CHRONOLOGY

4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Light
(contd)

24 Jan 1959 Detachment Number Seven, 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Light, consisting of three RB-57D-2 aircraft, crews, support personnel and equipment in place at Brize Norton Air Base, England on Operation "Border Town". (S)

20 Mar 1959 Detachment Number Five, 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Light, consisting of three U-2 aircraft, four crews, support personnel and equipment in place at Eielson AFB, Alaska on Project "Toy Soldier III", and "Fortune Finder". (S)

23 Mar 1959 First "Congo Maiden" mission flown by Detachment Five. (S)

28 Mar 1959 Last "Congo Maiden" mission flown by Detachment Five. The "Congo Maiden" missions were planned to be accomplished over a period of several weeks but due to unusually favorable weather conditions, they were accomplished in six days. (S)

6 Apr 1959 Detachment Number Seven redeployed to Laughlin AFB from Brize Norton AF, England after completion of Operation "Border Town". (S)

1 May 1959 The 4080th SRW adapted the Deputy Commander concept of operation. (U)

1 May 1959 508th Tactical Hospital inactivated. (U)

15 May 1959 Detachment Number Five redeployed to Laughlin AFB from Eielson AFB, Alaska after completion of operations "Toy Soldier III" and "Fortune Finder". (S)

SECRET

I - MISSION, ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

Mission: The primary mission of the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Light remained unchanged during the month os April and May 1959, which was the conducting of strategic reconnaissance missions.[1] The primary mission of the 4080th Combat Support Group also remained unchanged during April and May 1959, which was to support the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Light.[2] (U)

Operation "Border Town": In January 1959, three RB-57D-2 aircraft and four combat ready crews together with 115 personnel and approximately 46-tons of supplies and equipment were deployed from Laughlin Air Force Base, Texas, to Brize Norton Royal Air Force Station, England. This deployment was given the unclassified nickname "Border Town" and designated as Detachment Seven, 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Light. The advance party for the deployment departed Laughlin Air Force Base on 16 January 1959, arriving at Brize Norton a few days subsequent with the last aircraft arriving on 26 January 1959. The RB-57D-2 aircraft and crews departed Laughlin on 24 January 1959, arriving at Brize Norton the same date after one air refueling and flying non-stop. The time for the tactical aircraft to make the non-stop flight was approximately 11:30 hours for two of the aircraft and 12:15 hours for the third aircraft. The third aircraft lost all oxygen at the point of no return over the Atlantic ocean but managed to make land-fall by maintaining maximum altitude within the

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1. Stated in 2AF Regulation 23-12, dated 12 November 1957.
2. Stated in SAC Regulation 20-15R, dated 27 March 1959.

capability of the crew. This crew was required to fly at cabin altitudes of 15,000 to 18,000 feet in order to have sufficient fuel to reach land. A strip alert tanker was launched from Upper Heyford Royal Air Force Station, England and a rendezvous and a second air refueling was accomplished at Lands End, England, which enabled the RB-57D-2 aircraft to reach Brize Norton for landing. Two air refuelings were scheduled on the deployment; however, the first one was cancelled due to weather and at the second air refueling two receivers took on more than 15,000 pounds of fuel each and were required to share the spare tanker in order to fill their tanks. At least 20,000 pounds of fuel should have been available from each tanker to preclude the necessity for using a spare tanker.[3] (S)

Personnel deployed on the detachment consisted of 19 officer, 88 airmen, and 11 civilians (Three of the civilians were deployed from Warner Robins Air Material Area depot). Personnel selected for the deployment were notified more than 30 days in advance with the exception of one or two isolated cases, and the individuals receiving less than 30 days notification were counselled to insure that no personal hardship would be incurred. Prior to the end of the operations at the detachment, eight airmen personnel from the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing and two civilians from WRAMA were returned early because of no further requirement for their services at the Temporary Duty (TDY) location. Because of the high priority placed upon the successful completion of the mission the Detachment was heavily

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3. Ltr, Hq 4080th SRW to Comdr 2AF, subj: "Commander's Final Mission Report/M-27/Operations Order 33-59A, Border Town", DO, 17 April 1959. Exhibit 1.

manned to preclude any possibility of failure due to lack of qualified personnel. It was determined that future deployments with similar requirements could be reduced approximately 50.0 percent without sacrificing the capability of the unit.[4] (C)

The administrative workload during the TDY period was much heavier than was expected. Approximately 700 incoming or outgoing messages were processed and a high percentage of these messages were classified which required careful logging and filing. There were also numerous reports, and routine correspondence that created a relatively heavy administrative workload. As no administrative officer was deployed with the detachment one of the intelligence officers had to assume the duties of administrative officer.[5] (C)

Fourteen missions were scheduled to be flown during the period of the deployment and after the last mission was completed during the latter part of March 1959, 7th Air Division informed Strategic Air Command (SAC) Headquarters and Second Air Force Headquarters that the detachment could be released immediately for re-deployment to Laughlin Air Force Base. The usual tear down, crating, and normal preparation for the arrival of the first support aircraft was initiated. However, 35:00 hours from the scheduled departure of the first two support aircraft a delay message was received with instructions to maintain capability. Approaching so near re-deployment time before receiving information of an extension created many additional problems. It took considerable time to regain the capability existing at the time prepara-

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4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

tion was begun for re-deployment.[6] The detachment was released for re-deployment and the RB-57D-2 aircraft arrived back at Laughlin Air Force Base on 5 April 1959.[7] (S)

Project "Toy Soldier III": Detachment Five, 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing deployed to Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, in March 1959, for the purpose of conducting weather sampling missions under Operations Order 62-59 "Toy Soldier III" and Operations Order 75-59 "Fortune Finder". This detachment consisted of three U-2 aircraft, crews, support personnel and equipment and with the bulk of the "Congo Maiden" missions completed during March 1959, the month of April started out quietly and remained so for the entire month. April was devoted to accomplishing the scheduled 15 successful sampling missions plus two "Congo Maiden" missions.[9] (S)

Higher Headquarters was very much pleased with the results of the "Congo Maiden" missions as was evidenced by a message from General Thomas S. Power, Commander-In-Chief Strategic Air Command. The message from General Power to Colonel A. J. Bratton, Commander 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing read:

> "Congratulations for the splendid job performed by your crews and personnel during the recent "Congo Maiden" project. Although the operational phase of this project was of short duration, extensive coordination and planning was required. The entire operation was performed without incident and in such a manner as to bring recognition to the personnel of your command who were respon-

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6. Ibid.
7. Msg, Comdr 4080th SRW to CINCSAC, DMMR 5064D, 6 April 1959. Exhibit 2.
8. History, 4080th SRW, March 1959, pp. 5.
9. History, Det #5, 4080th SRW, April 1959. Exhibit 3.

Soldier III" was 3 April 1959. The first four sorties flown were unsuccessful because of equipment failure in the ball sampler installation. The last "Toy Soldier III" sorties was flown 29 April 1959, which completed the required fifteen successful sorties. In addition to the "Toy Soldier III" sorties flown during the month, three additional "Congo Maiden" routes were approved. Two of these routes were flown and operationally were considered successful although one route was partially cloud covered. The remaining route was scheduled twice but was cancelled by higher headquarters presumably because of weather. In order to obtain two successful "Congo Maiden" sorties it was necessary to schedule four sorties and 26 sorties were scheduled and 23 airborne in order to obtain 15 successful "Toy Soldier III" sorties.[27] With all the requirements accomplished, Detachment Five redeployed to Laughlin Air Force Base with the U-2 aircraft arriving at Laughlin on 14 May 1959.[28] (S)

Detachment Seven Operations: Three RB-57D-2 aircraft and four combat ready crews together with a total of 115 personnel and approximately 46 tons of supplies and equipment were deployed

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27. History, Det #5, 4080th SRW, April 1959. Exhibit 3.
28. Msg, Comdr 4080th SRW to CINCSAC, DCMA 6119E, 15 May 1959. Exhibit 69.

from Laughlin Air Force Base, Texas to Brize Norton Royal Air Force Station in England. The Advon Personnel departed the home station on 16 January 1959 and arrived at the TDY site on 19 January 1959. The remainder of support aircraft arrived a few days subsequent with the last aircraft arriving on 26 January. The tactical aircraft and crews departed Laughlin on 24 January and completed the deployment non-stop, with one air refueling, with one aircraft making the trip in 12:15 hours and the other two aircraft in 11:30 hours. One of the aircraft experienced the loss of oxygen at the point of no return over the Atlantic ocean but managed to make land-fall by maintaining altitude within the capability of the crew.[29] (S)

After arrival in the United Kingdom (UK) all crews were required by 7th Air Division to complete an orientation flight immediately after arrival at Brize Norton. These flights were planned to provide maximum opportunity for familiarization of communication facilities and procedures and Jet letdowns, at selected SAC Bases in the UK. In addition to the orientation flights, 14 other flights were scheduled and accomplished, with 11 of the flights successful. Two missions were considered unsatisfactory due to malfunction of the digital tape of the 320

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29. Ltr, Hq 4080th SRW to Comdr 2AF, subj: "Commander's Final Mission Report/M-27/Operations Order 33-59A, "Border Town," DO, 17 April 1959. Exhibit 1.

SAFE System and one because of excessive fluctuation of signal characteristics.[30] (S)

Weather presented a problem in adhering to the projected schedule as long periods of low ceilings and visibility associated with fog and stratus type weather resulted in delays of some missions and re-scheduling of others. During extended periods of this type weather, an additional problem resulted because the aircraft were grounded for excessive periods of time. It was found that the equipment continued to work better if the stand-down time did not exceed five days. A turn around time of three to four days on each aircraft was optimum and was considered good procedure on future deployments to fly each aircraft on a short operational check when the flying schedule provided more than five to seven days stand down between missions.[31] (S)

The reliability of the equipment of the RB-57D-2 weapons system during operation "Border Town" far exceeded past performance. Each mission flown was carefully analyzed locally, within the capability of available facilities. It was found that logical information was obtained on approximately 95.0 percent of all signals analyzed using a manual read out of the cards produced from the 320 SAFE System; whereas the automatic read out used by the 544th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron would produce solutions on

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30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.

only approximately 66.0 percent of the analysis. The manual readout required an officer and one airman approximately six hours. Considering the vast increase in solutions obtained using the manual procedure it appeared mandatory that at least all missions, on which solutions were lost, be reduced manually in order to secure maximum results.[32] (S)

The crews were relieved from all training requirements for the training quarter by virtue of completing more than 60 days TDY. Considerable training was accomplished and the operational requirements which were completed provided much more diversified training than would have been possible at the home station. A noticeable increase in crew proficiency was apparent with the completion of each mission and mission accomplishment forms were completed and accurate training records maintained.[33] (C)

After the 14 scheduled missions were completed, Headquarters SAC and Second Air Force were notified by 7th Air Division that the detachment could be released immediately for re-deployment. The usual tear down, crating, and normal preparation for the arrival of the first support aircraft was initiated. However, 35 hours from the scheduled departure of the first two support aircraft a delay message was received with instructions to maintain capability. Approaching so near re-deployment time before receiving

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32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.

information of an extension created many additional problems as considerable time was required to regain the capability existing at the time preparation was begun for re-deployment.[34] The detachment was released for re-deployment the second time and the RB-57D-2 aircraft arrived back at Laughlin Air Force Base on 5 April 1959.[35] (S)

Justification for B-57C Aircraft: There were three B-57C aircraft assigned to the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing which were utilized for giving initial check out flights to pilots prior to them flying the RB-57D-2 aircraft and the RB-57D-2 combat ready crews were required to receive all their instrument training, instrument practice, and standardization flights in the B-57C. The RB-57D-2 aircraft was a twin engine single pilot aircraft and the B-57C was the only dual controlled aircraft which could be substituted for the primary mission aircraft because of similar characteristics and design. Due to the limited number of RB-57D-2 sorties available, key staff personnel in the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing received all their tactical flying in the B-57C aircraft. The monthly operational requirements for the B-57C aircraft was 60 diversified training sorties and the monthly maintenance capability with the three B-57C aircraft assigned was

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34. Ibid.
35. Msg, Comdr 4080th SRW to CINCSAC, DMMR 5064D, 6 April 1959. Exhibit 2.

approximately 49 sorties, although the maintenance schedule for the same aircraft was approximately 62 sorties. With the three B-57C aircraft assigned the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing could complete its assigned mission. However, if the maintenance capability and schedule was lowered or if the B-57C aircraft inventory was reduced, the RB-57D-2 training of the 4080th would have required complete modification and/or reduction.[36] (U)

Major Aircraft Accident: On 15 May 1959, a Nationalist Chinese Air Force Pilot was accomplishing his initial check out ride in the U-2 aircraft when he was involved in what was considered a major aircraft accident. The pilot had completed all ground work satisfactorily, was current in the T-33 aircraft, and had completed necessary flights in the U-3A aircraft. An excellent flight briefing was conducted by an Instructor Pilot and everything was normal during run up and take-off roll, until the aircraft reached approximately 60 knots speed. At approximately 60 knots, the tail wheel came off the runway, with the pilot holding forward stick. As the speed increased to 90 knots the mobile control instructor told the pilot to come back on the stick. Apparently the pilot failed to do this, for the aircraft became air borne momentarily and then settled onto the runway on the nose gear. The mobile control instructor had repeated his call to come back on

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36. Msg, Comdr 4080th SRW to Comdr 2AF, DOT 5196D, 9 April 1959. Exhibit 70.

the stick, but the aircraft porpoised after the initial touch-down, and during the porpoise the mobile control instructor once again advised the student pilot to come back on the stick and called for added power. The student pilot responded but not in time for the aircraft to complete the porpoise and contact the ground hard. The aircraft was checked in the air for damage and landed without further incident.[37] (S)

Inspection of the aircraft after landing revealed extensive damage to bulkhead and fuselage skin areas near and around both forward and rear landing gears. It was considered as pilot error as the accident could have been avoided if the pilot had followed instructions given by the mobile control officer to come back on the stick during the take off roll.[38] (S)

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37. Msg, Comdr 4080th SRW to CINCSAC, 4080DS 59E, 15 May 1959. Exhibit 71.
38. Ibid.

FM COMAF 2 BARKSDALE AFB LA SECRET SECRET 0900L/27FEB59

TO COMSTRATRECONWG 4080 LAUGHLIN AFB TEXAS/MAIL/ 272115

SECRET FROM: DOD M-9-5000. SUBJ: (Uncl) RB-57 Conference. Part i of 3 part. /SAC message DO 1742, Secret, 17 FEB 59, is quoted for your information.

Quote. This message in 7 parts. Part 1. Reference your Secret message C M 9-3409, Subj: Phase-Out of RB-57Do Aircraft, dtd 9 Feb 59. Concur with your recommendation for conference to study entire package and make final recommendations. Part 2. Request your D/Plans and a maximum of four appropriately cleared persons from your hq and Laughlin AFB vidit this hq 25 Mar 59 for the purpose of briefing SAC staff on proposed 4025th SRS program. Request your hq effect coordination with 4080th, 55th and COMWRAMA as necessary to evaluate all aspects of problem. Part 3. Background for briefing preparation and discussion is as follows: A. Contingent upon results of Project "Pied Piper Gypsy," this hq will determine whether RB-57D-2 acft will be retained in SAC inventory or phased out. Termination of testing period is approximately 15 Mar 59. SAC position will be forwarded to you ASAP subsequent to 15 Mar 59. Part 4. Planning factors which must be considered in the event of the RB-57D-2 acft are retained include: A. Concept of operations to provide manning and equipment to support a Detachment of two (2) acft on overseas TDY on a continuous basis. B. Crew/acft ration which will provide TDY frequency of three months per eighteen months per combat crew. C. Squadron staff manning capable of supporting detachment concept of operations. D. Retention of sufficient B-57C acft to meet transition and pilot standardization requirements.

LT COL MERCHANT

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Part 5. Initial review of proposed movement of RB-57 acft to Forbes AFB indicates consideration must be given to the following areas: (1) Spares and support equipment problems relative to support of an additional weapons system at Forbes AFB. (2) Programmed missile activation, possible movement of 338th SRS (Weather) from Forbes and movement of a medium bomb wing to Forbes AFB. (3) Costly and excellent facilities recently justified and constructed at Laughlin AFB. Areas indicated in Part V will be closely evaluated. Part 6. Pertinent guidance expected soonest from USAF will be forwarded to you upon receipt. Part 7. The SAC D/Plans project officer for this program is Major B. P. Smith, DPLCZ, Extension 28164, this hq. Unquote. Part 2. Request 4080th prepare recommendations on Part 4 of SAC message for discussion with 2AF representatives on staff visit tentatively scheduled for Laughlin on 11 March. Part 3. Request you evaluate reasons for and against move of D-2 acft to Forbes and be prepared to discuss in detail on 11 Mar during 2AF staff visit.

