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12. 8 September 1962 - U-2 No. 378:

Lost on an operational mission over Nanchang, China, Mission GRC-127, cause unknown. (Lt. Col. Ch'en)

13. 27 October 1962 - U-2 No. 343:

Hit by surface-to-air missile (SAM) on operational mission over Cuba, crashed on Cuban territory. The pilot was killed and the U.S. was later allowed to remove his body from Cuba. (Major Anderson, SAC)

14. 31 October 1963 - U-2 No. 355:

Tracking of Mission GRC-184 terminated suddenly at 0623 GMT on 1 November, at a point southeast of Nanchang on the return from photo coverage of the Missile Test Range at Shuang Ch'eng Tzu. Fate of the pilot and aircraft unknown. (Maj. Yeh)

15. 20 November 1963 - U-2 No. 350:

Returning from overflight of Cuba, aircraft went into the sea approximately 40 miles northwest of Miami; aircraft and pilot lost. (Capt. Hyde, SAC)

16. 22 March 1964 - U-2F No. 356:

Aircraft and pilot lost on routine training mission off south coast of Taiwan. Probable cause, pilot error -- pilot inadvertently allowed aircraft to exceed its airspeed and structural limitations. (Capt. Liang)

17. 7 July 1964 - U-2G No. 362:

Aircraft and pilot lost on operational mission over east coast of China, in area of Lung Chi across the Straits of Quemoy. (L/C Lee)

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18. 10 January 1965 - U-2C No. 358:

Aircraft and pilot lost on an infra-red camera mission over the atomic site at Pao Tou. Probably hit by SAM since missile sites later found to be in the area where aircraft was lost. (Maj. Chang)

19. 25 April 1965 - U-2G No. 382:

Test flight of carrier-configured aircraft at Edwards Air Force Base went out of control, pilot bailed out but chute streamed. Pilot and aircraft lost. (Buster Edens)

20. 22 October 1965 - U-2C No. 352:

Training mission out of Tao Yuan, pilot and aircraft went into the sea off Taiwan; causes unknown. (Col. John Wang)

21. 17 February 1966 - U-2F No. 372:

Training mission from Tao Yuan crashed after overshooting runway following flame-out and emergency landing. Pilot killed and aircraft demolished. (Maj. Wu)

22. 25 February 1966 - U-2F No. 342:

Structural failure to aircraft following a practice refueling flight; the pilot bailed out safely. (Mr. Hall)

23. 21 June 1966 - U-2C No. 384:

Aircraft went out of control on training flight from Tao Yuan. Pilot bailed out too low, chute failed to open; aircraft and pilot fell into the sea near Naha, Okinawa. (Maj. Yu)

24. 8 September 1967 - U-2 No. 373:

An operational mission over Mainland China, shot down in the vicinity of Shanghai by surface-to-air missile. Fate of pilot unknown, assumed dead. (Capt. Huang)

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ANNEX 58

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21 December 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: All Suppliers

SUBJECT: Release of Project Developed Systems,
Sub-systems, Components, Techniques and
Technical Know-How to Department of Defense

1. Purpose: It is the purpose of this memorandum to set forth the basic policy of this Headquarters regarding the release of Project developed information to other than Project cleared persons and to outline a procedure for implementing this policy.

2. Security Standards: It is re-emphasized that from its inception access to knowledge of this Project has been consistently limited to individuals who are not only acceptable from a security point of view but have a valid "need to know". With few exceptions, such considerations as a high official position, the possession of security clearances for sensitive data, or an official concern with research and development or with operations of the type involved in this project have not been accepted as sufficient reasons for admitting an individual to knowledgeability. As suppliers are aware, an effort has been made to apply this policy to all persons regardless of their place in government or private industry although some erosion of security standards has inevitably occurred; partly as a result of the sheer number of individuals with a valid "need to know" but partly by reason of the pressure to cut in individuals on the basis of position or "responsibility" for a certain field of activity. One purpose of this memorandum is to prevent further erosion of security standards without inhibiting a desirable spread of knowledge of subsystems developed for the Project.

3. General Policy: Within the limits set by the requirement for continued security, the basic policy will be to permit the release with only a low security classification of information on subsystems to unwitting personnel who are cleared for the low classification involved, with the exceptions stated in paragraph 4 below. On the other hand, knowledge of the existence of an integrated weapons system based upon the U-2 aircraft and including all the subsystems remains highly classified and every effort must be made to withhold such knowledge from unwitting personnel. It is possible at this time to reduce the classification on subsystems only because no one subsystem is regarded as highly sensitive in itself and only if information concerning the subsystems is

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handled in such a way as not to permit unwitting personnel to infer the existence of the total weapons system.

4. Specific Rules: The following specific provisions which give effect to the general policy stated above should guide all suppliers in handling information concerning the Project's subsystems:

a. The existence of the U-2 aircraft itself has been acknowledged in carefully worded press releases which have been attributed to it (by inference) a range of perhaps 1800 nautical miles and a ceiling of about 55,000 feet. Photographs designed to reveal as little as possible concerning the aircraft's performance have received some circulation among military components overseas and may soon be released for publication. Nevertheless, the aircraft carries an official classification of SECRET (so physical access to it can be denied and security precautions explained), and its true performance is classified TOP SECRET and may be made known only to witting personnel. Likewise, the fact that it is a reconnaissance aircraft and any association of the various subsystems with the U-2 should be revealed only to witting personnel.

b. Each supplier of a subsystem is at liberty to disclose the existence of the subsystem as an already designed and developed piece of equipment and to provide information concerning its performance to potentially interested agencies of the United States Government and to business firms to which such disclosure is necessary in order to encourage the widest use of the subsystem for the purposes of the United States Government. Where it is desired to make disclosure to exploit a purely commercial opportunity prior clearance must be obtained. Information about each subsystem will normally carry the classification of "CONFIDENTIAL" in order to protect it from publication.

c. In disclosing information concerning a subsystem, the supplier must be prepared with a plausible and tenable explanation of its development. In many cases it may be sufficient to state it was developed for a TOP SECRET project concerning which no information whatever can be released. In other cases it may be plausible to explain the idea as having been developed by the supplier with its own resources. In no case can unwitting persons be permitted access to test data or records of experience of the subsystems which reveal anything concerning the Project or other elements of the total weapons system of which the subsystem is a component.

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d. An over-all procedure is presently being worked out with the Air Force for purchase by that Department through normal channels of any project-developed items desired by the Air Force. Suppliers will be fully briefed with respect to such procedures when they have been established.

5. To insure compliance with the requirements of this policy and to assist suppliers in the protection of Project information, suppliers will be responsible for keeping Project Headquarters advised of proposed discussions, negotiations, briefings, etc., with any non-Project-cleared personnel or departments. Approval of such meetings will be a normal routine matter, provided the arrangements are in accord with the above established general instructions. Any departure from the established standard will necessarily require a prior review by the Security Staff and notification should, therefore, be made sufficiently in advance of any proposed meetings.

6. The substance of this memorandum will be made available to those Government agencies currently associated with our program which logically may have occasion to avail themselves of Project development. It is expected they will respect the requirements levied against Project suppliers. The responsibility for compliance with this policy, however, will continue to rest with each individual supplier and any questions should be immediately forwarded to Project Headquarters to insure satisfactory review and disposition.

7. More detailed instructions to suppliers will be forthcoming in the future as procedures are developed. In the meantime suppliers will proceed in accordance with specific instructions given to individual suppliers with respect to specific problems of this nature which require immediate action.

(Signed)
PROJECT DIRECTOR

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26 March 1956

PROJECT COVER STORY

1. Requirements: So far as possible the cover story for this Project should satisfy the following requirements:

a. Although it should plausibly explain Air Force support of and participation in the alleged activities (since such support including the use of USAF facilities is essential and cannot be concealed), the cover story should be designed to dilute Air Force responsibility. The story should convey the impression that the activities are of interest to civilian organizations as well and that the Air Force is not exclusively responsible for them.

b. The story should not focus attention upon new and presumably highly interesting specialized equipment and especially not upon any new type of aircraft but rather upon the mission being performed, since the latter can be described in terms that make it far less sensitive than the former.

c. Granting that at least partial Air Force sponsorship is undeniable, the cover story should lodge such responsibility in a non-tactical component of the Air Force and should describe the activities in progress in such a way as to make them appear to be as remote as possible from any tactical mission.

d. The story must account for the peculiar nature of the project organization as a mixed task force predominantly civilian in composition, which will be apparent to many observers.

2. Nature of Activities: Project operations will be conducted under double cover, one aspect of which will be unclassified and part of a publicly-announced program, the second aspect being a classified activity in which the cover unit is allegedly engaged. The two aspects of this dual cover will be as follows:

a. Unclassified Aspect: The primary mission of overseas units will be described as the gathering of meteorological data at altitudes to 55,000 feet which will assist in the development of new forecasting techniques and provide climatological background for meteorological research by governmental and private agencies and institutions in the U. S. The specific objectives of the meteorological mission are as follows:

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- (1) Secure quantitative measurements of the following items:
 - (a) Turbulence: associated with jet streams; through the tropopause; in the lower stratosphere.
 - (b) Detailed temperature structure (i) Tropopause; (ii) lower stratosphere.
 - (c) Wind structure, 45 to 55 thousand feet.
 - (d) Measurement of ozone concentration.
 - (e) Watervapor content.
 - (f) Visibility in vicinity of tropopause.
 - (g) Additional information as available.
- (2) Test and evaluate current and newly developed high-level weather reconnaissance instruments.
- (3) Collect high-level cloud photography for the purpose of forming the basis for development of new techniques of analysis based on cloud structure rather than currently used methods of quantitative measurement.

b. Classified Aspect: A limited number of individuals who are cleared for access to highly classified information but who do not have a valid need to know the true project mission will be told (or allowed to infer) that in addition to the foregoing unclassified explanation of the activities of the overseas detachments, these units are engaged in high altitude air sampling. This story will be used only with a limited number of USAF and RAF officers and senior civilian officials who are not in sufficiently close contact with project activities to suspect that something more than the gathering of meteorological data is involved and who also feel that they are due some explanation of such classified activities. The maximum extent of information given would reveal that thermonuclear weapons tests send up into the stratosphere large quantities of radioactive debris. With the increased frequency of high yield weapons tests, the uncertainty as to the quantities of these fission products which exist in the

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stratosphere and which filter down slowly into the lower atmosphere have not been accurately verified. High altitude balloon sampling techniques have not proved completely satisfactory to date. Additionally, sampling of thermonuclear weapons debris forced into the stratosphere will be of great value to the AEC and DOD in their analyses of radioactive cloud geometry and composition.

3. Possible Future Expansion of Research Activities: At the time press releases are prepared, it can be announced that program activities may in the future be expanded to include additional research objectives, such as the following: cosmic ray studies and studies of ionospheric refraction as it affects radio propagation predictions. (These added objectives will not be publicly announced, however, unless further investigation reveals that they are technically feasible and the U-2 could be given an actual collection capability to backstop these added research activities.)

4. Backstopping of Primary Cover Mission: If high altitude meteorological reconnaissance cover is to "hold water" it is essential that the U-2 be equipped with meteorological instrumentation which will give it an actual capability of collecting the weather data in which the program is purportedly interested. Plans are underway to construct at least four meteorological configurations for use in the ZI and at overseas bases. If feasible, the configuration will include a small tracking camera useful for cloud photography but having no significant utility for reconnaissance of intelligence interest. Actual weather reconnaissance missions will be flown (restricted to friendly territory) employing these configurations. Initially, in the interest of time, only readily available instrumentation will be employed; modifications can be arranged at a later date. The meteorological packet will be constructed so as to permit ready insertion into and removal from the aircraft bay. The operational concept will call for flying weather reconnaissance missions during orientation, ferry and test flights, thus making full utilization of such flights for cover purposes and reducing the diversion of aircraft from the project's primary operational tasks. Data obtained at altitudes above 52,000 feet will be considered classified; arrangements will be made with AWS for the handling, dissemination and use of this material. Data (including cloud photographs taken with tracking camera only) secured up to 52,000 feet will be considered unclassified and will be made available to AWS and NACA for further dissemination as seems appropriate. Thus, this data can be exhibited and disseminated to support the cover story. Moreover, complete photographs will be made of the primary mission aircraft with the research instrumentation installed. The meteorological instrumentation

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will also be photographed outside the aircraft. Both data and photographs will be assembled for counter-propaganda use in event a U-2 is lost over hostile territory.

5. Use and Dissemination of Cover Stories: It is anticipated that the double cover story outlined in paragraph 2 above will be employed in such a way as to create 4 distinct categories of knowledgeability of project activities as follows:

a. There will be a wide circle who are aware that some out-of-the-ordinary activities are being carried on and who have access to the unclassified cover story as the explanation thereof.

b. A much smaller group, including mainly USAF and foreign technical and military personnel and certain personnel in the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and perhaps other civilian organizations, will be aware of the activities and will know the unclassified cover story but will also be told that the aircraft in question are also engaged in a classified mission, the nature of which cannot be divulged.

c. A still more restricted category, described in paragraph 2 b above, will have access to both cover stories and will therefore have an explanation of both the unclassified and classified activities in progress.

d. Finally, there will be the most restricted category of fully knowledgeable personnel.

Although the unclassified cover story will obviously have to be made public in order to serve its purpose it should be so handled as to minimize the attention drawn to and the interest developed in the project.

6. Sponsorship: In order to dilute USAF responsibility for the activities to be undertaken this project will be described as a joint undertaking of NACA and the AWS of the USAF. The role ascribed to the NACA and the unclassified cover story will be to have been the original promoter of the research program, to have provided guidance in the development of equipment and instrumentation required to perform the research mission, to provide continuing scientific guidance as required and to coordinate the exploitation of the scientific results obtained. This account of the role of the civilian agency will explain not only the mixed character of the enterprise but the circumstances under which most of the specialized

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equipment was developed outside of the regular Air Force channels. Participation on the part of the USAF will be ascribed to the Air Weather Service which meets the requirement of being a non-tactical unit. Its role will be said to be that of executive agent responsible for the actual conduct of operations overseas. It is plausible that, in such a joint project, operational responsibility overseas should be assumed by a component of the USAF since the NACA does not engage in operations outside the country. Moreover, the arrangement will lend treaty rights granted to the USAF applicable to this project.

7. Procurement and Ownership of Aircraft: The primary mission aircraft will be said to have been procured by the USAF, primarily for performance of a highly classified mission. The explanation of their availability for the mission described in the unclassified cover story will be that a limited number of these aircraft can be spared, the number varying from time to time, from the classified mission. The aircraft will carry civilian markings. Thus, in the unclassified story it will be implied that the operations being conducted abroad have no connection with the classified mission. Taken as a whole, this story will explain plausibly the procurement of the aircraft and the manner of their coming into the hands of the NACA. Only those individuals who have access to the classified cover story will have reason to believe that the classified and unclassified missions are being performed concurrently. It is perfectly consistent with the assignment of the aircraft to the AWS for actual operations overseas and also with the story that the development of the aircraft was monitored by the NACA. It will be implied at all times that the number of such aircraft is very small, and that its development as a "platform" for upper atmosphere research was carried out in experimental facilities and not on a production basis.

8. Organization: The cover unit will be designated as the 1st Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional, and allegedly be under the administrative control of the AWS. It will be explained that other USAF components are of course performing supporting roles, as would normally be expected; it will probably be unnecessary and unwise to be too specific as to the organization of such supporting activities. All USAF personnel will be documented as AWS; all civilian personnel will be documented as Department of Defense civilians, except that at least one NACA employee will be assigned to each of the overseas detachments. All personnel will travel on AWS orders. Project pilots will be described as civilians,

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possibly the employees of a cover organization, but working under the terms of a contract with the NACA. The arrangement will be consistent with alleged NACA ownership of the aircraft. The use of such civilian pilots rather than USAF personnel will be explained by their alleged familiarity with novel equipment developed by the NACA. More specific details of this feature of the arrangement remain to be developed.

9. Backstopping NACA Participation: Certain moves should be made both prior to and after deployment overseas to lend credence to the story of NACA participation.

a. Just as soon as practicable it will be desirable to begin living at Watertown the modified cover story. This will require the replacement of USAF by appropriate insignia on the aircraft and possibly, at an appropriate time, a news release or merely the deliberate leak of some information about activities at Watertown. The story to be used or leaked would be that the NACA, with Air Force cooperation, had been undertaking upper atmosphere meteorological research from the Watertown location. From this it would be widely inferred, by reason of location, that upper air sampling was also involved. Such a release coupled with this inference would support the basic story that these aircraft had been procured for a classified mission and later made available to NACA for an unclassified (or less highly classified) program.

b. Prior to deployment it will probably be desirable to allow the primary mission aircraft to be seen at one or more airfields other than Watertown in order that its first public appearance shall not be at an overseas location. It may well be desirable that at least one of the locations at which a landing would be made would be Moffett Field or some other widely known NACA installation.

c. After deployment occasional visits of reasonably well-known NACA officers could be arranged to overseas bases. These would, of course, be limited to NACA personnel already knowledgeable to some degree of the project.

10. NACA will be given a cover story for use in the event one of the aircraft is lost in unfriendly territory.

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(NOTE: The initial pre-deployment press release will be based on the unclassified cover story which follows; it will contain only a portion of the information outlined below. Answers to subsequent press queries will be based on the fuller details which follow, but will not go beyond.)

UNCLASSIFIED COVER STORY

Around mid-1954 Lockheed Aircraft Corporation initiated independently the construction of a high-altitude, single-engine jet aircraft. The aircraft, powered by a Pratt & Whitney J-57 engine, operates in the mid-subsonic speed range and up to altitudes of 55,000 feet; it has a low wing loading with a capability of extended operation at high altitudes. While having no combat or tactical significance, the aircraft's performance makes it a more suitable and economic vehicle (as compared with tactical types) for carrying out high-altitude research. Lockheed planned both to use the prototype model as a test bed or "platform" for carrying out a variety of its own experimental activities, and to interest the military in the aircraft as a vehicle for conducting research and experimental tests of their own. LAC carried out the development and testing of its experimental aircraft in consultation with NACA (National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics). Overcoming of fuel control problems was one of the areas in which NACA rendered assistance.

Although Lockheed developed the first experimental prototype on its own initiative, the USAF monitored the Lockheed development and had observers present during the aircraft's initial test flights. The aircraft's performance gave rise to USAF interest in a limited procurement contract. The high altitude performance of the aircraft made it a suitable vehicle for use in a joint USAF-AEC test program. Contractual negotiations between Lockheed and the USAF proceeded rapidly; first deliveries were made late in 1955.

Early in 1956 the NACA, relying in part on its knowledge of the U-2 aircraft, began planning for an atmospheric research program of broad interest to U.S. aeronautical science, both civilian and military. NACA, original promoter of the program, has not only provided guidance in the development of the aircraft and of equipment and instrumentation required to perform the research program but will coordinate the exploitation and dissemination of the scientific results obtained. The primary objective of NACA's program is the gathering of upper

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atmosphere data, e.g., turbulence associated with the jet stream and convective clouds, temperature and wind structures at jet levels, cosmic ray effects, etc., at altitudes up to 55,000 feet. Widespread but simultaneous observations from various points in the Northern Hemisphere will enable an integrated study of high altitude phenomena which is expected to be of particular value both to governmental and private research organizations. NACA considered the newly procured U-2 as one of the most suitable vehicles for carrying out its research program. The USAF agreed to make available a limited number of U-2's to NACA since the joint USAF-AEC test activities are intermittent in nature and NACA's program is considered of definite interest to the USAF, particularly the Air Weather Service. Availability of the U-2, one type of several aircraft that will be used in NACA's research activities, helps to obtain the needed data in an economical and expeditious manner.

Pilots employed in the NACA program are civilians hired and trained by LAC and made available to NACA specifically for the latter's research activities. NACA could not afford to draw upon its limited and already heavily committed group of test pilots. Lockheed also was unable to spare pilot personnel for the program, but did undertake the hiring and training of highly qualified civilians.

These activities will be conducted both in the United States and abroad. Since NACA does not have independent facilities for conducting test programs abroad, the overseas program will be organized as a "joint task force" based at USAF installations and supported by appropriate USAF major commands. The Air Weather Service will act as USAF "executive agent" in support of NACA activities, and will activate provisional units to give operational direction and render direct support to NACA. The Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional, (1st), has recently been activated to support the initial NACA research team assembled at Watertown Strip, Nevada.

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~~SECRET~~CLASSIFIED COVER STORY

Under cover of the NACA-AWS high altitude research program described separately, Air Weather Service will carry out a parallel and classified mission: upper air sampling of thermonuclear debris resulting from atomic tests. Data concerning the quantity of these fission products, which exist in the stratosphere and filter down slowly into the lower atmosphere, will be of great value to the AEC and Department of Defense in their analyses of radioactive cloud geometry and composition.

Just as is the case in NACA's meteorological research, the integration of sampling data obtained simultaneously at various points in the Northern Hemisphere will be of particular value.

Regarding the performance of the U-2, the following additional information can be revealed as needed to individuals made cognizant of the above classified cover story. The U-2 has an altitude capability of 55,000 feet with full payload. Its normal endurance is four to four-and-a-half hours with payload. Maximum range: 2,000 miles. It is contemplated that staging operations will be run from various bases to extend coverage capabilities.

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For release Monday, 7 May 1956

NACA ANNOUNCES START OF NEW RESEARCH PROGRAM

The need for more detailed information about gust-meteorological conditions to be found at high altitude, as high as 50,000 feet, has resulted in the inauguration of an expanded research program to provide the needed data, Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, Director of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, announced today.

"Tomorrow's jet transports will be flying air routes girdling the earth," Dr. Dryden said. "This they will do at altitudes far higher than presently used except by a few military aircraft. The availability of a new type of airplane, which is one of several that will be used in the program, helps to obtain the needed data in an economical and expeditious manner."

This aircraft, the Lockheed U-2, is powered by a single Pratt & Whitney J-57 turbo-jet engine and is expected to reach ten-mile-high altitudes as a matter of record, according to the NACA. A few of these aircraft are being made available for the expanded NACA program by the USAF.

The program is along the lines recommended by the Gust Loads Research Panel of the NACA's technical Subcommittee on Aircraft Loads. In its research programs, the NACA is charged with coordination of aeronautical research, and with taking action necessary to avoid undesirable duplication of effort.

Among specific research goals will be more precise information about clear air turbulence, convective clouds, wind shear, and the jet stream. Richard V. Rhode, Assistant Director for Research of the NACA, said that as a result of information so to be gained, tomorrow's air travelers might expect degrees of speed, safety and comfort beyond hope of the air transport operators.

"The program would not have been possible," Mr. Rhode said, "without the ability of American scientific efforts to join forces."

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Actually, according to Mr. Rhode, success of the program depends in large degree upon the logistical and technical support which the Air Weather Service of the USAF will be providing. USAF facilities overseas will be used as the program gets underway, to enable the gathering of research information necessary to reflect accurately conditions along the high-altitude air routes of tomorrow in many parts of the world. The data gathering flights will also be used, at the request of the USAF, to obtain information about cosmic rays and the concentration of certain elements in the atmosphere including ozone and water vapor.

The first data, covering conditions in the Rocky Mountain area, are being obtained from flights made from Watertown Strip, Nevada. Mr. Rhode noted that the data would be equally useful to technical experts of the Air Weather Service in expanding their knowledge of atmospheric conditions at high altitude.

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The Lockheed Aircraft Corporation has built a single engine jet aircraft (using the Pratt & Whitney J-57 engine) of which a number have been procured by the United States Air Force. It has been designated as the U-2. A few of these aircraft have been made available to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics for conducting a research program designed to observe and measure certain phenomena at high altitudes. Studies will include the effects of cosmic rays, turbulence characteristics especially in the jet stream, temperature structure, wind structure, and the concentration of certain elements in the atmosphere such as ozone and water vapor. The program will be conducted by the NACA with the logistical and technical support of units of the USAF/Air Weather Service. Research activities are presently being conducted in the United States from a restricted area at Watertown Strip in Nevada. Similar activities will be conducted from certain USAF installations overseas where the Air Weather Service will act as executive agent in the actual conduct of data-gathering operations since the NACA has facilities and personnel only in this country.

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TS-143486/Final

29 June 1956

PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED IN THE EVENT OF AN AIRCRAFT
LOSS OVER HOSTILE TERRITORY *I. Action - Prior to Evidence of Hostile Reaction

A. Immediate notification of Headquarters by the Detachment Commander through both Agency and USAF channels. In turn, Project Headquarters will notify State Department and NACA contacts and, along with USAF Headquarters, arrange for final review and agreement on action items indicated under II, below. The Detachment Commander's notification to Headquarters should include or be followed immediately by a report of those details which Headquarters will require in preparing its release in response to hostile reaction; i. e., actual location and circumstances (e. g., aircraft crash or forced landing, condition of the pilot, weather conditions, etc.) of the loss if known, text of Detachment "presumed lost" release (Paragraph C, below), and cover flight plan outlining the track alleged to have been followed by the aircraft.

B. Overflight operations will cease immediately. However, Detachment will continue to operate as normal with all flights assigned cover data-gathering missions.

C. Normal USAF press release prepared by Detachment Commander (and coordinated with appropriate Air Force contacts in USAFE) will be issued indicating that a U-2 aircraft is overdue and presumed lost, adding that the last reported position of the aircraft was -- (see below and Paragraph II. E(1)). The release will go on to indicate that Air Rescue Service has instituted a search for the aircraft. The announced area of search will depend upon the known or estimated point of compromise (e. g. loss over Murmansk area or the Arctic fringe of European USSR would suggest northern Norway as the area for Air Rescue operations; loss over the Ukraine would suggest the Black Sea littoral of Turkey as the most logical area for search.)

The release should be timed to accord with normal USAF practice (no more than a few hours after a known or assumed loss). Should press queries immediately follow the initial "presumed lost" press release but precede evidence of hostile reaction, a press release based on

* An earlier version of this instruction was issued to Detachment A on 8 June 1956. This revision of the same paper (with appropriate changes to cover local situations) was also issued to Detachments B and C.

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the unclassified cover story will be issued by the Detachment Commander (through, and after coordination with, USAFE) describing the alleged mission of the aircraft and sponsorship of the program.

D. Immediate and special counter-espionage precautions will be taken at the base of operations with steps of action coordinated by Detachment with 50X1, E.O.13526 and with local USAF/OSI contacts.

II. Action - After Hostile Press and/or Radio Reaction

50X1, E.O.13526

A. General PIO Policy: All releases in response to hostile reaction will originate in and emanate from Headquarters after full coordination has been made. Releases decided upon will be communicated immediately (1) through USAF channels to USAFE; (2) through Agency channels to the Detachment Commander (3) through State channels to U. S. Ambassadors in London, Bonn, and Moscow. Thus, upon evidence of hostile reaction, no releases will be made by field elements of the USAF or by host country authorities except those made subsequent to and in accord with releases communicated from Headquarters.

B. General Guide on Press Releases: The nature of the hostile reaction cannot be predicted in advance, thus the precise detail of post-loss releases must remain flexible. It is assumed that hostile reaction can take the form of a fairly complete and accurate expose of project activities; whether Soviet and/or Satellite reaction will take such form is open to speculation. Since we must be prepared for any eventuality, the sample releases which follow should be treated as general guidelines. The need for flexibility up to the point of actual release is the major reason for centralizing release authority in Headquarters to assure that the U. S. Government speaks with one voice. All releases dealing with the nature and sponsorship of project activity will of course be in accord with releases already issued and the unclassified cover story; however, this paper concerns itself only with the additional explanations that must be given to cover a loss over hostile territory.

C. Loss Close to Hostile Periphery: Should the aircraft be lost close to, but inside, the hostile periphery (within 200 miles), and this be admitted or at least not denied in the hostile reaction, we shall maintain one of the two following positions, depending upon the circumstances and relative plausibility:

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(1) the pilot was intercepted along the hostile periphery (but over Western territory or international waters) and forced to follow the hostile interceptors inside Soviet and/or Satellite frontiers; or

(2) that the pilot was obviously confused in his navigation and became lost, inadvertently overflying Soviet and/or Satellite territory.

D. Loss Deep Within Hostile Territory: In the event of a loss deep within hostile territory, there are two positions which could be maintained. The first position outlined below is preferred since it stands considerably less risk of being effectively disproved by a hostile power. The second position is included below because, under certain circumstances, the inherent risks of its being effectively countered by a hostile power might be minimal. In the end, the choice of the two alternatives outlined below would depend upon the detailed circumstances surrounding the incident as reported to Headquarters by the Detachment Commander (in accordance with paragraph I. a., above). This choice would rest with the Department of State.

(1) First Position: Should the loss occur deep within hostile territory, we would impliedly admit that Soviet accounts as to the location of the incident may well be correct, but we would go on to maintain that the violation of Soviet airspace was most certainly neither intended or ordered by U. S. authorities. We would emphatically deny any Soviet charge that the incident was a willful violation by the U. S. of their airspace for purposes of intelligence reconnaissance. We would indicate that the pilot last reported his position as (-----) and that subsequent radio contact could not be established presumably because of a malfunction or failure of the aircraft's radio communication and navigation system. Quite possibly the incident resulted from pilot hypoxia which, combined with failure of the aircraft's electronic navigation system, could have resulted in a grave deviation from the aircraft's planned course. With the aircraft on "automatic pilot" and the pilot in a euphoric condition, an unintended violation of Soviet airspace may have unfortunately resulted. (See Attachment B-1 for sample release).

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(2) Alternative Position: Should the loss occur deep within hostile territory, and the depth of penetration be revealed in the hostile reaction, we shall maintain that Soviet and/or Satellite allegations are incorrect or inaccurate, going on to state (using one or the other of the two variants in C, above) that the incident was close to the hostile periphery. Our counter-charge would claim that the hostile power is obviously distorting the facts for propaganda purposes just as has been done in several instances in the past when the Soviets or Satellites claimed willful violation of their airspace. We shall bolster our counter-propaganda position by maintaining that the incident could not have occurred deep within hostile borders since the known performance of the aircraft would not have enabled it to penetrate that deeply, given the known flight path of the aircraft up to the time of its last reported position. (See Attachment B-2 for sample release.)

NOTE: This position might be effectively countered by a hostile power if the photographic film recovered from the aircraft could be developed and analyzed, thus revealing the actual track traversed. Moreover a hostile power would undoubtedly attempt to line up neutral nationals to view the scene of the incident and testify to the accuracy of the hostile power's version of the affair.

E. Backstopping of Release: The type of releases suggested in C and D, above, require further backstopping as follows:

(1) The releases in II. C and D would be strengthened if we could assert positive knowledge concerning the location of the aircraft a short time before the incident. Thus, the release indicating the aircraft is overdue and presumed lost (I. C, above) should contain a statement on the "last reported position", adding that communications contact with the aircraft was subsequently lost. The "last reported position" should coincide with the area in which search operations are conducted.

(2) To lend credence to all of the counter-propaganda positions recommended above, we shall have photographs of the meteorological configurations allegedly carried by the lost aircraft; moreover, we shall point to upperatmosphere data (studies produced by NACA and

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USAF) which confirm the fact that the alleged data collection program was in fact conducted as evidenced by the data collected and studies compiled. (NOTE: Should the compromise occur early in the operational program, we may not have studies actually prepared since such studies would be based on data collected over a period of several weeks; however, this could be openly admitted since it is quite plausible, and selected portions of raw "take" could be used in lieu of prepared studies.)

Attachments:

A-1
A-2
B-1
B-2

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ATTACHMENT A-1

(NOTE: A proposed release for use in the event that an aircraft is lost close to the hostile periphery. Attachment A-2 is an alternate release.)

The U. S. Government denies the Russian accusation that an American aircraft which the Soviets charge (crashed, was shot down, was forced down) within Russian territory, was engaged in a photo reconnaissance mission over Russian territory.

Moscow Radio announced last night that an American aircraft (crashed, was shot down, was forced down) twenty miles south of Murmansk. The announcement charged that Soviet authorities investigating the incident had ascertained that the aircraft was engaged in a reconnaissance flight over Russian territory (and added that the American pilot, identified as, confirmed that his mission was one of photographing Soviet military installations and collecting other intelligence data).

A Russian diplomatic protest has been lodged with the U. S. Ambassador in Moscow. A formal U. S. reply to the Soviet note will follow a thorough investigation by U. S. authorities of the circumstances surrounding the incident.

The aircraft in question may possibly be one and the same as the Lockheed U-2 reported missing by USAF officials three days ago. This aircraft, engaged in a NACA-sponsored research program, was the object of intense air-sea rescue search during the last three days following a USAFE announcement that the aircraft was overdue and presumed lost 75 miles west of the North Cape of Norway. All efforts to locate either plane or pilot have failed.

The NACA research program, announced to the U. S. press in early May has as its purpose the collection of data on upper air phenomena (i. e., turbulence measurements, temperature and wind structures at jet levels, cosmic ray effects, etc.) at altitudes up to 55,000 feet. The NACA program is conducted both in the U. S. and abroad. Research aircraft abroad are based at USAF installations where NACA is supported by the USAF Air Weather Service.

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USAF authorities speculate that the missing U-2 aircraft, whose last reported position was 75 miles west of the North Cape of Norway, may have been intercepted over international waters and (was forced to land within the USSR, was shot down over international waters--a fact the Soviets are attempting to hide with their sensational accusations, crashed in an attempt to evade Soviet attack). One or a combination of the above explanations may account for the lost U-2.

ATTACHMENT A-2

(Same as Attachment A-1 with exception of the last paragraph, which is as follows)

USAF authorities state that the missing U-2 last reported its position as 75 miles west of the North Cape of Norway. Contact with the pilot was then lost. These officials speculate that the pilot (flying in bad weather, hampered by loss of radio contact and loss of radio navigation system) may have wandered inadvertently over Soviet territory where he later (was forced down, was shot down, by Soviet interceptors, crashed in an attempt to evade Soviet attack).

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ATTACHMENT B-1

Moscow Radio announced last night that an American aircraft (crashed, was shot down, was forced down) in the vicinity of Moscow. The announcement charged that Soviet authorities investigating the incident had ascertained that the aircraft was engaged in a reconnaissance mission. This was determined, the Soviet statement added, not only by an examination of the aircraft (wreckage) but also as a result of the "free admission" of the American pilot. The pilot, identified by the Russians as allegedly confirmed that his mission was one of photographing Soviet military installations and collecting other intelligence data.

A Russian diplomatic protest has been lodged with the U. S. Ambassador in Moscow. The U. S. reply to the Soviet note will follow in due course.

USAF spokesmen assert that Soviet accounts as to the location of the incident may be correct, but emphatically deny the incident resulted from a willful violation by the US. of Soviet airspace for purposes of intelligence reconnaissance. The violation of Soviet airspace, these spokesmen add, was certainly neither intended nor ordered by U. S. authorities. The American aircraft in question was a Lockheed U-2, reported missing by USAF officials three days ago. Engaged in a NACA-sponsored research program, the aircraft was the object of intense but unsuccessful air-sea rescue search off the Black Sea coast of Turkey. The NACA research program announced to the U. S. press in early May, has as its purpose the collection of data on upper air phenomena (turbulence measurements, temperature and wind structure at jet levels, cosmic ray effects, etc.) at altitudes up to 55,000 feet. The NACA program is conducted both in the U. S. and abroad. Research aircraft abroad are based at USAF installations where NACA is supported by the USAF Air Weather Service.

USAF authorities indicate that the missing U-2 aircraft, whose last reported position was 20 miles north of Sinap, Turkey, lost radio contact with its base. Presumably, the aircraft's radio communication and navigation system either developed a malfunction or failed outright. Quite possibly the incident resulted from pilot hypoxia which, combined with failure of the aircraft's electronic navigation system, could have resulted in a grave deviation from the aircraft's planned course. With the aircraft on "automatic pilot" and the pilot in a euphoric condition, an unintended violation of Soviet airspace may have unfortunately resulted.

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ATTACHMENT B-2

Moscow Radio announced last night that an American aircraft (crashed, was shot down, was forced down) in the vicinity of Moscow. The announcement charged that Soviet authorities investigating the incident had ascertained that the aircraft was engaged in a reconnaissance mission. This was determined, the Soviet statement added, not only by an examination of the aircraft (wreckage) but also as a result of the "free admission" of the American pilot. The pilot, identified by the Russians as allegedly confirmed that his mission was one of photographing Soviet military installations and collection other intelligence data.

A Russian diplomatic protest has been lodged with the U. S. Ambassador in Moscow. The U. S. reply to the Soviet note will follow in due course.

USAF spokesmen indicated that the Soviet allegations were palpably false and were a purposeful misrepresentation of the facts. They stated that the American aircraft in question was a Lockheed U-2, reported missing by USAF officials three days ago. Engaged in a NACA-sponsored research program, announced to the U. S. press in early May, has as its purpose the collection of data on upper air phenomena (turbulence measurements, temperature and wind structure at jet levels, cosmic ray effects, etc.) at altitudes up to 55,000 feet. The NACA program is conducted both in the U. S. and abroad. Research aircraft abroad are based at USAF installations where NACA is supported by the USAF Air Weather Service.

USAF authorities speculate that the missing U-2 aircraft, whose last reported position was 20 miles north of Sinop, Turkey, may either have been intercepted by Soviet fighters over the Black Sea or may have inadvertently wandered over the Soviet Black Sea coast, at which point it (was forced down, was shot down, or crashed in an attempt to evade Soviet attack). In no case, these officials added, could the incident have occurred deep within Russian territory as maintained in the Soviet charge, since the known performance of the single-engine jet aircraft would never have enabled it to reach the Moscow area, given the flight path already traversed by the aircraft up to the time of its last reported position.

The intent behind the serious Soviet charge probably reflects Russian embarrassment over an incident which actually occurred over

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international waters--a fact which the Soviets are attempting to hide by making their sensational charges. Alternatively, the pilot may have through (an error in navigation, bad weather, an emergency resulting from engine failure) wandered over the Soviet Black Sea coast--but Soviet charges are designed to make more sensational propaganda just as has been done in several instances in the past when the Soviets or Satellites claimed willful violation of their airspace.

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ANNEX 62

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is with Copy #1 of this history.

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ANNEX 63

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with Copy #1 of this History.

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DSS&T Historical Paper

No. OSA-1

Vol. V of XVI

DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)
History of the Office of Special Activities
 Chapter VIII

(PERIOD)
From Inception to 1969

DO NOT DESTROY

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
 INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
 E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)
 ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2002-0049, document no. 5
 DECLASSIFICATION DATE: March 1, 2016

Controlled by : DSS&T

Date prepared : 1 April 1969

Written by : Helen Kleyla

Robert O'Hern

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CHAPTER VIII. TEST PROGRAM:
WATERTOWN

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CHAPTER III. TEST PROGRAM, WATERTOWN

Selection of a Test Site

The original contract for production of twenty U-2 aircraft for the special project assumed the flight testing by Lockheed of the first three or four aircraft at a temporary site, after which production aircraft would be delivered direct from Burbank to the project at an agreed point. As planning went on, the decision was made to select a secure, remote site where a semi-permanent base could be built up and where all flight testing, equipment testing and pilot training could be carried out with the greatest possible secrecy.

Between January and April 1955, air surveys were made in the California-Nevada desert area east of Burbank by Kelly Johnson, and Col. Ritland also investigated Air Force real estate holdings which might be suitable. Requirements for the site were:

- a. It must have a landing strip of 5,000 feet suitable for all-weather operations. Runway improvements would be made if other conditions were acceptable.
- b. The site should be government-owned to facilitate access and avoid negotiations with local authorities.

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c. Security, including remoteness to public view and ease of guarding, was of prime importance.

d. Living conditions must be bearable, although heat and dust were to be expected anywhere in the area under consideration.

e. Location with respect to the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) must be considered to avoid Air Defense Command radar surveillance during test flights.

In April 1955 the choice had narrowed to two locations: the site proposed by Mr. Johnson located near the California-Nevada line northeast of Death Valley, and an area within the Atomic Energy Commission's Nevada Proving Ground near Las Vegas. On 6 April Messrs. Bissell and Herbert Miller briefed the Chairman of AEC, Admiral Lewis Strauss, on the program and received his concurrence on the use of the dry lake bed area known as Groom Lake inside the Proving Ground. The Chairman was pleased that such a project as AQUATONE was being undertaken and promised AEC support for the secret cover story of upper air sampling.

On 13 April Messrs. Bissell and Miller and Col. Ritland inspected the area under consideration, accompanied by Mr. Johnson and his chief test pilot, Mr. Tony Levier, and the AEC local manager, Mr. Seth Woodruff. A site on the west side of the dry lake bed was chosen for

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the base. The AEC was willing for its contractors in the area to do the engineering and construction work required, and between 15 and 18 April 1955 estimates were worked out by the Silas Mason Company and the Reynolds Engineering and Electrical Company (REECO) at an estimated figure of \$600,000. This was higher than an estimate obtained by Mr. Johnson from a California contractor, but after considering REECO's long local experience, a local work force in being with the necessary AEC clearances, and the advantages of AEC supervision of the contract, it was decided that the REECO proposal was more realistic and would in the long run be more economical, as well as more advantageous from the security standpoint.

On 26 April 1955, the following information was passed to project contractors for their information and action in preparing to support the test and training phase of the project:

"The test base site has been tentatively located at Groom Lake, Nevada. Groom Lake is a dry lake bed which lies in the northeast portion of the military reservation north of Las Vegas, and it is planned that the Atomic Energy Commission's test area within the military reservation will be extended to encompass Groom Lake.

"Physical security of this site probably cannot be equalled, but the fact that it is so remote raises a number of problems which must be settled well in advance in order properly to plan the base. Building is scheduled to be complete

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and equipment installed by 1 July 1955 and it will be extremely difficult to make any major alterations after that date. Therefore, it behooves one and all to have his test requirements well thought out and on the record as soon as possible but by 15 May at the very latest.

"Electric power requirements are most important. The base will generate its own power, and the plant will be designed to near peak load. 110, 220 and 440 volts will be available in alternating current. Any need for direct current will require special equipment.

"Barracks and messhall will be airconditioned, but no provision is made for any airconditioned working space. A need for a small airconditioned work space may be filled by a trailer. Dust palliatives will be applied in the immediate camp area.

"Some bench space will be available in the hangars. Are there requirements for special tools other than hand-operated drill presses and shears?

"In order to keep the number of barracks down to a minimum, it is necessary to have now a good guess as to numbers of personnel... and an estimate of how long each phase of test work will last." 1/

AEC Agreement

On 29 April the Director wrote to Admiral Strauss to formalize the Agency's understanding that AEC would, through contracts already in existence, and through the services of AEC personnel, perform the work required by the special project. Reimbursement by the Agency would be in accordance with Section 686, Title 31, U.S. Code, under

1/ TS-103545, 26 April 1955. Form Letter to Contractors.

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appropriate security safeguards. The sum of \$650,000 was allocated to cover the initial construction job. On 2 June 1955 a letter to the AEC General Manager, General Kenneth Fields, requested AEC to arrange through REECO for housekeeping and maintenance services at the new facility on a reimbursable basis, and asked for a proposal in writing from AEC. It required two months of drafting and negotiations to reach the final agreement which was signed by Mr. Bissell for CIA on 12 August 1955 and by Col. Alfred D. Starbird for AEC on 16 August 1955.

(See Annex 64.)

The Air Force meanwhile put in motion the transfer to the AEC of a ten-mile-square area at the northwest corner of the Proving Ground. The prohibited area required for the Project test site was established by Executive Order 10633 dated 19 August 1955. Authority establishing Watertown Strip as a USAF installation was circulated in a limited distribution letter dated 2 September 1955 from the Chief of Staff, USAF, to the AEC, copy to Flight Service. The area was designated "Watertown Strip (Unclassified), a USAF installation assigned for classified functions" and prior approval of Headquarters, USAF, was required for its use. (See the following two pages for the designation order and a rough sketch of the area.)

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HEADQUARTERS
WATERTOWN AIRSTRIP
NEVADA

GENERAL ORDERS)
NUMBER 1)

1 October 1955

DESIGNATION OF WATERTOWN AIRSTRIP - - - - - 1

1. DESIGNATION OF WATERTOWN AIRSTRIP. Watertown Air-
strip is designated and organized under Table of Distribution,
Headquarters USAF, 2 September 1955 at Watertown, Nevada and
assigned to Headquarters USAF effective 2 September 1955.

2. Authority: Letter Headquarters USAF dated 2 September
1955.

DISTRIBUTION:
A

Frederic E. McCoy
FREDERIC E. MCCOY
Colonel USAF
Commander

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WATERTOWN
STRIP

Groom
Lake

PROHIBITED
AREA





DANGER
AREA

10 miles

Indian
Springs

To Las Vegas 45 miles

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The Project Security Officer in May had secured for the test site the unclassified cryptonym "SADDLE SOAP", but Mr. Johnson's Lockheed group were already referring to the area (jokingly) as "Paradise Ranch", later shortened to "the Ranch", and this latter name soon came into general usage among project staff, Air Force and contractor personnel involved in activities at the test site.

Construction at Watertown

At the request of the Project Director, the Agency's Real Estate and Construction Division nominated as the engineer to oversee construction of the base, and he proceeded to Las Vegas to work directly with the AEC/REECO construction group. Although the 1 July forecast for completion of work slipped several weeks, by the middle of July the base had taken shape and was on the way to meeting the 25 July deadline set for Lockheed's delivery of the first aircraft.

One of the main problems at the site was water. An old well which had been reopened was delivering about 15 gallons per minute, which was considered adequate for the first month of operations. A second well was started but water had not been reached when the first aircraft arrived. Because of the overriding importance of a water

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Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

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supply at the base, the Project Director authorized that the work proceed with the uncleared drilling crews working at night or when the U-2 was inside the hangar, and this continued through August and September. Late in September the pump in the first well failed and the base was without a water supply, except for that hauled to the site by truck, until a new pump could be installed. Just at that point the well-diggers hit water-bearing strata in the second well and by 26 October it was in operation, pumping about 17 gallons per minute. By the end of 1955, with periodic checks on rate of production, it was determined that the water supply would support a population of 200 at 200 gallons per person per day, with 20,000 gallons stored in the elevated water tank.

Delivery of the First U-2

On 21 July 1955 Project Headquarters received its first teletype message from Watertown over the newly opened communications net:

"Operations proceeding according to plan. Lockheed group ETA 0830 July 25 confirmed. All REECO personnel will be evacuated during initial landing and unloading which will be completed by 1100 July 25. General REECO work will be completed evening July 27. Outdoor U-2 run-up and test commences morning July 28... Watertown support will be fully operative 25 July." 1/

1/ CABLE-001 (IN 26986) to ADIC, 21 July 1955.

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Support furnished Lockheed prior to the first flight test included a bailed C-47 aircraft for transporting personnel between Burbank and the test site; a USAF C-124 to deliver the U-2 to Watertown; two engine stands and jet fuel prepositioned at Watertown; and a fire truck (crew of firefighters furnished by Lockheed). No medical personnel or facilities were requested and a minimum amount of weather forecasting support.

Because of extensive rainfall, the lake bed was unusable for landing the C-124 bearing the first U-2 and the new runway had to be used although it had not yet had the seal and armoring applied and thereby suffered a minimum amount of damage with its first use.

First Flight

On 1 August taxi trials were run on U-2 No. 1. Results were very good but on a high speed taxi run the aircraft inadvertently left the ground by 30 feet and flew 1200 feet. The transition to flight was very smooth and not noticed by the Pilot. A hard landing resulted when the pilot cut power at low speed. The tires blew on landing due to excess braking and caught fire. "No ill effects except to Tony's ego" (Tony Levier, the test pilot) was the word received at Headquarters from Watertown.^{1/} Additional taxi tests were made on 2 August with satisfactory results

^{1/} CABLE-048 (IN 31046), to ADIC, 2 August 1955.

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and on 5 August a first flight of approximately thirty minutes was successfully and smoothly accomplished. Further low level tests were run on 6 August and on Monday, 8 August, the Project Director and a Headquarters party along with Kelly Johnson happily observed the U-2 perform at 35,000 feet. (See next two pages for side and rear view photographs of U-2 No. 1.) On 16 August the U-2 went to 52,000 feet, on 25 August to 57,000 and on 1 September it reached 60,000 feet. On 8 September Mr. Johnson wired the Project Director as follows:

"Regret we were unable to obtain altitude record by Labor Day, but have done so by reaching initial design altitude for take-off weight at 10 a.m. today (65,500). Pilot reports this height reached with idle power for that altitude. Everything worked, even airplane fuel boost pump, which prevented our last attempt last week. Sky is not dark up there, aircraft is steady, cockpit comfortable. Will now belabor Pratt & Whitney about fuel control and undertake to find limiting altitude for air starts." 1/


During the first two weeks of November, Maj. Gen. Albert Boyd and Lieut. Col. Frank K. Everest, Jr., of ARDC, were authorized to fly the U-2 for the Air Force phase two (training) evaluation. A report was submitted by Everest through Air Force channels and corrections of discrepancies noted by him were important factors in the Air Force acceptance of the U-2.

1/ CABLE-238 (IN 45803) to ADIC, 8 September 1955.


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
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Additional Construction

Subsequent to the first successful flights of the U-2, the Watertown population increased daily with the addition of company engineers and techreps (preparing their work space and bringing equipment to be tested), firefighters, communicators, security officers, and REECO service people; and an influx of TDY'ers, both VIP and others. Jeeps, sedans and trucks for the motor pool were driven in from Camp Mercury (AEC Nevada Headquarters) on loan from the Air Force Special Weapons Project (AFSWP). Base support aircraft furnished by the Air Force between July 1955 and the following spring included: one L-20 for local flying, two C-47's bailed to Lockheed and later retrieved for use at Watertown; two T-33's for transition training; and a C-54 to be used on the Burbank to Watertown shuttle run, with a Lockheed crew, later being replaced by a regular MATS crew. The MATS service was put into effect upon completion of land line communication between Burbank and Watertown on 3 October 1955. (On 17 November 1955, the shuttle crashed on the side of Mount Charleston, killing all fourteen on board. See Chapter VII, page 18.)

Once operations were in full swing, it was obvious that the limited facilities available would have to be expanded. Money was tight and the

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Project Director desired the base to be run on as austere a basis as possible. However, since numbers at the site were expected by mid-November 1955 to reach 133 (the maximum number of billets available) and 175 by January 1956, the decision was made to close down operations for ten days at the end of November 1955 in order to construct the additional essential facilities, including principally:

- Two new dormitories (increasing billets to 203)
- Control tower
- Parking aprons, tie-downs and taxiway
- Classroom and office for SAC Training Unit
- 40' x 100' warehouse
- Security post on water tower
- Installation of 20 trailers (billets)
- Dispensary addition, sinks and cabinets
- Photo lab addition, airconditioning and dehumidification
- Water line for well #2
- Monorails and hoists in Hangars #2 and #3

Shortly after the construction was completed (see following page for aerial view of Watertown at this stage), and the base returned to testing activities, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson paid a one-day visit to the site, witnessed an excellent demonstration of the A-2 camera's performance at 68,000 feet, and departed with a very favorable impression of the operation.

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RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
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


PHOTO BY AIRMAIL
APR 21 1964

CO 1492913




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SERIAL NO. 17111

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Engine Development: Fuel Control Problems

The first engine flame-out was experienced on 22 September 1955 when the U-2 reached 64,000 feet and during descent flamed out at 60,000 feet. The pilot's suit functioned properly and no difficulties were experienced during descent. The engine restarted promptly at 35,000 feet. In mid-November the Project Director became gravely concerned over fuel control difficulties repeatedly experienced during the previous few weeks and emergency conferences were held with top level Pratt & Whitney engineers and NACA experts to seek a solution. New settings and techniques were developed and on 6 December Lockheed was requested to test these settings at maximum altitude using Lockheed pilots until favorable results were obtained, then turning over two aircraft to the SAC unit for the training program.

While the flame-out problem was not completely solved, the situation did improve and it was recognized that pilots must operate within the narrow margins prescribed by the airframe and engine manufacturers in order to avoid flame-outs at altitude. In March 1956 the Detachment A Operations Officer, [redacted] reported that during a ten-day period of training flights by Detachment A pilots, only one flame-out was experienced which, he said, was very heartening as it appeared that

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the pilots had found the key to flying this aircraft at its maximum altitude.

J-57/P-37 Engine Versus J-57/P-31

From the early planning days of the project it had been hoped to equip the U-2's with Pratt & Whitney's new P-31 series engines but, due to slippage in production date it was April 1956 before the first ones were made available to the Project. Detachment A had already been declared combat ready in aircraft equipped with the P-37 engines, and was preparing to deploy. A comparison of the specifications on the two engines by the maker showed the following:

	<u>P-37</u>	<u>P-31</u>
Length	165"	169"
Diameter	40.375"	40.375"
Weight: Max.	4,096 lbs	3,680 lbs
Min.	4,047 lbs	3,662 lbs
Dry thrust	10,500 lbs	11,200 lbs

A meeting with Colonel Norman Appold of the Power Plant Laboratory at Wright Air Development Center was held the first of May 1956 to consider engine experience to date. It was concluded that the P-37 engine was ready to commit operationally and that if flown as dictated by Lockheed and Pratt & Whitney, the probability of flame-out was slight. A program for improving the reliability of the P-37 was to be instituted, and at the same

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an accelerated P-31 program should accumulate time on these engines to a minimum of 500 hours total and 100 hours on one engine for examination. And since no delay in the training program could be tolerated, all this must be geared to the training program and the development of subsystems.

On 19 June 1956, Mr. Bissell reported to Col. Appold that the necessary time had been accumulated on the P-31 and asked his views on the wisdom of employing it operationally (as had been recommended by both Mr. Johnson of Lockheed and [redacted] of Pratt & Whitney). Col. Appold agreed that the P-31 be used on operational missions provided that a hot section inspection was made after every 50 hours of operation and an overhaul every 100 hours, and that new blades were substituted in the first stage of the turbine every 100 hours, until forged blades were available. These recommendations were put into effect and the P-31's after acceptance flights were completed, were withdrawn from training aircraft and used only for operations in the field. This was in accord with USAF policy, in view of the critical supply position with regard to P-31 engines.

In Detachment A's first operational experience with the F-31 equipped aircraft the pilots on certain flights were unable to reach

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top power and altitude flying from a German base where abnormally cold temperatures were encountered at altitude. On the other hand, Detachment B pilots flying from Turkey later the same year were able to reach 66,000 to 70,000 feet before descent with little difficulty. It appeared to Col. Gibbs on investigation of this difference in performance that the P-31 engine was a good temperature indicator and that it would perform in accordance with the ambient temperature.

Organization and Lines of Command at Watertown

The Project Director had anticipated that the operational functions at the test site would be handled by the Commanding Officer and Operations Officer of the detachment currently in training there; i.e., Detachments A, B and C, in turn; and that the civilian in charge of the base would be carried on the T/O as Base Commander but would concern himself mainly with support matters.

In June 1955 [redacted] Agency staff employee, was nominated by the Director of Personnel to fill the position of Resident Base Manager at Watertown and was accepted for this assignment by the Project Director. Reporting to the site, [redacted] with the assistance of a small cadre assigned to the base from Headquarters, worked with the Agency engineer, REECO and AEC, setting up billeting and messing

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arrangements, working out bookkeeping procedures with AEC for operation and maintenance, and in general bringing the base up to a state of readiness to support test and training operations. General Order No. 1 of the 1007th Air Intelligence Service Group (HEDCOM) dated September 1955, designated the Watertown base complement as "Flight D, Project Squadron Provisional" (later changed to "Detachment D, Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional" to conform with the cover established in the spring of 1956).

Base command relationships at the test site were discussed with the newly appointed SAC Liaison Officer, Colonel Loran D. Briggs, and following up on this discussion, the Project Director on 16 September wrote as follows to Col. Briggs:

"We had originally contemplated that the Base Commander would be responsible only for the management of the facility and for administrative and support functions and that the Commander of the Detachment currently in training would be responsible for the function of operations officer. You pointed out that the officer charged with operational responsibilities should have continuity of tenure at the base and that the Detachment Commander should not be burdened with local operational duties. Accordingly you suggested that these be assigned to the Commander of the SAC Training Group. Upon reflection we are convinced that your comment on our proposal was entirely valid but we have concluded that the proper solution is to designate a Base Commander competent to discharge all of the responsibilities, operational as well as administrative, that attach to this position.

"Accordingly, we now plan to designate a competent Air Force officer of Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel rank as Base

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Commander; the present Acting Base Commander will serve as his deputy and in that capacity will continue to be responsible for performance of support functions at the base. " 1/

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

When the SAC nominee for Commanding Officer of Detachment A, Colonel Frederic E. McCoy, reported for duty at Headquarters, he was hastily briefed and sent to Watertown where on 1 October 1955 he assumed command of the base. He and [] were almost immediately at odds on the running of the base and a situation developed wherein Headquarters was constantly having to intervene and make decisions on matters which should have been quickly and amicably resolved at the local level.

On 12 October 1955, a memorandum entitled "Organization and Lines of Command at Watertown", which had been drafted by Mr. Bissell, was made an official order defining basic responsibilities and authorities at the base. As later amended, it read:

"1. The following organizations are, or will shortly be, active at the Watertown base:

"a. The permanent staff of the base under the Base Commander.

"b. A field detachment in training for overseas operations under a Detachment Commander.

1/ SAPC-1850, 16 Sept 1955. Letter to Col. Briggs from Project Director.

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"c. A SAC Training Mission, the Commander of which will be referred to herein as the Training Commander.

"d. Technical staffs of the several suppliers.

"2. The responsibilities of the above-listed components and their lines of command will be as follows:

"a. The Base Commander shall be responsible for the management of the Watertown Base as a facility, for the control of all air operations on the Base, for liaison on operational matters with other USAF installations, and for the support of other components on the Base. He shall also be responsible, as a representative of Project Headquarters, for the coordination of all activities on the Base, and he will report periodically to Project Headquarters on the progress of all activities. He shall monitor test programs at the Base and coordinate proposals for equipment changes which originate at the Base. He will be under the command of the Project Director and his Deputy.

"b. The Detachment Commander shall be responsible for the organization, build-up and administration of his Detachment and the readying of it for active operations. He will participate in training as its Commander. He will be under the command of the Project Director and his Deputy but will receive his guidance on all matters having to do with training from the Training Commander.

"c. The Training Commander will be responsible for the direction and supervision of training. He will be under the command of the Commander, SAC.

"d. Suppliers' representatives will be responsible for their test programs and for the maintenance of equipment undergoing tests. Initially, they will maintain equipment being used for training purposes. In the later stages of unit training, the maintenance of equipment shall become the responsibility of the Detachment on the Base. It shall be the responsibility of the Base Commander to coordinate the different suppliers' test programs and requirements for facilities.

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"3. In order to reduce to a minimum the number of persons stationed on the base, personnel of the Detachment currently in training will serve as the staff of the base to the greatest extent possible. For this purpose they will be detailed as appropriate to the Base Commander.

"4. The Deputy Base Commander shall be responsible, subject to the Base Commander, for management of the facilities at the Base and for the performance of support functions." 1/

The new Base Commander supplied by SAC, Col. Landon B. McConnell, arrived and assumed command at Watertown on 22 December 1955. This appointment did not have the immediate harmonizing effect which was hoped for, since Col. McConnell found it difficult to adjust to the terms of reference of this unorthodox command.

In January 1956, the Project Flight Surgeon reported to Mr. Bissell that morale at Watertown was sinking from its earlier high peak and he blamed this largely on factionalism between the permanent base personnel and Detachment A personnel, which he said was fostered by their respective commanding officers. Col. Ritland, after visiting the base in March 1956, felt that conditions had improved in most respects, but said

"...the ill feeling rests in our own personnel, namely Base personnel versus Detachment personnel. This general area was covered thoroughly with Cols. McCoy and McConnell

1/ SAPC-1617/G, 21 February 1956. Organization and Lines of Command.

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and they agreed to do all possible to prevent the growth of this unsatisfactory condition. In my opinion the Base CO has not been fully cooperative in discharging his responsibilities. In many cases morale problems have arisen unnecessarily since he had the facilities and authority to prevent them..." 1/

Another almost constant problem at Watertown was the relationship between the Project staff and contractor personnel, as well as differences between one contractor group and another. Lockheed, which as Prime Contractor had the responsibility for flight testing and systems integration, was the largest and most aggressive group at the base, and with Kelly Johnson as their leader they were prone to grab the ball and run without waiting for signals.

When Watertown was being reopened as a test site for the successor aircraft in 1959, Mr. Bissell advised the Acting Chief of the Development Projects Division, Col. William Burke, to make arrangements to operate Watertown as an Agency facility with Lockheed as a tenant, rather than, by default, to let it become a Lockheed facility. The basis of this advice would, he said, be clear to those who remembered the early days of the U-2.

1/ TS-143306, 30 March 1956. Comments by Col. Ritland upon completion of his tour of duty with the project.

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"...At the beginning of the project, Watertown was for many months in fact a Lockheed facility and we never succeeded in recovering effective control of it, and our efforts to do so gave rise to some unnecessary ill will." 1/

One episode which illustrates Mr. Bissell's quotation, above, happened as follows: On 20 March 1956, Mr. Bissell instructed the Base Commander to work out a master schedule of test requirements which would make the best use of available U-2's in order to reach a state of readiness, taking into account both the needs of all suppliers to install, calibrate and test their equipment, and the requirements for pilot training. Col. McConnell sent a memorandum to all suppliers requesting them to submit their schedules of tests required which would be integrated into a master schedule, kept flexible enough to provide for change of emphasis or additional tests that might develop.

On 16 April 1956 at a suppliers' meeting in Los Angeles, Kelly Johnson in an acrimonious vein took strong exception to the Base Commander's memorandum, and especially objected to the implication that the Base Commander would be responsible for the coordination of test programs which were the airframe manufacturer's responsibility. Mr. Johnson was reassured that the conduct of development flight test

1/ OXC-0155, 8 December 1959. Memo for AC/DPD from the DD/P.

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programs was indeed a Lockheed responsibility (as it had been from the start) and Lockheed would necessarily retain responsibility for detailed day-by-day scheduling. However, major priority decisions as to relative emphasis on individual systems or components were the responsibility of the Project Director, whose representative at Watertown would participate on behalf of the Project Director in planning flight test programs to ensure that desired priorities were observed. All suppliers must have the right of appeal through the Base Commander and ultimately to the Project Director on questions of priorities.

Phase-out of Watertown

The formation of field detachments, their training at the test site and deployment to the field, and the phasing in of the Air Force follow-on group (FOG) took place between January 1956 and March 1957, with development testing continuing throughout this period. Beyond the air frame, engine and primary photographic and electronic systems which were declared operationally ready in early spring 1956, other equipment tested through the second year at Watertown included the APQ-56 Side-Looking Radar and associated Radar, the B camera and film, the Bair Sextant, air samplers for collecting nuclear debris (both gaseous and particulate) and improved ELINT collection systems.

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The overcrowded conditions at Watertown, due to the influx of the SAC U-2 group in November/December 1956, were relieved with the departure of Detachment C in March 1957. The SAC training of its own U-2 group had been expected to reach completion by the end of March 1957 but was delayed by two months. The SAC U-2 group departed for its operational base (Laughlin Air Force Base at Del Rio, Texas) on 10 June 1957.

Meanwhile the AEC informed the Project Director that plans were being made for approximately 20 nuclear shots between 15 May and 30 September 1957, which would require the evacuation of Watertown for periods up to three days for each shot. In view of the possibility of radioactive fallout, no-one could remain continuously at Watertown during this series. Because of the interruptions in the training program which the numerous evacuations would entail, and because there were requirements for further development and testing of equipment due to the extension of the U-2 program, Project flight test activities were re-established at Edwards Air Force Base (North), California, under the auspices of ARDC, and with the reluctant acquiescence of the Project Security Officer, who did not feel that the relatively open and easily accessible base at Edwards was conducive to maintaining the required secrecy of operations. Watertown Strip was evacuated and mothballed on 21 June 1957.

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Preliminary estimates for the one-year mothballing of Watertown from 21 June 1957 came to \$15,723, plus \$1200 per month (\$800 for the caretaker and \$400 contingency for special repairs, etc.) Since the Agency's decision to keep or dispose of the property at the end of the year affected AEC and USAF, Mr. Cunningham requested the Project Director to obtain a decision from Gen. Cabell on the retention of the base as a physical asset of the Agency. The decision finally made a year later was to re-open Watertown for the flight testing of the successor aircraft to the U-2, despite arguments then by the Project Security Officer that erosion of security of the U-2 program had branded Watertown as a "spook" base, and that the new program should be kept separate from any connection with the U-2 to the greatest possible degree. The final decision, however, was made, not on the basis of security, but on the basis of fiscal and operational considerations, i. e., to carry out the OXCART program as a completely separate entity would have required unlimited time, unlimited funds, and unlimited personnel resources, which were not available.

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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

14 August 1955

This Memorandum of Understanding made by and between the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Watertown Project, witnesseth:

WHEREAS, the Commission has added an area of approximately six miles by ten miles to the Northeast corner of the Nevada Test Site for the purpose of providing a test area for the Project; and

WHEREAS, the Commission has been authorized to construct certain facilities which are a necessary adjunct to the successful conduct of tests by Project personnel; and

WHEREAS, the Commission operates, maintains and provides certain services related to Nevada Test Site facilities; and

WHEREAS, the Project desires that the Commission extend these services to the Project activities and the Commission is agreeable to extending such services at times which do not conflict with Commission activities;

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and the provisions hereinafter contained, it is mutually understood and agreed as follows:

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(OA-LXI-3284-1A)

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ARTICLE I - DEFINITIONS

As used in this Agreement, the term, "Commission" means the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, or the Manager, Santa Fe Operations Office, or his duly authorized representative, hereinafter called the "Commission."

As used in this Agreement the term "Project" means the Watertown Project or the Manager of the Project including his duly authorized representative, hereinafter called the "Project Manager."

ARTICLE II - SCOPE OF WORK

1. Except for items furnished by the Project, the Commission will be responsible for furnishing an adequate complement of competent personnel, equipment, materials and supplies as may be necessary to supply, operate, maintain and/or service the following listed items in the Project's test area on a 24-hour per day, year round basis (if necessary) in accordance with accepted engineering principles:

a. Power plant and entire electrical distribution system consisting of:

- (1) Three 100 KW Diesel Generators, including necessary appurtenant equipment and switchgear.
- (2) Approximately one mile of underground electrical distribution system.

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b. All wells, pumping equipment, water treatment plants and water distribution systems in their entirety.

c. All sewage treatment plants and sewage systems in their entirety.

d. All motor pools, together with appurtenant facilities.

e. Communications facilities, to the extent designated by the Project Manager.

f. Project buildings consisting of, but not limited to:

- (1) Three barracks
- (2) One mess hall (meals to be comparable to those at Camp Mercury)
- (3) One wash house
- (4) One dispensary and operations building
- (5) One maintenance building
- (6) Three hangars together with three tie-down areas
- (7) Trailers and facilities for trailer parking
- (8) Temporary facilities which may be required

g. All paved or temporary access roads, camp streets, erosion control, and drainage facilities required for the Project.

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h. The 100 foot wide by 5000 foot long runway which is paved with a 3-inch roadmix asphaltic pavement and maintain taxi strips, associated drainage areas, etc.

i. Other services or facilities not specifically enumerated above which are requested in writing by the Project Manager.

2. The Commission will perform new construction in the Project test area after receipt of an allocation of funds from the Project. New construction shall be based upon plans and specifications approved by the Project Manager. This work will be accomplished only upon receipt of a work order signed by the Project Manager and approved by the Commission. The Project shall have the right to remove or transfer any buildings or equipment which have been funded by the Project.

3. The Commission will perform remodeling, major plant revision or addition or extraordinary maintenance upon any structure or facility in the Project test area upon receipt of a written request of the Project Manager and approval by the Commission. No changes to existing facilities, other than those minor alterations necessary in the performance of routine maintenance work, will be made without such written request.

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4. The Commission will provide miscellaneous support services as requested in writing by the Project Manager to facilitate all aspects of the tests performed by the Project. This work is generally outside the scope of maintenance and operations of facilities or construction of facilities and would consist generally of the following:

a. Assisting Project personnel in assembling, installing, connecting and testing scientific equipment and providing auxiliary needs thereto.

b. Assisting in disconnecting, dismantling, delivering, packing and shipment of scientific and/or test equipment as directed by the Project Manager.

c. Placing test facilities in a stand-by condition adequate to protect for future use.

5. The Commission hereby grants permission for Project personnel to utilize Building No. 127 at Mercury, Nevada and appurtenant facilities at no rental cost, contingent upon their releasing the facilities upon notification from the Commission. All costs for repair and maintenance of Building 127, while being used by the Project, shall be borne by the Project. Facilities such as the mess hall, dormitories, etc., at Camp Mercury which are operated by the Commission are also available for use by Project personnel on the same basis that they are

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available to other personnel associated with Commission activities to the extent that such facilities are not required in connection with test activities of the Commission, and subject to the provisions of Article III Finance.

6. The Commission agrees to furnish to the Project non-expendable equipment, such as hutments, temporary buildings and equipment including office equipment, which is not required for current use by the Commission, on a loan or memorandum receipt basis. Such items will be subject to recall by the Commission and shall be returned as soon as practicable, but, in any event not more than sixty days after notice that the items are required by the Commission in the performance of activities under its jurisdiction. All such items shall be returned to the Commission in the same condition as received, normal wear and tear excepted. All costs for repair, replacement and maintenance shall be borne by the Project.

ARTICLE III - FINANCE

1. Basic Financial Policy. All direct costs incurred by the Commission and its contractors in carrying on the work and a proportionate share of Commission contractor indirect costs will be borne by the Project. Such indirect costs will be determined on the same basis as that used by the contractor in accounting for other Commission activities.

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2. Funding. Project work will be funded on a reimbursable basis. Prior to the undertaking of any Project work, the Commission will be advised in writing that funds have been earmarked for the Project in an amount sufficient to cover the estimated costs of the work involved. Standard Form 1080, together with an itemized statement of costs incurred, will be submitted quarterly for payment by the Commission to the Project's Washington headquarters.

3. Accounting Records and Reports. The Commission will account for the costs of the Project work in accordance with its established accounting system. Cost reports will be furnished to the Project on a monthly basis in the form and detail consistent with established AEC cost reporting practices on comparable Commission activities.

ARTICLE IV - SECURITY

The Project Manager will be responsible for security within the entire Project addition. The Commission will maintain a guard station, Post 385, which is located on the main access road at the boundary between the Project addition and the Nevada Test Site proper, and will control access through this station on a 24 hour a day basis. Access through this station to and from the Project addition, and beyond, will be allowed on the basis of badges issued by the Commission, to include personnel approved by

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the Project Manager for access to the Project camp operations area. The Commission will provide guards with AEC approved equipment and AEC patrol vehicles to perform such security guarding functions as may be requested by the Project Manager. Reasonable advance notice will be given to the Commission of requirements for changes in guard service.

The Project Manager will be responsible for personnel security clearance of persons granted access to the Project and will advise the Commission of security clearance approval of each such person. For this purpose the Commission will advise the Project Manager of the AEC clearance granted persons in question and grant the Project Manager's Security Representative access to the Commission's clearance files.

ARTICLE V - SAFETY AND FIRE PROTECTION

The Project agrees to take all steps and all precautions to protect health and to minimize danger from all hazards to life and property. It is agreed that the Project will abide by all safety regulations prescribed for Nevada Test Site operations including radiological safety regulations prescribed by the Commission, and will establish and enforce any special safety regulations applicable to authorized work of the Project. The Project will be responsible for fire protection within the entire Project

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addition. Fire protection at Camp Mercury will be provided at no expense to the Project.

It is mutually understood and agreed that the Project will hold the Commission harmless from any liability to third persons which may arise on the part of the Government out of activities of the Project at the Nevada Test Site proper or at the Project's testing area.

ARTICLE VI - PRESERVATION AND STORAGE OF DOCUMENTS

The Commission agrees to retain and preserve, without charge to the Project, all books, records, correspondence, instructions, receipts, vouchers and other memoranda having a record purpose value pertaining to the work under this Agreement, for the same periods of time for which the Commission is required to retain Commission records. At the option of the Commission, and in lieu of preserving such documents, the Commission may return such documents to the Project for storage.

ARTICLE VII - RELEASE OF INFORMATION

Any public release or dissemination of information connected with activities under this Agreement will be in accordance with policies prescribed by the Commission and all other participating Federal Agencies, as coordinated by the Project Manager, except that information relating to the purpose or accomplishment of tests at the Project will

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be released at the discretion of responsible personnel of the Project. In any event, any reference to the Commission, the Nevada Test Site, or the Commission's contractors shall be cleared through AEC channels prior to actual release.

ARTICLE VIII - TERM

This Agreement is effective as of 15 August 1955. It shall remain in effect until terminated by either party hereto upon sixty days' written notice to the other party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement.

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BY: Alfred D. Starbird
Col. Alfred D. Starbird, CE
Director of Military
Application
Atomic Energy Commission

BY: Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
Special Assistant to
the Director for
Planning and Coordination

DATE: 16 August 1955

DATE: 12 August 1955

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DDS&T Historical Paper

No. OSA-1
Vol. VI of XVI

DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)
History of the Office of Special Activities
IX to
Chapters X and XII

(PERIOD)
From Inception to 1969

DO NOT DESTROY

DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE
INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL,
E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3)

ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2002-0049, document no. 6
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: March 1, 2016

Controlled by : DDS&T

Date prepared : 1 April 1969

Written by : Helen Kleyla

Robert O'Hern

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CHAPTER IX. MATERIEL

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CHAPTER IX. MATERIEL

Early Planning

The initial logistics plan for AQUATONE, which concerned itself principally with the government furnished equipment (GFE) to be supplied by the Air Force, was worked out under the guidance of Colonel Gerald F. Keeling of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel (General C. S. Irvine). The plan devised in order to make the Air Force supply system most responsive to project requirements was to set up an administrative staff in USAF Headquarters under a cover story, and brief the Air Force Chief of Allocations, Chief of Operations and Supply, and the Commander of the West Coast depot which would be used for stockpiling project materiel. The first task under this plan was to procure, deliver and receipt for the complete list of GFE required by Lockheed.

In April 1955 the decision was reached that engine spares would be stored in the Pratt & Whitney bonded warehouse at Hartford. Both overhaul and maintenance spares would be stored together and requisitions for overseas delivery would be made directly to Pratt & Whitney to be shipped from Hartford.

Spares for components manufactured on the West Coast by Lockheed, Ramo-Wooldridge and Hycon were to be stored at

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[redacted] Arrangements for use of space at [redacted] were made by the DCS/M with General Rawlings of Air Materiel Command, but since the depot was short of personnel, the Project would have to staff its own operation there. Major Robert Welch, USAF, was assigned to the Project Staff early in July 1955 and was sent to [redacted] to organize the project depot.

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The logistics set-up at Project Headquarters was slow in developing. In June 1955 an Air Force materiel officer, Lt. Col. William A. Wilson, was assigned to the deputy slot, and an Agency staff supply officer, [redacted] was assigned to the test site at Watertown, but the Director of Logistics, CIA, had difficulty in finding a civilian officer whom he could release to fill the Director of Materiel slot. With the lack of headquarters organization and direction in this area, the materiel officers assigned to the SAC 4070th Support Wing moved into the void and took on the planning for equipping and deploying the first detachment.

Withheld under statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C., section 403g)

The Operational Plan of the 4070th dated 15 December 1955 outlined its responsibility to CINCSAC for not only training, determining combat readiness, and deployment overseas of each AQUATONE operational unit, but for the establishment of support detachments, each

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Withheld under statutory authority of the
 Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
 U.S.C., section 403g)

capable of supporting an operational unit in its overseas location. The Operational Plan (which is attached as Annex 65) was reviewed by Project Headquarters staff and returned to SAC, agreed with no changes.

Early in 1956, the Project Director noted to [redacted] who had been assigned from the Agency's Office of Logistics to fill the slot of Director of Materiel:

"I am disturbed by the fact that we may be taking too little initiative on supply matters in this Headquarters and leaving too much initiative to be taken by the 4070th SAC Support Wing. What I have in mind is that, not only are such tasks as detailed FAK (flyaway kit) and SLOE (standard list of equipment) lists made up by Colonel Shingler, but that, so far as I am aware, the planning and the initial drafts of all our supply procedures have originated there. The former of these two tasks is one for which we may not have adequate facilities at Headquarters. In any event it is appropriate that specific lists should be developed at Watertown and [redacted] rather than in Washington. I do feel strongly, however, that we should be taking the initiative in developing supply procedures and not leaving it to the support organization." 1/

In the same vein, Col. Osmond J. Ritland, on completing his tour as Deputy Project Director in March 1956, wrote:

"Although the materiel activities of the project have progressed nicely during the past three months, it has not

1/ SAPC-4639, 26 March 1956. Memo to Project Director of Materiel from Project Director.

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been accomplished by project personnel. I do not believe that this is too great a deficiency since our original charter requires SAC to support AQUATONE. ... At this point I would not disturb the present procedure, but I do feel an additional materiel officer is needed in Project Headquarters, and with the activation of Bases B and C, I visualize the need for a full-time construction engineer. ... " 1/

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In the same report, Col. Ritland gave praise to the as one of the strongest organizations in the project. He had been very favorably impressed with the facility, the personnel and the method of handling all supply activities at that installation. He also gave credit to the SAC Support Group in a letter to General LeMay (CINCSAC), as follows:

"... Materiel has been our weakest function with little or no seasoned ability to solve this complex problem, In a period of just a few months Col. Shingler, Lt. Col. Lien and Warrant Officer Moberly have planned and supervised the implementation of a workable supply system. This was not their assigned responsibility and was undertaken by them for the over-all advancement of the project. ... " 2/

Materiel Support to Field Units

The SAC Support Plan for Detachment A had included arrangements through 7th Air Division in England to extend all needed assistance to

1/ TS-143306, 30 March 1956. Final Report by Col. O. J. Ritland.

2/ Letter to CINCSAC (unnumbered), 30 March 1956, by Col. O. J. Ritland.

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the unit in carrying out its mission. When Detachment A was forced in June 1956 to move its operations to Germany, these arrangements were no longer valid. Therefore it was necessary to reconsider the 4070th's support plan in conjunction with the USAFE Director of Material, General Lester W. Light, who felt that SAC liaison support would not be required if all levels of command within USAFE properly accomplished all functions outlined in the Overseas Logistical Support Plan. He did not object to SAC representation to assist in monitoring logistics support, but felt that any such representative should be attached to Headquarters USAFE for control and appropriate direction.

In October 1956, Headquarters SAC in a letter to Headquarters USAF requested relief from the overseas support of the AQUATONE detachments. The Headquarters USAF Project Officer (Col. Geary) and the Project Director both agreed that the support responsibility should be transferred (in the case of Detachments A and B) to Director of Materiel, Headquarters, USAFE, with one supply liaison officer retained in the field as a troubleshooter. Thereafter logistics support for the first three field detachments was arranged through local and theater commands with the assistance of the Headquarters USAF Project Office, and with supplementary procurement through Agency channels (for

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example, the purchase and shipment to Adana of trailers for base housing at Detachment B).

The principal role played by the Project Headquarters Materiel Staff was in advising the Project Director on materiel policy matters, arranging with various Air Force echelons for needed support, and monitoring depot and field base activities. Once operations were underway in the summer of 1956, Headquarters Materiel set up a system of daily and weekly cable reports to headquarters on field consumption of fuel and film, engine time, malfunctions, field modifications to equipment and other usage statistics, in order to ensure the timely flow to the field of needed supplies and spares.

Depot Support

Heavy reliance was placed on the project depot which was set up to handle the project-peculiar items related particularly to the U-2 aircraft and its photo and electronic systems. The depot operation was first located at [redacted] from mid-1955 to June 1958, when it was moved to [redacted] with Major Welch still in charge. In October 1960, Project Materiel Staff for security reasons proposed shifting the overt support of the U-2 activities from [redacted] to the SAC U-2 (DRAGON LADY) depot at Warner Robins Air Force Base,

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Georgia, with all shipments to and from Project CHALICE detachments to be made through that facility. The principal reason for this move was in order to continue using [] in support of the follow-on program (OXCART). The removal of the U-2 support activity from [] was expected to enhance the security of both programs and avoid cross-contamination. It was also expected that monetary savings would result for the government by eliminating dual stock levels as between the SAC and CHALICE U-2 programs by amalgamating their depot support.

On 13 February 1961 a memorandum of understanding with respect to funding of CIA/SAC U-2 maintenance, overhaul and spare parts contracts was signed between DPD/Contracts and the USAF Air Materiel Command represented by Lt. Col. Sidney Brewer. The decision was to consolidate logistic support activities within a single Weapons System Support Center (WSSC) at Warner Robins Depot effective 1 January 1961. An analysis was made of comparative costs and future expected levels, and funding percentage ratios for each contract were agreed between the two parties. This common support program alleviated the necessity for detailed appropriation accounting for individual line items of support supplies and services.

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The activity and staff at [] grew along with the OXCART program, additional manning being required for the increased work load including the installation of automatic data processing. Maj. John Druary replaced Major Welch at the end of the latter officer's eight-year tour with the project in August 1962. In May 1963 in anticipation of the transfer to the Air Force of responsibility for [] support for OXCART and the SAC SR-71 program, USAF was requested to provide about 35 new slots for the depot and also became responsible at the time of take-over for 50 slots previously supported by the Agency.

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Meanwhile, Secretary of Defense McNamara was effecting economies in Defense Department installations which involved among other measures the phasing down of [] to a deep storage operation. This required another move and arrangements were made for space at San Bernardino Air Materiel Area at Norton Air Force Base, California. This move took place at the end of 1963 and as of 1 January 1964 the Air Force Logistics Command at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base assumed full manpower and logistics control at the new depot for OXCART, TAGBOARD and SR-71 programs. The U-2 operating hardware is still supplied from Warner Robins.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Headquarters Materiel Staff

From 1956 until 1962 the Materiel Staff at Project Headquarters maintained a T/O strength of only six or seven. During the period from 1959 to 1962 when the DD/P air operations formerly under the Air Maritime Division were placed under the cognizance of DPD, the materiel support for the P2V and other [] air programs continued to be carried out by the former Aircraft Maintenance Support Division's staff, which had been constituted as a separate branch under DPD Materiel. Following the reorganization of the special projects under the Deputy Director for Research and the return of other DD/P air operations to the Special Operations Division (SOD) effective in July 1962, the separate aircraft maintenance branch was also transferred to SOD, leaving the project materiel staff at its original seven.

In 1962 on the departure of [] the Director of Materiel slot was filled by an Office of Logistics nominee, [] [] Upon assignment in September 1962 of Col. Jack Ledford as Assistant Director for Special Activities, the organizational formula for the Office of Special Activities (OSA) was revised in order to reduce the number of division and staff heads reporting directly to the front office (then numbering ten) to a more manageable arrangement.

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Materiel was bracketed along with the operational functions under the "Director for Field Activities" as a part of that reorganization.

During [] tenure as Director of Materiel the staff was increased, looking toward an operational OXCART program in addition to continuation of the U-2 project, and numbers reached as high as 24 on the Headquarters Materiel Directorate staff. In August 1964, Colonel Alfred K. Patterson, USAF, replaced [] and continued to direct Materiel's maximum effort toward operational readiness of the OXCART and its sensor and countermeasures systems and to render necessary materiel support to the U-2 activities at Detachments G and H.

Another reorganization of OSA which took effect in mid-July 1966 restored Materiel to a separate Directorate, removing it from the Directorate for Field Activities, which in turn became the Directorate of Operations. At that time the Materiel Directorate was composed of five divisions: Installations, Maintenance, Supply, Plans and Requirements, and Avionics.

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15 December 1955

Headquarters Strategic Air Command
Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska

Operational Plan - 4070th Support WingI. MISSION

1. The Commander, 4070th Support Wing is directly responsible to the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command. This wing has the mission of training and equipping the operational units of Project "AQUATONE" and providing support for these units in overseas theaters. Specific responsibilities are:

- a. Direct and supervise the training of combat crews.
- b. Determine that these crews, and their equipment are operationally combat ready.
- c. Determine that the unit as a whole is operationally combat ready.
- d. The deployment overseas of each operational unit.
- e. Establishment of support detachments, each capable of supporting an operational unit in its overseas location.
- f. Effect the necessary coordination with this Headquarters to effect the action required of United States Air Force, Air Materiel Command, Military Air Transport Service, Overseas Theater Commanders and any other agencies deemed necessary to insure adequate and timely support for continuous operations.

II. CONCEPT

1. The 4070th Support Wing must be organized and manned so as to support separate operational units by detachments. Detachments must be capable of staging from forward bases remote from parent and intermediate base of operations.

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2. Operation will be based upon formation of three operational support detachments. Upon development of satisfactory degree of combat readiness, the first support detachment and operational unit will be deployed overseas to its intermediate base (Upper Heyford, UK). The second detachment and operational unit will be similarly deployed to the Far East upon attainment of combat readiness. The third detachment and operational unit will be based within the Zone of Interior at Watertown Air Force Base, Nevada and will be so organized as to train to, and maintain a readiness status permitting either the rotation of a complete detachment and/or operational unit or a flow of replacement personnel to deployed detachments and units. The selection of the Far East intermediate base will be predicated upon security, operational facilities and habitability.

3. Operations will consist of operating from intermediate bases or staging at forward bases and subsequent operation over areas of interest. The forward staging of operational units will be supported by detachments, with integral airborne support. The staging operation will be such as to minimize ground time at the forward bases and be adaptable to minimum installation facilities. This concept of operation will enhance the security of operation, maximize operational flexibility and minimize the risks inherent in focalizing operation in a given segment contiguous to unfriendly territory.

III. DETACHMENT ORGANIZATION

The organizational structure will be such as to provide for three detachments equally equipped and manned. Each detachment will be organized so as to permit independent operation; each detachment to be organized, manned and equipped to provide support necessary for operational units to stage to forward bases, operate therefrom with minimum base support, and subsequent return to intermediate base. Airlift support and manning will be integral to each in such quantity as to permit support of operational units at forward staging bases.

IV. TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATIONAL UNITS

1. Quantative and qualitative training will be sufficient to train supervisory and crew personnel. Training operational readiness standards, will be as established by CINCSAC.

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2. Aircrew training requirements are as follows:

a. The first operational unit will be combat ready by 15 April 1956. The second unit scheduled for deployment will achieve a combat readiness status as soon thereafter as equipment and personnel status permit. The third unit will be trained to achieve combat readiness in sufficient time to permit rotation with deployed units to provide a flow of replacement personnel as may be necessary.

V. TRAINING LEAD TIME

1. The 4070th Support Wing will be activated 20 December 1955. In order to have one support detachment and operational unit operationally ready in a minimum length of time, the headquarters personnel will be in place at March Air Force Base, California, by 20 December 1955.

2. Scheduled dates of activations, equipping and operational readiness are as follows:

- a. Activation - 4070th Support Wing - 20 December 1955
- b. Equipping date (1st Unit) - 15 January 1956
- c. Target date for 100% manning - 15 January 1956
- d. Combat ready (1st Unit) - 15 April 1956

3. Personnel requiring specialized training will be scheduled to complete courses of instruction, and be in place at Watertown concurrent with or prior to unit equipping date.

4. Unit manning provides for 10 pilots with minimum operational readiness based on pilot to aircraft ratio of 1.5 to 1.

VI. OPERATIONALLY READY REQUIREMENTS

1. The criteria established by AFR 55-6 will be used for reporting the operationally ready status of operational units. Minimum requirements for combat readiness for each item are set forth in SAC Manual 171-2.

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a. An operational readiness index of 7, based on the weakest link principle must be reflected in Column "C" (Commander's estimate of operational readiness) for the unit to be considered combat ready.

b. In order to report an over-all readiness index of 7, the minimum category indexes specified below must be met.

- (1) Column D - Non-Crew Personnel assigned - 9.
- (2) Column E - Non-Crew Personnel assigned, operationally ready - 8
- (3) Column F - T/O Equipment assigned (other than aircraft) - 9
- (4) Column G - T/O Equipment assigned operationally ready (other than aircraft) - 8
- (5) Column H - Flyaway Kit and Spares - 9
- (6) Column J - Average T/O aircraft possessed operationally ready - See Para IX, 2, a(1).
- (7) Column L - Average aircrews assigned and combat ready - 8 (See para V, 4).

2. In the determination of combat readiness, the following material factors will apply:

a. The unit will be required to maintain an in-commission rate of 70% with desirable attainment of 100% in-commission.

b. Flying hour support will be 70 hours/month.

c. Sortie rate will be based on eight flights/month. (Includes test hops and ferry flights).

d. Individual units mission and support equipment must be available at the ZI base on or before date detachment training is scheduled to commence.

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e. Unit operating tables II, VII, XVI, and XIX for common items must be located at the ZI operating base 30 days prior to receipt of T/O aircraft.

f. Unit operating tables II, XVI, XIX peculiar items, must be located at [redacted] 30 days prior to receipt of respective T/O aircraft.

g. Materiel Reserves:

(1) Station Sets: Unit operating at intermediate operating bases will utilize station set equipment pre-stocked under AFL 67-44. Peculiar equipment support will be transported by support aircraft in sufficient quantities to support each unit at enroute, forward operating and staging bases.

(2) Flyaway Kit: Three basic flyaway kits each consisting of items common to all aircraft will be required to support six aircraft for 30 days. These kits should be complete and phased in place 30 days prior to unit deployment to intermediate bases.

h. Flyaway kit and common item re-supply support will be as follows:

(1) Enroute support will be furnished by SAC.

(2) Common supply support will be obtained from the area to which deployed.

(3) Re-supply of kit components, UEE, emergency requirements, and common items not available in the deployed area will be obtained by priority requisition, on the prime ZI support point and airlifted to the using bases in accordance with Vol. XVI, Air Force Manual 67-1.

(4) Resupply of peculiar spares and equipment will be obtained as directed.

(5) Reparables will be returned to overhaul activities through logistic channels as specified. Airlift for this purpose will be used as required.

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i. Consumables

(1) Consumable bulk items including, but not limited to POL, JP fuel, will be furnished by the area sources to which units are deployed, based on the utilization rate.

(2) Special fuels will be requisitioned as directed.

j. Unit Flyaway kits and UEE will be located at Watertown Air Force Base, Nevada, and will deploy with the unit.

k. Consumable bulk items, including, but not limited to POL, JP fuel, and gaseous supplies must be available in sufficient quantities to support wing training operations based on utilization rates.

l. Facilities: Facilities, such as aprons, parking areas, office space, warehousing, etc., must be available as agreed between participating agencies.

m. Non-crew personnel, including maintenance and technical representatives must be trained and available to the operational unit prior to deployment.

VII. OPERATIONALLY READY DATES

The first unit will be combat ready 15 April 1956, the remaining units will achieve a combat ready status as soon thereafter as equipment and personnel conditions permit.

VIII. DEPLOYMENT LOCATIONS

The 4070th Support Wing will be based at March Air Force Base, California, and will be capable of deploying support detachments and operational units to intermediate bases. Units based at intermediate bases will be capable of operating from any overseas base normally supporting USAF fighter, bombardment or reconnaissance wings.

IX. MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS

1. Units will be allowed a maximum of 14 days to deploy to an intermediate base.

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2. Deployment will normally be conducted in the following manner:

a. Aircraft will be deployed as combat readiness is achieved by unit.

(1) Units will not be deployed with less than four operationally ready aircraft and a pilot to aircraft ratio of 1.5 to 1.

(2) Ground support personnel and equipment will be airlifted to staging bases.

(3) Mobility plans will be developed as required.

X. CHANNELS OF CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION

1. The 4070th Support Wing will be attached to the 8070th Air Base Group, March Air Force Base, California, for administration and logistical support.

2. Operational control and support responsibilities will be effected as set forth in "Organization and Delineation of Responsibilities" dated 2 August 1955.

(Signed)

R. M. MONTGOMERY
Major General, USAF
Chief of Staff

Distr:
USAF: Programs Grp 4
Proj AQUATONE Hqs 4
4070th Support Wing 2
Hqs SAC 6

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CHAPTER X. CONTRACT PILOTS

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CHAPTER X. CONTRACT PILOTS

Foreign Versus U.S. Pilots

During the White House meeting at which approval was granted for the U-2 reconnaissance program, the possibility of a forced landing of the U-2 in enemy territory was touched on, but it was the apparent Agency view at that time that the repercussions of such an accident would be somewhat mitigated if the aircraft were manned by "non-official" U.S. personnel, and to the extent practicable it was intended to man the U-2 with non-U.S. nationals.

A mechanism for recruiting foreign pilots was already in being within the Air Maritime Division (Project ZESTFUL), but the available pilots were extremely few and the lead time for acquiring and processing one was six months. A recruiting effort was initiated through the AMD channel early in 1955 and sources in Europe were canvassed for prospects. The majority of pilot candidates offered, however, were unacceptable for either physiological or security reasons.

At the end of July 1955, fifteen foreign pilots [redacted]

[redacted] between 23 and 25 years of age had been recruited, all of whom had at least 500 hours current jet time, but all of whom lacked facility in the English language. Arrangements for language training for these

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recruits were worked out with the Office of Training prior to their assignment to air operations.

The Project Director had learned from the aeromedical experts that very high qualifications from both the physical and proficiency standpoints would be required of pilots for this program, which might necessitate the exclusive use of U.S. pilots. This was broached to the DDCI (Gen. Cabell) who made no strong objection and was apparently prepared to accept this eventuality. Therefore, while the recruitment of foreign pilots continued, Col. McCafferty began discussions with the Air Force with a view to future recruitment of currently qualified Air Force pilots.

A proposal was made to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, of the Air Force (Lt. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell) on 13 June 1955 as follows:

"Whereas provisions are under way to provide adequate numbers of trained indigenous pilots for Project AQUATONE it is considered desirable to use American pilots. Present plans are to use American pilots if the international situation will permit a favorable policy decision at the time the operational phase of AQUATONE commences.

"In our discussions regarding the recruitment of Americans for this job, we felt that it would be highly desirable to obtain currently qualified Air Force officers. We would hope to obtain reserve officers with three to five

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years experience in jet aircraft in the First Lieutenant or junior Captain category. In addition, we would stipulate that they should be under thirty years of age, single, and in A#1 physical condition.

"We feel that, if properly approached, many young officers in this category would be willing to accept employment for hazardous duty of this sort. Our plans are to establish a cut-out organization and to provide this organization with funds, legal assistance and the power to write contracts for the employment of the American pilots. The pilots would be told that this was an organization backed by a group of American philanthropists, organized with at least the tacit approval of the United States Government. Their principal aim would be to recruit a group of volunteer pilots to fly hazardous missions in the interest of the United States Government against the Soviet Union and its satellites.

"These officers would be expected to go on inactive status, or possibly resign their Air Force Reserve commissions, and accept employment with this cover organization. They would be offered excellent pay with substantial bonuses for successful completion of operational missions. It would be most helpful if they could be offered a termination clause that would provide for their reinstatement or re-entrance on active duty in the Air Force. Obviously, these pilots would have to be told initially that this program had the blessing of the U. S. Government and specifically of the United States Air Force.

"We feel that recruitment could be carried out in the following steps:

"a. Initially a communication would be addressed to specific Wing Commanders through the appropriate Air Force command channels which would describe in a rather general way the intention of a civilian organization to recruit pilots in accordance with the cover story, indicate that the Air Force looked with favor upon the project, and ask that the recipients indicate the names of individuals in their units who would be

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likely candidates and could meet the qualifications specified above.

"b. From the names thus submitted, a list of candidates would be selected and Wing Commanders would be notified of the individuals in their units who were to be approached.

"c. The approach to the candidates would be made by a civilian representative of the cover organization. This representative would make it clear to the candidates that they were under no restriction in discussing the proposal with their Commanding Officers.

"It is believed that we should get started on this program at the earliest practical date since it will be necessary, first to run a security check on all personnel nominated by the respective Wing Commanders prior to contact and, second, to provide some time lapse to allow their separation from the service and employment by the cover organization prior to their actual training in project aircraft.

"If this proposal meets with your approval, we are prepared to staff out the details with whomever you might designate as your project officer. Col. George O. McCafferty is designated as the project officer for this Agency." 1/

The Air Force agreed to supply a limited number of pilots from SAC for the first detachment. (As it developed, SAC eventually furnished pilots for all three detachments.) Arrangements were made for cleared USAF officers in the Pentagon and at the SAC fighter bases

1/ TS-103563, 13 June 1955. Memorandum for Chief of Staff, USAF, Attn: Lt. Gen. Emmett O'Donnell, Jr., from Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

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to be visited to screen likely candidates and arrange for interviews by an AMD officer accompanied by a Security Officer and a Personnel Officer from the project staff (all working in alias).

Recruiting Procedures

The first pilot recruiting trip was made on 7 November 1955 to Turner Air Force Base, Albany, Georgia, and resulted in four candidates. The following week Bergstrom Air Force Base in Austin, Texas, was visited, netting four more. A second visit to Albany in March 1956 secured eight pilots out of eighteen interviewed, and in June 1956 teams visited Malmstrom Air Force Base at Great Falls, Montana, and Larson Air Force Base at Moses Lake, Washington, where a total of 15 candidates were signed up. The procedures employed by the recruiting teams were generally as follows:

a. The first interview was held in a hotel or motel room with proper security safeguards being observed. The following proposition was made: An American organization (unnamed) was seeking to recruit a group of volunteer pilots for hazardous flying with commensurate pay. It would be necessary to resign from the Air Force but a guarantee of reinstatement would be furnished in writing. If the pilot was interested he was asked to return for a second interview.

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b. At the second interview a hypothetical overflight mission for electronic intelligence collection against Russia was outlined. Terms of contract were stated as \$775 per month (general duty status), \$1500 per month (operational duty status), and \$1000 per month bonus (to be paid on completion of assignment), a total of \$30,000 per year maximum, plus subsistence, insurance and medical expenses to be paid by the organization.

c. Those willing to sign up were given instructions for further processing which included: a week-long physical and psychological examination at the Lovelace Clinic in Albuquerque; measurement for partial pressure suit and fitting of the suit; altitude chamber test at Wright Patterson; and polygraph and psychiatric interview by Agency Security Office and Medical Staff.

Before signing a contract, the recruit was given an operational briefing on the capability of the aircraft and equipment and on the true sponsor of the project. He was also afforded an opportunity to talk with a Headquarters USAF personnel and legal officer and to read the guarantee of reinstatement into the Air Force signed by Generals White and Twining. The contract was then signed, the men were photographed, fingerprinted, given their individual cover story and sent back to their bases to resign from the Air Force.

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[redacted]

With the signing of the first eight USAF pilots, less emphasis was placed on acquisition of more foreign pilots for the project, although recruitment continued under ZESTFUL to satisfy other Agency needs. In November 1955 the Project Director said in a status report to the DCI:

"We are at present planning to use American pilots, because of their greater proficiency and trustworthiness... In order to have a second string to our bow, we have recruited and are carrying out the basic training of some six to eight non-U.S. [redacted] pilots who could be used if political circumstances dictated." 1/

In mid-December 1955 [redacted] pilots had passed their physicals and initial checkout and were put into advanced pilot training at a USAF base (under AMD sponsorship) while awaiting a decision as to their use. [redacted] pilots had been turned over to the P2V program.)

