

1 MICHAEL W. BIEN – 096891  
VAN SWEARINGEN – 259809  
2 ALEXANDER GOURSE – 321631  
AMY XU – 330707  
3 ROSEN BIEN  
GALVAN & GRUNFELD LLP  
4 101 Mission Street, Sixth Floor  
San Francisco, California 94105-1738  
5 Telephone: (415) 433-6830  
Facsimile: (415) 433-7104  
6 Email: mbien@rbgg.com  
vswearingen@rbgg.com  
7 agourse@rbgg.com  
axu@rbgg.com

8 KELIANG (CLAY) ZHU – 305509  
9 DEHENG LAW OFFICES PC  
7901 Stoneridge Drive #208  
10 Pleasanton, California 94588  
Telephone: (925) 399-5856  
11 Facsimile: (925) 397-1976  
Email: czhu@dehengsv.com

12 ANGUS F. NI – Admitted *Pro Hac Vice*  
13 AFN LAW PLLC  
502 Second Avenue, Suite 1400  
14 Seattle, Washington 98104  
Telephone: (773) 543-3223  
15 Email: angus@afnlegal.com

16 Attorneys for Plaintiffs

17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

18 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

19  
20 U.S. WECHAT USERS ALLIANCE,  
CHIHUO INC., BRENT COULTER,  
21 FANGYI DUAN, JINNENG BAO,  
ELAINE PENG, and XIAO ZHANG,

22 Plaintiffs,

23 v.

24 DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official  
capacity as President of the United States,  
25 and WILBUR ROSS, in his official  
capacity as Secretary of Commerce,

26 Defendants.  
27

THOMAS R. BURKE – 141930  
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP  
505 Montgomery Street, Suite 800  
San Francisco, California 94111-6533  
Telephone: (415) 276-6500  
Facsimile: (415) 276-6599  
Email: thomasburke@dwt.com

DAVID M. GOSSETT – Admitted *Pro Hac Vice*

DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP  
1301 K Street N.W., Suite 500 East  
Washington, D.C. 20005-3366  
Telephone: (202) 973-4216  
Facsimile: (202) 973-4499  
Email: davidgossett@dwt.com

Case No. 3:20-cv-05910-LB

**PLAINTIFFS' RENEWED MOTION  
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

Judge: Hon. Laurel Beeler

Trial Date: None Set

1 **INTRODUCTION**

2 Today the Secretary of Commerce brought some clarity to one of the issues before  
3 this Court by finally confirming that WeChat will be banned—shut down—for the millions  
4 of Chinese speaking Americans that rely on it to communicate, speak, read, pray, organize  
5 and operate their businesses. In so doing, the Secretary also cut off communications not  
6 only between millions of people in the United States with each other but also  
7 communications with friends, families, and businesses in China and the rest of the Chinese  
8 diaspora that rely on WeChat.

9 This is nothing more than an unprecedented prior restraint on protected speech, on  
10 the press, on the right to assemble and petition the government and the free exercise of  
11 religion. It is anything but “narrowly tailored;” it is a sledge hammer. The burden is on  
12 Defendants to justify the restrictions on speech—but they have failed to do so. The  
13 evidence today that these “interests” of the government are, in fact, a pretext are even  
14 stronger today. For example, the use of TikTok may continue unabated even though the  
15 weak evidence defendants previously presented focused almost exclusively on TikTok, not  
16 WeChat, as the danger.

17 The prohibitions of the Executive Order, including the imposition of criminal and  
18 civil penalties, without additional notice, are effective on Sunday, but what acts are  
19 prohibited and by whom, remain vague and unclear.

20 The dispute is ripe, the harm is irreparable and the First Amendment questions are  
21 serious and crystalized. The balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of Plaintiffs and the  
22 preliminary injunction must issue to preserve the status quo.

23 This renewed motion incorporates by reference all materials in the record, including  
24 Plaintiffs’ original Motion (Dkt. 17-1), Reply (Dkt. 28), Notices to the Court (Dkts. 33 and  
25 45), and the declarations and exhibits supporting those filings (no arguments are waived).  
26 An Amended Complaint will be filed today.

