

The U.S. Department of Justice Report by the Weaponization Working Group

Pursuant to Executive Order 14147

The Richmond Domain Perspective Report

August 28, 2026

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INTRODUCTION

On January 20, 2025, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order 14147, *Ending the Weaponization of the Federal Government*, which established “the policy of the United States to identify and take appropriate action to correct past misconduct by the Federal Government related to the weaponization of law enforcement and ... the Intelligence Community.”¹ In response, Attorney General Pamela Bondi established the Weaponization Working Group at the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to “review [DOJ] activities” during the Biden Administration and to “identify instances where a department’s or agency’s conduct appears to have been designed to achieve ... improper aims rather than pursuing justice or legitimate governmental objectives.”² The Weaponization Working Group’s charge includes examining “[t]he January 23, 2023, memorandum in which the Federal Bureau of Investigation [“FBI”] suggested that certain Catholic religious practices were affiliated with violent extremism and criminal activity.”³

The referenced memorandum was a Domain Perspective. Domain Perspectives are internal FBI intelligence products intended to highlight trends in an FBI office’s area of responsibility, such as different types of violent or criminal activity, intelligence gaps, and opportunities for research. Their purpose is to raise awareness within the FBI. On January 23, 2023, the FBI Richmond Field Office published a Domain Perspective entitled “Interest of Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists in Radical-Traditionalist Catholic Ideology Almost Certainly Presents New Mitigation Opportunities” (the “Richmond Catholic Memo” or “Memo”).⁴ The Richmond Catholic Memo was the outgrowth of a single FBI investigation and linked what it viewed as certain traditional Catholic ideologies (what has, in the records the Working Group reviewed, been called “radical traditionalist,” “radical traditional,” or “radtrad” Catholicism) with violent extremism.

On the afternoon of February 8, 2023, the Richmond Catholic Memo was leaked to the public.⁵ After the leak, internal reviews concluded that the Richmond Catholic Memo did not meet FBI standards, including by improperly suggesting that certain domestic terrorist and religious viewpoints aligned without supporting evidence and by creating the impression that the FBI conducts investigative activity based on religious affiliation. The FBI withdrew the Richmond Catholic Memo, though the Richmond Field Office stood by its work.

This report traces the origins of the Richmond Catholic Memo.⁶

¹ Exec. Order No. 14147, *Ending the Weaponization of the Federal Government*, 90 Fed. Reg. 8235 (Jan. 20, 2025).

² Memorandum for All Department Employees, *Restoring the Integrity and Credibility of the Department of Justice*, Dep’t of Just. (Feb. 5, 2025).

³ *Id.*

⁴ See *infra* note 7.

⁵ E-mail from Public Affairs Specialist to Directorate of Intelligence Assistant Director (Feb. 8, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 001); E-mail from FBI National Press Office to Directorate of Intelligence Assistant Director (Feb. 8, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 002).

⁶ This report includes citations to numerous internal documents containing predecisional and deliberative discussions where necessary to demonstrate the scope and scale of events as they occurred. Because of the Trump Administration’s commitment to transparency, Attorney General Blanche has approved disclosure of these documents. The exhibits are representative of DOJ’s full findings to date. All discussion, citation, and provision of internal information in this report is disclosed pursuant to the authority and approval of the Attorney General. The limited release of this information does not

I. THE THESIS OF THE RICHMOND CATHOLIC MEMO.

On January 23, 2023, the Richmond FBI Field Office published the Richmond Catholic Memo, linking “racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists” to “radical-traditionalist Catholic ideology.”⁷ The thesis of the Memo was that “the increasingly observed interest of racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs) in radical-traditionalist Catholic (RTC) ideology almost certainly presents opportunities for threat mitigation through the exploration of new avenues for tripwire and source development.”⁸ The FBI assessed that “RMVE interest in RTCs [was] likely to increase over the next 12 to 24 months in the run-up to the next general election cycle complicating the overall RMVE threat picture while also creating new opportunities for mitigation efforts.”⁹ The FBI believed that the “RTC community [was] likely to remain relatively stable or show modest growth, providing RMVEs a persistent Catholic-oriented base with which to interact.”¹⁰ The FBI warned that “[c]atalyzing events in which RMVEs and RTC adherents might have common cause include legislation or judicial decisions in areas such as abortion rights, immigration, affirmative action, and LGBTQ protections.”¹¹

The Richmond Catholic Memo then listed the names, addresses, and phone numbers of multiple chapels and a seminary surrounding Richmond, Virginia, and recommended “engag[ing] in outreach with the leadership” of those religious institutions to “sensitize [the] congregations to the warning signs of radicalization and enlist their assistance to serve as suspicious activity tripwires.”¹² Further, the Memo suggested outreach to the Diocese of Richmond Pastoral Center to “enlist the diocesan leadership’s assistance in sensitizing parishes to the warning signs of radicalization.”¹³

II. THE BEGINNING: ONE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION UNRELATED TO A CATHOLIC CHURCH.

The genesis of the Richmond Catholic Memo stemmed from an investigation by the Richmond Field Office into an individual referred to here as “Target 1.” Target 1 moved to Virginia after graduating high school in New York.¹⁴ He diagnosed himself with Asperger’s Syndrome—though also said “he grew out of it”—and claimed to have attempted suicide in September 2018.¹⁵ In 2019,

constitute the waiver of privilege beyond the limited disclosure here. The limited release of information in this report does not constitute an authorization to any current or former employee to discuss internal or privileged information or to be subject to serve as a witness. DOJ’s *Touhy* regulations continue to apply. 28 C.F.R. §§ 16.21, *et seq.*; *United States ex rel. Touhy v. Regan*, 340 U.S. 462 (1951).

⁷ Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Richmond Office, Richmond Catholic Memo, 1 (Jan. 23, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 003).

⁸ *Id.* at 1–2.

⁹ *Id.* at 4.

¹⁰ *Id.* at 2.

¹¹ *Id.* at 4.

¹² *Id.* at 5.

¹³ *Id.* at 6.

¹⁴ Position of the United States with Respect to Sentencing at 2, *United States v. [Target 1]*, No. 3:23CR79 (E.D.Va. 2025).

¹⁵ *Id.* at 17.

the FBI became aware of the Target 1’s “violent and racially-motivated ideology” based on posts Target 1 published online.¹⁶

On August 17, 2020, Target 1 paced through his neighborhood carrying a flag associated with the Confederacy and slashed the tires of cars displaying political symbols he opposed.¹⁷ Furthermore, after police intervened, Target 1 assaulted them.¹⁸ Police also found firearms and ammunition at Target 1’s residence.¹⁹ Target 1 was convicted in state court of Felony Vandalism on January 7, 2021,²⁰ and sentenced to a term of five years’ imprisonment, with four years suspended.²¹

During his time in prison, Target 1 continued espousing violent, racial views. He wrote to a relative that the “government is evil” and “all that needs to be done is for us to truly unite in Christ Jesus and make total war against the Satanic occultists Government.”²² He vowed to “destroy” “Jews, Liberals, communists, degenerates, Zionists, progressives, capitalists, globalists, and green-party PETA-type environmentalists.”²³ Target 1 linked his radicalism to a type of religiosity, stating, for example, that he “chose the Lord over the law,”²⁴ and wrote a manifesto stating his views that the “government is evil” and “of the Devil” and that he needed to be armed.²⁵

After his release from state prison on June 28, 2021, and until federal agents searched his residence in November 2022,²⁶ Target 1 attempted to acquire or build firearms and ammunition,²⁷ built more than a half-dozen fully assembled Molotov cocktails,²⁸ and attempted to recruit others via social media.²⁹ He also encouraged his followers online to attack and murder minorities and police,³⁰ advocated for a mass shooting at a special needs school for children, and encouraged “taking up armed resistance against the government.”³¹ In 2025, Target 1 was sentenced to over eight years in federal custody for possession of destructive devices.³²

¹⁶ *Id.* at 5–6.

¹⁷ *Id.* at 8.

¹⁸ *Id.* at 2.

¹⁹ *Id.*

²⁰ Statement of Facts at 1, *United States v. [Target 1]*, No. 3:23CR79 (E.D.Va. 2024).

²¹ Position of the United States with Respect to Sentencing at 18–19.

²² *Id.* at 10.

²³ *Id.* at 3, 10–11.

²⁴ *Id.* at 10.

²⁵ Ex. 1 to Position of the United States with Respect to Sentencing at 2–3, *United States v. [Target 1]*, No. 3:23CR79 (E.D.Va. 2025).

²⁶ Position of the United States with Respect to Sentencing at 11; Indictment at 1, *United States v. [Target 1]*, No. 3:23CR79 (E.D.Va. 2023).

²⁷ Position of the United States with Respect to Sentencing at 15–16.

²⁸ *Id.* at 16.

²⁹ *See id.* at 13–14.

³⁰ *Id.* at 12, 14–15.

³¹ Michael Horowitz, Off. of the Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Just., Rep. to Cong. on the *Creation and Content of the FBI Internal Intelligence Product on Purported Link between Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists and “Radical Traditionalist Catholic” Ideology*, at 3 (Apr. 18, 2024), <https://perma.cc/8SB3-DAHV>.

³² Judgment at 2, *United States v. [Target 1]*, No. 3:23CR79 (E.D. Va. 2025).

III. TARGET 1'S CONNECTION TO A NONMAINSTREAM CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE FBI'S INITIAL CONTACT WITH HIS PRIEST.

In spring of 2022, after Target 1 had been released from state custody, he started attending Our Lady of Fatima Chapel. Our Lady of Fatima Chapel is affiliated with what some describe as a nonmainstream Catholic group known as the Society of St. Pius X, or SSPX. According to a presentation developed by the Richmond Field Office, French Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre founded SSPX in 1970,³³ following opposition to changes in the Roman Catholic Church after the Second Vatican Council ("Vatican II"). In July 2026, the Vatican "declared [SSPX] in schism and decreed the excommunication of its bishops."³⁴ According to the presentation, "SSPX Resistance" is itself a breakaway group from SSPX, and the SSPX Marian Corps, or "SSPX-MC," is a branch of the SSPX Resistance.³⁵

At some point in 2022, the FBI discovered that Target 1 attended Our Lady of Fatima Chapel.³⁶ Based on that discovery, the FBI decided to interview the chapel's priest. ("Priest 1").

The first telephone interview occurred on November 16, 2022.³⁷ Priest 1 said he lived in Northern Kentucky. He said he knew Target 1 through the church—though not well—and that, to Priest 1's knowledge, Target 1 was not a member of the church, was not Catholic, and had never been to confession.³⁸ Priest 1 knew Target 1 attended 3-4 catechism classes but said that Target 1's "stance on things definitely need[ed] to be modified before he c[ould] join the church."³⁹ Priest 1 also stated that Target 1 had "crazy views about race" and war and was a white supremacist.⁴⁰ When asked if Target 1 "ever discussed committing violence," the FBI report recounts that Priest 1 "seemed to become nervous and began stumbling on his words," and asked "if he could talk to the leadership of the church and/or a lawyer before speaking further."⁴¹

The second telephonic interview with Priest 1 occurred a week later, on November 23, 2022. During this conversation, Priest 1 said he heard from a church member that Target 1 "wanted to talk to him."⁴² The FBI Task Force Officer ("TFO") asked Priest 1 to clarify whether Target 1 "personally reached out," and Priest 1 said he was not sure and that "maybe [the church member]

³³ *A Society of Catholic Priests: Its Main Objective is the Formation of Holy Priests*, Soc'y of St. Pius X (2026), <https://perma.cc/G5H4-9YMR>; The FBI estimated there were approximately one million SSPX believers worldwide at the time the FBI began its investigation. See E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 3 to Supervisory Intelligence Analyst 2 (Jan. 20, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 004, slide 11).

³⁴ Nicole Winfield, *What To Know About The Schism By Traditionalist Catholics Who Defied Pope Leo XIV*, AP (July 2, 2026), <https://perma.cc/NG32-6PKB>.

³⁵ See E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 3 to Supervisory Intelligence Analyst 2 (Jan. 20, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 004, slides 15–16).

³⁶ E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 2 to Milwaukee Analyst 1 (Dec. 30, 2022) (attached as Exhibit 005).

³⁷ Interview of [Priest 1], FD-302 at 1 (Dec. 8, 2022) (attached as Exhibit 006); Other documents, including the DOJ Office of Inspector General Report cited above, state that the FBI also interviewed the Choir Director of the church during the investigation.

³⁸ Interview of [Priest 1], FD-302 at 1 (Dec. 8, 2022) (attached as Exhibit 006).

³⁹ *Id.*

⁴⁰ *Id.*

⁴¹ *Id.*

⁴² *Id.*

just thought [Target 1] would want to talk to him.”⁴³ The FBI TFO also asked the Priest if he talked to an attorney, as indicated in the previous conversation.⁴⁴ Priest 1 explained he could not “violate” “the relationship [he has] with the people at the church.”⁴⁵ The FBI TFO then explained his understanding of “papal privilege” and its application to confession, but that it was not a blanket privilege.⁴⁶ Priest 1 responded, “I don’t want to be involved.”⁴⁷

IV. FBI RICHMOND DEVOTES RESOURCES TO INVESTIGATING PRIEST 1 AND HIS CHURCH.

The FBI’s discussions with Priest 1 as described above, additional discoveries about Target 1 and SSPX, and information about SSPX from a foreign intelligence entity resulted in an expansion of the FBI’s investigation between roughly December 2022 and February 2023. The following events occurred in this timeframe:

- By December 2022, the FBI discovered that Target 1 described himself as a “radical traditional Catholic Clerical Fascist.”⁴⁸
- Around early January 2023, an Intelligence Analyst in the Richmond office uncovered and forwarded material about the SSPX Resistance that a foreign law enforcement agency had developed. That material described SSPX Resistance as “an Orthodox Catholic group which blends traditional Catholicism with National Socialist ideals.”⁴⁹ Intelligence purportedly indicated “the group has a wide European-American network and is attempting to radicalize individuals through the Catholic religion towards Neo-Nazi extremism.”⁵⁰ Open source information collected by the FBI showed that Priest 1’s uncle was also a priest (“Priest 2”)⁵¹, and that SSPX-Resistance’s founder, Bishop Richard Williamson, ordained Priest 2 in 1992.⁵² Information gathered by the FBI revealed that Williamson was expelled from SSPX in 2012, and acted as the de-facto Bishop for SSPX-Resistance “which ha[d] several constituent groups around the world, one of which is SSPX-MC (Marian Corps), led by [Priest 2].”⁵³
- Around the same time, the analysts at the Richmond Field Office expanded their investigation into Priest 2. In their view, Priest 2 was “one of the key people in the SSPX-MC.”⁵⁴ The expansion of the investigation to Priest 2 was based on Priest 2’s membership in SSPX-MC, a generalized concern about SSPX-MC based on the Richmond Field Office’s

⁴³ *Id.* 1–2.

⁴⁴ *Id.*

⁴⁵ *Id.*

⁴⁶ *Id.*

⁴⁷ *Id.*

⁴⁸ E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 2 to Milwaukee Analyst 1 (Dec. 30, 2022) (attached as Exhibit 005).

⁴⁹ E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 4 to Special Agent (Jan. 5, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 007).

⁵⁰ *Id.*

⁵¹ *Id.*

⁵² *Id.*

⁵³ E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 4 to Special Agent (Jan. 5, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 007).

⁵⁴ E-mail from Intelligence Agent 2 to Intelligence Agent 5 (Jan. 5, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 008).

open-source research and the foreign law enforcement agency's intelligence material, and Priest 2's nephew's pastorship of the SSPX church that Target 1 attended.⁵⁵

- On January 5, 2023, Intelligence Analyst 2 e-mailed an Intelligence Analyst and Staff Operations Specialist at the field office in Louisville, Kentucky, about Priest 2.⁵⁶ Intelligence Analyst 2 asked for "any information that [the Louisville Field Office has] on the [SSPX-MC] organization, [and Priest 1 and Priest 2], etc."⁵⁷ The Intelligence Analyst in the Louisville Field Office responded that she did not "recall ever coming across these names or organization before," copied other agents and analysts in Louisville "for their situational awareness," and recommended that Intelligence Analyst 2 "send Guardians on" the two priests.⁵⁸
- Also on January 5, 2023, the Richmond Field Office opened a Guardian on Priest 1 for the purpose of conducting "investigative steps to determine if [Priest 1] was recruiting and/or radicalizing [Target 1]."⁵⁹ The Guardian points to two facts that the Richmond Field Office claimed justified the additional scrutiny: (1) Priest 1's assignment at Our Lady of Fatima Chapel, and (2) Priest 2's leadership role in the SSPX-MC.⁶⁰ The Guardian illustrates the scope of the FBI's investigation of the two priests and the extent to which the investigation of Priest 1 was linked to Priest 2. It described the prior travel of Priest 1 and cross-checked it against Priest 2's travel, finding "no evidence that [the two priests] ha[d] traveled together, or were in the same overseas location at the same time."⁶¹ The Guardian also reveals that Priest 2 was interviewed by U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") at Boston Logan International Airport, and that Priest 2's phone was searched to determine Priest 2's level of contact with his nephew, Priest 1.⁶² In addition to the Guardian assessment, a Richmond Field Office analyst gathered additional information on Priest 1, such as when and where he was ordained and when he "celebrated his first Mass" both within and outside his local seminary.⁶³
- Around January 9, 2023, the FBI discovered that Priest 2 was traveling abroad "in late January," and pulled his flight and credit card details.⁶⁴

⁵⁵ Intelligence Analyst 4 wrote that Priest 2 "appear[ed] to have been in several conversations discussing SSPX" with a January 6 defendant but admitted "none of these conversations... are derogatory in nature." E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 4 to Special Agent (Jan. 5, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 007).

⁵⁶ Both Priest 1 and his uncle, Priest 2, resided in Kentucky. E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 2 to Special Agent (Jan. 4, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 008).

⁵⁷ E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 2 to Intelligence Analyst 5 (Jan. 5, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 008).

⁵⁸ *Id.* A Guardian is a report the FBI uses to determine "whether there is a nexus to terrorism, cyber, or other criminal activity to warrant further investigation and/or to apply additional investigative resources as determined by ... FBI Policies." Under FBI policies, "a Guardian assessment must have an authorized purpose and cannot be based solely on race, ethnicity, national origin or First Amendment protected activities." Jacqueline F. Brown, *Federal Bureau of Investigation Privacy Impact Assessment for the eGuardian System*, FBI (Jan. 4, 2013), <https://perma.cc/LZP2-FMPA>.

⁵⁹ Guardian of Priest 1 at 1 (attached as Exhibit 009).

⁶⁰ *Id.* at 2.

⁶¹ *Id.* at 4.

⁶² *Id.*

⁶³ See also E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 1 to Intelligence Analyst 2 (Jan. 6, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 010); E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 4 to Special Agent (Jan. 5, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 007).

⁶⁴ E-mail from Special Agent to FBI Louisville (Jan. 9, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 011); E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 2 to Domestic Terrorism Tactical Specialist (Jan. 10, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 012).

- On January 20, 2023, the Richmond Field Office opened a separate Guardian assessment on Priest 2 “to determine if [he] is/was involved in the recruitment and radicalization of Violent Religious Extremists such as [Target 1] and/or others.”⁶⁵ As a basis for its suspicions, the Guardian pointed to Priest 2’s “publicly available sermons/events/speeches” and claimed they “indicate a rhetoric and ideology similar to [Target 1]’s perspective, specifically concerning anti-Semitism, anti-establishment, and anti-abortion ideology.”⁶⁶
- On January 27, 2023, the FBI added a note to Priest 2’s Guardian with details of the upcoming travel of Priest 2. On January 31, the Boston Field Office conducted “surveillance not requiring a court order” of Priest 2 at Boston Logan International Airport.⁶⁷ Upon their return from international travel, Priest 2 and a travel companion were subjected to a secondary search and interview by CBP.⁶⁸ Afterward, the FBI observed them leaving the airport and entering the vehicle of a third person.⁶⁹ FBI personnel then followed Priest 2 from the airport to a residence associated with the driver of the vehicle.⁷⁰ Later that evening, the FBI conducted surveillance at a residence associated with Priest 2 (noting that the lights were on inside).⁷¹

On February 8, 2023, the Richmond Catholic Memo, described further below, leaked to the public. Just two days later, on February 10, 2023, the FBI closed the Guardian on Priest 2 “pursuant to [a] RH [Richmond Field Office] EM [executive management] directive.”⁷² And five days later, on February 15, 2023, Priest 1’s Guardian was likewise closed, because “[n]o identified threat to national security was found at this time” and “[n]o allegation of federal violation or threat to national security has been identified.”⁷³

V. THE RICHMOND FIELD OFFICE DEVELOPS A THEORY THAT “RADICAL TRADITIONALIST” CATHOLICS POSE A NATIONAL THREAT AND DRAFTS THE RICHMOND CATHOLIC MEMO.

In parallel with FBI’s investigations into Priest 1 and Priest 2, the Richmond Field Office began developing the Richmond Catholic Memo.

A. FBI Richmond Analysts Conceive of the Memo but Struggle to Find Supporting Evidence.

1. *FBI Richmond Analysts attempt to find evidence to justify a memo focused on “Radical Traditionalist” Catholics.*

On September 13, 2022, FBI Intelligence Analyst 1 proposed three ideas for domain perspectives for FBI’s fiscal year 2023: (1) one “on the impact of Virginia’s Consumer Data Protection Act,” (2)

⁶⁵ Guardian of Priest 2 at 7 (attached as Exhibit 009).

⁶⁶ *Id.* at 8.

⁶⁷ *Id.* at 11.

⁶⁸ *Id.*

⁶⁹ *Id.*

⁷⁰ *Id.*

⁷¹ *Id.*

⁷² *Id.* at 13.

⁷³ *Id.* at 5.

one “on short-/longer-term impact of new violent crime reduction initiatives ... on violence in Richmond metro area,” and (3) one “on increasing intersection of rad-trad (radical-traditional) Catholics and DVEs [domestic violent extremists].”⁷⁴ Intelligence Analyst 1 explained the third idea was “a direct outgrowth of [Target 1’s] case.”⁷⁵ Intelligence Analyst 1 asserted that the “intersection” between “rad-trad ... Catholics” and domestic violence extremism was “increasing,” but then acknowledged any purported increase turned on “finding sufficient additional evidence beyond [Target 1].”⁷⁶ As outlined below, FBI’s subsequent research turned up only two additional cases of a suspect self-identifying as a “radical traditional” Catholic—and nothing linking Catholics or groups not in full communion with the Catholic Church to domestic extremism.

By December 2022, Intelligence Analyst 2 searched the FBI’s internal databases for cases that might fit Intelligence Analyst 1’s hypothesis that “radical-traditionalist” Catholics posed a national threat.⁷⁷ Intelligence Analyst 2 only identified two cases as relevant: one in Portland, Oregon, and one in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Intelligence Analyst 2 then reached out to those offices to obtain additional information on those matters.

On December 21, 2022, Intelligence Analyst 2 contacted the Portland Field Office about the first identified case.⁷⁸ Intelligence Analyst 2 informed the office that she was preparing a report on “Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists in radical-traditionalist Catholic ideology.”⁷⁹ She explained that she learned about a deceased subject through her search and found him in an “ADL product”—a dossier prepared by the Anti-Defamation League’s Center on Extremism.⁸⁰ Even though the subject was deceased, Intelligence Analyst 2 thought the information about him was “interesting” and asked to reach out to an ADL contact regarding the individual’s “association with radtrad Catholic ideology” for use in the intelligence product.⁸¹ An Intelligence Analyst in Portland responded that Intelligence Analyst 2’s understanding was “correct,” and while he “[didn’t] see any issue” with Intelligence Analyst 2 using the information in her report, he deferred to the case agent to make the final call and to connect her with the ADL.⁸²

As for the second case, on December 30, 2022, Intelligence Analyst 2 reached out to two analysts in the Milwaukee Field Office about an individual who, according to Intelligence Analyst 2, “adhere[d] to rad-trad ideology” and attended a church affiliated with SSPX “for over a year.”⁸³ Intelligence Analyst 2 wanted to “pick [the Milwaukee Analyst’s] brain further to use this information as an evidence bullet in our product.”⁸⁴ A few weeks later, Intelligence Analyst 2 sent

⁷⁴ E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 1 to Supervisory Intelligence Analyst 2 (Sept. 13, 2022) (attached as Exhibit 013).

⁷⁵ *Id.*

⁷⁶ *Id.*

⁷⁷ E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 2 to Intelligence Analyst 6 (Dec. 21, 2022) (attached as Exhibit 014).

⁷⁸ *Id.*

⁷⁹ *Id.*

⁸⁰ *Id.*; Center on Extremism, Anti-Defamation League (attached as Exhibit 015); *see also* Center on Extremism, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (2026), <https://perma.cc/754H-R3FF>. The Anti-Defamation League is a non-governmental organization.

⁸¹ E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 2 to Intelligence Analyst 6 (Dec. 21, 2022) (attached as Exhibit 014).

⁸² E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 6 to Intelligence Analyst 2 (Dec. 28, 2022) (attached as Exhibit 014).

⁸³ E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 2 to Milwaukee Analyst 1 (Dec. 30, 2022) (attached as Exhibit 005).

⁸⁴ *Id.*

the Milwaukee field office a proposed paragraph to be included in the Richmond Catholic Memo.⁸⁵ The paragraph included reference to the SSPX church the Milwaukee subject attended, a description of his political views, his past history of alleged violence, his affiliation with violent groups, and his attempt to acquire weapons and ammunition.⁸⁶ The Milwaukee analyst approved of the language.⁸⁷

To further support their hypothesis regarding “rad-trad Catholics,” the Richmond Field Office also received intelligence material about SSPX from a foreign law enforcement agency.⁸⁸ The published Richmond Catholic Memo did not expressly mention this material, but as mentioned above, the material contained descriptions of the origins of SSPX Resistance, its leader, and the leader’s alleged connection to Priest 2.⁸⁹ Finally, the Richmond Field Office used its investigation into Priest 1 and Priest 2—specifically, Priest 2’s travel abroad in late January—to secure a meeting with the foreign law enforcement agency to discuss SSPX Resistance.⁹⁰ So while the final Memo does not mention the material received from that foreign agency, the Working Group believes it a fair assumption that this material influenced it.

2. *FBI Richmond Analysts believe they should convert the Richmond Catholic Memo to a SPEAR.*

Even before Intelligence Analyst 2 had reached out to the Portland and Milwaukee field offices to locate corroborating evidence supporting the proposed domain perspective, Intelligence Analyst 1 “got to thinking” that the FBI should prepare a broader report to be circulated to FBI leadership, known as a Strategic Perspective: Executive Analytic Report (“SPEAR”).⁹¹ SPEARs are used to communicate information to senior executives in the FBI. Unlike a Domain Perspective, which is sent to relevant personnel in a specific geographic or subject area, a SPEAR has national implications. In this case, the proposed SPEAR would link “rad-trad” Catholics to racially motivated or ethnically motivated violent extremists,⁹² which Intelligence Analyst 1 stated “[s]eems like something with national application.”⁹³

By January 3, 2023, Intelligence Analyst 2 represented that the Domestic Terrorism Intelligence Analyst over the Richmond Field Office was “onboard with the SPEAR” and that they planned to meet to discuss next steps.⁹⁴

At that time, Intelligence Analyst 2 and Intelligence Analyst 1 had only identified three individuals (Target 1, the deceased subject from the ADL report, and the subject from Milwaukee) in FBI databases with purported ties to SSPX and “radical-traditional Catholicism.” And Intelligence

⁸⁵ E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 2 to Milwaukee Analyst 2 (Jan. 11, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 016).

⁸⁶ *Id.*

⁸⁷ E-mail from Milwaukee Analyst 2 to Intelligence Analyst 2 (Jan. 13, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 016).

⁸⁸ E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 4 to Special Agent (Jan. 5, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 007).

⁸⁹ *Id.*

⁹⁰ E-mail from Special Agent to FBI Louisville (Jan. 09, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 011).

⁹¹ E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 1 to Intelligence Analyst 2 (Dec. 16, 2022) (attached as Exhibit 017).

⁹² *Id.*

⁹³ *Id.*

⁹⁴ E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 2 to Intelligence Analyst 1 (Jan. 3, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 005).

Analyst 2 admitted that the FBI did not know whether Target 1 “was collaborating with others” when he was arrested.⁹⁵

On February 2, 2023, shortly after the Richmond Catholic Memo was published, Intelligence Analyst 2 e-mailed a draft SPEAR to the Richmond Domestic Terrorism Intelligence Analyst.⁹⁶ On February 6, 2023, a Domestic Terrorism Intelligence Analyst from the Counterterrorism Division stated she would “take a look at it along with one of the other [intelligence analysts] up here who covers RMVE threats.”⁹⁷ Two days later, the Richmond Catholic Memo leaked, and the SPEAR was never published.

B. The Richmond Field Office Builds the Richmond Catholic Memo.

1. The Richmond Field Office’s attempt to define “radical traditionalist” Catholic.

The thesis of the Richmond Catholic Memo, as outlined above, linked the “interest of racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists” to “radical-traditionalist” Catholic ideology. To support the Memo then, FBI needed to define the term “radical traditionalist Catholic.” The FBI ultimately “characterized” that term in footnote (a) of the Memo, stating:

RTCs are typically characterized by the rejection of the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II) as a valid church council; disdain for most of the popes elected since Vatican II, particularly Pope Francis and Pope John Paul II; and frequent adherence to anti-Semitic, anti-immigrant, anti-LGBTQ, and white supremacist ideology. Radical-traditionalist Catholics compose a small minority of overall Roman Catholic adherents and are separate and distinct from “traditionalist Catholics” who prefer the Traditional Latin Mass and pre-Vatican II teachings and traditions, but without the more extremist ideological beliefs and violent rhetoric. Vatican II took place from 1962-1965 and essentially shaped the modern Roman Rite Catholic Church. It was intended to help the church respond to global cultural changes in the aftermath of World War II and resulted in significant reforms to the liturgy, attitudes toward non-Christian religions, roles and responsibilities of the laity, views on religious freedom, etc.⁹⁸

To arrive at this sweeping generalization—filled with political and religious viewpoints—the FBI devoted time to studying and even building a presentation titled “Traditionalist Catholicism Overview.”⁹⁹ The presentation makes broad generalizations about so-called “Traditionalist

⁹⁵ E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 2 to Milwaukee Analyst 1 (Dec. 30, 2022) (attached as Exhibit 005).

⁹⁶ E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 2 to Domestic Terrorism Intelligence Analyst (Feb. 2, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 018); Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Draft SPEAR, “Interest of Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists in Radical-Traditionalist Catholic Ideology Almost Certainly Presents New Mitigation Opportunities” (Feb. 2023) (attached as Exhibit 019).

⁹⁷ E-mail from Domestic Terrorism Intelligence Analyst to Intelligence Analyst 2 (Feb. 6, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 018).

⁹⁸ Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Richmond Office, Richmond Catholic Memo (Jan. 23, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 003).

⁹⁹ E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 3 to Supervisory Intelligence Analyst 2 (Jan. 20, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 004).

Catholics” and provides a window into how the Richmond Field Office differentiated “radical traditionalist Catholics” that the office believed posed national security threats from others.¹⁰⁰ The differentiation involved mostly doctrinal disputes, including changes made by the Second Vatican Council.¹⁰¹ For example, the presentation includes slides that focus on what the Field Office believed constitutes core beliefs of nonmainstream Catholics:

- A slide titled “Core Ideology and Beliefs” mentions supporting “Traditional Latin Mass” and “[c]onservative family values/roles” while “[r]ejecti[ng] ... modernity”; supporting “[d]iscontinuity and [d]isrupture” (which the slide does not define); and possessing a “[t]endency toward isolationism”;¹⁰²
- A slide titled “On Earth as it is in Heaven” mentions “[b]elief in the creation of a totalitarian, anti-pluralist Catholic nation, a ‘confessional state’”; “[r]ejection of religious neutrality and right to religious freedom”; “[s]ubordination of the state to Catholic principles”; and claims that “traditionalist Catholicism” is “[c]omparable to Islamist ideology.”¹⁰³

Then, in discussing so-called “radical traditionalist Catholics”, including SSPX and its offshoots, the slides focus on doctrinal and political issues. For example:

- A slide identifies groups that are supposedly “[a] Step Further” from the Catholics discussed earlier, labeling these groups “Radical-Traditionalist Catholicism (RTC)”; this slide indicates that this group views “mainline Catholicism” as “illegitimate,” takes “[h]ardline positions on abortion, LGBTQ matters, [and] interreligious dialogue”; uses “[e]schatological/apocalyptic overtones” and possesses an “[u]ndertone of anti-Semitism”;¹⁰⁴
- In discussing SSPX, the slide deck defines them by reference to their relationship with the Vatican (*i.e.*, not “fully separate nor in full communion”) and emphasizes that they are “[n]amed after Pope Pius X, who rejected ‘modernism;’”¹⁰⁵ and
- A slide discusses a group of dissenting SSPX priests, known as the “SSPX Resistance Movement,” and describes the group as having a “[v]ocal acceptance of conspiracy theories.”¹⁰⁶

The presentation included a boilerplate disclaimer slide stating that “[p]otential criminality exhibited by certain members of a group referenced herein does not negate nor is it a comment on the constitutional rights of a group itself or its members to exercise their rights under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.”¹⁰⁷ The disclaimer added that “[t]he FBI does not

¹⁰⁰ *Id.*

¹⁰¹ *Id.* (slide 5).

¹⁰² *Id.* (slide 7).

¹⁰³ *Id.* (slide 8).

¹⁰⁴ *Id.* (slide 9).

¹⁰⁵ *Id.* (slides 10–11).

¹⁰⁶ *Id.* (slide 14).

¹⁰⁷ *Id.* (slide 3).

investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment.”¹⁰⁸

After the leak of the Memo, the FBI clarified that it “does not use the phrase ‘radical traditionalist catholic’ to define any domestic terrorism threat category,” and does not use “religious affiliations ... to describe or identify violent extremists.”¹⁰⁹

2. *Reviewers do not flag any constitutional issues.*

On January 12, 2023, Intelligence Analyst 1 began soliciting feedback on the draft Richmond Catholic Memo.¹¹⁰ He e-mailed several colleagues in the Richmond Field Office “for requested reviews,” including a legal review, a review on “all things Catholic from our former seminarian” (Intelligence Analyst 3), and a peer review.¹¹¹ No one flagged any constitutional concerns in their edits. The Richmond Field Office’s Chief Division Counsel found “[n]o issues if this is internal. If this is external we need to make sure that it is necessary to include individual’s [sic] names in order to understand the product.”¹¹² However, the Chief Division Counsel did not raise concerns touching on issues of religious freedom.¹¹³ And when Supervisory Intelligence Analyst 1 returned her edits on the draft, she suggested mentioning Virginia’s proposed ban on abortions after 15 weeks as a “[c]atalyzing event[.]” where “radical traditionalist” Catholics and those intent on engaging in violence “might have common cause.”¹¹⁴ Other common causes mentioned included “abortion rights, immigration, affirmative action, and LGBTQ protections.”¹¹⁵

3. *The Richmond Field Office publishes the Richmond Catholic Memo.*

As outlined above, on January 23, 2023, the Richmond Field Office published the Memo.¹¹⁶ It linked what it viewed as certain traditional Catholic ideologies with violent extremism, relying on doctrinal and political viewpoints as establishing which religious groups or views were likely to attract potential “racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists.”¹¹⁷

The Richmond Catholic Memo asserted “with high confidence” that the field office “increasingly observed interest of [racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists] (RMVEs) in radical-traditionalist Catholic (RTC) ideology.”¹¹⁸ It assumed “that RMVEs will continue to find RTC ideology attractive and will continue to attempt to connect with RTC adherents.”¹¹⁹

¹⁰⁸ *Id.*

¹⁰⁹ E-mail from Counterterrorism Unit Chief to Directorate of Intelligence Assistant Director (February 8, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 020).

¹¹⁰ E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 1 to Intelligence Analyst 7 (Jan. 12, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 021).

¹¹¹ *Id.*

¹¹² E-mail from Chief Division Counsel to Intelligence Analyst 1 (Jan. 13, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 021).

¹¹³ *See id.*

¹¹⁴ Richmond Catholic Memo Draft, at 4 (attached as Exhibit 022).

¹¹⁵ *Id.*

¹¹⁶ Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Richmond Office, Richmond Catholic Memo (Jan. 23, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 003).

¹¹⁷ *Id.*

¹¹⁸ *Id.*

¹¹⁹ *Id.*

The Memo defined “radical-traditionalist Catholics”—and thus the ideology that attracted potential extremists—by their doctrinal views (“ RTCs are typically characterized by the rejection of” Vatican II and post-Vatican II popes) and their political views (“adherence to anti-Semitic, anti-immigrant, anti-LGBTQ, and white supremacist ideology”).¹²⁰ It attempted to distinguish “traditionalist Catholics” on the basis that they lack “the more extremist ideological beliefs and violent rhetoric.”¹²¹ The Memo did not provide concrete examples of the differences between “radical-traditionalist Catholics” and traditionalist Catholics, indicating that the key metric was simply how “traditionalist” a particular Catholic group was.¹²² For instance, in discussing SSPX, SSPX Resistance, and SSPX-MC, the Memo focused solely on their doctrinal views vis-à-vis what the FBI viewed as the mainstream Catholic church and never attempted to categorize those groups as “radical-traditionalist Catholics,” “traditionalist Catholics,” or something else.¹²³ The Memo also claimed the FBI could “mitigate the RMVE threat through outreach to traditionalist Catholic parishes,” even though the Memo’s thesis was that RMVEs were attracted to a meaningfully distinct “radical-traditionalist” Catholic viewpoint.¹²⁴ And while the Memo listed nine groups as “[SPLC]-Defined RTC Hate Groups in the United States,” it did not explain what made those groups “hate groups” besides their Southern Poverty Law Center (“SPLC”) listing or how listing these groups was consistent with FBI practice.¹²⁵

The Richmond Catholic Memo suggested that certain groups taking a position on political issues with religious relevance could attract violent extremists. For example, citing *Salon* articles, it pointed to “increasing collaboration” between a “far-right Catholic media outlet” and the political “‘groyper’ movement,” and, citing an *Atlantic* article, referenced “increase[d] hostility toward abortion-rights advocates on social media sites in the run-up to and aftermath of” the overruling of *Roe v. Wade*.¹²⁶ The Memo also claimed that “RMVE interest in RTCs is likely to increase ... in the run-up to the next general election cycle” based on political polarization and “the probability that policy issues of mutual interests to RMVEs and RTC adherents,” such as “abortion rights, immigration, affirmative action, and LGBTQ protections,” “remain in the public spotlight.”¹²⁷

The Memo cited Target 1’s case, the case out of the Portland Field Office, and the case out of the Milwaukee Field Office to show an “observed interest of RMVEs in RTC ideology.”¹²⁸ But it never explained why those criminals’ self-identification with particular groups, such as SSPX, justified a conclusion that groups with those viewpoints or similar religious viewpoints attracted, or were aligned with, violent extremism.