[redacted]

[redacted] In April 1956 Col. McCafferty and Lt. Col. Leo P. Geary visited the [redacted] at their training base and pronounced them fully qualified on the basis of proficiency, language

1/ TS-142630, 19 November 1955. Status Report on Project.

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and morale to be used on Project AQUATONE. There were four of the original eight left at this point; the others had chosen to return to [] after having been away from home almost a year.

Since it was still felt desirable to have some fully qualified foreign pilots available in the event political conditions prevented the use of Americans, the [] were sent to Watertown in late June 1956 for training in the U-2.

[]
[]
Before their departure for training, the Cover Officer had searched in vain for a means of fitting the [] into the project cover story. With the acceptance of sponsorship by NACA as cover, the very attribute for which these [] were recruited (that of being non-Americans) was now a drawback, for the use of civilian pilots of foreign origin was fundamentally incompatible with NACA procedures. [] recommendation to the Project Director was:

[] "If other considerations dictate that we must employ the pilots in AQUATONE, I would recommend that they continue to be handled [] as they have been in the past. The inherent problems and security risk of such an arrangement would have to be recognized and accepted." 1/

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1/ SAPC-6734, 5 June 1956. Memo to Project Director from Cover Officer.

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
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In [redacted] opinion the [redacted] pilots should have been written off before the U-2 training was begun, because cover-wise they jeopardized the entire program; this view was shared by the Project Security Officer.

Due partly to language problems, the [redacted] had a difficult time learning to fly the U-2 and on 15 July 1956, Colonel William Yancey, commander of the training unit, reported that they were not qualified to continue in the U-2 program. (Cols. McCafferty and Geary disputed this determination by the SAC training commander but to no avail.) The [redacted] pilots were returned to Washington and the decision was made (with the concurrence of Gen. [redacted]) to keep them in the United States until the end of the project because of the extensive knowledge of the whole operation they had acquired at Watertown. A year's program of study and training was arranged for them and in October 1956 their cases were turned over to the Contacts Division of the Office of Operations for administration.



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Once operational overflights began, the need to use other than U. S. pilots did not arise again until the long political stand-down of overflights. In February 1958 the British were offered pilot training in the U-2 and participation in the program, which they accepted, and in January 1961 an agreement was signed with the Chinese Nationalists for a joint reconnaissance program over Mainland China using Chinese Air Force pilots. Other than in these two joint programs, only American pilots have been used in the program.

Pilot Cover

In April 1956 arrangements were worked out with Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for furnishing employment cover for the contract U-2 pilots while assigned to the project. This plan was developed as described by Mr. Bissell in a memorandum to the Contracting Officer:

"Discussions to date have indicated the feasibility of an arrangement with Lockheed whereby the pilots under Project AQUATONE will appear to have been hired by Lockheed as Flight Test Consultants. Checks will be issued by Lockheed for the monthly compensation of each pilot although none of these funds will inure to the benefit of the individuals. In fact they will be required to sign a classified document acknowledging that the open contract establishes no right and obligations between Lockheed and the pilots.

"It has been agreed by NACA that a purported contract will be prepared whereby Lockheed is to furnish the services of certain pilots under a services contract with NACA.

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Contemporaneously a contract will be entered into between the Agency and Lockheed reflecting the true arrangements and acknowledging that the NACA contract confers no legal rights. The arrangements are such that the purported billings under the NACA-Lockheed contract will be in fact the billings and reimbursement under the Lockheed/CIA contract. The services contract will call for payment of \$10,000 per year per pilot for a group of approximately 30 pilots. The actual administrative charge to the Agency for this service will be \$250 per month for the entire group. For security reasons within the accounting system of Lockheed it will be necessary that an advance be made to Lockheed by the Agency in the amount of \$25,000 which, in effect, will be utilized as a revolving fund for their payments. Under these arrangements we will require Lockheed not to file with Federal or State tax agencies the normal types of information returns such as the Federal Form 1099 and the California Form 599. In view of this possible technical violation of law, Lockheed will require indemnification for possible additional costs." 1/

The pilot cover contracts negotiated with Lockheed in 1956 (numbered NA-W-6471 and NA-W-6471(R)) have been extended year by year to continue the arrangements described above, and were still in effect for Fiscal Year 1968.

For their overseas assignments the pilots were documented as civilian contract consultants to the three Weather Reconnaissance Squadrons, and deployed on military orders issued by the HEDCOM cover unit (the 1007th Air Intelligence Service Group).

1/ TS-143292, 12 April 1956. Memorandum for Contracting Officer from Project Director.

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Pilot Morale

In the first year of training and operations there were those (including the Project Flight Surgeon) who considered that the pilots were being overfostered in many respects by various project staff who administered pilot affairs. However, in view of the investment made to bring each of the pilots to a state of operational proficiency in the U-2 aircraft, and of the high hopes for the success of their mission, it was to be expected that every possible effort would be made to keep these men in a state of physical health and comfort, and of mental wellbeing.

The large majority of the pilots joined the program because of the monetary rewards involved and therefore careful attention to all matters relating to their individual finances was a crucial factor in the maintenance of morale. One headquarters finance officer was occupied almost full time keeping the pilots' financial affairs running smoothly,

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There were of course other important factors in maintaining the pilots' morale, including the improvement of personal equipment and procedures relating to the flying of missions from both a safety and a comfort standpoint; the guarantee of some flying time in other aircraft than the U-2; liberal rest and rehabilitation policies; prompt handling of personal mail through the security postal system, as well as attention to family emergencies; and assistance to those desiring to apply for regular Air Force commissions. A principal cause of low morale among the pilots as well as other detachment members, over which the Project Headquarters had no control, was the forced inactivity which recurred during periods of political stand-downs.

Pilot Contracts

The terms of the original contract signed in January 1956 by the first group of pilots provided, in addition to a monthly salary of \$775 when in general duty status and \$1500 when in operational duty status, a bonus payment of \$1,000 per month, to be accumulated for payment upon completion of the contract, provided termination was not for cause.

In March 1956, after discussion among themselves at Watertown, the eight pilots then in training signed a joint memorandum protesting the inequity of the bonus clause and requesting that the full \$1,000 bonus

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be credited to them monthly, even though payment might be delayed a year. This in effect amounted to treating the bonus as current salary. This requested change was reviewed by the Project Director of Administration with the General Counsel, and a counter-proposal (approved by the DCI on 20 March 1956) was made to the pilots whereby \$500 of the \$1,000 bonus would be credited on a monthly basis (although for tax purposes it would not be payable until the succeeding calendar year). The other \$500 would be payable upon successful completion of the contract and would not be paid if the individual were terminated for cause. The revised contracts were signed by all the pilots on 21 March and all agreed at that time that it appeared to them to be a very good contract. (See Annex 66 for terms of the contract.)

The 21 March 1956 version of the pilot contract remained in effect until the end of 1957. In view of the plan for the continuation of AQUATONE activities abroad and the imminent expiration of many of the pilot contracts, it was felt that new contracts should be signed by all those who were to be retained in the project. In view of the experience they had acquired over two years of operations, it was desired to retain as many as possible in order to avoid cost and delay of training new pilots. Although Col. Geary recommended (and Mr. Cunningham

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agreed) that the new contracts should be written at a lower figure, this suggestion was disapproved by the Deputy Project Director (Col. Jack Gibbs) who felt that the pilots should not be penalized because the Air Force was flying the same type of equipment at a lower cost, nor should they be penalized because they were flying fewer missions per month than had been anticipated when the pay scale was fixed. The General Counsel's Office (Mr. John Warner) agreed with Col. Gibbs. Certain increases were provided in the new contract and at the same time the pilots were accorded the privilege of having their dependents accompany them to Turkey or Japan. A comparison of the new contract with the old shows the following:

<u>Former Contract</u>	<u>New Contract</u>
General Duty Status \$775 monthly	\$1,000 monthly
Operational Duty Status \$1,500 monthly (both in the U.S. and overseas)	\$1,250 monthly (U.S.) \$1,500 monthly (overseas)
First \$500 increment: An amount of \$500 to be credited on the books of the Agency for each month of satisfactory service in an operational duty status overseas and to be paid in the year following that year during which it was earned.	Same.

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An amount calculated at the rate of \$500 per month for each month of satisfactory service in an operational duty status overseas to be paid provided services not terminated for cause based on misconduct or abandonment of obligations as set forth in the contract. This accumulated amount to be paid within a three (3) year period from termination of contract.

Same for overseas duty but now also applies to operational duty status in the U.S. and is to be paid within a 4-year period from termination of contract.

Post differential:

No provision.

To receive a post differential at rates established by the Project Director while serving at certain overseas locations.

The terms of the new contract were effective 1 January 1958 and ran through December 1959 in most cases. At this point there were seventeen of the original thirty pilots recruited in 1956 who signed for another two years. Air Force approval for the extension was granted verbally by General O'Donnell through Colonel Geary. At the end of 1959 all the pilots were extended for a fifth year under the same terms, and with Air Force approval again obtained verbally by Colonel Geary.

On 31 October 1960, six pilots were released for return to the Air Force (one having returned earlier that year) which left ten available. At this point action to extend or modify contracts was held in abeyance

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pending the outcome of high level deliberations regarding the future use of CHALICE assets. As an interim measure pilot contracts were extended on a month-to-month basis in the form of simple amendments approved by the General Counsel which in no way affected or altered the provisions of the existing contracts; the periods specified for return to the Air Force or for simple separation remained the same.

At the beginning of 1961, when Detachment G at Edwards Air Force Base had just been revamped into an operational group, the Acting Chief of the Development Projects Division, Col. Stanley W. Beerli, recommended that pilot contracts be renegotiated to provide a payment of \$1,750 per month for active duty status, and a bonus of \$750 for each month in which the pilot either was assigned to a mission involving overflight of foreign territory, or was given an unusual task to perform as determined by the Division. This rate of pay was approved 17 February 1961 by the DD/P and contracts then in effect were extended at this rate of pay to the end of 1961 (see Annex 67).

Meanwhile an elaborate program of medical, psychological, proficiency and security evaluations of the current pilot slate resulted in the decision to release three more to the Air Force as of 31 July 1961. A one-year contract for calendar year 1962 and a further one-year

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extension for 1963 was signed with the remaining seven who were assigned at Detachment G where they were occupied in testing aircraft and equipment, training other pilots, and flying operational missions from staging areas as required.

A new contract was negotiated for calendar year 1964 (when a few new pilots were recruited) wherein the principal change was the introduction of a graduated pay scale based on years of Agency service, as follows:

Up to two years of service, \$24,000 per annum;
Over two years and up to four years, \$30,000; and
Over four years, \$36,000.

Other emoluments than salary remained approximately the same as before. The terms of this contract have remained in effect since 1964 with extensions being made for a year at a time.

Insurance and Death Benefits

The original contract with the pilots provided that the Agency would arrange insurance and pay the premiums thereon as follows:

A \$15,000 policy with United Benefits Life Insurance Company (UBLIC);
A \$15,000 policy with War Agencies Employees Protective Association (WAEPA); and
An \$18,000 policy with Federal Employees Group Life Insurance (FEGLI).

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[redacted] was consulted on the legality of the proposed insurance coverage and he endeavored to secure alternate coverage from commercial companies on a sterile basis. He was particularly anxious to remove the pilot category of employee from the Agency-sponsored plan as underwritten by UBLIC in order to protect the interests of the other Agency employees insured thereunder. He was unsuccessful in this effort.

Meanwhile, on 15 May 1956, pilot Wilburn Rose was killed in a training accident at Watertown and death benefits had to be paid under the UBLIC policy, administered by Government Employees Health Association (GEHA). On 31 May 1956, the GEHA Board of Directors met and passed a resolution making AQUATONE's contract pilots ineligible for UBLIC coverage. They asked the Agency also to cancel those policies already written thereunder.

The whole matter of insurance for the pilots was then taken under study by the General Counsel. The GEHA Board was upheld in its position and the policy was established and approved by the Director on 18 January 1957 that the Agency (through AQUATONE) would underwrite the GEHA payment of death benefits on pilots. This was done by making advance payments to GEHA: the first for \$53,000 (\$30,000 to cover

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benefits paid out on the second and third fatality which occurred in the interim) and \$1,000 per man per year in the form of premiums to build up a reserve. The cryptonym JBMAVBUSH was assigned to this accounting mechanism by the Project Comptroller to afford secure handling of these arrangements.

Ironically, the second and third fatal accidents requiring the payment of death benefits occurred in 1956 while the insurance matter was being thrashed out, but the program then went for eight years without a fatality involving a contract American pilot.

In January 1964, Colonel Jack Ledford (then Acting Director of Special Activities) recommended, and obtained approval for, the discontinuance of the special coverage arrangements in favor of regular coverage at the normal rate for all personnel, since the OXCART pilots had been accepted for UBLIC coverage. As fate willed it, the coverage had scarcely been arranged when the next fatality occurred in April 1964 at Edwards Air Force Base. On 1 June 1964 the balance of funds held in reserve by GEHA amounting to \$77,500 were returned to OSA and the JBMAVBUSH account was liquidated.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Pilot Emergency Procedures

During early contingency planning for possible loss of a U-2 in hostile territory, the Project Security Officer put forward the following considered opinion of the Office of Security on the subject:

"We should not undertake any actual U-2 mission without a completely satisfactory destruction device. Moreover, we should consider the need to issue specific instructions to carry and use the 'L' pill... consideration must be given to the moral and religious aspects of leaving the final decision to the individual. Such instructions would place the ultimate responsibility for this extreme measure with the United States Government. We would want to assure ourselves that pilot personnel absolutely dispose of the 'L' pill in the event they fell into enemy hands and failed to utilize it. Possession would be contrary to our cover explanation and thwart any explanation that the aircraft was on a peaceful flight but merely off course." 1/

The question of a destructor for the aircraft was handled with the aid of Lockheed who designed a simple detonator with a three-pound charge which could be activated by the pilot as he prepared for emergency ejection from the aircraft. The question of self-destruction was a thornier problem and after the weightiest consideration by responsible project officers, a consignment of lethal ampoules was sent to each of the commanding officers of the field units along with a letter of instruction

1/ SAPC-4234, 12 March 1956. Memorandum to Project Director from [redacted] Project Security Officer.

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which read in part:

"The philosophy underlying the furnishing of these devices... is that these ampoules are to be 'made available' to the pilot just prior to the commencement of a mission over enemy territory. The individual pilot is under no obligation to carry an ampoule on his person during a mission, but he must have the opportunity of deciding on his own if he wishes to carry such a device. Even if carried, he is obviously under no compulsion to employ it if captured, though he should be advised of what treatment it is conceivable he might receive at the hands of the enemy, almost regardless of the information he is authorized to tell them or is finally compelled to reveal. However, should he decide, when first reaching enemy territory, that he does not wish to employ the device, he should be cautioned to dispose of it immediately lest its presence on his person give rise to certain suspicions about the exact nature of his mission. Again however, should he elect to try to conceal the ampoule, it is well to indicate that it can be swallowed whole and passed through the system without harm, or it can be secreted elsewhere in the body, though it is likely that in a thorough search even such a place of concealment would be discovered." 1/

Later, when operations began, the furnishing of an ampoule was added to the mission pre-flight check list, the Commanding Officer or his Deputy being the responsible agents, and the pilot made his own choice to carry one, or not, at that point. Most of the emergency planning, however, was done on the premise that the pilot would be captured alive by the enemy, despite the harsher alternative presented by Security.

1/ TS-143454, 2 May 1956. Letter to Commanding Officer, Detachment A, from the Project Director.

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When the Commanding Officer of Detachment A in March 1956 suggested giving his pilots broad intelligence briefings on the order of a National Intelligence Estimate, he was advised by the Director of Operations, then Col. A. M. "Mike" Welsh, that no intelligence should be passed to pilots except tactical intelligence such as defensive capabilities which might affect their missions. Col. Welsh was in favor of adopting a liberal policy, allowing the pilot to tell all he knew in the event of capture in order to obtain preferential treatment from the enemy. This, however, meant insuring that the pilot did not have knowledge of matters which should be kept from the enemy.

The following preliminary conclusions in the area of contingency planning were reached by the Project Director in agreement with his staff, in March 1956:

"The pilots' equipment, preparation, and briefing should be designed to contribute in every way possible to high morale without increasing the grave dangers inherent in the loss of a U-2 behind enemy lines. Specific preparations for this contingency should be made.

"a. Pilots should be briefed on escape and evasion methods and if they desire arrangements should be made for escape and evasion training either at Watertown [redacted] /This was carried out with the pilots of all three detachments [redacted] by Office of Training staff."/

"b. Pilots should be given the best possible survival equipment subject to weight and space limitation; the

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personal equipment will be sterilized with respect to USAF markings or identification.

"c. The pilot will be informed about the 'L' pill and permitted to carry one if he so desires but will receive no firm instructions to use it or not to use it.

"d. The pilot will be told he is perfectly free to tell the full truth about his mission with the exception of understating moderately the performance of the aircraft. He will be advised to represent himself as a civilian, to admit previous Air Force affiliation, to current CIA employment, and to make no attempt to deny the nature of his mission.

"e. Such briefing would leave the pilot the greatest possible freedom, by responding to interrogation to safeguard himself from extreme treatment." 1/

An instruction for pilots concerning their action in the event of an emergency was drafted by Colonel Welsh based largely on the above conclusions and later cleared with the DDCI and the Air Force. This instruction was issued as Operations Policy Letter No. 6 on 15 May 1956 at the time Detachment A was deploying to the field, and was in effect when Francis Gary Powers went down in Russia. (See Annex 68 for text.) After that event and the subsequent Russian revelations of information obtained from their prisoner through interrogation and presented at his trial, Operations Policy Letter No. 6 was revised to

1/ SAPC-4082, 22 March 1956. Memorandum to Staff from Project Director, Subject: Planning for Contingency of Loss of a U-2.

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place greater stress on the absolute necessity for destruction of the aircraft in an emergency, and to limit the information which a captured pilot should volunteer. This revised version was issued in December 1960.

In 1961 a program was begun in coordination with the Office of Training, Security and Medical Staff, during which the IDEALIST and OXCART pilots received risk-of-capture training and were assessed individually for their ability to withstand interrogation. Specific individual training was developed and conducted on a continuing basis. As an outgrowth of this program, Headquarters Directive 50-1055-24, meant to replace Operations Policy Letter No. 6, was drafted in March 1964, subsequently redrafted several times and finally passed forward for approval in October 1964 by Col. Ledford. The new directive was based on the theory that "resistance in successive positions" is more effective for a captive than attempted rigid adherence to a doctrine such as giving name, rank and serial number. The "successive positions" were defined and permissible and impermissible disclosures by the pilot were set forth.

The Executive Director/Comptroller (Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick) expressed disagreement with permitting a captive pilot to admit his

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CIA affiliation; the D/P (Mr. Helms) on the other hand recommended that the pilot be instructed to give only name, date and place of birth, address, and CIA affiliation, and disagreed with the idea of imposing a complicated set of instructions regarding fall-back positions upon the pilot who would, finding himself in hostile hands, already be under psychological pressure. The draft directive was returned to OSA in January for rewrite.

Months later, after many conferences, a meeting chaired by Col. Lawrence K. White produced an agreed version which set forth clearly permissible and impermissible disclosures and placed fewer demands upon a captive's judgment than did the former policy letter. It was dated October 1965 and was approved on 15 November 1965 by Mr. Helms (who at that time had succeeded to the position of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. The directive was entitled "Policy Governing Conduct of Resistance to Interrogation Training, and Guidance for Project Pilots Forced Down in Hostile Territory". It was presented to the National Security Council's "Special Group" on 26 November 1965 and approved by that group on 16 December 1965. (See Annex 69 for text.) As of the end of 1968 this directive, fortunately, had not needed to be invoked.

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In August 1960, the Project Security Officer, Mr. William J. Cotter, recommended terminating all contract pilots and recruiting and training six or eight new ones from SAC. Mr. Cunningham agreed and said he felt it was asking for trouble to move ahead with plans for Soviet overflights or even peripheral collection flights using the present group. Col. Beerli concurred in this recommendation. However, since the proposed renewal of overflights from Detachment B did not receive approval, the question of risking overflights with the currently assigned pilots became academic.

In late 1961, when U-2 operations were being conducted over Cuba and in the Far East, Mr. Cotter brought the matter up again in a memorandum to the Acting Chief, DPD:

"In view of the continued operational activity in IDEALIST and taking cognizance of the probability that this activity will continue for some time in the future, it is the strong opinion of this Branch that immediate action be initiated to recruit and train new pilots.

"The present staff of pilots available to DPD possess a wealth of knowledge concerning a broad spectrum of Agency intelligence activities. Although it must be assumed that certain of this information is already available to the RIS as a result of the 1 May incident, I suggest that grievous damage would result from additional information or confirmatory data which would be extracted from one of the present pilots in the event he were lost to the opposition.

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"I recognize the technical qualifications of the present staff of pilots is exceptional. I suggest, however, that we consider spotting, recruiting, processing and training, gradually, replacements for the present staff in the interests of sound security." 1/

In June 1963, one additional pilot was recruited and in June 1964 two more were recruited, all three from the U. S. Air Force. In November 1964, one U. S. Navy pilot was added, and one of the British pilots from the JACKSON contingent at Detachment G resigned his commission in the R. A. F. and was hired as a contract pilot in his status of resident alien. As of July 1967, four out of the original thirty pilots recruited in 1955-56 were still with Detachment G, each having served with the program for eleven years. (See Annex 70 for a listing of U-2 pilots, 1956-1967).

1/ DPD-5485-61, 8 September 1961. Memorandum for AC/DPD from Chief, DPD Security Staff.

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Aeromedical Support and Pilot Personal Equipment

At an early meeting of the Project Staff in January 1955, Col. Ritland recommended that the project seek the advice and assistance of a top-notch aeromedical expert as soon as possible. There were a wide variety of physical and psychological problems involved in long-range, high altitude flights which must be explored. No one had flown above 50,000 feet for much more than an hour or two and at 60,000 feet for only minutes. He recommended that Dr. Randolph Lovelace of the Lovelace Clinic in Albuquerque be consulted, since he was the outstanding expert in the country, having been involved in most of the Air Force work in the aeromedical field.

It was discovered that Dr. Lovelace was out of the Air Force picture at the moment and was concentrating on developing his clinic. Mr. Trevor Gardner was anxious for the aeromedical work on the project to begin immediately and recommended that Brig. Gen. Don D. Flickinger, Commander of the Office of Scientific Research of ARDC, be chosen to head up this work. Approval was given by Gen. Putt and Gen. Thomas Power (then Commander of ARDC) for Gen. Flickinger's participation in the program and for the use of all available Air Force facilities and research and development in the aeromedical field.

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General Flickinger immediately began to look for candidates with the special skills and training required to support the project, and to monitor closely the development and testing of pilot personal equipment. At the first suppliers' meeting in April 1955, he reported that the partial pressure suit planned for use by the U-2 pilots had proven effective for periods from 30 minutes to seven hours at 50,000 feet after descending from 65,000, depending on the condition of the pilot. The full pressure suit being developed by the Air Force was under high priority study and might possibly be ready by September 1956.

Early personnel nominations by Gen. Flickinger were:

Major George Steinkamp, Project Medical Officer; and Major Leo V. Knauber, Physiological Training Officer, who was largely instrumental in setting up the aeromedical facility at Watertown between July and September 1955. Lt. Col. Philip Maher of the Human Factors Division of the Air Force Surgeon General's Office assisted Gen. Flickinger in meeting project requirements, including furnishing medical supplies and training aids, monitoring the equipment contracts, and securing Air Force technicians to man the test site and the detachments.

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Medical services at the test site during the first six weeks of operation (including assignment of a doctor to the base until the arrival of the Project Flight Surgeon in mid-September 1955) were furnished by the Lovelace Clinic under an existing Air Force contract. At the end of 1955 the project contracted directly with Lovelace for its services, principally for pilot examinations, but also for continuing medical support for Watertown when needed. Reports on pilot examinations and Lovelace recommendations thereon were sent to the Project Flight Surgeon at Washington Headquarters and it was then his responsibility to secure appropriate review and approval by General Flickinger on behalf of the Air Force, and by the CIA Medical Staff. The area of responsibility of the Agency Medical Staff with regard to passing on these examinations and the criteria on which they were based, and with regard to other medical aspects of the project, was not clearly understood by the Project Flight Surgeon (Maj. Steinkamp), and it was well into 1956 before proper liaison and coordination between the Agency Medical Staff (represented by Dr. Frank Gibson), and Maj. Steinkamp was established.

Procedures were set up at the beginning of the training period at Watertown for interrogation of the U-2 pilots immediately following

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each flight. Interrogations were conducted by the assigned Flight Surgeon and/or Aviation Physiologist who were skilled in extracting the information relating to personal equipment and to the physical and psychological reactions of the pilots, which was needed for improving equipment and for establishing rules and procedures for safety of flight.

As with other critical categories of Air Force personnel, medical officers and NCO technicians were very difficult to obtain and late in arriving. To add to the medical staff shortage, the Air Force personal equipment specialist at Watertown was killed in the Mount Charleston crash of the MATS shuttle in November 1955, and the physiological training officer, Major Knauber, suffered a heart attack in the early spring of 1956 and had to be withdrawn from participation in the project. A contract for the services of a personal equipment technician for each base was written with the Firewel Company (which subcontracted for the manufacture of the pressure suit and auxiliary equipment), but these technicians had to be recruited and trained and were not available in the early training phase. A full-time Flight Surgeon for Watertown, Maj. James Deuel, reported for duty the first of June 1956, by which time the medical and equipment problems were beginning to smooth out.

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While certain parts of the pilots' personal equipment existed in Air Force stocks, modifications to the pressure suit and other components were deemed necessary for the environment to be experienced in the U-2, and therefore a period of development and testing of these items of equipment had to be undertaken along with the aircraft and systems testing. At the end of March 1956, Col. Ritland noted that although the history of personal equipment had been poor at the start, continuous improvement had been made in each item, and he anticipated that by the time Detachment B deployed in August 1956, this equipment would be standardized and available in sufficient quantities to meet project needs. The situation did improve through the summer of 1956 so that the Project Flight Surgeon was able to report in October that the personal equipment situation was in excellent shape both supply-wise and in operation, as was also the level of training of detachment personnel.

In the fall of 1957 when the Project Flight Surgeon's two year tour finished, it was agreed that a replacement at Headquarters would not be required, since the aeromedical needs of the two remaining field detachments and the test group which had moved to Edwards were being met routinely. General Flickinger was more easily available to the

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Project Headquarters staff for advice and consultation since A RDC Headquarters had moved meanwhile from Baltimore to Andrews Air Force Base on the outskirts of Washington. Therefore the Headquarters Medical Officer slot was cancelled and a Physiological Training Officer was assigned to Headquarters with the main task of monitoring the development and testing of personal equipment and establishing proper procedures for training the pilots in the use thereof. This policy has continued to the present.

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ANNEX 66

(Terms of Original Contract Signed by U-2 Pilots January 1956)
As Amended in March 1956

THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT as represented by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY wishes to employ you in connection with an activity which has been discussed with you in some detail. The relationship created under this contract is classified in accordance with Agency regulations and is information affecting the national defense within the meaning of Sections 793 and 794 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

1. For the duration of this contract your services will be reserved exclusively for Agency activities, and you will make yourself available for these activities at such times and places as the Agency may direct.

2. You will carry out such instructions as the Agency may from time to time impart to you. Normally, you will receive instructions through your immediate superior, who is also your normal channel for communication with the Agency. You will be kept fully informed as to whom this official will be.

3. For these services you will be paid monthly for the duration of this contract in accordance with the following scale:

a. General Duty Status - \$775.00 per month.

This status will be in effect until reporting for duty at the first site and will be in effect in the event the activities contemplated are discontinued.

b. Operational Duty Status - \$1,500.00 per month.

This status will begin upon first arrival at the initial site and will continue so long as you are engaged in the contemplated activities whether in this country or elsewhere and in the event the activities contemplated are discontinued, you will be continued in an operational duty status for a period of ninety (90) days. Also, in the event you are unable by reason of misconduct or refuse without reasonable cause to engage in the contemplated activities, you will revert to general duty status.

c. In addition to the above amounts there will be credited on the books of this Agency an amount of \$500.00 for each month of service in an operational duty status overseas. At your option,

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in lieu of crediting this amount on the books, a \$500.00 Series G United States Savings Bond will be purchased in your name. However, this amount or the bonds will not be paid or delivered to you until after the first day of the calendar year following the performance of service for which these amounts or bonds are applicable. Fractional portions of a month will be prorated on the basis of a 30-day month.

d. In addition, an amount calculated at the rate of \$500.00 per month for each month of satisfactory service in an operational duty status overseas will be paid to you provided your services are not terminated for cause based on your misconduct or abandonment of your obligations hereunder. This amount will be paid within a three (3) year period from termination of this contract and the specific date of payment will be at the sole discretion of the Agency. Fractional portions of a month will be prorated on the basis of a 30-day month.

e. Compensation currently payable will be paid on or about the tenth day of the month succeeding the month in which earned. Payment shall be made in a manner requested by you in writing provided the method is acceptable to the Agency.

(1) From compensation payable to you there will be deducted appropriate amounts for withholding for Federal income tax purposes and Social Security deductions.

(2) You will file annual Federal income tax returns in a manner approved by this Agency.

f. The determinations required under this paragraph will normally be made by your immediate superior and in any event final determination will be at the sole discretion of the Agency.

4. In addition to the compensation otherwise provided in this contract, you will be provided:

a. Quarters and meals during the entire period of your service while at locations designated by the Agency except while in a leave status, or in a general duty status in the continental United States.

b. Transportation including authorized travel expenses in substantial compliance with Agency regulations to and from areas of Agency activities or to and from such other points when the travel is directed and approved by the Agency.

c. Upon expiration or termination of this agreement, transportation to point of hire or such other point as may be mutually agreed.

d. Thirty (30) calendar days leave annually, accruing at the rate of 2-1/2 calendar days per month. Such leave will be accrued and credited in accordance with the duty status for the period in which earned. No more than 60 days leave may be accumulated. While on leave, you will continue to accrue leave and will be paid in accordance with your status immediately prior to commencement of leave. When leave accrued in one duty status is exhausted, additional leave taken will be charged against and paid at the rate of leave accrued in the other duty status. Unused leave standing to your credit at time of expiration or termination of this contract will be paid for on a lump-sum basis at the rate of earnings at the time of accrual, i. e., leave earned while in an operational duty status will be paid at the operational duty status rate of pay, and leave earned in a general duty status will be paid at that rate. All leave will be calculated on the basis of a 30-day month.

e. Transportation to and from such leave area as the Agency may approve.

f. Payment of medical costs and compensation for disability, injury or death incurred in performance of duty, to the extent provided by any applicable United States' laws or regulations.

g. In the event of sickness or injury to yourself not covered under this contract, you will be provided with the following:

(1) For minor injuries, sickness, and other medical and dental care, not requiring hospitalization, you will receive the office services of a doctor, selected by the Agency, free of charge, and necessary transportation in connection therewith, or, as deemed necessary and appropriate, medical care and treatment from appropriate facilities and doctors as may be approved by the Agency.

(2) The cost of hospitalization, or other specialized medical care for sickness or injury not due to your own misconduct, and necessary transportation in connection therewith.

h. In the event you are determined to be missing in service, benefits will be paid in accordance with Agency regulations on this subject which are in general accord with the principles of the Missing Persons Act.

5. The Agency has made arrangements whereby you will be eligible to secure certain life insurance and the Agency will pay the premiums on this life insurance. Payment of benefits under these various insurance programs will be in accordance with the laws, regulations and policies applicable in each case. The specific programs are as follows:

a. The life insurance plan underwritten by the United Benefit Life Insurance Company of Omaha, Nebraska. The face amount of this policy will be \$15,000.00.

b. The term life insurance policy available through the War Agencies Employees Protective Association which program is underwritten by the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States. The face amount of this policy is \$15,000.00.

c. The Federal Employees Group Life Insurance program which was authorized by Public Law 598, approved 17 August 1954. The face amount of this policy will be established at the next higher multiple of \$1,000.00 which is in excess of the current annual compensation rate.

Appropriate application forms and designation of beneficiaries will be required to be executed. The settlement of any claims arising under these policies will be initiated by the Agency without the requirement that the beneficiaries initiate action. The beneficiaries, of course, will be required to execute appropriate documents which documents will be transmitted to the beneficiaries by the Agency through appropriate means.

6. You hereby agree to make no claim for any compensation, benefit or service, other than those provided in this contract.

7. The duration of this contract will be two (2) years from the effective date hereof except that it may be terminated by the Agency at any time for cause based on your misconduct, wilful failure to follow

instructions, or abandonment of your obligations under this contract. In the event the activities contemplated are discontinued you may apply for reinstatement in your previous employment provided the Agency approves such application. If you do not apply for reinstatement under such circumstances this contract shall terminate sixty (60) days after the conclusion of the prescribed reinstatement period. In addition, if the Agency approves, you may apply for reinstatement in your previous employment at any time. In any event, this contract shall terminate as of the date of your reinstatement. Further, this contract may also be terminated at any time by mutual agreement in which case all benefits accrued to the date of termination will be paid you.

8. The effective date of this agreement is _____.

9. Due to the security considerations surrounding this contract and your activities, disputes or disagreements as to the terms of the contract are not subject to appeal to any other instrumentality of the United States Government and the final authority shall vest with this Agency.

10. You hereby agree never to disclose either the fact of this relationship or any information which you may acquire as a result thereof to any person, except as the Agency may authorize in writing. This clause imposes an obligation on you which shall survive the termination of this contract.

11. Your signature hereon will constitute acceptance of the terms of this agreement.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

By _____

ACCEPTED:

WITNESS:

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ANNEX 67

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(Terms of Pilot Contract as Amended Effective 1 January 1961)

Mr. _____

Dear Mr. _____:

Reference is made to your agreement with the United States Government, as represented by the Central Intelligence Agency, effective _____, as amended, a copy of which is attached hereto.

Effective _____, said agreement, as amended, is further amended as follows:

A. Paragraph 3. Delete sub-paragraphs a, b, c, d and substitute in lieu thereof the following:

"a. General Duty Status - \$1000.00 per month.

You will be placed in this status in the event your immediate supervisor determines that it is in the best interest of the contemplated activities, or in the event that you are unable by reason of lack or loss of personal proficiency in the contemplated activities, misconduct, or refusal without reasonable cause to engage in the contemplated activities, or if incapacitated as stated in paragraph 4e below, pending further decision of the Agency as to the future utilization of your services. Otherwise you will be in an:

b. Active Duty Status - (1) \$1250.00 per month.

(2) In addition, an amount calculated at the rate of \$500.00 per month for each month of satisfactory service in an Active Duty Status will be paid to you provided your services are not terminated for cause based on your misconduct or abandonment of your obligations hereunder. In the event your services are terminated for cause arising after 1 January 1961, the period of services from the commencement of this agreement to 1 January 1961 shall be considered a period of satisfactory service for the purpose of payments to be made under this sub-paragraph. The amount payable will be paid within a four (4)

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year period from the termination of this agreement and the specific date of payment will be at the sole discretion of the Agency. Fractional portions of a month will be prorated on the basis of a 30-day month. As of 1 January 1961, any amounts accrued under this agreement to 1 January 1961 will be placed in escrow by the Agency for your account and will be paid in accordance with the provisions of this section, provided however, that as to such amounts placed in escrow the conditions for payment included in the first sentence of this section shall not be applicable.

c. Bonus - \$750.00 per month.

(1) You will be paid \$250.00 for each calendar month in which you are assigned to participate in an operational mission which has as its objective the overflight of the territory of a foreign nation, or you perform an unusual task. What constitutes an unusual task will be determined by the Agency in its sole discretion. Payment under this sub-paragraph shall not exceed \$250.00 for any one calendar month.

(2) In addition to and for each bonus payment made under the above provision, there shall be concurrently credited on the books of this Agency the amount of \$500.00. At your option, in lieu of crediting this amount on the books, a \$500.00 United States Savings Bond of an appropriate type will be purchased in your name. However, this amount or the bonds will not be paid or delivered to you until after the first day of the calendar year following the performance of service for which these amounts or bonds are applicable."

B. Paragraph 4. Delete sub-paragraph d. Substitute new paragraph d as follows:

"d. Thirty (30) calendar days leave annually, accruing at the rate of two and one-half (2-1/2) calendar days per month. Monthly leave credit and accrual shall be at the following calendar day values:

General Duty Status	-	\$33.33 and 1/3 cent
Active Duty Status	-	\$58.33 and 1/3 cent
Active Duty Status		
with		
Bonus	-	\$83.33 and 1/3 cent

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While on leave, you will continue to accrue leave at the same calendar day value as you did immediately prior to commencement of leave. Leave will be charged on the same basis. All leave standing to your credit as of the effective date of this amendment will be converted to the above leave schedule with "Operational Duty Status Overseas" being equated to "Active Duty Status with Bonus", and "Operational Duty Status in the United States" being equated to "Active Duty Status". All leave will be calculated on a 30-day month. No more than ninety (90) days leave may be accumulated. Unused leave credited to your account at the time of expiration or termination of this contract will be paid for on a lump sum basis."

C. Paragraph 7. Delete paragraph 7 and substitute the following therefor:

"7. This agreement is effective as of _____ and shall continue thereafter through 31 December 1961, except that it may be terminated by the Agency at any time prior thereto for cause based on medical or other incapacitating reasons including lack or loss of personal proficiency, misconduct, willful failure to follow instructions, abandonment of the obligations under this agreement, or upon ninety (90) days actual notice. During the ninety day termination period, your Status (General Duty or Active Duty) as of the date of receipt of said notice shall remain unchanged. In the event of termination, you may apply for reinstatement in your previous employment provided the Agency approves such application. If you do not apply for reinstatement within thirty (30) days after notification of termination, this agreement shall terminate sixty (60) days after the conclusion of such prescribed thirty (30) day reinstatement period. In addition, if the Agency approves, you may apply for reinstatement in your previous employment at any time. In any event, this contract shall terminate as of the date of your reinstatement. Further, this contract may also be terminated at any time by mutual agreement in which case all benefits accrued to the date of termination will be paid you."

If the extension of the effective period of the agreement and the amendments occasioned thereby and set forth above are acceptable to you, would you indicate your acceptance at the place indicated below and return this letter and the copy of the agreement to the Contracting Officer.

ACCEPTED: _____

WITNESS: _____

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

By: _____
Special Contracting Officer

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ANNEX 68

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8 May 1956

OPERATIONS POLICY LETTER NO. 6

SUBJECT: Intelligence Briefings, Including Policy for Pilots
Forced Down in Hostile Territory

1. Purpose: The purpose of this policy letter is to furnish guidance to detachment commanders on the classified information which may be furnished to Project pilots concerning their mission, and the briefings which should be given to Project pilots on procedure and conduct to be adhered to in the event they are forced down in hostile territory. The policies set forth herein are general in nature. Specific information, as applicable, will be included in separate intelligence instructions.

2. Classified Information:

a. Generally, the classified intelligence information imparted to primary mission pilots should be limited to that information which is considered essential to the successful accomplishment of their mission. Non-essential information concerning equipment fabrication and capabilities, utilization of photography and ELINT information acquired, Project organization and personnel, etc., should be divulged only when the withholding of such information might adversely affect pilot morale and/or jeopardize the mission itself.

b. It should be stressed to the pilots during briefings that the less intelligence information they possess, consistent with mission requirements, the better it will be for them in the event of capture. For this reason it is imperative that they be limited to only such intelligence as is necessary to carry out their mission.

c. Comprehensive tactical intelligence briefings should be given to all primary mission pilots on those defensive capabilities which could directly affect their respective missions or which might enhance the possibilities of safe return to friendly territory in the event of an emergency. These briefings should include at least the following:

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- (1) Air order of battle
- (2) Radar order of battle
- (3) Anti-aircraft order of battle
- (4) Guided missile order of battle
- (5) Air escape routes
- (6) Detection, tracking and intercept capabilities
- (7) Aircraft performance and tactics

d. In addition, all primary mission pilots should be thoroughly indoctrinated in evasion and escape procedures and techniques, and conduct and procedures to be followed in the event they are forced down in hostile territory. (See paragraph 3, below)

3. Conduct and Procedures in Event of Emergency:

a. In the event of an emergency portending the loss of the aircraft behind enemy lines, the following procedures will be followed:

(1) If the emergency occurs in a populous area, prescribed procedures for demolition of the aircraft and classified equipment will be instituted. Under these conditions, bail out by the pilot will be standard procedure and a crash landing should not be attempted. These instructions, however, should not be construed as a restriction of the pilot's prerogative to attempt bail out or crash landing in neutral territory if there is a reasonable chance that such an attempt might be successful.

(2) In a remote area where the danger of immediate capture is less, a crash landing may be attempted at the option of the pilot, and the aircraft and equipment utilized for survival purposes. In this instance, the aircraft and classified equipment will be destroyed before departing the site of the crash landing.

b. After bail out or crash landing, if circumstances appear favorable, it is strongly recommended that evasion procedures and techniques be instituted immediately. Even when forced down on a deep penetration where successful evasion and ultimate return to friendly territory appears improbable, any delay in capture will be advantageous. In the final analysis, however, it will be the pilot's decision, based on the circumstances at the time, as to whether evasion will be attempted.

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c. Prior to deployment overseas, pilots will be given their choice of survival items to be included in their seat packs. Survival experts will furnish guidance on the selection of survival aids, if such assistance is desired.

d. If evasion is attempted, standard evasion techniques will be employed.

4. Conduct and Procedures in Event of Capture:

a. If evasion is not feasible and capture appears imminent, pilots should surrender without resistance and adopt a cooperative attitude toward their captors.

b. At all times while in the custody of their captors, pilots will conduct themselves with dignity and maintain a respectful attitude toward their superiors.

c. Pilots will be instructed that they are perfectly free to tell the full truth about their mission with the exception of certain specifications of the aircraft. They will be advised to represent themselves as civilians, to admit previous Air Force affiliation, to admit current CIA employment, and to make no attempt to deny the nature of their mission. They will be instructed, however, to understate moderately the performance of the aircraft in a plausible fashion. (It is recommended that stated capabilities should be decreased from actual capabilities by 10,000 feet altitude and 500 miles range). Such briefing should safeguard pilots from extreme treatment by permitting them the greatest possible latitude in responding to interrogations.

d. Pilots should make every effort to avoid discussing or divulging information given them during the tactical intelligence briefings on defensive capabilities; i. e., AOB, ROB, etc.

e. With regard to signed confessions, radio interviews, and similar activities which could be exploited for their propagandist value, all efforts must be made to resist.

5. Escape: Escape from captivity may be attempted at the discretion of the individual.

6. Policy and procedures for the conduct of pilots who are forced down in friendly or neutral territories will be as prescribed in Annex B of the Operational Order.

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ANNEX 69

~~TOP SECRET~~HEADQUARTERS DIRECTIVE
50-1055-24INTELLIGENCE
27 OCTOBER 1965POLICY GOVERNING CONDUCT OF RESISTANCE TO INTERROGATION
TRAINING AND GUIDANCE FOR PROJECT PILOTS FORCED DOWN IN
HOSTILE TERRITORY

1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this directive, which supersedes Operations Policy Letter Number Six, is to furnish guidance to the detachment commander on the classified information which may be furnished to Project pilots concerning their mission, and the briefings and training which should be given to Project pilots on procedure and conduct to be adhered to in the event they are forced down in hostile territory. The policies set forth herein are general in nature. Specific information, as applicable, will be included in separate intelligence instructions and Operations Plan Intelligence annexes.

2. CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

a. Generally, the classified intelligence information imparted to primary mission pilots must be limited to that information which is considered essential to the successful accomplishment of their mission. Non-essential information concerning equipment fabrication and capabilities utilization of photography and ELINT information acquired, Project organization and personnel, etc., will not be divulged.

b. It should be stressed to pilots immediately upon recruitment and in subsequent briefings that in the national interest, and in their own interest, it is desirable that the technical, operational, and intelligence information they possess be held to the absolute minimum consistent with mission requirements.

It is imperative that they be limited to only such intelligence as is necessary to carry out their mission.

c. Tactical intelligence briefings should be given to all primary mission pilots on those defensive capabilities which would directly affect their respective missions or which might enhance the possibility of safe return to friendly territory in the event of an emergency.

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d. Primary mission pilots should be thoroughly indoctrinated in evasion and escape procedures and techniques, and conduct in hostile territory. (See paragraph 4, below)

3. INFORMATION TO BE WITHHELD FROM PILOTS:

The following information has been and will continue to be withheld from Project pilots:

- a. Involvement or support of other governments;
- b. Mission approval mechanisms;
- c. Knowledge of any other non-project related CIA operations, locations or personnel;
- d. Non-project covert organizations, activities and modus operandi of CIA;
- e. Existence and accomplishments of related similar parallel reconnaissance programs;
- f. Communications network, equipment and operations.

4. CONDUCT AND PROCEDURES IN EVENT OF EMERGENCY:

a. In the event of an emergency portending the loss of the aircraft within denied territory it is of paramount importance that the pilot insure the destruction of the aircraft and its equipment to the greatest extent possible. This can best be accomplished by ejecting at a safe altitude with the expectation that the aircraft will encounter major structural damage and burning upon ground impact. The pilot would be expected to actuate destruct systems installed in electronic countermeasure systems aboard.

b. After bail-out or crash landing, evasion procedures and techniques will be instituted immediately. Even when forced down on a deep penetration where successful evasion and ultimate return to friendly territory appears improbable, any delay in capture will be advantageous.

c. Standard evasion techniques will be employed.

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5. CONDUCT AND PROCEDURES IN EVENT OF CAPTURE WITHIN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC:

a. If all attempts to evade should fail and immediate capture is inevitable, pilots should surrender without resistance.

b. At all times while in the custody of their captors, pilots will conduct themselves with dignity.

c. When interrogated by their captors, pilots will freely furnish the following information only:

- (1) Name
- (2) Date and place of birth
- (3) Address in United States
- (4) CIA affiliation (civilian)

d. Beyond information in 5. c., all queries should be met by a respectful refusal to divulge any further information.

e. It is assumed that the Communists will resort to a variety of methods and techniques in order to extract information they wish to obtain. Resistance to interrogation training includes instruction on methods and techniques of interrogation, including those common to all organizations and those specifically found in each potential target country. Emphasis should be placed on the importance of delaying any disclosures which could be exploited by hostile propagandists.

f. Disclosure of personal information: The pilot is expected to resist interrogation beyond the information set forth in 5. c. If, during the process of interrogation, the prisoner believes that his resistance to interrogation would be strengthened by adopting a different stratagem, he would make available some additional information. This new information should be wholly of a personal nature which will hopefully buy time for him and the United States Government. The individual will be assessed and instructed as to those parts of his personal life which should not be discussed. Each pilot will be made aware of the potentially dangerous

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consequences of talking about himself indiscriminately. For example, the discussion of certain emotionally loaded areas of his personal life can be exploited by a skilled interrogator to generate more emotion and thereby impair the captive's rational processes that are necessary for successful resistance. Counselling provided the pilot beforehand attempts to point out his own emotionally laden areas and to advise him on ways of avoiding them in his sessions with the interrogator. He will be further instructed to draw out allowable personal disclosures in order to give as much time as possible.

g. Disclosure of "Intelligence" information: A third group of disclosures has been chosen which would appear to the interrogators to be valuable intelligence information but which, in reality, would do little if any harm to CIA, its personnel and operations, or to the prisoner. The disclosures should be held in reserve and used as a last resort and given one at a time as reluctantly as possible. If the pilot is convinced that he must make disclosures within this group, he should preface any such disclosures with a statement that for obvious reasons he was given very little information other than what was essential for him to complete his mission. Technical data concerning our reconnaissance systems were not made available to him; he simply "pushed buttons" as he was instructed to do. In addition, throughout his association with our Project he was stringently compartmented to prevent his acquiring information that was not essential to his primary function as a pilot.

(1) Name and position of one CIA (civilian) employee who sent the pilot on the mission;

(2) Limited modus operandi of CIA as it has been exposed to the pilot, and names of a few CIA detachment personnel he has met, stressing CIA involvement not military;

(3) Limited technical information on the mission aircraft (only the information needed for pilot operation and excluding all details of construction and payload);

(4) Names of contractor firms that may be involved in the Project but excluding detailed knowledge of their contributions;

(5) Involvement of military personnel in a support role only, as associated with the overt ostensible unit mission, i. e., cover story.

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6. INFORMATION TO BE WITHHELD FROM INTERROGATORS:

The individual will be specifically instructed to resist to the limit of his ability disclosing or confirming the following:

- a. Knowledge of, or involvement in past overflights;
- b. Confirmation that the entire detachment was involved in reconnaissance operations over denied territory and specifically that military personnel were knowledgeable of this mission;
- c. Confirmation that refueling aircraft bore Air Force markings;
- d. Knowledge of any classified military operations he may have been exposed to in his Air Force career;
- e. Technical information about the mission aircraft or its systems except for those basic cockpit instructions needed to operate the vehicle.

7. CONDUCT AND PROCEDURES IN EVENT OF CAPTURE IN HOSTILE AREAS OTHER THAN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC:

- a. If all attempts to evade should fail and immediate capture is inevitable, pilots should surrender without resistance.
- b. At all times while in custody of their captors, pilots will conduct themselves with dignity.
- c. Pilots, in these circumstances, will strictly adhere to the cover story given them prior to the mission. Their cover story will be an appropriate statement which will be tailored to the circumstances of specific missions, and will be set forth in detail in the Fragmentation Order for the mission, or series of missions if applicable.
- d. Headquarters will be responsible for issuing instructions prior to each mission concerning aircraft markings, preparation of cover props, composition of survival and E&E gear, etc., to insure to the greatest possible extent that recoverable evidence is consistent with the cover story.

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8. FRIENDLY OR NEUTRAL TERRITORIES:

Policy and procedures for the conduct of pilots who are forced down in friendly or neutral territories will be as prescribed in the Operations Plan.

9. PILOT INDOCTRINATION INTO HOSTILE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS:

Every effort will be made to acquaint the pilots with procedures followed in the various hostile judicial systems under which they could be imprisoned and tried. These systems will include the USSR and Communist China as well as others to which they could be subjected. Specific training and indoctrination will involve examples of undesirable legal or propaganda effects to be expected as a result of submitting to certain demands made by the pilots captors.

10. ESCAPE:

Escape from captivity may be attempted at the discretion of the individual.

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ANNEX 70

~~TOP SECRET~~U-2 PILOTS - 1955-1967

<u>Name</u>	<u>EOD</u>	<u>Detachment</u>	<u>Termination</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Abraham, James G.	28 May 56	B	14 Oct 56	[Redacted] Returned to Air Force.
Baker, Barry H	10 July 56	C, B & G	30 June 67	Returned to Air Force and took 20-yr retirement. Awarded DFC and 1st Oak Leaf Cluster.
Barnes, James A.	13 July 56	C, B & G		With Detachment G.
Birkhead, Thomas C.	14 May 56	B & C	31 Oct 60	Returned to Air Force.
Carey, Howard	30 Mar 56	A	17 Sept 56	Killed in explosion of U-2 after take-off from Wiesbaden.
Cherbonneaux, Jas. W.	4 Oct 56	B & G		With OSA; converted to Agency Staff.
Crull, Thomas L.	31 Jul 56	C	31 Oct 60	Returned to Air Force.
Dunaway, Glendon K.	19 Jan 56	A	31 Jul 61	Returned to Air Force.
Edens, Buster E.	16 May 56	B, C & G	25 Apr 65	Killed during U-2G test flight at Edwards; bailed out, chute failed to open.
Ericson, Robert J.	25 Aug 56	C, B & G		With Detachment G.

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under statutory authority
of the Central Intelligence Agency
FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(6)

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Gorman, Arthur W.	25 Aug 1956	C	12 Dec 1956	[REDACTED]
Grace, Frank G.	13 July 1956	A	31 Aug 1956	Killed in crash at Watertown at Take-off on a night practice flight.
Grant, Bruce G.	22 January 1956	A	12 July 1956	[REDACTED] returned to Air Force; [REDACTED]
Hall, William W.	1 June 1956	B & G	23 Jan 1958	Contract terminated on mutual agreement; returned to Air Force awarded second Oak Leaf Cluster to DFC.
Jones, Edwin K.	28 May 1956	B & C	31 July 1961	Returned to Air Force.
Kemp, Russell W., Jr.	25 Aug 1956	C	11 June 1957	[REDACTED] returned to Air Force.
Knutson, Martin A.	12 January 1956	A, B & G		With Detachment G.
Kratt, Jacob, Jr.	21 January 1956	A & C	31 July 1961	Returned to Air Force.

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FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(6)

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McMurray, William H.	13 May 1956	B & C	31 Oct 1960	Returned to Air Force.
Overstreet, Carl K.	9 Jan. 1956	A	8 Jan 1958	Returned to Air Force; awarded DFC.
Powers, Francis G.	14 May 1956	B	6 Oct 1962	Shot down by Russians 1 May 1960 near Sverdlovsk. After release and return to States, opted accept employment with Lockheed as test pilot.
Rand, Albert J.	31 July 1956	C, B & G		With Detachment G.
Rose, Wilburn S.	15 April 1956	A	15 May 1956	Killed in training accident at Watertown.
Rudd, Walter L.	31 July 1956	C	31 October 1960	Returned to Air Force.
Shinn, John C.	31 July 1956	C & B	31 October 1960	Returned to Air Force.
Smiley, Albert B.	25 August 1956	A	4 June 1957	Returned to Air Force; awarded 3rd Oak Leaf Cluster to DFC.
Stockman, Hervey S.	21 Jan 1956	A	20 Jan 1958	Returned to Air Force, awarded 1st Oak Leaf Cluster to DFC.
Strickland, Frank L.	31 July 1956	C	29 Oct 1956	<div data-bbox="1166 968 1559 1059" style="border: 1px solid black; width: 242px; height: 43px; display: inline-block;"></div> returned to Air Force.

Withheld from public release
under statutory authority
of the Central Intelligence Agency
FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(6)

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under statutory authority
of the Central Intelligence Agency
FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(6)

Snider, Sammy V. C.	16 May 1956	B & C	31 October 1960	Returned to Air Force.
Vito, Carmine A.	10 January 1956	A, []	18 April 1960	[]

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

[]
partici-
pated in Indonesian over-
flight program
Returned to Air Force.

The following pilots were recruited subsequent to the initial thirty, listed above.

Bedford, James R., Jr.	27 June 1963	G	Recruited from Air Force.
Hall, Robert E.	24 June 1964	G	Recruited from Air Force.
McMurtry, Thomas C.	20 November 1964	G	Recruited from Navy.
Schmarr, Daniel W.	24 June 1964	G	Recruited from Air Force.
Webster, Ivor B.	16 November 1964	G	Former RAF (JACKSON) hired as resident alien.

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CHAPTER XI. DETACHMENT A.

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

Detachment A - Officer Cadre

Col. Frederic E. McCoy, Commanding Officer (Sept. 1955-June 1957)

- [Redacted]
- Lt. Col. Elmer Gould, Materiel Officer
- Maj. Philip Karas, Operations Officer
- Maj. George K. Reberdy, Medical Officer
- Maj. John T. Whitescarver, Intelligence Officer
- Maj. Fred W. Pope, Weather Officer
- Maj. Delbert E. Eversole, Pilot AOB, Intelligence Officer
- Maj. Henry H. Spann, Pilot AOB
- Maj. Samuel J. Cox, Jr., Photo Navigator
- Capt. Edward S. Majeski, Photo Navigator
- Capt. Russell E. Johnson, Physiological Training Officer

[Redacted]

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

U-2 Pilots:

- Howard Carey (killed on local training flight in Germany, 17 Sept 1956)
- Glendon K. Dunaway
- Frank G. Grace (killed on night training flight, Watertown, 31 Aug 1956)
- Bruce G. Grant [Redacted]
- Martin A. Knutson
- Jacob Kratt, Jr.
- Carl K. Overstreet
- Wilburn S. Rose (killed in training accident at Watertown, 15 May 1956)
- Albert B. Smiley
- Hervey S. Stockman
- Carmine A. Vito

Withheld from public release
under statutory authority
of the Central Intelligence Agency.
FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(6)

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CHAPTER XI. DETACHMENT A

Organization, Manning and Training of First Field Unit

On 7 September 1955, General Orders No. 1 of the 1007th Air Intelligence Service Group, HEDCOM, USAF, announced the designation and organization of Project Squadron Provisional, with subordinate units, Flights A, B C and D, "for the purpose of providing an organizational structure, operating units, and command channels for the USAF elements of a classified project". These were the original CIA cover units to which Air Force officers and enlisted men were assigned when selected to staff the headquarters and field units of AQUATONE.

Headquarters, USAF, proposed and CIA accepted as nominee for Commanding Officer of Flight A Colonel Frederic E. McCoy who, upon reporting to Project Headquarters in September 1955 was almost immediately sent to the domestic training base in Nevada, where in addition to building his detachment "from scratch" he was required to act as Base Commander until the nominee for that position arrived on board. He was thus thrown into a command position over a heterogeneous group in the field before he had enough time at Headquarters to absorb the flavor of the project and understand the philosophy behind its joint military/civilian nature.

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Col. McCoy's first concern, the build-up of his detachment cadre, was hampered by shortages of personnel and delays in reporting dates of those assigned. He advised Headquarters at the beginning of December 1955 that unless immediate action were taken to fill key positions, the detachment would certainly not deploy on schedule, with consequent adverse effects on the entire program. He expressed a strong desire to have an Air Force officer assigned as his Deputy rather than a civilian Executive Officer as called for by the Detachment Table of Organization. He was willing to have the administrative support officer also be designated a Deputy Commander if this were desired in order to retain for the Agency the control and liaison necessary between CIA Headquarters and the detachment in the field.

The Project Director of Administration did not concur with this suggested change in the command structure and said in a memorandum to the Project Director:

"...As I understand it, the thinking about the operational phase of the project has been that CIA would retain operational control of Detachment activities. I do not think that an overseas Detachment can be completely successful unless a large degree of autonomy is granted it, not only in its day-to-day administration, but in the actual conduct of its operational missions. If both the Detachment CO and the Deputy are of the same cloth, be it CIA or Air Force, you do not obtain that

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counterbalance and relative objectivity that initially seemed desirable..." 1/

Mr. Bissell agreed with this interpretation of the intent of the joint agreement, and an Agency staff officer, was recruited as Executive Officer for Detachment A.

The question of whether Commanding Officers of AQUATONE field detachments should be considered Chiefs of Stations or Chiefs of Bases under existing Agency Regulations was raised with the DD/S in January 1956 and it was confirmed that Chief of Station status was correct since these officers would report directly to Headquarters.

SAC Training Unit at Watertown

As a part of the Air Force support of AQUATONE, the 4070th Support Wing was activated 20 December 1955 with Headquarters at March Air Force Base, California, and with the mission of training and equipping the operational units of AQUATONE and providing support for these units in overseas theaters. Previously, in September, Col. William Yancey had been named to head the training detachment which was sent PCS to March, with TDY to the test site at Watertown for the purpose of training the three AQUATONE detachments.

1/ SAPC-2886, 9 December 1955. Memorandum to Project Director from Project Director of Administration.

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The SAC officers assigned to the training unit visited Watertown on 19 October and held discussions with Mr. C. L. Johnson and the Lockheed training pilots, and with Headquarters personnel. Suit fittings and chamber tests were set up for the next two weeks, followed by an orientation period at the Lockheed plant. The first week of November the unit began flying the U-2 under Lockheed test pilots' supervision.

Shortages were reported by Col. Yancey in mid-November including more personnel needed to maintain base aircraft and ground power equipment and to service fuel trailers; more ramp space and supply facilities; and two chase planes for the training program.

In December 1955 Col. Yancey reported further to Project Headquarters that he could not discharge his responsibility to Gen. LeMay of certifying to combat readiness of Detachment A until the detachment was assembled as a unit at Watertown Strip prior to deployment of any of its echelons overseas. Mr. Bissell agreed with this procedure

* SAC Training Unit Cadre: Col. William Yancey, Commanding Officer; Lt. Col. Philip O. Robertson; Maj. Robert E. Mullin; Maj. John DeLap; Maj. Louis A. Garvin, Capt. Louis C. Setter, Capt. John H. Meierdierck; MSGT Frederick D. Montgomery, SSGT Davis N. Sweidel, SSGT Paul W. Briest.

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and approved the augmentation of housing and other facilities required at Watertown. This action, however, took some time to accomplish.

On 7 February, Col. Berg also reported to Mr. Bissell that he had received some static from SAC Headquarters because Detachment A was not yet an entity at Watertown. The training program had been delayed almost a month due to the late arrival of the pilots, the first three beginning indoctrination and transition training in the T-33 on 11 January. Headquarters Staff meanwhile was bending every effort to fill the Detachment's T/O and get the assignees on board at the training base.

By the middle of February 1956 the majority of the Detachment A cadre and the first six contract pilots were at Watertown and with the aid of the SAC Support Unit were progressing in flight training in the U-2 and in setting up the flyaway kit and procedures for maintaining it. The operations staff were beginning to plan training flights and brief and debrief pilots under supervision of the SAC training officers. There were still personnel shortages, particularly in the materiel, personnel, and physiological training and personal equipment fields.

A Case Officer (in the Clandestine Services sense) to handle the needs of the contract pilots had been included in each detachment T/O

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(stemming from the original intention to use foreign pilots). Col. McCoy preferred, however, that his pilots be completely integrated into the unit and billeted overseas along with the other members of the group, with their administrative affairs being handled by regular unit personnel. Headquarters agreed, and returned the Detachment A Case Officer designee, to Washington for reassignment.

One difficult problem faced in organizing Detachment A was the practice of various Project Headquarters components and parent services of dealing directly with the Detachment's assigned personnel rather than going through command channels. Col. McCoy's frustration over this situation culminated in the following message to the Project Director:

"... This is a formal complaint relative to the lack of control of Detachment A personnel by the Commanding Officer caused by direct actions of other sources and channels. Request that Security, Communications and Administration be advised this is improper procedure. If such actions continue I will request withdrawal from the project. The Commanding Officer must control all personnel and materiel of his unit." 1/

Mr. Bissell immediately gave orders to Headquarters elements that once a detachment was activated at the test base, its personnel were

1/ CABLE-1743 (IN 00434), 5 April 1956.

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under control of its Commanding Officer and could not be directed by staff officers at Headquarters. The purpose of activating detachments at a training base before deployment was to cut the direct line between particular groups in the field and their Headquarters components, thus establishing the unit as a completely separate and self-sufficient entity under the immediate control of its Commanding Officer.

At the end of March 1956, cover arrangements for the overseas operational phase were negotiated with NACA and the Air Weather Service and on 29 March Detachment A was reconstituted "Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional (1st)" by authority of AWS General Order No. 7.

Selection of Base for First Operations: Early Survey of Turkish Bases

In March 1955, the Project Director outlined the operational concept of AQUATONE to Chief of Operations, DD/P, and said that rear operating bases would be needed in the U.K., Turkey and Japan, and forward staging bases probably in Pakistan or Iran, and Norway. The Chief of Operations (then Mr. Richard Felms) made two recommendations: first, that the initial and sole operational approach to any government be to the security service of that government, possibly supported by a parallel approach at the very highest level but no other

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approach should be considered through State Department or military channels; second, that the cover story generally to be used in these approaches should be that CIA is planning agent infiltration or exfiltration and will possibly take advantage of the opportunity to get incidental photographic or electronic coverage. (As a practical matter, neither of these plans turned out to be feasible once the operational stage was reached.) It was planned to have a knowledgeable person with CIA operational experience visit countries where bases would be desired and investigate the possibilities. It was tentatively agreed that regular Station (CIA) personnel would not be cut in on the project at any stage with the possible exception of Station Chiefs.^{1/} (On various occasions, due to the exigencies of the situation, this plan had to be modified in order to obtain vital assistance from Agency Stations.)

In the summer of 1955 Col. Marion C. Mixson of Headquarters Operations Staff and Mr. Gilbert Greenway of the Air Maritime Division investigated availability of bases in Europe and the Middle East, ostensibly for an Air Force project, and developed a base facilities list for future consideration.

^{1/} TS-103270, 1 March 1955. Memo for the Record by R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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On 7 October 1955, Lt. Col. Leo P. Geary, USAF (who was at that time assigned to [redacted]) began a week's survey of available bases in Turkey; after visiting Incerlik, Diyarbakir, and Batman, he reported the latter two unsuitable, but considered Incerlik (the SAC base at Adana) as satisfactory, provided a fair amount of additional construction could be accomplished before arrival of the Detachment. On the strength of Air Force support for the use of Adana, planning went ahead on the assumption that Detachment A would go to Turkey with approval being obtained as quickly as possible from the Turkish Prime Minister. It had been learned that an approach through either the Turkish Intelligence Service or the Turkish Air Force would not suffice since Menderes would have to know and approve the operation in any case. When the State Department was consulted in November 1955, however, it was recommended that the approach to Turkey be put off due to the less than cordial relations at that moment on the diplomatic front.

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A survey was made in December by Lt. Col. Geary of existing facilities in Greece, which led to a request that [redacted] approach the Greek Government to ascertain its attitude toward the use of bases at Eleusis or Neankhialos. (At the end of January 1956 the Greek

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Government gave its approval for project operations from either base, but action was postponed, on advice of the State Department, until after the upcoming Greek elections due to be held 16 February 1956.)

Approval Sought to Operate from the U. K.

During the first week of January 1956, it had been decided to approach the British for permission to operate out of a SAC base in England (by far the best choice of bases), even though the current Conservative Government and Prime Minister Eden were under heavy attack by the opposition at the time and were working toward rapprochement with the Soviets. Mr. Bissell departed on his mission on 9 January after receiving detailed guidance from Mr. Dulles and Gen. Cabell on the nature and substance of what should be said to the British. The effort was to be made throughout the talks to describe the proposed operation in such a way as to accomplish two results:

"... to emphasize the potential value to the UK and the sense of partnership with respect to the intelligence take and ... to play down the political significance and to emphasize the high probability that the majority of missions will go entirely undetected. The objective is not only to pave the way for clearance to operate from the U. K. but to minimize any sense of alarm about possible political repercussions and thus to minimize the incentive on the part of the British to try to maintain a tight control over operations." 1/

1/ TS-142937, 6 January 1956. Memo for Record by R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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On the 10th and 11th of January 1956 the special project was discussed in London with two representatives of the British Government.

Mr. Bissell's record of the conversations follows:

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"An initial approach was made in company with [redacted] to Sir John Sinclair, Chief of M-6. A parallel approach was made 24 hours later by General Wilson, Commander, Third Air Force, USAF, to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, the ranking RAF Officer in London at the time. Both men were briefed quite fully on the Project. The reason for these approaches was stated to be, in general, our wish to invite the partnership of HMG in an activity which would be of a great benefit to them as to us and, specifically, to advise them that permission would very probably be requested to operate from the U. K. It was explained to them that, although the Project was of course fully known to and approved by highest political authorities in our own Government, final and definitive permission to proceed with operations had not yet been sought. It was further said, however, that the development phase was now virtually completed and such permission would, we hoped, soon be obtained.

"In the course of the discussions, the following points were made concerning the character of the operation and the relationship of the British Government to it:

"a. The operation will not be a military one, but rather a clandestine intelligence gathering activity. It will be conducted by a mixed task force largely civilian in composition and under civilian control.

"b. The right of HMG to withdraw at any time its permission to operate from the U. K. would be clearly recognized (and is implicit in a request for permission to initiate such operations). In order to permit review of its decision from time to time, the British Government would be kept fully and continuously informed about operations undertaken from the U. K.

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"c. All raw intelligence secured through this project would be shared with the British Government, subject only to agreement on secure handling thereof. This applies to intelligence secured in operations from locations other than the U. K. as well as to that secured from operations out of the U. K. (with the possible exception of operations in the Far East).

"Both of the individuals to whom this presentation was made were advised that, although no formal request was being addressed to HMG pending final approval within our own Government, it was anticipated that this matter would be raised on the occasion of the Prime Minister's forthcoming trip to Washington. Sir John Sinclair undertook to bring the matter promptly to the attention of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs so that he and the Prime Minister would be prepared to discuss it in Washington. Sinclair made it clear that the request would have his own strong support. The Deputy Chief of the Air Staff likewise undertook to discuss the proposed operation with the Foreign Secretary and to furnish a technical opinion from the standpoint of the RAF. He, too, indicated that the project would have his enthusiastic support. Both men were advised of the extreme closeness with which knowledge of this project has been held within the U. S. Government and agreed that it should receive similar treatment in London. Among the Americans who took part in these conversations it was the consensus that the Foreign Secretary would play a central part in the final decision of the British Government, that he would probably favor the project, and that the Prime Minister would probably have strong reservations..." 1/

A meeting was to be arranged between the DCI and the Foreign Secretary during the course of the latter's visit to Washington, in order to get the reactions of the British Government, and Mr. Bissell recommended that before Prime Minister Eden and the Foreign Secretary

1/ SAPC-3455, 20 January 1956. Memorandum to DCI from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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arrived in Washington, approval should be sought from highest U. S. authority to begin the operational phase of AQUATONE, contingent upon the host government's agreement. (The latter recommendation was not acted upon since General Cabell counseled delaying the approach to the President until Detachment A was farther along the way toward a complete state of readiness.)

On 2 February 1956 the DCI met with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and the special project was discussed at length. The Foreign Secretary said he saw no objection in principle to the conduct of operations from the U. K. He emphasized that the Prime Minister would have to make the final decision and that HMG would not wish operations to be undertaken during the forthcoming visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to the U. K. It was agreed that the Foreign Secretary would take the matter up with Eden within the next few days and convey a definite answer in a week's time. If the answer were favorable, the Foreign Secretary would then be advised through the British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Roger Makins, as to specific action required of the British in order to expedite the preparation of a base in the U. K. ^{1/}

^{1/} TS-143202, 3 February 1956. Memorandum for the Record, by R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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On 8 February the DCI wrote to the Secretary of State advising him of the discussion with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and requesting that he formalize the approach to the British by transmitting a memorandum to the Foreign Secretary through Ambassador Makins. A suggested draft note to the Ambassador was supplied for the Secretary's use. It was later learned that no memorandum was given to the Ambassador when he called at the Department on 9 February--only a verbal request for information on his Government's willingness to cooperate in the special project. (See Annex 71 for text of exchange of notes between the DCI and the Secretary of State.)

No reaction was received to the U.S. query until 2 March 1956 when a rather negative and indefinite message was delivered by Ambassador Makins to the Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr. Later on that same day, a note to the British was drafted and approved by State requesting a definite answer so that, if necessary, alternate planning could go forward. It was agreed to halt construction going on under USAF direction at Lakenheath Air Base in England until definite reaction was received from the British; also to ask General Light, DCS/Materiel, USAFE, to survey available facilities in Germany for the project and develop plans for adapting

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the best available base to project needs; and, since the political climate vis-a-vis Turkey appeared to be improving, to take a fresh look at prospects for a high level approach to the Turks.

On 6 March 1956, [] announced that approval had been given by the British for the project to operate from Lakenheath. Lt. Col. William A. Wilson, the project's Deputy Chief of Logistics, who had departed from England for Germany to negotiate with USAFE for an alternate base, was called back to Lakenheath to get construction moving again, and the 7th Air Division (SAC) was advised by SAC Headquarters to render all necessary assistance in readying the base for Detachment A's deployment.

Detachment A Combat Ready

An optimistic estimate for deploying the first field unit had been set as between the 1st and 31st of March 1956, and Headquarters USAF had blocked space for 210 personnel and 160,000 pounds of cargo to be airlifted during that period. As delays in readiness occurred, the airlift requirement was rescheduled, eventually slipping to May 1st.

The quota of U-2 pilots for each detachment was set at 10, but due to the complex and time-consuming procedures for getting these pilots on board, only six had completed training by the end of March.

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A that time a total of more than 900 flying hours had been accumulated of the U-2 aircraft, and 39 of the more than 350 flights had been long-range ones of more than six hours duration. The proved performance of the aircraft at this date showed maximum altitude from [] [] range 4,150 nautical miles, and speed []

The Unit Simulated Combat Mission (USCM) tests were set for 10-14 April 1956 and an Evaluation Board appointed by the Air Force monitored and passed on each detail of the Detachment's performance. According to Col. Mixson of the project headquarters staff, who was a member of the Evaluation Board, the detachment proved its ability to carry out its assigned mission even though camera reliability was less than 100%, and engine performance was still somewhat of a problem. This latter point caused a good deal of concern and Gen. Cabell questioned whether deployment should not be postponed until engine performance was more reliable. (During the tests there was one forced landing away from home base due to a flame-out. The aircraft and pilot were recovered safely with the assistance of the Commanding General at Kirtland Air Force Base, where the emergency landing was made.)

Mr. Bissell, on 19 April wrote to Gen. Cabell and set out for his consideration the extent to which the deployment of Detachment A had

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already proceeded and the dislocation which would ensue as a result of a postponement of the move to the U. K. He made a very strong case for carrying through the scheduled deployment and then conducting a sufficient number of shake-down flights over friendly territory to prove the reliability of the system, familiarize the pilots with the operational environment and possibly test enemy radar.

On the same day Mr. Bissell's memorandum recommending the earliest possible deployment to England was written, a Russian seaman on the deck of the Soviet Cruiser Ordzhonikidze (which had brought Khrushchev and Bulganin to England on an official visit) sighted a frogman maneuvering in the water near the cruiser in Portsmouth Bay. The subsequent events of that day did not reach public attention until the 5th of May when the Soviet protest note was delivered to the British.

Deployment to England

On 24 April the DCI was informed by memorandum from Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Jacob E. Smart, that Detachment A was considered operationally ready as a result of the USAF evaluation. It was recommended that Detachment A be deployed to Lakenheath Air Base, England, during the period 29 April to 4 May 1956 in accordance with the planned schedule. Mr. Dulles concurred and added, in reply:

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"I particularly wish to express on behalf of this Agency my gratification at the highly effective support that has been rendered to this project by all components of the USAF and also at the close and cooperative relationship that has been developed between our two parent organizations. In particular, I would like to call your attention to the very great contribution that has been made to this enterprise by the SAC 4070th Support Wing under Colonel William R. Yancey, by his Director of Materiel, Colonel Herbert I. Shingler, Jr., and by the Project Office in USAF Headquarters under Colonel Russell A. Berg. Preparations for the operational phase could not possibly have been made so quickly or so well without the skillful and devoted service of the men in these two USAF components." 1/

The deployment took place on schedule with an airlift composed of eleven SAC and MATS C-124's and two MATS C-118's. By 7 May the entire group was in place at Lakenheath. The Operations Order of WRSP (I) stated its mission to be the conduct of "regular and frequent overflights of the Soviet Bloc to obtain photographic and electronic intelligence and to conduct weather and air sampling flights for cover purposes as required."

While the Detachment was settling into its new home and readying the aircraft and equipment for its primary mission, the case of the lost frogman (Commander Larry Crabb) became headline news. Certain British news media quoted "experts" as saying that British

1/ TS-143422, 1 May 1956. Memorandum for Maj. Gen. Jacob Smart from Allen W. Dulles.

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Intelligence had carried out this activity without Eden's knowledge and accusing Eden of not exercising proper control over his intelligence agencies. Criticism of the government mounted daily and the matter was brought up for debate in the House of Commons on 15 May.

On the 16th of May, Mr. Bissell arrived in London for the purpose of getting British approval to launch overflight operations. On the 17th he learned

that Prime Minister Eden had sent a message to President Eisenhower on 16 May requesting a postponement of the beginning of overflights from the U. K. The Eden note was delivered to the President on 17 May via the British Embassy and the State Department. Mr. Allen Dulles was shown the note and later dictated a summary of it from memory, as follows:

"I regret to trouble you again, but I now have new embarrassments in the frogman incident which was bad business. It was a Secret Service affair. The press is on the alert and likely to ask questions about unusual aircraft. I do not feel I can take further risk though I realize that you on your side will take all precaution. But there could be mishaps.

"In my Commons speech, I said I intended to safeguard at all costs the possibility that the discussions with B. and K. might prove to be the beginning of a beginning of better relations. This may bring a lessening of tensions and I can't

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risk impairing this prospect. I understand that high altitude sampling is the cover. If limited to this it would not wholly stultify preparations already made and would relieve me of anxieties for the time being. I am sorry to suggest a postponement and this is only asked because of my present difficulties." 1/

On 18 May during a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State Patrick Dean, Mr. Bissell mentioned that four U-2's were now at Lakenheath and were beginning their shake-down and training flights, at which news Mr. Dean became quite agitated since, he said, the Prime Minister had been informed there was only one aircraft involved. He requested that all air operations cease immediately until further notice. Col. McCoy was notified to ground all flights. On the same afternoon, however, a U-2 on a training flight had already caused an RAF fighter squadron alert which had been taken care of by the 7th Air Division with the aid of Air Vice Marshal McDonald after a very nervous few moments.

It was deemed advisable to have a statement released to the press announcing the presence of the Detachment in the U. K. in order to minimize curiosity on the part of the press and public once the new aircraft was sighted, as well as to enhance the cover story. The near

1/ Unnumbered TS Memo for the Record, 19 May 1956, Subject: Outline of Note from "A" to "E", delivered 17 May 1956.

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catastrophe of the fighter alert made this a necessity before further local flights took place. The Prime Minister agreed to a release within his imposed limitation that only high altitude sampling flights would be allowed. The approved text as released by the Air Ministry on 22 May read as follows:

"Preparations are being made to carry on a recently announced research program of the U.S. National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics in the U.K. and elsewhere in Europe with U.S. Air Force support. The program, recommended by the NACA's Gust Loads Research Panel, involves the gathering of information about clear air turbulence, convective clouds, wind shear, and the jet stream at altitudes between 50,000 and 55,000 feet.

"Although civilian personnel and aircraft will be used, the Air Weather Service of the USAF will provide operational and logistic support for the program, since the NACA has no facilities of its own outside the U.S. In the U.K. the program will be conducted from one of the RAF bases used by the USAF.

"Among the types of aircraft to be used is one recently developed by the Lockheed Aircraft Corp. for use as a high altitude test-bed. It is powered by a single jet engine, has a light wing loading, can maintain a ten-mile high altitude for several hours at a time and is therefore well suited for the gathering of data at high altitudes." 1/

Movement of Detachment A to Germany

As soon as it was known that the Prime Minister's "postponement" would be in the order of months rather than days, plans were followed

1/ TS-143476, Tab A, 25 May 1956. Memo for the Record by A. D. Marshall.

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up with General Light at USAFE Headquarters to prepare the base at Giebelstadt for a limited staging group with perhaps two aircraft rotating back to Lakenheath between operational missions for major maintenance. This arrangement was agreed at a meeting on 23 May in Frankfurt attended by Chief of Station Tracy Barnes, General Light, and General William H. Tunner of USAFE, and Mr. Bissell representing the project. However, while these plans were going forward, it was learned on 1 June that the Prime Minister was planning to request complete withdrawal of the U-2 unit from the U. K. as quickly as feasible. On 4 June 1956, the DCI sent a message to [redacted] with the following information to be passed to the British [redacted]

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"In view of the Prime Minister's determination, we will transfer AQUATONE operations to Germany or Turkey. For the interim period of approximately five weeks, we will leave one or two U-2's at Lakenheath for meteorological missions. Line of command, supply channel and communications will be established direct from Headquarters to interim operating base. Remaining activities at Lakenheath will be completely separate. . . Since we have no inclination here to seek modification of the Prime Minister's views, believe no useful purpose will be served by another letter on this subject from the Prime Minister to the President. Hope Patrick Dean can forestall another letter since these communications are apt to have the effect of hardening and formalizing positions on both sides. In any event we are abandoning all plans for utilization of Lakenheath

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other than continuing meteorological missions pending completion of facilities elsewhere." 1/

Since Giebelstadt could not be made ready quickly enough to receive the full group, on 5 June a conference in Gen. Light's office (with Cols. Mixson, McCoy and Shingler representing project interests) reached agreement that available space at Wiesbaden Air Force Base was operationally suitable and should be made the interim base for Detachment A, the move to take place beginning 11 June. Headquarters approved this plan and the movement of approximately half of the detachment was accomplished between 11 and 13 June with the all-out logistic support of USAFE Headquarters.

Approval to Begin Overflights

At a White House meeting on 28 May 1956, the DCI discussed the AQUATONE readiness for operations, among other subjects, with the President, but no decision came out of that meeting. On 1 June the DCI and General Twining met with Col. Goodpaster and left with him a paper entitled "AQUATONE Operational Plans" (see Annex 72) for the President's approval. The President had entered Walter Reed Hospital for tests and diagnosis of an abdominal ailment at the time.

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The paper outlined the present operational concept for the three U-2 detachments and the value of the intelligence which could be obtained, underlining the wasting nature of the asset and the necessity for an immediate beginning in order to reap the benefits of the temporary technical advantage now enjoyed over the Russians. On the basis of these considerations, it was proposed to proceed as follows:

"a. We are making preparations to start operations from Germany if possible by 15 June.

"b. Initially we will limit ourselves to missions over the Satellites. These fall within the pattern of operations already in progress by the Air Force.

"c. After a few such missions have been flown, we will, if all goes well, seek permission to undertake longer-range missions.

"d. In accordance with already established practices, we will not consult with the German Government with respect to our initial limited operations. Prior to the start of our long-range operations, however, we will inform Chancellor Adenauer of our plans. We will not specifically ask his approval in order to avoid placing an unwelcome responsibility on him. If, however, he raises any objections or feels these operations might prove embarrassing to him, we will consult further before embarking upon them.

"e. Depending upon the Chancellor's reaction, we will either plan to continue operations from Germany for the life of the project (as we hope) or operate only temporarily from Germany until facilities can be made ready in other locations... " 1/

1/ TS-143443/B, 31 May 1956. (See Annex 72)

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It was noted in the paper that the plan of action had the approval of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and the Secretary of State.

The President's illness, meanwhile, was diagnosed as leitis and on 9 June he underwent corrective surgery, remaining at Walter Reed Hospital until 30 June, then going to Gettysburg for a recuperation period. Having received no negative reaction from the White House regarding the proposed action, on 13 June Mr. Bissell advised the DCI:

"Our first detachment will be ready to begin operations from Wiesbaden on or about 15 June. It is planned to start with a few missions over Satellite territories in accord with your earlier decision.

"These initial operations are fully covered by the already outstanding authority granted the Air Force to conduct overflights of the Satellites, moreover they will fit within a specific Air Force program of 16 overflight missions which has been approved under that general authority by the JCS, State and CIA, and with which Commanding General USAFE has authority to proceed. It would appear no problem of additional authority arises.

"There can be no doubt that the substitution of the initial missions planned by the Detachment for some or all of those contemplated in the Air Force program will significantly reduce the political risks involved. The use of our new equipment will permit the same intelligence to be collected in fewer missions with less chance of tracking and with virtually no chance of interception. It goes without saying that this arrangement has the full approval of the Air Force and the Theater Commander for precisely these reasons.

"I propose to proceed as above unless you instruct me to the contrary." 1/

1/ SAPC-675, 13 June 1956. Memo to DCI from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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The Director agreed with the proposed course of action, and on the same day, 13 June, obtained the approval of the Secretary of State to proceed. On this authority Detachment A was notified to commence overflights of the Satellite countries as directed by Headquarters Operations Control Center.

At this point, although Detachment A was operationally ready at Wiesbaden, the opportunity was taken between 15 and 17 June to replace the P-37 engines with the newly approved P-31's in view of the higher performance attained by the P-31's.

As a result of discussions between Mr. Bissell and Gen. Cabell on the CIA side and Generals Twining and Millard Lewis on the Air Force side with regard to USAFE's requirements for Satellite photographic coverage, the following agreed position with respect to AQUATONE missions over the Satellites was conveyed to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee on 18 June:

"All concerned are in agreement that it is operationally unwise to employ the AQUATONE specialized reconnaissance system for targets of as low priority as those in the Satellites especially since these targets can be pretty safely covered by the use of other less advanced equipment. On the other hand, it is also recognized by all concerned that we have in effect been instructed by higher authority that at least a few missions limited to the Satellites must be flown in order finally to prove out our weapons system before we will be permitted to employ

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it for deep penetration missions of the USSR, the purpose for which it was designed. Accordingly, there is no disagreement as to the course of action to be followed.

"The commitment it is proposed to make to Gen. Turner is simply that during our initial missions over the Satellites and, where appropriate, on the outward and homeward legs of longer range missions, we will obtain as complete a coverage of his targets as possible. For the initial phase when missions are restricted to the Satellites, the decision has already been made, for the reasons indicated in the preceding paragraph, to incur the risks involved even though the targets are of limited importance. In the later phase when deep penetrations are in progress, it is understood that coverage of the Satellites will be strictly a by-product of operations justified by much higher priority requirements..." 1/

The first mission was flown on 20 June 1956 from Wiesbaden over Poland and return; the pilot was Carl Overstreet, the U-2 was equipped with the A-2 camera, and photographic results were classified as "good". The next day Gen. Twining made a stop-over in Germany on his way to Moscow to attend a Soviet air show and while at USAFE Headquarters he requested a stand-down of overflights for the duration of his visit to Russia. Detachment flying was therefore restricted to local test hops for another full week.

On 21 June Mr. Bissell accompanied Drs. Land and Killian to a meeting with Col. Goodpaster at which the President's policy guidelines

1/ SAPC-7029, 18 June 1956. Memorandum to Chairman, ARC, from Project Director.

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for the conduct of AQUATONE were set forth. The President was still in the hospital but he had read the "AQUATONE Operational Plans" memorandum and, in general, approved the course of action recommended. He had expressed these specific desires as to operational timing, as reported by Col. Goodpaster (see Annex 73):

a. Overflights of the Satellites could be carried out without informing Chancellor Adenauer but no overflights of the USSR should begin until the Chancellor had been informed of our plans.

b. Once missions had begun over the Soviet Union, every effort should be made to obtain the priority target coverage as quickly as possible so that the operation would not have to be continued for too long a period of time.

Immediate plans were made to brief Chancellor Adenauer so that the primary objective of the project could be undertaken as soon as possible. Gen. Cabell and Mr. Bissell proceeded to Frankfurt and on 27 June 1956, accompanied by Chief of Station Tracy Barnes and Mr. Alan P. White (acting as interpreter), went to Bonn and gave a full project briefing to the Chancellor and Foreign Minister Hans Globke. The reactions of the Chancellor were described by Mr. Barnes as "approval and enthusiastic endorsement" of the project. (Later

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at the request of the Chancellor a briefing was also given to the head of West German Intelligence (Gen. Reinhard Gehlen) on 11 July by Mr. Barnes.

First Missions over the Soviet Union

With the briefing of the German Chancellor accomplished, and Gen. Twining safely back from his trip, the weather turned unfavorable over the primary Soviet targets. Two more Satellite missions to the South were flown on 2 July covering Bulgaria and Rumania, but photographic results were only fair to poor.

On 3 July Project Headquarters cabled Detachment A that a high level decision had been made that the first two weeks operations (1 - 14 July) would be carefully reviewed on the 15th; and that clearance to continue after that would have to be renewed at short intervals. The Detachment was requested to develop maximum capability for the remaining time allowed, subject to equipment reliability and safety of flight, in order to make the best record possible.

At that point the weather cleared somewhat to the north and on the 4th of July the first mission over Russia was flown over Moscow and Leningrad. Because of heavy cloud cover over Moscow on the first mission, a second was flown on the 5th with excellent results. Three

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more missions covered the Baltic area, Kiev and Minsk (via Czechoslovakia and Hungary) on 9 July, and the Crimea/Black Sea area on the 10th.

Soviet Tracking Capability

Estimates of Russian radar and interceptor capabilities in the early planning stage of AQUATONE were: limited detection capability above 60,000 feet; little tracking capability; no aircraft interception; ground-to-air missile ceiling 50,000 feet, going to 60,000 feet in possibly a year and a half. On 30 March 1956, when Col. Ritland was leaving the project after a year as Deputy Project Director, he noted that the several sightings of the U-2 made by radar stations in the West Coast area were not consistent with intelligence forecasts to date. He felt it should be assumed that the aircraft would be picked up by unfriendly radar and plotted for short distances. He recommended that simulated maneuvers be conducted with the aid of the Air Defense Command to pin down the capability of ground radar to intercept and identify the aircraft.

The Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) of DD/I was called upon to make the recommended study (the first in a long line of vulnerability studies by OSI) and submitted their report on 28 May 1956:

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"a. Maximum Soviet radar detection ranges against the Project aircraft at elevations in excess of 55,000 feet would vary from 20 to 150 miles, depending on the radar and the manner in which it was employed. In our opinion, detection can therefore be assumed.

"b. Considering the importance of such factors as distance and speed, it is doubtful that the Soviets can achieve consistent tracking of the Project vehicle. There is certainly no available evidence from any other operation which would indicate sufficient capability on their part.

"c. No known Soviet interceptor can achieve the requisite altitude to enable successful engagement of the Project vehicle at its intended operational altitude, nor would there be much risk at any elevation above 57,000 feet. The possibility of using a stripped-down fighter or research vehicle to ram or otherwise intercept it is remote.

"d. An estimate of the risk from Soviet guided missiles, surface-to-air or air-to-air, can not be made with great certainty. We estimate a SAM capability in the regions of Moscow and Leningrad but, from analogy with U.S. missiles, we doubt that the Soviet SAM maintains adequate stability beyond 60,000 feet to be a major interception device against the Project vehicle. We know nothing about Soviet air-to-air missiles but, considering the problems of launching at extreme altitude coupled with the difficulty of getting the launching platform in position to launch, we believe no great risk attends this mode of interception (air-to-air) versus the Project vehicle.

"e. We believe it feasible, though extremely difficult, for the Soviets to maneuver a stripped-down reconnaissance aircraft into a position from which visual or photographic surveillance can be achieved for a brief time. We believe successful reconnaissance of this type would be the result of an unlikely combination of favorable circumstances rather than solely because of successful operation of Soviet GCI. Such reconnaissance could

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only occur near the centers of Soviet aircraft experimental work (Moscow-Remenskoye and the like). " 1/

In light of paragraph 1, above, it came as a rather rude shock to some to find that on the first overflight (20 June over Poland) the U-2 was tracked from the moment it entered the Soviet orbit throughout the flight. Mr. Bissell reported to the Project Staff on 10 July that Russian radar was tracking the U-2 so consistently that they would probably be able to compute its altitude more accurately than the aircraft's own altimeter. He anticipated the possibility of a diplomatic protest and said while such a protest might not force Project activities to stop, it would certainly limit the area of operations.

Russian Protest

On 11 July 1956, Soviet Ambassador to Washington Georgi N. Zaroubin presented a protest note (see Annex 74) to Secretary of State Dulles, charging that United States "military aircraft", identified as a twin-engined bomber, had grossly violated Soviet air space on 4, 5 and 9 July with flights as deep as 200 miles inside the Soviet Union. The Secretary of State, at the instruction of the President, called for the grounding of all overflight operations immediately.

1/ TS-143485, 28 May 1956. Memorandum by OSI, "Estimate of Interceptor Capabilities".

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On 16 July, Polish Ambassador Ramuald Spasowski delivered an oral protest to Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy that jets flying at high altitudes on 4, 5, 9 and 10 July had violated Polish airspace. On 21 July the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry passed a note of protest to the American Embassy in Prague demanding that overflights of Czechoslovakia be stopped.

The reply to the Russian protest was delivered to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington on 19 July and stated that after conducting a thorough inquiry, it had been determined that no United States military aircraft could possibly have been involved in the overflights alleged by the Soviet Union. (Full text of reply is in Annex 74.)

Faced with an indefinite grounding as a result of the first protest, Mr. Bissell addressed his thoughts on the "Immediate Plans for AQUATONE" to the Director and General Cabell on 18 July, in part as follows:

"...I can not help wondering whether the purely political implications of an immediate and probably final cessation of operations in Europe have been fully considered by the Secretary of State. As you are aware, it will appear to the Soviet authorities that their protest accomplished its purpose literally within hours of its delivery. Is it really desirable to demonstrate in this way both the closeness of our control over these operations and our extreme sensitivity to a diplomatic protest even when no evidence can be adduced in its support? Do we

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wish to demonstrate again to Adenauer and Menderes, as in the case of GENETRIX, that we will not carry through projects of this sort in the face of a protest? I would think that at a minimum one or two missions should be flown over satellite territories and at least one penetration made into the USSR if only to avoid what seems to me to be disastrous political consequences of a demonstration of timidity. I recognize this is a matter for the Secretary of State. If he is not worried about the political considerations or if he believes it is futile to reopen this matter with the President, there is certainly no move that can be made from this Agency...

"With respect to the construction now in progress at Giebelstadt, I believe the Air Force should be advised that there is little prospect we will ever wish to operate from that base so they may reach a prompt decision as to the completion, modification or suspension of work now in progress there...

"Although I do not recommend any modification at this time of the decision to install a detachment at Adana as soon as that base is ready, I would like to emphasize for the record the basis of that decision. The fact of the matter is that there is very little likelihood of our being able to penetrate the USSR from the south without detection. We have already flown missions over the Crimea and have been tracked more accurately there than in Central Russia. It is no exaggeration to say that the only prospect of being able to penetrate without tracking is for flights over the Caspian Sea. Accordingly, if the President's present views remain substantially unchanged, we will never be permitted to operate from Adana. Viewed in this light, the deployment of a unit to that location can be justified only as a preparation for the contingency that the President will change his mind in a few weeks time. I suppose this can be justified on the ground that we have already spent some 75 million dollars to little purpose and we may as well spend a bit more on the off chance that things will change for the better." 1/

1/ PS-158355, 18 July 1956. Memo for DCI and DDCI from Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

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It is understandable that Mr. Bissell should have felt almost complete frustration at the turn of events for he had been responsible, more than any one man or group of men, for bringing this unique reconnaissance system to operational readiness and, by the force of his own persuasion, obtaining political approval to launch it on its mission.

From this point on in the history of the project it became a matter of selling the capability of the system in order to stay in business. A special processing center for handling the mission film payload had been set up at Eastman Kodak Company's Rochester plant and as soon as the film from the first Russian overflights arrived there and processing began, a relay of Headquarters photo-interpreters visited the center to inspect the results and clip sections of film which showed promise of the greatest intelligence value. These were blown up to make briefing boards for the daily high level expositions of the AQUATONE intelligence product. These briefings came to be known as "Lundahl's Dog and Pony Show", so-called for Mr. Arthur C. Lundahl, head of the Photo Interpretation Center (PIC, later NPIC) which was then in process of being set up to handle the exploitation of AQUATONE film. His lucid expositions of the photo intelligence obtained made him a very effective advocate for the continuance of the program. However,

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it was again Mr. Bissell, who, after this first grounding, had to carry the burden of persuading higher levels not to abandon the U-2 capability.

Detachment A Command and Morale Problems

A visit by Mr. James Cunningham to Wiesbaden during the first week of July confirmed the fact that the concept of a civilian Executive Officer as second in command of Detachment A was not working out at all. While this was partially attributable to the personality conflict between the two men involved, Mr. Cunningham felt it was more the result of Colonel McCoy's clear, stated feeling that the Air Force should take care of everything pertaining to operations and the flying of the aircraft, and Agency personnel should take care of security and other support matters, and neither side should concern itself with the affairs of the other. As a result of this attitude, the senior Agency member of the team, [redacted] was not being informed at all of the nature and progress of operations, had never been asked to sit in on a mission briefing, did not know the "target for the day" or the alternate German bases to be used in the event of an emergency.

Mr. Cunningham recommended to the Project Director that the Executive Officer be withdrawn, and asked for a ruling on whether or not the concept of command should be revised. Mr. Bissell directed that

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while the present incumbent should be withdrawn without prejudice for reassignment, the concept of command remained valid (as demonstrated by the satisfactory arrangement between the Detachment B Commander and his Executive), and that a replacement for Executive Officer at Detachment A was to be recruited immediately. (This was done, but took several months to accomplish.)

Weather and local proficiency flights were resumed at Wiesbaden after a week of inaction following the protest, but morale of the personnel was very poor and the Commanding Officer was offering no leadership and exercising very little restraint on the group's behavior either on or off base. The temporary installation at Wiesbaden was unsatisfactory for a protracted stay with crowded housing, poor messing, and other causes for grumbling. The contract pilots had time to indulge in "gripe sessions" and to draw up lists of grievances (some justified, others not), all of which had to be arbitrated back at Headquarters. The basic cause of demoralization was the stand-down and the lack of information on prospects for future activity. All travelers returning to Washington from visiting Wiesbaden brought the same story of a slackening of effort by the group to stay operationally ready.

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Future Plans for AQUATONE

A conference was held at Headquarters on 26 July to discuss AQUATONE's future prospects, those present being Mr. Bissell, Gen. Cabell and Gen. Frank Everest, Director of Operations, Headquarters, USAF. It was planned to make a joint CIA/USAF/JCS approach to the President on 15 August 1956 to request permission to resume AQUATONE overflights. Detachment B was to be deployed as planned. Pending the 15 August verdict, Detachment A would remain at Wiesbaden but plans for redeploying to the Far East would go forward on a contingency basis. Construction at Giebelstadt was to continue on an orderly, rather than a crash, basis with the intention to send Detachment C there in November.

At the end of July, Gen. Curtis LeMay, Commander of SAC, had informed Agency representatives that, recognizing the value to SAC of AQUATONE's capability, he would give his fullest support if political approval was forthcoming. He was asked to let the Joint Chiefs know of his support in order to add weight to the approach to higher authority. (It should be remembered that at this time the Air Force follow-on program for procuring U-2's to bolster SAC's reconnaissance capability was well along with sizeable sums of money committed.)

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The Project Director devoted his best efforts in early August toward setting out for the Director the strongest possible brief in support of the continuance of the program, always with the realization that the presentation to the President would require previous concurrence of the Secretary of State. The final Bissell draft of this brief was presented to Gen. Cabell for approval and, with his changes, was passed to the Director on 11 August 1956 (see Annex 75). Mr. Allen Dulles agreed to see his brother, the Secretary of State, and obtain his approval of the recommendations in the memorandum. The Project Director hoped to obtain permission for about 15 deep penetrations of the USSR to cover the highest priority targets on the approved list, but if a negative decision resulted, he proposed that the capability be used against the lower priority Chinese Communist targets, operating out of Japan.

Middle East Activity: Postponement of Further Soviet Overflights

Before a hearing could be arranged with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the Secretary departed for the London Suez Conference, and the hoped-for meeting with the President was also put off until September. As a result of the conflict in the Middle East, approval was given for coverage of the trouble spots and Detachment B, just

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arrived on base at Adana, Turkey, was told to prepare to run these missions. Col. McCoy obtained permission also for his group to join in this coverage and on 29 and 30 August Detachment A originated two flights from Wiesbaden, covering Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, refueling at Adana, and returning to Wiesbaden. The results of these flights were processed and given immediately to the British and were used by them in tactical planning in the Suez action, although their field commanders were not privy to the source of their intelligence. While coverage of the Middle East continued by both Detachments A and B, on 30 October 1956 the decision was made by higher authority to deny the British any further intelligence from this source in view of the trend of British/French action in this very touchy international situation.

