

National Transportation Safety Board  
Office of the Chairman  
Jim Hall  
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Washington, DC 20594-2000



Dear Chairman Hall,  
Dec 1997

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I have just received your 19 December 1997 letter to me. Thank you very much for a personal reply. I carefully evaluated your letter, particularly this statement: "However, to repeat, the investigation of the accident involving TWA flight 800 has revealed no evidence to suggest that a failure of a cargo door precipitated the event."

The Tennessee lawyer in me says, "Ah ha! He repeated cargo door did not start the accident but he omitted the part about all cargo doors all examined and all latches were all normal and all doors all intact at water impact."

So, now sir, for me it comes down to 'did cargo door start the accident and where is the evidence.'

We agree that center tank exploded and cargo door area is shattered. Current official position is center tank exploded from unknown source, nose came off and fell into water shattering cargo door. My explanation is cargo door shattered from small rupture leading to explosive decompression causing huge hole, nose comes off leading to disintegrating fuselage and wing tanks and then engine number three



ignites vapor and center tank into explosion fireball seconds later and thousands of feet lower. We agree on so much; only dispute is timing of two events, door shattered and center tank explosion or tank explosion then door shattered.



There is an abundance of NTSB provided evidence that the cargo door was the initiating event. What is missing is the NTSB interpretation of the evidence they recovered. For instance, Exhibit 7A, Structures Group Report, page 34, examination of right horizontal stabilizer revealed: "A section of the structure out-board of H7 exhibited evidence of red paint transfer marks on the upper skin (H8); ..."

The picture above shows principle that red object at cargo door level can blow straight back and hit starboard horizontal stabilizer. TWA paint scheme is different than Boeing livery above.

The red paint has to come from somewhere. And somewhere some red paint has to be missing. There is a rare location on the wreckage reconstruction that

fits that description. It's the spotted red trim area above the cargo door. The cargo door explanation/interpretation has door rupturing/opening inflight, blowing out, up, and away, smashing into white painted fuselage skin above, transferring red paint to white, and removing red paint from trim at impact, then red trim pieces and top of door which is red blows directly aft in the 300 knot slipstream and impacts the object directly behind, the right horizontal stabilizer, leaving "...evidence of red paint transfer marks on the upper skin (H8)..."

There is no red paint skin down low under the wing where the center tank resides. There is a lot of red paint on the forward cargo door and trim above it and some of it is missing in photo on left.

The evidence is there, sir; the precise interpretation is yet to be officially determined.

The evidence is there on the CVR, the FDR, the wreckage reconstruction, the Exhibits of Sound Spectrum Study, Structures Report, Trajectory Study and many more. The expensive evidence collecting devices such as CVR and FDR, the expensive accident recreation device of the reconstruction, and the expensive analysis of experts into Exhibits are very, very important. They were done for very good reasons. They have provided the facts, evidence, and data. They did their job. What is missing and now needed is interpretation. Cargo door explanation is an interpretation that fits as initial event, then center tank explodes seconds later and lower. Interpretation of center tank explodes first; then forward cargo door area shatters on water impact later does not satisfactorily fit the facts, evidence and data.

Center tank as initial event is a puzzle piece that almost fits. It's there, it happened, it happened in flight so it's blue, it happened close to event time so the edge is straight, it could happen, it's happened on other planes, but...but...



Cargo door rupture as initial event fits better as initial event puzzle piece, Mr. Hall. It's happened before to exact model and type plane. It happened in flight. It was the initial event. The evidence UAL 811 left matches TWA 800 in many many important ways.

During the hearing, Mr. Chairman, the panel you called to discuss aging aircraft discussed wiring, poly-X, which was on TWA 800. They discussed a weak area of Boeing 747s after many cycles, Section 41; TWA 800 had not had its Section 41 retrofitted for strength. They discussed UAL 811 door coming open and off.

Mr. Hall, you have all the big puzzle pieces. You have the big picture. An old airplane came apart in the air. The plane had easily chafed wiring. The weak area previously identified had not yet been strengthened. The door had ruptured before. There was a center tank explosion. It all goes together with cargo door explanation as initial event. Center tank as initial event does not fit exact enough.

You asked in the recently adjourned but not concluded public hearing on TWA 800, "Why so few forward passengers burned?" And you asked that several times. It's a good question. It's why the center tank explanation does not fit the puzzle but cargo door does.

A proverb in this morning's Monterey newspaper read, "He who asks questions can not avoid the answers." And that's why so few real questions get asked. You asked one.

They were not burned because they were not there to be burned. Cargo door explanation has the door rupture then large explosive decompression hole in nose, then nose comes off with unburnt passengers inside which falls on long arc to water. Behind the separated and departed nose the center tank and wing and rest of fuselage falls for many seconds and disintegrates into vapor cloud and on-fire engine number three or four ignites center tank and other fuel into explosion fireball. The center tank explodes into nothingness, not into the forward passenger compartment.

Old wiring in weak area of old airplane caused previous event to happen again. Poly-X got chafed and

shorted door motor to unlatched position. Most latches did not go to unlatch position but the failed before door fails again near aft midspan latch. A small rupture hole at aft midspan latch became a huge explosive decompression square. Then 300 knots tore entire nose off within three to five seconds. Center tank exploded about forty seconds later at 7500 feet into fireball seen by many.

Cargo door fits better as initial event, sir.

May I push the red paint evidence? It's there, it's real, you can see it, and it shouldn't be there for center tank as initial event. Please have consideration for this important clue: Red paint smears. Cargo door explanation as initial event conclusively explains red paint smears for TWA 800 based upon principle of door transfer paint smears for UAL 811 in NTSB AAR 92/02.

Again, NTSB has done the work, collected the evidence, now is the interpretation time.



To read again your statement, "'However, to repeat, the investigation of the accident involving TWA flight 800 has revealed no evidence to suggest that a failure of a cargo door precipitated the event.'

(If I had known you were going to drop the 'all doors examined and all doors latched at water impact' position, I would not have talked about eight latches not being ten latches in the enclosed letter to government officials involved with TWA 800. Please excuse the iteration.)

Evidence is there of cargo door precipitating the event. In photo on left note smooth outward bulged door frame. It should have a latch attached at mid point and be an almost straight line. Rupture blew aft midspan latch away and caused outward bulge of frame.

To list all cargo door supporting evidence is to list everything NTSB has done in the last twelve years on high time Boeing 747s, from AI 182, to PA 125, to PA 103, to UAL 811, to UAL preflight, to FedEx; to TWA 800 reconstruction, FDR, CVR, Public Docket, and the adjourned but not concluded public hearing transcripts.

Interestingly, there is one interpretation by an NTSB official of the evidence which supports the cargo door explanation: Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Study, page 20, Author James F. Wildey, II, "The initial opening of the fuselage lower lobe (e.g. LF6A) would have the expected result of rapid depressurization accompanied by collapse of the main deck floor for some distance forward of STA



1000. The red area recovery of interior components as far forward as STA 600 would not be inconsistent with this floor collapse and associated structural breakup." That is to say, initial fuselage opening gives explanation for observed evidence. Cargo door explanation agrees. Initial opening is called aft midspan latch rupture in forward door, floor beams collapse downward, pieces of cargo structure depart plane first and land in red zone.

Photo below shows large explosive decompression square of shattered skin. Nearby skin is smooth and relatively undamaged.

Mr. Hall, I do know what I'm talking about when it comes to airplanes. I know what I'm talking about when I talk about a sudden night fiery fatal jet air-

plane crash.

And I say the aft midspan latch area ruptured on the forward cargo door inflight on TWA 800 leading to explosive decompression, nose tearing off in 300 knot slipstream and landing apart while rest of fuselage, wing, tail and wing tanks disintegrated while falling and engine number three, on fire

from being foddod, ignited the vaporous cloud and the center tank into explosion fireball seconds later and thousands of feet lower than the failure of the cargo door which precipitated the event.

I can persuade you, Mr. Hall. I know it. The evidence will do the talking. Give me the same hour and a half you gave the meteor explanation at the hearing. Doors come open every few years, not every 59000 years. Cargo door deserves better of your attention. It's worthwhile. Let me present my cargo door case to same critical audience that heard about small fragments and bolides. Let the evidence of cargo door have a chance to speak. Give me a chance.

Or not.

During the first TWA 800 Public Fact Finding Inquiry, you acted as a fair prosecutor, giving short moments to alternatives for the cause of TWA 800 and then laying out case over days for center tank as guilty party. The jury is still out. There is a continuance. You have a second chance to find the answer, Mr. Hall. Reconvene the hearing. Hearings are held every day in Washington, especially ones that have been recessed and then reconvened.

This time, you be the judge. Demand a fair presentation of all alternatives to include center tank, missile, bomb, meteor, methane gas, cargo door, and any more out there. As judge you can be objective and cut the wheat from the chaff. You can sort out the nonsense. You will find the answer.

You will have made your words come true.

Chairman Hall> "We have presented all of the factual information available at this time."

Chairman Hall> "We have sought to take a careful, objective look at all conceivable ideas and theories, and have called on a wide array of experts to assist us in this endeavor."

Chairman Hall> "We are by no means finished. Our work will continue and we will spare no effort to determine the cause of the crash of TWA 800."

One more effort is to reconvene the hearing to examine new evidence, new interpretations, and release more exhibits.

Ah, the exhibits. One goal of an amateur investigative sleuth is to acquire data. To do that I had to travel from California to Maryland in the dead of winter. I did go and I did acquire.

My information acquisition was achieved in this manner:

1. 2475 pages for 180\$ at Kinkos copying service as suggested by you, sir, and paid by me and brought back to Carmel Valley.
2. Exhibit items handed out to the press and left discarded on tables after hearing and picked up by me.
3. Handouts by NTSB for the general public and left on tables and picked up by me.
4. CD-ROM available, ordered by me and received.
5. Miscellaneous handouts at 'propaganda' table provided by NTSB.
6. Downloaded Exhibits from NTSB web site and mirror at CNN.
7. Additional web site information from NTSB such as Chairman's closing statement.

All items were available in the Convention Hall during the five day hearing to all present.

One stands out as unusual. It's Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit Number 4A, Witness Group Factual Report.

On the last day, Friday, I noticed this twelve page exhibit among the 2500 plus pages compiled high stack of reports on my hotel desk. I remarked on it to some friends nearby. I recall Mr. Kallstrom asking that witness statements not be discussed at the hearing and you agreeing. However, the issuing of the reports may have been authorized, just not talking about it was prohibited. I returned home on Friday night.

On Sunday, I thought about it and decided that the report might be sensitive for unauthorized persons. On Monday I gave Exhibit 4A, Eyewitness Report to my Congressman, Sam Farr, for resolution via his Office Person in his downtown Monterey office. I requested status of the report and asked to know if it is OK to put on my web site. Exhibits given to Mr. Farr on Monday were: Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit Number 15C, Report Number 97-82, Section 41/42 Joint, Forward Cargo Door.

Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit Number 4A, Witness Group Factual Report.  
Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit number 22B, page 45, Trajectory Study  
Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit Number 12B, Chart 12, Sound Spectrum Study

I would love to be quoting to you from that Exhibit 4A right now, Mr. Hall, but I can't. I play by the rules. The rule may be stupid and changed in the future, but right now, there is an uncertainty about the release of Exhibit 4A so it does not get discussed.

Apparently many picked up that innocent document which was probably placed in a release package and then failed to be retrieved at the last minute. One person realized the significance of the exhibit and turned it in to authority, me.

I urge you to release all exhibits to include eyewitness, powerplant, and wreckage plot. This is an airplane crash investigation, not a bank robbery.

I appeal to your fairness, Mr. Hall. You are a lawyer and understand rules of evidence, adversary system, appeal, hearsay, and preponderance of evidence. You also understand the definition of fairly.

fairly \ˈfɑr-leɪ adv 1 : handsomely 2 : in a manner of speaking  
<~ bursting with pride> 3 : without bias 4 : to a full degree or extent : plainly, distinctly 5 : somewhat, rather <a ~ easy job>

Let the causes of TWA 800 be presented fairly.


Let me present case plainly and distinctly with equal time as much as other alternatives had. Listen to cargo door case without bias.

I can do this by letter and email as I have been trying for years. A telephone conference call will suffice. Email will work. I will travel back to the East Coast for a meeting with you and your staff if one is called. Assign a local NTSB staff person to visit me in my home at 551 Country Club Drive, Carmel Valley, California. Have the person fly up from LA for an afternoon of discussion about cargo door, a possible cause for the crash of TWA 800 now considered because of new evidence uncovered by the completed wreckage reconstruction.

The mystery of TWA 800 can be solved. The big picture on the puzzle box is seen. Most of the pieces are there on the table. Most fit. Only the first piece which ties it all together has not been officially identified and confirmed. We both say door shattered and tank exploded but which came first?

Respectfully Submitted,

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551 Country Club Drive



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17th District, California  
House of Representatives  
Congress of the United States  
Washington, DC

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I address you as an American citizen to United States government officials. I have come to the conclusion that you are listening to me. You may not agree or always respond, but still my information is getting through. So I continue.

Chairman Jim Hall of NTSB has made an important yet unsubstantiated reply to Congressional inquiry regarding TWA 800 cargo door status: "Early in the investigation we determined conclusively that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water, and there was no evidence of any failure of any of the latching mechanisms on the doors."

That statement is not yet correct. A complete examination of the forward cargo door and two other cargo doors remains to be done. Only eight of ten latches have been examined in the forward door and none of the other doors. Chairman Hall has reported to me and senior officials that all doors have been conclusively determined to be all latched at water impact. That statement is not yet exactly true. It can be.

One person made an early conclusion under time pressure and poor working conditions about one shattered door and that erroneous first guess has been compounded into three doors over time and not corrected. It leads to this imaginary yet factual conversation between Chairman Jim Hall and Mr. Bob Breneman, the person who first examined and deduced forward cargo door all latched and intact at water impact:

Chairman Hall: I have reported in writing to high officials that all the cargo doors are all latched, is that correct, Mr. Breneman?

Mr. Bob Breneman: Maybe, sir!

Chairman Hall: What is the position of the forward cargo door manual locking handle, is it locked or unlocked?

Mr. Bob Breneman: Don't know, sir, didn't examine it.

Chairman Hall: Do any of the forward door latches show damage?

Mr. Bob Breneman: Don't know, sir, didn't examine them all, only eight of ten.

Chairman Hall: Are the latches on the two vertical sides of the forward door latched?

Mr. Bob Breneman: Don't know, sir, didn't examine the sides, only the top and bottom.

Chairman Hall: Do you have the two midspan latches?

Mr. Bob Breneman: Don't know sir, maybe, or maybe missing, or maybe destroyed.

Chairman Hall: Does the hinge show overtravel damage?

Mr. Bob Breneman: Don't know, sir, didn't examine it for that.

Chairman Hall: What is the status of the two overpressure relief doors in the forward door?

Mr. Bob Breneman: Don't know, sir, didn't examine them.

Chairman Hall: What are the positions of the aft and the bulk cargo door manual locking handles?

Mr. Bob Breneman: Don't know, sir, didn't examine them.

Chairman Hall: What is the status of any the latches and hinges of the aft and bulk cargo doors?


Mr. Bob Breneman: Don't know, sir, didn't examine any of them.

Chairman Hall: What is the status of the door frames, the overpressure relief doors, the viewing ports, and the hinges of the aft and bulk cargo doors?

Mr. Bob Breneman: Don't know, sir, didn't examine any of them.

Chairman Hall: Very well, Mr. Breneman, and you want me to say all cargo doors are all latched, locked and no latch failures at water impact for TWA 800?

Mr. Bob Breneman: You can say anything you want, Mr. Chairman, you're the Chairman!



Gentleman, I ask you, how did such a crazy thing come about? Here's how. The chain of erroneous conclusion regarding forward cargo door of TWA 800 is thus:

1. July 1996. Mr. Bob Breneman examined bottom eight latches. He stated to me in a phone call on 30 October 1997 that "early on as the pieces of door were being brought into Calverton hangar," he determined cargo door latched and not implicated in crash of TWA 800 because bottom latches latched. He said he felt relief that bottom latches were latched as the initial thought was the forward cargo door might be a problem. He could not recall status of two midspan latches.

2. 11 August, 1996. Mr. Ron Schleede emails me on 11 August 1996 to tell me, "I have examined the cargo door from twa 800--it is

locked and latched!"

3. 19 September, 1996. Mr. Al Dickinson emails me and states, "We have recovered many of the door/hatch/access panel/windows from the sea floor and none of them indicate that they came off the aircraft prior to the event which lead to the crash."

4. 1 November, 1996, Congressman Sam Farr, D-CA, writes to me and states, "In an effort to be of assistance to you, I have forwarded a copy of your communication to the Federal Aviation Administration and asked them to respond directly to you. Their officials have the resources and expertise to thoroughly investigate your claims about the inadvertent inflight opening of the forward lower lobe cargo door."

5. 18 November, 1996. Thomas E. McSweeney writes, (Douglas G. Kirkpatrick signs,) to Congressman Sam Farr, D-CA, reporting, "The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has no evidence that would lead us to suspect that the forward cargo door is implicated in this accident."

6. 26 November, 1996, Congressman Farr writes to me and states, "According to Mr. McSweeney, the FAA has looked into the possibility that door failures played a role in the accident, but have found no evidence to that effect."

7. 19 December 1996, Senator John McCain R-AR, Chairman, Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, writes to me and states, "Thank you again for contacting me with your concerns regarding the potential hazards involving Boeing 747s. As you know, I have passed the information you sent to Chris Paul and he has informed me of your findings. I have since forwarded the material

you sent to the Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee for their review."

8. 5 February 1997, LCDR Don Lawson of US Navy Aviation Accident School emails me and states, "From the head of the NTSB team working TWA 800:

1. He personally, even again this morning, looked at all the doors from the airplane. All latches were either destroyed or in closed positions. The destroyed latches were adjacent to ones in closed positions.
2. Nobody associated with the investigation is considering further a cargo/passenger door malfunction to be part of the probable cause of this accident. Door problems have been categorically ruled out because there is simply no evidence pointing to the doors (and latches)."

9. 10 Mar 97, Aviation Week and Space Technology, Page 35. "NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilot saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said."

10. 22 April, 1997. Mr. James Wildey II signs report No. 97-82 of Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit 15C, Section 41/42, Forward Cargo Door, dated 22 April 1997, with Mr. Al Dickinson, AS-10, listed as investigator. Report states, "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill."



11. May, 1997, TWA 800 reconstruction of fuselage wreckage is completed. Outward bulge of door frame, red paint smears above cargo door on white fuselage, missing/not hung aft midspan latch, outward peeled upper skin, rupture hole at aft midspan latch, and larger explosive decompression shape become apparent in photograph of reconstruction.

12. 19 May 1997, Mr. Ron Schleede emails me and states, "As I have told you before, the cargo door was locked and latched at impact."

13. 6 June, 1997. Senator McCain writes to me and states, "My staff reviewed the detailed information you provided concerning a faulty cargo door which could have caused the crash. They promptly contacted the appropriate agencies and were advised they had received similar correspondence from you

and were aware of and looking into your theory. Inasmuch as the investigation is not yet complete, I expect that the information you provided is being handled appropriately by the crash investigation team."

14. 11 June 1997. Congressman Sam Farr writes to me, "I have every confidence in the ability of the professional investigators who are looking into the cause of the accident. If one of the plane's doors was at fault, as you suspect might be the case, it is certain that evidence of this will be found. Further, since you have conveyed your ideas to the NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board), I have no doubt that NTSB staff will be in contact with you if the Board feels that this information would be useful to its investigation."

15. 24 October 1997. Chairman NTSB Jim Hall writes Congressman Farr and states, "'Please be assured that our team has examined all of the structure recovered from TWA flight 800, approximately 95%--including all of the cargo door mechanisms and structures. Early in the investigation we determined conclusively that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water, and there was no evidence of any failure of any of the latching mechanisms on the doors. This information has been forwarded to Mr. Smith by our investigators on previous occasions."

16. 29 October, 1997. Ronald T. Wojnar writes, (Darrell M. Pederson signs), "When the first bits of information became available that the nose section of TWA flight 800 had separated from the rest of the airplane, we were concerned that a possible in-flight opening of the forward cargo door may have caused the accident. However, when the wreckage of the nose section was recovered it became evident that the forward cargo door had not opened in flight or separated from the nose section prior to impact with the water."

"The FAA structural engineer who assisted the NTSB at the hangar at Calverton, New York, verified that the forward cargo door was recovered at the same location as the rest of the nose section. A further examination of the recovered wreckage showed that the upper door hinge was still attached to both the fuselage and the door. In addition, the door latches at the bottom of the door were still attached to the fuselage lower sill structure. This indicates that the door was in the "latched and locked" position at the time of impact with the water."

"The nose section of the airplane impacted the water on the right side, causing severe hydraulic damage with the result that the door structure did not remain completely intact. However, wreckage for the entire door was recovered at the same location as the nose section and had the same impact damage as the surrounding fuselage structure on the right side. This is additional verification that the forward cargo door had not opened in flight or separated from the airplane."

17. 20 November 1997. Mr. Peter Goelz of NTSB writes to Sandy Hentges of Congressman Farr's office and states, "As Congressman Farr was advised by letter dated October 24, 1997, early in the investigation we determined conclusively that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water, and there was no evidence of any failure of any of the latching mechanisms on the doors."

18. 10 December 1997. Congressman Sam Farr writes me and states, "You will also note that the NTSB continues to stand by their findings that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water."

19. 19 December 1997. Chairman Jim Hall of NTSB writes me and states, "However, to repeat, the investigation of the accident involving TWA flight 800 has revealed no evidence to suggest that a failure of a cargo door precipitated the event."