A TRUE COPY:

W. P. CUMISKEY
Major, USAF

DOD/eda

SECRET 2158Z/18MAY59 SECRET

COMSTRATRECONWG 4080 PRIORITY
LAUGHLIN AFB, TEXAS

COMSTRATRECONWG 4080 DET 3 RAMEY AFB, P. R.

COMSTRATRECONWG 4080 DET 4 EZEIZA AIRPORT, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA

INFO: COMAF 2 BARKSDALE AFB, LA

SECRET/FROM DCO 65 E. DAYLIGHT. SUBJECT: (U) VOICE RECORDER FOR U-2 AIRCRAFT. REFERENCE SAC SECRET MESSAGE DOPLRS 458 AND 2AF SECRET MESSAGE, DODT M-9-11091. EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE, THE REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN A VOICE RECORDING CAPABILITY IN THE U-2 AIRCRAFT NO LONGER EXISTS.

A TRUE COPY:

W. P. CUMISKEY
Major, USAF

JOHN B. BOYNTON, LT COLONEL, USAF

DCO 414 SECRET 1 of 1

SECRET

892488

FINAL MISSION REPORT FOR DETACHMENT 7

1. Final mission report for Detachment Seven, 4080th SRW Operations Order 33-59A, Bordertown, Headquarters, 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Light, dated 19 Dec 58.

2. Brief Narrative:

Three RB-57D-2 aircraft and four combat ready crews together with a total of one hundred and fifteen personnel and approximately forty-six tons of supplies and equipment were deployed from Laughlin AFB, Texas to Brize Norton RAF Station in England. The Advon Personnel departed the home station on 16 January 1959 and arrived at the TDY site on 19 January 1959. The remainder of support aircraft arrived a few days subsequent with the last aircraft arrival on 26 January 1959. The tactical aircraft and crews departed the home station at 0100Z 24 January 1959 after a twenty four hour delay due to weather. All three tactical aircraft completed the deployment non-stop with two logging approximately eleven and one-half hours and the third twelve and one-quarter hours. The third aircraft lost all oxygen at the point of no return over the Atlantic ocean but managed to make land fall by maintaining maximum altitude within the capability of the crew. This crew was required to fly at cabin altitudes of fifteen to eighteen thousand feet in order to have sufficient fuel to reach land. A strip alert tanker was launched from Upper Heyford by 7th Air Division and a rendezvous and a second Air Refueling was accomlished at Lands End which enabled the crew to proceed to Brize Norton for landing. An Operational Hazard report dated 30 January 1959 was prepared and forwarded covering this incident in detail. Two air

refuelings were scheduled on the deployment, however, the first one was cancelled due to weather. At the second air refueling two receivers took on more than 15,000 pounds of fuel each and were required to share the spare tanker in order to fill their tanks. At least 20,000 pounds of fuel should be available from each tanker to preclude the necessity for using a spare tanker. (S)

3. Personnel and Administration:

a. Personnel: One hundred and fifteen 4080th SRW Personnel and three support personnel from WRAMA were deployed on Project Border Town. Personnel consisted of nineteen officers, eighty eight airmen and eleven civilians. Personnel were selected and notified more than thirty days prior to deployment except for one or two isolated cases. Individuals receiving less than thirty days notice were carefully counselled to insure that no personal hardship would be incurred. Eight 4080th SRW Airmen personnel and two civilians from WRAMA were returned early because of no further requirement for their services at TDY location. Because of the high priority placed upon the successful completion of the mission the Detachment was heavily manned to preclude any possibility of failure due to a lack of qualified personnel. The manning of future Detachments with similar requirements can be reduced approximately fifty percent without sacrificing the capability of the unit. There were no personnel problems throughout the period of the TDY. (C)

b. Administration: The administrative work load was much heavier than expected. Approximately seven hundred incoming or outgoing messages were processed. A high percentage of these messages

were classified requiring careful logging and filing as required of all classified matter. There were also numerous reports, and routine correspondence that created a relatively heavy administrative workload. (C)

4. Operations and Training:

All crews were required, by 7th Air Division, to complete an orientation flight immediately after arrival at Brize Norton RAF Station. These flights were planned to provide maximum opportunity for familiarization of communication facilities and procedures and Jet letdowns, at selected SAC Bases in the United Kingdom. The orientation missions, as well as operational checks of equipment, and test hops, were conducted under the provisions of Operations Order Half-Breed, Headquarters, 7th Air Division, dated 27 January 1959. After all crews had completed an orientation flight a written critique was prepared and forwarded to 7th Air Division. (C)

Fourteen other flights were scheduled and accomplished under Frag Order, dated 31 Dec 58 Pied Piper Gypsy to Operations Order 60-59, dated 26 May 1958. (S)

Weather presented a problem in adhering to the projected schedule. Long periods of low ceilings and visibility associated with fog and stratus type weather resulted in delays of some missions and re-scheduling of others. During extended periods of this type weather, an additional problem resulted becaused the aircraft were grounded for excessive periods of time. It was found that the equipment continued to work better if the stand-down time did not exceed five days. A turn around time of three to four days on each aircraft is optimum and it is considered good procedure on future deployments to fly each

aircraft on a short operational check when the flying schedule provides more than five to seven days stand down between missions. (S)

The following recap indicates the mission results based upon accomplishments obtained using manual ground data reduction:

Number of Missions Scheduled:	14	
Number of Missions flown:	14	
Ground Aborts:	0	
Air Aborts (1 late T.O.)	3	(1 partially satisfactory)
Late Take Offs	1	
Number Succesful Missions:	11	
Number Unsuccessful Missions:	3	

Two missions were considered unsatisfactory due to a malfunction of the digital tape of the 320 SAFE System and one because of excessive fluctuation of signal characteristics. The missions considered unsuccesful provided considerable information from the APD-4 and the KD-2 camera. (S)

The reliability of the equipment of the D-2 weapons system during the deployment period by far exceeded past performance. Each mission flown was carefully analyzed locally, within the capability of available facilities. It was found that logical information was obtained on approximately ninety-five percent of all signals analyzed using a manual read out of the cards produced from the 320 SAFE System; whereas the automatic readout used by the 544th RTS will produce solutions on only approximately sixty-six percent of the analysis. The manual readout requires an officer and one airman approximately six hours. Considering the vast increase in solutions obtained using the manual procedure it appears mandatory that at least all missions, on which solutions are lost, be reduced manually in order to secure maximum results. (S)

The O-20 film was carefully replotted to determine navigation accuracy. On mission number two, one target return was misidentified which caused a forty-five mile navigation error. Prior to the first two missions, scope photography was not available in sufficient time to provide adequate study of the routes flown. On all subsequent flights available film was utilized to provide intensive study which produced accurate navigation tracks with precision resets of the ASN-6 ground position indicator. The average flight line deviation was approximately five miles from planned track. (S)

In some areas, extremely heavy concentrations of electronic signals, within certain frequency ranges, presents a problem in signal separation for accurate analysis. It is mandatory that each signal be isolated and analysed separately in order to produce accurate results. When more than one signal is analyzed simultaneosly, erroneous characteristics will be reflected and an inaccurate solution will result. The six MC band pass filter presently installed to help alleviate this problem requires further improvement in order to eliminate it. (S)

The crews were relieved from all training requirements for the quarter by virtue of completing more than sixty days TDY. Considerable training was accomplished and the operational requirements which were completed provided much more diversified training than would have been possible at the home station. A noticeable increase in crew proficiency was apparent with the completion of each mission. Mission accomplishment forms were completed and accurate records training records were maintained. (C)

After the fourteen scheduled missions were completed, 7th Air Division informed SAC Headquarters and Second AF Headquarters that the Detachment could be released immediately for re-deployment. The usual tear down, creating, and

Normal preparation for the arrival of the first support aircraft was initiated. Thirty-five hours from the scheduled departure of the first two support aircraft a delay message was received with instructions to maintain capability. Approaching so near re-deployment time before receiving information of an extension creates many additional problems. It then takes considerable time to regain the capability existing at the time pareparation was begun for re-deployment. (C)

5. Logistics:

(a) Maintenance:

Maintenance throughout the TDY period was excellent. The various systems of the aircraft performed with a much higher percentage of reliability than during any equivalent period of time in the history of the aircraft. An evaluation of the equipment and the percentage of reliability is estimated as follows: (S)

APN 107	100%	
320 SAFE	80%	93% Excluding tape malfunctions
APR 9	93%	
APR 14	100%	
APA 69	93%	
APA 74	100%	
APD 4	90%	
KD 2	97%	
O-20	98%	
System III	100%	
Auto-Pilot	86%	
APG	93%	

The basis for determining equipment reliability was mission completion. (S)

Although the RB-57D2 Weapons System showed remarkable improvement in reliability there are some areas that should be considered for further improvement. There are modifications particularly in the 320 SAFE System and the allied GFE equipment which appear feasible and desireable. A study will be made and recommended changes will be submitted at a later date. (S)

In so far as possible maintenance technicians were assigned to one aircraft and their entire efforts were devoted to their particular equipment on the aircraft to which they were assigned. This resulted in becoming more familiar with the characteristics and peculiarities of the equipment on their aircraft. This developed a spirit of team work which assisted in making every scheduled take-off an event and undoubtedly was a contributing factor in the improvement in equipment reliability. This type of maintenance is considered particularly effective on this weapons system during TDY periods and is worthy of consideration at the home station in so far as these procedures can be employed. COMMENT #1. Weather during the TDY period provided considerable precipitation, fog, and high humidity. All three aircraft were hangered at all times except for the period approximately three hours prior to flight until one hour after landing. This procedure was very effective in eliminating possible malfunctions of electronic equipment caused by excessive moisture and also provided the most ideal conditions for performing maintenance, pre-flight and for the security guards. The most serious maintenance problem resulted from a series of tape transport malfunctions in

the 320 SAFE System. Two malfunctions occurred during airborne flight and during a very thorough check of all tape decks, three more malfunctioning units were discovered in the shop. These malfunctions resulted from two different causes. The tension of the drive capstan was found to be out of adjustment and screws which attach the fasteners to the lid occasionally caused binding. The tension on the drive capstans were adjusted and the screws were reversed so that the screw heads would be in the inside of the lid which prevents any possibility of binding from this cause. (S)

(b) SUPPLY:

Supply support was outstanding during the entire TDY period. There were no AOCP and practically no ANFEs. The depot support provided by WRAMA was excellent and the WRAMA representative, at the TDY site with the Detachment, provided valuable assistance in coordinating with the depot and in assisting in monitoring supply requirements. Re-supply provided through reflex aircraft was invaluable, particularly on critical items. The Reflex deliveries averaged six days from requisition and routine deliveries through normal supply channels averaged eleven days. Some Reflex deliveries were received within three days. (C)

The Fly-a-way Kit proved to be adequate but can be improved by further screening and by applying the knowledge gained from its use during the TDY. Consumption data has been recorded and will be used to recommend improvements. The Fly-a-way Kit used was a RB-57Do kit with a D2 prod pack. In the future all items common only to the

RB-57D and D-1 will be deleted from the kit in order to reduce airlift requirements. (U)

(c) Transportation and Mobility:

The MATS support provided on the deployment was not nearly as good as on the re-deployment. There was an excessive amount of off-loading enroute which increases the possibility of damage or loss of equipment and also increases the time enroute. The Advon was picked up by a C-124 that was known to be incapable of making the entire trip which resulted in a ten hour delay at Donaldson AFB. Other support aircraft experienced unnecessary delays on the deployment. The re-deployment was well -planned and was completed in a very efficient manner. The unit mobility plan appears to be satisfactory based upon the experience of this TDY. (C)

(d) Base Facilities:

The Base Facilities at the TDY site were completely adequate and the Base support received was outstanding. The hanger, A&E shops and Operations building were well-adapted to Detachment 7 requirements. All other requirements were adequately provided by the 3920th Combat Support Group. (U)

6. Intelligence:

The Border Town Operations Order was not specific as to the intelligence requirements, therefore an air intelligence officer and a photo radar intelligence officer were included in the manning. It was found that considerable activity was experienced in both areas and these skills were well utilized on the deployment with one of the officers performing additional duty as Administrative Officer.

Deployments of this type serve as an excellent means of providing realistics retraining and familiarization in intelligence functions. (C)

7. Security:

The classification of the deployment coupled with the sensitive nature of the overall operation required that very tight security be maintained. All personnel were thoroughly indoctrinated concerning security. The fact that the aircraft were hangered most of the time seemed to arouse a little unwarranted suspicion, on the other hand, having the aircraft inside the hanger enabled the security guards to perform a more effective job of providing security. (U)

RECOMMANDATIONS:

1. That the deployment and re-deployment legs flown by the tactical aircraft be restricted to approximately eight to nine hours. (U)

2. Each tanker be required to carry a minimum of twenty thousand pounds of fuel to eliminate necessity of utilizing more than one tanker per receiver during air refueling. (U)

3. That air support planning be accomplished to eliminate necessity for off loading large quantities of equipment enroute. (U)

4. That consideration be given to further improvement of the 320 SAFE System, particularly on minor modifications. (C)

5. That manual data reduction be used to reduce data from the 320 SAFE in order to provide a maximum number of accurate analysis. (C)

6. That radar scope photography be provided, if available, in sufficient time to allow adequate study prior to the first sortie. (C)

7. That the prime depot again provide a supply liaison representative on future deployments. (U)

8. That REFLEX flights again be utilized on future deployments to provide fast re-supply particularly on critical items and anticipated AOCPs and ANFEs. (U)

9. That an improved Fly-a-way Kit listing be submitted by this Headquarters and acted upon by WRAMA. (U)

10. That maximum notice be given the Detachment, in event it becomes necessary to extend the TDY period, so that a higher capability can be maintained until the deployment is terminated. (C)

11. That D2 aircraft be hangered on future deployments if space is available, particularly during extremely damp weather. (U)

1900Z/6 APR59 UNCLASSIFIED

PRIORITY

COMSTRATRECONWG 4080 LAUGHLIN AFB TEX

CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR

INFO C@MAF 2 BARKSDALE AFB LA

UNCLAS/FROM DMMR 5064 D. DAYLIGHT. FOR DM4F AT SAC AND DM4E AT 2 AF. SUBJECT: RETURN OF RB-57D-2 AIRCRAFT. THE FOLLOWING LISTED AIRCRAFT, TIME AND DATE LISTED, RETURNED FROM DETACHMENT 7.

53-3964A	1624 HOURS CST	5 PRIL 1959
53-3965A	1624 HOURS CST	5 APRIL 1959
53-3968A	1624 HOURS CST	5 APRIL 1959

A TRUE COPY:

W. P. CUMISKEY
Major, USAF

JAMES F. FAGAN, CAPT., USAF

DMMR 8228 1 of 1 UNCLASSIFIED

HISTORY

History

of the

P.R.C.