On the return to Washington of Secretary Dulles, a briefing was held on 7 September with Mr. Bissell and Col. John Bridges of the USAF Intelligence Directorate briefing, and Secretary of the Air Force Donald Quarles and Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Radford, in attendance. Secretary Dulles expressed concern that any further operations from Germany would surely result in another protest from the Russians and said he would like to give further thought to the matter before any

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decision was made. Meanwhile he had to return to Europe for more conferences and during his absence an opportunity availed for a briefing of the President on 17 September.

(On the same day, the first U-2 accident at an overseas base occurred. Shortly after take-off from Wiesbaden on a training flight, the aircraft exploded in mid-air, killing the pilot, and spreading wreckage over a wide area. The President was given this information during the briefing of 17 September.)

After the briefing, the President indicated that he wished to have another meeting with the Secretary of State and General Cabell before making any decision regarding further overflights. He expressed again the feeling that as long as the Russians knew we were engaged in this activity they would feel it was intolerable and might feel they had to take some action such as hot pursuit of one of our aircraft to its base, thus creating an international crisis. Or the Russians might even consider the presence of our aircraft over their territory a preparation for war and be led to take countermeasures which might lead to war.

Despite the qualms expressed by the President, Mr. Bissell reported to his staff that the President appeared friendly and relaxed and did not appear inclined to postpone a decision of the issue beyond his next

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meeting with the Secretary of State. However, the hoped-for meeting was delayed further due to the international situation, or the absence of one or the other of the two principals from Washington.

Meanwhile the construction at Giebelstadt was completed and early in October 1956 Detachment A was relocated there with a much improved environment, including quarters, mess and security of operations. The replacement Executive Officer, [redacted] joined the group in September and found it even more demoralized than he had been warned it would be. The move to Giebelstadt brought morale up somewhat, at least temporarily.

In October 1956, the eyes of the world were on Hungary where the Freedom Fighters were being brutally subdued by Soviet troops and tanks. It was hoped that a decision in favor of further overflights of the USSR could be obtained from the President since there would be less likelihood of a Soviet protest, or if one were made, little chance of its attracting any sympathy whatever. When the Director met with the President on 15 November, however, there was still no decision on further AQUATONE activities, and the status quo continued with both Detachments A and B flying Middle East missions and an occasional Satellite overflight.

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Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

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At the beginning of April 1957, Mr. Bissell again reminded the Director of the major questions requiring answers, beyond the principal one of whether overflights of Russia would be permitted in the coming good weather period. If the Agency expected to retain the U-2 capability after the fall of 1957, he saw four possibilities:

- a. Continue at roughly the same strength.
- b. Continue at half strength and cut to two instead of three detachments.
- c. Continue at reduced scale under cover of a commercial survey company.
- d. Continue in cooperation with the Navy with one or two carrier-based units.

Decisions also had to be made on the disposition of Watertown, recruitment of replacement personnel for those whose tours were expiring; preparation of the budget for FY 1958; and establishment of requirements for Air Force (or possibly Navy) support. Mr. Bissell recommended discussing these issues with the Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Thomas White, and others of the Joint Chiefs, before seeking Presidential guidance. The meeting with the President was postponed several times and finally was held on 6 May 1957. Approval was obtained for

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a series of missions to be staged from Pakistan by Detachment B, but overflights of Russia from Germany were still considered too much of a provocation by the Secretary of State and the President.

For the first half of 1957 Detachment A flew only one operational mission (over Albania) and was occupied principally with local flights in support of the meteorological and air sampling programs. At the end of June 1957, Col. Mixson relieved Col. McCoy as Commanding Officer, and his arrival exerted quite a sobering influence on those members of the Detachment whose working and living habits had grown too lax under the previous regime.

On 20 September 1957, Detachment A was notified that its activities were to be phased out and the facility at Giebelstadt closed down in November. In October the final two operational missions approved for Detachment A were flown from Giebelstadt--one Elint mission over the Barents Sea during Soviet Navy Maneuvers, and one photographic mission over Murmansk with excellent results--a belated opportunity to demonstrate, after a year of frustration, what might have been accomplished by this group had the political climate been less unfavorable.

As a footnote to the last two missions, Norwegian radar plotted these two flights all the way back to base in Germany and as a result

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Norwegian Intelligence (Col. Evang) put pressure upon the [redacted] [redacted] to get the intelligence from these missions for his service. [redacted] authorized to offer Evang intelligence in the form of written reports, unless the Norwegians insisted on photos. The offer was made on 15 November and the Norwegians accepted the offer of a written report with appreciation, promising support for future operations if ever required.

On 5 and 6 November 1957, two U-2's took off from Giebelstadt each day and were flown via Plattsburg, N. Y., two to Edwards Air Force Base for Detachment G use, and two to Del Rio, Texas, to the SAC U-2 Wing. By 15 November, all Detachment A personnel had departed from Giebelstadt and on that day the communications link with Giebelstadt was closed and the facility turned back to the Air Force.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

8 February 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State

SUBJECT : Meeting with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd,
2 February 1956

1. On 2 February when I met with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, the first topic I discussed with him was the Special Project (AQUATONE/OILSTONE - TS) with which you are familiar. You will remember that Mr. Bissell had advised the British of this Project two weeks ago in London. At that time it was taken up with them simultaneously through Sir John Sinclair of MI-6 and the Deputy Chief of Air Staff. Both men were advised that the matter would be raised by us on the occasion of the Washington meetings. My purpose in discussing the matter with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd was to ascertain his attitude toward our provisional request that we be allowed to conduct operations under this Project from the UK.

2. Present at this meeting in addition to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd and myself were Sir Roger Makins, Mr. P. F. Hancock (Mr. Lloyd's private secretary), and Mr. Bissell. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd remembered the Project when I mentioned it to him and as we discussed it he seemed quite well informed about it. He seemed generally well disposed toward it and did not raise any objection in principle to the conduct of operations from the UK. He emphasized, however, that the Prime Minister would have to make the final decision. He explained that the Prime Minister had been told about the Project and the proposal to operate from the UK but had not been asked for a definite decision, since no formal request for permission to operate there had yet been presented to the British Government by us. He also added that his Government would not wish operations to be carried on during the forthcoming visit of the Soviet leaders to the UK.

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3. Certain specific points should be noted about the conversation.


a. At no point was any reference made to the imposition of controls or limitations on our activities by the British (in the event that they permit us to operate from the UK), although I made clear our recognition of their right to halt operations at any time and promised that they would be kept closely informed of our operations.

b. We indicated that we would share the intelligence take from any operations run out of England.

c. We told Mr. Selwyn Lloyd that his help would be needed in expediting certain modifications of existing structures that will have to be undertaken. (It was understood that we would pay for these modifications.)

4. In concluding the discussion it was agreed to proceed as follows: The Foreign Secretary promised to discuss this Project with the Prime Minister in the course of the remainder of their trip so that the latter would soon be prepared either to grant or to refuse approval in principle to the conduct of operations from the UK. Meanwhile, in order to put the matter in the proper channels, I said that I would communicate with you with a view to the transmission by you of a memorandum to Sir Roger Makins who would in turn send a message to London requesting the reaction of HMG. This message would serve both to formalize our approach and to remind Mr. Selwyn Lloyd of my conversation with him.

5. I attach herewith a draft of a note you might consider sending to Sir Roger Makins. Since our discussion of the Project was reasonably full and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd's secretary took notes on it, I do not believe it is necessary for either your communication to Sir Roger Makins or his cable to London to do more than refer to our conversation. For security reasons we would obviously prefer that no revealing reference to the Project be made in the British cable traffic. Accordingly, this draft is brief and quite sterile.



Allen W. Dulles
Director

Attachment: Draft

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PROPOSED NOTE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO SIR ROGER MAKINS

In the course of the visit to Washington of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs last week, the Director of Central Intelligence and Mr. Richard M. Bissell, jr. discussed with the latter a sensitive Project (AQUATONE/OILSTONE - TS) which will involve the collection of certain kinds of intelligence information on a much expanded scale. I understand that you participated in this conversation.

For technical reasons the operations contemplated in this Project cannot be conducted from the United States. The plan is to conduct them from several friendly countries both in Europe and the Far East. It is our earnest hope that they can start in the United Kingdom.

The purpose of this note is to ask that you ascertain through your channels the reaction of the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister to this proposal. In making this request, I wish to emphasize the real importance that is attached to this Project by the intelligence community of this Government and the benefits that will accrue to both Governments if it can be carried out successfully.

I hope the handling of the matter in this manner is in accord with the understanding that was reached in the conversation referred to above.


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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON~~TOP SECRET~~

February 9, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR The Honorable Allen W. Dulles

I raised the project referred to in your attached memorandum of February 8 with Ambassador Makins today. I asked him whether his Government was prepared to cooperate with it and what their ideas were about timing.



John Foster Dulles

Attachment:

Memorandum dated February 8,
re Meeting with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd.

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ANNEX 72

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31 May 1956

AQUATONE OPERATIONAL PLANS

1. In the light of the discussion of AQUATONE and related matters on 28 May, we have reviewed operational plans and possibilities in consultation with the Air Force. The following facts and considerations have a major bearing on our conclusions:

a. Work is going forward as rapidly as possible to prepare facilities in Turkey but these cannot be ready much before 1 August. Operations could be initiated in Germany by 15 June.

b. The six weeks from mid-June to late July that can be gained by starting operations in Germany are of especial importance because the weather is at its best and the days are longest at that time of the year. Operations over all target areas can be conducted more frequently and more productively in June and July than during the autumn and winter. These months acquire added importance from the fact that operations can be usefully conducted over northern target areas only during the summer months.

c. A second unit will be ready for deployment overseas early in August and facilities should be ready to receive it. There would not be room for both units at Adana, Turkey. In any event it is desirable to base operations at two or more locations so as to secure maximum coverage and to preserve our flexibility in the face of changing political circumstances.

d. Providing reasonably good security can be maintained locally, the operation of our equipment at a German base should involve no greater risk of compromise than its operation in England, since unauthorized persons are given the same opportunity to see it from a distance at any overseas base. Its appearance at several locations in Europe is consistent with the cover story that is being used and might help to dispel any air of mystery about the activity.

e. We are actively planning for operations in the Far East and expect shortly to select a base in that area and move forward with the preparation of any specialized facilities. However, in terms of numbers, some four-fifths of our intelligence targets in the USSR, and in terms of

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quality a higher percentage of really important targets, are accessible from Europe rather than from the Far East. Moreover, many of the Far Eastern targets have been, or can more readily be, covered by other means. It is for this reason that we propose to use the first two units in Europe and the third in the Far East.

2. The major task to which all of our preparations have been directed is the performance of long-range missions over areas hitherto inaccessible with any degree of safety. Such missions promise to yield decisively valuable intelligence obtainable in no other way. Time is of the essence in the performance of this task since the technical advantage that has been gained is only temporary and the security that cloaks it is a wasting asset. Before long, the Russians will develop the capability consistently to track and somewhat later to intercept high altitude aircraft. We must assume that they will soon have photographs of our equipment which will allow them to guess at its performance and will stimulate their efforts. Meanwhile, with the mere passage of time, the maintenance of tight security grows more difficult. Accordingly, it is our conviction that the sooner we are able to embark upon our major task the more securely it can be accomplished.

3. On the basis of the above considerations we propose to proceed as follows:

a. We are making preparations to start operations from Germany if possible by 15 June.

b. Initially we will limit ourselves to missions over the Satellites. These fall within the pattern of operations already in progress by the Air Force.

c. After a few such missions have been flown, we will, if all goes well, seek permission to undertake longer-range missions.

d. In accordance with already established practices, we will not consult with the German Government with respect to our initial limited operations. Prior to the start of our long-range operations, however, we will inform Chancellor Adenauer of our plans. We will not specifically ask his approval in order to avoid placing an unwelcome responsibility upon him. If, however, he raises any objections or feels these operations

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might prove embarrassing to him, we will consult further before embarking upon them.

e. Depending upon the Chancellor's reaction, we will either plan to continue operations from Germany for the life of the project (as we hope) or operate only temporarily from Germany until facilities can be made ready in other locations.

4. The Chief of Air Staff concurs in the above conclusions as far as they concern operational matters. (Specifically he concurs in 3 a, b, and c but makes no comments on d and e.) The Secretary of State also concurs in the above conclusions.

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ANNEX 73

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22 June 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Colonel Andrew J. Goodpaster,
Dr. James Killian and Dr. Edwin Land, 21 June 1956

1. At Dr. Killian's request I accompanied him and Dr. Land to the White House at noon on 21 June to brief Colonel Goodpaster on AQUATONE and to discuss current operations with him. No one else was present. Before the briefing was started, Colonel Goodpaster explained that he had just returned from a meeting with the President at Walter Reed Hospital and that the President had discussed AQUATONE with him. Colonel Goodpaster had with him the original copy of the memorandum entitled "AQUATONE Operational Plans" dated 31 May (copy of which is attached) which had been handed to him by the DCI and General Twining at the beginning of the month. The President had read the paper and had made a longhand notation upon it. His discussion of AQUATONE with Colonel Goodpaster had been related to the paper.

2. Colonel Goodpaster stated that the President's views were as follows:

a. In general, he approved the course of action recommended in the paper.

b. Specifically, he was entirely willing that we should operate over the satellites without informing Chancellor Adenauer about these activities but he emphasized that no longer run missions should be undertaken until the Chancellor had been told of our plans.

c. He agreed that the approach to the Chancellor should take the form recommended in the paper--that is, he should not formally be asked for his approval but merely told about the projected longrange operations, which would give him a chance to raise objections if he so desired.

3. The President, Colonel Goodpaster said, had added a general instruction in rather strong terms as to the policy to be followed in AQUATONE. This was to the effect that every effort should be made

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to obtain just as quickly as possible coverage of the high priority targets which were the real objective and justification of AQUATONE so that operations would not have to be continued for too long a period of time. I pointed out to Colonel Goodpaster that restriction of operations to the Satellites was directly inconsistent with the policy desired by the President. Goodpaster replied that in his view the President had no particular desire to restrict us to these limited operations except that he did not wish deeper penetration missions to be undertaken until after the project had been discussed with the Chancellor.

4. In concluding this phase of the conversation, I asked Colonel Goodpaster whether a correct interpretation of what he had said was that after the projected conversation with the Chancellor we are free to proceed with deep penetration overflights, provided, of course, that the Chancellor raised no objection and that our limited operations had gone well in the meanwhile. He indicated that this was his view.

5. The balance of the conversation was devoted to a rather full briefing of Colonel Goodpaster and discussion of various phases of the project primarily by Drs. Killian and Land. The main topics discussed were the following:

a. Progress of equipment, with special emphasis on the shift that has been made to the new (J-57/P-31) and more reliable engine and on the extremely high quality photography obtained in recent flights in the U.S. with the A-1 and A-2 camera configurations.

b. Present enemy interception capability, the predictable development of a higher altitude interception capability, and a consequent urgency of making use of this reconnaissance system while a clear advantage over interception still obtains.

c. Colonel Goodpaster's desire for periodic operational reports when deep penetration missions are being conducted.

d. The whole question of the position to be taken by the U.S. in the contingency of the loss of an aircraft over enemy territory. On this point I explained that arrangements of a rather pedestrian sort were being worked out with the Department of State and other interested parties. Drs. Killian and Land suggested consideration of a much bolder action by the U.S. involving admission that overflights were being

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conducted to guard against surprise attack. It was left that we would think further about this matter and perhaps suggest several alternative courses of action which would be discussed with someone in the Department of State and among which a choice could be made on short notice.

(Signed)
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Project Director

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ANNEX 74

(Text of Russian Protest: Unofficial Translation)

Embassy of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

10 July 1956

Note No. 23

The Embassy of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United States of America and, acting on instructions from the Soviet Government, has the honor to state the following:

According to precisely verified data, on July 4 of this year, at 8:18 a.m. Moscow Time, a twin-engined medium bomber of the United States Air Force appeared from the American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany and flew over the territory of the German Democratic Republic, entering the air space of the Soviet Union from the direction of the Polish People's Republic at 9:35 in the area of Grodno. The aircraft which violated the air space of the Soviet Union flew on the route Minsk, Vilnyus, Kaunas and Kaliningrad, penetrating territory of the Soviet Union to the depth of 320 kilometers and remaining over such territory for one hour and 32 minutes.

On July 5 of this year, at 7:41 Moscow Time, a twin-engine medium bomber of the United States Air Force, coming from the American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany, flew over the territory of the German Democratic Republic, and at 8:54 penetrated the air space of the Soviet Union in the area of Br est, coming from the direction of the Polish People's Republic. The aircraft violating the air frontier of the Soviet Union flew along the route Brest, Pinsk Baranovichi, Kaunas, and Kaliningrad, having penetrated Soviet territory to a depth of 150 kilometers and having remained one hour and 20 minutes over such territory. The same day another twin-engine bomber of the United States Air Force

Department of State of the
United States of America
Washington, D. C.

invaded the air space of the Soviet Union and penetrated to a significant depth over Soviet territory.

On July 9 there took place new flights of United States aircraft into the Soviet air space.

The above-mentioned violation of the air frontiers of the Soviet Union by American aircraft cannot be interpreted as other than intentional and conducted for purposes of reconnaissance.

It must be underscored that these gross violations of the air space of the Soviet Union took place at a time when, as a result of the efforts of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving governments, a definite lessening of international tensions has been achieved, when relations between governments are improving, and when mutual confidence between them is growing. Such a development of international relations is fully supported by the peoples of all countries who are vitally interested in strengthening peace.

One cannot, however, fail to recognize that reactionary circles hostile to the cause of peace in a number of countries are worried by the relaxation of international tension which has taken place. These circles do everything possible to interfere with further improvement of relations between countries and the creation of mutual trust among them. Among such attempts is the said gross violation by the American Air Force of the air space of the Soviet Union, which consistently carries out a policy of strengthening peace and broadening businesslike cooperation with all countries, including the United States of America.

In this connection, the fact attracts attention that the said violations of the air frontier of the Soviet Union by American aircraft coincided with the stay of General Twining, U. S. Air Force Chief of Staff, in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Soviet Government energetically protests to the Government of the United States against such gross violation of the air space of the Soviet Union by American military aircraft and considers this violation as an intentional act of certain circles in the United States, planned to aggravate relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

Calling the attention of the Government of the United States to the inadmissibility of such violations of the air space of the Soviet Union by American aircraft, the Soviet Government states that all responsibility for possible consequences of such violations rests with the Government of the United States.

The Soviet Government expects that steps will be taken by the Government of the United States to punish those guilty for the said violations and to prevent such violations in the future.

Washington, D. C.
July 10, 1956

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

July 19, 1956

No. 398

FOR RELEASE AT 7:00 P.M., E.D.T., THURSDAY, JULY 19, 1956.
Not to be previously published, quoted from or used in any way.

UNITED STATES REPLY TO SOVIET NOTE OF JULY 10
ALLEGING VIOLATIONS OF SOVIET TERRITORY BY UNITED STATES AIRCRAFT

Following is the text of a note delivered to the Soviet Union today. It is in reply to the Soviet note of July 10, 1956 alleging violations of Soviet territory by United States Air Force twin-engine medium bombers:

The Department of State has the honor to inform the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that the latter's note no. 23 of July 10, 1956 alleging violations of Soviet territory by United States Air Force twin-engine medium bombers coming from Western Germany, has received the most serious consideration of the United States Government. It is noted that the Soviet Government's note refers to "the American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany". Attention is called to the fact that there is no longer an American Zone of Occupation in Western Germany. Presumably, the reference is to the Federal Republic of Germany.

A thorough inquiry has been conducted and it has been determined that no United States military planes based, or flying, in or adjacent to the European area at the time of the alleged overflights could possibly have strayed, as alleged, so far from their known flight plans, which carefully exclude such overflights as the Soviet Note alleges. Therefore the statement of the Government of the Soviet Union is in error.

The Department of State at the same time feels obliged to comment on the accompanying statements in the Soviet Embassy's note implying a plot to hinder the improvement of international relations and insinuating that the alleged American Air Force flights might have been arranged by General Twining in Germany, following his visit to the Soviet Union. These remarks, which are as obviously out of place as they are unwarranted, indeed of themselves have the effect of hindering the improvement of international relations.

Department of State,
Washington, July 19, 1956.

(Text of Russian Protest: Unofficial Translation)

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It must be underscored that these gross violations of the air space of the Soviet Union took place at a time when, as a result of the efforts of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving governments, a definite lessening of international tensions has been achieved, when relations between governments are improving, and when mutual confidence between them is growing. Such a development of international relations is fully supported by the peoples of all countries who are vitally interested in strengthening peace.

One cannot, however, fail to recognize that reactionary circles hostile to the cause of peace in a number of countries are worried by the relaxation of international tension which has taken place. These circles do everything possible to interfere with further improvement of relations between countries and the creation of mutual trust among them. Among such attempts is the said gross violation by the American Air Force of the air space of the Soviet Union, which consistently carries out a policy of strengthening peace and broadening businesslike cooperation with all countries, including the United States of America.

In this connection, the fact attracts attention that the said violations of the air frontier of the Soviet Union by American aircraft coincided with the stay of General Twining, U. S. Air Force Chief of Staff, in the Federal Republic of Germany.

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The Soviet Government expects that steps will be taken by the Government of the United States to punish those guilty for the said violations and to prevent such violations in the future.

Washington, D. C.
July 10, 1956 .

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

July 19, 1956

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FOR RELEASE AT 7:00 P.M., E.D.T., THURSDAY, JULY 19, 1956.
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A thorough inquiry has been conducted and it has been determined that no United States military planes based, or flying, in or adjacent to the European area at the time of the alleged overflights could possibly have strayed, as alleged, so far from their known flight plans, which carefully exclude such overflights as the Soviet Note alleges. Therefore the statement of the Government of the Soviet Union is in error.

The Department of State at the same time feels obliged to comment on the accompanying statements in the Soviet Embassy's note implying a plot to hinder the improvement of international relations and insinuating that the alleged American Air Force flights might have been arranged by General Twining in Germany, following his visit to the Soviet Union. These remarks, which are as obviously out of place as they are unwarranted, indeed of themselves have the effect of hindering the improvement of international relations.

Department of State,
Washington, July 19, 1956.

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ANNEX 75

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8 August 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR ; Director of Central Intelligence *

SUBJECT : Decision on Project AQUATONE

1. Present Status: Reflecting the discussions and decisions of the past three weeks since AQUATONE operations were halted on 11 July, the following is the present status of the Project.

a. Detachment A is at Wiesbaden in complete state of readiness with four aircraft operational. It has been advised that no missions will be flown over denied areas until after 15 August at the earliest but in the meanwhile infrequent weather missions and certain test missions are being flown over friendly territory. Work is still proceeding on a permanent base, originally intended for this unit, at Giebelstadt.

b. Detachment B has completed training and its deployment to Adana from Watertown will start on 13 August. It should be fully operational with four aircraft at Adana by 25 August.

c. An advance party is surveying available facilities at Yokota AFB, Japan, and Kadena AFB, Okinawa. Plans are being completed and airlift scheduled for the redeployment of Detachment A from Wiesbaden to the Far East beginning about 21 August. (The same airlift will be used for the initial deployment of Detachment B and the redeployment of A.) It is understood that the final decision to leave Detachment A in Germany or redeploy it to the Far East will not be made until about 15 August and it will remain in a state of operational readiness until that date. If redeployed this Detachment should be operational in the Far East about 15 September.

d. The assembly, equipping and training of a third detachment (Detachment C) is going forward on schedule at Watertown. Most of its senior personnel have already entered on duty and eight pilots have been recruited. The Detachment should be ready for deployment in the first half of November.

e. As a result of slippage in the development of the most advanced cameras and much of the electronics equipment, considerable

(* The Bissell version with changes suggested by General Cabell.)

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development remains to be done. The C camera cannot be expected to be operational much before the end of the year and electronics system #4 will not be operational until late winter. On the basis of present plans these development programs and some training activities will continue at Watertown until 1 February. Thereafter plans are being made for Watertown will to be shut down and the remaining development activities will be handled at an Air Force base/ subject to decision subsequent to 25 August.

2. Decisions Required: By 15 August it will be necessary to decide:

a. Whether Detachment A is to resume operations in Europe, be redeployed promptly to the Far East, or remain inactive at Wiesbaden awaiting a later resumption of operations or redeployment.

b. Whether Detachment B is to start active operations from Adana when it is operational, fly "probing" missions or remain inactive there other than for flying its cover missions, awaiting later decisions.

Immediately after 15 August it would seem desirable to review procurement and development programs in the light of the above decisions with a view to determining whether or not to curtailing development and procurement which might be no longer required for this Project. At the same time it would likewise seem wise to review the requirement for a third detachment.

3. Considerations Bearing on these Decisions: What are here listed as considerations bearing on the problem are believed to be reasonably clearly established and objectively stated circumstances which in no way determine the major policy decisions but which do have clear implications for the form and timing of these decisions.

a. If it is determined that there is no reasonable prospect that Detachment A is not going to be used in Europe either at Wiesbaden or along with Detachment B at Adana, it ought to be put to work as soon as possible in the Far East after that determination is made. If a decision is not made by 15 August either to let it resume operations or to redeploy it, the opportunity for a prompt redeployment would be lost ~~and more time would be wasted to no good purpose.~~

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b. The organization which has been built up to carry out AQUATONE has been designed to conduct operations for a period of slightly more than a year. It is not a permanent organization and is ill-adapted to the task of maintaining in a routine manner a standby capability to be used in the event of war or of unforeseeable sharp change in the political climate. Its personnel, both civilian and military, have been recruited for short tours of duty, assigned overseas on a TDY basis without their families, and every effort has been made to develop the motivation for an intensive temporary undertaking. If the decision is made that a part or all of the capability that has been developed is to be placed on a standby basis, with no prospect of active use at any foreseeable time, /we would have serious problems in keeping/ the present organization would lose /from losing/ its morale, many of its best people, and its effectiveness.

c. Development and procurement are currently going forward on a scale adequate to support three detachments on a fully active basis for a continuous period of 15 months. Savings of some millions of dollars (part of which would accrue to the Agency and part to the Air Force) could be achieved by prompt cutbacks in these programs. Such cutbacks would, however, prevent the development of the full capability originally planned. Under the circumstances, failure to achieve any clear-cut decision as to the scale on which and the time period for which this capability will be actively employed is bound to /might/ result in the waste of substantial sums as well as the wasteful tying up of technical manpower which may be needed in other national security programs.

d. It must be repeated that well-informed technical opinion allows the existing reconnaissance system less than a year before the probability of interception of the U-2 aircraft starts to increase. /It would of course be longer before there could be generally effective deployment of advanced interceptors. /

4. Conclusions: All of the above considerations argue powerfully in favor of an attempt to secure reasonably clear-cut decisions on the future of this Project by the middle of August. /The most desirable decision is that authorizing a concerted effort against the top priority targets. Failing this, CIA and the Air Force should consider what the probabilities are of eventual favorable action./ ~~The broad decision that needs to be made is whether this capability is going to be used-~~

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(a) against the USSR, (b) against China, (c) against the European Satellites, or (d) not at all. It can be argued is difficult to believe that no any facts not now available are required as the basis for such a decision or that the passage of a few more weeks would not greatly alter an evaluation of risks to be incurred and benefits to be gained. In particular it is difficult to see what good can come of "probing" missions which will merely alert the defense and stimulate more political protests without accomplishing any really important purpose.

5. Proposed Procedure: In order to secure a decision it is believed that two kinds of staff work should be done:

a. First, a specific plan of operations should be proposed as the desired course of action and the more sensible alternative courses of action should be defined in equally specific terms so that a clear choice is presented to the political authorities. A specific proposal has been prepared in the form of a plan for some fifteen missions over the western USSR which would cover the highest priority intelligence targets. It is believed that for practical purposes there are only two alternative courses of action:

(1) - Operations limited to China and the European Satellites.

(2) - The placing of the capability on a standby basis.

b. Second, the proposal should be staffed out with the interested military authorities (the Air Force and the JCS) and with the Department of State in the hope that it can be presented with their concurrence. To this end, a military assessment of AQUATONE is being prepared by the Air Force and it is believed that support will be forthcoming both from General Twining and from Admiral Radford on behalf of the Joint Chiefs. It had been hoped that the Secretary of State's views could be obtained well in advance of 15 August.

6. Recommendations: It is strongly recommended:

a. That the recommended plan of operations over the USSR from the west, together with the two alternative courses of action, be presented to the Secretary of State at the earliest opportunity and the plan be modified if necessary so as to obtain his concurrence or at least acquiescence.

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~~b. -- That in the event of his non-concurrence in any further operations, steps be taken forthwith to turn over all the assets of the Project to the Air Force to be maintained as a standby capability.~~

~~c. /b/ That in the event of his concurrence in a plan of operations, this be presented to higher authority as a joint recommendation of the DCI and the JCS with the concurrence of the Secretary of State.~~

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Project Director

cc: DDCI

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CHAPTER XII. DETACHMENT B

~~TOP SECRET~~Detachment B - Officer CadreFirst Tour (May 1956 - October 1957)

Col. Edward A. Perry, Commanding Officer
 Mr. John Parangosky, Executive Officer
 Lt. Col. Roland L. Perkins, Operations Officer
 Operations Staff:
 Maj. Harry N. Cordes
 Maj. John F. Carlisle
 Maj. Chester Bohart
 Maj. James B. Hester
 Maj. William E. Kennedy
 Maj. Donald R. Curtis
 Maj. Joseph E. French
 Maj. Thomas W. Land
 Capt. Warren R. Kincaid, Jr.
 Capt. Roger J. Tremblay
 Maj. William R. V. Marriott, Medical Officer

Withheld under statutory authority of the
 Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
 U.S.C., section 403g)

Second Tour (November 1957 - May 1960)

Col. Stanley W. Beerli, Commanding Officer (Nov. 1957 - July 1959)
 Col. William E. Shelton, Commanding Officer (July 1959 - May 1960)
 Mr. John Parangosky, Executive Officer (through March 1959)
 Lt. Col. Carl F. Funk, Materiel Officer
 Operations Staff:
 Maj. Raymond N. Sterling
 Maj. Joseph L. Giraud, Jr.
 Maj. Arthur DuLac
 Maj. William Dotson
 Maj. James T. Deuel, Medical Officer

Withheld under statutory authority of the
 Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
 U.S.C., section 403g)

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Detachment B - Contract Pilots

First Tour (May 1956 - October 1957)

James G. Abraham



Thomas C. Birkhead

James W. Cherbonneau (joined Det B in Turkey, December 1956)

Buster E. Edens

William W. Hall

Edwin K. Jones

William H. McMurray

Francis G. Powers

Sammy V. C. Snider

Withheld from public release
under statutory authority
of the Central Intelligence Agency
FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(6)

Second Tour (November 1957 - May 1960)

Barry H. Baker (transferred to Detachment G August 1959)

James A. Barnes, Jr.

Robert J. Ericson

Martin A. Knutson (transferred from Detachment A November 1957)

Francis G. Powers

Albert J. Rand (transferred to Detachment G August 1959)

John C. Shinn

Glendon K. Dunaway (transferred from Detachment G August 1959)

Jacob Kratt, Jr. (transferred from Detachment G August 1959)

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CHAPTER XII - DETACHMENT B

Organization and Training

The activation and training phase of the second field detachment proceeded in a great deal more orderly fashion than the first, and while this was to be expected in the light of experience gained, there were other factors which led to the smoother transition of the second group into a well-knit, effective and highly motivated unit.

The Commanding Officer, Colonel Edward A. Perry, was an aggressive leader with a strong urge to lead a winning team. He demanded the full support and loyalty of his men and in turn, spared no effort in trying to achieve the best possible conditions for them. Col. Perry was tapped for the assignment from the Training Directorate of SAC Headquarters in January 1956 and thus had three months before the activation of his detachment in which to visit Project Headquarters and be fully briefed, to visit the training base and witness operations there, and to hand pick approximately 60% of his officer cadre from men known to him. In addition, the facilities at the training base at Watertown were in better shape in all respects to receive the second group: the SAC Training Unit had been able to put forward recommendations on deficiencies and problem areas in the aircraft for correction and to tailor their training course in line with the experience gained

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with the first group; arrangements for recruiting and indoctrinating techreps for overseas service were working more smoothly; and the primary equipment had been operationally proven.

Col. Perry's orders assigned him to the 1007th Air Intelligence Service Group with duty as Commanding Officer of Flight B of Project Squadron Provisional, effective 6 March 1956. He reported at Project Headquarters, Washington, and began working with the staff on the recruitment of his cadre and drafting plans and procedures for the training and operational phases. Personnel shortages and lateness in reporting were still being encountered, particularly in the specialties of aeromedicine and supply and warehousing.

May 7th (date of completion of Detachment A's deployment) was set as the day for activation of Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Provisional (II) at Watertown and the majority of the detachment's personnel had reported in by the middle of May. The detachment was not fully manned, however, until the middle of July.

The estimated date for completion of training in the U-2 of the nine* contract pilots and four Detachment B officers was for 10 July, with the

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FOIA 5 USC §552(b)(6)

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USCM tests beginning 23 July and deployment to follow about 10 August. Mr. Bissell wanted to advance these dates to 16 July and 5 August respectively in view of the fact that the sun angle over the Soviet targets of interest would become less favorable for photography each day. He also wanted to set target dates which would require real effort to meet; this was understood and agreed by Col. Perry.


The optimistic outlook was adversely affected by the late reporting of the detachment's contract pilots. Five were on deck by mid-May and three additional pilots reported by 1 June. The concurrent training of the four Greek pilots and two casualties for Detachment A, as well as the running of accelerated tests on the P-31 engine during May, June and July 1956 put a heavy burden on available aircraft. Col. Yancey's estimate in the middle of May was for a possible six weeks' delay in the operational readiness date; however, with some adjustments in work schedules and training programs and maximum effort by all concerned, the detachment held its USCM tests 18 through 21 July, was declared combat ready, and began deployment on 13 August 1956.

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Turkish Approval for Operations at Incerlik Air Base

The Air Force recommended on 7 March 1956 that Adana, Turkey, be developed as a base for Detachment B in preference to Elevisis, Greece. Reasons for the choice of Adana were that it was closer to priority targets, had better terminal weather and available alternate landing bases, available SAC logistical support (this was later discovered to be almost non-existent), and better physical security.

The Project Director concurred and proceeded to seek State Department concurrence. There was a delay due to a new Ambassador to Turkey not having been confirmed. On 11 April 1956 the Department of State approved an approach to the Turks through Turkish Air Force channels.

Meanwhile the Project Engineer, [] was sent via USAFE to Adana to ascertain what construction was necessary. The Air Force was to sustain the costs of additional facilities but the Project Director offered to reimburse the costs, if any, which the Air Force was unable to meet. After the survey, [] estimated

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that the basic facilities would be ready approximately 10 August, if there were no slippages in delivery of materials. This means the bare essentials required for living and operating on the base. The additional base support facilities required would take up to four months to construct.

On 24 April Col. Russell Berg, together with Mr. Bissell's Personal Assistant, [REDACTED] went to Ankara for the purpose of obtaining approval for overflights from Turkey by Detachment B at the Service-to-Service level. It became evident from conversations with Agency and U. S. Air Force contacts in Ankara, and the Charge' d'Affaires, Mr. Foy Kohler, that approval could only be received ultimately from the Prime Minister. [REDACTED] requested Project Headquarters by cable to obtain State Department concurrence in a Government-to-Government approach, and asked that the Charge' be so notified. This was done and on 28 April a message from the Secretary of State to Mr. Kohler was sent to Ankara [REDACTED] (see Annex 76 for text).

On 1 May 1956 Mr. Kohler saw Prime Minister Menderes and received unqualified approval for operations from Turkey. The Prime Minister was told that the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 50X4, E.O.13526 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] that the group at

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Adana would consist of about 130 personnel with five U-2's; that the operation would last approximately two years; that the intelligence collected would be given to the Turks through normal channels; and that in the event of a compromise, the Turkish Government would not be expected to take any of the responsibility. Menderes replied that in such an event he would at least meet in consultation and promised to keep knowledge of the operation (in the extended cover story version) to General Tunaboylu, Chief of Staff of the Turkish General Staff, and his Deputy, Lt. Gen. Rustu Erdelhun, and Mr. Nuri Birgi, Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry.

Because of approaches made to the Greeks concerning possible use of Elevisis, it was felt politically expedient to let the King and Queen and the Prime Minister know immediately that there had been a change in plans, but without referring to the use of a Turkish base. This was accomplished by

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Deployment to Incerlik

The advance echelons of communications, security and operations personnel departed for Adana on 25 and 27 July 1956, and by 2 August a temporary communications link was established between Incerlik and Project Headquarters. The officer in charge of the advance party,

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Lt. Col. Roland L. Perkins, sent back a gloomy report on the status of construction at Incerlik, but the Project Director felt there was no alternative to going ahead with deployment even though the U-2's and some of the equipment would have to be left in the open for a while until hangar and storage space was ready. Therefore the move went ahead according to schedule and between 14 and 17 August 1956 a combined MATS/SAC airlift of C-118's and C-124's delivered WRSP (II), complete with aircraft, equipment and supplies to Turkey.

To insure that there would be no misunderstanding with regard to line of command (as had occurred with Detachment A) the Project Director sent a dispatch to Col. Perry before his departure from Watertown outlining the duties of the Executive Officer in the management of the Detachment's affairs. These were:

- a. To implement policies and orders of the Commanding Officer and assure compliance therewith.
- b. To maintain liaison with CIA 50X1, E.O.13526
- c. To maintain liaison with host government agencies and coordinate contact of other detachment personnel with these agencies.
- d. To advise the Commanding Officer on Agency policies, regulations, etc.

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- e. To act as office of record for the detachment.
- f. To coordinate support activities with operational planning.
- g. To review organization and procedures and advise the Commanding Officer on proposed changes.
- h. To perform other duties as the Commanding Officer may direct.

Colonel Perry accepted fully the concept of joint administration but at the same time insisted that as Commanding Officer he retain full control over all elements of his command and that detachment personnel (including security and communications) should not communicate directly with their superiors in Washington, and that any reports by official visitors to the detachment should in every case be submitted through him.

Although the detachment retained its unit designation as WRSP (II), the additional designation of Detachment 10-10, TUSLOG, was added in order to incorporate the unit into the theater command for support purposes (including APO mailing privileges). Facilities construction, airlift, ground vehicles and other normal Air Force support were to be levied on USAFE Headquarters with the promise of priority treatment.

Incerlik Air Base, a SAC post-strike base for long-range aircraft, situated seven miles out of Adana near the southern coast of Turkey,

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was occupied by a small housekeeping group with little or no activity at the time of Detachment B's arrival. Liaison with the base complement was established with Col. Gordon F. Thomas, Base Commander, and cleared contacts in the local OSI and Provost Marshal sections.

The settling in of detachment personnel and readying of the aircraft and equipment for operations was hampered by delayed completion of facilities, poor sanitation, substandard mess, electrical failures, low quality indigenous help, and extreme heat.

The Detachment Flight Surgeon, Dr. Marriott, shortly after arrival of the group wrote up a detailed report of the unsatisfactory and unsanitary condition of the mess at Adana which was sent back to Headquarters. When it was shown to Col. Geary (who then occupied the position of Headquarters USAF Project Officer) he immediately brought it to the attention of Gen. Smart, Vice Chief of Staff, who in turn referred it to Gen. Tunner at USAFE Headquarters. Gen. Tunner sent his Inspector General down to Turkey to investigate (although he was quite angry at the report having reached Washington without "going through channels"). Action was soon taken to relieve the Food Service Officer and his assistant and get replacements. Other corrective action included procurement of dishes, glasses, silverware, water coolers and other

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items to improve service. New screening for windows and screen doors was ordered, and sanitation in general improved by cleaning and fresh paint. All of this did not happen overnight--in fact it took several months to realize the necessary improvements in the living and working areas.

The problem of airlift in and out of Adana for both freight and passengers was a principal concern of Col. Perry's group for almost four months after arrival. Consideration had been given to establishing a twice-weekly Athens-Adana run using the Agency C-54 [] [] but this was ruled out for security and other reasons (except in cases of dire emergency), and dependence had to be placed on the limited regular USAF flights (two or three a week) from Athens or Rhein Main, Germany. In December 1956 USAFE finally delivered a support C-54 to the detachment for its own use and this was probably the greatest boon to morale that was experienced by the group during its entire stay in Turkey. It meant not only the ability to bring in badly needed supplies and equipment and to exchange pouches and passengers for quick connection with Washington, but it also meant the possibility of scheduling rest and rehabilitation trips out of Turkey for Detachment personnel.

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Liaison was established with the Agency Station at Frankfurt, Germany, and arrangements were made for the Station's assistance in local purchases and other day-to-day project business in Germany. Later a Project Liaison Officer from Headquarters was established at Wiesbaden, first in the office of the DCS for Operations (physically located in the office of Lt. Col. R. D. Steakley) and later moved to the office of Lt. Col. Charles Carver of the USAFE Materiel Directorate. The project officer assigned performed liaison as required between Project Headquarters, USAFE components, the two operating detachments, Frankfurt Station, and the photo-interpretation center at Wiesbaden (URPIC/W). His activities were facilitated by access to

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and Agency pouch and other facilities at Frankfurt Station.

First Operations: Middle East Coverage

In the late summer and early fall of 1956, the rapid deterioration of the situation in Egypt and the relations between that country and the British and French, and the cutting off of intelligence bearing upon these developments, led the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (ARC) to recommend to the Intelligence Community that requirements for coverage of the Middle East be levied on Project AQUATONE whose

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U-2 aircraft were deployed conveniently nearby awaiting permission of higher authority to resume their primary mission of overflights of the Soviet Union. The initiation of Middle East overflights was authorized by the White House after concurrence by the Secretary of State in the ARC's recommendations. Both the President and the Secretary of State were kept constantly informed of the progress of these overflights by reports or by briefings with photographic displays of intelligence obtained.

The first Middle East flight by Detachment B was flown on 11 September 1956, and the last on 28 February 1960. During this period a total of 151 overflights were made: 11 by Detachment A, 17 by British pilots attached to Detachment B, and the balance by Detachment B's American pilots. During this period the following Middle Eastern countries were covertly* overflown:

Aden	Kuwait
Afghanistan	Lebanon
Bahrein	Pakistan
Egypt	Qatar
Ethiopia	Saudi Arabia
Israel	Syria
Iran	Turkey
Iraq	Yemen
Jordan	

* There is no information available that indicates that the U-2 was subject to radar tracking by any Middle East country except Israel.

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When Middle East coverage got underway in September 1956, the film from missions was still being sent back to the Eastman processing facility, but when the military situation in the Suez area heated up and mission results were required for immediate tactical use, the Photo Interpretation Center (PIC) established a branch at Wiesbaden (URPIC/W) with a small sub-unit later set up at Adana (URPIC/1), manned by a three-man team led by [REDACTED]. The Detachment thus had an immediate read-out capability so that flash reports could be cabled to Washington within a very short time after the mission aircraft landed at Adana. This facility was maintained in stand-by condition during non-operational periods so that on demand it could be reinstated in a matter of 12 to 24 hours.

Honoring the promise to Prime Minister Menderes to share the intelligence obtained with the Turks, the first intelligence summary was given to him on 27 November 1956 and related principally to the Syrian Air Order of Battle.

Problems with Commanding Officer, Detachment B

Once Detachment B was established at Adana, Col. Perry instituted a continuous stream of cable messages to Headquarters which at first were limited to listing deficiencies requiring Headquarters or USAFE

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supply action, but which soon turned to policy matters, questioning Headquarters decisions, and suggesting changes in established procedures. Interspersed were messages on the private channel to either Mr. Bissell or Col. Gibbs

In January 1957 his request for Headquarters consultation was granted, along with ten days of home leave to visit his family.

In announcing Col. Perry's forthcoming TDY at Headquarters,

Mr. Bissell noted to the concerned members of his staff:

"I do not anticipate any earth-shaking decisions or important new policies to emerge from Col. Perry's trip. I feel it is most important, however, especially in the light of our long exchange and not infrequent differences of view with him during the past several months, that we be exposed face to face to his philosophy and attitudes and he to ours. If we can obtain a more vivid and complete understanding of his problems as he sees them and he of ours, and if each of us can get a better grasp of the other's reasons for holding the views he does, the visit will be most profitable." 1/

1/ SAPC-12083, 4 January 1957. Memorandum to Project Staff from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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During his TDY at Headquarters on 5 and 6 February 1957, Col. Perry had a long private talk with Mr. Bissell, of which no record was made, but the results were that Col. Perry discussed his detachment problems with the Headquarters Staff in a fairly calm and cooperative spirit and departed for Adana apparently intent on getting on with the job.

In March a visit was paid to Adana by Col. Gibbs and a Headquarters party for purposes of a general inspection, and to discuss cutback and reassignment of personnel. The political hold-down of the primary mission and uncertainty of the future of the project made it necessary to try

1/ Letter to Dr. William R. Lovelace, Jr., dated 7 January 1957.

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to maintain the capability in the field on as economical a basis as possible. The condition of the Detachment's facilities and adequacy of current supply lines and procedures were reviewed. An improvement in the over-all picture was evident and the Liaison Office at USAFE Headquarters, Wiesbaden, was functioning very well since it had been placed in the offices of the Materiel Directorate in lieu of Col. Steakley's office in Operations.

The number of Middle East missions during the first few months of 1957 had decreased to a minimum as a result of United Nations peace-making activities in the Suez affair, and on 1 February the ARC had recommended discontinuance of use of the U-2 for this coverage in order not to jeopardize its use in penetration flights into the Soviet orbit in the current photographic season, permission for which it was hoped would be forthcoming soon. Two successful Elint missions with System V were flown along the Soviet border, the second of which on 18 March 1957, returning from Afghanistan inadvertently overflew a portion of the Soviet Union which set off a chain reaction through the intelligence community up to SAC Headquarters, and a written explanation of why and how this happened had to be prepared for Headquarters, USAF, with corrective action being taken with regard to pilots' operational procedures to ensure no repetition of the incident.

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The Middle East moved toward another crisis in April 1957.

King Hussein of Jordan threw pro-Communists out of his government and was faced with a possible uprising. The U.S. 6th Fleet was ordered to the Eastern Mediterranean to show support for Hussein. Middle East missions were flown as required for tactical coverage of this development by Detachment B until the situation in Jordan calmed down and the 6th Fleet was moved back on its normal station.

First Staging from Pakistan

At a meeting with the President on 6 May 1957 the decision was reached that overflights of Russia would be renewed and would be staged by Detachment B from Pakistan if permission could be obtained from the Government of Pakistan for use of a base. Mr. Bissell's Personal Assistant, [redacted], visited Karachi for this purpose between 3 and 7 June 1957 and along with [redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526

[redacted] briefed President Mirza and requested approval for a U-2 staging mission "into Sinkiang for air sampling and electronic intelligence" from a base in Pakistan. The President asked that Prime Minister Suhrawardy's approval be sought (without informing him that the President had already been seen). This was done and the Prime Minister gave his approval but said he would like the group to talk with

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General Ayub Khan. General Ayub, when approached, said he would advise the Prime Minister against this project unless the U.S. was willing to furnish Pakistan the needed military aid (principally fighter aircraft) previously requested. On 5 June 1957 a second visit with the Prime Minister by the U.S. representatives disclosed that Ayub had not dissuaded him from permitting the operation. Although the Prime Minister said he agreed with Ayub that Pakistan should have more aid, he did not ask a quid pro quo for use of the base. Lahore was chosen for the operation since the runway at Peshawar (a more desirable location) was undergoing repair. Col. Perry and the Project Engineer, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] joined [REDACTED] to visit and inspect the base facilities.

Operation SOFT TOUCH

Use of the base at Lahore was agreed for the approximate period of 7 July 1957 through 7 August 1957, with a possible extension if found to be necessary. The advance echelon arrived on 12 July and communications were established with Adana on 13 July. The main task force of 40 personnel, including all eight contract pilots and three U-2 aircraft (two with the new anti-radar application) followed immediately and after shake-down of equipment, waited until 4 August before target weather cleared and the first mission could be run. Nine overflights

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were carried out between 4 and 28 August and while four were classified as "poor" due to camera or other malfunction or target weather, excellent coverage was obtained of the guided missile test range at what later came to be known as Tyura Tam, and of the Siberian atomic proving ground at Semipalatinsk, as well as other known or suspected installations. (See overleaf for a listing of SOFT TOUCH missions and the targets covered.)

On 10 August 1957 the Government of Pakistan received a complaint from the Indians through the UN Kashmir Observer on an overflight of Indian territory on 5 August. The violation was not attributed to the U-2, and the Pakistanis took care of the Indian complaint by blaming the overflight in question on the Russians. 50X1, E.O.13526

recommended early withdrawal of the staging party since its continued presence would aid the Soviets in pinpointing the operating base from which the overflights were originating. The task force therefore withdrew on 30 August and returned to Turkey.

Briefings were given in Washington in early September on the results of these missions to the President and the Secretary of State by Gen. Cabell and Mr. Lundahl. On 27 November, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, and members of his cabinet were also briefed by Mr. Lundahl in London on SOFT TOUCH intelligence.

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SOFT TOUCH Missions:

Date	Msn. No.	Duration	Pilot	Targets	Config. & Results
4 August 1957	4036	8 hr. 35 min.	Powers	China, TiHwa, Mongolia (abort before Irkutsk)	A-2 Poor
5 August 1957	4035	7 hr. 30 min.	Edens	Novokazalinsk, Kzylorda, Aral Sea (Tyura Tam)	B(DB)* Good
11 August 1957	4039	6 hr. 25 min.	Mc Murray	Ust Kamerogorsk (abort before Novosibirsk)	B(DB) Poor
20 August 1957	4045	8 hr. 40 min.	Snider	Tomsk, Novosibirsk	A-2 Good
20 August 1957	4048	8 hr. 5 min.	Jones	Semipalatinsk, Omsk Balkhash	A-2(DB) Fair
21 August 1957	4049	9 hr. 10 min.	Birkhead	Krasnoyarsk	A-2 Poor
21 August 1957	4050	8 hr. 05 min.	Cherborneaux	Stalinsk, Semipalatinsk, Alma Ata	A-2(DB) Excellence
21 August 1957	4051	6 hr. 40 min.	Hall	Tibet, Lhasa	B Poor
28 August 1957	4058	7 hr. 35 min.	Jones	Leninabad, Aralsk (Tyura Tam)	A-2(DB) Excellence

* Note: DB stands for "Dirty Bird", the name given the U-2 with the anti-radar application.

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On 18 August 1957 a pro-Soviet military group in Syria executed a coup and subsequently joined forces with Egypt under Egyptian control. Coverage of Syria by Detachment B on 31 August and 1 September was obtained and a report on Syrian troop disposition and air order of battle was furnished the Turks on 9 September in order to forestall their overflying Syria to obtain such information and possibly touching off further serious hostilities.

On 10 September permission was received for a one time flight by Detachment B to cover the Russian missile test range at Kapustin Yar and fortunately the mission was timed so that the facilities were photographed just after a missile had been fired which provided bonus information.

Change of Command, Detachment B

On 20 September 1957, a change in policy was instituted by Headquarters allowing dependents to accompany detachment personnel overseas. The immediate effect was the necessity for additional housing. Before [redacted] departed for Adana on 25 September to look into the furnishing of additional quarters, he was given guidelines and delegated contractual authority by Mr. Bissell with the following proviso:

"I am interested in doing everything reasonable and proper to ensure that personnel of this Project stationed at

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Base B enjoy facilities, both residential and recreational, that are as livable as the conditions over which we have no control will permit. At the same time I do not wish to attempt construction on such a scale that we will overcommit ourselves financially or that through sponsorship of major construction we will attract attention to Base B as an Air Force base blessed by 'special favors' or a privileged status in Air Force Headquarters." 1/

Twenty off-base houses were rented during [] TDY in Adana and contractual arrangements were entered into with a local firm for renovation needed to bring them up to acceptable standards.

Col. Perry completed his 18-month tour and returned to Headquarters in October 1957 for reassignment by the Air Force. Col. Stanley W. Beerli agreed to move from his post as Commanding Officer of Detachment C in Japan and take over command at Adana. With the arrival of Col. Beerli in November 1957 at Detachment B, there was an almost complete change-over of personnel. Col. Beerli brought with him from Japan several of the unit who had served with him there as well as five of the Detachment C contract pilots.

By January 1958 the shaking-down process of the new command was generally completed. Two of the Detachment's earlier problems

1/ SAPC-19633, 25 September 1957. Memorandum for [] from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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were still bothersome--supply and air transport. This could be attributed in a measure to the geographic location of the base with respect to sources of supply, as well as to the lowered priorities now being granted to filling the Detachment's requirements, since the fast strike nature of the operation had given way to piece-meal coverage of primary targets.

Col. Beerli began work in February 1958 on a "Fast Move" staging concept which would allow the deployment of a self-supporting task force of approximately 30 men and one U-2 aircraft to a remote base with shop and office facilities installed within the C-124 used for airlifting the group to the forward staging base. This plan was drafted and sent to Headquarters where the Operations Staff, after full discussion, recommended that the concept be further investigated and refined so that it could be used in future staging operations to bases where permanent facilities were not available, thus expanding operational capability.

Second Staging Planning

Early in February 1958, as a result of briefing by the DCI and Mr. Bissell on future operational plans of the project, the Secretary of State approved approaching the Pakistanis again and requesting the use of a base for Operation BLUE MOON, a follow-up to the missions run

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the previous August from Lahore. The approval of President Mirza and Prime Minister Noon was secured on 21 February 1958. [redacted]

[redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526 [redacted]

of

the Project Headquarters Staff in Washington conducted the negotiations.

The briefing on mission purpose given the Pakistanis followed the Elint cover story (with no mention of photography). The U.S. Ambassador, James Langley, was also briefed, using the same cover story. Mr. Ali Asghar, Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Defense was seen by Col. Beerli in company with Col. Clinton True, Air Attaché, and

[redacted] and permission was granted to use the base at Peshawar,

a hangar and necessary facilities.

On 6 March 1958 the Soviet Government presented to the State Department (without making it public) a protest concerning the overflight of their Far East Maritime Province. The flight was a Detachment C mission over Ukrania on 1 March; however the Russians attributed the aircraft to the U.S. Air Force in its first protest note (later identifying the aircraft as of the U-2 type). All overflights by U-2's were immediately grounded, indefinitely, on order of highest authority, and BLUE MOON was therefore called off.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Staging from Norway: Planned and Postponed

On 26 June 1956 Mr. Bissell and Gen. Cabell flew to Germany to brief Chancellor Adenauer on AQUATONE. They were invited to travel in the aircraft of the Chief of NATO Forces, Gen. Albert Gruenther, and enroute to Germany they took the opportunity to brief Gen. Gruenther on the U-2 project and get his views concerning an approach to the Norwegians for use of a base from which to operate over Russia. Gruenther was pessimistic concerning these prospects and indicated that if any approach were made, it should be at the highest level in the Norwegian Government and not through Col. Evang, head of Norwegian Intelligence.

The next day [redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526 [redacted] was briefed on AQUATONE in anticipation of an approach to the Norwegians and he reported that the Norwegians were still somewhat sour as a result of the failure of GENETRIX (the balloon project) to achieve promised intelligence. He recommended that the first approach be to Col. Evang.

It was two years before an approach was actually made to the Norwegians in June 1958. [redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526 [redacted] arranged through Evang for Col. Beerli and [redacted] to visit Bodo on 19 June to inspect the available base facilities. Planning then went ahead for Operation HONEYMOON to be staged from Bodo. Two events intervened which

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delayed the carrying out of these plans. First on 27 June 1958 the Agency's C-118 aircraft from the Wiesbaden Air Section was shot down over Armenia by the Russians; the surviving members of the crew (including Lt. Col. Dale Brannon and other Agency-assigned military personnel) were seized and held by the Russians, while charges and countercharges were aired in the international press. Second, on 14 July a pro-Nasser group in Iraq assassinated King Faisal and took over the government. The next day, President Eisenhower ordered 5,000 U. S. Marines to be put ashore at Beirut from the 6th Fleet at the request of Lebanese President Chamoun, who feared overthrow of his government. At the same time British troops were requested by Jordan. The daily or twice daily U-2 coverage of the Middle East trouble spots on behalf of the Intelligence Community, particularly the U. S. Navy, required all of Detachment B's assets.

The proposed operation from Bodo had been opposed by Gen. LeMay unless each sortie were carefully and specifically justified. The Air Staff believed that three of the planned missions could produce inadvertent overflights with consequent Soviet protests. Meanwhile, [] [] that Norwegian Intelligence felt the Bodo operation should be postponed in view of the Middle East crisis.

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General Cabell concurred in the postponement, with future reactivation of the operation to be at the discretion of the Project Director.

United Nations intervention in the Middle East, voted at an emergency session of the General Assembly on 8 August, brought a lull to hostilities. On 11 August 1958, Detachment B, at the request of the U. S. Navy, ran Operation BIG EARS with Elint System IV over the 6th Fleet in order to test the Fleet's radar capabilities and limitations. The results of this operation were of great value to the Navy not only in its operations but for future research and development purposes as well.

Project NEW MOON

With the Middle East temporarily quiet, on 28 August 1958 the President was briefed on Operation NEW MOON (replacement for HONEYMOON) and he approved about 90% of the coverage proposed, personally checking the flightlines of each mission plan. NEW MOON was planned so as to use the Elint operation previously approved by the Norwegians as cover for an added Soviet overflight. Col. Evang was the only Norwegian to know of the overflight phase of the operation.

Col. William Burke, then Deputy Project Director, briefed the Air Staff on 2 September 1958 concerning the proposed coverage from Bodo of Polyarny Urals, including the President's desire that this overflight of the USSR be launched from Norway. The reaction of the Air

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Staff was that this mission was more likely to cause a protest than a mission originating in Pakistan and landing at Bodo, but all were pleased that at least a mission had been approved. Norwegian approval for use of Bodo was cleared [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] on 4 September 1958, and the task force departed from Adana on 10 September, arriving at Bodo on the 15th due to weather and aircraft malfunction enroute.

The weather was unfavorable until 25 October, when an Elint peripheral mission was launched. After waiting ten days longer for suitable weather for the primary mission, with no prospect of better weather, a substitute mission was flown from Bodo over the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea, and thence returning to Adana. The mission was tracked by Russian radar, and officials of the Norwegian Foreign Office became aware of the flight and were very unhappy, more over their ignorance of the arrangements made through Norwegian Intelligence than with the activity itself. Evang's position at that point was something less than secure.

Mr. Bissell expressed concern on the need for better liaison planning in future staging operations. He noted to Col. Burke in a follow-up on the Bodo operation:

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"Looking at our Norwegian activity with the advantage of hindsight, it is my impression that the following discrepancies may be outlined:

"a. We failed to achieve suppression of radar for one of the flights into Bodo.

"b. Though we went into Bodo under USAF cover, we failed to arrange for any notification to reach either Gen. Johnson or Gen. Mottsfield through normal USAF channels. We thereby called the attention of the Norwegian Air Force to the unusual nature of this operation.

"c. We never seemed able to reach a clear mutual understanding with Evang as to what information we were to furnish him during our stay in Bodo...

"The preparation of a liaison plan should cause us to consider carefully the nature of our cover in any country in which we operate and to inquire how notification of our arrival would reach the local authorities concerned if our cover story were in fact true. I would like to suggest therefore that the Cover and Security Sections in Headquarters as well as Operations and the appropriate individuals in the Detachment be concerned with the planning of future staging operations." 1/

In January 1959 it was learned that the Norwegian Ambassador to Moscow had been called in by Foreign Minister Zorin and told that the Norwegian Government should take steps to halt hostile acts against the USSR (i. e., allowing U. S. and British warplanes to use Bodo as a base for reconnaissance flights against the USSR).

1/ CHAL-0491, 30 December 1959. Memorandum to Deputy Director, DPS, from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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British Join Detachment B

In December 1958 the British OLDSTER unit arrived at Adana and were gradually integrated into the Detachment. The Prime Minister's approval for British pilots to participate in operational missions carried the proviso that some cover background should be built up with meteorological flights. Therefore before the unit settled in, one U-2 was ferried to Watton RAF Base, England, for the purpose of running some missions with the weather configuration to establish cover in England. (British participation in the program is covered in Chapter XIII.)

Elint Missions

Two outstanding Elint missions by Detachment B were among the "firsts" in the field of electronic intelligence collection. Timed to coincide with an expected Soviet "moon shot" on 2 January 1959, an Elint mission with System IV (Ferret) was flown over the Soviet/Afghanistan border in order to cover the launching of the Russian lunar probe "Metchta" from the Kyzyl Kum Desert in Turkmen. The results were good. The other "first" was the acquisition, using System VII, on 9 June 1959, of an intercept of 30 seconds of telemetry prior to the first stage burn-out of a Soviet ICBM launched from Kapustin Yar. The second stage telemetry was obtained by a SAC RB-47 at a lower altitude.

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with manned equipment and the two mutually confirmed intercepts were of great value to analysts in determining the size, type and other characteristics of the engines used in the missile.

Further Operations, 1959

Other than Elin missions, the Detachment kept busy with routine coverage of Middle East trouble spots, upper air sampling and weather missions. Two weather flights were staged by the British pilots, again out of Watton RAF Base, continuing to build their cover. These flights occurred on 7 and 8 May 1959 with the support of Detachment B and the British Meteorological Office, in coordination with the RAF.

In May 1959, Col. William Burke made an inspection visit to the Detachment and found the unit in good shape, particularly in pilot proficiency (including the British) as confirmed by tracker analysis of missions flown. He found the Detachment's off-base housing to be adequate but recommended that all pilots and their families should live on base, and that, if the tenure at Adana were extended through another season, trailers should be installed on base for all personnel for project security and to avoid any anti-American incidents.

Soviet Missile Launch Site Covered Again

The requirement of the U.S. defense community for intelligence on the status of the Soviet missile program was rendered more critical

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by the bellicose statements being made by Khrushchev referring to an already operational Soviet ICBM capability. Two CHALICE operations were planned and tentatively approved early in 1959 which would collect additional hard information on the location of operational ICBM sites and facilities engaged in missile production. A Big Three meeting in Washington the first of April, and plans for a Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva in May (at which Khrushchev's demand for a "Summit" meeting to settle all issues was to be discussed) caused the postponement of the planned U-2 operations. The inconclusive conference in Geneva adjourned on the 20th of June until July 13th, and in the interim permission was given for one mission. On 9 July 1959 a successful overflight of Tyra Tam and the Urals (Operation TOUCHDOWN) was flown from Pesawar and collected excellent photography.

A change of command at Detachment B took place when Col. Beerli finished his tour and departed for Washington to become Project Director of Operations. He was replaced at Adana by Col. William Shelton who arrived on duty on 31 July 1959. In August two contract pilots (Rand and Baker) rotated back to the ZI for assignment with Detachment G at Edwards while two Detachment G pilots (Kratt and Dunaway) moved with their families to Adana. Also in August, two U-2C's (the model

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configured with the J-75 engine) were ferried to Adana and an accompanying team, during an intensive two-weeks period, trained the operating and maintenance personnel, checking out 10 pilots. The aircraft, engines and other equipment functioned well and the system was declared operationally ready at the end of two weeks.

British Operations

In October 1959 Operation FULL HOUSE was staged from Watton RAF Base by the British pilots for meteorological missions and cover build-up. A Detachment B task force using the "Fast Move" concept of operations supported the deployment and two successful missions were flown. Two Soviet overflight missions by British pilots were finally approved by the Prime Minister in November and permission was obtained from the Government of Pakistan through British channels to use Peshawar as a staging base. Two separate deployments were supported by Detachment B to carry out these missions. On 6 December 1959 a successful photographic overflight of Kuybyshev, Saratov-Engels, and Kapustin Yar, landing at Adana, was flown, and on 5 February 1960 another flight was made over Tyura Tam, Ukraine, and Kazan, also terminating at Adana. Both of these missions collected excellent photographic intelligence, including coverage of the principal Soviet aircraft production centers.

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Project Relations with Norwegians

In November 1959, Miss Frances Willis (U.S. Ambassador to Norway) was in the Department of State on consultation and requested that Ambassador Cumming (State/Agency Liaison) arrange a meeting for her to discuss Project CHALICE relations with the Norwegians. Mr. James Cunningham, on behalf of the project, met with the two ambassadors on 18 November and the discussion immediately turned to CIA relations with Col. Evang and his unique position in the political structure in Oslo, particularly with regard to his dealings with the U-2 project representatives. In Mr. Cunningham's record of the meeting he noted:

"There was general agreement that in the event another mission is projected from Norway in the spring that the winter might profitably be spent in exploring the desirability and timing of briefing Cabinet members on CHALICE materials in order to make actual mission approval in the spring much easier. Ambassador Cumming stated that he was of the view that Secretary Herter would press the President rather hard in the spring for a high priority mission in Northwest Russia and that, in Cummings' opinion, the President would probably approve. Ambassador Cummings indicated that Secretary Herter's interest in this particular mission had been rekindled only yesterday by Premier Khrushchev's statements about missile production in the Soviet Union." 1/

1/ CHAL-0790, 18 November 1959. Memorandum for the Record by James A. Cunningham, Jr.

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Ambassador Willis said she would think about which of the Norwegian Cabinet members might most profitably receive such a briefing and would communicate with Ambassador Cumming on the Roger channel after her return to Norway in December regarding timing of a briefing. (Nothing has been found in the records to indicate that Ambassador Willis followed through on the recommended procedure for circumventing Evang as a sole channel for approvals. At any rate, the next approach to the Norwegians at the end of February 1960, looking toward staging from Norway in April, was made to Evang [redacted]

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Planning for Spring 1960 Operations

On 19 February 1960, General Goodpaster reported to General Cabell that the President had reviewed four CHALICE mission proposals which had been submitted for his approval, and had made the following decisions: ^{1/}

a. His first choice was a northern mission staged from a Norwegian base (Operation TIME STEP), which would cover the area along the Polyarny-Ural/Kotlas railroad line including a suspected

^{1/} CHAL-0890-60, 19 February 1960. Memorandum for the Record by Colonel William Burke.

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operational ICBM site.

b. If weather favored a launch from Pakistan, then Operation GRAND SLAM could be flown covering targets at Kyshtym, Sverdlovsk and the Kola Peninsula, including atomic energy, guided missile and submarine installations, with mission aircraft retrieving in Norway.

c. If, after waiting for favorable conditions to accomplish either a or b, above, these conditions did not develop within the allotted time, then the Sary Shagan mission could be flown (Operation SQUARE DEAL).

General Goodpaster made it quite clear that the President was approving only one mission and that the time period was between the 1st and the 30th of March 1960. The President could be approached for an extension if during that period the weather was not favorable. (A request for an extension was later granted up to 10 April, not because of weather but due to complications encountered in obtaining agreement from the Pakistanis and Norwegians.)

Project Headquarters requested [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to approach the Pakistanis for permission to run a series of U.S. flights from Peshawar. [REDACTED] replied on 5 March, after talking with U.S. Ambassador Rountree, that it might be a good idea

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to have the British High Commissioner, who had arranged for the use of Peshawar for the OLDSTER missions, negotiate on behalf of the U.S. This would avoid the question of F-104's for the Pakistani Air Force in exchange for use of a base being raised again by President Ayub Khan.

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On 9 March 1960 Mr. Bissell was informed [redacted]

[redacted] that MI-6 had asked him to pass on the information that there had been a cooling off in the Pakistani official relationship with the British with respect to use of their facilities, due to pressure from the Soviets. This had been reported to London by the High Commissioner in Karachi after the 5 February 1960 U-2

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overflight by the British team. It was therefore decided that Mr. Russell would approach Mr. Riaz Hussain, [redacted] principal liaison within the Pakistani Government, rather than go directly to President Ayub.

[redacted] reported on 15 March 1960 on the results of his approach to Col. Evang for permission to stage from Norway. Col. Evang had Norwegian Air Force approval for one British Elint flight in April and one U.S. flight in May. He therefore intended to approve TIME STEP for April, since the British had withdrawn their request for an April flight, but this had not as yet been cleared with Gen. Tofte Johnson, head of the Norwegian Air Force. A few days later

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[redacted] Headquarters that Col. Evang was ill with flu and not expected to be available until 28 March; therefore no plans could be discussed since Evang had authorized no one to discuss the mission other than himself.

Meanwhile on 25 March, Mr. Riaz Hussain notified [redacted] in Karachi that President Ayub had given permission to mount the operation from Peshawar allowing sixty days' use of the base if needed. The U.S. Ambassador and Air Attaché in Karachi were informed of the impending operation at that time [redacted]

The Project Director gave orders to Col. Burke on 28 March 1960, after reviewing the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee's latest input, as follows:

"You will accomplish TIME STEP or GRAND SLAM as soon after 31 March as weather is suitable for either mission. Should conditions develop in which either mission could be accomplished, first priority will be given to TIME STEP. It is assumed that the foregoing will require the preparation of alternative operations plans and the completion of arrangements to permit staging alternatively either East or North in response to the development of the weather." 1/

In Oslo, [redacted] learned from Col. Evang that between 9 and 19 April all Norway would be celebrating the Easter holidays and no government officials would be available during that period; also

1/ CHAL-0931, 28 March 1960. Memorandum to AC/DPD from DD/P.

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that both Andoya and Bodo Air Bases were involved in NATO exercises from 4 to 13 April. Therefore neither TIME STEP nor GRAND SLAM could be run before April 19th at the earliest, since the first was planned to depart from Norway and the second to retrieve there.

With Presidential authority due to expire on 10 April, the only alternative under the circumstances was to fly the third priority mission. Operation SQUARE DEAL was therefore staged from Peshawar on 9 April 1960, retrieving at Adana. The photographic mission was successful, but the aircraft was tracked for almost the entire route by Russian radar.

Operation GRAND SLAM

Planning continued toward carrying out the TIME STEP operation, with the hope of getting approval before the Summit Meeting in Paris on 16 May. Mr. Riaz Hussain was again requested to obtain approval from President Ayub for the additional mission to be flown from Peshawar and this was accomplished on 19 April 1960 with the proviso that the operation must end before the Summit Meeting. Also on 19 April, Col. Evang notified Gen. Tofte Johnson of the proposed mission and received his agreement for use of either Andoya or Bodo.

On 18 April 1960 the Detachment B Commander was notified that higher authority was being asked to approve three missions: TIME STEP,

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still number one, had been replanned to use Thule, Greenland, as an alternate pre-strike base, covering Novaya Zemlya in addition to the previously planned targets, and retrieving at Andoya or Bodo; GRAND SLAM, second priority; and a third possible mission, SUN SPOT, departing from Peshawar, covering Tyura Tam, the Vladimirovka Test Range, production facilities at Dnepropetrovsk and Kiev and five long-range bomber bases, and retrieving at Adana.

The DCI, Mr. Helms and Col. Burke briefed Secretary of State Herter on 19 April on the results of the SQUARE DEAL mission and on the plans for the three additional missions. Ambassador Cumming advised Col. Burke on 21 April that Secretary Herter approved the three missions, provided no use were made of Greenland bases. Also briefed on the three missions between 19 and 21 April were Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, and Generals Twining and LeMay.

On 25 April word was received via Gen. Goodpaster that the President had approved the three mission plans and gave permission to fly one of them before midnight 1 May 1960, Washington time. TIME STEP, the number one priority mission, required almost 100% perfect weather conditions, and the long-range forecast at that time was not favorable within the time span allowed. The Headquarters Operations Staff therefore

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began to plan for GRAND SLAM as the next choice. Col. Evang was advised that TIME STEP would probably be postponed and he agreed to support the new mission and to advise Gen. Johnson of the change.

On 26 April 1960, three C-130 support aircraft with fuel and pre-strike team departed Adana via Bahrein (permission for refueling there having been arranged by the British), landing at Peshawar. Two C-130's with fuel and post-strike team departed for Rhein-Main where they were to hold until the U-2 mission was launched. They would then proceed to Bodo arriving after the mission U-2, in order to support the story that the U-2 landing had been an emergency. (This was Col. Evang's cover story. He was later persuaded to allow the C-130's to arrive at Bodo three hours ahead of the mission aircraft so as to be prepared to effect a quick turn-around and relaunching of the U-2 for home base at Adana.)

Col. Beerli arrived at Bodo on 28 April (at Col. Evang's request) to coordinate the reception of the mission aircraft with the Norwegians. It was expected that GRAND SLAM might be launched as early as 28 April. The evening of 27 April, the primary U-2 and a spare departed Adana arriving at Peshawar prepared for an early morning 28 April take-off. At go-no-go time there was a cancellation due to route weather,

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and the two U-2's immediately flew back to Adana. On 28 April the two aircraft again proceeded to the pre-strike base only to receive another 24-hour hold for weather. The two aircraft again returned to Adana. The next weather briefing at Project Headquarters was held at 1130 GMT on 29 April and the weather was still marginal but showed promise of being acceptable for launching the mission early on the morning of 1 May (a Sunday).

On 30 April at 1415 GMT a cable went to Col. Beerli at Oslo (where he had gone to brief Col. Evang on mission plans) advising that the weather showed a fair chance of launching GRAND SLAM on 1 May, and that in the event a cancellation should be necessary at go-no-go time, the pre-strike force would be brought back to Adana from Peshawar, the post-strike group at Rhein-Main would be augmented to provide a pre-strike capability for TIME STEP, and the capability would be maintained to launch any one of the three approved missions if an extension of time could be obtained.

On 30 April at 1430 GMT the mission aircraft and spare again flew to Peshawar to await the launch signal from Headquarters. At about midnight on the 30th(local time at Adana) there was a loss of communication between that station and outside points, including the forward

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Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

group at Peshawar, due to an unexplained radio blackout. The mission launch signal (HBJARGON-32) was sent from Headquarters to Wiesbaden and telephoned to Detachment B at Adana on an open line by the Project Liaison Officer at Wiesbaden The substance of the launch message was then broadcast blind in clear transmission by Detachment B communications at Adana, using the phrase "HBJ 32 Go" on pre-arranged frequencies, for a period of about 30 minutes.

At 01/0230 GMT communications with Peshawar were re-established and the staging team acknowledged receipt of the clear text broadcast as of 01/0153 GMT. Mission launch had been made good at 01/0159 GMT (approximately one-half hour behind schedule). The post-strike team departed Rhein-Main for Bodo (via Oslo) with an estimated time of arrival of 01/0625 GMT to rendezvous with Col. Beerli and be prepared to receive the mission aircraft, which, as fate would have it, never did arrive.

The summary of Comint pick-up on the unsuccessful GRAND SLAM mission described the flight as follows:

"Good take-off 01/0159Z Peshawar, proceeded on course per mission plan. Soviet tracking began at border, continued without interruption for 1558 nautical miles until last reported position 01/0629Z nearly midway through flight plan.

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"Scattered fighter reaction occurred early in flight, not reported subsequently. Track for last 30 minutes showed U-2 in trouble, with reduced ground speed, altitude. Headquarters hypothesis, directly opposite Soviet reports, is that U-2 encountered some sort of mechanical malfunction, possibly including oxygen equipment.

"A special VIP flight took off from Moscow 01/1435Z, arriving at Sverdlovsk 01/1615Z, returned to Moscow 03/0247Z but quite unusually, landed at the Russian equivalent of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base rather than point of origin. Believe this aircraft may have been carrying top level aerodynamicists, possibly bits and pieces of the U-2..." 1/

On the non-arrival of the mission aircraft at Bodo within a reasonable period after its anticipated arrival time of 01/1119 GMT, a check was made at Andoya Air Base with negative results. Subsequently all other possible alternate landing points were checked to no avail. At 01/1617 GMT Col. Beerli telephoned from Bodo 50X1, E.O.13526 asking him to send the following message to Headquarters: "We have had no information from you for several hours. At this moment we have two planes standing by at Bodo as well as local help. What should we do?" Headquarters was at the same time sending a message to Col. Beerli, which crossed the one above, saying: "Situation here grim. Staff standing by for any eventuality. Imperative you keep Headquarters advised all information by any communications available."

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The Comint reports left little hope for the U-2's recovery and the Project Headquarters staff began to take care of the necessary details for pulling back the forward teams, and alerting all concerned stations around the world to the emergency. A first consideration was to fix the cover story which would be employed in the eventual announcement of a lost aircraft. The text of the announcement released on 2 May by the Adana Base Commander was agreed by all concerned agencies in Washington and said:

"... The U-2 aircraft was on a weather mission originating at Adana, Turkey. The purpose was the study of clear air turbulence. During a flight in Southeast Turkey the pilot reported he had oxygen difficulties. This was the last word heard at 1700Z over emergency frequency. The U-2 aircraft did not land at Adana as planned and it can only be assumed it is now down. A search effort is underway in the Lake Van area. The pilot's name is being withheld pending notification of next of kin." 1/

The change in the cover story with regard to the flight plan of the missing aircraft was decided at highest levels in Washington in an effort not to involve Pakistan, on the theory that the Turks were better able to stand the initial exposure to possible Soviet claims or threats.

Since it was impossible to predict in what form or manner the Soviets would break the news of the downed aircraft inside their borders, whether by open propaganda blast, or through private protest notes to the U. S.

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and others concerned, all that could be done was to brief all those involved and then wait for Khrushchev to show his hand, meanwhile tightening physical security at every point possible.

On 5 May, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, monitoring Radio Moscow, picked up the official announcement by Khrushchev of the shooting down near Sverdlovsk of an American plane which had crossed the Soviet frontier "from Turkey, Iran or Pakistan". On 7 May an additional statement said that the Soviets had captured the spy pilot alive and were interrogating him.

The rest of the story of the U-2 pilot, Frank Powers, and what happened over Sverdlovsk, is almost entirely in the public domain. The sequence of events in Washington following the May Day incident is covered separately in Chapter XIV.

Efforts to Remain Operational at Adana

All flights of U-2's from Incerlik Air Base ceased as of 3 May 1960 and not even local flights were allowed to maintain the aircraft and equipment in operationally ready status. The Menderes Government was ousted in a military coup on the night of 27 May 1960--a long-simmering revolt against its dictatorial and oppressive measures--and Menderes and most of the members of his government were imprisoned. No official of the new provisional government had been briefed on the U-2's mission,

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nor had any such briefings been requested. However, neither had any restriction against resumption of U-2 flights from Turkey after 1 May been imposed by the new government.

A strong effort to retain the U-2 capability in being in the field was made by the Project Director subsequent to the May Day mishap. Due to the political situation in Japan and the strong urging of U.S. Ambassador Douglas MacArthur, it became necessary to remove Detachment C's U-2 aircraft (and later its personnel) from Atsugi early in July 1960. The State Department also favored at least a temporary pull-back of Detachment B to the ZI in view of the Soviet intention to hold a public trial of Francis Gary Powers, and the possibility of revelations being made which would make the continued presence of Detachment B in Turkey a source of embarrassment to the U.S. Government. Plans were therefore made to phase the group out of Adana by September.

In August 1960 a high priority requirement of the Office of Scientific Intelligence of CIA for peripheral electronic reconnaissance of the Soviet/Middle East border region raised the question of keeping Detachment B in action to achieve this coverage. The return of the group to the ZI was suspended while a decision was sought. The DCI was agreeable to retention of Detachment B in place provided the State Department would

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consent. No decision had been reached at the time of the Moscow trial of pilot Powers (17-19 August 1960) and full time and attention of all concerned was being given to the monitoring of testimony made public there, and to the sifting of press and radio broadcast coverage of the affair. While the trial caused a worldwide sensation, the revelations were, over-all, not as damaging as had been feared, and the list of persons implicated by name was small compared to anticipated numbers of people and places feared "blown". The participation of the British was not brought out and the involvement of members of host governments whose bases had been used was fairly low key compared to what had been expected. Norwegian reaction to Soviet accusations caused the principal blowback among third countries involved.

In October 1960, an effort was made to obtain State Department reaction to the idea of retaining Detachment B for collection of Elint from the Soviet launch site at Sary Shagan. Mr. Cunningham visited Ambassador Cumming at State on 5 October for that purpose and was told that since Secretary Herter had previously supported the plan to return the group, any change in plans would require the Secretary's approval. Mr. Herter was not pressed for a decision at the time and a month later in an effort to settle the matter, Mr. Bissell sought

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General Cabell's recommendations on the future of the group at Adana. (USIB had meanwhile formally recommended the development and employment of a U-2 airborne Elint system for peripheral coverage of Soviet missile launching, but no source of funding had been ascertained.)

General Cabell's view was that a token force only be maintained at Adana, acting as caretakers of the equipment to be stored there, primarily for the purpose of retaining the use of the base in the event permission might be forthcoming in the future for Soviet Bloc or Middle East overflights, and secondarily to retain a base for the proposed Elint operations.

A principal problem to reactivating the U-2 flights in Turkey, even for merely local flying, was cover. NASA's Director, Dr. Glennan, had given a negative response (supported by State) to any further use of his agency as sponsor. Air Weather Service cover would require use of Air Force pilots and aircraft insignia, which would remove the civilian nature of the operation completely.

In consideration of problems relating to cover, funding and political approvals, Mr. Bissell concluded that Detachment B and its equipment should be returned to the ZI to augment the Edwards group and the new Taiwan group just being formed. Therefore on 10 November 1960 reduction to a holding unit was begun. All pilots were returned to Edwards

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and by January 1961 the unit was reduced to ten: Maj. Kenneth Martens, USAF, Commander; three CIA communications staff; four Lockheed techreps; and two support types.

The next effort to unground the U-2 and reactivate Detachment B came early in April 1961. Mr. Bissell obtained DCI and DDCI concurrence to a step-by-step revival of the capability, provided State was informed and given opportunity to disapprove. Mr. Hilsman, then Director of Intelligence and Research at State, was favorable toward the idea but recommended that the Special Group* be given detailed justification and time to study the proposal. The Special Group considered the proposal at a meeting on 17 August 1961 and instructed CIA and DOD to coordinate the ungrounding of the CIA U-2 in Turkey under

* At the 19 May 1960 meeting of the National Security Council's "Special Group" (the body which coordinated all CIA activities falling under the categories of covert activities listed in NSC 5412/2), Mr. Allen Dulles briefed the group on the 1 May U-2 incident. Afterwards, Mr. Gordon Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, expressed his belief that U-2 operations should have been a matter for the Special Group to consider and pass on. Mr. Allen Dulles explained that, since every phase of the project and all missions flown had received the coordination of the Secretary of State and the President, there had been no need to submit these operations to a lesser body for coordination. From that time onward, however, all U-2 overflights have, with very few exceptions, been passed on by the Special Group, the exceptions being the few cases of urgent requirements for which coverage was ordered by highest authority without reference to the Special Group.

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cover of TALL KING (a proposed SAC U-2/RB-47 operation over the Black Sea and Iran for Elint collection). This coordination was completed on 23 August but the U.S. Ambassador in Turkey, when queried by State regarding Turkish permission for the operation replied, in part:

"It remains my view that the use of U-2 aircraft, regardless of whether we have Turkish approval, could foreseeably have most serious public relations reaction as well as international political consequences which could be specially serious in present situation. My reasons for this have been previously expressed. This is admittedly, however, not only a Turkish problem, but one of wider significance and I must, of course, defer to any decision made on appropriately high level in Washington, but with hope that conclusion reached will in fact give full consideration to all implications, including possible effect on present flights which now going smoothly after period acute difficulty. I would wish to make clear that my concern here centers on use of aircraft of U-2 type in view its unfortunate history and by that token does not apply to RB-47 even though participating in joint exercises.

"As far as securing approval of Turkish Government is concerned, even though comments made above are essentially of political character, I do not feel approach here need be on a political level, but would recommend that request for U-2 and/or RB-47 flights be handled through presently established channel through which requests for other flights are transmitted. This channel is J-2, Office of General Kurttekin. I do not exclude the possibility, however, that Turks may wish to raise this problem to higher level, either within the military or in Foreign Office. . . " 1/

1/ IDEA-0476, 14 September 1961. Quoting cable from Ambassador Hare, Ankara, to the State Department.

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On 3 November 1961, the Department sent Ambassador Hare a further message saying that the Special Group had carefully considered his views (as expressed in the above-quoted cable) in the light of the changing international political scene, and had decided that the TALL KING operation should proceed as planned. He was accordingly requested to approach appropriate Turkish authorities. The approach was made through the U.S. Air Attaché, but no answer to the request was forthcoming from the Turks. At the time the Soviet airline, Aeroflot, was petitioning for the right to overfly Turkey on a Moscow-Cairo run and the Turks were giving this request serious consideration.

With little prospect of getting Turkish agreement to U-2 flights, Detachment B was told to complete plans for evacuation. The one remaining U-2 was disassembled and airlifted to Burbank for inspection and repair as necessary, and modification, the personnel were reduced to seven, and the Detachment B hangar at Incerlik Air Base was partitioned so as to allow the Air Force to use part of the facility. After departure of the last aircraft in February 1962, a small caretaking group with a communications tie-in with Project Headquarters in Washington remained at Incerlik as merely "a foot in the door".

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ANNEX 76

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/This message was drafted by Mr. Park Armstrong and approved for dispatch [] 50X1, E.O.13526 [] by Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr./

28 April 1956

EYES ONLY

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE CHARGE, ANKARA

I am taking this means of instructing you because of the unique sensitivity and security considerations concerning the project which is the subject of this message, namely, AQUATONE. Until otherwise directed, you should confine your communications on this matter to me to this channel. You should know that knowledge of this project within the Department is confined to myself, the Acting Secretary in my absence, and a very few high officers, but does not include the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs. You will be briefed more fully on this project by [] and Berg.

I desire that you see Prime Minister Menderes and present to him the request described below. You may tell the Prime Minister that this request comes personally from me. You may in your discretion take [] with you in order to answer any detailed or technical questions that the Prime Minister may ask.

You should approach Menderes along the following lines, if you think appropriate.

Now that the "weather balloon" project (GENETRIX) has been liquidated, the US Government wishes to express to the Government of Turkey its sincere appreciation for the wholehearted cooperation and assistance accorded the US Government in carrying out that effort.

The US Government admires the firm stand that your Government took when the USSR launched its propaganda campaign and protested against the balloons that entered its upper air space. The US Government regretted that it was not able at that time to coordinate its decision fully with you, but for reasons which are now to be conveyed to you, the US believed it wise to terminate promptly rather than to continue launchings.

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The fact is that the balloon project was the first phase of a reconnaissance plan that will shortly be ready to embark on a second and more important phase. At the time that the balloon launchings commenced, it was not then convincingly demonstrable that the second phase, which was in the testing stage, would prove out so that it could be undertaken with acceptable levels of risk. But by the time that the Soviet Union protested the balloon flights, these tests had proceeded much further, and in the interest of avoiding possible prejudice to the success of the second phase, it was considered prudent to discontinue further balloon launchings. The tests have now been completed with results that are satisfactory to us, and it is now feasible to deploy the units involved.

At this point you should describe Project AQUATONE to the Prime Minister, giving him such detail as he requests. You should tell him that the project is considered of the highest priority by the US Government and that, because of its obvious sensitivity and the need for the greatest possible security, the US Government has restricted knowledge of the project to the smallest possible number of high officials. However, operations will not commence until the decision to do so has been taken by the highest level of the US Government. You could say that the US Government has the utmost confidence in the discretion of the Prime Minister and is thus prepared fully to disclose the nature of the project to him, but trusts that, if he concurs in it, he will not find it necessary to inform more than the absolute minimum number of officials in his government who would need to know of it if the project is to succeed.

You should then inform the Prime Minister that the US considers that the airfield at Adana, from which the balloons were launched, is from all points of view the most favorable site for AQUATONE. You should point out its geographic advantages and you can say that no other available site compares favorably with it. You could point out that this request, in effect, is a continuation of the balloon phase by different means, involving a manned vehicle. You can further say that the US Government solicits the continued cooperation of the Government of Turkey in using the Adana airfield for this purpose. You may inform the Prime Minister that the UK is expected to cooperate with the US in this project by providing a site.

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In describing Project AQUATONE to the Prime Minister, you should frankly indicate that its purpose is overflight of hostile areas for reconnaissance purposes, but unless pressed by him, you should leave the maximum penetration capability and the intention to employ it as vague as the circumstances permit.

If the Prime Minister raises the question of quid pro quo, you may indicate to him that the US is prepared to share such of the results as would be of direct interest to the Turkish Government with it. By this we have in mind areas adjacent to Turkey and the northern littoral of the Black Sea.

If the Prime Minister should demur on the grounds that there are reasonable prospects that the USSR will agree eventually to the President's "open skies" proposal, you may tell him that the US Government is satisfied, as a result of reports of the position stated by the Soviet leaders recently in England, that the USSR has no repeat no intention of undertaking any such agreement. Thus it is of the utmost urgency for the US and Turkey to exercise the recently developed US capability to overfly the defenses before the USSR has time to develop the matching intercept capability.

I request that you hold this matter on an EYES ONLY basis. Ambassador Warren is being briefed on the project prior to his departure from Washington. I believe, however, that it is better for you to make this approach than have it be one of the first things Ambassador Warren would take up upon his arrival.

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DDS&T Historical Paper

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DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)
 History of the Office of Special Activities

Chapter XIII

(PERIOD)
 From Inception to 1969

DO NOT DESTROY

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Written by Helen Kleyla
Robert O'Hern

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CHAPTER XIII. BRITISH
PARTICIPATION IN U-2 PROGRAM

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CHAPTER XIII. BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN THE U-2 PROGRAM

Background

In a briefing paper for Director Allen Dulles in preparation for a White House meeting in May 1957, Mr. Bissell recommended that, if AQUATONE were to continue beyond 1957, in order to reduce the political hazards of overflights, certain modifications of operational concepts might be introduced. One of these was the use of non-U.S. pilots (possibly British) in order to heighten the possibility of plausible denial. Between 1957 and early 1958 the question of U. K. participation in the program was discussed with Sir Dick White, head of MI-6, and Air Vice Marshal William M. L. MacDonald, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Intelligence, on several occasions by Messrs. Dulles and Bissell, but only in the vaguest terms.

On 7 February 1958, Mr. Bissell cabled [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] outlining the current CIA/Air Force thinking on the nature and extent of a possible joint operation with the British. The main advantage for inviting UK participation at that time would be "to facilitate operations by them at times or under circumstances beyond the scope of authority accorded by U. S. political authorities." ^{1/} The Air Force and

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CIA were agreed that as a first step a number of British pilots should be given U-2 training in order to be prepared for future contingencies.

[redacted] was asked to convey Headquarters thinking to AVM MacDonald, ACAS/I, and learn whether he was prepared to select three to five pilots and move ahead with their training (in advance of final policy decisions).

The Air Ministry responded affirmatively and recruiting of RAF pilots was begun.

At the end of April 1958, Mr. Bissell spent several days in London discussing with MI-6 and Air Ministry officials the prospects for obtaining UK political approval for flights against Soviet and Satellite targets. It was agreed that a joint list of priority targets with justification for their coverage should be worked up, and in July or August, when pilot training would be farther along, an approach would be made to the Prime Minister. The timing would be in accordance with the current political situation, e. g., whether or not a Summit Meeting was in progress.

Project OLDSTER

An Air Ministry contingent composed of Air Vice Marshal Beresford Lees, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Operations, and Group Captain Stewart Gordon Wise, who was to serve as project officer within the Air Ministry cell, arrived at Project Headquarters in mid-June 1958 for

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orientation on the program and to reach agreement on plans and procedures for carrying out the joint project. In preparation for these talks the Headquarters staff had drafted two plans: Plan A envisaged a small RAF contingent of ten to twelve to be integrated into Detachment B at Adana, being supported by Detachment B and running missions which would be operationally controlled from Project Headquarters. Plan B called for establishment of a separate detachment at a suitable UK base, with personnel to be approximately 40% RAF and 60% American, with an RAF commander. After a week of consultation, Plan A was agreed in principle with further refinement of details to be worked out jointly. (See Annex 77 for text of Plan A.)

By June 1958 additional action had taken place, including:

- a. The nomination, processing and beginning of training of the first four RAF pilots (Flight Lieutenants John Alonzo MacArthur, David E. B. Dowling, Michael Granville Bradley, and Squadron Leader Christopher Hugh Walker).
- b. The establishment of cable communications between Project Headquarters and the project cell in the Air Ministry, via London Station. (In July 1958 a direct channel was opened into the Air Ministry cell.)
- c. An exchange of visits between the requirements people and the photo interpretation experts on each side.

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The initial ground training and checkout of the first four pilots in the U-2 was accomplished in early July 1958 at Del Rio, Texas, where their training was supervised by the SAC Wing at Laughlin Air Force Base. On 10 July, Squadron Leader Walker was killed in a training accident and as a result one of the three additional RAF pilots chosen for training (who were still in England) withdrew from the program. Delays were encountered in processing additional RAF personnel, including particularly a flight surgeon, and in completion of training by the SAC Wing due principally to shortage of aircraft. This caused a slip in the planned readiness date of the unit to October 1958.

Political Approvals

While the Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Dermot Boyle, and all RAF personnel involved were eager to get ahead with the project, there were delays on the political side through the summer of 1958 due to the Greek/Turkish clash over Cyprus and the Jordanian situation. On 27 July 1958 50X1, E.O.13526 was told by Sir Patrick Dean (then Deputy Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, and Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee) that there was no Foreign Office objection to the idea of operations from Turkey. He said also that he believed chances were good for obtaining approval of the British Prime Minister

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for possibly five missions at a time with specific mission approval to be given by Sir Patrick himself. (This plan did not eventuate, much to the chagrin of all concerned.)

On 27 August 1958, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan gave his approval to British participation in the project with the understanding that operational missions would be flown by "civilian" pilots and without RAF markings on the aircraft; the ground organization would be integrated with that already established by the Americans; and it was to be clearly understood that the Prime Minister reserved judgment of the use to be made of the aircraft, and that no operational flights were to be made without his specific permission.

On the same day, President Eisenhower gave his approval in principle to the OLDSTER project provided the Secretary of State agreed. Later General Cabell briefed the Secretary of State on the status of British participation and said it was proposed to determine informally from the Turkish Government whether the few British personnel involved could be stationed with the American group at Adana. The Secretary advised that he had no objection to the British joining the project nor to the informal approach to the Turkish authorities. He asked whether or not proposed British flights would be cleared with the U.S. in advance.

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General Cabell replied that arrangements would be for the British to notify the U.S. in advance of any intended operation with control and mission planning being accomplished at CHALICE Headquarters Control Center. Thus the CHALICE staff would have the opportunity to block the operation if U.S. authorities so desired.

On 5 September 1958, 50X1, E.O.13526 wrote to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, AVM Sydney O. Bufton, RAF, as follows:

"The favorable policy decisions which have just been made at the top levels of both our Governments suggest that the moment is particularly appropriate for an analysis of the policy issues involved. . . The U.S. intended, when it initially fielded its units, to have a capability of performing 32 operational missions a month. Moreover, it was hoped that a substantial number of this maximum capability would occur. Within fourteen days, however, after commencement of the initial missions, the Soviets made a formal protest. . . which forcibly established the fact that the Soviet radar capability was extremely good (better than expected) and Soviet Government was attaching a sharper significance to deep penetration than anticipated. Consequently our highest political authorities insisted that the missions be reduced in number from the plan above and be undertaken only for reasons of real importance. The intelligence community then reviewed its requirements with a view to reducing targets to only those of highest priorities. And approval was to be requested only when the international situation seemed appropriate for deep penetrations and when a mission or missions would not cause major embarrassment to US/Soviet relations. It was assumed all missions would be detected. . . therefore the fundamental consideration on the political side regarding approval of any

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given mission is whether or not the world political situation is such that the possibility of a Soviet protest is tolerable or politically acceptable to the sponsor...

"At no time has there been in the U. S. any permanent prohibition against deep penetration missions and I am advised by Washington that the President has been extremely receptive to the efforts and results of the program over the many months that it has been reviewed and examined by him. He now, as we have told you, favors British participation essentially for the very reason for which it was proposed, namely that our joint efforts may well tend to spread confusion among the Soviets as to the sponsorship of such activities." 1/

On 11 September 1958 Prime Minister Adnan Menderes of Turkey was briefed on the plan to put the British unit at Adana with Detachment

B. Permission was received to bring in no more than 12 British technicians to work with the American unit. Briefing of the Prime Minister was accomplished by the [redacted] 50X1, E.O.13526

[redacted] with Chargé d'Affaires Carlos Hall, Col. Geary, and Messrs. Cunningham, and [redacted] of Project Security Staff also present. Subsequently Mr. Cunningham visited London for definitive discussions with the British and Messrs. [redacted]

[redacted] of Project Personnel and Security Staffs, respectively, joined the working party to add their specialized knowledge in

1/ Letter to AVM Sydney O. Bufton, 5 September 1958, from [redacted]

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the fields of the care and handling of "civilianized" pilots and the building of cover stories. Until the Headquarters group arrived in London, little progress had been made, due principally to the Air Ministry's inability to adapt to a clandestine program. Partially as a result of this, MI-6 entered the scene as the clandestine support element. Good progress was subsequently made on pilot contracts, cover and other administrative and security matters.

The CHALICE/OLDSTER Operational Plan, which was worked out jointly, was signed on 28 October 1958 by AVM Bufton and Group Captain Wise for the British side and Mr. James Cunningham for CIA. The text of this agreement, TS/CHAL-0397, is appended as Annex 78.

On 12 November 1958, Group Captain Thomas Leigh Bingham-Hall was nominated to replace Group Captain Wise as the senior officer in the OLDSTER Air Ministry cell. He was given the cover of Commanding Officer, Meteorological Experimental Research Unit, RAF Station, Watton, but maintained his office in London under the immediate jurisdiction of AVM John Grandy, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Operations. One week later the first group composed of three pilots and a flight surgeon joined Detachment B, and began the process of integrating into the group.

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On 2 December 1958, Acting Secretary of State Herter was briefed on OLDSTER and shown the target complex overlays which were to be presented for the British Prime Minister's approval. The Acting Secretary was in general agreement with these.

On 5 December 1958 the White House was informed through the Aide to the President, Gen. Goodpaster, of the status of plans for British participation in the CHALICE overflight program by memorandum from Mr. Bissell as follows:

"You are aware of the plans for British participation in Project CHALICE. Their pilots and other personnel are now in place with our detachment in Turkey. An exchange of letters has taken place between ACM Sir Dermot Boyle and General White requesting and agreeing to the loan of U-2's to the British Meteorological Office. In about a week two U-2's will be staged at the RAF Station at Watton and will fly a number of meteorological missions with British personnel. We believe this will establish our cover.