1 **I. PLAINTIFFS ARE LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS, AND HAVE,**  
 2 **AT THE VERY LEAST, SHOWN SERIOUS QUESTIONS AS TO MERITS**

3 **A. Plaintiffs Are Likely to Succeed on Their First Amendment Claims and**  
 4 **Have Presented Serious Questions Going to Merits**

5 As we understand it from the Secretary’s public statements and the government’s  
 6 representations to this Court, the Secretary’s *Interpretation* is a complete ban on the use of  
 7 WeChat. Such a complete ban on WeChat is an unprecedented is a clear First Amendment  
 8 violation—but at the very least, meets the standard for a preliminary injunction to preserve  
 9 the status quo because “serious questions going to the merits were raised [with] the balance  
 10 of hardships [tipping] sharply in the plaintiff’s favor.” *All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell*,  
 11 632 F.3d 1127, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2011).

12 There are a litany of reasons why the WeChat ban is unconstitutional (or poses, at  
 13 the very least, “serious questions going to the merits” as to whether Defendants’ actions  
 14 violate the First Amendment). *First*, the EO and the *Interpretation* function as a prior  
 15 restraint in that they prevent Plaintiffs and other WeChat users from speaking without the  
 16 government’s approval and “make[] the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the  
 17 Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official.”  
 18 *Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham*, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969); *FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of*  
 19 *Dallas*, 493 U.S. 215, 226 (1990); *Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart*, 807 F.3d 229, 230 (7th  
 20 Cir. 2015) (holding operator was entitled to preliminary injunction based on government’s  
 21 campaign to starve an online forum for sex-related classified ads of its business).

22 *Second*, there are serious questions as to whether the EO and *Interpretation*, in  
 23 closing off WeChat to its users, are a content-based restriction that singles out content on  
 24 WeChat, created and distributed by people in the Chinese community, for differential  
 25 treatment. Defendants’ arguments that the restrictions are content-neutral is belied by the  
 26 differential treatment announced by the Government toward Tik-Tok, which does not  
 27 primarily have a Chinese-user base. *See Berger v. City of Seattle*, 569 F.3d 1029, 1051  
 28 (9th Cir. 2009) (rules purportedly regulating time, place, manner of speech actually found

1 to be “content-based by its very terms” by restricting people “from communicating a  
2 particular set of messages”). Despite allegedly similar concerns with respect to both  
3 WeChat and Tik Tok, Tik Tok users are not being immediately silenced, but Plaintiffs will  
4 be shut off from the domestic Chinese-American community and their overseas networks  
5 effective Sunday. Plaintiffs have submitted un rebutted evidence that there is no *bona fide*  
6 national security concern regarding WeChat, but instead that the directive is motivated by  
7 a desire to silence Chinese-American voices and incite anti-Chinese animus in exchange  
8 for political points. Therefore, serious questions are presented whether the EO can meet  
9 strict scrutiny as “the least restrictive or least intrusive means” of promoting a  
10 governmental interest, *see Ward v. Rock Against Racism*, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989), when  
11 the government has not even seriously considered the possible alternatives to a complete  
12 ban. *See Opp.*, Dkt. 22 at 38-39. At the very least, the Court needs to preserve the status  
13 quo so that the “burden [can] shift to the government to justify the restriction.”

14 *Thalheimer v. City of San Diego*, 645 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2011).

