



**NEWSLETTER
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The Blood and Guts Newsletter covers events and activities within our area and USABOT National.

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So here it is, the History of the 2nd Tank Battalion, CCR, 9th Armored division during the Battle of the Bulge. This is the chapter on the Bulge. The AAR's for 9th AD and for CCR 9th AD painted some of the picture a little better than what I have seen in any of the history books but this is the most detailed account of the events of the 2nd Tank Battalion.

In my opinion the 2nd TB probably fought the toughest tank vs tank battles of the Bulge. This is tank companies fighting with other companies of the armored division in a real slug fest with the leading elements of the German breakthrough. It is a shame that these units of CCR 9th AD are not mentioned more but at the time, these units were beaten up pretty bad. They were scattered in the winds between being captured, wounded or killed, separated from the unit, infiltration and attachment to other units. I think it comes down to the comments in the AAR's which result in the historians looking past them.

As historians for the Army the intent is to not place blame or point to failures of leaders. And these AAR's point to and mention the failure of the Corps Commander, MG Troy H. Middleton, as to the failures of the defense in the Bulge. Something I tend to agree with and have for some time but we are not to focus on that but learn from the mistakes and successes.

By obtaining these three documents that I have put in these last two newsletters I have better understanding of the events and much more respect for the units involved. Again, I really wish I had asked more questions than I did while talking with John Terral.

I hope you find these documents as interesting as I did. I will note that in the articles there are many town names that I recognized but the spelling was off. I documented by using the names as in the documents but then put the correct name in parentheses and using the correct name form that point on. You can use the map I provided in last month issue or use your Google Earth maps.

You will see in this issue the new Patton and US Tank Corps Monument item, a coffee mug. This mug is something we have been working on for several months. I placed the order for 47 back in June and they arrived the first of October. A little bit of a delay in the ordering process as this company is so busy and making nearly 2,000 items a day.

These turned out great! I did receive one complaint that he lost 2ozs of coffee from this mug to his previous mug but then stated that the extra trip to the coffee pot will provide him more PT and he was ok with that. Information is on page 10.

On the last page of the newsletter you will see the photo of the Tank Nerds. This is a new project to create a tee shirt for the 75th Anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge. This is something we are working on the details and will provide more information next month.

I am suppose to go talk at the members meeting of the American Legion Post 113 in Elizabethtown, KY in November and I am hoping that on Saturday November 9th during the breakfast there we can set up a table for the Patton and US Tank Corps Monument project. As this gets nailed down I will be sure to push out details on this.

At the time of the publishing of this newsletter the 8th Annual Tanker Homecoming is going on at Fort Bliss, TX. From the posts coming out it looks like another great event. I will share some photos in next months issue also.

KP Morris
Patton 6

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History of the 2nd Tank Battalion - Battle of the Bulge

From "History of the Second Tank Battalion of the Ninth Armored Division"
By COL (R) Philip J. Baird

Chapter V The Battle of the Bulge

Unfortunately, the Battalion did not fight as a unit during the ensuing engagements. Companies were attached to other divisions or separated by considerable distances where they could not be supported by other Battalion units.

* * * * *

Action of Co "B" – December 17 & 18: At 0800 on December 17, "B" Company was ordered to move to the vicinity of Dummage, Luxembourg and to take up positions to reinforce, by artillery fire, Co "C", 52nd Armored Infantry Bn, 9th Armored Division. As the company was moving into position at Dummage at 1000, it was ordered east to Clairvaux, and to report to the C.O. of the 110th Infantry Regiment, 28th Infantry Division. At Clairvaux, the Company Commander, Captain Lybarger, was ordered by the Regimental C.O. to send a platoon of tanks to Heinerscheid, south of Clairvaux, where the 1st Bn., 110th Infantry was having a rough time and to support that Bn. The first platoon of "B" Co was sent on this mission. The second platoon was ordered south out of Clairvaux with the mission of clearing the southern end of the town and to fight through to Marnach, where the 3rd Battalion of the 100th was encircled. The third platoon of "B" Co was to proceed to Reuler (just east of Clairvaux) and be attached to the 2nd Battalion, 110th which had the mission of getting to Marnach to relieve the 3rd Bn, 110th Infantry.

At Heinerscheid, the first platoon leader's tank was knocked out. The platoon sergeant carried on with the remaining three tanks, destroying one enemy tank and killing quite a number of enemy infantry. Late in the afternoon, the Infantry Battalion C.O. ordered the Sergeant to take his three tanks to Reuler.

Captain Lybarger was with the 2nd platoon when it arrived at Reuler at 1100 where the leading tank was fired upon by a German half-track, camouflaged as an ambulance. The Co C.O., in his tank, tried to outflank a German tank parked between two ambulances which had been firing at him and was met on the west side of the village by fire from five other enemy tanks. One German tank was destroyed before the Co C.O.'s tank was knocked out and the crew evacuated. The Platoon Sergeant destroyed another of the five enemy tanks before the three remaining withdrew from their position. The Co C.O. then took over one of the platoon tanks whose commander had been killed by sniper fire. When the Co C.O. was ordered to report to the Infantry Battalion C.O., he turned his tank over to the platoon leader who, with the platoon Sergeant in a second tank, continued to fight at the southern side of the village. Later the platoon Sergeant's tank was also knocked out by enemy tank fire.

At this time, the three remaining tanks from 1st Platoon returned from Heinerscheid and joined the two remaining company tanks. Together they accounted for three more enemy tanks and two half-tracks before being withdrawn.

What was left of the Infantry Battalion withdrew to the high ground northwest of Reuler, with the five remaining tanks covering their withdrawal. The tanks were then withdrawn to the Infantry positions and a night defensive position organized. The position was completely encircled by the Germans and at 2330 the Infantry Bn, C.O. decided to withdraw his Bn. by infiltration and attempt to reassemble at Eselton, a small town west of Clairvaux. The infantry heavy mortars and machine guns were loaded on the tanks. After the infantry withdrew, the tanks moved out heading north. Upon approaching the town of Urspelt, German anti-tank guns and tanks were contacted. One tank threw a track and two of them broke a track. Having no way to fix them, a thermite grenade was thrown in each of them and they burned. Another tank got stuck and was also destroyed. Finally, the one surviving tank with 11 men inside and about 25 on the outside became hopelessly stuck trying to ford a river. The men waded the river and walked due west to a small town where they found about a dozen men of Co "H", 110th Infantry. Finding that they were again surrounded by the enemy at 1600 December 18, they all broke up in small groups and infiltrated through the enemy line again.

* * * * *

The last radio message from the 3rd Platoon of "B: Co was received at 1700 December 17th stating that they had three tanks left, were surrounded and could not get out. There was no further contact. All of "B" Co's tanks had been lost and, at this time, an undetermined number of men.