"The British plans are well advanced for operational use of the U-2. The Air Ministry has secured full concurrence of the Foreign Office in seeking authority to obtain coverage of a number of top priority areas in central Asia from Pakistan. This proposal has been presented to the Prime Minister and his decision is expected early next week. The betting in London appears to be that he will grant the authority requested subject to mission-by-mission review by the Foreign Office.

"I am calling these facts to your attention with some urgency for the following reason. It is agreed with London that we will be immediately notified by cable of the Prime Minister's decision so that appropriate persons in Washington can be advised of it. The Prime Minister has indicated, however, that

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in addition to this rather informal communication through our channel, he will address a personal communication to the President, unless his decision is wholly negative (in which case there would be no point in raising the issue). His communication will be delivered to the British Ambassador here who will be instructed to hand it to you for delivery to the President. Such a communication could reach you as early as the 9th or 10th. We would hope to have at least 24 hours warning of its impending arrival but our communication could conceivably be delayed.

"The Under Secretary of State has been briefed on this procedure and also on the specific proposal that has been presented to the Prime Minister by the Air Ministry and we plan to keep the State Department advised as to the Prime Minister's decision. I assume that if his decision is favorable, it will be necessary promptly to secure the views of the Secretary of State and thereafter to bring this matter to the President's attention. I might say that the requirements which the proposed missions would meet are agreed between the two intelligence communities so the operation would have the same strong support as if we were doing it on our own authority. Moreover, although any communication or action on our part should be undertaken within, say, a week, there is no need for a crash decision since the operation could not in any event begin before 15 January. Lastly, there would of course be an opportunity to review progress here, mission by mission, as well as in London, so there is no question of an irrevocable decision covering three or four sorties.

"Perhaps we should communicate on the 8th or 9th as to the procedure you would use in handling the communication from the Prime Minister should one be received." 1/

The Prime Minister gave his approval for the OLDSTER unit to stage from Pakistan on 10 December 1958 in the following letter to

1/ TS/CHAL-0263, 5 December 1958. Memorandum for Gen. Goodpaster, from R. M. Bissell, Jr.

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President Eisenhower which was delivered by the British Ambassador on 11 December 1958:

"... The staffs on both sides have now worked out an agreed procedure for clearance and I have now approved in principle a programme of British flights for the next three months, of which details will be available to you. I have ruled that within this programme each individual flight should be submitted to me for clearance before it is made...

"I would not propose normally to inform you direct if I should find it necessary for reasons of policy to cancel or postpone a particular flight in the present or subsequent programmes; United States authorities will, of course, be aware of any such decision through operational channels. But if at any time I feel it necessary to cancel or suspend the programme in whole or in part I would propose to inform you direct of such a decision. I hope that you would be prepared to give me a similar notification of any comparable decision which you may take." 1/

President Eisenhower replied to the Prime Minister as follows:

"I share your desire that the policies of our two Governments with respect to these activities should not be inconsistent. If we should feel at any time that operations you are planning would do disservice to our common interests, we will feel free to communicate our views to you. I hope you will feel equally free to do likewise. I think it should be understood, however, that British missions are carried out on your authority and are your responsibility just as our activities are authorized and controlled here in accordance with procedures I have established. In this sense, it could be said that we are carrying out two complementary programs rather than a joint one..." 2/

1/ CHAL-0447, 10 December 1958.

2/ Reply to Prime Minister Macmillan (drafted for the President's signature by R. M. Bissell, Jr.).

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OLDSTER Operational Phase

One additional pilot and a navigator/flight planner joined the OLDSTER unit at Detachment B in January 1959. Two of the Detachment's U-2 aircraft were to be made available for their use. It had been decided by the DCI that title to the aircraft when being employed by the British for overflights must rest with the British Government. Only if this condition were met would the U.S. political authorities regard the operation as truly British, being undertaken with the authority of their own Prime Minister. Accordingly, arrangements were made to cover the transfer and the retrieval of the aircraft. Approval to stage British missions from Pakistan was obtained from General Ayub Khan, then Minister of Defense, and all appeared to be in readiness for British operations.

In January and February 1959, Air Ministry officials became concerned with the increase in vulnerability of the U-2 to possibly improved Soviet intercept capabilities. Exchanges of cables and a briefing of the British group on the latest intelligence and zoom climb test results cleared the air and improved the outlook of the OLDSTER pilots toward flying the U-2.

Then followed a series of delays including a visit to Russia by the British Prime Minister, several international meetings and other

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state visits throughout most of 1959. Meanwhile permission had been given for the British pilots to fly Middle East reconnaissance, and as a means of building cover, two meteorological research flights were staged from the RAF Base at Watton, England, with suitable publicity. On this staging the quick turn-around procedures developed at Detachment B were tested successfully, using a C-130 and a tent in a remote area of the field as an operating headquarters.

The first British overflight of Russia was finally approved and flown on 6 December 1959 from Peshawar, covering Kuybyshev and Kapustin Yar and using the B camera with excellent results. The second and only other Soviet mission was flown on 5 February 1960 covering Tyura Tam, Kazan and Ukraine, also using the B camera with excellent results.

As a security measure following the events of 1 May 1960, the entire RAF contingent was immediately withdrawn, debriefed and returned to normal duty. During the period of OLDSTER operations the following Headquarters-directed missions were accomplished:

USSR overflights	2
Peripheral Elint Missions	5
Middle East Photo Missions	17
Weather Flights	5
Total	<u>29</u>

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RAF Liaison Officer at Project Headquarters

During the discussions in London in May 1958, it was agreed that the British side would have one liaison officer stationed at Project Headquarters to represent the Air Ministry project group in both operational and administrative matters. The first assignee was Wing Commander Norman Mackie, and when news of his arrival on 28 June 1958 reached Project Headquarters, the question immediately arose as to where his desk should be; the Operations Control Center at that time was supporting the highly classified satellite program as well as CHALICE/OLDSTER. Mr. Bissell recommended that he sit in the Operations area, but not within the Control Center, and that he be briefed that there were other activities which were closed to him. If this arrangement should become too difficult to manage, he said, it might be best to cut the Wing Commander and one or two of his superiors in on the satellite activity rather than go in for elaborate compartmentation.

During the course of a visit to Project Headquarters by AVM Bufton and Group Captain Burnett, his deputy, at the time the OLDSTER unit became operational, the precise arrangements with regard to the liaison officer's responsibilities and privileged status were reviewed. He was to have local authority, on behalf of the Air Ministry OLDSTER cell,

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for approving mission plans for RAF pilots, and in order for him to discharge this responsibility, the current close working relationship within the operations structure was to be continued. Mr. Bissell explained to AVM Bufton that there were other projects of a highly sensitive nature which would be withheld from Mackie, although from day to day he might be exposed to some mention of them. Therefore it was requested that AVM Bufton approve the liaison officer's treating such information as privileged and not intended to be passed to his superiors in the Air Ministry. The AVM concurred and stated that Mackie would be told to treat any information gained as privileged and would be expected to behave as a "patriotic American" in these cases rather than as a British subject.

In a subsequent memorandum, Col. William Burke reported:

"On 11 December I reviewed this conversation with Wing Commander Mackie. He stated that he was aware of other projects; that he was relieved to hear of the AVM's feeling and position; that he felt he was occupying a privileged position and would not pass on to his Government information on projects other than CHALICE.

"My judgment, based on the frank and aboveboard character of W/C Mackie, as well as the close and unusually fine relationships which exist between him and the members of the staff, is that he will certainly honor this arrangement." 1/

1/ TS/CHAL-0470, 12 December 1958. Memo for Record by Col. Burke.

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The RAF Liaison Officer maintained his office within the Project Operations Control Center from July 1958 throughout the life of OLDSTER. In the spring of 1961 when Mackie was relieved by Wing Commander J. C. (Bill) Blair, an internal review of the situation relating to continuing British participation brought forth the following recommendation by the DPD Executive Officer, Mr. John McMahon:

"Looking back to AQUATONE there were obvious advantages to be gained through the mutual participation of the British and United States in the project. Such cooperation could be greatly enhanced by the presence of an OLDSTER representative... within the AQUATONE organization... Since the time of AQUATONE, however, the Division has expanded to include air support for all Agency requirements and, of course, we ourselves have stepped into various exotic programs of our own... When the charter of this Division was extended to include all CIA air activities, we accepted the responsibility to protect from unauthorized individuals, both CIA and otherwise, information concerning the operations conducted under the auspices of the various Area Divisions. I question the willingness of the Area Divisions to jeopardize knowledge of their operations to a foreign national. I question that the advantages to be gained from Commander Blair's permanent presence in this Division outweigh the obvious disadvantages in the compromise of information." 1/

Despite this, and similar recommendations from Security, the RAF Liaison Officer was not excluded from occupying office space within the Operations area until the move was made to the new building at

1/ DPD-1384/61, 3 March 1961. Memorandum for the Acting Chief, DPD-DD/P, from Executive Officer, DPD.

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Langley in February 1962. From that point through the balance of Wing Commander Blair's tour he required an escort in and out of the restricted area and was not given desk space there. Since the program never received approval from British political authorities for reconnaissance overflights subsequent to 1960, the task of liaison with Project Headquarters became something less than a full-time job. Subsequent to the departure of Blair, an RAF officer assigned to the British Joint Services Mission (Group Captain A. J. Moody) was given this chore as an added duty to his liaison with other U. S. agencies, principally the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

Continuation of British Participation: JACKSON (1961 to date)

Shortly after the withdrawal of the OLDSTER unit from Turkey in May 1960, AVM Bufton in a conversation with Mr. Allen Dulles, indicated interest on the part of the British in continuing to participate in the U-2 program. The Director at that time could not say what the future held for CHALICE, since a Presidential decision would be necessary to carry it on. Later when higher authorities agreed on a consolidation of CHALICE assets in the ZI, with a phased withdrawal of Detachment B from Turkey, the Air Ministry was so informed. The Headquarters feeling at this time was that there was little merit in

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British participation unless Foreign Office support were obtained for primary missions. Group Captain Bingham-Hall felt that the intelligence collection potential of a UK group operating from the ZI would be quite limited and he pressed to abolish his staff within the Air Ministry, retaining only a liaison officer in Washington. However, AVM Bufton, during September and October 1960, discussed continuation with the Foreign Office and on 11 October 1960 received political approval from the Foreign Secretary to retain the franchise. Project Headquarters expressed concern that approval had not been obtained from the Prime Minister himself, and were answered by AVM Bufton's cable as follows:

"Both Secretary of State for Air and the Foreign Secretary consider it reasonable and prudent to maintain overflight capability under the same rules that existed between us before and it is inconceivable that both Ministers would accept such arrangement without being sure of their ground. Even if you insisted that the PM be approached for his blessing it is extremely doubtful that he would say he was definitely going to agree to any further overflights or that he was not. He would merely, I am sure, support the decision of his Ministers to maintain a capability. There is no doubt that in due course he will be informed of the decision... I consider we should go ahead with our planning on the basis that before all the various arrangements are concluded the PM will be informed at an appropriate time..." 1/

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Two RAF pilots were chosen for the JACKSON program and reported for processing in December 1960 and for training at Del Rio in January 1961. Between January and June the pilots converted to the U-2 at Laughlin and in June moved to Edwards Air Force Base where, along with an RAF medical officer and a navigator/flight planner, they were integrated into Detachment G in accord with a memorandum of understanding signed on 25 May 1961 by AVM Bufton for the British side and Mr. James Cunningham for CIA (see Annex 79 for terms of this agreement). The JACKSON Operational Plan was drafted jointly over a period of several months during which time Bufton was replaced as Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Intelligence by AVM Alick Foord-Kelcey, who eventually signed the joint operational plan on behalf of the Air Ministry at the end of 1961. (See Annex 80 for the JACKSON Operational Plan.) At the same time Group Captain Harold A. C. Bird-Wilson replaced Bingham-Hall as head of the JACKSON cell in the Air Ministry.

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recommended that the RAF pilots be fully integrated into the air operations of Detachment G and be used for air sampling, ferry, overflight and peripheral missions, as well as other routine flying, with exceptions to be made on a mission-by-mission examination. However,

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during their first year at Edwards the British pilots (other than flying training and test flights) flew only three Headquarters-directed air sampling missions and one ferry mission to Midway Island. The British authorities did give an okay for use of their pilots on Cuban overflights without the necessity for mission-by-mission approval, but this offer was not taken up by CIA.

In April 1962, the Air Ministry in reviewing the question of use of their pilots in the joint IDEALIST/JACKSON program, sent the following message to Project Headquarters:

"The UK Government's original concept of JACKSON was that it preserved a capability for urgent intelligence collecting missions in the event of a major emergency. Contingency planning which has already been agreed to between us was regarded here as contributing to this capability. But as yet no emergency has actually materialised which has seemed to call for a U-2 operation...

"We recognise that you now have many projects on hand under your IDEALIST programme and that it is only a hindrance to you to have in the U-2 unit two RAF pilots who are unproductive. We are however most anxious to continue with our participation in the JACKSON project and within limits likely to be prescribed by political considerations we should like these pilots to be employed on tasks which will contribute effectively to the US/UK intelligence effort and my Secretary of State is ready to submit proposals to the Prime Minister with this end in view..." 1/

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Evolving from this effort to revitalize the program, a proposal to stage a JACKSON mission from Pakistan against the Sary Shagan Missile Test Range, employing System X, was put forward for approval. This operation (named ADVENTURE), after presentation to the British Foreign Minister on 10 July 1962, hung fire for a month with approval being expected momentarily; but before British approval could be obtained, the Director (then Mr. John A. McCone) called a halt to the plan in view of pressure from USAF to use the RB-57F for Sary Shagan surveillance. This somewhat disgruntled AVM Foord-Kelcey, since he was on the verge of presenting the proposal to the Prime Minister, and it was anticipated by Headquarters staff that the British would move to end their participation in the U-2 program. However, the Air Ministry still wished to maintain the capability in being and the agreement was reaffirmed late in 1962.

In May 1963 an exchange of messages between Air Chief Marshal Sir Wallace Kyle, Vice Chief of the Air Staff, and General Marshall S. Carter, DDCI, resulted in the extension for another year of the JACKSON Detachment at Edwards. The only activities during the following year involved replacements and training.

In September 1964 an exercise involving the ferrying of two U-2 aircraft via Plattsburg and RAF Wyton to a U. S. carrier in the

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Mediterranean, accompanied by a KC 35 carrying relief pilots and fuel, was being discussed via cable with the British. It did not develop beyond the talking stage either then, or when it was brought up in March 1965 at the time when trouble was again brewing in Cyprus.

In May 1965, Dr. Wheelon (then D DS&T) met with Group Captain Robert W. Oxspring and Group Captain Wise, who were currently responsible for JACKSON on the British side, for a discussion as to whether the project was still viable and warranted. He posed two questions:

(1) If the program continued, would this give equity for use of British airfields for staging? The British answer was that historically this request had been turned down by either the Commonwealth Relations Office or the Foreign Office. (2) Was there value to the British in having the U-2 and its advanced cameras available for their use? The British admitted that the system was better than their Canberra equipment, but that the RAF would find it difficult to operate the U-2 in any but a line RAF unit, which the British Government was reluctant to accept.

50X1, E.O.13526

On 14 May 1965, Dr. Wheelon [] as follows:

"We will make an explicit decision to continue or discontinue the JACKSON program in the near future. I want you to inform me of any reactions the British may show in

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this area as well as informing me of any other matter bearing on this issue..." 1/

In a background memorandum on the subject "Continuation of the JACKSON Program", prepared for Dr. Wheelon's information on 9 June 1965, Mr. Cunningham recommended that if the current search by the British for effective employment of the JACKSON capability proved non-productive, the program should be allowed to expire at the completion of the tours of the current incumbents at Edwards Air Force Base. (See Annex 81 for full text of Mr. Cunningham's brief.)

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[redacted] replying to the DDS&T's [redacted] a full month later, gave the following summary of the current RAF position: The RAF would like to retain JACKSON capability for possible contingencies. Group Captain Wise had hinted that the availability of a better vehicle would give him a stronger position. At present the RAF up through the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Intelligence desired to let the current tour of the JACKSON group run its course to the spring of 1967 and then reevaluate. As an aside, it was mentioned that Group Captain Wise had referred to the U-2 as a "dirty airplane", a very hot item politically, which the UK Government would find it difficult to

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operate independently under the existing political circumstances.

In July 1965 the Air Ministry underwent a reorganization, becoming "Ministry of Defence for Air", and JACKSON affairs were placed under the cognizance of the Director of Operations (Bomber and Reconnaissance), Air Commodore Antony Wilkinson Heward, with Air Vice Marshal D. C. Smallwood assuming responsibility on behalf of the Air Staff for the JACKSON program the first of September 1965.

Throughout the summer of 1965 there were intermittent talks (begun in June by Air Commodore John Aiken, then Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Intelligence) with regard to the possible purchase by the British of new model U-2's. Dr. Wheelon in August 1965 sent the following message to the DDS&T Liaison Officer 50X1, E.O.13526

"FYI we are not particularly anxious to sell U-2's to the U. K. We did discuss possibility with Aiken, Wise and others during their visit here. This originated with OSA and its desire to reestablish production line for U-2 and from this office as gambit to eliminate UK personnel from Edwards Detachment. If British come with strong proposal for purchase, we would have to make difficult policy decision here. Under circumstances I consider it desirable to play matter in low key and to leave all initiatives up to them." 1/

In September 1965 AVM Smallwood raised the question of use of British pilots for ferry flights outside the continental U. S. and said in

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a letter to Mr. Cunningham that although Hawaii was now the 50th State, he believed the terminology of "within the continental U.S." was stretching a point; he therefore requested notification in advance each time such use of British pilots was anticipated. (Up to the present, approvals of the few flights of this type have been received by return cable with no delays and no refusals.)

In October 1965, approval was given by the British Air Staff for a JACKSON mission from Darwin or Cocos Islands over targets in Java. Delays were encountered in obtaining the final approval from the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister, and with the subsequent favorable action of the Indonesian Army against the PKI (local Communist Party), the proposal was shelved in December 1965.

Air Commodore Heward made a visit to the U.S. in January 1966 visiting the group at Edwards and holding talks at Headquarters. At that time the British were making a decision on the use of the F-111 and while showing an interest in the new U-2 model, discussions were limited to possible joint reconnaissance in Southeast Asia (Indonesia) and Africa (Rhodesia), and the possibility of sending pilots through survival training at an RAF base north of Singapore.

Air Commodore R. L. Wade relieved Heward in February 1966 as Director of Operations (Bomber and Reconnaissance). In March 1966

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he wrote to Mr. Cunningham suggesting that all agreements concerning JACKSON, including use of pilots, cover stories, etc., be brought up to date. At the same time, Mr. Eugene Somers reported from London that Air Commodore Wade believed that the Labour Party, if it increased its majority in the current elections, would react more confidently to a proposal for JACKSON operations. Mr. Somers felt that Wade was dedicated to reactivation of the program.

In April 1966, Dr. Wheelon visited London and briefed a group of Air Staff officials including Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burnett, Air Marshal L. M. D. Hodges, and Air Commodores Wade and Aiken, on the performance capabilities expected from the U-2R. He explained the concept that the U.S. should give or sell several to countries such as India, Iran or Korea, which would render it more difficult for the opposition to associate the owner and the activity of these aircraft. The Vice Chief of the Air Staff stated that the RAF had studied the problem of purchase of U-2's over the past year or two and had arrived at a negative conclusion for two reasons: the political taint of the U-2, and the decision to buy F-111 aircraft.

This ended any further discussion of British procurement of U-2's. However, in October 1966 agreement was reached with the Air Staff that

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replacements for the RAF JACKSON contingent at Edwards would be furnished in the spring of 1967, and that a further meeting would be held in Washington in December 1966. The Minister of Defence, however, on 26 September 1966 ruled against any broadening of the project or instigation by Air Staff personnel of discussions with such in view.

An internal OSA review of the JACKSON program in October 1966 brought the following summation in a memorandum for the DD/SA from

[redacted] Special Assistant to the DSA:

"The previous staff studies... which have been undertaken periodically since 1960... essentially concluded that the program was, in fact, costing us very little and that in anticipation of unforeseeable contingencies (e.g. Middle East crisis), it was an asset which we should maintain. It also gave us a closer identity with the British, in an operational sense, which in retrospect was of dubious value. In this regard, nothing has changed as of this date, and if the prospects for the future are no more promising, I would firmly recommend that we terminate the JACKSON program. This would be without prejudice to some future reassessment with regard to British participation in the U-2R program when it becomes operational..." 1/

The joint meeting held in the OSA Control Center in December 1966 was held for the purpose of discussing the future of JACKSON with no

1/IDEA-3375/66, Memorandum for the DDSA from SA/OSA dated 24 October 1966.

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commitments to be made pending referral to respective higher commands.

Those present included Air Commodores Wade and Aiken and Group Captain Moody on the British side, and the Director and Deputy Director of OSA and members of the OSA Operations Staff. The consensus of views arrived at during this meeting was as follows:

"a. Although there are existing intelligence requirements in the Far East (outside China/Vietnam, etc.), e.g. Indonesia, there is little likelihood for approval of operations in that area under existing circumstances.

"b. The most probable areas of possible mutual interest for use of the unique U-2 capability appears to be Africa and the volatile Middle East. The UK representatives in particular felt that political approval would be most probable for these areas. The US representatives shared this opinion strongly but were concerned about the lack of adequate bases in the area.

"c. Currently available, and politically acceptable bases for U-2 stagings for possible target coverage of Africa and for contingencies in the Middle East are severely limited. Ascension Island rangewise may have limited utility; Aldabra will not be available for from 2 to 3 years; politically feasible Akrotiri, Cyprus, might be available but probably only under emergency or crisis situations. El Aden, Liberia, was suggested as a possible contingency staging base but would pose major problems from a security standpoint. In fact, the only base in the UK pocket which showed a promising potential at the moment was on the island of Masira off the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia.

"d. The possibility of carrier launchings and recovery was discussed but with an admonition that such operations would probably entail prohibitive costs for other than highest priority or crisis requirements. Refueling operations would involve the same problem but to a lesser degree.

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"Wade and Aiken expressed desire to utilize JACKSON pilots in a productive manner at the earliest possible date. They affirmed that coverage of Africa and the Middle East could not be accomplished readily by any operational capability presently available to the UK." 1/

It was further agreed to meet again at the working level to formulate firm recommendations for respective higher headquarters.

At the end of 1966 there were two pilots, a flight planner and a flight surgeon at Edwards with the JACKSON unit, all due for rotation and replacement during 1967.

1/ BYE-0394-66, Memo for DCI, Subject: Meeting with UK Representatives, 22 December 1966.

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ANNEX 77

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16 June 1958*
PROPOSED PROJECT CHALICE/KEEPER - PLAN A

1. Under this plan the KEEPER program would be conducted along the following lines:
 - a. A Royal Air Force contingent of approximately ten to twelve personnel would be assigned to Detachment B.
 - b. Possible operational bases for KEEPER missions will include but not necessarily be restricted to Adana, Turkey; Giebelstadt, Germany; Kinloss, Scotland; and Cyprus.
 - c. In order to accommodate the KEEPER augmentation at Detachment B, two additional U-2 and one additional T-33 aircraft will be provided at Detachment B.
 - d. KEEPER pilots will receive continuation and proficiency training at Detachment B.
2. Under this plan the RAF personnel assigned to Detachment B would include:
 - a. One Squadron Leader who will function as the British Detachment Commander and who will be an operational pilot.
 - b. Five other operational pilots - Squadron Leader/Flight Lieutenant.
 - c. An Adjutant who will serve as administrative officer and senior security officer.
 - d. Three to five other personnel as needed.
3. All KEEPER pilots will be under the operational control of the Commander, Detachment B with such control to be exercised through the Royal Air Force Detachment Commander. The Commander, Detachment B, will be responsible for maintaining the pilot proficiency of KEEPER pilots and for the training of all British personnel in their respective jobs. All staging operations will be under the command of the Commander, Detachment B or his designate.

(* Changed from KEEPER to OLDSTER due to conflict with another British crypt.)

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4. A Concept of Operations to include method of target selection is attached as enclosure 1.

* * * * *

Operational Concept for Joint CHALICE/KEEPER Program

A. Assumptions:

1. That the Royal Air Force KEEPER unit will be integrated within Detachment B.
2. That the KEEPER Unit will be supported by U. S. personnel on all operations.
3. That the KEEPER missions will be operationally controlled from CHALICE Headquarters in the same manner as normal CHALICE missions.

B. Target Selection:

1. Following discussions between British and U. S. Intelligence Requirements Officers, the Air Ministry will obtain authority to secure coverage of specified targets and areas, together with an indication of relative priorities. It will transmit such authority and priority indications in appropriate form to CHALICE Headquarters as guidance for mission planning.

C. Weather:

1. Weather for flight planning for KEEPER missions will be furnished by the Weather Central at Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, Nebraska using the same system now established to support CHALICE operations. The weather for mission planning will be sent to the unit 12 hours prior to take-off. Additional weather information for flight briefing will be sent to the unit approximately four and one-half hours prior to take-off. Weather information will be furnished only to those echelons which are directly concerned with detailed flight planning.

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~~TOP SECRET~~D. Mission Planning:

1. KEEPER operational missions will be planned in the Control Center at CHALICE Headquarters. Direction and control of these missions will be effected and maintained through the normal HBJARGON message system already established.

2. All KEEPER flights will be planned and/or approved by the Royal Air Force liaison officer assigned to Headquarters CHALICE, prior to being dispatched. He will also maintain liaison with the Air Ministry and keep them advised of planning and status of proposed operations.

3. The British Air Ministry will obtain political approval for specific missions or geographical areas for coverage well in advance of contemplated operations. The Air Ministry will be made an informational addressee on the "Alert" message dispatched to the unit 24 hours prior to take-off and designating the general area of operation. Approximately two hours later another message will be dispatched to the Air Ministry only describing in as much detail as weather information at the time permits, the flight path and the targets to be covered. On the basis of this message the Air Ministry may direct modifications of the flight plan. Although the schedule will not permit changes of the flight plan at a later point in the cycle, the Air Ministry may at any time exercise its prerogative of disapproving the mission because of political considerations or late developments which might be prejudicial to the proposed operation. Notification of approval or disapproval should be dispatched at least five hours prior to take-off. The Air Ministry will also be an informational addressee of the detailed Mission Plan (HBJARGON 100-12 hours prior to take-off), the "Go-No-Go" message (three hours prior to take-off), and will also be advised by CHALICE Headquarters when a landing report on the aircraft has been received. Emergency procedures relating to last minute cancellation or recall of airborne missions will be in accordance with existing CHALICE arrangements.

4. Although the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee, in conjunction with its British counterpart, has responsibility for establishing target priority, the precedence for coverage of individual targets will be determined by the Operations Staff, including the Royal Air Force Liaison Officer, based on operational considerations.

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E. Unit Responsibility:

1. As in the case of CHALICE Detachment Commanders, the KEEPER Unit Commander will have authority to cancel or delay KEEPER missions because of equipment non-availability or malfunction, or because of inadequate terminal weather. All decisions concerning route weather will be the responsibility of CHALICE Headquarters and the Royal Air Force Liaison Officer assigned thereto.

F. Mission Take:

1. Exposed primary camera film from KEEPER operational missions will be sent to Eastman Kodak Company, Rochester, New York, for processing.

2. The 70mm tracker film will be processed at the Detachment. Route weather and aircraft track will be determined and reported to Headquarters CHALICE in accordance with established procedures. The tracker film will then be duplicated and one copy sent to London and one copy to Washington. Distribution of primary configuration photography will be in accordance with current agreements.

3. ELINT tapes will be duplicated at the Unit and the original sent to Washington for read-out. One copy will be sent to London and an additional "hostage" copy will be retained by the Unit pending safe arrival of the Washington and London copies.

4. Escort of all mission take, photographic or electronic, between the Detachment, the U. S. and the U. K. will be under CHALICE security cognizance.

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ANNEX 78

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28 October 1958

CHALICE/OLDSTER - OPERATIONAL PLAN

- Appendix A - Administrative Arrangements
- Appendix B - Notification and Clearance Procedure
- Appendix C - British Overt Cover Story

Task Organization: Headquarters CHALICE (Washington)
Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry)
CHALICE Det B (Adana, Turkey)

General Situation

1. It has been agreed between the U.S. and HMG that it would be of mutual benefit to their respective intelligence communities for British personnel to play a full part in the execution of CHALICE photographic and elint intelligence missions over and around the USSR and other denied territories. Such participation seems likely to broaden the scope of these operations and thereby enhance the intelligence information available to both the US and British Governments.

2. The British participation is to be known under the code name OLDSTER and will consist of selected pilots and control personnel working as a national team at the direction of HMG within the existing CHALICE organisation for the purpose of satisfying intelligence requirements agreed between approved representatives of the two Governments.

Mission

3. To establish a British reconnaissance capability within the existing command structure of CHALICE Det B for the purpose of undertaking elint and photographic intelligence missions as directed by Headquarters OLDSTER.

Execution4. Personnel

(a) Headquarters OLDSTER is to provide 5 RAF Officer Pilots and 1 RAF Medical Officer who will be represented on appointment to the unit as civilians for all purposes during service outside the U.K. The senior RAF pilot is to be designated British Detachment Commander.

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(b) Headquarters CHALICE is to arrange for the integration of RAF personnel into the command structure of CHALICE Det B.

(c) Additional administrative details are covered in Appendix A.

Logistics and Material

5. (a) Headquarters CHALICE is to provide two additional U-2 aircraft and one T-33 aircraft to Det B for use of OLDSTER personnel.

(b) The British Detachment is to be provided with the full logistic and maintenance support available to Det B.

Operational Planning

6. Operational control of all OLDSTER sorties is to be exercised by Headquarters OLDSTER through Headquarters CHALICE and the local USAF Commander in the field. On all operational matters, the British Detachment Commander will be responsible to the local USAF Commander but has the right of direct access to London on all policy and domestic matters concerning British personnel which may arise from time to time. The flight training programme and selection of RAF pilots for operational and training missions is to be the joint responsibility of CHALICE Det B Commander and the British Detachment Commander.

Mission Planning

7. (a) Headquarters CHALICE is to prepare provisional mission plans from an agreed list of targets and in the light of operational and political considerations. These will be submitted to Headquarters OLDSTER for consideration, evaluation and for provisional political approval in accordance with Appendix B.

(b) The Air Ministry are to keep the agreed target lists and priorities under constant review and to notify Headquarters CHALICE of any amendments through existing channels.

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(c) After consideration of provisional mission plans Headquarters OLDSTER is to notify provisional planning approval to Headquarters CHALICE. Thereafter control of proposed missions is to be in accordance with the Reports Control Manual (Ops Manual 55-1). The procedure for obtaining British political clearance is detailed at Appendix B.

(d) After notification of approval by Headquarters OLDSTER, the operational control of the mission is to pass to Headquarters CHALICE. Headquarters OLDSTER retains the right to cancel a mission up to time of takeoff and, in addition, the RAF Detachment Commander retains the right to cancel any British mission based on his judgment of local operational considerations.

Mission Take

8. Photographic and Elint take from all OLDSTER missions is to be processed under existing CHALICE arrangements, and the intelligence information disseminated to both the U.S. and British intelligence agencies under the existing procedures.

Security

9. It is mutually recognised that the protection of the U.S. and British Governments in the event of an incident is of paramount importance, and it is intended to build up a suitable British overt meteorological cover story with a classified cover story of air sampling similar to the existing cover provided for U.S. activity. To this end, Headquarters CHALICE agrees to make available to Headquarters OLDSTER one U-2 aircraft for meteorological missions from a selected RAF base in the U.K. The provision of this aircraft will be on an opportunity basis and at the rate of approximately two sorties per 90 days. The proposed cover story is detailed at Appendix C.

U-2 Operational Base in the U.K.

10. RAF Watton has been selected as the United Kingdom airfield for meteorological flights and for ferry flights to and from the U.S.A.

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11. In the event that a post or pre-strike base is required for USSR peripheral or overflights the operational base most suitable for U-2 aircraft operations in the U. K. is RAF Kinloss because of terminal weather, availability of hangar and proximity to the Northern targets which are of interest to intelligence agencies. In addition, the lack of air traffic in the area and its isolated location eases the security problem.

12. RAF Kinloss is at present undergoing major works services on the main runway and this work will not be completed at the earliest before March 1959.

13. After work is completed at RAF Kinloss, it can be used as a pre and post-strike base. The RAF will meet airlift requirements within the U. K. to support any staging operations.

14. Facilities required at RAF Kinloss will be limited and will be laid on for each specific operation as the situation requires.

Transit flights to and from the United Kingdom

15. Special instructions dealing with clearance of flights between the U. K. and Adana will be passed by Headquarters OLDSTER to RAF Watton and Headquarters Fighter Command.

Communications

16. (a) Command posts are:

- (i) Headquarters CHALICE
- (ii) Headquarters OLDSTER
- (iii) CHALICE Det B

(b) Headquarters CHALICE is to provide and/or arrange for communications in support of the CHALICE/OLDSTER project at bases other than in the U. K. and is to establish standards for traffic transit times in accordance with operational and administrative requirements.

Signed: Asst. Chief of the Air Staff (Intel.) J. O. Bufton (AVM)
Dep. Director Ops (Recce) D. G. Wise (Gp Capt)
C. I. A., James A. Cunningham, Jr.

28th October 1958.

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OLDSTER Operational
Plan dated 28.10.58ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTSSection A - Personnel AdministrationTour of Duty

1. The anticipated tour of duty for RAF personnel with Detachment B is two years.

Personnel Records

2. All RAF personnel of Detachment B are to be established on the strength of AMU/SDL and all official records and documents will be retained at Headquarters OLDSTER. RAF personnel will be issued with a civilian flying log book in which entries to be made by the holder will conform to local security requirements and which will be certified by the USAF Detachment Commander. This book will be retained by the Detachment Operations Officer.

3. On completion of a tour on OLDSTER operations, entries in the civilian log books will be transferred to RAF log books and certified by Headquarters OLDSTER.

4. Forms 1369 (Annual Confidential Report) will be completed in respect of RAF personnel under arrangements to be made by Headquarters OLDSTER.

Leave of Absence

5. Privilege Leave and/or R&R absences from duty for RAF personnel will be approved by the British Detachment Commander in consultation with the Detachment B Commander and will be granted as operational requirements permit. The local USAF regulations on "off limits" areas and leave travel outside the country of assignment will be strictly observed by RAF personnel. Headquarters OLDSTER will be advised by cable of any annual leave proposed.

Order and Discipline

6. At all times when posing as civilians, RAF personnel are to conduct themselves in accordance with established and appropriate

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RAF regulations and with the local regulations of the USAF and Turkish authorities.

Casualty Procedure

7. The approved US casualty procedure is to be applied to all RAF personnel at Detachment B except that personal effects of the individual will be forwarded to Air Ministry London, marked "for the personal attention of ACAS(Ops)". All casualty reports and documents in respect of RAF personnel are to be copied to Headquarters OLDSTER.

Aircraft Accident Investigation

8. All aircraft accidents, regardless of type, involving RAF personnel are to be investigated in accordance with CHALICE Detachment procedures. Copies of such reports as well as related signals will be furnished to Headquarters OLDSTER.

Marriage

9. RAF personnel contemplating marriage are to immediately submit full particulars of the proposed spouse to the RAF Detachment Commander who will inform Headquarters OLDSTER for further instructions. It should be recognised that the continued utilization of an RAF officer on OLDSTER is contingent upon proper clearance of his spouse.

Travel Orders

10. RAF personnel, while in a duty status with Detachment B will travel from place to place on orders authorised by the USAF Detachment Commander. They will be shown as civilian employees of the British Meteorological Office on such orders, i. e. "Experimental Officer". The orders will further state that the individual's equivalent rank is that of Major.

Travel Notifications

11. Notification of movements of all personnel, including visitors is to be authorised by Headquarters OLDSTER, and forwarded to Detachment B with information copy to Headquarters CHALICE. Notification

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will include name, civil or military grade, as appropriate. It will also include purpose of travel, anticipated duration and clearance status of the individual. In the event of an individual proceeding to Detachment B for temporary duty whose access to specific locations or equipment should in any manner be restricted or curtailed, this information will be made a part of the ETA cable. Headquarters OLDSTER will be advised of proposed travel to the United Kingdom by OLDSTER personnel from Detachment B in advance.

Passports and International Immunization Records

12. Passports and official International Immunization Records will be provided for each individual by Headquarters OLDSTER prior to deployment to Detachment B. Upon arrival there these documents will be placed in the custody of the USAF Executive/Administrative Officer, Detachment B and will be released to the individual only for official travel or leave travel.

Section B - Registry

Registry

13. (a) The procedures for transmission of classified documents and personal mail to and from Headquarters OLDSTER and Detachment B will be as follows:-

(i) Classified documents originating in London will be appropriately marked, placed in double envelopes and delivered to the American Embassy, London, for despatch by diplomatic courier to Germany and thence by USAF arrangements by secure means to Detachment B. On arrival, the mail will be delivered unopened to the RAF Detachment Commander and a receipt obtained which will be returned to Headquarters OLDSTER in the reverse manner employed for outgoing material.

(ii) Classified documents being sent from Detachment B to Headquarters OLDSTER will be delivered to the USAF Detachment Executive/Administrative Officer, suitably marked for classification, and placed in double envelopes, as above.

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These will be transmitted to Headquarters OLDSTER through the reverse of the system set forth in paragraph 13(a)(i) above.

(iii) Personal mail will be handled in the same manner as in paragraph 13(a)(i) and (ii) above except that receipts will not be required. Mailing address for OLDSTER personnel at Detachment B will be:-

Room 7323, Air Ministry
Whitehall Gardens
London, S. W. 1.
England

Headquarters OLDSTER will forward personal mail. On no account will personal mail be transmitted through civil postal channels to or from an OLDSTER individual at Detachment B or at any other location overseas.

Section C - Medical

Responsibilities of British Medical Officer

14. The RAF Detachment Surgeon is directly responsible for the care of all RAF personnel and their dependents. In addition, he will assist the USAF Detachment Surgeon whenever required and practicable. All RAF personnel or dependents requiring medical care will first be referred to him. Upon determination of the amount and type of care required, he will either perform such care as lies within his capabilities of equipment and supplies, or will seek the assistance and guidance of the USAF Detachment Surgeon if the cases are beyond his local scope. Such additional support medical facilities as are needed to offer complete and definitive care for RAF personnel and dependents will be arranged through the USAF Detachment Surgeon and/or CHALICE Headquarters, keeping Headquarters OLDSTER informed.

Hospital Services

15. Should it become necessary to hospitalize RAF personnel or dependents for minor ailments not requiring surgical care, the facilities of the Base Dispensary will be made available through the

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Detachment B USAF Surgeon. A small daily charge may be made to the patient for such service.

16. In the event major surgery or extended hospitalization is required, of a non-emergency nature, the patient will either be air evacuated to NATO Hospital Izmir, Turkey or to Lyneham Air Force Base England for onward movement to an RAF Hospital in UK at the discretion of the RAF Detachment Surgeon.

17. Emergency care for RAF personnel or dependents, including emergency surgery, will be provided either at the Detachment B location or the USAF Hospital, Ankara, Turkey. Following such emergency treatment, if the patient's diagnosis is favourable but requires extended hospitalization, he may be air evacuated either to the NATO Hospital, Izmir, Turkey, or to an RAF Hospital in England.

Physiological Training and Maintenance of Personal Equipment

18. The RAF Detachment Surgeon is directly responsible for the support of the mission in relation to all aspects of Physiological Training and maintenance of personal equipment, as well as other specialized equipment concerned with pilot performance. In the performance of this duty he will be assisted, as required, by the USAF Detachment Surgeon, the USAF Physiological Officer and USAF medical support personnel.

(a) Special areas of responsibility will be to advise the RAF Detachment Commander of the physical and mental condition of flying personnel within the confines of acceptable aeromedical practise, the care and proper utilization of all personnel and specialized equipment directly concerning the welfare of flying personnel. It shall be his sole responsibility to withdraw an RAF officer from flying status based on a medical opinion, and to reinstate him to flying status when he sees fit.

(b) In the physiological field, it shall be his further responsibility to maintain training of flying personnel commensurate with mission performance.

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19. The RAF Detachment Surgeon has the responsibility to maintain appropriate medical health records for all RAF personnel attached to the unit. Though not in themselves classified documents, they will be stored as such by the RAF Detachment Surgeon and must in no circumstances be shown to uncleared personnel. If essential, extracts may be produced in sterile form.

20. The RAF Detachment Surgeon shall see to the maintenance of immunization standards for RAF personnel and dependents in accordance with arrangements made previously between Headquarters CHALICE and Headquarters OLDSTER.

Section D - Pay and Allowances

21. The RAF OLDSTER personnel will be posted to the Air Ministry Special Duty List and their RAF pay and allowances will be paid through normal service channels. Whilst engaged in this project they will receive additional allowances from special funds and be provided with free accommodation. These allowances will be calculated in two parts:-

(a) A special living allowance whilst based at Adana, equivalent to the living allowances paid by H. Q. CHALICE to their own pilots.

(b) A supplementary allowance calculated to raise their net RAF pay in the same proportion as CHALICE pilots' pay compares with USAF pay.

22. Each officer's special allowances will be calculated individually. The supplementary allowance will be paid independently to his U.K. bank account. The living allowance in Turkey will be paid at Adana in U.S. dollars through H. Q. CHALICE from a fund which will be replenished periodically from London.

23. Prior to departure for Detachment B RAF personnel are to elect an amount to be paid to them monthly by the Detachment B Finance Officer. The requisite amounts to cover these monthly payments will be made available in U.S. dollars to the Detachment B Finance Officer, and authority will be given for British personnel to draw U.S. dollars to meet their requirements subject to satisfactory assurance of recovery from his RAF emoluments.

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24. The Finance Officer Detachment B is to account for all supplementary Agency funds and render monthly accounts.

25. The medical officer attached to the OLDSTER team at Adana will qualify for the special living allowance but not for the supplementary allowance.

Section E - Security

General

26. It is agreed that the RAF personnel of Detachment B will be subject to the existing security regulations detailed under the direction and control of the USAF Detachment B Commander and subject to policy guidance from Headquarters CHALICE and OLDSTER.

27. When operating from RAF bases, Detachment B Commander may enlist the aid of the RAF security services as authorized by Headquarters OLDSTER.

Security Responsibilities of the British Detachment B Commander

28. The British Detachment Commander is to be responsible to the Detachment B Commander for ensuring that RAF personnel conform to the security rules and regulations laid down by the Detachment B security authorities.

Handling of Classified Material

29. The handling of OLDSTER material for Detachment B, including storage, maintenance and movement, will be executed in accordance with the Security Custodial Responsibilities laid down by Headquarters CHALICE.

Security Investigation of RAF Personnel

30. All personnel cleared for access to OLDSTER information will have P.V.T. clearance--No OLDSTER clearances will be initiated without the personal authority of A.C.A.S. (I). This clearance will be passed to Headquarters CHALICE with full clearance particulars.

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31. All investigations concerning breaches of security which may arise at Adana or any staging area, involving RAF personnel are to be conducted by Detachment B Security Staff and co-ordinated with British Detachment Commander. All security information and documentation involving RAF personnel of Detachment B will be handled on a "Eyes Only" basis between -

Detachment B Commander

and

RAF Detachment Commander,
Detachment B Senior Security Officer
A. C. A. S. (I)
A. C. A. S. (Ops)
Headquarters CHALICE Security Officer

Security Violations

32. All security violations by RAF personnel of Detachment B will be recorded under arrangements to be made by the Detachment B Commander and the British Detachment Commander. If it is found that any individual is guilty of excessive and continuing security violations, the case will be referred to Headquarters OLDSTER.

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Appendix B
OLDSTER Operational
Plan dated 28 Oct 1958

NOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE OF ELINT AND
PENETRATION FLIGHTS

Penetration Flights

1. Details of proposed penetration flights by British pilots including overlays setting out target complexes and proposed routes of missions over a three month period will be sent from Headquarters CHALICE to Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry) approximately fourteen days prior to start of a three month operational period.
2. Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry) will seek provisional political clearance using agreed British procedures from the Prime Minister for these missions.
3. Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry) will inform Headquarters CHALICE by signal of British provisional political clearance or otherwise to the proposed missions prior to the start of a three month period.
4. Following British provisional political clearance for proposed missions Headquarters CHALICE will be responsible for detailed planning as follows:-
 - (a) Producing an Operation Order for any staging operation that may be necessary. A copy of this order will be sent to Headquarters OLDSTER.
 - (b) Ensuring that the mission is conducted in accordance with established procedures.
 - (c) Observing and executing the following action prior to the actual mission:-
 - (i) Mission Forecast. This will be sent to Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry) on the Wednesday of each week. It will detail the proposed missions to be flown during the immediately following Monday to Sunday within the programme provisionally agreed (Para. 1 above).

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(ii) Operational Alert. This will be sent to reach Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry) no later than twenty-four hours in advance of planned take-off time. The message will contain operating details including target area and time of take-off.

(iii) Intention Message. This will be sent to reach Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry) not later than twenty-two hours prior to planned take-off time and will contain additional operating details including target and time of take-off.

(iv) Unit Mission Plan. This will be sent to reach Headquarters (Air Ministry) no later than twelve hours prior to planned take-off time. It will contain full details of specific mission including target, route, equipment and weather.

(v) Final OLDSTER Message. Headquarters OLDSTER (Air Ministry) will despatch to Headquarters CHALICE at least five hours prior to estimated time of departure a message giving final British political approval or disapproval to the mission.

(vi) Go-No-Go Message. Headquarters CHALICE will send Headquarters OLDSTER a copy of their message to the operational unit giving approval or non-approval to the proposed mission. This message will be despatched to arrive at least three hours before the estimated time of take-off and after the receipt of the message in (v) above.

Elint Flights

5. No Elint flights are to be undertaken by British pilots without authority from Headquarters OLDSTER.

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OLDSTER Operational
Plan dated 28th October,
1958OLDSTER COVER STORYIntroduction

1. The American cover story for clandestine U-2 flights is linked to the overt and publicised operation of USAF U-2 weather squadrons operating for NASA. Because of this and of the special characteristics of the U-2 it is logical that a British cover story should also be related to high altitude weather research.
2. The validity of this approach is reinforced by the fact that there is a real Meteorological Office requirement for this kind of research work and it would be looked upon as a natural and desirable development in meteorological circles.
3. Arrangements are to be made for the Meteorological Office to have the occasional use of the U-2 aircraft as a result of an understanding between the USAF and the RAF. This fact would not be classified but would not be given undue publicity and all press releases are to be strictly controlled by the Air Ministry. Meteorological data concerning turbulence associated with jet streams, temperatures are to be collected. This would be done either by installing British meteorological equipment or by utilizing existing American met. instruments. Meteorological U-2 aircraft are to pay periodical visits to this country and based at an RAF airfield. Such flights will be of approximately ten days duration every three or four months.
4. Meteorological data obtained at heights above 55,000 feet is to be classified "Secret" and the information is to be divulged to only those people concerned with analysing such material on a strictly "need to know" basis. Data below 55,000 feet is unclassified, and freely available for publication by the Meteorological Office.
5. Covert operations for purposes of photographic or electronic reconnaissance will take place from suitable bases in the United Kingdom or overseas as dictated by operational requirements using CHALICE aircraft. The aircraft will be flown by RAF pilots from the UK and by the same pilots documented as meteorological officers when flying from overseas. The Medical Officer and any supporting administrative staff

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would similarly be described as civilian technicians when visiting overseas bases. Whilst penetration flights will not carry meteorological equipment, in the event of an incident they will nevertheless be described as meteorological research flights.

6. In the event of penetration flights leading to a protest by Soviet or Communist bloc countries, little difficulty is foreseen in producing a rebuttal. In the event of an incident involving a forced landing or destruction of a U-2 over denied territory various explanations can be given as described in Annex 1.

Political Approach and Documentation of OLDSTER Personnel in Turkey

7. The initial approach has already been made to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of Turkey, who have agreed to British participation. This participation was described by the Americans as technical assistance by civilian technicians and test pilots.

8. RAF personnel will enter Turkey with civilian British passports describing them as civilian employees of the Meteorological Office. They will carry civilian medical certificates and a supporting paper from the Meteorological Office signed on behalf of the Director General to this effect. Personnel will enter Turkey by civilian airline to Ankara and will then be transported to Adana by American service transport. Further journeys between Turkey and the United Kingdom and other operational bases will be made in USAF aircraft authorized by the Commander of the CHALICE Detachment. The final exit from Turkey will be made openly by civilian airline from Ankara. Whilst stationed in Turkey all British personnel will ensure that they have no documents or uniforms which could connect them with the Royal Air Force. The true nature of their visit to Turkey will only be known to CHALICE-cleared personnel. Selected personnel who have a need to know more than the unclassified story will be told that the British personnel are in Turkey for peripheral air sampling duties. The British Ambassador in Turkey will be informed of the presence of these personnel but not told the true story, and instructed to refer to London any enquiries he might get about these personnel before replying to the Turkish Government.

9. All correspondence including private mail for OLDSTER personnel will be routed through the special "cell" in the Air Ministry for onward transmission by American diplomatic courier to Turkey. Return

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correspondence from Turkey will be sent to the Air Ministry by American diplomatic courier for forwarding.

Political approach and documentation of British OLDSTER personnel operating in Pakistan

10. The Americans have operated from Pakistan twice before but have only told the Pakistan President that they were engaged in periphery Elint collection. A similar story has been told to the American Ambassador although the U.S. Air Attaché is fully briefed. It will be necessary for some approach to be made to the Pakistan President for British participation. M.I. 6 will approach the P.U.S. of the Commonwealth Relations Office who will be cleared for limited knowledge of OLDSTER operations, and he in turn will inform the British High Commissioner along similar lines to those told to the American Ambassador.

11. H. M. High Commissioner will be instructed to approach the Pakistan President and ask for permission for British participation in peripheral Elint collection in agreement with the American plan. The visit to the President will be arranged in conjunction with a similar visit by the American Ambassador.

12. When proceeding to Pakistan on temporary duty British OLDSTER personnel will travel from Adana under the auspices of the USAF and retain their civilian cover as Meteorological Technicians.

Annex 1 to
OLDSTER Operational
Plan dated
28th October, 1958

PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN THE EVENT OF A
MISHAP OVER U.S.S.R. OR OTHER DENIED TERRITORY

1. The precise form of public statement in the event of a mishap could only be determined in the light of the mishap itself; the actual route being flown by the penetrating aircraft; and any statements made by the Soviet Government or any other Government.

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2. In general, if a penetrating U-2 aircraft became missing on a penetration flight it would be the intention of the U. K. to make this fact public and to initiate search and rescue operations. These operations would, of course, take place in an area appropriate to the point of penetration but would not, of course, involve operations over denied territory.

3. There are two points of principle which would be followed at all times. These are:-

(a) At no time would there be any admission to the fact that the penetrating aircraft had been involved in reconnaissance operations.

(b) In the event of the U-2 pilot falling into Soviet or other hands alive he will tell the truth about his operations. In these circumstances the U. K. would make it clear that any such statements were regarded in the same way as other past incidents which claimed to give 'free admissions' on points hostile to the Western cause, the germ warfare, and were made under duress of one kind or another.

4. There are two basic situations to be dealt with, one involving a deep penetration flight, and the other a shallow penetration flight.

Shallow Penetrations

5. In this situation any statement would be related to the fact that a U-2 aircraft was missing flown by a RAF pilot. The aircraft would be stated to have been engaged on a meteorological research flight as part of a programme at present being undertaken. Appropriate details would be made available of this programme and of the arrangements made, including details of the flight from the U. K. to enable RAF pilots to fly these aircraft.

6. Details would then be given of the particular flight on which the aircraft was engaged when it went missing. These details would not, of course, refer to any penetration activities but merely account for the fact that the aircraft was operating in the vicinity of the area at which the penetration was made.

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7. There would then be some speculation as to what had happened to the U-2 aircraft. This speculation might take one of the following forms:-

(a) That the aircraft was intercepted over international airspace and was either forced to land or was shot down over denied territory.

(b) That ground contact with the aircraft had been lost at a particular position, and that the pilot (flying in bad weather, hampered by loss of radio contact and loss of navigation system) may have wandered inadvertently over Soviet territory where he was later forced down, shot down or crashed.

8. Any statements on these lines would, of course, be accompanied by general guidance of previous incidents where Soviet or other Communist countries had shown themselves to react with excessive violence against inadvertent trespass within their airspace.

Deep Penetration

9. The general attitude would be very similar to that for shallow penetration, but it would be necessary to offer a specific explanation as to why the aircraft was so deep in Soviet or other territory. This explanation might take one of the following forms:-

(a) Contact with the U-2 aircraft had been lost at a particular time and particular place. It might be that the aircraft radio communication and navigation system had developed serious malfunction or had failed outright. The pilot might also have had oxygen trouble which, combined with the aircraft's complex navigation system might have resulted in this very grave deviation from the aircraft's planned course. It is possible that with the pilot suffering from lack of oxygen and with the aircraft on 'automatic pilot' this might have caused it to have reached the area stated by the Russians.

(b) That the radio contact with the U-2 aircraft had been lost at a particular time and at a particular place. It may have been that for reasons of pilot error or for technical reasons that the aircraft had, in fact, inadvertently violated Russian airspace. But

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under no circumstances could it be imagined that the aircraft could, on its own accord have reached the place stated by the Russians. Such a flight was not within its capability taking into account of time, the length of route it had previously flown.

Attachment #1 to
CHAL-0397

OPERATION OLDSTER PLAN.

1. This note sets out additional arrangements to those discussed in the plan dated 28th October, 1958. These additional arrangements supersede or amend appropriate parts of the 28th October plan as necessary.
2. In order to strengthen the OLDSTER cover story it has been decided to form a Unit at RAF Watton. This Unit would be known as the Meteorological Experimental Unit (M. E. U.).
3. The establishment of M. E. U. would consist of a Commanding Officer (part-time from Headquarters OLDSTER), and OLDSTER personnel from Detachment B, and a senior N. C. O. (Administrative).
4. The M. E. U. would be overtly located at RAF Watton and would have its headquarters in a hangar. An area for the exclusive use of the M. E. U. at RAF Watton would be made available under appropriate security arrangements. It would be made known as necessary at RAF Watton that M. E. U. was involved in meteorological investigations but also had the task of atomic sampling and its activities in this respect were to be regarded as Secret.
5. The full task of M. E. U. would be known to the Commandant, Central Signals Establishment but to no other unindoctrinated personnel at R. A. F. Watton. A senior N. C. O. (Administrative) would be permanently available at the secure area occupied by the M. E. U. The secure area would be large enough to contain 2 U-2s and would also have in it permanently stores and equipment for these aircraft.

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6. Arrangements would be made for M.E.U. to be on the Air Ministry Special Duties List. No personnel or administrative matters would be handled by RAF Watton. These would be under the exclusive control of Headquarters OLDSTER.

7. OLDSTER communications equipment would be installed in the secure area. The secure area of M.E.U. would act as the operational base during detachment of U-2 aircraft for meteorological experimental flights and atomic sampling flights from the U.K.

8. M.E.U. would be wholly controlled and administered by the Air Ministry (Headquarters OLDSTER).

9. Every attempt will be made to give credence to the operational role of M.E.U. The frequent absences of the majority of its personnel will be explained by reference to:-

(a) The Unit's operational equipment is American and can only be made available from time to time as American commitments allow.

(b) Meteorological research is taking place on a worldwide basis and personnel of the Unit are, or may be employed from time to time in America, the Middle East, Europe or the Pacific.

10. The vital part of the requirement to give credence to the activities of M.E.U. will be actual meteorological flights from RAF Watton. Headquarters CHALICE will, in conjunction with Headquarters OLDSTER, make arrangements for these flights to take place as frequently as conditions will allow. These conditions will be affected by:-

(a) The requirement for CHALICE/OLDSTER operational flights.

(b) The availability of qualified technical personnel and equipment.

(c) The availability of USAF transport aircraft.

11. If political approval is given for penetration flights to be made from the United Kingdom, the RAF will make available transport aircraft for the logistic support within the United Kingdom of any OLDSTER detachment.

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ANNEX 79

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25 May 1961

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

SUBJECT: Integration of Project JACKSON Pilot Personnel into
Project IDEALIST Detachment at Edwards Air Force
Base, California

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

As a result of a meeting held in Washington the afternoon of 19 May 1961, the following text is proposed for mutual agreement, covering principal arrangements required at the local level in Detachment G. Personnel at the meeting were AVM Sydney O. Bufton, RAF, ACAS/I; Air Commodore Roger Whelan, RAF, DDI (B);

[redacted] Development Projects Division; Wing Commander John C. Blair, RAF Liaison Officer to CIA; [redacted]

[redacted] and Mr. James A. Cunningham, Jr., Acting Chief, Development Projects Division.

1. JACKSON pilots assigned to Detachment G, Edwards Air Force Base, will be documented under the notional cover of 6510th Air Support Group, Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC). This unit is analagous to a Headquarters and Services Squadron in a lesser command and is the only unit on the base reporting directly to the Base Commander, Brig. Gen. Carpenter, USAF.

2. Since some form of documentation is required locally, all assigned RAF personnel will be furnished appropriate pocketbook documentation, i. e., gate passes, club cards, drivers' licenses, PX and Commissary cards, etc., which will indicate their association with the 6510th Air Base Group. By special arrangement with AFFTC, RAF personnel will not, however, be carried on any morning reports, manning documents, or published figures of the 6510th Air Base Group.

3. Living quarters for RAF personnel will be off base. While this in itself is a modest departure from the norm for officers serving under an exchange arrangement, both parties to this agreement

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feel that it is preferable in this instance, since it tends to reduce the opportunities for on-base exposure of RAF participation in Project JACKSON/IDEALIST. Civilian clothing will be worn at all times by RAF personnel. Although sufficient documentation as outlined in paragraph 2 above will be furnished each officer to permit him to freely utilize normal base support facilities, i. e., motion picture theaters, Officers' Clubs, PX and Commissary, it is specifically understood that RAF personnel, with the exception of the Flight Surgeon whose on-base bona fides have already been established, will not avail themselves of these facilities. In return for this it is understood that RAF personnel will be furnished a special allowance to compensate for the absence of such normal privileges.

4. If questioned, either on or off base, as to the nature of their assignment, RAF personnel will indicate that they are assigned to the 6510th Air Base Group. The sole exception to this is the Flight Surgeon, who will continue his administrative association with the special medical team at Edwards Air Force Base under the control of Brig. Gen. Don Flickinger, USAF, Assistant to the Commander for Bio-Astronautics, Air Research and Development Command. If questioned specifically as to their duties, they will respond that "they are on a classified assignment". At no time will RAF personnel admit their association with Detachment G, and if questioned about the identity of their commanding officer, they will give the name of Brig. Gen. Carpenter. Likewise, they will not volunteer information that will associate them with the U-2. If questioned as to whether or not they do in fact fly this aircraft, they will respond in the affirmative, admitting that they do this "in addition to flying various other types of aircraft".

5. In the event of a mishap, the initial reaction to inquiry will be to withhold the identity of the pilot until "notification to the next of kin". After twenty-four hours, which is the normal delay associated with such notification, the identity of the pilot will be released by the base Office of Information Services, with the following added statement: "At the time of the accident, this officer was detailed to Air Research and Development Command to familiarize himself with various aircraft in the USAF inventory. (RAF officer's name) was flying a U-2 aircraft, belonging to ARDC at the time the accident

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occurred. Normal accident investigation is being implemented to determine the cause of the crash."

6. It is understood that in the interest of both participants in this activity, Project JACKSON personnel will not frequent the Detachment G squadron area except while on official business. Open association with U. S. members of Detachment G on the base is not encouraged.

7. Both parties to this agreement are aware of the need for operational compartmentation at Detachment G. On occasion this may require that Project JACKSON personnel will be excluded from special areas where unilateral operations of U. S. interest only are in the process of being planned or conducted. Project JACKSON personnel will be briefed to this effect prior to arriving at Edwards Air Force Base by Wing Commander John C. Blair, RAF Liaison Officer to CIA.

8. Administrative guidance to RAF personnel in meeting normal requirements off the base such as State drivers' licenses, credit cards, documents relating to the purchase of personal items, etc., will be available within Detachment G. In all such instances the 6510th Air Support Group, AFFTC, will be shown as their place of assignment. Mail for Project JACKSON personnel, except for the Flight Surgeon, will not be received at a military address on the base but will be directed to their off base housing location.

It is realized that a document of this sort drawn up in advance of a new situation such as proposed for Project JACKSON personnel in the Detachment G environment cannot of necessity answer all situations which might develop. In any case not covered by this agreement and in those instances where an appropriate solution is not readily available within the Detachment G area itself, the problem will be referred in advance to Project IDEALIST Headquarters where it will be discussed between senior personnel of Project IDEALIST and the RAF Liaison Officer, hopefully leading to a mutually agreed position.

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It will be the responsibility of the RAF Liaison Officer to keep his headquarters advised of any major departure from this agreement which he feels may require additional coordination in London.

(Signed) JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR. 25 May 1961
Acting Chief, DPD

(Signed) AVM SYDNEY O. BUFTON 25 May 1961
Assistant Chief to the Air
Staff for Intelligence
Air Ministry

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ANNEX 80

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DDI(B)TS. 5013

18 May 1961

IDEALIST/JACKSON - OPERATIONAL PLAN

- APPENDIX 'A' Administrative Arrangements
'B' Notification and Clearance Procedure
'C' Cover story and arrangements for RAF
personnel at Detachment G
'D' RAF Liaison Officer/HQ IDEALIST/
Responsibilities and duties

Task Organisation: Headquarters IDEALIST (Washington)
Headquarters JACKSON (Air Ministry)
IDEALIST Detachment G (Edwards AFB)

General Situation

1. It has been agreed between the United States and Her Majesty's Governments that it would be of mutual benefit for British nationals to undertake photographic and ELINT intelligence missions in concert with the IDEALIST organisation.

2. The British participation is to be known under the codename JACKSON and will consist of a flying detachment working as a national team under the direction of H. M. Government within the existing IDEALIST organisation.

Mission

3. To establish a British reconnaissance capability within the existing IDEALIST organisation for the purpose of undertaking photographic and ELINT intelligence missions as directed by Headquarters JACKSON.

Execution4. Personnel

(a) Headquarters JACKSON is to provide two RAF officer pilots, one RAF navigation officer and one RAF medical officer. The senior RAF pilot is to be the British Detachment Commander.

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(b) Headquarters IDEALIST is to arrange for the integration of RAF personnel in the IDEALIST field organisation.

(c) Additional administrative detail is in Appendix 'A'.

Logistics and Material

5. (a) HQ IDEALIST is to provide U-2 aircraft and T-33 aircraft for the use of JACKSON personnel.

(b) The JACKSON detachment is to be provided with full logistic and maintenance support.

Operational Control

6. Operational control of all JACKSON sorties is to be exercised by Headquarters JACKSON through Headquarters IDEALIST and the local USAF commander in the field. On all operational matters, the British detachment commander will be responsible to the local USAF commander but he has the right of access to London through the RAF Liaison Officer established in IDEALIST HQ on all policy and domestic matters concerning British personnel which may arise from time to time. The flight training programme and selection of pilots for operational and training missions is to be the joint responsibility of the IDEALIST detachment commander and the British detachment commander.

Mission Planning

7. Mission planning is divided into:-

(a) Provisional mission plans to meet current intelligence requirements.

(b) Immediate planning to meet a sudden demand which may or may not already have been considered under (a) above.

8. To meet requirements in 7 (a):

(a) IDEALIST/JACKSON to prepare provisional mission plans from an agreed list of targets.

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(b) If a provisional mission plan reaches the point where British political approval is to be sought for its execution, HQ JACKSON is to notify HQ IDEALIST of provisional approval. If political approval is sought and obtained the control of the proposed mission is to be in accordance with the Reports Control Manual (Ops Manual 55-1). The procedure for the clearance of JACKSON operational flights is given in Appendix 'B'.

9. In the event of a sudden demand for a mission, IDEALIST HQ is to provide a detailed operational plan and when final political approval has been obtained is to control the mission in accordance with the Reports Control Manual.

Mission Take

10. Photographic and ELINT take from all JACKSON missions is to be processed under existing IDEALIST arrangements and the intelligence information disseminated to both the U.S. and British intelligence agencies under the existing procedures.

Security

11. It is mutually recognised that the protection of the U.S. and British Governments in the event of publicity in the U.S. (for instance, an accident) or in the event of an incident outside the U.S., is of paramount importance.

12. If any publicity is given in the U.S. to the British element, and especially to the pilots, which requires an answer or explanation from the British Government, the answer will be given that the RAF pilots are in the U.S. to fly various types of aircraft, including the U-2. Details of this cover story as well as the security measures to be adopted by the JACKSON detachment in the U.S. are given in Appendix 'C'.

13. Before any mission is undertaken outside the U.S., a cover story must be agreed between IDEALIST/JACKSON HQ. Any cover story will have to be related to the political situation at the time and to the overflight area or areas.

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14. Air Ministry is to maintain secure hangar facilities at RAF Watton for IDEALIST/JACKSON personnel and aircraft. These facilities are to include the screening of part of the hangar and suitably secured office and technical accommodation.

15. Special instructions for the reception and clearance of flights from RAF Watton are to be made as required by JACKSON HQ.

Communications

16. (a) Command Posts are:

- (i) Headquarters IDEALIST.
- (ii) Headquarters JACKSON.
- (iii) IDEALIST Detachment.

(b) Headquarters IDEALIST is to provide and/or arrange for communications in support of the IDEALIST/JACKSON project at bases other than in the U.K. and is to establish standards for traffic transit times in accordance with operational and administrative requirements.

(Signed)

A. Foord-Kelcey
Air Vice-Marshal
Assistant Chief of the Air Staff
(Intelligence)

James A. Cunningham
Development Project Division
Central Intelligence Agency

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JACKSON Operational PlanADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTSSection A - Personnel AdministrationTour of Duty

1. The anticipated tour of duty for RAF personnel with the detachment is from two to two and a half years.

Personnel Records

2. All RAF personnel are to be held on Special Duties List No. 1005 (British Defense Staff Washington) and all official records and documents, apart from medical documents, will be retained in HQ JACKSON.

3. No entries are to be made in RAF log books of U-2 flying. Flying times are to be recorded separately and given monthly to HQ JACKSON for entering into log books in a suitable form on completion of tour.

4. Annual Confidential Reports will be completed in respect of RAF personnel under arrangements to be made by HQ JACKSON.

Leave of Absence

5. Privilege leave and R. and R. absences from duty for RAF personnel will be approved by the British Detachment Commander in consultation with the IDEALIST Detachment Commander and will be granted as operational requirements permit. The local USAF regulations on "off limits" areas and leave travel will be observed by RAF personnel. HQ JACKSON is to be advised of any annual leave proposed.

Order and Discipline

6. RAF personnel are at all times to conduct themselves in accordance with established and appropriate RAF regulations and with the local regulations of the USAF authorities.

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7. The approved U.S. casualty procedure is to be applied to all RAF personnel at the Detachment except that personal effects of the individual will be forwarded to Air Ministry, London, marked "for the personal attention of A.C.A.S.(Ops)". All casualty reports and documents in respect of RAF personnel are to be copied to Headquarters JACKSON.

Aircraft Accident Investigation

8. All aircraft accidents, regardless of type, involving RAF personnel are to be investigated in accordance with IDEALIST Detachment procedures. Copies of such reports as well as related signals will be furnished to HQ JACKSON.

Marriage

9. RAF personnel contemplating marriage are to submit full particulars of the proposed wife to HQ JACKSON. The continued employment of a RAF officer on JACKSON depends upon proper clearance of his wife.

Travel Orders

10. RAF personnel, when on duty with the detachment, will travel from place to place on orders authorized by the USAF detachment commander. Whether they travel as RAF officers or as civilians will depend upon the circumstances of the time and will be decided before the operation by IDEALIST and JACKSON HQ.

Travel Notification

11. Any British visits to the detachment are to be cleared with IDEALIST HQ and the notification is to include name, civilian or military grade, purpose of travel, expected length of stay and clearance status. If the visitor should be denied access to any locations or equipment this is to be stated in the cable.

Passports and International Immunization Records

12. Passports and official International Immunization Records will be provided for each individual by HQ JACKSON as required.

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When travelling normally, only those forms showing the bearer to be a Royal Air Force officer are to be used.

Section B - Registry

Registry

13. The procedures for transmission of classified documents and personal mail to and from HQ JACKSON and the detachment will be as follows:-

(a) Classified documents originating in London will be appropriately marked, placed in double envelopes and delivered to the office of the IDEALIST representative in London for despatch by diplomatic bag to the U.S. On arrival at the detachment, the mail will be delivered unopened to the British detachment commander and a receipt obtained which will be returned to HQ JACKSON.

(b) Classified documents being sent from the detachment to HQ JACKSON will be given to the USAF detachment Executive/ Administrative officer suitably marked for classification and placed in double envelopes. These will be sent to HQ JACKSON through the reverse of the system described in paragraph 13(a) above.

(c) Personal mail is not to be received at a military address on base but is to be directed to the off-base housing location.

Section C - Medical

Responsibilities of British Medical Officer

14. The RAF Detachment Surgeon is directly responsible for the care of all RAF personnel and their dependents. In addition, he will assist the USAF detachment surgeon whenever required and practicable. All RAF personnel or dependents requiring medical care will first be referred to him. Upon determination of the amount and type of care required, he will either perform such care as lies within his capabilities of equipment and supplies, or will seek the assistance and guidance of the USAF detachment surgeon if the cases are beyond his local scope. Such additional support facilities as are needed to offer complete and definite care for RAF personnel and dependents will be arranged through the USAF detachment surgeon and/or IDEALIST HQ.

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Hospital and Emergency Services

15. As far as possible, the three officers living in Lancaster are to be treated for minor ailments without associating them directly with the Base Dispensary. In an emergency it may be necessary to use the Base Hospital facilities but as far as is practicable this is to be avoided. For surgery or hospitalization, if time permits, arrangements will be made with IDEALIST HQ for treatment elsewhere. Costs for such treatment will be borne directly by Project IDEALIST.

Dental Treatment

16. Dental treatment will be arranged with a private practitioner, away from the base, with the approval of IDEALIST HQ. Costs for such treatment will be borne directly by Project IDEALIST.

Physiological Training and Maintenance of Personal Equipment

17. The RAF detachment surgeon is directly responsible for all aspects of Physiological Training and maintenance of personal equipment, as well as other specialised equipment concerned with pilot performance. In the performance of his duty he will be assisted, as required, by the USAF detachment surgeon, the USAF Physiological officer, and medical support personnel.

18. He is to advise the USAF detachment commander of the physical and mental condition of flying personnel within the confines of acceptable aeromedical practice and it is his sole responsibility to withdraw an officer from flying status based on a medical opinion and to reinstate him to flying status when he sees fit. He is to advise on the care and proper utilisation of all personal and specialised equipment directly concerning flying personnel. In the physiological field, it is to be his further responsibility to maintain training of flying personnel commensurate with mission performance.

19. He is responsible for maintaining appropriate medical health records for all RAF personnel attached to the unit. Though not in themselves classified documents they will be stored as such by the RAF detachment surgeon and must in no circumstances be shown to uncleared personnel. If essential, extracts may be produced in sterile form.

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20. He is to see to the maintenance of immunization standards for RAF personnel and dependents in accordance with arrangements made between HQ IDEALIST and JACKSON.

Section D - Pay and Allowances

21. RAF pay and allowances will be paid through normal service channels but while the pilots and the navigator are based at Edwards Air Force Base they will receive from special funds an allowance of 5 dollars a day each. This allowance is to compensate them for loss of privileges on the base and for daily travelling allowances.

22. Money will be paid into an account in Detachment G and the pilots and navigator can draw their entitlement from the Finance Officer as required.

23. HQ JACKSON is to be informed when the account has fallen to 500 dollars and a statement of account is to be forwarded every six months to HQ JACKSON.

24. This special allowance is not to be paid when JACKSON personnel are on leave.

25. JACKSON personnel are not to be told the source of this special allowance, are not to discuss the allowance except with HQ JACKSON and the RAF Liaison Officer HQ IDEALIST, and are not to show the allowance on income tax forms.

Section E - Security

General

26. RAF personnel will be subject to the existing security regulations detailed under the direction and control of the USAF detachment commander and subject to policy guidance from HQ IDEALIST and JACKSON.

27. When operating from RAF bases, the detachment commander may enlist the aid of RAF security services as authorised by HQ JACKSON.

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28. The British detachment commander is to be responsible to the USAF commander for ensuring that RAF personnel conform to the security rules and regulations laid down by the detachment security authorities.

Handling Classified Material

29. The handling of JACKSON material for the detachment, including storage, maintenance and movement, will be executed in accordance with the Security Custodial Responsibilities laid down by HQ IDEALIST.

Security Investigation of RAF Personnel

30. All personnel cleared for access to JACKSON information will have P.V.(T) clearance and no JACKSON clearances will be initiated without the personal authorities of A.C.A.S.(I). Full JACKSON clearance particulars are to be passed to HQ IDEALIST.

31. All investigations concerning breaches of security which involve RAF personnel are to be conducted by the detachment security staff and co-ordinated with the British detachment commander. All security information and documentation involving RAF personnel of the detachment will be handled on an "eyes only" basis between:-

USAF Detachment Commander
and
RAF Detachment Commander
Detachment Senior Security Officer
A.C.A.S.(I)
A.C.A.S.(Ops)
HQ IDEALIST Security Officer

Security Violation

32. All security violations by RAF personnel will be recorded under arrangements to be made between the USAF and RAF detachment commanders. If it is found that any individual is guilty of excessive and continuing security violations the case will be referred to HQ JACKSON.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Appendix 'B' to
JACKSON Operational PlanNOTIFICATION AND CLEARANCE OF PERIPHERAL
AND PENETRATION FLIGHTS

1. HQ JACKSON will inform HQ IDEALIST by signal when provisional political approval is being sought for a mission. When provisional political approval has been obtained, and after both Headquarters have agreed the main outlines of the mission, HQ IDEALIST will be responsible for detailed planning as follows:-

(a) Producing an Operation Order for any staging operation that may be necessary. A copy of this order will be sent to HQ JACKSON.

(b) Ensuring that the mission is conducted in accordance with established procedure.

(c) Observing and executing the following action prior to the actual mission:-

(i) Mission Forecast. This will be sent to HQ JACKSON on the Wednesday of each week. It will give the proposed mission or missions to be flown during the immediately following Monday to Sunday within the programme provisionally agreed.

(ii) Operational Alert. This will be sent to reach HQ JACKSON no later than twenty-four hours in advance of planned take-off time. The message will contain operating details including target area and time of take-off.

(iii) Intention Message. This will be sent to reach HQ JACKSON not later than twenty-two hours prior to planned take-off time and will contain additional operating details.

(iv) Unit Mission Plan. This will be sent to reach HQ JACKSON no later than twelve hours prior to take-off time. It will contain full details of specific mission including target, route, equipment and weather.

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(v) Final JACKSON Message. HQ JACKSON will despatch to HQ IDEALIST at least five hours before estimated time of departure a message giving final British political approval or disapproval to the mission.

(vi) Go-No-Go Message. HQ IDEALIST will send HQ JACKSON a copy of their message to the detachment giving approval or non-approval to the mission. This message will be sent to arrive at least three hours before the estimated time of take-off and after the receipt of the final JACKSON message.

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~~TOP SECRET~~Appendix 'C' to
JACKSON Operational PlanCOVER STORY AND ARRANGEMENTS
FOR RAF PERSONNEL AT DETACHMENT G

1. JACKSON pilots assigned to Detachment G, Edwards Air Force Base, will be documented under the notional cover of 6510th Air Support Group, Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC). This unit is analagous to a Headquarters and Services Squadron in a lesser command and is the only unit on the base reporting directly to the Base Commander.

2. Since some form of documentation is required locally, all assigned RAF personnel will be furnished appropriate pocketbook documentation; i. e., gate passes, club cards, driver's licenses, PX and Commissary cards, etc., which will indicate their association with the 6510th Air Base Group.

3. Living quarters for the two pilots and the navigator will be off base in the town of Lancaster which is 38 miles from Edwards. While this in itself is a modest departure from the normal for officers serving under an exchange arrangement, it is preferable in this instance because it tends to reduce the opportunities for on-base exposure of RAF participation in Project JACKSON/IDEALIST. Civilian clothing will be worn at all times by RAF personnel. Although sufficient documentation as outlined in paragraph 2 above will be furnished each officer to permit him to use normal base support facilities, i. e., motion picture theatres, Officers' Clubs, PX and Commissary, it is specifically understood that RAF personnel are not to use these facilities. In return for this the RAF personnel will be furnished a special allowance to compensate for the absence of such normal privileges.

4. If questioned, either on or off base, as to the nature of their assignment, RAF personnel will indicate that they are assigned to the 6510th Air Base Group. The sole exception to this is the Flight Surgeon, so long as he continues his administrative association with the special medical team at Edwards Air Force Base under provisions arranged by the Assistant to the Commander for Bio-Astronautics, Air Force Systems Command. If questioned specifically as to their duties, they will respond that "they are on a classified assignment". At no time will RAF personnel admit their association with Detachment G, and if questioned about the identity of their commanding officer, they will give the

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name of Major General Carpenter. Likewise, they will not volunteer information that will associate them with the U-2. If questioned as to whether or not they do in fact fly this aircraft, they will respond in the affirmative, admitting that they do this "in addition to flying various other types of aircraft".

5. In the event of a mishap, the initial reaction to inquiry will be to withhold the identity of the pilot until "notification to the next of kin". After twenty-four hours, which is the normal delay associated with such notification, the identity of the pilot will be released by the base Office of Information Services, with the following added statement: "At the time of the accident, this officer was detailed to Air Research and Development Command to familiarize himself with various aircraft in the USAF inventory. (RAF officer's name) was flying a U-2 aircraft, belonging to AFSC at the time the accident occurred. Normal accident investigation is being implemented to determine the cause of the crash."

6. Project JACKSON personnel will not frequent the Detachment C squadron area except while on official business. Open association with U. S. members of Detachment G on the base is not encouraged.

7. On occasions Project JACKSON personnel may be excluded from special areas where unilateral operations of U. S. interest only are in the process of being planned or conducted.

8. The Commander, British Defense Staff, Washington, the Commanding Officer, Edwards Air Force Base, and other selected officers, will be briefed as required to support a story that RAF officers are, under normal arrangements, flying various aircraft, including the U-2. If it is possible, however, no statement should be made by any of these officers until instructions have been received by either HQ IDEALIST or HQ JACKSON.

9. The medical officer of the British detachment will continue to live on the Main Base at Edwards, to wear uniform, and to maintain interest in various aspects of the medical work being undertaken on the Main Base.

Outside the United States

10. It is expected that members of the British detachment, when staging outside the U. S., will travel on USAF orders as British civilian

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and will be issued with the necessary documents and instructions to enable this to be done.

11. RAF pilots flying the U-2 outside the U. S. will retain their RAF identity under all circumstances. If they force-land in friendly, neutral or denied territory they will always give their name, rank and number. Any further information that may be freely volunteered after a forced landing will depend upon the territory involved and pilots will be briefed accordingly before each mission.

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Appendix 'D' to
JACKSON Operational Plan

RAF LIAISON OFFICER/HQ IDEALIST
RESPONSIBILITIES AND DUTIES

The Royal Air Force officer (Wing Commander) assigned to Headquarters IDEALIST is the representative of the Air Ministry (Headquarters JACKSON), London, and is responsible for the following duties:-

(a) Act as liaison officer between HQ IDEALIST and HQ JACKSON for both operational and administrative matters concerned with the project.

(b) Advise HQ IDEALIST as regards RAF policy, methods, etc., which may be pertinent and required for information in connection with IDEALIST/JACKSON operations.

(c) Maintain liaison with HQ JACKSON and keep them advised of planning and status of proposed IDEALIST operations.

(d) In accordance with HQ IDEALIST/JACKSON policy and requirements, co-ordinate arrangements for JACKSON mission plans in conjunction with HQ IDEALIST Director of Operations.

(e) Monitor and supervise the JACKSON mission planning carried out by the HQ IDEALIST Operations Control Staff.

(f) Attend JACKSON mission briefings and in conjunction with the HQ IDEALIST Operations Staff make the necessary decisions concerning route and target weather.

(g) Be the final approving authority for all JACKSON flights. In the event of absence, this final authority may be given by the HQ IDEALIST Director of Operations but HQ JACKSON is to be advised accordingly.

(h) Co-ordinate any arrangements necessary for RAF/British visitors to HQ IDEALIST.

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BYE-2628-65
9 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Continuation of the JACKSON Program

You have asked for our thoughts on the question of the continuation of the so-called JACKSON Program. I believe that in order to evaluate its worth it would be helpful to spend a few moments looking briefly at the background of this effort:

a. The JACKSON Program began in early 1959 as the outgrowth of conversations between Allen Dulles and Sir Dick White in the early winter of 1958 in London. We had just gone through the Congressional elections in the fall of 1958 during which time, for political reasons, the U-2 project had been pretty thoroughly neutralized for several months prior to the election in order that no one "rock the boat" and perhaps endanger the Administration's hope of success at the polls. Having witnessed this same period of extended political sensitivity in the presidential contest of 1956, it was Mr. Dulles's view that a certain advantage might be gained by establishing a British U-2 capability with the thought that, because of the lesser frequency of British elections and the probability that they would not coincide with established U.S. elections, a way could be found to keep the U-2's flying from one side or the other fairly continuously.

b. The JACKSON Program matured during 1959 under the aegis of the RAF with nominal financial and documentation support from MI-6. An operational agreement was worked out in London, which today is still in effect, and Agency communications with the Air Ministry were established. A cell was created within the Air Ministry initially under ACAS(Ops), but prior to the first mission the cell was shifted to the area of ACAS(I), then presided over by the now Air Chief Marshal Bill MacDonald. In latter 1959 and 1960 until 1 May, a small detachment of four RAF pilots, a medical officer, and an operations officer/navigator was stationed within the U-2 detachment at Adana, Turkey, from which point some nineteen Middle East U-2 missions were flown as well as two from Pakistan over the Soviet Union. I feel that the system worked reasonably well, although at the time the British system of approvals seemed a bit tedious, since no less than

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eight senior Air Ministry and government officials, including the Prime Minister, had to sign off on each mission, as well as on any minor changes to the flight plan brought about by operational or weather conditions.

c. After 1 May 1960 the British withdrew rather rapidly from Adana, fearful that their whole position in the Middle East might be endangered by revelations which they expected would be made in August of that year at the time Gary Powers was brought to trial. Their fears, of course, did not materialize. However, the program lay dormant until early 1961 when it was revived by the then ACAS(1), Air Vice Marshal Sidney O. Bufton. Bufton was a close personal friend of the then DDCI, General Cabell, who supported the resumption of the program on what was, at best, a contingency basis. The number of pilots, however, was reduced to two since it was hard to see how any more could be supported in view of the diminished U-2 assets of the Agency. (At the time of the Powers incident, the Agency possessed fourteen U-2's. With the loss of Powers' plane a decision was made to return four of the remaining aircraft to USAF. These latter birds were subsequently recovered from USAF to replace losses.) Despite the best efforts of Sid Bufton there was a reluctance on the part of HMG to consider active commitments of the U-2's in areas where they might have been reasonably effective before the wholesale introduction of SA-2's in the Middle East. Following Bufton's departure his successor, Air Vice Marshal Foord-Kelcey, did little to advance the U-2 cause up through his retirement in 1964. There was a brief period in 1962 when it looked as though we were on the verge of obtaining an agreement from both governments to establish an RAF detachment in Pakistan to conduct the ELINT surveillance over Sary Shagan MTR with System X. I honestly believe the British were ready to give this project their best, but in August of that year Mr. McCone ordered a stand-down in any further planning in face of strong USAF representation on behalf of the RB-57F as a substitute vehicle for the Sary Shagan surveillance.

2. As you can see from the above, a factual box score would seem to indicate that the JACKSON Program was a losing proposition after 1 May 1960. In May of 1963 an attempt was made to interest the British in permitting us to use Cyprus as a base for U.S. U-2 flights against Israel and adjacent areas without notable success. We have found that in all instances where we have actively explored the possibility of using the JACKSON assets, that the Air Ministry and the

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Air Council have supported us to the political authorities. It has been the latter who have historically been bothered by the implications of losing an aircraft in the Powers' manner, where the pilot might be able to reveal his affiliation.

3. At the moment, the continuation of JACKSON is costing us little or nothing. There are two pilots, a navigator and a medical officer at Edwards Air Force Base for whose up-keep we are not responsible, but for whom we furnish flying time in U-2's and T-33's. MI-6 continues to pay the detachment a daily supplemental stipend and we have in the past afforded the RAF pilots, or at least some of them, carrier training although there is no carrier in the Royal Navy suitable for U-2 operations. Our communications link to the Air Ministry has permitted some useful exchanges on technical matters; i. e., during the Sino-Indian crises in 1962 when we were able to determine fairly accurately the capabilities of the Indian Air Force to conduct tactical reconnaissance against the Chicombs. It is only fair to say that if the matter of maintaining the link were put to a vote [redacted] [redacted] would be the first to opt for its abandonment. In a rather intangible way this program furnishes the excuse for direct liaison with the Air Ministry on reconnaissance matters, but this alone is probably insufficient justification. There is today in 1965 one area of the world where the JACKSON Program might be effective, and that is in Southeast Asia against Indonesia in connection with the smouldering Malaysian crisis. Even though the British are on the receiving end of T-KH material, because of weather and geography this collection system cannot be maximally effective against either Borneo or Indonesia itself. The U-2's operating from Darwin or Cocos Island or both could do the job. If political sensitivities permitted, Singapore could also be a base of operation, as could the Philippines. There is, as yet, no competitor to the U-2 in terms of performance within the RAF inventory, and little prospect that they will achieve one. The British might well see fit to join us, if the occasion arose, in conducting reconnaissance from India over China. Such a suggestion was even made by Air Vice Marshal Foord-Kelcey to General Carter in 1963. It is conceivable that the Air Ministry at least might give serious thought to employing their pilots over China from Takhli, if we so desired, in view of the progressive deterioration of the international situation in Southeast Asia. I feel there is only a limited prospect in employing the U-2 in the Middle East under RAF auspices except, perhaps, in

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the less heavily defended areas of Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. I see little expectation that either the U.S. or the U.K. could mount a U-2 staging from Pakistan in the near term, and U.K. pilots operating against China from Taiwan are totally out of the question.

4. All of the above would seem to suggest that unless there is some prospect of melding the RAF capability eventually into the OXCART Program, the chances of effective employment of JACKSON are not too encouraging. The present re-examination of the U.K. position, which I hear from Harry Hean is going on in London, may suggest the possibility of further operations of one sort or another. If this search on their part proves non-productive it might be appropriate to think of allowing the program to expire at the completion of the tours of the present incumbents at Edwards, which would be in the late spring of 1967. Your thoughts on this topic would be appreciated.

(Signed)

JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR.
Acting Assistant Director
(Special Activities)

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DDS&T Historical Paper
No. OSA-1
Vol. VIII of XVI

DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)
History of the Office of Special Activities
Chapter XIV

(PERIOD)
From Inception to 1969

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Controlled by: DDS&T
Date prepared: 1 April 1969
Written by: Helen Kleyla
Robert O'Hern

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CHAPTER XIV. THE MAY DAY
1960 INCIDENT

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CHAPTER XIV. THE MAY DAY 1960 INCIDENT

In Moscow

On the morning of May Day 1960, in the foreign diplomats' section of the reviewing stands in Red Square, the U.S. Air Attaché, Col. Edwin Kirton, was making notes which later that afternoon were sent "Operational Immediate" to the Pentagon under the heading "Hi-lites, May Day Parade" and included the following:

"Wide speculation caused by fact that Vershinin* was 55 minutes late and entered upper deck only at very end of military portion of parade. Immediately after arrival he held series of seemingly very urgent and serious conversations. First to consult with him was Viryoxov, head of PVO.**

"Vershinin went to head of line and consulted urgently for ten minutes with Malinovsky following which he came back to the right end of the line and continued serious conversation, pulling papers out of his pocket, and accompanied with repeated gestures. Speculation included: (1) that some spectacular event either succeeded or failed, but was of sufficient importance to keep Vershinin away from ceremonies, (2) that PVO forces may have shot down unfriendly aircraft..." 1/

In Washington

At approximately 0330 hours, Washington local time on Sunday, May 1st, personnel in the CIA operations control center at the Matomic

*Commander-in-Chief, Soviet Air Force.

**Soviet Air Defense Command.

1/ DAF Msg IN 32702, 1 May 1960, from USAIRA Moscow.

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Building, where Mission 4154 was being followed through Comint channels, became aware that all was not well with the flight. The Soviet radar tracking of the aircraft's progress was discontinued at 0129 hours Washington time at a point southwest of Sverdlovsk, just short of half-way through the mission.

Key project personnel were summoned to the control center in the early morning hours to analyze the latest information as reflected by the Comint tracking and to implement appropriate actions in view of the probable loss of the aircraft. Present in addition to project staff were Mr. Walter Bonney, Press Relations Officer of NASA, and Colonel Leo P. Geary, USAF Project Officer. The group was later joined by Mr. Richard Helms, Acting Deputy Director for Plans in the absence from the city of Mr. Bissell, and Ambassador Hugh Cumming, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. A full-scale discussion of the proposed text of a suitable cover story release ensued. Mr. Bissell joined the group at about 1530 hours, and it was decided that a story should be released from the aircraft's home base at Adana, Turkey, to the effect that a NASA high altitude weather research airplane was missing having last been heard from in the vicinity of Lake Van, Turkey, at 1700 hours, and that at last radio contact the pilot had reported oxygen difficulty.

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Ambassador Cumming informed Under Secretary of State Dillon by phone of the agreed release and obtained his concurrence (in the absence of the Secretary of State). The story differed in some aspects from the prepared one distributed to the Detachment, to Headquarters USAF, to USAF European theater command, and to third countries involved. The revised story was based on the latest information and assumption that the aircraft was down deep within the Soviet Union where any story connected with navigational error, pilot hypoxia, or aircraft malfunction would be difficult to sustain. Yet, in the absence of any verified information on the actual fate of the mission, condition of the aircraft and pilot, and uncertainty as to whether the Soviets would admit to a penetration of such depth, it was felt that the revised release offered better prospects of being sustained in the event the aircraft was totally destroyed and the pilot killed, or if the Soviets should take credit for shooting it down,* while at the same time electing to move the reported scene of the incident closer to their borders in order to conceal from their own people and the world the depth of the mission's penetration into the heavily guarded Russian heartland.

* During the period immediately after loss of the mission, the idea that the pilot might be taken alive did not receive the high priority attention which other possible eventualities received.

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The revised cover story, backed up by an actual mission flight plan, was sent through CIA communications channels to Detachment B, [REDACTED] 50X1, E.O.13526 and Headquarters USAFE. The Commanding Officer of the Detachment was directed to release the story after local coordination with the Incerlik Base Commander [REDACTED] 50X1, E.O.13526

[REDACTED] 50X1, E.O.13526 (This was done on 2 May, however the story did not appear in the news until 3 May when it was published with an Istanbul dateline.)

In Turkey

Word reached Detachment B at Incerlik Air Force Base in the afternoon of 1 May through cable channels of the non-arrival of the mission aircraft at Bodo and its probable loss deep inside Russia. In the absence of the Commanding Officer who was with the staging party in Pakistan, the senior officer in charge at Adana was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Housing and Administrative Officer, and it fell to him to break the news to Mrs. Barbara Powers, wife of the pilot, that her husband was missing on a flight. Mrs. Powers was suffering from a broken leg at the time, the result of a skiing accident a few weeks earlier. It was decided that it would be best for her to return immediately to the States, and on 3 May Headquarters authorized her PCS

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Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

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return by commercial air, with an escort for the full trip, as well as her German shepherd dog's transportation by the same plane (cost to be reimbursed by Mrs. Powers).

Secretary of State Herter and General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, were in Istanbul on 1 May, attending a NATO meeting when the U-2 was declared overdue, [REDACTED] was requested by Headquarters to fly to Istanbul and brief them on the situation.

Third Country Involvement: Pakistan

Since it was impossible to predict in what form the Soviets would break the news, whether openly or in private protests to the U.S. and other countries involved, on 2 May [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was requested by Headquarters to see General Ayub, [REDACTED] and tell him that the air intelligence activity approved by him through Riaz Hussain had experienced the loss of an aircraft which was believed down inside the USSR; that the U.S. would attempt to keep Pakistan from active involvement with the Soviets and would make every effort to minimize any Soviet pressure growing out of the incident; also that the U.S. was grateful to Ayub for his steadfast support of vital intelligence collection efforts. (Since Ayub had never

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been officially told of the true mission of the activity, Headquarters desired to forestall any violent reaction by him in case the Soviets laid blame on Pakistan.)

[redacted] saw Ayub on 4 May and delivered the message. Ayub received the news calmly, said he was sorry to hear of the loss of the aircraft but was not disturbed about what the Russians might say. He asked that the following message be relayed to Mr. Allen Dulles:

"We shall stand by our friends and will not let them down on this. The problem for us is not what to say or not to say to the Russians but what we can do about them and their continued overflights of our country. As to the latter we are very dependent on your assistance since we do not ourselves have the means to defend ourselves. Our needs in this regard, namely a few F-104 jet aircraft and some further supplement to our radar network, have already been made known to your government at the highest level... anything Mr. Dulles could say to the proper quarters to help out in this connection would be most appreciated." 1/

Soviet Disclosures: Washington Reactions

On 4 May, before the Soviets made any disclosure whatever, there were meetings at the Department of State attended by Col. William Burke, Acting Chief, DPD, with Ambassador Bohlen and Messrs. Richard Davis and Lampton Berry of the State Department. A question and answer brief prepared by the Agency principally for use by NASA was carefully

1/ [redacted]

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gone over. It consisted of answers to hypothetical questions which might be asked by the press concerning the aircraft and the upper air research program. This list was agreed by the conferees and was dispatched to all involved officials in Washington and at overseas stations.

The next day at a convocation of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow Khrushchev announced the shooting down of an American aircraft which he said had crossed the state frontier of the Soviet Union from either Turkey, Iran, or Pakistan. (See Annex 82 for Khrushchev statement.) The FBIS pick-up of this news from Radio Moscow was immediately referred to Project Headquarters and to the DCI who was attending a National Security Council meeting which was being held at High Point. After the NSC meeting convened, a further meeting of the President, Secretary of Defense Gates, Mr. Gordon Gray, Mr. Douglas Dillon, Mr. Allen Dulles and General Andrew J. Goodpaster, was held to consider the handling of the U-2 incident. It was agreed by the group that the President should not be personally involved, and it was determined that the Department of State should handle all publicity.

In Washington, a meeting at the Department of State attended by General Cabell and Mr. Bissell with Messrs. Davis and Berry of State, discussed the implications of the Khrushchev statement, which gave no

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clue as to the fate of the pilot. The group adjourned to Mr. Dillon's office on his return from the NSC conclave and learned of the decision that State would handle all publicity. In the afternoon of 5 May, the following agreed press release was made:

"The Department has been informed by NASA that, as announced May 3, an unarmed plane, a U-2 weather research plane based at Adana, Turkey, piloted by a civilian, has been missing since May 1. During the flight of this plane, the pilot reported difficulty with his oxygen equipment.

"Mr. Khrushchev has announced that a U. S. plane was shot down over the USSR on that date. It may be that this was the missing plane. It is entirely possible that, having a failure in the oxygen equipment which could result in the pilot losing consciousness, the plane continued on automatic pilot for a considerable distance and accidentally violated Soviet air space.

"In view of Mr. Khrushchev's statement, the U. S. is taking this matter up with the Soviet Government, with particular reference to the fate of the pilot." 1/

Meanwhile the White House Press Secretary, Mr. James Hagerty, made a statement to the press that the President had ordered an investigation of the entire matter. He also in a telephone conversation with Mr. Bonney of NASA suggested that the latter hold a press conference as soon as possible as a means of handling the heavy volume of press inquiries; such a conference was convened at 1330 hours on

1/ ADIC-0313 (OUT 66457), 5 May 1960.

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5 May in NASA Headquarters. (It is presumed that Mr. Hagerty had not been informed at that time that the State Department alone was to handle all publicity regarding the U-2, and that neither had NASA been so informed in time to prevent the press conference.) The answers given the press by Mr. Bonney were based on the brief prepared and agreed between CIA and State on 4 May.

On 6 May there were two radio and press briefings at the Department of State, one at 1110 hours held by Mr. Tully, and one at 1235 hours, by Mr. Lincoln White. At the latter, Mr. White made the statement in reply to a question that there was no deliberate attempt to violate Soviet air space, and there never had been. (Although this statement was Mr. White's own response to the question asked, it was taken by the members of the press as the Department position and so printed and broadcast.)

Later in the day of 6 May, Embassy Moscow reported that the Swedish Ambassador had been told by Jacob Malik at a reception on 5 May that "the pilot hit the silk and we are now interrogating him". Project Headquarters' first reaction to this bit of news was that it might be a plant to force a reaction from the U. S. in an effort to spare the pilot possible torture at the hands of his Russian captors.

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Shortly after noon on 7 May, Munich Base cabled information monitored from Radio Moscow that the Russians had the pilot of the downed aircraft, that he was alive and had been identified as an Air Force pilot working for CIA; also that the Russians claimed to have equipment from the plane. (See Annex 83 for 7 May speech by Khrushchev.)

This news touched off a series of extended meetings in CIA and the Department of State, the first between noon and 1430 hours in the DCI's office with General Cabell and Ambassadors Cumming and Bohlen from State and General Goodpaster from the White House. In this session a draft press statement was agreed; however this statement was reworked by Mr. Dillon and the Secretary of State (to go farther down the road toward open admission of overflight), and after being cleared with the President, was released at 1800 hours. (See Annex 84 for text.) The DCI was informed by telephone of the later decision at higher level to, in effect, "come clean" in the 1800 press release. This statement, six days after the incident, was the first official statement casting doubt on the previously published cover story. On the same day a public display of a NASA-marked U-2 at Edwards Air Force Base had been held to satisfy press demands for detailed information on the plane and

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its meteorological equipment and to support the cover story on the U-2's weather mission.

Also on the same day, Detachment B was instructed to furnish a "black" airlift to remove the British cadre at Adana from Turkey and return them to the Air Ministry in London for debriefing and a temporary leave until the U-2 incident had calmed down. This procedure was agreed by Project Headquarters at the request of the Air Ministry.

The next day, 8 May, was Sunday and no further statements on the incident were made by official Government spokesmen on the Administration side. (There were many public statements by Senators and Congressmen, however.)

Third Country Involvement: Norway

On 9 May [50X1, E.O.13526] Col. Evang (Chief of Norwegian Intelligence) had requested that CIA Headquarters send him a full report of all information available to the U-2 pilot which might reveal Norwegian involvement so that Evang could prepare to defend himself when the matter was brought up in the Storting. Evang was talking of a possible five years behind bars, although he had been given a U.S. visa on 9 May (secretly) in the event it became necessary for him to leave the country. He predicted a difficult period for [50X1, E.O.13526]

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for the next few months even if he, himself, should survive the crisis.