15 *Even if* the Court applies intermediate scrutiny (and it should not given the speech  
16 of millions involved) there are also serious questions as to whether the EO and the  
17 Secretary’s definitions satisfy those restrictions. The Government’s arguments on  
18 national security are overbroad, conclusory, and unsupported. *See Reply*, Dkt. 28 at 8-10.  
19 Even after clarifying that the WeChat ban is effective on Sunday, the Government still  
20 cannot identify the source of their “fear” that use of WeChat poses a threat to national  
21 security. *See Pls’ Response*, Dkt. 45 at 3-4. The Court does not need to take the  
22 Government’s word just because they invoke unsubstantiated concerns about “national  
23 security” as a talisman—especially when it is their burden to “justify the restriction” on  
24 speech. *Thalheimer*, 645 F.3d at 1116; *S.O.C. v. County of Clark*, 152 F.3d 1136, 1146  
25 (9th Cir. 1998) (plaintiffs demonstrated probable success on the merits because county did  
26 not meet its burden of demonstrating that its content-based ordinance was the least  
27 restrictive means to further a compelling interest).

28 Finally, it is beyond serious dispute that there are no substitutes to WeChat for

1 Plaintiffs. The constraints of the pandemic have forced the majority of communications  
2 and associations to occur virtually. Plaintiffs have no viable alternative to WeChat to  
3 access the vast network of Chinese communities found online. For numerous reasons,  
4 apps like Line, Telegraph, and WhatsApp are not broadly used within the Chinese and  
5 Chinese diaspora communities in which Plaintiffs wish to engage. Now that we know that  
6 the EO will be interpreted to ban fully WeChat, the practical effects of the WeChat ban are  
7 truly as broad as Plaintiffs hypothesized: Defendants have closed “an entire medium” of  
8 communication for Plaintiffs. *See* Mot., Dkt. 17 at 34-36.

9 **B. Executive Order 13943, as Interpreted by the Secretary’s Identification**  
10 **of Prohibited Transactions, Remains *Ultra Vires***

11 As we previously argued, Executive Order 13943 is *ultra vires* under the IEEPA.  
12 That remains the case even after the Secretary’s *Identification*. The EO itself establishes  
13 the prohibition that the Secretary’s *Identification* interprets, and that prohibition remains  
14 unlawful if the Secretary’s *Identification* does not define it narrowly enough so as to avoid  
15 running afoul of the express limitations on the President’s authority in 50 U.S.C. §  
16 1702(b). The Secretary’s *Identification* does not come close to doing so.

17 Subsection 1702(b) forbids Defendants from “regulat[ing] or prohibit[ing], directly  
18 *or indirectly*,” personal communications not involving transfers of value as well as the  
19 importation or exportation of information or informational materials. 50 U.S.C. §  
20 1702(b)(1), (3) (emphasis added). Congress included the phrase “directly or indirectly” in  
21 Section 1702(b) to ensure that the IEEPA’s protections for the personal communications  
22 and for exchange of information or informational materials has “a broad scope” that  
23 “facilitates transactions and activities incident to the flow of information and informational  
24 materials.” *Kalantari v. NITV, Inc.*, 352 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting H.R.  
25 Conf. Rep. No. 102-482 at 239 (1994)).

26 As we previously argued, the Executive Order by its terms bars “any transaction”  
27 with WeChat, regardless whether it falls within the scope of the IEEPA’s limitation.  
28 Indeed, the *Identification* simply demonstrates that the prohibition in the EO is unlawful.

1 Under the Secretary’s interpretation, the Executive Order prohibits “*Any* provision of  
 2 services to distribute or maintain the WeChat mobile application, constituent code, or  
 3 mobile application updates”; “*Any* provision of internet hosting services enabling the  
 4 functioning or hosting of the WeChat mobile application” and “*Any* utilization of the  
 5 WeChat mobile application’s constituent code, functions, or services in the functioning of  
 6 software or services developed and/or accessible within . . . the United States and its  
 7 territories.” Identification at ¶¶ 1-2, 6. As the Secretary himself admitted this morning, on  
 8 national television, WeChat will “for all practical purposes . . . be shut down in the U.S.”  
 9 as soon as the President’s prohibition takes effect on September 20. By “shut[ting] down”  
 10 an entire medium of communication, through which Plaintiffs and millions of other  
 11 Chinese Americans exchange ideas about news, culture, religion, politics, and myriad  
 12 other topics, Defendants have acted *ultra vires* by “indirectly” prohibiting Plaintiffs’  
 13 personal communications and importation and exportation of information or informational  
 14 materials.

