

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT LAUDERDALE DIVISION**

NIHAL MICHAEL GAUTAM,
Plaintiff, pro se,

v.

SHERIFF GREGORY TONY, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Broward County;
DEPUTY SHAKEEM GALLIMORE, individually;
DEPUTY THOMAS HOUSE, individually;
DEPUTY JEREMY LOAIZA, individually;
DEPUTY BRANDEN LYNCH, individually;
DEPUTY DOMINIC MAGRINO, individually;
DEPUTY ABEL RODRIGUEZ-LOPEZ, individually;
DEPUTY JULIANA TENAGLIA, individually;
DEPUTY LEONARD SEEDIG, individually;
DEPUTY DANIEL TIMME, individually;
DEPUTY JONATHAN ZIANGLO, individually;
DEPUTY JUSTIN FORSBERG, individually;
DEPUTY KIRK BLACKSON, individually;
LIEUTENANT CHRISTIAN SILVA, individually;
WELLPATH, LLC;
DISTRICT FIRE CHIEF MATTHEW PELLITTERI, individually;
DISTRICT FIRE CHIEF SAMANTHA WHITEHORNE, individually;
JOHN DOE MEDICAL & JAIL STAFF (WELLPATH/BSO); and
JOHN DOE FIREFIGHTERS (DEERFIELD BEACH FIRE RESCUE),
Defendants.

CASE NO : 0:25-cv-61218-WPD

THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

(Jury Trial Demanded)

Plaintiff Nihal Michael Gautam alleges as follows:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968, and has supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

2. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the events occurred in Broward County, Florida.

3. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages where permitted, declaratory relief, and narrowly tailored injunctive relief.

3A. Plaintiff resides in Broward County, routinely travels within BSO’s jurisdiction, and intends to continue protected filming, requesting records, and public advocacy regarding BSO practices.

3B. Within approximately ninety days, Plaintiff experienced two materially similar incidents involving muted BWCs, single-officer paperwork, and omitted personnel, creating a concrete likelihood of repetition absent court intervention.

3C. The challenged policies/customs (muting “huddles,” curated BWC exports without metadata, intake practices refusing injury documentation, and isolation without timely phone access) remain in effect.

3D. Plaintiff’s intended future activities (filming, petitioning, and public advocacy in Broward) will again place him in proximity to BSO personnel and Wellpath-staffed facilities, satisfying the “real and immediate threat” requirement for prospective relief.

PARTIES

4. Plaintiff Nihal Michael Gautam is a Broward County resident and civil-rights whistleblower who, as of May 2025, had an active federal suit against the City of Sunrise.

5. Defendant Sheriff Gregory Tony, in his official capacity, is responsible for BSO policies, customs, training, and supervision.

6. Defendants Deputies Shakeem Gallimore, Thomas House, Jeremy Loaiza, Branden Lynch, Dominic Magrino, Abel Rodriguez-Lopez, Juliana Tenaglia, Leonard Seedig, Daniel Timme, Jonathan Zianglo, Justin Forsberg, Kirk Blackson, and Lieutenant Christian Silva are BSO officers sued in their individual capacities. Each participated in the staging, seizure, transport, suppression, or supervision described herein.

7. Defendant Wellpath, LLC contracts to provide medical services at Broward Main Jail and is liable under § 1983 for policies, customs, or practices showing deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and for joint action to suppress evidence.

8. John Doe Medical and Jail Staff are Wellpath and BSO personnel who denied or delayed care, refused to photograph injuries, and isolated Plaintiff.
9. District Fire Chief Matthew Pellitteri and District Fire Chief Samantha Whitehorne are, on information and belief, BSO Fire Rescue officers assigned to Deerfield Beach Fire Rescue, sued individually for joint action and deliberate indifference at the Shell station.
10. John Doe Firefighters, Deerfield Beach Fire Rescue, directly interacted with Plaintiff, refused aid, attempted to remove his dogs, and coordinated with BSO on scene.
11. Doe Designations. The Doe defendants are presently unidentified individuals whose true names and exact roles will be substituted upon discovery.
- 11A. Plaintiff seeks limited, expedited discovery under Rule 26(d) to identify Doe Defendants and will promptly substitute named parties upon identification.

BACKGROUND AND PROTECTED ACTIVITY

12. On May 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed and served a Second Amended Complaint in Gautam v. City of Sunrise, alleging police misconduct and suppression of BWC evidence.
13. In the days immediately following, Plaintiff publicly discussed those allegations and continued collecting records, including CAD logs and BWC clips.
14. Plaintiff lacked stable housing and was traveling with his dogs and belongings, making him vulnerable to harassment and seizure.
15. Plaintiff experienced an abrupt loss of cell service and observed marked and unmarked vehicles surveilling him.
16. Upon information and belief, Defendants were aware of Plaintiff's filings and media activity and targeted him in retaliation for his protected speech and petitioning.
17. The events of May 25–26, 2025 occurred against this backdrop of protected activity and escalating surveillance.
18. Plaintiff puts Defendants on notice that he will seek preservation and production of Shell-station exterior/interior video, Fire Rescue station video, CAD, BWC raw files and logs (activation/mute/metadata), transport logs, and jail intake/medical records.
19. Plaintiff will substitute named Does upon identification through discovery.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

27. On or about May 23, 2025, Plaintiff hand-delivered his Second Amended Complaint in Gautam v. City of Sunrise to the United States District Court with the assistance of

Stephanie Decker, the mother of his minor child. Stephanie praised Plaintiff's legal work and offered assistance in filing.

28. Upon information and belief, Stephanie's involvement was not for the purpose of support but to gauge the extent of Plaintiff's knowledge regarding misconduct by Sunrise Police Department officers.

29. On the morning of May 24, 2025, after Plaintiff reviewed body-worn camera footage and began to understand the scope of the misconduct, he confronted Stephanie. Stephanie responded by threatening to have Plaintiff involuntarily committed under Florida's Baker Act and stated she was "calling them" to the hotel where Plaintiff was staying.

30. After filing his Second Amended Complaint on or about May 23, 2025, Plaintiff was effectively living out of his vehicle and traveling with his two dogs, Sunny and Daisy, and his personal belongings. Plaintiff was vulnerable and without stable housing.

31. During this period Plaintiff sought the assistance of Stephanie Decker, the mother of his minor child, who repeatedly promised to help him with transportation, storage of belongings, and basic necessities.

32. Instead, over the next two days Stephanie engaged in a pattern of offering help and then disappearing, leaving Plaintiff and his dogs exposed to the elements.