Congressional Briefing, 9 May 1960

At 1000 hours on Monday, 9 May, a meeting in the office of the Secretary of State gave consideration to the question of the handling of Congressional inquiries. Present at that meeting were: Secretary Herter, Under Secretary Dillon, Defense Secretary Gates, Deputy Secretary of Defense Douglas, Ambassadors Bohlen and Kohler, and Messrs. Dulles and Bissell of CIA. It was agreed that the DCI would brief chosen Congressional leaders, giving the basic facts in a closed session, and that Secretary Herter would issue, subject to Presidential approval, a press statement clarifying the position of the United States Government. After consultation with the White House, it was further decided that Mr. Herter would give his statement to the Congressional leaders before it was published. (See Annex 85 for text.)

An appointment was set up for 1400 hours the same day for the Congressional briefing, to be accompanied by an exposition of U-2 photographic intelligence by Mr. Lundahl. Mr. Dulles spent the intervening time with aides preparing his presentation, and Mr. Bissell joined the group at State in drafting the Secretary's proposed statement.

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Shortly before 1400 hours Mr. Bissell and Mr. Dulles joined the Secretary of State for the ride to the Congressional hearing room during which the text of the DCI's proposed remarks was read and approved by the Secretary. (Text included in Annex 85).

Congressional leaders who were present for the briefing on 9 May were: Senators Lyndon B. Johnson, Mansfield, Dirksen, Bridges, Saltonstall, Russell, Vinson, Wiley and Fulbright; and Congressmen Rayburn, Halleck, Hayden, Arends, Morgan and Chipperfield.

Further Moscow Revelations

On 10 May Tass radio reported that Pilot Powers had in his possession a letter signed by General Thomas D. White permitting him to fly an Air Force aircraft. Parts of the downed U-2 were put on display in Gorky Park in Moscow and press reports indicated that various items of equipment were tagged with maker's name or identified as U.S. Government property. Detachment B was queried on what items the pilot may have had in his possession, and what pieces of equipment were aboard the aircraft which had any identifying markings on them.

In the early days of the project, the question of "sterilizing" the equipment carried by the U-2 received a good bit of attention with the

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idea that items would not be attributable to the manufacturers of the components. That idea was abandoned as impracticable and the concept of sterilization which was then followed was that the aircraft and equipment should not incorporate any items which by their markings indicated them to be the property of the U.S. Air Force.

Damage Assessment

On 10 May a damage assessment on the incident was ordered to be carried out by DPD Security Staff in cooperation with the CI Staff of the Agency with the purpose of accumulating the fullest possible record of information which must be presumed to be available to the Russians and which could be used against the United States and its allies. This initial assessment was submitted to the DD/P on 27 June 1960 (text included as Annex 86).

The CIA Director of Personnel on 10 May, in response to a request by DPD, affirmed to the Comptroller that, under the authority granted by Agency Regulation 20-760, he had reviewed the circumstances of the disappearance of Francis G. Powers and of his reported capture and on the basis of his review had determined that Powers was in a status qualifying him for benefits of the Missing Persons Act (P. L. 490, 77th Congress) as amended, effective 1 May 1960. Authorization was

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given for the continuance of Powers' pay and allowances to be accrued in an escrow account with the specific authorization for allotment disbursements to be furnished later through DPD. Included was an allotment for support of Mrs. Powers who had been escorted to her mother's home in Milledgeville, Georgia, under Project Security Staff guidance.

As a precautionary measure, all records on project pilots (including the British) who had gone through the Lovelace Clinic were retrieved from the Clinic and held at Headquarters. The suppliers of the U-2 aircraft, engines, and other components were given defensive briefings on meeting press inquiries. Witting project and other Agency and USAF personnel were advised as to the information which should remain classified and be so treated in spite of public revelations and announcements made during the previous ten days.

President Eisenhower's Press Conference, 11 May 1960

Despite the agreement of State, Defense, and Agency officials at the post-NSC meeting of 5 May to avoid any personal involvement of the President in the matter, President Eisenhower made the decision completely on his own to face the press and announce his cognizance and approval of the secret flights over Russia. The text of the President's statement is included as Annex 87.

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On the same morning, Mr. Allen Dulles, accompanied by Messrs. Lundahl and Houston, was meeting with the CIA Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee to brief them on the history of the U-2 project and the recent incident. At the end of the briefing and questioning by Members, the Director made a final statement that he knew from the start what chances were being taken and that the Agency was ready and able to take the brunt of the criticism, but he wished the Members to be aware of the extreme importance of the contribution this operation had made to U.S. intelligence. A vote of confidence in Mr. Dulles was proposed by Congressman Van Zandt and agreed to by the Members. Mr. Houston's record of the meeting indicated that:

"The Subcommittee did not show any great concern about the timing of this last U-2 flight and its nearness to the Summit. They seemed far more perturbed about the fact that the pilot had spoken so much and so early, although they made clear that they were not holding this against the man. It was also clear that Members were deeply impressed by the description of the intelligence product and had no question about the necessity for and value of the project generally. At the end there was some discussion of what the position of the Subcommittee should be--whether embarrassment, or disappointment. The consensus seemed to be strongly in favor of standing behind the Executive Department's action with no apologies." 1/

1/ TS-174813, 12 May 1960. Memo for Record by General Counsel, CIA.

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In anticipation of a worldwide press barrage following the President's statement to the press on 11 May, the first propaganda guidance to CIA field stations on the U-2 incident was issued by cable later the same day, as follows:

"1. In discussion plane incident with your contacts you should for present and immediate future take basic guidance from Secretary of State official statement of 9 May and President's 11 May press conference. Will try to supplement official statements from time to time with additional points such as those in following paragraphs which you may use in discussion with senior cleared and witting officials your host government, but am sure you realize it difficult to keep you up to minute in this extremely fast-breaking situation.

"2. For time being prefer not to officially confirm exact details CIA participation in organization and control this operation but there no need deny CIA involvement. You may also say CIA considered product aerial surveillance program to be of extreme importance in assessment likelihood of and capability for Soviet surprise attack. This connection, you should cite many reasons for U.S. need obtain such information by clandestine means in view excessive Soviet secrecy and past record aggression. (Western Europe stations only: In those areas where our release of intelligence to local services includes general studies or estimates you should stress fact that host government was recipient benefits of information and in any event all Western countries benefitted from intelligence obtained.)

"3. You may inform liaison contacts that analysis information release by Soviets leads to serious doubt their claim to have shot down plane by rocket. This doubt based among other things on apparently faked photographs of crashed plane and of Soviet airfield, Soviet claim that maps, films, destruction device still intact despite crash from extreme altitude, contradictory statements as incident has progressed re place where plane downed, etc. Seems quite possible pilot had equipment failure and was forced down by fighters when reached lower altitudes. We attach

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no credibility to story he double agent or defected to Soviets and note past Soviet record in extracting confessions from persons under their control.

"4. Above raises many questions re Soviet motives and tactics whole affair. By own admission they knew of earlier surveillances but did not publicly announce until they could claim shoot down, in order hide weakness their air defenses and use incident as excuse again to brandish their nuclear missiles. Khrushchev propaganda treatment also obvious attempt blame U.S. for any failure at Summit and possibly to avoid real issues of disarmament inspection and control..." 1/

Further Third Country Problems

Because of pressure being exerted by Soviet diplomatic protests or visits by their Foreign Office emissaries, the Turkish, Norwegian, Pakistani and Japanese Foreign Offices in turn began to press the State Department for information to assist them in replying to the Russians. The texts of all the written and oral communications between the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and other governments in connection with the U-2 incident were collected by the State Department into one document dated 12 August 1960 (RSB MM-0 203, Secret Noform) a copy of which is appended as Annex 88.

Paris Summit Conference

While diplomatic notes were being passed back and forth, plans for the "Summit" meeting in Paris went forward and as one preliminary step

1/ Book Cable DIR-29243 (OUT 74598), 11 May 1960.

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General DeGaulle was afforded a briefing to bring him up to date on the U-2 matter. A flash summary to the DCI [redacted]

[redacted] reported that:

"DeGaulle stood before easel in his office one hour and twenty minutes on 14 May while briefed by Cunningham and Lundahl (NEDROW (P) interpreting). Original meeting had been scheduled to last one-half hour. He had minor interest in organization and history of project but showed much interest in U-2 incident, especially CIA conclusions regarding likelihood mechanical malfunction as cause versus Russian claims of shutdown. Once satisfied on this point, he expressed desire to see take, saying that it's the end results that count.

"He listened attentively to detailed PI briefing, carefully fixing most important locations in his mind and asking penetrating questions. For example, he desired to have our best estimate of the maximum effective range new Soviet Hexagon SAM sites and the bearing this had on SAC strategy and needs. Expressed great interest in Soviet atomic energy capabilities and in BW and CW evidence.

"He inquired whether the U-2 had uncovered Chinese atomic energy installations.

"When briefing completed, he made following points: he was very much impressed with the results and made it clear he considered CHALICE an intelligence operation of great significance. He was highly appreciative for briefing which he said would be helpful to him during Summit Conference. He believes that the operation should continue and he would like to be kept informed of significant intelligence developed in the future." 1/

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At the preliminary meeting of heads of governments in Paris on 16 May, Khrushchev condemned the United States in relation to the U-2 spy flights and gave his ultimatum for continuing with the Summit Conference, at the same time withdrawing the invitation for President Eisenhower to visit Russia. The U.S. President replied, leaving no doubt that the ultimatum was not acceptable to him. The invitation extended by President DeGaulle for a meeting of the four powers on 17 May was boycotted by the USSR and the other three powers issued a joint communique taking note of the fact that, because of the attitude adopted by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, it had not been possible to begin at the Summit Conference the examination of the problems which were to have been discussed, but affirming their readiness to take part in such negotiations at any suitable time in the future.

On 25 May President Eisenhower on radio and television from Washington gave the American people his version of what happened in Paris, and while he took full responsibility for approving all the various programs undertaken by the U.S. Government to secure military intelligence, he placed the blame for torpedoing the conference on Mr. Khrushchev and brought out the fact that Khrushchev had been aware

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o previous overflights of the Soviet Union at the time he visited the United States the previous September, but had said nothing then. In the same speech the President said that he had directed that the U-2 flights be stopped--their usefulness was impaired and continuance would only complicate relations of our allies with the Soviets. (Full text of the President's speech is at Annex 89.)

On 14 June in the Senate, the collapse of the Summit Conference was the subject of a major speech by Senator John F. Kennedy in which he said that the effort to eliminate world tensions and end the cold war through a Summit Meeting was doomed to failure long before the U-2 fell on Soviet soil, because the United States was unprepared with new policy or new programs to settle outstanding issues. In the same speech he put forward the challenge for a "Great Debate" on the issues by the American people through the media of their political parties.

Six weeks after the May Day event, after an appraisal of the favorable and unfavorable reactions with regard to CIA's role in the affair, a Book Dispatch went out to the Chiefs of CIA Stations and Bases from the Director, emphasizing the significant benefit to national security of the intelligence collected by the U-2 program and encouraging efforts to devise new methods for collecting vital intelligence in view of

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continued Communist secrecy and hostility. The text of the Director's secret testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 31 May 1960 was appended to the book dispatch for the background information of addressees (see Annex 87). In his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the Director had decided to go over to the attack, in which attitude he had the expressed support of the Acting DDP, Mr. Helms, who said he believed the Senators would appreciate the aggressive approach since underneath it all, there was a good deal of admiration and good will in the Senate and he felt they would react positively when they saw that the Director was neither apologetic nor on the defensive. This prediction turned out to be correct, and the Director was also able to maintain the precedent of non-disclosure of his testimony by the Committee.

As to the reaction of the Russian people to the U-2 incident, the Chief of the CIA Soviet Russia Division (Mr. John M. Maury) reported on 8 June 1960 that although persistent repetition of Soviet propaganda themes might eventually produce anti-American bias, travelers returning from Russia since the incident reported no change in the over-all friendliness toward Americans evidenced in personal contacts in recent years. Despite the expectation that the overflights would represent to

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the Soviet man in the street an affront to the dignity and sovereignty of the USSR, a threat to peace, and a menace to his own person, the attitudes reported reflected a sophisticated acceptance of espionage as a fact of life, and the expected emotional responses of indignation and hostility had not materialized. ^{1/}

Between 6 and 9 May 1960 the American Embassy in Moscow received approximately 6,000 letters and 200 telegrams purported to have been spontaneously written by ordinary Soviet citizens protesting the U-2 overflights. These communications were considered to be the result of a calculated psychological effort on the part of the Soviet propaganda bureau and showed that they had a substantial internal organizing ability along these lines.

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Preparation for the Defense of Powers

In the first week of June, State and CIA officers agreed that a maximum effort to provide legal assistance to the captured pilot would

^{1/} DPD-4769-60, 8 June 1960, "Soviet Image of the U-2 Incident".

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be made; this would be done through a private front, and would of course be subject to whatever restrictions might be imposed by the Russians. Through the Department of State Legal Adviser, Mr. Eric Hager, an agreement was successfully negotiated with the President of the Virginia State Bar Association who promised to furnish adequate counsel without fee and to protect and keep secret the governmental interest in the case.

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An account of the negotiations between State and Agency officers, the Virginia lawyers, and the wife and father of Frank Powers during the month of June 1960 in preparing the basis for a defense of the captive pilot was set forth on 30 June 1960 by Mr. John McMahon (at that time DPD Personnel Officer) and is included as Annex 90.

As events later developed, the lawyers were never permitted to participate in the trial; however, considerable expenses were incurred.

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in preparation of the defense, including travel expenses of the Powers family and lawyers to Moscow and return.

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Propaganda for the Defense

On 7 July the Soviet news agency published the indictment of pilot Powers under Article 2 of the Law of the Soviet Union on Criminal Responsibility for State Crimes. The Embassy was instructed to pass an aide memoire to the Soviet Government once more requesting permission to interview Powers and provide him with legal counsel, but like previous overtures, the note was ignored. The date set for the opening of the trial was 17 August, and it was anticipated that it would follow the pattern of previous "show" trials with the prisoner well-rehearsed and rendered cooperative through "brainwashing" techniques. Through arrangements with Mrs. Barbara Powers, DPD obtained the letters

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written to her by her husband from his Russian prison. They were analyzed, first, for evidence of the prisoner's use of the simple code in which he had been instructed during his training. He did not make use of this means of communicating secretly. In addition, expert consultants in handwriting were retained through the efforts of General Don Flickinger, USAF Medical Corps, to make a study of representative samples of Powers' handwriting before and after his capture. While such studies must be classed as experimental (the consulting psychologists, Drs. Harrower and Steiner of New York, were not informed as to whose handwriting was involved), the findings were considered of enough significance to warrant possible exploitation through propaganda prior to the trial.

The most important deduction arrived at by the analysis of the before and after handwriting was that more than likely some type of organic psychiatric change of significant degree in the subject had taken place in the interim between the writings. Such a change could result from such things as brain injury, electroshock, cerebral infection, or vascular deprivation and psychochemical application. However, State Department policy with regard to pre-trial publicity negated the propaganda use of the "brainwashing" thesis. An instruction sent to field

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stations in this regard on 5 August said that official and attributable comment prior to the trial would appear only in response to direct queries from responsible sources. If access to the prisoner continued to be denied, State would probably release the text of the 30 July note to the USSR reviewing the unsuccessful efforts thus far to obtain access to Powers, and to obtain Russian visas for legal counsel.

Strictly unattributable assets of the Agency might refer in low key to previous Soviet practices of rigging trials and extorting confessions. However, it was considered inadvisable and possibly counter-productive to make a broad effort to suggest the probability of brainwashing in the Powers case. (During the processing by his Soviet captors at the time of his being confined to prison, according to Frank Powers' own report subsequent to his release, he was given a hypodermic injection which was probably a general immunization shot. Although he was kept in solitary confinement and subjected to constant interrogation, sometimes ten to twelve hours a day, there was no evidence that he was given truth serums or other drugs.)

Stations were advised to encourage the attendance at the trial of responsible, reputable journalists whose reports would be balanced, and generally favorable to the West. One propaganda ploy which had

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Agency support was the delivery of a speech at the Congress of International Astronautical Federations in Stockholm on the day before the Powers trial was to open. The speech, to be given by Mr. Spencer Beresford (a Congressional consultant on space problems), contained arguments refuting the Soviet indictment of Powers and raising the question of national sovereignty over airspace--which was not defined by international law and was generally assumed to reach only as far as could be enforced. The State Department, two days before the speech was to be given and [redacted] foreign media assets lined up to give the speech maximum play, reached the policy decision that extensive publicity of the speech was not desirable since it expressed a point of view at variance in some respects with the U.S. Government approach to such problems and raised questions the U.S. would prefer not to have raised at that time. [redacted]

[redacted]

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On 10 August 1960, the State Department released a statement regarding the U.S. policy with regard to public utterances on the Powers trial as follows:

In order to avoid any possibility of prejudicing Mr. Powers' situation and in the interests of national security, the U.S. Government for the present will withhold comment on any aspect of the trial itself.

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However, it is to be noted that Powers has been in exclusive control of Soviet authorities for 101 days, that despite all efforts of this Government no one other than his jailers and captors has had access to him, and that anything he says should be judged in light of these circumstances and Soviet past practices in matters of this kind. *

A special "Propaganda Guidance to Stations and Bases on the Powers Trial" was dispatched by the Agency's [redacted] on 1 August 1960 for maximum use with all assets (see Annex 91).

Ad Hoc Committee on Powers Trial

On 29 July 1960, Mr. Allen Dulles appointed Mr. John M. Maury Chief of the Soviet Russia Division, to handle the over-all Agency coordination of activities related to the Powers trial. This occurred at the end of a meeting during which the Director gave a complete briefing to the Virginia lawyers picked to defend Powers, and granted permission for them to study the signed contract under which Powers was hired by the Agency.

Mr. Maury had met with the lawyers (all old friends of his) the evening before at the Mayflower to discuss ways of putting pressure on the Soviet Embassy to obtain visas for the party to go to Moscow for the trial. Mrs. Barbara Powers had also been present. Mr. Maury's note

* The second paragraph of the State Department Press Release was included at the specific request of the DCI, Mr. Allen Dulles.

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on the meeting reported that during the evening he had an opportunity to become acquainted with Barbara, who made quite a good first impression on him. At the same time he became aware of certain problems: (a) that Barbara had been dissatisfied with past Agency assistance rendered her and was particularly unhappy about the long delay in receiving any financial aid from the Agency; (b) that she wished to examine her husband's contract with the Agency, although her reason for this was not clear; (c) that she was highly critical of the State Department, contending that none of its officers (except Ambassador Bohlen) had offered her any significant advice or assistance; (d) she was also critical of Mr. Allen Dulles because he was not available to see her when she was at the Agency the day before.

On receipt of a copy of Mr. Maury's memorandum, the long-suffering DPD officers who had been assigned the onerous task of handling Barbara and seeing to her financial and other needs made known to Mr. Maury the completeness of the past assistance rendered and drew from him agreement that in any future contacts with Barbara, Mr. McMahon or of DPD, or Mr. Mike Miskovsky of the General Counsel Staff would be present to challenge any complaints by Barbara on the adequacy of Agency assistance to her.

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Mr. Maury's ad hoc committee met daily as required through the pre-trial period and was a convenient forum for obtaining agreed positions for action and rendering daily reports to the Director and others concerned. As events developed, it became obvious that the lawyers would not be permitted by the Soviets to participate in the trial and their visas were held up until almost the eve of their planned departure. There was considerable anxiety within CIA as well as the State Department that Barbara Powers not travel to Moscow alone and therefore, in view of the possibility that the lawyers might be prevented from accompanying her, arrangements were made for her mother, Mrs. Monteen Moore Brown, and her family physician, Dr. James M. Baugh, to go to Moscow with expenses being underwritten by CIA.

The Agency had no direct contact with or control over the Oliver Powers family entourage as their travel to Moscow was arranged and underwritten by the editors of Life magazine who had negotiated exclusive rights to cover the family's attendance at the trial. Their party consisted of Mr. and Mrs. Oliver Powers (father and mother of the pilot), Miss Jessica Powers (his sister), a family friend, Mr. Sol Curry, and Mr. Carl McAfee, Attorney.

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Once the two family groups were finally airborne toward Moscow, the Project Headquarters braced itself for whatever sensational revelations might develop with the opening of the trial. The ad hoc committee had set up a temporary command post in the DPD office area in the Matomic Building with news tickers installed to receive immediate transmission from all news services, and with twenty-four hour coverage by relays of staff personnel.

It was expected that testimony by the prisoner would reveal information on U-2 overflights of other areas, including the Middle East, Indonesia and China, introduced in such a way as to discredit the United States with neutral or favorably disposed countries peripheral to the USSR. Within the stricture laid down by State of "no comment" on the trial, the United States was in a position to deny categorically overflight of Indonesia and China, as well as the Middle East (with special exceptions of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan). Any revelations concerning U. K. participation was to be handled by the British Foreign Office.

Of the third countries involved in the May Day flight, only Norway continued to create problems for the U. S. This was due largely to having dealt exclusively with Colonel Evang, who had acted unilaterally in granting base rights to the Americans without clearing this with higher authority within the Norwegian Government. Consequently, when the

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Russians put pressure on the Norwegian Government, Evang was only able to stick with his own personal cover story: that the Americans had misled him on the true nature of the May Day operation.

In June the Pakistani Ambassador to Moscow reported to his own Foreign Office that he had learned the following from the Norwegian Ambassador to Moscow: that his Government had decided that the Americans were so inept and unwise in their handling of the incident that it would be best for Norway to be absolutely straightforward in their dealings with the Russians no matter how much this might offend the State Department; that their Foreign Minister in Oslo sent for the Russian Ambassador to Oslo regularly and kept him posted with all that they learned about the event to convince the Russians that the Powers flight took place without their knowledge; that knowledge of the large number of Americans who had landed at Bodo on 1 May had trickled down all over Norway because the Americans had taken no precautions to cover up their presence; and that the Norwegian Government believed that Powers had already made a clean breast of all he knew to the Russians and therefore it was useless to keep them in the dark about anything that could be learned from the Americans. 1/

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The Trial and Subsequent Events

During the trial of Frank Powers, the principal points which the prosecution hammered down were that Powers was guilty of violation of the USSR's air space; expert testimony was given to support the military and espionage nature of his flight; participation of third countries (Turkey, Pakistan and Norway) was underlined; and the shooting down of the U-2 by a Soviet rocket at 68,000 feet was established. The defense built up the picture of Powers as a victim of the capitalist system making much of his proletarian family background, his total lack of political motivation or interest, his non-resistance when arrested, and his regret for the consequences of his flight.

The English translation of the complete transcript of the trial, as published by Translation World Publishers, Chicago, Illinois, was procured by the CI Staff and a summary made thereof, copy of which is attached as Annex 92. One item of interest not included in that summary is Power's final statement made at the end of the trial, before the sentence was passed, which he read to the court:

"The court has heard all the evidence in the case, and now must decide my punishment. I realize that I have committed a grave crime and that I must be punished for it. I ask the court to weigh all the evidence and to take into consideration not only the fact that I committed the crime, but also the circumstances

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that led me to do so. I also ask the court to take into consideration that no secret information reached its destination; it all fell into the hands of the Soviet authorities. I realize that the Russian people think of me as an enemy. I understand this, but I would like to stress the fact that I do not feel and have never felt any enmity toward the Russian people. I plead with the court to judge me not as an enemy but as a human being not a personal enemy of the Russian people, who has never had charges against him in any court, and who is deeply repentant and sincerely sorry for what he has done." 1/

The verdict of the court was rendered at 1 00 hours on 19 August and Powers was sentenced to ten years deprivation of liberty, the first three of which were to be served in prison, commencing from 1 May. The verdict was not subject to judicial appeal.

Immediately upon conclusion of the trial, shortly after 6 p. m., the Powers family had their first visit with the prisoner accompanied by one Intourist interpreter, but closely monitored by six Soviets in uniform. The meeting was highly emotional with all in tears. Frank reported that his treatment had been better than he expected, he had not been subjected to any physical measures, but he had been prepared for the death sentence. He did not know the family were in Moscow until he saw them in the court room.

The lawyers saw the Prosecutor after the trial and later prepared a petition for clemency to the Supreme Soviet Presidium and a letter

1/ State Department Cable, Moscow 462, TOP SECRET, 19 August 1960.

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to Khrushchev requesting an audience with him for Barbara Powers. Presentation of the petition for clemency was discouraged by Soviet Advocate Grinev (who had acted as Defense Counsel for Powers). Grinev said he would himself file application for commutation at the appropriate time. However the petition drafted by the lawyers, addressed to Brezhnev, was delivered to Brezhnev's office, but was refused at the reception desk and therefore had to be sent by mail. The letter from Barbara to Khrushchev produced no results, however, the parents and wife were granted separate visits with Frank on 23 September, and Barbara had an additional private visit on 24 September.

The rules for future contact with the prisoner were explained as not less than one letter, 8 kilos of packages and 100 rubles of pocket money per month, one visit by relatives every two months, and one hour walk daily. Delivery of allowable items was arranged through the good offices of the U.S. Embassy, Moscow, and the two family parties left separately to return to the United States.

An effort was made by Oliver Powers, when Khrushchev visited New York in September 1960 for the United Nations General Assembly, to have an interview with the Russian leader but he was unable to accomplish this. However, through the National Broadcasting Company's

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assistance, he appeared on the Dave Carroway morning television program on 27 September and read his letter to Khrushchev over a nationwide television network.

The end of the Powers trial brought a reappraisal of the security situation with regard to the U-2 project in the light of all events since 1 May 1960, and a revised security guidance was circulated to all members of the U.S. Government and contractors within the cleared community by the DD/P (Mr. Bissell)

"The following information previously classified is now general public knowledge:

"a. That the U.S. Government, specifically CIA, between 1956 and 1 May 1960 was engaged in a program of overflights of the USSR for photographic and electronic intelligence purposes, utilizing the U-2 aircraft under cover of a NASA-sponsored weather research program.

"b. That Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960 undertook such a mission using a U-2 aircraft based at Detachment 10-10, Incirlik Air Base, Adana, Turkey, taking off from Peshawar, Pakistan, enroute to Bodo, Norway, via Sverdlovsk.

"c. That the operational capability of the U-2 is at least 70,000 feet altitude and 2,825 nautical miles (distance from Peshawar to Bodo via Sverdlovsk).

"The following have been removed from CHALICE control and classified Secret to permit wider usage by the US defense community:

"a. Full performance characteristics of the U-2.

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"b. CHALICE intelligence collection hardware involved in the 1 May incident (B camera, Systems III and VI, Mark 30 anti-radar and drift sight).

"The following information remains classified under CHALICE and should be handled accordingly by all:

"a. CHALICE activity subsequent to 1 May 1960.

"b. Extent of past CHALICE operations (COMOR may release certain product information where in best interest of U.S. defense community in a manner not to divulge U.S. exploitation of CHALICE).

"c. All details of CHALICE operational concepts.

"d. Details of cognizance and approvals of higher authority on past and future specific missions.

"e. USAF participation in CHALICE including pilot recruitment, training, reinstatement rights, materiel support.

"f. British participation.

"g. Host government arrangements and relationships.

"h. Contractual and development mechanisms and backstopping procedures (including Eastman Kodak Company Processing Center).

"i. Intra-U.S. Government relationships in CHALICE activities." 1/

1/ CHAL-1177-60, 27 Sept 1960. Memo to All Members CHALICE Community from the DD/P.

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As a postscript to the Powers trial, the National Broadcasting Company announced in October 1960 that they were in production on the first in a series of six so-called NBC White Papers, the theme of which they advertised as the "Political Effects of the U-2 Incident". Both the Air Force and the State Department shied away from any overt indication of disapproval of such a program, and neither would take steps to thwart it. The DCI was requested to appear on NBC-TV but turned down the request. Lockheed was approached in an attempt to enlist Mr. C. L. (Kelly) Johnson as narrator of a portion of the program. When this was put to the Agency for its reaction, the answer given was that the decision to cooperate with NBC in the aerodynamics aspects of the story was left to Mr. Johnson and Lockheed management. If they elected to cooperate, the Agency desired to be allowed to go over the prepared script in conjunction with the Air Force Project Office well in advance of the program's filming. This was agreed and a taping of the remarks of Mr. Johnson and Lockheed test pilot Schumacher during their part of the TV film was transmitted to DPD for review and clearance. An NBC camera crew went to Turkey and shot about 65 feet of film in the Detachment B trailer area where Frank and Barbara Powers had lived; the film was first

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confiscated by the Base Commander because the camera crew had not cleared their activities properly through channels, but it was later released after it was checked for security implications and found to be innocuous. The hour-long program was finally shown on 29 November 1960 between 10:00 and 11:00 p. m., with Chet Huntley as narrator. The script for the program with all dialogue and narration, as well as a description of the video portion, is appended hereto as Annex 93. The Assistant Chief, DPD, Mr. James Cunningham, estimated that as many viewers witnessed "The U-2 Affair" as saw the Kennedy-Nixon "Great Debate."

Trouble with Barbara

On her return from Moscow and after a debriefing by project staff in Washington, Barbara Powers continued on to her mother's home in Georgia, and the hand-holding problems began again with a relay of project case officers attempting a measure of control over Barbara's activities. Some assistance in this department developed in the person of Dr. James Baugh, the family physician who had accompanied Barbara and her mother to Moscow. He kept his Agency contacts in Washington informed of Barbara's escapades and lent his own efforts in trying to keep her out of the public eye (and out of jail). Despite all efforts, her bouts with alcohol and sexual promiscuity led eventually on 22 September 1961 to a sanity hearing at the request of her sister,

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mother and brother (the latter an Air Force Chaplain) and Dr. Baugh. The result of the hearing was the sending of Barbara to the Cleckley Clinic at the Medical School of the University of Georgia at Augusta. Her brother was named her guardian and he retained an Agency-cleared lawyer in Augusta as legal adviser. The psychiatrist in charge at the Clinic, Dr. Corbett Thigpen, diagnosed Barbara as psychopathic. However, she was released from the hospital in her mother's care on 30 October. On 18 November she was recommitted after a bout of drinking which ended in delerium tremens, was treated, again released in a week to her mother. Doctors at the clinic in consultation with an Agency team of CI and legal staff were in agreement that Barbara Powers would never change her activities or interests and that her behavior would continue to follow the pattern set thus far. The Agency team therefore concluded that should Barbara attempt to seek revenge against the Agency by talking to the press or in other ways, there was little that could be done to prevent her taking such action. This resignation to the facts of the situation had barely occurred when the prospect arose that Frank Powers might soon be released by the Russians and returned to the United States.

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The Abel/Powers Exchange

As early as 2 June 1960, Mr. Oliver Powers had on advice of his attorney, Mr. Carl McAfee, sent a letter to the convicted Soviet spy, Colonel Rudolf Abel, in Atlanta Federal Penitentiary, suggesting that they work together to achieve approval from the U.S. and Soviet Governments for a prisoner exchange between Abel and Frank Powers.

Colonel Abel did not reply directly to Mr. Powers due to a restriction against his corresponding with individuals outside except through his defense counsel, Mr. James Donovan. He therefore sent the Powers letter to Mr. Donovan along with his reply to it, which indicated that the matter should be brought to the attention of Abel's wife and lawyer in East Germany. The text of the Powers/Abel letter exchange and covering note to Donovan are included at Annex 94.

Mr. Donovan duly notified the Justice Department about the letters and Abel's request that Donovan possibly arrange a meeting with the East German lawyer. Mr. Donovan also called the CIA General Counsel and asked for guidance. A meeting held 16 June 1969 with DPD, SR, and OGC representatives concluded that the letters should be sent to the East German lawyer (who was most probably in touch with the Russians). Mr. Houston, CIA General Counsel, meanwhile was to coordinate the plan with Justice and State.

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The Chief of the CI Staff of CIA was convinced that the Soviets would in no circumstances admit responsibility for Abel, or interest in his release. This view was shared by U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, Llewellyn Thompson. The Chief of SR Division was interested in using the prospect for an exchange as a lever to pry information out of Abel—something his American interrogators had thus far been unable to do.

Mr. Donovan travelled to Europe on other business between 26 June and 8 July 1960, but the East Berlin lawyer, Wolfgang Vogel, did not approach him during the trip. The indictment of Powers and plans for his trial were announced on 7 July, and the Russians were obviously not ready to give up the propaganda opportunities that the trial afforded, no matter how badly they wanted to get Abel back. No action was taken on either side from July 1960 until January 1961.

On 11 January 1961, Mr. Donovan called Mr. Houston to advise that Abel's wife had written suggesting an appeal be made to the new Administration (President-elect Kennedy) for clemency for Abel. Donovan had written to Abel saying that it was not appropriate for him to do this but that his wife might appeal to the new Administration in a manner similar to the Powers family's appeal to Khrushchev.

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Abel asked Donovan to write directly to Mrs. Abel, which Donovan did, advising her that an appeal for clemency was fairly customary and that she should feel free to address a simple, non-legalistic petition to the President of the United States, after he had settled into office.

On 8 February 1961, Mrs. Hellen Abel (whose address at that time was shown as Leipzig, East Germany) did write a letter to the President asking for clemency and the release of her husband, and mentioning the fact that the USAF RB-47 fliers had been released in Russia.

The ad hoc working group on the Powers case, in view of the intimations from various sources that the Russians might consider an early release of Powers, met on 17 February 1961 and approved a set of contingency procedures in the event of such a release. This plan is attached as Annex 95. The plan was approved by the USAF Project Officer, Colonel Geary, with the following stipulation:

In keeping with the basic cover policy of IDEALIST, that public Air Force association with the project be held to an absolute minimum, it should accordingly be clearly understood that any participation by the Air Force in the return of Powers must be directed by higher authority. Such direction should be for the public record, brief, and matter of fact. "1/ / This statement related to the possibility of airlifting Powers back to the States by special USAF flight if he were released." 7

1/ IDEA-0220, 23 March 1961. Memo to Chief SR Division (Chairman, Powers Committee) from Assistant Chief, DPD.

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The 8 February 1961 appeal of Mrs. Abel was not answered until 3 May 1961 by the Pardon Attorney of the Department of Justice (not by the White House to whom it had been addressed) and it was in a negative vein; Mrs. Abel meanwhile on 8 May wrote Donovan that she had received no answer and asked him to expedite the matter, at the same time referring to the previous interest of Oliver Powers in an exchange.

After consultation with Mr. Houston at CIA, Mr. Donovan replied to Mrs. Abel, referring to the release of the Russian prisoner, Melekh, by the Americans and intimating that an indication of good faith on the part of the Russians was expected by the U.S. He suggested that Mrs. Abel approach the Soviet Government and determine its interest in the release of Abel, and asserted that Oliver Powers was willing to cooperate, but there should be no publicity in the matter.

Meanwhile Colonel Abel had written to his wife and suggested that she initiate action toward seeking an exchange between himself and Powers. On 17 June 1961 Mrs. Abel wrote Donovan stating that she had visited the Soviet Embassy in Berlin where it was recommended that she proceed with her efforts to obtain clemency for Rudolf Abel. She expressed certainty that if her husband were pardoned, Powers would

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be amnestied. She therefore requested that Donovan proceed with his efforts with the American authorities.

At this point the Agency CI Staff, in a summary of action to date regarding a Powers/Abel exchange, addressed a memorandum to the DCI taking the position that the Agency should oppose such an exchange, principally for CI operational reasons. The memorandum stated:

"Operationally speaking, the trade would be an exchange of everything for nothing. Powers has told all he knows and is of no further use to the Soviets except as a pawn—as he is being used in this matter. On the other hand, Abel has conducted himself in a highly professional manner. He remains resistant; he has refused to give information, even such information as his true identity. He is a person of high caliber and a potential source of information of great value, provided the proper pressures can be brought to bear. His release and deportation would be a major victory for the Soviets. In addition, his knowledge of the United States would be of considerable operational benefit to the RIS. . . The possibility that [redacted] [redacted] may talk may account for current Soviet interest in bringing about the release of Abel. . ." ^{1/}

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On 3 July 1961, Colonel Beerli, Acting Chief of DPD, advised the DI /P of the CI Staff position and expressed DPD's interest in pursuing the release of Powers by any means possible (a) to learn the true facts of his "shoot down" and treatment since his capture; (b) to learn the full scope of his debriefing and the damage resulting therefrom; (c) to deny

^{1/} Memo to DCI from James Angleton, Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, CIA, 30 June 1961. Subject: Exchange of Rudolf Abel for Powers.

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the Soviets the opportunity for further debriefings; and (d) to fulfill the Agency's and the U.S. Government's responsibility to effect Powers' release.

On 14 July, General Cabell notified Mr. Houston that he should informally convey to the State Department the Agency's position on the exchange as follows:

a. The U.S. Government should not take the initiative in the matter.

b. If the question became active, the Agency generally favored the idea of the exchange of Abel for Powers.

Thus far the Justice Department had not been brought into the CIA/State discussions. On 11 September 1961, a letter to Mr. Donovan from Mrs. Abel after a second visit to the Russian Embassy in Berlin contained what was considered by the Agency as a "key" paragraph:

"I gathered from our talk that there is only one possible way to achieve success, that is simultaneous release of both Francis Powers and my husband, which can be arranged." 1/

It was suggested to the Secretary of State (Mr. Rusk) by General Cabell in his memorandum of 2 November 1961 (see Annex 96) that

1/ ER 61-8690, 2 Nov 1961. Memo to Secretary of State from Gen. Cabell.

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"Mrs. Abel" was being instructed by the Soviet Government and the continuation of negotiations through this channel was recommended in an effort to obtain the release of Powers. The Secretary of State on 24 November 1961 wrote to the Attorney General (Robert F. Kennedy) giving him the background of the case to date, stating that foreign policy considerations need not be a factor influencing the Justice Department's decision concerning the exchange, and suggesting that the Donovan/Mrs. Abel channel be the means of consummating the agreement with the Soviets. The full text of this letter is at Annex 97.

The Attorney General gave his approval to the exchange effort the first week of January 1962 and at a meeting between State and CIA officers on 4 January it was agreed that Mr. Donovan should write to Mrs. Abel asking to meet her in Leipzig or Berlin and to be put in touch with appropriate Soviet officials. If this came to pass, he would indicate that he was authorized by the U.S. Government to negotiate the exchange. DPD was assigned responsibility for providing someone to identify Powers and arranging for the airlift. Mr. Houston reported that the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Roswell Gilpatric, had committed the Air Force to provide the airlift for this purpose.

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At this point, security of the negotiations became paramount, and CIA bases in [] and Frankfurt were requested to set up restricted cells for receiving communications via the HBJAYWALK channel on a very sensitive matter. Mr. John McMahon and Colonel Geary visited [] Germany to prepare for USAFE and CIA support which would be required. The code name ZRHOOKUP was given to the exchange plan.

Mr. Donovan wrote to Mrs. Abel that he had new information and would meet her at the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin at noon on 3 February. She was warned that all publicity must be avoided. Meanwhile Mrs. Abel's lawyer, a Mr. Vogel, had been in touch with the office of the U.S. Mission in Berlin concerning a possible package deal to include the Yale student, Frederick L. Pryor, who had managed to get himself arrested in the East Zone and whose parents were in West Berlin putting pressure on the U.S. Mission to effect their son's release. The U.S. Mission therefore asked the Department to instruct Donovan to ask first that Pryor be included in the exchange. The Department replied to the Berlin Mission that the undertaking in which it was about to be involved had been carefully planned and approved at highest levels; that the Department was fully aware of the Pryor problem; that instructions to Donovan were based on the best U.S. national interests and had already been passed to him in Washington; and that it was essential that no

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United States official should become involved in Donovan's negotiations.

Donovan's briefing had included the following guidance coordinated with State and Justice: (a) Upon being introduced to proper authorities in East Berlin he should show his letter from U.S. Pardon Attorney Reed Cozart to establish his authority to arrange Abel's release; (b) he should ask what the Soviets are willing to offer for Abel; and (c) if the Soviets offer only Powers, he should state that the U.S. expects more and mention Pryor and Makinen (another prisoner of the Soviets). Whatever the Soviet reply, Donovan should say he must communicate with his Government and arrange for a next meeting, allowing enough time to coordinate the next move with Washington.

According to plan, Donovan was airlifted from London to West Berlin on 2 February and on 3 February made his initial visit to the Soviet Consulate in East Berlin. The story of his negotiations is included at Annex 98 hereto, as it was reported by cable from the Berlin Base. Two separate descriptions of the Powers/Abel exchange in the middle of the Glienicke Bridge at the border crossing from West Berlin are also included as Annexes 99 and 100; one is by Mr. (now Ambassador) E. Allan Lightner, Jr., of the Berlin Mission,

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and the other by Mr. Fred T. Wilkinson, Deputy Director of Prisons, Department of Justice. Both of these gentlemen were members of the official U.S. party on the bridge to consummate the exchange.

On the return of Frank Powers to the States by special USAF airlift, he was established in a safehouse where he had a reunion with his wife and his family, after which he underwent a long debriefing (from which voluminous tape recordings and transcriptions now repose in OSA material at the Records Center). The essence of Powers' own story of what happened on May Day 1960 and during his imprisonment is contained in the transcript of his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 6 March 1962 (copy of which is appended as Annex 101).

A complete review of the case was made by a board of inquiry presided over by Judge E. Barrett Prettyman to determine if Powers complied with the terms of his employment and his obligations as an American. It was the conclusion of the board of inquiry and of the Director of Central Intelligence that Mr. Powers had lived up to the terms of his employment and instructions in connection with his mission and in his obligations as an American under the circumstances in

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which he found himself. On 5 March 1962 the DCI authorized the reinstatement of the contract and appointment of Powers and the payment of the salary due thereunder for "general duty status" (\$1,000 per month).

On 4 April 1962, Colonel Geary advised Project Headquarters that the Air Force agreed to the reinstatement of Powers in the Air Force provided the Agency, State and the White House agreed. All approvals were obtained and Colonel Geary was advised on 10 April. He met with Powers on 11 April for a discussion and it was agreed the reinstatement would be made effective on 1 July 1962. Meanwhile, however, Powers began legal proceedings to obtain a divorce from his wife, Barbara, and in view of the expected publicity in connection with this development, the reinstatement was postponed at USAF request until the divorce proceedings were completed.

On 25 September 1962, Powers applied to Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and was accepted for employment as a test pilot checking out U-2's following IRAN or modification. He resigned from the Agency's employ on 6 October 1962 and reported to Lockheed the middle of October where after ground school and area familiarization in the Los Angeles area, he went to Edwards Air Force Base and

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requalified in the U-2. It was his intention to work for Lockheed until the time was appropriate for him to be reinstated in the Air Force. On the settlement of his divorce case, he met with Colonel Geary on 30 March 1963, and after consideration of the personal pressures which he could expect to be faced with on his return to the Air Force, he decided it would be wiser to remain with Lockheed.

Many offers were made to Frank Powers for the publication of his story, which he duly reported to his Agency mentors. In answer to his query concerning permission to publish a book, the following decision was handed down on 27 June 1962 by the then Executive Director of CIA, Mr. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick (recently the author of a book on his own CIA career entitled The Real CIA):

"1. On 25 June a meeting was held in the DCI's office to discuss proposals by various publishers that Francis Gary Powers write a book on his experiences. It was concluded that such a book would be undesirable, would be harmful to Powers and not in the best interests of the Agency.

"2. That same day the General Counsel and Mr. John McMahon of DPD talked to Mr. Powers on this subject and he was reluctantly receptive to our guidance.

"3. This information is for the guidance of all concerned. In the event that Mr. Powers should raise the issue again it should be stressed to him that the writing of articles or a book would only involve him in controversy in which he would most likely come out second best. Further, he should be warned that

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he will be constantly the target for possible exploitation by unscrupulous individuals who want to make money off of Powers' reputation. Third, he should be aware of the fact that literary endeavors such as have been proposed to him are inevitably less financially rewarding than they appear at first. As long as Powers is with the Agency or continues an active Air Force career, the above will continue to be the policy in regard to his writings. It should be noted that one of the arguments that has constantly been advanced for the high pay of the U-2 pilots has been that they would not have an opportunity for personal gain through writings." 1/

When Frank Powers again raised the issue of writing a book in July 1967, he was again discouraged from doing so, even though five years had passed since his release by the Soviets and he was no longer subject to either Agency or Air Force Regulations.

Intelligence Star Awarded

On 20 April 1965 in the Director's Conference Room at Langley, Virginia, Headquarters, Francis G. Powers was awarded the Intelligence Star, the presentation being made by General Marshall S. Carter, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, with the following citation:

Mr. Francis G. Powers is hereby awarded the Intelligence Star for his fortitude and courage in the performance of duty under conditions of extreme personal hazard. Mr. Powers' contribution to United States intelligence is in keeping with the finest traditions of service to our Nation and to the Central Intelligence Agency.

1/ ER 62-4387/1, 27 June 1962, Executive Memorandum by the Executive Director.

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Postscript

As a postscript to the MUDLARK* story, it is perhaps fitting to wind up the May Day Incident's history as it was begun, with a message from the U.S. Air Attachè in Moscow. On 22 March 1963, Colonel William F. Scott cabled the following message from Moscow to Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, in the Pentagon:

Following message from AIRA USSR C-68 quoted for your information. Theodore Shabad, New York Times, probably will submit articles on Powers, U-2. His source states that the U-2 approached the Urals undetected. When detected, missiles unable to fire because of kodovye fishki (translation: code plug). Two aircraft attempted intercept, but could not reach altitude. As U-2 was leaving SAM area, one battery came into operation. Ground unit saw only one blip on screen. Did not know their own fighters were in area. Fired salvo of three missiles. One missile hit and destroyed Soviet fighter attempting intercept. Another hit U-2 in tail. Third missile missed. Shabad thinks his source reliable, a Soviet electronics engineer who got story from an individual on missile site in Urals area... " 1/

* MUDLARK was the code name given to the May Day 1960 Incident.

1/ USAIRATT Moscow to Hqs USAF, Washington, 22 March 1963.

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ANNEX 82

STATEMENT BY CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV TO THE
SUPREME SOVIET ON 5 MAY 1960
CONCERNING SHOOTDOWN OF U-2

On April 9 a U.S. aircraft flew in from Afghanistan. Some of our comrades raised the question of warning the United States, for this was in contradiction to our talks with U.S. leaders. Such provocation is a bad prelude to a summit meeting. We discussed this question and decided to do nothing, for it usually leads to nothing. Then we instructed our military to act resolutely and stop foreign aircraft from violating our air space.

The United States, apparently encouraged by previous incursions), crossed the Soviet frontier on May 1.

The Minister of Defense informed the Government. We said that the aircraft should be shot down, this was done. The aircraft was shot down. The investigation showed that it was a U.S. plane, but it did not carry the usual markings. It has been established that the plane flew in either from Turkey, or Iran or Pakistan. Nice neighbors!

On behalf of the Soviet Government I must tell you about acts of aggression by the United States against the USSR. I have in mind U.S. aircraft violating Soviet air space. In the past we protested against these violations, but the United States rejected them.

We decided to send a severe warning that we would take the steps necessary to insure the security of our country. I think we shall give the gravest warning to those countries which provide facilities for the United States to carry out aggression against the USSR.

Just think what would be the reaction of the United States if a Soviet plane flew over New York or Detroit. This would mean the beginning of another war. Why then do you not think that we may reply with the same measures should a foreign plane appear over our country. We think that there is no doubt in anybody's mind that we have the ability to retaliate. Of course we have no atomic bombers or patrol but we have rockets which are more reliable than bombers.

The governments of those countries providing facilities for the United States should realize that they may suffer as a consequence. U.S. violation of our air space is a dangerous sign. We are going to raise this point in the Security Council. It is difficult to comprehend such an attitude in view of the forthcoming Summit Meeting. What was it: A congratulation on May Day? No, they hoped that their aircraft would fly in with impunity and get back. It seems that the U.S. aggressive forces have of late been making every effort to thwart the Summit Meeting. Who sent the aircraft? If this was done by the U.S. Military on their own bat, this must alarm world public opinion.

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ANNEX 83

DON'T PLAY WITH FIRE, GENTLEMEN

From the concluding Words of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev to the Fifth Session of the Supreme Soviet USSR, Fifth Convocation, on 7 May 1960

Comrade deputies, the aggressive act committed by the American airforce against the Soviet Union has justifiably incensed deputies and all Soviet people. Numerous inquiries and appeals are being received by the session and the Soviet Government. In view of this, permit me to dwell on this question once again and to furnish certain new data.

After my report to the Supreme Soviet, in which I dwelt on this fact, the U. S. State Department claimed in an official press statement that the point in question was a violation of the Soviet state frontier by an American aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type, which allegedly was studying weather conditions in the upper layers of the atmosphere in the area of the Turkish-Soviet frontier. This plane had allegedly strayed off its course because the pilot had oxygen trouble.

The State Department asserts that the pilot lost consciousness and steered by its automatic pilot, the plane flew into Soviet territory. According to the State Department, the pilot only had time to report back about the failure of his oxygen equipment to the Turkish airfield in Adana, whence it flew, an airfield which allegedly does not belong to the military, but to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

Soon after that, NASA issued a statement confirming the State Department version. This statement says:

"One of NASA's U-2 research airplanes, in use since 1956, in continuing the program of studying wind and meteorological conditions at high altitudes has been missing since about 9 o'clock, May 1 (local time), when its pilot reported he was having oxygen difficulties over Lake Van, Turkey."

Comrades, I must tell you a secret: When I was making my report I deliberately did not say that the pilot was alive and in good health and that we have parts of the plane. We did so deliberately, because had we told everything at once the Americans would have invented another version.

And now, just look how many silly things they have said--Lake Van, scientific research, and so on, and so forth. Now that they know the pilot is alive they will have to invent something else. And they will do it.

(Khrushchev then read further from the NASA press release with added comments.)

This is the official version circulated by American officials to mislead public opinion in their country and the world. I must declare, comrade deputies, that these versions are completely untrue and circulated for gullible people.

The authors of these versions supposed that if the plane was shot down the pilot must probably perish. So there would be no one to ask how everything actually happened; there would be no way to check what sort of plane it was and what instruments it carried.

First of all, I wish to announce that the pilot of the downed American plane is alive and in good health. He is now in Moscow. Brought here also are the remains of this plane and its special instrumentation, discovered during the investigations.

The name of the pilot is Francis Harry Powers. He is 30 years old. He says he is a 1st lieutenant in the U. S. Airforce, where he served until 1956, that is, to the day when he went over the Central Intelligence Agency.

Francis Powers reported, incidentally, that while serving with the American airforce he used to get 700 dollars a month, but when he went over to the intelligence service and started carrying out spying assignments to glean secret information he began getting 2,500 dollars a month.

I want to tell you something about the results of the examination of the plane that has been shot down and its equipment, and results of questioning the pilot. The inquiry continues, but already the picture is fairly clear.

To start with, this was, indeed, a high altitude, low speed Lockheed U-2. They counted on its high altitude and believed that this plane could not be brought down by any fighter or antiaircraft artillery. That is why they thought it could fly over Soviet territory with impunity. In fact, the plane flew at a great altitude, and it was hit by the rocket at an altitude of 20,000 meters. And if they fly higher, we will also hit them!

The plane was in no way equipped for "upper atmosphere research" or for taking "air samples," as official American spokesmen assert. Not at all. This was a real military reconnaissance aircraft fitted with various instruments for collecting intelligence and, among other things, for aerial photography.

The competent commission of experts which examined the wrecked plane has established from the documentary evidence that this American plane is a specially prepared reconnaissance aircraft. The task of the plane was to cross the entire territory of the Soviet Union from the Amirs to Kola Peninsula to get information on our country's military and industrial establishments by means of aerial photography. Besides aerial cameras, the plane carried other reconnaissance equipment for spotting radar networks, identifying the location and frequencies of operating radio stations, and other special radio-engineering equipment.

Not only do we have the equipment of that plane, but we also have developed film showing a number of areas of our territory. Here are some of these photos. (Khrushchev showed the photos).....

/Additional items brought out during this speech:

Powers was attached to Detachment 10-10 at Incerlik.
Col. William Shelton is commander and Lt. Col. Carol? Funk
is deputy commander.

The flight also violated the territory of Afghanistan.

There was an explosive charge in the aircraft.

The pilot was supplied with a poison needle.

The pilot also had a pistol equipped with a silencer, rubles and other currencies, gold rings and watches.

Khrushchev warned the governments of Turkey, Pakistan, and Norway that they must be clearly aware that they were accomplices in this flight because they permitted the use of their airfields against the Soviet Union.

He also intimated that a press conference would soon be held at which the remains of the airplane would be put on display.

He said he thought it would be right to have the flier prosecuted so public opinion can see what action the United States is taking to provoke the Soviet Union and heat up the atmosphere, thus throwing us back from what we have achieved in relieving international tension.

He finished by announcing the decision of the Soviet Government to switch the Soviet Army and Navy over to rocket weapons, and the setting up of a rocket troops command with Marshal of Artillery Nedelin in command.

Above excerpted from the book
"To the Pillory with the Aggressors"

or

"The Truth about the Provocative
Invasion by an American Plane
of the Air Space of the USSR"

A Publication of the Union of Journalists
of the USSR, Moscow, 1960

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ANNEX 84

TEXT OF STATE DEPARTMENT RELEASE FOLLOWING KHRUSHCHEV
STATEMENT ON THE DOWNING OF U-2

7 May 1960, 1800 hrs.

The Department has received the text of Mr. Khrushchev's further remarks about the unarmed plane which is reported to have been shot down in the Soviet Union. As previously announced it was known that a U-2 plane was missing. As a result of the inquiry ordered by the President, it has been established that insofar as the authorities in Washington are concerned there was no authorization for any such flight as described by Mr. Khrushchev.

Nevertheless it appears that in endeavoring to obtain information now concealed behind the Iron Curtain a flight over Soviet territory was probably undertaken by an unarmed civilian U-2 plane.

It is certainly no secret that given the state of the world today, intelligence collection activities are practiced by all countries, and postwar history certainly reveals that the Soviet Union has not been lagging behind in this field. The necessity for such activities as measures for legitimate national defense are enhanced by the excessive secrecy practiced by the Soviet Union in contrast to the Free World.

One of the things creating tensions in the world today is apprehension over surprise attack with weapons of mass destruction. To reduce mutual suspicion and to give a measure of protection against surprise attack, the U.S. in 1955 offered its "Open Skies" proposal -- a proposal which was rejected out of hand by the Soviet Union. It was in relation to the danger of surprise attack that planes of the type of unarmed civilian U-2 aircraft have been patrolling the frontiers of the Free World for the past four years.

C05492916

ANNEX 85

May 9, 1960

No. 254

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

On May 7 the Department of State spokesman made a statement with respect to the alleged shooting down of an unarmed American civilian aircraft of the U-2 type over the Soviet Union. The following supplements and clarifies this statement as respects the position of the United States Government.

Ever since Marshal Stalin shifted the policy of the Soviet Union from wartime cooperation to postwar conflict in 1946 and particularly since the Berlin blockade, the forceful takeover of Czechoslovakia and the Communist aggressions in Korea and Vietnam the world has lived in a state of apprehension with respect to Soviet intentions. The Soviet leaders have almost complete access to the open societies of the free world and supplement this with vast espionage networks. However, they keep their own society tightly closed and rigorously controlled. With the development of modern weapons carrying tremendously destructive nuclear warheads, the threat of surprise attack and aggression presents a constant danger. This menace is enhanced by the threats of mass destruction frequently voiced by the Soviet leadership.

For many years the United States in company with its allies has sought to lessen or even to eliminate this threat from the life of man so that he can go about his peaceful business without fear. Many proposals to this end have been put up to the Soviet Union. The President's "open skies" proposal of 1955 was followed in 1957 by the offer of an exchange of ground observers between agreed military installations in the U.S., the USSR and other nations that might wish to participate. For several years we have been seeking the mutual abolition of the restrictions on travel imposed by the Soviet Union and those which the United States felt obliged to institute on a reciprocal basis. More recently at the Geneva disarmament conference the United States has proposed far-reaching new measures of controlled disarmament. It is possible that the Soviet leaders have a different version and that, however unjustifiedly, they fear attack from the West. But this is hard to reconcile with their continual rejection of our repeated proposals for effective measures against surprise attack and for effective inspection of disarmament measures.

I will say frankly that it is unacceptable that the Soviet political system should be given an opportunity to make secret preparations to face the free world with the choice of abject surrender or nuclear destruction. The Government of the United States would be derelict to its responsibility not only to the American people but to free peoples everywhere if it did not, in the absence of Soviet cooperation, take such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and to overcome this danger of surprise attack. In fact the United States has not and does not shirk this responsibility.

In accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, the President has put into effect since the beginning of his Administration directives to gather by every possible means the information required to protect the United States and the Free World against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for their defense. Under these directives programs have been developed and put into operation which have included extensive aerial surveillance by unarmed civilian aircraft, normally of a peripheral character but on occasion by penetration. Specific missions of these unarmed civilian aircraft have not been subject to Presidential authorization. The fact that such surveillance was taking place has apparently not been a secret to the Soviet leadership and the question indeed arises as to why at this particular juncture they should seek to exploit the present incident as a propaganda battle in the cold war.

This government had sincerely hoped and continues to hope that in the coming meeting of the Heads of Government in Paris Chairman Khrushchev would be prepared to cooperate in agreeing to effective measures which would remove this fear of sudden mass destruction from the minds of peoples everywhere. Far from being damaging to the forthcoming meeting in Paris, this incident should serve to underline the importance to the world of an earnest attempt there to achieve agreed and effective safeguards against surprise attack and aggression.

At my request and with the authority of the President, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Honorable Allen W. Dulles, is today briefing members of the Congress fully along the foregoing lines.

* * *

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STATEMENT
BY
MR. ALLEN W. DULLES
AT THE
BRIEFING OF THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADER
MONDAY, MAY 9, 1960
2:00 PM

Under authority of the National Security Act of 1947 which set up the Central Intelligence Agency, that Agency was then entrusted by the National Security Council with the duty of collecting intelligence essential to our national security.

Under other directives of the Council, the Central Intelligence Agency was also entrusted with certain tasks relating to meeting the menace of international communism and in particular the aggressive activities of the Soviet Union.

Since that time, and growingly in recent years the Soviet Union behind the shield of tight security, has been arming in secret with the objective and expectation that its military power would be largely invulnerable to counterattack if they initiated an aggression.

At the Summit Conference in 1955 in order to relax the growing tensions resulting from the danger of surprise attack, the President advanced the "Open Skies" proposal.

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That proposal was summarily rejected by Moscow and Soviet security measures were reinforced.

Thus the Soviet has been arming in secret while our counter-defensive measures in the field of armaments were largely matters of open knowledge.

The ordinary means of intelligence were largely ineffective to gain the information about Soviet armaments which were essential to our survival and to the survival of the Free World.

As early as December 1, 1954, a project to construct a high-performance reconnaissance plane was initiated. The first U-2 flew in August 1955.

By this time the results of the Summit Conference were known and the likelihood of realizing anything from the "Open Skies" project became negligible.

We were then faced with a situation where the Soviet were continuing to develop their missiles and missile bases, and their bomber bases without any adequate knowledge on our part.

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This was considered to be an intolerable situation; intolerable both from the point of view of adequate military preparation on our part to meet the menace; intolerable from the point of view of being able effectively to take counteraction in the event of attack.

Any state has the duty to take the measures necessary for survival, and we received a high directive to gain vitally required intelligence by every feasible means.

Meanwhile by espionage the Soviet had been endeavoring to penetrate our nuclear and certain other secrets and observing the details of our own military establishment.

A policy decision was then reached that the U-2 should be used to obtain information with respect to vital targets within the Soviet Union as conditions permitted. As Mr. Herter has indicated, this project had competent policy approval. The details and timing of missions were left for determination by those most competent to judge the highest priority targets and the right weather, rarely available in many parts of the Soviet Union.

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Since that time there have been a considerable number of successful flights over the Soviet Union, over Communist China, and over the Satellite areas. Many square miles of strategic territory in the Soviet Union and Communist China have been photographed.

Essential information has been obtained with respect to the development of the Soviet missile threat; its bomber bases; its nuclear establishments and other highly strategic targets.

Mr. Bissell, under my direction and that of General Cabell, has been in charge of this project. He will describe the flights in more detail, and selective photographs of the results of these missions will be shown out of a total of thousands available to us.

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ANNEX 86

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CHAL-1052-60

27 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: U-2 Incident (Estimate and Analysis of
Compromise of Agency Classified Information)

1. In accordance with your instructions, submitted herewith is an estimate of damage to Agency interests caused by the U-2 incident. It is believed that this report is essentially complete on the subject of damage. The operational and personnel security aspects of the investigation are being continued in DPD-DD/P and the Office of Security. The Office of Security is giving attention to the compilation of the names of staff, contract, and contractor personnel believed to have been compromised.

2. In making this damage assessment, the reviewing officers have taken into account that there is no valid evidence at present that the U-2 incident was brought about by sabotage, defection, or actual penetration of CHALICE. It is known, however, that radar interception of the 9 April flight over target resulted in a continuing Soviet alert after that date; that there is evidence of possible RIS activity in the vicinity of Adana and Peshawar which may have been targeted against CHALICE activity in those areas; that adverse weather conditions caused unusual delay in the launching of GRAND SLAM, resulting in two round trips by the U-2 Adana-Peshawar and a single flight Adana-Peshawar; that atmospheric conditions prevented the use of established communications channels and forced the use of open long-distance telephone lines from Wiesbaden to Adana through Athens for the transmission of clearance instructions for GRAND SLAM; that CW transmission of GRAND SLAM "GO" instructions in clear text occurred several times; and that the GRAND SLAM flight for the first time was under Soviet radar observation continuously from the border. There is no evidence that any of the above circumstances were responsible for the U-2 incident, although they could have contributed to the known "early warning" of the Soviets.

3. A definite pattern of damage to Agency interests emerges from the material and information so far assembled. In general, the classified information which must be presumed as having come into the possession of the Soviets through the U-2 incident may be attributed to the knowledge and memory of Francis G. Powers and to the captured U-2 equipment and an intelligence coordination of this information

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with intelligence data already available to Soviets through other sources. The area of compromise of Agency interests comes within the following broad categories. The scope of the damage within these categories is hereinafter more specifically stated:

- (1) Administrative procedures
- (2) Installations and bases
- (3) Personnel
- (4) Operational techniques and procedures in CHALICE
- (5) Equipment and contractual relationships
- (6) U.S. Government inter-Agency relationships
- (7) Relationships between the U.S. Government and other Governments in CHALICE
- (8) Related and successor projects to CHALICE
- (9) Miscellaneous intelligence knowledge of Powers

4. In addition to the volume of classified information which has come into the possession of the Soviets because of the U-2 incident, it must be noted that the world-wide publicity attendant upon this incident relating to the Agency sponsorship of the U-2 program and the employment of Powers, has served to make public knowledge, both limited and unlimited in scope, of Agency contractual and procedural activity.

5. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES:

- (1) CIA/AF personnel procurement methods

Use of 1007th Intelligence Group as CIA procurement and holding mechanism
 Personnel
 Contract terms
 Salary processing
 Investigation
 Medical processing at Lovelace Clinic
 Polygraph testing of pilots
 Documentation
 Terms of resignation from and reassignment to Air Force

- (2) CIA/AF training program for CHALICE

Details of flight training at the "Ranch" -
 Watertown, Nevada
 Detachment A
 Removal to Edwards AFB

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Participation of USAF (Hqs. 4080th)
 AEC/REECO Support functions
 Testing of CHALICE pilots periodically
 at Wright-Patterson AFB
 Identity of supplier groups
 Planned utilization and training of
 [redacted] Pilots
 T-33 transition navigation training
 U-2 training
 Use of C-124's, U-2's, MATS and Commercial
 Air for movement of personnel and equipment

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- (3) CHALICE Headquarters - 1717 H Street, N.W., D. C.

Location
 Organization
 Personnel
 Operations
 Administration (Travel, Admin and Finance)

- (4) Detachment 10-10

Location
 Establishment, organization, personnel,
 operational and administrative procedures
 Relationships with USAF Base Command and
 host government

- (5) Cover mechanisms and documentation

NASA
 NASA/AWS
 USAF letters
 AGO cards
 Cover contracts with supplier companies

6. INSTALLATIONS AND BASES:

- (1) Location, use and function of:

"Ranch" - Watertown, Nevada
 Edwards AFB, California

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[redacted]
 CHALICE Headquarters, 1717 H Street, N.W.

[redacted]
 Giebelstadt, Germany
 Adana, Turkey
 Atsugi, Japan

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Lockheed Aircraft Corp., Hangar #82,
 Los Angeles, California
 Bodo, Norway
 Wiesbaden, Germany

- (2) Possible knowledge of location, identity and some personnel of following CIA installations:

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[REDACTED]
 Frankfurt Station

[REDACTED]
 European Air Operations Division, German Station

- (3) Use of Lovelace Clinic, Albuquerque, New Mexico for U-2 pilot medical care
- (4) Schedule and flight plan of shuttle flights, Adana to Wiesbaden

7. PERSONNEL:

- (1) Knowledge of personnel assigned and participating in CHALICE at:

Operation GRAND SLAM (Also prior flights)
 Atsugi Naval Air Station
 Adana
 Peshawar
 Wiesbaden
 Edwards AFB
 Watertown
 CHALICE Headquarters
 Utilization of Dr. Randolph Lovelace and
 General Don Flickinger, USAF
 Manufacturers' technical representatives
 Lockheed Aircraft Corp.
 Perkin-Elmer Corp.
 Hycon Manufacturing Co.
 Eastman Kodak Company
 Pratt & Whitney

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8. OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES IN CHALICE:

- (1) Existence and purpose, but not specific content, of TALENT Security Control System

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- (2) Extensive knowledge of CHALICE - its personnel, and its operational, administrative and support routine
- (3) CHALICE staging procedures, routes, targets, planning, implementation, support during entire functional period of CHALICE, up to and including GRAND SLAM.

Operational concepts:

Diversionary tactics
 Fast strike concepts
 Use of C-124's and C-130's
 Ferrying: EAFB, Giebelstadt, Adana, etc.
 Mission profiles - transit and exit altitudes
 Tactical missions - Suez, Lebanon, Egypt, Israel
 Staging routines, including aircraft support, packing, etc. arrangements with USAFE
 Headquarters clearance

Administrative preparations:

Visas
 Preparatory arrangements with host governments for use of bases
 Diplomatic clearances for support aircraft
 Communications message sequence

- (4) Ability to effectively monitor through intimate knowledge of the operational concepts and administrative and material preparations involved in mission planning

9. EQUIPMENT AND CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS:

- (1) Pilot carried wallet containing U.S. currency and NASA identification card containing wording of AFR 55-26, dated 2 August 1959, bearing standard command line of General White authorizing NASA pilots to fly Air Force aircraft.
- (2) Standard navigation tools: green card showing navigation data; JN navigation charts covering route, containing normal navigation annotations and radio aids extracted from list of KWHAMLET radio broadcast stations; CNC chart showing entire route annotated with course lines to nearest friendly territory; pilot's aircraft checklist, and standard aircraft emergency checklist.

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- (3) Pilot possessed knowledge of return course Bodoë to Adana and ferry route Adana to Bodoë (no documents)
- (4) Escape and evasion packet containing cloth charts covering the area of operation, blood chit, assorted denominations of rubles and barter items.
- (5) Aircraft equipped with "enroute low altitude (RFC) Europe", 13 April 1960 and flight information publication terminal (high altitude), 15 April 1960. Both publications contain Aviano and Brindisi radio frequencies.
- (6) Cockpit contained standard European radio frequencies and channelization for aircraft radios.
- (7) The complete, though damaged, aircraft and equipment

Identity of designer
 Design features
 Construction and materials
 Mission capabilities and performance characteristics
 J-75 engine
 Photographic gear - function and performance of tracking camera and main camera
 ELINT gear and performance thereof. Pilot knowledge limited to purpose only.
 Radio and radar gear
 Pilot gear
 Component parts of aircraft, marked either by the manufacturer or the U.S. Government, are listed in detail in 13 May 1960.

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- (8) CHALICE supplier contracts (Agency/Air Force, Agency/Navy, and Air Force) are now known to a varying degree - as such to persons involved in those contracts, and to that extent are public knowledge. These disclosures may be expected to have some detrimental effect upon existing procurement and shipping procedures.

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10. U.S. GOVERNMENT INTER-AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS:

- (1) CIA/NASA cover plan
- (2) AF/CIA joint sponsorship of CHALICE
- (3) AFCIG-5 participation in CHALICE and identities of AFCIG-5 personnel
- (4) AF materiel support to CHALICE via USAFE and and identity of personnel involved in those areas. Through this, in addition to the simple monitoring of unclassified communications easily categorized by project priority materiel indicators: JUGHEAD, SHOEHORN, and BABYDOLL, the Soviets should soon be able to effectively monitor the entire CHALICE materiel system.
- (5) USAF/AWS participation in CHALICE, with knowledge of personnel probably limited to Base and Headquarters Weather Support elements.
- (6) Possible knowledge of USAF radar hold-down procedures as pertain to CHALICE.
- (7) Participation of USAF/TUSLOG Detachment 50 in ELINT and telemetry efforts from Incirlik AFB.
- (8) CIA relationships in CHALICE with the Department of State, and, through various Ambassadors or Chargés d'Affaires, with the Governments of those countries where CHALICE aircraft have been based, or have had either prestrike or post-strike bases. Norway, Germany, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey.

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11. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN CHALICE:

- (1) British high official cognizance and British participation in the CHALICE program through the Air Ministry.
- (2) Identity of all British pilots based at Adana who were involved in CHALICE. (Four British pilots, British Flight Planner, and British Flight Surgeon and their connection with the RAF).

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- (3) Role of the Watson AFB in the CHALICE Program.
- (4) The number of missions (USSR and Near East) flown by British pilots and the identities of those pilots.

12. RELATED AND SUCCESSOR PROJECTS TO CHALICE: (Following believed by most pilots)

(1) OXCART:

A follow-on program in progress or under construction
 A larger aircraft with altitude over 100,000 ft.
 Manned aircraft as opposed to unmanned vehicles
 Boeing, Convair, or Lockheed will build
 Two engines - turbo-jet to get it airborne
 and ram-jet to keep it airborne
 Speed about Mach 3
 Great range with missions from ZI to target
 and return
 Will possibly require towing to get airborne
 The "Ranch" at Watertown, Nevada, is being or
 will be activated for the follow-on program.

(2) Possible unofficial pilot knowledge of satellite project

13. MISCELLANEOUS INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE OF POWERS AND DAMAGE TO AGENCY INTERESTS BECAUSE OF U-2 INCIDENT:

- (1) The registration of Powers in the WAEPA and United Benefit Life Insurance programs serves to pinpoint these programs as insuring mechanisms used by CIA to insure its employees.
- (2) Pilot periodically briefed generally on Soviet capabilities regarding aircraft and missiles.
- (3) General knowledge as to existence of SAM sites and current SAM operational limitations.
- (4) General knowledge of Tyura Tam and Kapustin Yar activities and of our "Hot Shop" activity.

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- (5) Through observation of Detachment 50 aircraft pilot able to infer their engagement in ELINT and/or telemetry against Tyura Tam.
- (6) Pilot knowledge of content of various intelligence briefings during the past year concerning the area of operations, consisting mostly of Escape and Evasion matters published in area studies, and general briefings on Soviet Air Defense Systems, but not including locations of defensive elements.
- (7) Altitude and speed capabilities of current Soviet fighters as published in the Air Intelligence Digest.
- (8) ATIC studies and documents similar in nature to the above.
- (9) Limited knowledge of Soviet aircraft being equipped with AAM's.
- (10) Probable knowledge of CIA participation in the Indonesian revolt at least to the extent of CHALICE overflights.
- (11) Relationships between CIA and CAT and the employment of Allan Pope by CIA through CAT in the Indonesian revolt.
- (12) Participation of James Cherbonneaux and Carmine Vito in behalf of CIA in the Indonesian revolt. Knowledge of operational generalities, including location of base of operations and the fact that P-51 and B-26 aircraft were used.
- (13) Knowledge of the staging of CHALICE flights by Detachment C, based at Atsugi Naval Air Station in Japan.
- (14) Pilot believed to have an awareness that CIA is engaged in other clandestine air operations, but the specifics of his knowledge in this regard are unknown at the present time.

14. It is an inescapable conclusion from the foregoing information that the damage to Agency interests, installations, personnel, and equipment in CHALICE by reason of the U-2 incident is serious and far-reaching. In many respects the

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
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damage is complete insofar as any effective future clandestine use of CHALICE assets is concerned. It must be noted for future reference that much of the compromise of information can be attributed to a failure to follow through with a concept of complete compartmentation within the Project of pilot personnel who might be subject to capture.

15. Many after-the-fact recommendations could be made upon the basis of the above data but such recommendations would be academic in light of the developments in the U-2 incident. We would recommend only one thing, that in all highly sensitive projects the necessary compartmentation should not exclude the continuing advice and assistance of specialized components of CIA.

(Signed)

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)



CONCUR:

Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

Stanley W. Beerli
Colonel, USAF
Acting Chief, DPD-DD/P

S. H. Horton
Acting Chief, CI Staff

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ANNEX 87

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DISPATCH

BOOK DISPATCH NO. 1996
15 June 1960

To: Chiefs of Certain Stations and Bases**From:** Director of Central Intelligence**Subject:** U-2 Incident**Action:** For information

1. Over the past month, CIA has been the subject of an unprecedented volume of publicity centering around the U-2 project. The press in this country and abroad has devoted an enormous amount of space to reporting and analyzing all aspects of the incident on 1 May. We are glad that the publicity is now diminishing and believe that it will continue to do so.

2. Undesirable as exposure is, we can take comfort from the fact that in this country and in other free world areas, there has been a gratifying recognition of the Agency's efforts and, even more important, an awareness of the continuing need for intelligence activities.

3. On the whole, domestic opinion has been overwhelmingly favorable to the Agency. The leaders of Congress have generally praised the Agency's role; responsible newspapers have supported the need to collect intelligence; and hundreds of private citizens have written directly to express their support. There has been some adverse criticism, of course, but this has been concentrated on incidental parts of the operations or against policy decisions which did not involve the Agency.

4. We have achieved two principal things. One, the results of this collection effort have significantly benefited national security. Two, we have demonstrated to the world that such an operation can be conducted in secrecy for over four years. All of the people involved, and this includes representatives of all of the intelligence components in our government, have performed efficiently and securely and they are to be highly praised.

5. I am enclosing a copy of my statement made in Executive Session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A similar

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statement was made before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. This statement has not been made public and it should not be disclosed. It should be closely held by you and your immediate staff. There are also enclosed statements by the President, Representative Clarence Cannon and Senator Lyndon B. Johnson.

6. The official inquiries are about completed, and it is now time to look ahead. The past month has not changed any of the priority targets for intelligence collection. The Communists stand exposed to the world as obsessed with secrecy, and as still motivated by a hostile attitude toward the United States. It now falls on all of us to increase our efforts and to bring all our ingenuity to bear in devising new methods to collect the intelligence which is vital to our national security.

(signed)
ALLEN W. DULLES

Attachments:

1. Statement before Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
2. Excerpts from President's Press Conference 11 May 1960.
3. Remarks of Representative Cannon before House,
10 May 1960.
4. Statement of Senator Lyndon B. Johnson before Senate,
10 May 1960.

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STATEMENT BY
MR. ALLEN W. DULLES
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
to the
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
ON 31 MAY 1960

The duty of the Central Intelligence Agency under statute and under National Security Council directives pursuant to statute, is to provide the President and the National Security Council with evaluated intelligence relating to our national security.

The Agency has no policy or police functions.

In addition, however, the Agency has the duty, within policy limitations prescribed by the President and State Department, to do whatever is within its power to collect and produce the intelligence required by the policy makers in government, to deal with the dangers we face in the world today, a nuclear world.

Increasingly over the past ten years, the main target for our intelligence collection has been the U.S.S.R., its military, its economic, and its subversive potential.

The carrying out of this task has been rendered extremely difficult because the Soviet Union is a closed society.

Great areas of the U.S.S.R. are curtained off to the outside world. Their military preparations are made in secret. Their military hardware, ballistic missiles, bombers, nuclear weapons, and submarine forces, as far as physically possible, are concealed from us. They have resisted all efforts to realize mutual inspection or "open skies."

The ordinary tools of information gathering, under these circumstances are not wholly adequate. These ordinary tools include both the normal overt means of obtaining information, and the classical covert means generally referred to as espionage.

It is true that from these sources and from the many Soviet defectors who have come over to the Free World and from disaffected and disillusioned Soviet nationals, we obtain very valuable information.

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However, these sources and other sources developed through the application of various scientific techniques, while very helpful, did not give us the full intelligence protection this country required against the danger of preparation for surprise attack against us, from bases which might remain unknown and by weapons, the strength and power of which we might not be able adequately to evaluate.

Almost equally serious had been our lack of knowledge of Soviet defense measures against our retaliatory striking power.

Shackled by traditions, we were seeing the power of attack grow while the ability to secure the intelligence necessary for defense against attack was slipping, bound down in part by tradition.

For example, while Soviet spy trawlers can lurk a few miles off our shores and observe us with impunity, the Soviets cry "aggression" when a plane, invisible to the naked eye, flies over it some fifteen miles above the ground.

Either, theoretically, could carry a nuclear weapon. The trawler could deal a much more serious nuclear blow than a light reconnaissance plane.

But, of course, as we well know, no one would think of starting a nuclear war with either an isolated plane or ship.

In this age of nuclear peril we, the Central Intelligence Agency, felt that a new approach was called for in the whole field of intelligence collection.

* * * * *

This was the situation, when in 1954, almost six years ago, consultation was initiated on new intelligence collection techniques. We consulted with a group of highly competent technicians in and out of government. From our discussions there emerged the concept of a high-flying, high performance reconnaissance plane. In the then state of the art of aeronautics, it was confidently believed that a plane could be designed to fly unintercepted over the vitally important closed areas of the Soviet Union, where ballistic, nuclear, and other military preparations against us were being made.

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We also believed, as a result of these consultations, that the art of photography could be so advanced as to make the resolution of the pictures taken, even at extreme altitudes, of very great significance. On both counts the accomplishments exceeded expectations.

While the developmental work for this project, pursuant to high policy directive was in process, there came the Summit Conference of July 1955.

Here, in order to relax the growing tensions resulting from the danger of surprise attack, the President advanced the "open skies" proposal. Moscow summarily rejected anything of this nature, and Soviet security measures continued to be reinforced.

Accordingly, the U-2 project was pushed forward rapidly, and about a year after the 1955 summit meeting the first operational U-2 flight over the Soviet Union took place. For almost four years the flight program has been carried forward successfully.

Speed in getting the program underway had been a top priority. We were then faced, that is in 1955-1956, with a situation where the Soviets were continuing to develop their missiles, their heavy bomber and bomber bases, and their nuclear weapons production without adequate knowledge on our part.

This was considered to be an intolerable situation; intolerable both from the viewpoint of adequate military preparation on our part to meet the menace; intolerable from the point of view of being able effectively to take countermeasures in the event of attack.

It was recognized at the outset that this U-2 project had its risks and had a limited span of life due to improvement of counter measures; that a relatively fragile single-engine plane of the nature of the U-2 might one day have a flame-out or other malfunction in the rarified atmosphere in which it had to travel. If that resulted in a serious and prolonged loss of altitude, there was danger of failure and discovery.

To stop any enterprise of this nature because there are risks would be, of course, in this field to accomplish very little.

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While air reconnaissance is an old and tried method of gaining intelligence, a peacetime operation of this particular type and on this scale was unique.

But I submit that we live in an age when old concepts of the limits of "permitted" techniques for acquiring information are totally outdated. They come from the horse and buggy days.

I see no reason whatever to draw an unfavorable distinction between the collection of information by reconnaissance at a high altitude in the air and espionage carried on by individuals who illegally operate directly within the territory of another state.

In fact, the distinction, if one is to be drawn, would favor the former. The illegal espionage agents generally attempt to suborn and subvert the citizens of the countries in which they operate. High level air reconnaissance in no way disturbs the life of the people. It does not harm their property. They do not even notice it.

I believe these techniques should be universally sanctioned on a mutual basis and become an accepted and agreed part of our international arrangements.

The USSR has known a good deal about these flights for the last four years. It has studiously refrained from giving the people of the Soviet Union the knowledge they now admit they had.

With respect to the U-2 project, I am prepared to support and document these conclusions:--

First, that this operation was one of the most valuable intelligence collection operations that any country has ever mounted at any time, and that it was vital to our national security.

Second, that the chain of command and authority for the project was clear.

Third, that every overflight was carefully planned, fully authorized, and, until May 1, 1960, effectively carried out.

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Fourth, that the technical and logistic support was prompt and efficient.

Fifth, that the security which was maintained for this project over a period of more than five years has been unique.

I shall deal with these points in the inverse order in which I have presented them.

First - security. The project was run by a small, closely knit organization at headquarters and in the field. Knowledge of the operation was restricted to a minimum. Over more than five years, since the inception of the project, there has never been any damaging disclosure to interfere with the program.

The existence of the U-2 aircraft was, of course, well known, though its full capabilities, particularly the altitude and range were not disclosed. It had important weather and air sampling capabilities which were effectively used and which afforded natural cover for the project. These weather capabilities were open and publicized.

For example, as far as I know the U-2 is the first aircraft that has ever flown over the eye of a typhoon. It was used very effectively out in the Far East to learn about typhoons which cause so much damage, and we have a very extraordinary series of pictures of the U-2 looking right down at the eye of a typhoon from several miles above the top of it. Of course, the U-2 also had very valuable characteristics as a reconnaissance plane for peripheral flights.

With regard to technical and logistic support:--from the inception of the project, CIA has called on the United States Air Force for support in the form of technical advice and assistance in those fields where the Air Force has the most expert knowledge. These included advice on aircraft design and procurement, operational training of air crews, weather, aero-medicine and communications. I may say the Air Force liberally gave all this support to us.

The CIA also drew on the technical knowledge and advice of those members of the United States Intelligence Board with particular competence in the field of intelligence priorities -- targeting and the like. Each mission was carefully planned with respect to the highest priority requirements of the Intelligence Community.

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The project has been directed by a senior civilian in CIA with high competence in this area of work. He was responsible directly to me and, of course, to General Cabell.

Since the inception of CIA - going back for ten years - personnel from the military services, including the Air Force, have been detailed to CIA for tours of duty. We have had as many as 8 or 9 hundred of them at one time. These personnel take their orders from CIA, not from their parent service, during their period of detail. The U-2 project, under its civilian director, drew upon both the military and civilian personnel of the Agency. They were assigned to duties in headquarters and in the field staffs which were responsible for carrying out the technical functions of the program. They were chosen in view of their particular qualifications for this particular project.

Third, every overflight, from the inception of the project, and every phase of it, was carefully planned and staffed.

From time to time intelligence requirements were reviewed, and programs of one or more missions were authorized by higher authority.

Within the authority thus granted, specific flights could then be carried out on the order of the Director of Central Intelligence, as availability and readiness of aircraft and of pilot and as weather conditions permitted.

On the afternoon of 30 April last, after carefully considering the field report on the weather and other determining factors affecting the flight then contemplated, and after consultation with General Cabell and other qualified advisors in the Agency, and acting within existing authority to make a flight at that time, I personally gave the order to proceed with the flight of May first.

There was no laxity or uncertainty in the chain of command in obtaining the authority to act or in giving the order to proceed. With respect to the flight authorized on April 30, the same careful procedures were followed as had been followed in the many preceding successful flights.

Now I wish to discuss the value to the country of these flights from the intelligence viewpoint and from the

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viewpoint of national security considerations. I shall do this within the limitations of what I think both you and I feel are the necessary security restrictions.

Under the law setting up the Central Intelligence Agency, as Director, I am enjoined to protect "intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." Naturally I recognize this Committee as an authorized body to whom disclosures can properly be made that should not be made publicly. In so doing I wish to keep within the bounds of what I believe you would agree to be in the national interest to disclose, even here.

I feel that you should share the facts which I confidently believe justified the obvious risks of this project. Such risks were recognized and evaluated at all stages of the project.

For many years, the United States Intelligence Community has been directing its efforts to provide the information which would help to meet the threat of surprise attack. Every available means in the classical intelligence field have been utilized, and over recent years these have been valuably supplemented by the highly technical electronic and other scientific means to which I have referred.

Our main emphasis in the U-2 program has been directed against five critical problems affecting our national security. These are: the Soviet bomber force, the Soviet missile program, the Soviet atomic energy program, the Soviet submarine program. These are the major elements constituting the Soviet Union's capability to launch a surprise attack. In addition, a major target during this program has been the Soviet air defense system with which our retaliatory force would have to contend, in case of an attack on us and a counterattack by us.

Today, the Soviet bomber force is still the main offensive long range striking force of the Soviet Union. However, the U-2 program has helped to confirm that only a greatly reduced long-range bomber production program is continuing in the Soviet Union. It has established, however, that the Soviet Union has recently developed a new medium bomber with supersonic capabilities.

The U-2 program has covered many Soviet long-range bomber airfields, confirming estimates of the location of

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bases and the disposition of Soviet long-range bombers. It has also acquired data on the nuclear weapons storage facilities associated with them.

Our overflights have enabled us to look periodically at the actual ground facilities involved.

With respect to the Soviet missile test program -- this I shall illustrate graphically by showing you the photograph of these facilities, including both their ICBM and their IRBM test launching sites which could, of course, also become and may well be, operational sites.

Our photography has also provided us valuable insight into the problem of Soviet doctrine regarding ICBM deployment. It has taught us much about the use which the Soviets are making of these sites for the training of troops in the operational use of the short and intermediate range ballistic missiles.

The program has provided valuable information on the Soviet atomic energy program. This information has been included in the estimate which we give periodically to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, but without referring to the actual source of our data. This has covered the production of fissionable materials, weapons development and test activities, and the location, type, and size of many stockpile sites.

The project has shown that, despite Mr. Khrushchev's boasts that the Soviets will soon be able to curtail the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, the Soviets are continuing to expand fissionable material capacity.

The Soviet nuclear testing grounds have been photographed more than once with extremely interesting results. The photography has also given us our first firm information on the magnitude and location of the USSR's domestic uranium ore and uranium processing activities, vital in estimating Soviet fissionable material production. We have located national and regional nuclear storage sites and forward storage facilities.

In general, the program has continued to give useful data on the size and rate of growth of Soviet industry.

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The material obtained has been used for the correction of military maps and aeronautical charts.

Among the most important intelligence obtained is that affecting the tactics of the United States deterrent air strike force. We now have hard information about the nature, extent, and in many cases, the location of the Soviet ground-to-air missile development. We have learned much about the basic concept, magnitude, operational efficiency, deployment, and rate of development of the Soviet air defense system, including their early warning radar development.

We have obtained photographs of many scores of fighter air fields previously inadequately identified, and have photographed various fighter types vainly attempting to intercept the U-2. All of this has proved invaluable to SAC in adjusting its plans to known elements of the opposition it would have to face.

As a result of the concrete evidence acquired by the U-2 program on a large number of targets in the Soviet Union it has now been possible for U.S. commanders to make a more efficient and confident allocation of aircraft, crews and weapons.

U-2 photography has also made it possible to provide new and accurate information to strike crews which will make it easier for them to identify their targets and plan their navigation more precisely.

We have obtained new and valuable information with regard to submarine deployment and the precise location of their submarine pens.

In the opinion of our military, of our scientists, and of the senior officials responsible for our national security, the results of the program have been invaluable.

The program has had other elements of value. It has made the Soviets less cocky about their ability to deal with what we might bring against them.

They have gone through four years of frustration in having the knowledge since 1956 that they could be overflown with impunity, that their vaunted fighters were useless against such flights, and that their ground-to-air missile capability was inadequate.

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Khrushchey has never dared expose this to his own people. It is only after he had boasted, and we believe falsely, that he had been able to bring down the U-2 on May 1 by a ground-to-air missile while flying at altitude, that he has allowed his own people to have even an inkling of the capability which we possessed.

His frustrated military, many of whom know the facts, are far less confident today than they otherwise would have been.

At the same time, in competent military circles among our allies, the evidence of American capability demonstrated by the present disclosure of the U-2 flights has given a new and better perspective of our own relative strength as compared with that of the Soviet Union.

* * * * *

At this point I propose to show you some photographs to support my presentation regarding the intelligence value of the project.

Now I shall present the facts with regard to the dispatch of the May 1 flight and the ensuing developments insofar as the intelligence aspects are concerned and insofar as they are known to us.

As to the timing of the flight, there is, of course, no good time for a failure.

I have already presented the circumstances under which I assumed direct responsibility for dispatching this flight.

If this flight had been a success, we would have covered certain targets of particular significance and we would, in the normal course, have wished to analyze its results before scheduling a further mission. When it failed, it was obvious even before we received instructions that we would not try again before studying the cause and effects of failure. In either event, success or failure, after this flight we were not preparing to fly again for several weeks and until further policy guidance was received.

With respect to the timing of the flights, the President, in his speech of May 25, had this to say: "As to the timing, the question was really whether to halt the

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program and thus forego the gathering of important information that was essential and that was likely to be unavailable at a later date. The decision was that the program should not be halted.

"The plain truth is this: when a nation needs intelligence activity, there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed. Incidentally, from Pearl Harbor we learned that even negotiation itself can be used to conceal preparations for a surprise attack."

I would point out, also, that if you turn off all flights for months before international meetings and then for some time after such meetings and before trips to the Soviet Union of high American officials or trips here of Soviet officials; if you also estimate that in times of tension flights should be stopped because they might increase the tension, and in times of sweetness and light they should not be run because it would disturb any "honeymoon" in our relations with the Soviet Union; if, on top of this, you take into account that in much of the Soviet Union most days of the year are automatically eliminated because of weather and cloud cover and low Arctic sun, - then you can understand the problem of timing of flights.

If you asked me whether or not a flight would have been made after this particular flight, I cannot give you the answer because I do not know. At the time, we had no authority for any mission other than the one that was then undertaken.

With respect to the flight itself, when the aircraft did not reach its destination within the flight time and fuel capacity given it, it was presumed to be down. But at first we did not know where. It could have been within friendly territory, in hostile desert, or in uninhabited territory or within hostile territory where if alive the pilot would have been quickly apprehended as was the case. We did not know whether the plane was intact or destroyed, the pilot alive or dead.

I shall deal in a moment with the statements which were issued during this period of uncertainty.

The question of course arises as to what actually happened to cause this aircraft to come down deep in the heart of Russia.

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Let me remind you first that the returns are not yet all in, and so our picture is not complete. However, we do have a considerable body of evidence that permits a reasonable judgment with a high degree of confidence.

Our best judgment is that it did not happen as claimed by the Soviets. That is, we believe that it was not shot down at its operating altitude of around 70,000 feet by the Russians. We believe that it was initially forced down to a much lower altitude by some as yet undetermined mechanical malfunction. At that lower altitude, it was a sitting duck for Soviet defenses, whether fighter aircraft or ground-to-air fire or missiles.

As to what happened at the lower altitude, we are not sure. The pilot may have bailed out at any time or he may have crash landed. The aircraft was equipped with a destruction device to be activated by the pilot as he leaves the aircraft. Again we do not know whether or not he attempted to do so. It should be noted, however, that no massive destruction device capable of ensuring complete destruction could be carried in this aircraft as weight limitations were critical, and every pound counted.

Thus, whether or not the destruction device was used, one might expect sizeable and identifiable parts of the aircraft and its equipment to remain.

As to the nature and cause of the suspected malfunction, we are not prepared to pass judgment. But let me remind you that this aircraft and this pilot had proven their high degree of reliability in many technically similar flights, inside and outside friendly territory. When operating as in this case, about 1200 miles within unfriendly, heavily-defended territory, there can be no cushion against malfunction.

There has been much comment and questioning with regard to the pilot and his behavior after apprehension. Of course, we only have the Soviets' report on all of this, and we should accept it with caution.

All of the pilots engaged in this enterprise were most carefully selected. They were highly trained, highly motivated, and, as seemed right, well compensated financially. But no one in his right mind would have accepted these risks for money alone.

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Since the operational phase of the program started, the reliability record of the plane, for a craft of this character, was little short of phenomenal. It was a tribute to the high skill of the designer, the maintenance crews, and the pilots. Until the May first flight, over about a 4-year period of operations, no plane had been lost over unfriendly territory in the course of many, many missions. Several were lost during the training period at home and in friendly territory abroad.

Francis Gary Powers, the pilot on the May 1 flight, is a fourth generation American citizen, born in Jenkins, Kentucky, about 31 years ago. He received a BA degree from Milligan College, Tennessee, in September 1950. Scholastically he was high average. He joined the Air Force in the fall of 1950, as a private and served in an enlisted status until November 1951, when he was discharged as a Corporal in order to enter the Aviation Cadet School to train as a pilot. He attended the Air Force Basic and Advance Pilot Training School at Greenville, Mississippi. Upon completion of this training in December 1952, he was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant.

His first duty assignment was as an F-84 Commando Jet Pilot with the 468th Strategic Fighter Squadron at Turner Air Force Base, Georgia. He resigned his Air Force Reserve Commission under honorable conditions in May 1956. The reason for such resignation was to join the project we are discussing.

His record with the Air Force had been uniformly good. He was given a special security screening by the Air Force and also a supplemental check by the security office of the CIA.

During his Air Force career, he received training with respect to his behavior and conduct in event of capture, and after entering the employ of the Agency, he took the Agency's escape and evasion course at our training station here in the United States in June of 1956. He had subsequent training in escape and evasion after his assignment to his overseas post in August 1956.

An Air Force Major Flight Surgeon assigned to CIA who worked with the U-2 pilots during their training in the United States and continuously during their stay overseas,

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had this to say in regard to Francis Powers, "...During the period of my assignment as Flight Surgeon at Adana, I not infrequently shared a room with Mr. Powers and participated in social, flying, and mission duties with him. In my opinion Mr. Powers was outstanding among the pilots for his calmness under pressure, his precision, and his methodical approach to problems. I have flown considerably in jets with Mr. Powers. I would consider him temperate, devoted, perhaps more than unusually patriotic, and a man given to thinking before speaking or acting."

It should be remembered that Powers was a pilot, navigator, a well-rounded aviator trained to handle himself under all conditions, in the air or if grounded in hostile territory. He was not trained as an "agent" as there were no foreseeable circumstances, even the present ones, where he would act as such. Furthermore, such training would have been incompatible both temperamentally and with the strenuous technical demands of his flight mission.

The pilots of these aircraft on operational missions, and this was true in the case of Powers, received the following instructions for use if downed in a hostile area:

First, it was their duty to ensure the destruction of the aircraft and its equipment to the greatest extent possible.

Second, on reaching the ground it was the pilot's first duty to attempt escape and evasion so as to avoid capture, or delay it as long as possible. To aid him in these purposes and for survival he was given the various items of equipment which the Soviets have publicized and which are normal and standard procedure, selected on the basis of wide experience gained in World War II and in Korea.

Third, pilots were equipped with a device for self destruction but were not given positive instructions to make use of it. In the last analysis, this ultimate decision has to be left to the individual himself.

Fourth, in the contingency of capture, pilots were instructed to delay as long as possible the revelation of damaging information.

Fifth, pilots were instructed to tell the truth if faced with a situation, as apparently faced Powers, with

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respect to those matters which were obviously within the knowledge of his captors as a result of what fell into their hands. In addition, if in a position where some attribution had to be given his mission, he would acknowledge that he was working for the Central Intelligence Agency. This was to make it clear that he was not working for any branch of the armed services, and that his mission was solely an intelligence mission.

These instructions were based on a careful study of our experience in the Korean war of the consequences of brainwashing and of the extent of information which could be obtained by these and other means available to the Soviets.

Whether or not in this instance the pilot complied with all of these instructions, it is hard to state today with the knowledge we have. However, a careful review of what he has said does not indicate that he has given to the Soviets any valuable information which they could not have discovered from the equipment they found upon the pilot's person or retrieved from the downed aircraft.

I would warn, of course, against putting too much belief in what Powers may say, particularly if he is later put on trial. By that time they will have had a more thorough opportunity for a complete brain-washing operation which might well produce a mixture of truth and fiction.

I will now deal with the "cover story" statements which were issued following May 1.

When a plane is overdue and the fact of its takeoff and failure to return is known, some statement must be made, and quickly. Failure to do so, and, under normal conditions, to start a search for the lost plane, would in itself be a suspicious event.

Thus, when the U-2 disappeared on May first and did not return to its base within the requisite time period after its takeoff, action was required.

For many years, in fact since the inception of the operation, consideration has been given to the cover story which would be used in the case of the disappearance of a plane which might possibly be over unfriendly territory.

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Because of its special characteristics, the U-2 plane was of great interest to the U.S. weather services and to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the predecessor of NASA. NASA was very much concerned with the scientific advances which operations of these U-2s could make towards greater knowledge of the upper atmosphere and for other scientific purposes. As already indicated, U-2s have now undertaken many weather and related missions and their functions in this respect have been publicized by NASA, and this publicity has been distributed freely to the world.

It was therefore natural that NASA's operations be used to explain the presence of U-2s at various bases throughout the world, although NASA did not participate in the development of intelligence devices, nor did they participate in the planning and conduct of any intelligence missions.

Accordingly, when the May first flight was lost, an initial statement was issued on May 2nd by the Base Commander at Adana that a U-2 aircraft, engaged in upper air studies and operating from the base was down, and oxygen difficulties had been reported. This was identified in the press as a NASA plane. A search for the plane was initiated in the remote areas of eastern Turkey.

On May 5, early in the day by our time, Khrushchev made his claim that "an American aircraft crossed our frontier and continued its flight into the interior of our country...and...was shot down." At that time, Khrushchev gave no further details of significance.

Apparently as an attempt at deception, Khrushchev followed up his speech the next day by distributing photographs of a pile of junk--according to experts, pieces of an old Soviet fighter plane--possibly for the purpose of making us think that the U-2 plane had been effectively destroyed. Since the fake wreckage was quickly identified for what it was, this particular ruse had no effect.

The NASA statement which followed the Khrushchev speech of May 5 developed somewhat further the original cover story. Also on May 5, the Department of State issued a further release which generally followed the cover story. Mr. Dillon has covered this in his testimony before this Committee on May 27.

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At this time--on 5-6 May--we still did not know whether the plane or any recognizable parts of it or the pilot were in Soviet hands, or whether the pilot was dead or alive. Furthermore, then we did not know whether Khrushchev desired to blow up the incident as he later did, or put it under the rug and spare his people the knowledge that we had been overflying them.

Hence, in this situation, there seemed no reason at that time to depart from the original cover story.

These two press releases attributed to NASA were worked out in consultation between CIA and NASA and after conferring with the Department of State.

These statements did not come out of any lack of forethought or attention to their preparation or lack of coordination. The basic cover story had been developed some years ago for the exigency of a failure, and this original cover story was on May 5 modified to meet our then estimate of what was best to say in the light of what little we knew about the details of the May 1 flight failure.

