.

With reference to one and two, the foreperson should sign only one of the I. above, (I. Or II.). If the verdict is not guilty, then I. above should be signed. If the verdict is guilty, then II. above should be signed. The foreperson should sign only one if the verdict is guilty and you must also complete this section by placing an X, that is either criminal attempt murder in the first-degree or criminal attempt murder in the second-degree. You place an X in the appropriate box

indicating the level of crime.

Then, if you find the defendant guilty, you must also complete the section as to whether or not you unanimously find the defendant used or possessed and threatened the use of a deadly weapon. You must complete this section by placing an X in the appropriate box indicating your decision. Only one square may be filled with the other to remain unmarked.

Jury Verdict Count 2. One, We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, not guilty of criminal attempt murder in the first-degree. This is with reference to Sergeant Maines. Two, We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, guilty of criminal attempt murder in the first-degree or criminal attempt murder in the second degree.

Regarding (I. Or II.), the foreperson should sign only one of the above, (I. Or II.). if the verdict is not guilty, then one be above should be signed. If the verdict is guilty, then II. above should be signed. If the verdict is guilty, you must also complete the section as to whether or not you are selecting criminal attempt murder in the first-degree or criminal attempt murder in the second-degree. You must complete this section by placing an X in the appropriate box indicating the level of crime.

Then, if you find the defendant guilty, you must also complete the next section by placing an X in the appropriate box indicating your decision. Those choices are: We, the Jury, unanimously find the defendant used or possessed and threatened the use of a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm, during the commission or attempted commission of the offense. Or We, the Jury, do not unanimously find the defendant used or possessed and threatened the use of a deadly weapon during the commission or attempted commission of the offense. All these decisions must be made unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt.

Jury Verdict Count 3, attempt murder in the second-degree Emily Elliott. One, We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, not guilty of criminal attempt murder in the second-degree. Two, We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, guilty of criminal attempt murder in the second-degree.

The foreperson should sign only one of above,

(I. Or II.). if the verdict is not guilty, then I. above should be signed. If the verdict is guilty, then II. above shown signed. If you find the defendant guilty, you must also consider the two following choices: We, the Jury, unanimously find the defendant used or possessed and threatened the use of a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm

during the commission or attempted commission of the offense. Or, We, the Jury, do not unanimously find the defendant used or possessed and threatened the use of a deadly weapon during the commission or attempted commission of the offense.

You will complete this section by placing an X in the appropriate box indicating your decision. Only one square may be filled in with the other to remain unmarked.

Jury Verdict Count 4, charge of assault in the first-degree Agent Trimmer. One, We, the Jury, find the defendant, James St. George, not guilty of assault -- Eric James St. George not guilty of assault in the first-degree. Two, We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, guilty of assault in the first degree.

The foreperson should sign only one of the above, (I. Or II.). if the verdict is not guilty, then I. above should be signed. If the verdict is guilty, then II. above should be signed.

If you find the defendant guilty, you must complete the following section: The choices, We, the Jury, unanimously find the defendant used or possessed or threatened the use of a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of this offense. Or, We, the Jury, do not unanimously find the defendant used or possessed and threatened the use of a

deadly weapon during the commission or attempted commission of the offense.

You must complete the section by placing an X in the appropriate box indicating your decision. Only one square may be filled in with the other to remain unmarked.

Jury Verdict Count 5, assault in the first-degree, Sergeant Maines. We, the Jury, find -- this is one, We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, not guilty of assault in the first-degree. Two, We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George guilty of assault until the first-degree.

The foreperson should sign only one of the above, (I. Or II.). if the verdict is not guilty, then I. above should be signed. If the verdict is guilty, then II. above should be signed. If you find the defendant guilty, you must complete the following section, the choices: We, the Jury, unanimously find the defendant used or possessed and threatened the use of a deadly weapon, namely, a firearm, during the commission or attempted commission of the offense. Or We, the Jury, do not unanimously find the defendant used or possessed and threatened the use of a deadly weapon during the commission or attempted commission of the offense. You must complete the this section by placing an X in the appropriate box indicating your decision. Only one square

may be filled in with the other to remain unmarked.

