Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

3 February 2015

Mr. John Greenewald, Jr.
[redacted]

Reference: F-2015-00346

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This letter acknowledges receipt of your letter dated 23 January 2015, received in the office of the Information and Privacy Coordinator on 26 January 2015, wherein you provided your fee agreement to pay up to $25. This fee covers the cost for the documents offered to you on 7 January 2015, responding to your 13 November 2014 Freedom of Information Act request for **a copy of records, electronic or otherwise, pertaining to: Project Whale Tale.** In light of your agreement, enclosed are copies of the 36 documents, consisting of 344 pages, as noted in our 7 January 2015 letter. Please send a check or money order in the amount of $24.40, payable to the Treasurer of the United States, citing reference number F-2015-00346 to ensure proper credit to your account.

Sincerely,

John Giuffrida
Acting Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

SECRET

[redacted] 25X1

Copy 11

22 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director, OSA
Deputy Assistant Director, OSA

SUBJECT : Summary of OSA Activities for week Ending 17 July 1963

BRIEFINGS

Dr. Gus Kinzel, the Director of Research, Union Carbide Corporation, who was recently appointed Chairman of the CIA Science Advisory Board, was given an orientation briefing on 16 July by several members of the Office of Special Activities on our operational and developmental activities.

IDEALIST

1. Regarding the C''' camera which is being modified for U-2 application, Itek is presently working out the vehicle interface problem. The hatch cover and camera controls have been supplied from IDEALIST assets to Itek to confirm window and control system compatibility. All necessary new parts for the main instrument have been ordered and the mount design has been started. Itek representatives visited Headquarters on 15 July to discuss the flight test program, and another representative will visit Lockheed on 22 July to obtain the technical data required for the installation and flight testing in the IDEALIST aircraft. The estimated delivery date at this time is 1 September with the possibility that delivery may be made sooner. 25X1

[redacted]

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SECRET

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[redacted]

3. The DAD/OSA had several telephone conversations with Navy Captain Carmody on 15 July regarding the carrier training exercise for IDEALIST aircraft. Admiral Anderson was informed of this plan at a meeting on 13 July at which time he expressed concern over any protracted U-2 operations from the Sixth Fleet carriers in the Mediterranean since this might be discovered and destroy the image the Navy is striving to protray in this area of an impartial "force for peace" on behalf of the Western powers. Mr. Cunningham explained that it was not likely that the U-2 operations would become publicly known since this capability would be reserved in large part for critical targets in that area and elsewhere. Captain Carmody is still attempting to arrange a date for the projected training exercises on the USS KITTYHAWK during the period 3 through 16 August. Plans are being made to brief Vice Admiral Stroup, COMNAVAIRPAC, Captain Horace Epps, Skipper of the KITTYHAWK, and Vice Admiral Rayburn, the head of Naval Research, who are all associated with the carrier operations.

Captain Carmody had spoken to Rear Admiral C. E. Weakley, USN, Deputy Director of Research and Development of the Navy, who controls the Office of Naval Research, about this project, which has been code named WHALE TALE. Admiral Weakley is willing to use the name of the Office of Naval Research in the training exercise on the KITTYHAWK next month.

Captain Carmody, Mr. Cunningham and [redacted] went to San Diego on 17 and 18 July to investigate this operation. On 17 July they visited Kelly Johnson at Burbank to inspect the modified fuselage cart/ loading sling which is now ready for training tests. 25X1

[redacted]

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[redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

OXCART

25X1

[redacted]

2. Since spike control feedback is a continuing problem, Lockheed has mocked up new feedback routings. These eliminate some of the bends and should permit the feedback to work somewhat easier. These mock up tubes were sent to [redacted] on July 10 who will make feedback assemblies to these mockups, and return them to Lockheed for installation in the OXCART vehicles.

25X1

3. [redacted] is currently working on a procedure to prepare and evaluate proposed modifications to the A-12, A-12 systems or A-12 supporting equipment. This procedure involves a working group and a modification committee [redacted] who will thoroughly examine every proposal before forwarding it to headquarters. The proposal will then be forwarded to headquarters by priority cable slugged "OXCART modify". This procedure is being established in order to provide headquarters with the inputs for final decision on proposed modifications. At the present time no clear-cut method of establishing the requirement for changes to, or modification of, the A-12 exists.

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4. This past week has been very fruitful in improving the [redacted] gyro field and delivery problem. The cause of the overheating problem has been determined and [redacted] is working on a program to eliminate the temperature overfloat during the start up. The first three gyros which have [redacted] new bearing-spin motor assembly have been delivered to Minneapolis-Honeywell where they will be monitored by [redacted] and Minneapolis-Honeywell personnel during testing to determine temperature

25X1 NRO

25X1 NRO

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[redacted] 25X1

25X1 control techniques. Minneapolis-Honeywell is placing orders with [redacted] to stock long lead time items (such as float assemblies) which will reduce the turn around time from 90 days to 30 days, providing more useable gyros for our purposes.

5. Regarding the oil consumption problem of the OXCART vehicle, progress has been made in designing and approaching the problem, but further engine development testing is required to confirm attendant fixes. Increased load seals with seal plate modification show promises on initial rig testing at low pressure differential and will be evaluated in engine tests. However, this change, if proven successful, can only be installed in new engines or at overhaul since major engine disassembly is involved. In the meantime, changes to reduce the possibility of seal carrier interference, to improve the seal plate stiffness and flatness, and to improve leakage past static ring seals have been substantiated by engine tests and will be incorporated in engines #131 up in future overhaul guilds.

6. The speed extension flights in the OXCART vehicle thus far have involved reported roughness which is sometimes quite violent. It is believed that this roughness may be caused by the inlet bypass door opening. Pratt and Whitney has established a desired flight program which will eliminate some of the variables and isolate the magnitude of inlet bypass door position effect on engine operation. This program has been submitted to Pratt and Whitney personnel [redacted] and they in turn will propose to Kelly Johnson that these tests be made following the next go with the tilted control schedule. 25X1

7. OXCART Aircraft #122 made an envelope extension flight on 17 July attaining a speed of 2.82 mach at an altitude of 70,000 feet. This is the highest mach reached in the OXCART vehicle to this date. Another envelope extension flight is scheduled for 19 July 1963.

8. The OXCART pilots have all complained of the discomfort of the pressure suits presently being used in the Program. One of the main items of discomfort has been the face mask and neck bearing. As a result of this, a development program is underway by David Clark to develop a neck seal and shoulder mounted helmet to relieve this discomfort.

SECRET

[redacted] 25X1

A second major item of discomfort is the many straps and tubes passing over the shoulders and back and around the thighs. A program for integrated harness development is planned with David Clark in the near future.

NRO

The D/NRO has directed that the work on the M-2 and C-375 be terminated and that no further effort be directed toward these high resolution area search systems. Instead, the D/NRO desires that additional work be directed toward improving the resolution capability of the present CORONA-MURAL system. He particularly desires that improvements be made that will result in more consistent performance by which the majority of the take can be obtained in the high quality presently realized for a small percentage of the take. The objective is to obtain this maximum performance over most of the total take most of the time. The D/NRO desires a coordinated Program A-Program B proposal for this improvement as soon as possible. Subjects to be considered in the proposal are: Agena stability, V/H sensors, IMC, yaw control, variable exposure, and auto focus.

25X1

ACTION ITEMS

[redacted]

[redacted] 25X1

for Chief, Programs Staff
(Special Activities)

SECRET

[redacted] 25X1

Dist:
1 - AD/OSA
2 - DAD/OSA
3 - EXO/OSA
4 - DD/R
5 - D/FA/OSA
6 - D/TECH/OSA
7 - C/SD/OSA
8 - PS/OSA
9 - PS/OSA
10 - RB/OSA

25X1 PS/OSA: [redacted] (22 Jul 63)

25X1A

[redacted] 3241-63
Copy 9 of 9

11 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR : Security Staff, Office of Special Activities

SUBJECT : Request for IDEALIST Clearance--[redacted] 25X1A
25X1A [redacted] U. S. Army--WHALE TALE/TWO

1. In connection with arrangements being made for the WHALE TALE/TWO exercise, it is requested that an IDEALIST clearance be granted Colonel Long, Commander, Defense Language School Presidio, Monterey, California.

2. It is difficult to say at what point Colonel Long might actively become involved in WHALE TALE/TWO. If everything goes normally; i. e., there are no aircraft accidents, it is unlikely that we will need to brief Colonel Long formally. However, should an accident occur in a T2A aircraft based at NAF, Monterey, and should this receive publicity requiring release of the name of the pilot, it is possible that we may wish to attribute his presence in Monterey to attendance at the Defense Language School. This would be particu-
25X1A larly true in the event of an accident to either [redacted] who will be given training later this month.

3. Please advise me how much of a problem you feel a passive clearance of this sort would be, and when it can be accomplished. At such time as it is in hand, I will want to advise Captain Carmody, USN, OP-506, so that he in turn can inform Captain William J. Craven, USN, Commander, U. S. Naval Air
25X1A Facility, Monterey, to whom the IDEALIST [redacted] pilots will be reporting.

25X1A [redacted]

JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR.
Deputy Assistant Director
(Special Activities)

Distribution:
1, 2 - SS/OSA
3 - OP-506
4 - DAD/OSA
5 - AD/OSA
6 - D/FA/OSA
7 - SAL/OSA
8 - PB/OSA
9 - RB/OSA
DAD/OSA:JACunningham, Jr./mm

[redacted] 25X1A

25X1A

[redacted] 3237-63
Copy 8 of 8

11 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR : Captain Martin D. Carmody, USN
OP-506

SUBJECT : Identification of Personnel Participating in WHALE TALE/TWO

25X1A 1. I have just been advised by [redacted] of the identities of the four pilots from his command who will commence participation in WHALE TALE/TWO beginning 16 September 1963 at the Naval Air Facility, Monterey, California, in accordance with arrangements worked out at the time of our visit last month. The following people will participate:

25X1A [redacted]

25X1A In addition, [redacted] (Department of Air Force civilian), will be present for security support to the group until it is determined that his presence is no longer required.

2. I would appreciate it if you would notify Captain Craven, by whatever form of communication you feel most appropriate, of the identities of the individuals noted above, who will all report to him the morning of 16 September.

25X1A [redacted] advises me that the group will be staying at the "Motel Six" where we stayed during our visit. In accordance with our understanding, none of the four pilots will carry any personal documentation whatever on his person during flights to and from NAF, Monterey. On the assumption that we agreed that no no other documentation was required such as that proposed at one stage, there would be no requirement for photographs, fingerprints, ID cards, or the like; however, all four pilots will be prepared to sign the proper "Hold Harmless"

Handle via [redacted] 25X1A
Control System

25X1A

certificate required for their participation in military aircraft flights. It may not be necessary to suggest this to Captain Craven, but in the interest of security, I would suggest he be asked to make certain that the helmets and flight equipment of the pilots which they will receive from Navy issue not be stenciled with their names in large black letters as is sometimes SOP on military bases at the issue room level. Please let me know if there is any amplifying information which you require in order to have WHALE TALE/TWO get off the ground on time 16 September.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY)

25X1A

By: [redacted]
JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR.

Distribution:
1 - Addressee
2 - DAD/OSA
3 - AD/OSA
4 - D/FA/OSA
5 - SS/OSA
6 - PS/OSA
7 - PB/OSA
8 - RB/OSA
DAD/OSA:JACunningham, Jr. /mm

25X1A

[redacted] 3242-63
Copy 9 of 9

11 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR : Captain Martin D. Carmody, USN
OP-506

SUBJECT : Accident Investigation Procedures for WHALE TALE/TWO

1. It has suddenly occurred to me that it might be a good idea to suggest to you that you may want to think about the possibility of in some way altering what may be the Navy's normal accident investigation procedures in the event of injury, death, or damage sustained to aircraft and/or personnel in the course of the WHALE TALE/TWO exercise.

2. This suggestion is prompted by the rather awesome set of bureaucratic procedures that are almost immediately launched within the Air Force by DFSR when someone blows a tire or has an accident of any kind. Perhaps this sort of thing is susceptible of control by Captain Craven without reference to any outside jurisdictions, but maybe not. I do not, of course, argue that there should be no investigation of the accident, when and if it occurs, but it seems to me that the procedure should be altered so that normal distribution of the reports, as well as the composition of the investigating body, be controlled fairly carefully. Let me have your thoughts on this.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY)

25X1A

By: [redacted]
JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR.

Distribution:
1 - Addressee
2 - DAD/OSA
3 - AD/OSA
4 - D/FA/OSA
5 - SS/OSA
6 - PB/OSA
7 - SAL/OSA
8 - PS/OSA
9 - RB/OSA
DAD/OSA:JACunningham, Jr. /mm

[redacted] 25X1A

OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS MANUAL
FOR
CARRIER OPERATIONS

Approved For Release 2006/03/10 : CIA-RDP74B00836R000300180001-8

SECRET

1 March 1966

OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS MANUAL

FOR

CARRIER OPERATIONS

SECRET

CONTENTS

Attachments:

1. Security Annex
2. Tactical Maintenance Annex
3. Special Equipment Annex
4. Supply Annex
5. Tracker Annex
6. Materiel Annex
7. Elint Section Annex
8. Signal Center Annex

I GENERAL

This directive with attachments is designed to provide guidance in all phases of U-2 operations aboard a carrier. There are two basic concepts of operation envisioned; one will entail loading aboard the carrier on the east or west coast of the US and the other will require deployment by air support to the theater of operations prior to loading aboard. There is no appreciable difference between the two plans which would require special preparation.

The U-2 will be flown aboard utilizing the mirror landing approach set at 2.5 degrees and the Landing Signal Officer (LSO) will assist the pilot by providing cut one and cut two signals which will indicate the point to reduce the throttle and deploy spoilers plus other instructions as necessary to insure the safest possible approaches. Landings will be made on the angle deck utilizing four one inch cables for arrestment instead of the standard, larger size. Take-offs will be made on the straight deck and the aircraft position will be determined by fuel load with careful consideration given to clearance of island superstructure and other obstacles. The line-up point is critical due to the flow of air around the "island" and take-offs can be very hazardous unless extreme care is exercised in selecting the takeoff point.

Carrier operations are more hazardous than land based operations, therefore, special precautions should be taken to insure the highest degree of safety possible. Weather in the recovery area will be an important consideration. Even, light rain on the aircraft windshield during final approach will induce a serious condition for the pilot that will make carrier landings very difficult. Wind velocity and sea condition are other factors that must be taken into consideration to insure that deck wash turbulance and carrier pitch and roll are within acceptable limits.

Navigation over long distances at sea with the requirement to return and land at a precise point aboard the carrier will involve additional problems which must be carefully considered to insure optimum conditions for mission success.

II PREPARATIONS

A briefing will be given to all personnel selected for the deployment as soon after alert notification as possible. All equipment required for the staging will be assembled by each section concerned in the designated area in Hangar III. Manifests will be prepared by each section indicating box number, weight, and cube of each item and then turned in to Materiel for compilation. One member of each section participating in the deployment will be responsible for insuring that all equipment is packed and placed in the designated area in Hangar III. Airlift requirements will be submitted to Headquarters as soon as available including total weight and cube plus size and weight of the largest item. Also a personnel list of all detachment personnel selected for the TDY will be submitted to Headquarters.

Immediately after notification of a pending exercise, the pilots will be selected for refresher training and the following will be accomplished prior to deployment:

a. Review "G" model procedures.

b. Briefing by Landing Signal Officer.

c. Minimum of 5 sorties per pilot to practice mirror approaches with LSO assistance. (Approximately 10 landings per sortie)

d. Review Operations Order and prepare briefing for ferry mission in accordance with briefing outline and include the following additional items:

(1) Rendezvous area.

(2) Bingo fuel.

(3) Carrier requalification.

(4) Emergency procedures in event of missed trap.

(5) Carrier on board delivery (COD) of certain personnel, if necessary.

(6) Brief ship's crash crew and helicopter plane guard on rescue.

(7) Pilot briefed on water survival, ditching procedures and rescue operation.

e. Plans should be made to establish Communications between the launch base and the carrier. The planning for use of this link must include all possible measures to preclude security violations, i.e., use of codes or pre-arranged words and phrases.

f. Acutal deployment to the carrier will be accomplished in accordance with established unit procedures.

III ARRIVAL ABOARD

The Detachment Commander or his designated representative will make arrangements for billeting of all personnel immediately after arrival. An effort will be made to locate all personnel as close together as possible to facilitate making necessary contacts as required. All support equipment will be loaded aboard with every item properly secured to withstand rough seas. The area selected for the equipment will normally be in the aft section of the hangar deck and located so as not to interfere with the parking and movement of aircraft.

It is very important that close coordination be maintained with the carrier commander and his staff. This coordination must be considered in all phases of the operation from going aboard until the last man is off the ship.

Following is a list of key positions which must be utilized:

a. The Captain

b. Executive Officer

c. Operations Officer

d. Air Officer

e. Air Operations Officer

f. Communications Officer

g. Marine Commander

h. Hangar Deck Officer

i. Ward Room Officer

As soon as feasable after the deployment force is aboard, an informal meeting should be arranged between the above officers and the key personnel of the detachment. After this meeting, all sections heads should arrange another meeting with their counter parts so as to become familiar with the ships operating procedures and as soon as possible locate problem areas which may require decisions at

higher levels. Some of the points to be considered are:

a. Security requirements.

b. Complete utilization of the flight deck for designated periods of time.

c. Complete freedom of movement throughout the ship from first mission alert to the last mission report.

d. Ship support for unusual working hours.

The Detachment Commander will recommend a briefing of all detachment personnel by one of the senior officers of the ships company. The Executive Officer would be the most logical choice for this assignment. This will provide indoctrination for detachment personnel and will provide an opportunity to obtain information on special instructions that should be observed throughout the cruise. It is important that detachment personnel conform as closely as possible to the rules established for the ships company.

IV FERRY FLIGHT TO CARRIER

As soon as possible after all personnel and equipment are aboard, the Detachment Commander and/or Operations Officer should meet with the Captain and Operations Officer to coordinate the rendezvous with the aircraft. If this meeting results in any changes to the rendezvous plan, the launch base and headquarters will be notified immediately. Arrangements should be made at this time for the aforementioned get together of the ships company and detachment staff. This meeting can be held while the ship is enroute to the rendezvous point. Immediately after this meeting, the preparations to recover the aircraft should be initiated. It is expected that recovery will commence when the ship is 20 to 30 miles off shore and in favorable daylight and weather conditions.

Recovery procedures for ferry mission will begin at scheduled launch time from land base.

a. The Detachment Commander/Operations Officer will be on station in the Air Officer's bridge.

b. The Detachment Navigator and Weather Officer will be on station in the Air Operations Control Center.

c. The ISO will be immediately available in the flight deck area and be on the platform at ETA -0:15.

d. The Maintenance crew will be on deck with necessary equipment no later than ETA -0:30. NOTE: Maintenance chief should be immediately available to the Air Officer's bridge in event of airborne emergency. Commander and Maintenance Chief will have a plan for launching emergency recovery crew in Navy support aircraft if diversion is necessary.

e. Personal Equipment Specialists and necessary equipment will be on deck at ETA -0:15.

fighter type aircraft suitably configured to start recovery. Lens setting of 2.5° and wind over the deck to be 20 kts. One inch arresting cables should be readily available but not installed until ready to commence trap landings. Arresting gear setting for landings will be 10,000 lbs.

g. After pilot has completed requalification and is on deck the maintenance crew will move the aircraft to the hangar deck and prepare to recover the second aircraft. Wind over the deck should be reduced to a minimum for this operation with no more than 10 knots desired.

h. If only one aircraft is to be on the deployment it will be refueled to 495 gallons and the second pilot will fly a requalification mission.

ABORT CRITERA

a. Adherence to Project Headquarters Directive 50-10-19 shall apply for all operational flights.

b. When conducting refresher landings, the use of special equipment, elint and defensive systems will not be required. Malfunction of any of the following will be cause for air/ground abort.

(1) UHF.

(2) ADF.

(3) Hydraulic Pressure.

(4) Oil pressure.

(5) Engine roughness, temperature.

(6) Oxygen system.

(7) Fuel pressure or uncontrolable, uneven feeding.

(8) LENS.

(9) Arresting gear.

(10) Unusual deck pitching or deterioration of required minimums-1000 feet/3 miles.

(11) Any other unforeseen or peculiar happening which in the opinion of the driver or detachment commander would be reason for abort.

c. In the event aircraft is unable to trap aboard prior to reaching bingo fuel, aircraft will abort and return to home base. The flight planner and driver/operations officer stationed in air operations will monitor movement of ship's position in regards to fluctuating fuel requirements and distances in order to arrive home base with sufficient fuel reserve.

d. If aircraft cannot reach home base because of some particular incident incurred during the touch and go phase, it will proceed to diversion field. Home base and diversion information will be given to the driver at commencement of carrier operations and whenever there is a significant change in the ship's position.

V OPERATIONS ON CARRIER

The Detachment Operations Officer will schedule a briefing for the pilots by the Air Operations Officer to establish all traffic procedures to be used in the Ship's Control Zone i.e., instrument approaches, emergency traffic patterns, radar procedures, etc.

Upon receipt of the alert message normal notification procedures will be followed. The Ship's Captain should be informed that a mission is tenatively planned for the date indicated in the alert message.

Upon receipt of Mission Plan Message the detachment will prepare for the mission in accordance with normal procedures. In addition to this, the necessary coordination with the ship's staff will be initiated. Information exchanged during this coordination will concern:

a. Ship's position at launch.

b. Ship's course and speed during mission.

c. Coordinate Air Group activities.

d. Set up deck alert for rescue and/or recovery assistance.

e. Report on status of all ships communications equipment utilized by article.

f. Arrange for airborne or deck alert beginning 30-45 min before ETA of article.

g. Other necessary mission support information.

The mission launch schedule for carrier operations will be slightly different than the land base launch schedule. The following schedule provides sufficient time in proper sequence for each support section to complete preparation for the mission. NOTE: "H" is takeoff time.

a. H-18:00 Maintenance - engine run up and initial preflight.

b. H-11:00 Pilot to bed.

c. H-9:00 Communications - Install and check systems.

d. H-3:15 Pilot wake up and eats.

e. H-3:00 Special Equipment - Install configuration and tracker.

f. H-2:15 Operations (Operational Missions)

General Briefing

Specialized Briefing

g. H-2:00 Maintenance

Completes pre-flight on aircraft

Start moving aircraft to launch position

h. H-1:30 Personal Equipment

Prepare pre-breathing equipment

Check pilots flight gear

i. H-1:15 Personal Equipment - Pilot pre-breathing

j. H-1:10 Operations - Pre takeoff briefing

k. H-1:00 Maintenance

Aircraft in position on AFT END of flight deck opposite LSO platform.

Fuel aircraft.

l. H-0:50 Personal Equipment - Dress pilot and perform dynamic equipment check.

m. H-0:40 Maintenance

Starter, back-up starting unit, and spare ARC-34 UHF radio available at aircraft.

Purging hose connected - start purging driftsight.

Deck wires forward of aircraft removed.

Level fuel load if less than full tanks.

n. H-0:40 Operations (Mobile Officer at aircraft prior to pilot)

Exterior check.

Pitot cover removed.

Sextant and driftmeter covers removed.

Power on aircraft, inverters checked, No 1 inverter on, set compass, check auto pilot after three minutes, check radio compass, leave inverter and aircraft power on, Systems VI set as briefed.

o. H-0:30 Personal Equipment (At aircraft with pilot)

Cockpit preparation.

Adjust parachute and floatation gear on pilot.

Position pilot in cockpit.

Cockpit hook-up. (NOTE: Refer to OPS SOI-25.)

p. H-0:15 Operations

A qualified Mobile Control Officer together with the pilot, using the aircraft check list, will complete the following items:

Ejection seat connected. (Maintenance)

Cockpit check.

Check time hack on aircraft clock.

Check compass heading.

Place mission flight kit in aircraft.

Canopy closed.

Operations Officer in the Air Officer's Control bridge.

q. H-0:05 Operations (aircraft)

Pilot starts engine

Seals on.

Complete pre-taxi check list.

r. H-0:03 Maintenance - Purging hose disconnected and hatch covers removed.

s. H-0:02 Operations

Pre takeoff check.

Check trim set for takeoff.

Flaps set for takeoff.

Speed brakes in.

Tracker operating.

Pilot requests MAG heading and sets compass.

Clear deck received from air officer.

30 knots of wind over the deck for launch.

t. H-0:01 Maintenance

Pogo removed.

Hatch covers removed.

Crew chief gives signal when clear for takeoff.

Check boatswain mate for deck clearance.

u. H-0:00 Takeoff.

NOTE: Provisions of this schedule may be deviated with Commander's concurrence for training missions, if such deviations will improve efficiency.

VI FLIGHT PLANNING

Several problems are evident in carrier operations which are not common to a land based deployment.

The airfield is mobile. Coordinates of the carrier must be known for departure time and time of return. Also, hourly positions of the carrier must be known, while the aircraft is airborne. This is necessary in order to solve the intercept problem that might be generated by an abort. Due to the confined space and limited number of tools available to the pilot, simplicity is mandatory.

a. In addition to the normal flight maps, the complete route will be drawn up on a GNC Chart (Scale 1:5,000,000). If the carrier is moving to a position other than departure location, the track and hourly positions will be plotted. Radials from the aircraft's hourly position to the computed position of the ship for the time of arrival will be plotted. Annotations of MAG heading and time enroute will be made. For aborts at intermediate points, the pilot will be able to use his plotter and dividers for determining his course and distance to intercept. One other method can be used and that is to plot radials from the ship's position to readily identifiable check points near the aircraft's route to which he could proceed and thence begin his intercept problem.

b. Procedure for return to a stationary base with the carrier remaining within 10 NM of departure point during entire flight, is comparatively simple. Again a GNC would be used but radials, approximately 10^{o} apart and with point of origin at the carrier, would be plotted. Annotations of MAG heading and time to carrier would be made where the radials intercept the flight path.

Hi cone fuel must be translated into landing pattern entry fuel. Descent should not be made until positive identification has been made. Fuel remaining should be no less than 200 gallons at descent point or 150 gallons on down wind

leg.

Radar vectoring by means of skin painting or IFF/SIF procedures will be used for recovery. The low frequency beacon on the carrier should be on no later than 30 minutes before the aircraft's ETA.

VII MISSION RECOVERY PROCEDURES

This will be a more critical phase of operations than recovery at a land base, consequently it is imperative that the following steps be followed closely:

a. During the entire mission a Detachment Officer will be on duty at the Air Officer's bridge or the Air Operations Control Center. He will keep immediate telephone contact with the following personnel:

(1) Detachment Commander and/or Operations Officer.

(2) Maintenance Chief.

(3) LSO.

(4) Mobile Pilot.

In event of an abort, these personnel will go to their stations immediately and prepare to recover the aircraft. If the mission is completed, the Duty Officer will alert the recovery team 45 minutes before scheduled landing time.

b. No later than 30 minutes before scheduled landing time the following actions will be taken:

(1) Request launch of helicopter.

(2) Alert radar operations.

(3) Alert Air Officer.

(4) Check ship's position and ETA to rendezvous point.

(5) Check ship's NAV Aids.

(6) Detachment Commander should check that all recovery personnel are in position 15 minutes before landing time.

(7) Check alert aircraft airborne or on cockpit standby.

c. Except in an emergency the aircraft should be landed in the following manner:

(1) Enter initial approach on starboard side of the carrier.

(2) Lower hook on crosswind turn.

(3) Follow normal procedure to arrestment.

(4) If unable to trap due to hook malfunction or other problems pilot will request barrier at a minimum of 40 gallons of fuel.

d. In event of an emergency condition the pilot may elect to land from a straight in approach.

e. As soon as arrestment is complete Personal Equipment will deplane the pilot and the aircraft will be moved to the hangar deck.

f. Downloading of systems and post flight checks will be in accordance with normal procedures.

VIII SHIPMENT OF TAKE

The mission take will be prepared in accordance with standard procedures and made ready for shipment. Headquarters will arrange and direct method of shipment.

IX POSTFLIGHT PREPARATION

The aircraft and all systems will be thoroughly checked after the mission. Immediate preparation will be made to attain readiness status for the next mission requirement.

SECRET

SECURITY S.O.P.
FOR
CARRIER OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

The carrier operations concern the launching and recovery of the U-2 from an aircraft carrier, for which, you as a security officer will be required to provide and supervise the necessary security support. It remains for the security officer(s) assigned to further implement and improve upon the security during, and after, an actual operation begins.

There will be occasions during the mission when you, as a security officer, will become very exasperated from a standpoint fo good security, due to certain circumstances beyond your control. This will be particular evident during the take-off and landing of the U-2 since the carrier flight deck, of necessity, has at least four different crews participating on it during flight activity. These crews, depending on their function, will be attired in either red, green, blue or yellow sweaters and total about forty in number. Their duties include spotting the U-2, recovering and changing cables, providing emergency support in case of an accident, and handling various and sundry other assignments related to the launching and retrieving of aircraft. Our customary standard of keeping all uncleared personnel away from the U-2 is virtually impossible to uphold.

This situation of course cannot be altered; hence, it is best for the security officer to position himself advantageously and maintain close scrutiny over all activity. This is your best defense in view of the circumstances that prevail during flight deck operations.

PRELIMINARY PREPARATION

It is necessary prior to departure on a deployment to contact the Materiel

Officer to inform him of the number of boxes, their cube and their weight that the security office will be taking. This is required so that a shipping manifest can be prepared for the supporting airlift from the home base to the point of embarkation.

Before the day of departure, the security officer should visit each section to be involved in the operation such as LAC, PE, Special Equipment, etc., for the purpose of examining their equipment to insure sterility. 25X1 25X1

PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

There are at least four important items of a physical nature that require security supervision. They are as follows:

1. The U-2 - It is to be kept under adequate security supervision constantly. Normally, there will be an appropriate number of Marine Guards available to patrol a perimeter established around the aircraft with rope. The area in which the U-2 reposes should be compartmented by closing the hangar deck dividing door, and by securing whenever possible, the hatchways egressing into this general area. However, it appears that complete isolation of this area at all times would not be feasible. The hangar deck is a focal point for conducting training classes, chow formations, military drilling, and for the requisitioning of supplies from numerous rooms located around the periphery of the hangar deck. Access to this central area apparently must be permitted so as to avoid conflict with Naval personnel who have legitimate reasons for being there.

Through the Commanding Officer of the Marine Guards, request that no unauthorized person be allowed inside the rope barrier encircling the U-2 and that his guards instruct the curious or the suspect not to loiter in that general vicinity.

Emphasize to the Executive Officer and the Guard Officer that absolutely no photographing of the U-2 or related equipment will be permitted. It must be realized that even though the U-2 is no longer classified, pictures of it could prove extremely embarassing or detrimental if they were displayed or lost on foreign soil, or met with publicity from being mailed home. Furthermore, the presence of the U-2 onboard the carrier is indicative of a new capability and is not intended for public consumption at this time.

Supply the guard officer with an adequate number of authorization lists, denoting those people who will require access to the U-2. The lists should also

contain the room and telephone number for each security officer so that he can be reached expeditiously for inquiry.

