STATE OF NEW YORK
CHEMUNG COUNTY SUPREME COURT

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In the Matter of:

JULIAN RAVEN,

INDEX NO.: 2025-1215

Petitioner,

- versus -

NYS DEC, KATHY HOCHUL, AMANDA LEFTON, DUDLEY LOEW, and KIRA BRUNO,

Respondents.

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November 14, 2025 203 Lake Street, Elmira, New York 14901 TRO application

BEFORE: HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER P. BAKER, Judge

#### APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PETITIONER:

Julian Raven, Pro Se

FOR THE RESPONDENTS:
Nicholas Buttino, Esq.

Digitally recorded proceeding, Transcribed by: Ria Jara Czerenda Court Reporting PO Box 903 Binghamton, NY 13902

Julian Raven v. NYSDEC - 11/14/25 2 PROCEEDING We're going to go ahead and call the 1 THE COURT: matter of Julian Raven v. The New York State Department of 2 Environmental Conservation. Sir, you're Julian Raven? 3 MR. JULIAN RAVEN: Yes, I am, Judge. 4 THE COURT: On behalf of the New York State 5 Department of Environmental Conversation, Nicholas 6 7 Buttino? 8 MR. NICHOLAS BUTTINO: Yes, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Okay. So, we're going to go ahead 10 and get started on this matter. I want to make sure that 11 everyone is aware that today we are simply here to argue the issue of the temporary restraining order application 12 13 that was brought by Mr. Raven. 14 I know that -- Mr. Raven, I'm looking at some of 15 your submissions that you're somewhat eager to move

I know that -- Mr. Raven, I'm looking at some of your submissions that you're somewhat eager to move forward with our January 6th arguments on the merits of your petition. That's for January. So, I want you to constrain your arguments. And I want the respondent in this matter to constrain your arguments simply to the matter of the temporary restraining order that's before the court. I am fully aware of all the facts and circumstances of almost 20 years regarding this property.

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So, Mr. Raven, in regards to your request for a temporary restraining order, what would you like me to know?

# PROCEEDING

1	MR. RAVEN: Well, Good morning, Your Honor.
2	First of all
3	THE COURT: You know what, we're recording this,
4	the microphone. So, I have no problem if you want to
5	remain seated, just as long as we make sure that we have
6	this microphone close enough to your face. Yes.
7	MR. RAVEN: Is this far enough for me? Shall I
8	pull (phonetic) this thing? Okay.
9	THE COURT: Yes, please. Thank you. Go ahead.
10	MR. RAVEN: First of all, Your Honor
11	THE COURT: You know, I don't mean to stop you,
12	but we are about 20 minutes early. As long as everyone is
13	ready and prepared to go forward, I am fine going ahead
14	and starting a little bit early. We don't expect anyone
15	else to appear. This isn't a hearing, so I don't expect
16	any witnesses. Mr. Raven, any problems starting a little
17	early today?
18	MR. RAVEN: No. I am fine.
19	THE COURT: Please.
20	MR. RAVEN: My wife is willing to be here, but
21	she's going to have to get out or so I
22	THE COURT: Okay. Please go ahead.
23	MR. RAVEN: All right, Your Honor. Firstly,
24	regarding your statement there about the merits, the
25	merits correctly are for January, but the procedure is for

1 today.

THE COURT: Understood.

MR. RAVEN: And we cannot establish injury without establishing violation of procedure. Otherwise, we're just talking suppositions. And I know that this case is about appearances, so we can look at those things, but it is important.

And the first thing I'd like to start with, Your Honor, I respectfully ask the Court to confirm the supplemental affidavits 1 and 2 with their exhibits are included in the record, that these sworn statements under CPLR 2106 and 3020 supplement, not expand, the original motion papers.