Jury Verdict Count 6, charge of menacing, Agent Trimmer. One, We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, not guilty of menacing. Two, We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, guilty of menacing. The foreperson should sign only one of the above, (I. Or II.), if the verdict is not guilty, then I. above should be signed. If the verdict is guilty, then II. above should be signed.

If you find the defendant guilty, you must also complete the following section: Did the menacing involve the use or suggested use of a deadly weapon. The answers are yes or no. If you find that, yes or no should be marked, you should go ahead and mark the appropriate box indicating your decision. This decision must be unanimous. Only one scare may be filled in with the others to remain unmarked.

Jury Verdict Count 7, Sergeant Maines. One, We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, not guilty of menacing. Two, We, the Jury, find defendant, Eric James St. George, guilty of menacing. The foreperson must sign only one of the above, (I. Or II.). if the verdict is not guilty, then I. above should be signed. If the verdict is guilty, then II. above should be signed.

If you find the defendant guilty, then you must

also consider the following section: Question, did the menacing involve the use or suggested use of a deadly weapon, mark yes or no. You must complete this section by placing an X in the appropriate box indicating your decision. Only one square may be filed in with the others to remain unmarked. Your decision must be unanimous.

Jury Verdict Count 8, Emily Elliott. One, We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, not guilty of menacing. Two, We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, guilty of menacing. The foreperson may sign only one of the above, (I. Or II.). if the verdict is not guilty, then I. above should be signed. If the verdict is guilty, then II. above should be signed.

If you find the defendant guilty, you must also respond to the following question: Did the menacing involve the use or suggested use of a deadly weapon. Mark yes or no by placing an X in the appropriate box indicating your decision. Your decision must be unanimous. Only one square must be filled in with the others to remain unmarked.

County Nine, charge of an illegal discharge of a firearm. One, We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, not guilty of illegal discharge of a firearm. Two, We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric

James St. George, guilty of illegal discharge of a firearm. The foreperson may sign only one of the above, (I. Or II.). if the verdict is not guilty, then I. above should be signed. If the verdict is guilty, then II. above should be signed.

Jury Verdict Count 10, charge of unlawful sexual contact. One, We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, not guilty of unlawful sexual contact. Two, We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, guilty of unlawful sexual contact. The foreperson may sign only one of the above, (I. Or II.). if the verdict is not guilty, then I. above should be signed. If the verdict is guilty, then II. above should be signed.

Ladies and gentlemen, those are the jury forms. We are going to have you go back to the jury room now. We are going to send in the evidence and the jury verdict sheets that I've given you with copies of the instructions. Now you may discuss the case. I'm going swear the bailiff.

(The bailiff was duly sworn.)

(The jury left the courtroom.)

THE COURT: Okay. Nobody has requested, but I do and will place restrictions on recordings in this case to include the recordings by the defendant. And the way I

do that, is I'm going to ask the People if we can get a clean computer -- do you have it?

MR. FREEMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: Great -- from victim/witness. The bailiff will play the recording for them. They're not allowed to deliberate while the recording is ongoing. They can stop it, certainly the bailiff will step out with the recording. They can deliberate, they can come back and continue playing it. They can hear as much or as little as they like to hear. We don't allow them to rewind and go back over it. That will occur with all the recordings. I need everybody's contact information.

(Pause in the proceedings.)

THE COURT: Let's confirm that we have all of the items of evidence that are going to go back to the jury. If we have ammunition, I will hold that back and give them ammunition without the weapons.

MR. FREEMAN: And there is some live ammo, do you want us to separate that?

THE COURT: Yeah. Let's click it in as available, and I just let the jury know that the ammunition comes in separate.

(A recess was taken.)

THE COURT: Okay. Here's the question: We would like to confirm that Instruction 13 is not offered as a defense to

Counts 1 and 2. It is not listed on our Instructions 18 and 19, only 14 is listed.

So I'm taking a look here. Instruction 13 is self-induced intoxication, and I think the confusion in this case is that self-induced intoxication is not an affirmative defense.

