

Virtue and vice in the self-consciousness as individuality

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C. (AA.) Reason

V. The Certainty and Truth of Reason

B. The actualization of rational self-consciousness through its own activity

c. Virtue and the way of the world, 381. — 393.

I. introduction

The passion betrayed in some lines from passages 390-393 which comes midway in the journey of *Reason* becoming *Spirit* is fairly anomalous in Hegel's tightly controlled and systematic *Phenomenology of Spirit*<sup>i</sup> and warrants close examination not the least because it may illustrate *both* a misstep in Hegel's careful logic as well as the kernel which unlocks the whole of the system and encloses the uniqueness of Hegel's particular *German Idealism*.

“[Virtue] glories in this pompous talk about doing what is best for humanity, about the oppression of humanity, about making sacrifices for the sake of the good, and the misuse of gifts. Ideal entities and purposes of this kind are empty, ineffectual words which lift up the heart but leave reason unsatisfied, which edify, but raise no edifice; declamations which specifically declare merely this: that the individual who professes to act for such noble ends and who deals in such fine phrases is in his own eyes an excellent creature—a puffing-up which inflates him with a sense of importance in his own eyes and in the eyes of others, whereas he is, in fact, inflated with his own conceit.”<sup>iii</sup>

These lines are interesting for, firstly and perhaps at the least, a certain laxity in the diction from which we have come necessarily by now to expect a rigorous internal logic<sup>1</sup>. Hegel presents a dialectical and ununified concept of *virtue* which he then problematizes—at least, that version of virtue which consciousness takes the shape of here and defines along the way—as he narrates the tension between self-consciousness *as* virtue and the “way of the world.” What is at stake in Hegel's section on virtue, he tells us, is a notion of sacrifice which we will come to understand, it is the very “gifts” *gifted* to the self-consciousness; and so, at stake in an *analysis* of virtue, of a certain virtue, is the very same.

This movement is a familiar one by this point in the text. The first lines of the next section, “(BB.) Spirit” are “Reason is Spirit when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to truth, and it is conscious of itself as its own world, and of the world as itself.”<sup>iiii</sup> Therefore, our passage comes in the process of Reason achieving self-actualization via a dialectic which, Hegel informs us at the beginning of subsection B., “The actualization of rational self-consciousness through its own activity,” consists of the same shapes or “general stages” as were defined in the first section, section A. “Consciousness”:

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<sup>1</sup> Internal logic in that the particulars of the text conform to laws only as they have been provisionally inscribed by Hegel through the laborious work of, primarily, the first section of the *Phenomenology* which as an apparatus of conveying ultimate discursivity necessarily in the process builds itself into a *bricolage*, an artifact which *is* precisely but only provisionally what it at once claims to be impossible.

Just as Reason, in the role of observer, repeated, in the element of the category, the movement of *consciousness*, viz. sense-certainty, perception, and the Understanding, so will Reason again run through the double movement of self-consciousness, and pass over from independence into its freedom.<sup>iv</sup>

We are primed to observe carried out the laws and procedures created by the text in which Reason knows itself as an individual, it attempts to make itself into an empty universal with which it is unhappy before finding the “undivided unity with the universal,”<sup>v</sup> of true sublation. We recognize the appearance of virtue as that middle part, that false step. But to understand why it is a false step, we would need to analyze Hegel’s “virtue,” (referring now to my first quote) to analyze “sacrifice,” the “good,” the “sake” of the “sake of the good,” the “ideal,” the “heart,” “act,” “noble,” “excellent,” importantly “sense” in the sense of a “sense of importance,” “others,” and finally, “conceit.” And to analyze not least to reveal possible oppositions firstly with prior usage in *Phenomenology*, some, like “heart,” more recent, others, like “other” and “sense,” more distant. As well as others whose usage here perhaps paradoxically ostensibly precedes their appearance in the *world* as the restless, asymmetrical development of *Spirit*.<sup>2</sup>

This would deserve much time and attention. What I will do for now is suggest that the apparent passion in these lines as well as what may show to be an uncharacteristic backslide into more axiomatic or even uncritical diction constitutes a literary element, first—and as consistent as this element with what has been exercised in the text thus far in the appropriation of canonical terms or premises juxtaposed with an unfamiliar structure, a *wearing out* of the axioms and the givens of their tradition<sup>3</sup>—and second, a rhetorical formal element that is more significant as a *shift* in the text. The primary questions, then, are in what effect such elements have in the greater structure, with what weight they contribute to the Spirit *knowing itself*,<sup>4</sup> and whether it does, in fact, represent a point of weakness on Hegel’s part. Identifying a *particular* virtue, whether unified or fractured, with a basis extrinsic to the *Phenomenology*,<sup>5</sup> is not the foremost concern but a necessary product of the analysis whose reality, I will argue as well, has implications for the later chapters, the revealed Religion, and the ultimate content of Hegel’s Idealism. The concept of virtue most constitutive with that found in *Reason* is the virtue of the medieval period which has its name in the writings of the early church fathers and its properties yet known by other signifiers in the doctrines of the then proliferating, non-Abrahamic religions of east Asia.

b.

In the opening to this section which precipitates the tensions and so shapes of consciousness appearing in subsections a., b. and c., the *Phenomenology* foreshadows the *appearance* of Spirit yet to come, during which, the central themes of “sacrifice” and “virtue” find their cursory introduction. Self-consciousness as Reason knows itself to be the world via an immediate experience of the thing. It again tries to move from certainty to truth which have been shown to be different and exclusive: “What holds good for it in principle has to enter into consciousness and become explicit for it”<sup>vi</sup> The process of consciousness, the movement of Spirit in the world, is neither finished nor explicit. Consciousness must repeat the dialectic while at once retaining the

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<sup>2</sup> i.e. “good.”

<sup>3</sup> To suggest that Hegel’s reading of *virtue*, of the sources of a certain virtue or virtues which will be partially uncovered, is in fact as a reading a sort of primitive *deconstruction*, may be to suggest too much.