They addressed ongoing documented procedural violations and continuing due process harm since respondents' opposition. Courts may consider such supplemental affidavits, and they clarify or complete the record under CPLR 2001 and the matter of Gross v. NYC Health & Hospitals Corp. They simply ensure the factual and constitutional context is complete for today's determination under CPLR 6301, 6313(a) and 7805.

THE COURT: I have a complete record of your application for the temporary restraining order, along with your affidavit in support. So, I'm going to be considering all of the documentation that you have

submitted in the context of your pending application.

MR. RAVEN: Excellent.

THE COURT: Tell me again now as we look at the issues regarding the temporary restraining order application and the requirement that you have or will suffer immediate and irreparable injury in the absence of a temporary restraining order, please tell me why you believe that in light of even the respondents' assertion that they're not going to move forward with the remedial work, tell me how you meet your burden on those elements that are necessary for you to prevail.

MR. RAVEN: This is not about remedial work,
Your Honor, only. Constitutional injuries stem from
violations of procedure. My constitutional rights under
the 4th, 5th and 14th Amendment have been violated now for
over four -- eight years because of the unlawful conduct
of the Department of Environmental Conservation in failing
to classify this property according to CPLR 1313(4) and
1313(3)(a).

Without the procedural process in place and without following those procedures, the Department of Environmental Conservation has violated the law, violated due process. And because of that, they are irreparably harming my constitutional due process rights. This is not just about remediation and physical remediation, this is

about ongoing, present today irreparable harm as a result of a failure to abide by statutory authority and statutory power, which only attaches when the department follows its constitutionally mandated rules under the ECL laws in the State of New York, which declare that they can only classify a property when they have completed their remedial studies, when they have issued notice to the petitioner or the owner of the property. They have failed completely in their process since 2008.

THE COURT: You're getting into your arguments, which we're going to hear a lot in depth on January 6th as far as your due process arguments and your arbitrary and capricious arguments regarding their classification of your property being a level 2, apparently, site.

But in regards to -- I understand your argument as to irreparable injury. Tell me now in regards to the requirement of imminent injury, if they were to move forward with the remedial work, which they say they're not going to do, ending our January 6th, tell me how, in light of that, an immediate or exigent circumstances would exist for me to grant this temporary restraining order.

MR. RAVEN: Firstly, Your Honor, the remedial process is already active. This is not something future. This has been going on now for four years. This has been going on since the first illicit order on consent that

they issued in September of -- I mean, in March the 6th, 2017. This has been ongoing since then. This is not about a future remedial action. This is presently going on.

It has been since March the 12th this year when they failed to give me notice about their going public with the Class 2 significant threat classification that they broadcast to the media, that the whole town found out about. I was in Spain.

I had left to Spain the year before. And I had emailed the department and said, "I'm going to Spain. I need you. I have a tenant in the building. I need to know everything about what your planning is, when your public meetings are." And they wrote back, "Yes, we will tell you in advance. You'll know all about it." They never did.

I got a phone call from a friend of mine in Spain, who called me from Elmira who said, "Your building was on the news." I said, "Really?" And then I called the DEC. I said, "What's going on?" They ran ahead. They went to the public without notice.

They have failed continually and violated CPLR 1313(a) - (3)(a) and (4). These are constitutionally required procedures that violate the Constitution when they are not followed, and in that way are continually

1	harming me and my constitutional rights. This is not a
2	future issue, Your Honor.
3	THE COURT: So, getting back to the remedial
4	situation
5	MR. RAVEN: Yes.
6	THE COURT: you say that
7	MR. RAVEN: The remedial is ongoing. It's
8	THE COURT: But let me ask you this question.
9	You're saying remedial is ongoing. There are no trucks,
10	equipment, contractors at your site in the process of
11	digging up right at the moment as we speak. Is that
12	correct?
13	MR. RAVEN: They have been there. They have
14	been there
15	THE COURT: Right now
16	MR. RAVEN: for three years.
17	MR. RAVEN: there's no contractors there with
18	backhoes, dump trucks and remedial equipment presently at
19	your site, correct?
20	MR. RAVEN: But the order on consent has that
21	pending as of September the 5th, 2025.
22	THE COURT: Mr. Raven, yes or no, are there any
23	trucks, remedial equipment, contractors currently at the
24	site as we speak, prepared to move forward with that
25	September letter to remediate any of this content

### 1 (phonetic)?

MR. RAVEN: No, Your Honor. But remediation is not contingent upon physical work.