2. FUEL - It is axiomatic that his critical element should be carefully controlled by using and recording serialized seals on the truck hatches to insure that no contamination occurs. The fuel truck(s) should also be placed, if possible, on the hangar deck within the purview of the Marine Guards who are providing security for the U-2(s).

Have it understood that positively NO SMOKING, NO WELDING, or any other kind of activity hazardous to the fuel, or to the U-birds, will be allowed in that general area. It would be advisable to suggest that the Captain or the Executive Officer indicate this prohibition in an announcement to the crew.

3. EQUIPMENT - The security officer will also be charged with the security of classified equipment as it relates to the true purpose of our mission. The presence of this equipment in relation to our primary function will, undoubtedly, not be consistent with our cover and therefore should be treated just as meticulously, from a security standpoint, as the U-2, the fuel, or classified documents.

Another pertinent item under this category is the pilot food and high altitude gear. Again, these items must be considered critical since tampering or contamination of either could result in disaster.

If availability permits, the Airborne Systems Support Center rooms will be used for the storage of sensitive equipment. A preliminary inspection of these rooms divulged that there were three access routes to them. Normally, entrance would be gained through a key controlled locking door at which a guard should be posted with an authorization list. Within the compartment which had approximately foor or five rooms, there appeared to be two other exits. One was through the double elevator doors which could be securly bolted from within, and the other, was by exodus through an overhead submarine type hatch. This hatch should be secured with an aircraft tie-down chain to the steel ladder

which leads up to it. The chain has a quick-release mechanism which would be apropos in the event an emergency escape from the compartment is necessary.

The strong possibility exists that we may not be permitted to occupy the ASSC compartment, if the aircraft carrier from which we operate is carrying its own aircraft for training and operational purposes. If this is true, it then appears that we will be relying upon the portable trailers now being outfitted by the Special Equipment section as a place to secure sensitive equipment.

Providing the trailer is used, the security officer should inspect its locks, and if possible see that a Sargent-Greenleaf combination padlock is used. This will avoid the problem of keys being lost or duplicated and any efforts to tamper with this combination should be reasonably obvious. Of course, the combination should be kept by the security officer and access limited to those with a "need-for-entry."

Wherever the trailer is stored, it too should be kept under constant Marine guard except during loading and unloading activities over which a staff security officer(s) should supervise. For consolidation purposes, the hangar deck in the vicinity of the U-2 and fuel truck(s) would seem to be the best location for the trailer, providing an opaque screening arrangement can be erected during activities.

4. DOCUMENTS - It is not yet known how much classified material there will be in the form of documents, logs, cables, etc. It is suggested that at least a two drawer safe be taken for the purpose of storing documents, weapons, passports, etc., that need safekeeping. Dissemination of the combination should be held to a minimum and given only to those persons with a "need-to-know."

If a safe can not be taken, an alternative would be to use the communications room which has a combination type lock on it. If this room is utilized for the storage of documents, the security officer should set the combination

and control distribution of it carefully.

The problems of excess documents probably will not evolve. If it should, the security officer will have to arrange a system for control of them. It may be helpful to initiate a sign-out procedure, or to have them kept within the confines of one particular, secure room. These are only random thoughts - implementation of these suggestions mentioned above might prove too cumbersome for practicality. Again, it will fall to the ingenuity of the security officer to improvise in such situations.

As far as the communications room is concerned, it does not appear necessary to place a Marine guard with an access list at this door, especially if prudent control is exercised over distribution of the lock combination.

In summation, concerning the four numbered physical items, it would seem good practice for the professional security staff to inspect their responsible areas at least three time per day at unannounced intervals. This will serve to engender the respect of the Marine complement guarding the secure areas and create deference for your diligence at a time when a more lackadaisical approach could easily prevail.

STAFF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

It will be the duty of the senior security officer on board to see that the area involved where the loading and unloading of the "B" and "T" configurations and other sensitive systems will take place, is secure from observation and intrusion.

Coordination with the Commander of the Marine security guards will be required to ascertain whether all hatches leading to the hangar deck compartment can be sealed-off. If not, some type of screening device, previously alluded to, will be needed to obstruct unauthorized viewing of the installation of our sensitive equipment.

That the Marine guards need to be precluded from watching our mission activities needs no elaboration. If possible, they should either be sent below or placed in the hatchways leading to the hangar deck. The feasibility of this will have to be determined after consultation with the guard commander. Only staff and/or contract security officers should provide the security for the pre and post mission activities.

If any of the mission equipment such as the "B" or "T" has to be moved a considerable distance in order to be loaded or returned to where it is normally kept, it should be disguised by some form of covering and not exposed until it is behind the provided screening apparatus surrounding the U-2.

Another staff duty officer function is that of securing the briefing room prior to the beginning of the briefing. Usually, this is done by one security officer who will post a conspicuous, red "KEEP OUT - CONFERENCE IN SESSION" sign on the Ready Room door and then secure the door from the inside until the meeting is adjourned.

During the briefing it is the responsibility of the security officer to brief the driver fully regarding his conduct, and what he is expected to divulge, should he be forced down in hostile territory. Headquarters will furnish this information prior to the mission - be sure that you as the security officer are thoroughly familiar with the instructions to be given to the pilot.

After the briefing is concluded, the security officer will have each section chief sign a "Mission Certificate" stating that his equipment "...is free from any identifying data, tags, tickets, labels, etc., which are of a compromising nature to the project, the unit, its personnel and its supply mechanisms." In conjunction with this, the security officer will check the U-2 over vigilantly, specifically the cockpit, to see that no one has inadvertently dropped foreign articles therein indicating the source of the flight, or any other comprimising

material inconsistent with our cover. Conduct your inspection just before the driver enters the cockpit and be certain you are the last person to be in there before the pilot seats himself. As a precaution, remove all items from your coat and/or shirt pockets before making the inspection.

Finally, the security officer has the responsibility of placing the special waterproof E & E packet containing such things as gold, pure silk maps, and other items, in the pilot's flying suit while he is pre-breathing. It is your duty also to retrieve this packet from the driver upon his return and place it under safekeeping. Note: This packet of E & E material is critical - it contains maps of the area over which the U-2 will be flying for his use should he be forced to land and for cover purposes, and its monetary value is considerable too, so control it with caution.

In conclusion, it should be realized that some of the responsibilities enumerated above will have to be carried out by your fellow or subordinate security officers. It would be nearly impossible for one man to personally conduct the parade of duties required of him in preparation for a mission. Therefore, it follows that it is your obligation to see that each participating security officer is fully cognizant of his duties and that he carries them out as required.

SECURITY ESCORT - COURIER DUTIES

On an actual staging movement, it will be necessary to provide a security officer escort for any classified or sensitive equipment departing from the home base. If such a movement is done by air, the security officer escort will "Gerrymander" the support aircraft crew prior to departure, or shortly after becoming airborne. Here, once more, be formal and professional by giving brief, concise instructions to the crew. Point out that you prefer that they do not discuss among themselves, or with others, such things as names they have

learned, where they have been, what they have observed, what they may have overheard, or what they may possibly have deduced about the operation.

If the aircraft you are escorting will R.O.N. at a base enroute to your embarkation point, request the pilot to radio ahead, notifying the base air police that he is transporting a classified cargo and will need military police protection for it overnight. Do not, repeat, do not indicate that the cargo is top secret because the air police are only cleared up to and including secret. They will not accept the responsibility of guarding the aircraft if there is top secret material aboard.

Upon landing, using your guard instruction sheet, give the guard officer and/or his noncommissioned representative, a careful briefing as to what will be expected of them, especially noting that no one will be permitted to touch the cargo. Have the guard(s) stationed so that he/they can observe the actions of the maintenance crews during refueling. Provide the guards with a copy of the crew's orders and have it understood that once the normal maintenance crews have completed their assigned duties on the aircraft no one excepting the crew and yourself will be allowed to enter the plane.

For future contact references and expediency, always obtain the telephone number(s) for the guard officer and the Sgt of the guard - these numbers can be very helpful should you pass through at another time and are in need of similar security support from the military police.

Conclude your briefing to the guard(s) by giving them your BOQ room and telephone numbers and keep them informed of your whereabouts should you go to the O-club or elsewhere for meals. They should be able to communicate with you whenever the need arises.

On security escort - courier missions, always obtain a copy of the crew's orders and keep them on file along with the guard sign-in roster, the gerrymander

receipt, and your courier report. This will be your record in the event any questions arise at a later date regarding that particular operation.

PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

At present, it is now preferred that at least four security officers be assigned to a carrier operation. This number of men seemingly will suffice in that it would avail two for courier duty on closely run missions, with another standing by for emergency support and another to coordinate and supervise security activities on board the ship.

SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS

The security officer(s) who supports this type of deployment will have to be "chamber cleared." This means he has to have received sufficient academic instructions on high altitude flying and its effect upon the human body, and further, that he be processed under simulated conditions in a high altitude - rapid decompression chamber.

The Navy requires this type of training for those people who will be flying in the A3D, which cruises above an altitude of 40,000 feet. In addition, on in-flight refueling missions aboard an Air Force KC-135, the requirement that you be chamber cleared will also be levied.

PERSONAL READINESS

As is now planned, the courier on a carrier exercise will ferry the "take" aboard the A3D. Take a flight suit, jump boots, ear plugs and suitable underwear for high altitude flying.

As part of the security officer's official accouterments, he should have sufficient funds, his weapon and ammunition, his passport, shot record, orders, courier manifest receipt, and more importantly, his contact book in the event a contingency arises causing the aircraft to land at an unscheduled airbase.

In preparation for the unexpected, it can prove worthwhile to project on

what you would need to do if an emergency situation arose. If, for example, a crash occurred in an inaccessible area, are you prepared to go into this area with what you need to take? Are you ready with such things as the crash kit, clothing, the pilot's and your passport and shot record, weapons and other necessities. Advance thought in these matters can be immensely helpful if and when a crucial situation arises.

NAVAL PERSONNEL

The Captain of the ship or his Executive officer will be the voice of the security officer in reaching the crew concerning their personal responsibility to the security of the operation. One of the above will make an announcement to the crew over the public address system of the ship giving them the appropriate cover story. Within the framework of this story there should be a serious exhortation to the crew advising them to avoid any discussion of the U-2, the area of operation, the mission, etc., among themselves or in their mail.

Security as it relates to the naval personnel will be a matter of working through the Captain, his Executive Officer, or the Marine Commander.

In conclusion, preceding operating procedures are set forth for the guidance and benefit of those security officers who will be supporting the carrier operation. It is expected that the experience derived from a prolonged, bona fide operation, will better qualify the security officers involved to contribute experientially to a more comprehensive SOP.

DEPLOYMENT CHECK-LIST

_____ Have crash kit readied, (the contents are enumerated on the inside cover of the lid.) w/duffel bag(s)

_____ Have the administrative kit readied, (contents list also attached to inside lid.)

_____ Attend pre-deployment meetings to ascertain who (NAVY) needs clearances & get B.I. info.

_____ Take at least eight Sargent-Greenleaf combination locks and change keys.

_____ Arrange through finance to have sufficient funds for possible plane fares, excess baggage fees, emergencies, etc.

_____ Carry a limited number of I-3 briefing and debriefing forms.

_____ Pick up the passports and shot records for the deployment personnel.

_____ Have a sufficient supply of appropriate orders.

_____ Take a flight suit and jump boots, weapon and ammunition for courier duty.

_____ Conscientiously brief your deployment personnel as to their cover and their security responsibilities.

_____ Prepare whatever documentation that may be necessary to authenticate your cover.

_____ Be sure, if you prepare documentation that it is backstopped in case of inquiry.

_____ Ascertain that all security personnel who will serve as couriers aboard the A3D are chamber cleared.

_____ Have a list of all naval personnel on board and on the base who are I-3 cleared.

_____ Stay abreast of all incoming cable traffic on the operation so as to be alert for last minute alterations.

_____ Take a red "Keep Out - Conference in Session" sign for the briefing room.

_____ Have a complete list of all deployment personnel. Be prepared to give one to the main gate sentry, the Officer of the Deck, and the Mess Officer.

_____ If possible, depart earlier than the main body of the group so as to be there early enabling you to make advance arrangements and survey the area you must secure before the U-2 and other sensitive gear arrives.

ON BOARD CHECK LIST

_____ Get copies of the room and phone numbers of all our personnel on board.

_____ Provide the staging commander and his deputy with a copy of the above.

_____ List all pertinent telephone and room numbers of those on board you will be dealing with.

_____ Set up liaison with the Executive Officer of the ship and the Commanding Officer of the Marine Guards.

_____ Work out details of the manpower requirements with the C. O. of the Marine Guards.

_____ Inspect carefully all areas to be secured to ascertain your requirements before discussing it with the guard C. O.

_____ Insure proper security for: 1. The U-2, 2. The Fuel, 3. The Equipment, and 4. Documents.

_____ Set a new combination on the combination lock to the Communications compartment and distribute it as required.

_____ Check with the staging commander at least two to three times per day so as to stay advised and to offer support.

_____ Inspect the secured areas at unannounced times to see that the guards are conforming to instructions.

_____ Furnish each guard with an authorization for his responsible area.

_____ Stay abreast of the incoming and outgoing cable traffic.

_____ Plan emergency procedures with either the Exec Officer or the Captain.

_____ Set up a mail exchange system.

_____ Supervise all mission operations with staff security officers only.

_____ Collect the video tape of our operation from the Navy. ✓

_____ At the close of the deployment, collect and destroy, if feasible, all classified waste. If it cannot be destroyed, bundle it appropriately and bring it back to home base for destruction.

MISSION CHECK LIST

_____ Secure the briefing room.

_____ Brief the pilot regarding his responsibilities in case of an emergency landing in either a friendly or denied area.

_____ Examine pilot's gear for sterility after the briefing.

_____ Have the pilot sign a "Mission Certificate."

_____ Place the special waterproof E & E packet in the pilot's flight suit.

_____ Inspect the outside of the U-2 and particularly the cockpit for sterility.

_____ Supervise the loading and unloading of all sensitive systems in the U-2.

_____ Insure the loading and removal of sensitive systems is done in a secure, screened area.

_____ Have all section chiefs sign their respective "Mission Certificates."

_____ Allow no uncleared personnel near the U-2.

_____ Have the crash kit and your gear loaded and ready on the rescue aircraft.

_____ Upon return of the U-2, remain with it until it is secured below on the hangar deck and the sensitive systems have been removed.

_____ Prepare for forthcoming courier mission - have passport, shot record, orders, funds, weapon, manifest receipt, etc., in readiness.

_____ Pick up the courier manifest and sign for the "take."

_____ Gerrymander the support aircraft crew(s).

_____ Turn over the "take" to an authorized recipient and get signed receipts.

_____ Arrange for return transportation to the ship via the A3D or C-130.

_____ Collect daily from the Navy, the video tape which was made that day of the activities of the U-2.

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TACTICAL MAINTENANCE

Whale Tale Operation

PURPOSE: This SOI establishes and standardizes procedures to be exercised by the Tactical Maintenance Section on any WHALE TALE operation.

1. Policy. The Tactical Maintenance Section will be governed by the responsibilities and procedures established in this SOI to insure completion of organization mission.

2. Responsibilities. The Maintenance Supervisor is responsible for the implementation of procedures as established by WRSP-IV Memorandum Number MAT-8, as applies, and this SOI.

3. Procedures:

a. Upon notification of deployment all cargo will be delivered to designated area in Hangar 3. A complete list of cargo will be delivered to Director of Materiel Office indicating a breakdown of box numbers, weight, and cube of each item. In addition, one man will be provided to check maintenance cargo and assist in loading. This man will be one of those who is to accompany the deployment.

b. Upon arrival at carrier and prior to making a trapped landing, a chalk line will be made on Number 4 elevator showing position that main landing gear must track. Pertinent aircraft dimensions are as follows:

(1) Nose to main landing gear - 20' 6".

(2) Main gear to tail gear - 19' 9".

(3) Main gear to end of sugar scoop - 29' 3".

(4) Aircraft total length - 49' 9".

c. A chalk line will also be made on flight deck as directed by the Operations Officer to assist in positioning aircraft for turn around takeoffs. A full fuel load takeoff position will also be marked per Operations Officers instructions.

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d. The following equipment will be brought to flight deck and stowed in vicinity of island upon receipt fr m aircraft and prior to arrival of aircraft:

(1) Sulky.

(2) Nitrogen cart.

(3) Six foot ladder.

(4) Main gear turning plate.

(5) Grease plate - tail gear.

(6) MLG chock.

(7) Two pogo chocks.

(8) Tow bar - Tail landing gear.

(9) Tow bar - Main landing gear.

(10) MLG downlock pin.

(11) TLG downlock pin.

(12) Set of pogo pins.

(13) Set of special pogos.

(14) MLG chock - elevator use.

(15) TLG chock - elevator use.

(16) 250 lbs Ballast - 25 lb shot bags.

(17) Fuel truck.

(18) Two wing stands - adjustable.

(19) Personal tools.

(20) Adequate number of tie downs.

(21) Flight deck clothing.

e. Following procedures will be followed on trapped landings and turn around:

(1) Aircraft trapped.

(2) Maintenance personnel will proceed to aircraft.

(3) Pogos installed.

(4) Gear pins installed.

(5) Crew chief signals pilot to taxi over cable.

(6) Crew chief and pilot check flap position - (15 degrees).

(7) Engine shut down.

(8) Tail gear scissors disconnected.

(9) Sulky installed and tow vehicle connected.

(10) Aircraft positioned on takeoff chalk line.

(11) Aircraft chocked and secured as necessary.

(12) Fuel truck in position for servicing (Driver will remain in cab-truck will be chocked and tied down).

(13) Visual check of tail and main gear areas.

(14) Sulky removed.

(15) Tail gear scissors connected.

(16) Fueling completed - truck will move to area behind island or as directed.

(17) Fuel counter set.

(18) Signal for air starter unit.

(19) Signal for 28V DC external power source.

(20) Wings level for even fuel load.

(21) Canopy closed and locked.

(22) Start engine as directed.

(23) Air starter removed.

(24) DC external power source removed.

(25) External power source receptacle door closed.

(26) Gear down locks removed.

(27) Engine access door closed.

(28) Pogos removed - Hold wings level for hand launch.

(29) Crew chief signals pilot for brakes.

(30) MLG chock removed.

(31) Crew chief turns over launch at this point to Boatswain or Bosun.

f. The following procedures will be followed on aircraft removal from flight deck to hangar deck:

(1) Carrier speed reduced and no turns until aircraft secured in hangar deck.

(2) Man on brakes - stays in cockpit until secured below.

(3) Position aircraft parallel to Number 4 elevator with nose of aircraft toward bow of ship. Center line of aircraft should be approximately three feet inboard of inside edge of elevator. Main gear and tail gear should be stopped on turn plates with main gear in line with chalk line. (Paragraph 2).

(4) Inflate MLG strut with nitrogen to provide turning clearance.

(5) Install special pogos.

(6) Disconnect MLG scissors, brake hose clamps, etc. (Stow parts in bag and tie to strut).

(7) Disconnect LH TLG door and wire up out of the way - (Retain rod adjustment).

(8) Disconnect TLG scissor.

(9) Install MLG turning bar.

(10) Install TLG tow bar - small.

(11) Turn MLG and TLG ninety degrees simultaneously.

(12) Place adequate weight on left wing to provide clearance on right hand pogo.

(13) Aircraft moved into position on elevator by hand. Chock men ahead of each gear with special chocks as aircraft is being moved. When in proper position, aircraft will be chocked and a minimum of three tie down chains installed, one on each fuselage fitting and one from left hand pogo fitting to hold that wing slightly low.

(14) Elevator - Down to hangar deck level.

(15) Tie downs removed.

(16) Aircraft pushed by hand into hangar with a chock man ahead of each gear. Position aircraft in hangar as directed, exercising extreme caution.

(17) Install chocks and secure aircraft, one chain each fuselage fitting, one chain each pogo fitting, tail gear secured.

g. The following procedures will be followed upon mission alert and movement to flight deck:

(1) Commo equipment installed and checks complete (X minus 4 hours).

(2) Special Equipment and Tracker completed with "hatch up" (X minus 2 hours).

(3) Maintenance preflight completed as far as possible (X minus 1.5 hours).

(4) Aircraft prepared for movement on to elevator.

(5) Carrier speed reduced and no turns until aircraft secured in takeoff position on top side.

(6) Man on brakes - stays in cockpit until secured "on top".

(7) Aircraft pushed by hand on to elevator - main gear over chalk line and chock men ahead of each gear. Ballast as required on left hand wing. When properly positioned on elevator, chocks will be placed in position and a minimum of three tie down chains will be installed, one on each fuselage fitting and one from left hand pogo fitting to hold that wing low.

(8) Elevator - "up" to flight deck.

(9) Tie downs removed.

(10) Aircraft pushed by hand off elevator on to flight deck. Chock men ahead of each gear. Stop aircraft with main gear on turn plate and tail gear on grease plate.

(11) Turn MLG and TLG ninety degrees (Normal position) simultaneously.

(12) Remove MLG turning bar.

(13) Remove TLG tow bar.

(14) Connect MLG scissors, brake hose clamps, etc. Deflate strut to normal position.

(15) Connect left hand TLG door.

(16) Install sulky and towing vehicle.

(17) Tow aircraft to takeoff position (X minus 1 hour) secure with MLG chock and two fuselage fitting tiedowns.

(18) Fuel truck in position and servicing begins. (Driver will remain in cab in addition to required chocks and tie downs).

(19) Sulky removed and tail gear scissors connected.

(20) Special pogo locks removed.

(21) When fuel servicing is completed truck moved behind island or as directed.

(22) Signal for air starter unit.

(23) Signal for 28V DC power.

(24) Seat connected.

(25) Canopy closed and locked.

(26) Start engine as directed.

(27) Air starter removed.

(28) DC external power source removed.

(29) External power receptacle door closed.

(30) All tie downs removed.

(31) Gear downlocks removed.

(32) Engine access door closed.

(33) Pogos removed - hold wings level for hand launch.

(34) Crew chief signals pilot for brakes.

(35) MLG chock removed.

(36) Crew chief turns over launch at this point to Boatswain or Bosun.

h. During all "touch and go" landings the maintenance personnel will occupy the area as directed by air boss or Bosun.

SECRET

SPECIAL EQUIPMENT

Whale Tale Operation

PURPOSE: To outline procedures to be followed by Special Equipment in the event of a WHALE TALE operation.

1. Policy. Special Equipment Section will be governed by the responsibilities and procedures established in this SOI to insure completion of organizational mission.

2. Responsibilities. Special Equipment Section will be responsible for the implementation of procedures as established by WRSP-IV Memorandum Number MAT-8, as applies, and this SOI.

3. Procedures.

a. Upon notification of a deployment all cargo will be delivered to a designated area in Hangar 3. A complete list of cargo will be delivered to Director of Materiel Office indicating a breakdown of box number, weight and cube of each item. In addition, one man will be provided to check Special Equipment cargo and assist in loading. This man will be one of those who is to accompany deployment.

b. Special Equipment will provide one man to assist and monitor the loading of trailers on flat bed when it has been determined that they are required for this deployment.

c. Under normal conditions, four Special Equipment personnel will be furnished for this deployment.

d. Upon arrival at ship, the section will be completely set up in an area provided to insure readiness for a scheduled mission.

e. At time of mission alert the following steps will be followed:

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(1) -12 hours - Mission alert received. Configuration loaded with prescribed material and thoroughly pre-flighted.

(2) -3 hours - Final shop check of configuration. Configuration then loaded on article.

(3) -2½ hours - Pilot briefed.

(4) -2 hours - Final check of configuration operating in article.

f. One hour prior to return of article the material shipping boxes and required paperwork are readied for shipment.

g. Upon landing of article, configuration is again checked while in article and any discrepancies will be noted. Configuration is then removed to shop area for a more thorough post-flight check.

h. Material will then be removed from configuration, packed and turned over to Security Section for shipment.

i. Special Equipment Supervisor will attend the debriefing of pilot.

4. General. Normally the complete operation will follow that of any deployment, however the time elements involved may differ due to unknown factors involved. The necessity of Special Equipment trailer will be governed by availability of a suitable operating area on carrier. Regardless of circumstances, mission readiness will be attained at the earliest possible time contingent with difficulties encountered.

SECRET

SUPPLY

Carrier Operations Supply Procedures

PURPOSE: To outline the procedures to be used by supply personnel during operation aboard aircraft carriers. This memorandum applies to all supply personnel of this organization.

1. Policy. It is the policy of this organization that one supply man will accompany each full scale deployment aboard aircraft carriers and will take one staging kit, augmented for carrier operation, and such other items as may be deemed appropriate.

2. Responsibility. The Unit Supply Officer will be responsible for the implementation of these procedures.

3. Procedures.

a. Unit Supply will coordinate with the maintenance activity to determine which kit will be taken and any desired additions or deletions for the particular operation.

b. Action will be taken to insure that the kit selected is as complete as possible and that all kit records are properly posted and accurate and that all containers are properly marked and painted.

c. Upon notification of a deployment all cargo will be delivered to a designated area in Hangar 3. A listing will be prepared containing the identification and number of each container to include the individual weight and cube. The total weight and cube information will also be determined. This information will be provided to the Materiel Section, when called for, for the purpose of manifesting cargo for shipment.

d. Organizational Supply will supervise the loading operation, and will provide the forklift operators and additional loading team personnel as may be required.

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e. One driver for heavy equipment will be provided for the period of transfer of such equipment to the carrier loading point. When feasible, this will be the individual who will accompany the deployment.

f. The supply man accompanying the deployment will supervise and/or otherwise assist in carrier loading. He will coordinate with the maintenance activities and tie down crew on board the carrier to insure that the kit is placed at a point of convenance to maintenance and that the kit is ready for operation as soon as may be required.

4. General. Supply will insure that the kit is returned in good condition, including all reparable items generated, and will provide such assistance as may be required for loading, unloading, and return as specified for departure above.

TRACKER

Whale Tale Operation

PURPOSE: To outline procedures to be followed by the Tracker Section in the event of a WHALETALE operation.

1. Policy. Tracker Section will be governed by the responsibilities and procedures established in this SOI to insure completion of the organizational mission.

2. Responsibilities. Tracker Section will be responsible for the implementation of procedures as established by WRSP-IV Memorandum Number MAT-8, as applies, and this SOI.

3. Procedures.

a. Upon notification of a deployment all cargo will be delivered to a designated area in Hangar 3. A complete list of cargo will be delivered to the Director of Materiel Office indicating a breakdown of box number, weight and cube of each item. In addition, one man will be provided to check Tracker cargo and assist in loading.

b. Under normal conditions, one Tracker man will be furnished for this deployment.

c. Upon arrival on carrier, a shop area will be set up for immediate use. Whenever possible, this section will combine with the Special Equipment Section.

d. Upon a mission alert, Tracker personnel will completely preflight tracker in shop area. At this time the B-configuration hatch will also be readied.

e. All driftsight, sextant and hand control equipment will be preflighted on article as soon as aircraft is available.

f. Approximately 3 hours prior to takeoff the clock in the tracker is hacked, tracker is purged for thirty minutes and then mounted on B-configuration hatch while in shop or hangar area.

g. Tracker and Special Equipment personnel will then install B-configuration hatch to article.

h. All domes on tracker equipment are cleaned and all equipment is then double checked for correct operation.

i. Approximately thirty minutes before takeoff the driftsight and sextant systems are purged. This operation is continued until one minute after engine start. During this purging period the B-configuration window covers are to be removed. After the above steps are completed the article is ready for launch inasmuch as Tracker Section is concerned.

j. Tracker personnel will meet article upon return and re-install B-configuration window covers.

k. After article has been removed to the hangar deck the tracker will be downloaded from article and removed to shop. The material is then removed from the tracker and turned over to the Special Equipment Section for processing.

l. Tracker man will be present at pilot debriefings.

MATERIEL

Whale Tale Operation

PURPOSE: To outline procedures to be used by Director of Materiel personnel in the event a WHALE TALE operation is initiated.

1. Policy. WRSP-IV Memorandum Number MAT-8 applies to this operation.

2. Responsibilities:

a. The Director of Materiel will be responsible for monitoring and implementing so much of WRSP-IV Memorandum MAT-8 as applies to home station cargo movement.

b. The POL Section will be responsible for insuring that MIL SPEC 25524B fuel is on hand to support this operation. For planning purposes, this operation will normally require two R-2 type refuelers with 5,000 gallons of fuel in each. In addition, POL Section will furnish one man for deployment if deemed necessary by Commander. NOTE: This requirement will be normally determined by number of maintenance personnel deployed. POL man, when deployed, will be responsible for all fuel activities required during this operation. Close coordination will be exercised with Maintenance Supervisor.

c. Transportation Section will be responsible for transporting all cargo and equipment, including R-2 refuelers and Special Equipment trailers, not airlifted to port. In addition, any additional transportation will be furnished through this section.

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Approved For Release 2006/03/10 : CIA-RDP74B00836R000300180001-8

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December 1964

U-2 AIRCRAFT CARRIER OPERATION

project "WHALE TALE"

[redacted] 25X1

Navy has no objection to declassification and release.

25X1

Navy review(s) completed.

USAF review(s) completed.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Central Intelligence Agency, wishes to express his appreciation to the National Photographic Interpretation Center for assistance in the preparation for publication and printing of this report.

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CHAPTER I

EARLY HISTORY

The U-2 overflight program commenced in the summer of 1956 and for the ensuing four years, operating from land bases in various parts of the world, scored a record of successes which have resulted in its being widely acclaimed as one of the most effective and productive intelligence collection programs in the history of the craft.

On 1 May 1960 the loss of a U-2 deep inside the Soviet Union brought a torrent of world-wide publicity. Subsequently, the problem of obtaining even temporary staging rights in friendly foreign countries became progressively more complicated. Because of the notoriety associated with the aircraft, its appearance in a foreign country, if detected, was likely to create political problems for the host government. This was likely to be true even in those instances where the host country was not subject to immediate pressure by the Soviet Union but was more often a function of internal domestic politics within the host government.

While all such foreign governments recognized the usefulness of the U-2 as an intelligence acquisition vehicle and all were eager for the protection such knowledge affords, few were readily willing to undergo the varied political pressures inherent in granting staging rights to the aircraft.

Given the state of affairs alluded to above, resorting to aircraft carrier based operations was a hopeful prospect not only for coverage of those targets not readily accessible from friendly foreign soil, but for any critical operations where valuable time could not be expended in protracted political negotiations.

The concept of operating the U-2 from an aircraft carrier was not a new or particularly imaginative idea at this time. In fact, it had been considered early in the U-2 program and had been the subject of a discussion during a briefing given to President Eisenhower in May of 1957.



DESIGN PROPOSALS for developing a U-2 with a carrier launch capability were submitted as early as 1957, as shown here. The configuration ultimately chosen most nearly resembles that in the lower drawing with the addition of some additional features such as the mechanical spoilers installed on the wings.

At this time, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, recommended to the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen W. Dulles,

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that immediate action be initiated to develop a U-2 carrier based capability. On 2 August 1957, Lt. Gen. Charles P. Cabell, Acting Director, Central Intelligence Agency, in a memorandum to the Chief of Naval Operations stated as follows:

"(A) The carrier capability at this time would add little to the coverage of the Soviet Bloc obtainable by the U-2 from the land bases to which it now has access.