4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Light

and the

596405

4080th Combat Support Group

1 April 1959 - 31 May 1959

CHRONOLOGY

4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Light
(contd)

24 Jan 1959 Detachment Number Seven, 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Light, consisting of three RB-57D-2 aircraft, crews, support personnel and equipment in place at Brize Norton Air Base, England on Operation "Border Town". (S)

20 Mar 1959 Detachment Number Five, 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Light, consisting of three U-2 aircraft, four crews, support personnel and equipment in place at Eielson AFB, Alaska on Project "Toy Soldier III", and "Fortune Finder". (S)

23 Mar 1959 First "Congo Maiden" mission flown by Detachment Five. (S)

28 Mar 1959 Last "Congo Maiden" mission flown by Detachment Five. The "Congo Maiden" missions were planned to be accomplished over a period of several weeks but due to unusually favorable weather conditions, they were accomplished in six days. (S)

6 Apr 1959 Detachment Number Seven redeployed to Laughlin AFB from Brize Norton AF, England after completion of Operation "Border Town". (S)

1 May 1959 The 4080th SRW adapted the Deputy Commander concept of operation. (U)

1 May 1959 508th Tactical Hospital inactivated. (U)

15 May 1959 Detachment Number Five redeployed to Laughlin AFB from Eielson AFB, Alaska after completion of operations "Toy Soldier III" and "Fortune Finder". (S)

SECRET

I - MISSION, ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

Mission: The primary mission of the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Light remained unchanged during the month os April and May 1959, which was the conducting of strategic reconnaissance missions.[1] The primary mission of the 4080th Combat Support Group also remained unchanged during April and May 1959, which was to support the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Light.[2] (U)

Operation "Border Town": In January 1959, three RB-57D-2 aircraft and four combat ready crews together with 115 personnel and approximately 46-tons of supplies and equipment were deployed from Laughlin Air Force Base, Texas, to Brize Norton Royal Air Force Station, England. This deployment was given the unclassified nickname "Border Town" and designated as Detachment Seven, 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Light. The advance party for the deployment departed Laughlin Air Force Base on 16 January 1959, arriving at Brize Norton a few days subsequent with the last aircraft arriving on 26 January 1959. The RB-57D-2 aircraft and crews departed Laughlin on 24 January 1959, arriving at Brize Norton the same date after one air refueling and flying non-stop. The time for the tactical aircraft to make the non-stop flight was approximately 11:30 hours for two of the aircraft and 12:15 hours for the third aircraft. The third aircraft lost all oxygen at the point of no return over the Atlantic ocean but managed to make land-fall by maintaining maximum altitude within the

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1. Stated in 2AF Regulation 23-12, dated 12 November 1957.
2. Stated in SAC Regulation 20-15R, dated 27 March 1959.

capability of the crew. This crew was required to fly at cabin altitudes of 15,000 to 18,000 feet in order to have sufficient fuel to reach land. A strip alert tanker was launched from Upper Heyford Royal Air Force Station, England and a rendezvous and a second air refueling was accomplished at Lands End, England, which enabled the RB-57D-2 aircraft to reach Brize Norton for landing. Two air refuelings were scheduled on the deployment; however, the first one was cancelled due to weather and at the second air refueling two receivers took on more than 15,000 pounds of fuel each and were required to share the spare tanker in order to fill their tanks. At least 20,000 pounds of fuel should have been available from each tanker to preclude the necessity for using a spare tanker.[3] (S)

Personnel deployed on the detachment consisted of 19 officer, 88 airmen, and 11 civilians (Three of the civilians were deployed from Warner Robins Air Material Area depot). Personnel selected for the deployment were notified more than 30 days in advance with the exception of one or two isolated cases, and the individuals receiving less than 30 days notification were counselled to insure that no personal hardship would be incurred. Prior to the end of the operations at the detachment, eight airmen personnel from the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing and two civilians from WRAMA were returned early because of no further requirement for their services at the Temporary Duty (TDY) location. Because of the high priority placed upon the successful completion of the mission the Detachment was heavily

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3. Ltr, Hq 4080th SRW to Comdr 2AF, subj: "Commander's Final Mission Report/M-27/Operations Order 33-59A, Border Town", DO, 17 April 1959. Exhibit 1.

manned to preclude any possibility of failure due to lack of qualified personnel. It was determined that future deployments with similar requirements could be reduced approximately 50.0 percent without sacrificing the capability of the unit.[4] (C)

The administrative workload during the TDY period was much heavier than was expected. Approximately 700 incoming or outgoing messages were processed and a high percentage of these messages were classified which required careful logging and filing. There were also numerous reports, and routine correspondence that created a relatively heavy administrative workload. As no administrative officer was deployed with the detachment one of the intelligence officers had to assume the duties of administrative officer.[5] (C)

Fourteen missions were scheduled to be flown during the period of the deployment and after the last mission was completed during the latter part of March 1959, 7th Air Division informed Strategic Air Command (SAC) Headquarters and Second Air Force Headquarters that the detachment could be released immediately for re-deployment to Laughlin Air Force Base. The usual tear down, crating, and normal preparation for the arrival of the first support aircraft was initiated. However, 35:00 hours from the scheduled departure of the first two support aircraft a delay message was received with instructions to maintain capability. Approaching so near re-deployment time before receiving information of an extension created many additional problems. It took considerable time to regain the capability existing at the time prepara-

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4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

tion was begun for re-deployment.[6] The detachment was released for re-deployment and the RB-57D-2 aircraft arrived back at Laughlin Air Force Base on 5 April 1959.[7] (S)

Project "Toy Soldier III": Detachment Five, 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing deployed to Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, in March 1959, for the purpose of conducting weather sampling missions under Operations Order 62-59 "Toy Soldier III" and Operations Order 75-59 "Fortune Finder". This detachment consisted of three U-2 aircraft, crews, support personnel and equipment and with the bulk of the "Congo Maiden" missions completed during March 1959, the month of April started out quietly and remained so for the entire month. April was devoted to accomplishing the scheduled 15 successful sampling missions plus two "Congo Maiden" missions.[9] (S)

Higher Headquarters was very much pleased with the results of the "Congo Maiden" missions as was evidenced by a message from General Thomas S. Power, Commander-In-Chief Strategic Air Command. The message from General Power to Colonel A. J. Bratton, Commander 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing read:

> "Congratulations for the splendid job performed by your crews and personnel during the recent "Congo Maiden" project. Although the operational phase of this project was of short duration, extensive coordination and planning was required. The entire operation was performed without incident and in such a manner as to bring recognition to the personnel of your command who were respon-

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6. Ibid.
7. Msg, Comdr 4080th SRW to CINCSAC, DMMR 5064D, 6 April 1959. Exhibit 2.
8. History, 4080th SRW, March 1959, pp. 5.
9. History, Det #5, 4080th SRW, April 1959. Exhibit 3.

> sible for the operational planning and maintenance of this project. The crews, in particular, performed in an outstanding manner. Certain individuals made contributions of such exceptional value as to warrant personal mention. They are Lt Colonel Hayden C. Curry; Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr; and Major Bobbie G. Gardiner. The high standards maintained, as well as the operational proficiency displayed in this important undertaking, were paramount to the success attained. Please extend my congratulations to the responsible personne." [10] (U)

During the month of April 1959, visitorssto Detachment Five were Colonel A. J. Bratton, Commander 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing and Colonel Ellsworth A. Powell, Deputy Commander for Maintenance for 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing. Major General John P. McConnell, Commander Second Air Force and his staff visited the Detachment on 26 April. Lieutenant Colonel Hayden C. Curry, the Detachment Commander escorted the visiting officials through a display of the facilities and conducted a briefing for them on the operations of the detachment.[11] (U)

Project "Crow Flight": Two separate detachments of U-2 aircraft, crews, support personnel and equipment were deployed on operation "Crow Flight". Detachment Three was at Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico,[12] and Detachment Four was at Ezeiza Airport, Buenos Aires, Argentina.[13] Detachment Three operations during April consisted of flying scheduled missions out of Ramey, and deploying the U-2 aircraft and crews to Plattsburgh Air Force Base, New York, to fly scheduled missions. The aircraft deployed to Plattsburgh

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10. Msg, Comdr 4080th SRW to Comdr Det #5, 4080th SRW, C 5170D, 9 April 1959. Exhibit 4.
11. History, Det #5, 4080th SRW, April 1959. Exhibit 3.
12. History, Det #3, 4080th SRW, April 1959. Exhibit 5.
13. History, Det #4, 4080th SRW, April 1959. Exhibit 6.

on 19 April and two of them re-deployed to Ramey on 26 April with the third U-2 aircraft ferried to Edwards Air Force Base, California for installation of a new oxygen system and fuel tank vent system for the wing tanks.[14] After the modification the aircraft was ferried back to Ramey on 12 May 1959. During the month of May, Detachment operations again consisted of flying scheduled missions out of Ramey and on 17 May the aircraft were again deployed to Plattsburgh to fly scheduled missions, returning to Ramey 24 May.[15] (S)

"Crow Flight" operations from Ezeiza Airport, Argentina during April was the flying of scheduled sampling missions, and the ferrying of U-2 aircraft to and from Edwards Air Force Base, California for installation of a new oxygen system and fuel tank vent system for the wing tanks. The detachment received a letter of appreciation from the Commander and Chief of Air-Martime Operations for the Argentine Air Force for assistance rendered in support of operations conducted by the Argentine Air Force.[16] (C)

Operations for Detachment Four during May was more or less routine, with scheduled missions being flown. The month of May saw a rotation of some personnel as two officers and 32 airmen replacements arrived at Ezeiza Airport aboard a scheduled Military Air Transport Service (MATS) aircraft. The aircraft had departed Laughlin Air Force

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14. History, Det #3, 4080th SRW, April 1959. Exhibit 5.
15. History, Det #3, 4080th SRW, May 1959. Exhibit 7.
16. History, Det #4, 4080th SRW, April 1959. Exhibit 6.

Base with 34 airmen personnel but at a stop-over at Recife, Brazil, two of the airmen, through their own negligence, failed to board the aircraft, consequently the aircraft arrived at Buenos Aires with two less passengers than it had started with. The two airmen were returned to Laughlin Air Force Base directly from Recife, Brazil. The estimated date operations would cease was released to the Argentine Press after being coordinated and approved with appropriate Argentine and United States Government Agencies. The local civilian business concerns and other interested agencies in Buenos Aires were also advised by letter of the anticipated closing date, which was approximately 15 August 1959.[17] (C)

Movies for Detachment Four: In order to provide the personnel of Detachment Four with as much entertainment as possible, the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing arranged to ship 25-hours of movies to the detachment on 18 April 1959, and each 45 days thereafter to ship the detachment 50-hours of film via MATS. The films were obtained through the film library with the cooperation of the St Louis supply and were listed as training films, but every effort was expended to select films of an entertaining nature such as sports events, Bob Hope's Air Force Shows, war films, etc.[18] (U)

Reorganization and Redesignation: On 1 May 1959, the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Light adapted the Deputy Commander concept.[19] Under this concept, the directors of the various agencies of staff sections were changed. For example, the Director of Operations became

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17. History, Det #4, 4080th SRW, April 1959. Exhibit 8.
18. Msg, Comdr 4080th SRW to Comdr Det #4, 4080th SRW, DO 5216D, 10 April 1959. Exhibit 9.
19. GO 18, Hq SAC, 24 March 1959. Exhibit 10.

IV - MATERIEL AND MAINTENANCE

Aircraft Status: As of 30 April 1959, there were 57 aircraft possessed by Laughlin Air Force Base. Of this number, 36 were possessed by the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing as tactical aircraft while the remaining 21 were possessed by the 4080th Air Base Group as support type aircraft. The number of aircraft assigned to Laughlin Air Force Base and the number possessed was not the same due to aircraft assigned to the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing being deployed on detachments.[1] Three U-2 aircraft were deployed with Detachment Three on project "Crow Flight,"[2] three aircraft U-2 deployed with Detachment Four on project "Crow Flight,"[3] and three U-2 aircraft deployed with Detachment Five on operation "Toy Soldier 111".[4] (S)

There were 59 aircraft possessed by Laughlin as of 31 May 1959. Of this number, 38 were possessed by the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing as tactical type aircraft while the remaining 21 aircraft were possessed by the 4080th Combat Support Group as support type aircraft. Here again the number of aircraft assigned

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1. Rept, "Report of Aircraft Status and Purpose of Flight," RCS: 1-AF-A1, 30 April 1959. Prep by and on File in Stat Svs. Section of the Base Comptroller, Hq 4080th CSGp.
2. History, Det #3, 4080th SRW, April 1959. Exhibit 5.
3. History, Det #4, 4080th SRW, April 1959. Exhibit 6.
4. History, Det #5, 4080th SRW, April 1959. Exhibit 3.

and aircraft possessed was not the same as there were aircraft deployed on detachments.[5] Three U-2 aircraft were deployed to Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico with Detachment Three,[6] and three U-2 aircraft deployed to Ezeiza Airport, Buenos Aires, Argentina with Detachment Four.[7] (S)

Aircraft Deficiencies: During the month of April there were no major problems with the B-57C aircraft although the aircraft systems were given nine unsatisfactory ratings and 10 ratings of satisfactory with malfunctions. Of the 19 aircraft systems deficiencies on the B-57C aircraft, 18 were due to materiel reasons and one due to maintenance.[8] In May, the B-57C aircraft systems received 20 unsatisfactory ratings and six ratings of satisfactory with malfunctions. Of the 21 aircraft systems deficiencies, 21 were due to materiel reasons, two due to maintenance and three due to other reasons. The three deficiencies due to other reasons were system deficiencies which could not be duplicated on the ground.[9] (C)

During the month of April the RB-57D aircraft systems received a total of 157 deficiencie ratings. Of this number, 78 were rated unsatisfactory and 79 were rated satisfactory with malfuctions. Of

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5. Rept, "Report of Aircraft Status and Purpose of Flight," RCS: 1-AF-A1, 31 May 1959. Prep by and on File in Stat Svs Section of the Base Comptroller, Hq 4080th CSGp.
6. History, Det #3, 4080th SRW, May 1959. Exhibit 7.
7. History, Det #4, 4080th SRW, May 1959. Exhibit 8.
8. Rept, "Aircraft Effectiveness, Deficiency and Abort Report," for B-57C Aircraft for Month of April 1959, RCS: SAC-U15. Prep by and on File in Repts & Analysis Section of the Deputy Comdr for Maintenance, Hq 4080th SRW.
9. Rept, "Aircraft Effectiveness, Deficiency and Abort Report," for B-57C Aircraft for Month of May 1959, RCS: SAC-U15. Prep by and on File in Repts & Analysis Section of the Deputy Comdr for Maintenance, Hq 4080th SRW.

the total deficiencies, 145 were due to materiel reasons, six due to maintenance, two due to operations, and four due to other causes. The majority of the problems in the ECM system was due to receipt of erroneous navigation data and material failures. To correct the ECM problems a continuing study was being conducted. The auto pilot system received 22 deficiency ratings and the majority of them were contributed to the malfunctions of the mach rate sensor, which resulted in Unsatisfactory Reports being submitted on the mach rate sensors.[10] The RB-57D aircraft systems had 129 deficiency ratings during the month of May, of which 112 were due to material reasons, eight due to maintenance and five due to other reasons. The majority of camera deficiencies were attributed to O-20 camera material failure of the data chamber lights and data reflecting prisms. Trouble was also encountered in light leaks and static marks on the film which was believed to have been caused during rewind process. The rewind process was necessary due to receipt of film on spools other than the type used in magazines utilized by the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing.[11] (C)

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10. Rept, "Aircraft Effectiveness, Deficiency and Abort Report," for RB-57D aircraft for Month of April 1959, RCS: SAC-U15. Prep by and on File in Repts & Analysis Section of the Deputy Comdr for Maintenance, Hq 4080th SRW.
11. Rept, "Aircraft Effectiveness, Deficiency and Abort Report," for RB-57D aircraft for Month of May 1959, RCS: SAC-U15. Prep by and on File in Repts & Analysis Section of the Deputy Comdr for Maintenance, Hq 4080th SRW.

Supply Support for MM-4 Auto Pilot: The 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing considered the supply support of the MM-4 auto pilot to be unsatisfactory. There were three Rb-57D aircraft operating with marginal Rate Sensors which had been anticipated as Aircraft Not Fully Equipped (ANFE) since March 1959 without result. In addition, this component had design deficiencies and the 4080th had submitted five Unsatisfactory Reports. Permission was requested to use a different Rate Sensor model which was compatible with the MM-4 auto pilot system. The model the 4080th wanted to use was used in the KC-135 aircraft MC-1 auto pilot system but the request was denied on the basis that it was to be used only on the MC-1 auto pilot system and that assets were not available to support an additional requirement. The prime supply depot and higher headquarters were appraised of the situation in March 1959 and again in April 1959. Warner Robins Air Materiel Area (WRAMA) subsequently advised that the rate sensors were not available in their depot and authorized shipping the reparables direct to the factory and from the factory direct to the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing. The factory repair cycle required 60 days lead time, which with the insignifacant number of spares available in Air Force channels further compounded the difficulty. Due to the critical supply status of the auto pilot system the 4080th recommended that the spare assets be reevaluated and necessary spares be procured to satisfactorily maintain this equipment.[12] (U)

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12. Rept, "Comdr's Remarks Part 1 of Air Training Report" for 4025th SRS for Month of May 1959, RCS: 6-SAC-T12. Exhibit 57.

