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as approved on September 6, was now outmoded, that more dynamic action was indicated, that hesitancy about overflights must be reconsidered (this to be commented on later in this memorandum), that actions which could be attributed to indigenous Cubans would not be important or very effective, and that a very considerable amount of attribution and "noise" must be expected.

As a result, General Lansdale was instructed to give consideration to new and more dynamic approaches, the specific items of sabotage should be brought forward immediately and new ones conceived, that a plan for mining harbors should be developed and presented, and the possibility of capturing Castro forces for interrogation should be studied.

With respect to overflights,
were instructed to prepare and present to the Special Group on next
Tuesday at a special meeting alternate recommendations for overflights. These to include the use of U-2s on complete sweeps (as
contrasted with peripheral or limited missions), the use of firefly
drones, the use of 101s or other reconnaissance planes on x low
level, intermediate level, and high level missions, and other
possible reconnaissance operations.

Consideration was given to stating publicly that we propose to overfly Cuba in the interest of our own security and the security of the Western Hemisphere, and then to proceed even though doing so involved risk.

It was the consensus that we could not accept restrictions which would foreclose gaining all reasonable knowledge of military installations in Cuba.

During the meeting McCone reviewed the earlier meeting with General Lansdale, and pointed out to the group that this meeting clarified General Lansdale's authority over the entire MONGOOSE operation and that the CIA organization was responsive to his policy and operational guidance, and this was thoroughly understood.


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Consideration was given to the existing guidelines and it was the consensus that the August 1st guidelines for phase two were inadequate and new guidelines must be considered.

> John A. McCone Director

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Memorandum of Discussion with Mr. McGeorge Bundy Friday, October 5, 1962, 5:15 p.m.

- 1. McCone reviewed details of the Donovan negotiations, discussions with the President, Attorney General, Eisenhower, the decisions not to approach Congressional leadership, the discussion with Senator Javits, and the final report from Donovan. Bundy expressed general agreement.
- At the October 4th meeting of the Special Group Mongoose was discussed in some detail as was the meeting with Carter, Lansdale, et al in DCI's office on that day. McCone stated there was a feeling in CIA and Defense that the "activist policy" which founded the Mongoose operation was gone and that while no specific operational activities had been (refused) the amount of "noise" from minor incidents such as the sugar, the students firing on the Havana Hotel and other matters and the extreme caution expressed by State had led to this conclusion. More importantly, however, the decisions to restrict U-2 flights had placed the United States Intelligence Community in a position where it could not report with assurance the development of offensive capabilities in Cuba. McCone stated he felt it most probable that Soviet-Castro operations would end up with an established offensive capability in Cuba including MRBMs. McCone stated he thought this a probability rather than a mere possibility. Bundy took issue stating that he felt the Soviets would not go that far, that he was satisfied that no offensive capability would be installed in Cuba because of its world-wide effects and therefore seemed relaxed over the fact that the Intelligence Community cannot produce hard information onthis important subject. McCone said that Bundy's viewpoint was reflected by many in the Intelligence Community, perhaps a majority, but he just did not agree and furthermore did not think the United States could afford to take such a risk.
- 3. Bundy then philosophized on Cuba stating that he felt that our policy was not clear, our objectives not determined and therefore our efforts were not productive. He discussed both the Mongoose operations and the Rostow "Track Two". Bundy was not critical of either or of the Lansdale operations. It was obvious that he was not in sympathy with a more active role such as those discussed at 5412 on Thursday as he felt none of them would bring Castro down nor would they particularly enhance U.S. position of world leadership. Bundy seemed inclined to support the Track Two idea and also inclined (though he was not specific) to play down the more active Lansdale



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operation. Bundy had not talked to Lansdale but obviously had received some of the "static" that is being passed around in Washington. (Before) McCone in reporting on the discussions at Thursday's 5412 meeting repeated the views of the President and expressed by the Attorney General it was agreed that the whole Government policy with reference to Cuba must be resolved promptly as basic to further actions on our part. In general, Bundy's views were that we should either make a judgment that we would have to go in militarily (which seemed to him intolerable) or alternatively we would have to learn to live with Castro, and his Cuba and adjust our policies accordingly.

- 4. McCone then elaborated on his views of the evolution of Soviet-Castro military capability stating he felt defense was just phase one, phase two would be followed by various offensive capabilities and indeed the existing defensive capabilities such as the (MIG) 21s a very definite offensive capability against nearby American cities and installations. McCone stated that he thought that the establishment of a very expensive silensive mechanism could not be the ultimate objective of the Soviets or Castro and therefore the objective was (a) to establish an offensive base or (b) to insert sufficient Soviet specialists and military leaders to take Cuba away from Castro and establish it as a true Soviet controlled satellite. McCone stated that he felt there were only two courses open -- one was to take military action at the appropriate time or secondly to pursue an effort to split Castro off from the Communists and for this reason he, McCone, had vigorously supported the Donovan mission as it is the only link that we have to the Castro hierarchy at the present time. Note in this connection it might be well to study the evolution of the Toure experience in Guinea when the Communists moved in and captured all elements of the Government and economy and forced Tours to expel the Ambassador and try to rectify the situation. There may be a parallel here.
- 5. McCone reviewed the Eisenhower discussions. Bundy read the memorandum covering these discussions. Bundy stated that Adenauer did not express the concern of the U.S. policy reflected by Eisenhower and reported in the memorandum.
- 6. Bundy rejected the idea of regular NSC meetings stating that every President has to organize his Government as he desires and that the Eisenhower pattern was not necessarily adaptable to the Kennedy type of administration. McCone stated that if this is the case he intended to request



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occasional NSC meetings to review specific estimates or other intelligence situations and the next one would be a report and discussion of the estimate of Soviet air defense capabilities. Bundy agreed.

7. Bundy rejected the idea (calling) the several Special Groups 5412, CIA, Mongoose, and North Vistnam together feeling it was better to keep them separated. He also rejected the idea that the visiting commissions such as the Byroade Team and the Draper Team should report back to the Special Group (CI) feeling it was appropriate that they report to the President, (through) the Secretary of State, with consultation with the Special Group (CI). It was agreed that we would have a further discussion over the weekend.

JOHN A. McCONE Director

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43. Sherman Kent, Memorandum for the Director, "Implications of an Announcement by the President that the US would Conduct Overhead Reconnaissance of Cuba...," 8 October 1962

E-C-R-E-T INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES 8 October 1962 MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR SUBJECT: Implications of an Announcement by the President that the US would Conduct Overhead Reconnaissance of Cuba, and of the Actual Reconnaissance Thereafter NOTE: The following are the conclusions reached by a panel of members of the Board of National Estimates and of the ONE Staff 1. The President's announcement would be vigorously condemned by the Soviets and the Cubans as evincing an intention to commit acts of international aggression. 2. The weight of publicly expressed opinion in the free

2. The weight of publicly expressed opinion in the free world would probably condemn the announcement as threatening a marked increase in international tensions. Many Latin Americans would probably look upon it as incompatible with the principle of non-intervention. On the other hand,

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those few which desire the US to take decisive action against Cuba would probably consider the announcement as a disappointingly weak manifestation.

- 3. The Cubans, or some other country, would probably bring the matter before the UN shortly after the announcement. (They would be virtually certain to do so if a reconnaissance vehicle were shot down.) Having international law on their side, they would hope to achieve a UN condemnation of the US for acts threatening peace. The UN situation would be complicated, and it is possible that in one way or another the US could avert a formal resolution. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that the US would find much support among the assembled nations. It might find itself, for the first time, in virtual isolation.
- 4. The Soviets and the Cubans would probably be impressed by the evident willingness of the US government to raise still further the level of tension over Cuba, and to commit itself to further risks. We do not believe, however,

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that this would lead to any change in Soviet policy toward Cuba. The USSR would not consider that the US announcement created such a dangerous situation as to require it to reduce its support of Castro. Moreover, it would judge that, in political terms, it could ill afford to make any reduction at such a time. On the other hand, we do not believe that the announcement, or succeeding overflights, would cause the USSR to alter its Cuban policy in a direction which increased the provocation offered to the US, e.g., the provision of medium-range missile bases. In reacting publicly, the Soviets would probably reaffirm their commitment to Cuba's defense, though they would probably not make the commitment more specific or binding.

5. We think it unlikely that the Soviets would retaliate directly with any major moves against the Western position in Berlin. In confronting the Allies with local crises which raise the level of risk in Berlin, they generally prefer to choose a time when US opinion is not highly agitated over other East-West issues. While the announcement would

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create new strains in Soviet-American relations, this effect would not be so strong or so long-lasting as to influence basic Soviet choices with respect to Berlin.

6. The Soviets and Cubans would make every effort to shoot down any reconnaissance vehicle that came over Cuba. If they succeeded in doing so, the tensions would be somewhat increased, though the international political effects of the shootdown would not in themselves be as great as if it had occurred without the prior Presidential announcement. The demonstration of military capability which such an incident would provide would almost certainly impress many Latin Americans.

SHERMAN KENT Chairman

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Board of National Estimates

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October 11, 1962


#### MEMORANDUM ON DONOVAN PROJECT

Immediately after my discussion with the Cannon Committee (including Taber, Ford and Mahon), I went to the White House and explained to the President and McGeorge Bundy the positions taken by Ford and Mahon, as covered in separate memorandum prepared by Mr. Warner. The President made the judgment that we should proceed with the negotiations, recognizing there would be some political consequences and criticisms, but he, the President, was willing to accept this as a fact.

I then showed the President photographs of the crates which presumably would carry, or were carrying, IL 28s, Soviet medium bombers, and were deck loaded on a ship which had arrived in Havana in the early days of October. The President requested that such information be withheld at least until after elections as if the information got into the press, a new and more violent Cuban issue would be injected into the campaign and this would seriously affect his independence of action.

McCone stated that these particular photographs could not be restricted as they had been disseminated to the Intelligence Community and several joint and specified commands, such as CINCLANT, SAC, NORAD, and others and would be reported in the CIA Bulletin on Thursday morning. The President then requested that the report be worded to indicate a probability rather than an actuality because in the final analysis we only saw crates, not the bombers themselves. DCI agreed. The President further requested that all future information be suppressed. DCI stated that this was extremely dangerous.

It was then agreed that future information would be disseminated to members of USIB, with appropriate instructions that only those responsible for giving the President advice be given the information.



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Furthermore, that within GIA circles a minimum number of experts be informed. McCone stated there was no problem in GIA, that it was secure. It was therefore agreed that the USIB members would be instructed to restrict the information to their personal offices and fully and currently inform the Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman, the Service Secretaries and the Secretary of Defense. Similar restrictive action would be taken in State. Therefore all those involved in "giving advice to the President" would be fully informed. However operational divisions and the joint and specified commands would not be informed at this time, except at the direction of the above people who are receiving the information.

At this point the President mentioned that "we'll have to do something drastic about Cuba" and I am anxiously looking forward to the JCS operational plan which is to be presented to me next week.

McCone effected the above instructions by calling Mr. Cline, who was unavailable, and then Mr. Sheldon who agreed to prepare a procedure for review on Thursday morning.

McCone then called the Attorney General and advised him of his talk with the Cannon Committee. The Attorney General had no particular comment.

At six o'clock McCone received a report from Houston that Donovan had gone into a meeting at five o'clock. At eleven o'clock Houston reported the meeting was still in progress. At seven o'clock on Thursday morning Donovan still had no report.

At 11:15 General Eisenhower called McCone stating he was sorry a meeting could not be arranged, he was leaving very early the following morning for Gettysburg. McCone reported that negotiations were in progress and he also reported objections stated by several members of Congress. Eisenhower advised that the negotiations be pursued, indicating his support of it and furthermore stated that if the negotiations were satisfactorily concluded the complaints and objections would, in his words, disappear.

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McCone told General Eisenhower there were some defendable evidences of shipments of twin-engined light jet bombers. Eisenhower responded the situation must be watched very carefully. Positive action might be indicated and then he said there had been two instances where action was warranted but had not been taken. Eisenhower did not elaborate; however, I know from previous discussions he feels that when Castro embraced Communism publicly and announced publicly his allegiance to Moscow, we had then a reason to act militarily and if we had chosen to so act, such action would have been defendable.


On Thursday morning McGone reported by telephone to Mr. Kennedy, reviewing the Eisenhower discussion and stating that he, McGone, was concerned over Donovan's safety in view of the rash of publicity, most particularly the Herald Tribune article, and that he had instructed that contact be made with Donovan and that if things were not proceeding satisfactorily and a conclusion to the negotiations along the lines agreed in sight, then Donovan should come out. The Attorney General stated that he had no concern over Donovan's personal safety, that "they will not do anything to him". McGone stated he was not so sure and that he therefore concluded to bring Donovan out unless things were going well.

With reference to the political implications, McCone recalled that he had told the President and the AG that he would take all, or his full share of responsibility, that he wished the AG to bear this in mind as the position taken in this respect by Mr. McCone in the first conversation after his return from Europe still stood. AG expressed appreciation for this statement.

> John A. McCone Director

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27 February 1963

#### MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: U-2 Overflights of Cuba, 29 August through 14 October 1962

The August 29th flight flew over most of the island and photographed much of it. The photography revealed that eight SAM sites were under construction in the western half of the island. The flight also discovered an installation at Banes in the eastern end of the island that was not familiar to the photo interpreters. Subsequent research by the interpreters, comparing the August 29th photography with that of two similar installations recently noted elsewhere, had by September 14th enabled them to identify the installation as a cruise missile site.

The finding of SA-2's in Cuba on the August 29th flight presented us with a new problem in planning U-2 flights over Cuba.

Today, there is general acceptance of the fact that we are carrying out overhead reconnaissance of Cuba and that we will continue to do so as long as our national security requires it. This almost universal approval of U-2 flights over Cuba is an attitude that has existed only since the middle of last October. Prior to the finding of offensive ballistic missiles in Cuba, quite a different public attitude existed.

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In planning for any U-2 operations over well-defended, denied territory we were always aware of criticism that attended the U-2 incident over the USSR in May of 1960. The two incidents involving the straying of a U-2 over Sakhalin on August 30th and the loss of a Chinese Nationalist U-2 over the China mainland on September 8th served to sharpen the already existing apprehensions.

Within the intelligence community there was always at the backs of our minds the knowledge that in the event of a mishap we would have to be able to explain, convincingly and in detail, the justification—in terms of the highest priority intelligence needs—for having undertaken the mission.

Elsewhere in Government and among persons whose stated views strongly influence public opinion there were serious reservations regarding the use of the U-2. There were expressions of extreme concern from some public leaders over the increase in tension that might result from overflights, and others voiced the opinion that such flights were illegal or immoral. Although many public figures conceded the necessity of the United States securing intelligence by whatever means required, they were quick to caution that the use of the U-2 was quite a different matter from the classical use of spies and agents.

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The vulnerability of the U-2 to Soviet SA-2 systems and the discovery of those systems in Cuba contributed further complicating factors in weighing risks against the need for hard intelligence.

The situation as of September 1962 must be viewed against this background of universal repugnance, or, at the very least, extreme uneasiness regarding overflights.

Because of the widespread apprehension over use of the U-2, we took particular care to ensure that each flight produced the maximum of information of value to the entire intelligence community. Each track was drawn to cover high priority targets agreed upon by an inter-agency group known as the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, a committee of the United States Intelligence Board.

We were also concerned with the conservation of the asset.

The U-2 is not a sturdily-built aircraft. It is designed for one purpose--long flights at very high altitudes and at relatively low speeds. We had very few of these planes. Therefore, before we committed one to a mission we wanted to be absolutely certain that the intelligence need was great enough to justify the risk of loss of the pilot and aircraft. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance was the intelligence community's vehicle for making the target studies.

All CIA overflights were programmed through the medium of the CIA Monthly Forecast. At the time the Soviet arms build-up

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began in Cuba, flights over Cuba were being forecast and flown at the rate of two per month.

Because of the need to husband our resources and to ensure that highest quality photography was obtained from each U-2 flight, it was the practice not to launch a mission unless weather over most of the critical targets was predicted to be less than 25 per cent overcast.

After reviewing the result of the August 29th mission, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, in undeniably good judgment, recommended that the next mission should cover those areas of the island which were not photographed on the August 29th flight and that particular attention should be paid to the then unidentified site at Banes. It was important to learn whether the Soviets had made a limited deployment of SA-2's to Cuba or whether an island-wide defense was being built.