At about noon December 17, the 2nd Tank Bn less "B" Co and Service Co was ordered by Combat Command "R" to move from its billets area to an assembly area and be prepared to repel an attack which was making considerable progress in the vicinity of Clairvaux. The Bn assembled at a crossroad near Wilmerdange, Lux. and prepared a defensive position. Service Co, commanded by Capt Robert Cissell, was ordered to withdraw to Houffalize, Belgium, about 15 miles to the west. One tank platoon from Company "D" was attached to Service Co to protect the trains.

Late in the afternoon CCR was ordered to move under cover of darkness to the vicinity of Oberwampach, Lux. The battalion moved at 1925 and arrived at its new location about 0100 on December 18. During the march, gun flashes and smoke could be observed not far to the east along the entire front.

Company "A", together with Company "C" of the 52nd Armored Infantry Battalion was given the mission of defending and holding the Asselborn-Clairvaux road junction, covering each road. The three platoons of Company "A" were placed in positions covering the approach on the north from Asselborn and from the east from Clairvaux. One platoon of infantry went into position covering each of the roads about three hundred yards in front of the tanks. Co "C", less two platoons, and "B" of the 52nd were given the mission of defending and holding Allerborn road junction about 5 kilometers south of the "A" 2nd Tank Bn position.

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Action of Co "A", December 18-20: Since the infantry company commander was Captain Rose and the tank company commander was First Lieutenant DeRoche, the ranking officer was put in charge, and the tank-infantry team became Task Force Rose with the mission described above.

At about 0830, the infantry on the Clairvaux road were observed to be withdrawing behind the tanks. Company "A" was told by the infantry that three enemy tanks, supported by infantry, were approaching the crest of the high ground to its front under cover of the woods north of the Clairvaux road. About 0900 these tanks emerged from the woods and were taken under fire by Co "A". All three were hit, one was knocked out and the other two withdrew. At this time four more enemy tanks followed by infantry were observed approaching the same wood from the northeast. A few minutes later, a new enemy column was observed advancing down the Asselborn highway from the north. The friendly infantry on the road withdrew also and as the lead tank came into range, it was fired upon and withdrew.

Supporting artillery began to shell possible enemy positions, while enemy artillery in turn began to lay down fire upon Co "A" positions, and to lay a smoke screen across its front. After about 15 minutes, the smoke lifted but no action occurred,

At about 1100, the enemy again began to shell Co "A" and to lay another smoke screen across its front. After about an hour and a half, the smoke lifted and Co "A" immediately began to receive direct fire. The enemy, under cover of smoke had moved tanks to within 800 yards of "A" Co's position. Sixteen tanks were spotted and more were suspected, but could not be seen. The enemy also made use of groundmount 88's firing at a range of 2500 yards.

In the exchange of fire that followed, three Mark IV tanks were knocked out. "A" Company lost one tank by fire; another was hit three times, disabling the gun, but not otherwise impairing the tank; another tank threw a track in the process of maneuvering and had to be abandoned after an attempt to retrieve it failed. Two other tanks received direct hits but were not impaired. No casualties as yet were suffered.

As the firing continued, enemy activity could be heard and was finally observed to the right flank. The second platoon of "A" Company was rushed to the right to intercept any enemy there. By the time this move was completed, enemy tanks had already occupied positions along the main road from Asselborn down to the town of Winerange. The Infantry anti-tank platoon had taken positions in the woods and had no field of fire to repel an attack on the right.

"A" Company immediately engaged the enemy tanks, knocking out two of them while the others withdrew into defilade. One of the "A" Company tanks bogged down and was abandoned under fire. The enemy continued to reinforce its position on the right and increased its fire, compelling "A" Company to concentrate most of its strength at that point, less one section of the tanks to cover the Asselborn-Clairvaux road junction and to protect the left flank.

The infantry, during this action, had withdrawn behind the tanks and the commander of Task Force Rose could not be located. The Company Commander of Company "A" assumed command.

At this point the enemy apparently was satisfied to use its strength on the right as a holding force while moving down from the north and northwest in the attack. "A" Company was surrounded on three sides.

Upon learning of "A" Co's situation, and in the absence of the Bn C.O. who had been recalled to a meeting at CCR's HQ's in Longvilly, the Bn Executive Officer, Major Dalton, decided to send help to "A" Co. a task force was formed consisting of a platoon of tanks from "C" Co and the Battalion Assault Gun Platoon under the command of Bn S-3, Captain Baird. As this force was moving out, the Bn C.O. returned from CCR and cancelled the mission because it would weaken the defense of the Allerborn road junction which was also a Battalion Mission.

Reports were heard by "A" Company via radio that assistance was moving up to "A" Company. Two tanks of "A" Company succeeded in withdrawing to the rear and circling out and away from the enemy to meet and conduct the reported reinforcements to "A" Company's position. The reinforcement was recalled, but "A" Company received orders to break out of the encirclement and hit the enemy from the south in an effort to push them back and retake the Asselborn-Clairvaux road junction.

The Company Commander of "A" Company succeeded in occupying new positions upon which the enemy again immediately opened fire. In the exchange, "A" Company suffered no casualties or loss of equipment. In the exchange, "A" Company suffered no casualties or loss of equipment. Two enemy tanks, Mark IV's, were hit and burned.

It was getting toward evening and quite dark by now. Enemy strength made a counter attack almost impossible. The situation became more critical when enemy artillery began to shell with white phosphorous. The concentration became heavy enough to force "A" Company to withdraw behind a ridge just south of the town of Winerange in readiness to expel an expected attack.

Enemy artillery again began to shell with a concentration that lasted for two hours, forcing "A" Company tanks to remain but-toned up. No tanks were hit and no casualties suffered but at the end of that period, a report was received that enemy tanks were moving to the right and rear and circling to the left. "A" was completely surrounded. Enemy infantry began to infiltrate and enemy tanks opened fire once more.

The order to withdraw, if possible, came at last. "A" Company moved west cross-country until it hit the Troive-Houffalize road, following road thereafter. All towns were already occupied by the enemy, but by observing strict blackout and making use of the utmost speed possible "A" Company, favored by the elements of surprise, moved through all enemy positions with minimum of resistance. Houffalize, Belgium was finally the first unoccupied town to be entered.

Before reaching Houffalize, the BN C.O., Lt. Col. Harper in his tank and the battalion assault gun platoon were picked up enroute.

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They were withdrawing from the Allerborn road junction which had been overrun at about 2330. The BN C.O. halted five of "A" Co's tanks and together with the assault gun platoon attempted to establish some kind of resistance. This force was ambushed later the same night with only a few survivors. Lt. Col. Harper was killed by machine gun fire while he was dismounted from his tank.