"(B) The availability of alternate land bases provides a fair degree of insurance against political evictions, but

"(C) Carrier operations, by reason of flexibility and independence of foreign jurisdiction, would generally enhance the reconnaissance capability of the United States, especially with respect to areas outside the Soviet Bloc. Accordingly, although the benefit to the project would be too limited to justify the expenditure of project funds for the conversion of aircraft, this Agency would be happy to see this additional capability in hand. These views have, of course, been made known to the Navy in recent conversations. It is suggested that the Navy approach the Air Force directly and seek a resolution of the issue."

Since the U-2 project was a joint CIA-USAF project administered and operated by CIA and supported logistically by USAF, any proposal such as the conversion of U-2's for carrier suitability would have required both CIA and USAF concurrence. It subsequently developed that USAF decided there was no need for a carrier capability and in 1957 the attempt to develop the carrier capability was disapproved by the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force.

The Navy attempted on several occasions between 1957 and 1960 to obtain a joint agreement between CIA and Air Force to the effect that a carrier capability should be developed. These attempts met with little success due primarily to the fact that the Agency was able to land-base the U-2 at selected bases compatible with coverage of the Soviet Union and Bloc countries.

Despite the loss of the U-2 over the Soviet Union on 1 May 1960 and the limited operations of the U-2 which followed, the carrier proposal was not seriously pursued again until 1963.

CHAPTER II

APPROVAL

The proposal to develop a carrier configured U-2, designated the U-2G, gained impetus early in 1963 when Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, took a personal interest in the project.

General Carter engaged in discussions with Mr. Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, designer of the U-2, on the question of whether there would be major problems involved in modifying one or more of the CIA owned U-2's for carrier operations. Mr. Johnson assured General Carter that the aircraft could be modified with relatively minor design and engineering changes and at a reasonable cost.

In view of Mr. Johnson's assurances, General Carter instructed Colonel Jack Ledford, Assistant Director, Office of Special Activities, and his deputy, Mr. James A. Cunningham, Jr., to have their staff commence the required action for investigating the feasibility of operating CIA U-2's from aircraft carriers, and to determine the necessary measures to implement such a program.

The first of the actions taken by Col. Ledford and his staff featured a series of surveys and familiarization trips to various U.S. aircraft carriers and Naval air stations. The Agency team, headed by Mr. Cunningham, was accompanied by representatives from Lockheed Aircraft Corp. and the Office of the CNO. The purpose of the visits was to enable members of the Agency, Lockheed, and CNO jointly to investigate and define any potential problem areas which might affect the development of the U-2G and to work out, as quickly as possible, solutions to whatever problems that might arise. It was during the course of these visits and discussions that a tactical doctrine for U-2 carrier based operations began to emerge.

After the initial series of visits and meetings, the group concluded that there were no insolvable problems that would preclude operation of the modified U-2's from an aircraft carrier. Based on the findings and recommendations of the survey team, Mr. Cunningham undertook a comprehensive staff study on the proposal which was subsequently submitted to General Carter.

In addressing the substance of the concept, Mr. Cunningham wrote in part, as follows:

> "The basic question then is whether or not this aircraft can be economically adapted to work from carriers with an acceptable margin of safety in flight operations, and, once so adapted, can it operate with frequency varying from occasional to repeated, in this manner, without affecting the Navy's disposition of forces under existing Navy Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) commitments. As indicated earlier, present engineering analyses confirm that the aircraft can be so operated theoretically as to produce a viable carrier capability for reconnaissance purposes.
>
> "Aside from the unknown range and altitude characteristics of the converted aircraft (which will depend upon arresting gear weight for the most part), the only apparent aerodynamic question is associated with the behavior of the aircraft in the landing configuration when it is approaching a fast moving carrier from the stern. One suggestion which has been made



SURVEY PARTY aboard the U. S. S. INDEPENDENCE. Left to right: Capt. Swanson, U. S. S. INDEPENDENCE; Capt. Martin D. Carmody, Office of the CNO; [redacted] Chief of Security, OSA; Mr. Edward L. Green, Eastman-Kodak; [redacted] Lockheed Aircraft Corp.; Mr. James A. Cunningham, Jr., DAD/OSA; [redacted] OSA Project Officer; and [redacted] Agency U-2 pilot.

is that the standard angle of attack for such an approach with Navy aircraft which is three or four degrees to the horizontal be reduced to approximately 1 1/2 to 2 degrees in the case of the U-2 to permit a flatter angle of approach with power on so that "ballooning" of the aircraft prior to contact with the deck will be minimized.

"In a normal landing attitude, the U-2 rides tail high, which unless compensated for by a skillful power-on approach just above the stall speed may make the engagement of a carrier hook relatively difficult. There is a possibility that a problem may exist in wind pattern over the stern of a fast moving carrier, which according to Navy statistics, normally produces a down-draft immediately to the rear of the stern, followed by an up-draft from 1,000 to 1,500 feet aft of the carrier. With its sizeable wing area and with flaps fully extended, there may be some adjustments in technique which will have to be accomplished in order to overcome the possible adverse effects of these phenomena.

"Stack wash from the carrier's funnels can largely be eliminated as a deterrent characteristic, since carriers on which the U-2 would be landed make their arrested landings on the angled deck, approximately nine degrees from the central axis of the hull away from the island, and the captains of both the USS LEXINGTON and USS INDEPENDENCE stated categorically that

they 'could put the stack wash wherever the pilot wanted it.' This, of course, means that they could adjust the carrier's steaming angle to take maximum advantange of existing wind conditions to deflect stack wash. The only time this might be a modest problem would be when the aircraft is landed in a no wind condition, at which time it must rely solely on the carrier's forward momentum for relative wind."

Recognizing that the physical handling of the U-2G aboard a carrier would pose some unique problems, Mr. Cunningham further wrote:

"Movement of the aircraft from the hangar deck to the flight deck and conversely can be accomplished, despite the fact that no carrier in the United States Navy has elevators large enough to accommodate the U-2 without a portion of the wing extending beyond the outboard edge of the elevator. The largest elevator in the Fleet measures only 70 by 52 feet, while those on the carriers in the group most likely to be employed in U-2 operations (CVA's 59 through 62), measure 63 by 52 feet. Lockheed has designed a special fuselage cart called a 'LOWBOY,' which permits side castering operations essential to movement from the hangar deck floor to the elevator and from the flight deck to the elevator, etc. This will be equipped with adjustable brakes to prevent any incident should the aircraft be on the elevator during period of rough weather.

"In addition, Lockheed has manufactured a special sling using a fuselage cart as the basic ingredient, which will permit on-and off-loading of the aircraft from the carrier when it is necessary to remove it or replace it aboard other than under its own power. The hangar deck offers adequate space for a compartmentalized working and refueling area.



SPECIAL SLING was manufactured by Lockheed which permits on and off-loading of U-2 from the carrier when it is necessary to remove it or replace it aboard other than under its own power. This photo was taken at North Island NAS as aircraft is prepared for initial launch tests.

"Minor adjustments in the aircraft component of an operational carrier must be made to provide adequate storage space on the hangar deck, but Navy assures us that this is an administrative problem which can be encompassed by proper direction from higher authorities, beginning with the Chief of Naval Support and the CNO, augmented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in those cases where such temporary depletion of the Air Carrier Group would affect the Navy's SIOP capabilities."

On the subject of cover, the staff study stated:

"A clear and plausible cover story, stoutly maintained by responsible persons concerned and supported by the IDEALIST Detachment aboard the carrier, can probably preserve the fiction of innocuous use of the U-2 for considerable time. This story will require precise and unequivocal attention to every detail. The IDEALIST Detachment and the carrier commander must be given detailed guidance, not only on the objective of the story, but also the necessary supporting actions. The basic requirement is to have a plausible reason for the presence of the U-2 aboard a carrier. Present discussions with the Navy, including Vice Admiral Rayburn, Director of Research and Development for the Navy, and his Deputy, Admiral Weakley, indicate that sponsorship for the U-2 aircraft on the carrier in the long run can be anticipated from the Office of Naval Research headed by Admiral Coates. The discussions thus far have not only indicated that ONR would be willing to have the U-2's attributed to its organization, but that a workable cover arrangement not unlike that which the Agency worked out in 1955 with NACA (ultimately NASA) could be effectuated."

The study concluded with a series of recommendations which, if approved, were designed to produce an operational capability at the earliest possible date.

On 23 July 1963, General Carter approved the staff study and its recommendation and Lockheed immediately began working on the design changes and modifications for two of the Agency U-2's. Concurrently, the OSA staff began coordination with the U.S. Navy for the implementation of the pilot training program and for U-2 suitability tests aboard a carrier.

The principal configuration changes incorporated in the U-2G in order to enable it to operate effectively from carriers included a mechanically operated fuel jettison system to permit the aircraft to be reduced to maximum gross landing weight in the event of either an inflight emergency requiring an immediate landing or in those cases where the aircraft is returned to the ship from a mission with fuel to spare. A further modification was the incorporation of a heavier landing gear which effectively more than doubled the original design specification of maximum deceleration in terms of feet per second. Coupled with this beefed-up landing gear were heavier pressure bulkheads in the landing gear section and augmented longerons in the fuselage at the trailing edge of the wing to withstand the added impact of carrier hook engagement. A modified T2V arresting hook was installed in the aircraft, covered by a plastic fairing which reduces aerodynamic drag, and which is jettisoned at the time the aircraft enters the traffic pattern around the carrier preparatory to landing.

The single most important modification, however, was the addition of a pair of mechanical spoilers situated midway outboard on the trailing edge of each wing. These are activated by a simple switch on the throttle quadrant. Upon actuation at the point of touch-down of

the aircraft the wing stalls almost immediately, enabling the pilot to spot-land with nearly the same accuracy that would be encountered in more conventional aircraft. Light weight, one inch arresting cables have been substituted for the normal heavier arresting cables on the CVAs in order to reduce critical vibration encountered when the aircraft runs over the cables in the process of arrestment.

It subsequently proved necessary to depress the Fresnel lens landing system to an angle of 1.5 degrees to give the pilot of the U-2 a proper representation of the "meatball" during his final approach to the deck. Experience has shown that under normal landing conditions with an approach speed of approximately 82 knots and with from 26 to 30 knots wind across the flight deck, effective arrestments at a relative speed of 50-55 knots can be obtained with the ship's arresting engines set at the lowest available figure of only 10,000 pounds of force. All takeoffs from the carrier with the U-2 are normally made on the axial as opposed to the angle deck which requires a clear deck forward in all cases. Catapult launch of the U-2G is not feasible for structural reasons.



BEEFED UP LANDING GEAR more than doubled the original design specification of maximum deceleration in terms of feet per second.

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



ARRESTING HOOK installed in U-2 is shown in both the retracted and extended positions. Note in the upper picture the partial plastic fairing which reduces aerodynamic drag.

CHAPTER III

PILOT TRAINING AND SUITABILITY TESTS

The first tests of a U-2 on an aircraft carrier were undertaken in August of 1963. For the preliminary tests a conventional (unmodified) U-2 was used. The operation was designated "Project WHALE TALE."

On the night of 2 August, an Agency U-2 was flown to North Island Naval Air Station at San Diego, California, where, under cover of darkness, and after midnight, it was loaded aboard the Aircraft Carrier USS KITTY HAWK and stowed below decks in the hangar bay. The most stringent security precautions were employed by both Naval and Agency security personnel to limit unwitting persons gaining knowledge of the operation. The North Island base personnel who assisted in moving and loading the U-2 (fire chief, SP's, crane operator, etc.) were briefed in general terms as to the sensitivity of the "ONR exercise" and were admonished not to discuss it with anyone.

The following day, the KITTY HAWK proceeded to a pre-determined test area approximately 50 miles off the coast. While a sharp look-out was maintained for any intruding surface or aircraft, the U-2 was brought up from the hangar deck and prepared for launch.

The aircraft was marked with the large letters "O.N.R." on the vertical stabilizer, in keeping with the agreed cover story that this was an Office of Naval Research project. All personnel participating in the tests were alleged to be either O.N.R. personnel or Lockheed civilian technical representatives.

While the U-2 was being readied for take-off, the commanding officer of the KITTY HAWK, Captain Horace H. Epes requested the attention of the ship's personnel on the public address system and read the following prepared statement:

"This morning we will be conducting a series of tests sponsored by the Office of Naval Research to determine the suitability of launching the U-2 from a carrier. In today's operation we will be assisted by personnel from Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, the manufacturer of the U-2. 25X1

[redacted]

"The details of this program, and today's test, are classified because of the obvious far reaching implication of this program with relation to [redacted] In this regard, it is important that there be no discussion or disclosures of this test with unauthorized persons. This means anyone who is not aboard today. It is possible that you may read or hear something about this program in the newspapers or on the radio but this does not relieve you of your responsibility not to discuss today's test with unauthorized persons." 25X1 25X1

Insofar as it was possible to determine, this story was accepted without question by the carrier crew and as of the date of publication of this report, there have been no known security violations or even undesirable speculation by Naval personnel involved in the operation. The same cover story, with minor modifications,

INTERESTED OBSERVERS of the first U-2 carrier launch tests are photographed on the flag bridge of the U.S.S. KITTY HAWK on 4 August 1963. Left to right: Captain Horace H. Epes, Jr., USN, skipper of the KITTY HAWK; Captain Martin D. Cormody, USN, Office of the CNO; Mr. C. L. "Kelly" Johnson, Lockheed Aircraft Corp.; Vice Admiral Paul D. Stroup, USN, COMNAVAIRPAC; Mr. James A. Cunningham, Jr., CIA; and Captain George C. Duncan, Asst. Chief of Staff for Force Readiness, COMNAVAIRPAC.

was used on subsequent carrier operations, including the operational overflight mission in the South Pacific, with equally successful results.

The KITTY HAWK was underway at 20 knots; this, combined with a 10 knot headwind resulted in a 30 knot wind across the flight deck. The impressive wing span and light construction of the U-2 under these conditions gave the maintenance crew some difficulty in holding the aircraft on the deck, even without application of power. On signal, the U-2 with [redacted] LAC test pilot, at the controls, started its take-off run down the flight deck. As the throttle was advanced, the 16,000 pound thrust Pratt & Whitney J-75 engine catapulted the U-2 toward the bow of the ship. In approximately one-third the length of the flight deck the aircraft was airborne, the pogos fell away, and by the time the U-2 cleared the bow it was already approximately 1,000 feet above the carrier. Then, with pardonable exhibitionism, Schumacher racked the U-2 into a steep climb--a breath-taking spectacle to anyone who had never previously witnessed a U-2 take-off climb under full power. To the carrier crew, accustomed to the flat trajectory take-off of the heavier and more conventional carrier-based aircraft, the U-2 maneuver was a new and somewhat startling experience.

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The ensuing flight maneuvers were accomplished without incident. Schumacher made several low approaches to the flight deck to ascertain whether there were any aircraft controllability problems in the landing area and found that the U-2 was easily controlled throughout all the maneuvers. On his last pass at the KITTY HAWK's deck, he let the U-2 touch-down briefly and then reapplying power lifted off and set course for the LAC plant at Burbank, California. The initial tests were complete and proved that the U-2 could be operated successfully from carriers of the FORRESTAL class. They also furnished the Lockheed engineering staff with valuable data for use in the development of design changes necessary for modification of the U-2 for arrested landings aboard ship.

The U-2 pilots' Carrier Training Program, already well advanced in planning, was designated Project WHALE TALE II.

The decision to implement a training program for the Agency U-2 pilots was made concurrent with the decision to modify the U-2 for carrier operations. Mr. Cunningham, with other Agency staff members and Captain Martin Carmody, Office of Naval Operations, had previously met with the Naval Air Training Command Staff at Pensacola NAS, Florida, on 5 June 1963 to formulate and approve a syllabus for a training program for the pilots selected for the project.

It was agreed that these pilots, because of their high degree of competency and proficiency, would require only a short, but comprehensive, flight training program to qualify them for carrier operations. It was decided that the program would be accomplished in three phases, as follows:

(1) Phase One - Initial flight check-out in the Navy T2A aircraft and carrier type approaches and landings, all under the supervision of highly qualified Naval Landing Signal Officers at Monterey NAS, California.

(2) Phase Two - Further carrier type landings and approaches in the T2A at Pensacola NAS, Florida, until the Landing Signal Officer considered each pilot ready to land aboard an aircraft carrier. Actual T2A landings and qualifications aboard the aircraft carrier LEXINGTON in the Gulf of Mexico completed this phase.

(3) Phase Three - Initial carrier type approaches and landings in the U-2G at Edwards AFB until the Landing Signal Officer considered each pilot ready to land the U-2 aboard ship. Actual U-2 landings and qualifications aboard a FORRESTAL Class Carrier completed this phase.

The first group of four pilots began Phase One of the Carrier Flight Training at Monterey NAS on 17 November 1963, under the supervision of [redacted] (subsequently assigned to Project IDEALIST as resident Landing Signal Officer). After two weeks of training at Monterey, the group was ready for Phase Two, and on 21-23 November proceeded to Pensacola NAS where all four pilots performed the transition to qualified carrier pilots in their usual professional manner.

The second group consisting of four Agency pilots, Lockheed test pilot [redacted] and the Edwards Detachment Commander, [redacted] were initially scheduled to begin Phase One in December of 1963. However, due to heavy project operational commitments, their training was delayed until 5 January 1964. Training, once begun, went smoothly and professionally, and was completed on 15 February.

Phase Three commenced on 29 February 1964, the date the first U-2G was delivered to the Edwards AFB detachment. Each of the Agency pilots was given numerous sorties in the "G" where much practice went into the development of his flying techniques as derived

PRECISION PERFORMANCE of U. S. Navy T2A's is demonstrated in this photograph of Project Headquarters personnel being airlifted to the U. S. S. LEXINGTON to engage in planning for the WHALE TALE program. These aircraft were the training ships which initially were used to check-out U-2 pilots in carrier operations.

from his experience in the T2A. It should be noted that when [redacted] declared the pilots operationally ready, each felt confident of his ability to undertake the arrested landings, having developed a profound respect for [redacted] judgement and experience in carrier operations.

As the development of the U-2G was reaching its final stages by Lockheed and pilot training was nearing completion, the OSA staff began coordinating details for the suitability tests and pilot qualification with representatives from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander Naval Air Pacific, Vice Admiral Paul D. Stroup. With the cooperation and assistance of these officers, the program proceeded to the point where all elements were ready at the same time; the U-2G, project pilots, and the aircraft carrier USS RANGER which had been selected for the tests.

The RANGER operations were planned in three phases designed to take full advantage of the time the carrier was allotted for project use. This phase was designated WHALE TALE III and consisted of the following:

(1) Phase One - This phase was to be devoted to Lockheed Aircraft Corporation's exclusive use in testing the U-2G in carrier landings and suitability of operations aboard ship.

(2) Phase Two - Agency pilots' U-2G qualifications. This phase was to begin as soon as Lockheed had completed the Phase One test and had turned the aircraft over to the Edwards Detachment.

(3) Phase Three - This phase was to exercise the Edwards Detachment's operational capability and effectiveness while aboard ship.

WHALE TALE III began when a team composed of Headquarters, Detachment and Lock-

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heed personnel proceeded to the RANGER on 25 February 1964 and briefed and cleared the ship's Commanding Officer, Captain William E. Lemos, and other personnel for Project IDEALIST and the WHALE TALE III operations.

On 28 February 1964, Lockheed and Detachment personnel and equipment were loaded aboard the RANGER. On the following morning, the RANGER proceeded to the test area off San Diego where the operations were to be conducted. Phase One began with LAC pilot [redacted] flying aircraft number 362 in a series of touch-and-go landings on the RANGER. The touch-and-go landings all went smoothly; however, on the first attempt for a hook engagement landing, the aircraft bounced and the hook engaged the wire while the aircraft was in the air. This caused the aircraft to be slammed back on deck and nose over. Minor damage resulted to the nose section of the aircraft which was taken below deck for repairs. After repairs were completed, the aircraft was flown back to Burbank for the instrumentation read out. As a result of this incident, Phase One was rescheduled for 2 March 1964.

On 2 March, LAC pilot [redacted] returned to the RANGER in aircraft 348 and completed four successful arrested landings. This completed Phase One. The aircraft was then turned over to the Edwards Detachment and Phase Two began.

On the same day, the first Agency pilot, [redacted] began his U-2G qualifications in 348 and made several touch-and-go landings, but was unable to perform any arrested landings. He ran short of fuel while waiting for the RANGER to maneuver away from a foreign ship which had entered the operational area. He proceeded to North Island NAS for landing, and air operations were discontinued for the day.

On 3 March 1964, [redacted] the next pilot, flew out to the RANGER from North



MINOR MISHAP aboard the U. S. S. RANGER is recorded in this series of photos. In the first photo the aircraft is making a normal approach to engagement.

The U-2 has already touched down and has bounced back into the air. The engagement has taken place while still airborne.



The minor damage to the nose section was the result of the engagement taking place while still airborne. The damage was readily repaired aboard the carrier.

25X1 [redacted] [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

DESIGNING WAYS of C. L. "Kelly" Johnson, o Lockheed vice president and designer of the U-2, were put to the test in configuring the aircraft for carrier operations. Here he appears to be not displeased with the results on completian of the initial launch and recovery tests.

Island NAS in aircraft 348 to continue Phase Two. [redacted] on his first touch-and-go landing, allowed the right wing to drop. The right wing skid caught on an arresting cable and was torn off. [redacted] then flew the aircraft to Edwards and landed safely on the dry lake bed without further incident.

25X1

25X1

As a result of these two incidents, both of the modified U-2's needed minor repairs before Phase Two could be continued. Therefore, with the Navy's concurrence, the remainder of this exercise was planned to be conducted on 9 and 10 March 1964. This delay, as it worked out, was advantageous for all. The pilots refined their approach techniques by applying the experience gained from the 3 March flights.

25X1

On 9 and 10 March 1964, Agency pilots [redacted] qualified in the U-2 without further incident. Phase Two and Phase Three were concluded. At this time the Detachment was considered operationally ready.

25X1

25X1

[redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

IN THE GROOVE ALL THE WAY

A REAL SOFT TOUCH DOWN

THE HOOK ENGAGEMENT



A SLIGHT NOSE OVER TENDENCY



RUNNING THE WIRE OUT

THE END OF THE LANDING

25X1

Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/09/30 : CIA-RDP75B00446R000100210015-3

RECOGNITION - On 30 September 1964 before a capacity audience in the United States Intelligence Board meeting room of the Langley Headquarters of CIA, Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, Deputy Director of CIA, (Right) presents the Distinguished Intelligence Medal to Mr. James A. Cunningham, Jr., DAD/OSA, for his singular contribution to the development of the U-2 carrier capability. Mr. Cunningham, a former U. S. Marine pilot himself, was cited for "the development of a unique method of acquiring foreign intelligence information."

DAILY LOG

Office of the Deputy Director

7/25/63

Date 24 July 1963

1. Two Memos for Record by Jim Cunningham on U-2 carrier training exercise. CNO Adm. Anderson has expressed (thru intermediaries) some concern over protracted U-2 ops from 6th Fleet carriers--fearing a boomerang of Navy image in Med. ([redacted] 25X1

2. Code name WHALE TALE has been given to exercise. R/Adm. Weakley, ONR deputy , is quite willing [redacted] 25X1 to the training exercise next month on KITTY HAWK. ([redacted] 25X1

3. BRASS KNOB: During 11-17 July, [redacted] 25X1 25X1

25X1

Copy 12 of 12

23 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy for Field Activities, Office of Special Activities

SUBJECT : Carrier Training Exercise with USS KITTY HAWK (Unclassified Code Name WHALE TALE)

1. Following my visit of 17 and 18 July to Lockheed and to NAS, North Island, San Diego with reference to the projected carrier launch operation of a U-2, I can report the following information which should be of assistance to you in planning for implementing this activity.

A. Although we had hoped to be able to run the launch operation on 2 and 3 August, because of commitments for in-port repairs to the KITTY HAWK, we were told on arriving at North Island that invitations had already gone out to 1,500 ship's crew members for a dependents' cruise from San Diego on the morning of 3 August. This made it mandatory that we change our dates to 4 and 5 August with the actual launch to take place on the morning of the fifth.

B. Captain Martin D. Carmody and the undersigned met with Vice Admiral Paul D. Stroup, USN, COMNAVAIRPAC, the morning of 18 July and briefed him on the operation. Admiral Stroup has cognizance over the First Fleet under whom the KITTY HAWK comes. Admiral Stroup was very cooperative and said that he would arrange to brief and instruct Vice Admiral Taylor Keith, Commander First Fleet, when the latter returned from Pearl Harbor 20 July to insure that the minor change in carrier scheduling required to permit the WHALE TALE Operation would be accomplished. FYI Admiral Stroup had an IDEALIST clearance during his recent tour in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and was quite familiar with the parameters of the U-2. Admiral Stroup designated as the central

NRO and Navy review(s) completed.

25X1

point of contact on his staff for WHALE TALE Captain George C. Duncan, USN, Chief of Staff to COMNAVAIRPAC.

25X1

C. In company with Captain Duncan, following the briefing
25X1 of Admiral Stroup, Captain Carmody, the undersigned, and [redacted] visited the KITTY HAWK with [redacted]
25X1 [redacted] whom Kelly Johnson proposes will fly the trial in Article 352. The KITTY HAWK was tied up at the pier at North Island, and Captain Carmody and the undersigned met in the skipper's cabin to brief in Captain Duncan's presence Captain Horace H. Epes, USN. Captain Epes was most cooperative and attentive throughout the briefing and assured us of his wholehearted support for the operation. Some of the salient points covered with Captain Epes were:

(1) He would like to put his Communications Officer, a Lt. Commander Anderson or Henderson, I
25X1 believe, in touch with [redacted] so that together they might work out communications procedures and call signs to be used on the day of the launch. Captain Epes sug-
25X1 gested that [redacted] plan to visit the KITTY HAWK k this week for this purpose. It will be getting underway on 24 July from San Diego for certain airborne operations. The
25X1 Captain suggested that [redacted] report to the KITTY HAWK the evening of 23 July and go aboard, remaining there to observe carrier communications procedures on the 24th when air operations will be conducted. The Captain said that he would arrange to have [redacted] flown back
25X1 to land from the carrier after his discussions were completed.

(2) Captain Epes said there will be a minimum crew aboard the KITTY HAWK for the trial run on 5 August, consisting largely of the basic ship's crew plus a modest number in the Air Department. He felt that this would be sufficient to support our operations and still give us enough room to have a workable operating party and observers on board when the carrier moves out on the morning of 5 August. It is the Captain's proposal that they move into the Channel at 0730

25X1

hours PDST and steam westward out of sight of land, presumably something like 50 to 60 miles for the launch. He was of the view that the entire operation could be completed and the carrier back at the pier in North Island by 1400 hours, barring some mechanical problem with the aircraft.

(3) Captain Epes plans to brief only very senior members of his staff on the purpose of the launch, and to the balance of the crew he will simply indicate that what is going on is to be considered as not only classified information, but restricted from passage to others, since it is an ONR project of concern to the Navy. Photography by ship's crew will be prohibited during the time the U-2 is on board the KITTY HAWK. At the same time the Captain has offered full support from his photographic detachment of all steps in the loading, fueling, launch, and aircraft movement operation both in still photography and 16MM color as requested. In addition, he will make available to us television pictures of the pre-launch operations on the elevator and flight decks, as well as the launching and simulated landing approaches planned for the operation. These television pictures are taken from a point of vantage just beneath the primary fly bridge on the aft end of the island, and Video tapes of the entire operation will be given to us for retention. The television vantage point overlooks the Number 3 starboard elevator aft which will be employed in the operation.

(4) Although Captain Epes offered to furnish us his own MD-2 starter carts (an improved version of the MA-2 cart), [redacted] agreed with the Captain that LAC would furnish their air transportable starter cart for the operation. In addition, Lockheed will also provide an LAC fuel truck capacity unknown but over 5,000 gallons, which will be driven from Burbank to North Island to be in position there on Saturday, 3 August. This will contain the fuel needed for the launch operation.

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

(5) Navy will look to us to establish whatever coordination we feel is necessary with the Los Angeles Center of FAA as it bears upon the normal requirement to file an FAA flight plan for any flight originating on a carrier and terminating at a ZI installation. This coordination with FAA should also include suppression of positive control radars, if you feel this is required. Navy will also look to us to coordinate this operation with NORAD as it bears upon flights within the ADIZ in which the carrier will be operating. At present the tentative launch time, everything being equal, would be between 1030 and 1100 hours on the morning of 5 August.

25X1

D. Kelly Johnson told me that he expected his party requiring accommodations on board the KITTY HAWK for the night of 4 August would number 10 or 12 to include himself, [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] and presumably a full LAC crew. Whether this crew comes from Burbank or Edwards should be left

25X1 to you to work out with [redacted] As discussed with Captain Duncan, the plan we laid on would call for the arrival of the U-2 from Burbank at a time just prior to official sunset when light was adequate to permit an easy landing at North Island. Runways there are approximately 7,800 feet in length, and the prevailing wind is out of the direction of 290 degrees. However, since the entire airfield at North Island is adequate for landing (it's an old Navy landing MAT field), the prevailing winds should be no problem. It is then proposed that 352 be taxied beyond base operations to the access runway leading to the aircraft carrier docking area. The access taxiway is more than adequate in width in maneuvering under tow. The Navy will furnish an aircraft tug, and Lockheed will make available a U-2 tow bar. Distance from the access taxiway is probably on the order to half a mile. The aircraft would be towed right up to the position abeam of the Number 3 elevator starboard aft, at which point Captain Duncan says the base will be prepared to defuel the aircraft as required by LAC before hoisting. The Lockheed crew will then move the aircraft on to the hoisting cart, and the gantry crane at dockside will hoist it aboard the flight deck. Prior to moving the aircraft on the flight deck, the same crane will have

25X1

lifted the fuel truck and the LOWBOY dolly cart to the flight deck aft of the island. The angle of the gantry crane on the flight deck, together with the size of the lifting hook, was checked out personally by [redacted] on the 18th and was said to be adequate.

25X1

E. Once aboard the flight deck, the LAC crew would move the aircraft to the LOWBOY dolly and tow it aboard the elevator which would then move it to the hangar deck area where it would be stowed until the carrier was at sea the morning of 5 August. Since the flight profile is a normal one, there is no requirement for pre-breathing of the pilot, and the ship's aircraft oxygen system will be adequate.

F. The Navy has guessed that the entire operation of loading the aircraft from the deck side to the flight deck and thence to the hangar deck will probably take up to two hours. You may wish to discuss with [redacted] the question of how many, if any, spare parts should be taken aboard the carrier in case there is a minor pre-flight checkout failure of some small but necessary item.