Bench maintenance capability of the MM-4 auto pilot was lost by the 4080th because of a shortage of a flight controller needed on the mock up, which was a serious handicap and was affecting the mission of the 4080th. Pre-issue and base assets of this item was zero and supply difficulty action taken in February 1959, revealed that the item would remain in critical status as only source of supply was repair and return from Lear Incorporated. Two units were received by the 4080th in March and subsequently were replaced for unserviceable installed items. The unreliability of this controller resulted in seven Unsatisfactory Reports being submitted by the 4080th with no known action having been taken. Assistance in resolving the problem was requested from WRAMA, if only to effect reduction in contractor repair time.[13] (U)

Suspected Deficiency on U-2A Aircraft: Personnel of the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing noticed a condition on a number of U-2 aircraft which possibly is common to all U-2 aircraft but was regarded as suspected deficiency. The problem concerned aircraft oxygen filler valve inside the fuselage at bulkhead station 365 on the left hand side of the aircraft. As this bulkhead had approximately four access cutouts in the immediate area of the filler

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13. Msg, Comdr 4080th SRW to Comdr WRAMA, 4080 DM 5083D, 6 April 1959. Exhibit 58.

valve, engine blow back occured through these cutouts depositing smoky, oily substance on and around the filler valve. The oxygen line to the filler valve was under high pressure, and a leak developing at this point could have proven very hazardous. The 4080th suggested plugging the holes with a sealing compound.[14] (U)

Quality Control of Oxygen: Circumstances surrounding a U-2 aircraft incident at Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico with Detachment Three which resulted in a near accident, led to an investigation of the aviator breathing oxygen being furnished Ramey Air Force Base. It was found that one bottle on the oxygen cart was below the dew point for military specifications. This particular bottle was used to service two U-2 mission aircraft and on checking both aircraft systems the dew point was found to be -40 degrees. In August 1958, the Director of Materiel, 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing and the base supply officer at Ramey Air Force Base conferred on the subject of quality control of oxygen being furnished to Detachment Three. It was agreed the manufacturer of oxygen for Ramey Air Force Base would be visited to insure that military specifications were being met on aviators breathing oxygen and that procedures would be established to insure Detachment Three would be furnished oxygen from one lot to preclude the checking of each bottle for dew point. It was evident from this incident that quality control of oxygen at Ramey was not being furnished as previously, also a Detachment Commander of Detachment Three had rejected 48 bottles of oxygen

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14. Msg, Comdr 4080th SRW to Comdr AMC, DMM 5015D, 3 April 1959. Exhibit 59.

for not meeting military specifications. To remedy oxygen problems at Detachment Three, the 4080th sent an oxygen technical representative from Laughlin to Ramey to assist the personnel involved in the quality control of oxygen.[15] As a result of the visit to Ramey by the oxygen technical representative, the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing recommended that the aviator breathing oxygen being supplied by the Santa Maria Gas Company for use in the U-2 aircraft, be discontinued immediately. The Santa Maria Gas Company had no test equipment for checking the oxygen to see if it met military specifications, and the 4080th requested Second Air Force to obtain oxygen from Mobile Air Material Area (MOAMA) depot until such time that Ramey could guarantee breathing oxygen that met military specifications.[16] (S)

Life Raft Unsatisfactory Report: During an operation check of life rafts used with the S-5 parachutes worn by pilots for T-33 and B-57 type aircraft, the lanyard was pulled manually which inflated the life raft. Upon inflation the life raft and the pack burst. Two additional rafts were checked with the same results. The cause was determined to be due to the end flaps on the end side of the pack being sewed with number three cord nylon with three rows of stitches, and the zipper not separating. When inflated, the raft could not break the end flap stitches and separate the zipper before

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16. Msg, Comdr 4080th SRW to Comdr 2AF, DCM 92E, 25 May 1959. Exhibit 61.

Unsatisfactory Capstan Motor: The 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing considered the "B" unit capstan motor used in the SFERICS Systems 1 and 111 to be completely unsatisfactory for sustained use. The motor required the governor commutator and brushes to be cleaned and inspected each 15 hours of operation. The governor was readily accessible by removing the cap from the motor. In addition, there was a second commutator and set of brushes located inside the motor case that supplied current to the armature. Because access to these parts required complete disassembly of the motor, the manufacturer recommended that they be replaced each 100 hours of operation and returned to the factory for complete overhaul. Another reason the unit was considered unsatisfactory for sustained use was that dirty commutators and worn brushes caused the motor to run too slow and generated excessive Radio-Frequency (R-F) noise. For example, this could have made a sortie of seven hours duration appear to be eight hours on the read out and time relation for navigation data was lost. Although this was a major problem in SFERICS Systems 1 and 111 and had been reported as unsatisfactory, the results had been negative. Quality maintenance was being performed on this unit but in spite of the cleaning and inspection that was done each 15 hours, nine failures out of 12 sorties flown the first seven days of May was experienced. It was the opinion of the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing that increased quality control during follow-on production and repair would not resolve this problem, therefore, only through procurement of a new and reliable type motor would the problem be eliminated.[19] (S)

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19. Msg, 4080th SRW to 2AF, 4080 DCM 83E, 7 May 1959. Exhibit 64.

Deterioration of Helmet Bladders at Detachment Five: Due to rapid deterioration of helmet bladders, the physiological support personnel with Detachment Five at Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska were required to make frequent changes of this item. At usage periods ranging from nine to 20 hours flying time, the silicone impregnated synthetic rubber of the face ring would become marked on its external surface with whitish discoloration and thinning in many areas along the line in which it was sandwiched between the inner helmet frame and the outer ring. This was not the usual form of deterioration, observed at Laughlin Air Force Base after about six month's usage of a bladder, as the rubber would not tear through.[20] (U)

Since the only known variable was the humidity and temperature of the work area where the bladders and helmets were stored between flights, extensive measurements were made of this enviroment. These revealed temperature fluctuations between 42 and 82 degrees Farenheit, and relative humidities from 11.0 percent to 26.0 percent. It was assumed that the extreme dryness of the storage area air precipitated an invisible breakdown of the rubber, which was then changed in flight into visible deterioration by the action of ozone along the line of sandwiching. This line was the demarcation zone between the inner environment of the face ring and the outer environment of the face ring and bladder, exposed partially to the dry, ozone-laden cockpit atmosphere. Further support of this theory was obtained when a helmet, standing in the storage area unused for about six weeks without any visible evidence of change, was flown for nine hours

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20. History, Det #5, 4080th SRW, April 1959. Exhibit 3.

and upon inspection revealed the most marked deterioration of any of the helmet bladders. Full details, environmental measurements and some condemned bladders were sent to the weapons system support center for further analysis. Pending discovery of a quality control defect, or improvement of the product, it was felt paramount to select a working area which gave a normal range of humidity. In a cold climate, high relative humdity was preferred because of the extremely low absolute moisture content of cold air.[21] (U)

Detachment Maintenance: During the month of April, maintenance personnel with Detachment Five accomplished two periodic inspections on U-2 aircraft. One of these was accomplished in 32 hours and the other in 26 hours. After the inspections were completed, test flights of the aircraft produced only one minor discrepancy as a pilot write-up. On the first four "Toy Soldier" sorties flown, equipment malfunctions caused unsuccessful missions. The first two were caused by oil loss from the compressors due to rupture of the sight gauges and the next two were due to rupture of an inter-cooler line. The inter-cooler line rupture was determined to have resulted from vibration and an extra bracket was installed on the lines, with no further trouble being experienced. Considerable equipment bay pressurization loss was experienced and to prevent mission aborts for this reason, the aircraft were pressure-checked after the equipment installation before each mission. Considering the amount of aircraft hours flown in April,[22] the discrepancies were few and mostly minor. (S)

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21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.

The maintenance section at Detachment Three complied with six service bulletins during April, and completed one periodic inspection.[23] During May, three periodic inspections were performed with one aircraft requiring an engine change, which required five days for the change and inspection. Three days were required on the other two aircraft with the test hops completed. Generator problems were experienced on one of the aircraft, which resulted in five generators being used and found to be unsatisfactory. It was determined that wrong type brushes were installed which caused the generator to fail or burn out after a short period of time. All the generators were sent back to WRAMA for repairs. The maintenance section also discovered four bad voltage regulators which were also returned to WRAMA for repair.[24] (S)

Maintenance at Detachment Four progressed as required to support the mission during the month of April and May 1959.[25] [26] Three missions were unsuccessful during May due to trouble with the P-2 Platform. One of the missions was unsuccessful due to an air solenoid valve malfunction, and another was unsuccessful due to failure of the eletrical field in the Alternating Current (A/C) motor. On one low attitude mission the P-2 Platform did not operate. The A/C generator light would come on when the platform was turned on. The A/C generator, the A/C motor and the rootes blower were changed and the system worked satisfactorily on an operational check. On one

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23. History, Det #3, 4080th SRW, April 1959. Exhibit 5.
24. History, Det #4, 4080th SRW, April 1959. Exhibit 6.
25. History, Det #4, 4080th SRW, April 1959. Exhibit 6.
26. History, Det #4, 4080th SRW, May 1959. Exhibit 8.

mission, the Armed Forces of Atomic Testing (AFOAT) Nose did not function and resulted in the pressure regulator, the pressure switch, exhaust dump valve, and the forward seal being changed.[27] (C)

A foreign object entering the engine section resulted in an engine change on one of the U-2 aircraft. A periodic inspection was accomplished and the aircraft was successfully test flown. On two of the aircraft, the Mark-2 type hand controls were removed and replaced with Mark-3 controls, and with the departure of one of the aircraft from Ezeiza Airport to Laughlin Air Force Base, three maintenance crews were no longer required and one maintenance crew was returned to Laughlin on the May rotational aircraft.[28] (C)

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27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.

SECRET

V - OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

Flying Time: During the month of April 1959, aircraft at Laughlin Air Force Base flew a total of 2,183:00 hours. Of this total, 1,022:00 hours were flown by tactical type aircraft assigned to the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing and the remaining 1,161:00 hours were flown by support type aircraft assigned to the 4080th Air Base Group.[1] This flying time did not include 95:00 hours of RB-57D-2 aircraft flying time flown by Detachment Seven on operation "Border Town"[2], 160:00 hours of U-2 aircraft flying time by Detachment Three on project "Crow Flight"[3], 111:00 hours of U-2 aircraft time flown by Detachment Four on project "Crow Flight"[4], and 185:00 hours of U-2 aircraft time flown by Detachment Five on operation "Fortune Finder" and Toy Soldier III"[5]. (S)

The flying time by type aircraft for the month of April was

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1. Rept, "Report of Aircraft Status and Purpose of Flight", RCS: 1-AF-A1, 30 April 1959. Prep by and on File in Stat Svcs Section of the Base Comptroller, Hq 4080th ABGp.
2. Rept, "Comdr's Remarks Part of Air Training Report" for 4025th SRS for Months of 1 January 1959 thru 30 April 1959, RCS: 6-SAC-T12. Exhibit 56.
3. History, Det #3, 4080th SRW, April 1959. Exhibit 5.
4. History, Det #4, 4080th SRW, April 1959. Exhibit 6.
5. History, Det #5, 4080th SRW, April 1959. Exhibit 3.

as follows:[6] (U)

TYPE ACFT	POSSESSED	HRS FLOWN	TYPE ACFT	POSSESSED	HRS FLOWN
TB-57C	3	195:00	T-33A	14	792:00
RB-57D	9	263:00	C-54G	1	49:00
RB-57D-1	1	26:00	C-123B	2	173:00
RB-57D-2	6	124:00	U-3A	2	109:00
U-2	17	414:00	H-19A	1	20:00
			H-19B	1	18:00

Aircraft at Laughlin Air Force Base flew a total of 1,872:00 hours during the month of May. Of this total, 859:00 hours were flown by tactical type aircraft assigned to the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing while the remaining 1,013:00 hours were flown by support type aircraft assigned to the 4080th Combat Support Group.[7] This flying time did not include 145:00 hours of U-2 aircraft flying time flown by Detachment Three on project "Crow Flight",[8] 150:00 hours of U-2 aircraft time flown by Detachment Four on project "Crow Flight",[9] and 25:00 hours of U-2 aircraft time flown by Detachment Five on project "Fortune Finder" and

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6. Rept, "Report of Aircraft Status and Purpose of Flight", RCS: 1-AF-A1, 30 April 1959. Prep by and on File in Stat Svcs Section of the Base Comptroller, Hq 4080th ABGp.
7. Rept, "Report of Aircraft Status and Purpose of Flight", RCS: 1-AF-A1, 31 May 1959. Prep by and on File in Stat Svcs Section of the Base Comptroller, Hq 4080th CSGp.
8. History, Det #3, 4080th SRW, May 1959. Exhibit 7.
9. History, Det #4, 4080th SRW, May 1959. Exhibit 8.

"Toy Soldier III".[10] (S)

The flying time by type aircraft for the month of May 1959 was as follows:[11] (U)

TYPE ACFT	POSSESSED	HRS FLOWN	TYPE ACFT	POSSESSED	HRS FLOWN
TB-57C	3	176:00	T-33A	14	694:00
RB-57D	9	101:00	C-54G	1	89:00
RB-57D-1	1	5:00	C-123B	2	144:00
RB-57D-2	6	110:00	U-3A	2	96:00
U-2	19	467:00	H-19A	1	19:00
			H-19B	1	16:00

Air Refueling: During the month of April the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing required 30 air refuelings for the B-57 type aircraft assigned to the 4025th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron. The 376th Air Refueling Squadron scheduled 27 air refuelings and the 340th Air Refueling Squadron scheduled three. Of the 30 air refuelings scheduled, 16 were effective with an additional three air refuelings accomplished with the 4397th Air Refueling Squadron which were not scheduled. Of the non-effective air refuelings, 12 were due to tanker aborts, five were tanker air aborts and seven were tanker cancellations due to maintenance. The other two non-

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10. Rept, "Comdr's Remarks Part of Air Training Report" for 4028th SRWS for Month of May 1959, RCS: 7-SAC-T12. Exhibit 55.
11. Rept, "Report of Aircraft Status and Purpose of Flight," RCS: 1-AF-A1, 31 May 1959. Prep by and on File in Stat Svcs Section of the Base Comptroller, Hq 4080th CSGp.

effective air refuelings were receiver aircraft aborts, one an air abort due to the loss of cabin pressurization and one a ground abort due to engine over temperature.[12] (C)

During May the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing required and scheduled 10 air refuelings with the 301st Air Refueling Squadron, of which only two air refuelings were effective. Of the eight non-effective air refuelings, two were tanker ground aborts due to maintenance and one a tanker air abort due to maintenance. Of the other five, three were receiver ground aborts due to maintenance and two were receiver air aborts due to maintenance.[13] (C)

Air Refueling support for the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing was considered unsatisfactory due to the high number of scheduled air refuelings being lost, which resulted in the air refueling effectiveness for the training period 1 January 1959 thru 30 April 1959 as being only 47.0 percent. The losses for the training period were chargeable as follows: 34.2 percent tanker cancellations or aborts; 6.0 percent receiver cancellations or aborts; 3.4 percent higher headquarters cancellations; 9.4 percent weather losses. The tanker abort cancellation rate for January was 20.0 percent, February 40.0 percent, March 45.0 percent, and April 40.0 percent. This high rate of tanker cancellations

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12. Rept, "Air Refueling Report" for 4025th SRS for Month of April 1959, RCS: 6-SAC-T12. Exhibit 65.
13. Rept, "Air Refueling Report" for 4025th SRS for Month of May 1959, RCS: 6-SAC-T12. Exhibit 66.

and aborts continued to penalize the 4080th in it's training accomplishments.[14] (C)

Celestial Navigation Training: During the training period 1 January 1959 thru 30 April 1959, celestial navigation using the AN/AVN-1 Sextant was not scored because the equipment was undergoing operational tests and celestial procedures and techniques were being devised. During the period a total of 74 night, day, and grid celestial legs were flown to train crews and develope techniques.[15] On 30 April 1959, the 4080th notified Second Air Force that the testing of the AN/AVN-1 Sextant had established its reliability as an operational system and the availability of this equipment was sufficient to support celestial training for suffix "Charlie" crews assigned to the 4080th. Concurrence was requested from Second Air Force to include celestial navigation training as activity requirements for suffix "Charlie" crews commencing 1 May 1959.[16] (C)

ECM Missions: During the month of April, 21 ECM 320 SAFE missions were scheduled with 20 becoming airborne. Of the 20 ECM missions airborne, 10 sorties were unsatisfactory due to malfunctions of the ECM equipment, two were air aborts due to aircraft malfunction and one returned early due to a tanker aircraft

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14. Rept, "Comdr's Remarks Part of Air Training Report" for 4025th SRS for Months of January 1959 thru April 1959, RCS: 6-SAC-T12. Exhibit 56.
15. Ibid.
16. Msg, Comdr 4080th SRW to Comdr 2AF, DOTR 5789D, 30 April 1959. Exhibit 67.