The next mission was successfully flown on schedule on September 5th over the eastern and central portions of the island.

Three additional SAM sites were detected in the central portion of the island. Unfortunately, the flight encountered heavy cloud cover over eastern Cuba.

Late in August, Mr. McCone suggested to General Carter, who was acting as DCI during Mr. McCone's absence, that low-level

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reconnaissance of Guba be proposed. General Carter requested the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance to consider the kind of information that could be obtained thus. The Committee met on September first and third and reported its views on what might be accomplished through low-level flights.

As a result of the Committee's deliberations and because of the heavy cloud cover encountered over eastern Cuba on the September 5th mission, General Carter, on September 10th, 1962, addressed a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense recommending that the Secretary initiate the necessary action to provide for employment of tactical-type reconnaissance against Banes, which was still unidentified, or other targets identified by the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance as being suitable for low-level reconnaissance. The Secretary of Defense felt it preferable not to mount a low-level reconnaissance of Banes until the results of CIA high-level reconnaissance became available. As noted in the first paragraph, continuing research had by September 14th identified the Banes installation as a cruise missile site.

Now, let us return to the matter of the September U-2 flights.

One mission had already been flown on September 5th. One flight remained yet to be flown in September. A special meeting was held on September 10th to consider the specific track for that second flight.

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General Carter presented a CIA proposal for a single high-level flight designed specifically to photograph the Banes area, where earlier photography had not been conclusive, and generally to search for SAM sites in those areas of central and eastern Cuba that had not been covered since the September 5th flight.

This meeting followed closely on the heels of the two U-2 incidents previously mentioned: the straying of a U-2 over Sakhalin on August 30th and the loss of a Chinese Nationalist U-2 over the China mainland on September 8th.

The Secretary of State expressed concern at CIA's planned coverage of Cuba, involving extensive peripheral coverage as well as two legs directly over Cuban air space, all in one flight. He said that he had no objection to the peripheral parts and, in fact, thought it useful to continue to establish our right to fly over international waters. On the other hand, he recognized the necessity of obtaining vertical coverage of the Isle of Pines and the eastern portion of Cuba. He felt, however, that it was unwise to combine extensive overflying of international waters with actual overflights. He pointed out that the long peripheral flight would draw undue attention to the mission and further that should the aircraft fall into enemy hands after an overflight had occurred, this would put the United States in a very poor position for standing on its rights to overfly international waters.

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Taking these views into account the plan was changed and four flights were substituted for the one. Two flights were to be wholly peripheral, involving no land overflight. One was to cover the Isle of Pines, and the other was to overfly the eastern end of the island targeted against Banes and Guantanamo.

There was a three-week period from the 5th to the 26th of September during which only one flight was flown (on September 17th), and it yielded no useable photography. We finally acquired a moderately complete mosaic of the SA-2 defense of Cuba by piece-meal photography search carried out in late September and early October. The delay in completing the photographic coverage was due solely to the unfavorable weather predicted during this period.

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Much of Cuba was under heavy cloud cover throughout most of September, and the cloud patterns were rapidly and continually changing. The few periods of acceptable weather were so fleeting that they had passed before flights could be mounted.

The weather was checked for a possible mission every day beginning on September 6th. There was a one- or two- day period around the middle of the month when the forecasts were moderately favorable. A flight to the northeast was scheduled for the 16th. It went to the final briefing on the 15th, but was delayed for 24 hours because of weather and was cancelled when the weather continued unfavorable. Planning for a flight over the Isle of Pines was under way on September 15th. At the final briefing on the 16th, the forecast remained favorable. The mission was flown on September 17th, but by then the weather had turned sour and no useable photography was acquired.

Another mission was under consideration between September 18th and 21st, but the weather was bad and the mission was cancelled.

The mission to cover the Guantanamo and Banes areas was under consideration beginning 22 September. It went to alert daily, but weather was not acceptable until the 26th. On that date the mission was successfully flown and three SAM sites were discovered. This was the first of the four flights agreed upon on September 10th, and

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it was the first day on which weather permitted a successful flight.

One of the four tracks was originally approved to cover only the Isle of Pines. Mr. McCone called Mr. U. Alexis Johnson on September 28th and got approval to include coverage of the Bay of Pigs area. The flight was successfully flown on September 29th. The SAM and the cruise missile sites at Siguanea on the Isle of Pines were discovered.

Two of the three remaining missions for September were considered during the period September 29th through October 2nd. Both were cancelled because of bad weather.

The next flight under consideration was that along the periphery of the southeastern coast. It was delayed because of weather on October 3rd. It was briefed on October 4th and successfully flew the mission on the 5th. One additional SAM site was discovered.

There was good weather along the northeastern coast on October 6th. A flight was launched but it aborted because of aircraft fuel problems.

The flight along the northeastern coast was successfully flown the next day. October 7th. Four more SAM sites were discovered.

The mission of October 7th completed the September flight program.

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As the September overflight program progressed, identifying additional SAM sites, it became apparent that an island-wide SA-2 defense was being constructed. The next step was to discover how far advanced the earlier SAM sites were. This information could be obtained only by taking the risk of overflying an SA-2 site that might be operational.

At an interdepartmental group meeting on October 4th, the DCI made a strong representation for extensive overflights of Cuba. The group requested JCS, and CIA to examine all alternative means of conducting aerial reconnaissance and to report back as soon as possible. A meeting was called on October 9th to hear this report, and at this meeting the flight was planned which was actually flown on the 14th of October.

Additionally, from September 18th through October 2nd, agent and refugee reports dovetailed sufficiently to create a suspicion that there was something of unusual importance going on in a definite area west of Havana and that this unusual activity might be concerned with MRBM's. These reports, however, were not of sufficient credibility to warrant their being used in intelligence publications. Accordingly, the track of the flight planned at the October 9th meeting to test the operational readiness of the known SAM sites was drawn to cover the area in which MRBM's were suspected.

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The weather was checked daily on October 10th, 11th and 12th, but the forecasts were unfavorable. On October 12th, operational control of U-2 overflights of Cuba was transferred to the Strategic Air Command of the U.S. Air Force. The weather forecast continued unfavorable on October 13th. The mission was successfully flown by SAC on October 14th over the suspect area west of Havana and near the SAM site thought most likely to be operational. The flight was the first to discover the presence of MRBM's.

As of October 16th, blanket authority was given for unrestricted overflights of Cuba.

Attached at Tab A is a summary of weather forecasts and the status of missions, 5 September through 14 October 1962.

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### PARTII

# CRISIS OCTOBER 16-28 1962

Notification of high US officials . . . Formation of
National Security Council Executive Committee (Ex Comm)
. . . Policy debate over appropriate US response to missile
threat . . . Continuation of Operation MONGOOSE . . .

Discovery of intermediate-range ballistic missile sites in Cuba . . .
Notification of Allied heads of government . . . The President's
speech . . . Quarantine . . . Construction of missile bases continues
at rapid pace . . . U-2 shootdown . . . Resolution of Crisis . . .

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16 October 1962


CENTRAL INVESTIGATE ACENCY

MEMORANDER: Probable Soviet MERM Sites in Cuba


1. Photography of 14 Cetober 1562 has disclosed two areas in the Sierra del Roserio mountains about 50 n.m. west southwest of Mavana which appear to contain Soviet MRNs in the early stages of deployment. A third area, about five and ten miles east of the first two, respectively, appears to be a military encampment. The first site includes 14 large tents, 15 smaller tents and 75 vehicles of a number of different types. The most significant vehicles at this site are six canvactovered trailers of 80 feet in everall length which are of the general size and configuration of those used to transport the Seviet SS-3 (700 n.m. ballistic missile). These trailers, of which sight more are located at the second site, are believed to be larger than those required to transport the Seviet SS-2 (350 n.m. ballistic missile).

2. The second site is 5 n.m. east of the first, and in addition to the eight trailers, contains four specially configured vehicles or pieces of equipment which could be used for sissile creation in a field environment. At the time of photography, one of the trailers was in juxtaposition with one of these possible erectors. This site also contains 17 large tents, 20 small tents, 10 large equipment. So small tracks and 12 unidentified pieces of large equipment. So other missile associated equipment, such as instrumntation or propellant storage, have been detected. No facility to store nuclear warheads can be identified at any of those three installations.





- 3. The dimensions of the trailers indicate that either the SS-3 or SS-4 bellistic riselle systems are involved. Eath of these systems are road-mobile and can be deployed with mo heavy construction work for launch peds, etc. Both the SS-3 and SS-4 are single stage vehicles which will entry a 3,000 lb. warhead to a maximum range of 700 n.m. and 1100 n.m. respectively. The SS-3 system requires liquid crygen as an orderit, while the SS-4 engloye standle propellants. From a legistic and operational standpoint it would be more advantageous to deploy the SS-4 system to Cuba.
- 4. We do not have evidence from shipping coverage or other sources to indicate definitely when the missile units survived in Cubs. From the extensiveness of the present activity, we judge that equipment may have begun to scrive during september. At the time of the 14 October photography, a column of tracks and equipment was visible on a road within one of the installations. Although we cannot be sure, it seems likely that the bulk of the personnel and equipment were shipped from the USSS as an integrated road mobile unit, suitable for field deployment. The times required to reach operational readiness could thus be quite short. Assuming that the necessary fooling and boulding equipment is available, that exampleations are being installed, and that warhends are in Cubs or an route, an operational issue expability could probably exist in Cubs within the next for weeks.
- 5. The Soviet leaders' decision to deploy ballistic missiles to Cuba testifies to their determination to deter any entire US intervention to weaken or overthrow the Castro regime, which they experently regard as likely and imment. This estimate of US intentions prompted Moscow's statement of 11 September which varned that an attack on Guba would lead to a general nuclear conflict. The Soviets presumely believe that the presence of those missiles, which they expect would quickly become known to the US government, will significantly increase the costs and rinks of any US action against the Cuban regime. They also probably believe that the missiles will reinforce the deterrent link between Cuba and Borlin which was implicit in the 11 September Soviet statement and in subsequent private conversations. Moscow clearly is making to partry Berlin as a bostage for Cuba.





6. The Soviet icolors with have enticipated their presiding missiles to fals would exact any complications for their dilities to bring the Verteen grants into matieum expetitations on the Berlin and forms quantities. Although they appearably expect a falsiy prolongel protoil of summer and negotiation on Berlin after the US elections, this williances to except the riche invited in deploying wholes to folk does not in itself provide my clear indications regarding future Berlin tention. It does, however, undersome the importance become attached to demonstrating the alloyal shift in the world telemine of posts in forms of the bloc which, in the Moviet view, will exentually chiles the Best to seen to an approximation on Berlin.




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
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ANNEX: Strategic Considerations

- l. In weighing their decision to install ballistic missiles in Cubs, the Soviet leaders must have considered the military utility of these weapons with and without nuclear warheads, the targets in the US and elsewhere which they could reach, and the strategic value of deploying wissile forces of various sizes in Cuba.
- 2. Because of their type of guidance and relative inaccuracy, ballistic missiles have utility against fixed targets of known location, and not against such targets as convoys or naval forces at sea. The Soviet 700 and 1100 n.m. missiles, whose CEP's are estimated to be in the 1 to 1.5 n.m. range, could conceivably be employed with NE warheads against large military conters and urban areas. It is highly unlikely that the Soviets would see any advantage in deployment for this purpose, but they might regard this threat as contribution to the deterrence of Latin American support for US or Cuban refugee operations against the Castro regime.
- 3. Deployed 700 and 1,100 n.m. missiles with nuclear warheads would augment Soviet strategic striking power by virtue of their ability to reach a number of American targets with warheads having yields which are not significantly smaller than those of current Soviet ICEMs. From the present base area in Cuba, 700 n.m. missiles with nuclear warheads could reach eastern US targets within an arc including Savannah and New Orleans, including 7 SAC bomber and tanker bases and at least one important naval base. (The 350 n.m missiles could reach bomber bases in Florida, of which there are only two.) The 1,100 n.m. missile would threaten a much more significant number of critical military targets, including 18 SAC bomber and tanker bases, an ICBM base, and three major naval bases. In addition, such targets as the Panama Canal and US bases as far east as Puerto Rico could be reached. Both of these missiles have ranges sufficient to reach many US population, industrial and administrative center--including, in the case of the 1,100 n.z. vissile, Mashington, D.C. Installations of importance to the US stonic energy and space programs also would be within range of Cuban-based 700 and 1,100 - n.m. pissiles.







17 October 1962

#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

- I. On Monday evening, 15 October late, I was informed that the latest readout from Cuban U-2 photography indicated initial deployment of Medium Range Ballistic Missiles. I immediately authorized the dissemination of this information on a very limited need-to-know basis to USIB members and their immediate commanders. On Tuesday morning at 11:45 I attended an NSC Meeting at the White House which included the President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary Ball, Secretary Martin, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Gilpatric, General Taylor, the Vice President, Secretary Dillon, the Attorney General, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, and myself. I made a preliminary briefing to the group as to what we thought we saw and Mr. Lundahl and Mr. Graybeal expanded thereon. At the end of the intelligence portion of the briefing, the group went into general discussion.
- 2. Secretary Rusk was greatly disturbed about this new development but pointed out that Mr. McCone had predicted such a possibility back in mid-August. He said that he had been thinking about courses of action and that he had a number of comments to make, along the following lines:
  - a. A quick-strike surprise attack by air to wipe out these bases:
  - b. Consideration to expand this into a total invasion to take over the island;
  - c. We must not operate in a vacuum but must of course pre-inform our allies, at least in part;
  - d. We should consider making an announcement very shortly and to determine whether or not to call up the Reserves;



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- e. Perhaps we should get in touch with Castro through a third party and tell him it was now or never and that he was selling Cuba down the river by getting involved with Soviet missile bases:
- f. We should try to create maximum confusion and not worry too much about the noise level. Here he was referring to infiltration and sabotage efforts;
- g. We should review our policy on a provisional government and try to get all the various factions working together. In any event, we must keep Cuba isolated from the Free World although in doing so we must not isolate ourselves.
- 3. In the final analysis Mr. Rusk felt that we had to either make a quick surprise attack and knock out these bases or to lay on a heavy propaganda barrage in all areas which might cause a withdrawal. Rusk stated that we could not in our thinking separate Berlin and other trouble areas in the world. He seemed deeply troubled and did not seem firm in any of his proposals but appeared to have been boxing the compass as to courses of action.
- 4. Mr. McNamara pointed out that if we are going to take overt military action, it must at all costs be done on a 100% basis and before any of the missiles become operational. General Taylor pointed out that the element of surprise would be essential but since this would then be a one-shot operation, we should establish an immediate blockade and then look toward invasion although this latter prospect did not enthuse him. He stated that the decision to invade would be the hardest one to make because of the long-time involvements and the lack of any substitute for the Castro regime. Mr. Bundy pointed out that the Soviet decision must have been made early in the summer and that these missiles probably arrived in Cuba at about the time the President was making his policy statements. Bundy thought there was a real possibility that Khrushchev may be confused or misled as to the temper of the American people and the intimate concern we all have over Cuba.
- 5. The President pointed out that the missiles certainly had to be removed one way or another, and stated that he would meet again at





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six o'clock that evening with his advisors. In the meantime there was much information to be gathered and much analysis to be done as to pros and cons of all the various courses of action. He authorized as many U-2 flights as needed to get full, complete, 100% coverage of the island. He asked for a report on the latest analysis of just what the thinking toward Cuba is in Latin American countries as well as NATO as to any action the U. S. might take; some unanswered questions on whether or not to surface the fact that we were making surveillance flights and whether or not to surface this new information; also whether to precede any military action by some form of political pressure action; what would be the effect of military strikes, how long would it take to organize, how many sorties would be required, etc.

Dictated by General Conten on 17 oct 60.