15 **C. Plaintiffs are Likely to Succeed on their Challenges to the *Identification***  
 16 **Based on the Administrative Procedures Act.**

17 As the Court is well aware, Plaintiffs’ prior preliminary-injunction pleadings  
 18 focused only on the Executive Order, which is itself unlawful for all the reasons we have  
 19 given. But the Secretary’s *Identification*, which purports to implement the Executive  
 20 Order, is also itself unlawful under the Administrative Procedures Act. The APA directs  
 21 courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action” that is “arbitrary, capricious, an  
 22 abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”; “contrary to constitutional  
 23 right, power, privilege or immunity”; or “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or  
 24 limitations, or short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706. The *Identification* violates the APA  
 25 for at least two reasons.

26 First, the government conceded at oral argument today that the Secretary has  
 27 implemented the Executive Order so as to ban all use of WeChat by plaintiffs and other  
 28 domestic users. But Section 1702(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act

1 (“IEEPA”) states in relevant part that “[t]he authority granted to the President by [the  
 2 IEEPA] does not include the authority to regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly ...  
 3 (1) any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or *other personal communication*, which does not  
 4 involve a transfer of anything of value.” 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(1).<sup>1</sup> The Secretary has now  
 5 interpreted and implemented the Executive Order, however, precisely to bar such personal  
 6 communications using WeChat.

7 The Court previously expressed skepticism about the ripeness of our argument that  
 8 the Executive Order was *ultra vires* under the IEEPA, on the ground that the Secretary  
 9 might have interpreted the Executive Order to be consistent with the IEEPA. But now that  
 10 the Secretary has acted, the same underlying problem of the government running  
 11 roughshod over the limitations contained in the IEEPA demonstrates that the *Identification*  
 12 violates Section 706. The Secretary *could* perhaps have interpreted the Executive Order in  
 13 a limited fashion consistent with the IEEPA—the Court’s point. But he chose not to do so,  
 14 and thus his actual implementation of the Executive Order can and must be reviewed in  
 15 light of the IEEPA. It is plainly inconsistent with that controlling statute.<sup>2</sup>

16 Second, the *Identification* is also invalid on procedural grounds under the APA.  
 17 Because the Secretary’s determination of which transactions are covered by the Executive  
 18 Order is purported to have binding legal effect, it constitutes a final rule that should have  
 19 been promulgated via notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures under 5 U.S.C.  
 20 § 553(b). The government will surely argue that the *Identification* falls within the foreign  
 21 affairs exception in Section 553(a)(1). But that provision must be “narrowly construed and  
 22

23 \_\_\_\_\_  
 24 <sup>1</sup> It also provides that the president may not regulate or prohibit “(2) donations, by persons  
 25 subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of articles, such as food, clothing, and  
 26 medicine, intended to be used to relieve human suffering...[or] (3) the importation from  
 any country, or the exportation to any country, whether commercial or otherwise,  
 regardless of format or medium of transmission, of any information or informational  
 materials[.]” *Id.* (b)(2)-(3).

27 <sup>2</sup> To the extent the government argues for a narrower interpretation of the *Identification*,  
 28 that would be inconsistent with the government’s representations both in the media and in  
 this Court. It would also serve to illustrate plaintiffs’ argument that both the Executive  
 Order and the *Identification* are unconstitutional on vagueness grounds.

1 only reluctantly countenanced.” *Zhang v. Slattery*, 55 F.3d 732, 744 (2d Cir. 1995); *see*  
2 *also* H.R. Rep. No. 79-1980, at 257 (1946) (limited to “only those ‘affairs’ which so affect  
3 the relations of the United States with other governments that, for example, public  
4 rulemaking provisions would provoke definitely undesirable consequences.” The Ninth  
5 Circuit has repeatedly explained that this exception must be construed narrowly. *E.g.*, *E.*  
6 *Bay. Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump*, 932 D.3d 742, 775 (9th Cir. 2018). The government is  
7 regulating (and banning) the use by U.S. citizens and residents of a specific business’s app.  
8 Any underlying relation to the foreign affairs of the country is at best highly attenuated.