Gentlemen of government, I assume you respect facts, evidence, data...eight is not ten. Most is not 'all.' That forward door has ten latches. Eight have been examined. A close reading of the correspondence to me reveals that when latches are mentioned, only the bottom eight latch status of one door is reported. The other two latches, the midspan latches, are unexamined and unreported. To say door is all latched is wrong; it is misstatement, it is exaggeration, it is an error. You may consider it not a serious error, but it is an error nonetheless. It can be corrected. Closely examine the other two latches on that forward door.

To drive point home; to say that all the latches are latched based on examination of only eight of the ten is to make the wrong conclusion entire door was latched at water impact. If you lose two toes to frostbite you can not say truthfully say to your wife you have all your toes, you have most of your toes. If you have ten marbles and a bully comes by and takes two, you can not fib to your buddies you have all your marbles, you have most of your marbles. If your test has ten questions and you get eight right you can not truthfully report to your parents you got them all right, you got most of them right. If a door with ten latches has eight latched, you can not truthfully issue a report stating the door is all latched, it is mostly latched.

The forward cargo door and aft cargo door are identical in size and number of latching cams, locking sectors and latching pins. For each door there are ten latching cams and eight locking sectors. The mid-span latches have no locking sectors. An Airworthiness Directive to strengthen locking sectors would have no direct effect on the midspan latches because there are no locking sectors to strengthen. A latching system consists of a cam sector turned around a latching pin. The pins are in the door frame. All ten latches of the door have a cam sector and pin. Only the bottom eight latches of each door have an additional locking sector for each latch system for safety to prevent inadvertent unlatching.

The total for the two identical starboard cargo doors and frames of TWA 800 is twenty latching cams, twenty latching pins, and sixteen locking sectors. There exist twenty latching systems for two cargo doors and only eight have been examined, the bottom eight latch system on the forward cargo door. Eight latching systems examined of twenty in two identical doors which have both opened in flight in the past is not a high percentage. In fact, it changes from most latched to some latched.

Facts, evidence, data...The bulk cargo door as reported in Exhibit 7A, page 15, is an approximate square of eleven feet wide and ten feet high and is aft of wing on port side. Assuming TWA 800 had one port side bulk cargo door, as stated in exhibit 7A, and although larger, has the same amount of latches as the two starboard side cargo doors, the total number of cargo doors for TWA 800 is three.

The total number of latch pins for the three cargo doors and frames is thirty, total number of latch cams is thirty, total number of locking sectors is twenty four, total number of door sides is twelve, total number of feet of cargo door frame edge cut out of fuselage is one hundred eleven, and total manual locking handles is three.

Total number of cargo doors examined by FAA and NTSB of three available is three, 100%. Complete. None to go.

Total number of latch pins examined of thirty available is eight, 26.6%. Incomplete. Twenty two latches to go.

Total number of latch cams examined of thirty available is eight, 26.6%. Incomplete. Twenty two cams to go.

Total number of locking sectors examined of twenty four available is eight, 33%. Incomplete. Sixteen locking sectors to go.

Total number of sides of cargo door examined of twelve available is two, 16.6%. Incomplete. Ten sides to go.

Total number of feet of cargo door frame examined of one hundred eleven available is eighteen, 16.2%. Incomplete. Ninety three feet to go.

Total number of manual locking handles examined of three available is zero, 0%. Incomplete. Three manual locking handles to go.

To say all cargo doors conclusively determined as latched and locked, as Chairman Hall stated to Congressmen, is not true and needs to be true, and can be true. Just fully examine all three doors.

Or at least fully examine one previous faulty killer door, the forward cargo door, located just forward of the wing, where the first objects left TWA 800 as shown in Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 22B, Trajectory Study Supporting Material, page 30 in dark numbers. The first item to depart TWA 800 is "A489, fwd lower cargo bay struct, FS 900."

Every aft and forward cargo door is 110 inches wide and 99 inches high, or about nine by eight feet

square and each has four sides, one hinge, ten latch cams, eight locking sectors, thirty four feet of door frame cut out of fuselage, two over pressure relief doors, eight viewing ports, torque tubes, and one manual locking handle. Every cargo door frame in the fuselage has ten latching pins; eight on the bottom and two on the sides.

Total number of forward cargo doors examined of one available is one, 100%. Complete. None to go.  
Total number of latch pins examined of ten available is eight, 80%. Incomplete. Two latch pins to go.  
Total number of latch cams examined of ten available is eight, 80%. Incomplete. Two latch cams to go  
Total number of locking sectors examined of eight available is eight, 100%. Complete. None to go.  
Total number of sides of forward cargo door examined of four available is two, 50%. Incomplete. Two sides to go.  
Total number of feet of forward cargo door frame examined of thirty two feet available is eighteen, 52.9%. Incomplete. Sixteen feet of frame to go.  
Total number of manual locking handles examined of one available is zero. 0%. Incomplete. One manual locking handle to go.

To say that forward cargo door was conclusively determined to be latched and locked, as said by Mr. Breneman, Mr. Schleede, Mr. Dickinson, and Chairman Hall is not true, and needs to be, and can be. Just examine fully the forward cargo door. For example, the TWA 800 cargo door hinge can be examined for overtravel impression damage similar to that observed on UAL 811 in AAR 92/02 on page 35. That will confirm door opened in flight or rule against it.



I suspect it is wrong to tell people they are wrong. I can't help it. To say eight equals ten is wrong. To say conclusively when only 50% is examined is wrong. Wrong, wrong, wrong. The top and bottom of the forward cargo door were examined but the sides were overlooked. It's an oversight. It was a hasty, time driven, wishful thinking error. It's not right. It can be corrected.

As a citizen I trust I am permitted to be impertinent once in a while.

Facts, evidence, data ...

A fact is a forward cargo door has burst open in flight before on a high time Boeing 747 during climb leaving a sudden loud sound on the CVR as the air molecules rushed outside to equalize the internal high pressure with the external low pressure followed by an abrupt power cut to FDR. The evidence is the mangled CVR and FDR of TWA 800. The data is the sudden loud sound on CVR tape and abrupt power cut to the FDR of TWA 800.

It is apparent that the conclusion of fully latched forward cargo door was made early on in the investigation based upon only examining eight of ten latch systems. That erroneous conclusion has held firm although new data has arrived with the TWA 800 wreckage reconstruction completed in May.



The reconstruction shows new evidence, that's one reason why it was built. The new evidence is the red paint smears above the door on the usually white paint between windows; outward bulged door frame at aft midspan latch; outward peeled skin at many places on nose, door hinge, the missing manual locking handle, the missing two overpressure relief doors, missing red trim paint, and the missing/not hung midspan latches of the forward cargo door which are supposed to be there if latched and are not.

You can see it with your own eyes. The red paint smears are found only between seven passenger windows, all above the cargo door area. This indicates red paint transfer from a red object, most likely the red

painted top of door below. An outward force would cause red door to open outward and rotate on hinge and slam into upper white fuselage. It happened that way on UAL 811, in principle and documented on page 41 of AAR 92/02. Parts of the TWA 800 red paint trim on top of the white base coat above cargo door is missing and may be source of the red paint smears. Outside force from water impact would not give red paint smears.

You can see the missing aft midspan latch location with your own eyes. The door frame in which the aft midspan latch pin is embedded is smooth with no latch cam attached. The frame is smooth and indicates unlatched latch.

The door frame at the aft midspan latch is bulged outward from within. You can see it with your own eyes. Other bulged outward skin in the area shows a round rupture hole at aft midspan latch.

The skin is peeled outward above the windows above the cargo door. You can feel it with your own fingers. Mr. Streeter and Mr. Wildey contributed the knowledge there were hoop stresses in the area, stresses the closed forward cargo door is supposed to prevent.

The cockpit voice recorder data plays a sudden loud sound at event time. You can hear it with your own ears. It is sudden, loud, an audible sound, and it lasts a short time. NTSB has grouped AI 182, TWA 800, PA 103, and UAL 811 sounds together in Chart 12 of Exhibit 12-B. They match except in duration and that variable was determined by abrupt power cut, not the source of the sound which is probably rapidly rushing air molecules seeking to equalize high pressure inside to low pressure outside.



The Exhibits in the Public Docket reveal evidence. You can read it with your own eyes. For instance, Exhibit 7A, page 34, has red paint smears and an engine stator blade in the right horizontal stabilizer. Red painted top of door with red hinge and red trim on fuselage skin departed and blew back into object directly behind it, the right horizontal stabilizer. The engine, probably number three, came partially apart when it ingested foreign objects and spit stator blade out into slipstream into object directly behind it, the right horizontal stabilizer.

The cargo door, aft or forward, is a known killer of wide body airliners such as DC-10. The forward cargo door has caused a fatal accident in a high time Boeing 747, UAL 811. To rule out previously inadvertently opened in flight aft and forward Boeing 747 cargo door involvement in TWA 800 based on examination of only eight of twenty latching systems of the two cargo doors is not right. To rule out forward cargo door, a known killer of nine in a 747, who was at scene of recent crime and left early, based upon alibi of all latched when only eight examined is not right. The forward cargo door was not all latched; it was mostly latched. A mostly latched large door can rupture. The cargo door alibi has holes in it, a big hole, a four foot round hole at the aft midspan latch, as seen in NTSB reconstruction photograph.

Mr. Breneman and Mr. Schleede, under great time pressure, working in poor conditions, surrounded by hundreds of pieces of twisted metal, under supervision of police forces not familiar with aircraft accidents, trying to please seniors and media with simple answers to complex problems, quickly examined eight bottom latches of the forward door and deduced the entire door was latched and reported it as such. The door all latched conclusion was later raised to all cargo doors latched without examination of other doors to support conclusion. The early conclusion was not reviewed in light of completion of the reconstruction and old report was not modified. Officials in senior positions have maintained that early stance of all doors all latched through good discipline and loyalty but it is not supported by facts, evidence or data. It is supported by wishful thinking.

Chairman Hall has written a yet to be substantiated statement to Congressman Farr. Mr. Hall states,

"Early in the investigation we determined conclusively that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water, and there was no evidence of any failure of any of the latching mechanisms on the doors." Mr. Hall wisely refers to all cargo doors, not only forward cargo door but the aft and port side bulk cargo door as well. He wants a comprehensive report.



There is evidence of failure of one of the latching mechanisms, the aft midspan latch which is not latched to its pin and should be, as seen on NTSB reconstruction photograph. The forward midspan latch is not hung also and should be. There are no reports stating the status of the aft or bulk cargo door latches. It is not conclusively determined all doors were all latched. Only eight latches of one door of thirty latching mechanisms of three doors were examined. Mr. Hall's statement is not yet true, but can be.

A good idea is to do what the Chairman Hall obviously wants done, conclusively determine all cargo doors latched and locked at water impact and find no evidence of any failure of any latching mechanism.