Abort.[17] This left only seven successful sorties airborne. In May, 28 ECM missions were scheduled with 20 becoming airborne. Of the ~~30~~ 20 sorties airborne, six were unsuccessful for malfunctions not associated with the ECM equipment. Six were unsuccessful due to malfunctions of the 320 SAFE System, and two were unsuccessful due to malfunctions of other ECM equipment.[18] This left only six ECM sorties flown successfully. n (S)

Weather Reconnaissance Missions: Four weather reconnaissance missions were scheduled to be flown on project "Big Hickory" during April with two missions flown successfully. One of the missions was cancelled for aircraft maintenance problems and one was an air abort. Four sorties were also scheduled for project "Little Hickory" with three sorties flown successfully and one cancelled due to weather. No significant problem areas developed during the accomplishment of these missions.[19] In May, four weather reconnaissance sorties were scheduled for project "Big Hickory" with three flown successfully. The one non-successful sortie was cancelled due to weather. Four sorties were also scheduled for project "Little Hickory" and all four flown successfully. Once again no significant

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17. Rept, "Comdr's Remarks Part of Air Training Report" for 4025th SRS for Months 1 January 1959 thru 30 April 1959, RCS: 6-SAC-T12. Exhibit 56.
18. Rept, "Comdr's Remarks Part of Air Training Report" for 4025th SRS for Month of May 1959, RCS: 6-SAC-T12. Exhibit 57.
19. Rept, "Comdr's Remarks Part of Air Training Report"for 4028th SRWS for Months of 1 January 1959 thru 30 April 1959, RCS: 7-SAC-T-12. Exhibit 68.

problem areas developed during the accomplishment of these missions.[20] (C)

Detachment Three Operations: Operations at Detachment Three during the month of April consisted of flying scheduled weather sampling missions out of Ramey Air Force Base and deploying the U-2 aircraft to Plattsburgh Air Force Base, New York to accomplish weather sampling missions, and redeploying the U-2 aircraft back to Ramey. While deployed to Plattsburgh, the detachment pilots also flew instrument check rides in a T-33 aircraft. Flying at Detachment Three amounted to a total of 23 sorties for 160:00 hours of flying time. Of the 23 sorties flown, 20 were sampling missions, two were ferry flights and one was a test flight.[21] Operations during the month of May also included deploying the U-2 aircraft the Plattsburgh to accomplish weather sampling missions and redeploying back to Ramey. Detachment Three flew 26 sorties during May with 18 special sorties, four ferry flights and four test flights for a total of 145:35 hours flying time. However, all the sorties were not flown as scheduled due to mission aborts, late take-offs and mission cancellations. One mission was aborted due to hydraulic failure, and one aborted because of pressurization failure. On 12 May one of the pilots aborted into Kindley Air Force Base, Bermuda after experiencing hypoxia. Another mission was

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20. Rept, "Comdr's Remarks Part of Air Training Report" for 4028th SRWS for Month of May 1959, RCS: 7-SAC-T12. Exhibit 55.
21. History, Det #3, 4080th SRW, April 1959. Exhibit 5.

cancelled because of oxygen difficulties and another mission delayed 24 hours for oxygen. Still another mission was not completely accomplished as there was an early turn around due to oxygen shortage which was caused by excessive ground time and late take-off due to Air Traffic Control (ATC) clearance. Another mission was cancelled due to adverse cross winds.[22] (S)

The Physiological Support section at Ramey installed a new quick release type snap on the seat kits and safety wired all the connections. One of the pilots with the detachment asked the personal equipment personnel if the seat kit could possibly ride up over the parachute following ejection from the aircraft (caused by wind blast). This was simulated and found this could possibly have happened if the parachute and seat kit were not tight. A fix for this was to run two straps up through the kit and fasten them to the leg straps of the parachute.[23] (U)

Detachment Four Operations: Operations at Detachment Four scheduled 20 sorties for the month of April of which 14 were flown for a total of 110:40 hours. Of 14 A-Foil sorties flown all were successful except two, one being 50.0 percent successful and one being completely unsuccessful. Both of these were attributed to materiel failure of equipment. No ground aborts occurred during the month, however, one late take-off was caused by

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22. History, Det #3, 4080th SRW, May 1959. Exhibit 7.
23. Ibid.

inclement weather. As of 30 April 1959, 13,800 gallons of fuel remained, enough for approximately five missions,[24] however, this problem was eliminated as the fuel began arriving at Buenos Aires on 4 May 1959. The total shipment of drums was unloaded and available for use on 8 May 1959.[25] (C)

Some of the personnel at the detachment were replaced by personnel from Laughlin Air Force Base during May. Thirty-two airmen and two officers were rotated and as of 31 May the authorized strength for the detachment was 33 officers, 119 airmen and two civilians. This was a reduction in authorized strength of two airmen as the requirement for assigned U-2 aircraft was reduced from three to two, consequently the maintenance crew was returned to the Zone of Interior (ZI). The estimated date operations would cease at Ezeiza Airport was released to the Argentine Press after being coordinated and approved with appropriate Argentine and United States Government Agencies.[26] (C)

Detachment Five Operations: During the month of April, Detachment Five had a more normal schedule than previous. The personnel had a few days rest and time to get the various sections more organized for efficient operation before the flying activities really began for the month. The first sorties scheduled for "Toy

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24. History, Det #4, 4080th SRW, April 1959. Exhibit 6.
25. History, Det #4, 4080th SRW, May 1959. Exhibit 8.
26. Ibid.

Soldier III" was 3 April 1959. The first four sorties flown were unsuccessful because of equipment failure in the ball sampler installation. The last "Toy Soldier III" sorties was flown 29 April 1959, which completed the required fifteen successful sorties. In addition to the "Toy Soldier III" sorties flown during the month, three additional "Congo Maiden" routes were approved. Two of these routes were flown and operationally were considered successful although one route was partially cloud covered. The remaining route was scheduled twice but was cancelled by higher headquarters presumably because of weather. In order to obtain two successful "Congo Maiden" sorties it was necessary to schedule four sorties and 26 sorties were scheduled and 23 airborne in order to obtain 15 successful "Toy Soldier III" sorties.[27] With all the requirements accomplished, Detachment Five redeployed to Laughlin Air Force Base with the U-2 aircraft arriving at Laughlin on 14 May 1959.[28] (S)

Detachment Seven Operations: Three RB-57D-2 aircraft and four combat ready crews together with a total of 115 personnel and approximately 46 tons of supplies and equipment were deployed

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27. History, Det #5, 4080th SRW, April 1959. Exhibit 3.
28. Msg, Comdr 4080th SRW to CINCSAC, DCMA 6119E, 15 May 1959. Exhibit 69.

from Laughlin Air Force Base, Texas to Brize Norton Royal Air Force Station in England. The Advon Personnel departed the home station on 16 January 1959 and arrived at the TDY site on 19 January 1959. The remainder of support aircraft arrived a few days subsequent with the last aircraft arriving on 26 January. The tactical aircraft and crews departed Laughlin on 24 January and completed the deployment non-stop, with one air refueling, with one aircraft making the trip in 12:15 hours and the other two aircraft in 11:30 hours. One of the aircraft experienced the loss of oxygen at the point of no return over the Atlantic ocean but managed to make land-fall by maintaining altitude within the capability of the crew.[29] (S)

After arrival in the United Kingdom (UK) all crews were required by 7th Air Division to complete an orientation flight immediately after arrival at Brize Norton. These flights were planned to provide maximum opportunity for familiarization of communication facilities and procedures and Jet letdowns, at selected SAC Bases in the UK. In addition to the orientation flights, 14 other flights were scheduled and accomplished, with 11 of the flights successful. Two missions were considered unsatisfactory due to malfunction of the digital tape of the 320

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29. Ltr, Hq 4080th SRW to Comdr 2AF, subj: "Commander's Final Mission Report/M-27/Operations Order 33-59A, "Border Town," DO, 17 April 1959. Exhibit 1.

SAFE System and one because of excessive fluctuation of signal characteristics.[30] (S)

Weather presented a problem in adhering to the projected schedule as long periods of low ceilings and visibility associated with fog and stratus type weather resulted in delays of some missions and re-scheduling of others. During extended periods of this type weather, an additional problem resulted because the aircraft were grounded for excessive periods of time. It was found that the equipment continued to work better if the stand-down time did not exceed five days. A turn around time of three to four days on each aircraft was optimum and was considered good procedure on future deployments to fly each aircraft on a short operational check when the flying schedule provided more than five to seven days stand down between missions.[31] (S)

The reliability of the equipment of the RB-57D-2 weapons system during operation "Border Town" far exceeded past performance. Each mission flown was carefully analyzed locally, within the capability of available facilities. It was found that logical information was obtained on approximately 95.0 percent of all signals analyzed using a manual read out of the cards produced from the 320 SAFE System; whereas the automatic read out used by the 544th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron would produce solutions on

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30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.

only approximately 66.0 percent of the analysis. The manual readout required an officer and one airman approximately six hours. Considering the vast increase in solutions obtained using the manual procedure it appeared mandatory that at least all missions, on which solutions were lost, be reduced manually in order to secure maximum results.[32] (S)

The crews were relieved from all training requirements for the training quarter by virtue of completing more than 60 days TDY. Considerable training was accomplished and the operational requirements which were completed provided much more diversified training than would have been possible at the home station. A noticeable increase in crew proficiency was apparent with the completion of each mission and mission accomplishment forms were completed and accurate training records maintained.[33] (C)

After the 14 scheduled missions were completed, Headquarters SAC and Second Air Force were notified by 7th Air Division that the detachment could be released immediately for re-deployment. The usual tear down, crating, and normal preparation for the arrival of the first support aircraft was initiated. However, 35 hours from the scheduled departure of the first two support aircraft a delay message was received with instructions to maintain capability. Approaching so near re-deployment time before receiving

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32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.

information of an extension created many additional problems as considerable time was required to regain the capability existing at the time preparation was begun for re-deployment.[34] The detachment was released for re-deployment the second time and the RB-57D-2 aircraft arrived back at Laughlin Air Force Base on 5 April 1959.[35] (S)

Justification for B-57C Aircraft: There were three B-57C aircraft assigned to the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing which were utilized for giving initial check out flights to pilots prior to them flying the RB-57D-2 aircraft and the RB-57D-2 combat ready crews were required to receive all their instrument training, instrument practice, and standardization flights in the B-57C. The RB-57D-2 aircraft was a twin engine single pilot aircraft and the B-57C was the only dual controlled aircraft which could be substituted for the primary mission aircraft because of similar characteristics and design. Due to the limited number of RB-57D-2 sorties available, key staff personnel in the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing received all their tactical flying in the B-57C aircraft. The monthly operational requirements for the B-57C aircraft was 60 diversified training sorties and the monthly maintenance capability with the three B-57C aircraft assigned was

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34. Ibid.
35. Msg, Comdr 4080th SRW to CINCSAC, DMMR 5064D, 6 April 1959. Exhibit 2.

approximately 49 sorties, although the maintenance schedule for the same aircraft was approximately 62 sorties. With the three B-57C aircraft assigned the 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing could complete its assigned mission. However, if the maintenance capability and schedule was lowered or if the B-57C aircraft inventory was reduced, the RB-57D-2 training of the 4080th would have required complete modification and/or reduction.[36] (U)

Major Aircraft Accident: On 15 May 1959, a Nationalist Chinese Air Force Pilot was accomplishing his initial check out ride in the U-2 aircraft when he was involved in what was considered a major aircraft accident. The pilot had completed all ground work satisfactorily, was current in the T-33 aircraft, and had completed necessary flights in the U-3A aircraft. An excellent flight briefing was conducted by an Instructor Pilot and everything was normal during run up and take-off roll, until the aircraft reached approximately 60 knots speed. At approximately 60 knots, the tail wheel came off the runway, with the pilot holding forward stick. As the speed increased to 90 knots the mobile control instructor told the pilot to come back on the stick. Apparently the pilot failed to do this, for the aircraft became air borne momentarily and then settled onto the runway on the nose gear. The mobile control instructor had repeated his call to come back on

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36. Msg, Comdr 4080th SRW to Comdr 2AF, DOT 5196D, 9 April 1959. Exhibit 70.

the stick, but the aircraft porpoised after the initial touch-down, and during the porpoise the mobile control instructor once again advised the student pilot to come back on the stick and called for added power. The student pilot responded but not in time for the aircraft to complete the porpoise and contact the ground hard. The aircraft was checked in the air for damage and landed without further incident.[37] (S)

Inspection of the aircraft after landing revealed extensive damage to bulkhead and fuselage skin areas near and around both forward and rear landing gears. It was considered as pilot error as the accident could have been avoided if the pilot had followed instructions given by the mobile control officer to come back on the stick during the take off roll.[38] (S)

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37. Msg, Comdr 4080th SRW to CINCSAC, 4080DS 59E, 15 May 1959. Exhibit 71.
38. Ibid.

FM COMAF 2 BARKSDALE AFB LA SECRET SECRET 0900L/27FEB59

TO COMSTRATRECONWG 4080 LAUGHLIN AFB TEXAS/MAIL/ 272115

SECRET FROM: DOD M-9-5000. SUBJ: (Uncl) RB-57 Conference. Part i of 3 part. /SAC message DO 1742, Secret, 17 FEB 59, is quoted for your information.

Quote. This message in 7 parts. Part 1. Reference your Secret message C M 9-3409, Subj: Phase-Out of RB-57Do Aircraft, dtd 9 Feb 59. Concur with your recommendation for conference to study entire package and make final recommendations. Part 2. Request your D/Plans and a maximum of four appropriately cleared persons from your hq and Laughlin AFB vidit this hq 25 Mar 59 for the purpose of briefing SAC staff on proposed 4025th SRS program. Request your hq effect coordination with 4080th, 55th and COMWRAMA as necessary to evaluate all aspects of problem. Part 3. Background for briefing preparation and discussion is as follows: A. Contingent upon results of Project "Pied Piper Gypsy," this hq will determine whether RB-57D-2 acft will be retained in SAC inventory or phased out. Termination of testing period is approximately 15 Mar 59. SAC position will be forwarded to you ASAP subsequent to 15 Mar 59. Part 4. Planning factors which must be considered in the event of the RB-57D-2 acft are retained include: A. Concept of operations to provide manning and equipment to support a Detachment of two (2) acft on overseas TDY on a continuous basis. B. Crew/acft ration which will provide TDY frequency of three months per eighteen months per combat crew. C. Squadron staff manning capable of supporting detachment concept of operations. D. Retention of sufficient B-57C acft to meet transition and pilot standardization requirements.

LT COL MERCHANT

DOD/eda 22115 SECRET 1 of 2

SECRET

Part 5. Initial review of proposed movement of RB-57 acft to Forbes AFB indicates consideration must be given to the following areas: (1) Spares and support equipment problems relative to support of an additional weapons system at Forbes AFB. (2) Programmed missile activation, possible movement of 338th SRS (Weather) from Forbes and movement of a medium bomb wing to Forbes AFB. (3) Costly and excellent facilities recently justified and constructed at Laughlin AFB. Areas indicated in Part V will be closely evaluated. Part 6. Pertinent guidance expected soonest from USAF will be forwarded to you upon receipt. Part 7. The SAC D/Plans project officer for this program is Major B. P. Smith, DPLCZ, Extension 28164, this hq. Unquote. Part 2. Request 4080th prepare recommendations on Part 4 of SAC message for discussion with 2AF representatives on staff visit tentatively scheduled for Laughlin on 11 March. Part 3. Request you evaluate reasons for and against move of D-2 acft to Forbes and be prepared to discuss in detail on 11 Mar during 2AF staff visit.

A TRUE COPY:

W. P. CUMISKEY
Major, USAF

DOD/eda

SECRET 2158Z/18MAY59 SECRET

COMSTRATRECONWG 4080 PRIORITY
LAUGHLIN AFB, TEXAS

COMSTRATRECONWG 4080 DET 3 RAMEY AFB, P. R.

COMSTRATRECONWG 4080 DET 4 EZEIZA AIRPORT, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA

INFO: COMAF 2 BARKSDALE AFB, LA

SECRET/FROM DCO 65 E. DAYLIGHT. SUBJECT: (U) VOICE RECORDER FOR U-2 AIRCRAFT. REFERENCE SAC SECRET MESSAGE DOPLRS 458 AND 2AF SECRET MESSAGE, DODT M-9-11091. EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT OF THIS MESSAGE, THE REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN A VOICE RECORDING CAPABILITY IN THE U-2 AIRCRAFT NO LONGER EXISTS.

A TRUE COPY:

W. P. CUMISKEY
Major, USAF

JOHN B. BOYNTON, LT COLONEL, USAF

DCO 414 SECRET 1 of 1

SECRET

892488

FINAL MISSION REPORT FOR DETACHMENT 7

1. Final mission report for Detachment Seven, 4080th SRW Operations Order 33-59A, Bordertown, Headquarters, 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Light, dated 19 Dec 58.