48. Cline, Memorandum for the Record, "Notification of NSC Officials of Intelligence on Missile Bases in Cuba," 27 October 1962

SECTO

27 October 1962

LEMORALDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Notification of MSC Officials of Intelligence on Missile Bases in Cuba

- 1. At about 2100 on the evening of 25 October the President called me on the thone at a dinner party I was attending at the apartment of Mrs. Anna Chennault, widow of the late General, at 1101 Cathedral Avenue. He said he had heard stories that CTA officers were alleging that intelligence on offensive missile bases in Cuba had been available for several days before it was called to the attention of the President. He asked me to confirm that I was responsible for the analysis of this kind of intelligence and appropriate dissemination of it to higher authorities, and to tell him the facts in the case.
- 2. I told the President that I was responsible in CTA for substantive analysis of intelligence and the dissemination of current intelligence to the President and the National Security Council. I said I could state categorically that the stories he had heard were untrue, since I was sure the mission with the first photography of the MRBH offensive bases was flown on 1h October and it took approximately 2h hours for the film to be returned, processed, delivered to the National Photographic Interpretation Center and scanned by PI analysts. I said I was sure the technical analysis did not turn up the evidence until late afternoon or early evening of 15 October, that I myself heard of it first at that time, and that we completed the analysis before passing the information formally to the white House on the morning of 16 October. The President seemed content with this explanation.
- 3. In view of concern over this period of intelligence handling of this sensitive information, I have tried to reconstruct what I know of the events of the evening of 15 October and morning of 16 October, as follows.
- 4. Under direct orders from the President, given to me and General Carter at the White House several weeks earlier when the possibility that the Hanes coast-defense missile was a longer-range weapon, I had issued instructions to the Director, NPIC, to see that intelligence on new offensive weapons in Cuba came to me as soon as analysis had identified the type of weapon and that absolutely no dissemination of this intelligence should be made without my approval. On 15 October I spent all afternoon at the opening session of the Commonwealth-US Intelligence Methods Conference.

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When I returned to my office at 1730 I found a delegation of PI and military intelligence analysts awaiting me. I do not know how long they had been waiting to see me but it could not have been many minutes or they would have passed a message to me at the Conference Room. They were all agreed that they had just identified a missile base for missiles of a range upwards of 350 miles. I reviewed their evidence and was obliged to concur.

- 5. The DCI had gone to the West Coast and General Carter was then at an informal reception for the Commonwealth conferees in the Executive Dining Room at the Headquarters building in McLean. I was the host but delayed my arrival until 1815 to study this intelligence. Upon arrival I called General Carter aside and advised him in broad terms of the intelligence. I said it would take several hours to wrap up a definitive report with fully considered analysis. General Carter said he was going to dinner with General Taylor and General Carroll (DIA) and would let them know. I asked if he would notify Mr. McGeorge Bundy for the White House and he said he thought he might be at the dinner and would notify him there.
- 6. About 2130 that evening my intelligence officers checking out the evidence on the site reported somewhat cryptically by phone that they had agreed on a report identifying offensive missile systems probably in the 700-mile and possibly in the 1,000-mile range. I instructed them to complete a written report and stand by for action early the next morning.
- 7. A few minutes later I decided it was a mistake to wait until morning to alert the key officers at the White House and State Department, should insure early attention to the problem on the next day. I assumed General Carter would have alerted the Pentagon adequately via JCS and DIA but that he might have missed the White House. Accordingly I called Mr. McGeorge Bundy, found he had not seen General Carter, and double-talked the information to him in broad terms. He was very clear as to the import despite being short on facts due to the problem of security over the phone. This was about 2200. I then called Roger Hilsman of the State Department and conveyed the same information to him. I had more difficulty indicating securely to him that I really meant MRBM's rather than aircraft or other equipment we had anticipated, but the light finally dawned and he (as he later informed me) called the Secretary of State to pass on the word.
- 8. Early the next morning, 16 October, at about 0830, I talked again on the phone to Mr. Bundy. (I forget whether he called me or vice versa) I had by then reviewed a brief memorandum on the subject and calculated the ranges of possible missiles (by then we had settled on 700 to 1100 miles) and crudely indicated them on a map. At Mr. Bundy's invitation I went immediately to his office, having cleared this with General Carter, who had another engagement and instructed me to follow through on the White House formal notification. Sid Graybeal, my missiles expert from OSI, accompanied me. In Bundy's office I told him the story. He shortly

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brought in the Attorney General, when I also briefed. His initial coment was one four-letter word, off the record. If I remember correctly, Alex Johnson also came in to get the briefing. At any rate Mr. Bundy said that he had arranged an 1100 meeting with the President to fill him in and consider the US policy problems involved. At 0930 General Carter arrived. I showed him the memorandum we had prepared, discussed the evidence, and advised him Graybeal could support him fully with analytical back-up. I said I felt the Acting DOI should handle the briefing of the President, with which General Carter agreed; that he probably did not need me, with which he screwhat reductantly agreed; and that screbody had better get back to see that the DOI on the West Coast got the word, and continue research and analysis on the Cuban missile problem — with all of which General Carter heartily agreed.

9. I presume General Carter did surface the information at 1100, the DCI returned later that afternoon, and a whirlwind of intelligence reporting and policy formulation on Cuba set in from which we have not yet recovered.

RAY S CLINE

Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SEGNET

16 October 1962

#### MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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SUBJECT: MONCOOSE Meeting with the Attorney General

- 1. At 2:30 this afternoon, the Attorney General convened in his office a meeting on Operation MONOCOSE consisting of General Lansdale and Colonel Patchell, General Johnson of the Joint Staff, Robert Hurwitch of State (vice Ed Martin who was unable to attend), Hewson Ryan of USIA, and the undersigned.
- 2. The Attorney General opened the meeting by expressing the "general dissatisfaction of the President" with Operation MONDOSE. He pointed out that the Operation had been under way for a year, that the results were discouraging, that there had been no acts of sabotage, and that even the one which had been attempted had failed twice. He indicated that there had been noticeable improvement during the year in the collection of intelligence but that other actions had failed to influence significantly the course of events in Cuba. He spoke of the weekly meetings of top officials on this problem and again noted the small accomplishments despite the fact that Secretaries Rusk and McNemara, General Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, and he personally had all been charged by the President with finding a solution. He traced the history of General Lansdale's personal appointment by the President a year ago. The Attorney General them stated that in view of this lack of progress, he was going to give Operation MONGOOSE more personal attention. In order to do this, he will hold a meeting every morning at 0930 with the MONGOOSE operational respresentatives from the various agencies (Lansdale, Harvey, Hurwitch, Ryan, and General Johnson).
- 3. The Attorney General spoke favorably of the sabotage paper which had been presented by General Carter this morning to the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented). He obviously did not like the earlier memorandum, since he felt it showed no "push" in getting on with the acts of sabotage.
- b. When asked for my comments, I stated that we were prepared to get on with the new action program and that we would execute it aggressively. I pointed out, however, that the objective of Operation MONOCOSE would have to be determined at some point since the Cubans

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with whom we have to work were seeking a reason for risking their lives in these operations. I retailed my conversation with the young Cuban from the DRE who pointed out that they were willing to commit their people only on operations which they regarded as sensible. I defined "sensible" in Cuban terminology these days as meaning an action which would contribute to the liberation of their country, another way of saying that the United States, perhaps in conjunction with other latin countries, would bail them out militarily. My point was specifically echoed by Hewson Ryan. The Attorney General's rejoinder was a plea for new ideas of things that could be done against Cuba. In passing, he made reference to the change in atmosphere in the United States Government during the last twenty-four hours, and asked some questions about the percentage of Cubans whom we thought would fight for the regime if the country were invaded.

5. The meeting concluded with the reaffirmation by the Attorney General of his desire to hold a meeting each day, beginning tomorrow. He said that these meetings might later be changed to every other day when and if he finds a daily get-together is not necessary. The meetings are to last no more than one-half hour.

Richard Helms Deputy Director (Plans)

Distribution:


Original - Mr. Elder for the DCI and DDCI

1 cc - Chief, TFW

I cc - DD/P

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50. Arthur C. Lundahl, Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence and Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, "Additional Information—Mission 3101," 16 October 1962



16 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT

: Additional Information - Mission 3101

1. An examination of photography from Mission 3101 dated 14 October 1962 has revealed an MRBM Launch Site and two new military encampments located along the southern edge of the Sierra Del Rosario in west central Cuba.

2. The Launch Site and one of the encampments contains a total of at least 14 canvas-covered missile trailers measuring approximately 67 feet in length and 9 feet in width. The overall length of the trailers including the tow bar is approximately 80 feet.

- 3. The other encampment contains vehicles and tents with no missile trailers observed in search to date.
  - 4. Detail and equipment for each area is as follows:
  - a. Area 1 MRBM Launch Site located in a wooded area at 22-40-05N. 83-17-55W, 4.0 NM ENE of Ban Diego de los Banos. Site contains at least 8 canvas-covered missile trailers and 4 deployed probable missile erector/launchers (unrevetted). The probable launch positions, generally in-line, are separated by approximately 850 feet, 700 feet and 450 feet for a total distance of 2000 feet. The westernmost position has a missile tractor/trailer aligned with the erector. Other equipment includes 18 trailers/vans, approximately 60 miscellaneous vehicles, 18 large tents, 22 small tents, 4 buildings under construction and open storage.
  - b. Area 2 Military Encampment (missile) located in a wooded area at 22-40-50N 83-15-00W, 5.8 NM north of Los Palacios. Equipment includes at least 6 canvascovered missile trailers, approximately 75 vehicles and 18 tents.
  - c. Area 3 Military Encampment located in a wooded area at 22-42-40N 83-08-15W, 4.2 NM West of San Cristobal. Equipment includes 35 vehicles, 15 large





tents, 8 small tents, 7 buildings (possibly new) and 1 building under construction.

ARTHUR C. LUNDAHL
Director
National Photographic Interpretation Center



## SECRET

### 17 October 1962 - Wednesday

8:30 a.m. Meeting of study group: DCI, Secty. Rusk,
Secty. McNamara, Gen. Taylor, Secty. Gilpatric
Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Amb. Bohlen, Amb.
Thompson, Amb. Acheson, Secty. Ball,
Mr. Sorenson, Mr. Martin, Mr. Johnson

9:30 a.m. DCI met with the President

11:30 a.m. DCI went to Gettysburg - brief Gen. Eisenhower

4:00 p.m. Meeting of study group

10:00 p.m. Meeting of study group

### 18 October 1962 - Thursday

10:45 a.m. Mr. McGeorge Bundy

11:00 a.m. The President and others

4:00 p.m. Meeting at State Department with study group

7:30 p.m. Meeting at State Department with study group

9:00 p.m. Meeting at State Department with study group

### 19 October 1962 - Friday

11:00 a.m. Meeting at State Department with study group

4:00 p.m. Meeting at State Department with study group

SECRET.

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### 20 October 1962 - Saturday

8:30 a.m. USIB Meeting

10:30 a.m. Meeting of study group

1:30 p.m. Meeting of study group

2:00 p.m. Meeting at White House

### 21 October 1962 - Sunday

8:30 a.m. USIB Meeting

9:00 a.m. Meeting with Gen. Eisenhower

10:00 a.m. Meeting at White House

2:30 p.m. Special NSC Meeting

8:30 p.m. Brief the Vice President

### 22 October 1962 - Monday

8:30 a.m. USIB Meeting

10:30 a.m. Meeting with The President

3:00 p.m. NSC Meeting

5:00 p.m. Meeting with Congressional Leaders

### 23 October 1962 - Tuesday

10:00 a.m. Executive Committee of the NSC

1:30 p.m. Arthur Krock

2:00 p.m. Chairman Vinson 5:00 p.m. David Lawrence

2:30 p.m. Senator Hickenlooper 6:00 p.m. Executive Come of the NSC

3:30 p.m. Senator Russell

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Memorandum of Meeting attended in Secretary Ball's Conference Room by Secretary McNamara, Bundy, General Taylor, Robert Kennedy, Martin and McCone at \$30,170 thus.

1. Meeting involved an inclusive exploration of alternatives open to us in connection with the Cuban matter.

Ball seemed to feel military action would throw the NATO allies in disarray and permit Britain and France to separate from us on Berlin policy. Stated Kohler discussions with Khrushchev did not fit in with Soviet action in Cuba. Suggested Cuban situation might be by inadvertance. Suggested we might give Khrushchev an "out" on the grounds that he does not know what is going on in Cuba and discussed various types of action ranging from a limited military strike to minimize losses to me the calling of a Summit conference.

- 2. During the discussion Taylor and Ball speculated as to whether this whole thing was not a "mock up" designed to draw out action by us. and that the war heads were not there. This view was not supported.
- 5. McNamara urged avoiding taking a position, considering all alternatives, with meetings this afternoon and this evening in preparation of final discussion with the President tomorrow.
- 4. Urged exploration of all facts and listed the following:


About 50 or 60 MIG 17s and 19s now in Cuba and these apparently have no offensive capability.

One MIG 21 has been seen and a number of suspicious crates also seen indicating some MIG 21 capability and we do not know whether the MIG 21 has an offensive capability.

IL 28's have been delivered

Three MRBM sites under construction and can be ready in two weeks

Warhead locations unknown; also unknown whether MRBM's are nuclear or conventional. Also feels that if nuclear warheads supplied them Soviet will also supply nuclear bombs for bombers with offensive capability



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Shiploads of boxes of unknown purpose reported by Lundahi to DCI on October 14th.


28 Soviet ships en route to Cuba at the present time.


Sited at Havana, mysterious excavations, revetments, covered buildings, railroad tracks through tunnels, etc., might be nuclear storage site.

Other facts should be developed today.

Note: McCone responded by reading numbered paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of attached memorandum dated October 17th.

- 5. General Taylor and Thompson discussed political nature of problem including possibility of forcing settlement in Berlin and elsewhere Khrushchev wished show down on Berlin and this gives a show down issue. Believes Khrushchev would be surprised to find we know about MRBMs j. Thompson emphasized Khrushchev wants Berlih settlement but on his terms. And will probably deny knowledge of Cuban situation but at any event would justify actions because of our missiles in Italy and Turkey. Also Khrushchev recognizes that action by us would be devisive among our allies.
- 6. McCone emphasized his views on political objectives as stated in paragraph 5 of the attached memorandum, and also repeated paragraph 2-C. Also made the point in paragraph 6.
- 7. McNamara discussed many operational questions concerning the use of Soviet nuclear warheads in Cuba; how communications could be arranged; what authority was in the field. Thompson believes Soviet nuclear warheads was under very tight control. McCone reviewed recent Chicadee reports, indicated considerable automony in hands of field commanders much move so than we have.
- 8. Bundy and McCone left for meeting with the President.





October 17, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR DISCUSSION TODAY, OCTOBER 17, 1962.

SUBJECT: The Cuban Situation.

1. The establishment of medium range strike capability in Cuba by the Soviets was predicted by me in at least a dozen reports since the Soviet buildup was noted in early August.

### 2. Purposes are to:

- (a) Provide Cuba with an offensive or retailatory power for use if attacked.
- (b) Enhance Soviet strike capability against the United States.
- (c) Establish a "hall mark" of accomplishment by other Latin American countries, most particularly Mexico, and other Central American countries within strike range of the United States.
- 3. The MRBM capability we have witnessed will expand and the defensive establishments to protect this capability likewise will be expanded. There appears to me to be no other explanation for the extensive and elaborate air defense establishment.
- 4. In my opinion the missiles are Soviet, they will remain under Soviet operational control as do ours, they will be equipped with nuclear warheads under Soviet control (because conventional warheads would be absolutely ineffective). Cubans will supply most of the manpower needs with the Soviets permanently exercising operational command and control. Nevertheless, there will be a substantial number of Soviets on site at all times.

SECRET EYES ONLY

## -SECRET EYES ONLY

- 5. Soviet political objectives appear to me to be:
- (a) The establishment of a "trading position" to force removal of U.S. overseas bases count "Facilia".
- (b) To satisfy their ambitions in Latin America by this show of determination and courage against the American Imperialist.
- 6. Consequences of action by the United States will be the inevitable "spiiling of blood" of Soviet military personnel. This will increase tension everywhere and undoubtedly bring retaliation against U.S. foreign military installations, where substantial U.S. casualties would result,
- 7. The situation cannot be tolerated. However, the United States should not act without warning and thus be forced to live with a "Pearl Harbor indictment" for the indefinite future. I would therefore:
  - (a) Notify Gromyko and Castro that we know all about this.
- (b) Give them 24 hours to commence dismantling and removal of MRBMs, coastal defense missiles, surface to air missiles, IL 28s and all other aircraft which have a dual defensive-offensive capability, including MIG 21s.
- (c) Notify the American public and the world of the situation created by the Soviets.
- (d) If Khrushchev and Castro fail to act at once, we should make a massive surprise strike at air fields, MRBM sites and SAM sites concurrently.