Conclusion means the logical consequence of a reasoning process. A proper reasoning process requires as much data as available. There is much more data now available since the reconstruction was completed upon which to reach a logical conclusion. That reconstruction data has not yet been considered; the reasoning process is flawed, the current conclusion is in error.

For one door, ten is total, ten is conclusive; eight is not total, eight is not conclusive. For all doors, as Chairman Hall refers to, thirty latches is total; eight is some. Eight is not conclusive.

To say no evidence found of any failure of a latch mechanism requires the mechanisms be examined. If they are missing or not examined, as twenty two latch mechanisms are, then the statement is not valid. It can be valid. Examine all the latching mechanisms Chairman Hall states have not failed.

Mr. Dickinson refers to "door/hatch/access panel/windows" but does not mention latching mechanisms at all.

Mr. Wildey repeats the eight bottom latched observation from Mr. Schleede and Mr. Breneman in final report used for Exhibit 15C, the latest official statement.

LCDR Lawson quotes the lead investigator as saying, "All latches were either destroyed or in closed positions. The destroyed latches were adjacent to ones in closed positions." No numbers are given. Destroyed latches may be missing latches and are latches not examined. The bottom eight were reported as latched, that indicates the two midspan latches are destroyed; either way they were not examined and the word 'all' is not correct. Are the midspan latches destroyed, or missing, or recovered but not hung? Just what exactly is the status of the missing/destroyed/recovered midspan latches?

The only basis for the conclusion that the forward cargo door was all latched and intact at water impact as stated by Congressman Farr, Senator McCain, high FAA officials and NTSB Chairman Hall, is one report made 'early on' by an FAA structural engineer at Calverton, under stress, without benefit of wreckage reconstruction and who examined a few door pieces of many, and only eight of ten latches. That one person's best conclusion at the time has not been modified all these months even though new evidence has been observed in completed wreckage reconstruction such as red paint smears, bulging rupture hole, explosive decompression damage visible, absent aft midspan latch, smooth door frame and unattached aft midspan latch.

NTSB AAR 90/01, the original AAR about UAL 811, had the incorrect cause for the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight as improper latching. Upon later new evidence, the retrieval of the door from the ocean floor, the cause was changed to properly latched but electrical short and new AAR was issued, NTSB AAR 92/02. This shows that the NTSB responds to reason and logic supported by facts, evidence and data. It shows NTSB will modify itself when appropriate. It shows that the

highest priority of NTSB is to find out conclusively what happened, regardless.

Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit 15C, Section 41/42, Forward Cargo Door, dated 22 April 1997, with Mr. Al Dickinson, AS-10, listed as investigator and Mr. Wildey as author, states, "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill." That's it. One door gets one sentence. This is an incomplete report based upon the new evidence of the completed reconstruction, and an addendum should be added based upon total, not most of, examination of the forward cargo door latches. A comprehensive report would include all three cargo doors, all twelve sides, and all thirty latch systems, as suggested by Chairman Hall.

The aft cargo door, identical in shape, function, and design, is reported in Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit 7A, Structures Group Report, page 15, 2.3, Aft Fuselage, (Section 46), "The upper fuselage structure broke into relatively large sections and the lower fuselage structure, including the aft main and bulk cargo doors, fragmented into smaller pieces." That's it, that's the total examination of the aft cargo door and bulk cargo door. There is no report of any latch status. Two doors get one sentence.

Three cargo doors get two sentences. These are known killers, gentleman. A main side cargo door opened and caused the crash of a DC-9. An aft cargo door opened and caused the crash of a DC-10. The forward cargo door opened and caused the fatal accident of a Boeing 747.

Each cargo door is a very complex mechanism. Each door includes a hinge, bottom eight latch cams, bottom eight locking sectors, two midspan latches, manual locking handle, two overpressure relief doors, two pull in hooks, eight viewing ports, and various torque tubes. Every item is affected when door rupture/opens in flight. Every item needs thorough examination to determine conclusively if doors were all latched at water impact with no evidence of latching failures.

Chairman Hall's recent letter repeats position of no evidence found for cargo door as causing initial event but omits statement that all cargo doors examined totally and all latches latched. And there is lots and lots of NTSB provided evidence that the cargo door was the initiating event. What is missing is the NTSB interpretation of the evidence they recovered. For instance, Exhibit 7A, Structures Group Report, page 34, examination of right horizontal stabilizer revealed: "A section of the structure outboard of H7 exhibited evidence of red paint transfer marks on the upper skin (H8); ..."



Picture above is Boeing photograph of -400 series of basic 747-100 design. The livery of Boeing demo is different than TWA 800. It's still the most beautiful airplane in the world.

The red paint has to come from somewhere. And somewhere some red paint has to be missing. There is a rare location on the wreckage reconstruction that fits that description. It's the spotted red trim area

above the cargo door. The cargo door explanation/interpretation has door rupturing/opening inflight, blowing out, up, and away, smashing into white painted fuselage skin above, transferring red paint to white, and removing red paint from trim at impact, then red trim pieces and top of door which is red blows directly aft in the 300 knot slipstream and impacts the object directly behind, the right horizontal stabilizer, leaving "...evidence of red paint transfer marks on the upper skin (H8)..."

There is no red paint skin down low under the wing where the center tank resides. There is a lot of red paint on the forward cargo door and trim above and some of it is missing.



Photo above shows principle of colored object at cargo door location flying aft at 300 knots would strike right horizontal stabilizer. TWA had different paint scheme than above.

The evidence is there, gentlemen; the interpretation is missing. And the one that exists officially is not exactly correct. Eight is not ten and red is not white. There is a more exact interpretation of the evidence. Forty two seconds earlier than center tank explosion and five thousand feet higher. Nose comes off. Still no fireball explosion. Before nose comes off a large hole had appeared on starboard side, forward of the wing. The large hole started from a small hole, located at the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door. The aft midspan latch ruptured at the aft midspan latch because...because...I don't know the confirmed answer to that and need help. I have a good dozen possibilities why the fuselage rupture point of TWA 800 is located at aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door. Why, why, why?

TWA 800 is UAL 811 with bottom latches holding and the nose coming off. The evidence is there on the CVR, the FDR, the wreckage reconstruction, the Exhibits of Sound Spectrum Study, Structures Report, Trajectory Study and many more. The expensive evidence collecting devices such as CVR and FDR, the expensive accident recreation device of the reconstruction, and the expensive analysis of experts into Exhibits are very, very important. They were done for very good reasons. They have provided the facts, evidence, and data. They did their job. What is missing and now needed is interpretation. Cargo door explanation is an interpretation that fits as initial event, then center tank explodes seconds later and lower. Interpretation of center tank explodes first; then forward cargo door area shatters on water impact later does not fit the facts, evidence and data.

Come on now, gentleman, to confirm if a door was open or closed, you at least need to check the door locking handle, and you have not done that. The prime suspect, before bomb or missile or center tank or meteor, in a fuselage rupture accident forward of the wing on a high time Boeing 747 during climb after take off is the forward cargo door. They all could have done it, but which actually did it? Only one has done it before so I say the prime suspect is the one worthy of intense investigation.

There is one interpretation by NTSB of the evidence which supports the cargo door explanation: Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Study, Author: Mr. James F. Wildey II, page 20, "The initial opening of the fuselage lower lobe (e.g. LF6A) would have the expected result of rapid depressurization accompanied by collapse of the main deck floor for some distance forward of STA 1000. The red area recovery of interior components as far forward as STA 600 would not be inconsistent with this floor collapse and associated structural breakup." That is to say, initial fuselage opening gives explanation for observed evidence. Forward cargo door is within the STA 1000 to STA 600 zone.

Each step up the line the early, hasty conclusion of all doors all latched has been affirmed: Mr. Breneman sees eight bottom latches of one door latched. That leads to assumption all ten latched. Mr. Wojnar and Mr. Pederson confirm bottom latches latched so all latched and locked. That leads to assumption all three doors latched, locked and intact at water impact. Mr. Schleede says all latched and locked. Mr. Dickinson avoids direct statement about latches but refers to hatches.

LCDR Lawson quotes Mr. Dickinson saying all latches latched or destroyed.

Mr. Wildey repeats eight bottom latches latched so door all latched and intact at water impact based upon Mr. Dickinson's report.

Mr. McSweeney says no evidence of latching failure.

Mr. Goelz reports all latches on all cargo doors latched and locked to Congressman.

Chairman Hall says all cargo doors all latched and locked and no evidence of any latching failure to Congressman Farr and Senator McCain.

Mr. Farr and Senator McCain write to me all three cargo door latches latched and locked at water impact.

Chairman Hall writes to me and repeats no evidence for initial event as cargo door failure.

Here are the errors of deduction early on and not corrected, "A further examination of the recovered wreckage showed that the upper door hinge was still attached to both the fuselage and the door. In addition, the door latches at the bottom of the door were still attached to the fuselage lower sill structure. This indicates that the door was in the "latched and locked" position at the time of impact with the water."

"The nose section of the airplane impacted the water on the right side, causing severe hydraulic damage with the result that the door structure did not remain completely intact. However, wreckage for the entire door was recovered at the same location as the nose section and had the same impact damage as the surrounding fuselage structure on the right side. This is additional verification that the forward cargo door had not opened in flight or separated from the airplane."

Absolutely not true. Absolutely not good science. Absolutely not American.

As Americans, we build them, we fly them, we break them, we fix them, and then we fly them again. To fix a broken airplane requires precision.

Here is rebuttal to erroneous conclusion of all latched and shattered skin caused by water impact only:

1. Because upper door hinge was attached to door and fuselage skin is no proof door was attached to nose. In fact, the wayward UAL 811 door stayed attached to hinge also. The entire top piece of door of TWA 800 and the attached hinge, and the attached fuselage skin tore away, as the reconstruction photo shows.



2. The eight door latches on bottom sill were latched. Fine. There at ten latches holding that door closed. Eight is not ten. Ten is conclusive; eight is maybe. Eight of ten latched does not indicate, "that the door was in the "latched and locked" position at the time of impact with the water."

3. The nose may have landed on the right side; however, the outward peeled skin in many places, not inward, and the red paint smears, indicate force from within, not outside, caused peeling evidence. The outward force is sharply outlined on reconstruction photo; a water impact landing and damage would give gradual damage from severe to less severe to mild, not an abrupt cut as shown by photo. Nearby passenger door is intact; cargo door is shattered. Water impact damage did not cause the shattered skin found only in the cargo door area, explosive decompression did.

explosive decompression did.

4. Wreckage for the entire door was not recovered so could not be examined and said to be recovered at same location. The door was shattered into many large, small and tiny pieces as shown by the reconstruction. To say entire door was examined is wrong; it's in hundreds of pieces, there is no door, only pieces. Only 20% of door material is visible. The larger door pieces were reported to be recovered on several different days of dredging and reported by recovery officials to be found closest to Kennedy airport, a finding later corroborated by trajectory study Exhibits 22 A and B showing pieces of the car-

go hold, which the door belongs to, as the first to leave TWA 800 at initial event time.