9       Indeed, the Secretary of Commerce himself apparently recognizes that the National  
10 Emergency declared by the President in May 2019, underlying the WeChat Executive  
11 Order, is not a sufficient reason to skip over the APA’s notice-and-comment requirement.  
12 In November 2019 the Secretary issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to implement  
13 Executive Order 13873 (“Securing the Information and Communications Technology and  
14 Service Supply Chain”)—the very Executive Order declaring the national emergency on  
15 which the later WeChat Executive Order (E.O. 13943) was based. *See* Proposed Rule;  
16 Request for Comments; *Securing the Information and Communications Technology and*  
17 *Services Supply Chain*, 84 Fed. Reg. 65316 (Nov. 27, 2019).

18       And the concern about the lack of notice-and-comment procedures here is not  
19 purely hypothetical. In such proceedings, for example, plaintiffs and others could have  
20 argued that an alternative to an outright ban would have been strict data privacy or other  
21 restrictions on WeChat in the United States, rather than an outright ban.

22       Plaintiffs thus are likely to succeed on the merits of their APA claims.

23       **D. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their Vagueness Claims**

24       Plaintiffs have previously argued that the EO is void for vagueness because it was  
25 entirely unclear what transactions would be barred. *See* Dkt. 17, at 16-21; Dkt. 28 at 11-  
26 12. The issuance of the Secretary’s *Identification* of course changes this argument; but it  
27 does not in the end eliminate the argument: As plaintiffs explained this morning (Dkt. 45  
28 at 2-3), it remains unclear what the Executive Order, as implemented by the *Interpretation*,

1 bans. Indeed, different government officials have provided different interpretations of it to  
 2 the media today. *See id.* And as we also noted, the Secretary specifically retains the  
 3 authority to change what transactions are banned (*Identification* at ¶ 7). Coupled with the  
 4 provision in the Executive Order allowing for enforcement of the prohibitions without any  
 5 notice (E.O. 13943 at 2 § 3), our prior argument that the Executive Order is void for  
 6 vagueness remains likely to succeed on the merits even after the Secretary’s promulgation  
 7 of his *Interpretation*.

8 **II. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS NECESSARY TO AVOID**  
 9 **FURTHER HARMS**

10 The uncontested evidence shows Plaintiffs fear being disconnected from families  
 11 and friends in the United States and China as well as of being cut off from political  
 12 discussions, campaign participation, religious events, and other social and cultural events.  
 13 Mot. (Dkt. 17-1) at 35-36. The unrebutted evidence also shows a WeChat ban effectively  
 14 cuts off Plaintiffs’ primary means of communication with business and non-profit contacts.  
 15 *Id.* at 36.

16 There are no effective substitutes or available alternatives to WeChat because no  
 17 other app with the same or similar set of functions is designed for and used by Chinese-  
 18 speaking users, and none have the network effects of WeChat. *See* Duan Decl. ¶¶ 29-30;  
 19 Peng Decl. ¶¶ 24-26, 28; Zhang Decl. ¶¶ 19-20, 22-23; Coulter Decl. ¶ 11; Bao Decl. ¶ 17;  
 20 *see also* Sun ¶¶ 12-34. After learning today of Defendants’ WeChat ban, Plaintiff Peng is  
 21 “shocked and frightened, as my service recipients who are suffering mental health  
 22 problems – including depression, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and post-traumatic stress  
 23 disorder – will lose access to WeChat, the only channel for the them to receive services,  
 24 educational materials, and treatment resources. This is a humanitarian crisis.” *See* Suppl.  
 25 Peng Decl.” ¶ 7. Plaintiff Peng has tried to move the MHACC provider group to  
 26 alternative apps but the majority of her service recipients cannot be shifted to other apps  
 27 because WeChat is the only app with the functions MHACC needs that is also in the  
 28 Chinese language. *Id.* ¶¶ 8-9. This includes WeChat’s ability to: “store all service