<sup>4</sup> understood as the natural upward movement of the dialectic toward *some* concept of *truth* which we can say for the purposes of this paper nothing more than

<sup>5</sup> As, of course, it must be; Hegel’s project may prove to be the singularly most impressive attempt at the work of the mythopoetic *Engineer*; guided in *pure design* by principally abstract principles, yet it will not be more than attempt, and neither does the *Phenomenology* support or imply the possibility of a non-mythic *Engineer*.

concepts and oppositions presented therein, such as the *telos* of “observing reason.” The *individual* Reason knows itself *as* an individual but also that it realizes itself in relation to the other, which it now knows as *another* individual. It tries once more to ascend to the universal through laws and fails finding only empty universal. But in so doing allows a glimpse of the “goal.” The *Notion*, as the notion of this goal, in which is disclosed the “*realm of ethical life*”—which we have already come to understand as something closer to the implicit customs of a family or community rather than a formal moral framework—is the “unity of the essence of individuals in their independent *actual existence*... an intrinsically universal self-consciousness.”<sup>vii</sup>

The individuals we have in this section are less abstract than those of part B. They subsist in a society with other individuals. Reason as the universal Substance which is the goal<sup>6</sup> is “burst asunder” into many independent individuals. And so, Spirit, as Reason realized, withdraws. In 350, we get the first mention of sacrifice: “They are conscious of being these separate independent beings through the sacrifice of their particularity.” Before this sacrifice is explicit,<sup>7</sup> the individuals are shown again to act selfishly as they take themselves as their object and labour for their own needs. However, before the fragmented individuals move through what may prove in the “pleasure” and “law of the heart” sections to be a harmful selfishness—where “perversion” will emerge—to a concept of sacrifice out of which is born virtue, it is important to note that the *implicit* universal that is the Notion that is the substance as society or “the life of a people or nation” is the result of “their own doing as particular individuals, or is the work they have produce.”<sup>viii</sup> Without doing so intentionally, the individual is serving the universal. Thus, here we have a hint at the appearance of Spirit in the world and a hint at the intersubjectivity and *freedom* of the *state* as an “aesthetic and cognitive phenomenon” that emerges “through a legibly universal commitment of states to the *Bildung*<sup>8</sup> of their citizens.”<sup>ix</sup> As the text turns toward the development of “virtue” and “sacrifice,” “pleasure” and “perversion,” it is *this* freedom which initiates the reader, calls up in him religious associations and particular phantasms whose particular practice of religious life or the willful evasion of it—the hermit and the hedonist—and finds them inconsistent with freedom<sup>9</sup> as such.

Hegel’s *first* concept of virtue comes where one would expect to find it, in a value judgement of his own, as that quality oriented toward the *good*, understood simply to be that which the speaker holds to be good; and so, a virtue that, in definition, will come to be supplanted by *another* virtue whose quality is merely mistaken. In the free nation, the individual subsisting with the many individuals, regarding them as itself and itself as them, finds a provisional unity and Hegel states, “The wisest men of antiquity have therefore declared that wisdom and virtue consist in living in

<sup>6</sup> Here formulated again as, “It is...in the life of a people or nation that the Notion... has its complete reality,” (350).

<sup>7</sup> And explicitly different and perhaps more consequential than what occurs in the “Stoicism, scepticism, and the unhappy consciousness” section.

<sup>8</sup> Education, formation, development, the cultivation of the mind, for Hegel, the dialectical development of the self-consciousness coming to higher understanding and the historical coevolution of human culture and Spirit.

<sup>9</sup> Intrinsic to which is a free and freely paradoxical lack of freedom which therefore problematizes our notion of freedom as liberty or sovereignty of the self. From the OED: “Free” in the “The original sense of the Indo-European base has been conjectured to be ‘one’s own,’” whereupon “Freedom” is thus “The state or fact of being free from servitude, constraint, inhibition.” But where this “freedom” of the text, freedom as Reason realized as truth and in truth which is the truth of Spirit and the unity of universal and particular which especially in the End, the *telos*, the projected Goal of Hegel is ostensibly freedom, as well, *from* the dialectical, which as a unity of unity and difference and so a “containment” under a “one,” is, in his words, an “accordance with the customs of one’s nation,” and so “one” nation, it is, as “accordance” itself (as in “to accord” to “give or grant someone [power, status, or recognition]) is “compliance, conformity; agreement, correspondence; harmony,” therefore a “freedom” which is paradoxically *not* freedom.

accordance with the customs of one's nation.”<sup>x</sup> What is manifest in the triad of the subsequent section which this perambulates, is the lingering *trace* of this *happy state*, therefore the lingering *desire*<sup>10</sup> to realize it again, and the various faulty modes undertaken by consciousness in an attempt to fulfil that desire. Though the above quote displays a virtue which, while it *is* what is virtuous *to* Hegel,<sup>11</sup> is not Hegel's concept of virtue, it will prove not to be the only other virtue found in the *Phenomenology*.

## II. what a lesson, what an awful lesson<sup>12</sup>

### a. Faust and a spiritual-bond

Subsection a., *Pleasure and Necessity*, introduces a shape of consciousness which, as the heading suggests, is now concerned with base instincts. Having abandoned the Nation and Ethical Substance of the Greek city state, self-consciousness “Plunges therefore into life and indulges to the full the pure individuality in which it appears.”<sup>xi</sup> This shape of consciousness is represented in the titular figure of Goethe's *Faust*<sup>xii</sup> by way of a peculiar paraphrase. In their original verse and place in the tragedy, the lines adapted by Hegel are spoken by the primary antagonist, Mephistopheles, the devil himself, who is reflecting on his temptation of the scholar, Faust. In the Miller translation, between sections 360 and 361, we find the verse attributed to *Faust, Part I*:

It despises intellect and science  
The supreme gifts of man  
It has given itself to the devil  
And must perish<sup>13</sup>

Goethe renders the folktale after a classical tragedy and yet infamously bends the form of the tragedy. One way in which he begins to do so is by reframing the legend as a retelling of the *Book of Job*, a prologue in Heaven sees the devil as adversarial angel as in the Job requesting permission from the lord to freely test one of His mortal creation, the *good* man, Faust as the figure of Job. Only, Faust's *goodness*, his excellence in the eyes of his creator, lies not in the unwavering *faith* of Job. Unlike Job, Faust isn't a father; he isn't a keeper of livestock; rather, he is a “doctor,” that is, a philosopher, scholar, and intellectual. And yet, God, as with Job, declares Faust to be a wondrous servant and predicts that he will triumph in the trials of Mephistopheles through *virtue*. And to uncover a positive definition for *this* idea of virtue as it is perhaps embodied by Faust, we may look to the first verse spoken by the Devil as he complains to the Lord of the *evils* of the earth and mankind:

Better he [mankind] might have fared, poor wight,

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<sup>10</sup> A desire yet devoid of the principle, sensual desire which is for the Faustian shape; a desire here as a strong wanting, as the spiritual hunger for the unity of that which will be temporarily lost and *unknown* to consciousness and so never satiated until the *End*, as the very longing for God which, as we can currently know Him, is only satiated by *belief*.