Subsequently, on May 7, Khrushchev adduced evidence that he had the pilot alive, and quoted his purported statements. He also produced certain of the contents of the plane and later various parts of the plane itself. This clearly disclosed the true nature of the mission on which the plane was engaged.

The cover story was outflanked.

The issue then was whether to admit the incident but deny high level responsibility, or to take the course that was decided upon and clearly expressed in Secretary Herter's statement of May 9 and in the President's statement of May 11, and his address of May 25.

In Mr. Herter's appearance before this Committee, he has dealt with the statements which were issued during the period after May 6, except for the two statements involving NASA which I have covered.

I would only add that in my opinion, in the light of all the factors involved, the decision taken to assume responsibility in this particular case was the correct one. Denial, in my opinion, over the long run would have been tortuous and self-defeating.

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Those who took this decision knew that I was ready to assume the full measure of responsibility and to cover the project as a technical intelligence operation carried out on my own responsibility as Director of CIA. This alternative, too, was rejected because of the many elements making it hardly credible over the longer run.

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PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON U-2 INCIDENT

11 May 1960

President Eisenhower: Good morning. Please sit down. I have made some notes from which I want to talk to you about this U-2 incident.

A full statement about this matter has been made by the State Department and there have been several statesmanlike remarks by leaders of both parties.

For my part, I supplement what the Secretary of State has had to say with the following four main points. After that I shall have nothing further to say--for the simple reason I can think of nothing to add that might be useful at this time.

The first point is this: The need for intelligence-gathering activities. No one wants another Pearl Harbor. This means that we must have knowledge of military forces and preparations around the world, especially those capable of massive surprise attack.

Secrecy in the Soviet Union makes this essential. In most of the world no large-scale attack could be prepared in secret but in the Soviet Union there is a fetish of secrecy and concealment. This is a major cause of international tension and uneasiness today. Our deterrent must never be placed in jeopardy. The safety of the whole free world demands this.

As the Secretary of State pointed out in his recent statement ever since the beginning of my Administration I have issued directives to gather, in every feasible way, the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for defense.

My second point: The nature of intelligence-gathering activities.

These have a special and secret character. They are, so to speak, "below the surface" activities. They are secret because they must circumvent measures designed by other countries to protect secrecy of military preparations.

They are divorced from the regular visible agencies of government which stay clear of operational involvement in specific detailed activities.

These elements operate under broad directives to seek and gather intelligence short of the use of force--with operations supervised by responsible officials within this area of secret activities.

We do not use our Army, Navy or Air Force for this purpose, first to avoid any possibility of the use of force in connection with these activities, and second, because our military forces, for obvious reasons, cannot be given latitude under broad directives, but must be kept under strict control in every detail.

These activities have their own rules and methods of concealment which seek to mislead and obscure--just as in the Soviet allegations there are many discrepancies. For example, there is some reason to believe that the plane in question was not shot down at high altitude. The normal agencies of our Government are unaware of these specific activities or of the special efforts to conceal them.

Third point: How should we view all of this activity?

It is a distasteful but vital necessity. We prefer and work for a different kind of world--and a different way of obtaining the information essential to confidence and effective deterrents. Open societies, in the day of present weapons, are the only answer.

This was the reason for my "open skies" proposal in 1955, which I was ready instantly to put into effect--to permit aerial observation over the United States and the Soviet Union which would assure that no surprise attack was being prepared against anyone. I shall bring up the "open skies" proposal again at Paris--since it is a means of ending concealment and suspicion.

My final point is that we must not be distracted from the real issues of the day by what is an incident in the world situation today.

This incident has been given great propaganda exploitation. The emphasis given to a flight of an unarmed, non-military plane can only reflect a fetish of secrecy.

The real issues are the ones we will be working on at the Summit--disarmament, search for solutions affecting Germany and Berlin and the whole range of East-West relations, including the reduction of secrecy and suspicion.

Frankly, I am hopeful that we may make progress on these great issues. This is what we mean when we speak of "working for peace."

And as I remind you, I will have nothing further to say about this matter.

REMARKS OF CONGRESSMAN CLARENCE A CANNON (MISSOURI),
CONCERNING U-2 INCIDENT, BEFORE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
10 May 1960

MR. CANNON. Mr. Chairman, on May 1 the Soviet Government captured, 1,300 miles inside the boundaries of the Russian Empire, an American plane, operated by an American pilot, under the direction and control of the Central Intelligence Agency, and is now holding both the plane and the pilot.

The plane was on an espionage mission authorized and supported by money provided under an appropriation recommended by the House Committee on Appropriations and passed by the Congress.

Although the Members of the House have not generally been informed on the subject, the mission was one of a series and part of an established program with which the subcommittee in charge of the appropriation was familiar, and of which it had been fully apprised during this and previous sessions.

The appropriation and the activity had been approved and recommended by the Bureau of the Budget and, like all military expenditures and operations, was under the aegis of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, for whom all members of the subcommittee have the highest regard and in whose military capacity they have the utmost confidence.

The question immediately arises as to the authority of the subcommittee to recommend an appropriation for such purposes, and especially the failure of the subcommittee to divulge to the House and the country the justifications warranting the expenditure and all details connected with the item at the time it was under consideration on the floor.

The answer of the subcommittee is absolute and unavoidable military necessity, fundamental national defense.

During the Second World War the United States succeeded in breaking the Japanese naval code. Through this incredible good fortune the U.S. commanders were able to read every order transmitted from Tokyo and all inter-fleet communications. This advance and intimate information had much to do in preparing the way and increasing the effectiveness of our great victory in the Battle of Midway which broke

the power of Japan in the Pacific. But some incautious member of a congressional committee or its staff leaked the information to a reporter, and 30 minutes after the next edition of his newspaper hit the street Japan changed her naval code and all further advantage was lost.

This appropriation, and its purpose, is justified by honored and established precedent. This subcommittee, including the same personnel with the exception of two members who have since died, was the same committee which for something like 3 years provided in the annual appropriation bills a sum which finally totaled more than \$2 billion for the original atomic bomb. Session after session the money was provided, and the subcommittee visited Oak Ridge where the work was in progress without any Member of the House with the exception of the Speaker of the House being aware of this tremendous project or the expenditure of the money. According to the testimony of all military authorities that bomb ended the war and saved the lives of not less than half a million men who would have had to be sacrificed in the conquest of Japan. No one has ever said that the subcommittee was not justified in expending an amount that eventually aggregated more than the assessed valuation of some of the States of the Union for that purpose.

Espionage has been throughout recorded history an integral part of warfare. Before occupying the Promised Land Moses "by the commandment of the Lord" sent out from the wilderness of Paran 10 men under the direction of Joshua to spy out the land.

And no nation in the history of the world has practiced espionage more assiduously than Russia. The United States and every other allied nation today literally swarms with them. Within the last few weeks we sent to the Federal Penitentiary at Atlanta a Russian spy convicted at Federal Court who was regularly transmitting information directly to Moscow every night. Their spies stole from us the secret of the atomic bomb. Every Russian Embassy and Consulate has today time and again the number required for routine diplomatic and consular service. When we were at Oak Ridge we were told there were so many Russian spies there that only by a policy of strictest compartmentalism were they able to maintain the integrity of their work.

The need for espionage in this instance was exceptional and compelling. At the close of the world war in which we had saved Russia from complete subjugation we were surprised to learn that while all other nations were disarming and

returning to a peacetime status as rapidly as possible, Russia was feverishly driving her factories and continuing to increase her armament at top speed. Simultaneously they announced that communism and free enterprise could not live in the same world.

Every effort has been made by American administrations to reestablish conditions under which we could discontinue excessive expenditures for armament and divert these vast sums to business and humanitarian purposes. But each year Russia has become more arrogant and threatening and more demanding.

Under our American ideals and system of government, a declaration of war against any nation, however provocative, is unthinkable. Our military authorities have no choice but to give any enemy the advantage of first attack and then depend on massive retaliation for defense. The Communists have taken every advantage of this situation.

In modern warfare surprise is a tremendous advantage. Less than a week before the Communist attack on Korea a congressional committee from this House returning from Seoul reported that permanent peace had been established and the land was returning to prosperity. There was no shadow of war; not the slightest cloud appeared on the horizon. The sudden rush of a vast army of well armed, well trained, and well munitioned communists across the border made it necessary for us to throw precipitately into battle raw and untrained troops who were wholly unable to protect themselves or hold their positions. And there followed one of the most disastrous periods in the history of American arms.

During the hearings on this appropriation for the last 2 or 3 years, I have each year asked the CIA representative before the Committee, "How could the enemy mobilize an army of such size and accumulate hundreds of tons of supplies and munitions and the transportation facilities necessary for its movement without our learning that such an attack was in prospect?"

And each year we have admonished the Authority, the CIA, that it must meet future situations of this character with effective measures. We told them, "This must not happen again, and it is up to you to see that it does not happen again"; that the American forces must be apprised of any future preparation of attack in time to meet it. And the plan they were following when this plane was taken is their answer to that demand.

And I want to take advantage of the opportunity to compliment and thank Director Allen W. Dulles and his remarkable corps for the admirable way in which they have met the situation through these later years.

They are entitled to the highest commendation by the Department, the Congress, and the American people.

We cannot permit another Korea. We cannot take the risk of carnage and national devastation which might involve every American city. We cannot take the risk of the consequences which would follow a similar attack from across the Russian borders. And since the Russians refuse to cooperate in our efforts to establish permanent peace--refuse even to agree to ethical standards of warfare--we have no choice but to protect our nation and our people through the age-old methods of defense so long in use by the Communists themselves, lest we wake tomorrow, or do not wake tomorrow, as a result of our failure to know in time what they are planning against us.

The world has been appalled by the vicious vindictiveness of Khrushchev's denunciation. He yesterday characterized the policy of the United States as stupid and blundering. His fury is incited by the fact that it is neither stupid or blundering. On the contrary it has been infinitely successful and effective.

When we have answered his threats--and he has been very free with them on all occasions, even when he was here as our guest in our own country. When we have answered his threats by basing our Strategic Air Command in a position to defend ourselves and our allies, he has boasted that he could stop them at the border. That is why we are now so earnestly developing our submarines so that if he ever is able to neutralize our Strategic Air Command then we will have to take its place a fleet of nuclear-driven missile-firing submarines that will be just as effective a halter upon him as SAC is today.

His discovery that since 1956, for 4 years, CIA has been sending planes across his border--is the occasion for this outburst. It completely disproves his vaunted ability to stop SAC at the border.

The only reason he was able to apprehend even this plane or its pilot was that it developed some unforeseen and unavoidable mechanical or physiological defect, the first in

four years. He was unable to hit it or to overtake it at its cruising height of 70,000 feet. So in order to leave the impression that he captured this plane he distributed a picture of a pile of rubbish which those who know the plane recognized as absolutely spurious. The plane and the pilot were evidently taken comparatively uninjured. That completely destroys his claims of invulnerability against American attack. So he as usual resorts to subterfuge.

And now the most gratifying feature of the entire incident.

The world has always recognized the remarkable success of our form of government. It has been the wonder and admiration of mankind. But they have said that it was at a great disadvantage in a war with an authoritarian dictatorship.

We have here demonstrated conclusively that free men confronted by the most ruthless and criminal despotism can under the Constitution of the United States protect this Nation and preserve world civilization.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR LYNDON B. JOHNSON
BEFORE THE SENATE
10 May 1960

MR. JOHNSON of Texas: Mr. President, this is certainly a time in which Americans--and people everywhere-- must keep their heads. We cannot afford hysteria, panic, or hasty and ill-advised action.

There are many unanswered questions about the incident of the American plane that was shot down over the Soviet Union. There are serious questions which will have to be considered very carefully by Congress and by the American people.

But it is doubtful whether the answers will be forthcoming immediately. There are too many facts which are not available and which will be available only when the Soviets permit a cool and realistic appraisal of what happened in their airspace.

Furthermore, it is always difficult to come to objective conclusions in an atmosphere of sanctimonious statements and threats against other nations. It is ridiculous for Nikita Khrushchev to profess such shocked surprise over efforts to gather information.

When Mr. Khrushchev visited this country last year, I do not think he impressed any of us as being a man who is naive. By that, I mean naive about what his own country has been doing for many, many years.

The incident, of course, will be assessed with great care and all of its implications will be explored carefully. But meanwhile, we cannot lose sight of the overriding reality which confronts us immediately.

It is whether this incident will become an excuse and an alibi for sabotaging the Summit Conference.

Within a very few days, our country is going to enter negotiations with the Soviet Union in an effort to relax the very tensions that have brought about this kind of an incident. It is difficult to imagine those negotiations as having much success if they are to be conducted in this kind of an atmosphere.

If Nikita Khrushchev is going to spend his time taunting the United States over what he considers the blunders it has made and threatening other countries on the basis of facts which have not been clearly established, there will be little time to talk about the real problems which divide the world.

Those problems cannot be traced back to the fact that nations seek to extract information from each other. Espionage and intelligence gathering are not something that cause the cold war. They are merely byproducts of the cold war--something that follows logically when nations cannot trust each other.

Whatever may be his motivations, it is obvious that Nikita Khrushchev has handled this incident in such a way as to draw attention away from the real problems. We must get back to those problems--of people, of armaments, of respect for the integrity of smaller nations--if the Summit Conference has any meaning.

If blunders have been made, the American people can be certain that Congress will go into them thoroughly. But this is something that should be done objectively and not merely as a panicky reaction to Soviet charges.

And I think that one point should be crystal clear. Nikita Khrushchev cannot use this incident in such a way as to divide the American people and to weaken our national strength. The American people are united in a determination to preserve our freedoms and we are not going to be shaken from that course, or we are not going to be divided in this critical hour.

MR. DIRKSEN: The Senator from Texas has made a forthright statement, and I concur in it. This is not a time for us to retreat or walk backward; and I, for one, absolutely refuse to do so. To be sure, there is nothing that we need conceal particularly. Certainly, ever since civilization began, there have been intelligence activities and espionage of a kind; and in proportion as civilization has become more complex, obviously the intelligence activities have become more complex.

During World War I, we set up the Office of Strategic Services. I had opportunities to examine their installations in many parts of the world. So, Mr. President, as the majority leader has well put it, we would indeed be naive if we did not view this matter objectively and realistically; and we so stated yesterday when this matter was discussed on the floor of the Senate

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ANNEX 88

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August 12, 1960

WRITTEN AND ORAL COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN
THE US, USSR, AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN
CONNECTION WITH THE U-2 INCIDENT

On May 3, 1960 the US Air Force in Turkey reported that a U-2 weather plane from the US air base at Adana, Turkey, was missing. Addressing the Supreme Soviet on May 5, Khrushchev asserted that an American plane had been shot down over the USSR, but gave no details of the locale, circumstances, or fate of the pilot. In Washington, on the same day, a brief State Department press release reported that a weather plane belonging to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was missing. NASA on May 5 also issued a press release, a lengthy announcement giving the route of the "weather plane" in Turkey and stating that the pilot had reported oxygen difficulties. On May 6 a US note to the USSR asked for information on the plane and its pilot. This note was the first of a series of official communications, both written and oral, exchanged between the US, the USSR, and other governments in connection with the U-2 incident.

This paper presents, in chronological order, the texts of all such communications. Press releases and other unilateral statements are not generally included unless of particular significance. For convenient reference, this paper is also broken down on a country-by-country basis. An unclassified addendum presents the texts of Department of State press and radio briefings relating to this subject.

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I. USSR

- May 6 US note refers to Khrushchev's May 5 Supreme Soviet Statement and US May 3 announcement on missing aircraft and asks information on plane and pilot. (Document No. 1)
- May 7 Khrushchev, addressing Supreme Soviet again, announced that U-2 pilot was alive and had confessed the plane's reconnaissance mission. (Text not included)
- May 9 Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky warns that in event of future flights the USSR would retaliate against countries from whose bases they took off. (Excerpt, document No. 2)
- May 10 US note request permission for Embassy officer to interview U-2 pilot. (Document No. 3)¹
- May 10 Soviet note protests "aggressive" U-2 flight, warns of "retaliatory measures" if similar acts repeated. (Document No. 4)
- May 12 US note in reply to Soviet May 10 note denies flight for intelligence purposes had aggressive intent. (Document No. 5)
- May 13 Vershinin letter (dated May 12) to General White (USAF) "postpones" former's scheduled visit to US until "a more suitable time." (Document No. 6)

1. Further correspondence regarding the pilot (including the US aide memoire of July 11, the US note of July 30, and the Soviet note of August 4) were published in the Department's Press release No. 33 of August 6.

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May 16 Soviet note denounces US "policy of aggression and provocation" and warns that not only will future intruding aircraft be shot down but bases from which they come will be struck against. (Document No. 7).

II. PAKISTAN

A. Pakistan - USSR

May 13 Soviet note to Pakistan charges that U-2 took off from Peshawar airport in Pakistan, refers to the "dangerous policy" of allowing foreign armed forces to use Pakistani territory and warns that repetition would necessitate "retaliatory measures." (Document No. 8)

May 24 Pakistani note to the USSR denies participation in preparation of flight, notes US assurance that no such incident would be allowed to take place in the future, and refers to Soviet violations of Pakistani airspace. (Document No. 9)

June 22 Soviet note to Pakistan rejects claim that GOP unaware of intention of flight from Peshawar, rejects "groundless" claim that Soviet violated Pakistani airspace, rejects statement about US assurance with reference to "mendacious" assertions by US in connection with U-2, and states that USSR will hit bases in event of future flights. (Document No. 10)

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B. Pakistan - US

- May 14 Pakistani aide memoire to US states that if plane which had taken off from Peshawar had been diverted to USSR, Pakistan would have cause for "bitter complaint."
(Document No. 11)
- May 19 Pakistani note to US states that May 14 aide memoire might be considered a complaint from GOP. (Document No. 12)
- May 22 US note to Pakistan gives requested assurance. (Document No. 13)

C. Pakistan - Afghanistan

- May 16 Afghan note to Pakistan protests the use of a Pakistani airfield for a flight violating Afghan airspace, and states that RGA awaiting elucidations and assurance that no such violations would be allowed in the future. (Document No. 14)
- June 4 Pakistani note to Afghanistan denies allegation that flight originated from Peshawar with the cooperation of the GOP, and that if flight did take place it was without the knowledge of the GOP. The note recalls the GOP note of November 10, 1959, protesting to Afghan Government about frequent and repeated violations of Pakistani airspace. (Document No. 15)

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Jur 21 Afghan note to Pakistan states that Pakistan's reply was unsatisfactory and deviated from the facts, that failure to give assurance for the future was evidence of ill will of GOP and that earlier protest once more confirmed. (Excerpt, Document No. 16)

III. TURKEY

A. Turkey - USSR

May 13 Soviet note to Turkey notes that plane had been permanently based in Turkey, and warns of retaliatory measures in the event of repetition. (Document No. 17)

May 26 Turkish note to the USSR states that Turkish airspace not used for the overflight and that Turkey was responsible only for its own airspace, reaffirmed Turkey's right as a sovereign state to put its air bases at the disposal of its allies for purely defensive purposes, and notes that there had been complaints of Soviet overflights in Turkey. (Document No. 18)

IV. NORWAY

A. Norway - USSR

May 13 Soviet note to Norway states that despite Norway's earlier assurance that under Norwegian rules allied planes were not allowed to fly across Norway east of 24 degrees latitude Norway was an accessory to the US overflight,

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and warns of possible countermeasures if such flights continue. (Document No. 19)

May 27 Norwegian note to the USSR states that no Norwegian authority had cooperated with the flight, denies that Norwegian territory was at the disposal of the US Air Force for overflights. (Document No. 20)

B. Norway - US

May 13 Norwegian pour memoire to US protests that permission to land U-2 at Bodoe had not been requested and that landing of U-2 at Bodoe would have been against principles followed by Norwegian authorities in granting permission for landing foreign reconnaissance planes, and asks US to take steps to prevent similar incidents in the future. (Document No. 21)

May 16 US pour memoire replies that permission for a U-2 landing had not been requested, and that if such a landing had been made it would have violated the principles followed by Norwegian authorities. US will continue to abide by those principles. (Document No. 22). Department telegram to Oslo 1124 authorized US ambassador "to state to Lange that final sentence in PM is designed to be responsive to Norwegian request that 'American authorities take all necessary steps to prevent similar incidents in future.'"

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V. AFGHANISTANA. Afghanistan - US

- May 18 Afghan note to US protests violation of Afghan airspace by the U-2, and requests assurance that such action would not be repeated. (Document No. 23)
- May 20 US reply regrets that RGA interpreted a certain ex parte version of the flight as an unfriendly action. With regard to assurance requested, note quotes President Eisenhower to the effect that flights would not be resumed. (Document No. 24)

B. Afghanistan - Pakistan

- May 18 Afghan note to Pakistan protests the use of a Pakistani airfield for a flight violating Afghan airspace, and states that RGA awaiting elucidations and assurance that no such violations would be allowed in the future. (Document No. 14)
- June 4 Pakistani note to Afghanistan denies allegation that flight originated from Peshawar with the cooperation of the GOP, and that if flight did take place it was without the knowledge of the GOP. The note recalled the GOP note of November 10, 1959, protesting to Afghan Government about frequent and repeated violations of Pakistani airspace. (Document No. 15)
- June 21 Afghan note to Pakistan states that Pakistan's reply was unsatisfactory and deviated from the facts, that

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failure to give assurance for the future was evidence of ill will of GOP and that earlier protest once more confirmed. (Excerpt, document No. 16)

VI. US - JAPAN

- May 9 Department informs MacArthur, US prepared to (1) conclude specific undertaking with GOJ no intelligence missions will be flown over non-Japanese territory from US facilities in Japan without prior consultation GOJ, (2) give Kishi assurances U-2 in Japan used only for legitimate scientific purposes, (3) make public statement to this effect. (Document No. 25)
- May 10 MacArthur informs Vice Foreign Minister Yamada substance of US proposal. Kishi and Fujiyama felt it unnecessary to enter into formal agreement for consultation in case of intelligence overflights, suggest simple "legitimate and normal purpose" statement by US. (Document No. 26)
- May 10 US issues "legitimate and normal purpose" statement. (Document No. 27)
- May 11 MacArthur transmits text of US May 10 announcement to GOJ. (Text not included)
- May 12 Fujiyama acknowledges by note receipt of text of US May 10 announcement. (Document No. 28)

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- May 21 Fujiyama informs MacArthur of new Soviet note to Japan protesting security treaty and illegal overflights by US aircraft. Requests assurance that no US plane (U-2 or other) has conducted overflights of Soviet territory from Japan. (Document No. 29)
- May 28 Department informs MacArthur he can give assurances to Kishi or Yamada that there have been no overflights of Soviet territory by U-2 or other US plane from Japanese territory. (Document No. 30)
- June 2 Vice Foreign Minister Yamada given verbal assurance by MacArthur of no US overflights from Japanese territory. (Document No. 31)
- July 11 Foreign Minister Fujiyama told a press conference that the government had been informed that the U-2 planes had been withdrawn from Japan. (Text not included)
- July 21 Chief of Intelligence Japanese Air Self Defense staff shows MacArthur forged US document regarding U-2 overflights from Japanese territory. (Document No. 32)
Verbatim text of forgery (Document No. 33)
- July 21 Embassy Tokyo issues statement denouncing forgery. (Document No. 34)

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VII. ITALY

A. Italy - US

May 20 Department replies to Italian Ambassador's inquiry stating that U-2 pilot had no instructions to the effect that he might in an emergency use an Italian airport.
(Document No. 35)

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Annex No. 1

Document No. 1US Note to the Soviet Union - May 6

The US Government has noted the statement of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, in his speech before the Supreme Soviet on May 5 that a foreign aircraft crossed the border of the Soviet Union on May 1 and that on orders of the Soviet Government, this aircraft was shot down. In this same statement it was said that investigation showed that it was a US plane.

As already announced on May 3, a United States National Aeronautical Space Agency unarmed weather research plane based at Adana, Turkey, and piloted by a civilian American has been missing since May 1. The name of the American civilian pilot of the missing aircraft is Francis Gary Powers, born on August 17, 1929, at Jenkins, Kentucky.

In the light of the above the US Government requests the Soviet Government to provide it with full facts of the Soviet investigation of this incident and to inform it of the fate of the pilot.

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Annex I

Document No. 2Excerpt from Malinovsky Speech of May 9

We reply to you firmly, gentlemen American imperialists: no you will not fly over our land! We are not your Guatemala, Turkey, Pakistan or South Korea. We shot down and will shoot down any violator who dares to violate our airspace and will adopt all measures necessary for protecting the integrity of our state frontiers! We also warn the countries countenancing these evil doings, lending their territory and airfields for the flights of similar pirate planes over our country's borders -- think before it is too late. Technology is now so perfected that it can show us without fail the airfields from which such violators are flying. We have the right to take any measures in such a case against those bases and airfields and can raze these bases, so that nothing remains of them.

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Annex No. I

Document No. 3US Note to USSR of May 10

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and has the honor to refer to the public statements of the Soviet Government indicating that an American civilian, Francis Gary Powers, is under detention in Moscow. The Embassy requests that an officer of the Embassy be permitted to interview Mr. Powers.

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Annex No. I

Document No. 4

USSR Note to US of May 10

On May 1 of this year at 5 hours 36 minutes Moscow time a military aircraft violated the boundary of the USSR and intruded across borders of the Soviet Union for a distance of more than 2,000 kilometers. The Government of the USSR naturally could not leave unfinished such a flagrant violation of Soviet state boundaries. When the intentions of the violating aircraft became apparent, it was shot down by Soviet rocket troops in area of Sverdlovsk.

Upon examination by experts of all data at the disposal of the Soviet side, it was incontrovertibly established that the intruder aircraft belonged to the United States of America, was permanently based in Turkey and was sent through Pakistan into the Soviet Union with hostile purposes.

As Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N. S. Khrushchev made public on May 7 at the final session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, exact data from the investigation leave no doubts with respect to the purpose of the flight of the American aircraft which violated the USSR border on May 1. This aircraft was specially equipped for reconnaissance and diversionary flight over territory of the Soviet Union. It had on board apparatus for aerial photography for detecting Soviet radar network and other special radio-technical equipment which form part of USSR anti-aircraft defenses. At disposal of Soviet expert commission which carried out the investigation, there is indisputable proof of the espionage-reconnaissance mission of the American aircraft: Films of Soviet defense and industrial establishments, a tape recording of signals of Soviet radar stations and other data.

Pilot Powers, about whose fate Embassy of United States of America inquired in its note of May 6, is alive and, as indicated in the forementioned speech of Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev, will be brought to account under the laws of Soviet State. The pilot has indicated that he did everything in full accordance with the assignment given him. On the flight map taken from him there was clearly and accurately marked the entire route he was assigned after take off from city of Adana (Turkey: Peshawar (Pakistan) - the ural sea - Sverdlovsk - Archangel - Murmansk, followed by a landing at Norwegian airfield at Bude. The pilot has also stated that he served in su unit Number 10-10 which under the cover of National Aeronautics and Space Agency is engaged in high altitude military reconnaissance.

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This and other information revealed in speeches of the head of Soviet Government completely refuted the US State Department's concocted and hurriedly fabricated version, released May 5 in an official announcement for press, to the effect that the aircraft was allegedly carrying out meteorological observations in upper strata of atmosphere along Turkish-Soviet border.

After complete absurdity of the aforementioned version had been shown and it had been incontrovertibly proven that the American aircraft intruded across borders of Soviet Union for aggressive reconnaissance purposes, a new announcement was made by the US State Department on May 7 which contained the forced admission that the aircraft was sent into Soviet Union for military reconnaissance purposes and, by that very fact, it was admitted that the flight was pursuing aggressive purposes.

In this way, after two days, the State Department already had to deny version which obviously had been intended to mislead world public opinion as well as public opinion of America itself.

The State Department considered it appropriate to refer in its announcement to the "open skies" proposal made by the Government of the United States of America in 1955 and to the refusal of the Soviet Government to accept this proposal. Yes, the Soviet Government, like the governments of many other states, refused to accept this proposal which was intended to throw open the doors of other nations to American reconnaissance. The activities of American aviation only confirm the correctness of the evaluation given to this proposal at the time by the Soviet Government.

Does this not mean that, with the refusal of a number of states to accept this proposal for "open skies" the United States of America is attempting arbitrarily to take upon itself the right "to open" a foreign sky? It is enough to put question this way, for the complete groundlessness of the aforementioned reference to the United States of America's "open skies" proposal to become clear.

It follows from the aforementioned May 7 announcement of the United States State Department that the hostile acts of American aviation, which have taken place numerous times in relation to the Soviet Union, are not simply the result of the activity of military commands of the United States in various areas but are the expression of a calculated United States policy. That while the Soviet Government has repeatedly declared in its representations to the Government of the United States of America in connection with violations of the USSR national boundaries by

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American airplanes has been confirmed, namely, that these violations are premeditated. All this testifies that the Government of the United States of America, instead of taking measures to stop such actions by American aviation, the danger of which has more than once been pointed out by the Soviet Government, officially announces such actions as its national policy.

Thus, the Government of the United States of America, in the first place, testifies to the fact that its answers to representations of the Soviet Government were only for sake of form, behind which was concealed an effort to avoid the substance of the issue, and that all violations by American aircraft of the National boundaries of USSR represented actions conforming to US policy.

In the second place, and this is the main point, by sanctioning such actions of American aviation, the Government of the United States aggravates the situation even more.

One must ask, how is it possible to reconcile this with declarations on the part of leading figures of the United States of America, that a government of the United States like the Soviet Government, also strives for improvement of relations between the USSR and US, for relaxation of international tension, and the strengthening of trust between states. Military intelligence activities of one nation by means of intrusion of its aircraft into the area of another country can hardly be called a method for improving relations and strengthening trust.

It is self-evident that the Soviet Government is compelled, under such circumstances, to give strict orders to its armed forces to take all necessary measures against the violation of Soviet boundaries by foreign aviation. The Government of USSR regretfully states that, while it undertakes everything possible for normalization and improvement of international situation, the Government of the United States of America follows a different path. It is impossible to exclude the thought that, apparently, the two governments view differently the necessity for improving relations between our countries and for the creation of a favorable ground for the success of the forthcoming summit meeting.

The Soviet Government, as well as all of the Soviet people, considered that personal meetings and discussions with the President of the United States of America and other American official figures which Chairman of the Council Ministers of the USSR had during his visit in the United States of America, made a good beginning in the cause of normalizing Soviet-American

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relations and therefore the improvement of the entire international situation as well. However, latest actions of the American authorities apparently seek to return the state of American-Soviet relations to the worst times of the "cold war" and to poison the international situation before the summit meeting.

The Government of the USSR cannot avoid pointing out that, the State Department's statement, which is unprecedented in its cynicism, not only justifies the provocative flights of aircraft of the armed forces of the United States but also acknowledges that such actions are "a normal phenomenon" and thus in fact states that in the future the United States intends to continue provocative invasions into confines of airspace of the Soviet Union for the purpose of intelligence.

Thus the Government of the USSR concludes that the announcement of the State Department that a flight was carried out without knowledge and permission of the Government of the United States does not correspond to reality, since in the very same announcement the necessity for carrying on intelligence activities against the Soviet Union is justified. This means that espionage activities of American aircraft are carried on with the sanction of the Government of the United States of America.

The Government of the Soviet Union made an emphatic protest to the Government of the United States in connection with the aggressive acts of American aviation and warns that, if similar provocations are repeated, it will be obliged to take retaliatory measures, responsibility for consequences of which will rest on governments of states committing aggression against other countries.

The Soviet Government would sincerely like to hope that the Government of the United States recognizes in final analysis that interests of preserving and strengthening peace among peoples including interests of American people itself, whose striving for peace was well demonstrated during the visit of head of Soviet Government N.S. Khrushchev to the United States, would be served by cessation of aforementioned dangerous provocative activities with regard to the USSR, by cessation of the "cold war," and by a search through joint efforts with the Soviet Union and with other interested states for the solution of unsettled international problems, on a mutually acceptable basis, which is awaited by all peoples.

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Annex No. I

Document No. 5US Note to USSR of May 12

The Embassy of the United States of America refers to the Soviet Government's of May 10 concerning the shooting down of an American unarmed civilian aircraft on May 1, and under instruction from its Government, has the honor to state the following.

The United States Government, in the statement issued by the Department of State on May 9, has fully stated its position with respect to this incident.

In its note the Soviet Government has stated that the collection of intelligence about the Soviet Union by American aircraft is a "calculated policy" of the United States. The United States Government does not deny that it has pursued such a policy for purely defensive purposes. What it emphatically does deny is that this policy has any aggressive intent, or that the unarmed U-2 flight of May 1 was undertaken in an effort to prejudice the success of the forthcoming meeting of the Heads of Government in Paris or to "return the state of American-Soviet relations to the worst times of the cold war." Indeed, it is the Soviet Government's treatment of this case which, if anything, may raise questions about its intentions in respect to these matters.

For its part, the United States Government will participate in the Paris meeting on May 16 prepared to cooperate to the fullest extent in seeking agreement designed to reduce tensions, including effective safeguards against surprise attack which would make unnecessary issues of this kind.

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Annex I

Document No. 6

Letter From Vershinin to General White
Dated May 12

Dear Mr. General:

As you know in my letter of April 29 this year I accepted with thanks your invitation to visit US as a guest of USAF.

In connection with recent events known to you, I have considered it necessary to reconsider question of my journey to US and would like to state frankly my reasons therefor.

I think you will agree with me that at present time unfavorable circumstances have been created for successful accomplishing of purposes envisaged in exchange of visits of this kind.

In this atmosphere it is my opinion that it would be more appropriate to postpone my visit to US until a more suitable time.

Dear General, you will distinctly understand the motives which guide me in writing this letter to you.

Respectfully.

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Annex No. I

Document No. 7USSR Note to US of May 16

In connection with the note of the US Embassy, May 12, 1960, USSR declares the following:

In the said note US Government admits that the illegal intrusion by American planes into the confines of the Soviet Union and other states for the purpose of military espionage represents official policy of the United States. The U. S. Government, before the whole world, thereby proclaims as its political course in relations with other states a policy of conscious provocation, a calculated gross violation of international law and sovereignty of states, including one of its chief principles -- territorial inviolability of states.

Such a policy leads not only to an intensification of tension, suspicion, and mistrust in relations among states but also creates an atmosphere dangerous to the cause of peace. The statement by the secretary of State of May 9, to which reference is made in the Embassy note, just as subsequent public statements by US leaders, is an attempt to justify hostile actions which are permissible only in relations between states which are at war with each other.

A shameless incursion into the bounds of another state, whether it be by land, water, or air cannot be viewed otherwise than as an act of aggression, and the attempt to justify and legalize these actions is nothing other than a sermon of aggression. There can be no doubt that such a policy of the US Government, which brushes aside the elementary norms of international law and order and the principles of the UN Charter, will be decisively condemned throughout the world.

The question inevitably arises: How, in the light of these proclamations of such a policy by the US Government, can one believe its statements on aspirations for peace and an easing of international tension? In general, what talk can there be of trust in the foreign policy of the US Government while it remains in the position of justifying and preaching aggression?

The USSR Government considers it necessary to warn once again with all clarity that in the event of new attempts at an aggressive intrusion into the airspace of the Soviet Union, the intruding aircraft will be immediately annihilated. The policy of aggression and provocation proclaimed by the US Government

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renders vulnerable also those states whose governments, disregarding the interests of their peoples, provide their territories as sites for American bases from which are sent out aircraft to intrude into the airspace of our country; for, with regard to these states, the requisite measures will be taken by the Soviet Union, not excluding a blow at the aforementioned bases.

As far as the statement of the US Government is concerned, regarding the fact that the USSR will be prepared at the conference of heads of government in Paris to seek agreements directed at a reduction of international tension, the Soviet Union considers that the time has come for the US Government to display concern for this not in words but in deeds, and, first of all, to condemn the provocative actions of its aviation with regard to the Soviet Union, and to reject the policy of aggressive intrusion into the airspace of other states proclaimed by it, a policy most dangerous to the cause of peace.

The Soviet Government continues to support the restoration of good relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. It depends on the US Government, and on it alone, whether the obstacles which have now arisen on the road to this objective will be removed.

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Annex No. II

Document No. 8USSR Note to Pakistan, May 13

A military aircraft violated the USSR frontier at 0536 hours, Moscow time, on May 1 of this year and penetrated more than 2,000 kilometers within the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government, naturally, could not leave such a gross violation of the Soviet state frontier unpunished. When the intentions of the intruder plane became clear, it was shot down by Soviet rocket troops in the Sverdlovsk area.

Expert investigation of all the data possessed by the Soviet side has irrefutably established that the intruder plane belonged to the United States of America, was permanently based in Turkey and sent via Pakistan with a hostile mission into the Soviet Union.

The detailed results of the investigation, as announced by the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikita Khrushchev at the final May 7 meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet session, leave no doubt as to the purposes of the American plane which violated the Soviet border on May 1. This aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type was specially equipped for an intelligence and subversion flight over Soviet Union territory. It was equipped with apparatus for aerial photography and for detecting the Soviet radar network and other special radiotechnical means included in the Soviet Union's anti-aircraft defenses. The Soviet expert commission which carried out the investigation possesses irrefutable proof of the American plane's espionage mission: films with photographed Soviet defense and industry targets, tape-recorded signals of the Soviet radar stations, and other materials.

It has been established that the plane in question was based at the American-Turkish air force base of Incirlik near Adana, whence it flew on April 27 to the Peshawar airport in Pakistan. The flight map taken from the American spy pilot Powers, who survived, clearly shows the entire course he had to fly after leaving the Turkish city of Adana: Peshawar; the Ural Sea; Sverdlovsk; Archangel-Murmansk; and then the Norwegian airport of Bodoe, where he was to land.

The spy pilot divulged that he serves with the American unit 10-10, stationed in Turkey and engaged in high altitude intelligence, and that he, for one, has flown more than once along the Turkish-Soviet border with a view to studying the Soviet Union's anti-aircraft radar defense system.

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Confronted with these irrefutable facts, the US State Department was compelled to admit that the American plane, which violated the Soviet border on May 1 of this year, was sent into the Soviet Union on an intelligence mission. It was thereby admitted that this flight pursued aggressive purposes.

The USSR Government cannot disregard the part played in the preparation and implementation of this act, which was hostile to the Soviet Union, by Pakistan, from whose territory the provocative intrusion of the American plane into the Soviet airspace was undertaken.

In its statements of December 26, 1958, February 20, 1959, and March 25, 1959, the Soviet Government has already called attention of the Pakistani Government to the grave consequences connected with loaning Pakistani territory to establish foreign war bases, and their use by third powers for aggressive purposes against the Soviet Union and other peace-loving states.

The takeoff from Pakistani territory of a US Air Force plane, which penetrated into the Soviet Union on May 1st of this year, again confirms with ample clarity what a dangerous policy the Pakistani Government pursues by allowing foreign armed forces to use its territory.

The Government of the Soviet Union protests with the Government of Pakistan in connection with the granting of Pakistani territory to the United States for the commitment of aggressive actions against the USSR by the American air force and warns that if such actions are repeated from Pakistani territory, it will be compelled to take proper retaliatory measures. It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union possesses means to render harmless in case of need the war bases used for aggressive actions against the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that the responsibility for the consequences will be borne both by the governments of the States committing aggression against other nations and by the governments of the countries which are accomplices in it.

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Annex No. II

Document No. 9Pakistan Note to the USSR, May 24

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations presents its compliments to the Embassy of the USSR, and with reference to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, note dated the 13th of May, 1960, has the honour to state as follows:

The Government of Pakistan denies that it has played any part in the preparation and execution of the flight of any aircraft for the purpose of military intelligence over USSR. Pakistan has never given any facilities to any foreign aircraft known to be engaged in collecting intelligence and has no intention in the future of departing from its firm policy in this respect.

After due inquiry it has been ascertained that no aircraft took off from Peshawar airfield in the direction of the USSR. It was publicly stated by the Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan that in case any American plane, taking off from Peshawar had been diverted to USSR in the course of its flight, without knowledge of Pakistan and when Pakistan authorities had no control over it, Pakistan has cause for bitter complaint against the Government of the United States.

A formal protest was lodged later, demanding that the Government of the United States must assure the Government of Pakistan that no such incident would be allowed to take place in the future.

An assurance to that effect has been received from the Government of the United States of America.

The Government of the USSR has reiterated its oft-repeated allegation that the Government of Pakistan has military bases on its territory. It has also attested that these bases are used for aggressive purposes. The Government of Pakistan wishes again to point out, as it has done on many previous occasions, that there are no foreign military bases in Pakistan and therefore the question of their being put to aggressive purposes does not arise.

While sympathizing with the desire of the Government of the USSR to safeguard its air space against unfriendly intrusions, the Government of Pakistan deems it necessary to point out that its own air space in West Pakistan has been violated several

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times in recent months. The type of aircraft used in these operations and their direction of flight indicate that these must have been Soviet airplanes. The Government of Pakistan hopes that flights of this nature over Pakistan territory will not re-occur in the future.

The Government of Pakistan wishes to make it plain that Pakistan desires nothing but peace and friendliness with all its neighbors. It has no aggressive designs; Its own territory is its only concern, and to guard it, is its sacred duty. This duty, it will perform in all circumstances. The Government of Pakistan assures the Government of USSR that Pakistan wishes and intends to live in peace and friendship with USSR.

The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of USSR the assurances of its highest consideration.

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Annex No. II

Document No. 10

USSR Note to Pakistan, June 22

In connection with the reply of the Government of Pakistan dated May 24 of the current year to the note of the USSR Government dated May 13 about the fact that Pakistan made its territory available for the carrying out by the US Air Force of aggressive actions against the USSR, the Government of the USSR deems it necessary to state the following:

In its reply the Government of Pakistan reports that it made an official protest to the US Government and demanded from the latter assurances that "not a single similar incident would be allowed in the future." In doing so, the Government of Pakistan admitted that a US aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type had been based on Pakistani territory and had taken off from there traveling deep into Soviet territory. At the same time, trying to evade responsibility for participation in this aggressive act, the Government of Pakistan tries to raise doubts as to whether the US aircraft was dispatched on its intelligence-diversionist flight from Peshawar airport and to contend that it had no connection with this flight.

This attempt by the Government of Pakistan contradicts accurately established facts which are confirmed not only by statements of US spy pilot Powers and the flight route map taken from him, but also by admissions by the US Government itself.

The facts, however, are these: A US military aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type arrived at Peshawar airport April 27 from the Incirlik air force base on Turkish territory and remained at the Pakistani airport for three days. There final preparations for its flight were made. On May 1 this aircraft took off from Peshawar airport and flew into the USSR. It is common knowledge that this aircraft had no markings and could for that reason alone not help but to attract the attention of the relevant Pakistani authorities, who should have forbidden both the arrival of such an aircraft on Pakistani territory and its departure, taking into account that the Pakistani authorities must exercise proper control over their territory. But this was not done by the Government of Pakistan.

If one were to deny the facts and suppose that the claims of the Government of Pakistan contained in its note, that it did not know anything about the intended flight of the US aircraft over

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USSR territory from Peshawar airport and had not participated in preparations for such a flight, somehow correspond to reality, one could not help conclude that the United States controls Pakistani airports as though they were its own military bases and does not have to account to Pakistani authorities. But these claims by the Government of Pakistan cannot be reconciled with its other statements, particularly its statements to the effect that there are no US military bases on Pakistani territory.

Thus, the facts make it completely obvious that between April 27 and May 1 of this year the US aircraft was being prepared on Pakistani territory for penetration into the USSR with the cooperation of Pakistani authorities, and that the Government of Pakistan has thus assumed the role of accomplice in this matter.

The government of Pakistan, apparently trying to extricate itself from the situation in which it found itself as a result of its participation in the carrying out by the US Air Force of an aggressive act against the USSR, points to some kind of violations of Pakistani airspace by Soviet aircraft. Wholly rejecting these groundless claims, the Soviet Government states that, in contrast to the United States, which violates generally accepted norms of international law, the USSR has always respected and continues to respect the national sovereignty and independence of other states, including Pakistan.

As for the claims by the Government of Pakistan of its wish to have good relations with the USSR, it is essential to note that Pakistani leaders have also made such statements previously, yet the present state of Soviet-Pakistani relations by no means points to a desire by Pakistani leaders to turn their words into practical deeds. Nor is this confirmed by the aforementioned note of the Government of Pakistan, in which, instead of giving a clear answer about the prevention in the future of the use of Pakistani territory by the US Air Force for aggression against the USSR, the Government of Pakistan tries to evade responsibility, referring to some kind of assurances by US authorities.

The value of these assurances, one would have thought, are well known to the Government of Pakistan. It cannot help knowing that, under the impact of the facts, the mendacious assertions by the US Government in connection with the flight of the US aircraft into the USSR were refuted one by one. Taking this into account, the USSR Government cannot help conclude that the Government of Pakistan underestimates the full seriousness of the question and the danger which threatens Pakistan as

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a result of the use made by the United States of airports of its military bloc allies, particularly if one takes into account that the calculations of US militarist circles rely on the fact that their allies would, in case US aggressive circles provoke a military conflict, take the main burden of the first blow.

The USSR Government reaffirms the position it outlined in its note dated May 13 and reiterates that if in the future provocative flights by aircraft are made against the USSR from Pakistani territory, the Soviet Government will, with a view toward guaranteeing the security of the Soviet people, be forced to take the necessary steps, to the point of dealing blows at bases which may be used for carrying out such flights.

Using this opportunity, the USSR Government reiterates that it would like to have friendly relations, based on the principles of peaceful coexistence, with Pakistan as its close neighbor. Such relations would best meet the interests of the peoples of the USSR and Pakistan and would be a worthy contribution to the cause of the struggle for world peace. But such relations can arise only when both parties aspire to building them and when the Government of Pakistan appreciates the full danger of making Pakistani territory available as an arsenal to be used by US militarist circles for carrying out aggressive acts against the USSR.

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Annex No. II

Document No. 11The Pakistan Aide Memoire to the US, May 14

Our enquiries show that no aircraft has taken off from Peshawar airfield in the direction of Soviet Russia. In case any American plane taking off from Peshawar has been diverted to Soviet Russia in the course of its flight, and Soviet allegation that American aircraft which has been brought down in Soviet Russia took off from Peshawar is correct, we have cause for bitter complaint. The American authorities must realize the delicacy of our situation and ensure that all concerned refrain from such activities in future.

We are making a statement to the press to this effect.

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Annex No. II

Document No. 12Pakistan Note to the US, May 19

The Ambassador of Pakistan presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to refer to the Aide Memoire left with Mr. Frederic P. Bartlett, Director of South Asian Affairs by Mr. K.M. Kaiser, Minister of this Embassy on Saturday, the 14th of May, 1960. Under instructions from the Government, the Ambassador of Pakistan wishes to state that this Aide Memoire may be considered as a protest from the Government of Pakistan. In view of the circumstances mentioned in the Aide Memoire the Government of Pakistan shall be grateful for an assurance that any facilities that may be made available to the United States Government by the Government of Pakistan would not be used for any such purposes in future without the knowledge and concurrence of the Government of Pakistan.

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US Note to Pakistan, May 22

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Pakistan and has the honor to refer to the Ambassador's note of May 19 regarding the use of airfields in Pakistan by American aircraft. In this connection the Government of the United States is pleased to give the assurances requested by the Government of Pakistan.

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Annex No. II

Document No. 14Afghanistan Note to Pakistan, May 18

From irrefutable information about the forcing down of an American U-2 plane in the vicinity of Sverdlosk, USSR, and from the confessions of Mr. Powers, the pilot of the said plane, and also on the basis of the map recovered from the pilot which shows the route of the flight, it becomes apparent that the said plane had the illegal duty of espionage in the Soviet Union, and that the plane flew from a military base of Pakistan and after an illegal and unauthorized flight over Afghanistan entered the Soviet Union.

This flight which took place from military bases of Pakistan with the permission of the Government of Pakistan involves the Government of Pakistan in this undesirable violation which is absolutely in contravention of international law and contrary to accepted international practice, and damages the atmosphere of peace in this area and aggravates international tension.

As regards the violation of the air space of Afghanistan, perpetrated with the permission of the Government of Pakistan and from its military bases by a third country with unlawful motives, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly protests and places on the Government of Pakistan responsibility for the great danger resulting from its attitude.

The Royal Government of Afghanistan is awaiting necessary elucidations and also assurance from the Government of Pakistan that no opportunity will be provided in future for such a violation by the said government.

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Pakistan Note to Afghanistan, June 4

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations presents its compliments to the Royal Afghan Embassy with reference to the Note No. 947, dated the 18th May, 1960, handed over to the Ambassador of Pakistan at Kabul, has the honour to state that the allegation contained in the above note that a flight of the US plane, which was brought down in the USSR, originated from Peshawar airfield in Pakistan with the cooperation of the Government of Pakistan, is incorrect. In this context the attention of the Royal Afghan Government is invited to the following statement issued on the 14th May, 1960, in London by Mr. E. Ikramullah, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Government of Pakistan:-

"Our enquiry shows that no aircraft has taken off from Peshawar airfield in the direction of Soviet Russia. In case any American plane taking off from Peshawar has been diverted to Soviet Russia in course of its flight, and Soviet allegation that American aircraft which has been brought down in Soviet Russia, took off from Peshawar is correct, we have cause for bitter complaint. The American authorities must realize the delicacy of our situation and ensure that all concerned refrain from such activities in future."

It will be obvious from the above statement that if such a flight took place it was without the knowledge and approval of the Government of Pakistan. Under these circumstances there is no valid reason for the protest lodged by the Royal Afghan Government and the said protest therefore is hereby rejected.

The Government of Pakistan, however, wishes to draw the attention of the Royal Afghan Government to the Note No. AF.(I)/1/54/59, dated the 10th November, 1959, delivered to the Royal Afghan Embassy in Karachi protesting against repeated and frequent violations of Pakistan air space and Pakistan territory by unauthorized flights of aircraft from Afghanistan. The Government of Pakistan regrets to note that no assurance has so far been received from the Royal Afghan

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Government that such flights would cease and while again renewing a strong protest on those flights expresses the hope that they will not be permitted to recur in the future.

The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.

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Annex No. II

Document No. 16Afghanistan Note to Pakistan, June 21 (Excerpt)

Because of real facts and evidence that is clear to everyone, Ministry Foreign Affairs considers (Pakistan reply) not only unsatisfactory but intentional deviation from facts of case. It also considers this conduct of Government of Pakistan and its denial of assurance that such flights, which endanger peace of this region and that of the world, will not take place in the future as indication of ill-intentions Government of Pakistan. Therefore the earlier Afghan protest is once more confirmed.

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Annex No. III

Document No. 17

USSR Note to Turkey, May 13

A military aircraft violated the Soviet border at 0536 hours, Moscow time, on May 1 of this year, and penetrated more than 2,000 kilometers within the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government, naturally, could not leave such a gross violation of the Soviet state frontier unpunished. When the intentions of the intruder plane became obvious, it was shot down by Soviet rocket troops in the Sverdlovsk area.

Expert investigation of all the data possessed by the Soviet side has irrefutably established that the intruder plane belonged to the United States of America, was permanently based in Turkey, and sent via Pakistan into the Soviet Union on a hostile mission.

Detailed results of the investigation, as announced by the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Nikita Khrushchev at the final May 7 meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet session, leave no doubt as to the purposes of the American plane, which violated the Soviet frontier on May 1. This aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type was specially equipped for an intelligence and subversion flight over USSR territory. It carried apparatus for aerial photography and for detecting the Soviet radar network and other special radiotechnical means included in the Soviet anti-aircraft defense system. The Soviet expert commission which carried out the investigation possesses irrefutable evidence of the American plane's espionage mission: films with photographed Soviet defense and industry targets, tape-recorded signals of the Soviet radar stations, and other materials.

It has been established that the plane in question was based at the American-Turkish air force base of Incirlik near Adana, from where it flew on April 27 to the airport of Peshawar, Pakistan. The flight map taken from the American spy pilot Powers, who survived, shows clearly the entire course he had to fly after leaving Adana: Peshawar; the Aral Sea; Sverdlovsk; Archangel; Murmansk; and finally the Norwegian airport of Bodoe, where he was to land.

The spy pilot divulged that he served with the American unit 10-10, stationed in Turkey and engaged in high altitude intelligence, and that he, for one, made repeated flights along the Turkish-Soviet frontier in order to study the anti-aircraft radar system of the Soviet Union.

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Confronted with these irrefutable facts, the US State Department was compelled to admit that the American plane, which violated the Soviet border on May 1 of this year, was sent into the Soviet Union on an intelligence mission. Thereby it was admitted that this flight pursued aggressive purposes.

The Soviet Government cannot disregard the part played in the preparation and implementation of this hostile act against the Soviet Union by the Turkish Republic, in whose territory the American intruder plane was based and prepared for the flight.

The Soviet Government deems it necessary to state to the Government of Turkey that by lending its territory to the United States for setting up war bases and for carrying out aggressive acts against the Soviet Union by the US Air Force, it becomes an accomplice in such acts and thereby has a grave responsibility for the possible dangerous consequences of such actions. All this by no means agrees with the statements of Turkish leaders about their desire to help consolidate peace, ease international tension, and improve Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government earlier warned the Government of Turkey about the danger of the situation when Turkish territory is used as a military place d'armes by third powers. The Soviet side has drawn attention to this fact when the Soviet airspace was violated by foreign planes and balloons from Turkish territory. In the light of the above, the Soviet Government cannot help concluding that the Government of Turkey has not heeded these warnings of the Soviet Union dictating concern for the preservation of peace and a desire to improve Soviet-Turkish relations.

The Government of the Soviet Union protests to the Government of the Turkish Republic against the opportunity given to foreign warplanes to use Turkish territory for preparing and carrying out intrusions into the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government deems it necessary to warn that if such provocations are repeated from the territory of Turkey it will be compelled to take proper retaliatory measures. It is common knowledge that the Soviet Union has means to render harmless, if necessary, the war bases used for aggressive actions against the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that all responsibility for the consequences will be borne both by the governments of the states committing aggression against other countries and the accomplices in this aggression.

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Annex III

Document No. 18

Turkish Note to the USSR, May 26

The Turkish Government has studied, with all the attention which it requires, the Note which the Soviet Government has been pleased to deliver to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, with the date of May 13, 1960, on the subject of the American aircraft knocked (abbattu) down within the Soviet airspace on the first of May, 1960.

The Turkish Government considers it necessary from the outset to convey to the Soviet Government the knowledge that the incident relative to the overflight of Soviet airspace by an American aircraft and the dispute which has resulted therefrom cannot be the object of a discussion between the Turkish and Soviet Governments.

On the other hand, the Turkish Government does not intend to render a judgement upon this event, which has already been submitted to the jurisdiction of the United Nations.

The Turkish Government also desires to draw the attention of the Soviet Government to the fact that the airplane in question did not penetrate into the Soviet airspace, based on the statement of the competent Soviet authorities themselves, until three days after having departed from Turkish soil. This clearly proves that the Turkish airspace was not utilized for the overflight of Soviet airspace.

Moreover, the Turkish Government is also in a position to declare in a categorical manner that Turkey has never accorded to any aircraft whatever the authorization to pass from its airspace into the Soviet airspace without the aircraft in question having obtained the requisite permission. The Turkish Government likewise desires to state moreover, that the American authorities have never submitted such a request.

In view of the preceding, the Turkish Government desires to convey the following clarifications:

The responsibility of the Turkish authorities can not go beyond the limits of Turkish airspace. It is evident that authorizations granted to foreign aircraft overflying Turkish airspace

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are not granted except in conformity with the provisions of international law controlling the matter. In that which concerns flights outside of Turkish airspace, the Turkish Government fails to see how it can be held to assume responsibility except when it concerns authorized flights of aircraft of Turkish nationality.

Consequently, the Turkish Government is unable to accept in any manner the accusation put forward in the above-mentioned Note of the Soviet Government with regard to its responsibility arising from the fact that the American aircraft in question had utilized the air base at Incirlik prior to its departure for a destination in a third country other than the USSR.

With respect to the remark made by the Soviet Government relative to the use of certain Turkish bases by third governments and particularly by the Government of the United States, the Government of Turkey hastens to bring to the attention of the Soviet Government that as a sovereign state Turkey has the right, in conformity with the principles and provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, to put its air bases at the disposal of its allies with a purely defensive aim. Otherwise said, the Government of Turkey has never granted and will never grant to the aircraft of allied or other powers the right to use its bases or its air space with an aggressive aim which could prejudice the security or tranquility of its neighbors.

Furthermore, the Turkish Government can even declare to the Soviet Union that the arrangement existing between itself and the American Government does not permit American aircraft to fly in Turkish airspace without the authorization of the competent Turkish services and subjects them in this respect to the authority of the Turkish Government.

Under these conditions it is easy to understand that the Turkish Government can only reject the accusations and remarks brought to its attention in the Note of the Soviet Government.

With respect to the previous cases of overflights of Soviet territory to which reference was made in the above-mentioned Note, the Turkish Government had at the time clearly explained to the Soviet Government the reasons for which also in these cases no part of the responsibility whatsoever could be attributed to it.

On the other hand, the Turkish Government wishes to point out in this connection that the Turkish authorities had found themselves compelled on several occasions to formulate complaints on the subject of unauthorized overflights of Turkish airspace by Soviet aircraft.

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The Turkish Government is of the opinion that all these incidents should be resolved in conformity with the customary rules and principles of international law. Demarches which exceed this frame are certainly not of a nature to serve the interests of the parties and to contribute to the safeguarding of peace.

Before finishing the Turkish Government wishes to bring to the attention of the Soviet Government that Turkey, which has always founded its policy on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, has never ceased to devote itself to the establishment of the best relations with its neighbors, and that it has adhered only to those alliances which have a purely defensive character, with the aim of assuring its independence and contributing to the safeguarding of peace. And these alliances can never be considered to be of a nature to prevent Turkey from having the best of relations with countries which are not members of these alliances (but) which nourish the same desires with regard to Turkey and the same attachment to the ideal of peace.

Turkey would be very happy to see all its neighbors inspired by the same principles and showing as much solicitude as it does for the establishment of relations of good neighborliness.

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Annex IV

Document No. 19

USSR Note to Norway, May 13

A military aircraft violated the Soviet frontier at 0436 hours Moscow time, May 1, and flew over 2,000 kilometers deep into the Soviet Union. The USSR Government could not, naturally, have left such a gross violation of the Soviet national frontiers unpunished. As soon as the intentions of the intruding plane became obvious it was shot down by Soviet missile forces in the vicinity of Sverdlovsk.

An expert examination of all the evidence at the Soviet Union's disposal has put it beyond dispute that the invading plane belongs to the United States of America, was permanently based in Turkey, and was sent to the Soviet Union via Pakistan for hostile purposes.

The exact findings of the investigation, as reported by the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, at the closing meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet session May 7, leave no room for doubt as to the purposes behind the flight of the American plane which violated the Soviet frontier on May 1. This plane, of the Lockheed U-2 type, was expressly equipped for reconnaissance and subversory flight over Soviet Union territory.

The plane carried equipment for aerial photography and the detection of Soviet radar networks and other special radio-engineering facilities of the Soviet antiaircraft defenses. The Soviet expert commission, which made the inquiry, has incontrovertible evidence at its disposal of the spying and reconnaissance mission of the American plane: rolls of film showing Soviet defense and industrial establishments; a tape recording of the signal of Soviet radar stations; and other evidence.

It has been established that the plane in question was based at the American-Turkish airbase at Incirlik, near Adana, from where it flew to the Peshawar airfield in Pakistan, April 27.

The route map taken from the surviving American spy flyer, Powers, clearly and distinctly indicates the entire route which he was instructed to follow after taking off from the Turkish city of Adana: Peshawar, the Aral Sea, Sverdlovsk, Archangel, and Murmansk, with subsequent landing at the Bodoe airfield in Norway. The spy flyer reported that he was serving with the American 10-10 unit stationed in Turkey and engaged in high altitude aerial reconnaissance, and that he had, notably, made repeated flights along the Turkish-Soviet frontier for the purpose of studying Soviet antiaircraft radar networks.

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In the face of these incontrovertible facts, the US State Department has had to admit that the American plane, which violated the Soviet frontier May 1, had been sent into the Soviet Union for military reconnaissance. This meant recognizing that the flight had aggressive purposes.

The American pilot testifies that in the course of thorough preparation for his flight over USSR territory, made well in advance, he had, on the instructions of his command, made a preliminary flight from Turkey to Norway via Greece, Italy, and the Federal German Republic, and stayed there for two to three weeks studying landing conditions at the Bodoe airfield.

It should be recalled in this connection that as early as January 1959, the Soviet Government, having received exact and verified information about deliberate reconnaissance flights to Soviet territory by American military planes from Norwegian territory, and specifically the Bodoe airfield, already told the Norwegian Government that such a state of affairs was intolerable. In its reply, the Government of Norway did not deny that planes of third countries received permission from the Norwegian authorities in isolated cases to spy on Norwegian territory temporarily, allegedly for joint flights with aircraft of the Norwegian air force.

The Government of Norway said that these flights were made only with the permission of the Norwegian authorities and that, under Norwegian rules, allied planes were not allowed to fly across Norwegian territory east of the 24th degree Eastern longitude. But already it was clear that these assurances were an attempt to exonerate Norway's partners in the aggressive NATO bloc and to whitewash their actions which are a threat to peace and security in the north of Europe, actions for which Norwegian territory, too, is used. Now, the provocative flight over Soviet territory by an American plane which was to land on the Norwegian airfield at Bodoe proves irrefutably that the Norwegian Government did not heed the warnings of the Soviet Government. Moreover, it has in fact become an accessory to provocative actions by the United States against Norway's neighbor, the Soviet Union.

In view of the aforesaid, the question is posed: What is the real worth of the Norwegian Government's repeated assurances that the territory of Norway will not be made available in peacetime for the stationing of foreign armed forces, if this territory is already being used by planes of the US Air Force making aggressive flights into the confines of the Soviet Union? The Soviet Government calls attention to the Government of Norway to the fact that it is difficult to regard these actions otherwise than as unfriendly to the

Soviet Union and incompatible with the normal good neighbor relations between the two countries, and considers it necessary to stress that the Government of Norway bears a not inconsiderable share of the responsibility for the aggressive acts undertaken by the American air force with regard to the Soviet Union.

The Government of the Soviet Union protests strongly to the Government of Norway against allowing foreign military aircraft to use Norwegian territory for the preparation and commissioning of intrusions into Soviet airspace.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to warn that if such provocations continue from the territory of Norway, it will be obliged to take appropriate measures in reply. It will be recalled that the Soviet Union has the means which, if necessary, will make it possible to fully incapacitate the military bases used for the commissioning of aggressive actions against the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that the responsibility for the consequences will rest both with the governments of the states committing aggression against other nations, and the governments of the countries which are their accomplices.

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Document No. 20

Norwegian Note to USSR, May 27

The Norwegian Government has closely examined the contents of the note from the Government of the Soviet Union of May 13 and would like to communicate the following:

In its note the Government of the Soviet Union draws the attention of the Norwegian Government to the violation of the frontiers of the Soviet Union by an American aircraft, which flew over parts of the territory of the Soviet Union. Based upon the information that the pilot of the aircraft was equipped with a map indicating Bodo airfield as his destination, the Soviet Government protests against foreign aircraft being given the opportunity of using Norwegian territory in order to prepare and to carry out penetrations into the Soviet Union.

In this connection the Norwegian Government would like to make the following observations:

In its declarations to the "Storting" on May 9 and May 13, the Norwegian Government made it clear that no Norwegian civil or military authority had cooperated in any way in the execution of the flight in question. In these declarations the Government stated its reaction to this incident and explained the steps taken in the matter. Reference is made in this respect to the Foreign Ministers press release of May 19. The government has thus in the "Storting" openly presented the available information regarding this matter. The contents of the two declarations have also been brought to the knowledge of the Soviet Government on the understanding that the relations between our two countries must be based on frankness and sincerity.

In its note of May 13 the Soviet Government assert that the aircraft incident on May 1 diminishes the value of the Norwegian assurances regarding the stationing of foreign armed forces in Norway. This assumption is made on the grounds that Norwegian territory "already now is put at the disposal of aircraft of the United States Air Force penetrating into the Soviet Union for aggressive purposes". As is evident from the statements made by the Norwegian Government, there is no basis for such assumptions.

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It has been and still is the policy of the Norwegian Government never to permit the use of Norwegian territory for acts violating the territory of another country.

The Norwegian Government fully recognizes the need of the Soviet Union to safeguard its interests and its national security. Norway for its part has the same needs which the Norwegian Government endeavours to satisfy in the most appropriate way. The Government is fully conscious of the considerations which in this connection must be given to all legitimate interests of Norway's neighboring countries. It is thus essential to ensure that the good and confident neighborly relations with the Soviet Union are not endangered by the fact that Norway has safeguarded its security by participating in a regional defense alliance. It will always be a major aim of Norwegian foreign policy to maintain and strengthen these neighborly relations.

Against this background the Government of the Soviet Union will no doubt understand that the Norwegian Government must regret the warnings of measures against Norwegian territory contained in the Soviet note of May 13. The Norwegian Government cannot see that any steps have been taken by Norway in connection with this incident which can in any way be interpreted as unfriendly acts towards the Soviet Union, or which in any other way justify such warnings.

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Annex No. IV

Document No. 21

The Norwegian Pour Memoire to US, May 13

On the basis of the information available to Norwegian Government it seems evident that an American aircraft of type Lockheed U-2 which according to Soviet sources was shot down over USSR on May 1, 1960, was bound for Bodø Airfield. Norwegian authorities had not received any request for permission to land this particular aircraft. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that in this case landing on a Norwegian airfield would have been contrary to principles followed by Norwegian authorities in granting permission for landing of foreign reconnaissance aircraft.

The Norwegian Government must lodge its protest, and at same time ask that American authorities take all necessary steps to prevent similar incidents in the future.

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Annex No. IV

Document No. 22

US Aide Memoire in Reply to Norwegian Protests,
May 16

The US Government confirms that Norwegian authorities had not been requested to grant permission for American aircraft of type Lockheed U-2, which according to Soviet sources was shot down over USSR on May 1, 1960, to land at Bodoe airfield. Had such a landing been made on a Norwegian airfield, it would have been contrary to principles followed by Norwegian authorities in granting permission for landing of foreign aircraft.

The United States will continue to abide by those principles.

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Annex No. V

Document No. 23

Afghanistan Note to US, May 18

From irrefutable information about the forcing down of an American U-2 plane in the vicinity of Sverdlosk, USSR, and from the confessions of Mr. Powers, the pilot of the said plane, and also on the basis of the map recovered from the pilot which shows the route of the flight, it becomes apparent that the said plane had the illegal duty of espionage in the Soviet Union, and that the plane flew from a military base of Pakistan and after an illegal and unauthorized flight over Afghanistan entered the Soviet Union.

The Foreign Ministry of the Royal Government of Afghanistan considers this flight, in addition to being an act completely contrary to International Law and contrary to accepted relations between states and an unfriendly action part of United States Government and also considers such an act which takes place from a military base of another country in this area as disturbing to peace and a cause of increasing tension and conflict in this area as well as in international spheres.

In regard to the violation of Afghan air space by the American plane the Foreign Ministry of the Royal Government of Afghanistan strongly protests to the Government of the United States of America and awaits the necessary explanation as well as an assurance that such a violation of Afghan air space will not be repeated by the United States of America.

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Annex No. V

Document No. 24

US Note to Afghanistan, May 20

The Embassy of the United States Government refers to the Royal Government of Afghanistan note of May 18 concerning the forcing down of the American unarmed civilian aircraft on May 1 in the USSR and has the honor to state the following:

The United States Government notes with regret that the Royal Government of Afghanistan has interpreted a certain ex parte version of flight as unfriendly action by the United States Government. The United States Government entertains and has entertained only friendliest sentiments toward the Royal Government of Afghanistan and has never taken a course of action in the contrary sense. It is believed unnecessary to invite the attention of the Royal Government of Afghanistan to the history of US-Afghan relations to demonstrate the validity of this point.

With respect to the assurances desired by the Royal Government of Afghanistan and without prejudice to the exception taken by the United States Government to the charge of unfriendly action, the attention of the Royal Government of Afghanistan is invited to the public statement made on May 16, 1960 in Paris by President Eisenhower with respect to such flights. Quite apart from the route which this or any particular plane might have taken, the President said: "In point of fact these flights were suspended after the recent incident and are not to be resumed."

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Annex No. VI

Document No. 25Department's Instruction to MacArthur of May 9

1. In light your estimate situation in Japan, we are prepared to conclude specific undertaking with GOJ that we will not rpt not in absence armed attack against Japan fly any intelligence missions over non-Japanese territories from US facilities in Japan without rpt without prior consultation with GOJ. We desire to conclude this undertaking within framework Consultation Agreement. We would also give public assurances that lacking consent of GOJ we would not rpt not undertake such flights contrary to express wishes of GOJ.

2. With respect to past performances you may give Kishi assurance that U-2 equipment has been utilized only for legitimate scientific purposes. Realize such assurance will be accepted with some doubt in view recent happenings but our posture will certainly be none the worse for giving this assurance even with respect to past performance.

3. We also consider that it would be strongly in our interest to make public statement soonest along following lines: QTE US Government has given GOJ assurances that U-2 aircraft, flying from air bases in Japan, have been utilized only for legitimate normal and no intelligence overflight missions.

Under the new Treaty arrangements, the US Government has agreed to a specific consultation arrangement. If the GOJ requests such, US Government is prepared to make a further agreement clarifying that under this consultation agreement intelligence missions over non-Japanese territory from air bases in Japan will not rpt not be undertaken without prior consultation with the GOJ and in such consultation the US will not act contrary to views of Japanese Government. This formal undertaking will come into effect once the new Treaty arrangements are ratified by both Governments. UNQTE -- Department Telegram to Tokyo 2599.

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Document No. 26MacArthur Report on Talks with Yamada, May 10

1. I deeply appreciate swift and constructive instructions which you sent me in REFTEL, which have been tremendously helpful.

2. I met privately early this morning with Vice ForMin Yamada and conveyed to him for Kishi and Fujiyama substance of REFTEL, including public statement we propose to make. Yamada expressed great appreciation and left at once to meet with Kishi and Fujiyama.

3. I have just returned from second private meeting with Yamada, who had just come from meeting with Kishi and Fujiyama. He first asked that Kishi's deep and heartfelt thanks be expressed to President and to you for our constructive proposal, which was greatly appreciated. He said Kishi and Fujiyama both wished us to know that they understood that US had to undertake intelligence activities and that such intelligence activities were important for security of US and its friends and allies. They did not rpt not wish to create problems for US in our intelligence activities but on other hand they had very difficult problem to handle in term of public opinion. While they appreciated scope of statement we were prepared to make on our willingness to expand "prior consultation" to include intelligence overflights, Kishi and Fujiyama felt it unnecessary, at this juncture, to enter into new formal and official agreement re consultation in cases of intelligence overflights. In fact, if we mentioned in our statement prior consultation for intelligence overflights from Japanese bases, GOJ, for public opinion purposes, would be obliged to say that it would not rpt not authorize such overflights. Kishi did not think this would be helpful from our viewpoint.

4. Therefore Kishi proposed that we make simple statement along following lines based on first sentence of statement in para 3 of REFTEL:

Begin Draft Statement: The US Government has given the GOJ assurances that U-2 aircraft flying from air bases in Japan have been and will continue to be utilized only

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for legitimate and normal purposes and not for intelligence overflight missions. End Draft Statement.

Kishi said that although Socialist would cast doubt on good word and faith of U.S., he believed such statement would hold situation and therefore would not propose expanding "prior consultation" arrangement for overflights at this time.

5. Kishi strongly hopes Secretary or State Dept. can issue such statement as soon as possible. After statement is issued in Washington, he might, for public relations purposes in Japan, also wish to have me convey it formally to ForMin under first person note.

6. I strongly recommend that statement proposed above by Kishi be issued soonest in Washington, which I will subsequently transmit in first person note to Fujiyama if Kishi so desires. I feel that from our point of view Kishi's proposal is actually preferable to proposal in REFTEL.

Again, my deep appreciation for great speed with which such constructive action was taken on this very important matter. -- Tokyo Telegram to Department 3603.

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Document No. 27

Department's Instruction to MacArthur on Statement
of May 10

Department issuing statement as you request noon EDT May 10. If Kishi considers would be helpful his purposes you authorized pass first person note following similar language. FYI We assume Kishi understands our offer of specific undertaking on consultation remains available to him should subsequent events require such undertaking. -- Department Telegram to Tokyo 2610.

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Annex No. VI

Document No. 28Japan Note to US Dated May 12

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of our Excellency's note date 11 May 1960 in which was transmitted the text of the official statement made by the Department of State in Washington at 12:00 noon, Eastern Daylight Time, 10 May 1960, and to express my appreciation for your Excellency's prompt action in communicating the assurances of the United States Government concerning the missions of U-2 aircraft flying from air bases in Japan.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Aiichiro Fujiyama.

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Document No. 29Japan Informs MacArthur of New Soviet Note, May 21

Foreign Office has just informed us of new Soviet note to Japan protesting security treaty and illegal overflights by US aircraft. GOJ intends delay formal reply for few days but Foreign Office spokesman will issue informal statement later this afternoon. Vice Foreign Minister Yamada told us line not yet firm but he thought it would make following points:

- (1) Reiterate Japan-US security treaty purely defensive;
- (2) Note US assurances that U-2's based in Japan have not engaged in intelligence overflight missions; and
- (3) State that GOJ fully respects forms and obligations of international law and practice.

Yamada said two points in Soviet note presented great difficulties for GOJ during present widespread agitation re security treaty. Soviet note:

- (A) Obviously refers to intelligence overflights not only by U-2's but also by other US aircraft based in Japan; and
- (B) States US government has been warned by Soviet Union more than once before re such intelligence overflights.

Yamada asked as matter of great urgency for information to assist GOJ in preparing its formal reply to Soviet note which would have to be made soon. In particular GOJ believes statement that none of our planes has conducted or will conduct overflights is important together with information re alleged previous Soviet warnings.

While Diet Lower House has passed security treaty, Kishi's position is extremely difficult and he is in trouble. State of public opinion is such that major political crisis could build swiftly. As reference telegram emphasized, Kishi must be in position to make clear that none of our aircraft based in Japan has been engaged in, or

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will in future carry out, illegal overflights from bases in Japan. I again strongly urge, if we are in position to do so, that we make this clear at once in public statement to be issued by State Department (perhaps as comment on Soviet note). Also request Department send me soonest any background re Soviet allegation re previous warnings to US to which Soviet note refers so that I may pass this on to Foreign Office. If there were previous Soviet warnings did we in our replies deny overflights, admit we had overflown or what? -- Tokyo Telegram to Department 3784

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Document No. 30Department's Instruction to MacArthur, May 28

You may inform Kishi or Yamada that in reply to his query regarding overflights of Soviet territory other than by U-2's from bases in Japan, we have been making a most thorough search of all flight records pertaining to bases in Japan and, having gone back several years as far as accurate records are still available, we can now state there have been no such overflights from Japanese territory. Assurances contained para one Deptel 2599 apply here, i.e., nor will there be any such overflights from Japanese territory in future without prior consultation GOJ. (You should point out that commitment to prior consultation in future is for confidential information Japanese Government and in accordance its wishes will not rpt not be publicized. Strongly hope in any reply to Soviets, GOJ will not rpt not reveal confidential commitment on prior consultation with respect to future.) As regards U-2's we have already stated publicly that the United States Government has given the Government of Japan assurances that U-2 aircraft flying from air bases in Japan have been and will continue to be utilized only for legitimate and normal purposes and not for intelligence overflight missions.

As regards previous Soviet warnings to the United States Government re border violations in the past ten years the Soviet Government has alleged in approximately half a dozen cases that U.S. aircraft intruded into Soviet air space in neighborhood of Japan. In most of these cases, allegations were that American aircraft were intercepted by Soviet fighters, that Soviet fighters either signaled American aircraft to leave Soviet air space or that American aircraft opened fire on Soviet interceptors, and that the incidents ended in alleged disappearance of American aircraft. In one or two cases, there was no allegation of interception. In only one of these cases has Soviet government made specific charges of an intelligence mission with respect to these flights.

The Soviet Government in its notes never made it a point of issue where the planes were based. Soviet charges

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of firing by American aircraft on Soviet planes or deliberate violation of Soviet air space, or in the one instance of specific reference to reconnaissance, have been rejected as untrue by American side and Soviet government has been invited to litigate issues of law and fact in International Court of Justice. This the Soviets have consistently refused to do. FYI Of these cases of intrusions four involved U.S. aircraft based in Japan. This to be used only if pressed by Japanese and in context these not overflights per our rejection Soviet protest. End FYI.

The foregoing summary excludes Korean war questions and aircraft under UN command in the Korean conflict.

Department does not repeat not wish to comment publicly on Soviet note to Japan and prefers not repeat not to make any further press statement on issues raised by Yamada. -- Department telegram to Tokyo 2826.

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Annex No. VI

Document No. 31MacArthur Report on Talk with Yamada, June 2

Substance REFTEL communicated to Vice ForMin Yamada. We emphasized that having gone back as far as records were available for past several years we could state none of our aircraft based in Japan has engaged in illegal overflights from bases in Japan, and we reviewed record previous Soviet warnings as presented REFTEL. We informed Yamada our willingness give assurances there would be no such overflights in future from Japanese territory without prior consultation. As Yamada did not press for additional details re Soviet protests we did not mention info that Soviet allegations in four cases involved US aircraft based in Japan.

Yamada has just informed us Kishi and Fujiyama are most grateful for our assurances and consider their position in forthcoming Upper House discussions on security treaty has been materially strengthened. GOJ most appreciative offer re prior consultation for any future intelligence overflights, but for reasons set out in EMBTEL 3603 does not wish at this time formal and official agreement, whether classified or public, expanding scope of prior consultation commitment to cover overflights from Japanese bases.

In view of U-2 affairs Soviets are continuing to make in their propaganda on foreign bases and attempts by Kishi's opponents to link new treaty with intelligence overflights, Kishi and Fujiyama believe it is indispensable for them to be able to state, without any qualification, that none of our aircraft based in Japan has carried out, or will in future engage in, illegal overflights from bases in Japan. Verbal assurances we have given them, they now believe, fully meet their present Diet and public opinion problem. If asked specifically in Diet whether GOJ would authorize any overflights from bases in Japan, GOJ will of course reply in negative.

Yamada said FonOff has been attempting to draw heat from U-2 charges and quiet public agitation on issue as much as possible (EMBTELS 3953 and 3954). For this reason FonOff

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now does not plan to make immediate reply to Soviet note of U-2 of May 20 (EMBTEL 3784) but will wait for week or so and make one reply to this note and to earlier April 22 Soviet note protesting security treaty (EMBTEL 3452). Yamada said difficult to predict how soon U-2 issue will die down here as both Soviet propaganda broadcasts and those Japanese leftists under Communist control are determined to make situation as difficult as possible at this time. For all these reasons assurances we have now given GOJ are of vital importance to Kishi and Fujiyama, and Yamada reiterated their appreciation.

Yamada recalled that summary of previous Soviet protests we had communicated per REFTEL had excluded Korean war questions and aircraft under UN command in Korean conflict. He asked whether there were now in Japan any aircraft under UN command which were not covered by assurances we had given. We replied our understanding was there were no such UN aircraft based in Japan; that exclusion of "aircraft under UN command" from scope of our assurances was limited to Korean conflict prior to Korean armistice; and that all US operated aircraft flying from bases in Japan were covered by our present assurances. Would appreciate specific confirmation that our understanding is correct, since any other understanding of our assurances would raise grave problems involving continued use of our air bases here. -- Tokyo Telegram to Department 3986.

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Document No. 32Colonel Makino Informs MacArthur of Forgery; July 21

This afternoon Colonel Makino (Chief of Intelligence Japanese Air Self Defense Force Staff) called on Colonel Robert G. Emmens (Air Attache) with Yomiuri Assistant Editor and produced photostat of memorandum on Foreign Service stationery from Colonel Emmens to Ambassador marked Top Secret and dated May 7, 1960. Memo stated that U-2s based in Japan had been used to overfly Laos, Cambodia, Viet Nam, Communist China, Soviet Union, and North Korea and recommended that we trick the Japanese by temporarily removing planes from Japan to Okinawa and return them secretly after hullabaloo over U-2s and anti-Kishi demonstrations died down.

Memorandum is extremely clever forgery as we informed Colonel Makino.

Ambassador had copies made of photostat and called personally on Vice ForMin Yamada requesting that Japanese police authorities undertake immediate investigation with view to trying to apprehend perpetrator of forgery. Yamada assured him that competent authorities would be asked to begin investigation immediately.

Ambassador also discussed public handling of forged document. Since it seemed apparent that story might break during the night and since subsequent denials never catch up with initial story, Yamada, who was having press conference at 6:30 p.m. this evening Japan time, said he would announce to press conference that Ambassador had called to acquaint him about forged document and had requested him to have Japanese authorities undertake immediate investigation with view to bringing guilty party to justice. Yamada will also say that persons who are circulating forged document are obviously trying to create further difficulties in Japanese-American relations in wake of difficulties already created by extremists which led to cancellation of President's visit.

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Embassy Press Attache is also making statement along similar lines to American and other correspondents. Line he will take is included in second following telegram.

Immediately preceding telegram was drafted before above information came into our possession. It strongly recommended that we give new Ikeda Govt assurances that US bases in Japan have been and will continue to be utilized for only legitimate and normal purposes and not for any intelligence overflight missions. Forged memorandum mentioned in this telegram lends added importance to recommendation in preceding message since it is clear pro-Communists intend to do utmost to keep overflight issue alive. -- Tokyo Telegram to Department 228.

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Document No. 33Text of Forged US Document

(Forged Memo was on blue seal Foreign Service Stationery, marked Top Secret, headed from Office of the US Air Attache, Tokyo, Japan, Memorandum To Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, From: Colonel Robert G. Emmans, dated 7 May 1960.)

In connection with the report which I made to you personally, I am pleased to comply with your request for a written summary of the information we have obtained from Japanese military quarters with respect to the possible reactions of the Kishi Govt. to Khrushchev's statement on the Lockheed U-2 incident.

According to our sources the Govt. of Japan is greatly concerned about Khrushchev's statement that the USSR is prepared to knock out military bases from which our U-2s operate. The reason, as you know, is that our U-2s based at Atsugi and Tachikawa in addition to making flights over Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand, have operated over important military and industrial zones in Communist China, the Soviet Far East and Northern Korea as well. As a result, Japanese officials are of the opinion that the threat of Soviet retaliation represents a real danger to Japan.

Moreover the Japanese Government is under severe popular pressure since information concerning our U-2 operations has become widely known. Chief of the National Safety Agency Akagi has directed our attention to the fact that as early as December 1 of last year Socialist Deputy Ichiro Akukata, in a statement at a meeting of the Lower Chamber, mentioned the U-2 aerial photograph of coastal zones in China and Siberia. Then again on April 14 and 15 of this year, this question was touched upon in the discussion of the sources used in drawing up air planning charts for the Japanese National Safety Agency. Mr. Akagi has been informed that the Japanese opposition is about to launch a more vigorous and broader campaign against us and the Kishi regime.

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In view of the predicament in which the Japanese Government now finds itself -- and which has been further complicated by the mass demonstrations against the security treaty -- it is prepared to make official demands in the nearest future, perhaps by the 10th of this month, that the US Government withdraw all reconnaissance planes from its territory. If such a demand is made, it will seriously undermine our prestige and would also set off a chain reaction in other allied countries.

I consider it my duty to stress that the danger of such a demand being presented is real since Kishi, it is reported, very much fears that he may share the fate of Mr. Syngman Rhee. For this reason, I believe we should distract Japanese public opinion from the issue by stating that we have stopped our U-2 flights from Japanese territories and that such planes are no longer located at the Atsugi and Tactikawa bases. At the same time, we should temporarily transfer all U-2 planes from the main islands to Okinawa where we can conceal our operations much better. When the anti-Kishi demonstrations die down, we could return our planes to Japan proper in line with our geographic and strategic interests.

To prevent discovery of this maneuver by the Japanese public, AF headquarters is prepared not to use natives at the NW U-2 location sites and to strengthen security measures. Our military authorities will also tighten censorship over communications between Okinawa and the main islands.

At this point, I should like to comment briefly concerning the situation on Okinawa itself.

According to information received from the island, disaffection among the natives, including land owners, is mounting in view of our continued requisition of the property and the low rental fees which they receive. This disaffection may easily develop into big mass demonstrations against our bases, and stir up similar agitation throughout Japan. In order to avert further trouble it seems to me that we should double or treble our rental payments. This way the Japanese would have much less objection to our requisition of their property.

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At the same time we should strengthen our propaganda on Okinawa by pointing out that the expansion of our military bases will stimulate the building of new railroads, ports, medical centers, the development of agricultural and marketing facilities and the increase of employment for the natives -- in other words, we could show that the Japanese have more to gain than the Americans.

The substance of this memorandum has been communicated to the US Air Force headquarters.

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Annex No. VI.

Document No. 34Embassy Tokyo Statement on Forgery, July 21

A friendly news source this afternoon delivered to the Embassy a photostatic copy of a forged document on stolen Embassy stationery that purported to be a memorandum from Colonel Robert G. Emmens, the Embassy Air Attache, to Ambassador Douglas MacArthur, II. The memorandum, labeled "top secret", was dated May 7 and alleged that U-2 airplanes based in Japan had made intelligence overflights of Laos, Cambodia, Viet Nam, Thailand, Communist China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea. This forged document also recommended that the U-2 aircraft be temporarily removed from Japan and later secretly reintroduced into Japan so that overflights could continue. The forgery was circulated under cover of a memorandum signed by "the Japanese patriotic group," which obviously is designed to stir up anti-American sentiment in Japan.

In connection with this fraudulent document it will be recalled that well over two months ago the United States Government affirmed that U-2 planes which had been based in Japan had never engaged in any intelligence overflights and would never be used for any such purposes. It was announced on July 11 that the two U-2 planes that had been stationed in Japan had been dismantled, crated, and shipped back to the United States, and will not be returned to Japan. The Embassy immediately transmitted to the Japanese Foreign Office a copy of the false document and requested the Foreign Office to have the appropriate Japanese authorities undertake an immediate investigation so the perpetrators of this fraudulent and illegal act could be apprehended and brought to justice. From the paper used, (which was not Air Attache's but purloined Foreign Service stationery), the language and composition of the forged text, it is evident that the drafter was unfamiliar with Embassy procedures and practices. The Foreign Office assured the Embassy that an investigation would be undertaken immediately. It is obvious that the persons who were responsible for stealing Embassy stationery and perpetrating the forgery are trying to create new difficulties in Japanese-American relations in the wake of the difficulties already created by certain extremist groups receiving encouragement from abroad which led to the cancellation of the President's visit to Japan.

UNCLASSIFIED

RD, State-Wash., D.C.

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

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Annex VII

Document No. 35

State Department Statement to Italian Ambassador
May 20

Italian Ambassador called on Department (White) May 20 and indicated GOI had info from "plausible source" that U-2 pilot, Powers, had instructions to use airfields at Aviano and Brindisi in emergency. GOI desired know whether any truth to this information.

After careful checking White informed Italian Embassy (Perrone) May 21 that U-2 pilot had no repeat no instructions, written or oral, stating that in case emergency he could utilize any Italian airport. Referring to press reports that PCI deputy Pajetta had exhibited during Chamber Foreign Affairs Committee meeting photocopy of document allegedly found in U-2 listing radio beacons at Aviano and Brindisi, White said we would be interested in any information indicating alleged document is other than or excerpt from unclassified flight information publication entitled "Flight Information Publication Terminal (High Altitude)" which is customarily available in all airbase operations and carried in all aircraft.

Perrone expressed appreciation this information and said his government did not attach much importance to move by communists.
--Department telegram to Rome, 3537.

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

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ADDENDUMExcerpts from Transcripts of Department of State
Press and Radio News Briefings

The excerpts in this addendum contain statements and questions and answers concerning the U-2 incident which have bearing on our relations with other countries, and which are not available in Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, May 27, 1960, "Events Incident to the Summit". Pertinent material from the transcripts of the Departmental news briefings published in the Hearings is as follows:

- May 5 - Initial Departmental Statement (pp. 178-179)
 May 7 - Departmental Statement (p.187)
 May 9 - Statement by the Secretary of State (p. 193)

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DEPARTMENTAL PRESS BRIEFING

MAY 10, 1950

.... I have one brief statement to make: The United States Government has given the Government of Japan assurances that U-2 aircraft flying from air bases in Japan have been and will continue to be utilized only for legitimate and normal purposes and not for intelligence overflight missions.

Now, let me quickly point out that by "legitimate and normal purposes" is meant the NAASA Weather Observation Project.

Q. How was this assurance given Link?

A. Through our Embassy to the Government.

Q. Had they requested or made inquiries, or what?

A. I suppose inquiries were made.

Q. Your use of the word "legitimate" implies that intelligence overflight missions are illegitimate, does it not?

A. We have made statements on this. What I point out to you is the purposes of these planes are weather observations.

Q. Is there a procedure which limits them from the Soviet and Chinese Communist borders by any set distance?

A. I do not know.

Q. I think the Commander in Tokyo informed the Japanese Government that there was a 20-mile limit.

A. I am just not familiar with those details.

Q. Does this mean the Soviet and Chinese Communist airspace will not be violated?

A. This is strictly for weather observation, Spence (Davis).

Q. Does this apply to our planes in Japan only or to other places too?

A. I am directing myself to Japan.

Q. Do we have any information about Soviets conducting bi-weekly flights off the Japanese coast for photographing purposes?

A.

May 10, 1960 (Cont.)

-2-

A. I am just not prepared to go into that at this moment.

Q. Link, can you give us the normal course of these planes on weather observation patrol from our bases in Japan?

A. No, I don't have those details.

Q. The assurances refers only to a special type of plane.

A. That is right.

Q. Are these similar flights, Link, that were involved in those planes that were shot down off or rather close to the Soviet border?

A. No, no; these are U-2's.

Q. Link, the point that John (Scali) made are bound to be raised by many people, because your statements put out previously have gone out of their way to make the point that the flights that were made were legitimate. This does seem to imply that we have changed our point of view. Can you say this changes our previous statements?

A. No, it changes in no way, shape or form anything previously stated. It is simply to indicate that these planes will be used for strictly weather observation purposes, period.

Q. Link, perhaps you would like to substitute another word for "legitimate", perhaps get rid of it?

A. You can make it "normal", normal weather observation flights.

Q. The point is weather observation only. You said in explanation that it was, but why doesn't the statement say that? You said in explanation of the statement that it was normal weather observation.

A. That is right.

Q. Why don't we change it this way, Link?

Q. Now wait a minute. Are we changing it or is Link changing it?

A. I am perfectly happy to stand on it. If you people wish to change ---

....Q.

May 10, 1960 (Cont.)

-3-

....Q. Do you mean that these planes do not conduct weather observation over Soviet or Chinese Communist territories?

A. That is my understanding, certainly.

Q. Mr. White, does the answer mean that for observation research purposes these planes never approach the Soviet and Chinese Communist territories?

A. I don't have the precise details as to how far away they stay, but I emphasize that they are for weather observation purposes.

Q. These assurances only apply to the U-2 and not any other aircraft.

A. Well, that is what they are out there for.

Q. My question is does this statement apply only to the U-2 and not other aircraft.

A. Mike (O'Neill), this refers to the U-2's. Now, I refer you back to what has previously been said, that we are not closing our eyes to surprise attack from any direction.

Q. This, then, would not apply to any U-2's operating from air bases in Okinawa or Taiwan.

A. We will keep our eyes open, Bill (Dowds), you can be sure of that.

Q. Did we volunteer these assurances to the Japanese or did they raise them?

A. I assume this results from an inquiry by the Government.

Q. Link, can you say we have given similar assurances to any other country, or if there have been similar inquiries from any other country?

A. To my knowledge there have not been any from any other country.

Q. Link, on another point, Premier Khrushchev had some things to say last night about American Allies which might allow their bases to be used for intelligence overflights, and he specifically said that "if they allow others to fly from their bases to our territory, we shall hit at those bases." Do you have any comment on that?

A.

May 10, 1960 (Cont.) -4-

A. It is typical that the Soviet Government singles out as the objective of its threats those smaller countries of the free world who bear no -- N-O, no -- responsibility for the recent incident.

Q. You are saying that such countries as Pakistan and Turkey bear no responsibility for the launching of aircraft which may fly into the Soviet Union?

A. That is correct, for the recent incident.

Q. Link, are you finished with the statement?

A. Yes.

Q. What would we do if they undertook any such effort to hit at those bases?

A. About the only thing I can add here is that the United States has undertaken certain commitments in the multilateral and bilateral arrangements for the common defense existing between this Government -- that means the United States -- and those -- that means the other governments -- which once again appear to be subjected to a policy of intimidation by the Soviet Government. There should be no doubt -- N-O, no; D-O-U-B-T, doubt -- that the United States will honor these commitments!

Q. Link, in the light of that statement, can you tell us whether or not at this stage we do or do not accept the Soviet claim that this flight did go from Turkey to Pakistan with a target to end up in Norway?

A. I can add nothing to the statements that have already been issued.

Q. Link, Soviet Premier Khrushchev was also quoted as saying last night that if we send further planes over Russia, the Soviets are going to shoot them down. Do you have any comment at all on that?

A. I haven't fainted yet.

Q. Link, just for clarification, your statement mentioned commitments without specifying. These are commitments to come to the defense of any nations which are attacked?

A.

May 10, 1960 (Cont.) -5-

A. Those countries with which we have security arrangements.

Q. Can you say anything, Link, about the call yesterday of the Norwegian Ambassador? Can you say anything more about the call?

A. No; I think he explained this thing.

Q. Link, the Norwegian Ambassador was quoted as saying yesterday that he gathered that Secretary Herter did not know where this flight was going. Is that correct?

A. I can't specifically answer that. If the Ambassador said that, I am sure that he was being perfectly honest with you.

....Q. In your statement on Japan, was that assurance given as part of the consultation which we have agreed upon?

A. I don't know the circumstances of it, Spence (Davis). I assume they asked us about it and this is what we gave them.

....Q. Link, back on the statement you made originally about the U-2 flight to Japan, this implies that there has not been any order to ground these U-2 weather reconnaissance planes.

A. I don't know the specifics of that. The purpose of this statement is to assure the Japanese that these planes are being used for weather observation purposes.

Q. Thank you, sir.

A. You are very welcome.

DEPARTMENTAL PRESS BRIEFING

MAY 11, 1960

....Q. Link, while we are in this same general area, a Toronto newspaper yesterday said that U-2 flights have taken off from Canada's bases for surveillance of Russia. Do you have anything to say on this?

MR. WHITE: Yes, I am in a position to categorically deny this report.

Q. Who made this report?

Q. A Toronto newspaper, the Globe and Mail.

Q. What was that report about?

Q. That an American U-2 took off from Canadian bases.

Q. Are there any weather reconnaissance flights by U-2's from Canada?

A. The spokesman for the Canadian Defense Ministry has said: "A U-2 aircraft made a forced landing north of Prince Albert on March 15, 1960. This aircraft was on a routine flight, the purpose of which was upper atmosphere meteorological and radiological sampling. The plane was returning from a point over Liverpool Bay, near the mouth of the MacKenzie River. It has not proceeded beyond North American airspace. The flight in question was one of a series of scientific flights flown to obtain precise information about clean air turbulence, upper air cloud formations, jet stream and radiation in the upper atmosphere. The aircraft were unarmed and all flights were cleared in the normal manner."

Q. Link, does this mean there have been series of U-2 flights from Canadian bases?

A. No. The Canadian Defense Minister, Mr. Pearkes, has also made a statement. He said: "No U-2 mission has ever flown from a Canadian base. The only U-2 landing ever made in Canada was on March 15."

Q. These flights have taken off from American bases, is that it?

A. That is right.

Q. This long statement you gave was all from the spokesman of the Canadian Defense Ministry?

A. That is right.

Q.

May 11, 1960 (Cont.)

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Q. You are endorsing this full statement?

A. I am certainly raising no questions about it.

Q. Link, these flights took off from American bases?

A. I would assume so.

Q. They went up into Canadian airspace with Canadian permission, and then flew back to the United States, is that it?

A. Well, one of them landed in Canada. The only one that ever landed up there was this one on March 15.

Q. It doesn't say why it was forced to land?

A. I don't know.

Q. Could we find out about that? This might give us a clue as to why --

MR. REAP: I think the press story on that said it landed on an icy lake and made minor repairs and then took off again.

Q. Could anybody give us a clue as to what went wrong? This might give us a clue as to what went wrong over Russia.

MR. WHITE: I don't have any information on that other than what has been said by the Canadians.

Q. They haven't said anything about this plane as to the cause.

A. No.

DEPARTMENTAL PRES BRIEFING

MAY 12, 1960

....Q. Do you have any further clarification of the function and mission of the U-2's in Japan in view of these Communist charges and Japanese Socialist charges that they were so engaged in espionage? The question that comes to mind is why was Japan singled out as a base from which they were not flying these flights?

A. There is no truth to reports that a U-2 aircraft conducted intelligence missions from Japan period.

....Q. Link, the Pakistan Ambassador called today, I think, in reference to this business of whether Pakistan territory was used. Do you know what was told to him?

A. I don't have anything to add to what he said to you fellows when he came out.

Q. He said it had not yet been determined whether this plane actually had taken off from Pakistan territory as Khrushchev claimed. May we assume from that that the State Department doesn't yet know where this flight originated?

A. I think he said they were investigating.

Q. Who was investigating?

A. The Pakistanis.

Q. Well, isn't the United States Government also investigating?

A. I say I have nothing to add to what the Ambassador said.

DEPARTMENTAL PRESS BRIEFING

MAY 18, 1960

....Q. Anything new on the Pakistan protest that was reported yesterday?

A. Well, let me clarify the situation if I can. I think I recalled to you yesterday the Pakistan Ambassador's call on the Secretary of May 12, following which the Ambassador said to the press that he had lodged no protest. It now appears that the President of Pakistan was referring to an aide memoire handed to the Department on May 14, transmitting the statement released to the press by the Pakistan Government on that day. We are in contact with the Government of Pakistan on this matter and this communication is under study.

Q. Well, this communication is not a protest?

A. The statement by the Government on that day said that "Our inquiries show that no aircraft has taken off from Peshawar airfield in the direction of Soviet Russia. In case any American plane taking off from Peshawar has been diverted to Soviet Russia in the course of its flight, and Soviet allegation that American aircraft which has been brought down in Soviet Russia took off from Peshawar is correct, we have cause for bitter complaint. The American authorities must realize the delicacy of our situation and ensure that all concerned refrain from such activities in the future."