2. Brief Narrative:

Three RB-57D-2 aircraft and four combat ready crews together with a total of one hundred and fifteen personnel and approximately forty-six tons of supplies and equipment were deployed from Laughlin AFB, Texas to Brize Norton RAF Station in England. The Advon Personnel departed the home station on 16 January 1959 and arrived at the TDY site on 19 January 1959. The remainder of support aircraft arrived a few days subsequent with the last aircraft arrival on 26 January 1959. The tactical aircraft and crews departed the home station at 0100Z 24 January 1959 after a twenty four hour delay due to weather. All three tactical aircraft completed the deployment non-stop with two logging approximately eleven and one-half hours and the third twelve and one-quarter hours. The third aircraft lost all oxygen at the point of no return over the Atlantic ocean but managed to make land fall by maintaining maximum altitude within the capability of the crew. This crew was required to fly at cabin altitudes of fifteen to eighteen thousand feet in order to have sufficient fuel to reach land. A strip alert tanker was launched from Upper Heyford by 7th Air Division and a rendezvous and a second Air Refueling was accomlished at Lands End which enabled the crew to proceed to Brize Norton for landing. An Operational Hazard report dated 30 January 1959 was prepared and forwarded covering this incident in detail. Two air

refuelings were scheduled on the deployment, however, the first one was cancelled due to weather. At the second air refueling two receivers took on more than 15,000 pounds of fuel each and were required to share the spare tanker in order to fill their tanks. At least 20,000 pounds of fuel should be available from each tanker to preclude the necessity for using a spare tanker. (S)

3. Personnel and Administration:

a. Personnel: One hundred and fifteen 4080th SRW Personnel and three support personnel from WRAMA were deployed on Project Border Town. Personnel consisted of nineteen officers, eighty eight airmen and eleven civilians. Personnel were selected and notified more than thirty days prior to deployment except for one or two isolated cases. Individuals receiving less than thirty days notice were carefully counselled to insure that no personal hardship would be incurred. Eight 4080th SRW Airmen personnel and two civilians from WRAMA were returned early because of no further requirement for their services at TDY location. Because of the high priority placed upon the successful completion of the mission the Detachment was heavily manned to preclude any possibility of failure due to a lack of qualified personnel. The manning of future Detachments with similar requirements can be reduced approximately fifty percent without sacrificing the capability of the unit. There were no personnel problems throughout the period of the TDY. (C)

b. Administration: The administrative work load was much heavier than expected. Approximately seven hundred incoming or outgoing messages were processed. A high percentage of these messages

were classified requiring careful logging and filing as required of all classified matter. There were also numerous reports, and routine correspondence that created a relatively heavy administrative workload. (C)

4. Operations and Training:

All crews were required, by 7th Air Division, to complete an orientation flight immediately after arrival at Brize Norton RAF Station. These flights were planned to provide maximum opportunity for familiarization of communication facilities and procedures and Jet letdowns, at selected SAC Bases in the United Kingdom. The orientation missions, as well as operational checks of equipment, and test hops, were conducted under the provisions of Operations Order Half-Breed, Headquarters, 7th Air Division, dated 27 January 1959. After all crews had completed an orientation flight a written critique was prepared and forwarded to 7th Air Division. (C)

Fourteen other flights were scheduled and accomplished under Frag Order, dated 31 Dec 58 Pied Piper Gypsy to Operations Order 60-59, dated 26 May 1958. (S)

Weather presented a problem in adhering to the projected schedule. Long periods of low ceilings and visibility associated with fog and stratus type weather resulted in delays of some missions and re-scheduling of others. During extended periods of this type weather, an additional problem resulted becaused the aircraft were grounded for excessive periods of time. It was found that the equipment continued to work better if the stand-down time did not exceed five days. A turn around time of three to four days on each aircraft is optimum and it is considered good procedure on future deployments to fly each

aircraft on a short operational check when the flying schedule provides more than five to seven days stand down between missions. (S)

The following recap indicates the mission results based upon accomplishments obtained using manual ground data reduction:

Number of Missions Scheduled:	14	
Number of Missions flown:	14	
Ground Aborts:	0	
Air Aborts (1 late T.O.)	3	(1 partially satisfactory)
Late Take Offs	1	
Number Succesful Missions:	11	
Number Unsuccessful Missions:	3	

Two missions were considered unsatisfactory due to a malfunction of the digital tape of the 320 SAFE System and one because of excessive fluctuation of signal characteristics. The missions considered unsuccesful provided considerable information from the APD-4 and the KD-2 camera. (S)

The reliability of the equipment of the D-2 weapons system during the deployment period by far exceeded past performance. Each mission flown was carefully analyzed locally, within the capability of available facilities. It was found that logical information was obtained on approximately ninety-five percent of all signals analyzed using a manual read out of the cards produced from the 320 SAFE System; whereas the automatic readout used by the 544th RTS will produce solutions on only approximately sixty-six percent of the analysis. The manual readout requires an officer and one airman approximately six hours. Considering the vast increase in solutions obtained using the manual procedure it appears mandatory that at least all missions, on which solutions are lost, be reduced manually in order to secure maximum results. (S)

The O-20 film was carefully replotted to determine navigation accuracy. On mission number two, one target return was misidentified which caused a forty-five mile navigation error. Prior to the first two missions, scope photography was not available in sufficient time to provide adequate study of the routes flown. On all subsequent flights available film was utilized to provide intensive study which produced accurate navigation tracks with precision resets of the ASN-6 ground position indicator. The average flight line deviation was approximately five miles from planned track. (S)

In some areas, extremely heavy concentrations of electronic signals, within certain frequency ranges, presents a problem in signal separation for accurate analysis. It is mandatory that each signal be isolated and analysed separately in order to produce accurate results. When more than one signal is analyzed simultaneosly, erroneous characteristics will be reflected and an inaccurate solution will result. The six MC band pass filter presently installed to help alleviate this problem requires further improvement in order to eliminate it. (S)

The crews were relieved from all training requirements for the quarter by virtue of completing more than sixty days TDY. Considerable training was accomplished and the operational requirements which were completed provided much more diversified training than would have been possible at the home station. A noticeable increase in crew proficiency was apparent with the completion of each mission. Mission accomplishment forms were completed and accurate records training records were maintained. (C)

After the fourteen scheduled missions were completed, 7th Air Division informed SAC Headquarters and Second AF Headquarters that the Detachment could be released immediately for re-deployment. The usual tear down, creating, and

Normal preparation for the arrival of the first support aircraft was initiated. Thirty-five hours from the scheduled departure of the first two support aircraft a delay message was received with instructions to maintain capability. Approaching so near re-deployment time before receiving information of an extension creates many additional problems. It then takes considerable time to regain the capability existing at the time pareparation was begun for re-deployment. (C)

5. Logistics:

(a) Maintenance:

Maintenance throughout the TDY period was excellent. The various systems of the aircraft performed with a much higher percentage of reliability than during any equivalent period of time in the history of the aircraft. An evaluation of the equipment and the percentage of reliability is estimated as follows: (S)

APN 107	100%	
320 SAFE	80%	93% Excluding tape malfunctions
APR 9	93%	
APR 14	100%	
APA 69	93%	
APA 74	100%	
APD 4	90%	
KD 2	97%	
O-20	98%	
System III	100%	
Auto-Pilot	86%	
APG	93%	

The basis for determining equipment reliability was mission completion. (S)

Although the RB-57D2 Weapons System showed remarkable improvement in reliability there are some areas that should be considered for further improvement. There are modifications particularly in the 320 SAFE System and the allied GFE equipment which appear feasible and desireable. A study will be made and recommended changes will be submitted at a later date. (S)

In so far as possible maintenance technicians were assigned to one aircraft and their entire efforts were devoted to their particular equipment on the aircraft to which they were assigned. This resulted in becoming more familiar with the characteristics and peculiarities of the equipment on their aircraft. This developed a spirit of team work which assisted in making every scheduled take-off an event and undoubtedly was a contributing factor in the improvement in equipment reliability. This type of maintenance is considered particularly effective on this weapons system during TDY periods and is worthy of consideration at the home station in so far as these procedures can be employed. COMMENT #1. Weather during the TDY period provided considerable precipitation, fog, and high humidity. All three aircraft were hangered at all times except for the period approximately three hours prior to flight until one hour after landing. This procedure was very effective in eliminating possible malfunctions of electronic equipment caused by excessive moisture and also provided the most ideal conditions for performing maintenance, pre-flight and for the security guards. The most serious maintenance problem resulted from a series of tape transport malfunctions in

the 320 SAFE System. Two malfunctions occurred during airborne flight and during a very thorough check of all tape decks, three more malfunctioning units were discovered in the shop. These malfunctions resulted from two different causes. The tension of the drive capstan was found to be out of adjustment and screws which attach the fasteners to the lid occasionally caused binding. The tension on the drive capstans were adjusted and the screws were reversed so that the screw heads would be in the inside of the lid which prevents any possibility of binding from this cause. (S)

(b) SUPPLY:

Supply support was outstanding during the entire TDY period. There were no AOCP and practically no ANFEs. The depot support provided by WRAMA was excellent and the WRAMA representative, at the TDY site with the Detachment, provided valuable assistance in coordinating with the depot and in assisting in monitoring supply requirements. Re-supply provided through reflex aircraft was invaluable, particularly on critical items. The Reflex deliveries averaged six days from requisition and routine deliveries through normal supply channels averaged eleven days. Some Reflex deliveries were received within three days. (C)

The Fly-a-way Kit proved to be adequate but can be improved by further screening and by applying the knowledge gained from its use during the TDY. Consumption data has been recorded and will be used to recommend improvements. The Fly-a-way Kit used was a RB-57Do kit with a D2 prod pack. In the future all items common only to the

RB-57D and D-1 will be deleted from the kit in order to reduce airlift requirements. (U)

(c) Transportation and Mobility:

The MATS support provided on the deployment was not nearly as good as on the re-deployment. There was an excessive amount of off-loading enroute which increases the possibility of damage or loss of equipment and also increases the time enroute. The Advon was picked up by a C-124 that was known to be incapable of making the entire trip which resulted in a ten hour delay at Donaldson AFB. Other support aircraft experienced unnecessary delays on the deployment. The re-deployment was well -planned and was completed in a very efficient manner. The unit mobility plan appears to be satisfactory based upon the experience of this TDY. (C)

(d) Base Facilities:

The Base Facilities at the TDY site were completely adequate and the Base support received was outstanding. The hanger, A&E shops and Operations building were well-adapted to Detachment 7 requirements. All other requirements were adequately provided by the 3920th Combat Support Group. (U)

6. Intelligence:

The Border Town Operations Order was not specific as to the intelligence requirements, therefore an air intelligence officer and a photo radar intelligence officer were included in the manning. It was found that considerable activity was experienced in both areas and these skills were well utilized on the deployment with one of the officers performing additional duty as Administrative Officer.

Deployments of this type serve as an excellent means of providing realistics retraining and familiarization in intelligence functions. (C)

7. Security:

The classification of the deployment coupled with the sensitive nature of the overall operation required that very tight security be maintained. All personnel were thoroughly indoctrinated concerning security. The fact that the aircraft were hangered most of the time seemed to arouse a little unwarranted suspicion, on the other hand, having the aircraft inside the hanger enabled the security guards to perform a more effective job of providing security. (U)

RECOMMANDATIONS:

1. That the deployment and re-deployment legs flown by the tactical aircraft be restricted to approximately eight to nine hours. (U)

2. Each tanker be required to carry a minimum of twenty thousand pounds of fuel to eliminate necessity of utilizing more than one tanker per receiver during air refueling. (U)

3. That air support planning be accomplished to eliminate necessity for off loading large quantities of equipment enroute. (U)

4. That consideration be given to further improvement of the 320 SAFE System, particularly on minor modifications. (C)

5. That manual data reduction be used to reduce data from the 320 SAFE in order to provide a maximum number of accurate analysis. (C)

6. That radar scope photography be provided, if available, in sufficient time to allow adequate study prior to the first sortie. (C)

7. That the prime depot again provide a supply liaison representative on future deployments. (U)

8. That REFLEX flights again be utilized on future deployments to provide fast re-supply particularly on critical items and anticipated AOCPs and ANFEs. (U)

9. That an improved Fly-a-way Kit listing be submitted by this Headquarters and acted upon by WRAMA. (U)

10. That maximum notice be given the Detachment, in event it becomes necessary to extend the TDY period, so that a higher capability can be maintained until the deployment is terminated. (C)

11. That D2 aircraft be hangered on future deployments if space is available, particularly during extremely damp weather. (U)

1900Z/6 APR59 UNCLASSIFIED

PRIORITY

COMSTRATRECONWG 4080 LAUGHLIN AFB TEX

CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR

INFO C@MAF 2 BARKSDALE AFB LA

UNCLAS/FROM DMMR 5064 D. DAYLIGHT. FOR DM4F AT SAC AND DM4E AT 2 AF. SUBJECT: RETURN OF RB-57D-2 AIRCRAFT. THE FOLLOWING LISTED AIRCRAFT, TIME AND DATE LISTED, RETURNED FROM DETACHMENT 7.

53-3964A	1624 HOURS CST	5 PRIL 1959
53-3965A	1624 HOURS CST	5 APRIL 1959
53-3968A	1624 HOURS CST	5 APRIL 1959

A TRUE COPY:

W. P. CUMISKEY
Major, USAF

JAMES F. FAGAN, CAPT., USAF

DMMR 8228 1 of 1 UNCLASSIFIED

DETACHMENT 5
4080TH STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE WING, LIGHT
United States Air Force
Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska

APRIL 1959

MONTHLY HISTORY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. OPERATIONS

1. The first sorties scheduled for Toy Soldier III, 4080th Strat Recon Wing, L, Ops Order 62-59 was 3 April 1959. /U/

2. The first four sorties flown were unsuccessful because of equipment failure in the ball sampler installation. The last sortie to complete the required fifteen successful sorties was flown 29 April 1959. /S/

3. During the month, three additional Congo Maiden routes were approved. Two of these routes were flown and operationally were considered successful although one route was partially cloud covered. The remaining route was scheduled twice but was cancelled by higher headquarters presumably because of weather. /S/

4. A recap of flying activities for the month of April follows:

	Congo Maiden	Toy Soldier	Test
Sorties Scheduled	4	26	4
Cancellations for Weather	0	3	0
Cancellations by HHQ	2	0	0
Cancellations for Maint.	0	0	0
Cancellations for Other	0	0	0
Air Aborts	0	1	0
Ground Aborts	0	0	0
Late Take Off	0	1	0
Sorties Airborne	2	23	4
Sorties Successful	2	15	4
Flying Hours	10:20	166:50	7:45

Total Sorties Flown for April 29
Total Hours Flown for April ..... 184:55 /S/

II. INTELLIGENCE

1. With the bulk of the Congo Maiden sorties completed during the last hectic week of March, April started out quietly and remained so for the entire month. /U/

2. During early April we requested and obtained distribution on the SAC Current Intelligence Digests. Briefings on them were given weekly to the Detachment enlisted personnel and bi-weekly to the Commander, his staff and aircrews. /U/

3. The section played a minor part on the Toy Soldier sorties by debriefing crews for the Combar report. /U/

4. Two Congo Maiden sorties were launched and successfully completed, one on the 16th April, and the second on 25 April. Each mission was briefed and debriefed, reports were compiled and forwarded, tracker evaluation indicated missions were accomplished as briefed. /S/

5. During the interim periods, the section was spruced up with the addition of curtains. Files were brought up to date, and procedures and activities were documented for reference of intelligence personnel going on future detachments. /U/

1900Z/9APR59 UNCLASSIFIED

ROUTINE

COMSTRATRECONWG 4080 LAUGHLIN AFB DEL RIO TEX

COMSTRATRECONWG 4080 DET 5 EIELSON AFB ALASKA

UNCLAS/E F T O/ FROM C 5170 D. FOR COL CURRY FROM COL BRATTON.

THIS MESSAGE IN TWO PARTS. PART I. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS QUOTED

FOR YOUR INFORMATION: QUOTE. UNCLAS/C31 94. GENERAL POWER TO COLONEL

BRATTON, INFO GENERAL MCCONNELL. CONGRATULATIONS FOR THE SPLENDID JOB

PERFORMED BY YOUR CREWS AND PERSONNEL DURING THE RECENT CONGO MAIDEN

PROJECT. ALTHOUGH THE OPERATIONAL PHASE OF THIS PROJECT WAS OF SHORT

DURATION, EXTENSIVE COORDINATION AND PLANNING WAS REQUIRED. THE ENTIRE

OPERATION WAS PERFORMED WITHOUT INCIDENT AND IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO

BRING RECOGNITION TO THE PERSONNEL OF YOUR COMMAND WHO WERE RESPONSIBLE

FOR THE OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND MAINTENANCE OF THIS PROJECT. THE CREWS,

IN PARTICULAR, PERFORMED IN AN OUTSTANDING MANNER. CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS

MADE CONTRIBUTIONS OF SUCH EXCEPTIONAL VALUE AS TO WARRANT PERSONAL

MENTION. THEY ARE LT COLONEL HAYDEN C. CURRY, MAJOR RUDOLF ANDERSON, JR.,

AND MAJOR BOBBIE G. GARDINER. THE HIGH STANDARDS MAINTAINED, AS WELL

AS THE OPERATIONAL PROFICIENCY DISPLAYED IN THIS IMPORTANT UNDERTAKING,

WERE PARAMOUNT TO THE SUCCESS ATTAINED. PLEASE EXTEND MY CONGRATULATIONS

TO THE RESPONSIBLE PERSONNEL. UNQUOTE. PART II. I ADD MY CONGRATULATIONS

A. J. BRATTON, JR., Col., USAF

FOR AN OUTSTANDING ACCOMPLISHMENT. PLEASE DISSEMINATE THIS MESSAGE TO ALL MEMBERS OF YOUR DETACHMENT.

A TRUE COPY:

W. P. CUMISKEY
Major, USAF

SECRET

5

[redacted]
4080TH SRW, L, DET. NO. 3
APO 845, NEW YORK, N.Y.