<sup>11</sup> Virtuous *to* Hegel and what can be rediscovered, under different names, in Hegel's formulation of proper, intersubjective, cultured religious and ethical life to come, and in the Spirit of Absolute Knowing; likely retaining little of the latin *virtus* as “strength, manliness, valor” but rather, as the more minor usages of “good,” something like “useful.” Hegel's virtue as *the* “virtue” which is, *for* Hegel, a shape of consciousness as well as whatever properties are proper to it..

<sup>12</sup> Basil responds to Dorian's cry of “Each of us has Heaven and Hell in him”

<sup>13</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, [218] From the German:

“Es verachtet Verstand und Wissenschaft,  
des Menschen allerhöchste Gaben -  
es hat dem Teufel sich ergeben  
und muß zugrunde gehn.”

Hadst thou not given him a gleam of heavenly light;  
Reason, he names it, and doth so  
Use it, than brutes more brutish still to grow.<sup>14</sup>

For Goethe, and in stark deviation from prior renderings of Faust legend as Protestant “warning against the excessive desire for secular learning,”<sup>xiii</sup> the virtuous soul is the soul committed to Reason, knowledge, and German Idealism.<sup>15</sup> The shining example of virtue most deserving of God’s grace or *agape*, the one detested most by the Devil for how his piety keeps him leaps and bounds above earthly *evils*, base pleasures, and human wretchedness, is Faust, not stagnant in devotion but *driven by inquiry*.<sup>16</sup> This is how we begin to arrive at Hegel’s formulation of “Intellect and science” as “The supreme gifts of man.”<sup>17</sup>

Of course, this is not the Faust who will come to personify this shape of self-consciousness in the subsection, *Pleasure and Necessity*, as this figure *is* virtuous, his virtue defined by the ardent powers of Reason and intellect, where the figure of subsection a., submerged in his self-serving individuality, precedes self-consciousness’ *becoming virtue*, and is its antithesis. The verse quoted above is noted in the text to be “adapted” from *Faust* and that is precisely what it is. Hegel hasn’t simply quoted Goethe, he has tailored the verse, and thus reauthored it, integrated it into the *Phenomenology* to become the kind of fragmented, distorted and polyphonic intertextual allusion expected of a classical modernist like T.S. Eliot.<sup>18</sup> The passage is formally set apart from the text as metered, lyrical verse and yet evinces a continuity with it,<sup>19</sup> therefore hinting at a distinguished significance without initiating the reader to its origin or *locating* him with any precision in the

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<sup>14</sup> Goethe, *Faust: Part I*. In German:

“Ein wenig besser würd’ er leben,  
Hättst du ihm nicht den Schein des Himmelslichts gegeben;  
Er nennt Vernunft und braucht’s allein  
Nur thierischer als jedes Thier zu seyn.”

Where *thier* (translated to *brutes*) is an archaic spelling of *tier*; German for *animal* or *a person of animalistic quality*, and so could be translated also as [he uses Reason to be] *more animalistic than any animal*; or *a better animal than all animals*, and so, according to Mephistopheles, still simply an animal, albeit one endowed with the faculties to reach toward, to *reason* the *divine* but not to reach it in mortal life.

<sup>15</sup> Goethe, *Faust: Part I* [Introduction] “Goethe began it in his romantic youth, and availed himself recklessly of the supernatural elements in the legend, with the disregard of reason and plausibility characteristic of the romantic mood. When he returned to it in the beginning of the new century his artistic standards had changed, and the supernaturalism could now be tolerated only by being made symbolic. Thus he makes the career of Faust as a whole emblematic of the triumph of the persistent striving for the ideal over the temptation to find complete satisfaction in the sense.”

<sup>16</sup> Goethe, *Faust: Part I*

“His food and drink are not of earth.  
An inward impulse hurries him afar;  
Himself half conscious of his frenzied mood;  
From heaven claimeth he the fairest star,  
And from the earth craves every highest good,  
And all that’s near, and all that’s far,  
Fails to allay the tumult in his blood.”

<sup>17</sup> Where here, *science* (as derived from the original Goethe quote beginning, “*Verachte nur Vernunft und Wissenschaft...*”) is *Wissenschaft*, the same word used by Hegel later, in the chapter on *absolute knowing*, adjacent to his use of Reason (*Vernunft*), as the *science* of logic, as distinct from the practice of empirical science; and so, we can deduce, favorable to Hegel.

<sup>18</sup> *The Waste Land* so inosculated with its references as to be published in its first edition with extensive (often editorializing, self-effacing, parodic before Nabokov, Pynchon, Wallace *et al.*) footnotes.

<sup>19</sup> E.g. by altering the pronoun to the third-person singular, neutral form, as to accord with the “it” that is *self-consciousness*.

Goethe text. As a literary device, the *Faust* interpretation is even more peculiar than what Hegel will similarly do with the speech of Antigone in the next section<sup>20</sup>—and even perhaps elucidates a hermeneutics that underpins later translation choices—because *Faust, part I* was already in German.

The original passage, again, falls in a moment of reflection. The Faust of the *Phenomenology* is thus a speculative Faust envisioned by the Devil, the tragic Faust who is redeemed by Goethe, who is rather not the Promethean, prideful, trickster Faustus of Elizabethan theatre who turns away from God; but the Faust who turns away from his gifts and the principle of Reason. Mephistopheles, alone, plots his temptation to himself, articulating the Faust that must be, that will be, if the demon is successful in leading him away from the divinely imbued powers of man, those loftiest attributes—“Fate hath endow'd him with an ardent mind”—which would otherwise free him from the immediate and sensuous pleasures of the earth, from shallow insignificance—“whose precipitate endeavour/ Earth's joys o'erleaping, leaveth them behind”—and deliver him, virtuous. After articulating a Faust that may be, the Devil embodies another Faust that might have been when he dons the mortal's robe and assumes his identity to counsel a student:

Use well your time, so rapidly it flies;  
Method will teach you time to win;  
Hence, my young friend, I would advise,  
With college logic to begin!<sup>21</sup>

The double role of Mephistopheles as Faust presents another doubling of Mephistopheles/Faust as Goethe. The Devil deplores indiscriminately all intelligent thought—that which separates the animal of man from all other animals—and would trap the self-conscious individual in the Spirit of the earth, the self-consciousness in its pure individuality, governed only by the certainty of its own reality which is to say, as Hegel does,<sup>22</sup> *desire*. However, Mephistopheles as Faust as Goethe expresses sardonically to the student an ironical diatribe against merely a *certain type* of intellectual activity—truly, a certain brand of philosophy:

And next, before aught else you learn,  
You must with zeal to metaphysics turn!<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> C. (AA.) Reason, V, C., c., *Reason as testing laws*, paragraph 437.