1 recipients' names, addresses, contact information, medical history, and other vital  
 2 information;" "send out questionnaires;" allow for staff to "conduct one-on-one  
 3 counselling;" evaluate case histories; and design and delivery treatment. *Id.* ¶ 9. MHACC  
 4 has used " the real-time location sharing function on WeChat to prevent a suicide attempt."  
 5 *Id.* Plaintiff Peng is "not aware of any method to transfer this information outside of  
 6 WeChat." *Id.* Banning WeChat will mean that Plaintiff Peng and MHACC will lose "all  
 7 these this valuable patient-specific information and destroy[] the fundamental foundation  
 8 that MHACC has strived for years to build." *Id.* Plaintiff Peng will also lose "a critical  
 9 and irreplaceable forum to reach" other Chinese Americans with whom she engages in  
 10 political organizing. *Id.* ¶ 10.

11 **III. THE BALANCE OF HARDSHIPS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST WEIGH**  
 12 **HEAVILY IN PLAINTIFFS' FAVOR**

13 For the reasons already identified, the balance of hardships and public interest  
 14 weigh heavily in Plaintiffs' favor. The government's invocation of national security  
 15 concerns remains entirely speculative and conclusory.

16 **CONCLUSION**

17 For the reasons already in the record as well as those set forth above, Plaintiffs  
 18 request that the Court enter a preliminary injunction as follows: Defendants President  
 19 Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity, and Secretary of Commerce, Wilbur Ross, in his  
 20 official capacity, as well as their agents, servants, employees, and all persons acting under  
 21 their direction, are enjoined, pending final judgment, from enforcing Sections 1(a) and  
 22 2(a)-(b) of Executive Order 13943 to directly or indirectly prohibit or limit any use of the  
 23 WeChat application in the United States or by "United States persons" abroad.  
 24 Defendants President Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity, and Secretary of  
 25 Commerce, Wilbur Ross, in his official capacity, as well as their agents, servants,  
 26 employees, and all persons acting under their direction, are enjoined, pending final  
 27 judgment, from implementing Section 5 of Executive Order 13943 to directly or indirectly  
 28 prohibit or limit any use of the WeChat application in the United States or by "United

1 States persons” abroad.  
2

3 DATED: September 18, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

4 ROSEN BIEN GALVAN & GRUNFELD LLP

5 By: /s/ Michael W. Bien

6 Michael W. Bien

7 Attorneys for Plaintiffs  
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MICHAEL W. BIEN – 096891  
VAN SWEARINGEN – 259809  
ALEXANDER GOURSE – 321631  
AMY XU – 330707  
ROSEN BIEN  
GALVAN & GRUNFELD LLP  
101 Mission Street, Sixth Floor  
San Francisco, California 94105-1738  
Telephone: (415) 433-6830  
Facsimile: (415) 433-7104  
Email: mbien@rbgg.com  
vswearingen@rbgg.com  
agourse@rbgg.com  
axu@rbgg.com

THOMAS R. BURKE – 141930  
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP  
505 Montgomery Street, Suite 800  
San Francisco, California 94111-6533  
Telephone: (415) 276-6500  
Facsimile: (415) 276-6599  
Email: thomasburke@dwt.com

DAVID M. GOSSETT – Admitted *Pro Hac Vice*  
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP  
1301 K Street N.W., Suite 500 East  
Washington, D.C. 20005-3366  
Telephone: (202) 973-4216  
Facsimile: (202) 973-4499  
Email: davidgossett@dwt.com

KELIANG (CLAY) ZHU – 305509  
DEHENG LAW OFFICES PC  
7901 Stoneridge Drive #208  
Pleasanton, California 94588  
Telephone: (925) 399-5856  
Facsimile: (925) 397-1976  
Email: czhu@dehengsv.com