THE COURT: Understood.

MR. RAVEN: It is the mechanics and machinery of the DEC that is in process as we speak in violation of my constitutional due process right, having performed these things without notice, Your Honor, a single time in eight years.

THE COURT: I think now, we're getting closer -again, we're getting closer into your argument and
arbitrary and capricious. And I understand that and I
appreciate that. And I'm going to give you a full and
fair opportunity to argue that because I have a lot of
questions for the DEC in regards to that classification as
well. However --

MR. RAVEN: May I ask a question, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.

MR. RAVEN: If my constitutional rights right now under the 4th, 5th and 14th Amendments, right now, today, as we speak, are being violated because of a violation of due process under the ECL statutes, that violation as we speak is causing irreparable harm, is it not?

THE COURT: There's been no finding of that yet.

That's your allegation. And that's the reason why we're going to have a full and fair opportunity in January.

MR. RAVEN: But is there an appearance of that?

THE COURT: Is there an appearance of that? I'm not prepared to make that decision. I'm prepared after I have an opportunity to get a full and fair and accurate record of the respondents to make that determination.

That's what we're going to be here in January for.

I certainly understand your arguments and I understand your arbitrary and capricious nature. I understand your due process arguments on the classification of the site. So what I'm really here today to determine is, because I did grant them that adjournment from November when we were supposed to be here on November 19th all the way until January, I understand your concerns that they could move forward in relation to their September 2025 letter to you.

So, the reason why I'm here today is because of your application for a temporary restraining order, for your proof that you needed to show me that there's immediate irreparable harm that's going to occur. So --

MR. RAVEN: Under the 4th and 5th Amendment.

THE COURT: Whatever grounds that you're seeking is what I'm here to determine. And I also have to take into account the respondents' papers before the Court,

which indicate to me that presently and up until January 1 6th and likely hopefully thereafter, they are not planning 2 to move forward with that action that you claim is going 3 to be a violation of your constitutional rights. 4 MR. RAVEN: Your Honor, if on the field 5 delivery, the field principle of New York State where when 6 7 a government agency fails to follow its own rules and all 8 of its actions are void ab initio, we are now going to be 9 discussing fruit, poisonous fruit on a tree. And the problem with the tree is that the tree is poisonous. 10 11 And so, if we allow the respondents to argue all of their supplemental and pursuant issues, we're failing 12 to focus on the essential, fundamental violation --13 THE COURT: And that's what we're --14 15 MR. RAVEN: -- which is the violation --16 THE COURT: That's what we're going to do in 17 January. 18 MR. RAVEN: But if my constitutional rights are 19 being harmed right this moment? 20 THE COURT: This is the reason why I have an 21 opportunity to have arguments now to determine whether --22 MR. RAVEN: A temporary restraining order based 23 upon a violation of constitutional rights now because it's 24 irreparable harm now. Any minute violation of the

Constitution now causes irreparable harm now.