25X1

2. I am afraid I have gone into a great deal of detail here, but since I will be away when much of this is going on, I wanted to have everything which might bear upon this whole operation. As to the number of people going out with the ship on 4 August, I think that we should control that from Headquarters so that we in turn can advise Captain Carmody of identities and numbers in order to permit adequate billeting and feeding arrangement on board ship. Carmody will send appropriate TWX's to COMNAVAIRPAC, Attention Captain George Duncan, COS, under the unclassified code name WHALE TALE. Suggest you may wish to have [redacted] keep on top of this aspect of it. You should also know that Admiral Stroup plans to witness the launching by going on board the carrier the morning of 5 August. I believe Kelly plans to send the hoisting cart and the LOWBOY overland to San Diego to meet up with the fuel truck there. There is a restriction on taking the loaded fuel truck on the Coronado Ferry, which means that the fuel truck will have to go overland on a somewhat longer route. I am not sure if the ferry will accommodate the LOWBOY and fuselage cart, which I assume will be on a flatbed. Suggest you check this with Carmody as well.

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted]

4. In view of our discussions with you about weight penalties, I have advised [redacted] that we would await the completion of WHALE TALE and

25X1

25X1

evaluate the pilot report before committing ourselves to the ARS and beacon configuration for even a single aircraft. To this he seemed agreeable. As a last point, believe you may wish to invite Colonel Geary to attend this launch operation. I hope to be there myself!

JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR.
Deputy Assistant Director
(Special Activities)

cc: Capt. Carmody
ADD/R
AFIGO-S

Distribution:
1 - D/FA/OSA
2 - DAD/OSA
3 - Captain Carmody
4 - ADD/R
5 - AFIGO-S
6 - AD/OSA
7 - SS/OSA
8 - COMMO/OSA
9 - SAL/OSA
10 - MD/OSA
11 - D/TECH/OSA
12 - RB/OSA

DAD/OSA:JACunningham, Jr. /mm

TOP SECRET

(b)(3)

IDEA 1922-64
Copy 3

23 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director, Office of Special Activities

SUBJECT: Cover Story for Whale Tale Operation

1. I have noted Dr. MacMillan's reservations concerning the proposed cover story for the Whale Tale operation and his suggestion that we consider an alternate story based on air sampling.

2. As an alternate to the infra-red submarine detection aspect of the cover story, we could describe the objective of the operation as an upper air sampling mission to establish base line radioactivity at high altitudes in this part of the world. This would require only minor revisions to the cover plan as it is presently written.

3. It should be noted, however, that the crew of the Ranger has already been briefed on the infra-red story during the training phase, the camera hatches on the U-2 will not substantiate an air sampling mission, and the suggestion of air sampling could very well induce speculation that [redacted]ssion was, in fact, related to the French test program.

[redacted] If, in the view of the approving authority, the foregoing discrepancies [redacted]ceptable and the air sampling approach considered more appropriate, [redacted]ndertake the necessary revisions to bring the story in line with [redacted]cMillan's recommendation.

[redacted]

Special Assistant for Liaison/OSA

Per [redacted], the Special Group overruled Dr MacMillan and we will play the infra-red game. Jack Hawk 4-28-64

TOP SECRET

This document contains information referring to Project IDEALIST

TOP SECRET

IDEA 1922-64

23 April 1964



TOP SECRET

(b)(3)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

ORIG: 25 May 64 1753 VERNON R. MORRIS
UNIT: IDEA/OSA
EXT:
DATE: 25 MAY 64

TO: KWCACTUS
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO: OPS 1-15

ROUTING

1		9	
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PRECEDENCE	DEFERRED	X	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

08744

TO PRIORITY CACTUS INFO CITE ADIC 7653

RECITAL-X FISH HAWK

1. FOLG RECD FROM KWCURFEW:

   A. MSN ACFT LAUNCH 2020N 12830W ETD 26/1700Z.

   B. ETA TWO ASD NORTH ISLAND 26/0140Z WITH FILM.

   C. ETA TG ALAMEDA 28/1600Z.

2. FOLG INFO APPLY TO U-2 FERRY FLTS:

   A. 348 MSN NBR 0114G NORMAL CALLSIGN - BAGEL, EMERG - JUDY.

   B. 362 MSN NBR 0125G NORMAL CALLSIGN - TADPOLE, EMERG - STELLA.

   C. ANTICIPATE 2 PLUS 45 TIME ENROUTE.

   D. ROUTE DIRECT FROM LAUNCH POINT.

   E. HQ WILL PROVIDE NORAD NEC INFORMATION FOR SUPPRESSION RADAR.

3. HQ WILL REQUEST ODUNIT PROVIDE AIRLIFT FOR CURFEW DET.

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted]

VERNON R. MORRIS
C/IDEA/OSA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

TOP SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

 Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

ROUTING

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	ROUTINE	XX	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

ORIG: VERNON R. MORRIS
UNIT: IDEA/OSA
EXT:
DATE: 25 MAY 64 25 May 64 17 31

TO : KWBAIL KWSPECTRE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: OPS 1-15 75

INFO:

08738

TO IMMEDIATE BAIL INFO SPECTRE CITE ADIC 7650

RECITAL-62 FISH HAWK

1. W224A AND W234A

2. EXPECT APPROX 6000 FT DELTA 2 FILM FROM FISH HAWK DET A FOR WAXING, TITLING, DUPING, ETC., APPROX ETA 26/0900Z NIAGRA FALLS MUNI APT VIA U.S. NAVY ASD. FIRM ETA WILL BE FWD WHEN KNOWN.

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted]

VERNON R. MORRIS
C/IDEA/OSA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

TOP SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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23 MAY 64 19

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

ORIG: J.W. CHERBONNEAUX
UNIT: IDEA/OSA
EXT:
DATE: 23 MAY 1964

TO: KMCURTAIN KMCACTUS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: OPS 1-15

INFO:

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PRECEDENCE		DEFERRED	X	PRIORITY
		ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

INITIALS

INITIALS

08600

TO PRIORITY COPPER INFO CACTUS CITE ADIC 7589

RECITAL-X WISH HDQ

PLEASE ADVISE MR JAMES BARNES THAT HE WILL BE REQUIRED TO ATTEND A SERIES OF MEETING AT KMCACTUS REGARDING THE FLAME OUT PROBLEM AT KSCARD UPON HIS RETURN FROM THIS OPERATION. MEETING SHOULD LAST APPROX ONE TO THREE DAYS.

END OF MESSAGE

VERNON E. MORRIS
C/IDEA/OSA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

TOP SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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23 MAY 64 | 2[illegible]0 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

ORIG: J.W. CHERBONNEAUX
UNIT: IDEA/OSA
EXT:
DATE: 23 MAY 1964

ROUTING			
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DISSEMINATION		DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS
		ROUTINE	X OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

TO : KUCURFEW

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: OPS 1-15

INFO:

8573

TO IMMEDIATE CURFEW INFO CITE ADIC 7577

RECITAL-X FISH HAWK

REQ YOU FWD ASAP MSN W234A TAKE READ OUT VIA BREVITY CODE.

END OF MESSAGE

VERNON E. MORRIS
C/IDEA/OSA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

TOP SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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22 MAY 64 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

ORIG: V. R. MORRIS
UNIT: C/IDEA/OSA
EXT:
DATE: 22 MAY 1964

TO: KWCURFEW

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: OPS 1-8/DL

ROUTING

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	ROUTINE	X	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

TO IMMEDIATE CURFEW INFO CITE C8350

7467

RECITAL-X FISH HAWK

REF: CURFEW 020

FCST WX INDICATES GOOD POSSIBILITY OBTAINING COVERAGE TGT BRAVO WITH MSN PER REF. HQ CONCURS MSN LAUNCH 22/1600Z.

END OF MESSAGE

VERNON R. MORRIS
C/IDEA/OSA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

TOP SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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21 May 64 1030 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

ORIG: VERNON R. MORRIS
UNIT: IDEA/OSA
EXT: [redacted]
DATE: 20 MAY 64

TO: KWCURFEW

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: DPS 1-15

INFO:

ROUTING

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PRECEDENCE	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
	ROUTINE	X	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

8189

TO IMMEDIATE CURFEW INFO CITE ADIC 7416

RECITAL-X FISH HAWK

1. MSN W234A APPROVAL RECD FROM HIGHER AUTH WITH RESERVATIONS THAT TGT ECHO NOT REPEAT NOT BE COVERED AGAIN.

2. THIS MSG YOUR AUTH TO PLAN AND LAUNCH MSN WHEN SUITABLE WX PREVAILS.

3. REQ YOU PLAN ROUTE TO ARRIVE TGT BRAVO FIRST AND BRIEF GLITTER ABORT MSN IF UNABLE OBTAIN SATIS COVERAGE THAT TGT. IF SATIS COVERAGE BRAVO OBTAINED RE-COVER TGTS ALPHA AND COCOA ENROUTE TGT DELTA.

4. ~~ETI. LATEST POST WX INDICATES POSS WX FOR 27 MAY AND POSS FOR LAUNCH 28 MAY.~~ [redacted]

4. MSG RECEIPT REQUESTED.

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted]

VERNON R. MORRIS
C/IDEA/OSA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

TOP SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

 Copy No.

[redacted]AY 64 0843

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: VERNON R. MORRIS
UNIT: IDEA/OSA
EXT: [redacted]
DATE: 21 MAY 64

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTING

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	DEFERRED		PRIORITY		
	ROUTINE	X	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE		INITIALS

TO : KWCURFEW

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: OPS 14 5 ANF

OUT 08154

TO IMMEDIATE CURFEW INFO CITE ADIC 7399

RECITAL-X FISH HAWK

REF: CURFEW 018

NEXT POSSIBLE MSN 22 MAY. STILL AWAITING APPROVAL FROM HIGHER AUTHORITY.

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted]

VERNON R. MORRIS
C/IDEA/OSA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~TOP SECRET~~

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

 Copy No.

WHALE

SECRET CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

ORIG: [redacted]
UNIT: SAL/OSA
EXT: [redacted]
DATE: 11 SEPTEMBER 1963

ROUTING			
1	SAL/OSA	9	
2	AD/OSA	10	
3	DAD/OSA	11	
4	SS/OSA	12	
5	RI/OSA	13	
6	FA/OSA	14	
7	DD/S&T	15	
8		16	

PRECEDENCE					INITIALS
	DEFERRED	X	PRIORITY		
	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE		INITIALS

TO: KWCACTUS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: OCA 1-15

OUT 19260

TO PRIORITY CACTUS INFO

CITE ADIC 3012

HBJAYWALK WHALE TALE TWO

REF: ADIC 2960 (OUT #19124)

1. GENERAL COVER

A. DURING THE CARRIER CONVERSION TRAINING PHASE AT MONTEREY NAF, IDEALIST PILOTS WILL OSTENSIBLY BE NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS ON TEMPORARY ACTIVE DUTY. (ACTUAL DOCUMENTATIONS OF THE [redacted] PILOTS AS NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED ON ARRIVAL AT MONTEREY, HOWEVER, SUCH DOCUMENTATION WILL BE RETAINED IN THE CUSTODY OF THE CO, MONTEREY NAF, AND WILL BE UTILIZED ONLY IN THE EVENT OF AN INCIDENT REQUIRING IT. THIS WILL NOT BE REQUIRED FOR [redacted]

B. NO IDENTIFICATION PAPERS WILL BE CARRIED ON THE PERSON OF THE PILOTS WHILE ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN FLYING.

2. PROCEDURES A. IN THE EVENT OF AN INCIDENT (ACCIDENT, BAIL-OUT, ETC.) RESULTING IN PRESS INQUIRIES, ALL SUCH QUERIES WILL BE REFERRED TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER, MONTEREY NAF. THE LATTER WILL RESPOND TO QUERIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH FOLLOWING, BUT ONLY AFTER COORDINATING WITH HEADQUARTERS.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

TOP SECRET

COPY 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

 Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
DATE:

TO:

FROM:

CONF:

INFO:

ROUTING			
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PRECEDENCE					INITIALS
	DEFERRED		PRIORITY		
	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE		INITIALS

OUT 19268

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE

B. IF THE INCIDENT INVOLVES A FATALITY THE CUSTOMARY MILITARY PROCEDURE OF DEFERRING IDENTIFICATION OF THE VICTIM PENDING NOTIFICATION OF NEXT OF KIN WILL BE ADHERED TO.

C. IF THE MISHAP INVOLVES [redacted] HE WILL BE DESCRIBED AS A NAVAL RESERVE OFFICER ON TEMPORARY DUTY AT MONTEREY NAF. HE WAS ENGAGED IN PROFICIENCY FLIGHT TRAINING AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. IF NECESSARY, HE WILL BE IDENTIFIED AS A LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION EMPLOYEE IN CIVILIAN LIFE AND HIS TRUE HOME ADDRESS CAN BE GIVEN.

D. IF THE MISHAP INVOLVES [redacted] HE WILL BE DESCRIBED [redacted] HAD JUST RECENTLY ARRIVED AT MONTEREY TO ATTEND THE DEFENSE LANGUAGE SCHOOL AND WHO WAS ASSIGNED TO TO THE MONTEREY NAF TO MAINTAIN FLYING PROFICIENCY.

3. IF THE INCIDENT SHOULD OCCUR DURING THE PENSACOLA PHASE OF THE TRAINING, THE SAME GENERAL RULES WILL APPLY WITH THE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

TOP SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

RELEASING OFFICER AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

 Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

TO :
FROM :
CONF :
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ROUTING			
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PRECEDENCE					
	DEFERRED		PRIORITY		INITIALS
	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE		INITIALS

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PAGE THREE

TO INFO CITE

FOLLOWING EXCEPTIONS:

A. ALL QUERIES WILL BE REFERRED TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER, PENSACOLA NAS, WHO WILL COORDINATE WITH HEADQUARTERS PRIOR TO ISSUING ANY STATEMENT.

B. IN THE CASE OF AN INCIDENT INVOLVING [redacted] HE WILL BE DESCRIBED AS A [redacted] TEST PILOT FROM THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FACILITY AT [redacted] ON TEMPORARY DUTY WITH THE U. S. NAVY. HE WAS ENGAGED IN A ROUTINE TRAINING FLIGHT AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT.

4. IT IS EMPHASIZED TO ALL CONCERNED THAT NO STATEMENT WILL BE ISSUED BY ANYONE UNTIL SO DIRECTED BY HEADQUARTERS.

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted]

JACK C. LEDFORD
AD/OSA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

TOP SECRET

[redacted]
SAL/OSA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

 Copy No.

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2 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Whale Tale III Launching and Landing of U-2 from USS Ranger during period 29 February, 3 March, 9 - 10 March 1964

1. Driver Involvement

a. During the above period Mr. Robert Schumacher, Lockheed test pilot, Messrs. Barnes, [redacted] Edens and Bedford, Detachment G drivers, successfully completed the required touch and go's and arrestments necessary to qualify them for U-2 operation from an aircraft carrier.

2. Sequence of Events

a. 28 February - The Edwards Detachment personnel, the Lockheed representatives, and the group from Headquarters arrived aboard the carrier USS Ranger at North Island.

b. 29 February - At 0830 on 29 February, the carrier proceeded approximately 20 miles out to sea to await the arrival of Mr. Schumacher ferrying the U-2 from Burbank. Mr. Schumacher made several successful touch and go approaches but on his first trap he approached with the nose set towards the deck and the aircraft hook engaged the arresting cable approximately 18 inches from the deck. This resulted in the nose of the U-2 coming in contact with the deck destroying the pito-u tube and damaging the fuselage. The aircraft was removed to the hangar deck via the elevator situated aft of the island, where the Lockheed mechanics proceeded to make the necessary repairs. Upon completion of the repairs, the aircraft was returned to Burbank by Mr. Schumacher. The Ranger returned to North Island.

c. 2 March - Once again Mr. Schumacher rendezvoused with the Ranger approximately 20 miles from San Diego shore line and after making several touch and go approaches successfully completed 4 trap landings.

d. Following Mr. Schumacher's performance, Mr. Robert Ericson from Detachment G took off in the U-2 and made several touch and go approaches. It was observed that Mr. Ericson was having difficulty in landing the aircraft on the carrier. It was

[redacted]

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also pointed out that a Norweign trawler was observed in close proximity to the carrier during this exercise which required Capt. Lemos, the Skipper of the Ranger, to remove the Ranger from the vicinity of the trawler. This procedure required approximately 15 minutes, during which time Mr. Ericson was consuming very precious fuel. After making another touch and go approach, it was decided to have Ericson return to North Island instead of attempting to land on the carrier. The writer immediately followed Mr. Ericson from the carrier by Navy aircraft and arrived at North Island in company with Messrs. Barnes, Schumacher, and 3 Lockheed maintenance types shortly after Ericson. Ericson arrived at North Island with five gallons of fuel remaining in the aircraft.

e. The writer took the necessary steps to insure the security of the aircraft at North Island after it had been determined that the weather both at Edwards and Burbank did not permit the aircraft to proceed to those locations. The writer in company with the above group remained at North Island overnight and left at 0615 the following morning for the carrier.

f. 3 March - Mr. Barnes left North Island with the U-2 and Mr. Ericson accompanied the writer and the Lockheed group by Navy aircraft to the Ranger. Shortly after the arrival of the writer aboard the Ranger, Mr. Barnes proceeded to make two touch and go approaches, the second of which resulted in his shearing part of the star board wing tip which destroyed his right airlon resulting in his being ordered to return directly to North Base. Although experiencing some difficulty in navigating the aircraft enroute, Mr. Barnes did effect a satisfactory landing at North Base, without incident. The Ranger then returned to North Island and it was decided to continue the exercise on 9 and 10 March 1964.

g. 8 March - Once again the writer in company with Messrs. Cunningham and Cherbonneaux along with the Edwards Detachment personnel arrived aboard the USS Ranger.

h. 9 March - The Ranger proceeded to a point approximately 20 miles from the San Diego coast line to await the arrival of the first U-2 being flown by Mr. Barnes. The aircraft arrived in the pattern at approximately 1045 hours and Mr. Barnes made several touch and go approaches and completed two successful trap landings. Following this exercise [redacted] arrived with the second U-2, shot several touch and go landings and successfully completed four arrested landings. Once again Mr. Barnes took off to complete successfully his two remaining trap landings and prior to the

completion of the afternoon's exercise, Mr. Edens also managed to accomplish several touch and go approaches and one successful trap landing. The group remained aboard the Ranger overnight approximately 20 miles off the San Diego coast.

i. 10 March - During the morning of 10 March, Mr. Edens completed his three remaining trap landings successfully and Mr. Bedford completed four touch and go approaches and three trap landings. Like Mr. Schumacher, Mr. Bedford on his third trap landing dove for the deck upon his approach and suffered minor damage to the nose of the aircraft. As a result of this damage, it was decided to terminate the qualifications at this point and return the aircraft to the hangar deck for repair by the Lockheed group. Meanwhile the other U-2 was refueled to full capacity, 1345 gallons and was successfully launched by Mr. Schumacher for return to North Base. It was noted that this launching was successfully completed within 550' of the carrier runway. After the second aircraft was repaired, Mr. Barnes returned to North Island and the Headquarters and Edwards Detachment personnel disembarked.

3. Security

a. In the opinion of the writer, the security support provided by the Marine detachment aboard the ship was excellent. Through Capt. Frederic Tolleson, Commanding Officer of the Marine detachment aboard the Ranger, we were able to insure more than adequate coverage over the Bird fuel trucks, and all related equipment. Capt. Tolleson was provided an access list reflecting the names of the individuals who would have need to work on the Bird or make use of any of the special equipment.

b. An air-conditioned area approximately 2500 sq. ft. situated adjacent to the number 4 elevator approximately 2 decks above the hanger deck will be available for the storage of the B configuration, the tracker camera, and other special equipment. There will be two entrances to this area, one adjacent to the elevator which is controlled from inside the special equipment area and the other a secure door which will be guarded by a Marine sentry, also on a 24 hour basis. This door, which is controlled by an electric buzzer, is opened from the inside by the Marine sentry, who in turn controls access to an inner door which enters into the special equipment area. Capt. Tolleson assured the writer that a man will be available to guard this space on a 24 hour basis.

c. During the time the aircraft is on the flight deck Capt. Tolleson arranged to have several Marine guards in the vicinity of the Bird to insure that no curious sailors come within wing tips distance of the aircraft. Also during this time there will be a sufficient number of Marine guards patrolling the flight deck, the catwalks adjacent to the flight deck, and the island structure to insure that no photographs are taken of the U-2. When the aircraft is on the hangar deck, where it will be situated when not being prepared for actual operations, it will be confined in a roped off area along with the fuel trucks containing approximately 5,000 gallons of fuel each, access to which area will again be controlled by the Marine personnel.

d. The B camera will be removed from the aircraft on the hangar deck and moved by the number 4 elevator to the special equipment area described above, where it will be stored when not in use.

e. During the Whale Tale III exercise, the Executive Officer, when the Ranger was clear of the harbor, made an announcement via the public address system concerning the presence of the U-2 and citing the cover story involving Lockheed and the Office of Naval Research. The Executive Officer, during the briefing of the ship's crew, emphasized the sensitivity of the operation and strongly prohibited the crew from discussing the presence of the U-2 with anyone.

4. Problems

a. In view of the continuous noise aboard these carriers, it will be necessary to secure a suitable area where the operational pilot can rest prior to mission time. This will have to be a sound proof compartment. A proposal has been made to utilize the Admirals Sea Cabin for this purpose.

b. In view of the anticipated damage to the aircraft incurred during this operation, it will be necessary to insure an ample supply of spare parts aboard the carrier. This will be handled by Materiel.

c. In view of the probability of aircraft damage, it will be necessary to utilize two aircraft in this operation. It is pointed out that there are two aircraft configured for this use.

d. During the handling of the Bird on the flight deck, it will be necessary to slow down the carrier or change its direction to decrease the wind velocity blowing across the flight deck. It is recommended that a maximum wind velocity of 15 knots be tolerated for this procedure.

5. Operational Concept

a. The operational concept as outlined in the accompanying status report remains pretty much the same with the following exceptions:

(1) The operational aircraft will be landed aboard shortly after the carrier leaves the California coast. In this way the drivers will be able to improve their efficiency during the time the carrier is proceeding to the target area, estimated to be approximately eight days. Admittedly this increases the risk of the aircraft being spotted during the trip to the area of interest but it is felt that the operational readiness that could be developed upon by this procedure would justify this risk.

6. Miscellaneous Points

a. Personnel - As now planned it is estimated that there will be approximately 30 people participating in the operation from Detachment G. It is recommended that a maximum of three Security types from the Detachment be employed. Mr. Cunningham has recommended that a representative from Headquarters Security and Operations, accompany the group on the initial deployment. The writer is not convinced at this time of the need for his presence.

b. It should be kept in mind that Detachment Security personnel will be responsible for accompanying the take from the aircraft carrier, in all probability via Navy A3D to Honolulu, where it will be then turned over to a Security courier for onward movement to E-K. At the present time Operations is talking in terms of six missions. If these were to take place back to back it would impose a hardship on the Detachment Security personnel. This matter will have to be further resolved, depending on the number of missions approved.

c. Advanced Notification - It has been determined that the Navy will require at least 10 days notification to make a carrier available for an IDEALIST operation.

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d. Aircraft Readiness - It has been decided that the U-2s while on board ship will have to be flown at least every five days to insure their operational readiness.

e. Camera - As of this writing, it is planned to use the 112B camera for this exercise.

f. Communication - During the Whale Tale III exercise, it was determined that a minimum of two hours was required for the transmission of messages. Communications Division has assured the Operations personnel that this time will be reduced to everybodys satisfaction.

[redacted]
Security Officer
OSA

[redacted]

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BYE 2953-63
Copy 1 of 12

25 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy for Field Activities, Office of Special Activities

SUBJECT : Carrier Training Exercise with USS KITTY HAWK (Unclassified Code Name WHALE TALE)

1. Following my visit of 17 and 18 July to Lockheed and to NAS, North Island, San Diego with reference to the projected carrier launch operation of a U-2, I can report the following information which should be of assistance to you in planning for implementing this activity.

A. Although we had hoped to be able to run the launch operation on 2 and 3 August, because of commitments for in-port repairs to the KITTY HAWK, we were told on arriving at North Island that invitations had already gone out to 1,500 ship's crew members for a dependents' cruise from San Diego on the morning of 3 August. This made it mandatory that we change our dates to 4 and 5 August with the actual launch to take place on the morning of the fifth.

B. Captain Martin D. Carmody and the undersigned met with Vice Admiral Paul D. Stroup, USN, COMNAVAIRPAC, the morning of 18 July and briefed him on the operation. Admiral Stroup has cognizance over the First Fleet under whom the KITTY HAWK comes. Admiral Stroup was very cooperative and said that he would arrange to brief and instruct Vice Admiral Taylor Keith, Commander First Fleet, when the latter returned from Pearl Harbor 20 July to insure that the minor change in carrier scheduling required to permit the WHALE TALE Operation would be accomplished. FYI Admiral Stroup had an IDEALIST clearance during his recent tour in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and was quite familiar with the parameters of the U-2. Admiral Stroup designated as the central

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point of contact on his staff for WHALE TALE Captain George C. Duncan, USN, Chief of Staff to COMNAVAIRPAC.

C. In company with Captain Duncan, following the briefing of Admiral Stroop, Captain Carmody, the undersigned, and Lt. Colonels Marcona and Kattler visited the KITTY HAWK with Messrs. Cavanaugh, Cavette, and Schumacher whom Kelly Johnson proposes will fly the trial in Article 352. The KITTY HAWK was tied up at the pier at North Island, and Captain Carmody and the undersigned met in the skipper's cabin to brief in Captain Duncan's presence Captain Horace H. Epes, USN. Captain Epes was most cooperative and attentive throughout the briefing and assured us of his wholehearted support for the operation. Some of the salient points covered with Captain Epes were:

(1) He would like to put his Communications Officer, a Lt. Commander Anderson or Henderson, I believe, in touch with Mr. [redacted] so that together they might work out communications procedures and call signs to be used on the day of the launch. Captain Epes suggested that Mr. [redacted] plan to visit the KITTY HAWK this week for this purpose. It will be getting underway on 24 July from San Diego for certain airborne operations. The Captain suggested that Mr. [redacted] report to the KITTY HAWK the evening of 23 July and go aboard, remaining there to observe carrier communications procedures on the 24th when air operations will be conducted. The Captain said that he would arrange to have Mr. [redacted] flown back to land from the carrier after his discussions were completed.

(2) Captain Epes said there will be a minimum crew aboard the KITTY HAWK for the trial run on 5 August, consisting largely of the basic ship's crew plus a modest number in the Air Department. He felt that this would be sufficient to support our operations and still give us enough room to have a workable operating party and observers on board when the carrier moves out on the morning of 5 August. It is the Captain's proposal that they move into the Channel at 0730

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bears FEST and steam westward out of sight of land, presumably something like 50 to 60 miles for the launch. He was of the view that the entire operation could be completed and the carrier back at the pier in North Island by 1600 hours, barring some mechanical problem with the aircraft.

(3) Captain Epes plans to brief only very senior members of his staff on the purpose of the launch, and to the balance of the crew he will simply indicate that what is going on is to be considered as not only classified information, but restricted from passage to others, since it is an OSR project of concern to the Navy. Photography by ship's crew will be prohibited during the time the U-2 is on board the HITTY HAWK. At the same time the Captain has offered full support from his photographic detachment of all steps in the loading, fueling, launch, and aircraft movement operation both in still photography and 16MM color as requested. In addition, he will make available to us television pictures of the pre-launch operations on the elevator and flight decks, as well as the launching and simulated landing approaches planned for the operation. These television pictures are taken from a point of vantage just beneath the primary fly bridge on the aft end of the island, and Video tapes of the entire operation will be given to us for retention. The television vantage point overlooks the Number 3 starboard elevator aft which will be employed in the operation.

(4) Although Captain Epes offered to furnish us his own MD-2 starter carts (an improved version of the MA-2 cart), Mr. Cavanaugh agreed with the Captain that LAC would furnish their air transportable starter cart for the operation. In addition, Lockheed will also provide an LAC fuel truck capacity unknown but over 5,000 gallons, which will be driven from Burbank to North Island to be in position there on Saturday, 5 August. This will contain the fuel needed for the launch operation.

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(5) Navy will look to us to establish whatever coordination we feel is necessary with the Los Angeles Center of FAA as it bears upon the normal requirement to file an FAA flight plan for any flight originating on a carrier and terminating at a AF installation. This coordination with FAA should also include suppression of positive control radars, if you feel this is required. Navy will also look to us to coordinate this operation with NORAD as it bears upon flights within the ADIZ in which the carrier will be operating. At present the tentative launch time, everything being equal, would be between 1030 and 1100 hours on the morning of 5 August.

D. Kelly Johnson told me that he expected his party requiring accommodations on board the KITTY HAWK for the night of 4 August would number 10 or 12 to include himself, Mr. Cavanaugh, Mr. Cavette, Mr. Schumacher, and presumably a full LAC crew. Whether this crew comes from Burbank or Edwards should be left to you to work out with Cavanaugh. As discussed with Captain Duncan, the plan we laid on would call for the arrival of the U-2 from Burbank at a time just prior to official sunset when light was adequate to permit an easy landing at North Island. Runways there are approximately 7,800 feet in length, and the prevailing wind is out of the direction of 290 degrees. However, since the entire airfield at North Island is adequate for landing (it's an old Navy landing MAT field), the prevailing winds should be no problem. It is then proposed that 352 be taxied beyond base operations to the access runway leading to the aircraft carrier docking area. The access taxiway is more than adequate in width in maneuvering under tow. The Navy will furnish an aircraft tug, and Lockheed will make available a U-2 tow bar. Distance from the access taxiway is probably on the order to half a mile. The aircraft would be towed right up to the position abeam of the Number 3 elevator starboard aft, at which point Captain Duncan says the base will be prepared to defuel the aircraft as required by LAC before hoisting. The Lockheed crew will then move the aircraft on to the hoisting cart, and the gantry crane at dockside will hoist it aboard the flight deck. Prior to moving the aircraft on the flight deck, the same crane will have

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lifted the fuel truck and the LOWBOY dolly cart to the flight deck aft of the island. The angle of the gantry crane on the flight deck, together with the size of the lifting hook, was checked out personally by Mr. Cavanaugh on the 18th and was said to be adequate.

E. Once aboard the flight deck, the LAC crew would move the aircraft to the LOWBOY dolly and tow it aboard the elevator which would then move it to the hangar deck area where it would be stowed until the carrier was at sea the morning of 5 August. Since the flight profile is a normal one, there is no requirement for pre-breathing of the pilot, and the ship's aircraft oxygen system will be adequate.

F. The Navy has guessed that the entire operation of loading the aircraft from the dock side to the flight deck and thence to the hangar deck will probably take up to two hours. You may wish to discuss with Cavanaugh the question of how many, if any, spare parts should be taken aboard the carrier in case there is a minor pre-flight checkout failure of some small but necessary item.

2. I am afraid I have gone into a great deal of detail here, but since I will be away when much of this is going on, I wanted to have everything which might bear upon this whole operation. As to the number of people going out with the ship on 4 August, I think that we should control that from Headquarters so that we in turn can advise Captain Carmody of identities and numbers in order to permit adequate billeting and feeding arrangement on board ship. Carmody will send appropriate TWX's to COMNAVAIRPAC, Attention Captain George Duncan, COS, under the unclassified code name WHALE TALE. Suggest you may wish to have [redacted] keep on top of this aspect of it. You should also know that Admiral Stroop plans to witness the launching by going on board the carrier the morning of 5 August. I believe Kelly plans to send the hoisting cart and the LOWBOY overland to San Diego to meet up with the fuel truck there. There is a restriction on taking the loaded fuel truck on the Coronado Ferry, which means that the fuel truck will have to go overland on a somewhat longer route. I am not sure if the ferry will accommodate the LOWBOY and fuselage cart, which I assume will be on a flatbed. Suggest you check this with Carmody as well.