5. Door wreckage does not exhibit the same impact damage as the surrounding fuselage on the right side, as shown by the picture. The surrounding fuselage around the shattered cargo door area is smooth and intact.

The entire rupture/blowout/explosive decompression damage can be seen on NTSB photo of starboard side forward of the wing. The small initial rupture hole can be seen at unlatched missing midspan latch position on the curved outward door frame and petal shaped outward skin. The door then opened outward and upward tearing off with hinge and piece of fuselage skin attached, striking the white painted fuselage above and transferring red paint from trim and door to paint between the passenger windows.

The total explosive decompression damage can be seen as approximate square with sharp delineation at vertical sides further out from cargo door sides to top as horizontal line just below top row of passenger windows. The flat bottom of blowout is the bottom sill of cargo door. The picture shows a small rupture round hole within a large blowout square. Reinforced stringers and bulkheads defined the square shape.

The explosive decompression zone of damage is clear to see and resulted in severe, shattered, twisted skin and destroyed stringers, and downward movement of floor beams. It is a blowout frozen in metal. It is not water impact damage. Most of door is missing, including the crucial midspan latches where the blowout occurred.

The explosive decompression consequence is a huge hole on the right side of the nose of TWA 800, much larger than the huge hole on the side of the nose of UAL 811. It is easy to see the 300 knots of slipstream tearing that weakened and damaged nose off in three to five seconds.

Gentleman, we agree on so much about TWA 800.

1. Suspicion of forward cargo door opening in flight.
2. The cargo door area is shattered.
3. Bottom latches latched.
4. Two midspan latch status not reported.
5. Hinge attached to top of door.
6. Outward peeled skin.
7. Vertical cuts in fuselage skin.
8. Red paint smears between passenger windows and on right horizontal stabilizer.
9. Floor beams in area bent downward.
10. First pieces to leave were just forward of the wing.
11. Port side forward of wing relatively smooth.
12. Center tank had fire/explosion.

Do we agree eight is not ten? Do we agree red paint is not white paint? If we do, then a comprehensive examination of all three cargo doors is warranted. If a suspicion exists, and it does, that forward cargo door failed in flight, then only an exhaustive evaluation of that possibility will satisfy.

We all agree that center tank exploded and cargo door area is shattered. Current official position is center tank exploded from unknown source, nose came off and fell into water shattering cargo door. My explanation is cargo door shattered from rupture leading to explosive decompression, nose comes off leading to disintegrating fuselage and wing tanks and engine number three ignites vapor into fireball seconds later and thousands of feet lower.

We agree on evidence, just disagree on timing and that is only seconds. Tank then door; or door then tank?

You were right at the beginning to suspect the door. You were right. Don't give up so easily. Check out that door thoroughly.

Why? Eight is not 'all.' It has to get past nine before it can get to ten and be called 'all.' The official last

word to date, released 8 December 1997, is Exhibit 15C, Forward Cargo Door which states, "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill."

The number eight is written above, not ten. Ten is 'all.' Eight is most. The forward door was mostly latched. Mostly latched large doors can rupture when subjected to high internal pressures and have in the past.

The forward door was mostly latched, and as it turns out, that's not good enough. That aft midspan latch area appears to have ruptured in flight for TWA 800 and the evidence is there for you to see in the reconstruction and it is there to see in NTSB AAR 92/02, UAL 811 report. AAR 92/02 has a good examination of the forward cargo door and its adjacent fuselage after the door ruptured/opened in flight, killing nine. The rupture hole at the aft midspan latch on the door of UAL 811 can be seen in the photograph on page 36 of AAR 92/02. That UAL 811 rupture hole is smaller than TWA 800 rupture hole because the eight bottom latches held while they all unlatched completely on UAL 811. UAL 811 had all latches unlatch in flight. That's 'all,' as in ten.

Another Boeing 747 forward cargo door rupture description can be read about, Air India 182, that also broke apart in flight. The Indian and Canadian Occurrence report states the forward cargo door being frayed from an outward force and broken horizontally one quarter of the way up and bottom of door attached to fuselage. That is similar to TWA 800. Air India 182 and UAL 811 can be discussed together as relevant because NTSB grouped them together, along with PA 103, in Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 12-B, Sound Spectrum Study, page 21, Chart 12. All four accidents are similar in all having a sudden loud sound on CVR at event time, a sound that was matched from TWA 800 to AI 182 in NTSB Chart 12. The Canadian report on page 23 links that AI 182 sudden loud sound to the DC-10 cargo door decompression sudden loud sound. The reports link TWA 800 to PA 103 sound which is linked to AI 182 sound which is linked to DC-10 cargo door event sound. Chart 12 links all sounds to UAL 811.

Air India 182 is the matching Boeing 747 door rupture event to TWA 800. UAL 811 is the matching door open event to PA 103. Both pairs have similar forward cargo door area wreckage descriptions, drawings and photograph matches. Why doors opened is not yet officially determined for two of them.

Center tank explanation is being tested for one Boeing 747 accident. Irregularities can be excused as random. Cargo door explanation has four high time Boeing 747 accidents to explain. Every evidence item or sequence for a ruptured forward cargo door has to satisfy four accidents, and does.

The recently adjourned but not concluded TWA fact finding public hearing and release of public docket was good and can get better by the further release into the docket of three already completed exhibits: eyewitness, wreckage plot, and powerplant breakdown.

There is interesting observation, already briefly referred to, in an exhibit: Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge."



Engine number three is on the right side inboard and would be the engine to throw off a stator blade to penetrate the right horizontal stabilizer. Engine number four is too far outboard of stabilizer. The left side stabilizer had no such engine part penetration.

A stator blade was embedded in the right horizontal stabilizer right behind engine number three. This indicates engine number three was fodded early on and threw off pieces which is consistent

with cargo door explanation and inconsistent with center tank explosion as initial event in which engines windmill and fall intact to water.

The four engines hold vital accident clues. To ignore and omit that information is wrong. They are four vacuum cleaners at the scene of the crime. The door rupture or center tank explosion would send debris into the engines. How much debris, what kind it is, what did the engines do, and what happened to them is vitally important. Blade tip rubs and inlet cowling damage reports are extremely relevant. Pratt and Whitney was not even a party to the investigation and no exhibit item was released of the engine breakdown.

NTSB AAR 92/02, page 2, has engine number three foddred by baggage debris and throwing off fod into engine number four which caught fire. Both engines had to be shut down. Early news reports had TWA 800 engine number three foddred with inlet cowl material and the only engine to show burn damage. UAL 811 also had dents in right horizontal stabilizer and torn, punctured, and dented inlet cowl material according to AAR 92/02, page 7.

The engine breakdown report is vital and is connected to the TWA 800 investigation by the stator blade in right horizontal stabilizer. The engines are involved; they are not innocent bystanders. Engine number three may be the center tank mysterious ignition source. P&W should be invited to the party.

Gentlemen, another clue to an accident cause is the sequence of breakup and that is determined from wreckage plot. What departs the aircraft first may well be near the initial event. The NTSB has provided a study: Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 22B, Trajectory Study Supporting Material, page 45 in faded numbers and page 30 in dark numbers. Among all the charts of pieces of the plane coming off and when, there is one chart that shows the first to go, that is page 30 chart, Forward Cargo Structure trajectories. The first item is "A489, fwd lower cargo bay struct, FS 900." That item left even before the last ASR radar beacon to Islip radar. The next item to go before anything else in the entire plane is "A470, R fwd lower cargo bay struct, FS 820." There are five other forward cargo bay structures which are plotted and leave soon thereafter.

The overall debris appraisal was made by Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 22A, Trajectory Study, page 3: "The wreckage distribution shows that parts were initially shed from the area just forward of the wing."

Please carefully agree, gentleman, cargo door is just forward of the wing and the center tank is not.

The wreckage plot exhibit is needed to corroborate this most important conclusion of first parts shed forward of wing.

Eyewitnesses saw orange-red streak near TWA and later Aviation Week reports an NTSB official as saying it could be forward door departing aircraft. "NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilot saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, ... or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said." It may well be the shiny metal piece of door spinning away from sunlit TWA 800 and reflecting red-orange evening sunlight to ground observers who perceive the erratic, falling blur as a streak. NTSB has considered streak as door piece spinning away. They are probably correct. That NTSB hypothesis can be checked out by experiment of throwing out metal door sized objects at 13700 feet at 300 knots in evening sunlight and recording ground observers statements.

The eyewitness group exhibit should be released to corroborate or rebut cargo door explanation of streak as shiny metal piece of door spinning away reflecting evening sunlight and appearing as orange-red streak to ground observers.

The wreckage plot exhibit should be released to corroborate or rebut cargo door area material as first to leave TWA 800 at initial event time.

The powerplant group exhibit should be released to corroborate or rebut cargo hold debris being ingested by engine number three causing it to catch on fire, provide ignition source for center tank explosion, and then disintegrate and throw stator blade into right horizontal stabilizer of TWA 800.

Please conduct an examination of the two identical starboard cargo doors of TWA 800 and the bulk cargo door in at least the same depth as was given to the two cargo doors of other high time Boeing 747s grouped by NTSB as being similar, AI 182, PA 103, and UAL 811, as shown in their government reports, Canadian and Indian Aviation Occurrence, UK AAIB 2/90, and NTSB AAR 92/02. (All scanned in and available for viewing at [www.corazon.com](http://www.corazon.com)) And at least as much examination as the landing gear doors of TWA 800 in Exhibit 7A which had twenty two paragraphs more than the one sentence about forward cargo door in Exhibit 15C.

Exhibit 7A, Structure Report, discusses twenty one landing gear doors and the aft and bulk cargo doors but nothing about the forward cargo door. The forward cargo door, a known previously faulty complex device in a fuselage rupture killer accident, is detected departing early and near the scene of another fuselage rupture accident, and is given one sentence among literally thousands of pages of wreckage examination exhibits.

Not right. Not complete. Not precise. Not American.

According to NTSB and FAA AARs and SDRs, the aft and forward cargo doors of Boeing 747s have opened inadvertently four times, 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1994. That's four in nine years by official numbers or one cargo door opening in just over two years. Cargo door explanation for TWA 800 adds three more, 1985, 1988, and 1996. That's seven in eleven years by my numbers or a cargo door opening every year and a half. It is now a year and a half after TWA 800. That gives me a sense of urgency. I have researched the forward cargo door on high time Boeing 747s for eight years. TWA 800 was no surprise to me.

The message is that inadvertent rupture/opening at the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door in flight has caused the accident of TWA 800 and other high time Boeing 747s. The message is supported by official government released text, reports, documents, exhibits and photographs.

The medium is internet email and web, hard copy snail mail, face to face, telephone, the English language, high resolution color photographs, printed words, and stories.