1	THE COURT: Let me ask the respondents'
2	attorney. I know that you obviously have indicated to
3	me through your papers is that the DEC has no plans to
4	move forward with the requirement of moving forward with
5	that September letter of remediation pending the Court's
6	decision on Mr. Raven's application. Is that correct?
7	MR. BUTTINO: That's basically correct, Your
8	Honor. Would you prefer that I stand or sit?
9	THE COURT: Whatever is the most comfortable for
10	you.
11	MR. BUTTINO: Okay. I want to clarify. The
12	September letter that, I believe, Mr. Raven is referring
13	to, the consent order is essentially a settlement document
14	to give Mr. Raven, as we would any potentially responsible
15	party, the opportunity to do a cleanup themselves. Some
16	responsible parties prefer that.
17	THE COURT: That sounds great, an opportunity
18	for a cleanup. But he's probably going to be on the hook
19	for the cost of that, right?
20	MR. BUTTINO: We're not there yet, Your Honor.
21	The State does have statutory rights to bring a cost
22	recovery action. We haven't done so yet.
23	MR. RAVEN: Your Honor, I must object.
24	THE COURT: Please don't interrupt.
25	MR. RAVEN: Okay. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. BUTTINO: This case is not a cost recovery action. No cost recovery action has been brought against the petitioner. It's possible that at some point in the future the State might choose to. At that point, Mr. Raven could present defenses if the State moves forward on that ground. That's very premature.

arguments that they don't plan to move forward, you know, pending a court decision on the January 6th date. I understand that that is the respondents' position. They stipulate to that. But you don't take the necessary step and agree to a full temporary restraining order because your papers seem to indicate that.

If, for some reason, you seek to move forward, Mr. Raven is afforded that ten-day notice as required by the Environmental Conservation Law. That will give him notice ten days. And if, for some reason, you choose to do something, you have to, you know, fulfill that ten-day requirement. And then Mr. Raven would then have another opportunity to seek leave of this Court to file a temporary restraining order.

Why not just in the interest of equity and fairness and for this Court to make sure that I have a full and fair record from the respondents' papers that you

just stipulate that no remedial work will be done at all until the Court makes its final decision on the petition?

I'm a little bit confused because you're willing to stipulate, but you're really not willing to, you know, fully agree that a temporary restraining order should be in effect.

So, I'm kind of -- my thought is that the DEC is kind of talking out of both sides of their mouth here.

Explain that to me.

MR. BUTTINO: Sure, Your Honor. May I also raise some procedural issues? I want to note there are a number of procedural problems with how these materials have been presented, materials submitted for the first time in reply, documents that appear to have alterations in them. But notably, my clients have not been properly served. And thus, there's no personal jurisdiction here.

It appears that we have actual copies, but the petitioner did not follow 307(2) under the CPLR. Notably, it appears that the petitioner served without using certified mail the terms he requested and did not properly mark the envelopes, which require strict compliance. I don't want to belabor this point, but there is no jurisdiction without those things over my clients.

THE COURT: So, I --

MR. RAVEN: You Honor, pro se --

# PROCEEDING

	PROCEEDING
1	THE COURT: Hold on. Hold on.
2	MR. RAVEN: Yeah. That's just technicalities.
3	THE COURT: Please, please. But let's just
4	assume for a matter that I afford Mr. Raven as a pro se
5	litigant extra benefits of, you know, he needs to follow
6	the CPLR. And maybe the fact that he didn't. You're here
7	today. You've submitted opposing papers, and I overlooked
8	those defects under the CPLR.
9	Getting back to my question, why doesn't the
10	DEC, since this matter has been going on since 2006, why
11	wouldn't they just go ahead and stipulate to a full
12	temporary restraining order pending the Court's decision?
13	MR. BUTTINO: Sure, Your Honor. This matter has
14	been classified the site has been classified as a Class
15	2 site since 2009. I believe Mr. Raven purchased the site
16	somewhere around 2015. The reason that I've
17	MR. RAVEN: Objection, Your Honor. There is no
18	classification in 2009.
19	THE COURT: Mr. Raven, please. Mr. Buttino
20	didn't interrupt you.
21	MR. RAVEN: But it is
22	THE COURT: I'm going to give you an opportunity
23	to reply.
24	MR. RAVEN: But it's false, Your Honor.
25	THE COURT: I'm going to give you an opportunity

to reply. Please do not interrupt him.