MR. MENGES: Right. But it's a -- the Court knows it negates the mens rea.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MENGES: So I think sending it back saying that it is not.

THE COURT: So what I think would be -- the way to tell them would be that -- well, I can hear an offer. I think we can't have it be an affirmative defense because it's not an affirmative defense, and so it's erroneous to tell them it was.

We do tell them here self-induced intoxication negates the existence of the elements of after deliberation and with intent and so...

MR. FREEMAN: Yeah, it may.

THE COURT: Right, it may.

MR. FREEMAN: Yeah, so I think the answer to that that I think we would like to see the Court fashion something along the lines of, self-induced intoxication may -- may be considered or may negate the existence of

after deliberation or with intent, but it is not an affirmative defense and, therefore, was not listed on Instructions 18 and 19.

THE COURT: Mr. St. George, what did you want me to say?

(Pause in the proceedings.)

THE COURT: So it would never be used for 19 -- well, here, 19 is murder in the second-degree. So it would never be used for 19. So they've asked for 18 and 19.

MR. FREEMAN: That's correct, Judge, I didn't realize that 19 is the second.

THE COURT: Yeah, 19 is the second-degree.

MR. FREEMAN: So I think the answer should specify that voluntary intoxication doesn't apply to 19.

THE COURT: So, yeah, I don't want to -- I wouldn't want to tell the jurors that it's an affirmative defense because it's not and that's legally erroneous, but I think we can tell them that voluntary intoxication -- they're asking if it can be considered in 18 and 19. It can't be considered in 19. We need to just answer their questions, and I think we could just tell them it could be considered in 18 and not 19.

Does anyone object to that?

MR. FREEMAN: That's -- so you just want to tell

them it can be considered for 18 and not 19 and leave it at that?

THE COURT: Yeah, is everybody in agreement rather than just repeating the same words about negating the existence of the elements of after deliberation and with intent.

My thought is we might get more questions about this, but at this point, they're saying, we would like to confirm that Instruction 13 is not offered as a defense to Counts 1 and 2.

So let's look at Counts 1 and 2, too.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Your Honor, I have just have one question, why am I still in shackles?

THE DEPUTY: Because you're still in custody.

THE COURT: Because there's other people in the box with you and you're in custody and the jury's not here.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay. So Counts 1 and 2 are the attempt to commit murder in the first-degree, attempt to commit murder in the first-degree. So let's look and see what those instructions are, too.

MR. FREEMAN: Is this still answering the question?

THE COURT: Yeah, because they said Counts 1 and

1 2. 2 MR. FREEMAN: Okay. 3 THE COURT: Okay. So they're not referencing 4 all the correct jury instructions, but they are still 5 referencing --6 MR. FREEMAN: So do you want to say that --7 THE COURT: I'm looking for both of the 8 first-degree attempt murder. 9 MR. FREEMAN: Do we want to say that Instruction 10 13 applies to Instruction 18 as it relates to Count 1 and 11 2? 12 So Count 1 is Agent Trimmer, Count 2 THE COURT: 13 is Sergeant Maines, okay, and 18 applies to both of them, 14 yes? 15 MR. FREEMAN: Yes. 16 THE COURT: Okay. So we can just say 18. 17 MR. FREEMAN: And it does list Counts 1 and 2 at 18 the top of 18. 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MR. MENGES: On behalf of Mr. St. George, I 21 agree with -- I agree with that 18 -- 13 applies to 22 Instruction 18 as to Counts 1 and 2. THE COURT: So we are going to say 13 23 24 applies -- 13 may apply to Instruction Number 18; 13 may 25 not apply to Instruction Number 19 instead of trying to

use the different language to parse through affirmative defenses, et cetera. We want them to consider this through the appropriate --

MR. FREEMAN: Judge, I would ask -- we would ask that -- because part of their question is why isn't Instruction 13 listed in Instruction 18, you know, where the boxes are for the defense. And I would ask the Court to just also specify that it's not listed in Instruction 18 because it is not an affirmative defense that, therefore, the People have no burden to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt.

THE COURT: Well, you're correct on that.