33. Plaintiff was forced to abandon much of his property and spent two full days and nights in the heat and sun without support. Daisy, one of Plaintiff's dogs, became unable to walk due to exhaustion.

34. During this same period Plaintiff's cell phone service abruptly ceased without warning, cutting off his ability to call for assistance or communicate effectively. This outage intensified Plaintiff's vulnerability.

35. Throughout these two days Plaintiff observed a constant presence of marked and unmarked law enforcement vehicles following or surveilling him and his dogs. Plaintiff believes these vehicles were part of a coordinated operation to intimidate or isolate him in retaliation for his protected activity in filing the Sunrise lawsuit.

36. On or about May 25, 2025, Plaintiff, still stranded with his dogs Sunny and Daisy and his belongings, informed Stephanie Decker that he intended to go to Deerfield Beach because he could afford a hotel there.

37. Plaintiff was physically located in Sunrise, Florida at that time, visibly carrying Daisy, who was exhausted from two days in the heat.

38. While en route on foot, an unmarked vehicle—a beat-up racing car emitting loud engine noise—pulled alongside Plaintiff. The driver presented himself as a private citizen offering assistance.

39. The driver repeatedly told Plaintiff that he “knew [Plaintiff] wasn’t a bad guy” and that he would “help and take [Plaintiff] where [he] needed to go.”

40. Believing these assurances, and desperate for relief for his dogs, Plaintiff accepted the offer of transportation. The driver further offered dog food and water to make Plaintiff comfortable.

41. Upon information and belief, this vehicle and its driver were part of a coordinated law-enforcement operation to lure Plaintiff into a pre-staged trap in Deerfield Beach.

42. Plaintiff now believes that by disclosing his destination to Stephanie, the Defendants were able to pre-arrange a full pre-staged operation in Deerfield Beach in retaliation for Plaintiff’s protected activity.

43. The driver of the unmarked vehicle transported Plaintiff east toward Deerfield Beach, ultimately dropping him off near the beach and Hillsboro Boulevard area.

44. Upon arrival, Plaintiff found the area in a state of unusual activity: loud music blaring from multiple sources, large crowds, and significant vehicular traffic despite certain areas appearing closed off.

45. As Plaintiff walked for approximately an hour carrying his dog Daisy—who was visibly exhausted—he was approached by multiple unknown individuals who made unusual statements and asked questions unrelated to Plaintiff’s situation.

46. Plaintiff observed people displaying or firing what appeared to be prop firearms in his vicinity, creating a threatening and chaotic atmosphere.

47. Although dozens of people witnessed Plaintiff visibly struggling to carry his dog and belongings, no one offered assistance, reinforcing Plaintiff’s perception that he was being subjected to a coordinated intimidation operation.

48. After approximately an hour near the beach, Plaintiff realized he was being actively followed, just as he had been during the prior two days.

49. Plaintiff decided to leave the beach area and head west toward the city in the hope of finding “normal” people and safety for himself and his dogs.

50. As Plaintiff walked away from the beach, the harassment intensified. Numerous vehicles repeatedly circled him, performed U-turns, revved their engines loudly, and shined high-beam headlights directly at Plaintiff and his dogs.

51. The sustained noise and flashing lights caused visible distress to Plaintiff's dogs, who began to physically break down from exhaustion and fear.

52. At times the harassment was so severe that Plaintiff could not even raise his voice above the noise to calm his animals. Plaintiff was forced to hide behind bushes to shield his dogs' eyes from the continuous lights.

53. Upon information and belief, these actions were part of a coordinated effort to intimidate Plaintiff, break down his defenses, and induce psychological distress prior to his arrest.

54. After crossing the Hillsboro Bridge, Plaintiff continued on foot for approximately another mile under constant surveillance and harassment. Between 20 and 30 vehicles repeatedly circled Plaintiff, performed U-turns, revved their engines, and shined lights in his direction as he walked along a random Hillsboro-area road.

55. Plaintiff was by that point in full physical and emotional distress, having carried his dog Daisy for nearly two hours while managing his other dog, Sunny, and his belongings.

56. Exhausted, Plaintiff arrived at a Shell gas station in Deerfield Beach, hoping to find safety and assistance.

57. Upon arriving at the Shell gas station, Plaintiff observed multiple uniformed firefighters from Deerfield Beach Fire Rescue pumping gas into their vehicle.

58. Believing at last that he had reached a point of safety, Plaintiff approached the firefighters while carrying Daisy, a 70-pound golden retriever, visibly exhausted and in need of water.

59. Plaintiff asked the firefighters for help and water, expecting that as emergency responders they would assist a citizen in obvious distress.

60. Instead, the firefighters looked at Plaintiff with confusion, did not offer aid, and entered their vehicle and drove away without providing assistance.

61. This moment caused Plaintiff to realize for the first time the depth of the danger he was in and that the coordinated harassment he had experienced was not accidental.

62. Plaintiff then entered the Shell gas station convenience store while still carrying Daisy. Plaintiff, visibly exhausted and in distress, asked the staff and customers present for water and for someone to call 911.

63. To Plaintiff's shock, no one offered assistance. Staff and patrons looked at him with apparent confusion and treated his requests for emergency help as inappropriate or bothersome.

64. Plaintiff was refused both water for his dogs and a 911 call, leaving him further isolated and reinforcing the perception that the surrounding environment was part of a coordinated operation against him.

65. While inside and outside of the Shell gas station, Plaintiff repeatedly begged bystanders, staff, and customers to please call 911 on his behalf.

66. Despite Plaintiff's visible distress, the weight of carrying a 70-pound dog, and the obvious need for medical and humanitarian aid, no one responded to his pleas.

67. Instead, individuals at the Shell station looked at Plaintiff as though he were irrational or delusional, offering neither help for him nor for his dogs.

68. Plaintiff understood at that moment that he had been fully isolated and that even his direct requests for emergency aid were being suppressed as part of a larger coordinated operation.

69. Prior to midnight on May 25, 2025, Plaintiff remained at or near the Shell station located at or near the intersection of Hillsboro Boulevard and Federal Highway.

70. Plaintiff, still carrying Daisy and accompanied by Sunny, repeatedly begged staff, customers, and passersby to call 911.

71. After more than twenty minutes of such pleas, an individual eventually appeared to pretend to call 911 on Plaintiff's behalf. Plaintiff pressed this person to place the call on speakerphone so that he could speak directly to emergency dispatch.

72. During this time Plaintiff ran from car to car in a state of panic and disarray, yelling at the top of his lungs for someone to call 911. Despite Plaintiff's obvious distress, no one rendered assistance.