ANGUS F. NI – Admitted *Pro Hac Vice*  
AFN LAW PLLC  
502 Second Avenue, Suite 1400  
Seattle, Washington 98104  
Telephone: (773) 543-3223  
Email: angus@afnlegal.com

*Counsel for Plaintiffs*

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

U.S. WECHAT USERS ALLIANCE,  
CHIHUO INC., BRENT COULTER,  
FANGYI DUAN, JINNENG BAO,  
ELAINE PENG, and XIAO ZHANG,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official  
capacity as President of the United States,  
and WILBUR ROSS, in his official  
capacity as Secretary of Commerce,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:20-cv-05910-LB

**DECLARATION OF  
ELAINE PENG**

Judge: Hon. Beeler  
Date: 09/19/2020  
Time: 1:30pm

Trial Date: None Set

1 I, Elaine Peng, declare as follows:

2 1. I am a Plaintiff in the above-captioned action (the “Action”). I have personal  
3 knowledge of the matters stated herein and if called as a witness I could and would testify  
4 truthfully to them.

5 2. I am a United States citizen residing in Castro Valley, California.

6 3. As I previously stated in my Declaration dated August 26, 2020, I operate the  
7 Mental Health Association for Chinese Communities (“MHACC”), a nonprofit organization to  
8 provide mental health education and services to the local Chinese community.

9 4. The primary tool for MHACC to reach out and provide services to the Chinese  
10 Americans is WeChat. One WeChat group consists of approximately 110 MHACC volunteers  
11 for our use for internal communications. The second WeChat group has approximately 420  
12 members, made up of both volunteers, service recipients and their family members.

13 5. Since many of the Chinese community members we serve are not fluent in  
14 English, WeChat is the only online tool that they rely on.

15 6. The majority of our four hundred plus service recipients are either of elderly, or  
16 deficient in English, or both. When I first founded MHACC in 2013, we went to great trouble  
17 just to teach them on how to set up WeChat accounts, how to use WeChat to message and share,  
18 as many of them do not know how to use a smart phone. In some cases we have MHACC staff  
19 driving hours to service recipients’ homes or recipients driving hours to our office, just to have  
20 WeChat set up to access our services. The process took much time, energy and effort.

21 7. This morning I learned that the U.S. government is shutting down WeChat on  
22 this Sunday. I am shocked and frightened, as my service recipients who are suffering mental  
23 health problems – including depression, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and post-traumatic  
24 stress disorder – will lose access to WeChat, the only channel for the them to receive services,  
25 educational materials, and treatment resources. This is a humanitarian crisis.

26 8. In the last month or also, I have tried to shift the MHACC groups to alternative  
27 apps. But these apps are in English. Because of the language barrier and lack of technical skills  
28 to operate smartphones, the majority of my service recipients cannot be shifted to other apps.

1           9.           Additionally, almost all of MHACC’s data are stored on WeChat. I store all  
2 service recipients’ names, addresses, contact information, medical history and other vital  
3 information on WeChat. I send out questionnaires on WeChat for them to complete. Our staff  
4 conduct one-on-one counselling with them on WeChat. We rely on the chat history to evaluate  
5 their cases and design their treatment, and then deliver it to them on WeChat. In one case we  
6 even used the real-time location sharing function on WeChat to *prevent a suicide attempt*. Since  
7 WeChat is its own system, I am not aware of any method to transfer this information outside of  
8 WeChat. Banning WeChat will mean erasing all such valuable information and destroying the  
9 fundamental foundation that MHACC has strived for years to build.

10           10.           I am also politically active. Right now I am using WeChat to organize teams to  
11 spread Chinese-language materials to teach Chinese Americans – most of whom do not speak  
12 English – on how to become registered voters, as well as to send messages to potential Chinese  
13 American voters on the upcoming election. A majority of these Chinese American voters use  
14 WeChat as their only messaging and social media app. Without WeChat, I lose a critical and  
15 irreplaceable forum to reach them.

16           I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that  
17 the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

18  
19           Executed on September 18, 2020 at Castro Valley, California.

20  
21           

22           Elaine Peng