“They are not of yesterday or today, but everlasting  
Though where they came from, none of us can tell.”

As for what he will “similarly do”: i.e. mold the text of Antigone to suit his narrative in a subtle but profound way which, if done as a complete translated work on its own, would likely not be uncontroversial.

<sup>21</sup> Goethe, *Faust: Part I*. Continued:

“Then many a day they'll teach you how  
The mind's spontaneous acts, till now  
As eating and as drinking free,  
Require a process;—one! two! three!”

The Devil revels in the scholarly confusion he has whipped up in the student.

<sup>22</sup> In section 362., in what appears to be a scathing, vaguely puritanical, and dastardly obfuscated polemic against the act of sex.

<sup>23</sup> Goethe, *Faust: Part I*. For Derrida, this is the “delay of the philosopher,” he who “analyzes after the fact and whose students will never learn the secret of how to become a weaver. It is the indoctrinated, the uncritical. It is he who inherits his methods from a tradition without questioning its central axioms.

“Then forward steps your sage to show,  
And prove to you, it must be so;  
The first being so, and so the second,  
The third and fourth deduc'd we see;  
And if there were no first and second,

b. the true universal law of discipline

In the subsection between the Faustian self-consciousness and the self-consciousness that knows itself as virtue, self-consciousness fleetingly holds properties of each shape momentarily as it knows itself now as its own *End*. The individual believes that personal convictions should directly shape reality, viewing these inner laws as universal truths. In the first section, the world resists being shaped purely by subjective desires; the pursuit of pleasure inevitably confronts necessity, which represents the objective laws and constraints of reality that cannot be subordinated to personal will, the dictates of the “heart.” To consider the two-fold development simply as a journey toward *an* end (not the *telos* but rather the *end* as provisional goal, as the *object* for the sake of which an event is undertaken<sup>24</sup>) the shapes are then, 1. self-consciousness seeks to reach that end in the external “taking of its happiness” for itself, as such not generated *by* itself, and in so far as it is being-*for*-itself, as its own object, and in seeking *another*, “to become aware of itself” *through* the other, 2. self-consciousness, in knowing it must find its *Dasein* in universality, reflects into itself and discovers in itself the “character of necessity or universality” that presents as an *end* which for self-consciousness, in this section, will stabilize as *the end* to which each remaining effort of self-consciousness will attempt to be the *means*. As rather still an expression of individuality, no longer as an inward pull of *desire*, but an outward push of *excellence*, the self-righteous consciousness attempts to bend the world to the “law of the heart” which is immediately present to it and, in doing so, alienates the law which has become ordinance.<sup>25</sup> In no longer finding unity with it<sup>26</sup>—in ultimately not achieving its end—self-consciousness arrives at the conclusion that the individuality must be *sacrificed* in order to attain, in the shape of *virtue*, what it has discovered to be “*intrinsically* true and good.”<sup>xiv</sup>

Where the first shape represents again another type of hedonism, and in deploying the Faust figure, also a heresy of sorts, and the second shape critiques a certain moral relativism as the law of the heart fights to impose its own, arbitrary, moralistic demands on others, the third shape, as opposite these shapes, is even more extreme than the stoicism we’ve met in previous sections; it is both renunciation and crusade; it is crusading against the self-interest and the self-interested.

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Nor third nor fourth would ever be.  
This, scholars of all countries prize,—  
Yet 'mong themselves no weavers rise.—  
He who would know and treat of aught alive,  
Seeks first the living spirit thence to drive:  
Then are the lifeless fragments in his hand,  
There only fails, alas the spirit-band.  
This process, chemists name, in learned thesis,  
Mocking themselves, Naturer encheiresis.”

For Hegel, the resonance of Mephistopheles’ criticisms might also be most succinctly articulated by Derrida: “[In his] critique of Kantian formalism and analyticism... Hegel remarks that, at its most profound, Kant’s procedure with regard to the a priori synthetic principles and their root in the unity of self-consciousness relies too much on the givens of formal logic without deducing or producing the passage of this ‘simple unity of self-consciousness into these determinations and differences.’” Jacques Derrida, *Resistances de la Psychanalyse*.

<sup>24</sup> OED “end” n. II.14.a. An intended result of an action; an aim, purpose. (Cf. Latin *finis*.)

<sup>25</sup> In an ironic mirroring of the structure of the pleasure seeking self, those subjected to this “law of the heart,” as it has ostensibly originated in the individual self-consciousness, are thus, in the *content*, not fulfilling “the law of *their* hearts, but rather that of someone else” and so, are shown necessarily to deviate from the newly administered universal in favor of their *own individual* heart, the laws immediate to it, whose content could, in fact, never *be* universal while remaining *immediate* to it and repeats the process to no avail, alienating the truth of what it has discovered as its reality

<sup>26</sup> In fact, in finding it (the necessity of individuality) at once “perverted” and the “source of the perversion,” 377.