¹²⁰ *Id.*

¹²¹ *Id.*

¹²² *Id.*

¹²³ *Id.* at 2.

¹²⁴ *Id.* at 1, 4.

¹²⁵ *Id.* at 10.

¹²⁶ *Id.* at 4.

¹²⁷ *Id.*

¹²⁸ *Id.* at 2–3.

VI. AFTER THE RICHMOND CATHOLIC MEMO LEAKS, THE FBI DETERMINES IT DID NOT MEET AGENCY STANDARDS.

On the afternoon of February 8, 2023, the Richmond Catholic Memo leaked to the public.¹²⁹ The leak spawned significant internal criticisms of the Memo, and FBI leadership quickly distanced the agency from the report and removed it from FBI systems.

A. Following the Leak, FBI Headquarters Recognizes the Richmond Catholic Memo's Flaws.

FBI components criticized the Richmond Catholic Memo in the immediate aftermath of the leak. For example, two employees of the Counterterrorism Division responded to the Memo, with the first stating that the Division's "analysis of the [RMVE] threat does not align with FBI Richmond's analysis."¹³⁰ In an e-mail, a Counterterrorism Division employee stated that "[t]he FBI does not use the phrase 'radical traditionalist [C]atholic' to define any domestic terrorism threat category" or "open investigations based upon [F]irst [A]mendment protected activities, such as religion."¹³¹ Rather, "[w]hen describing ideologically-motivated violent extremists ... the FBI focuses first and foremost on violence, criminal activity, and violation of federal law" while "religious affiliations ... are not used to describe or identify violent extremists."¹³² The e-mail stated that "[t]he leaked internal-only intelligence product ... is the only finished intelligence product to specifically address RMVE's interest in radical-traditionalist catholic ideology," and that the Counterterrorism Division "does not assess there is a significant linkage between RMVE actors and this ideology which would necessitate further FBI interest, analysis, or intelligence collection efforts."¹³³

The Directorate of Intelligence Assistant Director also voiced concerns about the methodology and source material, noting that the Richmond Catholic Memo's use of "subjective information from SPLC" differed from past uses of material from that group, which involved "statistics and data" the SPLC gathered.¹³⁴ The e-mail further explained that "[t]radecraft standards require describing the quality and credibility of underlying sources," which the Memo failed to do for the SPLC "as a source for subjective information, such as [mentioning] its previously issuing apologies and retracting its naming of individuals or groups as extremist."¹³⁵ And because "the hate group identified in this case was related to a branch of a religious group, there should have

¹²⁹ E-mail from Public Affairs Specialist to Directorate of Intelligence Assistant Director (Feb. 8, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 001); E-mail from FBI National Press Office to Directorate of Intelligence Assistant Director (Feb. 8, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 002).

¹³⁰ E-mail from Counterterrorism Unit Chief to Directorate of Intelligence Assistant Director (Feb. 8, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 020).

¹³¹ *Id.*

¹³² *Id.*

¹³³ *Id.*

¹³⁴ E-mail from Directorate of Intelligence Assistant Director to Counterterrorism Unit Chief (Feb. 9, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 020).

¹³⁵ *Id.* SPLC has issued numerous apologies and retractions for inclusion of several individuals and groups on its list of hate groups. This includes former presidential candidate and Secretary of U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Dr. Ben Carson; and British activist Maajid Nawaz and his organization, Quilliam, to whom SPLC paid a \$3.375 million settlement. See SPLC Statement on Dr. Ben Carson, S. Poverty L. Ctr. (Feb. 11, 2015), <https://perma.cc/9ZHZ-A4HM>; SPLC Statement on Maajid Nawaz, S. Poverty L. Ctr. (June 18, 2018), <https://perma.cc/QY89-LZ77>.

been more care to caveat this information.”¹³⁶ The e-mail concluded that the Richmond Catholic Memo “states RMVE interest in RTC ideology as a fact and proceeds from that assumption without substantiation.”¹³⁷

There was some consideration of how to defend the Memo. The Deputy Assistant Director at the Directorate of Intelligence, for example, suggested the redactions in the leaked Memo removed “specifics about predicated cases and threat activity that provide context,” resulting in “a misleading and overly simplistic perception of the FBI’s activities.”¹³⁸ The Special Agent in Charge in the Richmond Field Office agreed with this assessment.¹³⁹ Other personnel discussed the leak itself, viewing it as pushing an agenda, such as showing that “the FBI is relying on the [SPLC] to define the hate groups the FBI should be focused on” or as retribution for having a clearance revoked.¹⁴⁰

On February 21, 2023, the Directorate of Intelligence published an Analytic Tradecraft Review of the Richmond Catholic Memo. The review observed that the Memo implies that “RMVE ideology and RTC ideology align,” and “almost explicitly states that RTC ideology is violent and extremist without offering any evidence [in] support.”¹⁴¹ The Directorate also flagged a lack of support demonstrating the alleged “increasingly observed interest” in racially motivated violent extremists in perceived radical, traditional Catholicism, as “[t]he authors have not established a baseline to show an increase in interest.”¹⁴² Similarly, the Directorate concluded that the Richmond Catholic Memo did not point to “FBI investigations showing a growing overlap [between RTCs and other groups] despite stating there was.”¹⁴³ The Directorate also faulted the Memo’s unthinking acceptance of the SPLC’s list of “radical-traditionalist” hate groups. The Directorate explained that because of the SPLC’s “history of having to issue apologies and retract groups and individuals they have identified as being extremists or hate groups,” because the report involved “a religious branch of Catholicism,” and because the listing of an entity as a hate group is “more subjective than statistical,” there should have been “extra care to caveat the information” and review the SPLC’s work.¹⁴⁴

B. After FBI Leadership Orders the Richmond Catholic Memo Deleted from FBI Databases, Staff Continue to Work on the Project.

Ultimately, FBI leadership ordered the deletion of the Richmond Catholic Memo from its files. On February 9, the day after it leaked, Supervisory Intelligence Analyst 1 was “directed by [her] management/FBI Executive Management to remove [the Memo] from Sentinel,” a task the

¹³⁶ E-mail from Directorate of Intelligence Assistant Director to Counterterrorism Unit Chief (Feb. 9, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 020).

¹³⁷ *Id.*

¹³⁸ E-mail from Directorate of Intelligence Deputy Assistant Director to FBI National Press Office (Feb. 8, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 023).

¹³⁹ E-mail from Special Agent-In-Charge to FBI General Counsel 1 (Feb. 8, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 024).

¹⁴⁰ E-mail from FBI Inspector 1 to Special Agent-In-Charge (Feb. 8, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 025).

¹⁴¹ Directorate of Intelligence, Analytic Tradecraft Review [of] Richmond Catholic Memo, at 1 (Feb. 21, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 026).

¹⁴² *Id.*

¹⁴³ *Id.* at 2.

¹⁴⁴ *Id.* at 1–2.

Information Management Division could not do because the document was on the “Freeze List.”¹⁴⁵ Ultimately, the request to remove the Memo from Sentinel was sent to lawyers in the Office of General Counsel at headquarters.¹⁴⁶ On February 9, 2023, Supervisory Intelligence Analyst 1 informed the Special Agent in Charge that the Memo “has been removed from [the Richmond Field Office]’s Feedback Loop/FIG SharePoint and the Intel Portal.”¹⁴⁷ According to people involved in removing the Memo from all FBI systems, there was significant pressure to complete the removal.¹⁴⁸ “The 7th Floor is breathing down my neck on this one,” said FBI General Counsel 2.¹⁴⁹

In Supervisory Intelligence Analyst 1’s recounting of the post-leak events, the Chief Division Counsel in Richmond directed her to remove the Memo from FBI databases on behalf of the Field Office leadership.¹⁵⁰ She told the Chief Division Counsel and the Assistant Special Agent in Charge that she “refused to draft the lead [to] remove it from Sentinel as [she] did not see how it met the criteria [for removal].”¹⁵¹ The Assistant Special Agent in Charge removed it instead.¹⁵²

In the 15 days it was accessible across the FBI before it was deleted, 19 intelligence analysts from 13 field offices, along with four agents and two task force officers from two field offices, three senior intelligence analysts from three different field offices, and a Chief Division Counsel from another field office accessed the Memo.¹⁵³

Even though FBI leadership ordered its deletion, one of the original drafters continued workshopping it.¹⁵⁴ Intelligence Analyst 1 sent an e-mail over a month later—on March 17, 2023—stating, “I spent today tinkering with the DP [Domain Perspective],” and included a list of “[m]ajor changes” and “a few areas where we could tinker further.”¹⁵⁵

¹⁴⁵ The Freeze List is a tool used to preserve FBI case files and associated materials and prevent their disposition or transfer to the National Archives and Records Administration because of their potential relevance to litigation. The Freeze List ensures that all relevant case files, subfiles, and/or associated materials are preserved in a legally defensible manner. Anyone within the FBI responsible for disposing of files or related materials must first check the Freeze List before adding to or destroying the records. If the case file is found on the Freeze List, then it may not be modified, disposed of or transferred to National Archives and Records Administration; E-mail from Supervisory Intelligence Analyst 1 to FBI Headquarters (Feb. 9, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 027).

¹⁴⁶ E-mail from Chief Division Counsel to FBI General Counsel 2 (Feb. 9, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 027).

¹⁴⁷ E-mail from Supervisory Intelligence Analyst 1 to Special Agent-In-Charge (Feb. 9, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 028). The Feedback Loop was a location on the internal FBI Richmond SharePoint site where FBI Richmond Executive Management could offer feedback or comment on intelligence products generated by FBI Richmond intelligence personnel.

¹⁴⁸ See E-mail from FBI General Counsel 2 to Chief Division Counsel (Feb. 10, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 029).

¹⁴⁹ *Id.*

¹⁵⁰ Notes from Supervisory Intelligence Analyst 1, 3 (undated) (attached as Exhibit 030).

¹⁵¹ *Id.* at 3.

¹⁵² *Id.*

¹⁵³ E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 2 to Intelligence Analyst 1 (Mar. 1, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 031).

¹⁵⁴ E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 1 to Intelligence Analyst 2 (Mar. 17, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 032).

¹⁵⁵ E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 1 to Intelligence Analyst 2 (Mar. 17, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 032).

V. ALTHOUGH AN INTERNAL REVIEW REVEALS MULTIPLE FAILURES IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE RICHMOND CATHOLIC MEMO, THE INDIVIDUALS AT THE RICHMOND FIELD OFFICE INVOLVED IN PRODUCING THE PERSPECTIVE ARE ONLY LIGHTLY DISCIPLINED.

In April 2023, the Inspection Division conducted a review of the creation and approval process of the Richmond Catholic Memo.¹⁵⁶ The Inspection Division found:

- That both the Directorate of Intelligence and the Counterterrorism Division believed that the Memo “erroneously equated the ideology of domestic terrorism (DT) subjects who self-identified as ‘Radical Traditional Catholic’ (‘RTC’) with [RMVE] ideology, without sufficient support.”¹⁵⁷
- That the Directorate of Intelligence believed the Memo “failed to consider the potential bias and credibility of open-source information” upon which it relied.¹⁵⁸
- That the Directorate of Intelligence and Counterterrorism Division believed the Memo “erroneously conflated” Target 1’s interest in religion with violent extremism activities and implied that RMVEs and “RTC” ideology align without offering supporting evidence. “This, in turn, created the appearance that the FBI conducts investigative activity based on religious affiliation.”¹⁵⁹
- That the use of the terms “RTC” and “far-right” are not consistent with FBI standards.¹⁶⁰

While the Inspection Division found “no evidence of malicious intent or an improper purpose” on the part of the drafters of the Memo, it concluded that those involved demonstrated a lack of “professional judgment and failed to adhere to FBI standards.”¹⁶¹

The Inspection Division then directed that “[a]ll individuals involved in the drafting, review, and approval” of the Richmond Catholic Memo “be admonished” and that the admonishments be reflected in their performance ratings.¹⁶² The Inspection Division required additional training on “analytical tradecraft standards and DT [domestic terrorism] terminology,” and heightened approval requirements for intelligence products that involve sensitive investigative matters.¹⁶³ Finally, the Inspection Division called for updated policy guidance “on the use of third-party sources in intelligence products ... to include consideration and documentation of the access, reliability, bias, and other factors affecting the credibility of all sources cited in analytic products.”¹⁶⁴

On July 19, 2023, in response to a call for “final collaboration” and “feedback” to the final draft of the Inspection Division’s internal review of the Richmond Catholic Memo, the Directorate of Intelligence Assistant Director requested “that the Conclusion section include a finding by [the Inspection Division] that the original basis for the conception and initiation of the DP was

¹⁵⁶ FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, INSPECTION DIV., DOMAIN PERSPECTIVE STRATEGIC REV. 3–4 (Apr. 21, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 033).

¹⁵⁷ *Id.* at 3.

¹⁵⁸ *Id.*

¹⁵⁹ *Id.* at 3–4.

¹⁶⁰ *Id.*

¹⁶¹ *Id.* at 4.

¹⁶² *Id.*

¹⁶³ *Id.*

¹⁶⁴ *Id.* at 5.

sound.”¹⁶⁵ According to the Assistant Director, it was “important to ... distinguish the conception and initiation from the *execution* as the aspect that was flawed.”¹⁶⁶ A lawyer in the Office of General Counsel responded, “I do not agree that the report should suggest that the conception and initiation of this product was sound.”¹⁶⁷

The Richmond Field Office did not agree with the criticisms of the internal review. On July 7, 2023, the Special Agent in Charge held a staff meeting at the Richmond Field Office to preview the Inspection Division’s findings. Notes from that meeting reveal that many in the office, including the Special Agent in Charge, disagreed with the Inspection Division’s report and believed it was unfair.¹⁶⁸ An Assistant Special Agent in Charge, for example, said “[t]here are no inconsistent performers in this room.”¹⁶⁹ And the Special Agent in Charge “apologized to” members of the field office involved in creating the Domain Perspective at the end of the meeting.¹⁷⁰ When Intelligence Analyst 2 said in an e-mail that she was “terribly sorry for all that everyone has had to endure as a result of this product,”¹⁷¹ the Special Agent in Charge told her she need not apologize, saying that the event “[w]ill make for a great chapter in your memoirs some day!”¹⁷²

Leadership at the Richmond Field Office expressed at an all-employee meeting on July 27, 2023, that “[t]he people involved didn’t deserve this” and referred to the individual who leaked the document as “[c]owardly.”¹⁷³ Later, on July 31, the Richmond Field Office arranged access for all its employees and their families to Employee Assistance Counselors¹⁷⁴ as a “response to the recent congressional hearing” involving the Domain Perspective.¹⁷⁵

At the conclusion of the 2023 fiscal year, Richmond Field Office employees were given annual performance evaluations. Those who were heavily involved in the creation of the Richmond Catholic Memo received positive feedback in their performance reviews, ranging from “Exemplary” to “Consistent.”¹⁷⁶ Some references to the Memo appear in these evaluations, such as language indicating that Supervisory Intelligence Analyst 1 language indicating the employee “oversaw an extremely difficult threat during the review period, which became increasingly so following the leak of one of the products related to the threat [the employee] resided over,” and led “her team despite the distractions and difficulties stemming from the aforementioned

¹⁶⁵ E-mail from Directorate of Intelligence Assistant Director to FBI Inspector 2 (July 19, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 034).

¹⁶⁶ *Id.*

¹⁶⁷ E-mail from FBI General Counsel 1 to Directorate of Intelligence Assistant Director (July 19, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 034).

¹⁶⁸ *See* Staff Meeting Notes, Supervisory Intelligence Analyst 1 (July 7, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 035).

¹⁶⁹ *Id.*

¹⁷⁰ *Id.*

¹⁷¹ E-mail from Intelligence Analyst 2 to Special Agent-In-Charge (July 7, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 036).

¹⁷² E-mail from Special Agent-In-Charge to Intelligence Analyst 2 (July 7, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 036).

¹⁷³ Staff Meeting Notes (July 27, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 037).

¹⁷⁴ “An EAC is a licensed mental health professional who can provide confidential, short-term counseling services.” E-mail from Financial Liaison Specialist to Special Agent (July 31, 2023) (attached as Exhibit 038).

¹⁷⁵ *Id.* While the e-mail does not specify which congressional hearings, the FBI Director was asked about the Richmond Domain Perspective at a congressional hearing on July 12, 2023.

¹⁷⁶ Evaluation of Special Agent-In-Charge (attached as Exhibit 039); Evaluation of Intelligence Analyst 1 (attached as Exhibit 040); Evaluation of Intelligence Analyst 2 (attached as Exhibit 041); Evaluation of Intelligence Analyst 3 (attached as Exhibit 042); Evaluation of Intelligence Analyst 7 (attached as Exhibit 043); Evaluation of Supervisory Intelligence Analyst 2 (attached as Exhibit 044).

product.”¹⁷⁷ Other evaluations mentioned that “senior leadership concluded the [Memo] failed to meet FBI standards,” but also noted that the review “found no evidence of malicious intent or an improper purpose [but] did find those involved lacked professional judgement [*sic*] and failed to adhere to FBI standards.”¹⁷⁸ These reviews also mentioned that employees were admonished for lack of professional judgement in creating the Richmond Catholic Memo.¹⁷⁹

CONCLUSION

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is entrusted with the solemn responsibility of protecting the First Amendment rights of all Americans. History will rightly judge the Richmond Catholic Memo as a grave failure of the FBI Richmond Field Office to uphold that responsibility.

Under the leadership of President Donald J. Trump, Attorney General Todd Blanche, and FBI Director Kash Patel, this Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation will protect the constitutional rights of all Americans and ensure law enforcement activity is based on legitimate law enforcement interests.

The FBI personnel involved in the creation of the Richmond Catholic Memo have been terminated from their positions.

¹⁷⁷ Evaluation of Supervisory Intelligence Analyst 1 (attached as Exhibit 045).

¹⁷⁸ Evaluation of Intelligence Analyst 1 (attached as Exhibit 040); Evaluation of Intelligence Analyst 2 (attached as Exhibit 041); Evaluation of Intelligence Analyst 3 (attached as Exhibit 042); Evaluation of Intelligence Analyst 7 (attached as Exhibit 043); Evaluation of Supervisory Intelligence Analyst 2 (attached as Exhibit 044); Evaluation of Supervisory Intelligence Analyst 1 (attached as Exhibit 045).

¹⁷⁹ *Id.*

EXHIBIT 001

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2023 3:16 PM
To: Ugoretz, Tonya L. (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED];
Wells, Robert R. (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Jones, Jason Allen (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED];
Turner, Suzanne (INSD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Dunham, Christopher G. (OCA) (FBI) [REDACTED];
[REDACTED] (OCA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED];
[REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED];
[REDACTED]; Milhoan, Catherine L. (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Goodwater, Douglas M. (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED];
[REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED];
[REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Coakley, Miriam M. (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED];
[REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED];
[REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED];
Subject: Richmond Intel Product, referenced in news --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Transitory

Good afternoon.

Responding to [REDACTED]'s (unclass) email from 2:19 today please find attached the product referenced in the article titled: The FBI Doubles Down on Christians and White Supremacy in 2023.

[REDACTED]
*Public Affairs Specialist
Congressional Liaison
FBI Richmond*

[REDACTED]
*(S/B) [REDACTED]
(Direct line) [REDACTED]
Follow us on Twitter - @FBIRichmond*

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

Hi all,

Adding InTo, SecD, and OPR. The date of the leaked domain perspective appears to be 23 Jan. 2023.

Thanks,
Miriam

From: [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] >
Sent: Wednesday, February 8, 2023 3:09 PM
To: Ugoretz, Tonya L. (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; Wells, Robert R. (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; Jones, Jason Allen (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; Turner, Suzanne (INSD) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; Dunham, Christopher G. (OCA) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (OCA) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; Coakley, Miriam M. (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] >
Cc: Milhoan, Catherine L. (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; Goodwater, Douglas M. (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] >
Subject: RE: Media Request: FBI Richmond Document cites SPLC

+ Miriam and others from OGC. I am also adding the second media inquiry.

From: [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, February 8, 2023 2:20 PM
To: Ugoretz, Tonya L. (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; Wells, Robert R. (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; Jones, Jason Allen (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; Turner, Suzanne (INSD) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; Dunham, Christopher G. (OCA) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (OCA) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED] >
Cc: Milhoan, Catherine L. (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; Goodwater, Douglas M. (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] >
Subject: FW: Media Request: FBI Richmond Document cites SPLC

Hello,

We have inquiries from the Washington Examiner and The Daily Signal (Heritage Foundation) about an article written by Kyle Seraphin. It references a January intelligence product from the Richmond Field office. After speaking with SC Goodwater, I am alerting all of you so we can get a copy of the actual document and hear any recommendations on how to respond.

I am attaching a cut and paste of the Seraphin article.

[REDACTED]
FBI National Press Office
[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] Daily Signal) [REDACTED] m>
Sent: Wednesday, February 8, 2023 12:21 PM
To: Public.Affairs <Public[REDACTED]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - Media Request: FBI Richmond Document cites SPLC

This is [REDACTED] at The Daily Signal. I'm writing a story about the FBI Richmond document that repeatedly cites the Southern Poverty Law Center on "radical-traditional Catholics."
(<https://www.uncoverdc.com/2023/02/08/the-fbi-doubles-down-on-christians-and-white-supremacy-in-2023/>) My sources have said that longstanding FBI guidance urged analysts not to rely on the SPLC as a source, but this document appears to violate that guidance.

[REDACTED] at the Richmond office directed me to email you here.

In 2019, the SPLC fired its co-founder, [REDACTED] amid accusations of racial discrimination and sexual harassment. During that scandal, a former employee said the SPLC's "hate" accusations are a "highly profitable scam." Critics say the SPLC brands mainstream conservative and Christian advocacy groups "hate groups," putting them on a list and a map with chapters of the KKK. A terrorist targeted the Family Research Council in 2012, and he told the FBI he used the "hate map" to plan the attack. The SPLC condemned the attack, but has kept FRC on the hate map ever since.

Even left-leaning litigators like Freedom From Religion Foundation Founder [REDACTED] and former ACLU president [REDACTED] have contested the SPLC's claim that Alliance Defending Freedom is a "hate group."

How would the FBI respond to criticism in citing the SPLC? Has the guidance from the Directorate of Intelligence changed?

I am working on an immediate deadline and would appreciate a prompt response. My story will be updated with any comment.

Best,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
The Daily Signal
The Heritage Foundation

[heritage.org](https://www.heritage.org)

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To whom it concerns,

Please see the below article.

<https://www.uncoverdc.com/2023/02/08/the-fbi-doubles-down-on-christians-and-white-supremacy-in-2023/>

The article includes an 8-page document dated January 23, 2023 which is purportedly authored by the FBI Richmond.



Threat Target/Facilitation Platform
FBI Richmond
23 January 2023
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This document is classified [REDACTED]
Warnings and Handling Caveats: Information Concerning Specific Individuals' Activities when that Individual
part of a Group. Full text is found in the Warnings and Handling Caveats section.
This document is only for FBI internal use. Do not externally disseminate this product.
Domain Perspective (DP) template approved for fiscal year 2023, as of 1 October 2022.

[REDACTED] Interest of Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists in Radical-Traditionalist Catholic Ideology Almost Certainly Presents New Mitigation Opportunities

[REDACTED] Executive Summary

[REDACTED] FBI Richmond assesses the increasingly observed interest of racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs) in radical-traditionalist Catholic (RTC)^a ideology almost certainly^b presents opportunities for threat mitigation through the exploration of new avenues for tripwire and source development. FBI Richmond makes this assessment with high confidence^c based on FBI investigations, local law enforcement agency reporting, and liaison reporting, with varying degrees of corroboration and access.

([REDACTED]) In making this assessment, FBI Richmond relied on the key assumption that RMVEs will continue to find RTC ideology attractive and will continue to attempt to connect with RTC adherents, both virtually via social media and in-person at places of worship. Indicators that would cause FBI Richmond to revise the judgments or confidence levels in its assessment include increases or decreases in RMVE subjects' attendance at RTC or traditionalist Catholic places of worship; increases or decreases in RMVE subjects' activity on social media platforms and forums maintained or frequented by RTCs; or the public distancing of prominent RTC or traditionalist Catholic personalities or institutions from RMVE ideologies. FBI Richmond assesses RMVE interest in RTCs is likely to increase over the next 12 to 24 months in the run-up

^a [REDACTED] Analyst Note: RTCs are typically characterized by the rejection of the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II) as a valid church council; disdain for most of the popes elected since Vatican II, particularly Pope Francis and Pope John Paul II; and frequent adherence to anti-Semitic, anti-immigrant, anti-LGBTQ, and white supremacist ideology. Radical-traditionalist Catholics compose a small minority of overall Roman Catholic adherents and are separate and distinct from "traditionalist Catholics" who prefer the Traditional Latin Mass and pre-Vatican II teachings and traditions, but without the more extremist ideological beliefs and violent rhetoric. Vatican II took place from 1962-1965 and essentially shaped the modern Roman Rite Catholic Church. It was intended to help the church respond to global cultural changes in the aftermath of World War II and resulted in significant reforms to the liturgy, attitudes toward non-Christian religions, roles and responsibilities of the laity, views on religious freedom, etc.

^b [REDACTED] See Appendix B: Expressions of Likelihood.

^c [REDACTED] See Appendix C: Confidence in Assessments and Judgments Based on a Body of Information.

to the next general election cycle, complicating the overall RMVE threat picture while also creating new opportunities for mitigation efforts. During this same 12 to 24 month period, the overall RTC community is likely to remain relatively stable or show modest growth, providing RMVEs a persistent Catholic-oriented base with which to interact. FBI Richmond did not include an Analysis of Alternatives in this product due to the quality of the source information and the lack of significant uncertainties.

[REDACTED]
(S) Source Summary Statement

[REDACTED] Reporting in this Domain Perspective (DP) was primarily derived from an FBI Richmond contact with direct access who reported for the first time, an FBI Portland liaison contact with direct access, an FBI Undercover Employee (UCE) with direct access, local law enforcement agency reporting with varying degrees of corroboration and access, and open source reporting. FBI investigative case files, local law enforcement agency reporting, and liaison reporting were critical to the development of the DP's overall assessments by providing credible examples of RMVE actors expressing interest in and/or actively adopting RTC ideology. Open source information was instrumental in providing an understanding of current trends in the far right white nationalist movement and background information on the various RTC and traditionalist Catholic factions. The information was dated between 9 July 2020 and 28 November 2022. The reporting was current as of 11 January 2023.

(S) Increasingly Observed Interest of RMVEs in RTC Ideology Almost Certainly Presents New Opportunities for Threat Mitigation

[REDACTED] FBI Richmond assesses the increasingly observed interest of RMVEs in RTC ideology almost certainly presents new opportunities for threat mitigation through the exploration of new avenues for tripwire and source development. This assessment is based on reporting from an FBI UCE, jail calls associated with an FBI subject, local law enforcement agency reporting, and liaison and contact reporting demonstrating RMVE actors have sought out and attended traditionalist Catholic houses of worship, as well as used language indicative of adherence to RTC ideology in social media postings.

- (S) According to an FBI Richmond contact with direct access reporting for the first time, prior to RMVE actor [REDACTED] early November 2022 arrest he had been attending the Society of Saint Pius X^o (SSPX)-affiliated Our Lady of Fatima Chapel in Richmond, Virginia, for approximately seven months and was participating in catechism

^d [REDACTED] Analyst Note: The Society of Saint Pius X (SSPX) is an international priestly society that promotes the traditional Catholic priesthood and the celebration of the traditional Latin Mass and sacraments. It is named after Pope Pius X whose anti-Modernist stance serves as the organization's inspiration. The SSPX is currently considered "canonically irregular" (i.e., not in full communion with the Vatican). The SSPX has spawned a number of offshoots. These include SSPX-Resistance, aka SSPX-Marian Corps (SSPX-MC), which rejected SSPX attempts to reconcile with the Vatican; the Priestly Fraternity of Saint Peter (FPSP), which holds to many of the SSPX beliefs and practices, but ultimately split from the SSPX to stay in full communion with the Vatican; and the Society of Saint Pius V (SSPV), which does not consider Vatican II valid and binding, questions the legitimacy of all of the popes since Vatican II, and has no canonical standing (i.e., is schismatic).

classes as part of the process to become baptized.^{1,2} Prior to attending Our Lady of Fatima Chapel, [REDACTED] stated he wanted to find a church that was “anti-Zionist” and “anti-progressive” because “that’s where God lives.”³ In [REDACTED] extensive anti-Semitic, anti-LGBTQ, and racist postings on the social media platform Gab, [REDACTED] claimed he was a “radical traditional Catholic Clerical Fascist.” At the time of [REDACTED] arrest, eight Molotov cocktails, six smoke bombs, one smoke grenade, and firearms components consisting of a complete Glock 19 slide/upper receiver, a lower parts kit, a 3D printed Glock 19 frame, a magazine, and 9 mm ammunition were found in his possession.⁴

- [REDACTED] According to an FBI Portland liaison contact with indirect access, as of September 2021, deceased RMVE subject [REDACTED] had previously posted online that he first sought out a mainline Roman Catholic community that practiced the Novus Ordo liturgy^e and then gravitated to the SSPX. In a comment posted to an online discussion group [REDACTED] noted, “I’ve been trying to be catholic [sic] for 2 years I went to a novus ordo church at first then became radicalized by the internet after they told me to go away because of fake virusb [sic].” [REDACTED] posted a photograph of himself outside of a Catholic church and several pictures from inside of the church captioned, “The holy sacrifice of the mass. Join the Catholic Taliban.” [REDACTED] also posted graphics depicting Jesus holding an assault rifle.⁵ Prior to his death, [REDACTED] was under investigation by FBI Portland for his involvement in civil disturbances, vandalism, threatening communications, weapons violations, and other acts of violence furthering his white supremacist ideology.⁶
- [REDACTED] According to an FBI UCE with direct access, as of July 2021, FBI Milwaukee RMVE subject [REDACTED] attended the SSPX-affiliated Maria Stella Maris Mission Church in San Pedro, California, for over a year prior to his relocation to Wisconsin. While at Maria Stella Maris Mission, [REDACTED] started a security company, [REDACTED] to provide armed security for the church. [REDACTED] planned to expand [REDACTED] to other churches and include “fraternal-based” meetings and events.⁷ FBI Los Angeles originally initiated an investigation of [REDACTED] based on allegations that [REDACTED] was a neo-Nazi with racist and sexist views known to verbally harass and physically assault those who opposed his positions. [REDACTED] was a member of Legio Christi^f, now known as “Imperium,” an organization that violently opposes LGBTQ individuals. [REDACTED] has attempted to acquire unregistered “paperless” firearms and large capacity ammunition magazines in the past.⁸

[REDACTED] Perspective

[REDACTED] As of 2021, the Southern Poverty Law Center identified nine RTC hate groups operating in the United States (*see Appendix D for a complete list of these groups and their headquarters*)

^e [REDACTED] Novus Ordo, short for Novus Ordo Missae, refers to the new order of the Catholic Mass promulgated by Pope Paul VI in the aftermath of Vatican II. The Novus Ordo Mass is delivered in the vernacular (as opposed to Latin) and is the normal form of the Mass in the Roman Rite of the Catholic Church.

^f [REDACTED] Legio Christi is not associated with the mainline Roman Catholic religious order known as the Legionaries of Christ, aka the Legion of Christ.

locations).⁹ Open source reporting and FBI investigations have noted a growing overlap between the far-right white nationalist movement and RTCs. Illustrative of this has been the increasing collaboration of the far-right Catholic media outlet Church Militant (and its activist wing, the Resistance network) with the America First/“groyper”¹⁰ movement.¹¹ The ongoing convergence of the far-right white nationalist movement and RTCs was further demonstrated through the increase in hostility toward abortion-rights advocates on social media sites in the run-up to and aftermath of the *Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization* decision that overturned *Roe v. Wade*.¹² Much of the interaction between far-right white nationalists and RTCs takes place online, and adherents of RTCs and other far-right white nationalist groups frequently share language and symbolism, such as crusader references or anti-Semitic discourses.

[REDACTED] This is the first FBI Richmond domain product to focus on the interest of RMVEs in the RTC movement. A search of FBI databases indicated this is also the first FBI finished intelligence product to specifically address this environmental variable.

[REDACTED] Outlook

[REDACTED] FBI Richmond assesses RMVE interest in RTCs is likely to increase over the next 12 to 24 months in the run-up to the next general election cycle complicating the overall RMVE threat picture while also creating new opportunities for mitigation efforts. This assessment is made in light of the ongoing polarization characterizing the US political environment and the probability that policy issues of mutual interest to RMVEs and RTC adherents will remain in the public spotlight. Catalyzing events in which RMVEs and RTC adherents might have common cause include legislation or judicial decisions in areas such as abortion rights,¹³ immigration, affirmative action, and LGBTQ protections. During this same 12 to 24 month period, the overall RTC community is likely to remain relatively stable or show modest growth based on potential disaffection with mainline Catholic churches on social issues in the aforementioned areas, providing RMVEs a persistent Catholic-oriented base with which to interact.

[REDACTED] Ultimately, there may be limits to the level of engagement between RTCs and other far-right white nationalists. For example, many RTCs consider other forms of Christianity to be heretical and an over-emphasis on white US nationalism may be off-putting to RTCs of different ethnicities and countries of origin. Conversely, deep-seated anti-Catholicism remains a characteristic of many far-right white nationalists. Nonetheless, the current trend of RMVE interest in RTC ideology provides new opportunities to mitigate the RMVE threat through outreach to traditionalist Catholic parishes¹⁴ and the development of sources with the placement

⁹ [REDACTED] The term “groyper” refers to followers of Nick Fuentes’s alt-right “America First” movement, which is characterized by its white Christian nationalism platform.

¹⁰ [REDACTED] Analyst Note: Currently, Virginia bans abortion after 26 weeks, 6 days, unless performed by a licensed physician in a licensed hospital with three physicians certifying that the continuation of the pregnancy will result in death of the pregnant person or impair their mental or physical health. According to open source reporting, in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision to overturn *Roe v. Wade*, Virginia Governor Youngkin has called on state legislators to enact restrictions that would ban abortions in Virginia after 15 weeks.

¹¹ [REDACTED] According to official websites for the respective organizations, there are both SSPX and FSSP houses of worship in the FBI Richmond AOR. There are no formally recognized SSPX-MC or SSPV houses of worship in the FBI Richmond AOR.

and access to report on RMVEs seeking to use RTC social media sites or places of worship as facilitation platforms to promote violence.

[REDACTED] Intelligence Gaps

[REDACTED] FBI Richmond established the following FY2023 Priority Collection Gap to drive collection against factors motivating RMVEs to commit violence, which may include increased religiosity and/or adherence to extreme religious teachings:

- [REDACTED] What are the catalysts for RMVEs to commit criminal or violent acts in FBI Richmond's area of responsibility (AOR)? [RH-GAP-0023-CTD-491-23]

[REDACTED] In addition, the following FBI Requirement Essential Element of Information focuses on RMVE actors adhering to ideologies that may be associated with aspirations to conduct criminal activity or acts of violence:

- [REDACTED] Identify instances of RMVEs' increasing adherence to, or merging of, relatively novel ideological themes to promote and/or warrant carrying out violence or other criminal activity. [Citation: USA-TERR-CTD-SR-1185-22.I.A.8]

[REDACTED] Opportunities

- [REDACTED] In addition to our Lady of Fatima Chapel, engage in outreach to the leadership of other SSPX chapels in the FBI Richmond AOR to sensitize these congregations to the warning signs of radicalization and enlist their assistance to serve as suspicious activity tripwires. The following are the formally recognized SSPX chapels in the FBI Richmond AOR:
 - [REDACTED] Immaculate Heart of Mary Chapel, 5267 John Marshall Highway, Linden, Virginia 22642; mailing address P.O. Box 1344, Front Royal, Virginia 22630; telephone number 603-244-6643
 - [REDACTED] Our Lady of Fatima Chapel, 5217 Futura Avenue, Richmond, Virginia 23231; telephone number 804-222-3530
 - [REDACTED] St. Thomas Aquinas Seminary,¹ 1208 Archbishop Lefebvre Avenue, Dillwyn, Virginia 23936; telephone number 434-505-7007, fax number 507-216-6243
- [REDACTED] Engage in outreach with the leadership of St. Joseph Parish (828 Buford Road, Richmond, Virginia; telephone number 804-320-4932, fax number 804-451-1009), the sole FSSP parish in the FBI Richmond AOR, to sensitize the congregation to the warning signs of radicalization and enlist their assistance to serve as suspicious activity tripwires.

¹ [REDACTED] According to the official SSPX website, St. Thomas Aquinas Seminary is the only SSPX seminary currently operating in the United States.

- [REDACTED] Based on historical instances of RTC/RMVE actors initially seeking out or attending mainline Catholic parishes, consider outreach to the Diocese of Richmond Pastoral Center (7800 Carousel Lane, Richmond, Virginia 23294; telephone number 804-359-5661, fax number 804-358-9159) to provide background information on the increasing intersection of RMVE actors and RTC, and enlist the diocesan leadership's assistance in sensitizing parishes to the warning signs of radicalization.
- [REDACTED] Use Requests for Collection to leverage existing sources and/or initiate Type 5 Assessments to develop new sources with the placement and access to report on RMVEs frequenting RTC social media platforms/forums/websites, RMVEs currently attending RTC places of worship, or RMVEs expressing an interest in attending RTC places of worship.