73. At one point a driver stopped and offered Plaintiff cash instead of calling 911, which Plaintiff found unusual and suspicious.

74. An individual then yelled from the Shell station that "if you're so worried there's a fire department across the street," referring to a station across from the Shell. Plaintiff, overwhelmed by the chaos, momentarily forgot his earlier interaction with firefighters and believed he might still be saved.

75. Eventually Plaintiff, still carrying Daisy with Sunny lagging behind, crossed the street to the fire station identified by a bystander, believing that uniformed firefighters would provide safety.

76. Plaintiff observed that the fire station had only a single older security camera covering its entrance. Plaintiff rang the bell several times before anyone responded.

77. When firefighters finally emerged, Plaintiff recognized them as the same personnel he had seen minutes earlier at the Shell station pumping gas.

78. The firefighters openly remarked that Plaintiff had not approached them earlier at the gas station and questioned why he was now asking for help, despite Plaintiff having done so.

79. The firefighters proceeded to ask Plaintiff a series of questions designed to test his mental state and awareness. Plaintiff answered all questions clearly and coherently.

80. Despite Plaintiff's visible distress, the firefighters refused to provide him or his dogs with water. They only handled the dogs' bowls using gloves.

81. The firefighters attempted to take Plaintiff's dogs "for safekeeping" while telling Plaintiff someone would stay with him to wait for police. Plaintiff, fearing for his animals' safety and the disappearance of evidence, refused to relinquish the dogs.

82. After Plaintiff refused, the firefighters withdrew inside the station, stating they could not help him further or wait with him for police.

83. Plaintiff overheard the firefighters remark that "this one is smart," confirming his belief that they were attempting to prime or test Plaintiff's responses before law enforcement arrived.

84. Fearing that the firefighters were attempting to isolate him from his dogs so that law enforcement could separate him from witnesses and evidence, Plaintiff ran back across the street to the Shell station, which had more cameras.

85. By this point Plaintiff was severely dehydrated and his dogs were in visible distress. Plaintiff again requested water for himself and his dogs from Shell station staff.

86. Staff told Plaintiff that he could have water but only if he left his dogs unattended while he filled the containers.

87. As Plaintiff complied and began filling water, an unmarked vehicle pulled up to the front of the Shell station. The driver attempted to take Plaintiff's dogs under the pretense of assistance.

88. Plaintiff perceived this as an attempt to separate him from his animals so that law enforcement could apprehend him off-camera and later claim no knowledge of his dogs.

89. Plaintiff refused to allow anyone to take his dogs, remaining with them at all times despite exhaustion and the risk of collapse.

90. While at the Shell station, Plaintiff physically intervened to stop two unknown men from taking his dogs. Upon information and belief, these two men were later permitted to remain at the scene throughout Plaintiff's arrest and are visible on body-worn camera footage conferring with Broward Sheriff's Office deputies.

91. Plaintiff then noticed an unidentified female law enforcement officer, apparently from a different agency, pumping gas at the station. Plaintiff yelled to her that he had been waiting over thirty minutes for police and begging people to call 911 without response.

92. Realizing that he was in imminent danger of being isolated and harmed off-camera, Plaintiff decided he had to take drastic action to create an unmistakable public record of the situation.

93. Plaintiff activated the emergency shut-off for all fuel pumps at the Shell station in order to create a visible, recorded commotion and ensure the presence of multiple cameras and witnesses.

94. Seconds after Plaintiff activated the station's emergency fuel shut-off to summon help, at least five marked BSO units entered the lot nearly simultaneously; deputies issued commands, and multiple BWCs were muted or not activated.

95. For more than thirty minutes before the shut-off, Plaintiff had unsuccessfully sought emergency assistance; he activated the shut-off solely to summon help and ensure camera coverage. Defendants immediately treated the event as a pretext to seize Plaintiff rather than to address any safety concern.

96. Deputies exited their vehicles with weapons drawn or at the ready, ordering Plaintiff to get on his knees and not to move, treating him as though he were armed and dangerous despite Plaintiff having been the one requesting assistance for more than thirty minutes.

97. Deputies began to encircle Plaintiff as he attempted to comply. One deputy, Deputy Juliana Tenaglia, issued verbal commands to Plaintiff to calm down and breathe.

98. Plaintiff realized at that moment that his backpack and dogs were behind him, outside the immediate view of cameras, while deputies were closing in. Plaintiff perceived that deputies were attempting to maneuver him out of camera view and away from his belongings and animals.

99. As Plaintiff complied with verbal commands, he observed a "cat-and-mouse" approach: Deputy Tenaglia maintaining a calming tone while other deputies silently closed the perimeter, preparing to move Plaintiff from view and control the narrative of his arrest.

100. Before the physical confrontation described below, Plaintiff, experiencing an elevated heart rate and panic due to being swarmed by multiple deputies, specifically requested to be medically evaluated.

101. In response, deputies called the same Deerfield Beach Fire Rescue personnel who had previously denied Plaintiff aid at the Shell station and at their station.

102. Plaintiff overheard deputies and off-duty civilians coordinating that Plaintiff would be “met down the road” after the evaluation, which Plaintiff understood as a plan to isolate him once he was separated from the Shell station cameras.

103. Fearing for his safety, Plaintiff refused the offered evaluation and decided instead to move closer to the Shell station cameras to ensure an accurate record of the encounter.

104. Throughout the encounter Plaintiff repeatedly stated that he was not under arrest or detained and asked why so many officers were present, making clear that he was in panic and seeking help, not resisting.

105. Plaintiff counted at least twelve officers on scene. Another deputy, Deputy Dominic Magrino, arrived and said “make that thirteen,” laughing at Plaintiff’s distress.

106. When Plaintiff stood up and attempted to take a few steps to get air and to explain that the situation was overwhelming, Deputy Magrino slammed Plaintiff and said, “you’re pissing me off.”

107. Deputies continued issuing conflicting orders such as “cross your knees,” “do this,” “do that,” keeping Plaintiff in a position where his body and actions were not fully captured by available cameras.

108. Plaintiff realized at that moment that, as in his previous Sunrise incident, the Defendants could rearrange and edit body-worn camera footage after the fact and that he needed to move into the field of Shell’s fixed cameras to ensure an accurate record.

109. Plaintiff attempted to shift closer to the Shell station cameras. He was then handcuffed, tackled to the ground, shackled, and physically carried to a police car.

110. Once Plaintiff was restrained and placed near a police vehicle, deputies began moving and repositioning their patrol cars, conferring with one another for approximately forty minutes to adjust camera placement and negotiate how to proceed, rather than providing immediate medical care or documenting Plaintiff’s injuries.