[redacted]

5 May 1959

RECEIVED
11 MAY 1959

SUBJECT: (U) Historical Report

TO: Commander
4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, Light
ATTN: Wing Historian
Laughlin Air Force Base, Del Rio, Texas

1. This report covers the month of April 1959. (U)

2. On 8 April 1959 the rotation of personnel took place with the exception of Major P. J. Halloran, who was extended 30 days. Officers and airmen arriving were: Capt J. A. Qualls, Capt R. J. Callahan, 1st Lt R. L. St Martin, M/Sgt R. T. Fletcher, S/Sgt L. J. Peacock, S/Sgt B. J. Sanders, S/Sgt C. Y. Smith, A/1C J. A. McGathon, A/1C R. R. Wallace, A/2C A. R. Endy, A/2C R. G. Sullivan, A/2C H. W. Summers, A/2C L. G. Wilheim, S/Sgt W. L. Brown, S/Sgt J. A. Fields, S/Sgt G. K. Lacy, A/1C W. J. Turpon, A/1C A. P. Lloyd, A/2C M. R. Russell, A/3C A. S. Parson, A/3C W. Kobzeff, S/Sgt E. C. Garrett, A/1C R. E. Kendrick, A/2C J. J. McPartland, S/Sgt N. P. Croteau, A/1C S. A. Lewis Jr., A/2C R. G. Hempel, T/Sgt J. S. Wright, A/2C J. E. Terrell, A/2C C. S. Kandel, A/2C T. E. Merkle, S/Sgt R. E. Absher. Major Halloran is Commander; Capt Qualls is Operations officer; Capt Callahan is Administrative Officer and Lt St Martin is Maintenance and Supply Officer. Officers and airmen departing Ramey left 11 April 1959 after briefing newcoming personnel. Those departing were: Maj F. W. Wilson, Capt R. S. Heyser, Capt J. A. Campbell, M/Sgt T. L. Carver, M/Sgt C. Luther, T/Sgt D. C. Arnett, T/Sgt W. Harp, S/Sgt D. L. Bahr, S/Sgt D. E. Borwn, S/Sgt B. J. Fonner, S/Sgt G. I. Gardiner, S/Sgt R. C. Greene, S/Sgt B. C. Heidgerken, S/Sgt S. R. King, S/Sgt B. R. Sanders, A/1C O. V. Collins, A/1C D Dills, A/1C J. A. Foder, A/1C J. C. Fontenot, A/1C J. M Keough, A/1C B. J. Sawyer, A/1C J. L. Swafford, A/2C L. E. Cotter, A/2C J. M Hawes, A/2C R. M. Johnson, A/2C G. D. Linton, A/2C B. D. Lunsford, A/2C A. R. Robinson, A/2C E. W. Shealy, A/2C W. C. Welch, A/2C C. H. Westcott, A/2C D. G. Zak. On 11 April 1959, a C-123 arrived from Laughlin with an engine and some hydraulic T-fittings for aircraft 714. Major Wozniak, Captain James, Captain Schug and Lt Dunagan were the crew. The C-123 departed Ramey for Laughlin on 12 April 1959. (S)

3. On 14 April the mission was delayed 24 hours due to bad weather at Buenos Aires. Maj Halloran had the monthly Commander's Call and briefed both officers and airmen of their job, responsibility to the 4080th SRW and how harmonious cooperation could make this TDY an enjoyable one. On 19 April the aircraft departed for Plattsburgh.

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SECRET

Captain Callahan had hydraulic failure and returned to Ramey. Later that day he flew the aircraft to Plattsburgh. Major King, Capt's McElveen, Reasoner and Lodin were at Plattsburgh to greet us. A T-33 was at Plattsburgh so on 20 April Capt Callahan and Capt Qualls each got one ride and Lt St Martin got two rides. On 21 April Capt Callahan and Capt McElveen both had successful North missions. On 23 April Capt Qualls and Lt St Martin flew the T-33. On 24 April Major King and Capt Qualls flew Big Orbit missions. Capt Callahan and Capt Barton (Flight Surgeon at Plattsburgh) flew the T-33. Two aircraft , 705 and 714, returned to Ramey on 26 April. Lt St Martin took 715 to Edwards for installation of the new oxygen system and a fuel tank vent system for the wing tanks. While the aircraft were at Plattsburgh, Colonel Beauchamp and Lt Col Boynton arrived at Ramey on 25 April for a staff visit. They greeted Capt Qualls and Capt Callahan upon their return on 26 April and met with Brig Gen Martin, 72nd Bombardment Wing Commander, on 27 April 1959. Colonel Beauchamp and Lt Col Boynton were on hand 28 April to observe the launching of Crow Flight Mission # 54. Col Beauchamp and Lt Col Boynton departed Ramey on 28 April only after "Oscar the Crow" had been beautifully embossed on each Wing tank of the 4025th's B-57C. Major Atkins arrived at Ramey on 28 April for an overnight stay. Major Atkins was ferrying aircraft 716 to Edwards for modification and departed 29 April 1959. (S)

4. Flying for the month of April was as follows: On 3 April Major Wilson flew North and Capt Campbell flew South; 7 April, Major Halloran flew North and Capt Heyser flew South; 10 April, Capt Capt Campbell flew North and Capt Heyser South; Capt Heyser returned early from his mission because the Rescue aircraft could not penetrate a line of Thunderstorms; 14 April, Mission delayed 24 hours due to weather at Detachment 4, mission cancelled on 15 April due to weather at Detachment 4; 16 April, Capt Callahan flew a test on aircraft 714. 17 April, Maj Halloran flew North and Lt St Martin flew South; 28 April, Maj Halloran flew North mission and Capt Qualls flew South. (S)

a. The total flying time for the month of April was 160:00 hours. There were a total of twenty-three sorties flown of which twenty were sampling missions, two were ferry flights and one was a test hop. (S)

5. During the month of April, the Maintenance Section complied with six service bulletins. One periodic inspection was completed on aircraft 714, the aircraft was test flown and released. While the aircraft were at Plattsburgh, a general clean-up campaign was conducted under the supervision of Major Halloran and M/Sgt Fletcher.

All the equipment was re-painted and put in A-1 working order. The Crash Boat was obtained for one fishing trip. There have been no D. R.'s or uniform violations received during April. The morale of all personnel is high and everyone is working together. (U)

6. On 29 April Detachment 3 was required to supply Ramey AFB with an Airdrome Clearance Officer. (U)

7. This report is classified SECRET to conform with the classification of 2AF Operations Order 74-57, dated 29 August 1958. (U)

Richard J. Callahan

RICHARD J. CALLAHAN
Captain, USAF
Historian

CONFIDENTIAL

H I S T O R Y

Detachment IV, 4080th SRW (L)

Ezeiza Airport, Buenos Aires, Argentina

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION II

OPERATIONS

Operations scheduled 20 sorties for the month of April 1959 for a total of 131 hours. Fourteen (14) sorties were flown for a total of 110 hours and 40 minutes. Two (2) sorties were lost due to inclement weather conditions. Of the 14 A-Foil sorties flown all were successful but 2, one being 50% successful and one being completely unsuccessful; both being attributed to materiel failure of equipment. Three (3) Test Flights were flown for a total of 6 hours and 20 minutes. There were no ground aborts during this period however, one late take off was caused by inclement weather. Of the 20 sorties flown, 4 Little Hickory missions were scheduled, 3 being successful and one cancelled dur to weather conditions. /C/

As of 30 April 1959 13,800 gallons of fuel remained, enough for approximately 5 missions, however, the anticipated arrival of fuel by surface will eliminate the fuel problem. /C/

Spanish Classes commenced 20 April 1959 for the purpose of tutoring Pilots, Navigators, and Radio Operators. /U/

SAFETY

On 6 April 1959, the monthly Flying Safety Meeting was held for all flying personnel. The subject of the month was "Cold Weather Operations". Climatic conditions expected in our flying area was given by our Weather Officer, also our Flight Surgeon talked on Rescue and Safety in cold weather. /U/

On 9 April 1959, the executive safety council meeting was held. All section heads were present plus ground and flying safety officers. The draft copy of the check list for AFR 62-14 was approved and is now available to appropriate officials. Safety activities planned for May and accomplishments of the past month were reported. /U/

On 30 April 1959, Ground Safety was covered and all personnel in the Detachment were present. Phases covered concerned, not only guarding against accidents but in illnesses, prolonged convalescence and disregarding of personal health and hygiene. Problem areas such as flight, quarters, traveling and recreational activities were covered extensively. /U/

SECTION IV

MAINTENANCE

Line maintenance progressed as required to support the mission. The painting of all ground power equipment with the exception of the fork lift and the oxygen cart was completed. /U/

The special equipment room is completed and is being utilized for the storing of P-2, A-Foil, and Ivory Tower Equipment. /C/

The following service bulletins were complied with during this period: /U/

Aircraft Number

	716	717	718
SB#	385	361	310
	373	385	326
	361	373	358
	363	381	366
	381	356	368
	388	297	361
	390	293	385
	356	359	297
	359	388	298
		252	381
		390	373
		363	359
			388
			390
			356

SECRET

Detachment 3
4080TH STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE WING, LIGHT
United States Air Force
APO 845, New York, New York

13 June 1959

SUBJECT: (U) Historical Report

TO: Commander
4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing
ATTN: Wing Historian
Laughlin Air Force Base
Del Rio, Texas

1. This report covers the month of May 1959. (U)

2. The detachment had some personnel changes this month. Major Patrick J. Halloran, 28296A, who was extended on TDY for 30 days, was replaced on 11 May 1959 by Major Raymond L. Haupt, 41906A. Captain Richard J. Callahan, A03021757, had trouble with his pressure suit and seat kit which required re-running in the pressure chamber and departed on the C-123 on 14 May. A/1C Dewewy M. Payne, AF18204939, arrived on the C-123 on 12 May to work in the FAK Section. No other changes were made during the month. Captain James A. Qualls was Operations Officer. First Lieutenant Roy L. St Martin was Supply and Engineering Officer. (U)

3. This month the detachment flew 26 sorties with 18 Special sorties, 4 Ferry flights and 4 Test flights for a total of 145:35. On 1 May 59 Captain Callahan had to abort the South mission because of hydraulic failure. Captain Qualls flew North mission. On 5 May Captain Callahan aborted on North mission because of pressizuration failure. Major Halloran flew South mission. 6 May Captain Callahan ferried aircraft back from Kindley from previous days abort. 8 May Captain Callahan flew South and Captain Qualls flew North. 12 May Captain Qualls flew South, Captain Callahan flew North but aborted into Kindley AFB, Bermuda after experiencing hypoxia. Lt St Martin ferried aircraft back from Edwards AFB, California after modification. 13 May Lt St Martin ferried aircraft 705 from Kindley. 15 May the mission was cancelled because of oxygen difficulties. Lt St Martin tested 715. 17 May all aircraft deployed to Plattsburgh. 18 May Capt Qualls and Lt St Martin flew in the T-33. 19 May mission was delayed 24 hours for oxygen. 20 May Lt St Martin flew North. Captain Qualls also flew a North mission but had to turn around early due to oxygen shortage. Cause was excessive ground time and late take-off due to ATC clearance. 21 May Capt Qualls and the Plattsburgh Flight Surgeon flew the T-33. 22 May Capt Qualls and Lt St Martin flew Big Orbit missions and Major Halloran ferried aircraft 705 to Edwards for modification. 24 May Capt Qualls and Lt St Martin redeployed to Ramey AFB, P. R. 26 May Major Haupt flew North and Major Atkins, who had arrived here on 18 May on Ferry flight from Edwards, flew the South mission for Detachment 3 and Lt Pine from Detachment 4 came in from Ezeiza North mission. 27 May Lt Pine ferried to Edwards for modification. 29 May Mission was cancelled due to adverse cross winds. 31 May Lt St Martin tested aircraft 714 out of Periodic Inspection. (S)

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4. Captain Stephens, Lt Dunagan, Captain Fermmer, Captain Lutz and Captain Shippey came in on 13 May to bring an engine and parts to Detachment 3. Departed on 16 May 59. (U)

5. Captain McElveen and Lt Herman came through on their way to Detachment 4 for rotation on 7 May. Captain Dixon and Lt Bevacqua came back from rotation from Detachment 4 on 15 May 59. (U)

6. The morale of personnel of Detachment 3 is high and no DR's or uniform violations were reported during the month of May. The week the aircraft were deployed to Plattsburgh, overnight passes were issued and an enjoyable time was had by all as near as could be ascertained. Detachment 3 personnel practically own one of the nice establishments just off base. When the passes were up, everyone come back ready to go to work again. (U)

7. Three Periodic Inspections were performed during the month with one aircraft requiring an engine change. Five days were required for the engine change and inspection. Three days were required on the other two aircraft with the Test hops completed. Test flights are included for number of days mentioned. This detachment had generator problems with aircraft 705 during the month. Five generators were used and found to be unsatisfactory. It was determined that wrong type brushes were installed which caused the generator to fail or burn out after a short period of time. All generators were sent back to WRAMA for repairs and all items were UR'ed. Maintenance discovered four bad voltage regulators and these were returned and UR'ed. (S)

8. Upon arrival here it was discovered that Fly-Away-Kit Section was unsatisfactory for the support required. Items had been shuffled around in FAK bins from their original locations as reflected on AF Form 197. The Form 197 showed more locations than we had. A complete inventory of FAK was conducted and bins and records were straightened to coincide with each other. The shortages were determined and all needed items were requisitioned from WRAMA. A FAK percentage will be available in the near future. Other supply items revealed shortages, and were requisitioned the Form 197's now show accurate amount of quanties authorized and on hand and their locations. Some excess items turned up during inventory and in accordance with Project Directive 67-8, dated 15 Sep 1957. A report is being submitted to WSSC for disposition of excesses. A Tee fitting is urgently needed in the FAK. This item has been on requisition since 10 April 1959. One sextant was ordered and found to be uncleaned. Item was disassembled and cleaned before installation. SLOE support for this detachment has been very good. (S)

9. The P. E. Section has made eight seat kit inspections, seven parachute repacks, seven URC-4 radio inspections and seven PK-2 life raft inspections. All were found to be in excellent condition and inspection cards were brought up to date. The seat kits had new quick release type snaps installed and all connections were safety wired as per conversation between Captain Qualls and personal equipment personnel at Plattsburgh during the last deployment. Captain Qualls came in on 25 May and asked if the seat kit could possibly ride up over the parachute following ejection from aircraft (caused by wind blast). This was simulated and found this could possibly happen if parachute and seat kit were not tight. A fix for this would be to run two straps up through the kit and fasten them to the leg straps of the parachute. This section is performing ~~is performing~~ Detachment 4 inspections periodically and found equipment in satisfactory condition.

10. This report is classified SECRET to confirm with the classification of 2AF Operations Order 74-57, dated 29 August 1958. (U)

James A. Qualls

JAMES A. QUALLS
Captain, USAF
Historian

H I S T O R Y

Detachment IV, 4080th SRW (L)

Ezeiza Airport, Buenos Aires, Argentina

Month of May 1959

SECTION II

OPERATIONS

Operations scheduled 23 sorties for the month of May 1959 for a total of 148 hours. Twenty-five (25) sorties were flown for a total of 150 hours. One (1) test flight was scheduled and five (5) were flown. Four (4) Pilot Proficiency Flights were scheduled and two (2) were flown. The increase in test flights was the contributing factor which raised the actual number of sorties flown over the number scheduled. /C/

Of the 19 A-Foil sorties flown one (1) was unsuccessful and was contributed to a maintenance error. Ten (10) P-2 Platform sorties were flown with three (3) being unsuccessful; each failure attributed to material failure. The 3 Little Hickory missions scheduled and flown were all successful. /C/

1st Lt Robert D. Pine departed for Edwards AFB in aircraft 717 on 26 May 1959. Major Richard A. Atkins returned from Edwards AFB in aircraft 716 on 26 May 59. /C/

There were no major problems encountered during this period. /U/

SAFETY

The monthly Safety Meeting was held on 6 May 1959. All rated personnel were present. /U/

On 11 May 1959, a special briefing was conducted for replacement crews. Special Subjects covered were local flying procedures, Emergency Procedures, and Rescue Facilities. /U/

Special Reports this month included one operational hazard report concerning a face piece release cord breaking during a local check. /U/

SECTION IV

MAINTENANCE

Line Maintenance progressed as required to support the mission. Maintenance difficulties experienced during this period are outlined below: /C/

The P-2 Platform did not operate on one low altitude mission. The A/C generator light would come on when the platform was turned on. The A/C generator, the A/C motor and the rootes blower were changed. The system worked satisfactorily on an operational check./C/

The AFOAT Nose did not function on one flight. The pressure regulator, the pressure switch, exhaust dump valve, and the forward seal were changed. /C/

One P-2 Platform mission was unsuccessful because of an air solenoid valve malfunction. /C/

One AFOIL nose malfunction was experienced on number four filter because of a solenoid valve failure. /C/

One P-2 Platform mission was unsuccessful because of failure of the electrical field in the A/C motor. /C/

With the departure of one U-2 aircraft three maintenance crews were no longer required consequently, one maintenance crew was returned to Laughlin AFB on the May rotational aircraft. /C/

Mark-2 type hand controls were removed and replaced with Mark-3 controls on aircraft number 717 and 718. The Mark-2 controls were returned to Laughlin AFB as requested. /C/

Aircraft # 718 required an engine change as a result of a foreign object entering into the engine section. A periodic inspection was accomplished and the aircraft was successfully tested on 25 May 59. A periodic inspection was completed on aircraft # 717. The test flight was flown on 19 May 1959. /C/

A new oxygen tester was received and greatly facilitates the oxygen dewpoint check that is required on all aircraft preflights. /C/

APPENDIX V

TRANSLATION.