John A. McCone Director

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SCORET EYES ONLY

# THE SECRET EYES ONLY

October 17, 1962

Several alternatives indicated below were posed for consideration at the close of meeting covered by memorandum dated October 17th.

All dealt with the specific actions U.S. Government should take against Cuba at this time. The discussions contered around:

- (a) Whether inilitary action should be taken prior to a warning to, or discussions with, Khrushchev and Castro.
- (b) Notification to or consultation with our ailies, including NATO, OAS, and others.
  - (c) Referral to the United Nations.
- (d) Effect on the "balance of nuclear power equation" of the MRBM installations in Cuba.

Three principal courses of action are open to us, and of course there are variations of each.

- (1) Do nothing and live with the situation. It was pointed out clearly that Western Europe, Greece, Turkey, and other countries had lived under the Soviet MRBMs for years; therefore, why should the United States be so concerned.
- (2) Resort to an all-out blockade which would probably require a declaration of war and to be effective would mean the interruption of all incoming shipping. This was discussed as a slow strangulation process, but it was stated that "intelligence repress" indicated that a blockade would bring Castro down in four months. (1700. I have seen no such estimate).

FOR SECRET EYES ONLY

## THE SECRET EYES ONLY

- (3) Military action which was considered at several levels. The following alternatives are:
  - (a) Strafing identified MRBM installations.
- (b) Strafing MRBM installations and air fields with MIGs.
- (c) (a) and (b) plus all SAM sites and coastal missile sites.
- (d) (a), (b), and (c) above plus all other significant military installations, none of which were identified.

Discussions of all of the above were inconclusive and it was asked that the group reassemble, and develop their views on the advantages and disadvantages and the effects of the following:

- (1) Warning to Khrushchev and Castro.
- (a) If the response is unsatisfactory, pursuing a course of military action.
- (b) If the response is unsatisfactory, referring to the OAS and the United Nations prior to taking military action.
- (2) Warning to Khrushchev and Castro and if the response is unsatisfactory, convening Congress, seeking a declaration of war, and proceeding with an all-out blockade.
- (3) Strike militarily with no warning, the level of the military effort being dependent upon evolving circumstances. In all probability this type of action would escalate into invasion eccupation, although the meeting was not agreed on this point.
- (4) Blockade with no warning and no advance notice such as a declaration of war, with the President depending upon existing Congressional resolutions for authority.

John A. McCone Director

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Brief Discussion with the President - 9:30 a.m. - 17 October 1962

Confirmed the situation and explored possible actions. McCone referred to but did not recommend warnings as outlined in paragraph 7. (This paragraph was not discussed in the earlier meeting in Ball's office).

President seemed inclined to act promptly if at all, without warning, targetting on MRBM's and possibly airfields. Stated Congressional Resolution gave him all authority he needed and this was confirmed by Bundy, and therefore seemed inclined to act.

President asked McCone to see Eisenhower promptly.

JOHN A. McCONE Director

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HUT SECRET EYES ONLY

## SECRET, EYES ONLY

17 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Conversation with General Eisenhower - Wednesday, 17 October 1962

At President Kennedy's request I called on General Eisenhower today at 12:00 o'clock. Reviewed the Cuban developments. President Kennedy had asked that I carefully avoid indicating any particular line of action as none had been agreed upon, and this was observed.


I briefed Eisenhower on all aspects of the recent Cuban-Soviet build-up and showed him the U-2 pictures of three MRBM missile sites under development. Eisenhower expressed no particular surprise indicating that he felt this offensive build-up would probably occur.

He then expressed criticism of the Bay of Pigs failure and also the fact that we did not respond more energetically when Castro publicly embraced Communism.

With respect to the current situation, Eisenhower felt that it would prove to be intolerable, that its purposes can not be clearly defined, and that a discussions adamant demands to either Khrushchev or Castro or both, would be of no avail.

In discussing blockades, he mentioned the difficulty of type of action we would take if and when a Soviet ship, laden with military hardware and personnel, is stopped on the high seas. The question he raised, as do I, is "What would we do with the ship then?"

Eisenhower questioned limited military action as being indecisive, irritating world opinion, creating fear in all areas where the Soviets could retaliate with limited action and therefore would be indecisive. Indecisive the recalled that when President Truman ordered limited air support in the first two or three days of the Korean war, he, Eisenhower, told the President that from a military standpoint this would not work and more decisive action was required.



## STORET EYES ONLY

Throughout the conversation Eisenhower seemed to lean toward (but did not specifically recommend) military action which would cut off Havana and therefore take over the heart of the government. He thought this might be done by airborne divisions but was not familiar with the size of the Cuban forces in the immediate area, nor the equipment. Eisenhower seemed to feel that such a plan would be more decisive, would mean less bloodshed, could be accomplished more quickly than a landing and a conventional type of slow invasion.

I told General Eisenhower that I did not expect an answer but both the President and I wished him to be fully informed and that I would like to consult with him from time to time. He agreed to be available personally or by telephone at any time.

> JOHN A. McCONE Director

SECRET, EYES ONLY

57. McCone, Memorandum for the File, "Memorandum of Meeting, Wednesday, October 17th, at 8:30 a.m., and again at 4:00 p.m.," 19 October 1962

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October 19, 1962

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

Memorandum of Meeting, Wednesday, October 17th, at 8:30 a.m., and again at 4:00 p.m., attended by Rusk, Ball (each part of the time) Martin, Johnson, McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, McCone, Bohlen, Thompson, Bundy, Sorenson, Dean Acheson (for a short time).

Note: The 4:00 o'clock meeting adjourned at about 7:00, and reassembled at 10:00 p.m., in Secretary Ball's conference room, adjourning at 11:45 p.m.

Note: At 9:30 a.m., DCI went to see the President, then went to Gettysburg to see General Eisenhower.

The purpose of the discussion was to develop a plan of action in connection with Cuba, and the alternatives are summarized in my memorandum of October 18th addressed to USIB, copy of which is attached.

This memorandum will record views as they were expressed and developed throughout the meetings.

Ambassador Bohlen warned against any action against Cuba, particularly an air strike without warning, stating such would be divisive with all Allies and subject us to criticism throughout the world. He advocated writing both Khrushchev and Castro; if their response was negative or unsatisfactory then we should plan action; advise our principal allies, seek a two-thirds vote from the OAS and then act. The Attorney General and Bohlen exchanged views as to just what type of an answer we could expect from Khrushchev and what he might do if we threatened an attack. During this discassion Secretary Rusk seemed to favor asking Congress for a declaration of a state of war against Cuba and then proceed with OAS, NATO, etc., but always preserve flexibility as to the type of action. Bohlen consistently warned that world opinion would be against us if we carried out a military strike. Secretary Ball emphasized the importance of time, stating that if action was over quickly, the repercussions would not be too serious.

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The Attorney General raised the question of the attitude of Turkey, Italy, Western European countries, all of which have been "under the gun" for years, and would take the position that now that the U.S. has a few missiles in their backyard, they become hysterical. This point was discussed back and forth by various people throughout both days of discussion.

Secretary McNamara made the point that missiles in Cuba had no great military consequence because of the stalemate mentioned in my October 18th memorandum. General Taylor supported this view in the early parts of the discussion, but in the later meetings expressed increasing concern over the importance of the missile threat from Cuba. Gilpatric supported McNamars's position. McCone doubted it, stating that McNamara's facts were not new as they had appeared in estimates months ago (which McNamara questioned). Nevertheless, he and McCone felt that a complex of MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba would have very important military significance. McNamara took issue claiming that the military equation would not be changed by the appearance of these missiles.

Bohlen and Thompson questioned the real purpose of the Soviet's actions in Cuba and seemed to feel that their acts may be in preparation for a confrontation with President Kennedy at which time they would seek to settle the entire subject of overseas bases as well as the Berlin question. McCone indicated this might be one of several objectives and undoubtedly would be the subject of discussion at the time of confrontation; however, McCone doubted that this was the prime purpose of such an elaborate and expensive installation as the Soviets were going forward with in Cuba. Bohlen seemed to favor precipitating talks, and was supported by Thompson.

SecDef and Taylor both objected to political talks because it would give time for threatening missiles to become operational and also give the Soviets an opportunity to camouflage the missiles. McCone presented most recent photographs and indicated CIA opinion that the first missiles will be operational within one or two weeks.

Bohlen again raised the question of opening up discussions. McNamara agreed that waxshowed this would be desirable but emphasized the importance of developing sequence of events which would lead to military action.



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There followed an extensive discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of a military blockade, total or partial.

It was at this point that McNamara and Taylor presented their schedule of alternative military strikes, copy of which is attached, and which was the subject of continual discussion in the ensuing meetings.

Dean Acheson then expressed his views as follows:

We should proceed at once with the necessary military actions and should do no talking. The Soviets will react some place. We must expect this; take the consequences and manage the situations as they evolve. We should have no consultations with Khrushchev, Castro, or our allies, but should fully alert our allies in the most persuasive manner by high level people. This would include all NATO partners, and the OAS. The President should forget about the elections and should cancel all future campaign speeches.

As an alternate to military action, a plan was discussed involving a declaration of war and the creation of an all-out blockade. Thompson spoke strongly in favor of a blockade. General Taylor at this point indicated that he favored a blockade although in subsequent meetings he seemed inclined towards a military strike. McCone gave an intelligence estimate on the effects of a blockade, indicating its seriousness would depend upon how "hard" a blockade it turned out to be, and finally stated that the main objective of taking Cuba away from Castro had been lost and we have been overly consumed with the missile problem. McCone stated that we must all bear in mind that we have two objectives, one, disposing of the missile sites, and the other, getting rid of Castro's communism in the Western Hemisphere.

The meeting adjourned for dinner and in the evening Secretary Rusk came forward with the following plan.

The United States cannot accept operational MRBMs in Cuba. There is not much profit in preliminary exchanges with Khrushchev and Castro because the President has said that the establishment of

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Soviet bases and offensive weapons in the Western Hemisphere would raise serious problems and therefore on September 5th and 13th the President has in effect warned both Khrushchev and Castro.

would result

Rusk continued that more talks with Khrushchev/in extended parlays and therefore he recommended against such an approach. Rusk then proposed that we hold until the middle of next week and then follow the OD course No. 1 (52 sorties against MRBMs). Prior, we inform key allies probably on Tuesday (Macmillan, de Gaulle, Adenauer, possibly the Turks and a few Latin American Presidents). On Wednesday, we strike with missiles and simultaneously send a message to Khrushchev, NATO, OAS, etc. We should be alert for an attack on Turkey and be prepared for the consequences in Berlin, Quemoy, Matsu, Korea, etc. Rusk made the estimate that world opinion would go along, 42 allies would go along and some neutrals would be favorable. Latin Americans must be told that we are acting in the interests of the Western Hemisphere. Rusk advocated that the first step -- we take out the missiles and thus remove the immediate problem of the establishment of an offensive capability, but that we be prepared for subsequent steps. He emphasized the United States cannot accept missiles in our security interests and in view of statements made by the President and others and our various policy declarations. Bohlen continued to persist for diplomatic approach but Rusk and several others were not at this point persuaded. McNamara raised innumerable questions concerning military operations; the manner in which the strike could be properly covered with protective air and how it might be restricted and also the advisability of case one, as contrasted with case one, two and /or three.

Both Ambassador Thompson and Secretary Martin in discussing the Rusk proposal favored a blockade, coupled with a declaration of war.

General Taylor at this point spoke in favor of a military strike taking out the MRBMs and the planes as well, and was supported by McCone, who took the opportunity to cover the points set forth in "talking paper for principals, October 17, 1962", attached. Also during the course of these meetings, McCone reported to the group and later to the President the results of his discussions with General Eisenhower, as covered in the attached memorandum of October 17th, this subject.

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In addition to the attached papers, State tabled during the day's meetings the following:

- (a) Possible course of action (undated) in 14 pages.
- (b) Possible world consequences in military action, undated, 5 pages.
- (c) Political actions (undated) 4 pages.
- (d) Political actions in support of major military action (undated) 3 pages.

These were all referred to as State papers (draft) and some were revised the following day.

Also State tabled the following papers:

Limited one-time strike against MRBM sites, undated, 6 pages. Plan of blockade (undated) 4 pages.

Paper labeled "Attack Three - Invasion" 5 pages with an attached scenario of 4 pages.

Possible Soviet Reactions to the following alternatives, C. E. Bohlen, October 17th, 2 pages.

Also, proposed letter to Khrushchev was tabled, paper dealing with probable Castro response to U.S. appeal and a proposed letter to Fidel Castro, marked "To Mr. F. C.", all included in State papers.

At the conclusion of the meetings which served the purpose of airing the views of all parties responsible for giving advice to the President, the alternatives open to us were summarized by the Attorney General and are covered in my memorandum to USIB, dated October 18th.

John A. McCone Director

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58. Albert D. Wheelon, Memorandum for Chairman, United States Intelligence Board, "Evaluation of Offensive Missile Threat in Cuba," 17 October 1962



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17 October 1963

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SUBJECT:

Evaluation of Offensive Missile Though to Guba

The following report was prepared by the Grider Missile and Assertautics Envillagence Commistee (GMAIC) (10the United States Empligence Board (USIB) in collaboration with the NPIC.

It is based on relatively complete photointerpretation of Mission Mo. 3101 flows on 14 Totober 1962, and the most publiminary readout of Mission No. 1102. Howe on 15 October 1962. Mission 365, also flows on 15 October 1962 did not cover this area of mutality deployment. The following conclusions were developed from data available as of 1999 is our on 15 October 1962.

1. The mindles observed in Wossern Cub: are making things builtain missibe wife; were reported most ig into this erea funity deployable. These missibes are of Saries e fight railing to. Ly Saries posteries.





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graphy are 1020 or a, 63-4 valuables. Detailed photointerpretation shows that the crisible are carreas covered, have blunt noses, and are 56 feet, glus or minus two feet in length. This agrees well with the length of the 55-4 missible tankage (64 feet) without its nose cone, are is different from the tankage length (56 feet) of the 630 nm SE-3. However, there are less certain length measurements which range from 55 to 65 feet on missible in another area, so that one cruse values. The general missible lengths provided in the clandestins reports are campatible with either the SS-3 or SS-4. The principle measurements, site configuration and ground support equipment missible agrees the SS-2 (350 nm), the S3-5 (2200 nm) and emiss type missible.

there is greened that the had 630 nm missile was produced in strip 1959 and that the predent surplus of these missiles once the expanded is between 73 and 60 missiles.






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On the other hand, 1320 nm missiles are still being produced and there is probably a Soviet inventory of 650 to 850 such missiles.

There have been no training firings of the 630 nm missile since

October 1961, whereas thirty 1020 nm missiles have been launched already this year (1962). Considering these aspects we believe the 630 nm missile program is relatively inactive and that the more modern 1020 nm missile is more likely for this venture.

- 4. The greater range capability of the 1020 nm missile produces significant US target coverage advantage over the 630 nm missile. (See Egune)
- 5. There are now two confirmed MRBM launch sites in Western Guba at Sen Diego & Los Banos and Los Palacios. A third site at San Gristo' il is connected with this deployment and a third launch site. We counct proclude the possibility that other sites will appear which mode follow the usual Soviet practice of organizing two battalions into a missile regiment, which is the operating unit of strategic follow. However, such regiments usually include a technical support with, and the third site could be the location







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of this unit.

- 6. There are eight missiles and four launchers visible at the most ad anned site (San Diego de Los Banos). It is probable that eight missiles will be deployed to each such site, apparently for a refire capability. The total force structure depends upon the intempretation of the third site and possibilities of a fourth site. The best current estimate is that at least 16 and possibly as many as 32 missiles will be operational in Cuba in the next week or so.
- 7. The sites being deployed in Cuba are field type launchers which rely on mobile erection, checkout, and support equipment. The four-in-line deployment of launchers, at sites which are thouselves five miles apart is representative of MRBM deployment in the Soviet Union. None of the sites are revetted, but this feature reald be added at any time.
- 8. We are having difficulty in distinguishing between the 630 and 1020 vin o, stems on the basis of site characteristics. since neither ran is ruled out on the basis of those physical measurements which have been made from the U-2 photography obtained to



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satellite photography and has precluded identification of similar Self type launchers in the Soviet Union or European satellites. From valid clangestine sources, we gather that the lozo am missile can be readily deployed to presurveyed alternate sites in a matter of 5 hours plus transit time. The possibility that launch sites can be relocated must not be overlooked.