MR. MENGES: Judge, if they're going to add that, I think you need to add the voluntary intoxication language as well because they have instructions on the both so to highlight one over the other would be prejudice.

THE COURT: Well, they're asking for 13, that is voluntary intoxication.

MR. FREEMAN: They have 13, they're just wondering what it applies to.

THE COURT: I can say it is not an affirmative defense so it's not listed in the area where affirmative defense goes.

So this is what they're worried about, they're

worried about the language, which is in 18, which is the last factor in both, "that the defendant's conduct was not legally authorized by the affirmative defense in Instruction Number 14."

MR. FREEMAN: Right. So I think we should answer that question by telling them that while they may consider it for Instruction 18, that it's not listed there because it's not an affirmative defense and, therefore, the People don't have any burden to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt.

So I would -- what I would suggest is: While you may consider Instruction 13 in deciding Counts 1 and 2 and Instruction 18, it is not listed because it is not an affirmative defense and, therefore, the People have no burden to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt.

THE COURT: We are trying to make it easier for them. We can tell them to just reread Instruction 13, but this is something that I want to address specifically.

MR. FREEMAN: And their question is why isn't it listed --

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. FREEMAN: -- in Instruction 18. That's why I think we should explain it.

THE COURT: So I'm looking to say something like, While you may consider Instruction 13 when making a

Honor.

decision on Counts 1 and 2 in Instruction 18 --

(Pause in the proceedings.)

THE COURT: This is what my thought is, that we say, While you may consider Instruction 13 in making a decision on Counts 1 and 2 and in Instruction 18, Instruction 13 is not an affirmative defense. And then repeat the language from 13. It may only be considered as to whether or not evidence of self-induced intoxication negates the existence of the elements of after deliberation and with intent.

MR. FREEMAN: That's fine.

THE COURT: Refer to 13 and 18.

MR. ST. GEORGE: No objection to that, Your

THE COURT: I think we have to answer the question as to 19, that 13 does not apply to 19.

MR. FREEMAN: I agree.

THE COURT: Okay. So this is what my intention will be: Instruction 19, attempted murder in the second-degree. Okay. While you may consider instruction 13 while making a decision on Counts 1 and 2 in Instruction 19, Instruction 13 is not an affirmative defense. It may only be considered as to whether or not evidence of self-induced intoxication negates the existence of the elements of after deliberation and with

intent. Refer to Instructions 13 and 18.

Instruction 13 does not apply to instruction 19 attempted murder in the second-degree. All right.

Everybody with me on this?

MR. FREEMAN: Yes, Judge, that's fine.

MR. ST. GEORGE: As well, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll write it out on this and we'll send it back.

(A recess was taken.)

THE COURT: Okay. Here's the question: We would like to confirm that Instruction 13 is not offered as a defense to Counts 1 and 2. It is not listed on our Instructions 18 and 19, only 14 is listed.

So I'm taking a look here. Instruction 13 is self-induced intoxication, and I think the confusion in this case is that self-induced intoxication is not an affirmative defense.

MR. MENGES: Right. But it's a -- the Court knows it negates the mens rea.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MENGES: So I think sending it back saying that it is not.

THE COURT: So what I think would be -- the way to tell them would be that -- well, I can hear an offer.

I think we can't have it be an affirmative defense because

it's not an affirmative defense, and so it's erroneous to tell them it was.

We do tell them here self-induced intoxication negates the existence of the elements of after deliberation and with intent and so...

MR. FREEMAN: Yeah, it may.

THE COURT: Right, it may.

MR. FREEMAN: Yeah, so I think the answer to that that I think we would like to see the Court fashion something along the lines of, self-induced intoxication may -- may be considered or may negate the existence of after deliberation or with intent, but it is not an affirmative defense and, therefore, was not listed on Instructions 18 and 19.

THE COURT: Mr. St. George, what did you want me to say?

(Pause in the proceedings.)

THE COURT: So it would never be used for 19 -- well, here, 19 is murder in the second-degree. So it would never be used for 19. So they've asked for 18 and 19.

MR. FREEMAN: That's correct, Judge, I didn't realize that 19 is the second.