The narrative of the *Phenomenology*, distorting as it does to the specters of the human spirit abstracted into the continuous, restless, Proteus that is the literary, singular *consciousness*, here begins to distort by a more explicit and formal religious spirit, whose many traces are language. *Perversion, pleasure, nature, impulse, discipline, desire* among others—*virtue*—evoke religious *doctrine*, religion as value ordering system, and a plurality of religious ideas, considerably more so than the primitive and formless *yearning* for “*oneness*” with the transcendent Unchangeable, the alien *Truth*, which consciousness encountered in the “unhappy consciousness” and, in which section—by the *sanctity* of that universal being, the *renunciation* of the body and the *giving thanks* that would fill it anew—was the text’s first foray into explicitly theological material. The simple theotropic *agape* (ἀγάπη)<sup>27</sup> of the unhappy consciousness has given way to a more discerning shape. Consciousness, as the virtuous soul, is motivated once more by the universal, and a universal *good*. However, we do not yet know its *content*, what, for it, *is* that good. To begin, virtue only knows itself by the negative formulation which is to “reverse again the perverted ‘way of the world’ and to make manifest its true essence.”<sup>xv</sup> This “way of the world” is therefore the materiality of existence and the sense experience of the hedonist soul, as well as the self-determined conviction of the law of the heart, the total reversal of which in virtue means then the sloughing off of all the accoutrements of bodily experience, the experience of *being* a body. Another renunciation. In 384, Hegel effectively compares the *good* of this section to the *master* or *lord* of ‘lordship and bondage’: in its conflict with “the way of the world,” the good is *being for an other*, making itself “true by conquering its opposite” for, only thus implicitly true in the form of *purpose* within the virtuous consciousness, it has no being of its own. For virtue, the process is not precisely embodying the good or asserting its reality, but rather only *willing* it. In the willing of self-annihilation, the shape of virtue which has originated from the previous two shapes, is, in effect, willing the annihilation of its own origin.

Thus, the collective pathologies of the various shapes of consciousness known as the individual constitute the pathological blemish which is human individuality standing in the way of the truth of the universal; and virtue is that which remains after the eradication of this blemish. Hegel identifies the will of this “Knight of Virtue” as *discipline*. The “weapons” which are used by the virtuous soul in combatting the individuality are the “capacities and powers” innate or proper to each of the combatants, including will and discipline.<sup>28</sup> The knight promises that the universal

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<sup>27</sup> As the pseudo-Freudian *drive* toward the divine, toward the grace and unconditional love of God; also, *caritas, agape* embedded within, as from St. Augustine *On Christian Doctrine*, the “motion of the mind toward enjoying God for God’s own sake.”

<sup>28</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, [230], paragraph 383. “What will be the outcome of this conflict itself, what virtue learns from it, whether, by the sacrifice it makes of itself, the ‘way of the world’ succumbs while virtue triumphs—this must be decided by the nature of the living weapons borne by the combatants. For the weapons are nothing else but the nature of the combatants themselves, a nature which only makes its appearance for both of them reciprocally. What their weapons are is already evident from what is implicitly present in this conflict.”

386. “Since this universal is equally at the disposal of the virtuous consciousness and the ‘way of the world’ it is not apparent whether virtue thus armed will conquer vice. The weapons are the same; they are these capacities and powers. Virtue has, it is true, held in reserve its belief in the original unity of its own purpose and the essential nature of the ‘way of the world’, a reserve that is intended to fall on the enemy from the rear during the fight, and in principle to achieve that aim.”

Weapons translated from *Waffen* *n.* literally, *weapons*; plural *Waffe*, weapon; also, *arms*, as in a stockpile of arms in a military armory; the instruments used in warfare or combat (ballistic weapons, bladed weapons, etc.); also, *armament*, a mass noun denoting the same weapons in greater count, military context, and weapons beyond the scope of what a single combatant may wield, such as artillery mounted to a warship. What is important is that the term in the original connotes at first the same literal or instrumental weapons as physical objects in physical violence as *weapon* in translation and so retains its impact as metaphor when used to describe mental processes, spoken language,



good of virtue *can* be accomplished and can reshape society via this discipline and another labour. This time, rather than the labour of that foreshadowed Notion, of the flitting appearance of Spirit, the *telos* of Hegel, *labour* is the labour of “faith” or devotion. This, for Hegel, represents a rupture of sorts. Virtue fails—is “conquered by the way of the world”—because of a contradiction: the coerced investment and spiritual labour is the investment and labour of an individual. The virtuous uses its *self* to fight itself in the conflict during which it attempts to concretize the *good* itself. Because this activity *is* individuality, virtue is, in effect, only ever the *claims* it makes about the good and so is of “no actual existence” but rather only vanity.

Paragraph 385 provides the first *positive* definition for virtue as the proper use of one’s *gifts*. The very same gifts of the Faust section: intellect, science, reason:

“The good or the universal, then, as it comes to view there, is what are called gifts, capacities, powers. It is a mode of the spiritual, in which it is represented as a universal, which requires the principle of individuality to give it life and movement, and in this principle has an *actual* existence. This universal is put to *good* use by the principle of individuality, in so far as this principle lives in the virtuous consciousness, but is *misused* in so far as it clings to the 'way of the world'—a passive instrument which, controlled by a free individuality which is indifferent to the use it makes of it, can also be misused for the production of an actual existence which destroys it: a lifeless material lacking an independence of its own, which can be formed this way or that, or even to its own ruin.”<sup>xvi</sup>

The universal and absolute, the truth, the *good*, are, for Hegel, interwoven with reality. The *self* and so the interest of the self and the world and its disordered *way* are interwoven. The “sham-fight” of the Knight of Virtue is thus known to him as a sham as he cannot combat reality without degrading what he holds to exist absolutely in its own right, the *good*, but without also encountering that *good*, and so risking it, manifest in his enemy. As self-consciousness then moves on to the final stage of Reason and into Spirit, the *Phenomenology* presents the parallel development of what is found to be virtuous to Hegel, the *essence* of virtue: living in accordance with the customs of one’s nation, in mutual recognition, and the mutually independent articulation of that nation through the balance of labour and human intellectual faculties.

### III. conflict of the virtues:

A task is undertaken<sup>29</sup>: can I identify *this* concept of virtue, by its name and properties, and this movement of consciousness in the world through self-observation, observation of others, or as evinced in literature? We know based on the *ancient virtue* comment what *not* to look for. We must necessarily look through every other concept of virtue, first, at least, with the guiding principle

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verbal argument, or even the use of the objects or instruments that are pens, typewriters, printing presses, etc. to render thoughts in the material dimension.