9. There is significant change detectable in the sites between the two everflights one day apart. Fencing of two areas is evident on the record day, and substantial progress is being made on creeking temporary buildings. Fifty vehicles (an increase of 15) and the partible appearance of erectors are noted at the third area.

10 The question of earliest operational capability with these sites depends critically on the type of missile being deployed. If we are correct in identifying these as 1020 nm missiles, with storable propolants and self-contained (inertial) guidance, the first site could be available almost immediately for emergency use. However, we do not see missile pose cones nor do we know of

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nuclear supply or storage, (See JAEIC Statement re nuclear weapons.

11. If the 530 am missile is being deployed, we would empect to find radio guidance equipment to the rear of the launchers and cryogonic gonerators to supply the liquid oxygen for this missile. Photographic scarch thus far has not revealed either type of equipment, although we cannot yet say that our search is embaustiva.

12. The avidance favors the 1020 nm missile system, and indicates that this system will become operational in a matter of days.

ALBERT D. WHEELON

Chairman

Guided Missile & Astronautics Intelligence Committee







59. Lundahl, Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence and Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, "Additional Information—Mission 3102," 18 October 1962



MERCHANDER FOR: Birector of Central Intelligence

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : Militianal Information - Mission 3102

 In communation of photography from Hissian 3100 dated
 Cotober 1960 has revealed a probable HEM/IEM Leuch Complex, a confirmed NEW site and a probable HEM site. The latter two sites were previously reported as military excompanite on Mission 3101.

2. A probable NEW/IRBH launch Complex consisting of two probable launch sites under construction, has been identified approximately 21 mm southwest of Mavana. The launch sites are approximately 2.5 nm spart and are situated on a fint-topped ridge line.

Launch Site No 1 14 located at 22-56-568 52-39-808 and 2.3 pm northeast of Gammajay. It is of the effect inline configuration and consists of four clougated launch and scene criented at 315 degrees and separated by approximately 750 feet. A central busher, 60 by 50 feet, is situated between the pade of each pair. This is connected by cable scar to a structure located inhourd of each pad. The launch site is in an early stage of construction and is succeed by fence.

Launch Site So 2 is located at 22-37-608 62-37-608 and 1.3 mm northeast of Canagay. This launch site also has an inline configuration, and consists of three launch yed areas, with indications of a fourth. The separation of the ped classings of one pair and their orientation is the same as that at Site No 1. The launch site appears to be in a very early stage of construction and is secured by fence. Photography of 29 August 1962 indicates that initial construction had begun at Site No 1, and that Site No 2 did not exist.

3. Additional information from Mission 3100 on the previously reported MODM area in as follows:

a. Site No 1 - NEED Launch Site Located & no EEE of San Diografie Located & no EEE of San Diografie Locates at 22-10-15H 83-17-15H. Unly the support area is visible through clouds and have. Changes from Hissian 3101 in area seen include 3 large tents and the completion of a building in early stages of construction on Hissian 3101. A security feace under construction is present on the south side of the installation.





b. Site No 2 - A reanalysis of Site No 2 near los Palacios, (previously identified as a military encompaest) on photography of 13 Cotober 1962, permits its upgrading to a confirmed MINN launch eite. Changes noted since Missien 1101 include the identification of an erector in the area where the 6 missies are puriod and the absence of a 60 foot unidentified object in the text area.

e. Site He 3 - Previously identified as a military encompment is now considered to be a probable MISE Launch Area and is located 3 mm west of Son Cristobal at 22-32-308 51-08-138. The site is situated on the south side of and milesont to the foothills of a mountain range. The area is under construction and contains the following elements: 2 missile exectors, 2 probable missile trailers, 2 structures, 100 by 18 feet, 1 building under construction, 70 by 35 feet with concrets arches lying mearby, 8 buildings, 70 by 35 feet under construction, at least to tents, and approximately 50 miscellaneous unidentified vehicles. Miditional equipment may be paried becometh the trees, or hidden by shedows.

ARTHUR C. LEMBARL
Director
Rational Photographic Interpretation Conter



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19 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE 1129 AM -10-18-62 w/ The President, et al

Early in the morning of October 18th, Secretary McNamara called Mr. McCone at his residence expressing great concern over the reports from NPIC as a result of their examination of the two flights run on October 15th. Lundahl was at the house with the enlargements which indicated that, in addition to the three mobile MRBM sites detected on flight October 14th, there appeared to be now two IRBM sites with fixed launchers zeroed in on the Eastern United States. McNamara felt that this development demanded more prompt and decisive action.

The group which had been meeting on <u>Tuesday</u> met in the Cabinet Room at 11:00 a.m. on Wednesday with the President. State tabled revisions in their papers on covering a limited one-time strike and blockade, most of which are dated 10/18 - 11:00 a.m.

At the opening of the meeting, McCone gave a brief resume of current intelligence and Lundahl presented the most recent photography. President questioned Lundahl further if the uninitiated could be persuaded that the photographs presented offensive MRBM missiles. Lundahl stated probably not and that we must have low-level photography for public consumption.

Secretary Rusk then stated that developments in the last 24 hours had substantially changed his thinking. He first questioned whether, if it is necessary to move against Cuba, and then concluded that it was because Cuba can become a formidable military threat. He also referred to the President's recent public statements and indicated a feeling that if no action was taken, we would free the Soviets to act any place they wished and at their own will. Also, Rusk stated the failure on our part to act would make our situation unmanageable elsewhere in the world. He furthermore indicated that this would be an indication of weakness which would have serious effect on our Allies. Secretary pointed out to the President that action would involve risks. We could expect counter action and the cost may be heavy. The President must expect action in Berlin, Korea and possibly against the United States itself. Rusk felt a quick strike would minimize the risk of counter action. He raised the question of solidarity of the Alliance and seemed to dismiss this question, feeling that the Alliance would hold together. Rus's stated that if we enter upon positive action, we can not say for sure what the final Soviet response will be and therefore what the final outcome will be. However he felt that the American people will accept danger and suffering if they are convinced doing so is necessary and that they have a clear conscience. The Secretary reviewed the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of World War I, World War II, and the Korean war. These factors militated in favor of consulting with Khrushchev

and depending on the Rio pact. This, he indicated, might have the possibility of prevention of action and settlement by political means. The other course open was the declaration of war. Rusk expressed himself in favor of leaning upon the Rio pact, but does not dismiss the alternative of a unilateral declaration of war as the ultimate action we must take. The alternate is a quick strike.

Ambassador Bohlen was not present but his views were expressed in a message which was read in which he strongly advocated diplomatic effort and stated that military action prior to this would be wrong. He urged against action first and then decisive value of discussion. He also stated that limited quick military action was an illusion and that any military action would rapidly escalate into an invasion. McNamara at this point presented the alternatives referred to the previous day, stating that alternatives one and two were not conclusive and that we would have to resort to alternative 3 and in fact this would lead us ultimately into an invasion.

General Taylor generally reviewed the situation stating that the Chiefs looked upon Cuba as a forward base of serious proportions, that it cannot be taken out totally by air; that the military operation would be sizeable, nevertheless necessary.

Ambassador Thompson urged that any action be preceded by a declaration of war; he strongly advocated that we institute a blockade and not resort to military action unless and until it is determined that Castro and Khrushchev refuse to reverse their activities and actually remove the missiles which are now in place.

Secretary Dillon questioned what would be accomplished by talking to Khrushchev. He pointed out that we would probably become engaged in discussions from which we could not extract ourselves and therefore our freedom of action would be frustrated. Dillon was very positive that whatever action we take should be done without consultation with Khrushchev. Rusk seemed to disagree indicating there was a possibility that Khrushchev might be persuaded to reduce his efforts but he admitted also that he might step them up as a result of discussions.

President Kennedy was non-committal, however he seemed to continually raise questions of reactions of our allies, NATO, South America, public opinion and others. Raised the question whether we should not move the missiles out of Turkey. All readily agreed they were not much use but a political question was involved. Bundy thought this a good idea either under conditions of a strike or during a preliminary talk.

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McNamara discussed in some detail the effects of a strike indicating that we could expect several hundred Soviet citizens to be killed; he pointed out that all of the Sam sites were manned exclusively by Soviets and a great many Soviet technicians were working on the MRBMs and at the air fields. He agreed that we could move out of Turkey and Italy; pointed out the political complications. At this point McNamara seemed to be reconsidering his prior position of advocating military action and laid special emphasis on the fact that the price of Soviet retaliation, whether in Berlin or elsewhere, would be very high and we would not be able to control it.

Secretary Ball throughout the conversation maintained the position that strike without warning was not acceptable and that we should not proceed without discussion with Khrushchev. President Kennedy then said that he thought at some point Khrushchev would say that if we made a move against Cuba, he would take Berlin. McNamara surmised perhaps that was the price we must pay and perhaps we'd lose Berlin anyway. There followed an exchange of view on the possibility of the Soviets taking Berlin and our prospect of retaining it.

President Kennedy rather summed up the dilemma stating that action of a type contemplated would be opposed by the alliance - on the other hand, lack of action will create disunity, lack of confidence and disintegration of our several alliances and friendly relations with countries who have confidence in us.

As a result of discussions of the "price" of a strike, there followed a long discussion of the possibilities of a blockade, the advantages of it, and manner in which it would be carried out, etc. There seemed to be differences of opinion as to whether the blockade should be total, or should only involve military equipment which would mean blockading Soviet ships. Also there were continued references to blockading ships carrying offensive weapons and there seemed to be a differentiation in the minds of some in the policy of blockading offensive weapons as contrasted to blockading all weapons.

There followed discussion as to policies the President should follow with respect to calling Congress into session, asking for a declaration of war, advising the country and authorizing action. Thompson continued to insist that we must communicate with Khrushchev. There was a discussion concerning the President's meeting with Gromyko and the position he should take should the Cuban question come up. The President was advised to draw Gromyko out and it was indicated he probably would receive a flat denial that there were any offensive weapons in Cuba.

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Meeting adjourned with the President requesting that we organize into two groups. One to study the advantages of what might be called a slow course of action which would involve a blockade to be followed by such further actions as appeared necessary as the situation evolved. Second would be referred to as a fast dynamic action which would involve the strike of substantial proportions with or without notice.

JOHN A. McCONE Director

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# JOINT EVALUATION

# SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA

OF

### PREPARED BY

Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee

Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee

National Photographic Interpretation Center

2100 HOURS

18 OCTOBER 1962

This report is based on relatively complete photo interpretation of U-2 photography mode on:

14 October 1962 Mission 3101 15 October 1962 Missions 3102 & 3103

Very preliminary and incomplete readout of coverage of the six U-2 Missions flows on 17 October 1962 are also reflected in this report.

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### CONCLUSIONS IN BRIEF

### Offensive Missiles

- 1. At least one Soviet regiment consisting of eight launchers and sixteen 1020-nm (SS-4) medium range ballistic missiles is now deployed in western Cuba at two launch sites. These sites presently contain unrevetted, field-type launchers which rely on mobile erection, checkout, and support equipment. These missiles are probably those reported moving into this area during September. Although there is continuing improvement of these sites, these mobile missiles must be considered operational now and could be launched within 18 hours after the decision to launch. A refire from each launcher could be accomplished within 5 hours after the initial firing.
- 2. Fixed, soft sites which could achieve initial operational capability during December 1962 are now being developed near Havana. We believe that the 2200-nm (SS-5) intermediate range ballistic missile is probably intended for these sites. Photography of these sites show eight, fixed launch pads under construction which probably equate to an additional missile regiment with eight ready missiles and eight for refire.
- 3. All of these offensive missile systems are Soviet manned and controlled. We believe that offensive action by these systems would be commanded from the Soviet Union but have not yet found the command and control communication links.

### Nuclear Warheads for Offensive Missiles

4. There is no positive evidence of the presence of nuclear warheads in Cuba, nor have weapons storage facilities of the standard, highly secure Soviet type been identified. However, there are seven, large Cuban

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munitions' storage areas south of Havana which could be converted to Soviet needs in a relatively short time. Temporary storage could be provided in ships or field sites which might not be identified.

5. Nevertheless, one must assume that nuclear warheads could now be available in Cuba to support the offensive missile capability as it becomes operational. The warheads expected for these missiles weigh approximately 3,000 pounds and have yields in the low megaton range.

### Coastal Defense Missiles

6. Three coastal defense missile sites have now been identified in Cuba, two of which must now be considered operational (Banes and Santa Cruz del Norte). In an alert status, these cruise missiles can be fired in about 10 minutes, with subsequent firings from each launcher at 5 minute intervals.

### Air Defense Missiles

7. There are now 22 surface-to-air missiles (SA-2) sites located in Cuba, nine of which are believed to be individually operational at the present time. The remaining SA-2 sites could be operational in two to three weeks. Each site contains six missiles with six additional missiles in an adjacent hold area. The initial firing can take place anytime after an alert, providing the site has reached readiness. Refire from a single launcher will take approximately 3 to 5 minutes.



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### Force Levels

9. There are now at least sixteen 1020-nm Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba which are in such a state of readiness that they could be fired within 18 hours of a decision to launch. It is likely that other installations now being examined in photography will raise the number to 32, all of which could be ready in the next week. Furthermore, 8 launchers with sixteen 2200-nm missiles will probably be operational in Cuba during December 1962. We must emphasize that this is the visible threat, and that additional missiles may be discovered as additional photography is analyzed.

### Support and Supply

10. Offensive missiles systems are being introduced into Cuba primarily through the Port of Mariel. Possible central missile checkout, storage and repair bases have been tentatively located at Soroa near the western deployment sites and at Managua south of Havana. It is significant that all three of the Soviet missiles now being deployed in Cuba (SS-4, SS-5, SA-2) probably use red fuming nitric acid as an oxidizer so that a common propellant supply and storage could be used.

### Significance

- 11. The magnitude of the total Soviet missile force being deployed indicates that the USSR intends to develop Cuba into a prime strategic base, rather than as a token show of strength.
- 12. A mixed force of 1020- and 2200-nm missiles would give the USSR a significant strategic strike capability against almost all targets in the U.S. (see map). By deploying stockpiled shorter range ballistic missiles at overseas bases against which we have no BMEWS warning capability, the



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in Cuba.

Soviet Union will supplement its ICBM home force in a significant way. This overseas strategic force is protected by an extensive SA-2 deployment

- 13. This same offensive force also poses a common threat to the U.S. and a large portion of Latin America for the first time.
- 14. The USSR is making a major military investment in Cuba with some of their most effective guided missile systems. The planning for this operation must have started at least one year ago and put into motion last spring.

#### ADDENDUM

Two additional launch sites have just been found north of Santa Clara (Mission 3107). Neither site was present on 5 September 1962. Analysis is still underway; only preliminary views can be expressed. One site is similar to the fixed soft site described in paragraph 2. This site is in a more advanced state of readiness and could have the essential features for an operational capability within one month. The other site is similar to the field-type installation described in paragraph 1. These new sites are not included in the numbers appearing elsewhere in this paper.

- 4 -



101 5.5.



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October 19, 1962

#### MEMORANDUM TO USIB MEMBERS:


A discussion among the principals on October 18th indicated a probable decision, if any action is taken against Cuba, to initiate a limited blockade designed to prevent the importation into Cuba of additional arms. To do this the United States would make such statements concerning a condition of war as is necessary to meet the legal requirements of such a blockade, but a formal "declaration of war against Cuba" would be avoided if possible and resorted to only if absolutely necessary.

The blockade could be extended at our discretion to include POL and possibly a total blockade if Castro persisted in the offensive build-up.

Continued surveillance would go forward so that we would know of the sittation within Cuba as it evolved.

The blockade would start possibly on Monday, following a public announcement by the President which would include a display of photographic intelligence, persuasive notification to our Allies among the Soviets and the Cubans, but with no prior consultations with our Allies or any Latin Americans unless it proved necessary for legal reasons to assemble the OAS and secure the necessary approval to invoke the Rio Pact.