THE COURT: Yeah, 19 is the second-degree.

MR. FREEMAN: So I think the answer should

specify that voluntary intoxication doesn't apply to 19.

THE COURT: So, yeah, I don't want to -- I wouldn't want to tell the jurors that it's an affirmative defense because it's not and that's legally erroneous, but I think we can tell them that voluntary intoxication -- they're asking if it can be considered in 18 and 19. It can't be considered in 19. We need to just answer their questions, and I think we could just tell them it could be considered in 18 and not 19.

Does anyone object to that?

MR. FREEMAN: That's -- so you just want to tell them it can be considered for 18 and not 19 and leave it at that?

THE COURT: Yeah, is everybody in agreement rather than just repeating the same words about negating the existence of the elements of after deliberation and with intent.

My thought is we might get more questions about this, but at this point, they're saying, we would like to confirm that Instruction 13 is not offered as a defense to Counts 1 and 2.

So let's look at Counts 1 and 2, too.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Your Honor, I have just have one question, why am I still in shackles?

THE DEPUTY: Because you're still in custody.

THE COURT: Because there's other people in the box with you and you're in custody and the jury's not here.

MR. ST. GEORGE: Okav.

THE COURT: Okay. So Counts 1 and 2 are the attempt to commit murder in the first-degree, attempt to commit murder in the first-degree. So let's look and see what those instructions are, too.

MR. FREEMAN: Is this still answering the question?

THE COURT: Yeah, because they said Counts 1 and 2.

MR. FREEMAN: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay. So they're not referencing all the correct jury instructions, but they are still referencing --

MR. FREEMAN: So do you want to say that -THE COURT: I'm looking for both of the
first-degree attempt murder.

MR. FREEMAN: Do we want to say that Instruction
13 applies to Instruction 18 as it relates to Count 1 and
2?

THE COURT: So Count 1 is Agent Trimmer, Count 2 is Sergeant Maines, okay, and 18 applies to both of them, yes?

MR. FREEMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So we can just say 18.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ FREEMAN: And it does list Counts 1 and 2 at the top of 18.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. MENGES: On behalf of Mr. St. George, I agree with -- I agree with that 18 -- 13 applies to Instruction 18 as to Counts 1 and 2.

THE COURT: So we are going to say 13 applies -- 13 may apply to Instruction Number 18; 13 may not apply to Instruction Number 19 instead of trying to use the different language to parse through affirmative defenses, et cetera. We want them to consider this through the appropriate --

MR. FREEMAN: Judge, I would ask -- we would ask that -- because part of their question is why isn't Instruction 13 listed in Instruction 18, you know, where the boxes are for the defense. And I would ask the Court to just also specify that it's not listed in Instruction 18 because it is not an affirmative defense that, therefore, the People have no burden to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt.

THE COURT: Well, you're correct on that.

MR. MENGES: Judge, if they're going to add that, I think you need to add the voluntary intoxication

5

language as well because they have instructions on the both so to highlight one over the other would be prejudice.

THE COURT: Well, they're asking for 13, that is voluntary intoxication.

MR. FREEMAN: They have 13, they're just wondering what it applies to.

THE COURT: I can say it is not an affirmative defense so it's not listed in the area where affirmative defense goes.

So this is what they're worried about, they're worried about the language, which is in 18, which is the last factor in both, "that the defendant's conduct was not legally authorized by the affirmative defense in Instruction Number 14."

MR. FREEMAN: Right. So I think we should answer that question by telling them that while they may consider it for Instruction 18, that it's not listed there because it's not an affirmative defense and, therefore, the People don't have any burden to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt.

So I would -- what I would suggest is: While you may consider Instruction 13 in deciding Counts 1 and 2 and Instruction 18, it is not listed because it is not an affirmative defense and, therefore, the People have no

burden to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt.

THE COURT: We are trying to make it easier for them. We can tell them to just reread Instruction 13, but this is something that I want to address specifically.

MR. FREEMAN: And their question is why isn't it listed --

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. FREEMAN: -- in Instruction 18. That's why I think we should explain it.