111. While Plaintiff was cuffed and shackled, Deputy Jeremy Loaiza repeatedly spoke to Plaintiff in a provocative manner, attempting to bait him into angry or retaliatory statements on body-worn camera so that Defendants could later use such footage to justify their actions.

112. Plaintiff did not respond to Deputy Loaiza's provocations and remained calm despite his distress. Upon information and belief, Defendants have not produced the full body-worn camera footage of this interaction in criminal discovery.

113. The entire operation was directed by Lieutenant Christian Silva from an unmarked vehicle. Despite his central role in the May 25, 2025 incident, Silva's presence was omitted from the criminal discovery produced to Plaintiff. Plaintiff independently identified Silva's involvement through his own investigation.

114. After restraining Plaintiff at the Shell station, deputies did not immediately transport him to jail or medical care. Instead, for nearly an hour they moved and repositioned patrol vehicles, conferred with one another, and delayed transport while Plaintiff remained shackled in distress.

115. Ultimately deputies appeared to decide they had to take Plaintiff to the Broward Main Jail. Plaintiff believes this decision was influenced by Defendants' awareness of his pending Sunrise complaint and their need to process him through a controlled environment.

116. Deputy Jeremy Loaiza then transported Plaintiff at extremely high speed, first to a local Broward Sheriff's Office substation and then to the Broward Main Jail.

117. The initial leg of the transport took less than ten minutes. Plaintiff believes the detour to the substation and the high-speed transport were intended to manipulate the timing and chain-of-custody records for his arrest.

118. Upon arrival at the Broward Main Jail, Plaintiff was forced while shackled to walk more than 300 feet past the secure fence line into the facility.

119. Plaintiff was not provided shoes, socks, or any padding on his ankles, wrists, or feet. He begged deputies to loosen the restraints or remove them so he could walk safely, but his pleas were ignored.

120. Plaintiff was compelled to walk up a long concrete ramp while shackled. By this point he could no longer feel his hands, fingers, or toes due to the circulation being cut off.

121. Plaintiff's ankles and wrists were visibly purple and bleeding from the restraints, but deputies took no action to document, loosen, or treat the injuries.

122. At medical intake, Plaintiff spent approximately ten minutes begging the attending nurse to photograph his injuries or transport him to a hospital.

123. Plaintiff pointed out his purple, bleeding wrists and ankles, as well as his inability to feel his hands, feet, and toes. Despite these obvious injuries, the nurse refused to provide care, call for a physician, or arrange hospital transport.

124. During this interaction the nurse explicitly stated to deputies, in Plaintiff's presence, that "you're not supposed to be walking in shackles." The entire exchange is captured on Deputy Loaiza's body-worn camera.

125. After Plaintiff was formally admitted, the nurse further remarked to Deputy Loaiza: "You're lucky it was me, it was really, really bad — anyone else would have sent him [to the hospital]."

126. Despite this acknowledgment of severe injury and risk, no treatment or documentation was provided, and Plaintiff was processed into the jail without medical care.

127. Despite Plaintiff's repeated pleas to be transported to a hospital, a jail staff member intervened, skipped Plaintiff ahead of the normal processing line, and forced him inside the secure jail facility.

128. Plaintiff understood that once he was placed inside the secure area, hospital transport would no longer be possible without extraordinary measures. Plaintiff believes this was done intentionally to foreclose any chance of outside medical review of his injuries.

129. Upon entry, the same staff member who rushed Plaintiff into the jail refused to provide him with a meal tray, stating that none were available.

130. Plaintiff was then subjected to interactions with inmates who appeared to be either compensated or acting under direction, who engaged in unusual behavior designed to test, antagonize, or destabilize Plaintiff while in custody.

131. During booking, Plaintiff observed that the inmates in his vicinity appeared to know each other and were treated with unusual privileges by jail staff.

132. Inmates were permitted extended or early phone use before they had been formally booked into the system, before bail amounts were set, and before they had been fingerprinted or assigned booking numbers.

133. Upon information and belief—based on guards' acquiescence, repeated tray replacements on request, and visible handling of concealed objects—certain individuals present during booking were paid informants or acting under direction of Defendants, gathering and relaying information about Plaintiff to an outside agency during the booking process.

134. Plaintiff further observed that when jail staff called out names for processing, a separate inmate appeared to be “running” the operation by selecting which individual would answer to which name.

135. In multiple instances, the individuals being processed did not appear to know their own names or charges, and the coordinating inmate would direct them by saying things such as “hey, that’s you, man,” assigning them an identity.

136. These irregularities reinforced Plaintiff’s belief that the booking area was being used to stage a coordinated operation to confuse, surveil, and destabilize him while he was in custody.

137. After being booked, Plaintiff observed that every other inmate in the holding area received a meal tray, but Plaintiff was deliberately denied one.

138. Plaintiff further observed that the trays given to other inmates contained or concealed a small, pointy object under the plastic covering. Inmates would openly handle these objects while in view of jail staff.

139. When an object was not sufficiently pointy or usable, inmates would ask guards for a replacement tray or to “wet it” or otherwise alter it. Jail staff complied with these requests without question.

140. Upon information and belief—based on these interactions and staff compliance—guards and inmates were acting in concert to intimidate and threaten Plaintiff by withholding food from him while distributing trays with concealed objects to others in his immediate vicinity.

141. Plaintiff perceived that these coordinated acts were designed to threaten him and to pressure him to comply with directions from unknown actors while in custody.

142. While in the holding area, deputies repeatedly ordered Plaintiff to the back of the cell. Having previously been detained at the facility, Plaintiff knew that around 6:00 a.m. all inmates would be locked into cells and feared that he would be harmed once the doors closed.

143. At this time Plaintiff had not been formally booked, had not been permitted to make phone calls, and remained isolated while irregular activity unfolded around him.

144. Fearing for his life, Plaintiff approached medical staff and found a nurse whom he perceived as trustworthy. Plaintiff explained the situation and requested to be placed on suicide watch as the only available means of protection from harm.

145. Plaintiff believes that but for this nurse's intervention and his own insistence, he would not have been placed on suicide watch and may have been seriously injured or killed during custody.

146. After Plaintiff was placed in isolation for suicide watch, Plaintiff overheard jail staff and associated individuals expressing frustration that their plan had been disrupted.

147. Staff and/or inmates openly discussed "the fax" stating they had until a particular date to "collect the money" for Plaintiff, laughing about how Plaintiff had mentioned the pointy objects in the trays but appearing angry that Plaintiff had managed to get himself isolated.