The balance of "A" Company in the meantime, having arrived at Houffalize, halted for three hours, then proceeded southwest on the Houffalize-Bastogne road in search of gas and ammunition. Fuel was finally located at St. Hubert and all tanks were refueled and serviced.

The following day, 20 December 1944, "A" Company proceeded to Neufchateau, Belgium, in an effort to contact the balance of the battalion and to receive instructions from Corps for its most profitable use. Contact with Combat Command "R" was made, fuel and ammunition was taken on, and the company then proceeded to Bastogne where it became part of Task Force Pyle.

After overrunning the troops defending the north road junction the enemy attacked the south road junction near Allerborn at approximately 2015 on the 18th of December 1944.

Action of "C" Company, 2nd Tank Battalion, 17-18 December 1944: After the battalion had moved from Trois-Verges to a road junction approximately 1,000 yards east of Allerborn, the night of 17 December 1944, it was ordered that Company "C", 2nd Tk Bn, plus "B" Company of the 52nd Armored Infantry Battalion would defend this road junction. These two companies were to form a team and the senior company commander would be the team commanding officer; therefore Captain Hays of the Infantry company was in command. Captain Pyle commanded "C" Company.

Due to the fact that the infantry was some miles away, "C" Company, 2nd Tk Bn sent a platoon about 500 yards north on the north-south road and another deployed near the road junction to defend it until the infantry arrived. There was no enemy action at this point. The infantry company arrived at approximately 0230. At that time Captain Hays took command and hastily deployed his company, leaving the tanks in their same positions. There was no enemy action that night.

All during the next day the position was strengthened by constructing dug-in anti-tank guns, tanks moved to better firing positions, and the infantry dug in. The noise of the battle being fought by Company "A", 2nd Tk Bn up ahead could be heard throughout the day. All in all, approximately fifty stragglers of the 28th Division were stopped by this team as they came back from fighting ahead, and were out in the line with the 52nd Armored Infantry Battalion's company.

About 1400, 18 December 1944, it was learned that Lt. Colonel Harper, Commanding Officer of the 2nd Tank Battalion had taken over Team Hays and that it would be named Team Harper. The rest of the 2nd Tank Battalion, consisting of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company and "D" Company, less one platoon, would help defend this road junction. Later in the afternoon the third platoon of Co "D" was ordered to Monet, Belgium to protect the command post of the 52nd Armored Infantry Battalion. Captain Heath commanded "D" Company.

These extra units were deployed, and at this time were told to hold the road junction at all costs and to the last man. Only an order by Corps would allow them to withdraw.

The enemy started his attack at about 2000 that evening of December 18th, moving an overwhelming force of tanks and infantry in from three directions under cover of a mortar and artillery barrage. At this time the Battalion staff left the stone farmhouse where the command post had been located and got into their respective vehicles. The Bn C.O. went to his tank in a wooded area and the battalion S-3 went to his tank located at the edge of the same woods. The Bn C.O.'s jeep driver, Corporal Field, being left exposed with no instructions went searching for the Bn C.O.'s tank in the darkness and smoke. He mounted a tank, only to find by the light of a gun flash that he was on a German tank. He quickly dismounted and found protection in another vehicle. The Bn S-3 mounted his tank to find that the crew supplemented by several others seeking shelter from the battle. As the Bn S-3 was getting into his overcrowded tank, a German tank appeared about 50 yards distant having passed completely through the defensive position. After clearing personnel in the tank away from the rear of the 76mm gun, the gunmen fired upon the enemy tank which blew apart in all directions lighting the area as it burned.

The battle was furious and the position of Team Harper was overrun by 2330. The order was given to fight through the enemy lines back to Longvilly.

After the war, it was learned, from the review of German records, and from interviews with former German officers that Col. Lauchert's 2nd Panzer Battalion of the 116th Panzer Division attacked the 2nd Tank Battalion's positions on the 18th of December 1944. New tanks in the 2nd Panzer came from the factories of Breslau and contained some of Hitler's new, wonder weapons, the infra-red night-fighting device. This piece of night sighting equipment was used for the very first time during the war at the Allerborn junction.

After the order to withdraw had been given on the night of 18 December 1944, most of the 2nd Tank Battalion Headquarters vehicles ran a gauntlet of fire and reached Longvilly. Many of them continued on to towards Bastogne, but a few, including a half-track and the S-3 tank were ordered to remain at Longvilly to support the proposed stand of the tanks units some place east of the town, and to help in the defense of Longvilly and CC"R" Headquarters during the night. Additional man and vehicles filtered into town all night.

CC"R" could not be convinced of the seriousness of the situation by the 2nd Bn Executive Officer, Major Dalton, who was killed later that day while riding in his jeep on the road just west of Longvilly.

During the night, the head of a column known as Team Cherry arrived at Longvilly. Lt. Col. Cherry was the C.O. of the 3rd Tank Bn of the 10th Armored Division. His column had driven many miles and the men were completely exhausted. As soon as the tanks

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at the head of the column halted, the men went to sleep. The 2nd Tank Bn XO and the S-3 tried to wake the crews to warn them that the enemy was closing in, but to no avail. Some of these tanks near the head of the column were destroyed by enemy fire, presumably while the crews were still asleep. When daylight came, part of this column turned around in the road and moved out to fight its way back to Bastogne, because the Germans had cut off the road west of Longvilly during the night.

Team Cherry's column was by this time greatly increased by a large number of vehicles and men which had filtered back from the previous fighting. There were vehicles of all descriptions tacked to the end of Team Cherry's column. Second Tank Battalion vehicles in the column included the command half-track, the S-3 tank, the maintenance half-track from "C" Company and a tank recovery vehicle from "C" Company. About thirty enlisted men of the 2nd Tank Battalion were present. Officers present included Captain Charles A. Brown, Captain William C. Leachman, Captain Philip J. Baird, Lt. Clyde I. Meyers, Lt. John R. Carlson, Lt. Robert J. Johnson, Lt. Joseph M. Obester, Lt. John F. Calvo and Lt. Roy B. Cowin, all of the Second Tank Battalion.

After proceeding an estimated two miles from Longvilly, the column stopped and small arms and artillery fire could be heard just over the next ridge to the West.

The column remained halted all morning, and without common channels of communication, the stragglers at the rear had no knowledge of the situation, but could observe the field artillery battery of Team Cherry preparing to fire in several different directions. The column came under increasing small arms and artillery fire.

About 1100, the Germans fired two "screaming meanies" at the tail of the column and set two vehicles on fire at the end of column by rocket fire. With this sudden action, panic broke loose among the already demoralized stragglers and there was first a jam of vehicles on the road as those at the rear tried to move forward and then there was a mass movement of individuals on foot in an attempt to reach safety in the surrounding hills. Vehicles were abandoned in great numbers. The scene was reminiscent of a large crowd leaving a football game.