Q. Does the American Government realize the delicacy of their situation?

Q. Is the United States planning a reply to this?

A. The matter is under study in the Department.

Q. This says "we are in contact with the Government of Pakistan on this matter." Is that here, or in Pakistan, or both?

A. I would assume both. I don't know specifically, but I would assume both places.

Q. The matter is under study; we didn't answer the aide memoire as yet?

A. Not to my knowledge.

DEPARTMENTAL PRESS BRIEFING

May 19, 1960

....Q. What is the status of the protest, Link, back and forth -- who owes whom a letter?

A. First off, let me say that the United States has delivered a reply to the Norwegian Government's oral protest and has given assurances in response to the request of the Norwegian Government.

Q. What are the assurances?

A. I have to confine myself to that. We have received a protest from the Afghan Government, and it is under study at the present time. We have not received the text, although we know that the Czechs have given us an oral statement referring to Secretary Herter's statement of May 9.

That is the situation as it now stands.

Q. How about the Pakistan protest that allegedly has been sent?

A. Just nothing new on that.

Q. I don't think we ever acknowledged receiving it.

A. Yes, yesterday I pointed out what that situation was.

Q. Link, this is asked out of ignorance. Have we received one from the Turks as well?

A. No.

Q. What did the Afghan's protest protest? What was the protest?

A. I don't have the text of it here. I understand they released it.

Q. Ambassador Willis in Oslo is reported to have said the assurances we gave the Norwegians were that the flights had been discontinued. Why can't you say that?

A. I wasn't aware she had said that, John (Scali). If she has, her word is good enough for me.

Q. Are you going to publish the text of that reply?

A. No, sir.

Q.

Q. The communication that Ambassador Willis had with the Norwegian Government is the one you are referring to here, or is there a separate note that went directly to the Norwegians?

A. As I pointed out, this was a reply to the Norwegian Government's oral protest. Maybe you didn't catch that.

Q. When you say the United States has delivered a reply, you are talking about what Ambassador Willis delivered.

A. That is correct.

Q. Link, was our reply oral too?

A. That is correct.

Q. Was there an aide memoire with the oral reply?

A. I just don't have that information; I don't know.

DEPARTMENTAL PRESS BRIEFING

May 26, 1960

....Q. Like, about ten days ago we got a note from the Czechs. You remember that, I think. The last time you said it was still under study.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you have something to say on that?

A. Actually it was an aide-memoire. But let me say, in answer to your question, that in view of the false accusations and abusive and intemperate language of this aide-memoire, it -- that is, the aide-memoire -- is not considered worthy of reply.

DEPARTMENTAL PRESS BRIEFING

June 1, 1960

....Q. Link, is anybody going to say anything about Mr. Malinovsky's kind words?

A. I have no comment on it, other than to recall to you what I had said a week or ten days earlier (May 10).

Q. Which was --

A. When the first threat was made -- I don't happen to have it with me, but the essence of it was that this is typical of Soviet tactics in an attempt to intimidate governments which are absolutely blameless in this situation; and that we had agreements with countries for our mutual protection, and let there be no mistake that those commitments would be lived up to. That was the essence of it.

Q. Link, is there any feeling around here that Malinovsky's threats in the speech the other day created a new element of danger or uncertainty in the East-West relationship?

A. Well, John (Hightower), all we have had here for months out of the Soviet Union and all I expect we will hear for months in the future is a relaxation of tensions; and I would hardly put the General's speech into any category of relaxing tensions.

Q. Do you expect to go on hearing about relaxation of tensions from Moscow?

A. I hope in a different tune.

....Q. Link, I think the Soviets have complained to West Germany, alleging that there have been some West German bases used for overflights into Communist-controlled territory.

A. My recollection is that the Germans replied to that yesterday. I have nothing to add.

DEPARTMENTAL PRESS BRIEFING

July 7, 1960

...Q. Do you have any comment on his [Khrushchev's] statement that the U.S. bases in Italy violate Austrian neutrality?

A. This is another in a series of recent heavy-handed Soviet statements obviously made in an attempt to intimidate our friends. Period.

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

William A. Cira,
Acting Director
INFORMATION SECURITY
OVERSIGHT OFFICE

May 24, 2016

Please be advised that the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) has concluded its consideration of the third part of mandatory declassification review appeal 2002-0049 filed by you and that the 60-day period during which an agency head may appeal an ISCAP decision to the President has expired. Enclosed is a chart that outlines the ISCAP decisions on the documents under appeal and details the information declassified by the ISCAP. With the exception of any information that is otherwise authorized and warranted for withholding under applicable law, we are releasing all information declassified by the ISCAP to you. If you have questions about this appeal, please contact William Carpenter of my staff at (202) 357-5250.

Sincerely,



WILLIAM A. CIRA
Executive Secretary

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Joseph Lambert
Director, Information Management Services
Central Intelligence Agency Member of the ISCAP

~~TOP SECRET~~

DDS&T Historical Paper

No. OSA-1

Vol. IX of XVI

DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)
History of the Office of Special Activities
 Chapter XIV continued

(PERIOD)
From Inception to 1969

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ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2002-0049, document no. 9
DECLASSIFICATION DATE: May 24, 2016

Controlled by : DDS&T

Date prepared : 1 April 1969

Written by : Helen Kleyla

: Robert O'Hein

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C05492917

ANNEX 89

TEXT OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ADDRESS ON
COLLAPSE AT THE SUMMIT

MAY 25, 1960

Fellow Americans:

Tonight I want to talk with you about the remarkable events last week in Paris, and their meaning to our future.

First, I am deeply grateful to the many thousands of you, and to Representatives in Congress, who sent me messages of encouragement and support while I was in Paris, and later upon my return to Washington. Your messages clearly revealed your abiding loyalty to America's great purpose--that of pursuing, from a position of spiritual, moral and material strength, a lasting peace with justice.

You recall, of course, why I went to Paris ten days ago.

Last summer and fall I had many conversations with world leaders; some of these were with Chairman Khrushchev, here in America. Over those months a small improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and the West seemed discernible. A possibility developed that the Soviet leaders might at last be ready for serious talks about our most persistent problems--those of disarmament, mutual inspection, atomic control and Germany, including Berlin.

To explore that possibility, our own and the British and French leaders met together, and later we agreed, with the Soviet leaders, to gather in Paris on May 16.

Of course, we had no indication or thought that basic Soviet policies had turned about. But when there is even the slightest chance of strengthening peace there can be no higher obligation than to pursue it.

Nor had our own policies changed. We did hope to make some progress in a summit meeting, unpromising though previous experience had been. But as we made preparations for this meeting, we did not drop our guard or relax our vigilance.

Our safety, and that of the world, demand, of course, effective systems for gathering information about the military capability of other powerful nations, especially those that make a fetish of secrecy. This involves many techniques and methods. In these times of vast military machines and nuclear-tipped missiles, the ferreting out of this information is indispensable to free world security.

This has long been one of my most serious preoccupations. It is part of my grave responsibility, in the over-all problem of protecting the American people, to guard ourselves and our allies against surprise attack.

During the period leading up to World War II we learned from bitter experience the imperative necessity of a continuous gathering of intelligence information, the maintenance of military communications and contact, and alertness of command.

An additional word seems appropriate about this matter of communications and command. While the Secretary of Defense and I were in Paris, we were, of course, away from our normal command posts. He recommended that under these circumstances we test the continuing readiness of our military communications. I personally approved. Such tests are valuable and will be frequently repeated in the future.

Moreover, as President charged by the Constitution with the conduct of America's foreign relations, and as commander-in-chief, charged with the direction of the operations and activities of our armed forces and their supporting services, I take full responsibility for approving all the various programs undertaken by our Government to secure and evaluate military intelligence.

It was in the prosecution of one of these intelligence programs that the widely publicized U-2 incident occurred.

Aerial photography has been one of many methods we have used to keep ourselves and the free world abreast of major Soviet military developments. The usefulness of this work had been well established through four years of effort. The Soviets were well aware of it.

Chairman Khrushchev has stated that he became aware of these flights several years ago. Only last week, in his Paris press conference, Chairman Khrushchev confirmed that he knew of these flights when he visited the United States last September.

Incidentally, this raises the natural question--why all the furor concerning one particular flight? He did not, when in America last September, charge that these flights were any threat to Soviet safety. He did not then see any reason to refuse to confer with American representatives.

This he did only about the flight that unfortunately failed, on May 1, far inside Russia.

Now, two questions have been raised about this particular flight: first, as to its timing, considering the imminence of the summit meeting; second, our initial statements when we learned the flight had failed.

As to the timing, the question was really whether to halt the program and thus forego the gathering of important information that was essential and that was likely to be unavailable at a later date. The program went forward.

The plain truth is this: when a nation needs intelligence activity, there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed. Incidentally, from Pearl Harbor we learned that even negotiation itself can be used to conceal preparations for a surprise attack.

Next, as to our Government's initial statement about this flight, this was issued to protect the pilot, his mission and our intelligence processes, at a time when the true facts were still undetermined.

Our first information about the failure of this mission did not disclose whether the pilot was still alive, was trying to escape, was avoiding interrogation, or whether both plane and pilot had been destroyed. Protection of our intelligence system and the pilot, and concealment of the plane's mission, still seemed imperative.

It must be remembered that over a long period these flights had given us information of the greatest importance to the nation's security. Their success has been nothing short of remarkable.

For these reasons, what is known in intelligence circles as a "covering statement" was issued. It was issued on assumptions that were later proved incorrect. Consequently, when later the status of the pilot was definitely established, and there was no further possibility of avoiding exposure of the project, the factual details were set forth.

I then made two facts clear to the public: first, our program of aerial reconnaissance had been undertaken with my approval; second, this Government is compelled to keep abreast, by one means or another, of military activities of the Soviets, just as their Government has for years engaged in espionage activities in our country and throughout the world.

Our necessity to proceed with such activities was also asserted by our Secretary of State, who, however, had been careful--as was I--not to say that these particular flights would be continued.

In fact, before leaving Washington, I had directed that these U-2 flights be stopped. Clearly their usefulness was impaired. Moreover, continuing this particular activity in these new circumstances could not but complicate the relations of certain of our allies with the Soviets. Furthermore, new techniques, other than aircraft, are constantly being developed.

I wanted no public announcement of this decision until I could personally disclose it at the summit meeting in conjunction with certain proposals I had prepared for the conference.

At my first Paris meeting with Mr. Khrushchev, and before his tirade was made public, I informed him of this discontinuance and the character of the constructive proposals I planned to make. These contemplated the establishment of a system of aerial surveillance operated by the United Nations.

The day before the first scheduled meeting, Mr. Khrushchev advised President De Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan that he would make certain demands upon the United States as a precondition for beginning a summit conference.

Although the United States was the only power against which he expressed his displeasure, he did not communicate this information to me. I was, of course, informed by our allies.

At the four-power meeting on Monday morning he demanded of the United States four things: first, condemnation of U-2 flights as a method of espionage; second, assurance that they would not be continued; third, a public apology on behalf of the United States; and, fourth, punishment of all those who had any responsibility respecting this particular mission.

I replied by advising the Soviet leader that I had during the previous week, stopped these flights and that they would not be resumed. I offered also to discuss the matter with him in personal meetings, while the regular business of the summit might proceed. Obviously, I would not respond to his extreme demands. He knew, of course, by holding to those demands the Soviet Union was scuttling the summit conference.

In torpedoing the conference, Mr. Khrushchev claimed that he acted as the result of his own high moral indignation over alleged American acts of aggression. As I said earlier, he had known of these flights for a long time. It is apparent that the Soviets had decided even before the Soviet delegation left Moscow that my trip to the Soviet Union should be canceled

and that nothing constructive from their viewpoint would come out of the summit conference.

In evaluating the results, I think we must not write the record all in red ink. There are several things to be written in black. Perhaps this Soviet action has turned the clock back in some measure, but it should be noted that Mr. Khrushchev did not go beyond invective--a time-worn Soviet device to achieve an immediate objective.

On our side, at Paris, we demonstrated once again America's willingness, and that of her allies, always to go the extra mile in behalf of peace. Once again, Soviet intransigence reminded us all of the unpredictability of despotic rule, and the need for those who work for freedom to stand together in determination and strength.

The conduct of our allies was magnificent. My colleagues and friends--President De Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan--stood sturdily with the American delegation in spite of persistent Soviet attempts to split the Western group. The NATO meeting after the Paris conference showed unprecedented unity and support for the alliance and for the position taken at the summit meeting. I salute our allies for us all.

And now, and most importantly, what about the future?

All of us know that, whether started deliberately or accidentally, global war would leave civilization in a shambles. This is as true of the Soviet system as of all others. In a nuclear war there can be no victors--only losers. Even despots understand this. Mr. Khrushchev stated last week that he well realizes that general nuclear war would bring catastrophe for both sides.

Recognition of this mutual destructive capability is the basic reality of our present relations. Most assuredly, however, this does not mean that we shall ever give up trying to build a more sane and hopeful reality--a better foundation for our common relations.

To do this, here are the policies we must follow, and to these I am confident the great majority of our people, regardless of party, give their support:

1. We must keep up our strength, and hold it steady for the long pull--a strength not neglected in complacency nor overbuilt in hysteria. So doing, we can make it clear to everyone there can be no gain in the use of pressure tactics or aggression against us and our allies.

2. We must continue businesslike dealings with the Soviet leaders on outstanding issues, and improve the contacts between our own and the Soviet peoples, making clear that the path of reason and common sense is still open if the Soviets will but use it.

3. To improve world conditions in which human freedom can flourish, we must continue to move ahead with positive programs at home and abroad, in collaboration with free nations everywhere. In doing so, we shall continue to give our strong support to the United Nations and the great principles for which it stands.

As to the first of these purposes--our defenses are sound. They are tailored to the situation confronting us.

Their adequacy has been one of my primary concerns for these past seven years--indeed throughout my adult life.

In no respect have the composition and size of our forces been based on or affected by Soviet blandishment. Nor will they be. We will continue to carry forward the great improvements already planned in these forces. They will be kept ready and under constant review.

Any changes made necessary by technological advances or world events will be recommended at once.

This strength--by far the most potent on earth--is, I emphasize for deterrent, defensive and retaliatory purposes only, without threat or aggressive intent toward anyone.

Concerning the second part of our policy--relations with the Soviets--we and all the world realize, despite our recent disappointment, that progress toward the goal of mutual understanding, easing the causes of tensions and reduction of armaments is as necessary as ever.

We shall continue these peaceful efforts, including participation in the existing negotiations with the Soviet Union. In these negotiations we have made some progress. We are prepared to preserve and build on it. The Allied Paris Communiqué and my own statement on returning to the United States should have made this abundantly clear to the Soviet Government.

We conduct these negotiations not on the basis of surface harmony nor are we deterred by bad deportment. Rather we approach them as a careful search for common interests between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union on specific problems.

I have in mind, particularly, the nuclear test and disarmament negotiations. We will not back away, on account of recent events, from the efforts or commitments that we have undertaken.

Nor shall we relax our search for new means of reducing the risk of war by miscalculation, and of achieving verifiable arms control.

A major American goal is a world of open societies.

Here in our country anyone can buy maps and aerial photographs showing our cities, our dams, our plants, our highways--indeed, our whole industrial and economic complex. Soviet Attachés regularly collect this information. Last fall Chairman Khrushchev's train passed no more than a few hundred feet from an operational ICBM, in plain view from his window.

Our thousands of books and scientific journals, our magazines, newspapers and official publications, our radio and television, all openly describe to all the world every aspect of our society.

This is as it should be. We are proud of our freedom.

Soviet distrust, however, does still remain. To allay these misgivings I offered five years ago to open our skies to Soviet reconnaissance aircraft on a reciprocal basis. The Soviets refused.

That offer is still open. At an appropriate time America will submit such a program to the United Nations, together with the recommendation that the United Nations itself conduct this reconnaissance. Should the United Nations accept this proposal, I am prepared to propose that America supply part of the aircraft and equipment needed.

I hope that the United Nations will act accordingly.

As far as we in America are concerned, our programs for increased contacts between all peoples will continue. Despite

the suddenly expressed hostility of the men in the Kremlin, I remain convinced that the basic longings of the Soviet people are much like our own. I believe that Soviet citizens have a sincere friendship for the people of America. I deeply believe that above all else they want a lasting peace and a chance for a more abundant life in place of more and more instruments of war.

Turning to the third part of America's policy--the strengthening of freedom--we must do far more than concern ourselves with military defense against, and our relations with, the Communist Bloc. Beyond this, we must advance constructive programs throughout the world for the betterment of peoples in the newly developing nations. The zigs and zags of the Kremlin cannot be allowed to disturb our worldwide programs and purposes. In the period ahead, these programs could well be the decisive factor in our persistent search for peace in freedom.

To the peoples in the newly developing nations urgently needed help will surely come. If it does not come from us and our friends, these peoples will be driven to seek it from the enemies of freedom. Moreover, those joined with us in defense partnerships look to us for proof of our steadfastness. We must not relax our common security efforts.

As to this, there is something specific all of us can do, and right now. It is imperative that crippling cuts not be made in the appropriations recommended for mutual security, whether economic or military. We must support this program with all of our wisdom and all of our strength.

We are proud to call this a nation of the people. With the people knowing the importance of this program, and making their voices heard in its behalf throughout the land, there can be no doubt of its continued success.

Fellow Americans, long ago I pledged to you that I would journey anywhere to promote the cause of peace. I remain pledged to pursue a peace of dignity, of friendship, of honor, of justice.

Operating from the firm base of our spiritual and physical strength, and seeking wisdom from the Almighty, we and our allies together will continue to work for the survival of mankind in freedom--and for the goal of mutual respect, mutual understanding, and openness among all nations.

Thank you, and good night.

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ANNEX 90

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P
YDPD 5262-60
30 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: The Legal Defense of Francis Gary Powers

1. For the sake of posterity recorded herewith are some events which have come to pass during the preparation of the defense of Francis Gary Powers. At the point of this writing an AP press release announcing this defense makes the following historical; but for the sake of the record, the frustrations, tribulations and travail are herein set forth.

2. During the week of June 5 the undersigned met with Mr. Larry Houston, General Counsel, CIA, Mr. Eric Hager, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, and Mr. Richard Davis, Chief, European Division of the Department of State concerning the legal ramifications in the Francis Powers case and what action, if any, should be taken by the U. S. Government concerning his defense. It was quickly agreed that we had an obligation to make definite legal overtures to the Soviets concerning the defense of Francis Powers. The Department of State had received five or six offers from various law firms and lawyers who had indicated their willingness to defend Francis Powers. We briefly discussed possible candidates for the defense without arriving at any conclusion and had mentioned the names of Edward Bennett Williams and Joseph Welch. Eric Hager had indicated that Williams' name had been thrown in the hopper by his partner, Muldoon. In response to all inquiries and offers concerning the defense counsel, the Department had taken the line that the decision rests with Mrs. Barbara Powers. Mr. Davis announced that Mr. Oliver Powers and his attorney, Carl E. McAfee from Norton, Va., had an appointment to see Mr. Kendall, the Legal Assistant to the President on Monday, 13 June, but per agreement with the Department of State, Kendall was to turn McAfee over to Eric Hager. During the course of our meeting, Eric Hager indicated that he thought he could arrange for legal defense of Powers through the Virginia State Bar Association and was to meet William P. Dickson, President of the Virginia State Bar Association in Charlottesville over the weekend to inquire of this possibility.

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3. On 10 June, Mr. Cunningham, Mr. Houston, Mr. John Warner and the undersigned met with the Director on this subject. When advised that Edward Bennett Williams had offered his services, the Director had suggested that it would not be a good idea in view of his connection with Senator McCarthy and Hoffa. The Director stated that he was about to go on a foreign trip and requested that he be advised when we had selected the lawyers.

4. On 13 June the original cast of characters engaged in another skull session at the Department of State. At this meeting the availability of experts in Soviet law was discussed and possible candidates to assist either counsel for the defense or the State observer at the trial. We ran through the names of Lipson, Berman and Hazard and others of apparent import.

5. Hager reported on his contact with Dickson at Charlottesville and stated that all had gone well; that Dickson had an immediate grasp of the situation and it was not necessary for him to go into specific details on the case. A plan of action had been laid; Dickson would nominate two lawyers who would be retained by Barbara Powers and as principle, i. e. the individual with power of attorney from Francis Powers, it would be proper for her lawyers to prepare the defense of Francis Powers. Hence, after the two lawyers were selected we would be informed of their names, run our check, then brief Barbara as to our plan of action and legal aspects of the case.

6. By this time our friends Oliver Powers and McAfee arrived in town and were scheduled for a meeting with Mr. Davis for a short discussion and application for passports and visas. I requested that Mr. Davis stress the fact that Barbara Powers had power of attorney and as such was, so to speak, the principle in the family affairs and that it was important that Oliver Powers not take any unilateral action on his own lest he undo our actions in a different direction.

7. Mr. Mike Miskovsky of OGC, who had done legal research concerning this case, began to take an active part. He attended the meeting with Hager, Davis, Oliver Powers, and McAfee. (His Agency connection was not announced.) During the Powers/McAfee meeting things seemed to go reasonably well. Oliver Powers indicated his desire to get together with Barbara Powers in this case and conceded the wisdom

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of working together. Carl McAfee, whose dreams of grandeur had run unchecked due to the apparent vacuum of other legal activity in the case, had envisioned himself as the trial lawyer in Moscow. At our request, Mr. Davis had queried Powers and McAfee as to whether they had any desire to contact CIA officials. Powers asked "What was that?" and when informed agreed to a meeting Tuesday.

8. On Tuesday, 14 June, General Cabell with Mr. Miskovsky met Oliver Powers and McAfee in Eric Hager's office at the Department of State. The meeting was limited to general terms and the obvious facts were not grasped by either Powers or McAfee. At the conclusion Powers stated that he still wondered what Lockheed Aircraft Corp. was going to do for his boy, and as a side issue indicated boyishly that this was the closest he had ever been to a general. Mr. Davis had sensed that the role of CIA in this situation had gone completely over the heads of both McAfee and Powers. Davis queried General Cabell whether or not he should clarify this point. The General replied in the negative with the statement that we keep this ace up our sleeves. The undersigned did not attend any meetings with McAfee and Oliver Powers but these events were related by Miskovsky and Davis.

9. I had called Barbara Powers the night of 13 June and indicated that she would be receiving a call from Mr. Dickson concerning two lawyers to help her in this case. I suggested that it would be a good idea if she agreed with what he proposed.

10. On 15 June an impromptu meeting was held at 4:00 in the afternoon. Eric Hager had called the shindig and blithely announced that Barbara Powers was on her way to Roanoke, Virginia, to meet the two attorneys Dickson had designated. At that time I received the names of John C. Parker of Franklin, Virginia, and Frank W. Rogers of Roanoke. Hager announced that Dickson would also be there to meet Barbara Powers and they would lay plans for the defense. I cried foul and indicated that it was necessary that I check the lawyers out and also brief Barbara beforehand. I left the meeting and caught a plane to Roanoke, with Mike Miskovsky to hold up the legal end.

Dickson met us about four minutes before Barbara's plane arrived. We briefed him of the Agency's involvement in the case and told him that we did not want the Government's affiliation with the defense to be public knowledge. He had sensed this from his discussions

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with Hager and fell quickly in line. Barbara arrived and we drove with Frank Rogers to a room which the lawyers had at the Hotel Roanoke. As usual luck was with us. We arrived at the Hotel Roanoke during the Miss Virginia Contest, and had our pick of reporters and photographers. We asked Barbara to freshen up in her room while we went to a sitting room and there Mike and I conducted a briefing of Dickson and Rogers and John Parker who was waiting in the room. Miskovsky opened the discussion by assuring the financial backing for the defense. We had been led to believe by Hager that Dickson's only concern was that funds would be available. Before Mike could finish talking money, Rogers interrupted him and stated that he thought he could speak for Parker and indicated that they were honored to be considered for this case and would not think of asking for any compensation.

We then briefly outlined the funding mechanism; that we would arrange for funds to be deposited to the Virginia State Bar Association, funds would be received from private sources and the lawyers would draw from this account for their expenses. Parker indicated that it would be quite agreeable to him if they carried the expenses to the end and then would present us with a list of expenses. I stated that this would be undesirable from our point because there would be considerable expenses involved and we did not feel that it was necessary to impose financial inconvenience on any individual. At this point Barbara entered the room and the lawyers engaged in general conversation to win her confidence and to learn something of their client. Amid scotch and soda the evening wore easily.

About 1:30 in the morning we adjourned and Dickson and I walked Barbara to her room. Dickson told Barbara that if she had any reservations about the lawyers to please let him know and they would withdraw from the case. Briefly Barbara told him she was satisfied. Requesting that I fix her T. V. Barbara dismissed Dickson, and closed the door. She asked that I have a nightcap with her which ended up plural and she seemed to let loose. She seemed honestly perplexed and puzzled over the ability of a couple of folksy Virginia lawyers to handle a big Soviet case. She had envisioned a one man band who would be a Soviet law expert, a city trial lawyer and a mouthpiece all rolled into one. I explained that these lawyers may not be the trial lawyers involved but their purpose was to protect her interests here in the U. S. and to prepare the defense for Frank Powers. They would explore the field of Soviet law experts and trial lawyers and decide on the team which could handle this

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entangled case. When she realized these men were involved primarily in the preparation of the defense and would not suddenly travel to Russia without consultation, she seemed satisfied and in fact the happiest since she arrived in the U. S. As the result of the night caps, I was happy, too, and decided to retire.

11. On the morning of 16 June, Thursday, we had another client-lawyer session. Plans were laid for McAfee and Oliver Powers to come to Roanoke so that the case could be handled as a family effort. John Parker began telephoning Soviet law experts to arrange meetings with them. Before McAfee and Oliver Powers arrived that afternoon Mike and I decided to pull out and forego further Miss Virginia publicity.

12. As history would have it, Oliver Powers and McAfee arrived and had a reasonably cooperative meeting with Barbara and Frank Rogers. Both McAfee and Powers again indicated the wisdom of a family effort in this case. McAfee on the side to Rogers made reference to a cable which Oliver Powers sent from Kingsport, Tennessee. McAfee could not recall the wording of the cable but keenly remembered it was addressed to Nikita Khrushchev. On Friday morning Barbara disappeared from the hotel but it was assumed that she had returned to Pound, Va., with McAfee and her father-in-law. This assumption was later confirmed.

13. Via phone on the evening of 16 June, Rogers indicated that the meeting had gone fairly well and it was his feeling that McAfee and Powers were in line. In the interim John Parker had traveled with Mike Miskovsky to Cambridge to meet with Harold Berman, Professor of Law at Harvard University. This meeting took place on Friday, 17 June. On Saturday, 18 June he saw John N. Hazard, Professor of Law at Columbia University. On Sunday, 19 June, Frank Rogers joined him for a morning visit with Hazard. Again they agreed that Hazard would be available to advise the trial lawyers on the case. Berman had previously stated that he would be available if required but a rather full schedule of European travel would interfere with complete devotion to the case. He stated his willingness to detour to Moscow for preliminary investigation of the trial if we deemed it advisable.

14. On Monday, 20 June, Rogers and Parker saw Art Dean while the undersigned and Miskovsky met with Ambassador Thompson to

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outline briefly our progress on the case to date. Ambassador Thompson throughout the meeting seemed plagued by the thought of defection as far as Powers was concerned. He made one reference to "defection" but thereafter referred to it as "possible defection" at the trial. He stated that it might be to our advantage to have Frank Powers ask for a Soviet counsel rather than an American which would imply that he was "gotten to" by the Soviets. He asked the question "What do we do if the Soviets give him back on our promise that we never do it again?" I accepted this question as rhetorical and treated it as such. He opined that the Soviets would probably hold the trial in August in order to make full propaganda play during the opening of the General Assembly in September. Someone of the group present queried Ambassador Thompson whether the Embassy was constantly asking the Soviets for permission to see Powers. He stated that every three or four days whenever they have discussions with the Soviets, they bring this point up.

Eric Hager made reference to the Counsellors agreement (the Litvinov Agreement) whereby we would have the right to demand of the Soviets that we (the Embassy) be permitted to see Frank Powers. Ambassador Thompson was quick to say no, that the Soviets would probably ignore our requests thereby weakening the agreement. Stunned by such logic, I remained silent. He did state that he asked Khrushchev personally if we could see Powers but was ignored. Ambassador Thompson queried if we had any information as to whether or not Powers was shot down at high altitude. When informed that we could not substantiate any altitude, he stated that if Powers had not been shot down at high altitude the Soviets would not likely let him free since he would disclaim their boast that they had reached him at his highest.

15. We arranged for Frank Rogers and John Parker to see Ambassador Thompson upon their arrival in D. C. late Monday afternoon. Although not extended an obvious invitation to attend we arranged for Mike to claim a seat in the conference. During this session Ambassador Thompson played the same song re defection.

16. On Tuesday, 21 June, Mike and I arranged for Agency briefings for Parker and Rogers at the Statler Hotel in Washington. OCI personnel gave an intelligence briefing on the current Soviet situation and Jack Maury and friends of SR added their inputs. On this glorious day

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we received word that the cable which McAfee had referred to on 16 June was a thank-you to Nikita Khrushchev for granting Oliver Powers a visa and a request by Oliver Powers that his attorney, Mr. Carl McAfee, be permitted to join him. As a parenthetical comment, the Office of Security has been requested to obtain the contents of this cable by Miskovsky. There was strong sentiment at this time to cut McAfee completely out of the picture, disbar him, tar and feather him, and employ any other disposal methods known to mankind. We developed our plans further concerning the trial and decided that Frank Rogers, Alex Parker, a trial lawyer from Richmond, Virginia, and brother of John C. Parker, together with John Hazard would form the team to travel to the Soviet Union, if the Soviets permitted, to defend Frank Powers. The undertones throughout these past few days had been the desire to send a cable to Nikita Khrushchev stating the Virginia State Bar Association's interest in the matter and their desire to send counsel for Frank Powers.

Mr. Eugene Kiefer of DPD met the lawyers and answered their questions concerning the technical facilities of the aircraft, the destructor and landing characteristics etc. As a result of this discussion the lawyers were convinced that the aircraft came apart at an unknown altitude due to unknown reasons and that Frank Powers had climbed out of the aircraft and parachuted to the ground.

17. On Tuesday night Alex Parker arrived in D. C. and Mike and I read him into the case. He was quick to move in and readily established himself in the planning of the case. We reworked the cable to Khrushchev and received Barbara's support on it. She asked that she be allowed to tell her father-in-law. The lawyers were somewhat reluctant to cut McAfee out of this channel in view of his potential danger to the case. To circumvent this they placed a call to McAfee which got through to him about midnight and requested that he come to Washington. He was somewhat reluctant but when advised of the importance he agreed to come first thing in the morning after clearing it with Mr. Oliver Powers.

On Wednesday, meetings were held with Hazard, more briefings of the lawyers and more rewrites of the cable took place. We worked on a release which the Virginia State Bar Association would give out and the timing of the cable. It was planned that a courier

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would bring the cable draft to Richmond to have it appear on the paper and typewriter of Alex Parker's office. His secretary alone would handle the paper. The draft would be shown to McAfee who arrived late the 22nd, first thing the morning of the 23rd. It would also be shown to Hazard. Changes, if any, would be called down to the secretary in Richmond who would incorporate them into the finished product and return the cable via our courier to John Parker at the Mayflower Hotel. The secretary would then file a Western Union telegram to Khrushchev from Richmond.

18. On the afternoon of 23 June Alex Parker, Frank Rogers, and Carl McAfee would appear for a visa at the Soviet Embassy giving the Soviets a copy of the government sterile cable. As planned these arrangements came to pass. When McAfee arrived on the 22nd he was reluctant at not being invited as a full-fledged member of the Virginia State Bar Association's team. The lawyers adequately handled this situation and McAfee was pleased to learn that he would travel with the lawyers and Powers to the trial, that his role in this defense would be to acquire homey background material concerning Frank Powers from the father and his home area. This information would be used as fill-in to portray Frank Powers as a quiet unsophisticated American country boy. He indicated that his pride was hurt in not being included in the press release as a member of the team but accepted the logic that he was young and inexperienced and it would not be fitting for the Virginia State Bar Association to endorse such a nomination. McAfee suggested that the cable be signed by Mr. and Mrs. Oliver Powers as well as Barbara Powers to imply a unified family front. This suggestion was heartily endorsed. McAfee was somewhat concerned over fees and the lawyers pointed out that his source would be from the father as he is the father's attorney; however, any expenses incurred in the Russia trip would be covered by contributions to the Virginia State Bar Association.

19. Although at this reading it appears that both McAfee and Powers Senior are in line, McAfee has been a true thorn in our side. It is hard not to discount the speculation that when he was advised by Hager that the Virginia State Bar Association was moving into the case that he put the father up to sending the cable to Khrushchev requesting that McAfee go to Russia. He conveniently forgot what this cable said and throughout he has not been an example of cooperation and honesty.

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He has indicated that he would declare Barbara Powers incompetent to handle the principal role in this case due to her "mental condition" which he later conceded was her drinking. He has advised us that he has received offers to associate with other firms in this case and made reference to a Baltimore firm which offered him \$100,000. He has implied that he could get his fees from the father because the father will have lots of money from offers. He has shown poor judgment in the case to date, has attempted to handle the case without other consultation, and in short, portrays a man who has a bear by the tail and doesn't know what to do. We remain suspicious of his cooperation but feel that as long as we can have him in sight we can control his actions.

20. As it now stands, Lawyers Inc. went to the Soviet Embassy the afternoon of 23 June and indicated their desire to go to Russia. The clerk advised them that they would have to write a letter giving their ages and other personal data. As a matter of routine he inquired whether or not they were going as tourists and they said no, it was business. He began inquiring as to what their business was and upon that the clerk was shown a copy of the cable whereby our clerk friend became so unscrewed he literally ran out of the room. He returned with the First Secretary who read and re-read the cable and became most gracious. The First Secretary advised them to please send a letter and then their request would be given normal consideration. With this accomplished the lawyers departed for their respective homes. According to plan, William Dickson, who was headed for New York on Thursday, was rerouted at our request to Virginia where he issued the press release to Norfolk, Richmond, and Roanoke newspapers indicating that the Virginia State Bar Association had offered its services to Barbara Powers who had retained its designated lawyers. This new development in the case has reawakened press interest in Virginia and after 24 hours of no comment, Alex Parker agreed to a TV interview the evening of 24 June.

(Signed)

JOHN N. McMAHON
Personnel Officer
DPD-DD/P

(Attached: Copy of Cable to
Khrushchev)

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C
O P Y [CABLEGRAM]

Richmond, Virginia

[23 June 1960]

Nikita S. Khrushchev
Chairman of the Council of Ministers
of the USSR
Moscow, USSR

As the wife and father and mother of Francis Gary Powers and the persons primarily and principally interested in his welfare, we feel that we should have the benefit of the advice and help of legal counsel. The Bar Association of Virginia has offered the services of its members. That organization is a voluntary independent association of advocates in Francis' home state.

This offer has been gratefully accepted and the Bar Association has designated Alex W. Parker, a practicing attorney of Richmond, Virginia, and Frank W. Rogers, a practicing attorney of Roanoke, Virginia, and Professor John N. Hazard of the faculty of law of Columbia University, New York City, as its representatives for that purpose to act in conjunction with Carl E. McAfee, who had previously been selected as counsel by Mr. and Mrs. Oliver Powers and who is a practicing attorney in Wise County, Virginia, where they and their son lived.

We respectfully request that these men be permitted to come to your country to confer with our husband and son and with any Soviet advocate who may be representing him and to cooperate with his Soviet advocate in preliminary conferences and in the trial and in the exercise of any other rights that may be permitted to Francis under the Soviet law. If no Soviet advocate has yet been appointed for him, we would also hope that these men would be allowed to cooperate with Francis and with the appropriate Soviet authorities for the purpose of obtaining such appointment if that should be Francis' desire. The undersigned Oliver Powers has already requested of you that Mr. McAfee be permitted to accompany him to your country to see you and talk with you about Soviet law and the trial, and now that the Bar Association's representatives have also offered their services, we hope for an early

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reply to the present request so that necessary travel arrangements can be made including the securing of visas.

We will be greatly comforted if our requests are granted, since it will permit our beloved husband and son to have his fellow countrymen consult with him and cooperate with his Soviet advocate in the preparation and trial of his case. We should think that such an arrangement would be welcomed by the people of all nations as proof of Soviet fairness and justice. We personally appeal to you because of our love for Francis. The lawyers of his native region, through those above named, authorize us to say that they join in this request because they wish so much to render all legal assistance permitted by Soviet law to one of their countrymen who is to be tried on a serious charge in a foreign country. We shall appreciate your reply addressed to the undersigned at Milledgeville, Georgia.

Barbara Moore Powers

Mr. and Mrs. Oliver W. Powers

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ANNEX 91

~~SECRET~~PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE TO STATIONS AND BASES ON POWERS TRIAL

Issue of 1 August 1960 (Bi-Weekly Guidance)

Paragraph 272

"According to an official announcement of the USSR Supreme Court, U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers will be tried on a charge of espionage in open session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court beginning 17 August. Despite repeated requests by Embassy officials to see him in accordance with a US-USSR agreement, Powers has been held incommunicado since his plane came down on 1 May. It still is unclear whether significant numbers of visas will be granted to free world reporters and other journalists who desire to attend the trial. Recently Moscow has suffered one significant setback in its efforts to exploit the U-2 incident. After the shooting down of the RB-47 reconnaissance plane, the Soviets charged that the aircraft had been caught spying over Soviet territory. They linked the RB-47 flight to the U-2 program, and claimed that it was evidence of the continuation of an aggressive, provocative policy on the part of warmongering circles in the Pentagon. However, Ambassador Lodge's speech in the UN stating categorically that the plane had been shot down over international waters, and demanding either an impartial investigation of the event or a referral of the case to the International Court of Justice cast considerable doubt on the Soviet charges. Lodge's stand was strongly supported by Great Britain. The subsequent Soviet veto of the nine to two approval of Lodge's proposal compounded the effect. During the pre-trial period the Communists have made at least two attempts to capitalize on the Powers case in the free world. The Italian Communist Party has begun to attack the Italian government and US bases in Italy using unsupported allegations that U-2 reconnaissance missions were flown from these bases. In Japan, a forged letter on US Embassy stationery has been uncovered proposing that U-2 aircraft be temporarily removed to Okinawa and later returned to Japan secretly so that overflights could be continued. The letter, supposedly signed by the US Air Attaché, was to be circulated by a national Japanese patriotic group."

Guidance

Our objective is to weaken, discredit and obscure Moscow's efforts to capitalize on the Powers trial. The USSR's efforts

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aim at the following goals: (1) to split the US and its allies, (2) to undermine our ability to use bases in other free world countries, especially neutralist countries, (3) to denounce US aggressiveness and depict the American people as being at the mercy of Pentagon militarists, thereby portraying the US as a threat to peace, (4) to eliminate doubts which have been cast on Soviet military strength and the USSR's ability to defend itself by having Powers testify that he was shot down by a rocket at 60,000 feet or more. In addition to the approaches outlined in Bi-Weekly Guidance #249 of 20 June 1960, "The Trial of Francis Powers", we should take the following additional steps. This action should not be undertaken until after the trial begins, and should be predicated on the tactics the USSR adopts to exploit the case. If the trial is open and adequately reported to the free world, we attack all clear violations of western, humanistic concepts of justice and due process, citing them as proof of the barbaric nature of the Soviet legal system and the subservience of justice in the USSR to cynical manipulation for political advantage. If any part of the trial is held in secret, we denounce this secrecy and assert that it proves that the Soviets are trying to hide those aspects of his testimony which are unfavorable to them. If any noted lawyers, journalists or other public figures whose views are known to be either favorable to the west or honestly impartial are denied permission to cover the trial or attend as observers, we point to this as evidence that the Russians are trying to limit attendance at the trial to their trained and reliable apologists. If we can contrast the denial of a visa to an observer who might favor the west with the names of known Communist sympathizers who have been granted visas, our case will be made even stronger.

Since we have no firm evidence that Powers has been brainwashed, a general charge to this effect should be avoided until we see how the trial proceeds. It is possible that Soviets will be content with exerting psychological pressure to have Powers confirm the actual facts of the flight and the Soviet version of the shutdown. If there are any obvious errors, discrepancies or weaknesses in Powers' testimony (e.g. confessions to having dropped agents, paramilitary supplies or biological warfare material into the USSR; statements that the U-2 program was a military operation; or that the RB-47 program was similar) or if Powers goes beyond his basic area of competence as a technician and supports clearly Soviet political propaganda on the stand (e.g. that he is personally familiar with militaristic plots in the Pentagon)

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we seize upon these as evidence of psychological pressure and use them to cast doubt upon all his other statements which have not been supported by real evidence or previous US government admissions. Through articles, feature stories and interviews with experts in the field, we publicize the techniques of brainwashing, emphasizing past uses of this tactic by the Communists, and stressing the fact that modern methods have become so sophisticated that anyone can be brainwashed, providing his captors have complete control of him for approximately one month. We publicize the fact that no Americans, either officials or members of his family, have been permitted to see Powers since May 1, even though this violates a long-standing agreement between the US and the USSR. We conclude that Powers' isolated detention lends a great deal of weight to free world fears that he has been brainwashed.

If Powers' statements permit we ridicule the various Soviet explanations of why the U-2 was allowed to penetrate as far as Sverdlovsk, and suggest that the only reason they were able to knock down Powers' plane was because it was forced within the range of their conventional defenses by some mechanical difficulty. We also scoff at the idea that the Soviets could view as aggression a reconnaissance flight by such a light aircraft, whose only armament was a .22 caliber pistol. We stress the fact that Powers is a civilian and that the U-2 project was not conducted by the armed forces. We cite the pre-trial propaganda of the Italian CP and the forgery in Japan as further indications that the free world CP's will go to any length of falsehood and deceit to further the ends of their masters in Moscow. Wherever possible we try to distract public attention away from the trial by exploiting any local events, incidents, speeches, etc., which will pre-empt the headlines. To help do this we can revive former cases of Soviet espionage, or stimulate heavy coverage of new cases which may arise. To support any of the above lines, such techniques as interviews with lawyers, military experts, experts on the USSR and persons with a first hand knowledge of Soviet justice should be used, in addition to press conferences and speeches in parliament where possible. Neutralist media should decry Moscow's use of the Powers trial to launch a violent propaganda attack on the west, thereby increasing world tensions and intensifying the Cold War. Such media may soften the approaches listed above, and tailor them to the tastes of their particular audiences. Where possible they should introduce the desired points of view by replaying them from other, non-neutralist media.

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Output aimed at Soviet and other Bloc audiences should stress (a) the huge extent of Soviet espionage, (b) the emptiness of Soviet boasts that their air space is "inviolable" and (c) regret for the reckless exploitation of the trial to worsen international relations, once again isolating the people behind the Iron Curtain and reinforcing Soviet secrecy.

FOR ALL ASSETS "

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ANNEX 92

SUMMARY OF TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL OF FRANCIS GARY POWERS
(Prepared by the CI Staff from "The Trial of the U-2")

13 October 1960

1. The only available complete transcript of the trial of Francis Gary Powers is contained in the publication "The Trial of The U-2", published by Translation World Publishers, Suite 900, 22 West Madison Street, Chicago, 2, Illinois, with introductory comment by Harold J. Berman.

2. In addition to the introductory comment by Harold J. Berman this publication is made up of:

1. Announcement of Criminal Proceedings
2. Indictment
3. Composition of The Court
4. First Day, Morning Session, August 17, 1960
 - Opening of the Trial
 - Preliminary Examination of Defendant
 - Announcement of Witnesses and Experts
 - Announcement of Composition of Court
 - Reading of Indictment
 - Examination of Defendant by Procurator Rudenko
5. First Day, Afternoon Session, August 17, 1960
 - Examination of Defendant by Procurator Rudenko
 - Examination of Defendant by Defense Counsel Grinev
6. Second Day, Morning Session, August 18, 1960
 - Examination of Defendant by Defense Counsel Grinev
 - Re-Examination of Defendant by Procurator Rudenko
 - Examination of Defendant by Presiding Judge Borisoglebsky
 - Examination of Defendant by Member of the Court Zakharov
 - Examination of Defendant by Member of the Court Vorobyev
 - Examination of Witness Asabin
 - Examination of Witness Cheremisin

Examination of Witness Chuzhakin
 Examination of Witness Surin
 Examination of Expert Alekseyev
 Examination of Expert Tyufilin
 Examination of Expert Istomin
 Examination of Expert Andreyev

7. Second Day, Afternoon Session, August 18, 1960
 Examination of Expert Voroshilov
 Examination of Expert Burmistrov-Zuyev
 Examination of Expert Prozorovsky
 Examination of Expert Zhdanov
8. Third Day, Morning Session, August 19, 1960
 Speech for the Prosecution by Roman A. Rudenko,
 Procurator-General of the USSR
 Speech for the Defense by Defense Counsel
 Mikhail L. Grinev
 Last Plea of Defendant Powers
9. Third Day, Afternoon Session, August 19, 1960
 The Verdict

3. Harold J. Berman is footnoted in this publication as "Professor of Law, Harvard University; author of 'Justice in Russia! An Interpretation of Soviet Law' (1950); 'The Russians in Focus' (1953); 'Soviet Military Law and Administration' (with Miroslav Kerner, 1955); and other books, as well as numerous articles including 'Soviet Law Reform--Deadline Moscow 1957', Yale Law Journal, 1957, vol. 66, p. 1161, and 'The Comparison of Soviet and American Law,' Indiana Law Journal, 1959, vol. 34, p. 563."

4. The information disclosed in the published transcript of the trial of Francis Gary Powers is hereinafter listed in more or less chronological order under the following headings:

1. Biographic Information
2. Contract
3. Training
4. Administration of Detachment 10-10
5. Other overflights
6. Preparation for 1 May Flight
7. Events During Flight of 1 May 1960
8. The Plane and Its Equipment
9. Testimony of The Commission of Experts
10. Names Mentioned at the Powers Trial

5. "The Trial of The U-2"

The Exclusive Authorized Account

1. BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

Francis Gary Powers - Citizen of the United States. Born: 1929 at Burdine, Kentucky. Both parents are alive and reside at Pound, Virginia. Father is a shoe repairman and Mother is a housewife. Graduate from Milligan College near Johnson City (Tenn.). Married and no children. Profession is "pilot" at Detachment 10-10, Adana, Turkey. Had five sisters and no brothers. Powers' grandfather lives with his family. All of Powers' sisters are married. The oldest sister married a shoemaker and he also drives a school bus, the second married an electrical fitter. The third married an ex-teacher and who is now a postman. The fourth sister just married two months ago and Powers does not know what her husband does. Father owns a farm. Father inherited his part from his father and bought the other part from the other members of his family. Farm just produces enough for the family.

2. CONTRACT

Flight on May 1st undertaken in accordance with provisions under a secret contract which Powers signed with CIA.

Approached in 1956 - paid \$2,500 a month - part held back and paid upon completion of contract - \$1,000 held back each month - main duties fly along Soviet border and collect any radar or radio information - possibly other duties.

Powers signed contract - believed Mr. Collins signed on behalf of CIA in Powers' presence.

Liability for disclosing details of contract was 10 years imprisonment and \$10,000 fine or both.

Date Powers left the Air Force and date when signed contract were close together.

Nothing in contract about flying along Soviet border - explained to Powers before he signed.

At time signed contract with CIA unaware would have to make flights over USSR territory. Six to seven months after contract was signed learned was to be part of duties.

When signing contract with CIA aware of flights along USSR border.

Did not know character of the intelligence work required at that time. Was told there might be other duties in the future.

While serving in Air Force received approximately \$700 per month.

After signing contract with CIA given a salary of \$2,500 a month. Each month received \$1,500 minus taxes - remaining \$1,000 to be held back to be paid after successful completion of contract.

If violated the contract, in particular, refused to make 1 May flight, did not know whether would receive remaining money.

When contract renewed was aware of character of duties. April 1956 signed original contract - renewed in May 1958 for term of two years, and in January 1960 renewed for one year.

Hesitated as to whether should renew the contract with CIA. Did not want to sign. If had a job would have refused to sign. Profoundly sorry had any part in it.

3. TRAINING

Training began after the end of May 1956 and went to the first part of August 1956.

Powers was in training under the name of Francis Palmer.

During training flew T-6 and T-33 as well as F-80 (practically same thing as T-33 but with only one seat) something like 300 hours. F-84G, American Air Force fighter aircraft - roughly 400-500 hours. F-84F, later model of F-84G - approximately 100-200 hours. U-2 approximately 500 hours. T-33 approximately 200 hours. Also worked as co-pilot on a cargo-type airplane, very little time.

Were taught only how to fly U-2 plane and how to operate the equipment. Other words, were taught how to use the equipment and the pilot's cockpit, but were not acquainted with the nature of this equipment.

Powers gave detailed testimony regarding the methods used to prepare spy pilots for a sudden special espionage assignment, for which purpose they were trained under what was known as the special program of "alert flights."

After training sent to Detachment 10-10, approximately 20 August 1956.

All pilots in Detachment 10-10 received same training.

4. ADMINISTRATION OF DETACHMENT 10-10

Detachment 10-10 commanded by military personnel, but main part of personnel were civilians.

Detachment 10-10 purpose and aims - in general to gather information along the borders of USSR - conduct weather research reconnaissance to determine radioactivity.

Colonel Perry commanded Detachment 10-10 in 1956.

Head of the Detachment was a military man.

The military base at Adana where Detachment 10-10 was located was on Turkish territory and belong to Turkey. The base was peopled by Turkish as well as American personnel. There was a Turkish as well as an American commander.

Base was a classified area and only personnel who worked on it had access to it.

Powers testified that Detachment 10-10 was set up jointly by CIA and U.S. Air Force and represented a combination of these two bodies.

Detachment 10-10 was inspected in April, 1960 by General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force.

Detachment 10-10 was inspected twice by General Everest, Commander of the U.S. Air Force in Europe.

General White visited the base in April and General Everest, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Air Force in Europe, were people from high command who visited Detachment 10-10.

Cardinal Spellman visited Detachment 10-10.

Seven civilian pilots at Detachment 10-10.

5. OTHER OVERFLIGHTS

In the fall of 1956, personnel of espionage Detachment 10-10 were transferred to the Incirlik American-Turkish air base near Adana, Turkey, where the formation of this Detachment was completed and where its direct espionage work was to begin. From there pilots of Detachment 10-10 started making systematic reconnaissance flights along USSR frontiers with Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, and also in the Black Sea area, using special reconnaissance equipment.

Assignments fulfilled in Detachment 10-10 prior to 1 May flight (not exact):

1956 - one or two flights
 1957 - six to eight
 1958 - ten to fifteen
 1959 - ten to fifteen
 Four months of 1960 - about one or two

Flights made along borders of Turkey and the USSR, Iran and the USSR, Afghanistan and the USSR and along the borders of the Black Sea.

Made flights over the southern shore of the Black Sea.

Flew south of the Caspian Sea but not over it.

Powers testified that from 1956 onwards a large number of flights for intelligence purposes were made along the borders of USSR. Stated, "I consider this to be the main work of our detachment. Each year I made several flights along the borders between the Soviet Union and Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. In 1956-57 I made three or four flights over the Black Sea. In 1956 I made one or two flights. There were six or eight such flights in 1957, ten to fifteen in 1958, ten to fifteen in 1959, and for the first four months of 1960 I made one or two flights."

"All these flights were along the southern border of the Soviet Union. Other pilots of the 10-10 Detachment made flights for the same purposes. We would take off from Incirlik airfield and would fly eastward as far as the town of Van, situated on the lake of the same name. After that we would proceed to Teheran, the capital of Iran, and having passed it would fly eastward, south of the Caspian Sea. After that I usually flew to the south of Meshed, crossed the Iranian-Afghan frontier and further along the Afghan-Soviet frontier. . . not far from the eastern frontier of Pakistan a turn was made and we returned to the Incirlik air field taking the same route. Later we began making a turn earlier, after penetrating into Afghan territory for about two hundred miles."

Flights were made along the border of the Soviet Union for reconnaissance purposes in the daytime and also at night. Did not know exactly what additional equipment was in the planes, but besides the usual panels with instruments which, as a rule, were constantly in the aircraft, there were additional switches which I turned on and off during night flights.

Airfield from which flew these flights was airfield of Incirlik, near Adana.

Knew about flight along Soviet border in 1956 day before flight.

1956 - interested in Black Sea area - later interest centered more to the east.

Planes for special flights along the Soviet border were equipped with special reconnaissance equipment.

In case of accident on these border flights could use airfields in Teheran, Meshed in Iran, Peshawar in Pakistan.

Did not keep radio contact with bases during flights with exception of short time after going up and shortly before landing.

Have radio contact with Incirlik but on 1 May with Peshawar.

Distribution of work between pilots of Detachment 10-10 fairly even.

Powers testified that Colonel Perry informed the pilots of Detachment 10-10 they would also make flights over USSR.

At Bodoe once before - August of 1958. Ferried a U-2 plane from Adana to Bodoe. Met by members of Detachment 10-10 in Bodoe. While there two flights made from Bodoe airfield - U-2 planes.

In 1958 ferried a U-2 aircraft from Incirlik to air base in Bodoe. Took off in Turkey and flew over a part of Turkey, then Greece and Italy. Exact route not remembered, might have been Switzerland, France or Austria, Western Germany, and believe Denmark, and Norway.

August 1958 Powers received assignment to transfer a U-2 aircraft from Incirlik base to Bodoe airfield in Norway, very same airfield at which he was to end May 1 flight. New commander of Detachment 10-10, Colonel Barly, who held this post up to 1959, with a large ground staff awaited Powers.

Flew U-2 from base at Incirlik to base at Peshawar in June 1959.

First arrived in Peshawar in 1959 - ferried a U-2 plane there. Met by representatives of Detachment 10-10. Tower operator gave permission to land in Peshawar - local Pakistani operator. Pakistani authorities were informed on the arrival of plane in Peshawar in the summer of 1959.

Detachment 10-10 personnel at the air base in Peshawar were not allowed to leave the base itself.

Has been to air base near Wiesbaden, Western Germany, Wiesbaden base. Ferried a training plane, T33. Was there many times.

In Wiesbaden on vacation.

Ferried airplane from Hibbelstadt to New York. U-2 plane.

Powers flew from Incirlik airfield to American air base in the Wiesbaden area (West Germany) and from that air base piloted a U-2 to the U.S. Air Force air base at Plattsburg, New York State.

6. PREPARATION FOR 1 MAY FLIGHT

Francis Gary Powers - Received assignment to fly over USSR on the morning of 1 May from the commanding officer of his detachment, Colonel Shelton. Detachment located in Adana, Turkey.

Flight of May 1 only flight over Soviet territory.

Not consulted about program of spy flights over Soviet Union.

Two prepared for flight - did not know which one would go.

Could not refuse to go, was an order.

Powers received assignment to fly to USSR in Peshawar, Pakistan.

Powers arrived in Peshawar a few days before the flight, some four or five days.

Arrived in Peshawar in a cargo aircraft with roughly 20 people and Colonel Shelton. Special trip in connection with flight to USSR and assigned to deliver only our people to the airfield.

Plane took off from Adana, Turkey and landed once en route for refueling. This airfield serviced by British personnel - believe it was Bahrein.

U-2 plane brought to Peshawar airfield the night before, April 30, by another pilot.

All preparations were made morning before the flight.

Morning May 1st - awakened approximately three or four hours before flight. Told was to fly today. Two and a half hours before take-off started to breathe oxygen. Soon after that received maps and explanations were made. Few points pointed out on map that might help to navigate - possible rocket-launching site, another was pointed out as something there but did not know, some airfields, did not know how many.

Morning of 1 May 1960 Powers awakened, as many times before, while training on the "alert flight" schedule.

Powers given a special mission for which had been trained for several years. Was to make a reconnaissance flight over the USSR to collect important information on military and industrial installations. Route of flight lay from the Peshawar base in Pakistan, across the territory of Afghanistan and a considerable part of USSR and was to end at Bodoe base in Norway.

Before the flight for about two hours Powers passed through preparations for breathing oxygen for high-altitude flights and received a briefing at that time.

Briefed by Colonel Shelton.

Powers left Peshawar in the U-2 airplane, a special high-altitude aircraft prepared and designed to fly at very high altitudes.

Left Peshawar about 6:30 local time in the morning.

On 1 May flight was told to follow the route, turn switches on and off as indicated, stands to reason it was done for intelligence reasons.

Colonel Shelton particularly interested in rocket-launching sites. Mentioned one place on the map where there was a possible rocket-launching site.

Can only assume maps prepared by navigator of the detachment.

Had little time to study route and map, roughly one hour and fifteen minutes.

Powers was told by Colonel Shelton that flying at such an altitude was absolutely safe and USSR anti-aircraft defense could not hit him.

Told there was no danger of encountering Soviet fighter planes. Did see the trail of a plane, but at lower altitude. Could not tell what kind of plane.

Destination of Powers' flight was to land at Bodoe, Norway.

If had trouble in the air at beginning of flight, return to Peshawar - second half of flight, take shortest route to Bodoe. Case of absolute emergency any airfield outside USSR. Personnel from Detachment 10-10 meet Powers.

Was to contact Bodee base by calling on radio and giving call signal, "Puppy 6-8" and asking for landing instructions. Representatives from Detachment 10-10 there to meet him.

Instructed if necessary to land in USSR territory to destroy the airplane with the help of buttons and levers which were located for that purpose and to escape capture-- head for the nearest border.

Colonel Shelton indicated Sodankyla airfield for Powers' 1 May flight.

1st of May had radio contact with Peshawar.

Powers felt sure that experts who study the film from his cameras know what interested the people who sent him but in his own opinion Soviet rockets interest not only us but the whole world as well. Assumed a flight like this would be to look for them. Repeated, he did not know and was only expressing his own opinion.

Realized intruding USSR airspace. Felt did country a very bad service. Felt that the people who sent him should have thought of the fact that the flight might torpedo the summit conference - provoke military conflict.

Regrets making the flight.

7. EVENTS DURING FLIGHT OF 1 MAY 1960

Powers flew directly from Peshawar airfield to Soviet border and crossed the border approximately 30 minutes after take-off.

Powers was to fly at the maximum altitude, 68,000 feet.

When took off from Peshawar on May 1 flew over a small part of Pakistan, a small part of Afghanistan - not known how much of USSR.

Did not know if permission was given to fly over Afghanistan.

U-2 crossed USSR border at 05:36 a.m. Moscow time.

Flight began approximately at 67,000 feet and as fuel burnt out rose to 68,000 feet.

Powers followed assigned flight route as close as could.

Did not know exact altitude when crossed USSR border - was lower than the altitude at which was shot down by a rocket. About 66,000 feet. Continued to climb as weight of fuel decreased and plane became lighter.

Eventually attained altitude of roughly 68,000 feet. Maybe a few above or a few below.

Flew over the USSR approximately three to three and one half hours. For three and one half hours at approximate speed of 380 miles an hour, would have been 1200 to 1300 miles inside USSR.

Not in radio communication with air bases in Incirlik and Peshawar when flying over USSR. Even if able to communicate would not because of possibility of being detected.

Flew over area of Sverdlovsk at altitude of 68,000 feet.

At altitude of 68,000 feet was struck down by something. Had no idea what it was, did not see it.

Shortly before plane hit Powers had some trouble with automatic pilot - everything else in order.

When plane struck by rocket it was at the maximum altitude, at about 68,000 feet, a few miles south of Sverdlovsk.

Felt a sort of hollow-sounding explosion. It seemed to be behind me. I could see an orange flash or an orange-coloured light behind me.

Powers testified that while flying in Sverdlovsk area at altitude of 68,000 feet, that is, more than 20,000 metres, he saw an orange flash and after that his plane began to lose altitude.

I remember that I was at a height of 30,000 feet and I realized I could not use the ejection seat.

The parachute opened automatically immediately after I left the airplane. By that time I was at an altitude of 14,000 feet.

Did not resist arrest and had no intention of resisting.

During detention treated very nice.

USSR Government gave orders to shoot down plane at 08:53 a.m. Plane shot down with a rocket at an altitude of 20,000 metres in the Sverdlovsk area, that is at a distance of more than 20 kilometres from the place it crossed the Soviet frontier.

Order to destroy U-2 on 1 May was carried out at 08:53 Moscow time. Plane entered the firing range at an altitude of over 20,000 metres - one rocket was fired and its explosion destroyed the target. The hitting of the target observed by instruments, and after a short interval posts of visual observation recorded falling plane fragments and parachuting down of the pilot who bailed out of the crashed plane.

8. THE PLANE AND ITS EQUIPMENT

Reconnaissance flights carried out both day and night. Did not know exactly what additional equipment was in planes for night flights, but besides the usual panels with instruments which, as a rule, were constantly in the aircraft, there were additional switches which Powers turned on and off.

Never told of its performance. Picked up information there were cameras installed, could not tell what size they were.

Never knew what equipment was on the plane. Loaded in secrecy - suppose while plane prepared for flight.

U-2 is an airplane of that type which is for reconnaissance as well as research work at high altitudes.

U-2 belonged to Detachment 10-10.

Had radio compass, a sextant which did not use during flight because take-off time delayed for 30 minutes, maps and an inverted periscope enabling Powers to see the earth.

Used radio compass and beamed into two or three radio stations, could not remember how many exactly. If remember correctly, one of them located near Chelyabinsk and the other near Stalinabad.

Had an instrument something like an inverted periscope which made it possible to spot a plane underneath if it should appear. This instrument used chiefly for navigation.

Knew nothing about the capability of the equipment. Knew it was used to gather information, but what information and how much had no idea.

Powers testified as to having switched on and off the corresponding controls of the special equipment installed in his plane. Altogether there were five such controls.

Not informed of results of missions and did not know whether equipment worked properly except as indicated by signal lights in the cockpit.

Colonel Shelton said such flights over USSR were absolutely safe - only thing could happen was technical failing of the plane.

Powers knew it was a reconnaissance plane - could guess purpose for which turned on and off equipment - much of general equipment did not know what it looked like except what saw there.

17th of May in the Gorki Central Park of Culture and Rest Powers was shown the remains and wreckage of plane and its equipment. Powers stated he believed it was the same "Lockheed U-2" which he flew.

Powers followed route indicated on chart and switched on and off designated equipment over places indicated.

Places marked on the chart A or B or C or numbers 1-2-3 before Powers received it.

Powers named main points of route as marked on chart:
(a) East of the Aral Sea, (b) North-west of Chelyabinsk,
(c) Before and after Kirov, (d) Points near Arkhangelsk, near the Island of Solo, near Kongoma, near Kandalaksha, south and north of Murmansk.

Powers believes the navigator of the detachment who flew with them into Peshawar, Major Dulak, made the route markings on the map.

Identified topographical maps - proven to Powers that he had four. Powers thought he had only two.

Not given specific instructions to operate equipment - turn switches on and off as indicated on the chart.

Powers made three marks on map - (a) airfield not indicated on chart, (b) huge cisterns, for oil storage and (c) big outfit indicating a lot of buildings.

Given a map before flight. Separate places pointed out which considered aids for navigation. Example - One place was told two airfields were there - the airfields not indicated on map - if saw this city with two airfields, which not on map, could have thought had lost course.

Identified chart - Red pencil indicates points on part of the route to which should have kept as close as possible. Blue was less important sections and just show the direction. Sections marked in red pencil of particular interest to CIA.

Map - section of the route from Kandalaksha to Bodoe marked in brown pencil - in case of lack of fuel or oxygen was to cut route short and follow this shortest route, only in case of emergency. Would have crossed territory of Soviet Union, Finland, Sweden, Norway.

Topographical maps were to assist Powers in getting out of USSR territory.

Sections were cut out of two of the maps - no idea who cut these sections out - maps were on cloth - words "restricted" or "confidential" and the words "USA Air Force" were cut out.

All airplanes, based in Turkey, had identification marks. Powers personally did not see identification on U-2 - did not look for any.

Identified log journal - received it from Colonel Shelton - contained overflight data - take-off time, call signals, indicated points on map and etc.

Had an instrument like a granger which was switched on just before crossing Soviet border, and remained on all the time. It was equipment to create artificial static for radar stations. Designed to distort the radar from attacking fighters, or rockets - air-to-air type of rockets.

Experts established that the U-2 fitted with special counter radar equipment designed to jam radar stations for interception and guidance of fighter planes.

Not acquainted with special apparatus on the plane.

In the tail sections of the plane were located equipment to distort radar signals aimed at the plane from radar stations on the ground and fighter aircraft.

At specified points on map turn this equipment on..

Plane was equipped with special means for its destruction.

Examination established that the remote control of the destructor unit was installed in the cockpit. The electrical control panel, among other inscriptions, has one reading "explosion." Pilot was therefore aware of the existence of a special demolition device on his aircraft and of the methods of operating it.

The plane has a special remote-controlled destructor unit manufactured by Beckman and Whitley Inc. (Model 175-10A).

Examination of the tape recorder established that it had a special demolition device designed for its destruction. Expert examination established that a part of the magnetic tape was in perfectly good condition.

Blasting device fitted to the tape recorder designed to record the signals of Soviet radar stations.

Powers testified, ". . . the Colonel also said that just in case anything should happen, he was giving me some packages with Soviet money and gold coins. They were put into my flying suit pockets. He also had a silver dollar coin which he showed me which had a pin installed in it. He said that there was no danger because no USSR aircraft or rocket could get to my altitude but in case something should happen and I was captured, the pin contained poison and if I were tortured and could not stand it I could use the pin to kill myself."

Following items were in Powers' possession and were given to him by Colonel Shelton: (a) Italian, French, German and gold money, (b) Noiseless 10-shot pistol,

(c) 205 cartridges and (d) Poison needle (in case of capture and torture).

Identified an appeal written in 14 languages - did not know appeal was in his possession. Seems that the people who helped Powers to dress put the appeal as well as other things in his pockets.

Certificate issued by NASA which certified that Powers was fit for service as a pilot of NASA planes. Powers testified, "As I personally had nothing to do with NASA, I think this document was issued to me as a cover to conceal the true nature of the intelligence detachment 10-10."

.Powers identification card had both the stamp and emblem of the U.S. Defense Department.

Presented document issued in name of NASA which gave Powers authority to fly a military plane - also to conceal the real purpose of the reconnaissance detachment. Powers had no contact with NASA at all.

Never given a poison needle on flights previous to 1 May. Colonel Shelton showed how to use the needle.

Colonel Shelton gave Powers piece of black cloth. Does not know why. Shelton ordered to give piece of black cloth to representative of Detachment 10-10 who were to meet Powers in Bodoe.

9. TESTIMONY OF COMMISSION OF EXPERTS

Flight documents and documents identifying Powers were put at the disposal of the commission of experts. Commission of experts divided them into three groups:

1. Identification card No. AFI, 288,068, in the name of Francis Gary Powers, bearing the stamp of the U.S. Defense Department.
2. A medical certificate issued to Francis Powers showing that he was serving in the U.S. Air Force.
3. Rules for the use of aircraft belonging to the Air Force by test pilots of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, registered as U.S. Air Force Instruction No. 5526, signed by Chief of the U.S. Air Force Staff, Thomas White, and addressed personally to Francis Powers on January 1, 1959.

4. Two certificates entitling Francis Powers to engage in blind flying, issued by the headquarters of the Bolling Air Force Base, District of Columbia.

All of these documents indicated that Powers belongs to the Air Force of the U.S.

Second group of documents studied by commission of experts consists of flight documents referring specifically to May 1 flight.

Third group consists of flight documents of the universally accepted type that are required by flight personnel on any flight. These include: record of aerial navigation charts, checklist of apparatus on board, list of the aircraft's equipment, directory of European airfields.

Expert commission came to the following conclusions: Powers belongs to the United States Air Force - flight of 1 May 1960 was deliberate and planned in advance - charts with the route plotted and the navigational data were prepared on the ground before the flight - during flight Powers knew his location, regularly controlled the flight by means of given landmarks, carried out his flight along a previously charted route - during flight over USSR entered on map information of an intelligence character and also entered weather conditions.

Commission of experts to establish if there were identification marks on the U-2: Results of investigation revealed there were no identification marks of any kind.

Powers: Would it be possible for identification marks to be put on top of the coating and then removed? I ask this because this plane has been in Incirlik for several months and I saw identification marks on all the planes there. I cannot agree that there have never been any identification marks on this plane.

Expert: In principle, there is this possibility.

Commission of experts given following parts of photographic equipment of U-2 plane for study: a destroyed air camera magazine with four rolls of aerial film 24 cm. wide, separate destroyed elements of the aerial camera, and two rolls of film 7 cm. wide.

The altitude at which aerial photographs were taken was determined by the pictures which account of the actual focal length of the camera; according to this determination, the altitude was 20,000-21,000 metres.

The photographing of the USSR territory was made from an altitude of about 21,000 metres on a sector running from an area North of the Soviet-Afghan state border, up to the Sverdlovsk area.

Commission of experts to examine the radiotechnical apparatus and the magnetic tape recordings found in U-2.

Aviation tape recorders - one partially and the other heavily destroyed.

Six tape recorder reels with ferromagnetic tape. Part of the magnetic tape had burned up, apparently as a result of a deliberate explosion.

Commission of experts given the following for examination: a pistol, 205 cartridges in different packages, a carton with 5 phials and a tin container with lids at both ends.

Powers - Unfortunately, nobody but myself knows that I cannot kill a person even to save my own life.

Commission of experts to carry out a technical examination of the special mechanism, the destructor unit. Examination established: (1) design of the destructor unit, (2) methods of operating the destructor unit (elements of the remote control circuit were not found), (impossible to establish the time lag of the explosion since no timing mechanism was found in the wreckage), (3) explosive contained in the destructor unit and its destructive power and (4) purpose of the destructor unit.

Commission on forensic medicine: Substance contained on the needle inside the pin, judging from the nature of its effect on animals, could according to its toxic doses and physical properties, be included in the curare group, the most powerful and quickest-acting of all known poisons.

Commission of experts to study the maps, films and other materials discovered among remains of the plane: Concluded that flight of 1 May was premeditated, prepared in advance and was conducted with reconnaissance aims. Analysis

of the flight chart showed that the plane flew from Peshawar airfield to Sverdlovsk area along the route set with an average speed of some 750 kilometers an hour.

10. NAMES MENTIONED AT POWERS TRIAL

Mr. Collins - signed contract with Powers on behalf of CIA. (This is a pseudo)

Colonel Shelton - CO Detachment 10-10

General Thomas White - Com. Genl. U.S. Air Force

General Frank Everest - Com. Genl. U.S. Air Force,
European Command

Colonel Perry - CO, Detachment 10-10

Colonel Berly (Beerli) - CO, Detachment 10-10

Major Dulak (DuLac) - Navigator, Detachment 10-10

Cardinal Spellman

(Signed)

John C. Mertz
CI/SI

C05492917

ANNEX 93

C05492917

NBC WHITE PAPER #1

THE U-2 AFFAIR

NARRATOR: Chet Huntley

BROADCAST: Tuesday, November 29, 1960
10:00 - 11:00 P.M. EST

EXECUTIVE PRODUCER: Irving Gitlin
PRODUCER-DIRECTOR: Al Wasserman
WRITTEN BY: Al Wasserman, and
Arthur Barron
ASSOCIATE PRODUCER: Arthur Barron

Black

SOUND EFFECTS - Jet Engine

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

You are listening to the sound of a jet. It is not an ordinary jet.

U-2 Takes off

SOUND EFFECTS UP

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

This is a U-2.

This is the incredible plane that projected our country into a crisis that shook the world.

CU Powers at trial

This is Francis Gary Powers, Pilot of the one U-2 flight that failed.

TRIAL AUDIO:

Powers Confession.

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Washington Scenes

Whatever the fate of Powers, the U-2 was not so much the drama of an individual...as of a nation, this nation, and the manner in which we reacted to a major and unprecedented crisis.

MS
Goldwater

GOLDWATER:

How can you negotiate with murderers?
How can you negotiate with people who
have shot down numbers of our planes?
How can you negotiate with people who
tell lies and who do not fulfill their
solemn obligations? I don't think
you can gain anything by going to
the summit with these type of people.

MS
Bowles

BOWLES:

Major elements in our government have
been caught telling blatant false-
hoods to the world, to ourselves, to
each other, and to Congressional
committees. We have not told the
truth. We have taken grave risks on
the very eve of a great and important
international conference.

MAIN TITLES:

1. NBC WHITE PAPER #1
2. THE U-2 AFFAIR
3. TIMEX BILLBOARD

THEME:

ANNOUNCER:

Timex billboard

FADE OUT:

FADE IN:

STUDIO
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

Almost six months have passed since the day of the U-2 flight and the crisis it created. But a crisis should not be filed and forgotten in a nation's archives simply because it is in the past. Now that the passions and partisanship of an election year have subsided - and because we feel that the consequences of this crisis are still unfolding and the lessons to be learned are still significant - NBC News has decided to retell and re-examine the story of that fateful flight of May first and the events that flowed from it.

Dissolve to:

Exterior Lockheed
Taxiing Shot

Second Taxi Shot,
Man Gesturing

If the story can properly be said to begin anywhere, it is with the superb airplane itself and the men who built it. This is a U-2, filmed by NBC with special permission at the place of its birth, the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in Burbank, California.

Interior Lockheed
Kelly Johnson

HUNTLEY (CONTINUED):

Here is the man who designed it,
Lockheed Vice President, Kelly Johnson.

JOHNSON:

Back in 1953 and 1954, we were studying ways and means of making fighter airplanes like the F 104 go higher and further than they did at that time. As we went further and further into these studies it soon became apparent that it would take an entirely new kind of aircraft to do the job that we wanted done.

JOHNSON (O.S.):

LS Plane
MS Wing

From this came the U-2.
We made a wing that had a very long span - over 80 feet. The wing had to carry the whole weight of the aircraft and still be very, very light. It had to be designed not only to hold a great amount of fuel, but it was designed so the wing tip acted as part of the landing gear.

CU Wingtip

Pogo

On the take off, we invented what we called the pogo landing gears. These stick into sockets in the wing, and rest on the ground and keep the airplane level on take off.

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Pilot Pre Breathing

If the design of the U-2 presented unusual problems, so too did flying it. The pilot of a U-2 must spend an hour-and-a-half before take-off relaxing and breathing pure oxygen in order to prepare himself for high altitude conditions.

CU Pilot

His helmet is airtight and sealed to his body by a cork ring; he can, therefore, neither eat nor drink before...

Exterior Lockheed
Pilot getting into
plane

or during a flight. A long flight may keep the pilot sealed up for more than eight hours.

Closer Shot,
getting into
cockpit

After such a voyage, he will emerge hungry and thirsty from his cramped cockpit, his skin chafed and raw from the tight fitting suit and helmet.

Plane Taxis to
Runway

The plane he flies will range as high as 90,000 feet - 17 miles above the earth -- far above the operating ceiling of any other jet....and during the eight hours it can stay aloft, the U-2 will half fly, half glide for nearly four thousand miles.

Take off

TAKE OFF EFFECT

HUNTLEY (O.S.) cont.

U-2 in Flight

It was evident from the start that the U-2 would be an invaluable airplane. It was--and is--employed by the Air Force and other agencies for high altitude scientific research. More recently, the Air Force has been using the planes to observe missiles in flight and to track missile nose cones on the way down. But, to the civilian Central Intelligence Agency, the U-2s ability to fly higher and farther than any interceptor aircraft made it a...

Dissolve to:

Stills

superb spy. With dark paint and a special reconnaissance equipment, the unmarked plane the Russians came to call the black lady of espionage systematically probed the borders and penetrated deep behind the iron curtain for nearly four years.

Tokyo Crash Sequence

A crash landing at a glider strip near Tokyo in 1959 provided the most dramatic breach in the secrecy surrounding

HUNTLEY (O.S.)
(CONTINUED):

the espionage activities of the U-2. These pictures were made before the area could be cordoned off by U.S. security guards.

General Newspaper
Stills

Over the years other hints of the black ladies' secret missions came to the surface...

"Mysterious Stranger"

first in a British flight magazine...

"Mystery Crash"

then in reports of a mysterious crash that killed Lockheed test pilot Robert Seiker....

Misc. Newspaper

then in other newspapers and aviation magazines...

Soviet Aviation

including Russian ones. In 1958 and 59 the newspaper Soviet Aviation attacked the espionage flights, the men behind them, and the planes they flew.

Black Plane

SILENCE

Dissolve to:

Stock
Powers Trial

This is the pilot of the one U-2 reconnaissance flight that failed... Francis Gary Powers.

TRIAL AUDIO

This is his family.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

8.

POWERS' MOTHER
(Over Trial Footage
and on camera)

POWERS' MOTHER:

Ever since Francis was just a little boy he was interested in airplanes, and made model planes. And - a - always said he wanted to become a pilot. So he - after so long a time, he made a pilot.

Well, I wanted the boy to do what he thought best. B ecause it was his life. And - a - I was kind of scared, though, as I was afraid of planes - the dangers of them. Anything that goes up has to come down. So that's the reason I was kind of afraid for him - afraid he would crash, some-time, and maybe kill himself.

Dissolve to:

Stock
Incirlik Air Base
Turkey

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

trailer camp

In August, 1956, Francis Powers arrived at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, an American installation on a flat, bleak, plain 10 miles from the town of Adana. It is a normal air force base....with one exception. Isolated in a trailer camp at its western end

Trailer Camp

HUNTLEY (O.S.)
(CONTINUED):

CU Trailer

Camp

Transport Takes Off

is the top secret IO-10 reconnaissance detachment, which conducted U-2 overflights. Francis Powers and his wife moved into trailer T 1356, where, in common with seven other civilian pilots and their families they lived in mystery and seclusion for nearly four years, aloof from the rest of the base. On Thursday, April 27, 1960, a transport plane flew Powers and other members of the IO-10 detachment from Incirlik....

Dissolve to:

Animation
Arrow Moves From
Incirlik to Peshawar

Pullback to larger
area to Show Powers'
Intended Flight Route

to the Pakistani Air Base at Peshawar. Then, when conditions were right, Powers would begin a thirty three hundred mile voyage across the Soviet Union, his equipment continuously monitoring its industry and defenses. If all went well, he would touch down at Bodo, Norway eight hours after take-off.

Dissolve to:

Globe Turning,
Day-Night Effect, Zoom
in Surface of Globe
Turning

And so, early on Sunday morning on the first of May, 1960, Francis Powers lifted off from Pakistan. Most of the western world was still in dark-

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (O.S.)
(CONTINUED):

ness and, as he crossed into Soviet territory, dawn was just breaking in Moscow.

Dissolve to:

Stock
Moscow
dawn scenes

In a few hours, the May Day parade was scheduled to begin - an annual display dedicated to the glorification of the Communist regime. Already the city was being prepared for the great event.

As Powers continued his flight, it was still the night of April 30th in the United States of America.

Dissolve to:

Night Scenes
Washington at Night
LS

In Washington, D.C., at midnight, it was time for the daily ritual....

Lights Go Off On
Capitol Dome

....of shutting down the city's landmarks.

Lights Go Off At
Lincoln Memorial

White House

At the White House, guards kept watch over an empty building. The President was away for the week-end at his Gettysburg farmhouse.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (O.S.)
(CONTINUED):

State Department

At the State Department, a few lights were burning late. A summit conference - the first in five years - was scheduled to begin in Paris in two weeks, and there were preparations to make.

Dissolve to:

Night
Exterior Washington
Post

In one section of the city there was considerable activity.

Interior
WashingtonPost
Mailing Room Scenes

The Sunday papers had just come off the presses and were being readied for delivery. Whatever news was to occupy attention that morning was already frozen in type and bound in wire. And of all those who would soon be casually scanning the morning papers, in Washington....

Dissolve to:

Stock

Moscow Newspaper
Delivery Girls Coming
Out Of Building

...and in Moscow - no one was aware that a news story that would shake the world was being born in the wreckage of an American plane, down 1,200 miles inside the Soviet Union.

Muscovites Reading
Papers

THE U-2 AFFAIR

FADE OUT

FADE IN:

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

We'll continue with The U-2 Affair
after this message from Timex.

FADE OUT:

FADE IN:

First Commercial

FADE OUT:

FADE IN:

Studio
MCU, Huntley

The circumstances surrounding the
downing of the U-2' are still largely
a mystery. American intelligence
sources have communicated a version
of what happened to several reporters
....among them, Robert Hotz, editor
of the authoritative Aviation Week
magazine.

Hotz, Plugging in
Tape Recorder

He Turns to Camera

HOTZ:

Our government knew that Powers was
in trouble almost from the moment
that it first occurred. This is
because we have a rather extensive
network of monitoring Soviet communi-
cations, and they also have a similar
network with which they monitor ours.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HOTZ (CONTINUED):

This is an example of what we get from listening to the Russians. This incident took place about two years ago.

He Turns on
Tape Recorder

Sound: Russian Fighter Pilot Conversation

CU Recorder

HOTZ (O.S.)

The Russian fighter pilots are moving in to attack. Here is the official translation of their conversation at this point...

The target is a four engine transport ...roger. 201 - I am attacking the target...the target is burning...there is a hit...the target is banking...it is going toward the fence. Open fire. 218 - are you attacking? Yes, yes. The tail assembly is falling off the target. I will finish him off, boys. I will finish him off on the run. The target is falling...yes. Form up...go home.

HOTZ Turns Off
Tape Recorder

HOTZ:

During Powers' flight across Russia our monitoring system was functioning and gained a great deal of useful

HOTZ (CONTINUED):

information. From conversation of the Russian radar crews it was evident that Powers' flight was expected and it was tracked almost from the moment he crossed the Afghan border. From conversations of fighter pilots and air defense installations it was evident that they set up relays of supersonic fighters in an attempt to shoot him down. As Powers neared Sverdlovsk, he reported a flameout in his jet engine and began to descend to the altitude at which it was possible to start this engine in the air. The last communication with Powers was about 40,000 feet. When Powers came down in the Soviet Union, our government knew the following facts....the fact that the plane had come down in the area of Sverdlovsk....the fact that it had been forced down by a mechanical failure, not shot down by a rocket at 70,000 feet as the Soviets later claimed. What our government did not know was whether the pilot was still alive

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HOTZ (CONTINUED):

and what the condition of the aircraft was when it hit the ground.

Dissolve to:

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Stills of Wrecked
Plane

Powers' plane had crashed in a field near the city of Sverdlovsk, some 900 miles east of Moscow. According to the Russians, the pilot had parachuted down and had been taken into custody by several local citizens. They described how they disarmed him, gave him a drink of water and a cigarette, and drove him to the local Rural Soviet, where he was turned over to security police.

Stock:
Russians Inspecting
Wreck

Powers Captors

Dissolve to:

Stock
Moscow May Day Footage

In Moscow, it was 8:53 A.M. at the time of the crash. The streets outside Red Square were already crowded with spectators waiting for the May Day parade to begin.

Kremlin leaders

As the Russian high command walked out of the Kremlin to take their places at the reviewing stand, they were probably still unaware of what had happened.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

Various shots
Parade and reviewing
stand

HUNTLEY (O.S.)
(CONTINUED):

Among those in Red Square watching the events of that morning was NBC News correspondent, Joe Michaels.

MICHAELS (O.S.)

Exactly at 10 A.M., as always, the May Day ceremony officially began. The first part of the parade was the military section. I watched the mobile units going by to see if there was anything new. There wasn't. Most of the time, I kept my eye on the reviewing stand. From a reporter's point of view this is the most likely place to pick up anything of interest. And at about 10:45 - three-quarters of an hour after the parade began - I did notice something most unusual. An excited Marshal Vershinin, the head of the Soviet Air Force, arrived late. He entered at the rear of the reviewing stand, went up to Khrushchev, and whispered something in his ear. Of course it's only a guess, but I am inclined to believe that this was the moment Khrushchev

MICHAELS (O.S.)
(CONTINUED):

found out that the U-2 was down.

Dissolve to:

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY

If the manner in which Khrushchev learned the news is open to speculation, so is the manner in which our own key officials learned. According to Powers' testimony, his destination was to have been....

Dissolve to:

Stock
Shots of Bodo

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

...the NATO Air Base at Bodo, Norway a small fishing town at the edge of the Arctic Circle. The plane was due at 7 A.M., Washington time on May 1st. When it failed to arrive, this information must have been communicated to....

Dissolve to:

CIA Seal on Fence
CIA Building,
Through Barbed Wire
CIA Building,
Director's Parking
Sign in F.G.

the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency in Washington. In any event, by noon, five hours after the plane was due, it is known that word had already spread among a group of top Washington officials.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (O.S.) cont'd

At C.I.A., under whose direction the overflights were conducted, Director Allen Dulles had been advised.

Pentagon

At the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Gates knew about it.

N.A.S.A. Building

At N.A.S.A. - the National Aeronautics and Space Administration - which operated the scientific weather flight program of the U-2s, Director Keith Glennan and Deputy Director Lawrence Dryden also knew.

State Department
Building

And at the Department of State, Under Secretary Douglas Dillor had been informed. What they did not know was that....

Dissolve to:

Night Shots of May
Day Festivities

...in Moscow, as the May Day festivities continued into the night, Francis Gary Powers, the pilot of the U-2 was alive and already confined in a cell somewhere behind the forbidding walls of Lubyanka prison.

Dissolve to:

LS Night
Washington

That same night of May 1, in Washington, our government began to take action. To tell us about it....

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (O.S.)
(CONTINUED):

Bourgholtzer

NBC News State Dep't Correspondent,
Frank Bourgholtzer.

BOURGHOLTZER:

I've been told by persons whom I believe that there was a meeting not long after the word was received that the U-2 was missing. This was a meeting at a relatively low level of those persons who normally meet to discuss such intelligence problems.

At this meeting a rather routine decision was made to go ahead and put out a cover story; that is to say, a story that would cover for the record the fact that the plane was missing without revealing anything of its true mission.

Dissolve to:

Interior,
General Phillips

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

This is B rigadier General Thomas R. Phillips, U.S. Army Retired, a former specialist in intelligence and military affairs analyst for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

PHILLIPS:

From an intelligence point of view, the original cover story seemed to be particularly inept. One gets the impression, and I believe it's a true one, that it had been in the files for a long time. And when the U-2 came down, it was just yanked out of the files and issued.

A cover story has certain requirements. It must be credible. It must be a story that can be maintained; and it should not have too much detail. Anything that's missing in a cover story can be taken care of by saying the matter is being investigated.

The most striking thing was the failure to consider, in the cover story issued, the possibility that the pilot might be alive and the airplane might be intact.

Dissolve to:

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

As the events of the week of May first were to demonstrate, the story that was issued to "cover" the disappearance of

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (CONTINUED):

the U-2 failed to serve its purpose.

This failure was not immediately

apparent.

The days following May first were quiet

ones, and the cover story first began

to come to the surface on Tuesday,

May third, in Istanbul, Turkey.

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Dissolve to:

Stock
Turkish Riots

On May third, Istanbul was a city under

martial law, the atmosphere heavy with

tension. Turkish students were riot-

ing in protest over the stern police

policies of Premier Menderes and his

ruling party. Although the government

was still in control, it's downfall

was only a few weeks off.

NATO Meeting

At the Municipal Palace in Istanbul,

troops stood guard while, inside, a

meeting of the NATO countries was

taking place. Attending, was Secre-

tary of State Christian Herter and a

number of his top aides in the State

Department. Among those covering the

developments of the day was a Turkish

reporter.

MLS Herter

THE U-2 AFFAIR

Dissolve to:

MLS Goren in
apartmentGOREN:

I'm Zeyyat Goren, United Press International Bureau Manager for Turkey.

It was a Tuesday morning, May the third. I was writing a story on the NATO Council Meeting and the anti-Menderes demonstrations. A stringer

of mine called me. He said he heard a story about an American plane missing -- somewhere in eastern Turkey -- from Incirlik Air Base at Adana.

After I got the tip, I called Incirlik Air Base and talked to the information sergeant, who gave me the details of the story.

MCU Goren

The sergeant said the story is true. The plane is missing since two days. And the last they have heard from the pilot, he has trouble with his oxygen supplies somewhere over Van Lake area - which, he added, is near to the Persian border. Of course, being a native of Turkey, I know Van Lake area is also near to the Russian border, which was the angle of my story - though I didn't know that day that this story will come such a big story.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

Dissolve to:

Ticker

Sound Effects

BILL FOX:

Dissolve to:

UPI New York

I'm Bill Fox, day cable editor for United Press International in New York. I was on duty on May 3rd when we received a dispatch from Istanbul, Turkey about eight o'clock in the morning reporting that a U.S. Air Force plane, a U-2, was reported missing somewhere in the rugged mountains of eastern Turkey in the area of Lake Van, which is near the Soviet border. I have here the original dispatch which we received by radio teletype from London. Of course, at the time I didn't know what a U-2 was, nor did I realize that we had a piece of history by the tail. But, the fact that an American airplane was missing in the general area of the Soviet border, I felt was newsworthy. Consequently, I rewrote the story, adding some information that another American plane had been downed in the same

MCU Fox

THE U-2 AFFAIR

BILL FOX (CONTINUED):

Story Being
Transmitted

Teletype Operator

Dissolve to:
Composing Room
Washington Post

Type Moves to Presses

Presses Rolling

general area about a year previously. I checked it with the foreign editor and sent it to the News Desk. From there it was put on our transcontinental A wire for simultaneous dispatch to all UPI subscribers throughout North America.

The text of our story went like this: A single engine U.S. Air Force plane with one man aboard was missing today near the Soviet border in the rugged mountains of southeastern Turkey. The plane was one of two that took off Sunday morning from Incirlik Air Base near Adana on a weather reconnaissance mission. One plane returned but the pilot of the missing craft reported that his oxygen equipment was out of order. Three C-54 planes from Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya under the command of Major Harry E. Hayes of Clarksville, Texas were combing the area in search of the missing plane, but thus far without success.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (O.S.):

MLS
Presses turning
tilt down to man
reading paper

The cover story appeared in print on the morning of May 4th. At the time, it was so unimportant that only a handful of papers across the country carried it - and only one, the Washington Post and Times Herald ran it on the front page...

CU
U-2 story
on page 1

...a small story that was eliminated in later editions to make room for a baseball headline.

Dissolve to:
Ext. Washington
Over shoulder of man
reading Washington
Post of May 4th.
PAN to street and
newsstand

In Washington, on Wednesday, May 4th, there was not much to be found in the way of news.

Dissolve to:
Ike and Republican
Congressmen

In the morning, the President had breakfast with a number of Republican Congressmen, then chatted with them on the steps of the White House.

Dissolve to:

Stock
Ike signing wheat
agreement

Later in the morning, he signed an important wheat agreement with India, and in the afternoon played a round of golf.

Dissolve to:
Stock
New York Tulip show,
Mayor Wagner cutting
ribbon; Cardinal Spell-
man standing by

In New York, Mayor Wagner presided at the opening of a tulip display. Spring was on its way.

HUNTLEY (O.S.) cont'd

Dissolve to:

Stock
Elysee Palace and
workmen

And in Paris, workmen were busy tidying
up the Elysee Palace for a summit con-
ference that would never be held.

Parisian children
playing

All in all, it was a quiet day, May 4th
- the last such day the world would
know for some time to come

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

We'll continue with the U-2 Affair
after this message from TIMEX and Miss
Julia Mead.

FADE OUT:

FADE IN:

SECOND COMMERCIAL

FADE OUT:

FADE IN:

Stock
LS Moscow

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Moscow, Thursday, May 5th. NBC News
Correspondent Joe Michaels again
reporting.

Dissolve to:

Stock
Meeting of Supreme
Soviet at which K
announces plane shot
down

MICHAELS (O.S.):

On Thursday morning, May 5th, I was
present in the Hall of the great Kremlin
Palace as the Supreme Soviet began its
three-day meeting. First on the agenda

MICHAELS (O.S.) cont'd

was a speech by Premier Khrushchev. At 10 a.m. Khrushchev began his three-and-a-half hour address. Most of it dealt with such matters as tax reform, wages, prices, currency change, and so forth. But towards the end, he suddenly introduced a new theme. To a stunned and startled audience, Khrushchev announced that an American U-2 spy plane had been shot down in the Soviet Union. He did not specify where, and he did not indicate the fate of the pilot. He went on to warn those countries harboring United States bases that they were "playing with fire" and promised a stern protest to the United States and to the United Nations. But he added, "I do not doubt President Eisenhower's sincere desire for peace. Reason must guide us."

STUDIO
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

With Khrushchev's speech, the U-2 affair had become a full-blown crisis. The world was waiting for our government to respond, and respond we did - during a two-day period of chaos.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

Dissolve to:

Bourgholtzer

Scherer

He turns to camera

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

...NBC News State Department Correspondent Frank Bourgholtzer...

...and White House correspondent, Ray Scherer, were following the story as it developed.

SCHERER:

At the time the U-2 incident broke into the headlines, events were moving so rapidly and we were all so close to the story that none of us could really follow its ramifications. Now, with the passage of time, certain things have become clarified.

We know, for example, that following the National Security Council meeting on May 5th, the President called together a small group to discuss how to handle the situation. Two decisions emerged from this meeting; one, to continue with the cover story that had already been planted; and two, that any statement by this government on the situation would come only from the State Department. This latter decision was not implemented. In a recent discussion with Jim Hagerty, Frank Bourgholtzer and I questioned him about that.

SCHERER:

Hagerty interview

Now after you saw us on that Thursday morning and told us that the President had asked for a full investigation, you referred us to NASA and to the State Department for further information.

HAGERTY:

That is right.

SCHERER:

Now I went over from the White House to NASA upon hearing your word they would have a statement. They seemed to know nothing about it. They weren't prepared to make a statement. But they did make one later. Why was the time --

HAGERTY

Ray, I don't know. I can't answer that.

SCHERER:

Were you in on the framing of their statement?

HAGERTY:

No, I was not.

SCHERER:

Just to establish a further point, did the men at NASA, and did the men in the State Department involved in the cover

SCHERER:(Cont'd)

story know it was a cover story, or were they simply agents?

HAGERTY:

That I cannot answer. I do not know.

Dissolve to:

Bourgholtzer

BOURGHOLTZER:

On the morning of May the fifth I was at the State Department. We were waiting with more than normal curiosity for Link White's daily briefing. He came out to see us at twelve forty-five and he read the following statement:

Stock
White Statement
May 5

WHITE:

The Department has been informed by N.A.S.A. that, as announced May three, an unarmed plane - a U-2 weather research plane based at Adana, Turkey, piloted by a civilian, has been missing since May one. During the flight of this plane, the pilot reported difficulty with his oxygen equipment. Mr. Khrushchev has announced that a U.S. plane has been shot down over the U.S.S.R. on that date. It may be that this was the missing plane. It is entirely possible that having a failure

WHITE: (cont'd)

in the oxygen equipment, which could result in the pilot losing consciousness, the plane continued on automatic pilot for a considerable distance and accidentally violated Soviet airspace. The United States is taking this matter up with the Soviet Government, with particular reference to the fate of the pilot.

Bourgholtzer

BOURGHOLTZER:

Thinking back to the answers Link White gave to the many questions we later posed...it is perfectly clear that he had not been informed of any decision to make the State Department the sole spokesman about the U-2. When reporters pressed him for details...he volunteered the information that "infinitely more detail" was being given out at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Scherer

SCHERER:

At 12:15 on May 5th, as soon as the Hagerty News Conference was over, I followed his suggestion, ran from the White House across Lafayette Park to

Scherer

SCHERER: (cont'd)

NASA. I was the first reporter to arrive. I said I have come for the statement. And they said, "What statement?" I said, "The statement that Jim Hagerty said that you were going to put out." Well that seemed to confuse them. They didn't know anything about any such statement. They finally took me into see Walt Bonney, the Information Chief. He didn't know anything about it either. There was a lot of conferring and some more confusion...Other reporters arrived. Well, I finally left and I had the impression that there wouldn't be any statement. But at 1:30 p.m., Bonney did release a statement that attempted to answer the questions reporters had been asking him.

Stock
Bonney

BONNEY:

Now, if the pilot continued to suffer lack of oxygen, the path of the airplane, from the last reported position, would be impossible to determine.

SCHERER: (Partially O.S.)

Scherer

The Bonney statement went considerably beyond that of the State Department. For instance, there were details about the supposed U-2 flight plan, how many U-2s we had, where they were stationed, and so forth. The statement was so detailed that it raised almost as many questions as it answered.

For example, Bonney contended that the U-2 had taken off from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey at 8 a.m. local time. This was considerably later than the time announced in Khrushchev's speech, and reporters were quick to notice the discrepancy.

Dissolve to:

Studio
HuntleyHUNTLEY:

One more incident occurred in Washington on that confusing May 5th which is worth noting. Late in the afternoon, a telegram was received from Ambassador Thompson, in Moscow, advising the State Department of the possibility that Powers might be alive. Despite this warning, on the following day we still seemed curiously unaware of the full potentialities of the situation.

Stock
President and
Roberts at
Exhibit

HUNTLEY (O.S.):

On the morning of Friday, May 6th, President Eisenhower attended a union industrial exhibit. Reporter Charles Roberts, of Newsweek Magazine, was there.

ROBERTS: (Partially O.S.)

On Friday, May 6th, I was standing just two feet from President Eisenhower when he gave his first public reaction to the U-2 incident. At a Union Industry Show in the Washington Armory, talking to George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, he remarked that he was going to give a hydrojet boat to Khrushchev on his trip to Russia. Then, he added the phrase, if I go. Up until then the White House had refused to comment on the U-2 incident or acknowledge in any way that it had disturbed our relations with the Soviet Union. After the show, around noon on Friday, Ike climbed into his helicopter, outside the armory, and flew to Gettysburg where, that afternoon, he played a round of golf. Some of us were surprised that he flew to Gettysburg in time of crisis - but the White House

Dissolve to:

Helicopter
leaves

Roberts
on golf course

THE U-2 AFFAIR

ROBERTS: (continued)

has always insisted that with modern communications the President can run the government from his Gettysburg farmhouse as well as he can from the White House.

Dissolve to:

Stock
Herter's return

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Later that same afternoon, Secretary of State Herter returned from abroad. Despite the crisis, it would still be two days before he and the President were to see one another.

Dissolve to:

Lincoln White
Press Conference

And at the State Department, in his press conference that day, held in a setting similar to this, it was evident that Lincoln White had still not been advised to exercise caution. In response to questioning by reporters, he said, "It is ridiculous to say we are trying to kid the world about this."

HUNTLEY (O.S.) cont.d

Later, he added, "There was absolutely no...N-O...no deliberate attempt to violate Soviet air space and there has never been."

Dissolve to:

Stock
Khrushchev's
May 7 speech

HUNTLEY (O.S.):

Saturday morning, May 7th.....
.....for Nikita Khrushchev, a day of
triumph.

KHRUSHCHEV - Audio

HUNTLEY (O.S.):

Once the applause of the Supreme Soviet quieted down, Khrushchev revealed a secret that he had been keeping almost a week. He displayed photographs, which he said were taken from the captured U-2, and announced that the pilot was alive and had confessed. Then he said, of the Americans, "When they learn that the pilot is alive, they will have to think of something else...and they will."