<sup>29</sup> A task which is partly a burden of the categorization of the text as a work of *philosophy*—and so *non-fiction*, not *fantasy*—a categorization whose very concept and possibility we know to be slippery to the point of articulating nothing, at times (in fact one could, someone like David Foster Wallace likely has, undergo a deconstruction of the methods of cataloging literature taken up specifically by retail book sellers in western neo-liberal capitalist society—as distinct from the famous methodology of Melvin Dewey which orders every library in America—and show how nearly all of it falls apart under scrutiny; even and especially in the precise dialectical ways which would present almost a microcosm of Hegelian discourse [i.e. categories such as, *African-American Studies* or *Black Writers*, as I’m reminded of the central conflict of the disgruntled novelist, Thelonious “Monk” Ellison, in Percival Everett’s *Erasure*]); and, which we know to be an exercise in exerting force, in a play of power that is contingent and illusory: under what label one finds a certain text in the bookstore will invariably influence the reading of that text, a reading which would be different if, text unchanged, one were to find it under a *different* label.

that Hegel derived the exact word itself *rationaly*, that is, not arbitrarily, from something (even if that something is just his copy of the dictionary) before needing to go through the properties of the signified to cross-reference them with every referent *not* commonly signified under the signifier *virtue*, in the event he intends to give a new name to about which he writes. Of course, being that the *Phenomenology* was not written in English, we must first start with the original German. In every use of virtue which has been analyzed, the word has been translated from *Tugend* from the Proto-Germanic root *\*duganþō*, meaning usefulness, fitness, or strength. The Latin *virtus*, from which comes *virtue*, derived from *vir* (man), also initially referred to qualities associated with ideal manhood, particularly courage, strength, and valor in a martial sense. The Ancient Greek *ἀρετή* (*aretē*) denoted much of the same but was metaphorically extended in the virtue ethics of Aristotle to virtues of character and intellect. *Virtus* similarly broadened in Roman philosophy and persisted as moral and heroic excellence—likely the “virtue of the ancients” to which Hegel makes reference—until the church and early Christian theology, the *ordo amoris*, virtue as accordance with God’s grace, as *caritas*, as piety. The much younger word, *Tugend*, at the time of the *Phenomenology*, would have signified a close approximation of the same collection of attributes.

When Hegel says, “Virtue in the ancient world had its own definite sure meaning, for it had in the *spiritual substance* of the nation a foundation full of meaning, and for its purpose an actual good already in existence,”<sup>xvii</sup> he seems to level a critique of the moral content of virtue or the direction in which it moves in a way that feels consistent with the Nietzschean account of the shift in the very concepts of Good and Evil and what is termed the *Übermensch* and the *sklavenmoral*.<sup>30</sup> Because he is never very specific in the *Phenomenology* with regard to a hierarchy of specific religious texts, ideas, sects, or practices, we can only speculate on which are or are not consistent with the moves of consciousness found within. However, based on the text, it feels fair to claim the concept of virtue is embodied broadly in two historical modes of religious thought and practice. Perhaps one reason for the vagueness is that the *content* of the two modes differ drastically; the *content* of one half of the dual instance of the virtue that is a spiritual misstep is found later in the text to be a *true* content and the absolute as objective picture thinking Spirit will struggle to retain

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<sup>30</sup> Though, in the Hegelian system, physical strength, courage, and will to power are neither valorized nor found to be of moral content in their own phenomena but rather incidental, necessary, “incorrect” (in so far as a mode of being they are *further* from the appearance and knowing of truth, ultimately fail, and are dialectically overcome on the way toward the “correct” content of a being free of a certain domination), but nonetheless neutral attributes which can equally contribute to vice and virtue. Where perhaps Hegel has been broadly critiqued on the basis of his perhaps flippantly rendered notion of violence as a necessary stepping-stone on the way to freedom, on the basis that freedom, for him, is not an explicitly egalitarian concept, and on the basis of however his corpus may have been used (as Heidegger by the Nazis) by oppressive, nationalist, authoritarian ideologues, it seems nonetheless a fair claim that where such claims or implications can be found at all, read very differently to the moral genealogy of Nietzsche. And where I can claim, without ever knowing or attempting to know the author, that certain literary devices at work in the totality of the text inscribe an authorial *passion*, as a device to be read as passion (as I have claimed about elements in this section of the *Phenomenology*), and which could only *be* as a *pointing* at its opposite, could mean only that (could only *mean* if) others are read *without* passion. I will leave it to others to claim whether Hegel is dispassionate or insufficiently passionate about certain matters commonly imbued with passion (i.e. racial matters); but I will claim that, with regard to the moral content and historical evolution of virtue, this section displays a passion that is passionately *against* the passivistic, ostensibly selfless, restrained, suffering-for-a-cause, righteous soul who situates himself in protest and spirituality as removed from the concrete actions of the community and, as such, the machinations of material, bodily existence. This claim hinges on the already quoted line referring to the “weapons” of both virtue and vice (see footnote XX) as only metaphorical weapons; it follows that the crusade of the Knight of Virtue is therefore a metaphorical crusade as well. While perhaps commenting on the theological work of writers from both the patristic era and later scholasticism, Hegel appears not to be commenting here on any of the historical crusades.