Taking hold of the situation, the officers mentioned above rallied the men who had not deserted entirely, got them up out of the holes they had found in the ground, and took stock of the situation. Captain William C. Leachman initiated this reorganization and led his force during the remainder of the action. Crews were organized and placed in abandoned vehicles, and preparations made to attack.

By this time contact had been lost with Team Cherry but the remaining force consisted of an estimated fifty vehicles of almost every description including three M-7 105mm howitzers, 7 M-4 tanks, two armored cars, three tank recovery vehicles, many anti-aircraft half-tracks, and a large number of other half-tracks.

The enemy was in position on the next ridge to the west. It was decided to advance along the road to the enemy location under cover of vehicular weapons. The column moved out at top speed and with all guns in action to the first objective where fire superiority was maintained over the enemy by the column which halted just short of the ridge. At this point the .50 caliber multiple anti-aircraft guns were especially effective and the M-7 105's were employed with direct fire ricochet fire which proved to be very demoralizing to the enemy.

A captured prisoner at this point revealed that the ridge was held by two companies of infantry and that 15 Panzer Lehr and about 5 captured American tanks were in the vicinity of Marguret, the village just over the ridge ahead.

A half-track was found in the column in radio contact with the Commanding Officer, Company "C", 20th Armored Infantry Battalion, who was in the town of Maguret. He advised that the column could advance to Maguret and reinforce his organization which held a part of the town.

On the strength of this, another rapid move was made over the ridge and down the edge of town with vehicular weapons employed to keep down the enemy fire. The column was halted at the edge of town by the infantry commander. The vehicles were left dispersed as much as possible and at his suggestion all men except skeleton crews dismounted, assembled at the head of the column, formed into squads and were sent out on combat patrol missions in the town with the purpose of getting the German to show their strength and disposition. Because of the lack of experience and training for this type of work by the men involved, this plan was largely unsuccessful and the patrols returned about nightfall without much information.

Upon arriving at the town of Maguret, it was found that one of the tanks of Team Cherry, which had been sent into the town during the morning, was a burned hulk forming an effective block in the middle of the main road. Furthermore, it was found that Company "C", 20th Armored Infantry Battalion of the 10th Armored Division had only one platoon with attachments in town, and held only three houses in one corner of the town. Late in the afternoon, Sgt. Gerrald of the 420th Armored Field Artillery Battalion reported as a forward observer, and at the same time another NCO reported from the 501st Parachute Regiment of the 101st Airborne Division to inform the force that his unit was in position about 2,000 yards away and that he would send a guide to lead the vehicles to safety in Bizory behind his lines.

The guide failed to arrive before dark, so the vehicles were dispersed as much as possible, while the CP was set up in one of the houses and a strong defense formed. The Commanding Officer, Company "C", 20th Infantry had been informed by his higher headquarters that all personnel were to remain with his unit at Maguret until relief came. The forward observer was immediately given a mission of placing fire on the enemy-held portion of town.

Everything was quiet until about 1930, when the sound of an American tank was heard moving in the town and toward where the half-tracks were parked on the edge of town. Soon it was in position and then a flare was seen to go up. Immediately German artillery fire began to fall on the American section of town and the tank shot into a nearby house setting it afire for light. The captured

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American tank then moved in among the half-tracks and shot three while the drivers of the rest moved them farther away from the town in the darkness.

Soon the tank moved back into the town and proceeded by a half-track, moved toward the CP where many men and tanks were concentrated. Sgt Gerrald during all this time had been having communication troubles and had the further handicap of working with a small scale map. Just as the tank was an estimated 25 yards from the CP, Sgt Gerrald succeeded in bringing accurate artillery fire down on him and he began to withdraw in haste. Adjusting his fire purely by ear, Sgt Gerrald followed the tank as he withdrew through the town. Two more attempts were made by the tank to close in and both were broken by the artillery fire. Furthermore, the German artillery fire ceased. For approximately three hours, Sgt Gerrald isolated the tiny American section of town and worked over the rest of the town with fire. He included a nearby hill on which German tanks were suspected to be located. Toward the end of this period, the movement of many tanks was heard near the town, which appeared to have been movement of German tanks to safer places.

The action during the day and night resulted in many serious wounds and the CP became filled with badly wounded men. No medical aid men were present, but Captain Charles A. Brown secured vehicular aid kits and flashlights, and applying his knowledge of first aid, directed the care of the wounded throughout the night; by his efforts the lives of many men were undoubtedly saved.

About 0200, 20 December 1944, word came by radio that the entire force was to withdraw through the lines of the 501st Parachute Regiment at 0630.

Beginning about 0300, intermittent artillery concentrations were laid on the town by a forward observer. These continued until after departure time to cover the noise and movement to withdrawal. About 0530, the carrying of the wounded men out of the town and to the half-track began. This movement was carried out as quietly as possible with the well men carrying the wounded and placing them in the vehicles. No enemy fire was encountered. By 0645 the vehicles were loaded with the wounded and five German prisoners captured in the fighting. The signal to move out was the starting of the engine of the lead tank. When it came, all engines started and the column moved out immediately. After moving about 1,000 yards, it was found that the 501st had cleared a minefield during the night for the column to pass through. Their artillery concentrations also fell in a protective screen around the column. Despite this preparation one tank was lost when its track was broken by a mine that had been missed.

Upon reaching Bizory the tanks were retained at that location for further use and the remainder of the vehicles with the wounded and their crews continued on to Bastogne. The S-3 tank with Captain Baird as tank commander, remained to continue the fight at Bizory with the 501st. Bizory was at the edge of the perimeter defense of Bastogne which was held by units of the 101st Airborne Division.

Vehicles and men from elements of the following organizations were known to have taken part in the above described action: 2nd Tank Battalion, 90th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized, 482nd AAA Battalion, 29th Armored Infantry Battalion, 3rd Tank Battalion, Headquarters, CC"R", 9th Armored Division and 28th Infantry Division.

As the elements of the Second Tank Battalion arrived at Bastogne, the men were registered, warmed, feed and put to bed. A skeleton headquarters was set up and the men and vehicles available were assigned to provisional fighting units in quick preparation for resumption of activities. An immediate effort was made to secure clothing, blankets, food and personal items for those who had lost all their belongings in the previous fighting.

On the evening of 20 December 1944, Team Pyle (Captain Howard J. Pyle) was formed, using a large part of available fighting strength of the battalion, while Captain Charles A. Brown assumed command of the elements not a part of the team.