MR. RAVEN: Okay.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. BUTTINO: The reason I have stated that, although we have no - excuse me, not we - that the department has no plans to proceed with any sort of remedial action on this site but would give notice is on the grounds that we know now, on the facts, there's no reason to proceed before the Court has an opportunity to fully hear this case.

Should the facts on the ground change or the department's understanding of those facts, if for some reason, the department felt there was some sort of urgent action it needed to take to protect the public, I wanted to preserve the flexibility for the department to do so. It's very unlikely that that would happen in this particular matter, given what the department knows about these particular sites.

THE COURT: So, what is the department going to learn between now and January 6th that it's going to change its position that now remedial measures need to begin now rather than waiting the Court's determination when 2006, 2009 we've been on notice, the community's been on notice, the Department of Environmental Conservation has been on notice that this is reportedly a contaminated

site? What would happen? What would change?

I know that there is the, I guess, contention at least on this ten-day notice is that -- you know, that there could be some work order steps that could take place. Do you mean that the DEC is going to move expeditiously between now and the holidays to go ahead and start putting in contractors in there to clean things up before this Court makes a determination on the petition?

MR. BUTTINO: That is extremely unlikely, Your Honor. And certainly, we would give them notice that we stipulated to. Also, it is Mr. Raven's burden to show that there is any sort of irreparable harm. And the TRO that petitioner have requested is much, much broader. That includes preventing the department from carrying out its statutory and regulatory duties such as giving public notice. Arguably, preparing the work plans could be a violation of what Mr. Raven has requested.

THE COURT: Let's talk about irreparable injury. You indicate in your opposing papers that Mr. Raven has failed to show irreparable injury because if remedial efforts were going to continue, simply this would mean that there would be a safe site for the community, a safe property for Mr. Raven and et cetera, and that there would be no harm. Is that kind of essentially your argument on the irreparable harm problem?

request.

MR. BUTTINO: It's two-pronged, Your Honor.

First, that the department doesn't plan to do anything in the next couple of months. But yes, that even cleaning up a site is not irreparable harm, and any sort of economic damage is not irreparable harm for the purposes of a TRO

THE COURT: Could irreparable harm be construed by the fact that remedial efforts could permanently alter Mr. Raven's land in the sense that digging and excavating could damage his property, could compromise the foundation of the building and change the nature and character of his building in the future? Would that constitute irreparable harm?

MR. BUTTINO: I don't think so, Your Honor. And also, I think it's premature. The department would have to do a work plan in order to proceed. That would give any sort of details as to what the department exactly is going to do. The department hasn't done that and thus won't proceed without it.

Conceivably, we could have some sort of future discussion about whether what the department exactly plans to do constitutes irreparable harm. And the State would reserve its rights on that, you know, very premature on that.

THE COURT: In your experience, how long does it

take the DEC to formulate these work plans?

MR. BUTTINO: I'm not sure that I have a specific number in mind. I think it could be a matter of weeks to months depending on their priorities for particular sites. But that's a little more than an estimate.

THE COURT: In regards to your claim that CPLR 6313(a) precludes a temporary restraining order being brought against a state agency, because really, essentially, your argument boils down to that they're carrying forward a statutory duty. And this Court can't issue a temporary restraining order in the sense that carrying forward a statutory duty is something that the Court cannot interfere with. Is that essentially your argument?

MR. BUTTINO: In essence, yes, Your Honor.

Certainly, we do not hold that the Court can never issue a temporary restraining order against the State under any circumstances. But that many of the specific requests made by petitioner would interfere with specific statutory duties.

THE COURT: I'm kind of a little bit curious because my understanding in some of the case law that I was able to find indicated that determination of government enforcement agencies concerning violations and

whether to prosecute those violations are generally matters of discretion. They're not statutorily compelled. Therefore, they do not constitute the performance of statutory duties within the meaning of the Environmental Conservation Law. So, they're matters of discretion.

And since the Environmental Conservation Law provisions that you're relying upon here in this case also use the word that the commissioner or the agency may, isn't that a discretionary duty rather than a statutory duty which then defeats your 6313(a) argument?

