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Radicalization in the Workplace

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Agenda

- **The Threat of Radicalization**
  - Radicalization in the Workplace
  - Mitigating the Risk of Radicalization

Radicalization is broader than radical Islam

What we think of when it comes to radicalization…

What is it actually?

"The action or process of causing someone to adopt **radical positions on political or social issues**"

Radicalization can take many forms

White supremacy and "identitarian" ideologies

…and their opponents…

…but also, any number of other ideologies

Radicalization is a worsening problem

Hate crime is one indicator of polarized views across the U.S.



Source: Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism (CSU-SB)

Technology is giving rise to new ideologies and facilitating their spread

Radicalization presents an external and internal threat



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Workplace radicalization can lead to several types of enterprise risks

Ideology heightens risk across all of the CDC's workplace violence types

The CDC's National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) defines four types of workplace violence…

Radicalization is a potential issue across multiple types of workplace violence

- **Type 1: Criminal Intent**
- **Type 2: Customer/Client**
- **Type 3: Worker-on-Worker**
- **Type 4: Personal Relationship**

The 2009 Ft. Hood shooting is one example of radicalized workplace violence

- **Opened fire at the Ft. Hood medical center medical screening waiting area, resulting in 13 killed and 32 wounded**
  - Attack began in the early afternoon on November 5 when, armed with a semi-automatic pistol, Hasan shouted “Allahu Akbar” and began shooting
- **Radicalized views on Islam and the War on Terror. Immediate trigger may have been fear of re-deployment and stories from soldiers**
- **Classified by the U.S. Department of Defense as a case of workplace violence**

A brief timeline of Hasan's life

- Born to Palestinian immigrants in Virginia
- Graduated from Virginia Tech and finished psychiatry training at Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences (2003)
- Began work at Walter Reed Medical Center – treating soldiers with PTSD
- In May 2009, promoted to Army Major and in July transferred to Ft. Hood

In Hasan's case, there were multiple signs of gradual radicalization

- As early as 2003, Hasan began making statements **defending suicide bombing, the primacy of Sharia law and Osama bin Laden** in the course of his medical training
- Was reported on by colleagues to superiors, with one supervisor encouraging him to consider leaving military
- Held **extensive email conversations with Anwar al-Awlaqi, including about fratricide** by U.S. soldiers
- Had **poor work performance overall** (including low patient load, inappropriate comments, poor attendance)

Hasan did not deny his radicalization in any form and continues from death row

- At his 2013 trial, Hasan told the judge: “I would like to agree with the prosecution that it wasn't done under the heat of sudden passion”
- Also noted: "There was adequate provocation — that these were deploying soldiers that were going to engage in an illegal war.“
- In 2014, wrote a letter to Abu Bakr Baghdadi asking to become a citizen of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
- Goes on hunger strike while on death row in 2017. In order to protest “America’s hatred for (Shariah) Laws”

The 2015 San Bernardino attack is another workplace radicalization case study

- Perpetrators were “self-radicalized” couple—Syed Farook and Tashfeen Malik
- Farook was employed by San Bernardino County Health Department as an environmental health specialist
- December 2, 2015 – mass shooting and attempted bombing resulted in 14 killed and 22 injured at office holiday party at Inland Regional Center



The pathway to radicalization was less obvious to outsiders

- Exchanged private social media messages over “jihad and martyrdom” in 2013 (unavailable to law enforcement prior to warrant)
- Father reportedly knew of radicalization, but later backtracked
- Public announcement of radical affiliation came just before the attack

The radical insider threat extends beyond workplace violence

The U.S. DoJ, for instance, identifies ideology as a potential motive for the "insider spy"

PERSONAL FACTORS

There are a variety of motives or personal situations that may increase the likelihood someone will spy against their employer:

Greed or Financial Need: A belief that money can fix anything. Excessive debt or overwhelming expenses.

Anger/Revenge: Disgruntlement to the point of wanting to retaliate against the organization.

Problems at work: A lack of recognition, disagreements with co-workers or managers, dissatisfaction with the job, a pending layoff.

Ideology/Identification: A desire to help the "underdog" or a particular cause.

Divided Loyalty: Allegiance to another person or company, or to a country besides the United States.

Adventure/Thrill: Want to add excitement to their life, intrigued by the clandestine activity, "James Bond Wannabe."

Vulnerability to blackmail: Extra-marital affairs, gambling, fraud.

“Insider spies” can be infiltrators with strong ideological leanings

Examples of activist infiltrators abound across the political spectrum

“Left-wing” activists infiltrate Smithfield…

DIRECT ACTION EVERYWHERE

PETA

Smithfield

“Right-wing” activists infiltrate PP and AFT…

PROJECT Veritas

Planned Parenthood

aft

Weeding out insider threats is becoming a matter of government policy

In May 2016, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence issued a change to the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM) that requires cleared contractors to establish and implement Insider Threat Programs (InTP)

- Contractors will be **required to gather, integrate, and report** available information indicative of a potential or actual insider threat

- The InTP must have capability to **gather information across various business functions** and must have sufficient **scope, depth, and support**

- A new initiative from the Defense Security Service (DSS) will begin **evaluating the effectiveness** of Industry InTPs in 2019

Radicalization of employees can also present a significant reputational risk

Northrop Grumman and Michael Miselis

NORTHROP GRUMMAN

- **Report by Frontline and ProPublica identified Miselis—a violent participator of Charlottesville protest—as Northrop employee**
- **Major mainstream critical coverage when Northrop Grumman was slow to act; Miselis eventually let go**