The remainder of the battalion vehicles, after the withdrawal order at approximately 2315, 18 December 1944, attempted to escape the enemy encirclement by moving south. After running a heavy gauntlet of fire, they were successful in clearing the area.

During the remainder of the night the battalion vehicles ran into enemy small arms fire between Longvilly and Bastogne. The following day the vehicles proceeded to Tintigny, Belgium where a CP was set up and remained during the balance of the month. During this period a provisional infantry company was formed. As tank replacements were made available, a provisional tank battalion was formed, which was under the command of the 9th Armored Engineer Battalion, protecting the Division goose egg, the Division CP being at Etalle, Belgium.

On 17 December 1944, when the battalion received orders to move to the assembly area, one platoon of Company "D" was ordered to report to Service Company to act as trains protection.

On the afternoon of 18 December, 1944, one platoon of "D" Company was attached to Battalion Headquarters.

At 1700, 18 December 1944, the third platoon of Company "D" was ordered to proceed to Moinet, Belgium to act as protection for the CP of the 52nd Armored Infantry Battalion. Upon arrival, the platoon assembled north of the town. At 0200, 19 December 1944, the platoon received a large amount of small arms fire. The Battalion CP was moved to the woods east of Moinet and road blocks were constructed covering the approaches. At 0800, 19 December 1944 this force, which had been bypassed by the enemy, was ordered to move west in an attempt to regain contact with friendly forces. The tank platoon was to act as rear guard for the movement. The column moved east then north for a short distance and then turned west. At 1100, the column was fired on by enemy machine guns and 20mm anti-tank guns. The tank platoon, although unable to maneuver due to soft terrain, was able to silence the opposition. As the column moved out, several infantry half-tracks became stuck, thus holding up the tank platoon for approximately

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three hours.

The column proceeded leaving the half-tracks and tank platoon behind. Later the column was ambushed and forced to surrender. After freeing the half-tracks from the mud the tank platoon and half-tracks moved out. As they started moving a German column was seen proceeding towards the west on the right flank and another on the left flank. The tank platoon moved into woods on high ground but were forced to abandon all tanks. The men infiltrated through the German lines and later joined friendly forces.

Action of elements of 2nd Tank Battalion in Bastogne, 20 December 1944 to 1 January 1945: From the evening 20 December 1944 to 1 January 1945. Captain Charles A. Brown was the acting battalion commander of men of the 2nd Tank Battalion who were in Bastogne, Belgium. During this period, men of this battalion manned three road blocks in Bastogne, one of which was on the bridge on the road to Marche and manned a bazooka post at the same bridge. These were twenty-four hour posts. In addition to this, various patrols were sent out by CC"R", and personnel were drawn from the personnel of the 2nd Tank Battalion. They generally had about forty men in the city. There was a constant turnover in personnel, however, due to the fact that fresh crews were sent from Bastogne to 2nd Tank Battalion tanks and the tired crews were pulled back into Bastogne to get warm and man road blocks. This turnover was also caused by the constant necessity for sending out personnel to relieve infantrymen and to work with the 101st Airborne Division. These men occupied foxholes, went on patrols, and manned machine gun installations. Special comment is made on these men who manned the road blocks, remaining at their posts during heavy artillery fire during the day and during bombings at night. In many instances these men remained at their posts, though untenable, until they had official orders to take up new positions which were more protected. Other special comment is made on the four messengers, Tec 5 Brooks, Company "C", Pvt Prusinski, Headquarters Company, Pvt Olsen Company "A", Pvt Atkinson, Headquarters Company, all of 2nd Tank Battalion. These men would carry information to various outposts and road blocks under heavy artillery fire and bombing in utter disregard for their own safety.

CC"R" 9th Armored Division called this group of men from 2nd Tank Battalion their mobile reserve, when called upon to send men to various units as reinforcements, personnel from the 2nd Tank Battalion supplied the demand.

Officers present in Bastogne were: Captain William C. Leachman, Captain Philip J. Baird, Captain Howard J. Pyle, Captain Charles A. Brown, 1st Lt Robert W. Linder, 1st Lt Guy J. Martin, 1st Lt John R. Carlson, 1st Lt Roy F. Clough, 1st Lt John E. DeRoche, 2nd Lt Herbert G. Pulsifer, 2nd Lt Thomas J. Wickey, 2nd Lt Robert J. Johnson, 2nd Lt Joseph M. Obester, 2nd Lt John C. Terral, 2nd Lt John F. Calvo, 2nd Lt Roy B. Cowin, Jr., all of 2nd Tank Battalion.

After the siege of Bastogne had been broken on 26th December by the 4th Armored Division, General Leonard, C.O. of the 9th Armored Division requested that his troops in Bastogne be returned to his control. On 30 December the dismounted men of 2nd Tank Battalion were removed from Bastogne by truck. The following day the remainder of the men moved out of the town in their tanks and half-tracks.

General Maxwell Taylor, C.O. of the 101st Airborne Division, personally came out to thank the men in this column for their help to his troops and to bid them farewell.

Action of Team Pyle, 20 to 25 December 1944: Team Pyle, commanded by Captain Howard J. Pyle, commander of Company "C", 2nd Tank Battalion was formed at Bastogne, Belgium on the evening of 20 December 1944. It consisted of 14 medium tanks from Company "A" and Company "C" of the 2nd Tank Bn under command of 1st Lt John E. DeRoche, commander of Company "A", 2nd Tank Bn, and sixty infantrymen of the 52nd Armored Infantry Battalion under command of Lt Adams. In addition, there was the command half-track of Headquarters, 2nd Tank Bn and its personnel.

This force arrived in Villeroux (Villeroux), Belgium at about 2300, 20 December 1944. Its mission was to attack and withdraw at certain places in the enemy lines to keep them off balance. Definite orders were to be given the next day. Information of the enemy situation was not available at higher headquarters, but a strong defensive position was established for the night.

Just after daylight 21 December 1944, Villeroux was attacked by approximately a company of German Infantry. This attack was repulsed and the enemy driven back with an estimated loss of 75 dead and 20 prisoners.

During the morning two more attacks in similar strength were repulsed and the situation was considered to be well in hand. Patrols of tanks and infantry were sent out to reconnoiter along the railroad east and south of the town, and they succeeded in locating strong forces of Germans infantry along the railroad track and inflicted heavy casualties among them before returning.

At about 1100, Captain Pyle was ordered by Combat Command Commander, who arrived at that time, to send one-third of his force north along the road to Senochamps, then west to stop an enemy column coming east from Sibret. Shortly after this, the remainder of the tanks were sent to follow on this mission.

At about 1200, Villeroux with the remainder of Team Pyle defending was subjected to a terrific artillery and mortar barrage which caused heavy casualties in the remainder of the command. The command half-track was lost in this action.