THE COURT: So I'm looking to say something like, While you may consider Instruction 13 when making a decision on Counts 1 and 2 in Instruction 18 --

(Pause in the proceedings.)

THE COURT: This is what my thought is, that we say, While you may consider Instruction 13 in making a decision on Counts 1 and 2 and in Instruction 18, Instruction 13 is not an affirmative defense. And then repeat the language from 13. It may only be considered as to whether or not evidence of self-induced intoxication negates the existence of the elements of after deliberation and with intent.

MR. FREEMAN: That's fine.

THE COURT: Refer to 13 and 18.

MR. ST. GEORGE: No objection to that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I think we have to answer the question as to 19, that 13 does not apply to 19.

MR. FREEMAN: I agree.

THE COURT: Okay. So this is what my intention will be: Instruction 19, attempted murder in the second-degree. Okay. While you may consider instruction 13 while making a decision on Counts 1 and 2 in Instruction 19, Instruction 13 is not an affirmative defense. It may only be considered as to whether or not evidence of self-induced intoxication negates the existence of the elements of after deliberation and with intent. Refer to Instructions 13 and 18.

Instruction 13 does not apply to instruction 19 attempted murder in the second-degree. All right.

Everybody with me on this?

MR. FREEMAN: Yes, Judge, that's fine.

MR. ST. GEORGE: As well, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I'll write it out on this and we'll send it back.

(A recess was taken.)

THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen, we've received notice from the jury that they have reached a verdict. We're going to bring the jury out. Please note that I need everyone to maintain the decorum of the courtroom when we receive the verdict.

Let's have the jury.

(Pause in the proceedings.)

(The jury entered the courtroom.)

THE COURT: And everybody can be seated, please.

Ladies and gentlemen, it's my understanding that you have reach at verdict?

JUROR 8: We have, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Is there a unanimous verdict?

JUROR 8: It is.

THE COURT: Could you hand the verdict sheets to the bailiff, please.

JUROR 8: (Juror 8 complied.)

THE COURT: Jury Verdict Count 1, charge of criminal attempt murder in the first-degree, Agent Trimmer. We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, guilty of criminal attempt murder in the second-degree. We, the Jury, unanimously find the defendant used or possessed and threatened the use of a deadly weapon, namely: a firearm, during the commission other attempted commission of the offense.

Jury Verdict Count 2, charge of criminal attempt murder in the first-degree, Sergeant Maines. We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, guilty of criminal attempt murder in the second-degree. We, the Jury, unanimously find the defendant used or possessed and

during the commission or attempted commission of the offense.

threatened the use of a deadly weapon, namely: a firearm

Jury Verdict Count 3, attempted murder in the second-degree, Emily Elliott. We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, not guilty of criminal attempt murder in the second-degree.

Jury Verdict Count 4, charge of assault in the first-degree, Agent Trimmer. We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, guilty of assault in the first-degree. We, the Jury, unanimously find the defendant used or possessed and threatened the use of a deadly weapon, namely: a firearm, during the commission or attempted commission of the offense.

Jury Verdict Count 5, Sergeant Maines. We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, guilty of assault in the first-degree. We, the Jury, unanimously find the defendant used or possessed and threatened the use of a deadly weapon, namely: a firearm, during the commission or attempted commission of the offense.

Jury Verdict Count 6, menacing, Agent Trimmer. We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, guilty of menacing. Did the menacing involve the use or suggested use of a deadly weapon? Yes.

Jury Verdict Count 7, Sergeant Maines. We, the

Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, guilty of menacing. Did the menacing involve the use or suggested use of a deadly weapon? Yes.

Jury Verdict Count 8, Emily Elliott. We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, guilty of menacing. Did the menacing involve the use or suggested use of a deadly weapon? Yes.

Jury Verdict Count 9, charge of illegal discharge of a firearm. We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, guilty of illegal discharge of a firearm.

Jury Verdict Count 10, charge of unlawful sexual contact. We, the Jury, find the defendant, Eric James St. George, guilty of unlawful sexual contact.