Sayfullo Saipov and Uber

Uber

- **Saipov was reported by almost every media article as an Uber driver**
- **According to CNN: "Uber said it is 'aggressively and quickly reviewing' his history with Uber and "at this time we have not identified any related concerning safety reports"**

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Managing and mitigating radicalization risk requires understanding of two elements

1

Process of Radicalization



2

Tools for Managing Risk

Models are one way to look at the radicalization process

More important to be well-versed than to be wedded to one

Borum's Four-Stage Model of the Terrorist Mindset



Moghaddam's Staircase to Terrorism



NYPD Model of Jihadization



Precht's Model



Source: Borum, Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research

Many studies of radicalization focus on risk factors as a starting point

Risk factors or "distal characteristics" are the starting point for most assessments of radicalization



TRAP-18 Distal Characteristics
Personal grievance and moral outrage
Framed by an ideology
Failure to affiliate with an extremist group
Dependence on the virtual community
Thwarting of occupational goals
Changes in thinking and emotion
Failure of sexual-intimate pair bonding
Mental disorder
Creativity and innovation
Criminal violence by history

Source: Meloy and Gill, The Lone-Actor Terrorist and the TRAP-18, Journal of Threat Assessment and Management (2016)

There are commonalities between warning behaviors for targeted attacks

Whether individuals are radicalized or not, the pathway to violence model provides insight on "proximal" warning behaviors

Source: F.S. Calhoun and S.W. Weston (2003). Contemporary threat management: A practical guide for identifying, assessing and managing individuals of violent intent



Potential warning behaviors

- Novel aggression
- Energy burst
- Leakage
- Last resort
- Directly communicated threat

Leakage is especially important to consider

Among a set of lone-actor terrorists…

Source: Gill, Paul. Lone-Actor Terrorists: A behavioral analysis. London: Routledge, 2011

Risk mitigation requires a multi-pronged approach

An organization must create "soft" and "hard" defenses against radicalization



When it comes to culture and institutions, get all stakeholders involved

Firm
(all employees)

- Raise knowledge of concerning behavior through general awareness campaigns
- Train employees on “see something, say something” and similar strategies
- Ensure that policies on infractions exist and are clear
- Stress culture of responsibility and accountability for safety

Threat Assessment Team
(representatives of key units)

- Develop SOPs for reporting and information sharing, as well as for activating the team
- Create procedures for incident response and investigation
- Delegate responsibilities for managing risk and taking action (especially if external support is needed)

Processes such as background verifications should be holistic too

Verifications (of different levels) should involve more than just employees, but also…

- Part-timers
- Vendors
- Consultants
- Contractors
- Visitors

Deeper investigations need to consider more than criminal history

Health Status	Lifestyle	Relationships and Family
Travel	Online, social media, and dark web presence	Political and Social Positions
Financial status and assets	Career Developments	Criminal, Civil, and Regulatory Matters

Protective intel can come from various sources, but keep a key principle in mind

#1 Principle – monitoring and intel must be aligned with company culture and appetite

Incident reporting and follow-up

Social media monitoring

IT/Cyber/Insider threat teams

When it comes to intel and investigations, both free and paid tools can help



Remember to consider "static" and the "dynamic" factors

Static	Dynamic
▪ History of poor **money-management**	▪ Undertaking debts to **finance a particular cause**

Static	Dynamic
▪ **Distant relationships** with members of family	▪ Deterioration in **close relationships in favor of new virtual relationships**

Static	Dynamic
▪ Past **support for a political viewpoint**	▪ Recent statements expressing **how a cause justifies violence**

Static	Dynamic
▪ Easily **irascible personality**	▪ Increasingly **frequent outbursts**

Static	Dynamic
▪ Trouble **keeping jobs**	▪ Worsening **job performance**

If consistent with company culture, create a protective intelligence database

Name	Organization	Last known address	Last known telephone	Last known email	Overall type of contact	Overall purpose of contact	Number of times contacted	Date of first contact
John Smith	John Smith Consulting	3592 Washington Rd., Sarasota, FL 53879	(555) 251-0639	smithyj2815@gmail.com	Letter/Package	Ideological Complaint	1	7/2/2017
Jane Doe	Jane Doe Pharmacy	1500 South Michigan Rd., Columbia, Indiana 22565	(815) 794-7560	Unknown	Phone Call	Employment Inquiry	2	1/14/2015

Date of latest contact	Signs of escalation	Approach behavior	Signs of psychological disturbance	Background investigation conducted	Overall concern level	Details on contact	Details on areas of concern
8/9/2017	N	N	N	N		Smith sent a letter complaining about the CEO's stance on President Donald Trump	N/A
7/8/2017	Y	N	N	N		Doe first called in January 2015 to speak to HR. She then called several more times in 2015-2016 and has started increasing frequency of contact in 2017	N/A

A comprehensive protective intel program can catch radicalized outsiders too

- Perpetrator James Lee took three hostages at Discovery Channel HQ in Washington, DC on September 1, 2010
- Ultimately shot and killed while wearing explosive vest with no casualties; vest detonated
- Had maintained an active website that had anti-Discovery Channel content and list of demands; maintained a radical environmentalist ideology
- Previous history of arrests, including outside Discovery Channel building

Protective intel can help keep track of motives and capabilities

In order to better manage the threat of workplace radicalization, it's important to keep some key questions in mind



Maintaining knowledge of macro intel issues can help with the micro

Understanding international, national, and local trends can put radicalization in context



As with other threats, management must ultimately rely on a multifaceted approach



Source: Dr. Palarea, Operational Psychology Services (2018)

Thank you! Any questions?

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