A platoon of tanks was immediately recalled and they were employed to cover the withdrawal of the remaining forces from the town and to cover the withdrawal of two 155mm howitzer battalions which were in position around the town. As orderly withdrawal was made and the Task Force Pyle was ordered to go into a defensive position about 3,000 yards to the north to protect the position of the 420th Armored Field Artillery Battalion of the 10th Armored Division. Occupation of this position was completed by midnight.

This position was held from the night of 21 December to 24 December 1944. During this time, the enemy attacked from almost all sides. He subjected the area to an almost constant shelling by mortars and medium artillery. Tank crews were forced to stay in their tanks for as long as forty-eight hours at a stretch, urinating in their helmets, wrapping up in anything available to keep warm during their long watches in vehicles which were lined with half-inch of frost caused by severe cold weather.

History of the 2nd Tank Battalion - Battle of the Bulge

Many had lost their extra clothing in the previous fighting, but what was left was divided with infantry in their common fight for survival. Although the regular supply of rations had ceased to exist, the scanty reserve of "D" bars, carried in the vehicles was divided with the doughboys. Some machine guns from the tanks were dismounted and given to the infantrymen to build up their fire-power.

Major Watts, 52nd Armored Infantry Battalion arrived 22 December to take command and the force then became Task Force Watts.


By the 24th of December 1944 the position became untenable for the firing batteries of the 420th Armored Field Artillery Battalion because of the heavy enemy shelling. They displaced by batteries during the day to a position near Bastogne. Task Force Watts covered this displacement.

Under cover of darkness on the night of 24 December the infantry were quickly pulled back, loaded on the tanks and the whole force left the position and withdrew through Senochamps to the vicinity of the road junction. Three tanks had been lost in the action to this point.

At this point the tanks and infantry were directly attached to companies of the 327th Glider Battalion of the 101st Airborne Division, and on 25 December the remaining personnel and one vehicle of Headquarters and the personnel of the destroyed tanks moved to Bastogne.

During the time in the city of Bastogne, the headquarters organized relief crews for those tank crews in the line and endeavored to get some warm clothes for them. The tanks fought with the companies of the 327th Glider Infantry for the remainder of the siege and their actions should be included in the reports of that organization.

I am working to get copies of the 327th Glider Infantry Battalion After Action Reports to see if the 2nd Tank Battalion, Team Pyle or Task Force/Team Watts is mentioned.



Company C - 811th Tank Destroyer Battalion - Battle of the Bulge

811th Tank Destroyer Battalion
After Action Report – Company C

Company C upon being attached to CCR, 9th Armored Division, proceeded to (Thommen) Belgium, and arrived at 1500 hours on 14 December. The unit received artillery fire on the location at 2200 hours, and was alerted for movement. At 0515 on 17 December the 1st Platoon was ordered to the vicinity of Ouren, Germany, and upon arrival there at 0715 hours was led into previously selected positions by an officer of the 112th Infantry Regiment. Captain Collins had halted the column and was proceeding on foot when enemy tanks and infantry attacked. After a day long engagement the platoon was ordered to retire to Weiswampach, Belgium, by the platoon commander at 2100. At a cost of two M-18's, 1 M-20, five jeeps and seven personnel, an unknown number of enemy infantry, and (number could be 14) Mark IV and V tanks were destroyed. At 0800 hours 18 December the platoon made a road march to the vicinity of Longvilly and rejoined the company.

Upon his return to the company at 1000 hours 17 December, Captain Collins ordered the remainder of the Company alerted for movement to Ouren, Germany, to support 1st Platoon. Movement was made to a position of readiness at Wilwerdang, Belgium. At 1101 hours a reconnaissance disclosed that road blocks and enemy fire made it impossible to move as planned. At 1400 hours the 2nd Platoon was ordered to Clarvaux, Belgium, to support 110th Infantry Regiment. A force of enemy armor consisting of 27 tanks and halftracks were engaged, at 2030 hours the Platoon returned to rejoin the Company at Werswaspach, Belgium. One Mark IV tank, one personnel carrier, one armored car and an undetermined number of infantry in a building were destroyed with the loss of one M-18.

At 1800 hours on 17 December the Company less 1st, 2nd and one platoon of Recn Company was ordered by CCR to move to bivouac area in vicinity of Oberwampach, Belgium. Organization closed in new area at 172130 December and 2nd Platoon rejoined the company for a road march from Walwerdang, Belgium to the vicinity of Oberwampach, Belgium.

At 1000 hours 18 December Company less 1st Platoon and one Platoon of Rcn Company was ordered by CCR to make road march to vicinity of Longvilly, Belgium. Gun positions were established south of Longvilly, Belgium, with the command echelon in Longvilly. At 1230 hours 18 December the 3rd Platoon was ordered by CCR to change their gun positions to vicinity of Wincarage, Belgium, and closed in new positions at 1400 hours 18 December 1944.

At 0600 hours 19 December 1944 2nd Platoon made effort to get to Bastogne, Belgium. Encountered enemy small arms fire and destroyed enemy scout car plus personnel. At this point the enemy had surrounded the 2nd Platoon and they were ordered by Lt Dodge to abandon vehicles and destroy same, which they did. Lt Dodge's men were in the rear of enemy lines for four days.

At 0200 hours 19 December the 3rd Platoon in position in Longvilly, Belgium, was attacked by enemy infantry. In this engagement the 3rd Platoon destroyed enemy personnel carrier loaded with infantry plus unestimated number of foot troops. All of Rcn vehicles were lost in this engagement. At 0530 hours 19 December Lt Bong was ordered to send one destroyer to investigate a number of enemy tanks at rear of Team Cherry of the 10th Armd Div, who were in column west of Longvilly, Belgium. This destroyer found four Mark IV's in column but was ordered not to fight, but to return and protect the rear of Team Cherry column. At 1200 hours 19 December enemy armor and infantry attacked Longvilly, Belgium, in force, and at 1230 hours 19th CCR of the 9th Armd Div moved out of Longvilly, and their move was covered by the 3rd Platoon and in this covering action the 3rd Platoon lost three destroyers and was credited with one enemy tank plus foot troops. The 3rd Platoon's security vehicles were jammed in the 9th Armd Div armored column and could not get out, and the enemy was shelling the column with field artillery pieces and mortar fire. Lt Bong considered the situation hopeless at this point, and loaded all of his men on his one remaining destroyer and they fought their way to Bastogne, Belgium; there the 3rd Platoon attached themselves to Company C, 609th TD Bn of CCB of the 10th Armd Div.