More extreme steps such as limited air strike, comprehensive air strike, or military invasion would be withheld awaiting developments. The possibility of more extreme actions has not been dismissed however initiating such actions was considered unwise.



709-0-103-1





The argument in favor of the blockade was principally that it · initiated a positive action which could be intensified at our will or could be relaxed depending upon evolving circumstances. Soviet reactions are expected to be severe and very probably involve a blockade of Berlin and a widespread propaganda effort, however it was considered that we could have some control over the extent of Soviet reaction and in the event of a confrontation, would be negotiating from a position of positive action which would be intensified at our own direction.

The obvious disadvantages are the protracted nature of the operation, the difficulties of sustaining our position in world opinion because of our own complex of foreign bases and our deployment of offensive missiles and nuclear weapons and finally, the action does not reverse the present trend of building an offensive capability within Cuba nor does it dispose of the existing missiles, planes, and nuclear weapons if the latter now exist there.

Positive military action initiated now appeared/desirable because of the impact of current and future world opinion, the spectacle of a powerful nation attacking by surprise attack a weak and insignificant neighbor, engagement by the United States in a "surprise attack" thus giving license to others to do the same, the indefendable position we would be in with our allies, and finally, the price to us of extreme actions of which the Soviets appear capable of executing.

. 5. 4 The above course of action is by no means unanimous. The opinions range from doing nothing on the one hand, to immediate military action on the other There exist differences of opinion as to the handling of Khrushchev, Castro, NATO, the OAS and Latin American states; and finally, a question of the "declaration of war" awaits legal opinion; also differences exist concerning the intensity of the blockade with some advocating a more comprehensive blockade which would include POL at the very start.

I would like guidance from USIB members for my use in further discussions which are to take place commencing at 11:00 a.m., October 19th, and will probably continue throughout the week end.

John A. McCone

#### 100 SECTION

Ceteber 19, 1982

Steps which would make air strike more acceptable to blockade group.

- Prior notice to Khrushchev by message from the President giving lowiets possibility of backing down and strengthening our case with our Allies and world opinion in the event that Khrushchev takes such action as blockeding Berlin.
- Some effort to try to minimise number of Soviets killed, or at least show we wanted to avoid this. Message to Khrushchev might arge him to remove Soviet technicisms immediately.
- 3. Prior notice to our principal Allies, and particularly Turkey and Raly (because of our missile bases there).
- 4. Prior sitimatom to Castro giving him chance to fold.
- Prior notification to certain Latin American Governments to allow them to take steps to prevent their being overthrown.

(All these notifications could be short but should be maximum military considerations would allow. Home of them need spell out our proposed actions, but should indicate it will be extremely serious.)

- 6. Some improvement in our position before world opinion. Example — President might make reference to Soviet construction of "Fishing Port" in Cubs, saying that in view other Soviet actions we are convinced Soviets were constructing Naval base.
- No attack on Havana to avoid killing foreign diplomats and thus arousing public opinion against us in those countries.

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TOP SECTION

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64. Special National Intelligence Estimate 11-18-62, "Soviet Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action on Cuba," 19 October 1962 (Excerpt)

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#### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

19 October 1962

SUBJECT: SNIE 11-18-62: SCYLET REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES ABUD NO KOTTOA PO

#### TES FROBLEM

To estimate probable Soviet reactions to certain US courses of action with respect to Cuba.

#### THE ESTEMPTE

1. A major Soviet objective in their military buildup in Cuba is to demonstrate that the world balance of forces has shifted so far in their favor that the US can no longer prevent the advance of Soviet offensive power even into its own hemisphere. In this correction they assume, of course, that these deployments scorer or later will become publicly known.



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- 2. It is possible that the USSR is installing these missiles primarily in order to use them in bargaining for US concessions elsewhere. We think this unlikely, however. The public withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba would create serious problems in the USSR's relations with Castro; it would cast doubt on the firmness of the Soviet intention to protect the Castro regime and perhaps on their commitments elsewhere.
- 3. If the US accepts the strategic missile buildup in Cuba, the Soviets would continue the buildup of strategic weapons in Cuba. We have no basis for estimating the force level which they would wish to reach, but it seems clear already that they intend to go beyond a token capability. They would probably expect their missile forces in Cuba to make some contribution to their total strategic capability vis-a-vis the US. We consider in Annex B the possible effects of a missile buildup in Cuba upon the overall relationship of strategic military power.
- 4. US acceptance of the strategic missile buildup would provide strong encouragement to Communists, pro-Communists, and the more anti-American sectors of opinion in Latin America and elsewhere.

  Conversely, anti-Communists and those who relate their own interests



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to those of the US would be strongly discouraged. It seems clear that, especially over the long run, there would be a loss of confidence in US power and determination and a serious decline of US influence generally.

#### EFFECT OF WARRING

- 5. If the US confronts Khrushchev with its knowledge of the MREM deployment and presses for a withdrawal, we do not believe the Soviets would halt the deployment. Instead, they would propose negotiations on the general question of foreign bases, claiming equal right to establish Soviet bases and assuring the US of tight control over the missiles. They would probably link Cuba with the Berlin situation and emphasize their patience and preference for negotiations, implying that Berlin was held hostage to US actions in Cuba.
- 6. There is some slight chance that a warning to Castro might make a difference, since the Soviets could regard this as a chance to stand aside, but it also would give time for offers to regotiate, continued buildup, and counterpressures, and we think the result in the end would be the same.

- 3 -





7. Any warning would of course degrade the element of surprise in a subsequent US attack.

#### EFFECT OF BLOCKADE

8. While the effectiveness of Castro's military machine might be impaired by a total US blockade, Castro would be certain to tighten internal security and would take ruthless action against any attempts at revolt. There is no reason to believe that a blockade of itself would bring down the Castro regime. The Soviets would almost certainly exert strong direct pressures elsewhere to end the blockade. The attitudes of other states toward a blockade action are not considered in this paper. It is obvious that the Soviets would heavily exploit all adverse reactions.

### SOVIET REACTION TO USE OF MILITARY FORCE

9. If the US takes direct military action against Cuba, the Soviets would be placed automatically under great pressure to respond in ways which, if they could not save Cuba, would inflict

- 4 -



For a further comment on differences between reaction to a blockade and to US measures of force against Cuba, see Annex A.



an offsetting injury to US interests. This would be true whether the action was limited to an effort to reutralize the strategic missiles, or these missiles plus airfields, surface-to-air missile sites, or cruise missile sites, or in fact an outright invesion designed to destroy the Castro regime.

10. In reaction to any of the various force of US action, the Soviets would be slarmed and agitated, since they have to date estimated that the US would not take military action in the face of Soviet warnings of the danger of nuclear war. They would recognize that US military action posed a major challenge to the prestige of the USSR. We must of course recognize the possibility that the Soviets, under pressure to respond, would again miscalculate and respond in a way which, through a series of actions and reactions, could escalate to general war.

11. On the other hand, the Soviets have no public treaty with Cuba and have not acknowledged that Soviet bases are on the island. This situation provides them with a pretext for treating US military action against Cuba as an affair which does not directly involve them, and thereby avoiding the risks of a strong response. We do not believe that the USSR would attack the US, either from

- 5 -





Soviet bases or with its missiles in Cuba, even if the latter were operational and not put out of action before they could be readied for firing.

12. Since the USSR would not dare to resort to general war and could not hope to prevail locally, the Soviets would almost certainly consider retaliatory actions outside Cuba. The timing and selection of such moves would depend heavily upon the immediate context of events and the USSR's appreciation of US attitudes. The most likely location for broad retaliation outside Cuba appears to be Berlin. They might react here with major harassments, interruptions of access to the city or even a blockade, with or without the signing of a separate peace treaty.

13. We believe that whatever course of retaliation the USSR elected, the Soviet leaders would not deliberately initiate general war or take military measures, which in their calculation, would run the gravest risks of general war.

- 6 -





# JOINT EVALUATION OF SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA

#### PREPARED BY

Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee

Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee

National Photographic Interpretation Center

**2000 HOURS** 

19 OCTEBER 1962

This report is based on relatively complete photo Interpretation of U-2 photography made on:

14 October 1962 Mission 3101 15 October 1962 Missions 3102 & 3103

17 October 1952 Missions 3104, 3105, 3106, 3109 and part of 3107 and 3108.





#### Offensive Missile Deployment\*

- 1. At least one Soviet regiment of 1020-nm (SS-4) medium range ballistic missiles is now deployed in western Cuba at two launch sites near San Cristobal. Each of these sites presently contains eight missiles and four unrevetted, field-type launchers which rely on mobile erection, checkout, and support equipment. These missiles are probably those reported moving into this area during September. Although there is continuing improvement of these sites, this regiment must be considered operational now. The presence of eight missiles at each site indicates a refire capability from each of the four launchers. Refire could be accomplished in 4 to 6 hours after the initial firing. A third facility in this area, previously identified as Launch Site 3, could be either a technical support area for this regiment or a third launch site; however, the early stage of development precludes a positive identification of this activity.
- 2. An additional regiment of Soviet 1020-nm (SS-4) missiles is now deployed at two sites east of Havana in the Sagua La Grande area, nine miles apart. These sites closely resemble the sites at San Cristobal but appear to be more permanent in nature. Terrain features have dictated considerable clearing and grading for deployment of the system. Also, there are permanent structures at the launch padareas which are not found at the San Cristobal sites. There are four launch positions at each site and we estimate an operational capability for each site within one week. The sizes of the missiles, associated equipment, and buildings found at the San Cristobal and Sagua La Grande sites are almost identical and are compatible with the 1020-nm MRBM system.
- 3. Two fixed sites are under construction in the Guanajay area near Havana. Four launchers, two blockhouses, and underground propellant storage are being built at each site. We believe that the 2200-nm (SS-5)

<sup>\*</sup>See Figures 1-9.

- 1 
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
IRBM is probably intended for these sites because they closely resemble Soviet sites believed to be associated with testing and deployment of this missile system. Site I is considered to be in a mid- to late-stage of construction and should be operational within six weeks. Site 2 is in an earlier stage of construction and could be operational between 15 and 30 December 1962. There are no missiles or support equipment detectable within the Guanajay Area at the present time.

#### Command and Control

4. All of the offensive missile systems in Cuba are Soviet manned and controlled. We believe that offensive action by these systems would be commanded from the Soviet Union, but have not yet identified the communication link.

#### Nuclear Warheads for Offensive Missiles

- 5. We believe that a nuclear warhead storage site is under construction adjacent to the most complete of the fixed missile launch sites near Guanajay (see Figure 6). This site could become operational at about the same time as the associated Launch Site 1. Construction of similar facilities has not yet been identified at other sites.
- 6. An especially secure port facility located at Punta Gerardo may be used for nuclear weapons offloading (see Figure 10).
- 7. There is still no evidence of currently operational nuclear storage facilities in Cuba. Nevertheless, one must assume that nuclear weapons could now be in Cuba to support the operational missile capability as it becomes available.
- 8. The 1020-nm missiles would probably be equipped with nuclear warheads yielding 2 to 3 megatons. The 2200-nm IRBMs could have 3- to






5-megaton warheads, if our planning estimate for the payload weight is correct.

#### Offensive Force Levels

9. We believe that there are now at least two regiments equipped with 1020-nm MRBM's in Cuba. One is located in the San Cristobal area and the other in the Sagua La Grande area. In addition, we believe a regiment equipped with 2200-nm IRBM's is being deployed to the Guanajay area. When operational, present MRBM and IRBM units will have an aggregate total of 24 launchers. An estimated schedule of site activation is presented in Table 1. Each launcher will have a refire capability. A summary of the MRBM and IRBM threat, including the projected number of operational ready missiles for each site, is presented in Table 2. The corresponding nuclear yield deliverable from each site is shown in Table 3. The technical characteristics of the two offensive missile weapons systems are summarized in Table 4.

#### Support and Supply

- 10. Offensive missile systems are being introduced into Cuba, probably through the Port of Mariel. A new Soviet ship, the Poltava, possibly designed as a ballistic missile transport, has been noted making frequent trips between the USSR and Cuba. This ship has made two trips to Cuba since 17 July, and is next estimated to arrive in Cuba on or about 2 November 1962. See Figures 11 and 12.
- 11. Possible central missile checkout, storage, and repair bases have been located at Soroa, between the two estern deployment areas, and at Managua, south of Havana.






12. It is significant that three of the Soviet missiles now being deployed in Cuba (SS-4, SS-5, SA-2) probably use red furning nitric acid as the oxidizer, permitting exploitation of a common system for propellant supply and storage.

#### Coastal Defense Missiles

13. Three coastal defense missile sites have now been identified in Cuba, two of which must now be considered operational (Banes and Santa Cruz del Norte). These cruise missiles have a range of 35 to 40 miles and are probably derived from the AS-1. They can be fired in about 10 minutes in an alert status, with subsequent firings from each launcher at 5 minute intervals.

#### Air Defense Missiles

- 14. There are now 26 surface-to-air missile (SA-2) sites located in Cuba, two of which appear to be alternate sites. See Figure 13. Of these, 16 are believed to be individually operational at the present time. The remaining SA-2 sites could be operational in two to three weeks. The list of sites considered to be operational is presented in Table 5.
- 15. Such SA-2 sites provide for six launchers with missiles, and an additional six missiles in an adjacent holdarea. The initial firing can take place anytime after an alert, providing the site has reached readiness status. Reload and refire from a single launcher will take approximately. 3 to 5 minutes.






#### Tactical Missiles


17. There are several refugee reports indicating the presence of tactical (FROG) missiles in Cuba, although there is no photographic confirmation thus far.

#### Significance

- 18. The magnitude of the total Soviet missile force being deployed indicates that the USSR intends to develop Cuba into a prime strategic base, rather than as a token show of strength. Some of the deployment characteristics include permanent elements which suggests that provision is being made for Soviet presence of long duration.
- 19. The rate of deployment to date, as well as the speed and variety of construction, indicates that the Soviet military build up in Cuba is being carried out on an urgent basis. This build-up has proceeded by deploying defensive weapons first, followed by deployment of offensive weapons. The pattern of missile deployment appears calculated to achieve quick operational status and then to complete site construction.
- 20. A mixed force of 1020- and 2200-nm missiles would give the USSR a significant strategic strike capability against almost all targets in the U.S. (see Figure 2). By deploying stockpiled MRBM IRBMs at overseas bases, the Soviet Union will supplement its ICBM home force in a significant way.
- 21. This same offensive force also poses a common threat to the U.S. and a large portion of Latin America for the first time.
- 22. The USSR is making a major military investment in Cuba with some of their most effective guided missile systems. The planning for this operation must have started at least one year ago and the operation itself begun last spring.



66. Lundahl, Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence and Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, "Additional Information—Mission 3107," 19 October 1962



MEMORIADUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT : Additional Information - Mission 3107

1. An MEM/IREM Launch Site has been identified in a wooded area along a ridge line 1.7 nm east-nertheast of Calabarar De Sagua and 10 as montheast of the Sagua la Grande MEM Launch Site. The launch site is connected directly by road with the rail-served town of Calabarar De Sagua and a branch rail line serving a nearby sugar mill passes within a mile of the mite. The launch site is comprised of four elemented pada, 190 by 90, arranged in a linear pattern and criented on a 315 degree animath. The northern pair of pade are separated by approximately 750 feet and the southern pair by about 960 feet. A transporter/erector approximately 60 feet in launch is in position on each of the two southern pads. A third transporter/erector is charred in a motor pool and a fourth is observed on the site service road, Additional facilities include at least 100 vehicles, 55 tents, 27 willdings and several open storage areas. The launch site appears to be in a late stage of completions or complete. No security fames is apparent. There was no evidence that site construction had begun on photography of 5 September 1962.

2. An MESS Launch Site has been identified 5 nm assistant of Sague La Grande at 32-43-438 80-01-158. It is situated in a level moded area and contains the following elements: 4 launch positions, 2 missile erectors and 1 probable missile erector; 5 missile transporters with missiles, 1 building 8/C with prefabricated arches, 3 buildings 100° x 18°, massrous tents and rehicles. There are no evidence of this site on 5 September 1962 photography.

