

Measuring informal housing & its socio-economic outcomes: First Nation Reserves in Canada

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In theory: Ricardo, Coase, Demsetz

- Formal land tenure:
 - Increases incentives to invest
 - Increases bargaining efficiency
 - Lowers transaction costs
 - Lowers costs of defense
 - Internalizes externalities
 - Allows collateralization



Indigenous Land Titles Initiative



First Nations
Tax Commission
Commission de la
fiscalité des premières
nations

In practice: Results of titling


- Peru:
 - increased labour force participation
- Argentina:
 - more infrastructure investment
 - reduced fertility rate
 - smaller household size
 - higher educational outcomes
- Collateralization?
- Reversion to informality

First Nation Reserves in Canada




Community Well-Being (CWB)

- Components:
 - Income
 - Education
 - Labour Force Activity
 - Education
- First Nations are heterogeneous



Land tenure on FN Reserves

- Formal (INAC):
 - Certificates of possession, leases
- Informal (not INAC):
 - Quantum unmeasured




Research question

- Does informality hinder socio-economic development (CWB) in British Columbia and Ontario?
 - 95 Reserves in BC and 74 in ON have CWB data
 - 34 Reserves in BC and 44 in ON have data for Income, LFA, Education, Housing

Measuring informality

- Census: total dwellings = (formal + informal)
- Indian Lands Registry: formal
- Imagery: informal
- Informality ratio = (informal/total)



Variables

Dependent

- Community Well-Being

Independent

- Informality
- Reserve population
- Reserve area
- Distance to service centre
- Distance to urban centre (pop. over 50,000)
- Global Non-Response rate (GNR)

The model

- OLS:

$$CWB_i = \alpha + \beta \text{informality}_i + X_i' \theta + u_i$$

- Seemingly Unrelated Regression:

$$\text{Income}_i = \alpha + \beta \text{informality}_i + X_i' \theta + u_i$$

$$\text{Education}_i = \alpha + \beta \text{informality}_i + X_i' \theta + u_i$$

$$\text{Housing}_i = \alpha + \beta \text{informality}_i + X_i' \theta + u_i$$

$$\text{LFA}_i = \alpha + \beta \text{informality}_i + X_i' \theta + u_i$$

Summary stats

- Overall: total housing count = 23,614
- Informal = 55.1%
 - 56% in Ontario (with 11,917 houses *in toto*)
 - 55% in BC (with 11,697 houses *in toto*)

Summary stats for 95 IR in BC and 74 in ON*

	Average	Max	Min
CWB	61, 63*	82, 75*	45, 38*
Population	337, 448*	2604, 2592*	70, 68*
GNR	0.20, 0.19*	0.50, 0.48*	0.02, 0.01*
Area (ha)	1246, 5222*	13283, 42614*	10, 13.4*
S. Centre (km)	149, 161*	691, 600*	1, 7.4*
City (km)	273, 262*	886, 600*	1, 7.4*
% housing inform.	75, 72*	100, 100*	2.55, 5*

Summary stats for 34 IR in BC and 44 in ON*

	Average	Max	Min
CWB	61, 62*	82, 75*	45, 45*
Income	62, 61*	94, 78*	45, 42*
Education	40, 38*	60, 55*	22, 12*
Housing	76, 75*	96, 94*	53, 47*
Labour Force Activity	67, 73*	81, 87*	47, 56*
Population	662, 662*	2604, 2592*	259, 260*
GNR	0.24, 0.20*	0.50, 0.48*	0.05, 0.07*
Area (ha)	1805, 6797*	13283, 42614*	13, 13
S. Centre (km)	163, 180*	691, 600*	1, 7.4*
City (km)	278, 258*	818, 600*	1, 7.4*
% housing inform.	66, 64*	100, 100*	2.55, 5*

Results (p1)

- Informal housing significantly reduces CWB!
- 10% increase of informality decreases CWB by:
 - 0.90 points in British Columbia
 - 0.83 points in Ontario
- Thought experiment for an IR in BC:
 - At time 1, 100% informal
 - At time 2, 100% formal
 - Change in CWB = 9 points!

Results (p2): Components of CWB

British Columbia

- Significant at 0.05 level:
 - Income
 - LFA
 - Housing

- Significant at 0.07 level:
 - Education

Ontario

- Significant at 0.05 level:
 - Income
 - Education
 - LFA

- Significant at 0.16 level:
 - Housing

Supplementary stuff

- Reverse-causality?
- Role of unobserved metrics:
 - Governance
 - Institutions
- Much more to empirically examine:
 - Assess all regions
 - Incorporate 2016 Census
 - Refine methodology (e.g. automated PFI generator)