148. Plaintiff perceived these statements as confirmation that his isolation had interfered with a coordinated plan to harm or exploit him while in custody.

149. When Plaintiff was transferred to the jail's psychiatric unit for suicide watch, staff issued him an ill-fitting "turtle suit" which could not be secured.

150. Because the garment had no functioning straps, Plaintiff was effectively left naked underneath, forced to hold together the top and bottom of the suit himself while carrying a small tank of water and shorts.

151. For the next three to four days Plaintiff remained in this state, humiliated and exposed, without proper clothing or privacy.

152. Plaintiff alleges that this treatment was not a legitimate suicide-prevention measure but a further act of humiliation and retaliation designed to break his spirit after he had successfully protected himself by requesting suicide watch.

153. On or about the night following his placement on suicide watch, while Plaintiff was asleep, a jail guard unexpectedly woke him and ordered him to move quickly.

154. When Plaintiff asked where he was being taken, the guard refused to answer and continued to yell at him to move without explanation.

155. Plaintiff was then transported without notice and left on the 8th floor of the Broward Main Jail.

156. On the 8th floor, Plaintiff was subjected to near-total isolation. All inmates except one with "dorm privileges" were on 24-hour lockdown. Plaintiff was denied any phone calls or outside contact for several days.

157. Desperate to reach family, Plaintiff eventually convinced the one inmate with privileges to call his cousin on his behalf.

158. Plaintiff remained without permitted calls or legal contact until after he passed a perfunctory psychiatric evaluation by a jail doctor, which occurred nearly four days later.

159. Plaintiff alleges that this secret transfer, denial of communication, and delayed psychiatric clearance were part of a deliberate plan to isolate him, obstruct legal counsel, and suppress evidence of his injuries and mistreatment.

BWC, CAD, AND TIMELINE DISCREPANCIES

160. To date, Defendants have produced only short, edited body-worn camera (“BWC”) clips totaling a little over twenty minutes for the Shell-station encounter, despite Plaintiff being physically detained in handcuffs and/or shackles for approximately two hours from initial seizure through on-scene staging and transport.

161. The produced BWC files contain abrupt stop events, unexplained gaps, and multiple mute periods, including during: (a) the perimeter “huddles,” (b) the period when patrol vehicles were repositioned for roughly forty minutes, (c) the separation attempts involving Plaintiff’s dogs, (d) pre-transport interactions, and (e) the substation detour and sally-port entry sequence. These gaps mirror the same cut-up, muted, and selectively produced BWC pattern Plaintiff previously exposed in the Sunrise case.

162. On information and belief, additional BWCs necessarily exist from numerous named BSO personnel present at the scene—Tenaglia, Magrino, Loaiza, Silva, Lynch, Gallimore, House, Rodriguez-Lopez, Seedig, Timme, Zianglo, Forsberg, and Blackson—as well as from responding units visible or audible on produced clips. Those BWCs (and their activation/mute logs) have not been produced.

163. The duration mismatch between (a) CAD entries/dispatch timing, on-scene headcounts, and jail-intake timestamps and (b) the ~20-minute BWC production indicates that substantial portions of on-scene custody are missing from Defendants’ production.

164. On information and belief, BSO maintains a practice of (a) conducting verbal planning in BWC-muted “huddles,” and (b) positioning detainees outside fixed camera coverage (e.g., canopy and façade cameras), followed by production of short, edited clips instead of complete native files with metadata.

165. The BWC materials provided to date are not native files with their full metadata: no vendor audit logs, no device/user audit trails, no activation/mute/stop event histories, no hash values, and no CAD audit trails showing edits or late entries. Plaintiff specifically seeks production of native BWC with associated audit logs maintained by the BWC platform (e.g., system/user access, start/stop, mute/unmute, download/export history) and CAD audit logs.

166. The two-hour period of restraint, combined with mute/stop clusters during critical moments, supports an inference that Defendants intentionally limited audiovisual records of their conduct while Plaintiff remained in custody and while force, separation, or coordination decisions were being made.

167. Plaintiff gives spoliation notice that the above-referenced BWC native files, activation/mute logs, CAD audit trails, transport dashcam, substation lot cameras, and jail sally-port/intake bay cameras must be preserved and produced, including tenant-level Axon Evidence audit logs and user-level export histories. Plaintiff will seek sanctions and an adverse inference under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) if ESI was lost or withheld with the intent to deprive Plaintiff of its use.

168. Plaintiff further gives notice that third-party video should be preserved and produced: Shell interior POS and exterior canopy cameras for May 25–26, 2025, and Deerfield Beach Fire Rescue entrance/lot cameras for the same period. The sudden convergence of at least five marked units within seconds of the emergency shut-off (see ¶¶94) and the number of personnel on scene make it highly likely that additional recordings exist.

169. The pattern of curtailed BWC, muted intervals during “huddles,” and missing native metadata repeats the same tactics used against Plaintiff in the earlier Sunrise incident, demonstrating continuity of methods and supporting policy/custom allegations (BSO) and obstruction-based predicate acts (e.g., falsification or concealment of records) to be detailed in the Counts.

170. Plaintiff will move for a preservation and production order compelling: (a) native BWC with full metadata and audit logs for all identified officers, (b) CAD entries and audit histories, (c) transport GPS and dashcam, (d) substation and jail camera footage, and (e) Wellpath intake notes/vitals/refusals and internal communications reflecting the nurse’s acknowledgments quoted in ¶¶124–125.

171. Single-Officer Paperwork Pattern. In both the March 6, 2025 Sunrise incident and the May 25–26, 2025 Broward incident, Plaintiff was swarmed by numerous personnel, yet the original arrest/probable-cause paperwork identified only a single arresting officer and omitted other participating and supervising officers. On information and belief, this “single-officer packet” practice conceals identities, limits discoverable narratives, and controls production of BWC/metadata to obstruct accountability.

INJURIES AND DAMAGES

172. As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff suffered physical injuries (bleeding wrists and ankles, numbness, swelling, pain), emotional distress, humiliation from

exposure in an ill-fitting suicide garment, loss of property and animal-care costs, disruption of work and family life, and ongoing fear requiring injunctive relief.

COUNTS

Count I — Fourth Amendment Excessive Force (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

Against: Deputies Dominic Magrino, Jeremy Loaiza, Shakeem Gallimore, Thomas House, Branden Lynch, Abel Rodriguez-Lopez, Juliana Tenaglia, Leonard Seedig, Daniel Timme, Jonathan Zianglo, Justin Forsberg, Kirk Blackson, and Lieutenant Christian Silva (individual capacities).