ARTHUR C. LEMBARL
Director
Estimal Photographic Interpretation Center



67. Special National Intelligence Estimate 11-19-62, "Major Consequences of Certain US Courses of Action on Cuba," 20 October 1962

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3-6-F 3-E-C-R-E-



#### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

20 October 1962

SUBJECT: SNIE 11-19-62: MAJOR CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION ON CUBA

#### THE PROBLEM

To estimate the major consequences of certain US courses of action with respect to Cuba

#### THE ESTIMATE

#### STATUS OF SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA

1. Firm evidence indicates the presence in Cuba of four MRBM and two IRBM launch sites in various stages of construction and organized into at least three regiments. Of these, two regiments of eight launchers each are mobile and designed to launch MRBMs with a range of about 1,100 n.m., while one regiment of eight fixed launchers may be designed for IRBMs with a range of about 2,200 n.m.

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submarine, or surface ship.

T-O-P-S-E-C-R-E-T

2. The 16 launchers for 1,100 n.m. MRBMs must be considered operational now. Four of the fixed launchers for the 2,200 n.m. IRBMs could probably become operational within the next six weeks. The other four would become operational in 8 to 10 weeks. We have no direct evidence that nuclear weapons are now present in Cuba, and it is unlikely that we would be able to obtain such evidence. However, the construction of at least one probable nuclear storage facility is a strong indication of the Soviet intent to provide nuclear warheads. In any case, it is prudent to assume that when the missiles are otherwise operational,

nuclear warheads will be available. These could be brought in by air,

- 3. We estimate that operational MRBM missiles can be fired in eight hours or less after a decision to launch, depending on the condition of readiness. After the IRBM sites are completed and wissiles are on launcher, a state of readiness of five hours may be maintained. Both systems are believed to be provided with two missiles per launcher, providing a refire capability from each launcher after about four to six additional hours for the MRBMs and six to eight hours for the IRBMs.
- 4. It is possible that further evidence will uncover additional launch sites which are presently undetected, but the extent of our coverage leads us to believe that such evidence would not drastically

- 2 -


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increase the total now deployed. On the other hand, new deployments could be started at any time.

- 5. The inventory of other major Soviet weapons now identified in Cuba includes:
- a. 22 IL-28 jet light bombers, of which one is assembled and three others have been uncrated;
- b. 39 MIG-21 jet fighters, of which 35 are assembled and four are still crates, and 62 other jet fighters of less advanced types;
- c. 24 SA-2 sites, of which 16 are believed to be individually operational with some missiles on launcher;
- d. 3 cruise missile sites for coastal defense, of which 2 are now operational;
- e. 12 Komar cruise missile patrol boats, all probably operational or nearly so.
- 6. Cuban-based MRBMs and IRBMs with nuclear warheads would augment the present limited Soviet ICBM capability by virtue of their ability to strike at similar types of targets with warheads of generally similar yields. In the near future, therefore, Soviet gross capabilities for initial attack on US military and civilian targets can be increased considerably by Cuban-based missiles. Ecwever, the deployment of these missiles in Cuba will probably not, in the Soviet judgment, insure destruction of the US second strike capability to a degree which would

- 3 -



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eliminate an unacceptably heavy retaliatory attack on the USSR. If the missile buildup in Cuba continues, the Soviet capability to blunt a retaliatory attack will be progressively enhanced.

#### PURPOSE OF SOVIET BUILDUP

- 7. A major Soviet objective in their military buildup in Cuba is to demonstrate that the world balance of forces has shifted so far in their favor that the US can no longer prevent the advance of Soviet offensive power even into its own hemisphere. In this connection they assume, of course, that these deployments sooner or later will become publicly known. At the same time, they expect their missile forces in Cuba to make an important contribution to their total strategic capability vis-a-vis the US.
- 8. Consequently, it is unlikely that the USSR is installing these missiles primarily in order to use them in bargaining for US concessions elsewhere. Moreover, the public withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba would create serious problems in the USSR's relations with Castro; it would cast doubt on the firmness of the Soviet intention to protect the Castro regime and perhaps on their commitments elsewhere.

- 4 -





#### US ACQUIESCENCE IN THE BUILDUP

9. If the US acquiesces to the presence of strategic missiles in Cuba, we believe that the Soviets will continue the buildup. We have no basis for estimating the force level which they would wish to reach, but it seems entirely clear now that they are going well beyond a token capability.

10. This course of US action would provide strong encouragement to Communists, pro-Communists, and the more anti-American sectors of opinion in Latin America. We believe that, especially over the long run, there would be loss of confidence in US power and determination and a serious decline of US influence, particularly in Latin America. Should any additional Latin American government fall to the Communists the Soviets would feel free to establish bases in the country in question if they chose.

A major immediate consequence would be that the Soviets would probably estimate lower risks in pressing the US hard in other confrontations, such as Berlin.

#### EFFECT OF WARNING

11. If the US confronts Khrushchev with its knowledge of the MRBM deployment and presses for a withdrawal, we do not believe the Soviets would halt the deployment. Instead, they would propose negotiations on the general question of foreign bases, claiming equal right to establish Soviet bases and assuring the US of tight control over the missiles.





2-0-P S-E-C-R-E-T



They would probably link Cuba with the Berlin situation and emphasize their patience and preference for negotiations, implying that Berlin was held hostage to US actions in Cuba.

12. There is some slight chance that a warning to Castro might make a difference, since the Soviets could regard this as a chance to stand aside, but it also would give time for offers to negotiate, continued buildup, and counterpressures, and we think the result in the end would be the same.

13. Any warning would of course degrade the element of surprise in a subsequent US attack.

#### A US BLOCKADE

14. Two basic modes of blockade could be considered: total and selective. We believe that even under a total blockade individual aircraft and submarines might get through to deliver vital military items, e.g., nuclear warheads. Even the most severe blockade would not deprive the Soviets of the use of missiles already in Cuba for a nuclear strike on the US.

15. Under any form of blockade, the Soviets would concentrate on political exploitation, especially in the UN. They might risk violent encounters in attempts to penetrate the blockade, but they would not resort to major force in the area of Cuba or forceful retaliation elsewhere,

- 6 -



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at least initially. If US enforcement of the blockade involved use of force by the US, the Soviets might respond on an equivalent level, but would seek to avoid escalation.

16. Thus any blockade situation would place the Soviets under no immediate pressure to choose a response with force. They could rely on political means to compel the US to desist, and reserve a resort to force until the US had actually used force. They would estimate that the inherent difficulties of enforcing the blockade and the generally adverse reactions, including those of US allies to it, would result in enormous pressures on the US to desist. They could heighten these pressures by threatening retaliation in Berlin or actually undertaking major harassments on the access routes, which could become tantamount to a blockade, and would probably do so at some stage.

17. We do not believe that even a severe blockade, of itself, would bring down the Cuban regime. Castro would tighten internal security and, unless action against the regime subsequently developed on Cuban soil, the Cuban population would be increasingly reluctant to oppose the regime. Direct action would still be required to bring down the Castro regime.

#### SOVIET REACTION TO USE OF MILITARY FORCE

18. In the case of US use of force against Cuban territory, the likelihood of a Soviet response by force, either locally or for retaliation elsewhere, would be greater than in the case of blockade. The

- 7 -



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Soviets would be placed automatically under great pressure to respond in ways which, if they could not save Cuba, would inflict an offsetting injury to US interests. This would be true whether the action was limited to an effort to neutralize the stra comissiles, or these missiles plus airfields, surface-to-air missile sites, or cruise missile sites, or in fact an outright invasion designed to destroy the Castro regime.

19. In reaction to any of the various forms of US action, the Soviets would be surprised and probably alarmed, since they appear to have estimated that the US would probably not take military action in the face of Soviet warnings of the danger of nuclear war. They would recognize that US military action posed a major challenge to the prestige of the USSR. We must of course recognize the possibility that the Soviets, under pressure to respond, would again miscalculate and respond in a way which, through a series of actions and reactions, could escalate to general war.

20. On the other hand, the Soviets have no public treaty with Cuba and have not acknowledged that Soviet bases are on the island. This situation provides them with a pretext for treating US military action against Cuba as an affair which does not directly involve them, and thereby avoiding the risks of a strong response. We do not believe that the USSR would attack the US, either from Soviet bases or with its missiles in Cuba, even if the latter were operational and not put out of action before they could be readied for firing.

-8-

<del>F-O-P S-E-C-R-B-</del>T PSALM



- 21. Since the USSR would almost certainly not resort to general war and could not hope to prevail locally, we believe that the Soviets would consider retaliatory actions cutside Com- The timing and selection of such moves would depend heavily up immediate context of events and the USSR's appreciation of US attite . The most likely location for broad retaliation cutside Cuba appears to be Berlin. They would probably react here with major harassments, interruptions of access to the city or even a blockade, with or without the signing of a separate peace treaty. Retaliation against some US installation overseas is possible but in our view unlikely.
- 22. We believe that there would probably be a difference between Soviet reaction to all-out invasion and Soviet reaction to more limited US use of force against selected objectives in Cuba. We believe that the Soviets would be somewhat less likely to retaliate with military force in areas outside Cuba in response to speedy, effective invasion than in response to more limited forms of military action against Cuba. We recognize that such an estimate cannot be made with very great assurance and do not rule out the possibility of Soviet retaliation outside Cuba in case of invasion. But we believe that a rapid occupation of Cuba would be more likely to make the Soviets pause in opening new theaters of conflict than limited action or action which drags out.
- 23. Firally, we believe that, whatever course of retaliation the USSR elected, the Soviet leaders would not deliberately imitiate general





war or take military measures, which in their calculation, would run grave risks of general war.

- 10 -



Del Briefung 20 October White House OVAL Room 1430-1500

Mr. President

We want to bring you up to date on the deployment of

Soviet military weapons systems to Cuba. You have been

briefed many times on the major :buildup of equipment in

Cuba prior to mid-October.

In the past week, in intensive photo reconnaissance

coverage beginning 14 October, we have discovered

unmistakable evidence of the deployment to Cuba of medium

range ballistic missiles (i.e. 1020 NM range 55-4) and

intermediate range ballistic missiles (i.e. 2200 NM range

SS-5). These ranges imply coverage of targets in the SE

United States inside an arc running roughly from Dallas through

Cincinnati and Washington, D. C. (on the part of MRBMs) and

practically all of the continental United States (on the part of

bu IRBMs).

There are at least four, and possibly five MRBM sites deployed in field-metric installations, two (or possibly three) , 4 launchers Two of these sites probably are in a state of at least limited operational readiness at this time, since the photography All of the sites are in a state of continuous crash construction and improvement and we would expect the remaining Biografie) MRBM sites to become operational in about one week's fime. 3

In addition to these MRBM sites, two fixed IRBM sites

(with four launch pads and permanent storage facilities) at each

site) are being constructed near Havana. One of these sites appears

to be in a stage of construction that period leads to an estimate of

operational readiness within six weeks from now, i.e. about

1 December and the other in a stage indicating operational readiness

between 15 December and the end of the year.

We have not seen nuclear warheads for any of these missiles, but we do not rely on ever seeing them in our photography

We have found what appears

at Guanajay, near Havana. It will probably be completed about

1 December along with the ; missile site itself. We also note a port

suitable for officacing nuclear weapons.

-4-

I should like to repeat that we do not have evidence of huclear

warheads in Cuba, but our estimate is that since the missile systems

in question are relatively ineffective without them, warheads either are or will be available. They could be in temporary storage prior to completion of the storage facility we have seen. The Poltava,

a Soviet ship; which we think the most likely carrier of security
sensitive military cargoes into the tightly guarded port of Marie

has made two trips to Cuba and is due back in about ten days.

In summary, we believe the evidence indicates the probability that eight MRBM missiles can be fired from Cuba today. Naturally operational readiness is likely to be degraded by many factors, but if all eight missiles could be launched with nuclear warheads, they could deliver a total load of 16-24 Megatons (2 to 3 MT per warhead). If able to refire, they could theoretically deliver the same load approximately five hours later.

-5-

When the full installation of missile sites we now see under

construction is completed at the end of the year, the initial salvo

capability would be 56 - 88 MT.

These views are the considered judgment; : noncurred in emanuscraly by the B V miled State-Intelligence Board, They are supported by the analysis of the National Photographic Intel Center, by the US Guiled Missels and actionswite Intel Committee, and the US Tout atomic. Engery butel Committee. I have the chief of these three evaluation groups have to auxwer questions you may have. First, however, we would like to



#### SUPPLEMENT 1

TO

## JOINT EVALUATION OF SOVIET MISSILE THREAT IN CUBA

#### PREPARED BY

Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
National Photographic Interpretation Center

2200 HOURS

20 OCTOBER 1962

This report is based on relatively complete photo Interpretation of U-2 photography made on:

14 October 1962 Mission 3101 15 October 1962 Missions 3102 & 3103 17 October 1962 Missions 3104, 3105, 3106, 3107, 3108, and 3109;

and preliminary analysis of 18 October 1962 Mission 3111.





This supplement up-dates and amplifies dated 2000 hours, 19 October 1962. Emphasis is on the READINESS status of the offensive missiles in Cuba.


#### Offensive Missile Readiness

#### General

1. Analysis of the comparative photographic coverage of the offensive-missile sites in Cuba now leads us to conclude that the Soviets did not have as their main objective an immediate operational capability at any of the identified sites. An <a href="emergency">emergency</a> operational capability to launch some of the missiles on hand within about 8 hours could now exist at the four MRBM sites. They appear to be pursuing an urgent but systematic plan to achieve an operational capability which will maximize the effectiveness of the missile regiments. Within the sites the steps necessary to achieve an immediate operational capability have not occurred. For example, at San Cristobal Site 2 the three launchers and five missiles present continue to be bunched together in a field. Were an immediate launch capability intended one would expect deployment of the launcher to the vicinity of the intended launch positions.

#### San Cristobal Area

2. Activity in Site 1 and Site 2 continues to indicate an urgent effort to achieve full operational readiness. The launch crews, missiles and associated equipment are in the immediate area. From the status of the sites as of our last coverage (Mission 3111 on 18 October), we estimate that Site 1 could now have full operational readiness and that Site 2 could achieve





this status by 25 October. By full operational readiness we mean the ability to launch in salvo four missiles per site with a refire capability of four missiles per site within 4 to 6 hours.


#### Sagua La Grande Area


- 3. The MRBM sites at Sagua La Grande were first identified on 17 October and were covered by photography twice that day. (The last previous coverage was on 7 July and showed no evidence of missile activity.) The status of preparation at the two sites on 17 October was approximately the same. It is believed that the missile regiment was moving imo the area on 17 October, inasmuch as 35 vehicles arrived in a support area at Site 1 within the 1 3/4 hour period between two photographic coverages.
- 4. Construction activity and random location of missile support equipment indicate that development of the area was not complete. The presence of missiles and launchers indicates that the sites have an emergency operational capability. However, the regiment could reach full operational readiness at these sites by 1 November.

#### Guanajay Area


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5. A detailed reexamination of the evidence available at this time indicates that the operational date for these launch sites may be somewhat earlier than our previous estimate. Construction activity appears to be progressing at a more rapid pace than that observed in the USSR at similar facilities. Several features of the sites such as the control bunkers, excavations for fuel tanks, and blast walls for component protection are several days more advanced than previously determined. Mission 3111 on 18 October indicates that concrete is being installed at all four pads at Site 1.





6. Although we are unable to determine a precise date for an operational capability, we believe these sites may be ready to launch missiles between 1 December and 15 December.







#### Nuclear Warheads for Offensive Missiles

- 9. At the probable nuclear storage site under construction adjacent to the Guanajay IRBM fixed missile launch Site 1, earth-moving activity at the 114 by 60 foot drive-through building continues at an apparent high rate.
- 10. A curved-roof building similar to that at Guanajay Site 1, but only about 35 by 67 feet has been observed at the newly identified possible missile site near Remedios.
- 11. Foundations of structures (approximately 60 by 35 feet) which might be intended to be future nuclear warhead storage facilities have been observed at the San Cristobal Sites 1 and 3 and at Sagua La Grande Site 1. The appearance of concrete arches nearby indicates that these buildings will be earth-covered.
- 12. The tank trailers observed in the quay area of the Punta Gerardo port facility are similar to those seen in 22 May 1962 photography taken before security fences were erected. This strongly suggests that these trucks have no nuclear association.
- 13. Search of the major airfields in Cuba has not as yet revealed any structures that can be identified as intended for nuclear storage.