So, ladies and gentlemen, I'm going to start with our Juror 25 in Seat Number 1, and if everyone could go along and tell me if you agree or disagree with the verdict.

JUROR 25: I agree.

JUROR 26: I agree.

JUROR 24: I agree.

JUROR 5: I agree.

JUROR 27: I agree.

JUROR 32: I agree.

JUROR 8: I agree.

JUROR 15: I agree.

JUROR 10: I agree.

JUROR 14: I agree.

JUROR 31: I agree.

THE COURT: Does anyone request any further pooling from the jury?

MR. FREEMAN: Not for the People.

MR. ST. GEORGE: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, you have spent so much time and we -- and you have paid so much attention to the case. We really couldn't do this without us -- without you, 12 people from the community coming together and making a decision. It is so important to our system and with thank you so much.

The verdict -- you've now completed your duties as jurors in this case and are discharged with the thanks of the Court. The question may arise whether you may now discuss this case with the lawyers, defendant or other persons. And for your guidance, the Court instructs you that whether you talk to anyone is entirely your own decision. It's proper for others to discuss the case with you and you may talk with them, but you need not.

If you talk to them, you may tell them as much or as little as you like about your deliberations, or the facts that influenced your decision. If anyone would

1 persist in discussing the case over your objection, you'd 2 let me know and I'd take care of it. 3 Again, thank you so much. If you had a couple 4 of minutes, I'd love to chat with you in the jury room. 5 I'll be there in just a moment. 6 (The jury left the courtroom.) 7 THE COURT: Okay. So we have received verdicts 8 in this case. We're going to go ahead and order a 9 presentence report, and I believe we need an OSE, correct? 10 MR. FREEMAN: A PSI, yes, Judge. 11 THE COURT: A PSI, do we need an OSE? 12 MR. FREEMAN: I think we do. I'm sorry, I was 13 thinking of something else. 14 THE COURT: So we will go ahead and order both, 15 and then we'll set this for sentencing. 16 THE BAILIFF: Let's do off docket. How is 17 March 27th at one o'clock.? 18 THE COURT: How is March 27th at one o'clock? 19 MR. MENGES: Could we do any day but a Tuesday? 20 THE BAILIFF: March 28th at one o'clock? 21 MR. MENGES: March 28th at one o'clock -- I'm 22 sorry, hold on a second. 23 THE BAILIFF: Or March 29th at two o'clock. 24 MR. MENGES: That's actually spring break week. 25 Can I do it the weekend before? Could we do it the --

THE BAILIFF: April 4th at one o'clock? 1 2 MR. MENGES: April 4th at one o'clock is fine. 3 THE COURT: April 4th at one o'clock? 4 MR. FREEMAN: We're okay with that, Judge. 5 THE COURT: On behalf of the defense, April 4th 6 at one o'clock? 7 MR. ST. GEORGE: No objection, Your Honor. 8 MR. MENGES: That's fine. 9 THE COURT: Okay. So then we will go ahead and 10 sentence April 4th at one o'clock. Anything further? 11 MR. FREEMAN: Judge, Counts 1 and 2 and 4 and 5 12 are crimes of violence. We'd ask that the Court convert 13 defendant's bond to a no-bond per statute. 14 The Court will go ahead and do that. THE COURT: 15 All right. We'll see everyone back here that 16 would like to attend for sentencing. Thanks very much, 17 everyone. 18 You're going to go ahead and file the exhibits? 19 MR. FREEMAN: We will. 20 THE COURT: We need to get the exhibits, the 21 physical exhibits back to the district attorney. You will 22 preserve the exhibits for purposes of appeal. 23 MR. FREEMAN: Yes. 24 (The proceedings concluded at 5:50 p.m.) 25

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

The above and foregoing is a true and accurate transcription of my stenotype notes taken in my capacity as the Court Reporter for the First Judicial District Court, County of Jefferson, State of Colorado.

Dated at Golden, Colorado this 12th day of February, 2019.

RÍCHAEL M. SILVIA

Registered Professional Reporter

Certified Realtime Reporter

Colorado Realtime Certified Reporter

^{*}This is an electronically signed transcript