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3. One final point deals with the question of cover. Captain Epes will require from us a general cover plan which Captain Carmody will send him by TWX after we write it. As arrangements have been discussed with Navy, it is everyone's feeling that the only acceptable plan is to attribute this effort to the Office of Naval Research. As I noted in earlier memoranda, Vice Admiral Rayburn, Director of R&D for Navy, and his Deputy Admiral Weakley have both concurred in this. Captain Carmody plans to touch base with Rear Admiral Coates, the head of ONR, next week to lay on specifics. In general the story in my view should turn around the pivot of a classified ONR project dealing with the adaptability and suitability of U-2 take-offs from various types of carriers of which the HITTY HAWK (CVA-63) is only one. I think we should go very easy on admitting at this stage the existence of any classified inner cover story, such as air sampling. It has been proposed that in addition to the tail number now worn by Article 352, namely N315X, there should be painted on the vertical stabalizer in white letters at least eight inches high the words "Office of Naval Research". It has also been suggested that the same legend be stenciled on both sides of the fuselage under the canopy of the aircraft in smaller letters, and that if available, ONR decals similar to the old NASA decals be applied at the same general location. It would be in effect said that ONR had a contractual arrangement with Lockheed to support this launch project as Phase I of a larger program, leading to the study by the U-2 of upper air meteorology over Atlantic and Pacific waters as these phenomena relate to carrier operations. I have supposed all along that we will take pains to see that Article 352 is wearing a plain hatch during the flight from the carrier, as well as from Burbank to North Island. One detail I omitted, and that was that during the test operation from the airfield to the deckside, Captain Duncan has agreed to furnish special shore patrol and/or Marine guard support to block off all access roads to prevent close observation of the loading activity. Captain Carmody also suggested that it would be a good idea for him to touch base with Admiral John S. McCain, Chief of Naval Information (PIO type) to backstop this cover in event there should be any observation of the U-2 in the San Diego area which prompted inquiries of the Navy. I understand informally, however, that on at least one other occasion in the past a U-2, presumably one of the ASSC birds at Edwards, landed at North Island without causing any problems.

4. In view of our discussions with you about weight penalties, I have advised [redacted] that we would await the completion of WHALE TALE and

evaluate the pilot report before committing ourselves to the ASS and beacon configuration for even a single aircraft. To this he seemed agreeable. As a last point, believe you may wish to invite Colonel Geary to attend this launch operation. I hope to be there myself!

[redacted]

JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR.
Deputy Assistant Director
(Special Activities)

[redacted]

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BYE 2952-63
Copy 12 of 16

23 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Acting Deputy Director (Research)

SUBJECT : Proposed Operation of U-2 Aircraft from Aircraft Carrier

This Staff Study contains recommendations for the approval of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; these recommendations are contained in Paragraph V.

I. PROBLEM:

To determine the feasibility, cost, and level of effort required to furnish an operating capability for U-2 aircraft from aircraft carriers.

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

A. Advantages of Carrier Operations:

1. Carrier operations would permit a wide choice of operating locations for the launch of IDEALIST U-2 overflights. In theory at least, the oceans of the world (minus the territorial waters of hostile countries) are available as launch and/or retrieval areas. This flexibility and mobility can deny unfriendly radar nets the advantage of monitoring activities and known or probable IDEALIST U-2 bases.

2. IDEALIST operations conducted from aircraft carriers would be entirely under the control of the United States Government. This would eliminate the involvement of second or even third countries in IDEALIST operations, simplfying the political clearance problem immeasurably and theoretically cutting down the time lost in deployment in those cases where deployment cannot take place until political negotiations for land bases have been consummated.

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Handle via BYEMAN Control System

3. Although not designed for carrier operations, preliminary engineering analyses indicate that at relatively small cost and within a reasonable time span, a minimum of two U-2 aircraft can be structurally modified to permit the proposed carrier operations. Examination of available United States aircraft carrier facilities by principal members of OSA and senior contractor personnel within the past sixty days discloses no area of disabling deficiency in terms of logistics, communications, or operational support.

4. Within the general statement above, it is a fact, however, that of the presently in-commission United States Navy carriers, consideration of U-2 operations should be in all probability limited to certain of the attack carriers (Navy designation "CVA"). The most feasible CVA's for U-2 operations are the SARATOGA, RANGER, and INDEPENDENCE, all of which offer an ideally situated and physically segregated operating facility known as the Airborne Systems Support Center (ASSC). The balance of the seven CVA's favored for this operation would ultimately be modified to include the ASSC, but probably not until calendar 1964 and thereafter as funds are available.

5. In addition to the flexibility alluded to above, it should be noted that based on present evidence, those carriers with the ASSC facility offer the additional advantage of adequate space for the complete processing and initial flash readout of both "B" camera and tracker film. Original negatives can be produced and PI'd on board with only a small modification to existing Navy processing facilities on ship. Present Navy carrier processing capability in equipment and trained manpower is inadequate, having been designed for other reconnaissance systems with different technical parameters. Present estimates are that the on-board processing capability would cost in the neighborhood of from $30,000 to $80,000 in capital equipment, depending upon numbers of copies to be produced and titled. This equipment could be moved on and off the carrier when not required. Supplemental technical representatives (a total of twelve in all) to furnish a full processing capability on board would be furnished by Eastman Kodak as a team at approximately $35,000 to $38,000 per month based on three missions per month for that period when their services aboard ship were required. Adoption of an on-board processing and PI capability would eliminate one of the potential

good

disadvantages of carrier operations, namely the time lost in transportation of mission take from the carrier to an adequately equipped processing facility on shore, as well as the hazard of losing the original negative before it has been duplicated.

6. In addition to offering advantages tactically in the launch phase of operations, a carrier-based U-2 can return to its launch point under carefully controlled approach conditions from as far as 300 miles away from the ship. In addition, the ship itself can maneuver to receive the aircraft under conditions of optimum weather, wind, and visibility, a feature not enjoyed by a fixed land base.

B. Disadvantages of Carrier Operations:

1. The principal disadvantage of carrier operations would be the exposure of the U-2 capability to as large a group of uncleared individuals as would be present on a CVA attack carrier with its air group aboard. Such a carrier would have in the neighborhood of 4,200 people, not including the U-2 Detachment, and even though Navy carriers can today operate without supporting task forces, it would be impossible to conceal the existence of the U-2 on board ship and to deny from the crew the knowledge of when flights took place. Certain steps can be taken to minimize the exposure of the aircraft and to prevent unauthoritative speculation as to its mission, but no such system offers airtight security.

2. Although the range and altitude performance of a carrier-modified U-2 will not be known accurately until after a vehicle so configured is test-flown, the process of "beefing up" the aircraft's structure and installing adequate arresting gear and modifying the landing gear will add a certain weight penalty. The aircraft designer is currently forecasting a net penalty in the neighborhood of 300 pounds for the carrier modification. It may be that this penalty will eventually be larger than that conservative figure, which itself is less than half of what might be referred to as a "normal weight penalty" associated with this modification. Although it is theoretically possible to land a U-2 on a carrier deck with the ship underway without carrier arresting gear, such an operation would be decidedly marginal from a safety point of view, and is consequently not recommended.

3. Modifying even so small a number of U-2's as the pair now under consideration will require carrier conversion training for all IDEALIST Detachment pilots. In addition, T/O provision will have to be made for a Navy Landing Signals Officer to not only qualify in the aircraft himself, but to be present on the carrier at all times when U-2 flight operations are taking place. Once carrier qualification has been established for IDEALIST pilots, repeated requalification will be required as long as the carrier capability is kept alive.

4. Resupply for a carrier-based IDEALIST Detachment cannot be accomplished as readily as it can for a land-based unit, despite the Navy's excellent under way replenishment system. A ship-based detachment will require enlarged kits of special items, such as spare parts, electronic and camera equipment, etc. Fuel must be loaded aboard and segregated from other fuel, possibly well in advance of anticipated use. In view of the periodic repositioning of carriers in the Fleet, it may be advisable and necessary to preposition fuel on several such ships, thus adding somewhat to the complexity of the operation.

5. Even as modified for carrier operations, the U-2 will not in any sense be a fully-qualified carrier aircraft. Its handling, launching, and retrieval will always have to be considered as a special operation, requiring the exercise of considerable technical skill both from ground support personnel and pilots. As an example of the aerodynamic limitations of the U-2 in the converted configuration, it should be noted that in designing a true carrier aircraft, Lockheed made the T2V trainer, capable of withstanding arresting landings where deceleration is as high as from 17 to 20 feet per second. These were the specifications called for by the United States Navy. In its modified configuration, the U-2 will probably not be stressed for deceleration greater than 10 feet per second, which is approximately twice its present stress and still only about 60 percent as much as a true carrier aircraft. The designer holds, however, that this disparity is not critical when the aircraft is operated at the prescribed approach speed of roughly 85 knots and when the carrier is moving at its maximum recovery speed of roughly 33 knots. The

relative speed reduces the arresting impact to the redesigned maximum tolerances. It would impose an unacceptable weight penalty on the U-2 to make it capable of being arrested at the 85 knot figure. The pitch rate of the aircraft after hook engagement, perhaps the most critical aspect of carrier landings with the U-2, is said to be well within acceptable safety limits according to present computer calculations made by Lockheed. The only on-deck modification to the carrier itself would be the substitution of smaller diameter arresting cables to reduce stress forces on the U-2 in landing or takeoff as cables are overrun. Standard cabling is on the order of 1 1/2 inches in diameter. A 1/2 inch cable is proposed for use during U-2 operations.

III. DISCUSSION:

A. Since 1 May 1960 and following the torrent of world-wide publicity associated with the U-2 incident, the problem of obtaining even temporary staging rights in friendly foreign countries has been growing progressively more complicated. Because of the notoriety associated with the aircraft, its appearance in a foreign country, if detected, is quite apt to produce political problems for the host country. This is apt to be true even in those instances where the host country is not subject to immediate pressure by the Soviet Union and is sometimes a function of internal domestic politics within the host government. Recent experiences [redacted] tend to confirm that while all such foreign governments recognize the usefulness of the U-2 as an intelligence acquisition vehicle and all are eager for the protection such knowledge affords, none is readily willing to undergo the varied political pressures inherent in granting staging rights to this aircraft. It is highly unlikely that this situation will be changed as time goes on, and under certain conditions it may well worsen.

B. Given the state of affairs alluded to above, resorting to carrier operations is a hopeful prospect not only for coverage of those targets not easily reached from friendly foreign soil, but for any critical operations where valuable time cannot be expended in protracted political negotiations. The basic question then is whether or not this aircraft can be economically adapted to work from carriers with an acceptable margin

of safety in flight operations, and, once so adapted, can it operate with frequency varying from occasional to repeated in this manner without affecting the Navy's disposition of forces under existing Navy Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) commitments. As indicated earlier, present engineering analyses confirm that the aircraft can be so operated theoretically as to produce a viable carrier capability for reconnaissance purposes. Aside from the unknown range and altitude characteristics of the converted aircraft (which will depend upon arresting gear weight for the most part), the only apparent aerodynamic question is associated with the behavior of the aircraft in the landing configuration when it is approaching a fast moving carrier from the stern. One suggestion which has been made is that the standard angle of attack for such an approach with Navy aircraft which is three or four degrees to the horizontal be reduced to approximately 1 1/2 to 2 degrees in the case of the U-2 to permit a flatter angle of approach with power on so that "ballooning" of the aircraft prior to contact with the deck will be minimized. In a normal landing attitude, the U-2 rides tail high, which unless it is compensated for by a skillful power-on approach just above the stall speed may make the engagement of a carrier hook relatively difficult. There is a possibility that a problem may exist in wind pattern over the stern of a fast moving carrier, which according to Navy statistics, normally produces a down-draft immediately to the rear of the stern, followed by an up-draft from 1,000 to 1,500 feet aft of the carrier. With its sizeable wing area and with flaps fully extended, there may be some adjustments in technique which will have to be accomplished in order to overcome the possible adverse effects of these phenomena. Stack wash from the carrier's funnels can largely be eliminated as a deterent characteristic, since carriers on which the U-2 would be landed make their arrested landings on the angled deck, approximately nine degrees from the central axis of the hull away from the island, and the captains of both the USS LEXINGTON and USS INDEPENDENCE stated categorically that they "could put the stack wash wherever the pilot wanted it". This, of course, means that they could adjust the carrier's steaming angle to take maximum advantage of existing wind conditions to deflect stack wash. The only time this might be a modest problem would be when the aircraft is landed in a no wind condition, at which time it must rely solely on the carrier's forward momentum for relative wind.

C. Movement of the aircraft from the hangar deck to the flight deck and conversely can be accomplished, despite the fact that no carrier in the United States Navy has elevators large enough to accommodate the U-2 without a portion of the wing extending beyond the outboard edge of the elevator. The largest elevator in the Fleet measures only 70 by 52 feet, while those on the carriers in the group most likely to be employed in U-2 operations (CVA's 59 through 62), measure 63 by 52 feet. Lockheed has designed a special fuselage cart called a "LOWBOY", which permits side castering operations essential to movement from the hangar deck floor to the elevator and from the flight deck to the elevator, etc. This will be equipped with adjustable brakes to prevent any incident should the aircraft be on the elevator during period of rough weather. In addition, Lockheed has manufactured a special sling using a fuselage cart as the basic ingredient, which will permit on and off-loading of the aircraft from the carrier when it is necessary to remove it or replace it aboard other than under its own power. The hangar deck offers adequate space for a compartmentalized working and refueling area. Minor adjustments in the aircraft component of an operational carrier must be made to provide adequate storage space on the hangar deck, but Navy assures us that this is an administrative problem which can be encompassed by proper direction from higher authorities, beginning with the Chief of Naval Support and the CNO, augmented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in those cases where such temporary depletion of the Air Carrier Group would affect the Navy's SIOP capabilities.

D. On the subject of cover, a clear and plausible cover story, stoutly maintained by responsible persons concerned and supported by the IDEALIST Detachment aboard the carrier, can probably preserve the fiction of innocuous use of the U-2 for considerable time. This story will require precise and unequivocal attention to every detail. The IDEALIST Detachment and the carrier commander must be given detailed guidance, not only on the objective of the story, but also the necessary supporting actions. The basic requirement is to have a plausible reason for the presence of the U-2 aboard a carrier. Present discussions with the Navy, including Vice Admiral Rayburn, Director of Research and Development for the Navy, and his Deputy, Admiral Weakley, indicate that sponsorship for the U-2 aircraft on the carrier in the long run can be anticipated from the Office of Naval Research headed by Admiral Coates. The discussions thus far have not only indicated that ONR would be willing to have the U-2's attributed to its organization, but that a

workable cover arrangement not unlike that which the Agency worked out in 1955 with NACA (ultimately NASA) could be effectuated. This would be based upon meteorological collection of certain weather phenomena of interest to ONR and presumably bearing upon the Navy's mission. Details of this arrangement remain to be worked out, but under its format the entire IDEALIST Detachment on board a carrier would probably be accredited to ONR, the aircraft would be so marked visibly, and some appropriate coverall or wearable insignia would be worn by all Detachment members while on board ship reflecting the ONR affiliation. Thus the U-2 would revert to its original cover of a weather reconnaissance vehicle, possibly with a classified cover of atomic sampling.

E. On the subject of modified costs and equipment proposed for the U-2 in the carrier configuration, present estimates are that the complete carrier modification on two aircraft can be furnished by Lockheed at a cost not to exceed $250,000. This figure represents the savings implicit in accomplishing the modification at the time these aircraft are also converted from J-57 to J-75 models, a course of action now underway. According to present plans, the first carrier-configured U-2 should be rolled out of the Lockheed plant at Burbank late in November 1963. It is expected that the second aircraft would follow approximately nine weeks thereafter. A program of flight test and shake-down will follow roll-out and is expected to take up to sixty days. Thus it is probably realistic to assume the existence of a single aircraft carrier capability no earlier than 1 February 1964, with the full two-plane capability by 1 April 1964 barring unforeseen difficulties. At present it is our feeling that maximum flexibility in terms of the operating envelope will result from equipping one of the two aircraft with ARS and beacon, while leaving the other essentially out of this capability. Final configuration will not be fixed upon until the results of the 5 August carrier launch trial are known. The net difference in weight between these aircraft then would be approximately 325 pounds, and the stalling speed of the ARS equipped aircraft would be approximately 2 to 3 knots higher than without ARS. The inclusion of ARS in one aircraft provides a capability to operate under the worst situation anticipated in carrier operations, namely launch from a carrier at sea followed by refueling in order to reach an appropriate land base in friendly territory. No

weight penalty in terms of additional airframe strengthening is required for the ARS configured aircraft. Both carrier aircraft will be equipped with single side band radios which are compatible with carrier SSB installation, thus permitting not only mission recall, but emergency communications from the ship to the aircraft in the event of hostile action or mechanical malfunction. Such equipment is standardized within the IDEALIST U-2 fleet.

F. Adequate and secure communications exist on these CVA's which would initially be considered for U-2 carrier operations. These include those carriers equipped with the so-called Integrated Intelligence Operations Center (IIOC), which at the moment lists the INDEPENDENCE, the SARATOGA, and the RANGER. These carriers also offer the advantage of a physically segregated operations, processing, and communications center in space known as the Airborne Systems Support Center (ASSC), originally installed for use by the A5C (Navy VIGILANTE reconnaissance aircraft) not expected aboard carriers of this type until mid-1964. The scope of U-2 carrier operations can later be expanded to include the FORRESTAL, ENTERPRISE, and KITTY HAWK, and possibly later the USS CONSTELLATION and USS AMERICA. In a pinch the three CVA's of the "Midway Class", namely the ROOSEVELT, CORAL SEA, and MIDWAY, can possible be used. Present Navy levels of effort call for only five carriers on station projected through 1964, including two in the Mediterranean and three in WESTPAC. The balance of the available carriers are either "cruising" or in shipyards. Communications on board those ships with IIOC include the KW-22, KW-26, and KW-37 equipments, compatible with IDEALIST communications. In addition to the 300 nautical-mile maximum Carrier Controlled Approach capability on the CVA's (equivalent to long range GCA), each carrier operates a low-frequency homer beacon and other navigation aids of value to the IDEALIST program.

G. Carrier operation is a new and unique experience for IDEALIST Detachments, and it will require some familiarization training. Both pilots and ground handling personnel will have to meld into the life of the carrier so that IDEALIST missions can be launched expeditiously. On the other hand, IDEALIST staging detachments being small and all persons involved providing mutual support, the carrier detachment should operate as a unit. A United States Navy officer thoroughly familiar with carrier

operation can provide guidance for planning at Headquarters and also provide briefing and advice for IDEALIST Detachments prior to moving aboard a carrier.

H. The ultimate use of aircraft carriers for the U-2 depends on the availability of carriers in or near the desired area of launch. To direct a large carrier to support a U-2 sortie or series of sorties requires approval by the highest levels of the Department of Defense. A clear plan for execution which requires carrier support for the shortest possible time span will go far toward getting a carrier when it is requested.

I. Contact was established with the Office of the Commander, Naval Air Training Command, NAS, Pensacola in June for the purpose of discussing carrier conversion training for IDEALIST pilots. The Chief of Staff, NATC, stated that such a group could be accommodated with little inconvenience and furnished a syllabus which would include ground school in the training aircraft, plotting board navigation classes, checkout in the T2A jet trainer, and approximately twenty arrested carrier landings on the USS LEXINGTON (CVS) utilized for this purpose by NATC. The total flight time involved would be approximately thirty flying hours, and the duration of the training at Pensacola would be four or five weeks, depending upon weather. Reimbursability for this training was not discussed. An alternate training location of NAS, Monterrey (California) is also under investigation for this purpose by Navy.

IV. CONCLUSIONS:

A. The employment of U-2's aboard United States Navy aircraft carriers of the CVA attack carrier type is both possible and productive. There appear to be no technical or engineering obstacles to their projected use in this manner.

B. United States Navy assistance in establishing operational procedures, as well as pilot training, is advisable.

C. Two U-2 aircraft can economically be modified for carrier operations within an acceptable time span.

D. The frequency of carrier-launched U-2 flights will depend upon the priority of targeting requirements.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. That concurrence of the D/NRO in this program be obtained.

B. That Lockheed Aircraft Corporation be authorized to modify two U-2 aircraft now in J-75 conversion for carrier operations without delay. Final configuration of the carrier version should be fixed only after results of the August launch trials are known.

C. That Navy assistance be sought in training all IDEALIST U-2 pilots in carrier operations.

D. That Navy authorities be consulted to determine methods of operation and procedures for minimizing inconvenience to normal Navy carrier routines.

E. That the United States Navy be asked to detail a Landing Signals Officer (carrier-qualified pilot) for coordination checkout in the U-2 and assignment to the IDEALIST Detachment.

F. That a set of communications procedures for projected carrier operations be expeditiously accomplished with Navy assistance.

G. That the development of a carrier-based processing facility be approved in principle. This capability would provide a minimum of one original and a duplicate negative to be provided on board ship.

H. That a suitable cover story for long range carrier-based U-2 operations be promptly drawn up with Navy assistance and coordinated with the so-called Ad Hoc Cover Committee.

JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR.
Deputy Assistant Director
(Special Activities)

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Recommendations in Paragraph V APPROVED:

SIGNED

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director



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OPERATIONS WHALE TAIL SCHEDULE

16 AUG	348 arrives	
18 AUG	Set-up mirror-check for malfunction.	
19 AUG	MLP commences with 348. Pilots will be RAND, HALL, ERICSON.	
	0900-1000	HALL
	1045-1145	ERICSON
	1230-1330	RAND
	1415-1515	HALL
20 AUG	0900-1000	ERICSON
	1045-1145	RAND
	1230-1330	HALL
	1415-1515	ERICSON
23 AUG	0900-1000	RAND
	1045-1145	HALL
	1230-1330	ERICSON
	1415-1515	RAND
24 AUG	0900-1000	ERICSON
	1045-1145	HALL
	1230-1330	RAND
	1415-1515	(BACK-UP)
	(1) Carrier briefing to Pilots	
25 AUG	0900-1000	(BACK-UP)
	1045-1145	"
	1230-1330	"
	1415-1515	"

30 AUG — Personnel depart Edwards for North Island and report to Detachment Commander at ship's location at 1600.

31 AUG

(1) 348 Ferry to Kitty Hawk. Pilot-RAND.

(2) T.O to overhead..,1+00. Pilot Dumps on signal.

(3) Pilot executes one low approach to wave-off and three touch and go's.....0+25.

(4) After completion of touch and go's, first arrest....0+10.

(5) Shutdown and turn-around.....0+30.

(6) Take-off, balance and second arrest.....0+15.

(7) Shutdown and turn-around.....0+30.

(8) Take-Off, balance and third arrest....0+15.

(9) Shutdown and turn-arround.....0+30.

(10) Take-off, balance and fourth arrest.....0+15.

1st pilot is completed. Time required from low low approach to final arrest.....2+50.

(11) Second pilot take-off, balance, execute one low approach to wave-off, and three touch and go's prior to first arrest. Time cycle and number of arrests the same as first pilot.

1 SEPT

(1) Third Pilot repeat.

(2) 348 ferry to Edwards at completion of Carqual.

2 Sept

(1) Personnel and equipment return to Edwards.

OPERATIONS PERSONNEL LIST

1. LT COL VAN CURA
2. LCDR HUBER
3. LT KAUP
4. MR. ERICSON
5. MR. HALL
6. MR. RAND

D/M WHALE TALE SCHEDULE -

2 - 16 August:

All sections assemble and operationally check out equipment required for deployment including:

(1) Enroute Supply Kit # 4.

(2) Maintenance Support Trailer (Rolling Bench Stock).

(3) Refueling Equipment.

(4) Arresting Gear.

(5) Aircraft Ground Support Equipment.

(6) Oxygen and Nitrogen.

Total weight of the above is 18,000 pounds which will be transported to North Island NAS via organizational vehicles.

16 August:

Article 348 arrive from plant.

17 August:

Two hour shakedown flight for Article 348 at 0930 hours.

18 August:

(1) Clear aircraft discrepancies and insure aircraft is ready for MLP flights.

(2) Order special fuel from Ashland Oil Company for delivery 29 August direct to North Island NAS.

27 August:

(1) All sections assemble cargo in designated area in Hangar 3 prior to 1000 hours.

(2) Manifest cargo and load vehicles at 1000 hours.

29 August:

Special fuel arrives North Island during afternoon.

30 August:

(1) 0600 hours - Cargo and support equipment depart Edwards AFB.

(2) 1200 hours - Cargo and support equipment arrive North Island.

(3) 1600 hours - Personnel report to Detachment Commander at ship location.

31 August:

Article 348 ferries to Kitty Hawk location.

31 August - 1 September:

Carquals.

2 September:

Cargo, support equipment and personnel return to Edwards.

D/M PERSONNEL LIST

1. Lt Col McCarthy.
2. MSgt Cockrum.
3. Mr Prewitt.
4. Mr Morelock.
5. Mr Newman.
6. Mr Richey.
7. Mr Waters.
8. Mr Caldwell.
9. Mr Kramer.
10. Mr Baltzelle.

SECRET

17 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Proposed Carrier Launching of U2

1. The following information is being recorded to assist the writer, or in his absence, the individual who will be responsible for monitoring the Subject operation.

2. In accordance with the wishes of the DCI, it is planned to launch a U2 from the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk as soon as possible. As it now stands, it would appear that this launch could take place as early as the first week of August. As presented by [redacted] on 17 July the present plan would call for the U2 to be loaded aboard the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk completely free of any special equipment such as cameras, electronic reconnaissance recording devices and ECM gear. The aircraft will be loaded with its fuel tank empty and will require a gasoline truck to accompany it aboard the carrier. The carrier will proceed to an undetermined point in the Pacific where the actual launching will take place. After launching, the U2 will be retrieved at Det G.

3. It is the intention of the Navy to provide Office of Naval Research decals for the U2 which will indicate the interest of that Office in the operation.

4. Some of the problems anticipated in connection with this operation and suggested solutions are as follows:

A. Cover - In view of the suggested interest of the Office of Naval Research in this operation a proposed cover to explain the presence of the aircraft and those accompanying personnel would be to ascribe the operation as a requirement for the Office of Naval Research to determine the feasibility of launching certain types of aircraft, in this case a U2, from the deck of an aircraft carrier. In this regard all of the Detachment personnel accompanying the aircraft would indicate that they are there at the request of the Office of Naval Research to facilitate the test launching.

[redacted]

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B. Detachment Personnel - An effort should be made to handle the operation with a minimum number of personnel from the Detachment. Since the Bird will be stripped of any special equipment, there should be no need for any camera personnel present and the number of communication people needed should be very limited. It is recommended that all of the Detachment personnel represent themselves as Lockheed Tech Reps who are there to service and protect the U2 in connection with an existing contract between Lockheed and the Office of Naval Research. They should be provided the names of some noteworthy personnel in the Office of Naval Research and should be thoroughly briefed regarding their conduct while aboard ship. Obviously there should be no drinking or gambling permitted and they should be cautioned against fraternizing with the crew without appearing too spooky.

C. Aircraft Carrier Personnel - It is suggested that an announcement be made to the aircraft carrier personnel by possibly the Executive Officer indicating the presence of the U2 and prohibiting the crew members against taking photographs of the U2 either while it is aboard ship or during its actual launching and cautioning them against discussing the presence of the aircraft or its launching with any unauthorized individuals. It is felt by the writer that this admonition should be played in a low key so as not to attract undue attention to the operation.

5. It is the intention of the writer, in company with [redacted] to discuss this proposed launching with Mr. Cunningham and with Capt. Carmody and Commander Skidmore of the U. S. Navy. The discussion with the Navy personnel should solicit their opinion regarding the acceptability of the cover story as outlined above accounting for the presence of the U2 and its related personnel aboard the carrier.

[redacted]

Security Officer
OSA

[redacted]

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(b)(3)

BYE 2919-63
Copy 10 of 11

17 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Conversation with Captain Carmody Relative to Carrier Training Exercise for IDEALIST Aircraft

1. Captain Carmody called the morning of 15 July to say that although he was not personally present there was a meeting 13 July between Admirals Schoech, Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations, and Admiral Ricketts on the subject of long-range planning for U-2 carrier operations. The purpose of the meeting apparently was for Admiral Schoech to inform Admiral Anderson of recent developments, including our discussions of recent date with Admiral Schoech on this subject.

2. According to Carmody, Admiral Anderson expressed concern over any protracted U-2 operations from Sixth Fleet carriers in the Mediterranean lest this ultimately be discovered and boomerang on the image which Navy is striving to portray in this theater, namely that of an impartial "force for peace" on behalf of the Western powers. I reassured Carmody that because of the relative complexity of U-2 operations it was probable that carrier-based U-2 ops would not become a household affair and that this capability would be reserved in large part for critical targets in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. In view of this, I told Carmody it was my feeling that Anderson's reticence although understandable was not necessarily pertinent.

3. Carmody said he was still attempting to arrange a date for the projected training exercise on the USS KITTY HAWK during the period 3 through 16 August, and that because the time between now and then was relatively short for planning purposes, he felt that he and I should proceed this week to brief Vice Admiral Stroop, COMNAVAIRPAC in San Diego, since Stroop has the KITTY HAWK within his purview. At the same time it was agreed that we should also informally brief Captain Horace Epps, USN, Skipper of the KITTY HAWK (CVA-63). He also said that it would be a good idea before going out there to

presume well need I clearance on both -

[redacted]

get together with Vice Admiral Bayburn, the head of Naval Research, to discuss informally with him the projected cover arrangements for the training exercise. I agreed to the San Diego trip to be set for 17 and 18 July to include in addition to the pair of us Lt. Colonel Ken Martens, representing OSA IDEALIST Operations. During this trip we will also have a chance to drop in on Kelly Johnson Wednesday afternoon, 17 July, to see the modified fuselage cart/loading sling, which he has put together and which was successfully tested late last week. According to Kelly, he is ready for the training test at any time henceforth.

4. As an outgrowth of my conversation with Carmody, I had several discussions with Commander Skidmore at [redacted] request to determine the communications capability of the KITTY HAWK, especially on SSB which will be used to monitor the flight from Edwards. Skidmore spoke to a Lt. Peterson, identified only as "the KITTY HAWK Project Officer at OPNAV" on this subject. The KITTY HAWK has a max output of 1,000 watts on SSB and covers all frequencies from 2 to 30 MC in 1.0 increments. They allegedly can switch at will from one frequency to the other, so that compatibility of the Edwards SSB and that on the carrier appears to be no problem. The KITTY HAWK can monitor a total of 5 frequencies simultaneously at maximum power of 1,000 watts or 3 frequencies simultaneously at 100 watts. In addition, by adding a single antenna on the forward end of the ship they can provide an on-deck pre-flight checkout of the aircraft SSB prior to launch. It was agreed with Skidmore that the question of mission call signs and authentication procedures would be left for discussion with Captain Epps in San Diego during our visit. I reminded Skidmore that there was no SIF in the U-2, and that we did not wish to get into difficulty either on flying near the carrier or entering the ADIZ from a point at sea. He said he thought that we should mention this to Admiral Strauy and obtain his assistance in suppressing carrier radars, but he added that since it would be necessary to fly an FAA-approved flight plan from the KITTY HAWK to Edwards for the U-2, the problem of clearance to fly through the ADIZ should not be impossible to handle.