The messenger is me. Why listen to me? Others have explanations. The only difference is I'm a survivor of a sudden night fiery jet airplane crash talking about a sudden night fiery jet airplane crash. My crash is documented on web site [www.corazon.com](http://www.corazon.com), US Navy carrier jet crashed, one dead, one alive. I'm the live one. C.T. Butler was the dead one. Mr. Butler saved my life. Literally, as in exact. It was a sudden night fiery fatal jet airplane crash. We were practicing landings and heard a strange noise on starboard side. Within three seconds he told me to eject and I did. He did too. I pulled my face curtain and waited, my canopy jettisoned, my ejection seat fired and then separated from me and my parachute deployed and opened automatically and two seconds later, I hit the nighttime flat dirt of Sanford Florida at 1130 at night on June 14th, 1967. My pilot, LCDR Charles T. Butler, pulled his face curtain, had his canopy separate after my canopy had gone, his ejection seat fired, separate from him and his parachute automatically deployed. But did not open in time as his body hit the ground and killed him from multiple traumatic injuries. In the two seconds coming down in my parachute, the RA-5C Vigilante with twin GE J-79-8 engines, Navy carrier reconnaissance two seater jet, exploded beneath us.

The suddenness of it is stunning. From perfectly normal to ejection seat firing within three seconds. From normal to death within ten seconds. That suddenness is what the passengers of TWA 800 knew and what the CVR and FDR recorded.

So, the messenger has the experience in the matter under discussion, a sudden, night, fiery fatal jet airplane crash. Few have that specific.

The messenger has the aviation knowledge of modeler, then Navy aircrewman technician for 2000 hours, then Navy bombardier reconnaissance navigator in carrier jet for 650 hours, then private aircraft Mooney owner for 1000 hours, and commercial licensed pilot, instrument rated with FAA Part 135 certificate holder for 100 hours. Few have that breadth.



I also have the brilliant insight of intelligence to figure this problem out. In a flash I saw that eight is not ten. Red is not white. Most have that genius.

Chairman Hall has said in his closing statement of the recent TWA 800 public inquiry, "We have presented all of the factual information available at this time." Well that's not exactly true as the exhibits on eyewitnesses, powerplants, and wreckage plot were available but not released or presented. The Chairman's statement can be made true by release of all the factual information available.

He also said, "We have sought to take a careful, objective look at all conceivable ideas and theories, and have called on a wide array of experts to assist us in this endeavor." Well, that's not exactly true either. A careful look has not been taken at the rupture at cargo door theory and only one engineer looked at a few pieces. The Chairman's statement can be made true by having a wide

array of experts carefully look at cargo door explanation.

Chairman Hall continued by stating, "We are by no means finished. Our work will continue and we will spare no effort to determine the cause of the crash of TWA 800." Chairman Hall says the right words, let them be made true.

We are judged by our actions, not our words. Please examine all twenty latching pins, all twenty latching cams, and all sixteen locking sectors of the two identical cargo doors for comparison and damage consistent with inflight unlatching as described in NTSB AAR 92/02. In addition, for completeness, the other cargo doors on TWA 800 should receive the same thorough examination. Only then can Chairman Hall's statement to high elected government officials about conclusive determination that all three cargo doors are latched and locked and no evidence found of any latching failure be correct or corrected. Only then can the statements of Mr. Goelz, Mr. Schleede, Mr. Dickinson, LCDR Lawson, Mr. Wildey, Mr. Breneman, Mr. Wojnar, Mr. Pederson, Mr. Kirkpatrick, Mr. Sweeney, Senator McCain, and Congressman Farr be correct or corrected.

Only then will the numbers add up.

What if I'm wrong?

If I am wrong, I want to know about it. I ask questions to determine if cargo door explanation holds up.

Why are the red paint smears there?

What is status of midspan latches of forward door?

What is status of all latches.?

Why is forward skin shattered and then close by smooth and intact?

What is hinge status?

Are locking handles locked or unlocked?

What is position of the overpressure relief doors?

Why is large rupture square shape apparent?

Why is forward door frame aft so smooth with no midspan latch attached?

Why is red paint missing on red trim?

Why is red paint on right horizontal stabilizer?

Why is engine stator blade in right horizontal stabilizer?

Why is fuselage skin peeled outward?

Why most of door material missing?

Why port side smooth and starboard side shattered?

Why did cargo door structure leave plane first?

What caused the sudden loud sound?

What ignited the center tank?

Why so few forward passengers burned? (I know the answer to that one, they were not there to be burned.)

Why are statements made by high officials that are not exactly true, but could be with a little extra work?

I would hope someone here would ask the question, "What if he is right?"

In Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Report, page 30, Mr. Wildey of NTSB writes: "It is therefore possible that new scenarios (sequences) may emerge as new information is acquired whether it be from newly identified parts, or simply a new interpretation of current information."

That is an open minded approach both reasonable and logical. It is possible and it has happened. New evidence, new interpretation, new scenario/sequence has emerged: aft midspan latch rupture in forward cargo door.

If cargo door explanation is wrong the downside is work done on examining three cargo doors which was not necessary to determine accident cause. But, if cargo door explanation is right, then...

There are no evil people involved with TWA 800; everyone is giving their best effort. It appears there is a blind spot regarding cargo doors on Boeing 747s. It may be legacy from UAL 811 where everybody looked bad. NTSB excoriated Boeing for not modifying door after DC-10 cargo door accident. It lambasted the airline for not complying with AD in time. It chided FAA for giving such a long compliance time for AD. And then NTSB got cause of opening door wrong and had to correct itself with new AAR, 92/02. But, the cause was eventually determined: Electrical short to door motor which overrode safety feature of locking sectors coupled with a bad switch S2, caused unlatching of door which burst open, in a "tremendous explosion" smashing outward and up into the fuselage above, leaving paint smears and a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut to the FDR. As a result of NTSB recommendations and FAA ADs, the bottom latches were fixed so that they would not open again with the same problem, and they didn't. TWA 800 bottom latches held, the strengthened locking sectors worked.

But, the midspan latches have no locking sectors and a rupture hole is evident at that aft midspan latch point and the aft midspan latch is missing. The cause was conclusively determined for UAL 811 but not conclusively fixed. Now is that time.

In the short term cargo door confirmation looks bad but in long term it is best for Boeing and the US. Everybody, even me as a passenger demanding cheap fares and lots of luggage loaded fast, has to share blame for these accidents. We all have blood on our teeth. Boeing for designing large, squarish, outward opening, non-plug, doors cut into a highly pressurized hull. The airlines for wanting to operate the planes when out of warranty and wanting large cargo loading capability. Government for trying to please all parties and ending up pleasing none. And the lawyers for putting blame assessment first before the accident cause was conclusively found thereby bringing in the police, nondisclosure and secrecy in an area where information and idea exchanges are essential, aircraft accident investigation.

The police have been intimately involved in all four cargo door caused accidents and have adversely affected the professional aircraft investigators. AI 182, RCMP still have an active investigation going. PA 103, United Nations still has inquiry going. UAL 811, the Coast Guard and Hickam Air Force Police had an active investigation going until further investigation revealed door was gone but not by bomb. TWA 800, FBI had sixteen months of primary active investigation and even when suspended the FBI controls release of relevant documents into the Public Docket and access to the evidence, the wreckage reconstruction.

Now is the time for openness for TWA 800; let a citizen have a chance to explain what happened. Everyone else has had a whack at it, from lawyers to cops to scientists to politicians to wackos. It's time for a survivor of a sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash to be listened to.

Please engage my intellect. Check my numbers, confirm my sources, evaluate my reasoning. My goal is to prevent death, the only worthy adversary, by preventing plane crashes by preventing pressurized fuselage ruptures by preventing aft midspan latch area of forward cargo door of high time Boeing 747s from opening in flight. I am attempting to persuade the National Transportation Safety Board that a worthy line of investigation is the possible inadvertent rupture/opening of the forward cargo door in flight. If confirmed, NTSB will make recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration. The FAA will then direct the manufacturer to fix the doors again. Boeing shall then makes changes to conclusively stop those doors from opening in flight.

Let Senator John McCain hold all the latches in his hand for examination. He is a jet pilot who has also ejected and understands mental and metal stresses as well as dangers of high speed structural failure and the suddenness of aviation accidents.

Let Congressman Sam Farr examine all the latches. He asked the key question, "What causes the doors to open?"

Let Chairman Jim Hall examine all the latches. He effectively made the definitive statement, 'all doors, all latched, no problems.'

Let everyone who has officially reported status of latches on cargo doors hold all of them in their hands and examine them closely.

There are mechanical problems associated with confirmation of cargo door opening on TWA 800. They can be fixed with workers, that's why the manufacturer makes the big bucks, that's his job, to fix things.

There are political problems associated with confirmation of cargo door opening on PA 103. They can be fixed with negotiation, that's why the politicians get the high respect, that's their job, to smooth things over.

There are administrative problems with confirmation of cargo door opening on high time Boeing 747s. They can be fixed in time, that's why government bureaucrats get steady tenure, that's their job, to handle the paperwork.

There are investigative questions raised in the confirmation of cargo door openings in airliner pressurized hulls. They can be answered. That's why aircraft investigators get their hands dirty, it's hard work to figure out what happened.

Chairman Hall stated, "I now declare this hearing to be in recess indefinitely."

I request that the recess soon end and the hearing reconvene. The sequel should release all the information available, take a careful, objective look at all conceivable ideas and theories, call on a wide array of experts to assist, and take every effort to determine the cause of the crash of TWA 800.

Very Respectfully,

John Barry Smith  
barry@corazon.com  
408 659 3552  
551 Country Club Drive  
Carmel Valley, CA 93924  
Taken from my deck.





Email attachments:

From: Schleede Ron <SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov>  
To: barry <barry@corazon.com>  
Subject: RE: TWA crash cause  
Date: Sun, 11 Aug 1996 11:39:00 -0400  
Encoding: 13 TEXT  
Status:

I have examined the cargo door from twa 800--it is locked and latched!

-----

From: Dickinson Al <DICKINA@ntsb.gov>  
To: barry <barry@corazon.com>  
Subject: RE: mechanical crash cause  
Date: Thu, 19 Sep 1996 19:04:00 -0400  
Encoding: 129 TEXT  
Status:

Mr. Smith, thank you for your message concerning the TWA 800 crash investigation. We have recovered many of the door/hatch/access panel/windows from the sea floor and none of them indicate that they came off the aircraft prior to the event which lead to the crash. In addition, both the CVR and the FDR do not have any information that indicates any of the above things departed the aircraft prior to the event. A depressurization event most certainly would have been noted by the crew and recorded on the CVR. We will continue to look for any indications leading to the source of the event and definitely pay attention to items mentioned in your letter.

Thank you for your interest in aviation safety.