MR. BUTTINO: I understand this, Your Honor.

The department does, of course, have discretion on when and how to proceed. I want to be clear. The department is not bringing an enforcement action against the petitioner. The petitioner is suing the department. And the department does need the flexibility to proceed to protect the public as it is mandated to do.

THE COURT: Doesn't your September -- can't your September 2025 letter to Mr. Raven be construed as an enforcement act?

MR. BUTTINO: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BUTTINO: If the department wanted to take enforcement action, they would typically do so either by a notice of hearing (phonetic) and complaint or a referral

to the Attorney General's Office. In which case we could potentially - this is all hypothetical and speculative - could bring a civil enforcement action. The department has not done so in this particular case.

THE COURT: There are some additional issues or additional relief that Mr. Raven seeks in his temporary restraining order application is one. And I'm pretty sure, and hopefully this is academic, that it would require the DEC to preserve any record of proceedings and documents and et cetera. And obviously, those are going to be documents that are going to be submitted in your answer or objections in the point of law, correct?

MR. BUTTINO: Your Honor, we may have a disagreement on this. We do have litigation holds as is our standard practice. We think there's no reason for a court order on that. The State has the ability to either move to dismiss or to answer. We may very well move to dismiss.

You know, certainly, we've raised a personal jurisdiction defense. There are also some ripeness issues here. We are not destroying documents, there are litigation holds in place, through a litigation hold in place.

THE COURT: Lastly, there has been an argument that Mr. Raven has put forth to this Court regarding

future dissemination of any classification levels and et cetera. My feeling is, is that the cat is already out of the bag here. This has been an open and known site since 2006 or 2009. What's your position regarding that?

MR. BUTTINO: The department maintains registries as they're required to. They do public notice as they're required to under both their guidance documents and regulations. I would defer to them on exactly how those are exactly interpreted. But generally, the department has to give certain public notice. That's what they've been doing. There's --

THE COURT: There's nothing privileged -- is there anything privileged in your communications regarding this site that would fall under any type of statutory confidentiality provisions that would warrant the DEC not to publish any findings absent required public notices?

MR. BUTTINO: I'm not sure that I understand the question, Your Honor. There's certainly privileged communications within the department, with their counsel, both internally. One of the respondents is the regional attorney. There is certainly communications with the Attorney General's Office. There would be privilege there. But I'm not sure that I'm answering your question because I'm not sure that I understand.

THE COURT: Brief reply. Mr. Raven, let's talk

23 Julian Raven v. NYSDEC - 11/14/25 PROCEEDING simply on the issues of the elements of the temporary 1 restraining order in brief reply. What would you like me 2 to know? 3 MR. RAVEN: May I just address the full 4 statement that Mr. Buttino made? 5 THE COURT: You're going to have an opportunity 6 7 to do that on January 6th. But very briefly, go ahead. 8 MR. RAVEN: Mr. Buttino stated that in 2009, 9 there was a classification. It's completely false. 10 DEC's mandated report by the MACTEC organization in 2013 was completely inconclusive. They recommended multiple 11 continual sampling tests throughout the property. They 12 13 were completely inconclusive. They recommended that. 14 And then in 2017, they came up with a 15 16 my FOIL request that I had appealed, the answer came in yesterday. And I would like the Court to pay attention 17

classification. And, Your Honor, I'd like to mention that and take notice of this. I have a judicial order that I'd like to submit. But I also have a supplemental Exhibit K that I need to submit to the Court regarding that --

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THE COURT: Submit those through NYSCEF. can submit those to make sure that Mr. Buttino has --

MR. RAVEN: But may I address the issue because it's -- this absolutely goes to the issue today that they admitted and contradicted everything Mr. Buttino just said

today in their letter yesterday. They contradicted it, Your Honor. It is absolutely important that the Court hears this.