5. As a last note, I turned over to Chief, Material Division, the movement of the T2V carrier arresting gear parts from Navy to Fred Cavanaugh. Commander Justice in [redacted] office said 15 July that these parts were ready for shipment by either Quicktrans or commercial air freight. Mr. [redacted] and I agreed that since the weight in cubs is small, and since Justice

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said that these parts would be on indefinite loan, there was no requirement to forward them to Cavanaugh through Warner-Robbins Air Force Base as we had earlier thought there might be. Mr. [redacted] plans to send them in care of The C and J Equipment Company, Burbank, and I left it to him to work out details with Commander Justice.

[redacted]

JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR.
Deputy Assistant Director
(Special Activities)

[redacted]

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PROPOSED

STANDARD OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS

FOR

CARRIER OPERATIONS

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CONTENTS

Attachments:

1. Security Annex
2. Tactical Maintenance Annex
3. Special Equipment Annex
4. Supply Annex
5. Tracker Annex
6. Materiel Annex
7. Elint Section Annex
8. Signal Center Annex

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I GENERAL

This directive with attachments is designed to provide guidance in all phases of U-2 operations aboard a carrier. There are two basic concepts of operation envisioned; one will entail loading aboard the carrier on the east or west coast of the US and the other will require deployment by air support to the theater of operations prior to loading aboard. There is no appreciable difference between the two plans which would require special preparation.

The U-2 will be flown aboard utilizing the mirror landing approach set at 2.5 degrees and the Landing Signal Officer (LSO) will assist the pilot by providing cut one and cut two signals which will indicate the point to reduce the throttle and deploy spoilers plus other instructions as necessary to insure the safest possible approaches. Landings will be made on the angle deck utilizing four one inch cables for arrestment instead of the standard, larger size. Take-offs will be made on the straight deck and the aircraft position will be determined by fuel load with careful consideration given to clearance of island superstructure and other obstacles. The line-up point is critical due to the flow of air around the "island" and take-offs can be very hazardous unless extreme care is exercised in selecting the takeoff point.

Carrier operations are more hazardous than land based operations, therefore, special precautions should be taken to insure the highest degree of safety possible. Weather in the recovery area will be an important consideration. Even, light rain on the aircraft windshield during final approach will induce a serious condition for the pilot that will make carrier landings very difficult. Wind velocity and sea condition are other factors that must be taken into consideration to insure that deck wash turbulance and carrier pitch and roll are within acceptable limits.

Navigation over long distances at sea with the requirement to return and land at a precise point aboard the carrier will involve additional problems which must be carefully considered to insure optimum conditions for mission success.

II PREPARATION

A briefing will be given to all personnel selected for the deployment as soon after alert notification as possible. All equipment required for the staging will be assembled by each section concerned in the designated area in Hangar III. Manifests will be prepared by each section indicating box number, weight, and cube of each item and then turned in to Materiel for compilation. One member of each section participating in the deployment will be responsible for insuring that all equipment is packed and placed in the designated area in Hangar III. Airlift requirements will be submitted to Headquarters as soon as available including total weight and cube plus size and weight of the largest item. Also a personnel list of all detachment personnel selected for the TDY will be submitted to Headquarters.

Immediately after notification of a pending exercise, the pilots will be selected for refresher training and the following will be accomplished prior to deployment:

a. Review "G" model procedures.

b. Briefing by Landing Signal Officer.

c. Minimum of 2 sorties per pilot to practice mirror approaches with LSO assistance. (Approximately 10 landings per sortie)

d. Review Operations Order and prepare briefing for ferry mission in accordance with briefing outline and include the following additional items:

(1) Rendezvous area.

(2) Bingo fuel.

(3) Carrier requalification.

(4) Emergency procedures in event of missed trap.

e. Plans should be made to establish SSB Communications between the

launch base and the carrier. The planning for use of this link must include all possible measures to preclude security violations, i.e., use of codes or pre-arranged words and phrases.

f. Actual deployment to the carrier will be accomplished in accordance with established unit procedures.

III ARRIVAL ABOARD

The Detachment Commander or his designated representative will make arrangements for billeting of all personnel immediately after arrival. An effort will be made to locate all personnel as close together as possible to facilitate making necessary contacts as required. All support equipment will be loaded aboard with every item properly secured to withstand rough seas. The area selected for the equipment will normally be in the aft section of the hangar deck and located so as not to interfere with the parking and movement of aircraft.

It is very important that close coordination be maintained with the carrier commander and his staff. This coordination must be considered in all phases of the operation from going aboard until the last man is off the ship.

Following is a list of key positions which must be utilized:

a. The Captain

b. Executive Officer

c. Operations Officer

d. Air Officer

e. Air Operations Officer

f. Communications Officer

g. Marine Commander

h. Hangar Deck Officer

i. Ward Room Officer

As soon as feasable after the deployment force is aboard, an informal meeting should be arranged between the above officers and the key personnel of the detachment. After this meeting, all sections heads should arrange another meeting with their counter parts so as to become familiar with the ships operating procedures and as soon as possible locate problem areas which may require decisions at

higher levels. Some of the points to be considered are:

a. Security requirements.

b. Complete utilization of the flight deck for designated periods of time.

c. Complete freedom of movement throughout the ship from first mission alert to the last mission report.

d. Ship support for unusual working hours.

The Detachment Commander will recommend a briefing of all detachment personnel by one of the senior officers of the ships company. The Executive Officer would be the most logical choice for this assignment. This will provide indoctrination for detachment personnel and will provide an opportunity to obtain information on special instructions that should be observed throughout the cruise. It is important that detachment personnel conform as closely as possible to the rules established for the ships company.

IV FERRY FLIGHT TO CARRIER

As soon as possible after all personnel and equipment are aboard, the Detachment Commander and/or Operations Officer should meet with the Captain and Operations Officer to coordinate the rendezvous with the aircraft. If this meeting results in any changes to the rendezvous plan, the launch base and headquarters will be notified immediately. Arrangements should be made at this time for the aforementioned get together of the ships company and detachment staff. This meeting can be held while the ship is enroute to the rendezvous point. Immediately after this meeting, the preparations to recover the aircraft should be initiated. It is expected that recovery will commence when the ship is 20 to 30 miles off shore and in favorable daylight and weather conditions.

Recovery procedures for ferry mission will begin at scheduled launch time from land base.

a. The Detachment Commander/Operations Officer will be on station in the Air Officer's bridge.

b. The Detachment Navigator and Weather Officer will be on station in the Air Operations Control Center.

c. The ISO will be immediately available in the flight deck area and be on the platform at ETA -0:15.

d. The Maintenance crew will be on deck with necessary equipment no later than ETA -0:30. NOTE: Maintenance chief should be immediately available to the Air Officer's bridge in event of airborne emergency. Commander and Maintenance Chief will have a plan for launching emergency recovery crew in Navy support aircraft if diversion is necessary.

e. Personal Equipment Specialists and necessary equipment will be on deck at ETA -0:15.

f. Commander and LSO will assure that the deck is correctly configured to start recovery. One inch arresting cables should be readily available but not installed until ready to commence trap landings.

g. After pilot has completed requalification and is on deck the maintenance crew will move the aircraft to the hangar deck and prepare to recover the second aircraft. Wind over the deck should be reduced to a minimum for this operation with no more than 10 knots desired.

h. If only one aircraft is to be on the deployment it will be refueled to 495 gallons and the second pilot will fly a requalification mission.

V OPERATIONS ON CARRIER

The Detachment Operations Officer will schedule a briefing for the pilots by the Air Operations Officer to establish all traffic procedures to be used in the Ship's Control Zone i.e., instrument approaches, emergency traffic patterns, radar procedures, etc.

Upon receipt of the alert message normal notification procedures will be followed. The Ship's Captain should be informed that a mission is tenatively planned for the date indicated in the alert message.

Upon receipt of Mission Plan Message the detachment will prepare for the mission in accordance with normal procedures. In addition to this, the necessary coordination with the ship's staff will be initiated. Information exchanged during this coordination will concern:

a. Ship's position at launch.

b. Ship's course and speed during mission.

c. Coordinate Air Group activities.

d. Set up deck alert for rescue and/or recovery assistance.

e. Report on status of all ships communications equipment utilized by article.

f. Arrange for airborne or deck alert beginning 30-45 min before ETA of article.

g. Other necessary mission support information.

The mission launch schedule for carrier operations will be slightly different than the land base launch schedule. The following schedule provides sufficient time in proper sequence for each support section to complete preparation for the mission. NOTE: "H" is takeoff time.

a. H-18:00 Maintenance - engine run up and initial preflight.) security for run-up

b. H-11:00 Pilot to bed.

c. H-9:00 Communications - Install and check systems.

d. H-3:15 Pilot wake up and eats.

e. H-3:00 Special Equipment - Install configuration and tracker.

f. H-2:15 Operations (Operational Missions)

General Briefing

Specialized Briefing

g. H-2:00 Maintenance

Completes pre-flight on aircraft

Start moving aircraft to launch position

h. H-1:30 Personal Equipment

Prepare pre-breathing equipment

Check pilots flight gear

i. H-1:15 Personal Equipment - Pilot pre-breathing

j. H-1:10 Operations - Pre takeoff briefing

k. H-1:00 Maintenance

Aircraft in position on AFT END of flight deck opposite ISO platform.

Fuel aircraft.

l. H-0:50 Personal Equipment - Dress pilot and perform dynamic equipment check.

m. H-0:40 Maintenance

Starter, back-up starting unit, and spare ARC-34 UHF radio available at aircraft.

Purging hose connected - start purging driftsight.

Deck wires forward of aircraft removed.

Level fuel load if less than full tanks.

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n. H-0:40 Operations (Mobile Officer at aircraft prior to pilot)

Exterior check.

Pitot cover removed.

Sextant and driftmeter covers removed.

Power on aircraft, inverters checked, No 1 inverter on, set compass, check auto pilot after three minutes, check radio compass, leave inverter and aircraft power on, Systems VI set as briefed.

o. H-0:30 Personal Equipment (At aircraft with pilot)

Cockpit preparation.

Adjust parachute and floatation gear on pilot.

Position pilot in cockpit.

Cockpit hook-up. (NOTE: Refer to OPS SOI-25.)

p. H-0:15 Operations

A qualified Mobile Control Officer together with the pilot, using the aircraft check list, will complete the following items:

Ejection seat connected. (Maintenance)

Cockpit check.

Check time hack on aircraft clock.

Check compass heading.

Place mission flight kit in aircraft.

Canopy closed.

Operations Officer in the Air Officer's Control bridge.

q. H-0:05 Operations (aircraft)

Pilot starts engine

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Seals on.

Complete pre-taxi check list.

r. H-0:03 Maintenance - Purging hose disconnected and hatch covers removed.

s. H-0:02 Operations

Pre takeoff check.

Check trim set for takeoff.

Flaps set for takeoff.

Speed brakes in.

Tracker operating.

Pilot requests MAG heading and sets compass.

t. H-0:01 Maintenance

Pogo removed.

Hatch covers removed.

Crew chief gives signal when clear for takeoff.

Check boatswain mate for deck clearance.

u. H-0:00 Takeoff.

NOTE: Provisions of this schedule may be deviated with Commander's concurrence for training missions, if such deviations will improve efficiency.

VI FLIGHT PLANNING

Several problems are evident in carrier operations which are not common to a land based deployment.

The airfield is mobile. Coordinates of the carrier must be known for departure time and time of return. Also, hourly positions of the carrier must be known, while the aircraft is airborne. This necessary in order to solve the intercept problem that might be generated by an abort. Due to the confined space and limited number of tools available to the pilot, simplicity is mandatory.

a. In addition to the normal flight maps, the complete route will be drawn up on a GNC Chart (Scale 1:5,000,000). If the carrier is moving to a position other than departure location, the track and hourly positions will be plotted. Radials from the aircraft's hourly position to the computed position of the ship for the time of arrival will be plotted. Annotations of MAG heading and time enroute will be made. For aborts at intermediate points, the pilot will be able to use his plotter and dividers for determining his course and distance to intercept. One other method can be used and that is to plot radials from the ship's position to readily identifiable check points near the aircraft's route to which he could proceed and thence begin his intercept problem.

b. Procedure for return to a stationary base with the carrier remaining within 10 NM of departure point during entire flight, is comparatively simple. Again a GNC would be used but radials, approximately 10° apart and with point of origin at the carrier, would be plotted. Annotations of MAG heading and time to carrier would be made where the radials intercept the flight path.

Hi cone fuel must be translated into landing pattern entry fuel. Descent should not be made until positive identification has been made. Fuel remaining should be no less than 200 gallons at descent point or 150 gallons on down wind

leg.

Radar vectoring by means of skin painting or IFF/SIF procedures will be used for recovery. The low frequency beacon on the carrier should be on no later than 30 minutes before the aircraft's ETA.

VII MISSION RECOVERY PROCEDURES

This will be a more critical phase of operations than recovery at a land base, consequently it is imperative that the following steps be followed closely:

a. During the entire mission a Detachment Officer will be on duty at the Air Officer's bridge or the Air Operations Control Center. He will keep immediate telephone contact with the following personnel:

(1) Detachment Commander and/or Operations Officer.

(2) Maintenance Chief.

(3) LSO.

(4) Mobile Pilot.

In event of an abort, these personnel will go to their stations immediately and prepare to recover the aircraft. If the mission is completed, the Duty Officer will alert the recovery team 45 minutes before scheduled landing time.

b. No later than 30 minutes before scheduled landing time the following actions will be taken:

(1) Request launch of helicopter.

(2) Alert radar operations.

(3) Alert Air Officer.

(4) Check ship's position and ETA to rendezvous point.

(5) Check ship's NAV Aids.

(6) Detachment Commander should check that all recovery personnel are in position 15 minutes before landing time.

(7) Check alert aircraft airborne or on cockpit standby.

c. Except in an emergency the aircraft should be landed in the following manner:

(1) Enter initial approach on starboard side of the carrier.

(2) Lower hook on crosswind turn.

(3) Follow normal procedure to arrestment.

(4) If unable to trap due to hook malfunction or other problems pilot will request barrier at a minimum of 40 gallons of fuel.

d. In event of an emergency condition the pilot may elect to land from a straight in approach.

e. As soon as arrestment is complete Personal Equipment will deplane the pilot and the aircraft will be moved to the hangar deck.

f. Downloading of systems and post flight checks will be in accordance with normal procedures.

VIII SHIPMENT OF TAKE

The mission take will be prepared in accordance with standard procedures and made ready for shipment. Headquarters will arrange and direct method of shipment.

IX POSTFLIGHT PREPARATION

The aircraft and all systems will be thoroughly checked after the mission. Immediate preparation will be made to attain readiness status for the next mission requirement.

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PROPOSED SECURITY S.O.P.
FOR
CARRIER OPERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

The carrier operations concern the launching and recovery of the U-2 from an aircraft carrier, for which, you as a security officer will be required to provide and supervise the necessary security support. At this time an operational staging has not been conducted; therefore, it remains for the security officer(s) assigned to further implement and improve upon the security during, and after, an actual operation begins.

There will be occasions during the mission when you, as a security officer, will become very exasperated from a standpoint of good security, due to certain circumstances beyond your control. This will be particularly evident during the take-off and landing of the U-2 since the carrier flight deck, of necessity, has at least four different crews participating on it during flight activity. These crews, depending on their function, will be attired in either red, green, blue or yellow sweaters and total about forty in number. Their duties include spotting the U-2, recovering and changing cables, providing emergency support in case of an accident, and handling various and sundry other assignments related to the launching and retrieving of aircraft. Our customary standard of keeping all uncleared personnel away from the U-2 is virtually impossible to uphold.

This situation of course cannot be altered; hence, it is best for the security officer to position himself advantageously and maintain close scrutiny over all activity. This is your best defense in view of the circumstances that prevail during flight deck operations.

PRELIMINARY PREPARATION

It is necessary prior to departure on a deployment to contact the Materiel

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Officer to inform him of the number of boxes, their cube and their weight that the security office will be taking. This is required so that a shipping manifest can be prepared for the supporting airlift from the home base to the point of embarkation.

Before the day of departure, the security officer should visit each section to be involved in the operation such as LAC, PE, Special Equipment, etc., for the purpose of examining their equipment to insure sterility. In order to be consistent with your cover, if for example you are posing as Lockheed employees, it is imperative that the deployment gear being used by these sections does not arrive at the ship with telltale Edwards AFB or USAF stenciling on it.

In conjunction with this effort to promote sound cover, brief your personnel carefully and forcefully regarding the story to be used. Make certain that everyone fully understands the cover, and also, make a conscientious effort to elicit questions from the audience you are briefing - questions at this point can avert comprimise and embarassment later. It is good practice, in this respect, to randomly accost certain individuals prior to departure on a operation, and query them to ascertain how well they understand and can employ their cover. This can be accomplished discreetly and without causing resentment if it is done in a professional and businesslike manner.

During the briefing review, fully explain any special security requirements related to the operation such as handling of mail, sterilization of their personal effects not consistent with the cover, avoidance of loose talk while on board the ship or at home, et al.

Remember! A thorough, well prepared briefing, convincingly delivered, is your best insurance against security leaks and comprimise. The security officer can control the physical aspects of security, but he must depend upon the individual for effective personnel security.

PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

There are at least four important items of a physical nature that require security supervision. They are as follows:

1. The U-2 - It is to be kept under adequate security supervision constantly. Normally, there will be an appropriate number of Marine Guards available to patrol a perimeter established around the aircraft with rope. The area in which the U-2 reposes should be compartmented by closing the hangar deck dividing door, and by securing whenever possible, the hatchways egressing into this general area. However, it appears that complete isolation of this area at all times would not be feasible. The hangar deck is a focal point for conducting training classes, chow formations, military drilling, and for the requisitioning of supplies from numerous rooms located around the periphery of the hangar deck. Access to this central area apparently must be permitted so as to avoid conflict with Naval personnel who have legitimate reasons for being there.

Through the Commanding Officer of the Marine Guards, request that no unauthorized person be allowed inside the rope barrier encircling the U-2 and that his guards instruct the curious or the suspect not to loiter in that general vicinity.

Emphasize to the Executive Officer and the Guard Officer that absolutely no photographing of the U-2 or related equipment will be permitted. It must be realized that even though the U-2 is no longer classified, pictures of it could prove extremely embarassing or detrimental if they were displayed or lost on foreign soil, or met with publicity from being mailed home. Furthermore, the presence of the U-2 onboard the carrier is indicative of a new capability and is not intended for public consumption at this time.

Supply the guard officer with an adequate number of authorization lists, denoting those people who will require access to the U-2. The lists should also

contain the room and telephone number for each security officer so that he can be reached expeditiously for inquiry.

2. FUEL - It is axiomatic that his critical element should be carefully controlled by using and recording serialized seals on the truck hatches to insure that no contamination occurs. The fuel truck(s) should also be placed, if possible, on the hangar deck within the purview of the Marine Guards who are providing security for the U-2(s).

Have it understood that positively NO SMOKING, NO WELDING, or any other kind of activity hazardous to the fuel, or to the U-birds, will be allowed in that general area. It would be advisable to suggest that the Captain or the Executive Officer indicate this prohibition in an announcement to the crew.

3. EQUIPMENT - The security officer will also be charged with the security of classified equipment as it relates to the true purpose of our mission. The presence of this equipment in relation to our primary function will, undoubtedly, not be consistent with our cover and therefore should be treated just as meticulously, from a security standpoint, as the U-2, the fuel, or classified documents.

Another pertinent item under this category is the pilot food and high altitude gear. Again, these items must be considered critical since tampering or contamination of either could result in disaster.

If availability permits, the Airborne Systems Support Center rooms will be used for the storage of sensitive equipment. A preliminary inspection of these rooms divulged that there were three access routes to them. Normally, entrance would be gained through a key controlled locking door at which a guard should be posted with an authorization list. Within the compartment which had approximately four or five rooms, there appeared to be two other exits. One was through the double elevator doors which could be securly bolted from within, and the other, was by exodus through an overhead submarine type hatch. This hatch should be secured with an aircraft tie-down chain to the steel ladder

which leads up to it. The chain has a quick-release mechanism which would be apropos in the event an emergency escape from the compartment is necessary.

The strong possibility exists that we may not be permitted to occupy the ASSC compartment, if the aircraft carrier from which we operate is carrying its own aircraft for training and operational purposes. If this is true, it then appears that we will be relying upon the portable trailers now being outfitted by the Special Equipment section as a place to secure sensitive equipment.

Providing the trailer is used, the security officer should inspect its locks, and if possible see that a Sargent-Greenleaf combination padlock is used. This will avoid the problem of keys being lost or duplicated and any efforts to tamper with this combination should be reasonably obvious. Of course, the combination should be kept by the security officer and access limited to those with a "need-for-entry."

Wherever the trailer is stored, it too should be kept under constant Marine guard except during loading and unloading activities over which a staff security officer(s) should supervise. For consolidation purposes, the hangar deck in the vicinity of the U-2 and fuel truck(s) would seem to be the best location for the trailer, providing an opaque screening arrangement can be erected during activities.

4. DOCUMENTS - It is not yet known how much classified material there will be in the form of documents, logs, cables, etc. It is suggested that at least a two drawer safe be taken for the purpose of storing documents, weapons, passports, etc., that need safekeeping. Dissemination of the combination should be held to a minimum and given only to those persons with a "need-to-know."

If a safe can not be taken, an alternative would be to use the communications room which has a combination type lock on it. If this room is utilized for the storage of documents, the security officer should set the combination

and control distribution of it carefully.

The problems of excess documents probably will not evolve. If it should, the security officer will have to arrange a system for control of them. It may be helpful to initiate a sign-out procedure, or to have them kept within the confines of one particular, secure room. These are only random thoughts - implementation of these suggestions mentioned above might prove too cumbersome for practicality. Again, it will fall to the ingenuity of the security officer to improvise in such situations.

As far as the communications room is concerned, it does not appear necessary to place a Marine guard with an access list at this door, especially if prudent control is exercised over distribution of the lock combination.

In summation, concerning the four numbered physical items, it would seem good practice for the professional security staff to inspect their responsible areas at least three time per day at unannounced intervals. This will serve to engender the respect of the Marine complement guarding the secure areas and create deference for your diligence at a time when a more lackadaisical approach could easily prevail.

STAFF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

It will be the duty of the senior security officer on board to see that the area involved where the loading and unloading of the "B" and "T" configurations and other sensitive systems will take place, is secure from observation and intrusion.

Coordination with the Commander of the Marine security guards will be required to ascertain whether all hatches leading to the hangar deck compartment can be sealed-off. If not, some type of screening device, previously alluded to, will be needed to obstruct unauthorized viewing of the installation of our sensitive equipment.

That the Marine guards need to be precluded from watching our mission activities needs no elaboration. If possible, they should either be sent below or placed in the hatchways leading to the hangar deck. The feasibility of this will have to be determined after consultation with the guard commander. Only staff and/or contract security officers should provide the security for the pre and post mission activities.

If any of the mission equipment such as the "B" or "T" has to be moved a considerable distance in order to be loaded or returned to where it is normally kept, it should be disguised by some form of covering and not exposed until it is behind the provided screening apparatus surrounding the U-2.

Another staff duty officer function is that of securing the briefing room prior to the beginning of the briefing. Usually, this is done by one security officer who will post a conspicuous, red "KEEP OUT - CONFERENCE IN SESSION" sign on the Ready Room door and then secure the door from the inside until the meeting is adjourned.

During the briefing it is the responsibility of the security officer to brief the driver fully regarding his conduct, and what he is expected to divulge, should he be forced down in hostile territory. Headquarters will furnish this information prior to the mission - be sure that you as the security officer are thoroughly familiar with the instructions to be given to the pilot.

After the briefing is concluded, the security officer will have each section chief sign a "Mission Certificate" stating that his equipment "...is free from any identifying data, tags, tickets, labels, etc., which are of a compromising nature to the project, the unit, its personnel and its supply mechanisms." In conjunction with this, the security officer will check the U-2 over vigilantly, specifically the cockpit, to see that no one has inadvertently dropped foreign articles therein indicating the source of the flight, or any other comprimising

material inconsistent with our cover. Conduct your inspection just before the driver enters the cockpit and be certain you are the last person to be in there before the pilot seats himself. As a precaution, remove all items from your coat and/or shirt pockets before making the inspection.

Finally, the security officer has the responsibility of placing the special waterproof E & E packet containing such things as gold, pure silk maps, and other items, in the pilot's flying suit while he is pre-breathing. It is your duty also to retrieve this packet from the driver upon his return and place it under safekeeping. Note: This packet of E & E material is critical - it contains maps of the area over which the U-2 will be flying for his use should he be forced to land and for cover purposes, and its monetary value is considerable too, so control it with caution.

In conclusion, it should be realized that some of the responsibilities enumerated above will have to be carried out by your fellow or subordinate security officers. It would be nearly impossible for one man to personally conduct the parade of duties required of him in preparation for a mission. Therefore, it follows that it is your obligation to see that each participating security officer is fully cognizant of his duties and that he carries them out as required.

SECURITY ESCORT - COURIER DUTIES

On an actual staging movement, it will be necessary to provide a security officer escort for any classified or sensitive equipment departing from the home base. If such a movement is done by air, the security officer escort will "Gerrymander" the support aircraft crew prior to departure, or shortly after becoming airborne. Here, once more, be formal and professional by giving brief, concise instructions to the crew. Point out that you prefer that they do not discuss among themselves, or with others, such things as names they have

learned, where they have been, what they have observed, what they may have overheard, or what they may possibly have deduced about the operation.

If the aircraft you are escorting will R.O.N. at a base enroute to your embarkation point, request the pilot to radio ahead, notifying the base air police that he is transporting a classified cargo and will need military police protection for it overnight. Do not, repeat, do not indicate that the cargo is top secret because the air police are only cleared up to and including secret. They will not accept the responsibility of guarding the aircraft if there is top secret material aboard.

Upon landing, using your guard instruction sheet, give the guard officer and/or his noncommissioned representative, a careful briefing as to what will be expected of them, especially noting that no one will be permitted to touch the cargo. Have the guard(s) stationed so that he/they can observe the actions of the maintenance crews during refueling. Provide the guards with a copy of the crew's orders and have it understood that once the normal maintenance crews have completed their assigned duties on the aircraft no one excepting the crew and yourself will be allowed to enter the plane.

For future contact references and expediency, always obtain the telephone number(s) for the guard officer and the Sgt of the guard - these numbers can be very helpful should you pass through at another time and are in need of similar security support from the military police.

Conclude your briefing to the guard(s) by giving them your BOQ room and telephone numbers and keep them informed of your whereabouts should you go to the O-club or elsewhere for meals. They should be able to communicate with you whenever the need arises.

On security escort - courier missions, always obtain a copy of the crew's orders and keep them on file along with the guard sign-in roster, the gerrymander

receipt, and your courier report. This will be your record in the event any questions arise at a later date regarding that particular operation.

PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

At present, it is now preferred that at least four security officers be assigned to a carrier operation. This number of men seemingly will suffice in that it would avail two for courier duty on closely run missions, with another standing by for emergency support and another to coordinate and supervise security activities on board the ship.

SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS

The security officer(s) who supports this type of deployment will have to be "chamber cleared." This means he has to have received sufficient academic instructions on high altitude flying and its effect upon the human body, and further, that he be processed under simulated conditions in a high altitude - rapid decompression chamber.

The Navy requires this type of training for those people who will be flying in the A3D, which cruises above an altitude of 40,000 feet. In addition, on in-flight refueling missions aboard an Air Force KC-135, the requirement that you be chamber cleared will also be levied.

PERSONAL READINESS

As is now planned, the courier on a carrier exercise will ferry the "take" aboard the A3D. Take a flight suit, jump boots, ear plugs and suitable underwear for high altitude flying.

As part of the security officer's official accouterments, he should have sufficient funds, his weapon and ammunition, his passport, shot record, orders, courier manifest receipt, and more importantly, his contact book in the event a contingency arises causing the aircraft to land at an unscheduled airbase.

In preparation for the unexpected, it can prove worthwhile to project on

what you would need to do if an emergency situation arose. If, for example, a crash occurred in an inaccessible area, are you prepared to go into this area with what you need to take? Are you ready with such things as the crash kit, clothing, the pilot's and your passport and shot record, weapons and other necessities. Advance thought in these matters can be immensely helpful if and when a crucial situation arises.

NAVAL PERSONNEL

The Captain of the ship or his Executive officer will be the voice of the security officer in reaching the crew concerning their personal responsibility to the security of the operation. One of the above will make an announcement to the crew over the public address system of the ship giving them the appropriate cover story. Within the framework of this story there should be a serious exhortation to the crew advising them to avoid any discussion of the U-2, the area of operation, the mission, etc., among themselves or in their mail.

Security as it relates to the naval personnel will be a matter of working through the Captain, his Executive Officer, or the Marine Commander.

In conclusion, preceding operating procedures are set forth for the guidance and benefit of those security officers who will be supporting the carrier operation. It is expected that the experience derived from a prolonged, bona fide operation, will better qualify the security officers involved to contribute experientially to a more comprehensive SOP.

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DEPLOYMENT CHECK LIST

_____ Have crash kit readied, (the contents are enumerated on the inside cover of the lid.)

_____ Have the administrative kit readied, (contents list also attached to inside lid.)

_____ Be sure you have keys for the crash and administrative kit.

_____ Take at least four Sargent-Greenleaf combination locks and change keys.

_____ Arrange through finance to have sufficient funds for possible plane fares, excess baggage fees, emergencies, etc.

_____ Carry a limited number of I-3 briefing and debriefing forms.

_____ Pick up the passports and shot records for the deployment personnel.

_____ Have a sufficient supply of appropriate orders.

_____ Take a flight suit and jump boots, weapon and ammunition for courier duty.

_____ Conscientiously brief your deployment personnel as to their cover and their security responsibilities.

_____ Prepare whatever documentation that may be necessary to authenticate your cover.

_____ Be sure, if you prepare documentation that it is backstopped in case of inquiry.

_____ If an Air Force truck is used to transport material to San Diego, or another embarkation point, have the driver block out the A. F. markings after passing by the main gate sentry and before arriving at the dock.

_____ Ascertain that all security personnel who will serve as couriers aboard the A3D are chamber cleared.

_____ Have a list of all naval personnel on board and on the base who are I-3 cleared.

_____ Stay abreast of all incoming cable traffic on the operation so as to be alert for last minute alterations.

_____ Take a red "Keep Out - Conference In Session" sign for the briefing room.

_____ Have a complete list of all deployment personnel. Be prepared to give one to the main gate sentry, the Officer of the Deck, and the Mess Officer.