Khrushchev
waves photos

Headlines

TICKER EFFECT

HUNTLEY:

Khrushchev's announcement had blown our cover story to pieces. Newsweek correspondent, Charles Roberts, continues with his report of developments in Gettysburg that day.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

Charles Roberts

ROBERTS: (PARTIAL O.S.)

Early Saturday morning, May 7th, a number of reporters, including myself, came up to Gettysburg to cover late developments.

Stock
Gettysburg and
Press Conference

White House News Secretary James Hagerty had promised us a story that morning, and we thought it would relate in some way to the U-2. At nine thirty-six, while the President was out playing golf, we sat down with Hagerty at a make-shift press room at the Gettysburg hotel. To our astonishment, the story he promised concerned nuclear testing.

He announced that the United States was prepared to resume nuclear testing as soon as possible - as he put it. The tests were to be for the purpose of improving means of detecting underground blasts - a step towards policing a nuclear test ban. But we were still surprised that the government would put out an announcement, while it was under fire for aerial spying, that might be interpreted as a new cold war maneuver. Hagerty still refused to discuss the U-2 incident. He said he had informed the President of Khrushchev's latest

THE U-2 AFFAIR

Roberts

speech, but that he would have no comment. Any reaction, he said, would have to come from the State Department. Meantime, Ike had been on the golf course since 9:05. He finished his round at 11:28 - score unreported. Then, he returned to the farmhouse, where he spent the remainder of the day. During that day, at the State Department in Washington, a crucial meeting was held to work out an answer to Khrushchev's latest speech. The President did not attend that meeting, but Hagerty informed us that Ike was in contact with Secretary of State Herter by phone during the day. Late in the afternoon, a statement was read to the President by phone - and he approved it without change. At six p.m. Lincoln White of the State Department read that statement to newsmen.

Stock
White Statement

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Only the previous day, Lincoln White had said, "There was absolutely no deliberate attempt to violate Soviet air space and there never has been." Now he was stating something different.

WHITE:

As a result of the inquiry ordered by

WHITE (CONT'D)

the President it has been established that insofar as the authorities in Washington are concerned, there was no authorization for any such flight as described by Mr. Khrushchev. Nevertheless it appears that in endeavoring to obtain information now concealed behind the iron curtain a flight over Soviet territory was probably undertaken by an unarmed civilian U-2 plane.

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

This one statement, agreed upon at a hastily convened meeting, represented a historic decision - our government was, in effect, admitting that we had previously lied, and that we had committed espionage - admissions no nation had ever made before.

Headlines

TICKER

Man on street
interviews

Q:

How will this incident affect the United States, do you think?

YOUTH

I feel that it will give the Americans a 'black eye' all over Europe.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

MAN 1:

My feeling is that the country did the right thing in sending these planes over - or this plane over. Because we have to keep abreast of the Russians, as far as the information is concerned.

MAN 2:

I think that if we fly over Russian territory, we take the chance of being shot down because of engaging in espionage - the same as we would do to them if they flew over our territory.

MAN 3:

I think that we ought to sink one of those submarines that have been spying off Cape Canaveral.

WOMAN:

Well, I don't think we should admit it. Yes. Yes. Never mind what the pilot said. We have a right to protect ourselves.

MAN 4:

Thinking it over, I think the State Department has really erred in the whole thing. They got a mix-up there. They don't seem to be coordinated. The one doesn't know what the other is doing.

Q:

What do you think about it?

WOMAN 2:

Well, I can only say what we were told in Church yesterday. We should pray for that boy. He needs it.

Stock
Eisenhower
Press Conference

HUNTLEY (O.S.):

On Wednesday, May 11th, President Eisenhower answered the one major question that remained: who had authorized the flights?

MCU Eisenhower

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER:

Our deterrent must never be placed in

jeopardy. The safety of the whole free world demands this. As the Secretary of State pointed out in his recent statement, ever since the beginning of my Administration I have issued directives to gather, in every feasible way, the information required to protect the United States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable them to make effective preparations for defense.

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

The President himself had assumed responsibility for authorizing the program of intelligence flights. We have learned that C.I.A. Director, Allen Dulles, had offered to serve as the traditional scapegoat and to resign. However, this is not the course the President chose. This avowal of responsibility by a head of state for intelligence activities was unprecedented in the history of international relations. It is a decision that has been the subject of considerable debate. Here are the views of the Chairman of the Senate Committee that investigated the U-2 Affair - Senator William Fulbright - and of the President's Press Secretary, James Hagerty.

Fulbright

Hagerty

HAGERTY (cont'd)

There is a great deal of puzzlement in my own mind of people that say why did the President or the government of the United States take responsibility. Well now this is something new that has been added to my world. If you gentlemen are spies, and I am not, and you get caught, I can say I never heard of you, or saw you before. But if you strap a U-2 to your back, it is a little difficult, to say the least, not to admit and assume responsibility.

Fulbright

FULBRIGHT

The President need never have avowed or disavowed is the point I make. He should have taken the position of silence in this matter and let the uh if anyone had to take responsibility, it should have been the head of the intelligence.

MCU Fulbright

Uh it should have to depend on circumstances as to who avowed or disavowed anything but it shouldn't have been the President who as I say embodies the whole sovereignty and dignity of the whole American people. I think personally this was perhaps the most serious fault in this whole operation, this whole incident.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

Coupled with the President's assuming responsibility for the U-2 flights, was our attempt to justify our right to engage in them.

Hagerty

HAGERTY:

As the President himself at a press conference and in speeches said, when a closed society makes threats against our very welfare, it is up to us to find out everything we can about such a closed society, whether they are preparing for war, whether they are building up, and also the determination of the members of the government that there will never be another Pearl Harbor if they have anything to do about it.

Fulbright

Fulbright:

I think one of the most serious things to uh growing out of this, was our endeavor, on the part of our people, to justify uh this-these flights. Uh, to say you need something such as intelligence in international relations certainly is no justification for it. But in the position the President took he was in fact asserting the right to

THE U-2 AFFAIR

do this and not the need. They could understand the need. They understand that espionage goes on within certain areas all the time. But they never take full responsibility for it. The head of state does not. I think that it's responsible to believe that this avowal put Mr. Khrushchev in the position where he could not proceed to treat with the man who at the same time is asserting the right to violate the sovereignty of his country, in this case, the U.S.S.R.

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

Following our avowal of the U-2 flights, one more significant question was raised during the week preceding the summit conference - the question of whether the flights would be continued. As the week began this became a source of apparently deliberate confusion.

Scherer

SCHERER:

On Monday morning May 9th, The New York Times carried a story saying, "It was learned that the President had ordered cessation of all flights over or near the borders of the U.S.S.R." Well, later that morning, at Jim Hagerty's

THE U-2 AFFAIR

SCH ERER (CONT'D)

News Conference, we asked him whether the flights had been cancelled. He said that the President had not cancelled the flights. When asked whether they had been cancelled by any order other than the President, Jim answered, "I know of no such orders." Well the impression we were left with was that despite the events of the last few days, the U-2 flights were still going on. This impression was reinforced by a statement of Secretary of State Herter, which was released by Lincoln White the same afternoon.

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY:

Although the administration had denied that it intended to imply that the flights would continue, this was the inference that was drawn by most observers. All these events led to an atmosphere of increasing tension as the summit conference approached.

EXHIBIT of U-2
wreckage, CU's
of equipment,
pistol, money
Power's boot

HUNTLEY: (O.S.)

In the Soviet Union, Khrushchev toured an exhibit that opened in Gorki Park. Here in a hall customarily devoted to the pasttime of chess, the Russians had put on display remnants of the plane,

HUNTLEY (O.S.) cont'd

its equipment, and the pilot's personal effects.

Stock
Khrushchev
Press Conference

Later, in an impromptu press conference, Khrushchev reacted violently to what he termed our threat to continue the flights. He cancelled his invitation to President Eisenhower for a visit to the Soviet Union that had been planned for the following month.

Stock
Senate Briefing

And in Washington, as Administration leaders explained their decision to Congress, the beginning of a major controversy, involving both this country and its allies, was already apparent.

Bowles

CHESTER BOWLES:

We have certainly lost ground. Major elements in our government have been caught telling blatant falsehoods to the world, to ourselves, to each other, and to Congressional committees. We have not told the truth. We have taken grave risks on the very eve of a great and important international conference. And we put the President in a position of not knowing who keeps score.

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Goldwater

BARRY GOLDWATER:

We have nothing to gain by going to the summit. We have nothing to negotiate at the summit. And about all we can do is to add dignity to this last beastly act of the Soviets. And I hope the President decides not to go. How can you negotiate with murderers? How can you negotiate with people who have shot down numbers of our planes. How do you negotiate with people who tell lies and who do not fulfill their solemn obligations? I don't think you can gain anything by going to the summit with these type of people. I think we ought to realize, in this country, that we're in a cold war and we better be in this war to win it - and start acting like it.

Lester Pearson

HUNTLEY (C.S.)

The former Foreign Minister of Canada:

PEARSON:

It was pretty stupid, on the part of the United States, if I may say so, for getting its elf in a position, before the summit conference, that the Soviets could exploit an incident of this kind.

PEARSON: (cont'd)

In other words, I don't think they've handled the matter very well...As long as the cold war goes on, governments are going to collect intelligence, legally or illegally, and the Russians are at the forefront of that parade. But if you do this kind of thing - collect intelligence - you should do it intelligently.

HUNTLEY (O.S.):

Ike leaving for summit - helicopter lands, he gets out, walks to plane, takes off

On Saturday, May 14th, President Eisenhower left the White House by helicopter to board the plane that would take him to Paris. The trip that was to have been the capstone of his career was already foredoomed to a failure that he, least of all, would have wanted. As James Reston had written in The New York Times, "The tragedy of President Eisenhower in the spy-plane case is that he and his colleagues have created almost all the things he feared the most. He wanted to reduce international tensions and he has increased it. He wanted to strengthen the alliance and he has weakened it. He glorified teamwork and morality, and got lies and administrative chaos. Everything he was noted

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (CONT'D)

for - caution, patience, leadership, military skill, and even good luck - suddenly eluded him precisely at the moment he needed them the most.

Ike at Orly
Airport

What happened after the President's arrival has become part of the folklore of history. The conference that was^{to be} held

Elysee Palace

at the Elysee Palace was never formally convened. After bitterly attacking the President of the United States, Premier Khrushchev stalked out of the first preliminary meeting. And before returning to Moscow...

Khrushchev
leaving Elysee PalaceKhrushchev at press
conference of May 18th,
pounding table
and shouting

...he began what has since become an all too familiar pattern of public performances.

KHRUSHCHEV AUDIO:

HUNTLEY (O.S.)

Stock
Russian Demonstrations

The Russians now exploited to the fullest the propaganda advantage we had given them with the U-2. Whether the incident was chiefly responsible for the summit failure is still being debated: but it did provide ammunition for the Russians as they intensified cold war pressures throughout the world. Fear of Russian rockets in the months following the

British anti-
bases demonstrations

THE U-2 AFFAIR

HUNTLEY (CONT'D)

summit made American bases the object of an increasing number of protest demonstrations.

Japanese demonstrations

SOUND EFFECTS

The United States found itself embarrassingly on the defensive - and in the riots against the Japanese-American Security Treaty, even high United States officials were caught in the storm.

SOUND EFFECT

Hagerty Interview

SCHERER:

Jim, by way of taking a longer look at this whole U-2 incident, now that the dust has settled somewhat, how do you think the United States came out of it?

HAGERTY:

Well, I think they came out very well. I think that basically the argument of an open society versus a closed society has been very well brought to the fore, has been brought to the attention of the peoples of the world. I think that is an overseas reaction. I think domestically the reaction of the American people quite frankly was "It was too bad we got caught, but we are glad we were doing it." That is the way I would sum it up.

THE U-2 AFFAIR

BOURGHOLTZER:

Do you, looking back, think that if you had it to do over again, you might have done anything in some different fashion?

HAGERTY:

No, with the exception that I think everybody admits, of the failure of the cover story. But outside of that, no.

SCHERER:

As you look back on this U-2 incident, who was in charge of our side of the thing as it developed - issuing of statements, coordination of policy, the whole aspect?

HAGERTY:

Well, I just can't answer that, Ray, I am sorry.

SCHERER:

Having had this experience, and now speaking with the benefit of hindsight, what lessons emerged from this for the future?

HAGERTY:

Don't get caught.

HUNTLEY:

At the hearings held by the Fulbright Committee, the Secretary of State, Mr. Herter, was also asked what lessons could

Studio
Huntley

HUNTLEY: (cont'd)

be learned from the U-2 affair. His answer was "Not to have accidents." We leave it to the American public to decide whether "Don't get caught" and "Not to have accidents" are the only lessons to be learned from U-2.

What you have seen in the past hour is an attempt at a historical evaluation of a most controversial subject, including opposing viewpoints on the matter. Over thirty responsible reporters who covered this story as it unfolded contributed to this effort. There are certain conclusions that may reasonably be drawn from the facts examined in this report.

1. The cover story was inadequate to its mission. It was hastily released, excessive in detail and failed to take account of the possibility that Powers might be alive.
2. As the U-2 crisis developed, there was a serious lack of coordination among the governmental agencies involved, which resulted in conflicting and damaging statements to the world.

HUNTLEY: (cont'd)

3. By avowing the intelligence flights, an act unprecedented in the history of nations, our government suffered the consequences of having been caught in public misstatements.

4. Nobody expects the United States, or any other nation to stop intelligence activities, but by justifying the U-2 flights and implying they would continue, we materially affected the Summit Conference. If Khrushchev intended to wreck the conference beforehand, we gave him a ready made excuse. If he intended to negotiate, we made it difficult for him to do so.

5. Throughout the whole U-2 affair, we suffered from the fact that there was apparently no one official or agency to direct our total response to this crisis.

This is not a matter for the history books, but vitally affects our ability to survive as a nation. There will be other crises that the new administration, and succeeding administrations, will have to face. In the world as it is today, we cannot afford another U-2 affair. Good night.

Fade out

C05492917

ANNEX 94

From Rudolf I. Abel
#80016

June 12, 1960

To Mr. James B. Donovan, 160 William St., New York

Dear Jim,

I received your letter of June 6th. In the past week I also received a letter from Mr. Powers, the father of the U-2 pilot. He writes as follows:

Address: Pound Va.
June 2, 1960

"Dear Colonel Abel,

I am the father of Francis Gary Powers who is connected with the U-2 plane incident of several weeks ago. I am quite sure that you are familiar with this international incident and also the fact that my son is being currently held by the Soviet Union on an espionage charge. You can readily understand the concern that a father would have for his son and for a strong desire to have my son released and brought home. My present feeling is that I would be more than happy to approach the State Department and the President of the United States for exchange for the release of my son. By this I mean that I would urge and do everything possible to have my Government release you and return you to your country if the powers in your country would release my son and let him return to me. If you are inclined to go along with this arrangement I would appreciate your so advising me and also so advising the powers in your country along these lines.

I would appreciate hearing from you in this regard as soon as possible.

Very truly yours,

Signed: Oliver Powers"

I replied to him as follows:

"Dear Mr. Powers,

Your letter of June 2nd received June 10th.

Much as I appreciate and understand your concern for the safety and return of your son, I regret to say

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM

that, all things considered, I am not the person to whom your request should have been directed. Obviously, this should be my wife. Unfortunately, by order of the Department of Justice, U.S., I am not permitted to write to my family and so cannot convey your request to them directly.

Sincerely yours,

Signed: R. I. Abel"

However, I do think that my family should be informed of this step of Mr. Powers and that copies of his letter and my reply should be sent to my wife's lawyer in East Berlin. I would like you to send a copy of the letter from the Dept. of Justice dated May 25th that you enclosed in your letter of June 6th also to this lawyer.

Regarding this latter letter, it does little more than reiterate the previous letter on this matter. The "little more" is the allusion to Powers and the matter of the fine. This has been taken care of, while the Powers affair is not in my competency and complaints about his treatment should be addressed elsewhere.

Since the Dept. of Justice regard their position as one of prison administration, the proper place to initiate court action is not with Judge Byers but with the Federal District Court here in Atlanta where the penitentiary is located. I would like you to take the necessary steps in this direction on your return from Europe.

Incidentally, there might be some benefit if you could meet my wife's lawyer when you visit Switzerland. I imagine that he would have no difficulty in doing so, and you could give him a much clearer picture of what is going on than any exchange of letters can do.

Hoping you have a good trip

Sincerely yours,

Rudolf I. Abel
#80016

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM

C05492917

ANNEX 95

~~SECRET~~Attachment to
IDEA-0189
23 February 1961Release Procedures -- Francis Gary Powers1. Situation

A. Mr. Francis Gary Powers has been sentenced to 10 years in a Soviet prison and is now serving that sentence. It is possible, however, that it might better serve Russian propaganda purposes to release Mr. Powers prior to the termination of his prison sentence. The press has speculated to this effect, and Mr. Powers has mentioned the possibility of an early release in a letter to his father. Two additional factors that have given rise to speculation about Mr. Powers' release are the return of the RB-47 crew members and the expressed Russian friendship for the new Administration. Although the United States does not have any formal or informal information indicating an early release, it appears appropriate to consider the procedures to be followed in the event Mr. Powers returns to the United States in the near future.

B. Any planning for this contingency, of course, is hampered by lack of knowledge relative to Mr. Powers' attitude and desires and the timing and circumstances surrounding Mr. Powers' release. It might be noted, in relation to Mr. Powers' attitude toward the United States Government, that he has been under Soviet control since 1 May 1960 and has mentioned in his letters that he is constantly in the company of his cellmate, whom he has not mentioned by name, apparently speaks good English and is helping Mr. Powers in his study of Russian. The cellmate could possibly be a government "plant" engaged in subtle psychological preparation for the time of release.

C. In order to formulate a plan of action, nevertheless, some basic assumptions must be made. For purposes of the below-mentioned plan, it is assumed that Mr. Powers will cooperate with the United States authorities to the extent necessary to carry out procedures outlined below. It is further assumed that Mr. Powers will be turned over to United States authorities at the United States Embassy at Moscow or possibly transported by Soviet aircraft to Berlin, where he would be turned over to United States authorities.

~~SECRET~~Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~SECRET~~

2. Press Release Policy:

A. Generally, every effort will be made to minimize press releases by United States Government authorities and Mr. Powers himself. The spokesman for the United States Government will be the Department of State with releases by the President's press secretary as deemed appropriate by the President.

B. Mr. Powers will be encouraged to make a brief statement upon his arrival in Europe, stating substantially as follows: "I am glad to be on my way back to the United States and anxious to see my wife and family. I have no particular plans for the immediate future except to visit with my family and consult with certain United States authorities. I do not desire to make any public statements in relation to the incident or my trial until I have thoroughly discussed the matter with these authorities." The Department of State will announce Mr. Powers' release in a short statement relating to the mechanics of his turnover. Such a statement might be: "Mr. Francis Gary Powers, imprisoned American flyer, was released from his Soviet prison today and turned over to the United States Embassy in Moscow. Mr. Powers will be flown back to the United States as soon as transportation is available. In the interest of Soviet-U. S. relations, for the present no press conferences will be held or further comments made by the U. S. Government relative to the U-2 incident or Mr. Powers' trial."

C. Mr. Powers will be thoroughly briefed at the United States Embassy in Moscow or Consulate in Berlin prior to meeting any members of the press. Some of the points to be covered in the briefing, the substance of which will be pouched or cabled to Moscow or Berlin as time permits, will be:

(1) The reaction of the press and the American public to Mr. Powers' return to the United States cannot be predicted and, therefore, Mr. Powers should be prepared for the worst.

(2) Despite any derogatory comments or demonstrations heard or observed by Mr. Powers on his trip home, Mr. Powers should know that these statements do not reflect the attitude of the U. S. Government.

~~SECRET~~

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~SECRET~~

(3) It is the recommendation of United States Government authorities that Mr. Powers make as few public statements as possible and limit these statements to brief descriptions of his state of health and treatment while in Russia. He should express his desire to proceed to the United States as soon as possible and rejoin his wife and family and at all costs avoid any statements and comments about the incident of the trial.

(4) Mr. Powers should continually bear in mind that the first statements he makes will be long remembered and widely quoted. These statements will also be misquoted and, perhaps in many cases, misinterpreted. Mr. Powers should follow the rule that the less said the better.

(5) Mr. Powers should also be aware that members of his family will also be subjected to pressures from the press and, therefore, he should refrain from discussing politically sensitive matters with them.

(6) Mr. Powers should be advised that the public, and therefore the press, is keenly interested in certain questions, the answers to which have deep political consequences and should not be answered by Mr. Powers in the interest of National Security and his own interest as well. The most sensitive of these questions are:

(a) Were you actually shot down at 68,000 feet or did you descend to a lower altitude before the incident occurred?

(b) What type of interrogation methods did the Russians use?

(c) What were your instructions in the event of capture?

(d) What are your feelings about your testimony at the trial now that you have returned to the United States?

(7) Mr. Powers should be advised of travel plans and cautioned not to enter into discussions with anyone other than his Department of State escort for the first leg of his trip back to the U.S.

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(8) Mr. Powers should be reminded that his revelation of CIA affiliation was designed to identify the activity as a non-military undertaking. The protection of the extent to which the military was involved in the program is still extremely important and, therefore, Mr. Powers should avoid any discussion of military personalities or support to the program.

3. Transportation

A. If Mr. Powers is released to U. S. authorities at the U. S. Embassy in a city behind the iron curtain (Moscow appears to be the most likely city), he will be flown via commercial airliner to a European city, escorted by a Department of State consular officer. The Agency will bear the cost of this travel for both Mr. Powers and the consular officer. In the event Mr. Powers is turned over at a city in the Western world, the subsequent portions of this plan will apply, substituting the point of release for the "European city" mentioned above.

B. Transportation from the European city to the United States should be by the most expeditious and secure method. The use of a scheduled commercial airliner is not considered the optimum, since the press would have the maximum opportunity for exposure to Mr. Powers on the airliner and at the various stop-overs. More control over the press and Mr. Powers could be experienced by the U. S. Government if Mr. Powers could be flown back from the European city to Washington via a USAF Special Air Missions flight. This flight will be arranged by DPD-DD/P.

C. In the event that the Department of State or the USAF is queried about the use of a USAF aircraft for this purpose, these authorities will indicate that the airlift was requested by another (unspecified) department of the United States Government, and the request was granted by the USAF.

D. The crew of the USAF aircraft should file appropriate flight clearances, indicating the ultimate destination of the aircraft as Andrews AFB. This fact should not be given out by the crew. For diversionary purposes, the aircraft will make an unscheduled landing at Dover AFB, Delaware, where onward transportation will be available. DPD will provide a security escort, who is known to Mr. Powers as a personal friend as well as a security agent, for the USAF leg of the

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return trip to the ZI. Mr. John Gittinger, a consultant to the Agency on psychological matters, will also accompany the flight. Both Mr. White, the security escort, and Mr. Gittinger will interview Mr. Powers to determine his attitudes and desires.

E. Special arrangements for expeditious transfer of Mr. Powers from one aircraft to another, minimum press contact at layover points, and customs and immigration clearances must be made at each stop by the Agency station involved with cooperation from Department of State personnel and local officials. The Agency station will work in the background and utilize Department of State and other appropriate overt officials to make physical contact with Mr. Powers at stopover points. USAF representatives and officials will likewise remain in the background and not greet or be seen with Mr. Powers except for that minimum amount of contact necessary for boarding the aircraft.

4. Living Quarters in the ZI

A. Upon arrival in the ZI, Mr. Powers will be taken to a "safehouse" location where he will meet with his family in privacy. The most desirable location would be a rest house type facility on a military installation. Possibly a private estate that can be adequately secured by a commercial security service would serve the purpose. Arrangements for the procurement of an appropriate location will be made by IOS/OS/DDS

B. For an initial period (one week), Mr. Powers will visit with his family at the safehouse location. The family, other than his wife, who will stay with him during his entire stay at the safehouse, will be transported to and from the safehouse by Government transportation.

C. Every attempt will be made to discourage his family from attempting to meet Mr. Powers in Europe or any time prior to his arrival at the safehouse location. Contact with Mr. Powers' father will be maintained through the Department of State, while contact with his wife can be maintained directly by the Agency.

D. After Mr. Powers has visited with his family for a few days, he will be encouraged to indicate to his father and other relations that he would like to be alone with his wife for a few weeks, during

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which period he plans to talk to certain U. S. Government authorities. The debriefings that take place at that time will be conducted by CI Staff/DDP and SRS/OS/DDS. Representatives of SR Division, DD/P, and DPD-DD/P will participate in debriefings pertaining to their particular areas of interest.

E. All queries by the press, in relation to Mr. Powers' whereabouts will be answered by the Department of State in a statement to the effect that "Mr. Powers is back in the U. S. visiting with his family and talking with various U. S. authorities."

5. Administration

A. Casualty Branch, Office of Personnel/DDS will handle the necessary administrative details of Powers' personal effects with him during the abovementioned debriefing period.

B. Powers' ultimate disposition will be determined by an Agency board of inquiry after debriefing reports have been prepared, disseminated, and evaluated by interested and responsible Agency senior officials.

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ANNEX 96

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ER 61-8690

2 November 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Dean Rusk
The Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

SUBJECT: Powers - Abel Exchange

1. Francis Gary Powers, who is under sentence in the Soviet Union for violation of Soviet espionage laws, is under contract to the Central Intelligence Agency. He was apprehended by Soviet forces while on a prescribed mission for this Agency. After a thorough investigation based on the information available to us, we have concluded that Mr. Powers had carried out his duties as directed and, even though captured, has continued to conduct himself in a responsible manner. As far as we can determine, he has generally followed his instructions while a captive and has not communicated significantly damaging prohibited intelligence information to his Soviet captors. Therefore, this Agency is responsible to seek Francis Gary Powers' return to this country by all available means, as soon as possible.

2. While the Soviets may feel that they have fully exploited the propaganda to be gained from Powers' capture and trial, there is reason to believe that he has not disclosed to them information relating to the national interest which could be further exploited. Included is information concerning third-country overflights of a nature which could still be embarrassing to this Government.

3. From an intelligence and air operational standpoint, this Agency is most interested in interrogating Mr. Powers to learn the precise events which transpired on the first of May 1960 which resulted in his capture. He can furnish this Agency with technical information concerning his flight, behavior of the aircraft which resulted in the failure of his mission and his capture. We also desire information on his treatment and interrogation in the Soviet Union during the entire period he has been under the control of the Soviet Union.

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4. Since Mr. Powers' capture on 1 May 1960, this Agency has continuously worked toward the release by legal means of Francis Gary Powers. In this connection, we have worked with the Department of State and provided various types of support, including the preparation of legal briefs and working closely with civilian lawyers who worked diligently and long toward his release. This Agency has maintained Mr. Powers in a pay status and has made various provisions for the welfare of his wife. In regard to his wife, we should point out to you that she has recently been committed to a Georgia State mental hospital after being declared legally insane. Her commitment has raised serious problems of maintaining her husband's morale while a captive so that we are concerned that the information concerning his wife will not cause his Soviet captors to make new efforts to obtain more information from him. Since Mr. Powers has now been in Soviet hands almost eighteen months, we cannot be sure what his attitude would be to an exchange and his return to the United States, but his latest letters to his wife, which we have seen, indicate hope for his release and concern that the United States Government is not taking action which he believes would achieve his freedom.

5. In connection with efforts toward the release of Francis Gary Powers, the idea of an exchange of Powers for Colonel Abel has been again considered as a serious possibility since the wife of Colonel Rudolf Abel has raised the subject in a series of letters which she has written to President Kennedy and her husband's lawyer, James Donovan, in New York. The most recent letter from Mrs. Abel, which states that for the second time she has been to the Russian Embassy in Berlin, contains a key paragraph which reads as follows:

"I gathered from our Mrs. Abel/Russian Embassy talk that there is only one possible way to achieve success, that is simultaneous release of both Francis Powers and my husband, which can be arranged."

If, as we suspect, Mrs. Abel's letters are being written or guided by Soviet officials, this letter appears to open the door for direct negotiations on an exchange. It is the desire of this Agency that this avenue of communication and negotiation with the Soviet Union be continued and the release of Francis Gary Powers from the Soviet Union should be pressed for by this Government through negotiation.

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6. We realize that the release of Powers at this time through these particular negotiations must be weighed against the release of Colonel Abel. While Abel has maintained complete silence on his role within the Soviet intelligence apparatus, it is a fact that Colonel Abel was, and probably continues to be, an important cog in that apparatus. His release at this time, when he has served only a portion of his sentence, would be of value to Soviet intelligence.* On balance, however, we believe the national interest would best be served by the return of Powers even at the cost of Abel's release.

(Signed)
C. P. CABELL
General, USAF
Acting Director

* The following sentence appeared in the original OGC version of this memorandum, but was deleted at the instruction of General Cabell:

"It is painfully clear, however, that this Government is unable to determine what his exact role has been, and it is a fair conclusion that Abel's role will not be made known to this Government by him."

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ANNEX 97

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 24, 1961

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

As you may know, for the past several months there has been taking place a monitored exchange of correspondence between James Donovan, court appointed attorney for Rudolf Abel, and an individual in Leipzig, Germany, identifying herself as Mrs. Abel. Mrs. Abel, possibly reflecting a Soviet Government position, has raised the possibility of a Powers-Abel exchange, one in which the CIA is interested.

The latest letter from Mrs. Abel, dated September 11, 1961 (enclosed), indicates more clearly than previously that an exchange "can be arranged." In the course of consultation with Mr. Oehmann of your office regarding the lines of a reply, Mr. Oehmann indicated that it would be helpful for you to have, in addition to the draft of a proposed reply, a statement setting forth the general views of the CIA and the Department for your consideration in weighing the various factors involved. The proposed reply to Mrs. Abel and a CIA memorandum on the subject are enclosed.

I do not believe that foreign policy considerations as such need be a factor influencing the Justice determination in consultation with the CIA as to whether we should proceed in an attempt to obtain the release of Powers in exchange for the release of Abel. While normally the Department seeks in every way to protect United States citizens incarcerated abroad, a special problem exists, of course, in connection with the Powers case. Bearing in mind the quid pro quo which would be required, and the present status of relations with the USSR, foreign policy considerations do not dictate one course of action or the other. Accordingly, in the present matter, I believe that the function of the Department of State is limited to guidance as to the form and manner of proceeding. I suggest a continuation of the Donovan-Mrs. Abel correspondence with the transmission to Mrs. Abel of a Donovan

The Honorable
Robert F. Kennedy,
Attorney General.

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message along the lines of the enclosed draft. Should the Department of Justice and the CIA decide it to be in the net United States interest to attempt a Powers-Abel exchange and should subsequent letters from Mrs. Abel suggest more precisely the possibility of such a move, the Department will be prepared to consider with the Department of Justice and the CIA how this might most appropriately be put into effect.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed)

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. From Mrs. Abel,
dated September 11, 1961.
2. Proposed reply to Mrs. Abel.
3. CIA Memorandum.

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ANNEX 98

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NEGOTIATION OF POWERS/ABEL EXCHANGE

3 February 1962: BERLIN 7474 (IN 28235)

After negotiating controls at Friedrichstrasse S-Bahnhof with help of border guards who brought him to head of line when he indicated he had imminent appointment at Soviet Embassy, Donovan referred by receptionist at Soviet Embassy to the Soviet Consulate. There he was introduced to "Mrs. Abel", "Daughter", and "cousin of Mrs. Abel", a man about fifty-five years old, introduced as Mr. Reeves. The person portraying the role of Mrs. Abel impressed Donovan as a typical German but the daughter and cousin possibly not German nationality. After preliminary amenities regarding the welfare of Abel, Second Secretary of Soviet Embassy, Ivan Alexandrovich Shishkin (believed KGB) appeared and conducted the meeting. During the meeting the Abel family said nothing.

Donovan said he had come to Berlin on the basis of a message to the U. S. Headquarters, Berlin, conveyed from the East German lawyer Vogel via West German lawyer Stark purporting Soviet Government interest in exchanging Abel for Powers, Makinen and Pryor. Shishkin stated this proposal was entirely new to him and he would be compelled to obtain instructions from his government. Shishkin indicated he had commenced intercession on behalf of the Abel family about one year ago on the basis of a proposed exchange of Powers for Abel and this was the only proposal he was authorized to discuss. Donovan indicated that he, likewise, would be compelled to obtain instructions from his Government to discuss any other proposal than an exchange of Powers, Makinen and Pryor for Abel, indicating personal displeasure at having made the lengthy trip as a private citizen whose time was valuable if the message from Vogel purporting to be official was not in fact a genuine offer. Donovan posed the direct question to Mrs. Abel whether she had in fact suggested a three for one exchange to Vogel, but she appeared frightened and uncertain what to answer, whereupon Shishkin interceded and discussed the letter from Justice which Donovan presented in support of the validity of his claim that the U. S. was prepared to exchange Abel. Shishkin complained that the letter was "vague" but appeared satisfied with Donovan's explanation that it was deliberately so to avoid possible press leak. . . He explained that he had traveled to Berlin from London on special U. S. Government flight so his presence in Berlin was not known to any but a few government officials.

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Shishkin appeared impressed with the necessity for an early answer so Donovan could return to New York. He agreed to meet again Monday, 5 February at 1700 local. Donovan told Shishkin he could produce Abel 48 hours after agreement was reached, in Berlin, the exchange to be carried out with Donovan's personal participation, and that he must be back in the U. S. by Saturday, 10 February.

While it is difficult to predict Soviet reaction, we continue to feel there is a good possibility that they will accept a three for one exchange. While Shishkin commented toward the end of the meeting that the U. S. Government apparently wanted three for one, he seemed genuinely impressed with Donovan's response that "one artist is worth much more than three mechanics".

3 February 1962: ADIC 7388 (OUT 09034)

Opening gambit well done. Speculate as you must they may believe from the date of the Justice letter that the U. S. originally may have been ready for a one to one exchange. However overtures for a package deal were made as early as December 18 and should be no surprise to the Soviets. Therefore press for three to one stating place and details could be set at once.

If Monday reaction indicates to Donovan there is no hope of three to one, he should say he must refer back for further instructions.

The door must be left open for a one to one Powers for Abel but every effort desirable for three to one.

Seems to us advisable to softplay Vogel approach unless the Soviets appear to adopt it.

If further meeting is necessary, suggest Tuesday afternoon as we can respond quickly.

State concurs this message.

5 February 1962: BERLIN 7500 (IN 28344)

Following is Donovan account of events afternoon 5 February. Donovan returned to Soviet Embassy East Berlin at proper time (1700 hours

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local). Daughter and cousin (cousin's name was spelled for Donovan upon his request and is Drews, who took a more active part this time and acted as sole interpreter in later conference with Attorney Vogel) were in the anteroom but not mother, who was "nervous" and did not attend the meeting but stayed in the hotel.

Shishkin invited Donovan to a private conference leaving the Abels in the anteroom. Donovan presented a brief note from Mr. Lightner stating authorization to proceed to East Berlin in connection with business at the Soviet Embassy. Shishkin read the note carefully and said "while not doubting Donovan's integrity on Saturday, one must be careful about such things". Shishkin inquired whether Donovan had reported to his government on the Saturday meeting and what instructions Donovan had received. Donovan replied that he had fully reported and had been instructed to return on 5 February to hear from Shishkin what, if any, further instructions he had received.

Shishkin very formally opened portfolio on his desk and read a message from Moscow. The message said that "the Soviet Government through human feelings will exchange Powers for Abel. This human act on both sides and the elimination of permanent source of anti-Soviet propaganda should contribute to better relations between countries. If the Americans are interested in freeing of Makinen who is now in Kiev, the Soviet Government is ready to exchange Abel for Makinen but the simultaneous exchange of both Powers and Makinen for Abel is impossible. It is up to Americans to make their choice. If the matter is properly concluded and better relations result, further developments could occur." (Donovan gained the impression this statement was intended to imply that the Soviets might be inclined to give clemency to Makinen at some time in the not too distant future.) As to Pryor, this matter was out of the province of Soviet authorities but could be accomplished through the East German Government. This can be done through Miss Abel and her attorney Vogel who already has received favorable consideration by the East German Government. Shishkin has no further instructions. If the American Government is willing to proceed, Donovan should discuss the plan for exchange with Miss Abel which the Soviets then will consider. However, said Shishkin, American suggestion of Glienicke Bruecke "not bad". Donovan then left with Miss Abel and cousin.

On the way, Miss Abel and Donovan discussed possible procedure and tentatively agreed on Glienicke Bridge, Wednesday evening, 7 February,

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at 2200 hours local, with postponement to Thursday evening, 8 February, same time, same place if, due to weather or other contingency, one of three to be exchanged cannot comply.

At Vogel's office, Vogel produced a letter from the Attorney General of East Germany dated 5 February and stating to Vogel that the East German Government would honor his petition for clemency of his client (Pryor) and agree to turn over of Pryor to American officials provided Americans on their part met the "conditions with which Vogel is familiar". The letter is signed by Windisch, State Attorney. Vogel provided a certified copy of this letter at Donovan's request. In answer to a specific question, Vogel stated he could deliver Pryor at the exchange place at the proper time. In response to Donovan's questioning, Vogel stated Pryor's father was visiting his office late 6 February and Vogel requested instructions. Donovan stated he should make no reference to this conference or Donovan's presence in Berlin. He should inform Pryor's father that Vogel's petition is proceeding very favorably and that Vogel expects a decision on Friday. Vogel agreed to this procedure. Vogel meeting was friendly with no reference by Donovan to broken promises re delivery of all three for Abel.

Donovan informed Shishkin and Vogel that while he has no further instructions from his government, he will attempt to deliver a reply as soon as possible 6 February to both Shishkin and Vogel. It is the clear impression of Donovan that the Soviets are making their final and maximum concessions in response to the strong position taken by Donovan last Saturday and also realize the necessity for a prompt decision. In Donovan's opinion we have achieved the maximum possible at this time and Washington should approve unless they wish to break off negotiations for an indefinite period. Request prompt advice, and if recommendations are accepted, ask that Abel's journey be immediately arranged with arrival at Berlin early Wednesday, 7 February. If approved, Donovan will send by messenger morning 6 February letters to Shishkin and Vogel accepting proposal to carry out an exchange of Powers and Pryor for Abel on Glienicke Bridge at 2200 hours local 7 February, with explanation that if due to weather or other conditions this cannot be done, each party should notify the other, which case exchange will take place Thursday night, 8 February, same time, same place.

Also request approval procedure suggested at New York briefing by which, after exchange is completed, Powers goes directly to waiting

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aircraft while Donovan makes brief announcement at press conference called by General Clay and refers all further inquiries to his government in Washington. Donovan then returns home on Powers plane. (Pryor will be taken immediately to Frankfurt with parents notified and invited to accompany him.)

(Chief of Station Comment:

Fully concur Donovan's assessment improbable that further concessions can be gained from Soviets. Recommend we proceed with plan to exchange Powers and Pryor for Abel Wednesday evening, 7 February. Will discuss press announcement with Generals Clay and Watson and Mr. Lightner the morning of 6 February and advise if local command desires modification of Donovan proposal, but in the interim we plan such an announcement by Donovan immediately following exchange since almost inevitable that exchange will attract sufficient attention and result in police leak to the press indicating something occurred which will be best countered by direct announcement. This procedure also will provide for American press release at least simultaneously with Soviet release and serve to transfer further questioning re the exchange to Washington. Will also discuss question of notifying Pryor family and arrangements to transfer Pryors to Frankfurt with local command and make further recommendations.)

5 February 1962: BERLIN 7501 (IN 28345)

The following message has just been received (about 2205 hours local) on telephone number provided Shishkin by Donovan as emergency contact channel: "Unexpected difficulties have arisen. Urgent that I discuss this with you at 1100 hours 6 February in my office. Signed Vogel."

The caller gave the above message in German after utilizing the proper agreed recognition signal on the phone and establishing in addition that he was connected with the correct number. The fact that message was in German and signed Vogel indicates that meeting desired by Vogel in his office in Friedrichsfelde (rather distant from Soviet Embassy) even though telephone contact was not provided Vogel but given only to Shishkin. While it is true that the number was passed to Shishkin in the presence of "Abel family" it seems almost certain that Shishkin passed the number

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on since it appears unlikely the Abel family could have had opportunity to note the number which Donovan provided Shishkin only in writing.

The message clearly raises serious questions about the timetable for exchange. Suggest following plan:

A. Donovan proceed to Soviet Embassy between 1000 and 1100 hours 6 February and attempt to see Shishkin, clarify whether the message in fact from Vogel and if feasible have Vogel meet Donovan at the Soviet Embassy.

B. Advise Shishkin that in view of mysterious Vogel message Donovan has notified his government earliest possible exchange time is Thursday evening, 8 February, 2200 hours and must send further message to his government before any preparations will be commenced to transfer Abel to Berlin for exchange.

C. Dependent on outcome of talk with Shishkin, either converse with Vogel by phone, have him visit Soviet Embassy or visit Vogel in his office to determine "difficulties". In this connection note Vogel apparently speaks no English and Donovan requires an interpreter. Request your views regarding sending Mission officer with Donovan able to serve as interpreter.

Donovan suggests message may indicate East German desire to release Pryor independent of the Abel-Powers exchange and may not necessarily indicate any repudiation of what Donovan regards as firm commitment to release both Powers and Pryor in return for Abel.

Request comments and/or concurrence above proposals.

6 February 1962: ADIC 7422 (OUT 09115)
Ref A Berlin 7500
Ref B Berlin 7501

This is a joint State/Agency message.

Re para 6 Ref A. Approve exchange of Powers and Pryor for Abel under conditions set forth in Ref A. It apparent that East Germans may be attempting to extract more from exchange than simply giving up

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Pryor (as indicated by Ref B). Should East Germans attach any condition to exchange, Donovan should refuse to discuss other than exchange as agreed with Shishkin and Vogel on 5 February meeting, i. e. Powers and Pryor for Abel.

Re Para 5 Ref A. Vogel should be instructed by Donovan to indicate to Pryor's father that he (Vogel) is making continuing efforts on his son's behalf. Vogel should make no commitment as to timing.

Re Paras 7 and 8 Ref A. Do not agree to proposed press conference or announcement in Berlin. Powers-Abel exchange, not Pryor, is the important issue and the present plan is that the White House will make the announcement immediately when we receive the flash that the plane is airborne with Powers aboard. As you have been informed you will receive message giving any necessary additional instructions re Pryor after we know exchange agreed and details. We do not want Donovan to have a press conference of any kind in Berlin. He can do this in New York. After White House announcement, Mission should refer all press inquiries to Washington.

Re Para 3 Ref B. Agree with suggested action except Mission officer should not accompany Donovan to East Berlin.

In arranging timing for exchange Donovan should keep in mind that approximately 48 hours required from the time when word of an exchange agreement is received in Washington to the time Abel is delivered in Berlin.

Re Para 7 Ref A. Agree Donovan return via Powers aircraft.

6 February 1962: BERLIN 7526 (IN 28428)

Following is Donovan report of events of 6 February.

Arrived at Soviet Embassy 1030 hours local and after 15 minute wait was admitted to see Shishkin who expressed surprise at the unexpected visit. Donovan informed Shishkin that after leaving his office 5 February in accordance with his suggestion Donovan had talked with Miss Abel who with her cousin took Donovan to Vogel's office. Described visit and stated that upon return to West Berlin he had reported fully to Washington. Told Shishkin that while we had expected

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Powers, Makinen, and Pryor, Donovan did recommend acceptance of offer of Powers and Pryor since Donovan believed that with improvement of relations between countries mentioned by Moscow clemency for Makinen could be expected in relatively near future. To latter Shishkin nodded.

Donovan then stated his government had advised willingness to accept this offer. He next informed Shishkin of the Vogel message and how it had disrupted all plans, handed Shishkin a copy of Vogel message. He said "How very strange a message. What does it mean?" Donovan stated that this was one of his objects in visiting Shishkin that morning since the message had come to the telephone number which Donovan gave only to Shishkin. He immediately said that other people were present, but when Donovan pointed out that he had passed Shishkin a card with the number written on it, Shishkin said "Some people have sharp eyes". In any event, he continued, he knew nothing of the message.

Shishkin stated he wished to reaffirm that his government was still willing to trade Powers for Abel but Pryor was beyond his authority. He did express the personal opinion that Donovan was in a position of trader who sells the same goods to two persons. Denial by Donovan and detailed argument followed, and he informed Shishkin that if the deal agreed to 5 February is now repudiated, Donovan's recommendation to his government would be that he return to New York. Shishkin advised Donovan to proceed to Vogel's office and after discussion there return to the Embassy.

Donovan proceeded to Vogel's office where Drews present who explained that Miss Abel was taking care of mother. Drews read lengthy statement of which Donovan has a copy. Purport of statement is that Vogel visited the Attorney General the night of 5 February and was told his behavior was incorrect, that East Germany agreed to exchange Pryor for Abel and nothing more; that it cannot give its consent to exchange of one person for two persons, with one from a different country. Also, Vogel feels unable to postpone the trial of Pryor and the Attorney General informed him that in case of American refusal of the exchange of Pryor for Abel they will "start the trial and make a sensation out of it as they have enough evidence to convict Pryor which, as you understand, might have negative results for the U. S. A. and the Pryor family in particular." Lengthy argument in which Donovan accused

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East Germany and Vogel of bad faith and stated neither his government nor he had time for such idle games. He flatly stated that the exchange of Abel for Pryor was out of the question and that unless East Germany adhered to the commitment of 5 February he must break off negotiations and report to his government.

At this point Vogel summoned an assistant into the room who reported that Vogel had just obtained an appointment with the Attorney General for further discussion of the matter. Vogel requested that Donovan remain in East Berlin while he "tried his best". Drews invited Donovan to lunch where the entire conversation consisted of probing to see whether the Pryor exchange for Abel is not feasible and specific reference was made to the prominence and political influence of the Pryor family.

During lunch also Drews volunteered without Donovan mentioning it that the night before when Vogel brought the sad news, Miss Abel remembered the telephone number she had memorized when Donovan gave it to Shishkin, and a foreigner friendly to Drews was willing to take a message to West Berlin. In response to Donovan's questions, Drews stated Mrs. Abel's first name was Lydia and Miss Abel was named Helen, with latter unmarried. Both points in conflict with previous correspondence and letters introduced in evidence at Abel's trial.

Near the end of lunch, Drews excused himself for the men's room, presumably to telephone. Shortly thereafter Vogel arrived to report a big battle but final victory over Attorney General. He stated that the entire difficulty was due to the fact that the Attorney General was angry that on 3 February Donovan visited Shishkin instead of first visiting Vogel and the Attorney General. Upon question, no explanation was given of the letter from the Attorney General delivered 5 February. He now stated East Germany was satisfied if Vogel and Donovan proceed to the Soviet Embassy and Soviet officials confirm the deal. In response to a question he stated this meant all East German objections to Pryor and Powers exchange for Abel were removed.

We proceeded to the Soviet Embassy where Shishkin treated Vogel as a stranger and received substantially the same report without comment. He then requested Donovan to have a private meeting with him. He informed Donovan that at the first meeting 3 February at which he

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urged that Powers was sufficient for Abel, he had asked Donovan whether Powers was not a national hero in the United States. Donovan had stated that to judge by general press, Powers was not regarded as a national hero and that substantial view in the U.S. was that Abel should not be released under any circumstances. Shishkin stated that he had communicated this to his government and that he now had a new message from Moscow this afternoon stating that "since the Americans regarded Makinen as more valuable than Powers, Moscow now makes firm offer of Makinen for Abel." Donovan pointed out not only that Powers had been regarded as sine qua non and primary basis of any deal, but the Moscow message of 5 February recognized this by first unqualifiedly approving the deal and referring to Makinen as an afterthought.

Donovan reiterated his instructions were absolutely no deal without Powers. Shishkin replied that the message this afternoon replaced all others and he now unauthorized to discuss any matter except Abel for Makinen exchange. Donovan stated that after the message of 5 February and confirmation this morning, this must mean that Soviets were not seriously interested in obtaining back Abel and accused Shishkin of playing chess game since last Saturday. Donovan stated Shishkin should inform Donovan now whether 5 February deal still acceptable. If not, Donovan would report this to his own government and recommend he return home. Shishkin stated that since this was a new matter he must communicate with Moscow and requested Donovan to return on 7 February between 1400 and 1500 hours local to hear Moscow reply. Donovan stated he saw no point to this since Shishkin has Donovan's telephone number and is able to communicate the reply. Accordingly Donovan declined a personal visit on 7 February. Shishkin accepted this and said Donovan would receive a message on 7 February.

Donovan left with Drews who had waited in the anteroom and walked the entire distance to the S-Bahn with Donovan, continuously probing for Donovan reaction which he could "report to Miss Abel". Donovan told Drews his reaction was that the negotiations on the non-American side since Saturday had been conducted with irresponsibility and bad faith, that if the deal fails he would be obliged upon his return to report to Col. Abel that his "family" apparently were abandoning him and that perhaps Abel should reconsider his entire position to date.

Donovan thanked Drews for lunch and returned to West Berlin at 1640 hours local.

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~~TOP SECRET~~7 February 1962: ADIC 7455 (OUT 09203)

Congratulations to Donovan for conduct of difficult negotiations. Suspect Shishkin may come back with offer of Powers and GDR will welch on Pryor. If so, Donovan make final attempt include Pryor but if in his judgment he reaches point where Pryor problem may endanger Powers deal, he should break off and close on Powers-Abel.

If Shishkin won't offer Powers, approve Donovan return U. S. after emphasizing to Shishkin that Soviets have responsibility for breaking off negotiation which would be difficult if not impossible to reopen.

Moving Abel to New York and can deliver him in less than 48 hours if necessary.

7 February 1962: 50X1, E.O.13526

From Col. Geary at Wiesbaden.

Ref departure time of C-118 /carrying Abel to Berlin recommend his take-off time be moved up tentatively NLT 0500Z on 8 Feb, or midnight local. This would put him here approximately 1700Z, 1800Z local and enable us to move him on immediately for exchange the same night. This would certainly alleviate any possible problems of housing Abel etc. Therefore if agreement reached today exchange could be made Thursday night. Foregoing is entirely feasible and suggest if you concur you info Donovan soonest. Every hour we let this thing slip just gives those so and so's an opportunity for further nonsense.

7 February 1962: ADIC 7456 (OUT 09204)

To Col. Geary, and Berlin, Frankfurt 50X1, E.O.13526

Airlift postponed pending final word on exchange from Berlin per BERLIN 7526.

7 February 1962: BERLIN 7537 (IN 28496)

Following message received 1515 hours local 7 Feb on Berlin Base number assigned Donovan for this purpose: "Donovan: Unfortunately we got no reply today. We hope to get it tomorrow. Will inform immediately. Shishkin." Will forward comments and recommendations after discussion of case by Donovan with Clay and perhaps Lightner later this afternoon.

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7 February 1962: ADIC 7461 (OUT 09219)
Ref: BERLIN 7537

Request Donovan sit tight and wait for message from Shishkin.

Please notify us immediately when message received including content of message. If no reply within twenty-four hours please also advise negative report.

8 February 1962: BERLIN 7542 (IN 28548)

General Clay felt strongly that swift response must be given to Shishkin telephone message quoted Berlin 7537 since he viewed it as definite possibility next Shishkin message would simply request Donovan again visit Soviet Embassy for discussion. Generals Clay and Watson and Mr. Lightner unanimous in opinion Donovan should not again submit himself to East Berlin meeting. Accordingly and several hours prior to receipt of ADIC 7461, General Clay directed Mr. Lightner to send a Mission officer to East Berlin the evening of 7 February to telephone the following message on behalf of Donovan to Shishkin at the Soviet Embassy: "Received your telephone message and regret delay as unfortunately the time which I can spend here is limited. As my back still troubles me I would like to ask that you come to the residence of Mr. Howard Trivers of our Mission between 4:00 and 6:00 p.m. tomorrow Thursday, February 8th 1962. The address is 12 Vogelsang. I hope you can let me know beforehand that you will be there. However I will be there during these hours."

Mission officer Mr. Frank Meehan succeeded after some time in establishing telephonic connection with Shishkin at 2245 hours local. Shishkin extremely cordial and urged that Donovan please believe him that he was doing his best in the matter and was hopeful of the outcome. He hopes to have a reply tomorrow and will telephone as soon as he gets a reply. As to proposed meeting Shishkin not sure he could come over but will try. If unable to keep appointment he will telephone. In concluding the phone conversation he requested the Mission officer ask Donovan to please not be impatient and reiterated that he was hopeful the matter will work out satisfactorily.

The choice of Trivers' residence as a meeting spot is based on consideration that meeting with Soviet official in the Consulate would be extraordinary occurrence and would cause comment among the German

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employees who could not be kept from learning of the event. Reference to Donovan's health was factual as he is suffering from cold in the back, which is known to Shishkin.

The purpose of the meeting is to enable Donovan to receive the Soviet proposal and discuss it to the extent necessary in order to clarify the exact terms or to work out details of exchange if the Soviet proposal is acceptable.

General Clay also wishes to have brought to your attention the fact that "Miss Abel" indicated to Donovan during the 6 February meeting (as Vogel has indicated on previous occasions to "Middlemen" reporting on Vogel's behalf to the Pryor family and to the U.S. Mission, Berlin) that East German authorities have stated the death sentence is not excluded in the Pryor case. General Clay feels that the East can if it so desires, make public revelation of negotiations to date cast in a light almost certain to have unfavorable impact in various circles in the United States.

8 February 1962: BERLIN 7545 (IN 28575)

At 1204 hours local received following telephone call in English: "Donovan: I got a favorable reply. Waiting to see you at my office at 4:00 o'clock today (caller added "this afternoon") if your health allows you to come here. Shishkin."

General Clay feels in view of the indication of a favorable reply that Donovan should go and has asked the Mission spokesman to phone Shishkin stating on Donovan's behalf: "In view my health request you have car meet me at exit S-Bahnhof Friedrichstrasse to bring me to Soviet Embassy for requested meeting." Frank Meehan is enroute to accomplish this. Donovan is in full agreement and will proceed to East Berlin about 1500 hours local.

8 February 1962: ADIC 7495 (OUT 09308)

This is a joint Agency/State message.

Obviously it is increasingly difficult to avoid publicity and therefore essential to move as fast as possible. If answer on Powers is favorable we must move Abel soonest so request you send result Donovan visit today

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as soon as he returns leaving detailed report till later. At least give us enough to make the decision whether Abel departs or stays in New York.

8 February 1962: BERLIN 7558 (IN 28602)

Donovan returned 1810 hours local from meeting and announced telephonically he had achieved "complete agreement". Stated action should be initiated to move Abel over here. Turnover scheduled for 0730 hours Saturday morning 10 February.

[] now enroute downtown to pick up Donovan and debrief. Expect fill-in cable within three hours. On the basis of agreed criteria "complete agreement" must mean East agreement to turnover Powers and Pryor for Abel.

8 February 1962: BERLIN 7561 (IN 28639)

Donovan meeting at Soviet Embassy attended only by Shishkin who served lavish refreshments and generally gave Donovan the red carpet treatment. He stated the Soviet Government had accepted Donovan's "ultimatum" and would release both Powers and Pryor in return for Abel. Only condition which emerged was that Pryor and Powers were to be released at separate points but simultaneously. Shishkin gave his word of honor "as a Soviet official" that the exchange of all three would take place and tentative planning foresees exchange of Powers for Abel at Oberbaumbruecke Sector crossing point (normally West Berliner crossing point) at 0730 on 10 February if that place is satisfactory to us, Pryor to be released elsewhere, probably Friedrichstrasse, at same time. Miss Abel allegedly will attend on Soviet side and Shishkin asked whether any of Powers family would be present which Donovan answered in the negative.

Much of the conversation was devoted by Shishkin to expressing concern for press treatment which might ensue, explaining that it might negate improvement of Soviet-US relations which should otherwise be the result of this exchange. Shishkin stated he would like to see separate announcements, first Moscow announce that Powers was released as humane response of Soviet Government to petition for clemency submitted by the Powers family. Later, perhaps several weeks later, Washington

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would make the announcement that the President had granted clemency to Abel. Shishkin stressed throughout this discussion that press treatment was not a condition of the exchange but he merely was expressing what was desirable from the Soviet viewpoint. Donovan responded that he would recommend we seek this objective but that in realistic terms Shishkin must realize the release of Abel cannot be kept secret. Donovan especially urged that Soviet Government recognize that the United States press is not controlled and that a leak of the Abel release must not be viewed by the Soviets as bad faith in any respect affecting the prospects of clemency for Makinen at a future date. Shishkin asserted he fully understood. As to the Pryor release, it is to be treated entirely separately as East German act of clemency. Donovan emphasized that the release of Pryor 9 February, hours before the exchange of Powers and Abel would serve to keep it somewhat separate from the latter exchange but Shishkin stated while recognizing the validity of this view, his orders were to effect release of Pryor and Powers simultaneously.

Recommend give careful consideration press release in light of Shishkin suggestion.

Donovan to meet Shishkin again at 1200 hours 9 February at the Soviet Embassy to discuss details of the exchange. Will reconnoiter Oberbaumbruecke but tentatively believe 0700 or 0730 at that spot is satisfactory. Pryor could proceed by foot through Friedrichstrasse crossing point, be met by person able identify him and Mission officer, be taken away by car immediately with Mission officer notifying exchange party by radio from Checkpoint Charlie or patrol car when Pryor released whereupon identification of Powers and exchange for Abel could occur. Powers, Donovan, Murphy, and Doctor could proceed immediately to Tempelhof and depart for Wiesbaden by special flight. Pryor and parents should be flown to Frankfurt immediately by separate flight.

Donovan's assessment of this that it is a genuine offer. Advise views re turnover, other instructions.

General Clay and Mr. Lightner concur in this message.

8 February 1962: ADIC 7523 (OUT 09367)

C-118 No. 33300 departed McGuire Air Force Base 2253Zulu 8 February. ETA Wiesbaden 1100 Zulu 9 February. Passengers: Abel, Mr. Fred Wilkinson, Deputy Director of Prisons, Mr. Noah Alldredge, Justice Dept. escort, and Mr. Nicholas P. Stoiaken, Russian-speaking CIA Security escort.

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9 February 1962: ADIC 7526 (OUT 09377)

Offer of Powers and Pryor for Abel acceptable.

Concur exchange point and procedures para 4 BERLIN 7561 but for reasons covered below would prefer 0630 hours if possible.

Shishkin proposals for handling press aspects neither acceptable or workable. Soviet change in timing from evening to early morning clearly aimed at insuring Soviets release story first. Plans for White House release immediately after exchange must remain in effect. You should arrange for radio or telephone notification from exchange point to Base Commo Room at moment exchange completed. This then will be flashed immediately to Washington for passage to White House. Please use this channel with highest precedence. Exploring use also of telephone. Will advise.

Donovan should reiterate that news of exchange can not be kept secret. Word of Powers' freedom will provoke barrage of inquiries as to whereabouts of Abel. Under no circumstances should Donovan state flatly that there will be a White House press release. He should emphasize, however, that pressures of the free press will require official announcement. Donovan can indicate that he certain any announcement will not exploit exchange to detriment of Soviet Union. Donovan should indicate these his personal views.

Since publicity matter on Powers-Abel now in better perspective we tending to view that maybe unnecessary to airlift Pryors to Frankfurt. Pryors, however, should remain in safehouse several hours after Powers departure. Mission officer should inform parents that government trusts they will be discreet in any comments to the press bearing in mind that other American citizens are still held and the government must continue to seek aid for them. In particular they should not mention Makinen. May be helpful to them in dealing with the press to know that complex negotiations regarding Powers and Abel of which they could not be informed had been under way before their son was detained. Will confirm above including comments on transportation of Pryors.

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9 February 1962: BERLIN 7579 (IN 28698)

C-118 arrived Tempelhof 1525 hours local. "Package" now enroute detention site. All in order.

9 February 1962: BERLIN 7582 (IN 28699)

"Package" secured in maximum security cell at 1615 hours local.

9 February 1962 : BERLIN 7581 (IN 28701)

Donovan met Shishkin at Embassy East Berlin 1200 hours local. Reported general concurrence of our government to accept Powers and Pryor for Abel with expectation of clemency for Makinen in the near future. Shishkin stated that a review of traffic on Oberbaumbruecke this morning leads them to return to our original proposal of Glienecke Bridge. Because of the 25 mile trip for the Soviets, it could not be done before 0830 hours. Donovan sought an earlier time but Shishkin said he could not make it so Donovan agreed to 0830.

On Pryor, Shishkin argued long about release to his father in Vogel's office in East Berlin. Donovan flatly refused any site in East Berlin and Shishkin finally agreed to the release at Friedrichstrasse border point simultaneously with Powers-Abel exchange. Donovan again urged Shishkin in self interest to release Pryor today (9 February) but Shishkin replied it would be contrary to his instructions.

The principal concern of the Soviets over the official statement to be issued by the United States. Shishkin said they would not hold us responsible for what the press may do but emphasized the importance of the official statement for future relations between countries. Donovan replied that no Berlin statement was contemplated and he could assure Shishkin no propaganda by the United States Government and nothing of the official statement discrediting the USSR. Two points all-important to Soviets: First, no use of the word "exchange"; second, nothing in the official statement connecting Abel with the Soviets. Donovan replied that he would communicate these views to his government. Donovan strongly urges the official statement be drafted to avoid these precise two points. First because of the hope of early clemency for Makinen which Donovan believes can depend on the proper conclusion of this deal,

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and second because unnecessary, since the entire press will call it an exchange and will link Abel with the Soviets. Donovan feels this is all right so long as not in the official statement. Shishkin stated that the ideal statement would mention clemency for Abel on petition of his family and because of his age, making no reference to the Soviet Union. Shishkin still would like the statement re Abel released later but Donovan refused to make any such commitment. Shishkin stated that the Soviet Government announcement will relate solely to Powers and describe clemency because of his family and the desire to improve relations between two countries. No Soviet official statement will ever refer to either Abel or Pryor.

Shishkin will attend the exchange with two other officials and Powers with two guards. He suggested the six officials meet in the center of the bridge at 0820 hours for assurance that all is well. The guards will then bring the prisoners forward and when recognized each man will be released to the opposite side. Officials will shake hands and all leave. Donovan agreed but said all must be reviewed by his government and, if any change, would communicate message to Shishkin. Upon inquiry, Donovan assured Shishkin no reporters or photographers were contemplated tomorrow at the exchange.

Donovan returned to West Berlin at 1330 hours.

9 February 1962: ADIC 7540 (OUT 09414)

Concur use of Glienicke Bridge. Reluctantly agree on 0830 hours.

Meeting at center bridge must include Murphy to identify and Lightner to receive Powers. Presumably Wilkinson, Alldredge will be with Abel; depending on his wishes, Donovan should also be present either with Abel or the officials at center bridge.

9 February 1962: BERLIN 7583 (IN 28702)

Feel certain you agree Donovan's performance here has been outstanding. General Clay, General Watson, and Messrs. Lightner and Trivers, all with first-hand experience in negotiating with Soviets, have been unanimous in spontaneous praise for tactics Donovan used

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and feel his cool nerves, especially considering his exposed position as a private citizen alone in East Berlin, played an important part in the apparently successful outcome.

Submit for urgent consideration some mention of Donovan in official government statement, placing particular stress on the fact that Donovan undertook the mission at the request of and on behalf of the U.S. Government. Donovan has in the past week on several occasions pointed out that his role as Abel's defense counsel is widely misinterpreted in addition to which Powers is not regarded by a large segment of the American public as a hero, with the potential effect that Donovan will appear to have been instrumental in a deal more in the interest of the Soviet Union than the United States. Emphasis upon the official backing of Donovan's mission therefore is of some importance to him particularly with regard to his professional reputation.

9 February 1962: ADIC 7537 (OUT 09400)

For Col. Geary and Mr. Joe Murphy, Re: Assessment and Handling Powers.

Suggest you review together the approach to be taken in discussions with Powers. Murphy has been briefed and it is imperative you are both coordinated.

Discussions should be keyed to Powers own desire to talk, in other words let him lead.

Agree it desirable that he be prepared for mixed reaction publicity-wise. As you pointed out, this is extremely delicate. Rather than make it personal, though, you could caution him that his release will bring to the surface the May 1 incident again, which had many opponents as well as proponents and undoubtedly this affair will be rehashed somewhat again implying that the publicity will be directed to all concerned--the U.S. Government, CIA as well as himself.

You should tell him that we are anxious for him to relax, have a medical check up and be with his family. Tell him that we have arranged for him to stay in a house away from the public. At this point you can determine his desires re his family. You should also indicate that we desire of course to talk with him but he must first relax.

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9 February 1962: ADIC 7549 (OUT 09432) FLASH

White House requests test run be accomplished immediately on communications, namely total timing for radio car and/or phone call from Glienicke Bridge to Base Commo then cable to Washington.

White House expects results of test by 2200 Zulu.

Hold applicable commo circuits open until conclusion tests.

Test message should read "Message initiated at bridge at blank Zulu.

9 February 1962: FRANKFURT 7708 (IN 28708) OPIM

Tests between Berlin and ADIC 9 February all under three minutes through CIA secure staff communications circuitry. Berlin to regular Headquarters Signal Center, L Building, approximately one minute. Berlin will have acknowledgement of Headquarters receipt approximately five minutes after Berlin transmission...

10 February 1962: BERLIN 7606 (IN 28790) OPIM

Exchange Powers for Abel on Glienicke Bridge commenced on schedule with American representatives Donovan, Lightner and Murphy moving up to the middle of the bridge at 0820 local where they were met by the Soviets Shishkin, the new Soviet Political Adviser Alexeev (one of the two Soviets currently excluded from the American Sector of West Berlin), and "Cousin Drews"; "Miss Abel" did not appear. Soviets stated they had an open line direct to Friedrichstrasse and that the release of Pryor would occur precisely on schedule. Through the American Provost Marshal and West Berlin Police net, American command post at end of Glienicke Bridge likewise had an open line to Checkpoint Charlie on the west side of Friedrichstrasse. At approximately 0835 hours local received word that Mr. Frank Meehan, USBER representative, and Mr. Pryor Senior had been called to east side of Friedrichstrasse crossing point.

For more than 15 minutes, our observers (including CIA and military police representatives on the scene at Friedrichstrasse)

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reported that they could observe nothing occurring on the other side. Meanwhile, the Soviets were becoming exceedingly insistent on the Glienicke Bridge because they said that through their direct line they had received word that Frederick Pryor had been released at 0835 local.

Since word had been received from our observers at Checkpoint Charlie that Meehan and Pryor Senior were in East Berlin, we then agreed to bring Abel forward to the center of the Bridge while the Soviets brought Powers, and identification was accomplished by both sides at approximately 0840. Shortly before 0850 the Checkpoint Charlie line reported positive identification of Frederick Pryor and the return of Meehan, Pryor Senior and the son. Word was immediately passed by the American Provost Marshal, Lt. Col. Sabolyk, to Mr. Lightner at the center of the Glienicke Bridge and after perfunctory handshakes the party of Powers, Donovan and Murphy came off the bridge and departed by car for Tempelhof...

Only West Berlin Police and customs officials observed the exchange on Glienicke Bridge. The press was not present at Friedrichstrasse so the first realization that Pryor was released came via Washington press statement.

10 February 1962: ADIC 7568 (OUT 09475)

From McCone. Congratulations to Berlin. A hearty well done to [] and all concerned in the Powers, Pryor, Abel exchange. All here impressed that word was given the White House for press release within three minutes of the actual turnover. Apparently allowing Washington easily to scoop Moscow on the release.

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Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 403g)

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ANNEX 99

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ACCOUNT OF EVENTS AT GLIENECKER BRIDGE, 10 FEBRUARY 1962

by E. Allan Lightner, Jr., U. S. Mission, Berlin

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 Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
 U.S.C., section 403g)

¹Excerpt from report to The Honorable Foy D. Kohler,
 Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Depart-
 ment of State, Washington, D. C., dated February 15, 1962⁷

On the morning of February 10 I was picked up at 7:00 a.m.
 and driven to the Berlin Brigade Provost Marshal's office where
 I found [redacted] lawyer James Donovan, Deputy Director of
 Prisons, Mr. Wilkinson, and the CIA chap who had come out to
 identify Powers, Mr. Murphy. Donovan had just had a last
 talk with Abel who had spent the night in one of the cells in
 the basement of the Provost Marshal's building. We went over
 the technical details of the handover and then at about 7:50
 we departed for Glienecker Bridge.

Perhaps it would be useful to mention the technical de-
 tails of the exchange that we agreed upon. Most of these
 details had already been prescribed in the arrangements that
 Donovan had made the day before with the Soviet representa-
 tive, Second Secretary of Embassy, Ivan Alexandrovich Shishkin.
 The exchange was to take place at 8:30. At 8:20 Donovan,
 Murphy, and myself would walk out to the center of the bridge,
 where we would be met by three from the other side. After
 ascertaining that everything was in order for the exchange at
 the Glienecker Bridge and for the release of Pryor at Fried-
 richstrasse, we would signal for Abel to be brought up. The
 Soviets would similarly signal for Powers to come up. The
 two men would come up under guard and stop five meters behind
 our group in the middle of the bridge. At this point, Murphy
 would cross over to the other side where Powers was and would
 talk to him long enough positively to identify him. Similarly,
 one of the members of the other party would cross over to our
 side to identify Abel. At this point we understood that
 Abel's alleged daughter would be the person to identify him.
 Having satisfied ourselves as to the identity of the persons
 to be exchanged, we would then await news by two-way radio
 or over a direct telephone line that Pryor had been released
 at Friedrichstrasse and returned to the United States Sector.
 Upon receipt of this word, Abel and Powers would cross over
 to their respective sides, we in the center would shake hands
 and the exchange would be complete.

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 U.S.C., section 403g)

As indicated, shortly before 8:00 our party left the Provost Marshal's building for the Glienecker Bridge. [redacted] Donovan, Wilkinson, Murphy and myself were in two sedans. The Provost Marshal, Colonel Sabolyk, assisted by the two prison guards who had brought Abel to Berlin and a giant fellow from Sabolyk's staff, took charge of Abel. We arrived at the bridge at approximately 8:15. The car with Abel was kept in the background a short distance from the bridge. It was a beautiful morning, rather unusual for Berlin at this time of year, and we could observe several fishermen already fishing along the bank. Almost at once we saw one sedan and then another arrive on the other side of the bridge, and several civilians emerged. We saw three of them near their end of the bridge, so Donovan, Murphy and I started across. They also moved forward. Donovan commented, as we paced toward each other, that it reminded him of "High Noon", and indeed there was plenty of dramatic tension at that moment with the two groups marching toward each other across the bridge. Donovan, who had been negotiating with Shishkin during the past week, pointed him out as the towering figure in the center. It seemed a long time before we faced each other on the line in the middle of the bridge. Donovan shook hands with Shishkin, whom he introduced to Murphy and myself. Shishkin introduced one of his companions as Mr. Alekseev, a seedy looking man of medium height, maybe 50 years old, in heavy gray overcoat and slouch hat. I looked at him with unusual interest because he was of course the Political Adviser at Karlshorst, Lt. Colonel Alekseev, of the Soviet KGB and at the present time persona non grata in the American sector. The other member of the trio was Mr. Drews, a name I recognized as being one of the people with whom Mr. Donovan had been negotiating, particularly during his contacts with the East German lawyer Vogel. He was also medium height, thin, almost gaunt, fiftyish, shabby. He was supposed to be Mrs. Abel's cousin. Each of the three Russians was in civilian clothes. I'll call them Russians, although I'm not sure whether Drews was Russian or German.

Shishkin, a tall, beady-eyed, no-nonsense fellow with rimless glasses, who spoke English well, but with a strong Russian accent, immediately suggested that we proceed with the business at hand. He said the first thing that should happen would be immediately to bring up Abel and Powers. After they were properly identified, he Shishkin, would instruct the people at Friedrichstrasse by a direct line to release Pryor. He should have word that this had been

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accomplished within a few minutes thereafter. Then, we could complete the exchange on the bridge. Although this was a change from the earlier agreed procedure, Donovan and I agreed that this plan was satisfactory. Because it constituted a slight change in our understanding of the arrangement, I returned to our side of the bridge and after briefly explaining the change to [redacted] asked that Abel be brought up immediately. I then returned to the center of the bridge, and the two parties escorting Abel on our side and Powers on the other side started to move forward. At this Shishkin raised a row. He said there were too many guards with Abel and that the agreement had been that each prisoner should be accompanied by only two. I'm not sure exactly what the agreement on this point was, but we had no reason to object, and so Donovan, I believe it was, shouted to Wilkinson that only one other person besides himself should accompany Abel. Sabolyk designated his man, the giant, to go along. I learned later from [redacted] that the two guards who had come out from Washington were extremely annoyed at this turn of events, but they had to take a back seat.

The exchangees came forward and stopped about five yards behind our central group. As they advanced, I nudged Murphy to ask him if it looked as if our boy was approaching, and Murphy said it sure did, and then he went over to talk to Powers to make absolutely sure. Drews did the same, going over to talk to Abel. In a very few minutes it was established that all was in order. At this point something went a bit awry because before we realized it Abel and Drews had crossed over to the Russian side and Powers and Murphy had come over to our side. This obviously was a little premature, as we had not yet received word that Pryor had been released. Shishkin signaled to his people at the end of the bridge to send word for Pryor to be released and assured us that word would come through at any moment. This was, I think, about 8:35 a.m. We waited and waited. I was particularly worried at this point because of the fact that we had prematurely permitted Abel out of our custody. Actually, we saw to it that there were always at least one or two Americans with Abel during this period of waiting. Donovan went over and talked to him for a while, as did Wilkinson. Both of them had long been associated with him, from the time of the trial, onwards. Wilkinson was his warden at Atlanta for years.

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After a few minutes, Shishkin said he had word that Pryor had been released. We shouted to the other end of the bridge and got word back that there was no news of Pryor's return to our side. Shishkin said he could not understand this as his information was explicit. After another few minutes, I walked back to the end of the bridge and explained the situation to [redacted] asking that he try to get a more detailed report of what was happening at Friedrichstrasse. He was told that Frank Meehan had gone over to the other side but had not yet returned. I took this information back to Shishkin in the center of the bridge and we kept on waiting. It seemed like a long time, but I suppose the total waiting time was not more than fifteen minutes. Anyway, we finally got word that Pryor and Meehan had appeared at Checkpoint Charlie and we finished the business on the bridge. This meant that Wilkinson countersigned and dated the Presidential commutation of sentence which he had brought with him and which became effective with the handing over of Powers. He then gave the document to Abel, the six principals shook hands all around, and we then went our respective ways. The time was 8:52 a.m.

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ANNEX 100

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL - Day Lead Article by Wm. J. Eaton

Dateline: Washington, D. C., 20 April 1962.

(Editor's Note: Early this year, in the middle of a bridge linking West Berlin with Communist East Germany, the United States and Russia exchanged two cold war pawns--U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers and convicted Soviet spy Colonel Rudolf Abel. Following is the first personal account of the dramatic trade.)

A gate swung open one cold night last February and a car sped away from the bleak walls of Atlanta Prison. One of the passengers was a gaunt, balding man in a new suit. The others called him "The Package". Halfway around the earth, men were preparing for a rendezvous with this package.

The spot was a wind-swept bridge connecting the East and the West in Berlin. "The Package" was the highest ranking Russian spy ever caught in the United States.

The details of how Soviet master spy Rudolf Abel was smuggled out of prison and swapped for American U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers last February 10th was disclosed today by one of the leading participants. The story was told by Fred T. Wilkinson, Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and Abel's chief American escort on his journey to freedom.

Wilkinson's account in the Prison Bureau's Newsletter said that President Kennedy commuted Abel's 30-year sentence on condition that he never return to the United States.

Jokes about hat-swapping and lawyers' delaying tactics helped reduce tension on the bridge during a last-minute hitch in the exchange, Wilkinson said. The Powers-Abel swap was held up for some minutes until word was received that a second American prisoner--Yale student Frederick L. Pryor--had been released by the East Germans at another border-crossing point.

Wilkinson recalled how three Americans and Abel faced three Russians and Powers 15 feet away:

"This was one of the most tense times in the whole project, I think, although I was armed and it didn't seem too important. At first we were a little formal. By pre-arrangement we walked across and the Russian identifier asked to have Abel take his glasses off. The same applied to Mr. Powers. He was quickly identified. But we were not yet ready to make the exchange. We were waiting for a signal on the radio that our second man had been released at checkpoint Charlie. The Russians kept telling us it was O.K. I found one big Russian in charge had a great sense of humor. We started a little by-play and finally decided we would let the men change sides. We let Abel go over to the other side and Powers came to our side with his identifier because from our point of view he was not a prisoner.

"The second Russian looked at my hat. He seemed to like it and I told Abel to tell him I wanted to trade it for the fur turban the Russian was wearing, but the other Russian wouldn't permit it. When we were about to trade, the second man scowled deeply and said 'Nix, nox!' This by-play went on for quite a while. I am sure the Russian and I both wanted to trade.

"Powers looked very good. Finally we got the signal that the other exchange had been made. My good-humored Russian friend said he would bet the exchange of Pryor was being held up because his lawyer was there and was arguing about his capitalist fees!

"I took out the Presidential document which the Russians wanted; we noted the date and the release on the document, which I signed and turned over to Abel. The document commuted his sentence provided he does not re-enter this country.

"We left the bridge and Mr. Powers was put into a car that had been waiting and was taken away."

Wilkinson got to know Abel when he was warden at Atlanta, and said he felt he had a measure of Abel's confidence. That may have been why Wilkinson was chosen for the secret mission. He and Noah Alldredge, Supervisor of Custodial Service, accompanied Abel from this country to Berlin for the exchange. Abel was fitted with new clothes on the pretext that he would confer with his attorney and federal officials in New York, Wilkinson said.

The Soviet agent was removed from Atlanta penitentiary shortly after midnight on February 8th and flown to New York City on a 2 a. m. jet from Atlanta. These precautions were taken because the federal officials did not want other prisoners--two in particular but who were not identified--to know that Abel had left the prison.

The Soviet spy was held in New York overnight before being flown to West Berlin on a secret Air Force flight. Abel was known as "The Package" in a system of codes that helped to preserve air-tight secrecy about the mission, Wilkinson said. Wilkinson and Alldredge obtained emergency passports and took a train to New York from Washington to keep their rendezvous with "The Package". During this time, Wilkinson said, he was in constant touch with another agency whose employees called each other by first names and last initials.

After several unexplained delays in departure, he said, they left to pick up Abel on a corner near 11th Street in Manhattan.

Wilkinson added: "Abel looked a little puzzled until he saw me, and then he smiled. . . I asked him if he was ready to make a little trip and he said 'yes'. Then I told him I wasn't in a position to tell him what this was, but that we might be able to help him. But he was pretty sharp and caught on. He said, 'Well, I would like to go home.'"

The party drove to a New Jersey air base and Abel was "pretty well told" during the transatlantic flight why he was being taken on the trip. But secrecy was maintained and drapes were drawn around the passenger compartment at one point when a radio repairman was called to fix the plane's radio at Wiesbaden, Germany. They arrived in Berlin on the

afternoon preceding the February 10th exchange and began talks with Army officers on details.

"There was still a lot of uncertainty about the point of exchange," Wilkinson said. "We would have it all set up and then someone would change it--probably the Russians!"

By morning, however, the Gleinicker Bridge on the road to Potsdam was selected as the place for the exchange. Wilkinson said the American party and Abel moved out to the bridge about 7:30 a. m. and sat across the road from a group of East German guards carrying rifles.

At 8 a. m., on signal, Wilkinson, State Department representative Allan Lightner, and another American who was to identify Powers walked out on the bridge with Abel.

Three Russians marched from the other side with Powers and history was made minutes later.

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ANNEX 101

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FRANCIS GARY POWERS

HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
FRANCIS GARY POWERS

MARCH 6, 1962

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



Mr. Powers, after having been subjected to a public trial in Moscow, you should feel no trepidation whatever in appearing before a group of your fellow citizens and elected representatives.

I hope that you feel just as much at ease as you possibly can.

I understand from Senator Byrd that you are a Virginia boy. What part of Virginia are you from?

**STATEMENT OF FRANCIS GARY POWERS, ACCOMPANIED BY
LAWRENCE HOUSTON, GENERAL COUNSEL, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

Mr. POWERS. I spent most of my life in the southwest part of Virginia, around Pound and Grundy, Va.

Chairman RUSSELL. Were you educated in Virginia?

Mr. POWERS. Through grammar school and high school in Virginia and college in Tennessee.

Chairman RUSSELL. What did you do after you left college?

Mr. POWERS. I worked for one summer as a lifeguard at the swimming pool near my home in Virginia, joined the Air Force in October of that year.

Chairman RUSSELL. When were you first employed by the CIA?

Mr. POWERS. In May of 1956.

Chairman RUSSELL. You were an experienced pilot at the time you were employed by the CIA; were you not?

Mr. POWERS. Yes, sir. I don't remember the exact number of hours, but I have had well over a thousand hours of flying time.

Chairman RUSSELL. How much experience did you have with the U-2?

Mr. POWERS. A little better than 500 hours flying time.

Chairman RUSSELL. Now, Mr. Powers, we would like to have you go ahead and tell us in your own words of your mission on the 1st of May 1960.

If you could pull up the microphone a little closer I think some of the members of the committee perhaps will hear you a little better.

Mr. POWERS. I was awakened on the morning of May 1, sometime between 2 and 3 o'clock in the morning. I knew before that I might have to fly the next day but I wasn't certain at the time.

I had breakfast. The doctor looked me over. I was feeling fine. The navigator gave me a briefing either before or during the time that I was prebreathing for this flight. He showed me the maps, the route that I would take, the turning points, the different headings, and where the equipment was to be turned off and on. Later I talked to the weather forecaster who gave me the probable weather conditions along the route, the weather at destination, how high to expect condensation trails.

Then, after that, I talked to the detachment commander who told me what I was to do in case of an emergency, in case of engine trouble, or a forced landing over enemy territory. This was both before I put on my pressure suit and while I was prebreathing the oxygen.

Somewhere, I suppose about 5:30 in the morning, I finished dressing and was taken to the aircraft. I climbed into the aircraft and waited—I had to wait for signal before starting the engine and before taking off. The signal came a little late. I don't remember exactly how late, but it was later than scheduled.

I took off, climbed on course. I remember that the condensation trails were a little higher than I had been told they would be, but not much. I climbed above this layer and reached my altitude and continued on course. The weather was cloudy underneath. I couldn't see the ground for over an hour, and I drifted right off course. There was a clear area near the Ural Sea where I corrected back toward course but never did get exactly back on course before I got over the clouds again.

It was in this area that I saw two condensation trails from jet aircraft, so I knew at this time—they appeared to be paralleling my course. The first one headed in exactly the opposite direction as myself, and a few minutes later, I assume it was the same aircraft passed me going on the same heading that I was going on. He made no maneuvers that I could tell and I never did see the aircraft itself, just the condensation trail.

Chairman RUSSELL. Did you estimate his altitude?

Mr. POWERS. He was well below me. I felt fairly good at the time. I was well above the condensation trail layer and I don't think he ever saw me if he was looking for me. I got back over the clouds there, made a correction for the wind, but I still drifted to the right of course. I would say approximately 200 miles south of Sverdlovsk the clouds ended, and I corrected back to course and was on course the rest of the flight. Just about the time that the clouds ended, I began having a little autopilot trouble. It wasn't very bad at the time so I just disengaged the autopilot, a few minutes later reengaged it and it worked for about 10 minutes and I had the same trouble again.

I went through this procedure two or three times and finally decided not to use it any more, and I'd say the last 15, 20, or 30 minutes was flown by hand without the autopilot.

Weather in this area was perfectly clear, visibility was excellent. I saw no other condensation trails from other aircraft. I was on very close to course all the way. I got to, I would say, within 30 or 40 miles of Sverdlovsk probably as well as I can remember southeast of the city, made a turn to the left of approximately 90°, rolled out on course, lined up on my next flight line. I was to go over the southern edge of the city—the southwestern edge of the city.

I can remember seeing an airfield there that was not on my map. After making this turn, I had to record the time that I reached this particular point, the engine instrument readings, the exhaust gas temperature, the altitude, several things, I don't remember exactly what they all were, and I was doing this at the time that I heard and felt this explosion.

It was approximately a minute after I had rolled out of this turn. I can't be sure of the times there. It is hard to recall just exactly what sensation I had at this time. I can remember feeling, hearing, and just sensing an explosion, but there was no—just a slight acceleration of the aircraft was all that I felt in the aircraft itself. I immediately looked up from the instruments and everywhere I looked was orange.

I don't know whether the whole sky was orange, or just the reflection of an orange light in the canopy, but I had never seen anything like this before, and I am sure there was an explosion. I feel that the explosion was external to the aircraft and behind me, but I really don't know. I have never been in an aircraft in which the engine

exploded or which has had an explosion on board, so I don't know exactly what that would feel like, but I am sure you could feel that through the controls or through the seat some way, and so I am almost positive it was external to the aircraft.

For a short time there—I don't know how long—time had no meaning at this particular time—I thought everything was all right. The right wing started to drop, which is normal in an aircraft, it wanders around a little, and I turned the wheel, brought the right wing back to level position, and either after it reached the level position or just before it reached that, the nose started dropping.

I could probably demonstrate this better with the model here. It was going along like this. The right wing dropped slightly, not very much. I used the controls. The wing came back up level and just before or after it got level, the nose started going down, and very slowly. So I applied back pressure to the control column and felt no resistance to the movement of the control column, and this kept going faster and faster. So I immediately assumed at the time that the tail section of the aircraft had come off, because it—a very violent maneuver happened in here. I think I reached a position about like this and I feel sure that both wings came off.

This was where the very violent maneuver took place.

Chairman RUSSELL. You were not where you could see the wings to determine whether they had come off?

Mr. POWERS. I didn't have much time to look, and I was being thrown around in the cockpit very much at this time. It had come down in this position. I had pulled the control column all the way back into my lap, and it did no good. As it came down, it kept going faster and it got like this and I feel that the wings came off then, but I really don't know. And a very violent maneuver during this time, and it ended up in a spin about this position. I know the nose was high, and I know it was turning very fast around, it seemed like around something heavy like in the fuselage. I don't know how much of the aircraft was left at the time. But all I could see by looking out of the cockpit was sky. The g. forces were very strong. I have no way of estimating how much.

I know that when I tried to get in the ejection position, it took both hands on my legs to pull my feet back into the stirrups of the ejection seat.

It was spinning very violently. I was thrown forward and up, and I was hanging onto the seat belt, not sitting in the seat.

My first reaction was to reach for the destruct switches, and I reached up. I don't know whether I touched them or not, but I thought that I had better see if I can get out of here before using this.

I knew that there was a 70-second time delay between the time of the actuation of the switches and the time that the explosion would occur.

So, after deciding that I had better check and see if I could get out before actuating the switches, I tried to get into position in the ejection seat so that I could use it. In this particular aircraft there isn't much clearance between the pilot's knees and the top of the windshield, the rail, steel rail across the top of the windshield, and I was being thrown forward, and if I had used the ejection seat at that time, I would have probably lost both legs just above the knees.

I don't know how long I tried getting back in position, but at the time I could think of no other way to get out, just the ejection seat. My mind was fixed on that one idea.

I kept glancing at the altimeter as the aircraft was falling and it was going around very fast. I remembered somewhere during this time above the altitude of 34,000 feet that a friend of mine who had had an accident in an aircraft was having trouble getting out of the aircraft, and I remembered him telling me of his experience.

He said that he told himself that he just had to stop and think, and this entered my mind at the time, so I just stopped struggling and tried to think, and this was the first time that I realized that maybe I could just open the canopy, loosen the seat belt, and climb out.

And, along in here, I saw 34,000 feet on the altimeter, and it was still moving very fast.

I immediately reached up, opened the canopy. One side came loose first—I think it was the right side. The other handle loosened the left side and it floated off—I believe it was to the left. I really don't know, but it just disappeared.

I had pulled my emergency belt out, however—I think that was one of the first things I did after this real violent maneuver—so that when I separated from the aircraft, I would have an oxygen supply while descending, but I had forgotten to unfasten my oxygen hoses—the can on my left.

I opened the seat belt, and I was immediately thrown forward and halfway out of the aircraft.

I can probably demonstrate this better than I can tell. The top of the canopy was, say, the top of this table, and I was hanging out over the front of the aircraft about like this [indicating], and I think the only thing that was keeping me in the aircraft was the oxygen hose.

If that had not have been fastened, I would probably have gone out right away, I don't know.

Well, then, I tried to get back into the aircraft so that I could actuate these destructor switches. I couldn't—the g. forces were too great and I could not pull myself back over the top of the windshield.

I tried to reach around underneath the windshield. I knew where the switches were. And I couldn't get my hand back underneath.

Also, somewhere about this time my faceplate of my flying suit frosted up completely. That is when it got into the cold air, and all I could see was just the eyes on the faceplate about an inch or so in front of my face. I knew that I was well below 34,000 feet.

I had no idea of what my altitude was. I couldn't get back in the airplane. I didn't know whether I could get those oxygen hoses loose or not. I couldn't actuate the destruct switches.

So then I decided just to try to get out. I gave several lunges and something snapped and I was floating free. It was almost immediately that the parachute opened, and this surprised me because I hadn't pulled the ripcord.

The parachute was equipped with an automatic opening device, but it has to be actuated by pulling another cord, and apparently that cord got hung on something in the airplane and pulled, because it was well less than a minute, I am sure, after leaving the aircraft that the chute opened.

A short while after that—I don't remember how long—I got to thinking that this chute was set to open at 15,000 feet or lower; that

the maximum altitude it would open would be 15,000 feet; so I knew that I could take my faceplate off, and not be in danger from the thin air.

So I removed the faceplate, just left it hanging on the hoses that were connected to the suit, and started looking around, and I was still very high—I estimate above 10,000 feet, but I have no idea of the exact altitude.

There were a lot of thoughts running through my mind at this time. It is impossible to recall them all, but I remembered I had a map in my pocket. I took this map out, looked at it, tore it into small pieces, and scattered it in the air.

I also thought of the coin with the poison pin in it. This had been given to me just prior to the flight, and it was my option whether to take this or not, and I chose to take it. I got to thinking that when I got on the ground if I were captured they would surely find this coin but maybe with just the pin lying loose in the pocket it would be overlooked, so I opened up the coin, got the pin out, and just dropped it in my pocket.

I had several other things in my pockets, but they were more or less necessary to survival if I could evade capture, so I decided not to get rid of those things. I don't remember exactly what they were. It was just some of the things that I couldn't get into my survival pack itself. I couldn't tell where I was going to land. There were a lot of wooded areas there, and there was one fairly large one that I would drift toward and then drift back away from. I was trying to guide the parachute over to this wooded area, but I had no success in that.

The winds were variable as I was coming down in the parachute, and first I would go toward the woods, later away from them.

When I got down fairly close to the ground, there was a car I could see on a dirt road. I didn't know what he was doing, but he wasn't going too fast and he seemed to be just keeping up with me, and the closer I got the closer he would get to me. He came to a little village there, turned left out to the outskirts, of the village and stopped, and I guess I was maybe 200 feet in the air at this time, and I think it was two men got out of the car.

I was descending what appeared to be very rapidly at the time, and I landed in an open field about 25 feet from a tractor with one driver on the tractor and one man standing beside the tractor.

When I hit the ground I fell down. When I looked up, one of the men, I don't know which it was, was out grabbing a hold of the parachute to try to collapse it. I remember releasing a strap on one side so that the air would spill out of the chute. A couple of these men helped me to my feet. I don't remember whether they tried to say anything to me at the time or not. I think they did, and I just shook my head. They helped me remove my parachute harness and the helmet of the flying suit. They took away the pistol and a knife that I had on my parachute. After I got my helmet off and could look around, there was a large crowd of people there, a lot of children, so apparently there was a school in this area. I don't know how many grownups but I would say there were at least 50 people. This is just a guess.

These men tried to talk to me and I would just shake my head and indicate that I couldn't understand them. One of them pointed at me and held up two fingers, and I got the impression that he was

asking if there were two of us, and I told him "No," just shook my head "No," and pointed to myself and held up one finger telling him that I was alone. And then he pointed up in the air and I looked up and saw what I think was a parachute, but I knew that I had no other parachute on board the aircraft.

I knew that it was no one that I knew, so I wasn't very interested at the time. They didn't pay too much attention to this. They just talked among themselves, one on each side of me caught my arm and led me to this car that I had seen earlier. They put me in the car in the front seat next to the driver and with a man on my right and there were three, I believe, in the back seat. They had loaded up the parachute, and I think my survival pack, in the trunk of the car.

They started driving through the village and I indicated to them that I would like to have something to drink, so he stopped in front of a house there in this small village. One of the men went inside, brought out a glass of water which I drank and they gave the glass to some of the people standing around and we left this village. It was on a very bad dirt road, a lot of ruts, a very rough ride. The car was small, and I estimate that it took about 30 minutes to get to this next village which was a larger place.

There was a paved street running through this second village.

They stopped on the side of the street that we approached the village from, got me out of the car, and there was what I took to be a policeman there.

They talked to him and he went through my pockets, not very thoroughly, led me across the street into some sort of an office, and I estimate that I stayed there about 2 hours. There were both civilian and military there. I don't know whether the military was there when I arrived or not but I know they were there during the time and before I left. One of the military men tried to speak to me in German, and I told him I didn't understand him. There was no one there that could speak English, so they didn't ask me any questions at the time.

People kept bringing in small pieces of wreckage from the aircraft. I saw several pieces of metal, some with English written on it, there was a small roll of film. They had my parachute there, the survival pack. Oh, they searched me here at this building also. They stripped me down to my underwear, went through my pockets, felt along the seams, but they didn't find the needle at this time.

They called in a doctor. She was a young woman, I would say about 30 years old. I had some scratches on my right leg which she painted and bandaged. They tried to talk to me several times, but I couldn't understand them and they couldn't understand me, and I estimate it was around 2 hours, maybe a little more, but I have no way of knowing how long I was there. They loaded me up in a military vehicle, a little larger than our jeep. There was an officer on my left, myself in the middle, and an enlisted man on my right in the back seat. The enlisted man had a carbine of some kind.

In the front seat there was a military driver and a civilian. They took me into a fairly large city which I assumed was Sverdlovsk. It was in the downtown area, into a fairly large office building, I would say about three stories high, and they took me to the second floor.

There they performed a thorough search and found the needle at this place. I tried to invent a story there that I didn't know where I was, I was off course, but they brought out the packages that I had in my survival pack or on my person with maps of the Soviet Union, Russian rubles, and several other items that indicated the nature of the mission. It was then that I decided to follow the instructions that I had received earlier and tell them that I was a member of the CIA and the nature of the mission.

It was quite obvious that they knew it anyway. I think I stayed there approximately 30 minutes. They made a lot of telephone calls. There was a man there who spoke English also and asked me several questions, and that is how I found out my story wouldn't hold up.

They seemed to be in a hurry. They made several telephone calls, talked a lot among themselves, and they gave me back my underwear and the outer flying suit but kept the pressure suit. They also gave me something similar to our poncho with two slits on each side made out of canvas. The slits were for the arms to go through. They put this on me.

One man got out a pair of handcuffs. They talked among themselves and he put them back in his pocket and they never did put them on me. We went back outside.

They loaded me in a fairly large car, limousine type, drove to an airfield, and when we got there, we stopped at the gate on one side of the terminal building, I suppose it was, and we waited there maybe 5 minutes, and there was a jet passenger aircraft in front of this building. Someone opened the gate. We drove to the front entrance of this aircraft. They made me run up the steps and led me into the front compartment which contained 10 seats. There were four men with me. I remember at least one was in uniform and one was a civilian, but I don't remember what the other two were wearing.

They asked me no questions on this flight.

I am getting ahead of myself. It seemed to me that the aircraft was waiting there for us because as soon as we got in they moved the loading ramp away and started up immediately, and through the curtains to the back, when the stewardess walked through, I could see that there were other passengers in the back, so I suppose it was a regular passenger flight to Moscow.

During the flight they asked no questions. Some of the—a couple of the men played chess. They ate, offered me food but I couldn't eat, and it was during this time that I made up my mind exactly what course I would follow during the forthcoming weeks. I knew that if these people released the news that I was there—I didn't know that they would at the time, but I knew that if they did—that there would be a lot of stuff in the papers in the States, and I also knew that they probably subscribed to every paper we have, and I wanted to make my story as close to what I thought would be released in the papers as possible.

I think the flight took about 3 hours.

We arrived at the airport in Moscow. They had me sit there for about 5 minutes, brought me out, ran me down the steps to a waiting car, and we immediately left. The car had curtains inside that they kept pulled.

You could see outside through the curtains, but I don't suppose anyone could see inside.

They took me downtown to the building that I stayed in until September 9.

There was another search performed immediately upon my arrival at this building. They took all my clothing and gave me other clothing there. There was an interrogation, I would say, within 30 minutes after my arrival there, and there were quite a few high-ranking people, many of them in uniforms, many of them in civilian clothes.

I don't remember exactly the questions they asked during this time, but I think it was mostly concerned with establishing that I was a member of the CIA, or worked for the CIA, and the purpose of the flight.

I don't know how long this lasted. I do know that Rudenko, who was the prosecutor during the trial, was more or less in charge of this interrogation session.

He offered me a Chesterfield cigarette. They asked me, I think at this time, what I knew about Moscow; what I knew about Russia; and I told them I knew very little about it.

They asked me if I would like to see Moscow, and I said "Yes." And they said, "Well, that might be arranged." Then I don't know whether I said anything or not, but, after this session was over, they took me to the prison section of this building. There I received a physical examination, not a very thorough one.

There was a lot of time spent just locked up in a room with nothing but a bench built against the wall and just waiting. The doctor came into this room and examined me there. I waited again.

They took me to a doctor's office, and it was either a different doctor or a nurse, I don't know which, gave me a shot. This was after dark; I don't know what time it was.

They immediately took me to a cell and put me in it, brought in some food which I couldn't eat, and I lay down and tried to sleep. The next morning there was an interrogation, and, for some reason or the other, this was left out of the books that they had compiled of the investigation.

I don't know why this one was left out, but it was.

Chairman RUSSELL. How do you know it was left out?

Mr. POWERS. They told me that according to the Russian law, I could review the evidence in the case before the trial.

Going through this evidence a week or so prior to the trial, I saw that one was missing, and I told this to my Soviet-appointed defense counsel, and he just shrugged his shoulders. That morning they said that in the afternoon we would take a tour of Moscow, and I was all for this because I know as long as I was riding around in a car they would not be asking questions, and I would have been willing to take a trip every day.

The real interrogation started on the morning of the 3d, and it varied, the sessions varied in length, but there were times as much as 10 to 12 hours in a single day, several times at night, but, as the time went on, they got shorter and a longer period between the interrogations.

It was somewhere in the latter part of May that I had a very bad cold, could hardly talk, that they gave me the first day off that I did not have an interrogation.

I don't remember the exact date, but it was after the 20th of May.

Through June the sessions became shorter and sometimes they would skip the whole weekend, Saturday and Sunday.