(from "La Nacion" newspaper)

RETURN FROM A MILITARY MISSION

Prior to their departure date, which was scheduled for October next, the members of the American mission under denomination "Crowflight" will leave for their country the 15th August next.

It has been heard that the group under Col Howard G. Shidal's command for high atmospheric investigations, consider their work to be finished by that date and, therefore, are preparing the steady return to their bases. Major Richard Atkins as Chief of Operations assigned the U-2 jets to return first to the United States, which will accomplish similar work at Plattsburg, New York. As to the six rescue aircraft C-54, they will return to Puerto Rico.

Beginning from the 15th of August and during one month one hundred members of that mission will leave Ezeiza for the United States transporting all the equipment that was utilized for that operation. At the beginning of the operation the personnel utilized amounted to 150 men.

- - - - - - - - - - -

June 1959

Headquarters
4080TH STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE WING, LIGHT
United States Air Force
Laughlin Air Force Base, Texas

AIR TRAINING REPORT FOR 1 MAY - 31 MAY 1959

RCS: 7-SAC-T-12

COMMANDER'S REMARKS

(b) Specific Remarks. (U)

1. Higher Headquarters Ordered Missions: Three hundred and two (302) hours flown performing Air Weather Service Missions as directed by Second Air Force Operations Order 74-57, dated 29 August 1958 (Crow Flight). Twenty-five (25) hours flown performing Air Weather Service Missions as directed by Second Air Force Operations Order 75-59, dated 18 March 1959 (Fortune Finder). (S)

a. Ferry Flights: Twelve (12) sorties for thirty-five (35) hours. (U)

2. Test Flights: Sixteen (16) sorties for twenty-six (26) hours. (U)

3. Weather or Local Conditions:

	CAUSES	ESTIMATED HOURS LOST
a. May	Local Weather	21

4. Restrictive Directives: None. (U)

5. Waiver of Training Requirements: CINCSAC Secret message DOTRFD-278, dated 9 January 1959, waived training requirements of SACR's 50-8 and 51-26 for all crews engaged in overseas activities over 60 days during a training period. Crews overseas less than 60 days are waived 50% of these training requirements. The following listed crews are waived 50% under the provisions of this message: L-09U, L-18U, S-25U, L-27U, L-30U, S-31U, L-32U, L-34U, L-35U, L-37U, S-38U, L-39U, and L-59U. (S)

a. Crew S-02U is being utilized as Detachment Commander of Detachment 3 and is waived training requirements of SACR's 50-8 and 51-26 by Second Air Force message DOTC-0484, dated 2 April 1959. (U)

CAFSC FROM	PROJ AUTH	PROJ ASGD	OVER/SHORT
43131/51C	161	108	Short 53
43171C	68	69	Over 1
TOTALS	229	177	Short 52

CAFSC TO	PROJ AUTH	PROJ ASGD	OVER/SHORT
43131B/51D	61	96	Over 35
43171D	26	51	Over 25
TOTALS	87	147	Over 60

8. Comments or Recommendations of the Unit Commander: (U)

a. May:

(1) Operations Order 19-58 (Big Hickory) Weather Reconnaissance Missions. Four (4) sorties were scheduled and of these one (1) was cancelled due to maintenance and three (3) were flown successfully. Project Little Hickory scheduled four (4) sorties and all were flown successfully. No significant problem areas have developed. (C)

9. Wing Commander's Remarks: None. (U)

10. Instructor Pilot Information: (U)

a. Total Instructor Pilots on Orders	14
b. Combat Ready Aircraft Commander Instructors	13
c. Staff Instructor Pilots	1
d. Instructor Pilots on Waiver	0

11. Rendezvous Information: N/A. (U)

12. Non-Combat Ready Crews: (U)

CREW NUMBER	ESTIMATED CR DATE	REASON FOR DATE CHANGE
N-63U	June	Needs Standboard Recheck
N-64U	June	
N-65U	August	
N-66U	September	
N-67U	September	
N-68U	November	
N-69U	November	
N-70U	December	

Headquarters
4080TH STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE WING, LIGHT
United States Air Force
Laughlin Air Force Base, Del Rio, Texas

AIR TRAINING REPORT FOR 1 JANUARY - 30 APRIL 1959

RCS: 6-SAC-T-12

COMMANDER'S REMARKS

(b) Specific Remarks

1. Higher Headquarters Directed Missions: Two-hundred and eighteen (218) hours were flown as directed by Second Air Force Operation Order 33-59A, dated 24 December 1958 (Border Town). Seventeen (17) hours flown as directed by CINCSAC Confidential message DOPLRS 522, dated 17 January 1959. One-hundred and forty-one (141) hours flown on Operation Red Snapper as directed by Second Air Force Operations Directive Confidential message DODT-M-8-19194, dated 19 November 1958. Twenty-one (21) hours flown on Static Display Project Falcon 59 as directed by Second Air Force Confidential message DODC-M-9-2637, dated 30 January 1959. (S)

a. Ferry Flights: Two (2) sorties for eight (8) hours. (U)

2. Test Flights: Sixty-two (62) sorties for seventy-six (76) hours. (U)

3. Weather or local conditions: (U)

	CAUSES	ESTIMATED HOURS LOST
a. January	Local Weather	35
b. February	Local Weather	9
c. March	Local Weather	None
d. April	Local Weather	None

4. Restrictive Directives: None. (U)

5. Waiver of Training Requirements: CINCSAC Secret message DOIRPD 278, dated 9 January 1959, waived training requirements of SACR's 50-8 and 51-26 for all crews engaged in overseas activities over 60 days during a training period. Crews overseas less than 60 days are waived 50% of the training requirements. Crews L-18A, L-35C,

Headquarters
4080TH STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE WING, LIGHT
United States Air Force
Laughlin Air Force Base, Texas

AIR TRAINING REPORT FOR 1 MAY - 31 MAY 1959

RCS: 6-SAC-T-12

COMMANDER'S REMARKS

(b) Specific Remarks: (U)

1. Higher Headquarters directed missions: Forty-five (45) hours flown on Operation Red Snapper as directed by Second Air Force Operations Directive Confidential message DODT-M-8-19194, dated 19 November 1958. (C)

a. Ferry Flights: None.

2. Test Flights: Six (6) sorties for seven (7) hours. (U)

3. Weather or Local Conditions: (U)

	CAUSES	ESTIMATED HOURS LOST
a. May	Local Weather	13

4. Restrictive Directives: None. (U)

5. Waiver of Training Requirements: None. (U)

6. Crew Data: See Form 184i. (U)

7. Materiel and Personnel Problems: (U)

a. May:

(1) This headquarters recommends a complete re-evaluation of the spare assets for the Martin 320 SAFE System and the APN-107 Radar System since the decision has been made to program operation into Fiscal Year 1960. A detailed study of consumption and turn-around data for the past two (2) years shows that our present stocks of necessary spare components and "Bits and Pieces" are totally inadequate for operation on any extended basis. (S)

(2) Supply support of the MM-4 Auto Pilot is unsatisfactory and Supply Difficulty action under AFR 67-82 has been taken in 4080SRW message 59-49, dated 3 June 1959. At present three (3) aircraft are operating with marginal Rate Sensors (2262-6615-3114) which have been

Headquarters
4080TH STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE WING, LIGHT
United States Air Force
Laughlin Air Force Base, Del Rio, Texas

AIR TRAINING REPORT FOR 1 JANUARY - 30 APRIL 1959

RCS: 7-SAC-T-12

COMMANDER'S REMARKS

(b) Specific Remarks. (U)

1. Higher Headquarters Ordered Missions: One Thousand two hundred and thirty-seven (1237) hours flown performing Air Weather Service Missions as directed by Second Air Force Operation Order 74-57, dated 29 August 1958, (Crow Flight). Twenty-two (22) hours flown performing Air Weather Service missions as directed by Second Air Force Operation Order 75-59 dated 18 March 1959 (Fortune Finder). Two hundred and thirty-nine (239) hours flown performing Air Weather Service missions as directed by CINCSAC Operation Order 62-59 dated 25 February 1959 (Toy Soldier). Fifteen (15) hours flown on Static Display Project Falcon 59 as directed by Second Air Force Confidential message DODC-M-9-2637 dated 30 January 1959. Twenty-seven (27) hours flown as directed by CINCSAC Secret message DOPLRS 184, dated 8 January 1959, (Bait Can).(S)

a. Ferry Flights: Forty-two (42) sorties for one hundred (100) hours. (U)

2. Test Flights: Forty-eight (48) sorties for eighty-six (86) hours. (U)

3. Weather or Local Conditions: (U)

		CAUSES	ESTIMATED HOURS LOST
a.	JANUARY	Local Weather	102
b.	FEBRUARY	Local Weather	43
c.	MARCH	Local Weather	41
d.	APRIL	Local Weather	24

4. Restrictive Directives: None. (U)

5. Waiver of Training Requirements: CINCSAC Secret message DOTRPD 278, dated 9 January 1959, waived training requirements of

d. APRIL: None

8. Comments or Recommendations of Unit Commander: (U)

a. APRIL:

(1) Operations Order 19-58 (Big Hickory) Weather Reconnaissance Missions. Four (4) sorties were scheduled during April and of these one (1) was cancelled for aircraft maintenance problems and one (1) was an air abort. Two (2) missions were flown successfully. Project Little Hickory scheduled four (4) sorties and of these, three (3) were successful and one (1) was cancelled due to weather. No significant problem areas have developed. (C)

9. Division Commander's Remarks: Not required. (U)

10. Instructor Pilot information: (U)

a.	Total Instructor Pilots on Orders	14
b.	Combat ready aircraft commander instructors	14
c.	Staff Instructor Pilots	0
d.	Instructor Pilots on waiver	0

11. Rendezvous Information: N/A (U)

12. Non-Combat Ready Crews: (U)

a. Projected Combat Ready Dates are as follows: (U)

CREW NUMBER	ESTIMATED CR DATE	REASON FOR DATE CHANGE
N-62U	May	
N-63U	May	
ICM-401U	Unknown	

b. CINCSAC message DOTRPP A-53-1-3725, dated November 1958, directed this Wing to train Royal Air Force pilots in U-2 aircraft. These pilots are to be given training equivalent to our own Combat Ready Status. Projected completion dates are as follows: (S)

NAME AND RANK	PROJECTED COMPLETION DATES
AUSTIN, Bunny, Flt Lt	COMPLETED April 1959
COX, Byron, Sqdn Leader	COMPLETED April 1959

2215Z/15MAY59 UNCLASSIFIED

COMSTRATRECONWG 4080 PRIORITY
LAUGHLIN AFB, TEXAS

SAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR

INFO: COMAF2 BARKSDALE AFB LA

/UNCLAS/FROM DCMA 6119 E . FOR DM4A AND DM4F AT SAC AND DM4E AT 2AF.

SUBJECT: RETURN OF U-2 AIRCRAFT. THE FOLLOWING LISTED U-2 AIRCRAFT ARRIVED AT THIS STATION ON THE TIME AN D DATE INDICATED, FROM DET 5.

56-6952A	1400 HOURS CST	14 MAY 1959
56-6953A	1411 HOURS CST	14 MAY 1959

A TRUE COPY:

W. P. CUMISKEY
Major, USAF

JAMES C. ALLEN, MSGT

DCMA 8228

SECRET 15MAY59 SECRET

COMSTRATRECONWG 4080 OPS IMMEDIATE
LAUGHLIN AFB, TEXAS

CINCSAC, ATTN: COL. WOODROW P. SWANCUTT, DIRECTOR OF SAFETY
OFFUTT AFB, NEBR.

COMAF 2, ATTN: COL. IRA B. MATTHEWS, DIRECTOR OF SAFETY
BARKSDALE AFB, LA.

LT/COL SID BREWER, PO BOX 604, FAIRBORN, OHIO, (MAIL ONLY)

SECRET/EFTO/4080DS 59 E . SUBJECT: COMMANDERS TWENTY FOUR HOUR REPORT OF MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT. (SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED IAW PARAS 49 AND 52, AFR 62-14)

THIS WAS AN INITIAL CHECK OUT RIDE IN THE U-2 TYPE AIRCRAFT FOR CAPTAIN CHUNG-DUEI (FIRST NAME) HSU (LAST NAME), SERIAL NUMBER 809320. THE PILOT HAD COMPLETED ALL GROUND WORK SATISFACTORILY, WAS CURRENT IN T-33 AIRCRAFT, AND HAD COMPLETED NECESSARY FLIGHTS IN U-3A AIRCRAFT. BRIEFING FOR THIS FLIGHT WAS CONDUCTED BY AN IP IN THE SQUADRON AND WAS CONSIDERED EXCELLENT, USING BRIEFING GUIDE AND COVERING ALL PHASES OF FLIGHT INCLUDING EMERGENCY PROCEDURES.

THE PREFLIGHT, START AND TAXI INDOCTRINATION WERE NORMAL. THE AIRCRAFT TOOK OFF ON SCHEDULE AT 2230Z. RUN UP WAS NORMAL AND AT 85 PER CENT RPM THE PILOT RELEASED THE BRAKES FOR TAKE OFF. 85 PER CENT RPM IS NORMAL TAKE OFF RPM FOR INITIAL FLIGHTS IN U-2 AIRCRAFT. AT APPROXIMATELY 60 KNOTS, THE TAIL WHELL CAME OFF THE RUNWAY, WITH THE PILOT HOLDING FORWARD STICK. AS THE SPEED INCREASED TO 90 KNOTS THE MOBILE CONTROL INSTRUCTOR TOLD THE PILOT TO COME BAC ON THE STICK. THE PILOT APPARENTLY DID NOT DO THIS, FOR THE AIRCRAFT BECAME AIR BORNE MOMENTARILY AND THEN SETTLED ONTO THE RUNWAY ON THE NOSE GEAR. THE MOBILE CONTROL INSTRUCTOR HAD REPEATED HIS CALL TO COME BACK ON THE STICK, BUT THE AIRCRAFT PORPOISED AFTER THE INITIAL TOUCHDOWN. DURING THE PORPOISE THE MOBILE CONTROL INSTRUCTOR ONCE AGAIN ADVISED THE STUDENT PILOT TO COME BACK ON THE STICK AND CALLED FOR ADDED POWER. THE STUDENT PILOT RESPONDED BUT NOT IN TIME FOR THE AIRCRAFT TO COMPLETE THE PORPOISE AND CONTACT THE GROUND HARD. THE AIRCRAFT WAS CHECKED IN THE AIR FOR DAMAGE AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT.

592459

SECRET

DONALD R. JAMES, D/SAFE

SAFE 411 SECRET 1 of 2

INSPECTION OF AIRCRAFT AFTER LANDING REVEALED EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO BULKHEAD AND FUSELAGE SKIN AREAS NEAR AND AROUND BOTH FORWARD AND REAR LANDING GEARS. POGOS WERE ATTACHED FOR THIS FLIGHT. AIRCRAFT GROSS WEIGHT AT TAKE OFF WAS 15,775 POUNDS WITH 775 GALLONS OF FUEL ON BOARD. WEATHER WAS HIGH THIN BROKEN, TEMPERATURE 83, DEW POINT 68, ALTIMETER SETTING 29.94, CUMULUS WEST, AND WINDS AVERAGE 140 DEGREES AT 11 KNOTS. WEATHER NOT CONSIDERED A FACTOR CREW REST NOT CONSIDERED A FACTOR.

THIS ACCIDENT WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF THE PILOT HAD FOLLOWED INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE MOBILE CONTROL OFFICER TO COME BACK ON THE STICK DURING THE TAKE OFF ROLL. FURTHER INVESTIGATION MAY REVEAL OTHER CAUSE FACTORS BUT THIS IS DOUBTFUL. FINAL BOARD ACTION IS CONTEMPLATED WITHIN ONE WEEK. UNLESS OTHER FACTORS BECOME APPARENT DURING INVESTIGATION REQUEST THIS HEADQUARTERS BE RELIEVED FROM REQUIREMENT TO SUBMIT PROGRESS REPORTS CONCERNING THIS ACCIDENT.

A TRUE COPY:

W. P. CUMISKEY
Major, USAF

594459