>Date: Wed, 05 Feb 1997 12:34:04 -0800  
>From: Donald Lawson <DLawson@mntny.nps.navy.mil>  
>To: barry@corazon.com  
>Subject: 747 cargo door final report

>

>>From the head of the NTSB team working TWA 800:

> 1. He personally, even again this morning, looked at all the doors from

>the airplane. All latches were either destroyed or in closed positions.  
>The destroyed latches were adjacent to ones in closed positions.  
> 2. Nobody associated with the investigation is considering further  
>a cargo/passenger door malfunction to be part of the probable cause of  
>this accident. Door problems have been categorically ruled out because  
>there is simply no evidence pointing to the doors (and latches).  
>  
> - So, there it is. They had already looked at the doors (so I still have  
>faith in the system) and they looked at it further and replied back basing  
>their answer on the actual evidence in hand. It may not be the answer  
>you were looking for, but I believe that you were looking for the attention  
>to the possible problem and not a particular answer o that problem. And  
>you accomplished that.  
>  
>  
>

LCDR Don Lawson

Mime-Version: 1.0  
Date: Thu, 19 Dec 1996 09:53:05 -0500  
From: Julie Swingle <Julie\_Swingle@mccain.senate.gov>  
Subject: Boeing 747 Information  
To: barry@corazon.com

Dear Mr. Smith,

Thank you again for contacting me with your concerns regarding the potential hazards involving Boeing 747s.

As you know, I have passed the information you sent to Chris Paul and he has informed me of your findings. I have since forwarded the material you sent to the Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee for their review.

Again, thank you for contacting me. I am always glad to have the opportunity to be of assistance.

Sincerely,

John McCain  
U.S. Senator

JM/jes

ATA Code : 5230  
Aircraft Manufacturer : BOEING  
Aircraft Model : 747245F  
Aircraft Serial No. : 20826  
Difficulty Date : 27 November 1994  
Operator Desig. : FDEA  
Operator Type : Air Carrier  
A/C N Number : 640FE  
Precautionary Procedure : Unshed. Landing  
Nature : Warning Indication  
Stage of Flight : Take Off  
Station : ORD  
Flight # : 77

Discrepancy/Corrective Action:

ON ROTATION, AFT CARGO DOOR OPENED. REPLACED SPRING ON LOCK PIN AND ADJ  
PER MM 52-34-12.

Part Name : SPRING  
Manufacture Part Number : MS245851290  
Part Condition : FAILED  
Part/Defect Loc. : AFT CARGO DOOR  
Name : FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP  
Submitter Code : Carrier  
District Office : Southern US office #04

-----  
Member of Congress  
17th District, California  
House of Representatives  
Congress of the United States  
Washington, DC

John McCain III  
Member of Congress  
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC

John J. Duncan, Jr.  
Member of Congress  
House of Representatives  
Congress of the United States  
Washington, DC

James Hall  
Chairman,  
National Transportation Safety Board

Robert Francis II  
Vice Chairman  
National Transportation Safety Board

Bernard Loeb,  
Director of Aviation Safety  
National Transportation Safety Board

Thomas E. Haueter  
Chief, Major Investigations Division  
National Transportation Safety Board

Al Dickinson,  
Lead Investigator, TWA 800  
National Transportation Safety Board

Ron Schleede,  
Investigator, TWA 800  
National Transportation Safety Board

James F. Wildey II  
National Resource Specialist  
National Transportation Safety Board

Peter Goelz  
Director, Office of Government, Public, and Family Affairs  
National Transportation Safety Board

Lyle Streeter  
FAA AAI  
Aircraft Accident Investigator  
FAA National Headquarters

Thomas McSweeny  
Director, Aircraft Certification Service  
FAA National Headquarters

Doug Kirkpatrick  
Aircraft Certification Service  
FAA National Headquarters

Ron Wojnar,  
Manager  
Federal Aviation Administration  
Transport Airplane Directorate

James Devany  
Acting Manager  
Federal Aviation Administration  
Transport Airplane Directorate

Darrell Pederson,  
Assistant Manager  
Federal Aviation Administration  
Transport Airplane Directorate,

Bob Breneman,  
Aerospace Engineer,  
Federal Aviation Administration  
Transport Airplane Directorate,

Donald Lawson  
Navy Aviation Accident School Instructor  
Naval Postgraduate School

Dear Mr. McSweeney

27 Jan 98

I received a letter under the National Transportation Safety Board letterhead and signed by Mr. Jim Wildey, National Resource Specialist-Metallurgy. It's dated January 12, 1998, was sent January 13th, 1998, and was received in my mailbox on January 20, 1998. That's why it's called snail mail and it reads in total:

"Dear Mr. Smith: The Safety Board has received your letter to the Chairman, dated December 30, 1997, concerning the possibility that the TWA 800 accident was related to an in-flight opening of a cargo door. As conveyed to you in previous letters we have sent you, the Safety Board believes that sufficient facts have been gathered to rule out this possibility. Thank you for your interest in this subject. Sincerely, JF Wildey II Jim Wildey National Resource Specialist-Metallurgy"

Well, that's it, that's the response. Ninety pages gets three sentences. Another one sentence for cargo door. Well, it's a start. My intellect is engaged.

Below would be the short version response to the 12 Jan 98 letter to me from NTSB:

"Dear Safety Board:

John Barry Smith has received your letter to John Barry Smith, dated January 12, 1998, negating the possibility that the TWA 800 accident was related to an in-flight opening of a cargo door. As conveyed to you in previous letters I have sent you, John Barry Smith believes that sufficient facts have been gathered to rule in this possibility.

Thank you for your interest in this subject.

Listed below are the facts, evidence, and data to rule in the inadvertent rupture of the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door in flight caused by water shorting bare chafed wires to ground in the forward cargo hold giving power to door motor to unlatch position.

Sincerely,

JB Smith,  
Citizen"

Attached list of evidence to rule in probability of door rupture in flight for TWA 800. Below evidence is consistent with forward cargo door rupture to open to explosive decompression on right side forward of the wing leading to nose off and fireball at 7500 feet when center and other fuel tanks explode.

1. horizontal stab has red paint smear
2. stator blade in right horizontal stab behind engine number 3
3. inward movement top of cargo door matches UAL 811
4. top of door attached to hinge matches UAL 811
5. petal shape of rupture area around aft midspan latch
6. missing pieces of locking handle, latching pins, overpressure relief doors, midspan latches
7. rectangle of explosive decompression zone of outward peeled skin on right side forward of the wing on right side
8. downward movement of floor beams near cargo door
9. hoop stresses found
10. cvr sudden loud sound matches NTSB Chart 12 UAL 811
11. fdr abrupt power cut matches UAL 811
12. TWA 800 matches UAL811 in twenty five similarities
13. TWA 800 matches PA 103 in many similarities
14. TWA 800 matches AI 182 in many similarities
15. red paint smears above cargo door on white paint
16. fire on 4 in UAL 811 for ignition source for fireball/center tank explosion on TWA 800
17. starboard side more damaged than port side.
18. inflight objects hit same things such as right wing fillet in other other accidents
19. poly x is known to be susceptible to chafing and TWA 800 had poly x.
20. section 41 is known to be weak and TWA 800 did not have the retrofit
21. history of cargo door openings in past in various airliners including model and type of TWA 800.
22. EPR problems on aircraft before or during fatal flight.
23. fires in forward cargo hold in the past on Boeing 747s.
24. vertical tears in fuselage skin forward of the wing on the right side match UAL 811
25. singe marks on right side of fuselage show burnt skin, then abruptly at tear line there are no singe marks.
26. red paint rubbed off revealing white paint underneath above cargo door area
27. first pieces off came from forward cargo hold just forward of the wing
28. at least nine missing never recovered bodies, just fragments.
29. initially thought to be a bomb, just like AI 182, PA 103, and UAL 811

Evidence to check to rule in or rule out cargo door involvement.

1. hinge overtravel impression damage to match AAR 92/02
2. aft midspan latch pin for heat damage to match AAR 92/02
3. aft midspan latch for damage
4. put door back together from shattered pieces to show petal rupture
5. stator blade from which engine
6. red paint matching from cargo door area to right horizon stab
7. chafed wire bundles to bare wire in forward cargo hold to match AAR 92/02

Questions that can be answered from powerplant report:

1. Did number 3 engine fall apart from other three engines thus matching the wreckage plots of AI 182 and PA 103?
2. Did stator blade in 800 horizontal stab come from number 3?
3. Was there inlet cowl FOD on number three to match PA 103?

4. Was there fire evidence in number 3 or number 4?

Dear Experts,

Below is the long version:

I know you know sudden jet crashes are not nonsense because it happened to you.

I know you know PA 103 had a relatively mild directed blast that left soot because you read the report, may have even written it.

I know you know about sudden loud sound followed by abrupt power cut on 811 because you read the report, may have even listened to the actual sound on tape.

I know you know about the decompression rectangle forward of the wing with outward peeled skin for 811 because you have seen the photograph, may have even taken the picture.

I know you know about what I'm talking about with CVR, FDR, FOD, TWA, PA, UAL, AI, CG, PSI, EPR, MSL, KCAS, Poly-X, AD, AAR, DC-10, 747, AAIB, TSB, P&W, JTD, because you have read the reports and may have even written the acronyms.

I have read your reports, I have listened to your testimony in hearings on TV and in person, I have read your exhibits, I have looked at your pictures in newspapers, magazines, on TV, on CD-ROM, and on easels. I have read your letters and emails. I consider you the experts.

I solicit the experts' opinions:

Senator McCain, what is your opinion of my destruction sequence of TWA 800? You have been in a sudden jet crash, your opinion counts on this sudden jet crash.

Chairman Hall, what is your opinion of my destruction sequence of TWA 800? You are the boss, your opinion counts.

Vice Chairman Francis, what is your opinion of my destruction sequence of TWA 800? You were involved with PA 103 and were there early on for TWA 800, your opinion counts.

Investigator Haueter, what is your opinion of my destruction sequence of TWA 800? You are in charge of all accident investigations for the NTSB, your opinion counts.

Investigator Dickinson, what is your opinion of my destruction sequence of TWA 800? You are the lead investigator for TWA 800, your opinion counts.

Investigator Schleede, what is your opinion of my destruction sequence of TWA 800? You were the lead investigator on UAL 811 and assisted with TWA 800, your opinion counts.

Investigator Streeter, what is your opinion of my destruction sequence of TWA 800? You are a federal aircraft accident investigator and represented FAA as a party to TWA 800, your opinion counts.

Mr. McSweeny, what is your opinion of my destruction sequence of TWA 800? FAA considered carefully the outward opening doors, your opinion counts.

Metallurgist Wildey, what is your opinion of my destruction sequence of TWA 800? You know about PA 103 and wrote a breakup sequence for TWA 800, your opinion counts.

Lieutenant Commander Lawson, what is your opinion of my destruction sequence of TWA 800? You've investigated many jet crashes, your opinion counts.

What is the FAA's opinion of my destruction sequence of TWA 800? The FBI, the CIA, the lawyers, and the press have all given opinions which have been seriously considered, the opinion of the Federal Aviation Administration counts.