At 0630 hours 20 December the 3rd Platoon's one remaining destroyer was attached to a combat team of the 10th Armd Div, and was sent out to establish a road block. One crew of 3rd Platoon found an abandoned M-10 and manned the M-10 to reinforce one of the positions of the 609th TD Bn. At 1000 hours 21 December the crew knocked out one Mark V tank. At 1435 hours 21 December the M-10 and crew were ordered to return to Bastogne, Belgium. Due to lack of fuel the M-10 and crew were used as road block.

At 0530 hours 22 December the M-18 of the 3rd Platoon was relieved from attachment to the combat team of the 10th Armd Div and was sent to Champs, Belgium, where in the company of two destroyers of the 705th TD Bn, and infantry of the 101st Airborne Division, seized the town of Champs and all the high ground around the town. During the night of the 23rd the remaining M-18, under control of Sergeant Shipulski, and the gun manned by Corporal Zickafoose, knocked out two tanks. Their mission in this engagement was direct support of the infantry. This position was held for three days and nights, and on 25 December the last M-18 of the 3rd Platoon was knocked out by enemy mortar fire after repeated enemy attacks. After their vehicle was knocked out the men were used to relieve men of the 609th TD Bn, also as security in the town of Bastogne.

At 0930 hours 23 December C Company was ordered by CCR to make road march to vicinity of Tintigny, Belgium, and arrived in billets at 1640 hours at Tintigny. Captain Collins reported to CCR in Tintigny, and found that the organization had been attached to Captain Gould of the 2nd Tank Bn. On reporting to Captain Gould the company was ordered to move to Villers-Sur-Semone (Semois), Belgium, and prepare to defend the town. Upon arrived at Villers-Sur Semois) outposts were established and a 24 hours patrol was out into effect.

From 24-28 December Company C maintained outposts and road patrols as well as obtaining lost and damaged equipment. At 1000 hours 29 December at Villers-Sur-Semois, Belgium, organization was ordered to move to Tintigny, Belgium, arriving there at 1035 hours, and found billets.

New Tank Corps Monument Item

Patton Battalion has anew item for the Patton US Tank Corps Monument Project. It an 11oz Diner Mug made here in the USA by Deneen Pottery. These are available for \$25 each and shipping if needed is between \$8 and \$10 depending on quantity and distance. Out of the 47 ordered we are down to just 15 left on hand. So they are going quick. Contact me or look for them on the 19Series Website. <https://19seriesclothing.com/>



Patton Monument Report for 2019

As of October 18, 2019, the Monument fund has \$14,598.00.

Total in Monument Account: \$14,598.00.

The Bourg Tee Shirts we have on hand.

Large: Yellow - 3, Tan - 2, **2XL:** Yellow -4, Tan - 3, OD - 4, **3XL:** Yellow - 2, Tan - 2, OD - 1, **4XL:** Yellow - 2.


M4 Tee Shirt

Large: Tan - 1, OD -1.

2XL: Tan - 1

Lapel Pins

We are looking at \$12 each for these.



I have over 40 of the Treat'em Rough stickers again! We are asking \$5 each, which includes shipping. If you want some please contact me!

Patton Battalion Funds / Memberships / Dues

The Patton Battalion, as of October 18, has 451 members on our battalion Facebook page. Out of those 451 members we are currently at 93 paid members. The Patton Battalion has \$741.13 in funds in the PayPal account. We have \$340.48 in the Patton Operating account. I deposited \$80 on 10-11-2019 from cash from mugs sold to help cover shipping costs on mugs.

In order to be a paid member of the battalion you must be a paid member of USABOT National. Again, a paid first year membership of \$15.00 which gets you a free battalion patch. Since we now have the battalion patch in the larger size both in color and subdued you have a choice as to which one you want free with your paid membership.

Both patches are also available for \$5 EA.

Your annual membership renewal will be \$10.00 every year after that. **Annual dues for the battalion are now due in June of each year!**

You can pay for your battalion membership through Paypal at:
pattonbattalion@outlook.com or
patton.battalion@usabot.org.

If you don't have a Paypal account you can send a check or Money Order to:

Patton Battalion - USABOT
1432 Flood Road
Shelbyville, KY 40065



ATTENTION

USABOT Memberships can be renewed and purchased By mail at

USABOT
68 West Marion ST
Doylestown, OH 44230

Make checks payable to USABOT
If at all possible try to go the USABOT Store Online
and register there so that the G4 can track.

WWW.USABOT.ORG

Patton Monument Layout

Proposed wording for back of monument - Left Side

Captain George S. Patton, Jr., during WWI, while assigned as the first officer to the U.S. Army Tank Corps, 10 November 1917, built the U.S. Army Light Tank School at Bourg, France, developed training, tactics, techniques and procedures for light tanks and help develop the first U.S. built tank, the M1917.

Letter from Captain Patton to Commander-in-Chief A.E.F, Subject: Command in the Tank Service. October 3, 1917.

1. I understand that there is to be a new service of "Tanks" organized and request that my name be considered for a command in that service.
2. I think myself qualified for this service for the following reasons.
 - A. The duty of "Tanks" and more especially of "Light Tanks" is analogous to the duty performed by cavalry in normal wars. I am a cavalryman.
 - B. I have commanded a Machine Gun Troop and know something of the mechanism of Machine Guns. I have always had a Troop which shot well so think that I am a good instructor in fire. It is stated that accurate fire is very necessary to good use of tanks.
 - C. I have run Gas Engines since 1917 and have used and repaired Gas Automobiles since 1905.
 - D. I speak and read French better than 95% of American Officers so could get information from the French Direct. I have also been to school in France and have always gotten on well with Frenchmen.
 - E. I believe that I have quick judgment and that I am willing to take chances. Also I have always believed in getting close to the enemy and have taught this for two years at the Mounted Services School where I had success in arousing the aggressive spirit in the students.
 - F. I believe that I am the only American who has ever made an attack in a motor vehicle.
3. This request is not made because I dislike my present duty or am desirous of evading it but because I believe that when we get "Tanks" I would be able to do good service in them.

November 10, 1917: Order for tanks approved by GHQ AEF General Order 153, Paragraph 37.

On November 16, 1917, Captain Patton and 2nd Lieutenant Elgin Braine, the second person assigned to the US Tank Corps, were sent to the French Tank School at Champlieu, France and began learning about French Light Tanks.

"Light Tanks" was the first paper submitted by Captain Patton. The double-spaced, fifty-eight-page report was submitted on 12 December 1917 to the new Chief of Tanks, B.G. Samuel D. Rockenbach. It served as the foundation for subsequent tank developments in the AEF. The report, divided into four sections, including a detailed mechanical description of the Renault light tank, recommendations for the organization of tank units, a discussion of tank tactics and doctrinal theory, and proposed methods for the conduct of drill and instruction.