Approval:

SIA/IPC RH [REDACTED] (CSCC)
SIA RH [REDACTED] (Criminal/DT)

Reviewed by:

OGC/CDC [REDACTED]

Coordinated with:

SA [REDACTED] (FBI Portland)
IA [REDACTED] (FBI Milwaukee)

Warning and Caveats

[REDACTED] Potential criminality exhibited by certain members of a group referenced herein does not negate nor is it a comment on the constitutional rights of the group itself or its members to exercise their rights under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment.

[REDACTED] FBI Richmond prepared this Domain Perspective. Please direct comments and queries to the FBI Richmond Intelligence Program at [REDACTED].

Appendix A: Intelligence Metadata

Environmental Variable(s)

- [REDACTED] Social/Cultural Conditions

Threat Issue and Threat Variable(s)

Addresses the impact of EV(s) on threats cross-programmatically: ☐ Yes ☒ No

- [REDACTED] Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism (RMVE), HQ-CTD-491-25, FBI Richmond Band II Threat
 - [REDACTED] Threat Variables
 - [REDACTED] Threat Actors: RMVEs
 - [REDACTED] Threat Activities: Use of force or violence in support of ideological objectives
 - [REDACTED] Facilitation Platform: Social media platforms, RMVE places of worship
 - [REDACTED] Threat Targets/Victims: Racial or religious minorities, immigrants, members of the LGBTQ community, members of the pro-choice community

Key Intelligence Question(s)

- [REDACTED] How do ideological, personal, sociopolitical, community, economic, behavioral or other factors contribute to the radicalization and mobilization of violent extremists? (FBI-CTD-2-06-23)

Appendix B: Expressions of Likelihood

Phrases such as “the FBI judges” and “the FBI assesses,” and terms such as “likely” and “probably” convey analytical judgments and assessments. The chart below approximates how expressions of likelihood and probability correlate with percentages of chance. Only terms of likelihood should appear in FBI products; the chart includes terms of probability strictly for comparison, as they sometimes appear in reporting of other government agencies. Furthermore, the FBI does not arrive at judgments through statistical analysis; and will not use terms of probability to convey uncertainty in external FBI intelligence products.

UNCLASSIFIED

Terms of Likelihood	Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain(ly)
Terms of Probability	Remote	Highly Improbable	Improbable (Improbably)	Roughly Even Odds	Probable (Probably)	Highly Probable	Nearly Certain
Percentages of Chance	1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%

Table showing terms of likelihood aligned with terms of probability and percentages of chance.

(b) Appendix C: Confidence in Assessments and Judgments Based on a Body of Information

(b) Confidence levels reflect the quality and quantity of the source information supporting a judgment. Consequently, the FBI ascribes high, medium, or low levels of confidence to assessments, as follows:

(b) **High confidence** generally indicates the FBI's judgments are based on high quality information from multiple sources. High confidence in a judgment does not imply the assessment is a fact or a certainty; such judgments might be wrong. While additional reporting and information sources may change analytical judgments, such changes are most likely to be refinements and not substantial in nature.

(b) **Medium confidence** generally means the information is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence. Additional reporting or information sources have the potential to increase the FBI's confidence levels or substantively change analytical judgments.

(b) **Low confidence** generally means the information's credibility or plausibility is uncertain, the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or the reliability of the sources is questionable. Absent additional reporting or information sources, analytical judgments should be considered preliminary in nature.

Appendix D: Southern Poverty Law Center-Defined RTC Hate Groups in the United States

Following are the nine RTC hate groups operating in the United States in 2021 as defined by the Southern Policy Law Center, followed by the location of their organizational headquarters.

- Catholic Apologetics International (Greencastle, Pennsylvania)
- Catholic Family News/Catholic Family Ministries, Inc. (Niagara Falls, New York)
- Christ or Chaos (Corsicana, Texas)
- Culture Wars/Fidelity Press (South Bend, Indiana)
- The Fatima Crusader/International Fatima Rosary Crusade (Buffalo, New York)
- In the Spirit of Chartres Committee (Glenelg, Maryland)
- The Remnant/The Remnant Press (Forest Lake, Minnesota)
- Slaves of the Immaculate Heart of Mary (Town of Richmond, New Hampshire)
- Tradition in Action (Los Angeles, California)

Source: [REDACTED] Website | Southern Poverty Law Center | "Radical Traditional Catholicism" | <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/radical-traditional-catholicism> | Accessed on 12 December 2022.

Endnotes

- ¹ ([REDACTED]) FBI | FD-302 | [REDACTED] | 25 November 2022 | 8 December 2022 | " [REDACTED] Interview of [REDACTED] Priest - Our Lady of Fatima Catholic Chapel" | [REDACTED] Source was a [REDACTED]
- ² ([REDACTED]) FBI | FD-302 | [REDACTED] | 28 November 2022 | 5 December 2022 | " [REDACTED] Interview of [REDACTED] , Our Lady of Fatima Chapel" | [REDACTED] Source was [REDACTED]
- ³ ([REDACTED]) FBI | FD-1057 | [REDACTED] | 12 July 2021 | 27 June 2021 | " [REDACTED] Jail Calls from 1 May to 27 June 2021" | [REDACTED] Jail Calls.
- ⁴ ([REDACTED]) FBI | FD-302 | [REDACTED] | 13 November 2022 | 17 November 2022 | " [REDACTED] Police - Scanned Documents from Search Warrant" | [REDACTED] Source was a [REDACTED]
- ⁵ ([REDACTED]) FBI | Email | [REDACTED] | 15 September 2021 | 16 September 2021 | " [REDACTED] Email and Product from ADL" | [REDACTED] Source was a [REDACTED]
- ⁶ ([REDACTED]) FBI | FD-1057 | [REDACTED] | 9 July 2020 | 9 July 2020 | " [REDACTED] DT - RACIALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENT EXTREMIST - WHITE; TIER 6 - OTHER" | [REDACTED] Source was an [REDACTED]
- ⁷ ([REDACTED]) FBI | FD-302 | [REDACTED] | 20 July 2021 | 22 July 2021 | " [REDACTED] Consensually Recorded Meeting with [REDACTED] Source was an [REDACTED]
- ⁸ ([REDACTED]) FBI | FDR | [REDACTED] | 25 October 2021 | 25 October 2021 | " [REDACTED] To request Swiss authorities assistance with obtaining information from Proton Technologies AG" | [REDACTED] Source was an [REDACTED]
- ⁹ ([REDACTED]) Website | Southern Poverty Law Center | "Radical Traditional Catholicism" | <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/radical-traditional-catholicism> | Accessed on 12 December 2022.
- ¹⁰ ([REDACTED]) Website | Salon | "White Nationalists Get Religion: On the Far-Right Fringe, a Catholics and Rascists Forge a Movement" | 12 May 2022 | <https://www.salon.com/2022/05/12/nationalists-get-religion-on-the-far-right-fringe-catholics-and-forge-a-movement/> | Accessed on 5 December 2022.
- ¹¹ ([REDACTED]) Website | Salon | "Traditional" Catholics and White Nationalist "Groypers" Forge a New Far-Right Youth Movement" | 13 May 2022 | <https://www.salon.com/2022/05/13/trad-catholics-and-nationalist-groypers-forge-a-new-far-right-youth-movement/> | Accessed on 5 December 2022.
- ¹² ([REDACTED]) Website | The Atlantic | "How Extremist Gun Culture is Trying to Co-opt the Rosary" | 14 August 2022 | <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/08/radical-traditionalist-catholic-christian-rosary-weapon/671122/> | Accessed on 5 December 2022.

[REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, January 20, 2023 11:17 AM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Subject: Presentation --- [REDACTED]
Attachments: RadCath Presentation [REDACTED].pptx

RMTRUserProp: Short-Term Use Email (Transitory)
SentinelCaseId: Short-Term Use Email (Transitory)

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Transitory

[REDACTED]
Attached is my presentation, let me know what you think!

[REDACTED]
Intelligence Analyst
Richmond Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Desk: [REDACTED]
Mobile: [REDACTED]
UNet Email: [REDACTED]
FBINET Email: [REDACTED]


=====
Classification: [REDACTED]



Traditionalist Catholicism Overview

OVERALL CLASSIFICATION
OF THIS PRESENTATION IS:

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Richmond Division



The overall classification of this briefing is





Warning and Caveats

 Potential criminality exhibited by certain members of a group referenced herein does not negate nor is it a comment on the constitutional rights of the group itself or its members to exercise their rights under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment.





Agenda



- Background
- Basic Teachings of Traditionalist Catholicism
- Groups, Branches, and Sects
- Key Figures



In the Beginning...



The Second Vatican Council 1962-1965

- Called into session by Pope John XXIII, ended by Pope Paul VI
- Focused on updating the church for the modern world
- Changes to worship, ecumenism, theology, and laity
- Opposed by traditionalists, led to schism




Second Vatican Council in Session




A Parting of Ways



Pope John XXIII



Pope Paul VI



Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre



Core Ideology and Beliefs



Core Concepts

- Traditional Latin Mass (AKA Tridentine Rite), practices
- Conservative family values/roles
- Rejection of modernity
- "Discontinuity and Disrupture"
- Tendency toward isolationism



Traditional Latin Mass (TLM)



On Earth as it is in Heaven



Integralism

"Error non habet ius."

"Error has no rights."

- Belief in the creation of a totalitarian, anti-pluralist Catholic nation, a "confessional state"
- Rejection of religious neutrality and right to religious freedom
- Subordination of the state to Catholic principles
- Comparable to Islamist ideology



A Step Further



Radical-Traditionalist Catholicism (RTC)

- Belief that mainline Catholicism is "illegitimate"
- Hardline positions on abortion, LGBTQ matters, interreligious dialogue
- Eschatological/apocalyptic overtones
- Rigid fundamentalism/integralism
- Undertone of anti-Semitism



Francis Schuckardt, Founder of the Congregation of Mary Immaculate Queen (CMRI)



Schools of Thought



Five Key Groups

- **"Canonically Regular"**
 - Formally approved by the Vatican, in full communion with mainline Catholic Church
 - E.g. Priestly Fraternity of St. Peter (FSSP), Institute of the Good Shepard (IBP)
- **Irregular Status**
 - Unresolved canonical situation, neither fully separate nor in full communion with Vatican
 - E.g. Society of St. Pius X (SSPX), Priestly Society of St. Josaphat (SSJK)
- **Sedeprivationist**
 - Believe that the pope and hierarchy is legitimate, but have no power until Vatican II is renounced
 - E.g. Instituto Mater Boni Consilii, Orthodox Roman Catholic Movement
- **Sedevacantists**
 - Believe that every pope since 1965 is illegitimate, current Church is heretical and there is no pope
 - E.g. Society of St. Pius V (SSPV), Congregation of Mary Immaculate Queen (CMRI)
- **Conclavists**
 - Reject current pope as illegitimate, nominate their own popes (known as an "antipope")
 - E.g. Palmarian Catholic Church, "Pope Michael"



Society of St. Pius X (SSPX) (1 of 3)



Key Facts

- International fraternity of traditionalist Catholic priests founded in 1970 by French Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre
- Named after Pope Pius X, who rejected "modernism"
- Formally separated from main Catholic Church in 1988
- 1135 clergy/religious working in 72 countries, membership estimated at ~1 million



Pope St. Pius X



Society of St. Pius X (SSPX) (2 of 3)



Structure

- Led by Superior-General
- Separated into Districts and Autonomous houses
 - Currently 14 districts and 3 autonomous houses
- Headquartered in Menzingen, Switzerland
- Significant presence in France



SSPX International Seminary, Écône, Switzerland




Society of St. Pius X (SSPX) (3 of 3)



District of the United States

- Led by District Superior
- 20 Pories, 106 missions/chapels, 26 schools, 3 retreat centers
- Headquartered in Platte City, MO
- Roughly 100 priests in district



SSPX Logo



SSPX Resistance Movement (1 of 2)



Overview

- Dissenting SSPX priests, loosely organized
- Appeared in 2012, inspired by Bishop Richard Williamson
- Rejected any negotiation with Vatican
- Vocal acceptance of conspiracy theories



Bishop Richard Williamson, Founder of the SSPX Resistance Movement



SSPX Resistance Movement (2 of 2)




Society of St. Pius X – Marian Corps (SSPX-MC)

- Affiliated with SSPX Resistance
- Locations in Boston, KY; Vienna, VA; St. Marys, KS
- Appeared in 2012, signed "Vienna Declaration"
- Robust online forum presence
- Formerly known as "Society of St. Pius X of the Strict Observance (SSPX-SO)"
- International network of supporters
- Internal personality conflicts
- Largest resistance group, total number unknown
- Itinerant priests travel domestically and abroad



Breakdown





Contact Information



[REDACTED]
Intelligence Analyst
Richmond Division – Squad [REDACTED] (CSCC)
Desk: [REDACTED]
Mobile: [REDACTED]
UNet Email: [REDACTED]@fbi.gov
FBINET Email: [REDACTED]



[REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, January 3, 2023 10:33 AM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Subject: FW: [REDACTED]

RMTRUserProp: Short-Term Use Email (Transitory)
SentinelCaselId: Short-Term Use Email (Transitory)

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Transitory

[REDACTED]
I apologize as I thought I copied you on this email. [REDACTED] is an interesting individual and I am waiting to hear back from [REDACTED]. It may be worth doing a call with them depending on their response. I am going up to HQ today and will be meeting with the DT IA who covers Richmond. She is onboard with the SPEAR so I will talk to her about the next step in that process. I added an intel gap and PCG to the product. I need to do a footnote on SSPX and write the substantiation paragraph. I can convert this to a SPEAR for us (you've done all of the hard work—thank you!). Oh, do you mind popping over to [REDACTED]'s desk and showing him what you found on the priest? Thanks!!

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, December 30, 2022 12:16 PM
To: [REDACTED] (MW) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Cc: [REDACTED] (MW) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Transitory

Good afternoon,

My coworker and I are drafting an Intelligence Note related to the interest of RMVEs in Radical-Traditionalist Catholic ideology. Our subject, [REDACTED] prompted our interest in exploring this topic. On 11/13, [REDACTED] (Gab account @ [REDACTED]) was arrested and a search was executed at his residence. Molotov cocktails, 3D printed pistol frames, firearm components including handgun components, ammo, and a non-specific target list was found at his residence among other things. We do not know how far along in the attack planning process he was at this time or if he was collaborating with others. CART and OTD are still working to get into his computer. [REDACTED] had attended Our Lady of Fatima Catholic Society of Saint Pius X (SSPX) Chapel for approximately seven months and participated in three or four catechism classes as part of the process to become baptized. In [REDACTED] extensive anti-Semitic, anti-LGBTQ, and racist postings on social media platform, Gab, [REDACTED] claimed he was a "radical traditional Catholic Clerical Fascist."

I have been doing some queries to look into other RMVE subjects who adhere to rad-trad ideology and I read that [REDACTED] had attended Maria Stella Maris Mission Church located in San Pedro, California for over a

year. This church was operated by the Society of Saint Pius X (SSPX). I wanted to see if [redacted] still adheres to this ideology and if I could pick your brain further to use this information as an evidence bullet in our product.

Thanks so much for your time!

Sincerely,

[redacted]

=====
Classification: [redacted]

=====
Classification: [redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/08/2022

██████████, was interviewed at telephonically. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Task Force Officer and the nature of the interview, ██████████ provided the following informationa

On 11/16/2022 TFO ██████████ and SA ██████████ spoke to ██████████ on the phonea ██████████'s phone number is ██████████. ██████████ Our Lady of Fatima Catholic Chapel, 5217 Futura Avenue, Richmond, Virginia, 23231. ██████████ advised the following:

- ██████████ lives in ██████████
- ██████████ knows ██████████ through the church. ██████████ is not a member of the church, is not catholic, and has never been to confession that ██████████ was aware of.
- ██████████ does not know ██████████ well.
- ██████████ has attended 3 or 4 catechism classes ██████████ has put on.
- ██████████ advised that ██████████ "stance on things definitely needs to be modified before he can join the church."
- ██████████ knew that ██████████ had been to jail, that ██████████ just got a truck, that ██████████ lives with his aunt, and ██████████ wants to be an electriciana
- ██████████ has "crazy views about race" and war.
- ██████████ is a white supremacist and ██████████ has talked to him about ██████████ being a Latinoa

██████████ was asked if ██████████ had ever discussed committing violence against any of the groups ██████████ does not like. ██████████ seemed to become nervous and began stumbling on his wordsa ██████████ asked if this conversation would be used at a later datea TFO ██████████ told ██████████ it was possiblea ██████████ asked if he could talk to the leadership of the church and/or a lawyer before speaking furthera He stated he did not want this to look bad on the church. ██████████ stated he was a new priest and was ordained ██████████ He started ██████████ ██████████. ██████████ would not provide the ██████████.

TFO ██████████ spoke to ██████████ on 11/23/22a ██████████ said he heard from someone in the church that ██████████ was in jail and wanted to talk to him. ██████████ was inquiring how to speak to him. When asked to clarify if ██████████ had personally reached out, ██████████ backtracked and said he wasn't sure, maybe this person just

Investigation on 11/28/2022 at Richmond, Virginia, United States (Phone)

File # ██████████ Date drafted 11/25/2022

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Interview of [REDACTED] Priest [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], On 11/23/2022, Page 2 of 2

thought [REDACTED] would want to talk to him.

TFO [REDACTED] asked if he had talked to his ([REDACTED]'s/church's) lawyer as he indicated he was going to on 11/16/22. He stated he had not. He then said that "the relationship I have with people at the church, I can't violate that." TFO [REDACTED] provided his understanding of papal privilege and how it applied to confession but was not a blanket privilege. [REDACTED] said "I don't want to be involved."

[REDACTED] asked what [REDACTED] was charged with. TFO [REDACTED] told him unlawful paramilitary activity. [REDACTED] wanted further explanation and was told to look it up on the Internet. [REDACTED] mentioned he had looked up [REDACTED] through the [REDACTED] Jail web site. [REDACTED] asked about [REDACTED] attorney situation. TFO West explained [REDACTED] was entitled to a lawyer and he could hire one or have one appointed.

TFO [REDACTED] explained he understood [REDACTED] didn't want to be involved, and TFO [REDACTED] could not force him to have this conversation, but that other options would likely be explored to facilitate having this conversation in the future.

receiving authorization from the originating agency. Recipients are prohibited from subsequently posting the information marked LES on a website or an unclassified network.

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, January 5, 2023 2:00 PM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (TFO) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
[REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Subject: FW: SSPX-R --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Nonrecord

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] >
Sent: Thursday, January 05, 2023 1:53 PM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Subject: SSPX-R --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Transitory

[REDACTED]

Afternoon,

Please see below information on SSPX-R. Unfortunately there is a ton of information in our holdings. The most useful thing I was able to conclude was that SSPX-MC ([REDACTED]'s group) is definitively a branch of SSPX-R. Given the SSPX-R's ideology, [REDACTED]'s interactions with [REDACTED] is very concerning.

██████████ According to a presentation delivered by ██████████ Officer ██████████ in July 2022, the Society of St Pius X - Resistance (SSPX-R), is an Orthodox Catholic group which blends traditional Catholicism with National Socialist ideals. ██████████ intelligence indicates that the group has a wide European-American network and is attempting to radicalize individuals through the Catholic religion towards Neo-Nazi extremism. ██████████

██████████ SSPX-R was founded by Bishop Richard Williamson after he was expelled from SSPX in 2012. Williamson now acts as the de-facto Bishop for the SSPX-R which has several constituent groups around the world, one of which is the SSPX-MC (Marian Corps), led by ██████████ who was ordained in 1992 by Williamson. ██████████'s nephew, ██████████ was ordained into the SSPX in 2022, and delivered his first mass on 27 February 2022 in Arcadia, California. ["Expelled bishop urges network of Catholic resistance". The Catholic Herald; "Declaration LeFebvre Priests Vienna, Virginia". www.cathinfo.com; Marian Corps (SSPX-MC)" (PDF). Ecclesia Militans.]

██████████ Phone logs collected from ██████████ (██████████, closed) who pleaded guilty to 40 USC 5104(c) in March 2021 indicate he was in telephonic contact with ██████████. While ██████████ appears to have been in several conversations discussing SSPX, none of these conversations, including those with ██████████, are derogatory in nature. (██████████)

██████████
Intelligence Analyst
Domestic Terrorism Targeting Unit 2

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Classification: ██████████

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Classification: ██████████

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Classification: ██████████

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Classification: ██████████

Transitory

All – I don't recall ever coming across these names or organization before. The best way to address this is to send Guardians on [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. I cc'd the CT SSA, SIA, DT agents and TFOs for their situational awareness.

I found this information online, [REDACTED], you probably have it already – background on the Society of Saint Pius X-Resistance (SSPX-R)

<file:///C:/Users/KLNULE/Downloads/Initial+Findings+SSPX+Resistance.pdf>

Regards,

[REDACTED]
Intelligence Analyst
Counterterrorism – Domestic Terrorism
Louisville Field Office – [REDACTED]
Desk – [REDACTED]
Cello – [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, January 05, 2023 1:01 PM
To: [REDACTED] (LS) (FBI) [REDACTED] (LS) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: SSPX Resistance background --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Transitory

Good afternoon,

On 11/13, RMVE subject [REDACTED] (Gab account [REDACTED]) was arrested and a search was executed at his residence. Molotov cocktails, 3D printed pistol frames, firearm components including handgun components, ammo, and a non-specific target list was found at his residence among other things. We do not know how far along in the attack planning process he was at this time or if he was collaborating with others. CART and OTD are still working to get into his computer. [REDACTED] had attended Our Lady of Fatima Catholic Society of Saint Pius X (SSPX) Chapel for approximately seven months and participated in three or four catechism classes as part of the process to become baptized. In [REDACTED] extensive anti-Semitic, anti-LGBTQ, and racist postings on social media platform, Gab, [REDACTED] claimed he was a “radical traditional Catholic Clerical Fascist.” FBI Richmond attempted to interview the priest, [REDACTED] (see email below) who was not cooperative. Additionally, he has been to see [REDACTED] six times in jail. Richmond is opening a Guardian on [REDACTED]. According to [REDACTED], he frequently flies back to Kentucky. It appears that his uncle is [REDACTED], one of the key people in the SSPX-MC organization.

We would be very interested in any information that you have on the organization, the [REDACTED], etc. We could set up a conference call tomorrow or a day next week that works for you to discuss further.

Thanks so much for your assistance.

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, January 04, 2023 11:35 AM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (RH) (TFO) [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
[REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Subject: RE: SSPX Resistance background --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Transitory

Good morning,

Just as a follow up, I found the product below last week when I was searching Sentinel related to SSPX. I shot it to [REDACTED] as we are drafting a joint product together on RMVE's interest in rad-trad ideology. [REDACTED] did some research and sent me the information below on Fr. [REDACTED]. I ran [REDACTED]'s number and it came back to a Father [REDACTED] located in Kentucky. So we have [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] both residing in Kentucky. I was going to dig deeper into this.

SSPX-Resistance spun out of a disagreement with the SSPX's attempts to reconcile with the Roman Catholic Church and became a "thing" when the SSPX Bishop Richard Williamson was expelled from the group (Williamson is British and is known for his anti-Semitic remarks; at one point he was charged in Germany with Holocaust denial). Upon expulsion, Williamson called for a "Catholic resistance." The most notable and largest group in North America originally called itself "Society of St. Pius X of the Strict Observance" (SSPX-SO), though it is now known as the "Society of St. Pius X – Marian Corps" (SSPX-MC). Fr. [REDACTED] is one of the key people in the SSPX-MC organization. In addition to the phone number which I provided you earlier, a dated email address for [REDACTED] was provided as [REDACTED]

*Note: All this information was gleaned from open source, I haven't fully validated it.

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, January 4, 2023 10:51 AM
To: [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI)
[REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (RH) (TFO) [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
[REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Subject: FW: SSPX Resistance background --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Transitory

Good morning,

During the course of our investigation into [REDACTED] we determined that [REDACTED] was attending Our Lady of Fatima Chapel – SSPX. After [REDACTED] arrest, TFO [REDACTED] and I attempted to interview Father [REDACTED] regarding his interactions with [REDACTED]. Since [REDACTED] has not completed his catechism or been baptized in the church his

communication with Father [REDACTED] is not considered privileged. However, upon asking Father [REDACTED] questions about [REDACTED] desire and plans to commit violence, Father [REDACTED] became very uncomfortable and started incoherently stuttering. He requested to speak with the churches leadership and attorneys before continue to provide any more information. Since then, Father [REDACTED] has refused to speak with us any further, but has continued to speak with [REDACTED] while in prison, and even attempted to visit him.

IA [REDACTED] recently discovered this product regarding [REDACTED]'s attendance at the [REDACTED] conference and their discovery of SSPX-R's efforts to recruit and radicalize white supremacists/neo-Nazi's. Prior to our interview with Father [REDACTED], we were unaware of any connection with SSPX and neo-Nazi radicalization. We would like to set up an initial meeting with you all to discuss more details around this presentation, and possibly conduct a VTC with [REDACTED], Counter Terrorism to determine if they have any more information on SSPX [REDACTED] and/or Father [REDACTED]. Please let me know if you guys have time tomorrow or Friday morning.

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (TFO) [REDACTED]

Sent: Wednesday, January 04, 2023 10:16 AM

To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)

[REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)

(RH) (FBI)

Subject: SSPX Resistance background --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====

I think this is the Intel product [REDACTED] mentioned to [REDACTED].

Interesting. Make sure to look at the powerpoint on SSPX Resistance.

<https://sentinel.fbi.net.fbi/apps/desktop/#/main/serial/200898289>

[REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====

Classification: [REDACTED]

SIM(s):
Religious Organization

SIM Status: SIM Approved

Generated: 02/15/2023 4:01 PM EST

Incident Summary

possibility to conspire to commit violence with FBI subject

CTD

Racially or Ethnically
Motivated Violent Extremism
(RMVE)

Status: Closed (on 02/15/2023) Pending PM Review
No identified threat to national security was found at this
time. If further information is received, this assessment
may be re-opened in accordance with DIOG Section 5.

Unknown
Unknown

Subject type: Main



Program Measures

5 Day Draft Measure	5 Day Action Measure	180 Day Measure
1	1	41

Mitigation

☐ ☐ ☐



Counterterrorism

Type 1/Type 2

Threat to Life: No
DoD/Nexus: No
Report Type: Terrorist Threat
Program: DTOS/DTOU
Management: FBI
Origin Agency: Other
Receipt Method:
Field Office:
Assigned Squad:
Approver(s):

Supervisors

Report Creator:
Report Owner:
Authorized
Purpose:

The authorized purpose
of this assessment is to
conduct investigative steps
to determine if [redacted] was
recruiting and/or radicalizing

Case Access:
Sentinel Case:

Unrestricted

Baseline Collection Database/Resource Queries

Date Last Checked	Database
01/06/2023	Business Filings
01/05/2023	CHS Check (CFU)

Baseline Collection Plan Authorized Methods Utilized

Date Last Checked	Technique Utilized
02/03/2023	Accept voluntarily provided information by governmental or private entities.

01/06/2023	DIVS	01/06/2023	Access/examine FBI/DOJ records, and obtain information from FBI/DOJ personnel.
01/06/2023	DMV	02/15/2023	Administrative note for informational purposes.
01/06/2023	GMAN	01/19/2023	Request info/view record from other govt agencies/entities (federal/state/local/tribal/foreign).
01/06/2023	Guardian		
01/06/2023	NCIC		
01/19/2023	Other		
01/06/2023	Sentinel		
01/06/2023	TIPS		
Baseline Compliant ☐		Baseline Compliant ☐	

FBI subject [REDACTED] was opened in 2019, based on violent and antigovernmental comments on multiple social media platforms. Recently, [REDACTED] was arrested by the [REDACTED] Police Department for paramilitary activity, and during the search of his home several Molotov cocktails were recovered, along with additional evidence to indicate his desire and plans to commit violence.

In early 2022, [REDACTED] joined Our Lady of Fatima Catholic Chapel, Richmond, Virginia, which is a chapel associated with the Society of Saint Pius X (SSPX). SSPX is a traditionalist Catholic Church not associated with the Vatican. Upon [REDACTED] arrest, it was determined that Father [REDACTED] was the priest for Our Lady of Fatima Catholic Chapel. TFO [REDACTED] and reporting Agent attempted to interview [REDACTED] after the arrest, and since [REDACTED] had yet to complete catechism and be baptized, his communication with [REDACTED] was not considered privileged. When [REDACTED] was asked about [REDACTED] desire to commit violence, he became nervous and requested to speak with his chain of command and SSPX legal team.

Since then, it has been determined that [REDACTED] is the leader of an extremist section of SSPX called SSPX-MC or SSPX Resistance. SSPX-MC has been known to recruit and train Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violence Extremists. [REDACTED] has continued contact with [REDACTED] through jail calls approximately 6 times since his arrest, which are recorded. In those recordings, [REDACTED] is heard requesting to speak to [REDACTED] attorney and wanting to talk about certain topics when they meet in person so their conversation is not recorded.

Subjects

Subject Type: Main

Investigative Notes

CHS Check

Authorized Method: Access/examine FBI/DOJ records, and obtain information from FBI/DOJ personnel.

Databases checked: CHS Check (CFU)

Description: On 1/5/2023, CHSC [REDACTED] conducted a CHS Check on [REDACTED]

Status: Completed

History:

01/05/2023 02:02:17 PM Created Note: CHS Check

[REDACTED] (RICHMOND)

Baseline Searches for [REDACTED]

Authorized Method: Access/examine FBI/DOJ records, and obtain information from FBI/DOJ personnel.

Databases checked: BusinessFilings, DIVS, DMV, Guardian, NCIC, Other, Sentinel, TIPS, GMAN

Description: [REDACTED] On 6 January 2023, writer conducted baseline searches for captioned Guardian subject [REDACTED] DOB [REDACTED] SSN: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Accurant searches for [REDACTED] listed his likely current address as [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Driver's license searches yielded an expired [REDACTED] driver's license (attached).

[REDACTED]

Open source searches listed [REDACTED] as a reverend father at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DIVS, GMAN, Sentinel, Guardian, TIPS Kentucky Secretary of State record searches for [REDACTED] were all negative.

Status:

Approved

Attachments:

[REDACTED].png (281.3 KB)

History:

01/06/2023 04:40:26 PM Created Note: Baseline Searches for [REDACTED] (LOUISVILLE)

01/06/2023 04:41:07 PM Submit note for approval (LOUISVILLE)

01/06/2023 04:54:04 PM Approve note (LOUISVILLE)

Virginia State Police Database Checks

Authorized

Request info/view record from other govt agencies/entities (federal/state/local/tribal/foreign).

Method:

Description:

On January 10, 2023 TFO [REDACTED] queried the Virginia State Police Database VIMS for the following identifiers:

Name: [REDACTED]

Address: [REDACTED]

SSN: [REDACTED]

DOB: [REDACTED]

No records found.

A check of the Virginia Firearms Transaction Center (AO11) revealed no attempts to purchase within the last 12 months in the Commonwealth.

Status:

Approved

History:

01/10/2023 01:47:37 PM Created Note: Virginia State Police Database Checks (RICHMOND)

01/10/2023 01:48:02 PM Submit note for approval (RICHMOND)

01/10/2023 01:52:09 PM Approve note (LOUISVILLE)

CBP Records Review

Authorized

Request info/view record from other govt agencies/entities (federal/state/local/tribal/foreign).

Method:

Databases

Other

checked:

Description:

Note: This information is third party information and may not be disseminated outside of the FBI without prior permission from CBP.

CBP records for [REDACTED] were reviewed. [REDACTED] uses [REDACTED] on his passport. [REDACTED] has a U.S. passport ([REDACTED]) and a passport card [REDACTED] both of which expired January 17, 2023. [REDACTED] has the following travel:

November 2, 2021 to November 8, 2021 – CHO to DFW to MEX, return BJX to DFW to CHO.

July 15, 2020 – Planned flight LAX to CDG but [REDACTED] did not travel.

October 24, 2018 to November 5, 2018 – ATL to CDG to TLS, return YCE to AMS to ATL. Due to the number of co-travelers and routing, this appears to be a church-related tour.

August 13, 2018 to September 7, 2018 – EWR to GVA, Return FCO to IAD to LGA.

July 18, 2017 – IAD to DUB. Return not recorded.

March 22, 2013 to April 2, 2013 – MCI to EWR to MUC to FLR, return MUC to PHL to MCI. [REDACTED] was secondaried upon his return and was found to be a minor traveling with alcohol.

[REDACTED] has older travel under the name [REDACTED]. Due to the age of the records they may not be complete:

June 28, 2005 to July 6, 2005 – LAX to YVR, return YEG to TUS to PHX. [REDACTED] was traveling with his mother, [REDACTED] DOB: [REDACTED]. The [REDACTED]s were secondaried on this trip as they lacked birth certificates.

[REDACTED]s travel was compared to the travel of [REDACTED] (DOB: [REDACTED]) who is believed to be [REDACTED]s uncle. There was no evidence that the [REDACTED]s have traveled together, or were in the same overseas location at the same time.

Records identified [REDACTED] DOB: [REDACTED] as a co-traveler on [REDACTED] 2005 Canada and 2013 Europe trips. [REDACTED] may be a cousin of [REDACTED].

Status: Approved

History:

01/19/2023 05:36:19 PM Created Note: CBP Records Review [REDACTED] (LOUISVILLE [REDACTED])

01/20/2023 11:31:39 AM Approve note [REDACTED] (LOUISVILLE [REDACTED])

Information from [REDACTED]s phone

Authorized: Accept voluntarily provided information by governmental or private entities.

Method:

Description: CPB provided information regarding [REDACTED] from an interaction with [REDACTED] at Boston Logan airport as he was returning from a trip to the United Kingdom. The following is a brief summary of the information relevant to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the phone number [REDACTED] and the email [REDACTED] were found. [REDACTED] contact was noted between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] described as "informal" and persisting from December 2021 to December 2022. The last contact was December 26 - December 28, 2022. A single outgoing call was identified.

Agent note: The full report will be uploaded at a later time.

Status: Approved

History:

02/03/2023 11:23:34 AM Created Note: Information from [REDACTED]s phone [REDACTED] (LOUISVILLE [REDACTED])

02/06/2023 09:06:10 AM Approve note [REDACTED] (LOUISVILLE [REDACTED])

Relevant information re-serialized to this assessment.

Authorized: Administrative note for informational purposes.

Method:

Description: After searching for relevant information, derogatory or exculpatory. In related cases, a record of an interview of [REDACTED] by FBI RH personnel from [REDACTED]: [REDACTED] WAG and RMVE Threats; Tier 3] serial 363, was reserialized to this assessment. No further information was found.

Status: Approved

History:

02/15/2023 03:14:54 PM Created Note: Relevant information re-serialized to this assessment. [REDACTED] (LOUISVILLE [REDACTED])

02/15/2023 03:53:59 PM Approve note [REDACTED] (LOUISVILLE [REDACTED])

SAC concurrence to close Guardian

Authorized: Administrative note for informational purposes.

Method:

Description: SSRA, [REDACTED] received concurrence to close this Guardian from SAC Jodi Cohen through ASAC [REDACTED] on 2/15/2023.

Status: Approved

History:

02/15/2023 04:00:41 PM Created Note: SAC concurrence to close Guardian

(LOUISVILLE)

Interviews and Attached 302s

Subject Interview(s)

Interviewed: No

Justification: Substantial derogatory information was not found. No allegation of federal violation has been presented. At present, it is assessed that there is no need for a subject interview.

Referrals

Has this matter been referred to OGA/State/Local? No

Disposition

Disposition

Note:

Substantial derogatory information was not found. No allegation of federal violation or threat to national security has been identified. At present this assessment is requested to be closed. If further information is received, this assessment may be re-opened.

Disposition: No identified threat to national security was found at this time. If further information is received, this assessment may be re-opened in accordance with DIOG Section 5.

CBP Notifications: No

It is noted that the individual or group identified during the Assessment does not warrant further FBI investigation at this time. Any dissemination of information from this Assessment regarding the individual or group identified must include an appropriate caveat with the shared information. It is recommended that this Assessment be closed.

Workflow

01/05/2023 12:33:09 PM Created Incident

Assigned By:

Assigned To:

01/05/2023 12:39:35 PM Incident submitted for opening

Assigned By:

01/05/2023 02:09:59 PM Created SIM: Sent to CDC for review

Assigned To:

Assigned By:

01/05/2023 02:09:59 PM Incident opened

Assigned To:

Assigned By:

01/05/2023 02:26:26 PM CDC recommends SIM approval - Sent to ASAC for Review

Assigned By:

01/05/2023 04:06:25 PM ASAC approves SIM - Sent to SAC for Review

Assigned To:

Assigned By:

01/05/2023 04:37:07 PM SAC approves SIM- SIM Workflow Complete

Assigned To:

Assigned By:

01/06/2023 08:25:47 AM Transfer Requested through Sentinel
Transferring to LS-Covington RA per prior coordination with SSRA

Assigned To:

Assigned By:

01/06/2023 08:26:54 AM Incident transferred

Assigned To:

Assigned By:

Assigned To:



01/06/2023 08:36:54 AM Incident assigned

Assigned By:

Assigned To:

01/06/2023 09:08:09 AM Incident assigned to user

Assigned By:

Assigned To:

02/06/2023 09:05:46 AM 30 day review performed
SSRA failed to extend assessment prior to it expiring. Extended to
allow further investigation.

