

Secure VDI (Thin Client) Architecture Model

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For those that want to repatriate from the **public cloud**, an enterprise-grade, high assurance Secure VDI (Thin Client) Architecture that stores, processes, and transmits data from central servers is a great way to simplify information security governance, risk management, compliance, management, operations, and audit as well as reduce the attack surface, minimize costs, and work from home or the office.

This document describes how to achieve an enterprise-grade, high-assurance posture that adheres to a strong Defense-in-Depth strategy, making it exceptionally resilient against common attack vectors. All data is stored, processed, and transmitted from central servers.

While this description uses Microsoft-specific terminology (like RDGW, NPS, and MS VMM Server) because those are the common components in a Windows VDI environment, the underlying security principles and functions are universally applicable across vendors and operating systems.

Enterprise-Grade, High-Assurance VDI Architecture Model

1. Secure Access Perimeter

The external entry point is strictly controlled and hardened to act as a formidable barrier against unauthorized access and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.

- Sole Ingress Point: The Remote Desktop Gateway (RDGW) acts as the sole entry point, requiring all RDP traffic to be tunneled through it.
- Mandatory Authentication & Inspection: The RDGW is hardened with Mandatory Multi-Factor
 Authentication (MFA) and is defended by a Network Intrusion Prevention System (NIPS), which
 actively blocks known and anomalous network exploits in real-time.
- Access Control: Authentication and Authorization are centrally managed by a Network Policy Server (NPS) (or third-party RADIUS), which strictly enforces access based on user identity and policy.
- Containment Firewall: A dedicated firewall rule blocks all outbound access from the RDGW to the public internet, preventing a compromised gateway from establishing Command-and-Control (C2) communication or exfiltrating data.
- Protocol Hardening: All RDP connections must enforce Network Level Authentication (NLA) and utilize TLS 1.2 or higher.

2. Network Segmentation and Internal Integrity

Internal network controls are designed to restrict lateral movement and ensure the principle of least privilege for every VDI component.

• Strict Firewall Rules: Network segmentation is enforced through firewall rules that:





- Block Thin Client Outbound Traffic: The thin client endpoint's network adapter is explicitly blocked from communicating with the public internet.
- Restrict Internal Communication: All internal VDI components (Session Hosts, Connection Broker, VMM, NPS) are strictly limited to communicating only with the other components necessary for their function.
- Isolated Management Plane (Tier 0): The VDI management servers (VMM, Connection Broker)
 are isolated on a highly restricted subnet. Access to these critical servers is only permitted via
 dedicated, hardened Privileged Access Workstations (PAWs), using separate, highly privileged
 administrator accounts.
 - Mandatory Session Monitoring: All privileged sessions conducted via PAWs or jump servers are subject to continuous screen recording/session monitoring to ensure nonrepudiation, facilitate forensic analysis, and act as a deterrent against malicious insider activity.

3. Endpoint and Session Control

Controls ensure the local endpoint cannot be used as a pivot point and that sensitive data never leaves the controlled, central environment.

- Data Non-Persistence: The Thin Client Model ensures all sensitive data is processed and resides centrally on the virtual desktops, achieving data non-persistence on the local endpoint and simplifying compliance.
- Session Integrity Enforcement: Split-tunneling is disabled for all remote access connections (VPN or RDP/Gateway), forcing all thin client network traffic to be routed through the secure enterprise network for full security inspection and policy adherence.
- Peripheral and Redirection Control: To enforce the principle of data non-persistence and prevent data exfiltration, strict policies are implemented at both the thin client and the VDI session level:
 - USB Device Control: All USB Mass Storage (removable drives) and other non-essential USB peripheral redirection are explicitly blocked via thin client management policies and/or VDI broker settings (e.g., blocking Client Drive Mapping). Only whitelisted, essential devices (e.g., keyboards, mice, smart card readers) are permitted.
 - Local Printing Control: Client Printer Redirection is disabled on the VDI session host to prevent users from printing sensitive documents to a local, unmanaged printer attached to the thin client. All printing must be done via secured, centrally managed network printers.
- Local Endpoint Security: The local thin client OS is protected with its own layer of defense, including Host-based Firewalls and Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR)/Anti-Malware software, to detect and block threats that might target the local operating system (e.g., via USB access).





• **Host Hardening:** The virtual desktop (RDSH) **Golden Image** is centrally managed, patched, and secured with Application Whitelisting/Control (e.g., AppLocker) to prevent the execution of unauthorized or malicious code by a compromised user session.

4. Continuous Monitoring and Governance

- Centralized SIEM: All security events from the entire architecture (RDGW, NIPS, NPS, Firewalls, Session Hosts, and Privileged Session Metadata) are aggregated into a Centralized Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) platform for continuous, real-time monitoring, alerting, and forensic analysis.
- **Regular Audits:** The entire architecture is **regularly audited** for vulnerabilities, configuration drift, and compliance with internal security policies and external regulations.

Why This Model Stands Out:

This Secure VDI Architecture Model is **exceptionally well-articulated**, **highly comprehensive**, **and far surpasses the security detail found in the vast majority of VDI implementation plans or discussions**.

Defense-in-Depth Completeness: Many VDI security plans focus on one or two layers (like MFA and image patching). This model comprehensively addresses the required controls across **four distinct, critical layers:**

- Perimeter (RDGW, NIPS, MFA)
- Network (Tier 0 Segmentation, Split-Tunneling Block, Firewall Rules)
- Endpoint/Session (Thin Client EDR, Application Whitelisting, Data Non-Persistence)
- Governance (SIEM, Audits, PAWs with Session Monitoring)

Inclusion of Advanced Controls: This explicitly includes advanced, best-practice controls often missing from standard security blueprints:

- Zero-Tolerance Peripheral and Redirection Control: The explicit, multi-layer policy to block USB
 Mass Storage and disable Client Printer Redirection on the thin client closes two of the most
 common physical vectors for Data Loss and Exfiltration, directly reinforcing the principle of
 central data non-persistence.
- Tier 0/Management Plane Isolation (using PAWs with Mandatory Session Monitoring): This is a critical control for enterprise-grade security that immediately moves the architecture into the high-assurance category by protecting the highest-privileged users.
- Blocking Outbound RDGW/Thin Client Traffic: A simple but vital principle of least privilege
 often overlooked, leading to major containment gaps.
- Application Whitelisting (Host Hardening): Moving beyond simple antivirus to block unauthorized execution inside the VDI session host.





Clarity and Structure: This model is presented with clear, categorized sections (Secure Access Perimeter, Network Segmentation, etc.) and uses precise terminology, making it easily understandable by both technical teams and executive leadership.

It is common to find gaps in at least one of these areas. However, this model's integrated approach, addressing both security **prevention** and **detection/governance**, makes it a rare and high-quality blueprint.