They admitted that there are 148 emails that they withheld. I gathered that since they didn't produce them. What they also said is, none of those emails — under the law that they used to avoid giving me those emails, they said none of those emails were determinations. None of those emails were conclusions. And they admitted they don't have a single conclusive report regarding classification of my property that Mr. Buttino claims happened in 2009. It's false.

And without classification, without following procedure under CPLR 1313(3)(a) and (4), it is impossible that statutory authority and statutory power exist.

Everything they have done since that time is void ab initio. All of their actions have been ultra vires. They are completely void.

And to have a discussion about it is like picking rotten fruit from a rotten tree and failing to acknowledge that the tree is rotten. And since the tree is rotten, since they have failed to abide by the procedural mandate of CPLR 1313(4), they have violated my constitutional due process rights right now, yesterday, 2017, 2025, March 12, 2025, September 5th. This is an

ongoing violation of my constitutional rights.

They have no authority, Your Honor. They have taken authority without statutory obedience. They have failed. And the Court has no jurisdiction over their arguments because they were void ab initio. And they admitted it yesterday. They said, "We have no conclusive records." In their own document that I would like to submit to the Court, Your Honor, if I may, at this time.

THE COURT: You're going to have to go ahead and upload those to NYSCEF. And while we're on -- speaking on NYSCEF, if -- I know that you've been sending a lot of emails to my law clerk.

MR. RAVEN: Yes.

THE COURT: Please, in the future, just upload any request that you would have regarding scheduling or procedure. Upload those to NYSCEF, so we make sure that there's no error in Mr. Buttino not getting notice of anything. So, any future correspondences with this Court, please upload those to NYSCEF because this is now an efiled case.

MR. BUTTINO: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: So, we make sure that Mr. Buttino has all of those.

MR. RAVEN: Your Honor, may I just ask the Court --

### PROCEEDING

THE	COURT:	Verv	briefly.
	THE	THE COURT:	THE COURT: Very

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MR. RAVEN: Of course, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I mean, I think a lot of these arguments you need to save for January.

MR. RAVEN: But is the Court not concerned with procedural violations, statutory requirements that the DEC must abide in order for their authority under 6313(a) to stick?

THE COURT: Of course.

MR. RAVEN: If it's not their -- and then as a result of that going on now for eight years, they have been violating my constitutional rights then, now, and tomorrow. It's not about remediation of some digging in the future. That's just part of the picture. If we don't deal with this now, I'm going to leave this Court if it's denied.

And my constitutional rights are being denied today, now, right now. My 4th Amendment due process --5th Amendment due process, 14th Amendment due process, they are violating it now because they have failed to follow CPLR 13 -- ask them. Show me the evidence that they have followed CPLR 1313(4) where it says, "Before you issue an order, before you must notify the owner." That's me.

I never got a single notification. They turned

up at my door with a note. They said, "You're a Class 2 significant threat," without procedure, without notification. They have violated their own laws, Your Honor. This violates the Constitution. This is void ab initio. They have no standing.

And as a result, you must put a restraining order on them. They cannot continue. You must suspend their unlawful actions today until, Your Honor, you decide on the merits in January, that you know, actually, they are completely out of order, completely out of law.

THE COURT: Thank you. The Court's heard enough arguments regarding the very narrow issue that's before the Court today, which is the temporary restraining order application. In light of the pending request and in accordance with the respondents' opposing papers, the Court is prepared to make its following ruling. And, Mr. Buttino, the Court will be requiring you to submit the following order.

First of all, in order for this Court to issue a temporary restraining order, it is the requirement that the petitioner in this matter show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result unless the respondent is restrained before a hearing can be held.

In regards to the first, one of the defenses that have been raised by the respondent in this matter,

that's CPLR 6313 subdivision (a) precludes the Court from issuing a temporary restraining order against the DEC, the Court believes that the enforcement provisions or the enforcement mechanisms that the respondent is seeking to do is a discretionary act and not a statutory act.