Assigned By:

Assigned To:

02/15/2023 03:23:06 PM Incident submitted for closure


Assigned By:

Assigned To:

02/15/2023 04:00:55 PM Incident Closed

Assigned By:

Assigned To:



SIM(s):
Religious Organization

SIM Status: SIM Approved

Generated: 02/10/2023 9:26 PM EST

Incident Summary

Potential recruitment and radicalization of violent religious extremists

CTD

Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremism		Status: Closed (on 02/10/2023) Pending PM Review This Report or Assessment relates to or enhances an existing PI/FI	Priority 4 Tier 5 (Radicalizer/Recruiter)																																						
(Male, Social Security: [REDACTED] Subject Type: Main In Custody: No Locations: [REDACTED]			<table><tr><th colspan="3">Program Measures</th></tr><tr><th>5 Day Draft Measure</th><th>5 Day Action Measure</th><th>180 Day Measure</th></tr><tr><td>1</td><td>1</td><td>22</td></tr><tr><th colspan="3">Mitigation</th></tr><tr><td>☐</td><td>☐</td><td>☐</td></tr></table>	Program Measures			5 Day Draft Measure	5 Day Action Measure	180 Day Measure	1	1	22	Mitigation			☐	☐	☐																							
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5 Day Draft Measure	5 Day Action Measure	180 Day Measure																																							
1	1	22																																							
Mitigation																																									
☐	☐	☐																																							
		Counterterrorism Type 1/Type 2 <table><tr><td>Threat to Life:</td><td>No</td></tr><tr><td>DoD/Nexus:</td><td>No</td></tr><tr><td>Critical Infrastructure Sector:</td><td>Not Critical Infrastructure</td></tr><tr><td>Report Type:</td><td>Suspicious Activity</td></tr><tr><td>Activity Type:</td><td>Other</td></tr><tr><td>Program Management:</td><td>DTOS/DTOU</td></tr><tr><td>Observed:</td><td>01/04/2023 12:00:00 AM</td></tr><tr><td>Time/Zone:</td><td>GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern</td></tr><tr><td>Origin Agency:</td><td>FBI</td></tr><tr><td>Receipt Method:</td><td>Other</td></tr><tr><td>Reported By:</td><td>TFO [REDACTED]</td></tr><tr><td>Field Office:</td><td>RICHMOND</td></tr><tr><td>Assigned Squad:</td><td>[REDACTED]</td></tr><tr><td>Approver(s):</td><td>[REDACTED]</td></tr><tr><td>Report Creator:</td><td>[REDACTED]</td></tr><tr><td>Report Owner:</td><td>[REDACTED]</td></tr><tr><td>Authorized Purpose:</td><td>The purpose of this assessment is to determine if [REDACTED] was involved in the recruitment and radicalization of Violent Religious Extremists such as [REDACTED] and/or others.</td></tr><tr><td>Case Access:</td><td>Restricted</td></tr><tr><td>Sentinel Case:</td><td>[REDACTED]</td></tr></table>		Threat to Life:	No	DoD/Nexus:	No	Critical Infrastructure Sector:	Not Critical Infrastructure	Report Type:	Suspicious Activity	Activity Type:	Other	Program Management:	DTOS/DTOU	Observed:	01/04/2023 12:00:00 AM	Time/Zone:	GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern	Origin Agency:	FBI	Receipt Method:	Other	Reported By:	TFO [REDACTED]	Field Office:	RICHMOND	Assigned Squad:	[REDACTED]	Approver(s):	[REDACTED]	Report Creator:	[REDACTED]	Report Owner:	[REDACTED]	Authorized Purpose:	The purpose of this assessment is to determine if [REDACTED] was involved in the recruitment and radicalization of Violent Religious Extremists such as [REDACTED] and/or others.	Case Access:	Restricted	Sentinel Case:	[REDACTED]
Threat to Life:	No																																								
DoD/Nexus:	No																																								
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Observed:	01/04/2023 12:00:00 AM																																								
Time/Zone:	GMT -05:00 US/Canada Eastern																																								
Origin Agency:	FBI																																								
Receipt Method:	Other																																								
Reported By:	TFO [REDACTED]																																								
Field Office:	RICHMOND																																								
Assigned Squad:	[REDACTED]																																								
Approver(s):	[REDACTED]																																								
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Case Access:	Restricted																																								
Sentinel Case:	[REDACTED]																																								

Baseline Collection Database/Resource Queries	
<u>Date Last Checked</u>	<u>Database</u>
01/31/2023	BaseJumper
01/31/2023	BusinessFilings
01/23/2023	CHS Check (CFU)
01/31/2023	Clearwater
01/31/2023	DIVS
01/23/2023	DMV
01/31/2023	DWS
01/31/2023	DaLas
01/31/2023	GMAN
01/31/2023	Guardian
01/31/2023	HYDRA
01/31/2023	Harmony
01/31/2023	IC3
01/31/2023	ID Scoreboard
01/23/2023	NCIC
01/31/2023	NCTC CollabJ
01/31/2023	NCTC Current
01/31/2023	NGIC BiZR
01/31/2023	NMEC
01/31/2023	NSA/Pulse
01/31/2023	OTD/IMXU
01/31/2023	OnDec
01/31/2023	Other
01/31/2023	Photographic Web Sites
01/31/2023	Public Search Engines
01/31/2023	QLIX
01/31/2023	Sentinel
01/31/2023	Social Media
01/31/2023	TIDE
01/31/2023	TIPS
01/31/2023	Telephone Databases
01/31/2023	Web Crawlers
Baseline Compliant ☐	

Baseline Collection Plan Authorized Methods Utilized	
<u>Date Last Checked</u>	<u>Technique Utilized</u>
01/27/2023	Accept voluntarily provided information by governmental or private entities.
01/31/2023	Access/examine FBI/DOJ records, and obtain information from FBI/DOJ personnel.
01/31/2023	Engage in SSA approved 72 hr increments of surveillance not requiring a court order.
01/26/2023	Request info/view record from other govt agencies/entities (federal/state/local/tribal/foreign).
Baseline Compliant ☐	

Through open source research, FBI RH has reviewed Father [REDACTED]'s publicly available sermons/events/speeches which indicate a rhetoric and ideology similar to [REDACTED] perspective, specifically concerning anti-Semitism, anti-establishment, and anti-abortion ideology.

Through FBI information and open source research, FBI RH assesses that SSPXR have a vast international network with extremist religious imagery and branding co-opted by identified violent extremists with the purpose of radicalizing and recruiting individuals for their greater goal of "Catholic Integralism" by establishing a theocratic state.

Based on the above information, the purpose of this assessment is to determine if [REDACTED] was involved in the recruitment and radicalization of Violent Religious Extremists such as [REDACTED] and/or others and to determine if [REDACTED] was conspiring with [REDACTED] to commit a violent criminal act.

Subjects

[REDACTED] Male, [REDACTED]

Social Security: [REDACTED]
Subject Type: Main
In Custody: No
Locations: [REDACTED]

Investigative Notes

CHS Check

Authorized: Access/examine FBI/DOJ records, and obtain information from FBI/DOJ personnel.
Method:
Databases: CHS Check (CFU)
checked:
Description: On 1/23/2023, [REDACTED] conducted CHS check on [REDACTED]
Status: Approved

History:

01/23/2023 10:11:47 AM Created Note: CHS Check
01/23/2023 12:41:43 PM Approve note

[REDACTED] CHMOND /
[REDACTED] RICHMOND

Ops Center Baseline Checks

Authorized: Request info/view record from other govt agencies/entities (federal/state/local/tribal/foreign).
Method:
Databases: DMV, NCIC, Other
checked:
Description: Baseline Checks for [REDACTED] New Jersey checks were negative. Massachusetts checks attached.
Status: Approved
Attachments: [REDACTED]

Vehicle Information
Driver's Transcript
Criminal History
DL Information
Accurint

History:

01/23/2023 12:16:28 PM Created Note: Ops Center Baseline Checks

[REDACTED] (RICHMOND /RH-MISSION
SUPPORT)

01/23/2023 12:17:36 PM Submit note for approval

[REDACTED] (RICHMOND /RH-MISSION
SUPPORT)

01/23/2023 09:04:59 PM Approve note

[REDACTED] (RICHMOND/ [REDACTED]

County Police Records Check

Authorized Method: Request info/view record from other govt agencies/entities (federal/state/local/tribal/foreign).

Databases checked: Other

Description: On January 24, 2023 TFO [REDACTED] searched [REDACTED] County Police records for the following:

DOB [REDACTED]
SSN [REDACTED]

No records located.
Approved

Status:

History:

01/24/2023 08:34:01 AM Created Note: [REDACTED] County Police Records Check

[REDACTED] (RICHMOND/ [REDACTED]

01/24/2023 04:46:34 PM Approve note

[REDACTED] (RICHMOND/ [REDACTED]

County Police Database Checks

Authorized Method: Request info/view record from other govt agencies/entities (federal/state/local/tribal/foreign).

Databases checked: Other

Description: On January 26, 2023, TFO [REDACTED] searched the [REDACTED] County Police PremierOne records system for the following:

DOB [REDACTED]
SSN [REDACTED]

Zero results located.
Approved

Status:

History:

01/26/2023 09:43:20 AM Created Note: [REDACTED] County Police Database Checks

[REDACTED] (RICHMOND/ [REDACTED]

01/26/2023 09:47:42 AM Approve note

[REDACTED] RICHMOND

COUNTERTERRORISM

01/27/2023 11:04:34 AM Approve note

RICHMOND

Surveillance of

Authorized: Engage in SSA approved 72 hr increments of surveillance not requiring a court order.
Method:
Description: On 1/31/23, surveillance was conducted on subject [REDACTED] by members of FBI Boston's [REDACTED] upon his arrival into Boston Logan airport. The following was observed by surveillance team members:

[REDACTED] and his travel companion, [REDACTED] (DOB [REDACTED] Passport [REDACTED], exited the international Terminal E departures area at Boston Logan Airport at approximately 4:05pm and entered a dark colored [REDACTED] bearing [REDACTED] Tag [REDACTED]. This vehicle is leased by [REDACTED] of [REDACTED]. The driver of the [REDACTED] matched physical characteristics of [REDACTED].

-A short time later the [REDACTED] bearing [REDACTED] Tag [REDACTED] was observed in the driveway of it's registered owner, [REDACTED].

-At approximately 4:50pm, the [REDACTED] was observed leaving [REDACTED] with a driver who matched the registered owner's physical appearance. The driver was the sole occupant in the vehicle at this time. The vehicle went directly to Route 1 Grill House in Saugus, MA. The driver exited and went inside the restaurant for a short period of time, then exited carry a bag of what appeared to be takeout food. The vehicle then returned to [REDACTED].

-At approximately 8:10 pm, a spot check was conducted on [REDACTED]. While lights were on in the residence, no movement was observed inside. There were no vehicles observed in the driveway, however it could not be verified if any vehicles were within the attached garage.

Prior to surveillance, both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were the subject of a secondary search and interview by Customs and Border Protection Officers. The results of the searches and interviews are being documented by CBP and will be uploaded to this Guardian upon receipt.
Approved

Status:

History:

01/31/2023 11:44:08 AM Created Note: Surveillance of [REDACTED]
01/31/2023 01:28:13 PM Submit note for approval [REDACTED]
02/03/2023 03:39:00 PM Approve note [REDACTED]

(BOSTON /
(BOSTON /
RICHMOND

Database Checks Conducted

Description: [REDACTED] SOS [REDACTED] conducted database checks using the following identifiers:

Name: [REDACTED]
DOB: [REDACTED]
SSN: [REDACTED]
Addresses: [REDACTED]
Addresses: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] According to open source research, there were no additional phone numbers or email addresses were yielded to within the full comprehensive report on the captioned individual identifying property holdings, vehicles, possible relatives, and court filings.

[REDACTED] Social Media Research was conducted on all phone numbers, emails, and potential usernames identified within a secondary inspection report from [REDACTED] recent travel. (See attached results) The results identified the following likely WhatsApp account regarding phone number [REDACTED]. The results identified the likely Apple, Amazon, Dropbox and Google account (UID [REDACTED]) associated with email address: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Further social media checks were conducted based on these results within open source research, which yielded no other or alternate identified accounts.

[REDACTED] Travel records revealed 224 Encounter reports with 5 secondary inspections to include an electronic media inquiry from 1991 to Present.

Status:

Attachments:

[RISX \(989.4 KB\)](#)

Social Media checks

History:

01/31/2023 12:54:02 PM Created Note: Database Checks Conducted

01/31/2023 01:16:47 PM Submit note for approval

01/31/2023 01:18:04 PM Recall note

01/31/2023 01:20:06 PM Submit note for approval

02/07/2023 10:46:20 AM Approve note

[REDACTED] RICHMOND

[REDACTED] RICHMOND

[REDACTED] RICHMOND

[REDACTED] RICHMOND

[REDACTED] (RICHMOND) [REDACTED]

Interviews and Attached 302s

Subject Interview(s)

Interviewed: No

Justification: Closing Guardian pursuant to RH EM directive and rolling into existing predicated FI.

Incident Change Notes

Updated incident

Justification: To further explain the justification and potential criminal acts.

History:

02/07/2023 10:49:21 AM Created Note: Updated incident

[REDACTED] RICHMOND [REDACTED]

Referrals

Has this matter been referred to OGA/State/Local? No

Disposition

[REDACTED] Disposition

Note: Closing Guardian incident pursuant to RH EM directive. This matter relates to an existing FI and will be serialized to that file.

Investigation Type: Full

Disposition: This Report or Assessment relates to or enhances an existing PI/ FI

Associated Case Numbers:

Workflow		
01/20/2023 10:58:03 AM	Created Incident	Assigned By:
		Assigned To:
01/20/2023 11:11:45 AM	Incident submitted for opening	Assigned By:
		Assigned To:
01/20/2023 11:38:54 AM	Incident recalled	Assigned By:
		Assigned To:
01/20/2023 11:40:07 AM	Incident submitted for opening	Assigned By:
		Assigned To:
01/20/2023 02:16:07 PM	Created SIM: Sent to CDC for review	Assigned By:
		Assigned To:
01/20/2023 02:16:07 PM	Incident opened	Assigned By:
		Assigned To:
01/23/2023 10:58:11 AM	CDC recommends SIM approval - Sent to ASAC for Review	Assigned By:
		Assigned To:
01/26/2023 01:12:13 PM	ASAC approves SIM - Sent to SAC for Review	Assigned By:
		Assigned To:
01/26/2023 02:03:46 PM	SAC approves SIM - SIM Workflow Complete	Assigned By:
		Assigned To:
02/07/2023 02:25:51 PM	Incident reassigned	Assigned By:
		Assigned To:
02/09/2023 03:53:43 PM	Incident assigned to user Reassigning due to admin squad transfer.	Assigned By:
		Assigned To:
02/10/2023 09:26:12 PM	Close Incident Without Submission	Assigned By:
		Assigned To:

(RH) (FBI)

From: (RH) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, January 6, 2023 3:24 PM
To: (RH) (FBI); (RH) (FBI)
Cc: (RH) (FBI); (RH) (TFO);
Subject: RE: SSPX-R ---
RMTRUserProp: Short-Term Use Email (Transitory)
SentinelCaseId: Short-Term Use Email (Transitory)

Classification:

=====
Transitory

Just FYI - Based on my research, the highlighted from the original email below is slightly inaccurate/incomplete. It looks like [REDACTED] was ordained on [REDACTED] at the St. Thomas Aquinas Seminary and assigned to the Archdiocese of [REDACTED] (I am 99% certain that this St. Thomas Aquinas Seminary is the same one we identify in the DP and is located in our AOR in Dillwyn, Virginia; this is the only SSPX seminary in the United States per the SSPX website). According to the SSPX website, [REDACTED] celebrated his first Mass on 7 January 2022 (technically, the website says 2020, but all indications are that this is a typo) at the St. Thomas Aquinas Seminary. He celebrated his first Mass outside the Seminary on 30 January 2022 in Syracuse, New York, with his next Mass outside the Seminary listed as the one in Arcadia, California on 27 February 2022.

[REDACTED]
From: [REDACTED]. (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Friday, January 6, 2023 1:43 PM
To: [REDACTED]. (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: FW: SSPX-R --- [REDACTED]

Classification:

=====
Transitory

Are we meeting at 10a this morning?

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Monday, January 09, 2023 10:53 AM
To: [REDACTED] (LS) (FBI) <[REDACTED]> [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]> [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) <[REDACTED]> [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]> [REDACTED] (TFO) <[REDACTED]> [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Cc: [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) <[REDACTED]> [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) <[REDACTED]> [REDACTED] (LS) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: RE: SSPX Resistance background --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Transitory

[REDACTED]

Would be great to set up a VTC this week to discuss immediate operation needs based on our investigation and to coordinate next steps. We are currently drafting an FDR to pass info to [REDACTED] and set up a VTC with them, who will have more information on the recruitment platform of SSPX-R, so you guys will definitely want to be involved in that. Father [REDACTED] is traveling to the [REDACTED] in late January, so this will be a timely meeting. Hopefully we can set something up with them next week. After those meetings, I propose [REDACTED] and I head your way for a day to give you a full length brief on [REDACTED] and hopefully by then we have some more information on SSPX-R and [REDACTED] to coordinate a more strategic plan, thinking maybe early February.

If you are ok with that plan, let me know if your team has time to meet tomorrow at 10am?

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (LS) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Thursday, January 05, 2023 5:02 PM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]> [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) <[REDACTED]> [REDACTED] (RH) (TFO) <[REDACTED]> [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]> [REDACTED] (FBI) <[REDACTED]> [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Cc: [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) <[REDACTED]> [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) <[REDACTED]> [REDACTED] (LS) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: RE: SSPX Resistance background-- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Transitory

FBI LS, is tracking and will make ourselves available for the VTC when scheduled.

EXHIBIT 012

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, January 10, 2023 1:11 PM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] (LS) (FBI)
[REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
[REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (RH)
(TFO)
Cc: [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI)
<[REDACTED] (LS) (FBI) <
Subject: RE: SSPX Resistance background --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Transitory

Just as a follow-up to [REDACTED]'s email, please see attached spreadsheet. It looks like [REDACTED] is currently in Canada. Flight details and the credit card used for payment are included.

[REDACTED]/LS- I did not want to step on your toes, but I just did a quick search on [REDACTED] while I was in ARC. Attached are hits that also include credit card information. There was a TECS hit from 7/6/2005 stating [REDACTED] was "traveling with Mother, child was born at home in [REDACTED], had copies of CERT FROM School in [REDACTED]."

If you guys need anything, please let me know.

Thanks!

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, January 10, 2023 11:17 AM
To: [REDACTED] (LS) (FBI) [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI)
[REDACTED] (RH) (TFO) [REDACTED] (RH)
(FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI)
[REDACTED] (LS) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: SSPX Resistance background-- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Transitory

For everyone's awareness, according to the SSPX Resistance Website – Father [REDACTED] will be traveling to the [REDACTED] Jan 20th – 30th, says more details will follow on the website.

[REDACTED]
Tactical Specialist
Domestic Terrorism [REDACTED]
Joint Terrorism Task Force
Richmond Division
Desk [REDACTED]
Cell [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 13, 2022 1:02 PM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Subject: RE: FY23 FOSP Meetings --- [REDACTED]

SentinelCaseId: NON-RECORD

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Rad-trad Catholics. Things that make you go hmmm.

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, September 13, 2022 11:31 AM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Cc: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED];
[REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: FW: FY23 FOSP Meetings --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

[REDACTED] – The following are some prospective products for FY23. No guarantee they will all come to fruition. I would guess all three of these would be co-authored (see respective Ccs) and fall under the TM2 measure:

- DP on impact of Virginia's Consumer Data Protection Act which is scheduled to go into effect on 1/1/2023 (co-authored with [REDACTED]; **Threat Issue: Cyber Criminal**)
- DP on short-/longer-term impact of new violent crime reduction initiatives (e.g., increased funding, DOJ Public Safety Partnership, Youngkin Violent Crime Task Force) on violence in Richmond metro area, possibly to include Petersburg (co-authored with [REDACTED] **Threat Issues: Violent Gangs, VIC-D**)
- DP on increasing intersection of rad-trad (radical-traditional) Catholics and DVEs. This one is the least fleshed out and is a direct outgrowth of the [REDACTED] case. Feasibility is subject to finding sufficient additional evidence beyond [REDACTED] (co-authored with [REDACTED] who is almost certainly hearing of this for the first time via this email...; **Threat Issues: AA/AG, RMVE**)

Let me know if you have any questions.

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Monday, September 12, 2022 10:18 AM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
<[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
<[REDACTED]>

[REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (PD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, December 28, 2022 11:30 AM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (PD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: [REDACTED] --- [REDACTED]

RMTRUserProp: Short-Term Use Email (Transitory)
SentinelCaseId: Short-Term Use Email (Transitory)

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Transitory

Hi [REDACTED],

Yes, I believe the information in the ADL product on [REDACTED] and SSPX is correct. ADL had access to his Telegram account and his postings.

As far as using that info in your product, I don't see any issue with it, but I'll defer to the case agent. He would also be the one to check with on reaching out to the ADL contact.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Intelligence Analyst
FBI - Portland Division (Eugene/Medford RAs)
Desk: [REDACTED] | Cell: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] >
Sent: Wednesday, December 21, 2022 1:03 PM
To: [REDACTED] (PD) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (PD) (FBI)
[REDACTED] >
Subject: [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Transitory

Good afternoon,

My coworker and I are drafting a product related to interest of Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists in radical-traditionalist Catholic ideology. One of our bullets is related to our subject who was just recently arrested-

- [REDACTED] According to multiple sources, prior to RMVE actor [REDACTED] early November 2022 arrest, [REDACTED] had attended Our Lady of Fatima Catholic Society of Saint Pius X^[i] (SSPX) Chapel for approximately seven months and participated in three or four catechism classes as part of the process to become baptized.^[ii] In [REDACTED] extensive anti-Semitic, anti-LGBTQ, and racist postings on social media platform, Gab, [REDACTED] claimed he was a "radical traditional Catholic Clerical Fascist." Subsequent

to [REDACTED] arrest, eight Molotov cocktails, six smoke bombs, one smoke grenade, firearm components which included a complete Glock 19 slide/upper receiver, a lower parts kit, a 3D printed Glock 19 frame, a magazine, and 9 mm ammunition were found in his possession.^[iii]

In doing some Sentinel queries, I found an ADL product related to [REDACTED] and SSPX. I wanted to see if the information is correct regarding his association with radtrac Catholic ideology and if so, could we use it for our product? I saw that he was deceased, but thought it was interesting. I also wanted to see if I could reach out to your ADL contact?

Thanks so much for your time.

Sincerely,

[REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

[1]

FOR INTERNAL **LAW ENFORCEMENT USE ONLY.**

DO NOT DISTRIBUTE WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM THE ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE

The Anti-Root Collective

Individual Assessment


TOP LINE: The following individual, whom we identified only by his first name ' [REDACTED] embraces extremist beliefs (ranging from [white supremacy](#) to [eco-terrorism](#)) coupled with a lionization of notorious extremist murderers (such as [Ted Kaczynski](#)) and calls for violence. Most recently he has visited two [REDACTED] Oregon locations, making comments that raise concerns. Highlighted content in this document represent statements [REDACTED] made supporting violent action.

Name: [REDACTED] (last name unknown)

DOB: [REDACTED]

Monikers:

[REDACTED]



Location: Nomadic—although he claims [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. Currently, he appears to be in [REDACTED] [REDACTED].

Ideology: White Supremacist; Eco-Fascist; Antisemite; Racist and Misogynist (incel culture)

Quick Links

Telegram: Private (ADL has access)

Email: [REDACTED]

Telegram handle: [REDACTED]

Telegram Channel: [REDACTED]

Oliver: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, January 13, 2023 1:27 PM
To: [REDACTED] (MW) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (MW) (FBI); [REDACTED] (MW) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Bullet for DP --- [REDACTED]

RMTRUserProp: Short-Term Use Email (Transitory)
SentinelCaseId: Short-Term Use Email (Transitory)

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Transitory

Thank you!

From: [REDACTED] (MW) (FBI) [REDACTED] >
Sent: Friday, January 13, 2023 10:10 AM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] >
Cc: [REDACTED] (MW) (FBI) [REDACTED] (MW) (FBI)
[REDACTED] >
Subject: FW: Bullet for DP --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Transitory

[REDACTED],
No issues for us, looks great!

Sincerely,
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Intelligence Analyst
FBI Milwaukee
Squad [REDACTED] / Embedded [REDACTED]
Desk: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] >
Sent: Wednesday, January 11, 2023 1:56 PM
To: [REDACTED] (MW) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (MW) (FBI)
[REDACTED]
Subject: Bullet for DP --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Good afternoon,

Do you guys have any issue with us using the below bullet in our DP?

Thanks!

██████████) According to multiple sources, as of July 2021, FBI Milwaukee RMVE subject ██████████ had attended Maria Stella Maris Mission SSPX, located in San Pedro, California for over a year prior to his relocation to Wisconsin. While at Maria Stella Maris Mission, ██████████ started security company "██████████" (██████████) to provide armed security for the church. ██████████ planned to expand ██████████ to other churches and include "fraternal-based" meetings and events.^[i] FBI Los Angeles initiated the investigation into ██████████ based on allegations that ██████████ is a neo-Nazi with racist and sexist views, known to verbally harass and physically assault anyone that does not share his views, and holds nonconformist views towards authority. ██████████ was a member of Legio Christi, now known as "Imperium," which is an organization that holds violent opposition towards LGBTQ individuals. ██████████ has attempted to acquire unregistered "paperless" firearms and large capacity ammunition magazines in the past.

=====
Classification: ██████████

=====
Classification: ██████████

=====
Classification: ██████████

[i]

[REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, December 19, 2022 8:30 AM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Subject: RE: DP - SPEAR --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

I think that is a brilliant idea [REDACTED] left the Bureau, but I will reach out to the DT IA.

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Friday, December 16, 2022 4:33 PM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: DP - SPEAR --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Transitory

Good late Friday afternoon! I was just spit-balling over here with [REDACTED] and got to thinking – how do you think [REDACTED] HQ would feel about co-authoring a SPEAR on this rad trad Catholic/RMVE topic? Seems like something with national application. We could probably knock out the DP since a lot of it is already done and then possibly convert to a SPEAR – more bang for our buck and a wider audience. What say you?

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Sent: Monday, February 6, 2023 11:39 AM
To: [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: SPEAR for Review --- [REDACTED]
Attachments: RadTradSPEAR Draft.docx

RMTRUserProp: Short-Term Use Email (Transitory)
SentinelCaselid: Short-Term Use Email (Transitory)

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Transitory

Two minor edits.

From: [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] >
Sent: Monday, February 06, 2023 11:15 AM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>
Subject: RE: SPEAR for Review -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Transitory

Hi [REDACTED]!

Thank you for passing this along. I'm gonna take a look at it along with one of the other IAs up here who covers RMVE threats and we'll get our suggestions back to you soon.

v/r
[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] >
Sent: Thursday, February 02, 2023 3:47 PM
To: [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] >
Subject: SPEAR for Review --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Transitory

Would you mind to take a look at the attached SPEAR and advise of edits? I will work on the background notes and shoot those to you for your input tomorrow (hopefully).

Thanks!



Strategic Perspective: Executive Analytic Report

Interest of Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists in Radical-Traditionalist Catholic Ideology Almost Certainly Presents New Mitigation Opportunities

XX February 2023

() The FBI assesses the increasingly observed interest of racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs) in radical-traditionalist Catholic (RTC)^a ideology almost certainly^b presents opportunities for threat mitigation by exploring new avenues for tripwire and source development. Open source reporting and FBI investigations have noted a growing overlap between the far-right white nationalist movement and RTCs. Illustrative of this has been the increasing collaboration of the far-right Catholic media outlet Church Militant (and its activist wing, the Resistance network) with the America First/“groyper”^c movement.^{1,2} The ongoing convergence of the far-right white nationalist movement and RTCs was further demonstrated through the increase in hostility toward abortion-rights advocates on social media sites in the run-up to and aftermath of the Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization decision that overturned Roe v. Wade.³

- () According to an FBI Richmond contact with direct access reporting for the first time, prior to RMVE actor () early November 2022 arrest he had been attending the Society of Saint Pius X^d (SSPX)-affiliated Our Lady of Fatima Chapel in Richmond, Virginia, for approximately seven months and was participating in catechism classes as part of the process to become baptized.^{4,5} Prior to attending Our Lady of Fatima Chapel, () stated he wanted to find a church that was “anti-Zionist” and “antiprogressive” because “that’s where God lives.”⁶ In () extensive anti-Semitic, antiLGBTQ, and racist postings on the social media platform Gab, () claimed he was a “radical traditional Catholic Clerical Fascist.” At the time of () arrest, eight Molotov cocktails, six smoke bombs, one smoke grenade, and firearms components consisting of a complete Glock 19 slide/upper receiver, a lower parts kit, a 3D printed Glock 19 frame, a magazine, and 9 mm ammunition were found in his possession.⁷

^a () Analyst Note: RTCs are typically characterized by the rejection of the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II) as a valid church council; disdain for most of the popes elected since Vatican II, particularly Pope Francis and Pope John Paul II; and frequent adherence to anti-Semitic, anti-immigrant, anti-LGBTQ, and white supremacist ideology. Radical-traditionalist Catholics compose a small minority of overall Roman Catholic adherents and are separate and distinct from “traditionalist Catholics” who prefer the Traditional Latin Mass and pre-Vatican II teachings and traditions, but without the more extremist ideological beliefs and violent rhetoric. Vatican II took place from 1962-1965 and essentially shaped the modern Roman Rite Catholic Church. It was intended to help the church respond to global cultural changes in the aftermath of World War II and resulted in significant reforms to the liturgy, attitudes toward non-Christian religions, roles and responsibilities of the laity, views on religious freedom, etc.

^b () See Appendix B: Expressions of Likelihood.

^c () The term “groyper” refers to followers of Nick Fuentes’s alt-right “America First” movement, which is characterized by its white Christian nationalism platform.

^d () Analyst Note: The Society of Saint Pius X (SSPX) is an international priestly society that promotes the traditional Catholic priesthood and the celebration of the traditional Latin Mass and sacraments. It is named after Pope Pius X whose anti-Modernist stance serves as the organization’s inspiration. The SSPX is currently considered “canonically irregular” (i.e., not in full communion with the Vatican). The SSPX has spawned a number of offshoots. These include SSPX-Resistance, aka SSPX-Marian Corps (SSPX-MC), which rejected SSPX attempts to reconcile with the Vatican; the Priestly Fraternity of Saint Peter (FSSP), which holds to many of the SSPX beliefs and practices, but ultimately split from the SSPX to stay in full communion with the Vatican; and the Society of Saint Pius V (SSPV), which does not consider Vatican II valid and binding, questions the legitimacy of all of the popes since Vatican II, and has no canonical standing (i.e., is schismatic).



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FBI INTERNAL NOT APPROVED FOR EXTERNAL RELEASE

- () According to an FBI Portland liaison contact with indirect access, as of September 2021, deceased RMVE subject () had previously posted online that he first sought out a mainline Roman Catholic community that practiced the Novus Ordo liturgy^e and then gravitated to the SSPX. In a comment posted to an online discussion group () noted, "I've been trying to be catholic [sic] for 2 years I went to a novus ordo church at first then became radicalized by the internet after they told me to go away because of fake virusb [sic]." () posted a photograph of himself outside of a Catholic church and several pictures from inside of the church captioned, "The holy sacrifice of the mass. Join the Catholic Taliban." () also posted graphics depicting Jesus holding an assault rifle.⁸ Prior to his death, () was under investigation by FBI Portland for his involvement in civil disturbances, vandalism, threatening communications, weapons violations, and other acts of violence furthering his white supremacist ideology.⁹
- () According to an FBI UCE with direct access, as of July 2021, FBI Milwaukee RMVE subject () attended the SSPX-affiliated Maria Stella Maris Mission Church in San Pedro, California, for over a year prior to his relocation to Wisconsin. While at Maria Stella Maris Mission, () started a security company, () to provide armed security for the church. () planned to expand () to other churches and include "fraternal-based" meetings and events.¹⁰ FBI Los Angeles originally initiated an investigation of () based on allegations that () was a neo-Nazi with racist and sexist views known to verbally harass and physically assault those who opposed his positions. () was a member of Legio Christi^f, now known as "Imperium," an organization that violently opposes LGBTQ individuals. () has attempted to acquire unregistered "paperless" firearms and large capacity ammunition magazines in the past.¹¹

() **The FBI assesses RMVE interest in RTCs is likely to increase over the next 12 to 24 months in the run-up to the next general election cycle complicating the overall RMVE threat picture while also creating new opportunities for mitigation efforts.** This assessment is made in light of the ongoing polarization characterizing the US political environment and the probability that policy issues of mutual interest to RMVEs and RTC adherents will remain in the public spotlight. Catalyzing events in which RMVEs and RTC adherents might have common cause include legislation or judicial decisions in areas such as abortion rights,^g immigration, affirmative action, and LGBTQ protections. The current trend of RMVE interest in RTC ideology provides new opportunities to mitigate the RMVE threat through outreach to traditionalist Catholic parishes and the development of sources with the placement and access to report on RMVEs seeking to use RTC social media sites or places of worship as facilitation platforms to promote violence.

Prepared by the Richmond Division and the Domestic Terrorism Operations Unit; coordinated with

^e () Novus Ordo, short for Novus Ordo Missae, refers to the new order of the Catholic Mass promulgated by Pope Paul VI in the aftermath of Vatican II. The Novus Ordo Mass is delivered in the vernacular (as opposed to Latin) and is the normal form of the Mass in the Roman Rite of the Catholic Church.

^f () Legio Christi is not associated with the mainline Roman Catholic religious order known as the Legionaries of Christ, aka the Legion of Christ.

^g () Analyst Note: Currently, Virginia bans abortion after 26 weeks, 6 days, unless performed by a licensed physician in a licensed hospital with three physicians certifying that the continuation of the pregnancy will result in death of the pregnant person or impair their mental or physical health. According to open source reporting, in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision to overturn Roe v. Wade, Virginia Governor Youngkin has called on state legislators to enact restrictions that would ban abortions in Virginia after 15 weeks.



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FBI INTERNAL NOT APPROVED FOR EXTERNAL RELEASE

Analytic Tradecraft Summary

CONFIDENCE: This assessment is made with high confidence based on FBI investigations, local law enforcement agency reporting, and liaison reporting, with varying degrees of corroboration and access.

SOURCING: Reporting in this SPEAR was primarily derived from an FBI Richmond contact with direct access who reported for the first time, an FBI Portland liaison contact with direct access, an FBI Undercover Employee (UCE) with direct access, local law enforcement agency reporting with varying degrees of corroboration and access, and open source reporting. The FBI relied heavily upon FBI investigative case files, local law enforcement agency reporting, and liaison reporting for the key judgement. Open source information was instrumental in providing an understanding of current trends in the far right white nationalist movement and background information on the various RTC and traditionalist Catholic factions.

ASSUMPTIONS: The FBI based this assessment on the key assumption that RMVEs will continue to find RTC ideology attractive and will continue to attempt to connect with RTC adherents, both virtually via social media and in-person at places of worship.

GAPS: The FBI does not currently know how many RMVE actors aspiring to commit acts of violence are adhering to RTC ideologies. Additionally, it is unknown if priests or other parishioners within certain RTC communities are recruiting or radicalizing members or individuals. The FBI does not know how many RTC communities exist in the US and what, if any associations currently exist between RTC communities/individuals and other Domestic Violent Extremist groups.

ALTERNATIVES: The FBI did not include an Analysis of Alternatives in this SPEAR due to the quality of the source information and the lack of significant uncertainties.

ANALYTIC LINE: This is the first FBI SPEAR highlighting the focus on the interest of RMVEs in the RTC movement. This product is based on a FBI Richmond Domain Perspective on the same topic.

**) Warnings & Caveats:**

The information marked [REDACTED] in this document is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and may be distributed to government (federal, state, tribal, or local) employees and contractors with a need to know. It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). Dissemination to the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a need to know without prior approval of an authorized FBI official is prohibited. Precautions must be taken to ensure this information is controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in a manner that precludes unauthorized access.

) Potential criminality exhibited by certain members of a group referenced herein does not negate nor is it a comment on the constitutional rights of the group itself or its members to exercise their rights under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment.

Endnotes:

¹ [REDACTED] Website | Salon | "White Nationalists Get Religion: On the Far-Right Fringe, a Catholics and Rascists Forge a Movement" | 12 May 2022 | <https://www.salon.com/2022/05/12/nationalists-get-religion-on-the-far-right-fringecatholics-and-forge-a-movement/> | Accessed on 5 December 2022.

² [REDACTED] Website | Salon | "Traditional" Catholics and White Nationalist "Groypers" Forge a New Far-Right Youth Movement" | 13 May 2022 | <https://www.salon.com/2022/05/13/trad-catholics-and-nationalist-groypers-forge-anew-far-right-youth-movement/> | Accessed on 5 December 2022.

³ [REDACTED] Website | The Atlantic | "How Extremist Gun Culture is Trying to Co-opt the Rosary" | 14 August 2022 | <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/08/radical-traditionalist-catholic-christian-rosary-weapon/671122/> | Accessed on 5 December 2022.

⁴ [REDACTED] FBI | FD-302 | [REDACTED] | 25 November 2022 | 8 December 2022 | "[REDACTED] Interview of [REDACTED], [REDACTED] Our Lady of Fatima Catholic Chapel" | [REDACTED] | Source was a [REDACTED]

⁵ [REDACTED] FBI | FD-302 | [REDACTED] | 28 November 2022 | 5 December 2022 | "[REDACTED] Interview of [REDACTED], Our Lady of Fatima Chapel" | [REDACTED] | Source was [REDACTED]

⁶ [REDACTED] FBI | FD-1057 | [REDACTED] | 12 July 2021 | 27 June 2021 | "[REDACTED] [REDACTED] Jail Calls from 1 May to 27 June 2021" | [REDACTED] | Jail Calls.

⁷ [REDACTED] FBI | FD-302 | [REDACTED] | 13 November 2022 | 17 November 2022 | "[REDACTED] Police - Scanned Documents from Search Warrant" | [REDACTED] | Source was a [REDACTED]

⁸ [REDACTED] FBI | Email | [REDACTED] | 15 September 2021 | 16 September 2021 | "[REDACTED] Email and Product from ADL" | [REDACTED] | Source was a [REDACTED]

⁹ [REDACTED] FBI | FD-1057 | [REDACTED] | 9 July 2020 | 9 July 2020 | "[REDACTED] [REDACTED] DT - RACIALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENT EXTREMIST - WHITE; TIER 6 - OTHER" | [REDACTED] | Source was an [REDACTED]

¹⁰ [REDACTED] FBI | FD-302 | [REDACTED] | 20 July 2021 | 22 July 2021 | "[REDACTED] Consensually Recorded Meeting with [REDACTED]" | [REDACTED] | Source was [REDACTED]

¹¹ [REDACTED] FBI | FDR | [REDACTED] | 25 October 2021 | 25 October 2021 | "[REDACTED] To request Swiss authorities assistance with obtaining information from Proton Technologies AG" | [REDACTED] | Source was an [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2023 8:50 AM
To: Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Richmond Intel Product, referenced in news --- [REDACTED]

RMTRUserProp: Personal Email (Nonrecord)
SentinelCaseId: Personal Email (Nonrecord)

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Nonrecord

Good copy

Respectfully,
ASAC [REDACTED], National Security Branch
Richmond Field Office
Office: [REDACTED]
Mobile [REDACTED]

From: Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, February 9, 2023 8:12 AM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]

Subject: FW: Richmond Intel Product, referenced in news -- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Start from the bottom. Let's discuss shortly.