#### Offensive Force Levels

See Table 2.

#### Support and Supply

No change.



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


#### Coastal Defense Missiles

No change.


#### Air Defense Missiles

- 14. There are now 24 primary surface-to-air missile (SA-2) sites located in Cuba (see Figure 2). Two of these sites, Santa Lucia and Deleite, each have an alternate site located 3 to 5 nm from the primary site. These alternate sites are pre-surveyed, have no equipment and could possibly be used for mobility training exercises. Of the 24 primary sites, 20 are individually operational at the present time. The remaining primary SA-2 sites could be operational sites in approximately one week.
- 15. There are 6 surface-to-air missile assembly and support areas. Photography shows large quantities of surface-to-air missile cannisters and missile transporters. See Table 3 for a list of surface-to-air missile sites, missile assembly areas and associated equipment.



### Guided Missile Patrol Craft

17. There are now a total of 12 KOMAR class patrol craft in Cuba. Each KOMAR craft carries two homing missiles which have an effective range of 10 to 15 nm and carry 2000 pound HE warheads. The KOMARs



- 5 -



must return to base or to a tender for reloading. Funders for these craft have not yet been identified in Cuba. All KOMARs in Cuba are considered to be operational. At least six are based at Havana and four at Banes. The remaining two have been observed operating in the Mariel area, but it is not known whether they are based there or were operating from the Havana base.


18. The KOMARs have all been transported to Cuba as deck cargo on Soviet ships, two and four per shipload. The first shipment arrived in Havana on 14 August 1962. Whereas it probably took several weeks to establish base and logistic support for the first KOMARs to become integrated fully operational units, additional units can probably become operational within one week after offloading.

#### Tactical Missiles

No change.

#### Significance

19. The apparent Soviet objective to rapidly achieve full operational status for their MRBM and IRBM regiments rather than to achieve an immediate operational capability at each site as the missiles and equipment arrive, may be very significant to the planners judging various Soviet courses of action.








#### Addendum

Preliminary analysis of photography of 18 October reveals an unidentified secured installation in an early stage of construction 5 nm southwest of the town of REMEDIOS. It consists of 4 large excavations in a symmetrical pattern; however, their function cannot be determined at this time. This installation is, however, considered to be a suspected surface-to-surface missile site.



70. Intelligence Memorandum, "Evaluation of Offensive Threat in Cuba," with cover memorandum, Carter to Members of United States Intelligence Board, 21 October 1962





# OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

21 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Members of the United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT : Evaluation of Offensive Threat in Cuba

- 1. The attached copy of the subject intelligence memorandum is forwarded for your information, guidance, and appropriate action. As agreed by the USIB, it is to be used as background material for oral briefings to authorized personnel only. Reproduction is not authorized.
- 2. It is believed that sufficient copies have been forwarded to you to meet the immediate operational requirement for preparation of briefings. Requests for additional copies or for initial distribution from offices not under your immediate control, but in your department of the Government, will be referred to you for action.

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence



## SECRET



#### EVALUATION OF OFFENSIVE THREAT IN CUBA


#### Significance

1. A significant deployment of guided missiles to Cuba is already well advanced, and has proceeded by first deploying a large force of defensive weapons, followed quickly by long-range offensive guided missiles and aircraft. (See Figure 1.) A mixed force of 1000- and 2200-nm ballistic missiles in Cuba provides for the first time a significant strategic strike capability against almost all targets in the U.S., and against a large portion of Canada and Latin America. (See Figure 2.) The planning for this operation must have started at least one year ago and the actual deployment itself began last spring.

#### Offensive Deployment

- 2. The equipment for 1000-nm ballistic missiles is now being deployed in Western Cuba at four launch sites near San Cristobal. (See Figures 3-5.) Two of these are now operational and the other two are proceeding to this status on an accelerated basis. The missiles are probably those reported moving into this area during September. Each of the four sites contains eight missiles and four unrevetted, field type launchers which rely on mobile erection, checkout, and support equipment. This implies a refire capability from each unit.
- 3. Other 1000-nm ballistic missiles are also deployed at two sites nine miles apart, east of Havana in the Sagua La Grande area. (See Figures 8-9.) These sites closely resemble the sites at San Cristobal but appear to be more permanent in nature. Terrain features have dictated considerable clearing and grading for deployment of the system. Also, there are permanent structures at the launch positions at each site and we estimate an operational capability for each site within one week. The sizes of the missiles, associated equipment, and buildings found at the San Cristobal and Sagua La Grande sites are almost identical and are compatible with the 1000-nm missile system.








- 4. Two fixed sites for 2200-nm, ballistic missiles are under construction in the Guanajay area near Havana. (See Figures 6-7.) Four launchers, two blockhouses, and underground propellant storage are being built at each site. Site 1 is considered to be in a mid-to-late stage of construction and should be operational within six weeks. Site 2 is in an earlier stage of construction and could be operational between 15 and 30 December 1962. There are no missiles or support equipment detectable within the Guanajay Area at the present time.
- 5. An additional fixed site has been observed at Remedios in Eastern Cuba which is similar to those at Guanajay. This is probably a valid indicator of deployment of a second grouping of 2200-nm ballistic missiles.
- 6. In addition to missiles, IL-28 light bomber aircraft with a combat radius of about 750 miles are also arriving in Cuba. Approximately 22 of these bombers, most still in crates, are now present. These are in addition to the force of about 40 MIG-21 fighters there.

#### Nuclear Warheads

- 7. We believe that a nuclear warhead storage site is under construction adjacent to the more complete of the fixed missile launch sites near Guanajay. (See Figure 6.) Construction is proceeding at a high rate. This site could become operational at about the same time as the associated Launch Site 1.
- A curved-roof building similar to that at Guanajay Site 1, but only about 35 by 67 feet has been observed at the newly identified possible missile site near Remedios.
- 9. Foundations of structures (approximately 60 by 35 feet) which may be intended to be future nuclear warhead storage facilities have been observed at the San Cristobal Sites 1 and 3 and at Sagua La Grande Site 1. The appearance of concrete arches nearby indicates that these buildings will be earth-covered.



### THE REST



- 10. Search of the major airfields in Cuba has not as yet revealed any structures that can be identified as intended for nuclear storage.
- 11. There is still no evidence of currently operational nuclear storage facilities in Cuba. Nevertheless, one must assume that nuclear weapons could now be in Cuba to support the operational missile capability as it becomes available. The missiles would probably be equipped with thermonuclear warheads.

#### Support and Supply

- 12. Offensive missile systems are being introduced into Cuba through the Port of Mariel and perhaps other ports. A new Soviet ship, the Poltava, possibly designed as a ballistic missile transport, has been noted making frequent trips between the USSR and Cuba. (See Figure 11.) This ship has made two trips to Cuba since 17 July, and is next estimated to arrive in Cuba on or about 2 November 1962.
- 13. Possible central missile checkout, storage, and repair bases have been located at Soroa, between the two eastern deployment areas, and at Managua, south of Havana.
- 14. It is significant that all of the ballistic and air defense missiles now being deployed in Cuba probably use a common oxidizer, permitting exploitation of a common system for propellant supply and storage.

#### Coastal Defense Missiles

15. Three coastal defense missile sites have now been identified in Cuba, two of which must now be considered operational (Banes and Santa Cruz del Norte). (See Figure 10.) These cruise missiles have a range of 35 to 40 miles.

#### Air Defense Missiles

16. There are now 24 primary surface-to-air missile sites located in Cuba. (See Figure 10.) Two of these sites, Santa Lucia and Deleite,






each have an alternate site located 3 to 5 nm from the primary site. These alternate sites are pre-surveyed, have no equipment and could possibly be used for mobility training exercises. Of the 24 primary sites, 20 are individually operational at the present time. The remaining primary surface-to-air missile sites could be operational in approximately one week.

17. There are 6 surface-to-air missile assembly and support areas. Photography shows large quantities of surface-to-air missile cannisters and missile transporters.

#### Guided Missile Patrol Craft

- 18. There are now a total of 12 missile-launching patrol craft in Cuba. Each craft carries two homing missiles which have an effective range of 10 to 15 nm and carry 2000-pound, high-explosive warheads. They must return to base or to a tender for reloading, although tenders for these craft have not yet been identified in Cuba. All of these missile launching patrol craft in Cuba are considered to be operational. All have been recently observed operating in the Mariel area, but it is not known whether they are based there or were operating from other bases.
- 19. These craft have all been transported to Cuba as deck cargo on Soviet ships, two and four per shipload. The first shipment arrived in Havana on 14 August 1962. Whereas it probably took several weeks to establish base and logistic support for the first craft to become integrated fully operational units, additional units can probably become operational within one week after offloading.



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#43

October 21, 1962

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, ATTORNEY GENERAL, SECRETARY MCNAMARA, GENERAL TAYLOR, AND MR. McCONE. 10:00 Am. - 10/21/6~

- General Sweeney reviewed in considerable detail the plans for an air strike against the missile bases, the air fields, a few SAM sites in critical locations and finally the plans for invasion.
- 2. It was decided that at a minimum an air strike must include both the missile sites and the air fields and such SAM sites as are necessary, and General Taylor was instructed to plan accordingly.
- 3. There was complete agreement that military action must include an invasion and occupation of Cuba.
- 4. Secretary McNamara and General Taylor told the President that an air strike could not provide absolute assurance that all missiles were destroyed; they indicated a 90 per cent probability. They also stated that any warning would very possibly cause the movement of missiles to obscure unknown locations from which they could become operational. General Taylor therefore recommended, on the basis of military grounds, that the air strike be conducted immediately, suggesting tomorrow morning, and that it be without warning. Secretary McNamara confirmed the military appraisal expressed above but made no recommendation as to policy.
- 5. In response to direct questioning from the President, the Attorney General and McCone advised against surprise attack for the reasons discussed at previous meetings. The Attorney General failed to make an absolute recommendation with respect to future military actions, indicating this question could be decided as the situation developed from day to day, and that only preparatory

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steps should be taken now. McCone urged on the other hand that the President in a public statement indicate an intention to remove the missiles and other potential weapons by means and at a time of his own choosing if surveillance did not prove conclusively that the Soviets and the Cubans were removing them.

6. The meeting adjourned to be reconvened at 2:30, with additional principals in attendance.

John A. McCone Director

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TAT GEO

October 21, 1962

MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT ALONE, OCTOBER 21, 1962. (Approx. 4:30 p.m.)

On my report of my discussion with General Eisenhower at my residence this morning, the following information was given later to the Attorney General. It is not to be given to anyone else.

After briefing by Lundahl, General Eisenhower and I engaged in a long discussion concerning the proper procedure to be followed. Eisenhower's conclusions are as follows:

- 1. Any military action would be inconclusive and therefore inadvisable unless it employed invasion and occupation of Cuba. Eisenhower gave this opinion on a basis of his experience in war in countless examples of air strikes which though most effective, were never completely conclusive.
- 2. From a military point of view a surprise attack would be most effective and most desirable if followed in a minimum time by invasion.
- 3. However, from a broader point of view, he opposed surprise attack because of the indictment, the resulting tensions, and the fact that such action by the United States would license other countries to resort to violent military action without notice.
- 4. Therefore Eisenhower would accept the handicaps from a military point of view, of warning or notice, and therefore would follow the suggested plan of initiating a blockade, conducting intense surveillance, and announcing the intention of taking military action if the Soviets and the Cubans either maintained the status quo of their missile installations or continued the construction of theil missile bases. The military action he envisaged would be air strikes and invasion.



## HOP SECRET

5. General Eisenhower emphasized he was giving his opinion based solely on intelligence and without the benefit of a study of the war plans or the most recent diplomatic exchanges with Castro, Khrushchev, our allies, etc. It seemed fair to conclude that his views as expressed above represent a flash judgment rather than a considered judgment arrived at with all facets of the problem laid before him.

John A. McCone Director

- 2 -

73. McCone, Memorandum for the File, "Meeting with the Vice President on 21 October 1962," 22 October 1962

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22 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting with the Vice President on ZI October 1962

On Sunday night, October 21 at 8:30 I brisfed Vice President Lyndon Johnson at the request of the President, conveyed through McGeorge Bundy.

The briefing involved a review of photography by Lundahi paralleling briefings given to General Eisenhower and others.

We then discussed policy and details of the proposed speech by the President in considerable detail.

The thrust of the Vice President's thinking was that he favored an unannounced strike rather than the agreed plan which involved blockade and strike and invasion later if conditions warranted. He expressed displeasure at "telegraphing our punch" and also commented the blockade would be ineffective because we in effect are "locking the barn after the horse was gone".

I followed the position and the arguments used in my briefing paper of 20 October. The Fice President finally agreed reluctantly but only after learning among other things the support indicated by General Eisenhower.

JOHN A. McCONE

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SHORT EYES CONT

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#### TOD SECRET

@ 0, 21 Oct 62

#### SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP IN CUBA

- I. Now clear to US that Khrushchev last spring made foreign policy decision on Cuba which involved unprecedented risks and which made it undeniable that Soviets are playing for very high stakes indeed.
  - A. Soviets believed decisive action necessary because:
    - 1. Cuban economy was deteriorating;
    - There seemed to be mounting pressure in the US for intervention.
  - B. Soviets also saw opportunity to:
    - Demonstrate that the US can no longer prevent advance of Soviet offensive power even in its own hemisphere;
    - Significantly expand Soviet capabilities for initial attack on US targets;
    - 3. Thus weaken Western resolve and unity in countering Soviet moves in the East-West global contest, particularly over Berlin and Germany.
- II. The Soviet decision has since been implemented in two phases:
  - A. First, the build-up during the summer of defensive capabilities;

TOP SPORET

400, 21 Oct 62

- B. Second, the establishment this fall of a major Soviet base in Cuba for strategic attack on the US.
- III. What we know about what the Soviets are actually doing in Cuba is based on hard intelligence from many sources:
  - A. Repeated aerial photography of Cuba, which has been compared with a mass of aerial photography of the USSR;
  - B. Photography of Soviet ships en route to Cuba from low-altitude aircraft and by surface observers in various locations;
  - C. A firm knowledge, developed from many sources over the years, of Soviet military doctrine and practice;
  - D. Interrogation in detail of the 1,500-2,000 refugees a week coming into Florida from Cuba;
  - E. Agent operations.
  - IV. The first indication that the USSR had taken a decision on Cuba came in late July.
    - A. At that time, 4 Soviet passenger ships after a voyage under secrecy conditions arrived at the western Cuban naval base, Mariel. As of 20 October, fifteen such unpublicized passenger voyages have been counted.

- 2 -

#### TOP SECRET 0400 21 Oct 62

- B. In early August, dry cargo vessels began arriving in unprecedented numbers.
  - Since then about 140 voyages--including the largest and newest of the Soviet merchant fleet--have been made or are in progress.
  - 2. Of these, only about 15 were clearly not involved in delivering military cargo. About 100 have carried military equipment and the cargoes of the other twenty-five have not yet been established. (Soviet vessels carrying arms normally make false declarations of destination when passing the Bosporus.)
  - 3. Most of the Bloc cargoes supporting the Cuban civilian economy—which now requires assistance ranging from baby food and grain to machinery parts—is now moving in Western flag vessels.
- The earlier deliveries, up to about 1 September, appeared to consist largely of military construction, transportation, and electronics equipment, and led to speculation that the Soviets might be deploying a SAM system.

- 3 -

TOP SECRET

430, 21 Oct 62

- Photography of 29 August and 5 September confirmed that a SAM system was being deployed. Twelve sites were identified.
   One MIG-21 was seen, as were eight Komarclass missile boats and one land-based antishipping cruise missile site. During September the known number of each of these systems increased.
- D. In early September, consequently, we had ample evidence of a significant buildup. All confirmed deliveries, however, fitted into a pattern of weapons which are essentially defensive in design and in normal operational employment. On basis of such evidence President issued his statements of 4 and 13 September that Soviet activity in Cuba was defensive in nature.
- V. Our present knowledge of the state of these weapons in Cuba is as follows:
  - A. SAM sites (These are the standard Soviet sixlauncher second-generation-type called in NATO terminology GUIDELINE).
    - At least 24 sites, with alternate positions for several. These sites cover most of the island. Three or four more will cover the entire island.

- 4 -