173. Plaintiff realleges ¶¶1–19 and ¶¶27–172.

174. Defendants used objectively unreasonable force under the Fourth Amendment, including slamming Plaintiff to the ground, applying/maintaining excessively tight handcuffs and shackles, carrying him while restrained, and refusing to loosen restraints despite visible injury and pleas.

175. Plaintiff posed no immediate threat, complied with commands, and sought medical help; less intrusive means were available.

176. The force caused bleeding wrists/ankles, numbness, pain, swelling, and lasting distress.

177. Each named Defendant either personally used force, directed it, or integral-participated with knowledge and opportunity to limit it.

178. These prohibitions were clearly established at the time. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

179. Defendant Lt. Christian Silva personally participated in, directed, or knowingly acquiesced in the constitutional violations by ordering and/or approving BWC-muted “huddles,” staging Plaintiff outside fixed camera coverage, and continuing detention and force despite lack of probable cause, thereby causing Plaintiff’s injuries.

179A. Independently and alternatively, Lt. Silva bears supervisory liability because (1) he personally directed the unconstitutional tactics; (2) he knew of the violations and failed to stop them; and/or (3) a causal connection exists based on a history of similar abuses and customs he adopted, ratified, or tolerated. See Eleventh Circuit standards on supervisory liability (causal-connection avenues: direction, knowledge and failure to act, or custom/policy leading to violation).

Count II — Fourth Amendment Unlawful Seizure/Arrest (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

Against: The same BSO individual Defendants as Count I.

180. Plaintiff realleges ¶¶1–19 and ¶¶27–172.

181. Defendants detained and arrested Plaintiff without probable cause. For more than thirty minutes, Plaintiff attempted to obtain emergency aid; he activated the fuel shut-off solely to summon help and preserve camera coverage.

182. Defendants immediately swarmed, issued conflicting commands, maneuvered Plaintiff out of fixed cameras, and seized him without a particularized, objective basis that he committed a crime.

183. Any asserted offense was pretextual and manufactured through staging and refusal to render aid.

184. These prohibitions were clearly established at the time. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

185. Defendant Lt. Christian Silva is additionally liable in a supervisory capacity for directing or approving the tactics described herein, including coordinated positioning to avoid fixed cameras and the decision to proceed without probable cause.

185A. This claim is pled in a manner that does not necessarily imply the invalidity of any conviction; to the extent Heck applies, Plaintiff seeks prospective and declaratory relief and damages upon favorable termination.

Count III — First Amendment Retaliation (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

Against: All BSO individual Defendants.

186. Plaintiff realleges ¶¶1–19 and ¶¶27–172.

187. Plaintiff engaged in protected speech/petitioning (filing and publicizing the Sunrise case, requesting aid, criticizing police conduct).

188. Defendants took adverse actions (seizure, force, evidence suppression, isolating Plaintiff, provoking statements on camera) motivated by Plaintiff's protected activity.

189. Defendants' actions would chill a person of ordinary firmness; the seizure and force were causally connected to Plaintiff's protected activity.

190. Even if Defendants later claim arguable probable cause, Plaintiff pleads absence of probable cause and selective enforcement given his prolonged attempts to summon aid and the immediate tactical swarm. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

Count IV — Failure to Intervene (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

Against: All BSO individual Defendants who did not use force but had a realistic opportunity to stop it.

191. Plaintiff realleges ¶¶1–19 and ¶¶27–172.

192. Defendants were present and had time to prevent or mitigate excessive force and unlawful seizure but failed to intervene.

193. Their inaction proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries.

194. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

Count V — Fourteenth Amendment (Pretrial) Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

Against: Wellpath, LLC; John Doe Medical Staff; John Doe Jail Staff; and Deputy Loaiza (individual capacity) for transport/intake denial.

195. Plaintiff realleges ¶¶1–19 and ¶¶27–172.

196. Plaintiff had obvious serious medical needs: bleeding wrists/ankles, numbness, swelling, and pain from restraints.

197. Wellpath/jail staff knew of and disregarded those needs by refusing photographs, hospital transport, or treatment despite a nurse stating “you’re not supposed to be walking in shackles” and “anyone else would have sent him to the hospital.”

198. Deputy Loaiza ignored pleas to loosen restraints and facilitated intake without medical care.

199. The deliberate indifference caused pain, risk of nerve damage, and prolonged suffering. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages against individual Does and Loaiza; compensatory and Monell-type liability against Wellpath. These allegations state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment applying at least the deliberate-indifference standard recognized in the Eleventh Circuit, and alternatively are objectively unreasonable under Kingsley.

Count VI — Fourteenth Amendment Punitive/Unconstitutional Conditions (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

Against: John Doe Jail Staff and Wellpath, LLC.

200. Plaintiff realleges ¶¶1–19 and ¶¶27–172.

201. After intake, Defendants subjected Plaintiff to punitive conditions unrelated to any legitimate governmental objective: defective suicide garment leaving him exposed; denial of meals when others received trays; isolation and denial of calls for days; secret night transfer to the 8th floor.

202. These conditions were excessive relative to any nonpunitive purpose and imposed with deliberate indifference.

203. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages (individual Does) and compensatory/Monell-type liability (Wellpath). These allegations state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment applying at least the deliberate-indifference standard recognized in the Eleventh Circuit, and alternatively are objectively unreasonable under Kingsley.

**Count VII — § 1983 Conspiracy / Joint Action to Deprive Civil Rights
Against: BSO individual Defendants, District Fire Chiefs Pellitteri and Whitehorne,
John Doe Firefighters, and Wellpath/John Doe Medical & Jail Staff.**

204. Plaintiff realleges ¶¶1–19 and ¶¶27–172.

205. Defendants reached an understanding—evidenced by coordinated staging, BWC muting, attempts to separate Plaintiff from his dogs off-camera, refusal of Fire Rescue aid, delayed transport, and intake isolation—to deprive Plaintiff of constitutional rights.

206. Overt acts included the swarm, conflicting commands, physical takedown, muting BWCs during “huddles,” refusal to document injuries, denial of care, and isolation.

207. The conspiracy caused Plaintiff’s injuries and damages. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages (individuals) and compensatory relief (Wellpath).