Stanley

From: Ugoretz, Tonya L. (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2023 7:40 AM
To: [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI); [REDACTED]; Coakley, Miriam M. (OGC) (FBI)
[REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI)
[REDACTED] >; Wells, Robert R. (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Jones, Jason Allen (OGC) (FBI)
[REDACTED]; Turner, Suzanne (INSD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Dunham, Christopher G. (OCA) (FBI)
[REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (OCA) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI)
[REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Milhoan, Catherine L. (OPA) (FBI)
[REDACTED] >; Goodwater, Douglas M. (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED]
(OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Rojas, Rachel L. (InTO) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Beidler,
Douglas S. (SecD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Platt, Lon Stuart (OPR) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Byron, Pamela
(DI) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Hardiman, Kellie M. (CTD)

(FBI) [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED]

(CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Decker, Eric L. (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Richmond Intel Product, referenced in news --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Good morning,

We understand there is discussion of recalling this Domain Perspective. DI conducted a preliminary review of the product's analytic tradecraft to help inform that decision, with the following key takeaways:

- **With respect to sourcing (in particular, SPLC):** SPLC has been a source for statistics and data not otherwise available to law enforcement. However, this product cites more subjective information from SPLC (a list of hate groups) without examining SPLC's threshold for determining a hate group or explanation of how that threshold aligns with the FBI's definition.
 - Tradecraft standards require describing the quality and credibility of underlying sources. This product's Source Summary Statement does not address factors that would affect the quality and credibility of SPLC as a source for subjective information, such as its previously issuing apologies and retracting its naming of individuals or groups as extremist.
 - In addition, since the hate group identified in this case was related to a branch of a religious group, there should have been more care to caveat this information.
- **Assumptions:** CTD notes below that this product "is the only finished intelligence product to specifically address RMVE's interest in radical-traditionalist catholic ideology of which we are aware." This product states RMVE interest in RTC ideology as a fact and proceeds from that assumption without substantiation. A more logical first product on this topic would have laid out the author's assessment of a connection between RTC ideology and violence or extremism so that assessment could have been appropriately reviewed.

We will share our fuller read with CTD and welcome any questions.

Thanks,
Tonya

From: [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED]

Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2023 6:03 PM

To: Ugoretz, Tonya L. (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Coakley, Miriam M. (OGC) (FBI)

[REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Meador, Stanley M. (RH)

(FBI) [REDACTED]; Wells, Robert R. (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Jones, Jason Allen (OGC) (FBI)

[REDACTED]; Turner, Suzanne (INSD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Dunham, Christopher G. (OCA) (FBI)

[REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OCA) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI)

[REDACTED] (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED] Milhoan, Catherine L. (OPA) (FBI)

[REDACTED]; Goodwater, Douglas M. (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]

(OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Rojas, Rachel L. (InTO) (FBI) [REDACTED]

Douglas S. (SecD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Platt, Lon Stuart (OPR) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Byron, Pamela

(DI) (FBI) [REDACTED] (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Hardiman, Kellie M. (CTD)

(FBI) [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED]

(CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Richmond Intel Product, referenced in news --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Transitory

Miriam:

Per our conversation this afternoon –

CTD's analysis of the racially or ethnically motivated violent extremist (RMVE) threat does not align with FBI Richmond's analysis. The FBI does not use the phrase "radical traditionalist catholic" to define any domestic terrorism threat category. Further, the FBI does not open investigations based upon first amendment protected activities, such as religion. The leaked internal-only intelligence product referenced in the article is the only finished intelligence product to specifically address RMVE's interest in radical-traditionalist catholic ideology of which we are aware. CTD does not assess there is a significant linkage between RMVE actors and this ideology which would necessitate further FBI interest, analysis, or intelligence collection efforts. FBI engagement with all communities of faith to provide educational materials on indicators of mobilization helps protect those communities by allowing them to recognize potential violent actors before violence occurs against their congregants or other members of the community. When describing ideologically-motivated violent extremists, such as RMVEs, the FBI focuses first and foremost on violence, criminal activity and violation of federal law. Political or religious affiliations (such as "far-right") are not used to describe or identify violent extremists. Some portions of the paper referenced in the article do not adhere to these FBI standards.

A query of Sentinel identified 13 documents and 5 attachments that included the term, "radical traditionalist catholic" or "Radical-Traditionalist Catholic":

1. *The leaked product:*

- a. On 24 January 2023, FBI Richmond serialized the Domain Perspective titled, "Interest of Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists in Radical-Traditionalist Catholic Ideology Almost Certainly Presents New Mitigation Opportunities" ([REDACTED]). The case file [REDACTED] was opened on 17 May 2013 and is still open.
- b. On 6 February 2023, FBI Tampa serialized a "CT Intel Monthly Roundup," which cited the FBI Richmond product [REDACTED]. The case file [REDACTED] was opened on 24 May 2018 and is still open.
2. On 23 September 2022, the National Threat Operations Center serialized its weekly Domain Awareness tips, which included an attachment listing the tips; one of the tips cited the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) website, <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2007/12-anti-semitic-radical-traditionalist-catholic-groups> ([REDACTED]). The case file [REDACTED] was opened on 15 October 2020 and is still open.
3. On 15 August 2018, FBI Boston opened a Guardian ([REDACTED]) based on an individual who called the FBI Public Access Line (PAL) and reported possible involuntary servitude/human trafficking by "Slaves of the Immaculate Heart of Mary." According to the Guardian, an open source search of "Slaves of the Immaculate Heart of Mary" identified a Southern Poverty Law Center article that described it as a "radical traditionalist catholic religious order." On 16 August 2018, FBI Boston converted the Guardian to a Type 1 Assessment [REDACTED] (Closed)), which was closed on 15 November 2018.
4. On 7 March 2018, FBI Los Angeles serialized a FOIA release, which included a paragraph about "radical traditionalist Catholics," which was identified as coming from the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) ([REDACTED], Serial 3759). The case file [REDACTED] was opened on 12 January 2010 and closed on 6 August 2012.
5. On 15 August 2017, FBI Indianapolis serialized an "Indiana Open Source Bulletin," which cited the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) as stating "radical traditional catholic" hate groups were operating in Indiana [REDACTED]. The case file [REDACTED] was opened on 5 June 2011 and is still open.
6. On 6 July 2016, FBI Milwaukee serialized a Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) document titled, "The Year in Hate and Extremism," which included "radical traditional catholic" groups as hate groups [REDACTED]. The case file [REDACTED] was opened on 30 June 2016 and is still open.

7. ATF report titled, "Northern Border Extremists, Overview of American/Canadian Extremists":
- On 27 May 2015, FBI Boston serialized a copy of a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) report titled, "Northern Border Extremists, Overview of American/Canadian Extremists," dated 1 December 2008, which cites hate groups identified by the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), including "radical traditional catholic" groups [REDACTED]. The case file [REDACTED] was opened on 15 May 2002 and is still open.
 - On 26 February 2016, FBI San Francisco serialized a *Guardian* [REDACTED], and attached documents titled, "U ATT_18.pdf" and "U ATT_20.pdf," which included copies of a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) report titled, "Northern Border Extremists, Overview of American/Canadian Extremists," dated 1 December 2008, which cites hate groups identified by the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), including "radical traditional catholic" groups [REDACTED]. The case file [REDACTED] was opened on 13 January 2009 and is still open.
8. On 24 June 2014, FBI Minneapolis serialized a document citing open source research on the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), and the document stated the SPLC maintained a list of hate groups which included "radical traditionalist catholic" groups [REDACTED]. The case file [REDACTED] was opened on 24 June 2014 and closed on 19 May 2019.
9. The RESTRICTED case file [REDACTED] is marked as a sensitive investigative matter (SIM) involving: Domestic Public Official; Domestic Political Candidate; and Domestic Political Organization or an Individual Prominent in Such an Organization. The case file was opened on 3 March 2006 and closed on 25 September 2018. The following documents in the case file cite the phrase "radical traditionalist catholic":
- On 31 January 2011, a restricted document citing the phrase "radical traditionalist catholic" was filed to [REDACTED]. The serial and case file are restricted.
 - On 8 September 2010, a restricted document citing the phrase "radical traditionalist catholic" was filed to [REDACTED].
10. On 9 July 2009, FBI Indianapolis serialized a Domestic Terrorism Domain Threat Assessment, which cited the Southern Poverty Law Center as identifying 16 "hate groups" active in their domain, to include two "radical traditionalist catholic" groups [REDACTED].
11. On 16 April 2009, FBI Buffalo serialized an intelligence assessment to provide baseline information on the threat and scope of civil rights in Buffalo [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. The document states, "The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) identified four active hate groups within the Buffalo jurisdiction and classified them as black separatist, white nationalist, radical traditionalist catholic and general hate groups." The case file [REDACTED] was opened on 5 October 2005 and closed on 28 February 2018. The case file [REDACTED] was opened on 22 December 2006 and is still open.

CTD defers to DI for any further comment/action/assessment.

[REDACTED]
Unit Chief - CT Executive Staff
Desk: [REDACTED]
Cell: [REDACTED]

From: Ugoretz, Tonya L. (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2023 4:06 PM
To: Coakley, Miriam M. (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
[REDACTED]; Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Wells, Robert R. (CTD) (FBI)
[REDACTED]; Jones, Jason Allen (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Turner, Suzanne (INSD) (FBI)
[REDACTED]; Dunham, Christopher G. (OCA) (FBI) [REDACTED] (OCA)
(FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CTD)

(FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Milhoan, Catherine L. (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Goodwater, Douglas M. (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED];
(OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Rojas, Rachel L. (InTO) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Beidler, Douglas S. (SecD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Platt, Lon Stuart (OPR) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Byron, Pamela (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Richmond Intel Product, referenced in news --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Thank you. + DAD Pam Byron and A/SC [REDACTED] for DI.

For the background of ALCON, this product type, a Domain Perspective, is an FBI product intended to highlight how a shift or new development related to an environmental variable (EV) may affect threats or mitigation in a particular domain. (EVs include demographic shifts, technology development, economic conditions, special events, social/cultural conditions, etc.)

The Field Office's IPC is the final approver. The product is typically Internal (which seems to be the case here based on the screen shots in the article). From a quick read, this product's topics would have triggered legal review.

From: Coakley, Miriam M. (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] >
Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2023 3:25 PM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Ugoretz, Tonya L. (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Wells, Robert R. (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Jones, Jason Allen (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Turner, Suzanne (INSD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Dunham, Christopher G. (OCA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OCA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Milhoan, Catherine L. (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Goodwater, Douglas M. (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Rojas, Rachel L. (InTO) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Beidler, Douglas S. (SecD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Platt, Lon Stuart (OPR) (FBI) [REDACTED] >
Subject: RE: Richmond Intel Product, referenced in news --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Transitory

+ InTo, SecD, and OPR.

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] >
Sent: Wednesday, February 08, 2023 3:16 PM
To: Ugoretz, Tonya L. (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Wells, Robert R. (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Jones, Jason Allen (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Turner, Suzanne (INSD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Dunham, Christopher G. (OCA) (FBI) [REDACTED] >

[REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (OCA) (FBI) [REDACTED] (CTD)
(FBI) [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] (DI) (FBI)
>; Milhoan, Catherine L. (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; Goodwater, Douglas M.
(OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] >;
[REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] >;
[REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; Coakley,
Miriam M. (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] >; [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] >;
[REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] >

Subject: Richmond Intel Product, referenced in news --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Transitory

Good afternoon.

Responding to [REDACTED]'s (unclass) email from 2:19 today please find attached the product referenced in the article titled: The FBI Doubles Down on Christians and White Supremacy in 2023.

[REDACTED]
*Public Affairs Specialist
Congressional Liaison
FBI Richmond
1970 East Parham Road
Richmond, Virginia 23228*

*(S/B) [REDACTED]
(Direct line) [REDACTED]
Follow us on Twitter - @FBIRichmond*

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, January 13, 2023 9:10 AM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Subject: RE: RMVE/Radical-Traditionalist Catholic DP for Review --- [REDACTED]
RMTRUserProp: Short-Term Use Email (Transitory)
SentinelCaselId: Short-Term Use Email (Transitory)

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Transitory

Thanks, [REDACTED]! This product is internal, however, we plan to write an external product and will follow your guidance.

The caveat is on page 6. Should I use a different caveat? I thought this one seemed to fit best for all three subjects, but I will change it to whatever you recommend.

Thank you for the review.

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, January 13, 2023 9:05 AM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Subject: RE: RMVE/Radical-Traditionalist Catholic DP for Review --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Transitory

No issues if this is internal. If this is external we need to make sure that it is necessary to include individual's names in order to understand the product. That lies with the SIA/SSA.

Also, you have the caveat for individual as part of a larger group listed and it says full warning is in caveat section but I do not see caveat section. Maybe that is in an attachment that is not here.

Otherwise, no issues.

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, January 12, 2023 3:15 PM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Subject: RMVE/Radical-Traditionalist Catholic DP for Review --- [REDACTED]

Classification:

[REDACTED]

=====

Export Record//Other System

All – Please see attached draft DT DP co-authored by [REDACTED] and Yours Truly for requested reviews:

[REDACTED]: For peer review; feel free to make track change edits directly into the Collaboration site version (document title “Rad-Trad”)

[REDACTED]: For CDC review

[REDACTED]: Requesting a fact-check of footnotes, terminology, etc. pertaining to all things Catholic from our former seminarian

[REDACTED]: No review required, just FYSA

Thanks,

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

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Classification:

[REDACTED]

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Classification:

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Classification:



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Domain Perspective



Threat Target/Facilitation Platform
FBI Richmond
XX January 2023

This document is classified [REDACTED]
Warnings and Handling Caveats: Information Concerning Specific Individuals' Activities when that Individual is part of a Group. Full text is found in the Warnings and Handling Caveats section.
This document is only for FBI internal use. Do not externally disseminate this product.
Domain Perspective (DP) template approved for fiscal year 2023, as of 1 October 2022.

Interest of Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists in Radical-Traditionalist Catholic Ideology Almost Certainly Presents New Mitigation Opportunities

Executive Summary

FBI Richmond assesses the increasingly observed interest of racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVEs) in radical-traditionalist Catholic (RTC)^a ideology almost certainly^b presents opportunities for threat mitigation by exploring new avenues for tripwire and source development. FBI Richmond makes this assessment with high confidence^c based on FBI investigations, local law enforcement agency reporting, and liaison reporting, with varying degrees of corroboration and access.

In making this assessment, FBI Richmond relied on the key assumption that RMVEs will continue to find RTC ideology attractive and will continue to attempt to connect with RTC adherents, both virtually via social media and in-person at places of worship. Indicators that would cause FBI Richmond to revise the judgments or confidence levels in its assessment include increases or decreases in RMVE subjects' attendance at RTC or traditionalist Catholic places of worship; increases or decreases in RMVE subjects' activity on social media platforms and forums maintained or frequented by RTCs; or the public distancing of prominent RTC or traditionalist Catholic personalities or institutions from RMVE ideologies. FBI Richmond assesses RMVE interest in RTCs is likely to increase over the next 12 to 24 months in the run-up

^a Analyst Note: RTCs are typically characterized by the rejection of the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II) as a valid church council; disdain for most of the popes elected since Vatican II, particularly Pope Francis and Pope John Paul II; and frequent adherence to anti-Semitic, anti-immigrant, anti-LGBTQ, and white supremacist ideology. Radical-traditionalist Catholics compose a small minority of overall Roman Catholic adherents and are separate and distinct from "traditionalist Catholics" who prefer the Traditional Latin Mass and pre-Vatican II teachings and traditions, but without the more extremist ideological beliefs and violent rhetoric. Vatican II took place from 1962-1965 and essentially shaped the modern Roman Rite Catholic Church. It was intended to help the church respond to global cultural changes in the aftermath of World War II and resulted in significant reforms to the liturgy, attitudes toward non-Christian religions, roles and responsibilities of the laity, views on religious freedom, etc.

^b See Appendix B: Expressions of Likelihood.

^c See Appendix C: Confidence in Assessments and Judgments Based on a Body of Information.

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[REDACTED]

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to the next general election cycle, ~~adding complexity to complicating~~ the overall RMVE threat picture while also ~~creating new nodes of public intersection that can be targeted to further opportunities for~~ mitigation efforts. During this same period, the overall RTC community is likely to remain relatively stable or ~~show modest growth modestly~~, providing RMVEs a persistent Catholic-oriented base with which to interact. FBI Richmond did not include an Analysis of Alternatives in this product due to the quality of the source information and the lack of significant uncertainties.

Commented [1]: This is very academic/high-minded sounding. Can we simplify to something more plain speak, maybe like this? Open to other suggestions.

[REDACTED]

Source Summary Statement

Reporting in this Domain Perspective (DP) was primarily derived from an FBI Richmond contact with direct access who reported for the first time, an FBI Portland liaison contact with direct access, an FBI Undercover Employee with direct access, local law enforcement agency reporting with varying degrees of corroboration and access, and open source reporting. FBI investigative case files, local law enforcement agency reporting, and liaison reporting were critical to the development of the DP's overall assessments by providing credible examples of RMVE actors expressing interest in and/or actively adopting RTC ideology. Open source information was instrumental in providing an understanding of current trends in the far right white nationalist movement and background information on the various RTC and traditionalist Catholic factions. ~~This collection information occurred was dated~~ between 9 July 2020 and 28 November 2022. The reporting was current as of 11 January 2023.

Commented [2]: Take or leave or suggestion on SSS but I think it makes it clearer. I always suggest this to my folks re: collection occurred, which is a confusing way to put it. We just means the DOI range.

Increasingly Observed Interest of RMVEs in RTC Ideology Almost Certainly Presents New Opportunities for Threat Mitigation

FBI Richmond assesses the increasingly observed interest of RMVEs in RTC ideology almost certainly presents new opportunities for threat mitigation through the leveraging of previously unexplored avenues for tripwire and source development. This assessment is based on ~~FBI investigations~~, local law enforcement agency reporting, and ~~liaison and contact~~ reporting demonstrating RMVE actors have sought out and attended traditionalist Catholic houses of worship, as well as used language indicative of adherence to RTC ideology in social media postings.

Commented [3]: Typically we are not supposed to cite to "FBI investigations," but rather describe the reporting cited. Looks like "FBI employee" and jail calls

- According to an FBI Richmond contact with direct access reporting for the first time, prior to RMVE actor [REDACTED] early November 2022 arrest he had been attending the Society of Saint Pius X^d (SSPX)-affiliated Our Lady of Fatima Chapel in

^d Analyst Note: The Society of Saint Pius X (SSPX) is an international priestly society that promotes the traditional Catholic priesthood and the celebration of the traditional Latin Mass and sacraments. It is named after Pope Pius X whose anti-Modernist stance serves as the organization's inspiration. The SSPX is currently considered "canonically irregular" (i.e., not in full communion with the Vatican). The SSPX has spawned a number of offshoots. These include SSPX-Resistance, aka SSPX-Marian Corps (SSPX-MC), which rejected SSPX attempts to reconcile with the Vatican; the Priestly Fraternity of Saint Peter (FPSP), which holds to many of the SSPX beliefs and practices, but ultimately split from the SSPX ~~in order~~ to stay in full communion with the Vatican; and the Society of Saint Pius V (SSPV), which does not consider Vatican II valid and binding, questions the legitimacy of all of the popes since Vatican II, and has no canonical standing (i.e., is schismatic).

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
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Richmond, Virginia, for approximately seven months and was participating in catechism classes as part of the process to become baptized.² Prior to attending Our Lady of Fatima Chapel, [REDACTED] stated he wanted to find a church that was “anti-Zionist” and “anti-progressive” because “that’s where God lives.”³ In [REDACTED] extensive anti-Semitic, anti-LGBTQ, and racist postings on the social media platform Gab, [REDACTED] claimed he was a “radical traditional Catholic Clerical Fascist.” At the time of [REDACTED] arrest, eight Molotov cocktails, six smoke bombs, one smoke grenade, and firearms components consisting of a complete Glock 19 slide/upper receiver, a lower parts kit, a 3D printed Glock 19 frame, a magazine, and 9 mm ammunition were found in his possession.⁴

- [REDACTED] According to an FBI Portland liaison contact with indirect access, as of September 2021, deceased RMVE subject [REDACTED] had previously posted online that he first sought out a mainline Roman Catholic community that practiced the Novus Ordo liturgy⁶ and then gravitated to the SSPX. In a comment posted to an online discussion group [REDACTED] noted, “I’ve been trying to be catholic [sic] for 2 years I went to a novus ordo church at first then became radicalized by the internet after they told me to go away because of fake virush [sic].” [REDACTED] posted a photograph of himself outside of a Catholic church and several pictures from inside of the church captioned, “The holy sacrifice of the mass. Join the Catholic Taliban.” [REDACTED] also posted graphics depicting Jesus holding an assault rifle.⁵ Prior to his death, [REDACTED] was under investigation by FBI Portland for his involvement in civil disturbances, vandalism, threatening communications, weapons violations, and other acts of violence ~~in~~ furthering ~~ance~~ of his white supremacist ideology.⁶

Commented [4]: [REDACTED] pet peeve alert

- [REDACTED] According to an FBI Undercover Employee with direct access² as of July 2021, FBI Milwaukee RMVE subject [REDACTED] attended the SSPX-affiliated Maria Stella Maris Mission Church in San Pedro, California, for over a year prior to his relocation to Wisconsin. While at Maria Stella Maris Mission, [REDACTED] started a security company, [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), to provide armed security for the church. [REDACTED] planned to expand [REDACTED] to other churches and include “fraternal-based” meetings and events.⁷ FBI Los Angeles originally initiated an investigation of [REDACTED] based on allegations that [REDACTED] was a neo-Nazi with racist and sexist views known to verbally harass and physically assault those who opposed his positions. [REDACTED] was a member of Legio Christi⁸, now known as “Imperium,” an organization that ~~holds~~ violently ~~oppos~~ ~~ition~~ ~~towards~~ LGBTQ individuals. [REDACTED] has attempted to acquire unregistered “paperless” firearms and large capacity ammunition magazines in the past.⁸

Commented [5]: Does this need to be capitalized?

Perspective

⁶ [REDACTED] Novus Ordo, short for Novus Ordo Missae, refers to the new order of the Catholic Mass promulgated by Pope Paul VI in the aftermath of Vatican II. The Novus Ordo Mass is delivered in the vernacular (as opposed to Latin) and is the normal form of the Mass in the Roman Rite of the Catholic Church.

⁷ [REDACTED] Legio Christi is not associated with the mainline Roman Catholic religious order known as the Legionaries of Christ, aka the Legion of Christ.

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[REDACTED]

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As of 2021, the Southern Poverty Law Center identified nine RTC hate groups operating in the United States (see Appendix D for a complete list of these groups and their headquarters' locations).⁹ Moreover, open source reporting and FBI investigations have noted a growing overlap between the far-right white nationalist movement and RTCs. Illustrative of this has been the increasing collaboration of the far-right Catholic media outlet Church Militant (and its activist wing, the Resistance network) with the America First "groypers" movement.¹⁰ The ongoing convergence of the far-right white nationalist movement and RTCs was further brought into focus demonstrated through the proliferation of increase in violent hostility toward abortion-rights advocates on social media sites in the run-up to, and aftermath of, the *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization* decision that overturned *Roe v. Wade*.¹² Much of the interaction between far-right white nationalists and RTCs interact primarily takes place online, and adherents of RTCs and other far-right white nationalist groups frequently share language and symbolism, such as crusader references or anti-Semitic discourses.

Commented [6]: For consistency – far-right vs far right

This is the first FBI Richmond domain product to focus on the interest of RMVEs in the RTC movement. A search of FBI databases indicated this is also the first FBI finished intelligence product to specifically address this environmental variable.

Outlook

FBI Richmond assesses RMVE interest in RTCs is likely to increase over the next 12 to 24 months in the run-up to the next general election cycle adding complexity to the overall RMVE threat picture while also creating new nodes of public intersection that can be targeted to further mitigation efforts. This assessment is made in light of the ongoing polarization characterizing the US political environment and the probability that policy issues of mutual interest to RMVEs and RTC adherents will remain in the public spotlight. Catalyzing events in which RMVEs and RTC adherents might have common cause include legislation or judicial decisions in areas such as abortion rights, immigration, affirmative action, and LGBTQ protections. During this same 12 to 24 month period, the overall RTC community is likely to remain relatively stable or show modest growth based on potential disaffection with mainline Catholic churches on social issues in the aforementioned areas, providing RMVEs a persistent Catholic-oriented base with which to interact.

Commented [7]: Make changes here to whatever you decide to go with, re: comment in Exec summ

Commented [8]: Could be worth mentioning in sentence or footnote the proposed ban on abortion in VA at 15 weeks

Ultimately, there may be limits to the level of engagement between RTCs and other far-right white nationalists. For example, many RTCs consider other forms of Christianity to be heretical and an over-emphasis on white US nationalism may be off-putting to RTCs of different ethnicities and countries of origin. Conversely, deep-seated anti-Catholicism remains a characteristic of many far-right white nationalists. Nonetheless, the current trend of RMVE interest in RTC ideology provides new opportunities to mitigate the RMVE threat through outreach to traditionalist Catholic parishes¹ and the development of sources with the placement

⁹ The term "groypers" refers to followers of Nick Fuentes's alt-right "America First" movement, which is characterized by its white Christian nationalism platform.

¹⁰ According to official websites for the respective organizations, there are both SSPX and FSSP houses of worship in the FBI Richmond AOR. There are no formally recognized SSPX-MC or SSPV houses of worship in the FBI Richmond AOR.

[REDACTED]
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and access to report on RMVEs seeking to use RTC social media sites or places of worship as facilitation platforms to promote violence.

[REDACTED] Intelligence Gaps

[REDACTED] FBI Richmond established the following FY2023 Priority Collection Gap to drive collection against factors motivating RMVEs to commit violence, which may include increased religiosity and/or adherence to extreme religious teachings:

- [REDACTED] What are the catalysts for RMVEs to commit criminal or violent acts in FBI Richmond's area of responsibility (AOR)? [RH-GAP-0023-CTD-491-23]

[REDACTED] In addition, the following FBI Requirement ~~Issue~~ and Essential Element of Information focuses on RMVE actors adhering to ideologies which may be associated with aspirations to conduct criminal activity or acts of violence:

- [REDACTED] Identify instances of RMVEs' increasing adherence to, or merging of, relatively novel ideological themes to promote and/or warrant carrying out violence or other criminal activity. [Citation: USA-TERR-CTD-SR-1185-22.IA.8]

[REDACTED] Opportunities

- [REDACTED] In addition to our Lady of Fatima Chapel, engage in outreach to the leadership of other SSPX chapels in the FBI Richmond AOR to sensitize these congregations to the warning signs of radicalization and enlist their assistance to serve as suspicious activity tripwires. The following are the formally recognized SSPX chapels in the FBI Richmond AOR:
 - [REDACTED] Immaculate Heart of Mary Chapel, 5267 John Marshall Highway, Linden, Virginia 22642; mailing address P.O. Box 1344, Front Royal, Virginia 22630; telephone number 603-244-6643
 - [REDACTED] Our Lady of Fatima Chapel, 5217 Futura Avenue, Richmond, Virginia 23231; telephone number 804-222-3530
 - [REDACTED] St. Thomas Aquinas Seminary,ⁱ 1208 Archbishop Lefebvre Avenue, Dillwyn, Virginia 23936; telephone number 434-505-7007, fax number 507-216-6243
- [REDACTED] Engage in outreach with the leadership of St. Joseph Parish (828 Buford Road, Richmond, Virginia; telephone number 804-320-4932, fax number 804-451-1009), the sole FSSP apostolate in the FBI Richmond AOR, to sensitize the congregation to the

Commented [9]: Probably not a commonly understood term. Can you clarify/simplify or add footnote?

ⁱ [REDACTED] According to the official SSPX website, St. Thomas Aquinas Seminary is the only SSPX seminary currently operating in the United States.

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[REDACTED]
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warning signs of radicalization and enlist their assistance to serve as suspicious activity tripwires.

- [REDACTED] Based on historical instances of RTC/RMVE actors initially seeking out or attending mainline Catholic parishes, consider outreach to the Diocese of Richmond Pastoral Center (7800 Carousel Lane, Richmond, Virginia 23294; telephone number 804-359-5661, fax number 804-358-9159) to provide background information on the increasing intersection of RMVE actors and RTC, and enlist the diocesan leadership's assistance in sensitizing parishes to the warning signs of radicalization.
- [REDACTED] Use Requests for Collection to leverage existing sources and/or initiate Type 5 Assessments to develop new sources with the placement and access to report on RMVEs frequenting RTC social media platforms/forums/websites, RMVEs currently attending RTC places of worship, or RMVEs expressing an interest in attending RTC places of worship.

Approval: SIA/TPC RH [REDACTED] (CSCC)
SIA RH [REDACTED] (Criminal/DT)

Reviewed by: OGC/CDC [REDACTED]

Coordinated with: SA [REDACTED] (FBI Portland)
IA [REDACTED] (FBI Milwaukee)

Warning and Caveats

Potential criminality exhibited by certain members of a group referenced herein does not negate nor is it a comment on the constitutional rights of the group itself or its members to exercise their rights under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The FBI does not investigate, collect, or maintain information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment.

FBI Richmond prepared this Domain Perspective. Please direct comments and queries to the FBI Richmond Intelligence Program at [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Appendix A: Intelligence Metadata

Environmental Variable(s)

- [REDACTED] Social/Cultural Conditions

Threat Issue and Threat Variable(s)

Addresses the impact of EV(s) on threats cross-programmatically: ☐ Yes ☒ No

- [REDACTED] Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism (RMVE), HQ-CTD-491-23, FBI Richmond Band II Threat
 - [REDACTED] Threat Variables
 - [REDACTED] Threat Actors: RMVEs
 - [REDACTED] Threat Activities: Use of force or violence in support of ideological objectives
 - [REDACTED] Facilitation Platform: Social media platforms, RMVE places of worship
 - [REDACTED] Threat Targets/Victims: Racial or religious minorities, immigrants, members of the LGBTQ community, members of the pro-choice community

Key Intelligence Question(s)

- [REDACTED] How do ideological, personal, sociopolitical, community, economic, behavioral or other factors contribute to the radicalization and mobilization of violent extremists? (FBI-CTD-2-06-23)

Appendix B: Expressions of Likelihood

Phrases such as “the FBI judges” and “the FBI assesses,” and terms such as “likely” and “probably” convey analytical judgments and assessments. The chart below approximates how expressions of likelihood and probability correlate with percentages of chance. Only terms of likelihood should appear in FBI products; the chart includes terms of probability strictly for comparison, as they sometimes appear in reporting of other government agencies. Furthermore, the FBI does not arrive at judgments through statistical analysis and will not use terms of probability to convey uncertainty in external FBI intelligence products.

UNCLASSIFIED

Terms of Likelihood	Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain (ly)
Terms of Probability	Remote	Highly Improbable	Improbable (Improbably)	Roughly Even Odds	Probable (Probably)	Highly Probable	Nearly Certain
Percentages of Chance	1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%

Table showing terms of likelihood aligned with terms of probability and percentages of chance.

Appendix C: Confidence in Assessments and Judgments Based on a Body of Information

Confidence levels reflect the quality and quantity of the source information supporting a judgment. Consequently, the FBI ascribes high, medium, or low levels of confidence to assessments, as follows:

High confidence generally indicates the FBI's judgments are based on high quality information from multiple sources. High confidence in a judgment does not imply the assessment is a fact or a certainty; such judgments might be wrong. While additional reporting and information sources may change analytical judgments, such changes are most likely to be refinements and not substantial in nature.

Medium confidence generally means the information is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence. Additional reporting or information sources have the potential to increase the FBI's confidence levels or substantively change analytical judgments.

Low confidence generally means the information's credibility or plausibility is uncertain, the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or the reliability of the sources is questionable. Absent additional reporting or information sources, analytical judgments should be considered preliminary in nature.

Appendix D: Southern Poverty Law Center-Defined ~~US-Based~~ RTC Hate Groups in the United States

Following are the nine RTC hate groups operating in the United States in 2021 as defined by the Southern Policy Law Center, followed by the location of their organizational headquarters.

- [REDACTED] Catholic Apologetics International (Greencastle, Pennsylvania)
- [REDACTED] Catholic Family News/Catholic Family Ministries, Inc. (Niagara Falls, New York)
- [REDACTED] Chris or Chaos (Corsicana, Texas)
- [REDACTED] Culture Wars/Fidelity Press (Buffalo, New York)
- [REDACTED] The Fatima Crusader/International Fatima Rosary Crusade (Buffalo, New York)
- [REDACTED] In the Spirit of Chartres Committee (Glenelg, Maryland)
- [REDACTED] The Remnant/The Remnant Press (Forest Lake, Minnesota)
- [REDACTED] Slaves of the Immaculate Heart of Mary (Town of Richmond, New Hampshire)
- [REDACTED] Tradition in Action (Los Angeles, California)

Source: [REDACTED] Website | Southern Poverty Law Center | "Radical Traditional Catholicism"
<https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/radical-traditional-catholicism> | Accessed on 12 December 2022.

[REDACTED]
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Endnotes

- ¹ [REDACTED] FBI | FD-302 | [REDACTED] | 25 November 2022 | 8 December 2022 | [REDACTED] Interview of [REDACTED] - Our Lady of Fatima Catholic Chapel" [REDACTED] | Source was a [REDACTED] who had no prior reporting history with FBI Richmond.
- ² [REDACTED] FBI | FD-302 | [REDACTED] | 28 November 2022 | 5 December 2022 | [REDACTED] Interview of [REDACTED], Our Lady of Fatima Chapel" [REDACTED] | Source was [REDACTED] who had no prior reporting history with FBI Richmond.
- ³ [REDACTED] FBI | FD-1057 | [REDACTED] | 12 July 2021 | 27 June 2021 | [REDACTED] Jail Calls from 1 May to 27 June 2021" [REDACTED] | Jail Calls.
- ⁴ [REDACTED] FBI | FD-302 | [REDACTED] | 13 November 2022 | 17 November 2022 | [REDACTED] Police - Scanned Documents from Search Warrant" [REDACTED] | Source was [REDACTED]
- ⁵ [REDACTED] FBI | Email | [REDACTED] | 15 September 2021 | 16 September 2021 | [REDACTED] Email and Product from ADL" [REDACTED] | Source was [REDACTED]
- ⁶ [REDACTED] FBI | FD-1057 | [REDACTED] | 9 July 2020 | 9 July 2020 | [REDACTED] | DT - RACIALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENT EXTREMIST - WHITE, TIER 6 - OTHER" [REDACTED] | Source was [REDACTED]
- ⁷ [REDACTED] FBI | FD-302 | [REDACTED] | 20 July 2021 | 22 July 2021 | [REDACTED] Consensually Recorded Meeting with [REDACTED] | Source was an [REDACTED]
- ⁸ [REDACTED] FBI | FDR | [REDACTED] | 25 October 2021 | 25 October 2021 | [REDACTED] To request Swiss authorities assistance with obtaining information from Proton Technologies AG" [REDACTED] | Source was [REDACTED]
- ⁹ [REDACTED] Website | Southern Poverty Law Center | "Radical Traditional Catholicism" | <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/radical-traditional-catholicism> | Accessed on 12 December 2022.
- ¹⁰ [REDACTED] Website | Salon | "White Nationalists Get Religion: On the Far-Right Fringe, a Catholics and Rascists Forge a Movement" | 12 May 2022 | <https://www.salon.com/2022/05/12/nationalists-get-religion-on-the-far-right-fringe-catholics-and-forge-a-movement/> | Accessed on 5 December 2022.
- ¹¹ [REDACTED] Website | Salon | "Traditional" Catholics and White Nationalist "Groyppers" Forge a New Far-Right Youth Movement" | 13 May 2022 | <https://www.salon.com/2022/05/13/trad-catholics-and-nationalist-groyppers-forge-a-new-far-right-youth-movement/> | Accessed on 5 December 2022.
- ¹² [REDACTED] Website | The Atlantic | "How Extremist Gun Culture is Trying to Co-opt the Rosary" | 14 August 2022 | <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/08/radical-traditionalist-catholic-christian-rosary-weapon/671122/> | Accessed on 5 December 2022.

FBI INTERNAL USE ONLY – DO NOT DISSEMINATE EXTERNALLY
[REDACTED]

From: Byron, Pamela (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>

Sent: Wednesday, February 8, 2023 6:11:04 PM

To: [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>; Beidler, Douglas S. (SecD) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>; Coakley, Miriam M. (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>; Ugoretz, Tonya L. (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>; Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>; Wells, Robert R. (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>; Jones, Jason Allen (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>; Turner, Suzanne (INSD) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>; Dunham, Christopher G. (OCA) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (OCA) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] @fbi.gov <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@fbi.gov>

Cc: Milhoan, Catherine L. (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>; Goodwater, Douglas M. (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] @fbi.gov <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@fbi.gov>; [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>; Rojas, Rachel L. (INTO) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>; Platt, Lon Stuart (OPR) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>; Hardiman, Kellie M. (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>

Subject: RE: Media Request: FBI Richmond Document cites SPLC

As mentioned on FBINET, the type of product leaked is a Domain Perspective (DP) – the purpose of DPs is to offer information and/or highlight how a shift or new development in an AOR (domain) related to an environmental variable could impact the threat environment. Environmental variables include demographic shifts, technology development, economic conditions, special events, social/cultural conditions, etc. In particular, the analysis in DPs (as in FBI products in general) is focused on the activity of identified or potential threat actors, not on the environmental variables themselves, and how those threat actors react to shifts in the environment, and the subsequent impact on the threat posed by those actors.