in its final asymmetrical oscillations between immediacy and abstraction before the symmetry of Absolute Knowing. The virtue to which Hegel refers can be sufficiently enough, though incompletely, said to be *self-sacrifice* and so the two modes to which I refer are also two modes of self-sacrifice; the modes of Judeo-Christian theology and Eastern Religion.<sup>31</sup> I say the content of each is markedly different, and so the implication is that a binary differentiation of content is broadly justified; however, the content is not unified under the respective metacategories even as it pertains to the very *content of the concept of the self* which is to *be sacrificed*: though both monotheistic, there are major deviations in Jewish and Christian religions; more notably, the two similarly oppositional-yet-interwoven eastern religions, Hinduism and Buddhism, differ in content in a way which will become important which is, to be put simply, the *Ātman* (आत्मन्) and *Anātman* (अनात्मन्), or, as a structural element that systemically carries through to the theistic and non-theistic, the dualistic and non-dualistic, respectively, the core doctrines of self and no-self. Where they differ in content, which, translated as such, is to say to differ in a conception of the self or subject, but more pointedly, in a concept of the self as *soul*<sup>32</sup>, they share the mode—the practice of, foundational, guiding principle, or methodology, the condition of the religious order, *religion* as the collection of binding behaviors or *vows*, as vowing to *behave* accordingly, which are collected under a principle, principles or belief, beliefs, to which the religion as conditions then of *living* purport to be in aim, but not as those beliefs, ideas, *truths* themselves—of *sacrifice*; and, a sacrifice of that which is to one's own which is to say, not the sacrifice *of* an other—even where one may, for example, restrain from having a wife, sex partners, children, it would not be to sacrifice the individual self-conscious which is a single potential wife or sex partner, it would not be to sacrifice a child, rather one's own free capacity to correspond to those *others* in that way. Importantly, the case of the myriad *differences* between any and all possible correspondents to the Hegelian concept is a curious case in which some of the differences are demonstrated in the text to be crucially and virtually completely apparent to and masterfully understood by Hegel; while others are demonstrated to completely evade or be left unmastered by his understanding.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Better thought of as the Dharmic religions or the Indic religions (though both of these exclude some of the previously mentioned doctrines of northeast Asia or “Greater East Asia”) as *Eastern* and *Oriental* often includes or refers primarily even to Islam and Islamic cultures; and, the seat of Judeo-Christian theology as well is referred to often as the *ancient near-east*. The slipperiness of the binary of West and East, a critical awareness of which is demanded first and foremost in the Hegel, and which makes for a problematic and fraught analysis of colonialism and freedom as demonstrated in *The Architecture of Freedom*, problematizes as well an account of the world religions for similar reasons. If a geographic account is difficult, so too are other modes of category (poly/mono/non-theistic, indigenous/non-indigenous), including *negative* categorization (i.e. *all* religions that are *not* Abrahamic religions). But let *Eastern Religions*, here and hereafter, be most primarily: Vedic religions (the most dominant and parallel being Hinduism) and Buddhist religions (allowing that the term will, with flexibility, inevitably at times encompass other, adjacent or intertwined religions or philosophies including but not limited to Daoism, Jainism, Shinto).

<sup>32</sup> As static, determinate.

<sup>33</sup> It seems it would be unfair to suggest Hegel rather *had* acquired a full education in world religions/philosophical writings with the command of a contemporary specialist in any *one* of them and yet chose to ignore or misrepresent certain details in the development of his system. Such an idea would seem mildly inconsistent with the holistic impetus of the project. Additionally, such a conclusion would seem only to follow from an ethnocentrism or bias of animus as an articulation or revisionist assertion of Euro-supremacy that would be, as is also demonstrated in *The Architecture of Freedom*, difficult to prove reliably. Though it is possible and certainly some scholars suggest that Hegel, in mentioning particular concepts “along the way,” as it were, which is, given less attention, real-estate, ostensibly less consideration in the text, “subordinates [that concept] to a horizon in which it wasn’t allowed to be itself,” (Merold Westphal). In the case of these eastern religions, specifically, it is the case that, while the “east-west” exchange of ideas and influence can be evidenced as early as classical Greek antiquity (see: Pyrrho as “Greek Buddha”), the canon was not nearly as accessible to scholars or known to the west as it now is.

The Knight of Virtue is, then, really no knight at all. Rather he is both the practitioner of a certain type of Christianity and the practitioner of a certain type of Eastern religion characterized less by knighthood and more by renunciation, discipline, asceticism, or martyrdom. Martyrdom, a certain martyrdom, is particularly apt for how it connotes, as an extension of the natural fate of a martyr as a martyr to be elected to or *chosen* by the martyr, especially in hyperbolic usage, a willing suffering (an exaggerated suffering, even the pantomime of suffering) displayed (or, if feigned, *performed*) in the pursuit of garnering sympathy, admiration, or credit. Such is the precise behavior eviscerated in 390., the inflamed quotation which opens this paper in which Hegel refers to the “talk (crucially, the *talk*) about doing what is best for humanity” and “making sacrifices for the sake of the good.” In fact,

The problem is that the virtue which Hegel argues against is a fragmented virtue. The feigned virtue<sup>34</sup> of the impassioned paragraph 390 which opened this paper is a virtue that is in definition a non-virtue whose status as a mode of vain individuality would be fairly critiqued if it weren’t conflated with both the apparent virtue of extreme self-denial and that of the middle way of Christian virtue ethics and Buddhist precepts, neither of the latter two of which, upon close inspection, seem to contain any of the directives of the virtuous soul as such; in a discussion of Matthew 22: 39,<sup>35</sup> on the question of whether a virtuous man of God<sup>36</sup> should love himself more than any other, Thomas Aquinas says, “A person’s love for himself stands as an exemplar of the love that is to be had for another. But the exemplar is superior to what is exemplified. Therefore, a person should, out of charity, love himself more than his neighbor.” Not even the emanation of Pseudo-Dionysius, the heretical medieval mystic or hermitic writings argue for the precise sort of combat detailed in “virtue and the way of the world.” Neither does Buddhism deny the *phenomenological experience* of consciousness, including the experience *of a self* which experiences itself as something static and delineated from the rest.<sup>37</sup> None but the most devoted ascetic yogis are representative of the type of bodily deprivation hinted at; they seem unlikely to be making *any* claims about the greater good, let alone ones of vanity.

#### IV. final comments

Hegel’s logical method presents at times quite closed to analysis. The work of his diction and syntax and his method of defining and redefining every term he uses as he fits it into his phenomenology as a representation of the development and the stages of consciousness, leads to

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<sup>34</sup> What now has common name in “virtue signaling” as the performative display of suffering.

<sup>35</sup> “You shall love your neighbor as yourself”

<sup>36</sup> Whom as a Christian takes his principle directive as to live as Christ lived, his sacrifice and so a *certain* sacrifice modeled as a guiding foundational precondition of the community; and who takes as his chief virtue *caritas* [charity] in concerning himself with, as Hegel says, oppression and the sake of the good.