_____ If possible, depart earlier than the main body of the group so as to be there early enabling you to make advance arrangements and survey the area you must secure before the U-2 and other sensitive gear arrives.

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ON BOARD CHECK LIST

____ Get copies of the room and phone numbers of all our personnel on board.

____ Provide the staging commander and his deputy with a copy of the above.

____ List all pertinent telephone and room numbers of those on board you will be dealing with.

____ Set up liaison with the Executive Officer of the ship and the Commanding Officer of the Marine Guards.

____ Work out details of the manpower requirements with the C. O. of the Marine Guards.

____ Inspect carefully all areas to be secured to ascertain your requirements before discussing it with the guard C. O.

____ Insure proper security for: 1. The U-2, 2. The Fuel, 3. The Equipment, and 4. Documents.

____ Set a new combination on the combination lock to the Communications compartment and distribute it as required.

____ Check with the staging commander at least two to three times per day so as to stay advised and to offer support.

____ Inspect the secured areas at unannounced times to see that the guards are conforming to instructions.

____ Furnish each guard with an authorization for his responsible area.

____ Stay abreast of the incoming and outgoing cable traffic.

____ Plan emergency procedures with eiter the Exec Officer or the Captain.

____ Set up a mail exchange system.

____ Supervise all mission operations with staff security officers only.

____ Collect the video tape of our operation from the Navy.

____ At the close of the deployment, collect and destroy, if feasible, all classified waste. If it cannot be destroyed, bundle it appropriately and bring it back to home base for destruction.

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MISSION CHECK LIST

_____ Secure the briefing room.

_____ Brief the pilot regarding his responsibilities in case of an emergency landing in either a friendly or denied area.

_____ Examine pilot's gear for sterility after the briefing.

_____ Have the pilot sign a "Mission Certificate."

_____ Place the special waterproof E & E packet in the pilot's flight suit.

_____ Inspect the outside of the U-2 and particularly the cockpit for sterility.

_____ Supervise the loading and unloading of all sensitive systems in the U-2.

_____ Insure the loading and removal of sensitive systems is done in a secure, screened area.

_____ Have all section chiefs sign their respective "Mission Certificates."

_____ Allow no uncleared personnel near the U-2.

_____ Have the crash kit and your gear loaded and ready on the rescue aircraft.

_____ Upon return of the U-2, remain with it until it is secured below on the hangar deck and the sensitive systems have been removed.

_____ Prepare for forthcoming courier mission - have passport, shot record, orders, funds, weapon, manifest receipt, etc., in readiness.

_____ Pick up the courier manifest and sign for the "take."

_____ Gerrymander the support aircraft crew(s).

_____ Turn over the "take" to an authorized recipient and get signed receipts.

_____ Arrange for return transportation to the ship via the A3D or C-130.

_____ Collect daily from the Navy, the video tape which was made that day of the activities of the U-2.

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TACTICAL MAINTENANCE

Whale Tale Operation

PURPOSE: This SOI establishes and standardizes procedures to be exercised by the Tactical Maintenance Section on any WHALE TALE operation.

1. Policy. The Tactical Maintenance Section will be governed by the responsibilities and procedures established in this SOI to insure completion or organization mission.

2. Responsibilities. The Maintenance Supervisor is responsible for the implementation of procedures as established by WRSP-IV Memorandum Number MAT-8, as applies, and this SOI.

3. Procedures:

a. Upon notification of deployment all cargo will be delivered to designated area in Hangar 3. A complete list of cargo will be delivered to Director of Materiel Office indicating a breakdown of box numbers, weight, and cube of each item. In addition, one man will be provided to check maintenance cargo and assist in loading. This man will be one of those who is to accompany the deployment.

b. Upon arrival at carrier and prior to making a trapped landing, a chalk line will be made on Number 4 elevator showing position that main landing gear must track. Pertinent aircraft dimensions are as follows:

(1) Nose to main landing gear - 20' 6".

(2) Main gear to tail gear - 19' 9".

(3) Main gear to end of sugar scoop - 29' 3".

(4) Aircraft total length - 49' 9".

c. A chalk line will also be made on flight deck as directed by the Operations Officer to assist in positioning aircraft for turn around takeoffs. A full fuel load takeoff position will also be marked per Operations Officers instructions.

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d. The following equipment will be brought to flight deck and stowed in vicinity of island upon receipt fr m aircraft and prior to arrival of aircraft:

(1) Sulky.

(2) Nitrogen cart.

(3) Six foot ladder.

(4) Main gear turning plate.

(5) Grease plate - tail gear.

(6) MLG chock.

(7) Two pogo chocks.

(8) Tow bar - Tail landing gear.

(9) Tow bar - Main landing gear.

(10) MLG downlock pin.

(11) TLG downlock pin.

(12) Set of pogo pins.

(13) Set of special pogos.

(14) MLG chock - elevator use.

(15) TLG chock - elevator use.

(16) 250 lbs Ballast - 25 lb shot bags.

(17) Fuel truck.

(18) Two wing stands - adjustable.

(19) Personal tools.

(20) Adequate number of tie downs.

(21) Flight deck clothing.

e. Following procedures will be followed on trapped landings and turn around:

(1) Aircraft trapped.

(2) Maintenance personnel will proceed to aircraft.

(3) Pogos installed.

(4) Gear pins installed.

(5) Crew chief signals pilot to taxi over cable.

(6) Crew chief and pilot check flap position - (15 degrees).

(7) Engine shut down.

(8) Tail gear scissors disconnected.

(9) Sulky installed and tow vehicle connected.

(10) Aircraft positioned on takeoff chalk line.

(11) Aircraft chocked and secured as necessary.

(12) Fuel truck in position for servicing (Driver will remain in cab-truck will be chocked and tied down).

(13) Visual check of tail and main gear areas.

(14) Sulky removed.

(15) Tail gear scissors connected.

(16) Fueling completed - truck will move to area behind island or as directed.

(17) Fuel counter set.

(18) Signal for air starter unit.

(19) Signal for 28V DC external power source.

(20) Wings level for even fuel load.

(21) Canopy closed and locked.

(22) Start engine as directed.

(23) Air starter removed.

(24) DC external power source removed.

(25) External power source receptacle door closed.

(26) Gear down locks removed.

(27) Engine access door closed.

(28) Pogos removed - Hold wings level for hand launch.

(29) Crew chief signals pilot for brakes.

(30) MLG chock removed.

(31) Crew chief turns over launch at this point to Boatswain or Bosun.

f. The following procedures will be followed on aircraft removal from flight deck to hangar deck:

(1) Carrier speed reduced and no turns until aircraft secured in hangar deck.

(2) Man on brakes - stays in cockpit until secured below.

(3) Position aircraft parallel to Number 4 elevator with nose of aircraft toward bow of ship. Center line of aircraft should be approximately three feet inboard of inside edge of elevator. Main gear and tail gear should be stopped on turn plates with main gear in line with chalk line. (Paragraph 2).

(4) Inflate MLG strut with nitrogen to provide turning clearance.

(5) Install special pogos.

(6) Disconnect MLG scissors, brake hose clamps, etc. (Stow parts in bag and tie to strut).

(7) Disconnect LH TLG door and wire up out of the way - (Retain rod adjustment).

(8) Disconnect TLG scissor.

(9) Install MLG turning bar.

(10) Install TLG tow bar - small.

(11) Turn MLG and TLG ninety degrees simultaneously.

(12) Place adequate weight on left wing to provide clearance on right hand pogo.

(13) Aircraft moved into position on elevator by hand. Chock men ahead of each gear with special chocks as aircraft is being moved. When in proper position, aircraft will be chocked and a minimum of three tie down chains installed, one on each fuselage fitting and one from left hand pogo fitting to hold that wing slightly low.

(14) Elevator - Down to hangar deck level.

(15) Tie downs removed.

(16) Aircraft pushed by hand into hangar with a chock man ahead of each gear. Position aircraft in hangar as directed, exercising extreme caution.

(17) Install chocks and secure aircraft, one chain each fuselage fitting, one chain each pogo fitting, tail gear secured.

g. The following procedures will be followed upon mission alert and movement to flight deck:

(1) Commo equipment installed and checks complete (X minus 4 hours).

(2) Special Equipment and Tracker completed with "hatch up" (X minus 2 hours).

(3) Maintenance preflight completed as far as possible (X minus 1.5 hours).

(4) Aircraft prepared for movement on to elevator.

(5) Carrier speed reduced and no turns until aircraft secured in takeoff position on top side.

5.

(6) Man on brakes - stays in cockpit until secured "on top".

(7) Aircraft pushed by hand on to elevator - main gear over chalk line and chock men ahead of each gear. Ballast as required on left hand wing. When properly positioned on elevator, chocks will be placed in position and a minimum of three tie down chains will be installed, one on each fuselage fitting and one from left hand pogo fitting to hold that wing low.

(8) Elevator - "up" to flight deck.

(9) Tie downs removed.

(10) Aircraft pushed by hand off elevator on to flight deck. Chock men ahead of each gear. Stop aircraft with main gear on turn plate and tail gear on grease plate.

(11) Turn MLG and TLG ninety degrees (Normal position) simultaneously.

(12) Remove MLG turning bar.

(13) Remove TLG tow bar.

(14) Connect MLG scissors, brake hose clamps, etc. Deflate strut to normal position.

(15) Connect left hand TLG door.

(16) Install sulky and towing vehicle.

(17) Tow aircraft to takeoff position (X minus 1 hour) secure with MLG chock and two fuselage fitting tiedowns.

(18) Fuel truck in position and servicing begins. (Driver will remain in cab in addition to required chocks and tie downs).

(19) Sulky removed and tail gear scissors connected.

(20) Special pogo locks removed.

(21) When fuel servicing is completed truck moved behind island or as directed.

(22) Signal for air starter unit.

(23) Signal for 28V DC power.

(24) Seat connected.

(25) Canopy closed and locked.

(26) Start engine as directed.

(27) Air starter removed.

(28) DC external power source removed.

(29) External power receptacle door closed.

(30) All tie downs removed.

(31) Gear downlocks removed.

(32) Engine access door closed.

(33) Pogos removed - hold wings level for hand launch.

(34) Crew chief signals pilot for brakes.

(35) MLG chock removed.

(36) Crew chief turns over launch at this point to Boatswain or Bosun.

h. During all "touch and go" landings the maintenance personnel will occupy the area as directed by air boss or Bosun.

SECRET

SPECIAL EQUIPMENT

Whale Tale Operation

PURPOSE: To outline procedures to be followed by Special Equipment in the event of a WHALE TALE operation.

1. Policy. Special Equipment Section will be governed by the responsibilities and procedures established in this SOI to insure completion of organizational mission.

2. Responsibilities. Special Equipment Section will be responsible for the implementation of procedures as established by WRSP-IV Memorandum Number MAT-8, as applies, and this SOI.

3. Procedures.

a. Upon notification of a deployment all cargo will be delivered to a designated area in Hangar 3. A complete list of cargo will be delivered to Director of Materiel Office indicating a breakdown of box number, weight and cube of each item. In addition, one man will be provided to check Special Equipment cargo and assist in loading. This man will be one of those who is to accompany deployment.

b. Special Equipment will provide one man to assist and monitor the loading of trailers on flat bed when it has been determined that they are required for this deployment.

c. Under normal conditions, four Special Equipment personnel will be furnished for this deployment.

d. Upon arrival at ship, the section will be completely set up in an area provided to insure readiness for a scheduled mission.

e. At time of mission alert the following steps will be followed:

SECRET

(1) -12 hours - Mission alert received. Configuration loaded with prescribed material and thoroughly pre-flighted.

(2) -3 hours - Final shop check of configuration. Configuration then loaded on article.

(3) -2½ hours - Pilot briefed.

(4) -2 hours - Final check of configuration operating in article.

f. One hour prior to return of article the material shipping boxes and required paperwork are readied for shipment.

g. Upon landing of article, configuration is again checked while in article and any discrepancies will be noted. Configuration is then removed to shop area for a more thorough post-flight check.

h. Material will then be removed from configuration, packed and turned over to Security Section for shipment.

i. Special Equipment Supervisor will attend the debriefing of pilot.

4. General. Normally the complete operation will follow that of any deployment, however the time elements involved may differ due to unknown factors involved. The necessity of Special Equipment trailer will be governed by availability of a suitable operating area on carrier. Regardless of circumstances, mission readiness will be attained at the earliest possible time contingent with difficulties encountered.

SECRET

SUPPLY

Carrier Operations Supply Procedures

PURPOSE: To outline the procedures to be used by supply personnel during operation aboard aircraft carriers. This memorandum applies to all supply personnel of this organization.

1. Policy. It is the policy of this organization that one supply man will accompany each full scale deployment aboard aircraft carriers and will take one staging kit, augmented for carrier operation, and such other items as may be deemed appropriate.

2. Responsibility. The Unit Supply Officer will be responsible for the implementation of these procedures.

3. Procedures.

a. Unit Supply will coordinate with the maintenance activity to determine which kit will be taken and any desired additions or deletions for the particular operation.

b. Action will be taken to insure that the kit selected is as complete as possible and that all kit records are properly posted and accurate and that all containers are properly marked and painted.

c. Upon notification of a deployment all cargo will be delivered to a designated area in Hangar 3. A listing will be prepared containing the identification and number of each container to include the individual weight and cube. The total weight and cube information will also be determined. This information will be provided to the Materiel Section, when called for, for the purpose of manifesting cargo for shipment.

d. Organizational Supply will supervise the loading operation, and will provide the forklift operators and additional loading team personnel as may be required.

SECRET

e. One driver for heavy equipment will be provided for the period of transfer of such equipment to the carrier loading point. When feasible, this will be the individual who will accompany the deployment.

f. The supply man accompanying the deployment will supervise and/or otherwise assist in carrier loading. He will coordinate with the maintenance activities and tie down crew on board the carrier to insure that the kit is placed at a point of convenance to maintenance and that the kit is ready for operation as soon as may be required.

4. General. Supply will insure that the kit is returned in good condition, including all reparable items generated, and will provide such assistance as may be required for loading, unloading, and return as specified for departure above.

SECRET

TRACKER

Whale Tale Operation

PURPOSE: To outline procedures to be followed by the Tracker Section in the event of a WHALETALE operation.

1. Policy. Tracker Section will be governed by the responsibilities and procedures established in this SOI to insure completion of the organizational mission.

2. Responsibilities. Tracker Section will be responsible for the implementation of procedures as established by WRSP-IV Memorandum Number MAT-8, as applies, and this SOI.

3. Procedures.

a. Upon notification of a deployment all cargo will be delivered to a designated area in Hangar 3. A complete list of cargo will be delivered to the Director of Materiel Office indicating a breakdown of box number, weight and cube of each item. In addition, one man will be provided to check Tracker cargo and assist in loading.

b. Under normal conditions, one Tracker man will be furnished for this deployment.

c. Upon arrival on carrier, a shop area will be set up for immediate use. Whenever possible, this section will combine with the Special Equipment Section.

d. Upon a mission alert, Tracker personnel will completely preflight tracker in shop area. At this time the B-configuration hatch will also be readied.

e. All driftsight, sextant and hand control equipment will be preflighted on article as soon as aircraft is available.

SECRET

f. Approximately 3 hours prior to takeoff the clock in the tracker is hacked, tracker is purged for thirty minutes and then mounted on B-configuration hatch while in shop or hangar area.

g. Tracker and Special Equipment personnel will then install B-configuration hatch to article.

h. All domes on tracker equipment are cleaned and all equipment is then double checked for correct operation.

i. Approximately thirty minutes before takeoff the driftsight and sextant systems are purged. This operation is continued until one minute after engine start. During this purging period the B-configuration window covers are to be removed. After the above steps are completed the article is ready for launch inasmuch as Tracker Section is concerned.

j. Tracker personnel will meet article upon return and re-install B-configuration window covers.

k. After article has been removed to the hangar deck the tracker will be downloaded from article and removed to shop. The material is then removed from the tracker and turned over to the Special Equipment Section for processing.

l. Tracker man will be present at pilot debriefings.

SECRET

MATERIEL

Whale Tale Operation

PURPOSE: To outline procedures to be used by Director of Materiel personnel in the event a WHALE TALE operation is initiated.

1. Policy. WRSP-IV Memorandum Number MAT-8 applies to this operation.

2. Responsibilities:

a. The Director of Materiel will be responsible for monitoring and implementing so much of WRSP-IV Memorandum MAT-8 as applies to home station cargo movement.

b. The POL Section will be responsible for insuring that MIL SPEC 25524B fuel is on hand to support this operation. For planning purposes, this operation will normally require two R-2 type refuelers with 5,000 gallons of fuel in each. In addition, POL Section will furnish one man for deployment if deemed necessary by Commander. NOTE: This requirement will be normally determined by number of maintenance personnel deployed. POL man, when deployed, will be responsible for all fuel activities required during this operation. Close coordination will be exercised with Maintenance Supervisor.

c. Transportation Section will be responsible for transporting all cargo and equipment, including R-2 refuelers and Special Equipment trailers, not airlifted to port. In addition, any additional transportation will be furnished through this section.

SECRET

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ELINT SECTION

SOP'S

CARRIER OPERATIONS

ELINT

Pre-flight: The following systems will be pre-flighted when notified of pending Headquarters mission.

a. System III

b. System VI

c. System IXA

d. System XIII

Post-flight: System III will be the only System requiring post-flight.

Tape Check: Post-flight check sheets be filled out according to Headquarters SOP and filed in tape cans for shipment to Headquarters, one copy of data sheets remain in Commo file.

Times: Pre-flight approximately three to four hours required. Post-flight approximately two hours required.

COMMUNICATIONS

Pre-flight: Radio and NavAids

a. SSB 618T-3 transceiver and BIRDWATCHER

b. ARC-34, UHF transceiver

c. ADF-21A, Direction Finder

d. VOR, Navigation equipment

Times: One and half hours required to run through the sequence of check-off, most time used up for BIRDWATCHER.

Sign-Off Sheets: Communications Team Leader will check and note any aircraft write-ups on A/C logs. Corrections made on write-ups of electronics will be

~~SECRET~~

signed off by the Team Leader or one of the electronic techs working on the troubled unit. The Team Leader will attend pilots debriefings or appoint someone in his staff to do so.

Responsibility: The Communications Team Leader will be responsible to the Detachment Commander.

PERSONNEL

Personnel requirements for Communications and Elint activities:

a. Engineer - Team Leader

b. Electronic Tech - System III and Communications

c. Electronic Tech - System VI and Communications

d. Electronic Tech - System IXA, XII and Aids

e. Wire/Tech - Teletype maintenance

Signal Center Requirements:

a. CTC - Communicator

b. CTC - Operator

c. CTR - Radio monitor for BIRDWATCHER and SSB in radio room.

This does not include personnel that headquarters might want to supplement the task force.

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SIGNAL CENTER

SOP'S

CARRIER OPERATIONS

ENCIPHERING AND DECIPHERING/LOGGING AND FILING:

Procedures will be in accordance with the established KWCLUB regs.

DISTRIBUTION:

Incoming cables will be typed on DD Form 173 and 173-1; number of copies dependent on Commanders requirement.

SPECIAL PROCEDURES: In the event tape relay is used, DTG's must be obtained from the ship's communications officer.

ZFF-1: Procedures will be used on all traffic filed, follow up for immediate or priority will be made in one hour if ZDF-1 not received. The signal center will make arrangements for Project Commo Officer to be notified by host Commo Officer when a ZDF-1 is received from RUEADW (OPCEN)

RESPONSIBILITIES: The Communicator will be responsible to the Detachment Commander and the Communications Team Leader.

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

22 JAN 64 18 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: J. W. CHERBONNEAUX
UNIT: IDEA/OSA
EXT:
DATE: 21 JAN 64

TO: KUCACTUS
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: OPS 1-2.
INFO:

	ACT	INFO
DFA		✓
PLANS		✓
D/TECH		
OXC		✓
IDEA		
SS		
MD		
WS		
INTEL		
AB		
COMMO		
CC		✓
FILE		

ROUTING

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PRECEDENCE: DEFERRED | X | PRIORITY | INITIALS
ROUTINE | | OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE | INITIALS

- 38210

TO PRIORITY CACTUS INFO CITE ADIC 0059

RECITAL-X WHALE TALE TWO

REF: CACTUS 5957 (IN 59548)

1. SECOND CARRIER TRNG GROUP WILL PROCEED PENSACOLA NAS FOR CARRIER QUALS T-2A. GROUP IS TO BE IN PLACE PENSACOLA 26 JAN, AND WILL HAND CARRY NAVAL FLIGHT GEAR ISSUED THEM AT MONTEREY NAS.

2. MAJ JAMES CHERBONNEAUX AND MR THOMAS SWEENEY FROM HQ WILL MEET WITH GROUP AT PENSACOLA TO OBSERVE THIS PORTION OF THE CARRIER TRNG.

END OF MESSAGE

VERNON R. MORRIS
C/IDEA/OSA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

J. W. CHERBONNEAUX
IDEA/OSA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: J. W. CHERBONNEAUX
UNIT: IDEA/OSA
EXT:
DATE: 23 JAN 64

TO: KWCACTUS KWBEIGE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: OPS 1-12

INFO:

	ACT	INFO
DPA		✓
PLANS		✓
D/TECH		
OXC		✓
IDEA		
[illegible]		
[illegible]		
[illegible]		
INTEL		
AS		
COMSEC		
CC		
FILE		✓

ROUTING

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PRECEDENCE

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	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

38357

TO PRIORITY CACTUS BEIGE INFO CITE ADIC 0115

RECITAL X WHALE TALE TWO

REF: ADIC 0059 (CUT 38210)

1. PENSACOLA CARRIER TRNG FOR SECOND GROUP WILL BE DELAYED DUE PRESSING NAVY REQUIREMENTS. SECOND GROUP NOW TO BE IN PLACE PENSACOLA 2 FEB 64. RESERVATIONS FOR GROUP HAVE BEEN MADE AT TOWN HOUSE MOTEL IN MAJ CHERBONNEAUX NAME. CONTACT AT PENSACOLA IS CAPT JOHN THOMAS (NOT CLEARED I)

2. FOL HQ STAFF WILL OBSERVE PENSACOLA CARRIER TRNG 3-5 FEB: MR JAMES CUNNINGHAM, MR THOMAS SWEENEY, MAJ JAMES CHERBONNEAUX

3. MAJ CHERBONNEAUX AND MR SWEENEY (BOTH CLEARED I 3) WILL VISIT KWCACTUS AND KWBEIGE 27 THRU 29 FEB. PURPOSE OF VISIT IS TO ESTABLISH OPNL REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES FOR FORTHCOMING U-2G SHIP-BOARD TEST, AND KWGLITTER U-2G QUALIFICATIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR. COORDINATING OFFICERS
DAD/OSA

DONALD E. SONGER
D/FA/OSA

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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10 Feb CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: J. W. CHERBONNEAUX
UNIT: IDEA/OSA
EXT:
DATE: 10 FEB 64

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING

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SPECIAL HANDLING: DEFERRED X PRIORITY INITIALS
ROUTINE OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE INITIALS

TO: KWCACTUS KWBEIGE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: OPS 1-12

	ACT	INFO
DFA		✓
PLANS		✓
D/TECH		
OXC	✓	
IDEA		
SS		
MD		
WD		
INTEL		
AB		
COMMO		
CC		
FILE		✓

40477

TO PRIORITY CACTUS BEIGE INFO CITE ADIC

RECITAL-X WHALE TALE THREE 0695

1. NSG TRAFFIC REFERRING TO THE U-2G TEST, PILOT QUALS AND THE KWCACTUS DETACH OPNL READY EXERCISE (29 FEB THRU 6 MAR 64) WILL BE SLUGGED WHALE TALE THREE.

2. KWCACTUS DET CMDR AND STAFF WILL MAKE A SURVEY TRIP TO THE ACFT CARRIER RANGER AS SOON AS THE CAPT AND SHIP'S SELECTED CREW MEMBERS ARE "I" CLEARED. THESE CLEARANCES ARE EXPECTED IN NEAR FUTURE. KWCACTUS SURVEY TEAM WILL BE IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES DURING VISIT ABOARD SHIP, AND WILL BE FREE TO DISCUSS ALL MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE FORTHCOMING WHALE TALE THREE OPN WITH THE CLEARED MEMBERS OF THE SHIP'S COMPANY. (NAMES WILL BE FWD BY SEP MSG).

3. THE COVER STORY OF THE SURVEY TEAMS VISIT WILL BE: ALL MEMBERS OF THE TEAM ARE LOCKHEED CIVILIANS WORKING ON A SPECIAL PROJECT WITH THE OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH. CAPT WM E. LEMOS OF THE RANGER WILL BE THE ONLY MEMBER OF THE SHIP'S COMPLEMENT WHO WILL KNOW THE TRUE RANK AND STATUS OF THE SURVEY TEAM MEMBERS.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~SECRET~~

RELEASING OFFICER: AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

 Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

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DATE:

TO:
FROM:
CONF:
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PRECEDENCE: DEFERRED | PRIORITY | ENTIRE
ROUTINE | OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE | INDIC

PAGE TWO

40477

TO MSG CITE

4. REQ KWCACTUS FWD NAMES OF PERSONNEL FOR SURVEY TEAM TO HQ ASAP. THESE NAMES WILL BE FWD TO CAPT WM E. LEMOS THRU NAVAL CHANNELS. SUGGESTED STAFF MEMBERS OF TEAM ARE AS FOLLOWS: DET CMDR, DET OPS OFFICER, DET MAINT SUP, DET SPEC EQUIP SUP, DET AND DET COMMO CHIEF. (COORD WILL BE EFFECTED WITH NAVY BY HQ TO ALLOW DET COMMO CHIEF IN RANGER'S COMMO CENTER).

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted]

gregory — two places?

[redacted]

DONALD E. SONGER
D/FA/OSA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

VERNON R. MORRIS
C/IDEA/OSA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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11 Feb 64 1340z

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: J. W. CHERBONNEAUX
UNIT: IDEA/OSA
EXT:
DATE: 11 FEB 64

TO : KWCACTUS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: OPS 1-12

	ACT	INFO
DFA		✓
PLANS		✓
DITECH		
OXC		
IDEA	✓	
SS		
MD		
WS		
INTEL		
AS		
COMMO		
CC		✓
FILE		✓

ROUTING

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PRECEDENCE		DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	X	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

40674

TO CACTUS INFO CITE ADIC 0955

RECITAL X WHALE TALE THREE

REF: CACTUS 6157 (IN 62052)

CONFIRMING TELECON MAJ CHERBONNEAUX TO COL GREGORY, KWCACTUS SURVEY TRIP TO USS RANGER WILL BE SCHEDULED AFTER COL GREGORY S RETURN FROM KWCOCOA.

END OF MESSAGE

VERNON R. MORRIS
C/IDEA/OSA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

J. W. CHERBONNEAUX
IDEA/OSA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

 Copy No.

ORIG: J. W. CHERBONNEAUX 12 FEB 64 16 25
UNIT: IDEA/OSA
EXT:
DATE: 12 FEB 64

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTING

1	IDEA	9	
2	DDP	10	
3	Ltr Plans	11	
4	File	12	
5		13	
6		14	
7		15	
8		16	

HANDLE VIA	DEFERRED	X	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

TO : KWCACTUS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: OPS 1-12

40798

TO PRIORITY CACTUS INFO CITE ADIC

RECITAL-X WHALE TALE THREE 0932

REF: A. ADIC 0932 (OUT 40567)

B. CACTUS 6182 (IN 62362)

RE REF B - HQ UNDERSTANDS PROBLEMS OF KWGLITTER UTILIZATION DURING THE END OF FEB, 1ST OF MAR. FYI, HQ NOW COORDINATING WITH USN AND LAC SO AS TO MAKE CARRIER SCHEDULE FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO ACCOMMODATE TRNG OF MIN OF FOUR, MAX OF SEVEN KWGLITTERS. WILL ADVISE YOU ON THIS SCHEDULE AS SOON AS COORDINATION COMPLETED.

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted]

VERNON R. MORRIS
C/IDEA/OSA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted]

J. W. CHERBONNEAUX
IDEA/OSA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No. 4

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: J. W. CHERBONNEAUX
UNIT: IDEA/OSA
EXT:
DATE: 12 FEB 64

ROUTING

1	DDCI	9	
2	DDP	10	
3	FARAMS	11	
4	FIO.	12	
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PRECEDENCE				
	DEFERRED	XX	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

TO: KWCACTUS
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: OPS 1-12
INFO:

40799

TO PRIORITY CACTUS INFO CITE ADIC 0993

RECITAL-X WHALE TALE THREE

REF: A. ADIC 0895 (OUT 40477)

B. CACTUS 6175 (IN 62279)

1. RE REF B, PARA @ - HQ FEELS IT IS NOT NEC THAT [redacted] ACCOMPANY SURVEY TEAM TO USS RANGER, DUE TO FACT THAT BOTH WILL BE ABOARD SHIP FROM TWO TO THREE DAYS DURING WHALE TALE THREE EXERCISE.

2. RE PARA 3 _ 24 FEB IS MOST LIKELY DATE FOR SURVEY TEAM TO GO ABOARD USS RANGER.

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted]
VERNON R. MORRIS
C/IDEA/OSA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

[redacted]
J. W. CHERBONNEAUX
IDEA/OSA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

 Copy No. 4

18 FEB 64 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: J. W. CHERBONNEAUX
UNIT: IDEA/OSA
EXT:
DATE: 18 FEB 64

TO : KWCACTUS KWBEIGE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: OPS 1-12

	ACT	INFO
DFA		✓
PLANS		✓
D/TECH		✓
OXC		
IDEA	✓	
SS		✓
MD		
WS		
INTEL		
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COMMO		✓
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41715

TO PRIORITY CACTUS BEIGE INFO CITE ADIC 1320

RECITAL X WHALE TALE THREE

1. MR. KENNETH C. ZEIGFIELD, FAA STAFF, CLEARED I-3, WILL BE IN THE LOS ANGELES AREA 18, 19 AND 20 FEB, TO COORD WITH L A FAA CENTER, RE WHALE TALE THREE EXERCISE.

2. HE WILL CALL EITHER MR. FRED CAVANAUGH OR MR. LADDIE SAKALA TO ASSIST IN ARRANGING FOR AN EXPEDITED IFR FLIGHT PLAN FOR U-2 FERRY FLIGHTS TO AND FROM THE USS RANGER.

3. FYI, U-2 FERRY FLIGHTS FOR THIS EXERCISE WILL BE IN THE BLACK EXCEPT WHEN WEATHER AT BURBANK IS I.F.R. IN THIS CASE, FAA FLIGHT PLANS WILL BE FILED IAW WITH KWBEIGE EXISTING PROCEDURES AND WILL LIST SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND ALF AS DESTINATION OR TAKE-OFF PT.