In that context, there are a couple of things to note with this situation:

- The redactions in the attached product removed case-related information in both the sourcing/citations at the end as well as in the main body of the product, including bullets about threat actors and their activities. We defer to CTD and RH on specific characterization of that information, but note that the redacted information included specifics about predicated cases and threat activity that provide context, without which leave a misleading and overly simplistic perception of the FBI's activities.
- The purpose of these products is to highlight opportunities for engagement with partners and/or potential victims, to include religious institutions. That outreach (redacted in this product) is mischaracterized in the story as targeting of these entities, rather than appropriate engagement including potentially even a duty to warn.

We stand by to assist on any other questions.

Thanks,
Pam

Pamela Byron
Deputy Assistant Director
Directorate of Intelligence / FBI
[REDACTED] (desk)
[REDACTED] (mobile)

From: [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@fbi.gov>

Sent: Wednesday, February 8, 2023 4:25 PM

To: Beidler, Douglas S. (SecD) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@fbi.gov>; Coakley, Miriam M. (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@fbi.gov>;

From: Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>
Sent: Wednesday, February 8, 2023 6:36 PM
To: Jones, Jason Allen (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Byron, Pamela (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Beidler, Douglas S. (SecD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Coakley, Miriam M. (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Ugoretz, Tonya L. (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Wells, Robert R. (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Turner, Suzanne (INSD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Dunham, Christopher G. (OCA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OCA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>
Cc: Milhoan, Catherine L. (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Goodwater, Douglas M. (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Rojas, Rachel L. (InTO) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Platt, Lon Stuart (OPR) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Hardiman, Kellie M. (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>
Subject: Re: Media Request: FBI Richmond Document cites SPLC

Thanks Jason,

We agree with Pam's input and do believe the redactions, which included case citings, clearly alter the narrative of the products intended purpose.. I have asked my team to go direct with CTD on what could possibly be released as there are other field office equities.

As an additional, I was advised there were prior conversations with HQ on subsequent external release of this product via an EIR.

Stanley

From: Jones, Jason Allen (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>
Sent: Wednesday, February 8, 2023 6:22:03 PM
To: Byron, Pamela (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Beidler, Douglas S. (SecD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Coakley, Miriam M. (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Ugoretz, Tonya L. (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; Wells, Robert R. (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Turner, Suzanne (INSD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Dunham, Christopher G. (OCA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OCA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>
Cc: Milhoan, Catherine L. (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Goodwater, Douglas M. (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Rojas, Rachel L. (InTO) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Platt, Lon Stuart (OPR) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Hardiman, Kellie M. (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>
Subject: Re: Media Request: FBI Richmond Document cites SPLC

Very helpful Pam We should consider providing an unredacted or less redacted version to press inquiries if operationally appropriate. A good example of an opportunity to fight misinformation with the facts.

Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI)

From: Jones, Jason Allen (OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, February 8, 2023 9:37 PM
To: Turner, Suzanne (INSD) (FBI); Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI); Byron, Pamela (DI) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI); Beidler, Douglas S. (SecD) (FBI); Coakley, Miriam M. (OGC) (FBI); Ugoretz, Tonya L. (DI) (FBI); Wells, Robert R. (CTD) (FBI); Dunham, Christopher G. (OCA) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OCA) (FBI); [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (DI) (FBI)
Cc: Milhoan, Catherine L. (OPA) (FBI); Goodwater, Douglas M. (OPA) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); Rojas, Rachel L. (InTO) (FBI); Platt, Lon Stuart (OPR) (FBI); Hardiman, Kellie M. (CTD) (FBI)
Subject: Re: Media Request: FBI Richmond Document cites SPLC

I don't disagree. My point is that the leaker is someone whose security has been revoked. And now he is trash talking the House. I am only suggesting we need to closely and quickly bottom out the facts. I've seen this movie before when we react before we have the facts (and have confirmed those facts 3 times.).

From: Turner, Suzanne (INSD) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>
Sent: Wednesday, February 8, 2023 9:03:29 PM
To: Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; Jones, Jason Allen (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; Byron, Pamela (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; Beidler, Douglas S. (SecD) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; Coakley, Miriam M. (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; Ugoretz, Tonya L. (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; Wells, Robert R. (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; Dunham, Christopher G. (OCA) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; [REDACTED] (OCA) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; [REDACTED] (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>
Cc: Milhoan, Catherine L. (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; Goodwater, Douglas M. (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; [REDACTED] (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; Rojas, Rachel L. (InTO) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; Platt, Lon Stuart (OPR) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; Hardiman, Kellie M. (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>
Subject: RE: Media Request: FBI Richmond Document cites SPLC

Hello,

Just offering a different view of this leaked document. The individual who redacted this appears to be redacting cases, sources, methods, and names of those who authored the product. Potentially protecting this information not necessarily changing the meaning of the product. It appears to me the point of leaking the document is to indicate the FBI is relying on the Southern Poverty Law Center to define the hates groups the FBI should be focused on. So providing a more unredacted version may not change the narrative regarding the Southern Poverty Law Center and the FBI.

Suzanne



DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

FEBRUARY 21, 2023

Analytic Tradecraft Review Richmond Domain Perspective

- **Readability:** Incorporation of Analytic Tradecraft Standards (ATS) throughout the product would have led to a substantive, defensible product. Not enough questions were asked about assumptions, biases, and alternatives before the product was approved. Additionally, at times it was difficult to determine if a sentence was the author's opinion/analysis, facts, context, or background. In addition, despite numerous footnotes providing explanations, it was not clear, if all SSPX Churches referenced in the evidence are considered RTCs or if all RTCs have the same ideology or practices. **[ATS 3: Properly distinguishing between underlying intelligence information and analyst's assumptions and judgments; ATS 6: Clear and logical argumentation]**
- **Main Assessment:** The product incorporates the "floating likelihood" concept. In FY2023, many of our products opened up the possibility of placing the likelihood anywhere in the assessment, to include before the "so what." Domain Perspectives have allowed this for longer. The consequence to this, seen here, is RMVE interest in RTC ideology is stated as a fact by the FBI, and how we mitigate that fact is the assessment. Since the assessment of RMVE interest is not fleshed out, the paper reads (has the implication) RMVE ideology and RTC ideology align. The fact footnote "a" almost explicitly states that RTC ideology is violent and extremist without offering any evidence to support their ideology being violent. There is also a lack of support to demonstrate there has been an "increasingly observed interest" of RMVEs in RTC. The authors have not established a baseline to show an increase in interest. They only include three evidence bullets discussing three individuals (one is deceased). If they have it, the authors could have provided more evidence to show the interest has been increasing. Although they provide some details in the Perspective, it is not enough to establish what the baseline was before the "increase". An Assessment on RMVE's interest, would ideally have led to analysis establishing a clearer, scoped expression of RMVE interest in the RTC (i.e. taking advantage of it as a recruitment platform), rather than implying their violent alignment with RMVEs. **[ATS 6: Clear and logical argumentation]**
- **Sourcing:** The source descriptors were not consistent throughout the product (confidence statement, SSS, in-text, endnotes). There are vague descriptors in the confidence statement and more specific ones in-text. Most of the evidence bullets appear to be missing some in-text descriptors. In addition, they rely on open source information but do not provide any details regarding any potential bias/credibility of the sources, including concerning SPLC. Per ICD 203 6.d, analysis should be informed from all relevant information available. Like ADL, SPLC is an important resource for the FBI because it centrally locates hate crime information and data the FBI might not otherwise be privy to because it does not meet federal reporting standards, we didn't receive reports via our law enforcement and private sector liaison, or because victims of hate crimes might not be comfortable reporting information to law enforcement. However, this is where the importance of tradecraft becomes essential, and not purely academic. Per ATS 1, we should be describing the quality and credibility of underlying sources. The SPLC has a history of having to issue apologies and retract groups and individuals they have identified as being extremist or hate groups. The

source summary statement does not address these factors that would affect the quality and credibility of the sourcing. Here is an example of another SSS that attempts to address the SPLC's credibility related to RMVE groups: "The open source reporting provided corroboration to this assessment; further, the open source articles published by ABC News, NBC News, CNN, the Daily Beast, and The Texas Tribune indicate no known partialities; however, Southern Poverty Law Center, Center for Countering Digital Hate, and Human Rights Campaign could have potential partialities, although they indicated thorough research in their reporting." Since this was reporting on a religious branch of Catholicism that SPLC identified as a hate group, there should have been extra care to caveat the information, which was more subjective than statistical, and examine SPLC's threshold for determining a hate group and explain how it aligns or differs from the FBI's definition. [ATS 1: Properly describes quality and credibility of underlying sources]

- **Assumptions:** There are some unstated key assumptions that should have been included. For example, a major assumption that should have been stated is the FBI assumes RTCs will not internally mitigate the threat by reporting RMVEs to LE or removing them from congregations/organizations. In addition, aren't we assuming the RMVEs are attending these churches because of ideological reasons and not simply to participate in a more traditional Catholic mass or practice Catholicism? [ATS 3: Properly distinguishing between underlying intelligence information and analyst's assumptions and judgments]
- **Perspective:** While they provide information from open source in the Perspective detailing alleged connections between far-right Catholics/RTCs and other groups, there is no information in the Perspective regarding FBI investigations showing a growing overlap despite stating there was. The Perspective would be the place they could establish the baseline if the assessment is about an "increasingly observed interest" in RTC.
- **Analysis of Alternatives (AoA):** Because this product is assessing mitigation opportunities, there was no need for an AoA. However, if it would have assessed RMVE's interest, the evidence should have prompted an alternative interpretation. [ATS 4: Incorporate AoA]
- **Outlook:** Because RTC was conflated with RMVE ideology, the Outlook indicates we should liaison with traditionalists, but not RTCs. While worded carefully to ensure our source recruitment focus is on RMVEs, examining assumptions, biases, and alternatives perhaps would have affected how the Outlook was written to include establishing tripwires with RTC organizations should our assumption they wouldn't internally mitigate the threat be incorrect. In addition, it was not clear how the main Outlook assessment differed from the main assessment as they both assessed an "increase". The Outlook seemed to focus more on the RTCs instead of the RMVEs. The intent of some sentences in the Outlook was not clear. [ATS 5: Customer relevance; ATS 6: Clear and logical argumentation]



INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY DIRECTIVE 203

Analytic Standards

A. AUTHORITY: The National Security Act of 1947, as amended; the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004; Executive Order 12333, as amended; Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-28; and other applicable provisions of law.

B. PURPOSE

1. This Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) establishes the Intelligence Community (IC) Analytic Standards that govern the production and evaluation of analytic products; articulates the responsibility of intelligence analysts to strive for excellence, integrity, and rigor in their analytic thinking and work practices; and delineates the role of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Analytic Ombuds.

2. This Directive supersedes ICD 203, *Analytic Standards*, dated 21 June 2007, and rescinds ICPM 2006-200-2, *Role of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Analytic Ombudsman*.

C. APPLICABILITY

1. This ICD applies to the IC, as defined by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended; and to such elements of any other department or agency as may be designated an element of the IC by the President, or jointly by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the head of the department or agency concerned.

2. This Directive does not apply to purely law enforcement information. When law enforcement information also contains intelligence or intelligence-related information, this Directive shall apply only to the intelligence or intelligence-related information and analysis contained therein.

D. POLICY

1. The IC Analytic Standards are the core principles of intelligence analysis and are to be applied across the IC. IC Analytic Standards shall be applied in each analytic product in a manner appropriate to its purpose, the type and scope of its underlying source information, its production timeline, and its customers. IC elements may create supplemental analytic standards that are tailored to their particular missions.

2. The IC Analytic Standards are the foundational assessment criteria for a regular program of review of IC analytic products. Each IC element shall maintain a program of product evaluation using the IC Analytic Standards as the core elements for assessment criteria.

3. The IC Analytic Standards serve as a common IC foundation for developing education and training in analytic skills. The results of analytic product evaluations will be used to improve materials and programs for education and training in analytic knowledge, skills, abilities, and tradecraft.

4. The Standards also promote a common ethic for achieving analytic rigor and excellence, and for personal integrity in analytic practice. Adherence to IC Analytic Standards is safeguarded by the ODNI Analytic Ombuds, who addresses concerns regarding lack of objectivity, bias, politicization, or other issues in Standards application in analytic products.

5. The Standards promote the protection of privacy and civil liberties by ensuring the objectivity, timeliness, relevance, and accuracy of personally identifiable information (PII) used in analytic products. Analysts should include PII in products only as it relates to a specific analytic purpose (e.g., necessary to understand the foreign intelligence or counterintelligence information or assess its importance), consistent with IC element mission and in compliance with IC element regulation and policy, including procedures to prevent, identify, and correct errors in PII.

6. The IC Analytic Standards guide analysis and analytic production. All IC analytic products shall be consistent with the following five Analytic Standards, including the nine Analytic Tradecraft Standards.

a. Objective: Analysts must perform their functions with objectivity and with awareness of their own assumptions and reasoning. They must employ reasoning techniques and practical mechanisms that reveal and mitigate bias. Analysts should be alert to influence by existing analytic positions or judgments and must consider alternative perspectives and contrary information. Analysis should not be unduly constrained by previous judgments when new developments indicate a modification is necessary.

b. Independent of political consideration: Analytic assessments must not be distorted by, nor shaped for, advocacy of a particular audience, agenda, or policy viewpoint. Analytic judgments must not be influenced by the force of preference for a particular policy.

c. Timely: Analysis must be disseminated in time for it to be actionable by customers. Analytic elements have the responsibility to be continually aware of events of intelligence interest, of customer activities and schedules, and of intelligence requirements and priorities, in order to provide useful analysis at the right time.

d. Based on all available sources of intelligence information: Analysis should be informed by all relevant information available. Analytic elements should identify and address critical information gaps and work with collection activities and data providers to develop access and collection strategies.

e. Implements and exhibits Analytic Tradecraft Standards, specifically:

(1) Properly describes quality and credibility of underlying sources, data, and methodologies: Analytic products should identify underlying sources and methodologies upon which judgments are based, and use source descriptors in accordance with ICD 206, *Sourcing Requirements for Disseminated Analytic Products*, to describe factors affecting source quality and credibility. Such factors can include accuracy and completeness, possible denial and deception, age and continued currency of information, and technical elements of collection as well as source access, validation, motivation, possible bias, or expertise. Source summary

statements, described in ICD 206, are strongly encouraged and should be used to provide a holistic assessment of the strengths or weaknesses in the source base and explain which sources are most important to key analytic judgments.

(2) Properly expresses and explains uncertainties associated with major analytic judgments: Analytic products should indicate and explain the basis for the uncertainties associated with major analytic judgments, specifically the likelihood of occurrence of an event or development, and the analyst's confidence in the basis for this judgment. Degrees of likelihood encompass a full spectrum from remote to nearly certain. Analysts' confidence in an assessment or judgment may be based on the logic and evidentiary base that underpin it, including the quantity and quality of source material, and their understanding of the topic. Analytic products should note causes of uncertainty (e.g., type, currency, and amount of information, knowledge gaps, and the nature of the issue) and explain how uncertainties affect analysis (e.g., to what degree and how a judgment depends on assumptions). As appropriate, products should identify indicators that would alter the levels of uncertainty for major analytic judgments. Consistency in the terms used and the supporting information and logic advanced is critical to success in expressing uncertainty, regardless of whether likelihood or confidence expressions are used.

(a) For expressions of likelihood or probability, an analytic product must use one of the following sets of terms:

almost no chance	very unlikely	unlikely	roughly even chance	likely	very likely	almost certain(ly)
remote	highly improbable	improbable (improbably)	roughly even odds	probable (probably)	highly probable	nearly certain
01-05%	05-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%

Analysts are strongly encouraged not to mix terms from different rows. Products that do mix terms must include a disclaimer clearly noting the terms indicate the same assessment of probability.

(b) To avoid confusion, products that express an analyst's confidence in an assessment or judgment using a "confidence level" (e.g., "high confidence") must not combine a confidence level and a degree of likelihood, which refers to an event or development, in the same sentence.

(3) Properly distinguishes between underlying intelligence information and analysts' assumptions and judgments: Analytic products should clearly distinguish statements that convey underlying intelligence information used in analysis from statements that convey assumptions or judgments. Assumptions are defined as suppositions used to frame or support an argument; assumptions affect analytic interpretation of underlying intelligence information. Judgments are defined as conclusions based on underlying intelligence information, analysis, and assumptions. Products should state assumptions explicitly when they serve as the linchpin of an argument or when they bridge key information gaps. Products should explain the implications for judgments if assumptions prove to be incorrect. Products also should, as appropriate, identify indicators that, if detected, would alter judgments.

(4) **Incorporates analysis of alternatives:** Analysis of alternatives is the systematic evaluation of differing hypotheses to explain events or phenomena, explore near-term outcomes, and imagine possible futures to mitigate surprise and risk. Analytic products should identify and assess plausible alternative hypotheses. This is particularly important when major judgments must contend with significant uncertainties, or complexity (e.g., forecasting future trends), or when low probability events could produce high-impact results. In discussing alternatives, products should address factors such as associated assumptions, likelihood, or implications related to U.S. interests. Products also should identify indicators that, if detected, would affect the likelihood of identified alternatives.

(5) **Demonstrates customer relevance and addresses implications:** Analytic products should provide information and insight on issues relevant to the customers of U.S. intelligence and address the implications of the information and analysis they provide. Products should add value by addressing prospects, context, threats, or factors affecting opportunities for action.

(6) **Uses clear and logical argumentation:** Analytic products should present a clear main analytic message up front. Products containing multiple judgments should have a main analytic message that is drawn collectively from those judgments. All analytic judgments should be effectively supported by relevant intelligence information and coherent reasoning. Language and syntax should convey meaning unambiguously. Products should be internally consistent and acknowledge significant supporting and contrary information affecting judgments.

(7) **Explains change to or consistency of analytic judgments:** Analytic products should state how their major judgments on a topic are consistent with or represent a change from those in previously published analysis, or represent initial coverage of a topic. Products need not be lengthy or detailed in explaining change or consistency. They should avoid using boilerplate language, however, and should make clear how new information or different reasoning led to the judgments expressed in them. Recurrent products such as daily crisis reports should note any changes in judgments; absent changes, recurrent products need not confirm consistency with previous editions. Significant differences in analytic judgment, such as between two IC analytic elements, should be fully considered and brought to the attention of customers.

(8) **Makes accurate judgments and assessments:** Analytic products should apply expertise and logic to make the most accurate judgments and assessments possible, based on the information available and known information gaps. In doing so, analytic products should present all judgments that would be useful to customers, and should not avoid difficult judgments in order to minimize the risk of being wrong. Inherent to the concept of accuracy is that the analytic message a customer receives should be the one the analyst intended to send. Therefore, analytic products should express judgments as clearly and precisely as possible, reducing ambiguity by addressing the likelihood, timing, and nature of the outcome or development. Clarity of meaning permits assessment for accuracy when all necessary information is available.

(9) **Incorporates effective visual information where appropriate:** Analytic products should incorporate visual information to clarify an analytic message and to complement or enhance the presentation of data and analysis. In particular, visual presentations should be used when information or concepts (e.g., spatial or temporal relationships) can be conveyed better in graphic form (e.g., tables, flow charts, images) than in written text. Visual information may range from plain presentation of intelligence information to interactive displays for complex information and analytic concepts. All of the content in an analytic product may be presented

visually. Visual information should always be clear and pertinent to the product's subject. Analytic content in visual information should also adhere to other analytic tradecraft standards.

E. RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The Deputy DNI for Intelligence Integration (DDNI/II) shall:

- a. Confirm and direct the application of these Analytic Standards by IC elements in analytic intelligence products;
- b. Conduct an IC-wide program of periodic review and evaluation of analytic intelligence products, guided by the annual identification of functional or geographical areas of analysis for specific review:
 - (1) Disseminate ODNI Analytic Tradecraft Standards Evaluation Rating Criteria to IC elements;
 - (2) Prepare findings of analytic intelligence product reviews for reporting to Congress and relevant IC elements;
 - (3) Develop lessons learned and identify exemplary products for use by IC elements in training;
 - (4) Refine the IC-wide program of periodic review and evaluation based on new lessons learned and best practices identified.
- c. Assist IC elements in effective application of the Analytic Standards; and
- d. Oversee analytic product evaluation programs in individual IC elements to ensure standards and practices are compatible with the IC-wide program.

2. The Chief, Analytic Integrity and Standards Group, within the Office of the DDNI/II, is designated as the ODNI Analytic Ombuds and shall:

- a. Be available to ODNI analysts who wish to raise concerns about adherence to analytic standards (including tradecraft standards) in analytic products;
- b. Respond to concerns raised by Community analysts, as appropriate, with fact finding, problem solving, conflict resolution, counseling, and recommendations:
 - (1) Analysts in IC elements other than the ODNI must first use existing administrative procedures within their own IC element to raise concerns about adherence to analytic standards;
 - (2) When these internal administrative procedures have been exhausted, or when an analyst believes that those procedures will not preserve confidentiality, the analyst may bring these concerns to the ODNI Analytic Ombuds;
 - (3) In such instances, the ODNI Analytic Ombuds will carry out responsibilities in the same manner as if responding to an ODNI analyst's concerns. The ODNI Analytic Ombuds may address concerns that span more than one IC element; and
- c. Perform all responsibilities confidentially so that analysts may raise concerns without fear of reprisal. However, confidentiality will not extend to significant misconduct, to violations of law or ethics, or when otherwise precluded by law.

3. Heads of IC elements shall:

- a. Ensure that analytic intelligence products produced and disseminated by their element properly apply the IC Analytic Standards;
- b. Designate an individual or office responsible for responding to concerns raised by the element's analysts about adherence to analytic standards (including tradecraft standards) in analytic products;
- c. Conduct internal programs of review and evaluation of analytic intelligence products utilizing the IC Analytic Standards as the core criteria, and provide annual status reporting to the DDNI/II according to DDNI/II guidelines; and
- d. Ensure that the IC Analytic Standards are properly addressed in their elements' education and training programs.

F. EFFECTIVE DATE: This Directive becomes effective on the date of signature.



 Director of National Intelligence

2 JANUARY 2015

 Date

[REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2023 12:37 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Need to remove an item from Sentinel in a "Freeze List" file ---
[REDACTED]

RMTRUserProp: Short-Term Use Email (Transitory)
SentinelCaseld: Short-Term Use Email (Transitory)

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Transitory

Hi [REDACTED],

Richmond is looking to remove [REDACTED] from Sentinel. As advised by [REDACTED] with Richmond concurrence it is being removed pursuant to Policy Directive 0861D, 8.2.5. Pursuant to Policy Directive 0619D Richmond is requesting OGC permission to proceed with the request to remove the serial from Sentinel.

Thanks,
[REDACTED]

SSA [REDACTED]
Chief Division Counsel
Richmond Division
desk [REDACTED]
mobile [REDACTED]



Confidentiality Statement:

This message is transmitted to you by the Office of the Division Counsel of the Richmond Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation. The message, along with any attachments, may be confidential and legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, please destroy it promptly without further retention or dissemination (unless otherwise required by law). Please notify the sender of the error by a separate e-mail or by calling [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, February 9, 2023 10:34 AM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Need to remove an item from Sentinel in a "Freeze List" file --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Transitory

Good morning,

If a file is on the freeze list you will have to get permission from OGC to proceed with the PCO request. Since you are asking prior to submitting the lead, please email [REDACTED] and copy [REDACTED] on the email. She is the one able to give permission for us to do a PCO in any case on the freeze list.

Thanks,

[REDACTED]
Records Information Management Specialist
Information Maintenance Unit
Building: CRC Room [REDACTED]
Phone: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2023 10:23 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Subject: Need to remove an item from Sentinel in a "Freeze List" file --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Good morning,

I have been directed by my management/FBI Executive Management to remove a serial from Sentinel and per the guidance [here](#), because the document is in a "Freeze List" file, IMD cannot process the request and I should reach out to this email box. ([REDACTED])

- "If case is listed on the Freeze list or meets any of the criteria listed in CPD 0619D, IMD is unable to process your request; for additional guidance e-mail [REDACTED]"

Please contact me ASAP regarding this request at one of the below numbers.

Thanks,

[REDACTED]
SIA [REDACTED]
Richmond SQ: [REDACTED] (CRIM & DT)
[REDACTED] (desk)
[REDACTED] (cell)
[REDACTED] by (UNCLASS)

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2023 11:39 AM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Subject: Follow-up --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Sir:

It has been removed from RH's Feedback Loop/FIG Sharepoint and the Intel Portal.

As discussed, I am working on the Sentinel removal. Per this guidance document [here](#), "If case is listed on the Freeze list or meets any of the criteria listed in CPD 0619D, IMD is unable to process your request; for additional guidance e-mail [REDACTED]" That email box notified me "will have to get permission from OGC to proceed with the PCO request." I am working with [REDACTED] in conjunction with [REDACTED] on the lead/process. The other option as we discussed is to restrict the four files the product is in. I will proceed with that option with your concurrence.

- [REDACTED] (RMVE Type 3 Assessment INTELPRODs subfile)
- [REDACTED] (Type 4 Assessment - Demographic and Social/Cultural Conditions INTELPRODS subfile)
- [REDACTED] ([REDACTED] casefile INTELPRODS subfile)
- [REDACTED] (Domain Management Control file)

After discussions with the analysts, this is the timeline of discussions about this product and with whom (from [REDACTED]):

On 1/3/23- I coordinated with FBI PD and also spoke with them on the phone during this timeframe to receive concurrence to use information on their subject. I did not provide them with the full product, rather I gave them context for their subject.

On 1/11/23- I provided the MW-related bullet from the DP to the following individuals from FB MW for the concurrence. I did not provide the entire DP. Sometime during that same time frame, I spoke with [REDACTED] about the overall product, our investigation, and their subject.

On 1/12/23- [REDACTED] sent the full product to the following individuals for review and edits:

On 1/13/23- FBI MW concurred with the aforementioned bullet on their subject.

Sometime before publication, I discussed the product with DTOU IA [REDACTED]

On 1/24/23, product published.

On 2/02/23 and after - I provided the product which I converted to a draft SPEAR to DTOU for coordination. DTOU formally reviewed it after it was published and indicated DTOS was aware of the product. DTOU and RH were formally drafting a joint SPEAR using the same information. DTOU suggested using an EIR.

On 2/08/23, In preparation for the EIR, I reached back out to FBI MW to get concurrence to include their subject, however, the name of the subject would be masked. FBI MW gave concurrence yesterday on 2/08/23.

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

SIA [REDACTED]
Richmond SQ [REDACTED] (CRIM & DT)
[REDACTED] (desk)
[REDACTED] (cell)
[REDACTED] (UNCLASS)

[REDACTED]====
[REDACTED]: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2023 3:21 PM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Subject: Re: Convo yesterday

Thank you so much!

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2023 3:15:24 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: Re: Convo yesterday

Good afternoon [REDACTED],

Pursuant to FBIHQ EM and OGC advisement, RH has completed charge out requests

Respectfully,
ASAC [REDACTED]
National Security Branch
Richmond Field Office
(Office) [REDACTED]
(Mobile) [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2023 3:04:19 PM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: Re: Convo yesterday

[REDACTED], my PLS [REDACTED] should be reaching out for confirmation of the casefile number so she can lift the Freeze. Just wanted to give you the heads up.

From: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2023 2:34:29 PM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: Re: Convo yesterday

Great, thanks! Will give my folks and IMD the heads up.

From: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2023 2:34:23 PM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] C. (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: Re: Convo yesterday

Good Afternoon All,

Apologies for reaching out again, but I am being asked to report to the 7th floor as to whether we anticipate that the lead will be signed off by Richmond and makes it's way to IMD today. The request has been for the charge out process to

be completed before EOD today and I am trying to juggle schedules of folks from my side in relation to lifting of the Freeze from our end and IMD's charge out from their end with some folks looking to leave this afternoon shortly.

Let me know and thanks.

[REDACTED]
Sr. Discovery Counsel to the Litigation Branch

From: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2023 1:48:58 PM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] C. (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: Re: Convo yesterday

Thanks [REDACTED]

Apologies for all the conversation and emails today. The 7th Floor is breathing down my neck on this one. Are we just awaiting sign off from Richmond before it makes it's way to IMD?

Thanks,
[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2023 1:44:27 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] C. (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: Re: Convo yesterday

Will do. Copying our NSB ASAC.

SSA [REDACTED]
Chief Division Counsel
Richmond Field Office
Federal Bureau of Investigation
[REDACTED] direct
[REDACTED] main

Confidentiality Statement:

This message is transmitted to you by the Office of the Division Counsel for the Richmond Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation. The message, along with any attachments, may be confidential and legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient of this message, please destroy it promptly without further retention or dissemination (unless otherwise required by law). Please notify the sender of the error by a separate e-mail or by calling [REDACTED].

From: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2023 1:00:54 PM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: Re: Convo yesterday

Just talked to IMD and they are standing by for the lead to make it's way to them. Let me know if you have any idea when they might get it? Thank you!

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Friday, February 10, 2023 12:34:11 PM
To: [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: Re: Convo yesterday

Thoughts/Prep

Why done? IAs job to id emerging trends to look @ what we are seeing here, (top 5 - DT case) look for similar patterns elsewhere, and highlight intelligence production

What is a DP? / Process for DP

- What is a DP?
 - A product that answers the broad question "How may EVs affect threats and related threat variables, or affect the FBI's ability to mitigate these threats?"
 - EV in this case: Social/Cultural: "reactions related to conditions affecting the setting in which people live, often related to people's beliefs or customs; more specifically, changes in public acceptance/perception of laws, events, population groups, etc., changes in social norms, mass protests or social causes."
 - An analysis of the interaction between a threat/threat variables and an EV; looking at the threat through the lens of the EV
- Process:
 - Requires coordination with DMC (if not co-author). DMC [REDACTED] was a co-author.
 - Requires approval by SIA and IPC (done)
 - Requires review by CDC if needed per IPPG 10.3.2.1 (done in this case)
 - As it is not external, no approval with IPM needed. No coordination or approval with HQ required as it's a field product (however, CTD was coordinating with RH on a follow-on SPEAR or EIR version of the product and remains interested)
 - Coordination with FOs whose information was used was done in this case (PD, MW)
 - Also reviewed by ATS-trained senior IA and RH IA with expertise in Catholic theology (former Seminary student)

DT background/training

- Never worked DT; worked IT as an embedded IA for ~6 months in 2012 and then as a strategic IA on JDA to NCTC from July 2015-July 2017
- Attended DT conference in August 2022, which had broad overarching presentations on various topics
- No significant/dedicated DT training outside of mandatory training/IBC

AIS

- Product was peer reviewed by an ATS-certified senior IA
- Scale of scoring for any of the ATS categories, including sourcing – from 0-3. You are not required in all products to satisfy the 3/Excellent criteria. It is a mischaracterization that RH did not properly "meet ATS standards" by failing to include the information required for an "Excellent"/3 rating. Essentially, the IA/SIA makes a judgment as to how important each source is to the judgment and how necessary it is to caveat that source to enable customer understanding.
- In this product's case, the open source and SPLC information was in the Perspective section only to provide background/context and did not support the analytic judgment, which was supported by case information, liaison, and law enforcement reporting. The authors and reviewers did not see the need for an expansive sourcing statement.

EV as
facilitation platform/
Threat target

Redmeat call

- o Definition for Fair/1: "(1) Contains basic, generic descriptions of cited reporting, data, or methodologies but (2) Provides little detail on factors that may affect the quality and credibility of underlying sources, data, or methodologies."
- o ICD 203: "(1) Properly describes quality and credibility of underlying sources, data, and methodologies: Analytic products should identify underlying sources and methodologies upon which judgments are based, and use source descriptors in accordance with ICD 206, Sourcing Requirements for Disseminated Analytic Products, to describe factors affecting source quality and credibility. Such factors can include accuracy and completeness, possible denial and deception, age and continued currency of information, and technical elements of collection as well as source access, validation, motivation, possible bias, or expertise."
- o ICD 206: "Sourcing information shall be included in covered analytic products to enhance the credibility and transparency of intelligence analysis, and to assist readers in making an informed assessment of the quality and scope of sources underlying the analysis ... Sourcing information in each product should be sufficient to meet these purposes, while avoiding exhaustive source listings."

Timeline/Origin & my involvement

led by PMC/SG

- Paper idea originated before I took over as DT SIA in November 2022
- No significant discussions with authors on the paper before it came to me for edits; it was not part of SO's POA for FY23, likely during just-check-in-se formal (informal)
- Received draft for review on 1/17/23, I completed edits on 1/20 and sent to IPC. It had already been reviewed by CDC before it came to me. completed his review that day, 1/20. The authors proceeded with Sentinel serialization.
- o I saw no major significant issues with the paper in my review. I understood it was a sensitive topic (as DT always is) but I found the message of the paper to be clear and in no way advocating for targeting of individuals solely based on 1A activity. I did not see any additional need for caveats or clarifications as I assessed the intended audience – RH EM – would fully understand the purpose and intent of the product (validated by the SAC's 2/3 posts on the Feedback Loop). My frame of mind was not "how could I did not have a role in advertising the product. sent an email to RH customers advertising it had been posted to the RH Feedback Loop on 1/26. I had no discussions regarding the product following its publication and before the leak.

not customary for me to have exhaustive disc. before review unless asked esp. by senior

this be mischaracterized & twisted in a bad faith manner?

Post-leak

- 2/8 - Received word it had leaked that afternoon. Assisted ASAC and Public Affairs Specialist respond to OPA questions that evening. First word that HQ had issues with the paper that evening.
- 2/9 - Meeting with SAC, ASACs, CDC, others. SAC delivered verbal feedback disavowing the product from DI and CTD. RH SAC requested an in-depth email with a timeline of the product, who reviewed it, where it was sent, etc., which I provided later that day. Request from FBI HQ EM to remove the product from the Intelligence Portal, RH Sharepoint, and from Sentinel. I completed the first two and pursued research on how to remove from Sentinel. As it was in a Freeze file, we needed OGC permission. That day, I sat in CDC's office as we discussed

was a net tipative development. Did not raise red flags. This is a fact in the blog obviously. would have seen proper + approvals.

with OGC personnel, [REDACTED] who advised we should select 8.2.5 (PD 0861D) as the reason it should be removed from Sentinel. I was not clear on how this applied. I drafted the leads to remove them from Sentinel per RH EM direction. Later that day, A/IPC [REDACTED] and I met with ASAC [REDACTED] to let him know we were uncomfortable with removing it from Sentinel. That evening, ASAC [REDACTED] emailed me on green to tell me to "hold" on the Sentinel removal and we'd discuss the next day.

- 2/10 – ASAC [REDACTED] told me initially HQ/IMD would handle the removal from Sentinel, but I was later directed by CDC [REDACTED] (who was directed by RH EM) to remove it from Sentinel. I told both CDC [REDACTED] and later ASAC [REDACTED] that I refused to draft the lead remove it from Sentinel as I did not see how it met the criteria. I deleted my draft leads. ASAC [REDACTED] completed the lead to remove it from Sentinel that day.
- 2/14 – Meeting with SAC, ASACs, CDC, authors, [REDACTED] others, to discuss what happened, plan going forward, and any morale issues stemming from the incident.
- Week of 2/13 – Email exchanges between ASAC [REDACTED] CTD SC Michael Machtinger, IPC [REDACTED] and others, to arrange a meeting between DI/OGC/CTD and RH to gain further clarity on DI/OGC/CTD issues with the paper, to help inform planned training the three divisions would provide to RH.
- 2/16 – Meeting with [REDACTED] ASAC [REDACTED] A/ASAC [REDACTED] (maybe A/IPC [REDACTED]). ASAC [REDACTED] directed us to stop planning a meeting with DI/OGC/CTD and conveyed the training must occur by the following week.
- Approximately 2/17 – Met with RH SAC to discuss chilling effects on all types of production as well as morale issues.
- 2/21 – SAC provided an update on the situation in an all-hands Richmond meeting.
- 2/22 – Met with RH SAC to alert him to plans to meet with DI and discuss employee concerns.
- 2/23 – DI/OGC/CTD provided training to the entire Richmond Division.
- 2/28 – RH SAC forwarded me the written feedback email from CTD (emailed on 2/8). This is the first time I received written feedback on the product from any party despite asking numerous times.
- 3/6 – SIA [REDACTED] discussed a planned meeting between RH and DI/OGC/CTD with DI DAD Pam Byron.
- 3/9 – SIA [REDACTED] IPC [REDACTED] SIA [REDACTED] and A/ASAC [REDACTED] met with DI/OGC/CTD to discuss issues with the paper, RH's plans to redo the paper, and suggestions from DI/OGC/CTD to correct issues with the paper. DI/PSU UC [REDACTED] provided a soft *hard* copy of suggested edits. This was the first time I received written feedback on the paper from the DI despite asking numerous times.
- 3/14 – Meeting with SAC, ASACs, [REDACTED] to discuss how 3/9 meeting at HQ went, a brief discussion of the Inspection. SAC requested I provide a list of names for people to be interviewed to ASAC [REDACTED] which I sent 3/14 and confirmed on 3/15.

Reviewed emails received through 2/20

Thoughts I'd raise, if given the opportunity

- There should have been more coordination with and input received from RH to inform and contribute to FBI's strategy regarding this paper, including the public response and follow-on actions.
- ★ • Throughout this whole process, I've heard numerous times: "DT is just different," "DT is the most difficult program we work," "There's a lot of sensitivities with DT," and on and on. Why isn't there a dedicated Program/Policy Guide for DT? Why isn't there an intense training for all new personnel assigned to DT, a la CIOPs? There needs to be.
- ★ • This leads us to situations where a group of experienced SAs, IAs, SIAs, CDC, SSA etc. over here don't see any issues with a DT paper but once it's leaked and subsequently reviewed by DI/OGC/CTD, they see a ton of issues.
- As discussed with Pam Byron on 3/9, OPA and FBI HQ EM needs to be a lot more knowledgeable about intelligence products and processes. On the evening of 2/8, high-level FBI executives were having to explain to other high-level FBI executives what a DP was.
- There should much more coordination on FBI public statements with relevant entities, to include the DI when making a statement about an intelligence product and the authoring office of that intelligence product.
- FBI's public statements were unprecedented and not in line with the FBI's normal media strategy in response to intelligence leaks.
- In my view, the removal of the product from Sentinel was highly inappropriate.
- In my view, the FBI HQ EM response to the product was politicized and potentially presented several Analytic Ombudsman level issues.
- In my view, there ^{is} and will be severe ramifications to FBI and FBI intelligence from FBI HQ EM's actions. Chilling effect of analysis, DT operational activity, ^{event!} reduction in public confidence in the FBI, severe morale issues.