<sup>37</sup> *The self (individual or collective) as pure negativity: the process of the self and the world, the sense-immediacy and the universal, in trying to unify, the self recognizes its process of cognizing as a process of negation, the moving toward unity and the truth of being and what is, and what is, it discovers, is only this process of negation, and knows then that its essence is this pure negation, all reality, the object and the subject, is the result of this activity of negation, which naturally including the self or identity, the self then knows that its self is not a fixed thing but that any of its thinghood at any point is also a result of its own ability to negate and transform itself* is an exegesis which could be applied equally to the authoritative texts of the Theravāda Buddhist tradition as the chapter, *Absolute Knowing*.

conclusions that follow from his premises. The premises themselves are so thoroughly worked out as to give the appearance of perfect sense and, indeed, they rather make sense in the vacuum of this account of being, consciousness, and knowledge. To arrive at a concept of virtue to be criticized, one must accept the presupposition that the way of the world subordinated the good to the individual through desire, that the desire allows the individual to know itself as individuality but also sets it aside as an individual unified with another is an individual only in moments. Then, to presume further the reasonable *good* of the teleological self-actualization, to not contest a movement of consciousness by such in its conclusion that the whole of its concept of its self is what is to be nullified; to presuppose it undertakes nullification earnestly and only accidentally manifests vanity. Any critique of the premises or the terms, which would necessarily come from without, is thwarted by their being intricately seeded in the continuity of the text, the impenetrability of the discourse, and the endless contingency of the terms. The procedure of logic in the section on individuality reads nearly as a Freudian *kettle logic*.<sup>38</sup> But the discontinuity of Hegel's claims are protected from commentary by the fortress that is the text itself in which tugging any mutually independent thread draws one through each of the preceding section to rest at, "The knowledge or knowing which is at the start or is immediately our object cannot be anything else but immediate knowledge itself," and which seems to be at least part of the reason why readers of Hegel, in the words of Kimberly Hutchings and Tuija Pulkkinen, endlessly birth him and kill him.<sup>39</sup>

As I perhaps demonstrated earlier, the almost spiteful *weaving* of the *phenomenology*, in how it operates on the level of its signifiers, extends to those apparitions of an appeal to the *ethos*.<sup>40</sup> The Knight of Virtue is knight of chivalrous duty only to Hegel's virtue and Faust is Hegel's Faust; even where invoking the text of Goethe most primarily, the Hegelian hermeneutics make a critique grounded in that text to be a futile gesture. Yet he *does* name Faust, and he does nudge us toward a reading of Goethe. Thus, what he is doing is demanding an active and critical readership who is aware, as Derrida says, of language's immanent capacity for and necessity of its own critique.<sup>41</sup> The problem however, for the author, in this case and under this prescription, is that the precise mode of literary production and rhetoric belies with frightening transparency exactly how much the author *knows*. In creating his own Faust, Hegel demonstrates himself to be an avid reader of Goethe. But Goethe also wrote,

Wer Großes will, muß sich zusammenraffen;  
In der Beschränkung zeigt sich erst der Meister<sup>42</sup>

To achieve great things, we must be self-confined:  
Mastery is revealed in limitation<sup>43</sup>

Hegel's project resists limitation; in creating his own *virtue*, at least, he therefore equally exposes himself as a poor reader of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, the mystics like Richard Rolle, the

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<sup>38</sup> Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*. "That he had returned the kettle undamaged. That it was already damaged when he borrowed it. That he had never borrowed it in the first place."

<sup>39</sup> Hutchings, Kimberly, and Tuija Pulkkinen, eds. *Hegel's Philosophy and Feminist Thought: Beyond Antigone?* Introduction

<sup>40</sup> which are, in turns, Oedipus, Faust, Antigone, *et des autres*

<sup>41</sup> Oh is hegel deconstruction? resistances

<sup>42</sup> "Natur und Kunst, sie scheinen sich zu fliehen" (or "Nature and Art") from *Gedichte. Ausgabe letzter Hand*, 1827. Penguin 2005 translated David Luke.

<sup>43</sup> Or the more literal: "In limitation, the master reveals himself."

beguines like Marguerite Porete, and, more embarrassingly, the whole canon of eastern philosophy.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Namely, the Vedic corpus, the *Tao Te Ching*, any of the Buddhist scriptures, *Pramāṇa* philosophy, Jainism, the yoga sutras, pre-meiji Japanese thought, and most especially, those indo-east-asian non-dualist thought where it pertains to *anātman* (another *negative* doctrine whose conceptualization as such under a Hegelian dialectic would prove, as misapprehension, not to hold up), *bhava*, *dharma* as phenomenology, *kensho/satori* as essence or notion, the insight of *prajñā*, the experiential study of subjective experience or cognition, *Śūnyatā*, whose rendering in the *Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya* reveals the performative dimension of language, suggests that phenomena lack inherent self-nature and exist interdependently, dissolves fixed categories, initiates a unity of form and emptiness immanent in the real, the *knowing* of which entails an endless play of negation and interplay of opposites as consciousness is always linguistically mediated and dynamic and whose process of *knowing* ultimately constitutes reality, and achieves as much through a foregrounding and “wearing-out” of the spoken signifier, finding being, meaning, revolution, and peace in the *aesthetic* the way a student of Hegel is both charged, by Hegel, with doing and prevented, by Hegel (and the blunt, artlessness of his prose) from doing. This incredible wealth of philosophical production—which might plausibly one day be argued as having arrived at the central theories of Hegelian philosophy *avant le lettre* (unsung post-structuralist, Siddhartha Gautamama)—feels glossed as either the misguided nullifying or sacrifice of individuality, the doomed to be unbalanced empty discipline of stoicism or the unhappy consciousness, or simply one of the religions, as not the Religion, whose *content* is not the *content* of what is known in absolute knowing. The elevation of the figure of Christ and the trinity is equally challenging to rectify where the present chapter appears to criticize the church fathers for interpreting Christ as a model of renunciation rather than reconciliation to later posit the human/finite incarnation of God/infinite that is Christ to be instrumental in the development of Spirit in such a way that appears unaware of how much of the accounts of the ministry of Jesus found in the gospels are narratives and ideas deeply derivative of these indo-east-asian ascetic schools and that the *unity* itself was just as *retroactive* or *revisionist* as the work of the early church fathers forcing scripture to fit neo-platonism.

## Endnotes

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- <sup>i</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977)
- <sup>ii</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, [234]
- <sup>iii</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, [263]
- <sup>iv</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, [211]
- <sup>v</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, [235]
- <sup>vi</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, [211]
- <sup>vii</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, [212]
- <sup>viii</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, [212]
- <sup>ix</sup> Hassanaly Ladha, *The Architecture of Freedom* (Bloomsbury Academic 2020), [285]
- <sup>x</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, [214]
- <sup>xi</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, [218]
- <sup>xii</sup> Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust: Eine Tragödie [erster Teil]* or *Faust: Part I* (Anchor Books 1961)
- <sup>xiii</sup> Goethe, *Faust: Part I* [Introduction]
- <sup>xiv</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, [228]
- <sup>xv</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, [230]
- <sup>xvi</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, [231]
- <sup>xvii</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, [234]