END OF MESSAGE

VERNON H. MORRIS
C/IDEA/OSA
RELEASING OFFICER

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J. W. CHERBONNEAUX
IDEA/OSA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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ORIG: J. V. [illegible] 20 FEB 13 57 Z
UNIT: IDEA/OSA
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TO: KWCACTUS KWBEIGE KWWHALE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: OPS 1-12

42110

TO IMMEDIATE CACTUS BEIGE INFO WHALE CITE ADIC 1433

RECITAL X WHALE TALE THREE

OPERATIONS ORDER 1-64

NICKNAME: WHALE TALE THREE (UNCLASSIFIED)

CHART AND MAP REF: ONC 404

1. GENERAL: A REQUIREMENT EXISTS TO TEST THE CARRIER MODIFIED U-2G AND THE EDWARDS DETACH FOR FEASIBILITY OF OPNS FROM A USN ACFT CARRIER. TO SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT, LAC WILL PERFORM THE INITIAL TEST AND TRIALS OF THE U-2G ABOARD SHIP. WHEN THESE TRIALS HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED, A STAGING DETACH FROM KWCACTUS WILL COMMENCE CARRIER QUALS OF THE DETACH PILOTS. AFTER THE PILOTS HAVE BEEN QUALIFIED, THE DETACH ABOARD SHIP WILL GO THROUGH AN OPNL READINESS EXERCISE.

A. ENEMY FORCES (OMITTED)

B. FRIENDLY FORCES

(1) USN WILL:

(A) PROVIDE THE USS RANGER FOR THIS EXERCISE.

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(B) PROVIDE AIR TRANSPORTATION TO AND FROM THE RANGER FOR THE LAC PILOT.

(C) ASSIST KWCACTUS DETACH PERSONNEL AS NECESSARY.

(2) KWBRIGE WILL:

(A) PROVIDE THE NEC PERSONNEL AND EQUIP TO COMPLETE THE CARRIER TEST AND TRIALS OF THE U-2G.

(B) PROVIDE FUEL TRUCK AND NEC FUEL FOR ALL FLIGHT PHASES OF THIS EXERCISE.

(C) BRIEF AND ASSIST THE KWCACTUS DETACH AS REQUIRED, TO FACILITATE THE TRANSITION FROM PHASE ONE TO PHASE TWO OF THIS OPNS ORDER.

(D) PROVIDE FOR THE LAC PILOT TO MAKE BOTH INITIAL ~~AND~~ FLIGHT[S] AND LANDINGS OF ACFT 340 AND 362 ABOARD THE RANGER.

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(E) PAINT U-2G ACFT IAW ONR MARKINGS.

(3) ODUNIT - will provide AIRLIFT Support For KWCactus Staging (Re)

II. MISSION:

PHASE ONE: TO TEST THE FEASIBILITY OF OPERATING THE U-2G FROM ACFT CARRIERS.

PHASE TWO: TO QUALIFY THE KWCACTUS PILOTS IN OPERATING THE U-2G ABOARD ACFT CARRIERS.

PHASE THREE: TO EXERCISE THE KWCACTUS DETACH OPNL CAPABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS ABOARD ACFT ACRRIERS.

III. TASK ORGANIZATIONS:

A. HQ IDEALIST WILL:

(1) OBTAIN USN APPROVAL AND COORD FOR THE USE OF THE USS RANGER.

(2) OBTAIN ACFT TO SUPPORT THE DEPLOYMENT OF KWCACTUS PERSONNEL AND EQUIP TO AND FROM SAN DIEGO.

(3) ESTABLISH A COMMO LINK BETWEEN PROJ HQ AND THE USS RANGER.

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(4) COORD WITH KWBEIGE FOR THE MOVEMENT OF KWBEIGE PERSONNEL AND EQUIP.

(5) PROVIDE TO KWBEIGE AND KWCACTUS NAMES OF CLEARED USN CONTACTS AND THE PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING ANY REQUIRED SUPPORT.

(6) ARRANGE FOR RADAR SUPPRESSION, ACQUIRE WARNING AREAS CLEARANCE AND COORD WITH FAA AS REQUIRED FOR ALL FLIGHTS DURING THIS EXERCISE.

(7) PLAN AND DIRECT THE KWCACTUS DETACH SIMULATED COMBAT MSNS AND OPNL READY EXERCISE.

B. KWCACTUS WILL:

(1) PLAN TO HAVE AN OBSERVER TEAM CONSISTING OF CMDR, OPS OFFICER, ALL KWGLITTERS AVAIL AND SELECTED DETACH SUPS IN SAN DIEGO BY 1900L, FRI, 28 FEB, TO OBSERVE PHASE ONE OF THE OPNS ORDER.

(2) PROVIDE FOR A STAGING TEAM CONSISTING OF THE REQ PERSONNEL AND EQUIP TO CONDUCT PHASE TWO

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AND PHASE THREE OF THIS OPS ORDER (AS DEFINED IN ANNEX B).

(3) PROVIDE HQ ASAP WITH WEIGHT AND CUBE OF CARGO, SIZE OF LARGEST ITEM OF CARGO, AND NBR AND NAMES OF PERSONNEL ACCOMPANYING, STAGING TEAM.

IV. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:

A. PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR THIS OPN WILL BE IMPLEMENTED UPON RECEIPT OF THIS ORDER. ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT OF KWCACTUS DETACH WILL NOT COMMENCE UNTIL DIRECTED BY HQ.

B. ALL MSG REFERRING TO THE OPN WILL BE SLUGGED WHALE TALE THREE.

C. KWCACTUS STAGING TEAM CMDR WILL CARRY A COPY OF ALL MSG SLUGGED WHALE TALE THREE ON DEPLOYMENT.

D. AIRLIFT SCHEDULE: (SEE ANNEX A) (SCHEDULE OF EVENTS).

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E. PHASING OF DEPLOYMENT: (SEE ANNEX A) (SCHEDULE OF EVENTS).

V. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICAL MATTERS:

A. ADMINISTRATIVE:

(1) MAJ CHERBONNEAUX HAS BEEN DESIGNATED AS PROJECT OFFICER FOR THIS OPERATION. HE WILL COORD ALL MATTERS PERTAINING TO ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPNL.

(2) COVER BY SEP MSG.

(3) SECURITY SEE ANNEX D.

(4) LOGISTICS SEE ANNEX E.

VI. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS:

A. COMMAND:

(1) MR JAMES CUNNINGHAM WILL BE CMDR OF ALL PROJECT IDEALIST ASSETS FOR THIS EXERCISE.

(2) MR [redacted] WILL BE DESIGNATED THE KUCACTUS STAGING TEAM CMDR.

B. COMMUNICATIONS: SEE ANNEX F.

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ANNEXES:

ANNEX A - SCHED OF EVENTS

ANNEX B - OPERATIONS

ANNEX C - NONE

ANNEX D - SECURITY

ANNEX E - LOGISTICS

ANNEX F - COMMO

END OF MESSAGE

DONALD E. SONGER
D/FA/OSA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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VERNON R. MORRIS
C/IDEA/OSA
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20 FEB 64 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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ORIG: J. W. CHERBONNEAU
UNIT: IDEA/OSA
EXT:
DATE: 18 FEB 64

TO: KWCACTUS KWHEIGE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

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TO IMMEDIATE CACTUS BEIGE INFO CITE ADIC 1434

RECITAL X WHALE TALE THREE

ANNEX A TO OPERATIONS ORDER 1-64

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS:

DATE	DAY	TIME	EVENT
28 FEB 64	FRI	1900L	LAC GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT LOADED ABOARD SHIP AND PERSONNEL ASHORE FOR NIGHT - NAVY NORTH ISLAND.
29 FEB 64	SAT	0700L	ALL PERSONNEL ABOARD SHIP.
29 FEB 64	SAT	0800L	RANGER LEAVES DOCK AND HEADS FOR POSITIONS SOUTH OF SAN CLEMENTE IS.
29 FEB 64	SAT	1000L	362 LANDS (LAC PILOT)
29 FEB 64	SAT	1000/1200L	SIX TRAPPED LANDINGS (LAC PILOT).
29 FEB 64	SAT	1200/1300L	LUNCH
29 FEB 64	SAT	1400L	DECK HANDLING AND STOWAGE DEMO.
29 FEB 64	SAT	1445L	REFUEL - FULL TANKS.

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DATE	DAY	TIME	EVENT
29 FEB 64	SAT	1530L	MAX WT T.O. DEMO AND FUEL DUMP
			362 RETURNS BUR. BACK TO PORT
1 MAR 64	SUN		CONTRACTOR ANALYZES DATA.
1 MAR 64	SUN	1900L	EDWARDS DETACH AHR SAN DIEGO,
			EQUIP LOADED ABOARD, PERSONNEL
			ASHORE FOR NIGHT.
2 MAR 64	MON	0700L	ALL PERSONNEL ABOARD SHIP.
2 MAR 64	MON	0800L	RANGER LEAVES DOCK FOR SAME
			OPS AREA AS BEFORE.
2 MAR 64	MON	1000L	362 LANDS (LAC PILOT)
			LAC PILOT RETURNS BUR. VIA
			NAVY 82F FOR 348 PICK UP.
2 MAR 64	MON	1000/1100L	#1 PILOT QUAL, TWO TOUCH AND GO
			AND TWO TRAPPED LANDINGS - MOVE
			362 FWD ON MAIN DECK.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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DATE	DAY	TIME	EVENT
2 MAR 64	MON	1100L	348 LANDS. - STOW 348 BELOW - HANGAR BAY
2 MAR 64	MON	1100/1200L	#1 PILOT QUAL - TWO TRAPPED LANDINGS, STOW 362 BELOW.
2 MAR 64	MON	1200/1300L	LUNCH
2 MAR 64	MON	1300/1500L	#2 PILOT QUAL WITH 348.
2 MAR 64	MON	1500/1700L	#3 PILOT QUAL WITH 348.
2 MAR 64	MON	1730L	STOW 348 BELOW, BACK TO PORT.
3 MAR 64	TUES	0500L	ALL PERSONNEL ABOARD.
3 MAR 64	TUES	0600L	RANGER LEAVES DOCK.
3 MAR 64	TUES	0800L	USCM (MSN ALERT)
3 MAR 64	TUES	0800/1000L	#4 PILOT QUAL WITH 362.
3 MAR 64	TUES	1000/1200L	#5 PILOT QUAL WITH 348.
3 MAR 64	TUES	1200/1300L	LUNCH
3 MAR 64	TUES	1300/1500L	#6 PILOT QUAL WITH 362.
3 MAR 64	TUES	1500L	362 T.O. FOR BUR. (LAC PILOT) (595 FUEL LOAD)

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DATE	DAY	TIME	EVENT
3 MAR 64	TUES	1500/1700L	#7 PILOT QUAL WITH 348.
3 MAR 64	TUES	P.M.	348 OPS READY FOR WED. T.O. RANGER REMAINS AT SEA.
3 MAR 64	TUES	2000L	MSN PLAN TIME.
4 MAR 64	WED	0800L	LAUNCH 348 ON MSN PROFILE (FULL FUEL LOAD)
4 MAR 64	WED	1100L	348 DUMPS FUEL - RETURNS TO SHIP AND LANDS.
4 MAR 64	WED	1200L	348 REFUELED AND LAUNCHED BACK TO EDWARDS.

/DONALD S. SONGER
D/FA/OSA

COORDINATING OFFICERS

VERNON R. MORRIS
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[redacted] FEB 64 20 05Z CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

ORIG: J. W. CHERBONNEAU
UNIT: IDEA/OSA
EXT: [redacted]
DATE: 18 FEB 64

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TO : KWCACTUS KWBEIGE

FROM: DIRECTOR

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TO PRIORITY CACTUS BEIGE INFO DTG ADIC 1435

RECITAL-X WHALE TALE THREE

ANNEX B TO OPERATIONS ORDER 1-64

OPERATIONS:

I. MISSION: TO EXTEND THE FLEXIBILITY OF PROJECT IDEALIST U-2 PHOTOGRAPHIC AND ELECTRONIC COVERAGE OF WORLD WIDE TARGETS BY QUALIFYING THE IDEALIST DETACH LOCATED AT KWCACTUS IN ALL PHASES OF OPERATING A U-2 FROM AN ACFT CARRIER. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, A THREE PHASE EXERCISE WILL BE CONDUCTED ABOARD THE USS RANGER BASED AT SAN DIEGO.

II. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT: THE FIRST DAY OF THIS EXERCISE, LAC WILL COMPLETE THE FINAL TEST AND TRIALS REQUIRED TO PROVE THE FEASIBILITY OF OPERATING A U-2G ABOARD AN ACFT CARRIER. THE POL DAYS ABOARD THE RANGER WILL BE DEVOTED TO THE QUAL OF KWCACTUS KWGLITTERS, AND EXERCISING THE DETAILS OF A LAUNCH AND RECOVERY OF AN OPNL U-2 MSN FROM AN ACFT CARRIER.

III. GENERAL:

A. BOTH CARRIER MODIFIED ARTICLES WILL BE USED

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FOR THIS EXERCISE. LAC PILOT SHUMACHER WILL FLY BOTH, ABOARD THE RANGER ON 2 MAR. BOTH ACFT WILL BE STOWED ABOARD ON NIGHT OF 2 MAR AND 348 WILL BE STOWED ABOARD ON NIGHT OF 3 MAR.

B. THE U-2'S WILL BE ALTERNATED DURING THE QUAL FLIGHTS. THE ONE NOT BEING FLOWN WILL BE STORED ON THE HANGAR DECK.

C. FOR ALL TRAPPED LANDINGS ABOARD, INCLUDING THE LAC DEMO LANDINGS, THE FOL PROCEDURES WILL APPLY:

(1) AFTER ACFT HAS COME TO COMPLETE STOP ON THE DECK, THE DETACH MAINT SUP WILL GIVE THE PILOT A CUT ENG SIGNAL.

(2) ACFT WILL THEN BE TOWED TO THE AFT END OF THE AXIAL DECK.

(3) ACFT INSPECTED AND SUMP TANK TOPPED OFF.

(4) ACFT STARTED AND T.O. MADE ALONG AXIAL DECK.

D. TWO HRS AIR PLANNED FOR EACH PILOT QUAL SORTIE.

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THIS INCLUDES 20 MIN FOR INITIAL TAKE-OFF AND TWO TOUCH AND GO LANDINGS; PLUS ANY WAVE OFF'S REQ; 20 MIN BETWEEN EACH TRAPPED LANDING; (PER PARA C) AND 20 MIN FOR PREPARATION OF ACFT FOR NEXT SORTIE.

E. TO SIMULATE INSOFAR AS POSSIBLE, EVERY ASPECT OF AN ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT TO AN ACFT CARRIER, THE KWCACTUS PERSONNEL AND EQUIP WILL BE DEPLOYED FROM KWCACTUS ON 1 MAR AT 1700L TO SAN DIEGO. THEY WILL LOAD THE EQUIP ABOARD THE RANGER BY 1900L. THE PERSONNEL MAY STAY ASHORE THE NIGHT OF 1 MAR. ALL PERSONNEL WILL BE ABOARD THE RANGER BY 0700L ON 2 MAR. PERSONNEL MAY GO ASHORE ON THE NIGHT OF 2 MARCH. TO BE BACK ABOARD BY 0500L, 3 MAR. DET PERSONNEL WILL STAY ABOARD SHIP UNTIL THE ORE HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND THE SHIP RETURNS TO DOCK ON 4 MAR. THE DET PERSONNEL AND EQUIP WILL BE REDEPLOYED TO KWCACTUS ON 4 MAR AS SOON AS THE EQUIP CAN BE OFF LOADED FROM THE SHIP

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AND LOADED ON THE SUPPORT ACFT.

F. FOR THIS SIMULATED COMBAT MSN, THE U-2 USED WILL BE LOADED INSOFAR AS POSSIBLE WITH A COMPLETE OPNL MSN SPEC EQUIP LOAD. A FULL FUEL LOAD TAKE-OFF WILL BE MADE, AND A CLIMB TO MAX ALT COMPLETED. THE MSN WILL BE FLOWN, AND THE RECOVERY BACK ABOARD WILL BE MADE UTILIZING THE RANGERS RADAR APPROACH SYSTEM. THE PILOT WILL DUMP FUEL PRIOR TO LANDING. THE U-2 WILL BE TAKEN BELOW, AND THE SPEC EQUIP OFF LOADING EXERCISE CONDUCTED, THEN THE ARTICLE WILL BE REFUELED AND LAUNCHED ON ITS RETURN FLIGHT TO EWCACTUS.

G. THE B CAMERA AND TRACKER CAMERA WILL BE ON THE SIMULATED OPNL MSN, WITH A PLAIN LOWER HATCH. EVERY ATTEMPT WILL BE MADE TO SCREEN THE LOADING/UNLOADING EXERCISE OF THIS EQUIP ON THE U-2 FROM UNCLEARED EYES ABOARD SHIP. IF IT IS FOUND TO BE IMPOSSIBLE TO SCREEN THIS PORTION OF THE EXERCISE, THEN THE EQUIP WILL BE LEFT IN THE BOXES, AND

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THE LOADING/UNLOADING SIMULATED.

IV. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES:

A. SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND WILL BE THE PRIMARY ALTERNATE FOR EMERG LANDINGS DURING THIS EXERCISE.

B. 100 GAL OF FUEL WILL BE ABSOLUTE MIN FOR LANDINGS ABOARD SHIP. WITH LESS THAN 100 GAL, THE PILOT WILL PROCEED TO SAN CLEMENTE ALF AND LAND.

C. IN CASE OF ACFT RADIO FAILURE, THE LSO WILL ATTEMPT TO LAND THE U-2 BY USE OF PADDLES. AFTER TWO UNSUCCESSFUL LANDING ATTEMPTS, THE PILOT WILL PROCEED TO KNCACTUS, FUEL PERMITTING, OR IF AT MIN FUEL SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND.

V. COMMUNICATIONS:

A. FLIGHT PLANS WILL NOT BE FILED FOR ANY OF THE FLIGHTS OF THIS EXERCISE. RADAR SUPPRESSION WITH NORAD AND FAA COORD WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY HQ. IF WX AT BURBANK REQUIRES FLIGHTS FROM BURBANK TO THE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~TOP SECRET~~

RELEASING OFFICER AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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PRECEDENCE	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS
	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

PAGE SIX

TO | INFO | CITE

CARRIER TO BE ON A FAA CLEARANCE, LAC PILOT WILL FILE IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING STANDARD PROCEDURES, AND LIST SAN CLEMENTE IS ALF AS DESTINATION.

B. THE FOL CALL SIGNS ARE ASSIGNED FOR THE DAYS AND FLIGHTS AS INDICATED. THESE CALL SIGNS HAVE BEEN COORD WITH FAA AND NORAD.

2 MAR	362	FERRY TO RANGER	KAYAK 02
	362	#1 PILOT QUAL	KAYAK 03
	348	FERRY TO RANGER	KAYAK 04
	348	#2 PILOT QUAL	KAYAK 05
	348	#3 PILOT QUAL	KAYAK 06
3 MAR	362	#4 PILOT QUAL	KAYAK 07
	348	#5 PILOT QUAL	KAYAK 08
	362	FERRY TO BURBANK	KAYAK 10
	348	#7 PILOT QUAL	KAYAK 11
4 MAR	348	SIM OPNL MSN	KAYAK 12
	348	FERRY TO BURBANK	KAYAK 13

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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PAGE SEVEN

TO INFO CITE

C. MSG TRAFFIC

(1) ALL MSG REFERRING TO THIS OPN WILL BE SLUGGED WHALE TALE THREE.

(2) RECITAL SLUG WILL BE USED ON ALL OPS TRAFFIC.

END OF MESSAGE

DONALD E. SONGER
D/FA/OSA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

TOP SECRET

VERNON R. MORRIS
C/IDEA/OSA

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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19 Feb 64 | 10Z CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: J. W. CHERBONNEAUX
UNIT: IDEA/OSA
EXT:
DATE: 19 FEB 64

TO: KWCACTUS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: ODP 1-12

	ACT	INFO
DFA		✓
PLANS		✓
D/TECH		
OXC		
IDEA		✓
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MD		
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	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

41833

TO PRIORITY CACTUS INFO CITE ADIC 1344

RECITAL-X WHALE TALE THREE

REF: CACTUS 6242 (IN 63218)

1. RE PARA 1 AND 2 REF MSG, HQ SUGGEST THAT MIRROR ANGLE BE DECREASED BY JACKING REAR END OF TRAILER TO GIVE ACTUAL U-2G PCLP LANDING APPROACH ANGLE. HQ BELIEVES DUE TO SPEED OF CARRIER AND POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED LANDING SPEED OF U-2 GOING ABOARD, THAT SHIP BORNE MIRROR SYSTEM CAN BE USED FOR U-2G LANDINGS. THIS WILL BE PROVEN BY 29 FEB TEST AND TRIALS.

2. RE PARA 3 AND 4 IN REF MSG, HQ CONCURS WITH L/CMDRS REVISED TRAINING REQUIREMENTS, HOWEVER, SUGGEST YOU REVIEW THIS ADDITIONAL TRAINING TO ASSURE COMPLETION OF REQUIRED SORTIES ON ALL KWGLITTERS PRIOR TO 29 FEB.

END OF MESSAGE

VERNON F. [redacted]
C/IDEA/OSA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

J. W. CHERBONNEAUX
IDEA/OSA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

 Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: J. F. CHERBONNEAUX
UNIT: IDEA/OSA
EXT:
DATE: 19 FEB 64

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	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

TO: KWCACTUS
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF:
INFO: OPS 1-12

	ACT	INFO
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PLANS		✓
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FILE		

42058

6

TO PRIORITY CACTUS INFO CITE ADIC 1408

RECITAL-X WHALE TALE THREE

REF: ADIC 0895 (OUT 40477)

1. FYI PROJ HQ HAS OBTAINED REQUIRED CLEARANCES ON USS RANGER PERSONNEL, PLUS CNO'S CONCURRENCE OF SURVEY TEAMS VISIT ON 25 FEB 64.

2. MAJ CHERBONNEAUX AND MR [redacted] (I-3) FROM PROJ HQ WILL ACCOMPANY KWCACTUS SURVEY TEAMS VISIT TO THE RANGER. MAJ CHERBONNEAUX AND [redacted] WILL ARR KWCACTUS ON 23 FEB 64, AND WILL RETURN TO KWCACTUS AND REMAIN UNTIL COMPLETION OF WHALE TALE THREE EXERCISE. SURVEY TEAM WILL PROCEED KWCACTUS SAN DIEGO AND KWCACTUS VIA COMM AIR.

3. FYI, THE FOL PERSONNEL OF THE RANGER ARE CLEARED IDEALIST:

CAPT WILLIAM E. LEMOS, CMDG OFF.

CMDR WILLIAM R. FLANAGAN, EX OFF.

CMDR WILLIAM W. PORTER, OPS OFF.

CMDR MORRIS G. ESWIOL, AIR OFF.

L/CMDR LAWRENCE H. WELLS, COMMO OFF.

COORDINATING OFFICER

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RELEASING OFFICER AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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20 FEB 64 16 54 CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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PAGE TWO

42056

TO INFO CITE 1408

REQ KWCACTUS S.O. BRIEF CAPT LEMOS AND OTHERS OF ABOVE GROUP WHO, IN CAPT LEMOS' OPINION, SHOULD BE BRIEFED.

4. NEW SUBJECT. IF POSSIBLE, REQ YOU SCHEDULE MAJ CHERBONNEAUX FOR ONE SORTIE IN THE U-2G, PLUS AS MANY T 33 SORTIES AS POSSIBLE DURING HIS VISIT.

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted]

[redacted]

DONALD E. SONGER
D/FA/OSA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

[redacted]

VERNON R. MORRIS
C/IDEA/OSA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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20 Feb 64

U.S. CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~T-O-P~~ ~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

ORIG: PJMCCARTHY:ab
UNIT: HD/OSA-DD/S&T
EXT:
DATE: 19 FEBRUARY 1964

TO : KWCACTUS, KWBEIGE , KWWHALE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: OPS 1-12

	ACT	INFO
DFA		✓
PLANS		✓
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OXC		
IDEA		✓
SB		
ND		✓
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INTEL		
AB		
COMMO		
CC		✓
FILE		✓

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PRECEDENCE	DEFERRED	X	PRIORITY	MINUTES
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42113

TO PRIORITY CACTUS, BEIGE INFO WHALE CITE ADIC 1436

RECITAL X - WHALE TALE THREE

ANNEX E TO OPORD 1-64

LOGISTICS

I. SUPPLY

A. FAK SPARES - SUFFICIENT SPARES WILL BE TAKEN TO ENABLE THE DETACHMENT TO BE COMPLETELY SELF SUPPORTING FOR THE DEPLOYMENT PERIOD. A SPARE ENGINE AND ENGINE ROLL BACK CAPABILITY WILL NOT BE DEPLOYED. IF ENGINE REMOVAL IS REQUIRED, AIRCRAFT WILL BE OFF LOADED AT DOCKSIDE TO PERFORM REQUIRED WORK ASHORE.

B. RESUPPLY - WILL BE OBTAINED FROM DETACHMENT AT-HOME-ASSETS, METHOD OF TRANSPORTATION FROM EDWARDS TO CARRIER WILL BE AT DETACHMENT COMMANDER'S DISCRETION.

C. FUEL

1. SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES OF MIL SPEC 25524B FUEL WILL BE DEPLOYED BY KWBEIGE TO SUPPORT ENTIRE WHALE TALE THREE OPERATION.

2. OTHER FUELS NOT REQUIRED.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~T-O-P~~ S E C R E T

RELEASING OFFICER AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

TO | INFO | CITE

D. OXYGEN/NITROGEN - SUFFICIENT QUANTITIES WILL BE DEPLOYED TO SUPPORT MISSION REQUIREMENTS.

E. FILM - UNIT WILL SIMULATE DEPLOYMENT OF FILM LOAD FOR EXERCISE MISSION.

II. EQUIPMENT

A. ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT TO BE DEPLOYED WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE DETACHMENT COMMANDER AND STAFF AFTER THE INITIAL SURVEY TRIP IS MADE ABOARD THE CARRIER. SUFFICIENT ITEMS WILL BE DEPLOYED TO SUPPORT ALL SCHEDULED OPERATIONS OF WHALE TALE THREE.

B. SUFFICIENT SYSTEMS AND CONFIGURATIONS OR EQUIVALENTS WILL BE DEPLOYED TO SIMULATE ACTUAL MISSION.

III. MAINTENANCE

NORMAL PRE-FLIGHT AND POST-FLIGHT MAINTENANCE WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED ABOARD THE CARRIER.

IV. TRANSPORTATION

A. AIRLIFT - AIRLIFT WILL BE SCHEDULED BY PROJECT HEADQUARTERS TO DEPLOY DETACHMENT EQUIPMENT FROM EDWARDS AFB TO NAVAL AIR STATION, NORTH ISLAND.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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TO INFO CITE

B. TRANSPORTATION FOR RESUPPLY OF SPARES WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE DETACHMENT.

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted]

[redacted]

DONALD E. SONGER
D/FA/OSA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

~~TOP~~ SECRET

D. W. WARFIELD
C/MD/OSA

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy No.

20 Feb 64

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

ORIG:
UNIT: OSA/Security
EXT:
DATE: 19 February 1964

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TO : KWCACTUS, KWBEIGE, KWWHALE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: OPS 1-12

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DPA		✓
PLANS		✓
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NDEA		✓
SS		✓
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CSC		✓
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PRECEDENCE				INITIALS
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-	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

42114

TO PRIORITY CACTUS, BEIGE INFO WHALE CITE ADIC 1437

RECITAL X - WHALE TALE THREE

ANNEX D TO OPORD 1-64

SECURITY

1. SECURITY OF THE EXERCISE WILL BE IMPLEMENTED AND MAINTAINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED PROJECT STANDARDS.

A. ARTICLE WILL BE HOUSED IN THE HANGAR BAY SITUATED ON THE HANGAR DECK. CONTINUOUS CONTROL WILL BE EXERCISED OVER ARTICLE, FUEL, CLASSIFIED SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS ATTENDANT TO THE EXERCISE. MAXIMUM UTILIZATION WILL BE MADE OF THE USMC SHIPS PERSONNEL FOR GUARD COVERAGE. REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT IN THIS AREA SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE CO OF THE RANGER.

B. STAFF SECURITY OFFICER WILL CONDUCT A FINAL INSPECTION OF THE PILOT AND ARTICLE TO INSURE STERILITY COMPATIBLE WITH COVER STORY ESTABLISHED FOR THIS EXERCISE. THIS INSPECTION WILL BE MADE AT THE TIME THE AIRCRAFT LEAVES THE RANGER ON SIMULATED MISSION.

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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TO INFO CITE

C. THE SENIOR SECURITY OFFICER WILL PERFORM LIAISON WITH THE NAVAL PERSONNEL CONSISTENT WITH THE DESIRES OF THE DETACHMENT COMMANDER.

D. IDEALIST BRIEFINGS WILL BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM AND WILL BE RESTRICTED TO THOSE WHO HAVE AN ACTUAL "NEED TO KNOW". IDENTITIES OF CLEARED PERSONNEL OF THE RANGER HAVE BEEN PROVIDED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE, BRIEFINGS SHOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS NOTED IN THIS MESSAGE.

E. SECURITY WILL INSURE THE EXTERNAL SECURITY OF THE BRIEFING AREA DURING ALL BRIEFING SESSIONS.

F. DETACHMENT PERSONNEL WILL MAINTAIN A HIGH STANDARD OF PERSONAL CONDUCT ABOARD SHIP AND WILL ABIDE BY ALL REGULATIONS GOVERNING SHIP'S PERSONNEL. IN THIS REGARD, THERE WILL BE NO DRINKING OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES WHILE ON BOARD THE RANGER. NO LIQUOR SHOULD BE BROUGHT ABOARD.

G. THE SENIOR SECURITY OFFICER WILL INSURE THE REMOVAL OF ALL CLASSIFIED WASTE AND THE STERILITY OF THE OPERATIONAL

COORDINATING OFFICERS

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	ROUTINE	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE		INITIALS

PAGE 3

TO INFO CITE

AREA AT THE TERMINATION OF THE EXERCISE.

H. SECURITY, THROUGH THE SHIPS CO, WILL INSURE THAT NO PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE ARTICLE OR SPECIAL EQUIPMENT ARE TAKEN BY THE SHIP'S COMPANY. ALSO DISTRIBUTION OF THE VIDEO TAPES REFLECTING LANDINGS AND LAUNCHING OF THE ARTICLE SHOULD BE CLOSELY CONTROLLED.

[redacted]

[redacted]

COORDINATING OFFICERS

/DONALD E. SONGER
D/FA/OSA
Rreleasing OFFICER

TOP SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AC/SS/OSA
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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25FEB64 14 [redacted] Z

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ORIG: VERNON R. MORRIS
UNIT: IDEA/OSA
EXT: [redacted]
DATE: 25 FEB 64

TO : KWCACTUS

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO: OPS 1-12

	ACT	INFO
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PLANS		✓
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	ROUTINE		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

42673

TO PRIORITY CACTUS INFO CITE ADIC 1608

RECITAL X WHALE TALE THREE

REF: A. ADIC 1435

B. TELECON SONGER AND GREGORY

RE REF PARA III.G, THIS MSG AUTH TO USE "B" HATCH, WITH HATCH COVERS INSTALLED, FOR SIMULATED OPERATIONAL MSN.

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted]

VERNON R. MORRIS
C/IDEA/OSA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)