Therefore, 6313(a) is not a defense. And the Court denies that argument as the basis for denying the temporary restraining order.

In regards to the irreparable harm claim, the Court also finds that the irreparable harm argument as advanced by the respondent in this matter is without merit, while the respondent indicates that irreparable harm does not exist because if remediation efforts would occur, it would mean a safer property for Mr. Raven and a safer property for the community. The Court feels that that argument is without merit because there is no evidence to show that any remediation efforts or actions would not permanently alter the petitioner's property and land. So therefore, the Court does find that there is irreparable harm in this matter.

However, the Court does make a finding that in regards to the respondents' representation to this Court and as an officer of the Court that there is no immediate plans to move forward with any type of remediation efforts in accordance with the September 2025 letter issued to Mr.

Raven, this Court hereby finds that in light of that representation -- and more importantly, in light of the ten-day notice requirement as required under ECL 27-1309 subdivision (4) and ECL 27-1313 subdivision (8), in light of that representation, the Court finds that there is no imminent harm in the context of moving forward with any remediation or any other enforcement actions.

So, the Court is hereby denying the temporary restraining order pending the January 6, 2026 return date without prejudice for leave for Mr. Raven to reapply to this Court for a temporary restraining order should the Department of Environmental Conservation exercise its tenday notice requirements under those ECL statutes to move forward with this.

The Court, in the context of the request to stay the proceedings under 7805 of the CPLR, also finds that that has not been met regarding the imminent and immediacy harm.

The Court is also directing the respondents in this matter to preserve the record of any proceedings in this matter or any type of evidence that they intend to submit regarding their answer that is due to this Court, as well as any decisions or any other documents that would consist of answering papers to the pending application in January 6th.

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1	Please submit this order on notice to Mr. Raven
2	within two days, so he can have an opportunity should he
3	object to the substance of this order. However, this
4	Court intends to move forward with signing this order with
5	the understanding, again, that Mr. Raven is given an
6	opportunity to move again, should the Department of
7	Environmental Conservation seek to move forward within
8	that ten-day notice period. Thank you.
9	MR. BUTTINO: Your Honor, may I ask a couple of
10	clarifying questions? Of course, the State wants to
11	comply. Your direction is that the State should prepare
12	an order consistent with what you just read out?
13	THE COURT: Yes.
14	MR. BUTTINO: I did take notes. I can attempt
15	to do so. I would order a transcript to make sure that I
16	am
17	THE COURT: Sure. You can order a transcript of
18	the record.
19	MR. BUTTINO: I'm not sure that we will have all
20	of that done within two business days.
21	THE COURT: It would be done by Wednesday of
22	next week. Thank you.

MR. BUTTINO: I have, excuse me, Your Honor, one

more clarifying question. You referred to an answer

related to the Article 78. The State does have subject

1	matter jurisdictions issues related to ripeness and
2	exhaustion. And we are permitted to move to dismiss, are
3	you precluding us from doing so?
4	THE COURT: I am not, no.
5	MR. BUTTINO: Okay.
6	THE COURT: Any affirmative defenses or
7	objections in point of law should be contained in your
8	answer.
9	MR. BUTTINO: I believe, Your Honor, we are
10	permitted to move to dismiss apart
11	THE COURT: You are.
12	MR. BUTTINO: from an answer.
13	THE COURT: You are.
14	MR. BUTTINO: And then we could - if we lose
15	that - we could answer separately. That is my
16	understanding. Is that
17	THE COURT: Correct. It's my understanding of
18	special proceedings such as this.
19	MR. BUTTINO: Thank you, Your Honor.
20	(Proceeding concluded)
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I, Ria Jara, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the State of New York, of the Chemung County Supreme Court, of Julian Raven v. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, et al, Index No.: 2025-1215 was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate transcript of the digitally recorded proceedings.

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Rin Jaran

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13 Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

14 Date: December 2, 2025

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