- ★ • Needs to be loud, public (at least ^{event!} to enforcement) confirmation that all policy was followed in this case + controversy stemmed from differences in interpretation of policy/guidance, which is impossible to avoid ^{entirely} ^{+ "point out the controversial sources"}
- ★ • "Washington Post test" deeply problematic w/ more straightforward guidance + training.

- ★ • Needs to be recall/revision process.

- ★ • Why did it take so long to get written (from some entities still don't have) feedback on "appalling" product?

[REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, March 1, 2023 9:53 AM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Subject: Talking Points --- [REDACTED]

RMTRUserProp: Short-Term Use Email (Transitory)
SentinelCaseId: Short-Term Use Email (Transitory)

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Transitory

Good morning,

Below are some of the talking points that I have put together for the SAC. This is a lengthy document and I will send you the full document when I finish for your review. Please note that the 3rd bullet point under “Additional Points” is extremely sensitive and cannot be shared. I welcome anything you can add to this and I will share the entire document with you when I finish this am.

Thank you!!!

SPLC- 9,040 references in Sentinel/ Southern Poverty Law Center- 13, 250 references in Sentinel:

Do to the thousands of SPLC citations, writer only reviewed products from May 2022 to present.

- Cited in a 12 January 2023 Domain Perspective with no caveated language.
- Cited in a 17 January 2023 Domain Perspective with no caveated language.
- Cited in a 21 December 2022 Intelligence Note approved for External Dissemination with no caveated language.
- Cited in a 28 December 2022 CID White Paper with no caveated language: ^[1] [REDACTED] According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, Christian identity is an anti-Semitic, racist theology that rose to a position of commanding influence on the racist right in the 1980s.
- Cited in a 7 November 2022 TIR approved for External Dissemination with no caveated language.
- Cited in a 9 December 2022 Domain Perspective with no caveated language.
- Cited in a 28 November 2022 SCCR with no caveated language.
- Cited in a 6 September 2022 Intelligence Note with no caveated language.
- Cited in a 14 June 2022 Intelligence Note with no caveated language.
- Cited in a 23 June 2022 Collection Trends with no caveated language.
- Cited in a 25 May 2022 Intelligence Note with no caveated language.

- Referenced in FBI brochure, “What Happens to Victims of Hate Crimes” under “Who Can Help Me?” (Jan 2022)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- Referenced in TIRs, Case Predications, Uploaded to Type 3s, Guardians, RFCs, SIGs, etc. with no caveated language.
- Repeatedly referenced on BuNet in DHS and DOD products, along with Daily News Briefing.

SPEAR:

- ([REDACTED]) On 2/06/2023, FBI RH sent DTOS the SPEAR for review. DTOS responded with positive feedback and suggested changing the SPEAR to an Emerging Intelligence Report due to the fact that the DP was highlighting a newly identified vulnerability and was forward leaning in its assessment. DTOS previously received the DP.
- ([REDACTED]) In the draft SPEAR, FBI RH removed Appendix D (SPLC-Defined Hate Groups) as the SPEAR was intended for external dissemination. Appendix D was ONLY cited in the internal document for situational awareness and context. It was never intended for external dissemination. There are numerous serials in Sentinel containing SPLC and other advocacy groups’ Hate Group lists.

Additional Points:

- ([REDACTED]) **KEY TAKE AWAY: Protect the American People- The current trend of RMVE interest in RTC ideology provides new opportunities to *mitigate the RMVE threat through outreach to traditionalist Catholic parishes and the development of sources with the placement and access to report on RMVEs seeking to use RTC social media sites or places of worship as facilitation platforms to promote violence.***
- ([REDACTED]) **The Domain Product addressed the following requirement:** Identify instances of RMVEs' increasing adherence to, or merging of, relatively novel ideological themes to promote and/or warrant carrying out violence or other criminal activity. [Citation: USA-TERR-CTD-SR-1185-22.I.A.8]
- ([REDACTED]) 19 Intelligence Analysts from 13 field offices, including CTAS and DTOS; 4 agents and 2 TFOs from 2 field offices; 3 SIAs from 3 different field offices (not including RH SIAs), and one CDC from another field office viewed the product in Sentinel from the date the product was released on 1/24/2023 through the day prior to the document being leaked. None of those individuals contacted FBI RH with concerns, suggestions, or negative feedback related to the product.

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Classification: [REDACTED]

June 18, 2021

The Will To Fight



It's unfortunate that today many Catholics lack the will to fight. Some have the potential to take over the world and influence it for the better, but they are afraid to use their will for good. They see nothing but the continuous sacrifices they would have to make, the heavy burdens they would have to carry, friends they may lose, the pleasurable world they would have to abandon. The thought of using their will for the betterment of their soul and the souls around them becomes unbearable. They are afraid of sacrifice, and such a fear paralyzes their will to fight.

Such Catholics see sacrifice in a negative light: in their mind, to sacrifice is to lose everything, when in reality to sacrifice is to gain everything, for it rids the soul of self. It uproots selfishness and replaces it with selflessness; it replaces their will, with the will of God. And if God abides in one's soul, then they truly do possess everything, for He is everything. A man who interprets sacrifice as a loss, is a man who seeks only to pleasure himself.

For many of us, this lack of the will to fight comes from the thought that what we do doesn't matter. We see our daily decisions and actions as insignificant. What we watch doesn't matter. What we listen to doesn't matter. How we pray doesn't matter. How we act doesn't matter. And what others do, say, and think also doesn't matter, because their decisions don't affect us. The world is so upside down, the things that matter, don't. And things that don't matter, do. And we are so desensitized and wrapped up in self we believe it. And we believe it because it gives us a reason not only to justify our mediocrity, but to wallow in it.

Among those mediocre Catholics are men and women who are meant to be the next St. Peter or the next St. Joan of Arc, who will change the world and lead an army into battle. There are Catholics who are meant to be great leaders, but that thought of sacrifice is so unbearable that they cower in terror. To put this into perspective, what if the great saints had said no to God? Imagine the souls that would have been lost! So, what if we say no to God? To say no would be a spiritual abortion! Not only would we be killing our own soul, but the souls we were meant to impact for the good, are now in danger. If we do not live up to our full potential, then we negatively impact every soul that we touch in an infinite manner. Even if what we are doing is not sinful, we could be giving others more, but we aren't, because we refuse to surrender wholly to God's will.

Many of us even make excuses and blame others for the crisis in the Church or the lack of faith among Catholics, when really we should be blaming ourselves, for we are part of the problem. Yes, there are terrible people out there in the world, but what are we doing to make a change in our lives and the lives of others? If we were to take a moment for reflection, could we honestly say that we live our lives without compromise? I don't think so. We all make compromises, even on the most minuscule of levels. And each time that we compromise, we weaken our will to fight. And if we continue on that path of compromise, we will eventually kill our will to fight, and arrive at the conclusion that things like exercise, studying, reading, and prayer are nothing but silly methods and traditions that nobody but overachievers and strange pious people do. And when we perceive the most important of things to be silly and insignificant, then we perceive the most insignificant of things to be the most important. Things like sports, clubs, getting drunk, porn, women, and technology will consume us and take precedence over everything beneficial for our soul.

The solution to the crisis of the Catholic will to fight, is to confront ourselves. Are we capable of fighting? Is not the question, because we are all capable of that. The real question is, are we willing to fight? And if we are willing, then we must exercise that will to fight by doing our duty of state to the best of our abilities, no matter what people may think of us, no matter the consequences, no matter how bad it may hurt. When we don't want to pray, we pray. When we don't want to read, we read. When we don't want to study, we study. When we don't want to exercise, we exercise, because that fortifies our will to fight and prepares us for war.

The world needs strong Catholics, not tomorrow, but TODAY.

2 comments



Leave a message...



Great insights. Thanks.

2 years ago · Reply · [Twitter](#) [Facebook](#) [LinkedIn](#)



Why isn't Our Warpath front page news? Donate donate donate... NOW

2 years ago · Reply · [Twitter](#) [Facebook](#) [LinkedIn](#)

[REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Sent: Friday, March 17, 2023 4:23 PM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Subject: DP --- [REDACTED]
Attachments: RTC-Revision.docx

RMTRUserProp: Short-Term Use Email (Transitory)
SentinelCaseId: Short-Term Use Email (Transitory)

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Transitory

Good afternoon. I spent today tinkering with the DP, not with the intention to immediately push to re-disseminate, but just to see how difficult it might be to address DI's, CTD's, and OGC's areas of concern. I do not intend to formally pursue this any further without assurances from higher up that this initiative is supported. Take a look and let me know what you think.

Major changes:

- Re-oriented the analytical line slightly
- Softened instances of language that seemed to be causing distress
- Added a fourth Substantiation bullet with the [REDACTED] information
- Re-ordered the language in Substantiation bullet #1
- Shortened one of the first page footnotes
- Dropped the Perspective entirely
- Added an AofA

There are a few areas where we could tinker further:

- "RTC" is still in there, but caveated
- We could possibly chop some of the language in the Substantiation bullets
- I'm not crazy about the AofA since it is kind of just the opposite of the analytical line, but I didn't really have a better idea
- Some of the end notes are incomplete pertaining to the new Substantiation bullet
- Maybe some additional sourcing for some of the footnotes

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]



INSPECTION DIVISION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS



STRATEGIC REVIEW REPORT

Richmond Field Office - Domain Perspective Strategic Review

04/17/2023 – 04/21/2023

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "W. J. DelBagno", is written over a horizontal line.

William J. DelBagno
Acting Assistant Director
Inspection Division



INSPECTION DIVISION

DOMAIN PERSPECTIVE STRATEGIC REVIEW



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DOMAIN PERSPECTIVE STRATEGIC REVIEW



SUMMARY

On 01/24/2023, the Richmond Field Office (Richmond) published in Sentinel a Domain Perspective (DP)¹ entitled, “Interest of Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists in Radical-Traditionalist Catholic Ideology Almost Certainly Presents New Mitigation Opportunities.” In early February 2023, FBI senior leadership learned about the DP and concluded it failed to meet FBI standards and must be removed from FBI systems.

Both the Directorate of Intelligence (DI) and the Counterterrorism Division (CTD) concluded that the DP erroneously equated the ideology of domestic terrorism (DT) subjects who self-identified as “Radical Traditional Catholic” (“RTC”) with racially motivated violent extremist (RMVE) ideology without sufficient support. The DI further found that the DP failed to consider the potential bias and credibility of open-source information cited in support of the DP’s assessment, while CTD determined the DP included improper terminology to describe DT threat actors.

At FBI leadership’s direction, the Inspection Division (INSD) conducted a Strategic Review of the drafting, coordination, approval, and removal procedures utilized in Richmond’s production of the DP. In parallel, the DI reviewed the DP for adherence to Analytic Tradecraft Standards, while CTD reviewed the assessment and terminology used in the DP.

As detailed below, INSD completed its Strategic Review and made the following findings:

- Although the authors first conceived of the DP based on Richmond’s investigation of a fully predicated, high-priority DT subject—and not for an improper purpose, the DP equated the subjects’ interest in their self-described form of religion with RMVE ideology without sufficient evidence or articulable support. The DI and CTD concluded that the DP erroneously conflated subjects’ interest in religion with their RMVE activities, and implied RMVE and “RTC” ideology align without offering

¹ The Domain Perspective (DP) is an operational or strategic level product that focuses on how a shift in, or new development related to, an environmental variable (EV), or EVs, may affect threat(s) or the FBI’s efforts to mitigate those threats. DPs are written as internal-only products; however, they can be disseminated externally by following the procedures found in the DP Guidance document and in Section 10.4.1 of the Intelligence Program Policy Guide.



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evidence in support. This, in turn, created the appearance that the FBI conducts investigative activity based on religious affiliation in violation of one of the FBI's most fundamental principles that investigative activity may not be based solely on the exercise of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment;

- [REDACTED] Although there was no evidence of malicious intent or an improper purpose, all individuals involved with the drafting, review, and approval of the DP lacked professional judgment and failed to adhere to FBI standards. Once the DP was in the public domain, this conflation of the subjects' interest in the Catholic faith with their RMVE activities created the appearance that the FBI may be inappropriately considering religious beliefs and affiliation as a basis for its investigations;
- [REDACTED] INSD identified a lack of training and awareness of DT terminology along with no clear delineation of responsibility for specific elements during the review and approval process in Richmond. The DP utilized terms, such as "RTC" and "far-right," which are not consistent with DT terminology by the FBI, and doing so created the inaccurate appearance that these are accepted DT terms; and
- [REDACTED] Richmond's perception that the DP warranted less scrutiny because it was an internal intelligence product is not consistent with FBI intelligence policy and guidance, and the subsequent lack of adherence to those FBI standards led to the creation of the final version of the DP.

Accordingly, INSD directs the following corrective actions:

- [REDACTED] All individuals involved in the drafting, review, and approval of the DP shall be admonished, their FY 2023 performance ratings reflect the same, and their respective supervisors will engage with the Human Resources Division to ensure deficiencies are addressed and performance is maintained at an acceptable level;
- [REDACTED] Training will be provided on analytical tradecraft standards and DT y, in addition to that which has already been conducted;
- [REDACTED] Heightened approval will be required for any intelligence product involving a sensitive investigative matter; and



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- Policy will be updated and guidance will be provided on the use of third-party sources in intelligence products, consistent with Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203 Analytic Tradecraft Standard One, to include consideration and documentation of the access, reliability, bias, and other factors affecting the credibility of all sources cited in analytic products.

OBJECTIVE

At the request of the Deputy Director (DD) and the Associate Deputy Director (ADD), INSD conducted a Strategic Review of the drafting, coordination, approval, and removal procedures utilized in Richmond's production of the DP.

DP CONCEPTION

The DP was first conceived in mid-September 2022 when Richmond Intelligence Analyst (IA) and Domain Management Coordinator (DMC) IA (authors) began discussing potential intelligence products to assist with Richmond's DT outreach efforts in line with the FY 2023 Field Office Strategic Plan, which included an objective of strengthening outreach to public and law enforcement partners.²

The authors identified the investigation () as one that highlighted an opportunity for outreach based on potential threat activities associated with the subject. was considered Richmond's highest priority DT subject and was ranked # overall on the FBI Indicators of Mobilization to Violence (IMV).³ utilized Gab, a social

² The Field Office Strategic Plan (FOSP) is a field office's guide for how the office will mitigate threats in its Area of Responsibility during the fiscal year. The FOSP is developed annually subsequent to the release of the FBI's Master Threat List, which in FY 2023 included RMVE as a DT National Threat Priority. Richmond's FOSP included the following objective: "FBI Richmond recognizes liaison relationships are critical to identifying and disrupting the RMVE threat, as initial identification of potential RMVE actors often comes from members of the public or law enforcement partners who had interaction with the actor. Accordingly, FBI Richmond will continue to make liaison relationships a priority, and endeavor to strengthen those relationships through outreach."

³ The IMV is an analysis tool that compares the behaviors of previously mobilized terrorism subjects with behaviors of terrorism subjects who did not mobilize. IMV is not a predictive tool; it assists the FBI in objectively and methodically assessing which US-based terrorism subjects are the most likely to mobilize to violence and was designed to assist with assessing investigative priorities and resource allocations decisions. For context, the IMV ranked subjects were disrupted and the IMV ranked subject was the



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media platform, to communicate with individuals advocating anti-Semitic hate and violence. [REDACTED] self-identified as a “radical traditional Catholic Clerical Fascist.” INSD interviews revealed this was how Richmond initially learned of the term “RTC.” In the spring of 2022, [REDACTED] began attending Our Lady of Fatima Chapel in Richmond, Virginia. Although it was not specified in the DP, IA [REDACTED] advised that others associated with [REDACTED] also self-identified as “RTC” within various forms of social media.

[REDACTED] By way of background, the [REDACTED] investigation stemmed from a Guardian Assessment initiated in September 2019 in relation to [REDACTED] purchase of several AR-type rifles, multiple high-capacity magazines, and large quantities of .223 ammunition from a local gun store. [REDACTED] was overheard saying due to recent elections in Virginia, all options had been exhausted and the only solution left was violence. [REDACTED] was arrested by local law enforcement in August 2020 for assault on a law enforcement officer and again in November 2022 by the [REDACTED] on state charges of unlawful paramilitary activity. Police seized eight Molotov cocktails, six smoke bombs, one smoke grenade, and firearms components. [REDACTED] also received packages at his home containing lock picking/garage door bypass equipment and a lower receiver Glock kit. [REDACTED] was being seen by a psychologist who reported to law enforcement that [REDACTED] expressed willingness to commit acts of violence. [REDACTED] opined that [REDACTED] behaviors were consistent with an individual willing and able to carry out an act of violence against others.

DP CREATION/REVIEW/APPROVAL

[REDACTED] Richmond personnel began researching and drafting the DP in November 2022. Information in the DP was derived from two main types of information. The first type was operational intelligence gathered through various FBI investigations, including Richmond’s [REDACTED] investigation. Additionally, the authors believed a case similar to [REDACTED] in the Milwaukee Field Office (Milwaukee) should be referenced, as the subject held many similarities to [REDACTED]. The authors further identified a Portland Field Office (Portland) investigation as a source of information because the main subject also displayed similarities to [REDACTED] even though the subject was recently deceased from a self-inflicted accidental gunshot wound. Accordingly, the authors coordinated with the case managers of the [REDACTED] investigation, as well as with agents and analysts in Milwaukee and Portland, to verify the facts cited in the DP. The agents and analysts in Milwaukee and Portland only reviewed the bullet points associated with their respective investigation and did not review or contribute to the broader DP.



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The second part of the research was derived from open sources, to include the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC). IA [REDACTED] acknowledged that SPLC was known to have a political bias. Nonetheless, the authors did not provide any details about potential bias or the credibility of sources and cited the SPLC and other open-source reporting in support of the assertion of a “trend” and the characterization of an “RTC movement.” The authors included the SPLC information and other open source material in the Perspective section of the DP.

INSD assessed there was no formal peer review process for intelligence products in Richmond, but that it was a general practice for a senior IA to review draft products before sending to the Supervisory Intelligence Analyst (SIA) for approval. Coordination and review of intelligence products occurred on Richmond’s Intelligence SharePoint site. The authors requested that senior IA [REDACTED] (peer reviewer) peer review the product via the Intelligence SharePoint site in January 2023. The peer reviewer edited the DP for mechanical and structural edits to ensure the DP conformed to the Style Guide for FBI Analytic Intelligence Products. Although trained as an Analytic Tradecraft Reviewer, the peer reviewer stated she did not conduct a tradecraft review or edit for substance because the DP was not an external product. For external intelligence products, approval is required by the field office Intelligence Program Manager in addition to a required review process by FBIHQ entities. FBI policy and guidance do not distinguish between internal and external products regarding tradecraft standards. INSD found that no Richmond personnel reviewed the DP for analytic tradecraft.

IA [REDACTED] also specifically requested peer review from Richmond IA [REDACTED] who had [REDACTED] Catholic Seminary, to ensure terminology and definitions regarding unique Catholic terms were presented properly. IA [REDACTED] did not have any major issues with the substance, but suggested some items for clarification.

IA [REDACTED] requested legal review by Richmond Chief Division Counsel (CDC) [REDACTED] (legal reviewer) on 01/12/2023. The CDC advised he had never reviewed a DP before. He advised the product should include a First Amendment legal caveat, but otherwise concurred as long as the product remained an internal product. In his legal analysis of the DP, the CDC did not review the terminology and deferred to the SIAs to use accurate terminology for their program. He also deferred to their expertise on any definitions. The CDC stated he believed the subjects referred to themselves as “RTCs.” The CDC perceived the purpose of the DP as informing management regarding outreach to the Catholic Church, due to RMVE interest in certain individuals, and maintained the DP was not intended to target Catholics or their faith. He



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did not believe the product communicated any criminality by the churches and did not believe the information in the DP violated the law as there was a nexus to FBI investigations and criminal actors, and was not based solely on First Amendment protected information.

When the final draft was complete, the DP was routed for approval. The DP was provided to Richmond SIA (approver) and Intelligence Program Coordinator (IPC) SIA (approver) for review and approval. SIA stated during her interview with INSD that she didn't make many edits. IPC SIA was the second and final approver. He received the DP on 01/23/2023 and reviewed it the same day. During his interview, IPC SIA stated he did not know where the term "RTC" originated and was not part of the confidence level decision on the DP. DMC stated there were a few edits to the product at each stage of the peer and approval process, but nothing substantive. Richmond personnel advised that review and approval of the DP was handled the same as all internal intelligence products.

The DP was published in Sentinel on 01/24/2023 and added to the Richmond Intelligence SharePoint site on 01/26/2023. On 02/03/2023, Special Agent-In-Charge (SAC) Stanley M. Meador provided feedback via the Intelligence SharePoint site indicating that the DP would assist with outreach opportunities to entities such as the local Catholic Diocese. Since all references to the DP were removed from the Intelligence SharePoint site, it is unknown if any other feedback was provided on the DP.

DP REMOVAL

On or about 02/08/2023, myriad news organizations began reporting on the DP, which was an unauthorized disclosure of the DP with redactions.

On 02/09/2023, SAC Meador convened a meeting with Richmond Executive Management (EM), the SIAs, and the CDC to discuss the unauthorized disclosure. SAC Meador advised he was directed by DD Abbate not to make any public statements. DD Abbate stated they were waiting for OPA and in a "holding pattern" on all statements.⁴ DD Abbate further instructed SAC Meador to "pull it down," which SAC Meador understood to mean remove the DP across the board from all holdings in Richmond. SAC Meador instructed an intelligence

⁴ The Office of Public Affairs made efforts to determine the authenticity of the DP as an FBI document.



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analyst to remove the DP from the Richmond's Intelligence SharePoint site. The IA did so on the same date and ensured the deleted DP was removed from the site's recycle bin.

() SAC Meador tasked the CDC to work with the Office of the General Counsel (OGC) to determine what needed to transpire to facilitate the DP Permanent Charge-Out (PCO) of Sentinel.⁵ A Richmond Assistant Special Agent-In-Charge was delegated to oversee the PCO for Richmond. The ASAC advised he drafted the lead in Sentinel to facilitate the PCO from the system, but was not involved with any discussions regarding the OGC approval.

() On 02/10/2023, the PCO process was completed.

() IMPACT

() On 02/21/2023, DI personnel completed an Analytic Tradecraft Review of the DP utilizing the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's Analytic Tradecraft Standards as established in ICD 203. The DI identified issues regarding the readability, main assessment, sourcing, assumptions, perspective, analysis of alternatives, and outlook. In particular, the DI found the DP implies RMVE and "RTC" ideology align and asserts increased interest of RMVEs in "RTC" ideology without offering evidence in support. The DI further found the authors relied on open source information without providing details about the potential bias or credibility of the sources, such as the SPLC.

() Similarly, CTD reviewed the DP for its assessment and use of DT terminology. CTD expressed concern that the DP inaccurately conflated subjects' interest in religion with their RMVE activities. In the three FBI investigations cited in the DP, the authors mentioned interest in religion alongside concerning rhetoric and illegal acts, but did not establish that interest led subjects into the RMVE movement or had an impact on the acts for which they were investigated or arrested. Additionally, CTD concluded the authors used improper terminology to describe DT threat actors.

⁵ () PCO refers to a deletion of a record from all electronic recordkeeping systems, including Sentinel and the Automated Case Support (ACS) system.



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INSND assessed the most egregious instances of failing to adhere to the Analytic Tradecraft Standards were regarding Standard One (Properly describes quality and credibility of underlying sources, data, and methodologies) and Standard Six (Uses clear and logical argumentation). Concerning Standard One, INSND assessed despite Richmond's inclusion of SPLC information in the Perspective section, the authors should have been aware of the impact the perceived bias that publication would have on DP consumers. Regarding Standard Six, even though [REDACTED] defined himself as an "RTC," INSND assessed the use of that term in conjunction with the definition of RMVE had the effect of conflating or erroneously equating the two terms. Although the authors first conceived of the DP based on Richmond's investigation of [REDACTED] a fully predicated, high-priority DT subject—and not for an improper purpose, the DP equated interest in a particular form of religion with RMVE ideology without sufficient evidence or articulable support. The errors in the DP are significant as they created the false appearance that the FBI conducts investigative activity based on religious affiliation.

[REDACTED] FBI policies classify investigative activity that involves religious organizations as a "sensitive investigative matter." That designation recognizes the sensitivity of conduct that traditionally concerns the exercise of First Amendment rights by individuals who associate for religious purposes. While there are instances in which the FBI may take appropriate cognizance of the role religion may play in the motivation for criminal or terrorist acts (*i.e.* when subjects of investigation state their criminal or terrorist acts are based on religious doctrine), such was not the case with the three subjects of the DP. The DP failed to draw any direct connection between the subjects' affiliation with the Catholic faith and their motivation to engage in criminal activity. This lack of a nexus between religious beliefs and criminal activity created the misconception that the FBI conducts investigative activity based on religious affiliation in violation of one of the FBI's most fundamental principles that investigative activity may not be based solely on the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. As a result, the publicity the DP received diminished public trust and had a significant negative impact on the reputation of the FBI.

[REDACTED] Subsequent to the unauthorized disclosure, SAC Meador received permission from DD Abbate to meet with the local Catholic Diocese to address the DP. On 03/09/2023, SAC Meador met with high ranking members and attorneys of the Dioceses of Richmond. An invitation to visit the field office was provided to the Dioceses and on 03/24/2023, the [REDACTED] and attorneys of the Dioceses of Richmond received briefings on terrorism, civil rights, and hate crimes.



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CONCLUSION

During the Strategic Review, INSD interviewed 26 individuals involved with the drafting, coordination, approval, and removal of the DP. INSD assessed all individuals involved in the creation, review, and approval of the DP not only failed to adhere to the Analytic Tradecraft Standards as set forth in ODNI ICD 203 and reinforced by FBI policy and guidance, but also failed to recognize that the DP, as drafted, impermissibly considered the religious beliefs of the subjects, failing to draw any connection between the subjects' beliefs and their desire to engage in violent criminal activity. Once in the public domain, the DP had the effect of creating the impression that the FBI targets individuals based on their religious affiliation in contravention of the FBI's core investigative principles. As is true for all FBI employees, those involved in the drafting, review, and approval of the DP, regardless of role, rank, or position, had a responsibility to recognize, address, and remedy this defect in the DP. These individuals include: SAC Meador (Division Head post-publication review of the DP on the Richmond Intelligence SharePoint site); CDC [REDACTED] (legal review); IPC SIA [REDACTED] (approver); SIA [REDACTED] (approver); IA [REDACTED]; (peer review); IA [REDACTED] (peer review); IA [REDACTED] (author); and DMC IA [REDACTED] (co-author). INSD identified a lack of training and awareness of DT terminology along with no clear delineation of responsibility for specific elements during the review and approval process in Richmond. INSD identified Richmond's perception that the DP warranted less scrutiny because it was an internal intelligence product is not consistent with FBI intelligence policy and guidance, and the subsequent lack of adherence to those FBI standards led to the creation of the final version of the DP. In addition, INSD identified the need to update policy and provide guidance on the use of third-party sources in intelligence products, consistent with ODNI ICD 203 Analytic Tradecraft Standard One, to include consideration and documentation of the access, reliability, bias, and other factors affecting the credibility of all sources cited in analytic products.

TIMELINE

Mid-September 2022: Richmond developed concept of the DP.

11/11/2022: The Richmond DMC placed a working document into Richmond's Intelligence SharePoint site.



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11/15/2022: expressed interest in Richmond writing an Executive Update on

November – December 2022: The authors started the researching and drafting phase of the product. Richmond DMC focused on open-source intelligence, while IA focused on operational information.

12/30/2022: Richmond IA contacted Milwaukee to discuss a Milwaukee subject to be referenced in the DP.

01/03/2023: Richmond IA coordinated a DP evidence bullet point with Portland.

01/05/2023: Richmond DT SSA received an email from the DMC advising of an internal intelligence product being written and that IA was coordinating with CTD, DTOS on an external product – a Strategic Perspective Executive Analytic Report (SPEAR).

01/12/2023: Richmond DT SSA received the draft DP for awareness. The authors sent the DP for coordination to the peer reviewers and the CDC for review.

Richmond IA received the DP via the Intelligence SharePoint site and conducted peer review edits. IA did not edit for substance, but for mechanical and structural edits, and to ensure it met FBI Style Guide requirements.

Richmond IA provided feedback for the DP on terminology and clarification of elements related to Catholicism.

01/13/2023: The CDC indicated there were no legal issues with the DP and provided advice on legal concerns if the product was externally disseminated.

01/17/2023: The DP was provided to the approvers for review.

01/20/2023: SIA completed review of the DP and passed the DP to the Richmond IPC for review.

01/23/2023: The DP was submitted for approval in Sentinel.



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██████████) **01/24/2023:** The DP was published in Sentinel.

██████████ **01/26/2023:** The Richmond IPC added the DP to the Richmond Intelligence SharePoint site.

██████████ **02/02/2023:** The Richmond personnel sent the draft SPEAR, based on the DP, to CTD, Domestic Terrorism Operations Unit (DTOU).

██████████ **02/03/2023:** SAC Meador provided feedback in the Richmond Intelligence SharePoint site indicating he appreciated the perspective and wanted to meet with the team to discuss outreach to the Catholic Dioceses.

██████████ **02/06/2023:** DTOU viewed the draft SPEAR and suggested using an Emerging Intelligence Report (EIR).

██████████ **02/08/2023:** Multiple news outlets began reporting on the DP. DD Abbate advised SAC Meador of the DP leak. SAC Meador notified two Richmond ASACs of the DP leak.

██████████ **02/09/2023:** SAC Meador was directed by DD Abbate to “pull it down,” which SAC Meador understood to mean remove the DP from all holdings in Richmond. SAC Meador convened a morning meeting with his EM, SIAs, and CDC to discuss the DP. An IA was asked to remove the product, edits, and any reference to the product from Richmond’s Intelligence SharePoint site.

██████████ **02/09/2023:** SAC Meador tasked the CDC to work with OGC to determine what needed to be done to facilitate charge out of the DP.

██████████) **02/10/2023:** A Richmond ASAC sent a lead to IMD requesting the PCO of the DP from all record-keeping systems. As justification for the PCO, the lead stated the DP contained information that “should have been restricted or prohibited.” The lead also noted that OGC concurred with the PCO. The PCO removal process was completed on 02/10/2023.

██████████) **02/21/2023:** The DI completed a tradecraft review of the DP, identifying deficiencies in the DP.



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() 02/23/2023: OGC, DI, and CTD provided Richmond personnel training via Skype on DT terminology, civil liberties, evidence, assumptions, and sourcing.

() 02/24/2023: CTD and DI issued a joint message providing guidance regarding intelligence production on DT threats. The guidance reiterated that product authors should clearly identify underlying sources on which judgements are based and must use terminology from CTD's Consolidated Strategy Guide.⁶

⁶ The Consolidated Strategy Guide is an annual required publication of each FBIHQ operational division whereby threat guidance documents are generated for identified threat issues. Each threat guidance document must include the threat definition, a threat overview to describe a national-level summary of the threat issue, and the corresponding national threat strategy.



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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Observations, Analysis, and Instructions

Appendix B: ODNI ICD 203 – Analytic Standards

Appendix C. Richmond Domain Perspective (DP) - (Restricted Access)

Appendix D: Redacted version of DP found online - (Restricted Access)



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APPENDIX A: OBSERVATIONS, ANALYSIS, AND INSTRUCTIONS

Observation 1: Although there was no evidence of malicious intent or an improper purpose, all individuals involved with the drafting, review, and approval of the DP lacked professional judgment and failed to adhere to FBI standards, such as use of improper DT terminology and adherence to the Intelligence Program Policy Guide. SAC Stanley M. Meador lacked professional judgment in the Division Head's post-publication review of the DP.

Analysis 1: Although the authors first conceived of the DP based on Richmond's investigation of a fully predicated, high-priority DT subject—and not for an improper purpose, the DP equated interest in a particular form of religion with RMVE ideology without sufficient evidence or articulable support: the DI and CTD concluded that the DP erroneously conflated subjects' interest in religion with their RMVE activities, and implied RMVE and "RTC" ideology align without offering evidence in support. This, in turn, created the appearance that the FBI conducts investigative activity based on religious affiliation in violation of one of the FBI's most fundamental principles that investigative activity may not be based solely on the exercise of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. As a result, the publicity the DP received diminished public trust and had a significant negative impact on the reputation of the FBI.

Instruction 1a: DD must admonish SAC Stanley M. Meador for his lack of professional judgement, ensure his FY 2023 performance ratings reflect the same, and engage with the Human Resources Division to ensure deficiencies are addressed and performance is maintained at an acceptable level.

Instruction 1b: SAC, Richmond must admonish all individuals involved in the drafting, review, and approval of the DP for their lack of professional judgement, ensure their FY 2023 performance ratings reflect the same, and engage with the Human Resources Division to ensure deficiencies are addressed and performance is maintained at an acceptable level. The individuals involved in the drafting, review, and approval of the DP include: CDC (legal review); SIA (approver); SIA (approver); IA (peer review); IA (peer review); IA (author); and IA (co-author).

Observation 2: INSD identified a lack of training and awareness related to the Analytic Tradecraft Standards as outlined in ODNI ICD 203, particularly in regard to internal intelligence products. INSD further identified a lack of training and awareness regarding the appropriate Domestic Terrorism (DT) terminology when referring to and describing threats.



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() **Analysis 2:** INSD determined there was a perception in Richmond that internal intelligence products did not require the same level of analytic rigor as external products. However, the Intelligence Program Policy Guide (1170PG) made no distinction between internal and external products. Section 10.2.2. stated: *“All FBI analytic products must comply with the ODNI IC analytic standards, which guide the analysis, critical thinking, and production-planning decisions for all product lines and all authoring entities. The standards are outlined in ICD 203.”* Further, Richmond made frequent use of improper terminology to describe DT threat actors, which implied these terms were accepted DT terminology. Appropriate DT terminology does not solely use a protected characteristic, such as race, ethnicity, gender, national origin, sexual orientation, or gender identity of a DT threat actor, or the exercise of First Amendment rights, to define or label a DT threat actor group; and, to the extent that the DT threat actor group self-identifies using such a characteristic, it is appropriate for that fact to be made clear in the reference to the term. Richmond should have utilized DT terminology consistent with CTD’s Consolidated Strategy Guide.

() **Instruction 2a:** DD must ensure all ADICs and SACs are familiar with and adhere to the Analytic Tradecraft Standards as outlined in ODNI ICD 203.

() **Instruction 2b:** SAC, Richmond must ensure all Richmond intelligence personnel are familiar with and adhere to the Analytic Tradecraft Standards as outlined in ODNI ICD 203.

() **Instruction 2c:** AD, DI must ensure all personnel who draft and approve intelligence products receive training, to include periodic refresher training, regarding the Analytic Tradecraft Standards as outlined in ODNI ICD 203.

() **Instruction 2d:** AD, CTD must ensure all DT personnel are familiar with the appropriate DT terminology when referring to and describing threats.

() **Instruction 2e:** GC, OGC must ensure all CDC/ADC personnel are familiar with the appropriate DT terminology when referring to and describing threats.

() **Instruction 2f:** AD, DI must implement a model peer review process with clearly delineated roles and responsibilities to ensure proper review of finished intelligence products prior to approval in Sentinel.

() **Observation 3:** The Intelligence Program Policy Guide (IPPG) fails to require an elevated level of approval for intelligence products involving a sensitive investigative matter.



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Analysis 3: The IPPG does not require the SAC or respective HQ Division Senior Executive Service (SES) level program manager to be informed of intelligence production as part of the review and approval process. Internal intelligence products, such as the DP, only require approval by the Supervisory Intelligence Analyst. INSD determined the Richmond SAC and a respective HQ Division SES level program manager had not reviewed or approved the DP prior to its publication in Sentinel. INSD assessed SAC and respective HQ Division SES level program management approval should be required prior to dissemination of any intelligence product dealing with a sensitive investigative matter, as defined by DIOG Section 10.1.2.1 which stated: *“A sensitive investigative matter (SIM) is defined as an investigative matter involving the activities of a domestic public official or domestic political candidate (involving corruption or a threat to the national security), a religious or domestic political organization or individual prominent in such an organization, or the news media; an investigative matter having an academic nexus; or any other matter which, in the judgment of the official authorizing the investigation, should be brought to the attention of FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) and other DOJ officials.”*

Instruction 3: AD, DI must amend the IPPG such that the SAC and respective HQ Division SES level program manager approvals are required for any intelligence product involving a sensitive investigative matter.

Observation 4: The Richmond DP failed to adhere to Analytic Tradecraft Standards as outlined in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203.

Analysis 4: The Intelligence Program Policy Guide (1170PG) Section 10.2.2. stated: *“All FBI analytic products must comply with the ODNI IC analytic standards, which guide the analysis, critical thinking, and production-planning decisions for all product lines and all authoring entities. The standards are outlined in ICD 203.”*

On 02/21/2023, Directorate of Intelligence (DI) personnel completed an Analytic Tradecraft Review of the DP utilizing the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s Analytic Tradecraft Standards as established in Intelligence Community Directive 203. The DI identified issues regarding the readability, main assessment, sourcing, assumptions, perspective, analysis of alternatives, and outlook.

INSD assessed the most egregious instances of failing to adhere to ATS were regarding Standard One (Properly describes quality and credibility of underlying sources, data, and methodologies) and Standard Six (Uses clear and logical argumentation). Concerning Standard



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One, INSD assessed despite Richmond's inclusion of SPLC information in the Perspective section, authors should have been aware of the impact the perceived bias that publication would have on DP consumers. The DP would not have suffered a contextual loss by removing the SPLC details on "RTCs." Rather, the DP could have been made stronger by including additional FBI investigative findings regarding [REDACTED] own acts of violence. Regarding Standard Six, even though [REDACTED] defined himself as an "RTC," INSD assessed the use of that term in conjunction with the definition of RMVE had the effect of distorting possible distinctions between the two. The DP would have been more effective by focusing on the violent acts of [REDACTED] regardless of how he described himself.