**Count VIII — Monell Liability: Policies, Customs, and Practices (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
Against: Sheriff Gregory Tony in his official capacity.**

208. Plaintiff realleges ¶¶1–19 and ¶¶27–172.

209. BSO maintained policies/customs that were the moving force of the violations, including: (a) conducting BWC-muted “huddles” and repositioning detainees outside fixed camera views to limit reviewable footage; (b) failure to preserve native BWC with activation/mute logs and CAD audit trails; (c) tolerating or encouraging edited/short BWC productions instead of full native files with metadata; (d) intake/transport practices permitting excessively tight restraints and refusal to loosen despite visible injury; (e) isolating detainees without timely phone access post-booking; and (f) “single-officer packet” practice: preparing arrest/probable-cause submissions that list only one officer despite multi-officer participation, omitting assist officers and supervisors, and failing to preserve or produce related edit histories and supplemental narratives, resulting in systemic identity suppression and frustrated review of use-of-force and BWC compliance.

210. These policies/customs reflect deliberate indifference and caused Plaintiff’s constitutional injuries.

210A. Final policymakers and/or supervisors ratified post-incident submissions that omitted assist officers and supervisory personnel and accepted edited BWC exports lacking native metadata.

210B. Prior analogous incidents within BSO, including Plaintiff's earlier March 2025 incident, were known to supervisors, who nonetheless continued the practices identified in ¶¶209(a)–(f).

210C. The Sheriff's Office maintained inadequate training and auditing regarding BWC muting events, activation compliance, and preservation of native files with audit logs, despite foreseeable constitutional violations during multi-unit arrests.

211. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory damages against the official capacity to the extent permitted by law, and costs.

211A. Punitive damages are not sought against the Sheriff in his official capacity.

Count IX — Monell-Equivalent Liability for Private Contractor (42 U.S.C. § 1983) Against: Wellpath, LLC.

212. Plaintiff realleges ¶¶1–19 and ¶¶27–172.

213. Wellpath maintained policies/customs at Broward Main Jail causing constitutional violations, including: (a) refusing ER transfer and injury photographs despite obvious restraint injuries; (b) processing detainees without documenting injuries acknowledged by staff; and (c) delaying/denying phone access for detainees placed on suicide watch or isolation without medical necessity.

214. These policies/customs caused Plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and injunctive relief requiring policy reforms and staff training.

Count X — Civil RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1962(c))

Against: BSO individual Defendants, Wellpath, LLC, District Fire Chiefs Pellitteri and Whitehorne, John Doe Medical & Jail Staff, and John Doe Firefighters (individual capacities).

215. Plaintiff realleges ¶¶1–19 and ¶¶27–172.

216. Enterprise. Defendants formed an association-in-fact enterprise ("Enterprise") consisting of BSO deputies/supervisors, Fire Rescue personnel, and Wellpath medical/jail staff, functioning as a continuing unit with a common purpose: suppressing accountability by manipulating recordings, falsifying/withholding records, and retaliating against Plaintiff for protected activity.

217. Interstate Commerce. The Enterprise’s activities affected interstate commerce (BWC/cloud services, CAD/datacenter transmissions, emails/texts/portals).

218. Continuity and Relatedness. The Enterprise’s methods mirror those used against Plaintiff weeks earlier in his Sunrise matter: BWC-muted “huddles,” staged positioning outside fixed cameras, short/edited BWC productions without native metadata, and omission of involved personnel from CAD/discovery. The same scheme reappeared here with BSO/Wellpath/Fire Rescue, demonstrating related predicate acts and both closed-ended (over months) and open-ended continuity (an ongoing practice likely to recur absent court intervention).

218A. Distinctness. The association-in-fact Enterprise is distinct from the individual Defendants: it comprises BSO personnel, Fire Rescue personnel, and Wellpath staff acting in concert through shared procedures to curate recordings and suppress documentation across agencies.

219. Enterprise & Operation/Management. The “Broward Custody Suppression Enterprise” is an association-in-fact of BSO deputies/supervisors, Deerfield Beach Fire Rescue personnel, and Wellpath medical/jail staff that functioned as a continuing unit. Each RICO Defendant participated in the operation or management of the Enterprise (*Reves v. Ernst & Young*) by planning or executing BWC-muted huddles, staging Plaintiff outside fixed cameras, controlling what video/metadata left the scene, and enforcing intake/medical practices that suppressed documentation and outside review.

220. Predicate Acts — Particularity (Rule 9(b)). Defendants committed at least the following racketeering acts: (a) Wire/Mail Fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1341): On or about May 26–28, 2025, BSO personnel transmitted to the State Attorney’s Office, via email or evidence portal, arrest/probable-cause paperwork and BWC materials that falsely represented the encounter as involving a single arresting officer and omitted other known participants (assist officers and supervisor), together with edited BWC lacking native metadata and audit logs. These material omissions and misrepresentations were intended to mislead charging and review decisions. (b) Wire Fraud — Internal BWC Exports: On May 25–26, 2025, BSO users performed BWC exports/downloads via the BWC platform contemporaneous with mute/stop clusters and staging. These transmissions (reflected in tenant/user audit logs) constitute interstate wire communications and were part of the scheme to limit and curate audiovisual evidence. (c) Witness Tampering/Retaliation (18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b), 1513(e)): On May 25–26, 2025, Defendants intimidated, isolated, and retaliated against Plaintiff—a known whistleblower—by maneuvering him off camera, muting BWCs during “huddles,” provoking statements for later use, denying hospital transfer and documentation of visible restraint injuries, and secretly transferring and denying phone access to obstruct reporting and counsel. (d) Obstruction of Justice/Investigations (18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1510, 1511) (pled in the alternative to

1512/1513): suppression, alteration, and withholding of audiovisual evidence and audit trails material to criminal and civil investigations.

220A. Particular Transmissions. On or about May 26–28, 2025, BSO personnel transmitted via the evidence portal/email to the State Attorney’s Office an arrest packet purporting to identify a single arresting officer while omitting known assist officers and the supervising lieutenant; contemporaneously, they exported BWC clips without native metadata or audit histories. The transmissions were reasonably calculated to—and did—mislead charging and review decisions.

220C. Particular Persons/Systems (on information and belief). The arrest packet and BWC exports described in ¶¶220(a)–(b) and 220A were transmitted by the assigned case agent and/or evidence technician within BSO’s Digital Evidence Unit using BSO’s Axon Evidence (Evidence.com) tenant to the State Attorney’s Office Evidence Portal and/or by email between May 26–28, 2025, including the probable cause affidavit signed by the single listed arresting officer and curated BWC clips lacking native metadata and audit logs.

221. Economic Injury. Plaintiff suffered business and property losses proximately caused by the racketeering, including lost self-employment revenue during unlawful detention and isolation; out-of-pocket kennel/canine care and property replacement costs; travel and lodging expenses caused by the suppression scheme; and other pecuniary losses (exclusive of litigation expense).