Patton described the light tank as a self-propelled armored vehicle capable of delivering predetermined firepower on the battlefield whenever needed. It had to be able to overcome all terrain obstacles in its path, provide maximum protection to both crew and engine, and be armed in order to accomplish this mission. He further specified that the vehicle must be easily manufactured in large numbers, have a power-to-weight ratio proportionate to the potential of its engine and traction, and be transportable to training or battle areas by either rail or truck. In later years when Patton was arranging his files, he wrote in pencil across the top, "This paper was and is the Basis of the U. S. Tank Corps. I think it is the best Technical Paper I ever wrote. GSP, Jr."

On December 17, 1917 Patton and Braine went to Langres, France where they reported to the Commandant of the Army Schools for the purpose of establishing a Tank School.

In late December Patton and Braine reconnoitered land that would be suitable for the tank School. They found and looked over ground near Bourg and decided that it was exactly what was needed for a school, tank park and maneuver ground. At Bourg, five miles south of Langres on the road to Dijon, the land was in the Bois d'Amour, a rising piece of ground crowned by a wood and flanked by two good roads and a railroad. Bourg, with nearby villages of St. Geosmes and Brennes, as well as Langres, were conveniently located for billets.

Promoted to Major, Temporary, January 26, 1918.

Assigned formally as the Commandant of the 1st Light Tank School, February 14, 1918.

Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, Temporary, April 3, 1918.

Organized 1st Light Tank Battalion with himself commanding, April 28, 1918.

Organized 2nd Light Tank Battalion, with himself in command of the Regiment, June 6, 1918.

Captain Patton, after seeing division patches on units arriving in France, said "I want you officers to devote one evening to something constructive. I want a shoulder insignia. We claim to have the firepower of artillery, the mobility of cavalry and the ability to hold ground of the infantry so whatever you come up with it must have red, yellow and blue [the traditional colors of artillery, cavalry and infantry] in it". The winning design was a triangular patch with equal parts of the three colors. The winning designer was awarded a \$100 dollar bill. Patton wanted to make the Tank Corps stand out from everyone else. That triangle [shoulder patch] was the first step.

Student, General Staff College, Langres, France, August 20, 1918.

Organized and assigned himself Brigade commander 304th Tank Brigade, August 24, 1918.

On 12 September 1918, Colonel Patton led the 304th Tank Brigade, consisting of the 326th and 327th tank battalions, that he trained, into combat during the Battle of St. Mihiel.

Led the 304th Tank Brigade during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. The Distinguished Service Cross Citation reads: for extraordinary heroism in action while serving with the Tank Corps, A.E.F., near Cheppy, France, 26 September 1918. Colonel Patton displayed conspicuous courage, coolness, energy, and intelligence in directing the advance of his brigade down the valley of the Aire. Later he rallied a force of disorganized infantry and led it forward, behind the tanks, under heavy machine-gun and artillery fire until he was wounded. Unable to advance further, Colonel Patton continued to direct the operations of his units until all arrangements for turning over the command were complete. General Order No. 113 (1918)

Promoted to Colonel Temporary, October 18, 1918.

His leadership, esprit de corps, élan, fundamentals and the combat aggressiveness that he instilled into the U.S. Tank Corps, continued into World War II through Korea, the Cold War, Desert Storm, Iraqi Freedom and continues on to this very day...."Treat'em Rough!"

Patton Monument Layout

Proposed wording for backside of Monument (Right Side Rear)

TANK BATTALIONS THAT SERVED IN COMBAT

**301st Heavy Tank Battalion
306th Tank Brigade
331st Tank Battalion**

**304th Tank Brigade
344th Tank Battalion & 345th Tank Battalion**

ST. MIHIEL

● ESSAY ● NONSARD ● JONVILLE ● PANNES ● ST. MAURICE ● WOEL ● BENEY ●

MEUSE-ARGONNE

● VARNNES ● MONTBLAINVILLE ● EXERMONT ● CHEPPY ● CHARPENTRY ● CHAPAL CHEHERY ●
● BAULNY ● VERY ● SOMMERANCE ● MONTREBEAU WOODS ● KANDRES-ET-ST. GROERGES ●

WITH BRITISH FORCES

● BRANCOURT ● FRESNOY ● LA-HAIE MENNERESSE ● ST. SOUplet ●
● CATILLON-ET-GIMBRAMONT FARM ● LE-CATELET BONY ●

MEDAL OF HONOR

2

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS

50



WORLD WARS TANK CORPS ASSOCIATION

In 1919 the movement began to create Tank Corps Posts as a part of the newly formed American Legion. The purpose of the organization was to promote and maintain public interest in tanks as an arm of the service and to form a bond between its members by means of social and fraternal activities. These tankers created Tank Corps Posts formed in Chicago, New York, St Louis, Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. just to name a few. The group was fond of the two men who made great impressions on them during World War 1, General Dwight D. Eisenhower and General George S. Patton, Jr.

The WWTCA lobbied the Post Master General in 1953 to create a General George S Patton, Jr. stamp. The stamp was unveiled on November 10, 1953 on General Patton's birthday.

The official combat badge of the American fighting tankmen was approved and released by the World Wars Tank Corps Association in April, 1957. Centered on the badge is a replica of the British Mark V tank running over the flaming sword symbolic of battle and in particular of Chateau Thierry. The background is blue and the inscription "World Wars Tank Corps." All armored combat men of both World Wars were eligible for the badge which was issued only through the World Wars Tank Corps Association. President Eisenhower received the first combat badge on July 7, 1958, at the White House.

The WWTCA lobbied the War Department to create a Combat Armor Badge after the success of Armor in World War II and the Korean War. In 1950's the WWTCA began to sponsor a measure before Congress to establish a Combat Armor Badge and Expert Tanker's Badge. The discussion would continue throughout the 1960's and 1970's during the Vietnam War and again in 1991 after Operation Desert Storm.

One of the last contributions made by this group was the Armored Force Monument located in Arlington National Cemetery.



Patton Battalion - USABOT

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Be sure to check us out on
Twitter @pattonbattalion



Coming up in the October Issue - 52nd Armored Infantry Battalion AAR, Back story on CCR 9th AD men during the Bulge, 8th Annual Tanker Homecoming, FT Bliss, TX.

Upcoming Events

US Cavalry & Armor Association Chapter Fort Knox - Stable Call monthly meeting, 3rd Thursday of every month, Location TBD - Fort Knox, KY

World War I Event - Indiana Military Museum, Vincennes, IN, March 2020.

Sullivan Cup - Best Tank Crew Competition - Fort Benning, GA, First week of May 2020

Patton and the US Tank Corps Monument - Fort Knox - **TBD**

8th Annual Tanker Homecoming
Fort Bliss, TX