([REDACTED]) **Instruction 4:** AD, DI must update policy and provide guidance on the use of third-party sources in intelligence products, consistent with ICD 203 Analytic Tradecraft Standard One, to include consideration and documentation of the access, reliability, bias, and other factors affecting the credibility of all sources cited in analytic products.

(RH) (FBI)

From: Jones, Jason Allen (OGC) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, July 19, 2023 8:22 AM
To: Ugoretz, Tonya L. (DI) (FBI); Delbagno, William J. (INSD) (FBI); Lenzner, Jonathan Falk (DO) (DET); Miller, William Michael (DO) (DET); Polinsky, Melissa (OGC) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); McCarthy, Dawn L. (OGC) (FBI); Dunham, Christopher G. (OCA) (FBI); Milhoan, Catherine L. (OPA) (FBI); Goodwater, Douglas M. (OPA) (FBI); Wells, Robert R. (CTD) (FBI); Fodor, Matthew W. (CTD) (FBI); Machtinger, Michael P. (CTD) (FBI); Byron, Pamela (DI) (FBI); Viola, Virginia E. (DI) (FBI); Decker, Eric L. (DI) (FBI); Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI); Porter, David K. (DO) (FBI); Myrthil, Lyonel (DO) (FBI); Raia, Christopher G. (NSB) (FBI); Fahim, Christina (IB) (FBI); Young, Ryan T. (IB) (FBI)
Cc: Hall, Cindy L. Peters (INSD) (FBI); Rivera-Esparra, Felix A. (INSD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); Rehler, Kristin (INSD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Richmond Strategic Review-- Final Draft Report --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Transitory

I do not agree that the report should suggest that the conception and initiation of this product was sound.

From: Ugoretz, Tonya L. (DI) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, July 19, 2023 7:11 AM
To: Delbagno, William J. (INSD) (FBI); Lenzner, Jonathan Falk (DO) (DET); Miller, William Michael (DO) (DET); Jones, Jason Allen (OGC) (FBI); Polinsky, Melissa (OGC) (FBI); [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI); McCarthy, Dawn L. (OGC) (FBI); Dunham, Christopher G. (OCA) (FBI); Milhoan, Catherine C. (OPA) (FBI); Goodwater, Douglas M. (OPA) (FBI); Wells, Robert R. (CTD) (FBI); Fodor, Matthew W. (CTD) (FBI); Machtinger, Michael P. (CTD) (FBI); Byron, Pamela (DI) (FBI); Viola, Virginia E. (DI) (FBI); Decker, Eric L. (DI) (FBI); Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI); Porter, David K. (DO) (FBI); Myrthil, Lyonel (DO) (FBI); Raia, Christopher G. (NSB) (FBI); Fahim, Christina (IB) (FBI); Young, Ryan T. (IB) (FBI)
Cc: Hall, Cindy L. Peters (INSD) (FBI); Rivera-Esparra, Felix A. (INSD) (FBI); [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI); Rehler, Kristin (INSD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Richmond Strategic Review-- Final Draft Report --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
=====

Transitory

Bill,

Thank you for the opportunity to review. DI's input on the report and recommendations is attached. Among our comments, there are a few critical ones I want to highlight:

- DI asks that the Conclusion section include a finding by INSD that the original basis for the conception and initiation of the DP was sound. As INSD documents in the report's DP Conception section, the product addressed an approved, identified need in the FOSP and had a basis in investigative information on which to build a recommendation for outreach. It is important to note this, and to distinguish the conception and initiation from the *execution* as the aspect that was flawed.

- I don't know if it is common practice to name non-SES individuals in an INSD Strategic Review Report, but I don't recall seeing this done in the past and believe there is substantial risk to doing so here. We request removal of non-SES names from the report and do not believe follow-on actions related to the individuals involved would be hampered by removing them.
- For Observation 2 identifying a lack of training on Analytic Tradecraft Standards, DI found no substantiation of this observation in the report. We request the Observation be reworked to acknowledge the training that is available and delivered to employees (a list of which DI can provide) and focus on gaps (training non-analyst reviewers) and the need for refresher training.
- DI requests Instruction 3 be changed to require approval from the Headquarters Division for the relevant program rather than SAC approval. This will better ensure consistent, national-level oversight and is consistent with other intelligence product approvals for sensitive topics (such as public corruption and foreign malign influence).

We are available to discuss and work with the INSD team on our comments and appreciate the work that went into this.

Thanks,
Tonya

From: Delbagno, William J. (INSD) (FBI) [REDACTED] >
Sent: Thursday, July 13, 2023 6:40 PM
To: Lenzner, Jonathan Falk (DO) (DET) [REDACTED]; Miller, William Michael (DO) (DET) [REDACTED]; Jones, Jason Allen (OGC) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; Polinsky, Melissa (OGC) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; McCarthy, Dawn L. (OGC) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>; Dunham, Christopher G. (OCA) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; Milhoan, Catherine L. (OPA) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; Goodwater, Douglas M. (OPA) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; Wells, Robert R. (CTD) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; Fodor, Matthew W. (CTD) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; Machtinger, Michael P. (CTD) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; Ugoretz, Tonya L. (DI) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; Byron, Pamela (DI) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; Viola, Virginia E. (DI) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; Decker, Eric L. (DI) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; Porter, David K. (DE) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; Myrthil, Lyonel (DO) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; Raia, Christopher G. (NSB) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; Fahim, Christina (IB) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Cc: Delbagno, William J. (INSD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Hall, Cindy L. Peters (INSD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Rivera-Esparra, Felix A. (INSD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (WF) [REDACTED]; Rehler, Kristin (INSD) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Subject: Richmond Strategic Review-- Final Draft Report --- [REDACTED]
Importance: High

Classification: [REDACTED]
 =====

Transitory

Good afternoon,

As mentioned in the morning briefing, INSD completed a final draft of the Richmond Domain Perspective strategic review. Thank you to everyone who provided feedback thus far to get to this point.

I'm sending out this email to ask for your final collaboration and to add stakeholder Division Heads if not already included. I'd kindly request that stakeholders provide input back to the INSD team by **no later than close of business of Tuesday, July 19th**. If more time needed or it's necessary to meet again in-person, please let me know as soon as possible and we'll make those arrangements. Feel free to contact anyone on the Cc line from INSD.

For next steps, after the completion of this collaboration, INSD will send the finalized version, with any accepted updates, back to this group and onward to the DD, ADD, and the EADs IB and NSB. I am including their respective CoS/Special Assistants for awareness and tracking.

Thank you again for your reviews and collaboration.

Bill

William J. DelBagno
Acting Assistant Director
Inspection Division
Office: [REDACTED]
Cell: [REDACTED] 5

From: Rehler, Kristin (INSD) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, June 28, 2023 11:39 AM
To: Lenzner, Jonathan Falk (DO) (DET) [REDACTED]; Dunham, Christopher G. (OCA) (FBI)
[REDACTED]; Goodwater, Douglas M. (OPA) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Machtinger, Michael P. (CTD) (FBI) [REDACTED];
McCarthy, Dawn L. (OGC) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI)
[REDACTED]; Miller, William Michael (DO) (DET) [REDACTED]; Miller, William Michael
(DO) (DET) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (WF) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Myrthil, Lyonel (DO) (FBI)
[REDACTED]; Ugoretz, Tonya L. (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Viola, Virginia E. (DI) (FBI)
[REDACTED]; Decker, Eric L. (DI) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Cc: Rivera-Esparra, Felix A. (INSD) (FBI) [REDACTED]; Hall, Cindy L. Peters (INSD) (FBI)
[REDACTED]; Delbagno, William J. (INSD) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Subject: Richmond Strategic Review-- Draft Report --- U [REDACTED]
Importance: High

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Transitory

Thank you for attending the briefing with the Director's Office on June 13th. As promised, attached is the Draft Report for Collaboration. Substantively, there should be no surprises. The report mirrors what was briefed.

Please let me know if you have any concerns and provide any comments by COB Friday.

v/r,
Kristin

Kristin Rehler
Inspector
FBI | Inspection Division
Office | JEH Room [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (Office)
[REDACTED] (Mobile)



7/7 Meeting – led by SAC

“Pencils down” but later “You can write whatever you want”

SAC went over the draft findings of the inspection report, including that all individuals involved exercised bad judgment, didn’t have common sense, did grave damage to the Bureau, etc. He would not share with us the exact language, suggesting it would be too harsh.

The SAC said INSD’s draft language for our wrap-ups regarding the incident was not acceptable to the DD. “It’s not enough,” the DD said, and they are working on harsher language.

I asked the SAC what will be “enough?” What else is to come? And he had no specifics/no real answer, merely that they are working on harsher language.

He told everyone he wish we could be flies on the wall so we could hear how hard he/people were fighting for us and pushing back. But he said the DD will not be swayed.

The SAC said he mentioned to the DD that he had multiple papers on his desk plagued by the same errors and DD/INSD did not care, said it was immaterial, not relevant.

The SAC he asked the DD that he understood there were human beings involved, and DD/INSD did not care.

The SAC said he told the DD that he has a bishop, cardinal, the church on one hand saying this paper was well-written and theologically sound; he said this paper was reviewed by at least a dozen people, shared as a good paper by a senior IA to a large distro list, shared with CTD, who were pursuing a follow-on SPEAR and NO ONE had any issues, and that doesn’t matter when it comes to the fall-out? DD/INSD said no.

When I told the SAC I wanted the full report when it became available, and said it should be shared with DI, he shook his head.

A/ASAC [REDACTED] “There are no inconsistent performers in this room”

SAC told us not to worry about getting an inconsistent

The SAC apologized to all of us.

Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Sent: Saturday, July 8, 2023 5:55 PM
To: Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI)
Subject: Re: Follow Up

Thank you. I will try my best.

From: Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, July 7, 2023 10:58:54 PM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: Follow Up

No apology needed [REDACTED]. I'm glad you are on the team and am thankful for your commitment.

Keep that head up, this too shall pass. Will make for a great chapter in your memoirs some day!

Stanley

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, July 7, 2023 10:29:09 PM
To: Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: Follow Up

Thank you for keeping us informed. I am terribly sorry for all that everyone has had to endure as a result of this product. Each person negatively impacted is a trusted colleague and/or supervisor whom I deeply respect and admire. I feel personally responsible as I should have known the potential DT pitfalls and the susceptibility to politicization surrounding this paper better than anyone.

Thank you for supporting us and please accept my sincerest apologies.

From: Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] >
Sent: Friday, July 7, 2023 7:27:03 PM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI); [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Subject: Follow Up

Evening everyone, sorry to both you on a Friday evening.

I just wanted to follow up with you on one point from our meeting today.

7-27 All emp

118 participants

Indicated how he had to be careful with how he has addressed since beginning

Said product was leaked in a redacted fashion, not including parts that speak more to its intent and context

Laid out what has been done since – training, great meeting with Diocese and ADIC/Cardinal and discussed what product is and isn't and what the purpose was – to recommend outreach. Strategic Review, no OPR or OIG, not a misconduct issue.

Noted that RH does not have a formal peer review process, but this is not mandated. Took the step to formalize review process.

Went over ICD 203 for awareness for all.

Said INSD and he are testifying.

Expressed intent by FBIHQ is to redact any names in the report to Congress save SES names.

"The people involved didn't deserve this." Plenty of other ways to raise concerns. Cowardly leaker. Said his priority is to care for them as he would for any of us. Please remember them.

Understood the toll it takes and its impact on morale.

Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, August 1, 2023 5:12 PM
To: Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI)
Subject: Re: Message for EACs Coming to Richmond

Excellent idea! Let me know if you need me to explain further what the CIP is and how it works.

From: Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>
Sent: Tuesday, August 1, 2023 4:40:13 PM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>
Subject: RE: Message for EACs Coming to Richmond

[REDACTED] (I am planning to discuss this at tomorrow mornings monthly all supervisor meeting. Post the meeting, I am going to send out the email to all the supervisors. I want to engage the supervisors to ensure they are checking in with their respective teams on this and know that the resource is available. I think first discussing tomorrow with the supervisors will go a long way versus a blast email with no notification to them first.

Stanley

From: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>
Sent: Monday, July 31, 2023 1:36 PM
To: Meador, Stanley M. (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>
Subject: FW: Message for EACs Coming to Richmond

Sir,

Please see below for messaging to the RH FO for the CIP. I can explain more when you are available.

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (IP) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>
Sent: Monday, July 31, 2023 1:34 PM
To: [REDACTED] (RH) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; [REDACTED] (CV) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>; [REDACTED] (BS) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>
Cc: [REDACTED] (HRD) (FBI) [REDACTED] v>
Subject: Message for EACs Coming to Richmond

[REDACTED],

It was great talking to you today. Here is the message for your SAC to send out to the Richmond Division. If your SAC will send this out sooner than later that will be great as it will give time for employees to reach out to the EACs. If you or your SAC have any questions after you brief the SAC on the plan, please just let me know.

████ and █████, █████ mentioned he will work with Richmond Security so your badges work when you show up on the 8th. █████ will be in the office on the 8th and your POC, he will be out on the 9th but will make sure an EAP Peer is ready to help you on the 9th.

Email Pony

In response to the recent congressional hearing, Richmond Executive Management has invited the Employee Assistance Unit (EAU) to provide additional EAP support on Tuesday, August 8th and Wednesday, August 9th.

On August 8th and 9th, two Employee Assistance Counselors (EACs) will be available to support all employees and your families, alongside Richmond EAP personnel. An EAC is a licensed mental health professional who can provide confidential, short-term counseling services. Additional details about location will be disseminated soon.

All employees are encouraged to schedule individual sessions with the EACs personnel listed below. Individual counseling sessions are available in-person (inside or outside of the Office) or over the phone and can be scheduled by texting:

- EAC █████ (6 █████)
- EAC █████ (█████)

If you have additional questions, please contact A-RPM █████ (█████)

█████
Financial Liaison Specialist/ Employee Assistance Coordinator/ A-RPM, Employee Assistance Unit Central Region
FBI Indianapolis

█████ 0
█████ 7

Office Hours: Monday- Thursday 7:00 am to 5:30 pm



U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
Senior Executive Service (SES)
Performance Management System
Executive Performance Agreement



Part 1. Consultation. <i>I have reviewed this plan and have been consulted on its development.</i>						
Executive's Name (Last, First, MI): Meador, Stanley, M			Rating Period: 10/01/2022 to 09/30/2023			
Executive's Signature [Redacted]			Date: 02/26/2023			
Title: SAC Richmond			Organization: Federal Bureau of Investigation			
Rating Official's Name (Last, First, MI): Paul Abbate			☐ Career ☐ Non-Career			
Rating Official's Signature [Redacted]			☐ Limited Term/Limited Emergency			
Rating Official's Signature [Redacted]			Date: 2/26/23			
Part 2. Progress Review						
Executive's Signature [Redacted]			Date: 6/16/2023			
Rating Official's Signature [Redacted]			Date:			
Reviewing Official's Signature (Optional)			Date:			
Part 3. Summary Rating						
Initial Summary Rating	☐ Level 5 Outstanding	☒ Level 4 Excellent	☐ Level 3 Achieved Results	☐ Level 2 Minimally Satisfactory	☐ Level 1 Unsatisfactory	
Rating Official's Name (Last, First, MI):						
Rating Official's Signature [Redacted]			Date: 10/20/23			
Executive's Signature [Redacted]			Date: 11/13/2023			
Reviewing Official's Signature (Optional)			Date:			
Higher Level Review (if applicable)						
☐ I request a higher level review. Executive's Initials:			Date:			
Higher Level Review Completed ☐ Concur ☐ Non-Concur (Attach comments. Recommended rating may be included.)			Date:			
Higher Level Reviewer Signature:						
Performance Review Board Recommendation		☐ Level 5	☐ Level 4	☐ Level 3	☐ Level 2 ☐ Level 1	
PRB Chair Signature:			Date:			
Annual Summary Rating		☐ Level 5	☐ Level 4	☐ Level 3	☐ Level 2 ☐ Level 1	
Appointing Authority Signature:			Date:			
Part 4. Performance Formula and Calculation of Annual Summary Rating						
Critical Element	Element Rating		Weight	Score		Summary Level Ranges
	Initial	Final (if changed)		Initial	Final (if changed)	
1. Leading Change			10%			475 - 500 = Level 5 400 - 474 = Level 4 300 - 399 = Level 3 200 - 299 = Level 2 Any CE rated Level 1 = Level 1
2. Leading People			20%			
3. Business Acumen			10%			
4. Building Coalitions			10%			
5. Results Driven			50%			
Total			100%			
SAVE CLEAR PRINT						



SAC/ADIC PAR Report - FY23

Richmond Field Office

ADIC/SAC Performance Plan	Total Points Available	Percent of PAR%	Score Received	Bonus Points	Final Score
Critical Element 1: Leading Change	50	10%	50		50
Success Index	25	5%	25		
RPO Shift	25	5%	25		
Leading People	100	20%	50		50
Leadership Element Part 2	100	20%	50		
Critical Element 3: Business Acumen	50	10%	43.8		43.8
Performance Group	50	10%	43.8		
Critical Element 4: Building Coalitions	50	10%	47		47
Weapons of Mass Destruction	20	4%	17		
Critical Incident Response Group	30	6%	30		
Critical Element 5: Results Driven	250	50%	220		220
Counterintelligence Program	50	10%	42.5		
Counterterrorism Program	50	10%	42.5		
Criminal Program	50	10%	42.5		
Cyber Program	50	10%	42.5		
Directorate of Intelligence Program	50	10%	50		
Total	500	100%	410.8	0/25	410.8

* - Bonus Points are assigned at the discretion of the Deputy Director and are out of a pool of 25 points. No critical element may receive a greater number of points than shown in the 'Total Points Available' column above. When distributing the bonus points, they go in the order of CE5, CE4, CE2, CE3, and CE1.



SAC/ADIC PAR Report - FY23

Critical Element 1: Leading Change

Richmond Field Office

Field Office Health Measures: Success Index Rating

Measure	Final Score
Number of Special Emphasis Programs (SEPs) hosted	Accomplishing the Mission
Number of Liaison Information Report (LIR) products disseminated	Accomplishing the Mission
Number of engagements with Collegiate Partners	Accomplishing the Mission
Number of Technical Surveillance Counter Measure (TSCM) Field Office POCs	Accomplishing the Mission
Percent of 67B and 67D cases that complete Field Office intake within 14-days	Accomplishing the Mission

Evaluated Measures 5

Incomplete Measures 0

N/A Measures 0

Measures in the Success Index are weighted equally and will be scored according to the following criteria:

- 25 points will be awarded if 0 measures fail to meet the threshold.
- 20 points will be awarded if 1 measure fails to meet the threshold.
- 10 points will be awarded if 2 or more measures fail to meet the threshold.

Weighted Score

Number of Measures in the Index rated "Underperforming"	0
Total Points Awarded (Out of 25 Possible Points)	25



[REDACTED]

SAC/ADIC PAR Report - FY23

Critical Element 1: Leading Change

Richmond Field Office

RPO Shift

Final Score	25/25 Points
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[REDACTED] on [REDACTED]
In addition to the [REDACTED] IA [REDACTED] drafted in support [REDACTED] he also peer-reviewed,
edited, and/or released an [REDACTED] IA [REDACTED] assisted in
completing [REDACTED]

- ([REDACTED]) Peer Review/Mentorship/Training Provided: IA [REDACTED] co-instructed three full-day iterations of
"Effective Writing" at the Rappahannock (January 2023), Fairfax County (April 2023), and Cardinal (June
2023) regional law enforcement training academies. These efforts significantly contributed the effective
relationships of the RH Division with law enforcement partners and conveyed value to the training
audiences. [REDACTED]

-Development Opportunities/Training Received: [REDACTED] During the review period, IA [REDACTED] completed a
significant number of training activities to improve his skills in furtherance of the [REDACTED] role and in support of
his ongoing collateral duties. These have included:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

-Collaboration/Initiative/Leadership: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

During the review period, IA [REDACTED] was involved in the drafting of an internal domain perspective (DP)
intelligence product. In February 2023, senior leadership concluded the DP failed to meet FBI standards.
Subsequent official review of the drafting, review and approval of the DP found no evidence of malicious
intent or an improper purpose however did find those involved lacked professional judgement and failed to
adhere to FBI standards. IA [REDACTED] was admonished for lack of professional judgement related to their
involvement in the drafting of the DP.

IA [REDACTED] also made the following significant contributions during FY23:
[REDACTED]

How Can I Develop?

What areas you should focus on improving, and/or how you can grow and develop your existing skills next fiscal year

() In the future, IA () conveyed that he would like to develop and grow in the following areas, and is fully supported to do so:

- () Collaborate on and deliver additional iterations of the Effective Writing and Interview & Interrogation courses
- () Continue to enhance my Domain-related tradecraft to include familiarization with the new ()
- () Explore additional collaborative opportunities with ()
- () Expand use of structured analytic techniques in support of ()
- () Obtain additional training and experience in furtherance of collateral duties ()
- () Potentially complete a T ()

Acknowledging IA () has since received training regarding ODNI Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203, IA () will continue to ensure adherence to ODNI ICD 203 for future intelligence products.

RATINGS

Objectives: Exemplary Performer
OVERALL: Exemplary Performer

Competencies: Exemplary Performer

ATTACHMENTS

File Name: _____ **Date:** _____

WRAP-UP PUBLISHER

By: _____ **Publish Date:** _____



PERFORMANCE WRAP-UP



EMPLOYEE INFORMATION

Name	[REDACTED]	Document ID	5661a15
Position	INTELLIGENCE ANALYST	Pay Plan	GS
Division	RICHMOND	Grade	14
Rater	[REDACTED]	Fiscal Year	2023
Reviewer	[REDACTED]	Rating of Record	2023-09-30
WU Type	Year-End Wrap-Up	Overall Rating	Consistent Performer

How Did I Do?

What you accomplished towards your Objectives, and how you performed against your Competencies for your plan period

[REDACTED]

You did a great job this year supporting your embedded squad and helping to execute Richmond's strategic plan and complete FOSP measures. You completed all of your objectives, exceeding some, and performed all of your competencies at the expected level. You particularly excelled this year at initiative,

[REDACTED]. You can always be relied upon to assist with exigent events, including on late nights and over weekends, which I greatly appreciate. Your products were well-written and received good feedback and included [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. You powered through frustrations [REDACTED] this past year and still worked to support the office, your SSA, and your agents, and completed needed analytic products, including pushing hard [REDACTED]. As a senior NS [REDACTED] IA, you continue to serve as a model for other IAs on how to effectively work with other Divisions and external partners. [REDACTED]

During the review period, IA [REDACTED] was involved in the drafting of an internal domain perspective (DP) intelligence product. In February 2023, senior leadership concluded the DP failed to meet FBI standards. Subsequent official review of the drafting of the DP found no evidence of malicious intent or an improper purpose however did find those involved lacked professional judgement and failed to adhere to FBI standards. IA [REDACTED] was admonished for lack of professional judgement related to their involvement in the drafting of the DP.

How Can I Develop?

What areas you should focus on improving, and/or how you can grow and develop your existing skills next fiscal year

[REDACTED]

In FY24, continue to serve as a model for junior IAs or SOSs in the Division on developing and pursuing insightful and operationally-impactful products for identified consumers, working with other Divisions, and capably representing the FBI in formal, external settings. Serve as a formal mentor for a junior IA in or out of the Division or consider presenting at a FIG meeting on an area of your expertise. Consider developing and leading an SAT with multiple individuals in RH or other offices participating, which can help elevate your written products. Among your competencies, work on Organizing and Planning and Communication by updating the OneNote more frequently, keeping the Squad calendar updated, and notifying me well in advance of schedule or work adjustments. Find or create opportunities to brief your analysis, formally or informally. Continue to find ways to stretch yourself, including by seeking to produce intelligence products jointly with new partners, by producing in a new product line, or by seeking out new skills or knowledge through training. Support Richmond community outreach and recruitment events in FY24, including outside of an ERT capacity.

Acknowledging IA [REDACTED] has since received training regarding ODNI Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203, employee will continue to ensure adherence to ODNI ICD 203 for future intelligence products.



PERFORMANCE WRAP-UP



EMPLOYEE INFORMATION

Name	[REDACTED]	Document ID	591(640
Position	INTELLIGENCE ANALYST	Pay Plan	GS
Division	RICHMOND	Grade	11
Rater	[REDACTED]	Fiscal Year	2023
Reviewer	[REDACTED]	Rating of Record	2023-09-30
WU Type	Year-End Wrap-Up	Overall Rating	Consistent Performer

How Did I Do?

What you accomplished towards your Objectives, and how you performed against your Competencies for your plan period

[REDACTED] In the first full Fiscal Year as an FBI IA, IA [REDACTED] has demonstrated attention to detail, flexibility, and the ability to learn new analytical tradecraft skills. He has collaborated regularly with other intel cadre and operational personnel seamlessly. He is able to successfully integrate and bring his skills to bare while also learning as much as possible from the seasoned personnel. His interpersonal skills are a plus as he is able to work with various personnel on different programs to contribute value to intelligence and operational efforts, lending to the overall accomplishment of the mission. IA [REDACTED] has accomplished many of the requirements for new IAs, and effectively integrates these requirements into purposeful tasks that address needs of various programs. IA [REDACTED] was promoted to GS-11 in Dec2022 based on his fulfillment of all requirements for promotion after 1 year of successful service. He continues to build his skills through proactive development for continued success. IA [REDACTED] does not shy away from challenging assignments, and is willing to take the extra steps to tackle the difficult projects and as well as help others as needed.

IA [REDACTED] frequently asked valid questions and sought consultation on his work, using peer review and input to ensure that he met the high standards of the FBI. He focused on collaborating with other analysts, SOSs, and agents, to promote the culture of an investigative team. He has taken the initiative and asked for work that is challenging or unfamiliar that led to a much greater variety.

[REDACTED]) Finished Intelligence Production: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]) Liaison and Community Engagement: IA [REDACTED] participated in the Teen Academy in July 2023 for both the ERT demonstration and the intel facilitation session. He also continues to make efforts to meet with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. He has engaged with other FBI Divisions and partners to provide support. Other accomplishments include:

- Worked FBI Richmond's Teen Academy 26-27 July 2023, leading an intel discussion and ERT presentation.

- Attended OGA meetings on 11 January and 7 February 2023.

() Subject Matter or Intelligence Function Expertise: IA [] continues to complete [] and contribute value to the overall RH intel efforts. He successfully completed the [] on 26-27Sep23, an advanced [] course normally completed by more senior IAs and SIAs. He has gained valuable skills during the FY with targeting and threat analysis as well as with report writing and dissemination. Other accomplishments included:

- Opened and worked a []
- Currently organizing a []
- Assisted []

() Brief: IA [] advised/briefed the SAC on a sensitive matter during the SAC's preparation for a high profile meeting in March 2023. He also conducted a formal brief/meeting on counterintelligence and criminal threat connections for members of Squads [] on 31 August 2023.

() Raw Intelligence Production: From 1Oct22 -30Sep23, IA [] drafted []

(U) IA [] spearheaded a WG to assess crossover of [] matters with [] intel personnel. Through the WG efforts, he is planning for further analysis and production related to these combined topics into FY24.

() Development: IA [] completed the following developmental activities during FY23:

During the review period, IA [] was involved in the review of an internal domain perspective (DP) intelligence product. In February 2023, senior leadership concluded the DP failed to meet FBI standards. Subsequent official review of the drafting, review and approval of the DP found no evidence of malicious intent or an improper purpose however did find those involved lacked professional judgement and failed to adhere to FBI standards. IA [] was admonished for lack of professional judgement related to their involvement in the drafting/review of the DP.

[REDACTED]

IA [REDACTED] contributed the following to address competencies during FY23:

Collaboration

- [REDACTED]
- Extensively working with agents, analysts, and tactical specialists on all aspects of work.

Communication

Initiative

- Routinely sought out work on Squads [REDACTED] to include looking for new projects, case assistance, and peer review wherever possible.
- Participating in collateral duties such as [REDACTED] and assisting in the recruitment of an EAP chaplain.
- Taking opportunities to learn from subject matter experts about their roles and how they impact my work, especially in the reports, domain, targeting, and collection roles.

Organizing and Planning

- Worked with supervisor to gain a clear understanding of expectations.
- Gained a working knowledge of production tools, databases, and resources to assist in remaining organized and planning how to complete tasks.

Problem Solving / Judgement

- Collaborating with other analysts has demonstrated the importance of consultation in problem solving, and how my judgement impacts others.

How Can I Develop?

What areas you should focus on improving, and/or how you can grow and develop your existing skills next fiscal year

Per the FY23 Objective for Development, complete intermediate-level training on FBI Analytical Tradecraft as available.

In addition, and as discussed, IA [REDACTED] is fully supported and encouraged [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

IA [REDACTED] would benefit from authoring [REDACTED] and expand work beyond [REDACTED]. Collaboration on [REDACTED] will help introduce newer and more innovative ways to contribute to the work of the RH FIG. Further liaison and outreach activities, especially with our USIC partners, would also be beneficial. IA [REDACTED] also hopes to conduct briefings and presentations to different audiences on topics such as terrorism or intelligence in general. In addition, he would like to participate in more in-person training, especially if it involves travelling, in order to get a better picture of the FBI as a whole in the different field offices and headquarters divisions.

Acknowledging IA [REDACTED] has since received training regarding ODNI Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203, employee will continue to ensure adherence to ODNI ICD 203 for future intelligence products.

RATINGS

Objectives: Consistent Performer

Competencies: Consistent Performer

OVERALL: Consistent Performer

ATTACHMENTS

File Name:

Date:

WRAP-UP PUBLISHER

By:

Publish Date:



PERFORMANCE WRAP-UP



EMPLOYEE INFORMATION

Name	[REDACTED]	Document ID	558488
Position	INTELLIGENCE ANALYST	Pay Plan	GS
Division	RICHMOND	Grade	14
Rater	[REDACTED]	Fiscal Year	2023
Reviewer	[REDACTED]	Rating of Record	2023-09-30
WU Type	Year-End Wrap-Up	Overall Rating	Exemplary Performer

How Did I Do?

What you accomplished towards your Objectives, and how you performed against your Competencies for your plan period

You have done an excellent job this year supporting your squad, meeting FOSP objectives, and exceeding your performance objectives by completing [REDACTED]. You authored timely [REDACTED]. You co-authored yet another impactful [REDACTED]. Your External Intelligence Bulletin received an AIS score of "Excellent" across all tradecraft standards, reflecting your skill. Since you had already completed a [REDACTED] and a [REDACTED]. You have taught five iterations of the Advanced Writing and the Interview and Interrogation courses to multiple State and Local partners, receiving rave reviews and increasing their skill and proficiency. You expertly performed your competencies, particularly communication, initiative, and professionalism/integrity, as exemplified by your well written and highly graded [REDACTED] your leadership on several [REDACTED], and your expert and professional representation of the FBI and Richmond to our state and local partners you teach. You continue to fulfill a number of collateral duties and took on [REDACTED]. [REDACTED]. [REDACTED]. You have supported your squad through [REDACTED], and spent countless hours helping to [REDACTED].

During the review period, IA [REDACTED] was involved in the reviewing an internal domain perspective (DP) intelligence product. In February 2023, senior leadership concluded the DP failed to meet FBI standards. Subsequent official review of the drafting, review and approval of the DP found no evidence of malicious intent or an improper purpose however did find those involved lacked professional judgement and failed to adhere to FBI standards. IA [REDACTED] was admonished for lack of professional judgement related to their involvement in the review of the DP.

How Can I Develop?

What areas you should focus on improving, and/or how you can grow and develop your existing skills next fiscal year

[REDACTED]

You already collaborate seamlessly with the IAs in RH, so I want you to continue to strengthen your relationships with IAs in the DI and/or neighboring field offices by [REDACTED] where appropriate. Continue to stretch yourself [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Help mentor [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Use your experience and awareness [REDACTED] s to keep writing more impactful products that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Time and circumstances permitting, I want you to think about [REDACTED] e. As one of our more experienced tradecraft experts, please continue to find opportunities to share your experience and expertise with others, including our partner agencies, by providing training.

Acknowledging IA [REDACTED] has since received training regarding ODNI Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203, IA [REDACTED] will continue to ensure adherence to ODNI ICD 203 for future intelligence products.



RATINGS

Objectives: Exemplary Performer

Competencies: Exemplary Performer

OVERALL: Exemplary Performer

ATTACHMENTS

File Name:

Date:

WRAP-UP PUBLISHER

By:

Publish Date:





PERFORMANCE WRAP-UP



EMPLOYEE INFORMATION

Name	[REDACTED]	Document ID	558692
Position	SUPERVISORY INTELLIGENCE ANALY	Pay Plan	GS
Division	RICHMOND	Grade	14
Rater	[REDACTED]	Fiscal Year	2023
Reviewer	STANLEY MEADOR	Rating of Record	2023-09-30
WU Type	Year-End Wrap-Up	Overall Rating	Exemplary Performer

How Did I Do?

What you accomplished towards your Objectives, and how you performed against your Competencies for your plan period

As the IPC, SIA [REDACTED] oversaw the intelligence program and its production, to include the outlined measures for the FY 23 FOSP. During the review period, SIA [REDACTED] lead the office and his fellow SIAs to achieve all of their outlined goals for the year and achieve a gold rating despite the challenges faced through the review period. SIA [REDACTED] leadership was a key element in this achievement.

Also during the review period, SIA [REDACTED]

During FY23, SIA [REDACTED]

In another demonstration of his thoughtful leadership, SIA [REDACTED] created a [REDACTED]

In a forward leaning effort to better track communications, expectations, and requests from HQ, SIA [REDACTED] created a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Overall, SIA [REDACTED] demonstrated consistency, thoughtfulness, leadership, and vision as [REDACTED] during the review period. His implementation of [REDACTED] helped the program achieve success during the year and will ensure the program's consistency for years to come, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SIA [REDACTED] was called upon many times during the year to represent the Division and his employees; during all of these encounters, he was extremely well spoken and professional.

During the review period, SIA [REDACTED] was involved in the approval of an internal domain perspective (DP) intelligence product. In February 2023, senior leadership concluded the DP failed to meet FBI standards. Subsequent official review of the drafting, review and approval of the DP found no evidence of malicious intent or an improper purpose however did find those involved lacked professional judgement and failed to adhere to FBI standards. SIA [REDACTED] was admonished for lack of professional judgement related to their involvement in the (drafting, review or approval) of the DP.

How Can I Develop?

What areas you should focus on improving, and/or how you can grow and develop your existing skills next fiscal year

SIA [REDACTED] is encouraged to participate in an inspection in the upcoming year to broaden his understanding of how the larger FBI views leadership and how field offices are measured under the current standards.

SIA [REDACTED] is encouraged to participate in a mentoring opportunity of his choosing, such as the Cross Cultural Mentoring Program.

Acknowledging SIA [REDACTED] has since received training regarding ODNI Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203, SIA [REDACTED] will continue to ensure adherence to ODNI ICD 203 for future intelligence products.



RATINGS

Objectives: Exemplary Performer

Competencies: Exemplary Performer

OVERALL: Exemplary Performer

ATTACHMENTS

File Name:

Date:

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PERFORMANCE WRAP-UP



EMPLOYEE INFORMATION

Name	[REDACTED]	Document ID	558881
Position	SUPERVISORY INTELLIGENCE ANALYST	Pay Plan	GS
Division	RICHMOND	Grade	14
Rater	[REDACTED]	Fiscal Year	2023
Reviewer	STANLEY MEADOR	Rating of Record	2023-09-30
WU Type	Year-End Wrap-Up	Overall Rating	Consistent Performer

How Did I Do?

What you accomplished towards your Objectives, and how you performed against your Competencies for your plan period

SIA [REDACTED] oversaw an extremely difficult threat during the review period, which became increasingly so following the leak of one of the products related to the threat SIA [REDACTED] resided over. Despite the challenges, SIA [REDACTED] lead her team to successfully completing all outlined goals and objectives leading to a gold rating for the intelligence program. This is a testament to SIA [REDACTED] ability to lead her team despite the distractions and difficulties stemming from the aforementioned product.

SIA [REDACTED] achieved all her outlined goals for the year, while also mentoring [REDACTED] m. SIA [REDACTED] put forth great effort [REDACTED]

SIA [REDACTED] expanded her network and overall understanding of the FBI this year by participating [REDACTED]. She further participated in various outreach and liaison activities, [REDACTED]. Following the difficulties experienced by the RH Division, SIA [REDACTED] was sought out by DI leadership to further the conversation on consistent messaging to the greater intelligence cadre of the FBI.

SIA [REDACTED] also increased her knowledge of criminal intelligence and domestic terrorism topics by attending training and collaborating with other entities working these threats. She further encouraged her employees to expand their product lines to support their customers in these areas as well as across the division as a whole.

During the year, SIA [REDACTED] focused on her employees well-being and fostered a sense of community among her team. SIA [REDACTED] focus on her team's development and growth was a major pillar of SIA [REDACTED] leadership style, which was evident in the team's ability to succeed despite the year's challenges.

During the review period, SIA [REDACTED] was involved in the approval of an internal domain perspective (DP) intelligence product. In February 2023, senior leadership concluded the DP failed to meet FBI standards. Subsequent official review of the drafting, review and approval of the DP found no evidence of malicious intent or an improper purpose however did find those involved lacked professional judgement and failed to adhere to FBI standards. Employee was admonished for lack of professional judgement related to their involvement in the approval of the DP.

How Can I Develop?

What areas you should focus on improving, and/or how you can grow and develop your existing skills next fiscal year

SIA [REDACTED] is encouraged to participate in a mentoring opportunity of her choosing, such as the Cross Cultural Mentoring Program.

SIA [REDACTED] is encouraged to continue outreach and collaboration with the DI to provide further field representation to on-going conversations being held at that level related to intelligence trends/strategy and overall communication across the FBI's intelligence cadre.

Acknowledging SIA [REDACTED] has since received training regarding ODNI Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203, SIA [REDACTED] will continue to ensure adherence to ODNI ICD 203 for future intelligence products.



RATINGS

Objectives: Consistent Performer

Competencies: Consistent Performer

OVERALL: Consistent Performer

ATTACHMENTS

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