Count XI — RICO Conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d))

Against: The same Defendants named in Count X.

222. Plaintiff realleges ¶¶1–19 and ¶¶27–172.

223. Defendants knowingly agreed to facilitate the Enterprise’s scheme and its pattern of racketeering, as evidenced by coordinated staging, BWC muting, report control, medical intake suppression, and isolation.

224. Plaintiff seeks treble damages and costs under § 1964(c).

Count XII — Florida Common-Law Battery

Against: Deputies Magrino, Loaiza, and all other BSO individual Defendants who used force.

225. Plaintiff realleges ¶¶1–19 and ¶¶27–172.

226. Defendants intentionally touched/struck Plaintiff in a harmful or offensive manner without consent or legal justification.

227. The force caused bodily injury and suffering. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages against the individual tortfeasors.

228. Defendants acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of Plaintiff's rights within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). In the alternative, to the extent any conduct occurred within the course and scope of employment, the Sheriff is vicariously liable under Florida law.

Count XIII — Florida False Arrest/False Imprisonment
Against: BSO individual Defendants.

229. Plaintiff realleges ¶¶1–19 and ¶¶27–172.

230. Defendants intentionally and unlawfully restrained Plaintiff against his will without probable cause.

231. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages against the individuals.

232. Defendants acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of Plaintiff's rights within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). In the alternative, to the extent any conduct occurred within the course and scope of employment, the Sheriff is vicariously liable under Florida law.

232A. This claim is pled to avoid any bar under Heck; Plaintiff seeks damages consistent with favorable termination principles.

Count XIV — Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Florida Law)
Against: BSO individual Defendants and John Doe Jail/Medical Staff.

233. Plaintiff realleges ¶¶1–19 and ¶¶27–172.

234. Defendants' conduct—staging, swarm, excessive restraints despite injury, humiliation via defective suicide garment, and isolation without calls—was extreme and outrageous and intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress.

235. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

236. Defendants acted in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of Plaintiff's rights within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). In the alternative, to the extent any conduct occurred within the course and scope of employment, the Sheriff is vicariously liable under Florida law.

236A. To the extent any claim seeks vicarious liability or relief against the Sheriff in an official capacity under Florida law, Plaintiff alleges compliance with, or the inapplicability of, the pre-suit notice requirements of Fla. Stat. § 768.28(6), and asserts

that Defendants' individual conduct falls within the statutory bad-faith/wanton-and-willful carve-out of § 768.28(9)(a).

Count XV — Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Preservation/Production/Policy Reforms)

Against: Sheriff Gregory Tony (official capacity) and Wellpath, LLC.

237. Plaintiff realleges ¶¶1–19 and ¶¶27–172.

238. An actual controversy exists regarding Defendants' ongoing policies/customs and the preservation/production of critical ESI and video evidence.

239. Plaintiff seeks a preservation and production order requiring: (a) native BWC and activation/mute/stop audit logs for all identified officers, with SHA-256 hash values or equivalent; (b) CAD entries and audit histories; (c) transport GPS/dashcam and substation lot video; (d) Shell interior POS and exterior canopy footage and Fire Rescue entrance/lot footage for May 25–26, 2025; (e) jail sally-port and intake bay videos; and (f) Wellpath triage notes, vitals, refusals, and nursing communications; and (g) BWC platform tenant and user audit logs including: device ID; officer ID; roles/permissions; activation, mute/unmute, stop timestamps; export/download timestamps; exporting user; IP address; export method (native vs. redacted/compiled); applied redaction flags; hash values; and any system-side retention or deletion events.

240. Plaintiff also seeks narrowly tailored policy reforms, including: (i) prohibiting BWC muting except as required by statute, with logged justifications; (ii) mandatory preservation of native BWC and metadata; (iii) intake protocols requiring injury photos and ER transfer for obvious restraint injuries; (iv) timely phone access post-booking absent articulable security need; and (v) requiring arrest/incident submissions to identify all on-scene officers (assist and supervisory), preserving RMS version histories and edit logs, and producing BWC user/system audit logs contemporaneously with any arrest packet transmitted to prosecutors, for arrests involving multi-unit responses and detainee restraint injuries.

241. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief that Defendants' policies/customs described herein violate the U.S. Constitution.

242. Given two similar incidents within three months, Plaintiff's ongoing public advocacy against BSO practices, and Defendants' continuing policies/customs, there is a real and immediate risk of repetition sufficient to warrant prospective injunctive relief.

Count XVI — Florida Civil RICO (Fla. Stat. § 772.103)

Against: The same defendants named in Counts X–XI (individual capacities).

243. Plaintiff realleges ¶¶1–19 and ¶¶27–172.

244. Defendants, through an association-in-fact enterprise, engaged in a pattern of criminal activity within the meaning of § 772.102 by committing at least two predicate offenses, including, inter alia, Witness Tampering/Retaliation (Fla. Stat. § 914.22) and Tampering with or Fabricating Physical Evidence (Fla. Stat. § 918.13), and by transmitting materially false or incomplete records intended to mislead authorities about force, custody, and participants.

245. These acts were the proximate cause of Plaintiff's business and property injuries, including lost self-employment revenue during unlawful detention and isolation; out-of-pocket kennel/canine care and property replacement costs; travel and lodging expenses caused by the suppression scheme; and other pecuniary losses (exclusive of litigation expense).

246. Plaintiff seeks treble damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and costs under Fla. Stat. § 772.104, and such other relief as is just.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Plaintiff requests:

- Compensatory damages against all Defendants, jointly and severally where permitted by law;
- Punitive damages against individual-capacity Defendants (not against the Sheriff in official capacity); for Wellpath, punitive damages are sought under applicable state-law torts;
- Treble damages under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (Counts X–XI) and Fla. Stat. § 772.104 (Count XVI);
- Declaratory and injunctive relief as pleaded in Count XV;
- Pre- and post-judgment interest;
- Attorneys' fees and costs under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) and Fla. Stat. § 772.104; and, to the extent Plaintiff is later represented by counsel, reasonable attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 from counsel's appearance forward;
- Costs and any other relief the Court deems just and proper;
- Spoliation remedies, including adverse-inference instructions and sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e), including Rule 37(e)(2) issue-preclusion/adverse-inference sanctions upon a finding of intent to deprive;
- Declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202; and

- (For any state-law claims requiring Fla. Stat. § 768.28(6) notice, Plaintiff alleges compliance or inapplicability; individual-capacity claims fall within § 768.28(9)(a)'s bad-faith/wanton-and-willful carve-out.)

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

Dated: 10-4-2025

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Nihal Michael Gautam

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