### Sequence of Destruction for TWA Flight 800

Hot humid air in forward cargo compartment was subjected to cold conditioned air after takeoff on hot summer evening near New York on July 17, 1996. Condensation was precipitated out and formed on cold metal fuselage skin. Poly-X wire bundle which held cargo door motor on power was chafed by the friction of continuous vibration against clamp or many door openings and closings on it. Sheath around bundle was worn through to insulation and then worn through to bare wire. Condensed water met the bare wire and shorted against fuselage metal charring wires and powering on door motor which attempted to turn all ten cam sectors to unlocked position. At 13700 feet MSL and 300 KCAS, the eight lower cam sectors were prevented from unlocking because of strengthened locking sectors. However, the two midspan latches have no locking sectors. The slack in bellcranks, torque tubes, and high time worn cam latches allowed the aft midspan latch to rotate just past center allowing the 3.5 PSI internal pressure to rupture outward the forward cargo door at the aft midspan latch.

The nine foot by eight foot squarish door burst open at midspan latch sending the latch and door material spinning away in the setting sun which reflected upon the shiny metal as it spun away erratically and appeared as red-orange streak to ground observers moving all which ways. The aft door frame was clean of attachment to door and bulged outward. Fuselage skin was torn vertically. The door fractured and shattered. The bottom eight latches held tight to the bottom eight latch pins on bottom sill while bottom external skin of door blew away. The top piece of red topped cargo door opened out and up smashing into the white fuselage skin above it leaving the red paint of the door on the white paint between passenger windows above. The red paint of the trim was rubbed away showing the white paint underneath. The top piece of the door took the hinge with it and fuselage skin as it is tore away. The loose red painted trim piece and top of door flew directly aft and impacted the right horizontal stabilizer leaving a red paint transfer mark on it. The hinge still appears to be working normally likely having overtravel impression marks on the opposite hinge when door overextended to slam on fuselage above. The top piece of the door shows inward damage when it hit fuselage above.

The explosive decompression of the thirty eight thousand pounds of internal force on the door blew out a large hole about twenty feet wide and forty feet high on the right side of the nose forward of the wing. Parts of the cargo hold structure were the first parts to leave the aircraft. The now uncompressed air molecules rushed out of the huge hole equalizing high pressure inside to low pressure outside while making a very loud noise. Fuselage skin was peeled outward at various places on the right side of the nose. The sudden rushing air was recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder as a sudden loud sound. The explosive decompression of the forward cargo hold severely disrupted the nearby main equipment compartment which housed power cables and abruptly shut off power to the Flight Data Recorder.

At least nine passenger's bodies were never found, only bone fragments. The number three engine also ingested metal in baggage and started on fire from inefficient burning of fuel. The number three engine with pylon started to vibrate and a stator blade from the engine was spit out and impacted directly behind it in the right horizontal stabilizer.

The floor beams above the cargo hold were bent downward, fractured and broken from the sudden decompression. The main structural members of door and frame were gone and compromised. The flight attitude of the aircraft was askew to the left from reaction of explosive decompression to the right. Air rushed into the hole and weakened other skin and frame peeling skin outward. The 300 knots of air pressed upon the weakened nose and crumpled it into the large hole. The nose tore off and landed in a dense debris heap apart from the rest of the plane.

The port side forward of the wing was smooth and unshattered while the starboard side forward of the wing was shattered, torn, and frayed at ruptured cargo door area and severely disturbed over twenty feet by forty foot explosive decompression zone. Outward petal shaped fuselage skin appeared at aft midspan latch from rupture. Aft midspan latch was blown away. Outward peeled skin appeared from

blowout. Fuselage skin remained smooth next to blown out skin.

The rest of the plane without the nose suddenly decelerated from 300 knots and caused whiplash injuries to passengers. Passengers inside fuselage had baro-trauma to eardrums which ruptured trying to equalize middle ear pressure. The plane maneuvered with huge gaping wound in front increasing drag. The wind force disintegrated the fuselage and wings. Fuel poured out of ruptured tanks as wreckage fell. The broken fuselage, the ruptured wings, the fuel cloud, the center tank, and the spinning, on fire engine number three met at 7500 feet and exploded into a bright loud fireball putting singe marks on the fuselage skin while leaving earlier departed nose burn and singe mark free. The center tank exploded as well as other nearby fuel tanks. Forward passengers were not burned because they were in the earlier separated nose. The debris fell and spread out from 7500 feet to sea level in windblown south-east direction, leaving a wide debris field.

Ground observers heard the fireball explosion of the center tank and other fuel and looked up. They saw fire and smoke and falling debris.

Explosive decompression at the forward cargo hold led to suspicion of bomb in cargo compartment but bomb later ruled out. Debris ejected to the right from explosive decompression led to suspicion of missile exploding on left side of nose. Streak of shiny metal object spinning away reflecting evening sun to ground observers led to suspicion of missile exhaust but later ruled out.

Fire/explosion of center tank into fireball led to suspicion of center tank explosion as initial event. There were difficulties in determining ignition source, fuel volatility, unheard fuel explosion sound on CVR, unilateral fuselage damage, singe marks, and other evidence needed to corroborate center tank explosion as initial explosion.

Fuselage rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door inflight is initially rejected because bottom eight latches are found latched around locking pins while two midspan latches are unexamined and status unreported.

Questions about center tank explosion as initial event which evidence raises.

1. Sudden loud sound on Cockpit Voice Recorder is described as start of aircraft breakup but not sound of explosion. Sound on CVR does not match other staged Boeing 747 center tank explosion. How can an explosion in the center tank be powerful enough to start the aircraft breakup and blow off nose of Boeing 747 and not be heard on CVR?

Sudden loud sound is sound of explosive decompression which gives a sudden loud sound when forward cargo door ruptures/opens in flight. The TWA 800 sudden loud sound was linked to PA 103 sudden loud sound on CVR which was linked to AI 182 sudden loud sound on CVR which was linked to DC-10 cargo door explosive decompression on CVR. UAL 811 had a cargo door rupture/open in flight and recorded a sudden loud sound on the CVR. The sound is the sudden rushing of air molecules which were compressed now moving fast outward to equalize with the lower pressure outside air.

2. Center tank explosion would be spherical, not directed, and would either give no damage forward of the wing or about equal damage on both sides of the fuselage of TWA 800. The wreckage reconstruction shows smooth skin with little damage forward of the wing on the port/left side yet severe, shattered, torn, and frayed damage on the starboard/right side of the fuselage in the cargo door area. How can a center tank explosion cause unilateral damage only on starboard side?

Explosive decompression and rupture of forward cargo door area when aft midspan latch ruptures would give shattered, torn and frayed, damage to cargo door area while leaving port/left/opposite side smooth and light damage. Cargo door rupture would give the unilateral damage on starboard side as shown by TWA 800 wreckage.

3. TWA 800 wreckage reconstruction shows outward peeled skin, outward rupture hole, and paint transfers. Water impact damage would be inward, not outward. How could water impact damage pro-

duce outward peeled skin, outward rupture hole, and paint transfers?

Explosive decompression in nose of TWA 800 would give outward peeled skin in nose, outward rupture hole, and paint transfers as internal high pressure rushes outward to equalize with the low outside pressure.

4. TWA 800 wreckage reconstruction shows red paints smears only above the forward cargo door area and nowhere else on both side of the Boeing 747 fuselage. This indicates that the red painted door below ruptured/opened outward, slammed upward, and smashed into the white painted area above and transferred red paint from door onto white paint between windows. How did red paint smears get where they are?

After the rupture at aft midspan latch the door fractured and upper piece of the red painted door was pushed outward, rotated on its hinge, slammed upward and smashed into the white painted fuselage skin above, transferring red paint to the white painted area between the passengers windows, as shown by the TWA 800 reconstruction. UAL 811 also had paint transfer from door to fuselage when its door opened in flight.

5. A center tank explosion would be far enough away from power cables to allow the Flight Data Recorder to record longer than the abrupt power cut it suffered. How can a center tank explosion which is not loud enough to be heard on the CVR and some distance away be strong enough to abruptly cease power to the FDR?

The explosive decompression in the cargo compartment would severely disrupt the cargo hold floor and the adjacent main equipment compartment in which the FDR and power cables are located. The severe disruption would abruptly cease power to the FDR. UAL 811 also had abrupt power cut when its cargo door opened in flight.

6. How could forward cargo door rupture/open when bottom eight latches are latched and locked in TWA reconstruction?

The forward cargo door of Boeing 747s is about nine feet by eight feet square. It has a hinge on the top and eight cam latches on the bottom. On each nine foot side is one midspan latch. The bottom eight cam latches go around eight latching pins. Over each cam latch is a locking sector. The two midspan latches have no locking sectors. The forward cargo door could rupture at the midspan latch and the hinge and bottom eight latches could still be attached to fuselage skin. The top of the door with hinge attached would tear off with the fuselage skin and spin away. The bottom eight latches could stay attached to bottom sill and continue down to the sea with the nose. The middle of the large door can still be ruptured/opened while the lower part stays attached to airframe. Doors can open/rupture with most or all latches latched. TWA 800 reconstruction shows aft mid span latch missing which implies it became unlatched. The aft door frame sill is smooth and not attached to door which implies door opened in that area.

7. How could forward cargo door rupture cause center tank explosion?

When cargo door ruptures in flight a huge hole is created in nose which the 300 knot slipstream tears off. The falling, noseless, structurally compromised aircraft disintegrated into wings of rupturing fuel tanks, fuselage pieces including center tank, and spinning hot on fire jet engine. When falling debris reached about 7500 feet, the fodded on fire engine number three ignited the fuel cloud and center fuel tank into a fireball. Center tank fire/explosion occurred but later and lower than forward cargo door rupture initial event.

Event, consequence, significance, source for destruction sequence:

1. Hot humid air in forward cargo compartment was subjected to cold conditioned air after takeoff on hot summer evening near New York on July 17, 1996.

NTSB exhibits gave takeoff time and temperatures plus the airconditioning system in Boeing 747s.

2. Condensation was precipitated out and formed on cold metal fuselage skin.

Water was available to ground any bare wires to fuselage skin. Observation made of water cascading out of forward cargo hold of Boeing airliner by John Barry Smith standing in concourse at San Francisco Airport on December 6, 1997.

3. Poly-X wire bundle which held cargo door motor on power was chafed by the friction of continuous vibration against clamp or many door openings and closings on it. Sheath around bundle was worn through to insulation and then worn through to bare wire.

Bare wires can be shorted to ground causing power to go to door motor. NTSB exhibits list two forward cargo hold charred wiring fires. NTSB hearing on aging aircraft detailed problems with poly-x wiring chafing from vibration. NTSB AAR 92/02 detailed problems with chafing wires causing door motor to turn on. TWA 800 had poly-x wiring.

4. Condensed water met the bare wire and shorted against fuselage metal charring wires and powering on door motor which attempted to turn all ten cam sectors to unlocked position.

Event explains how door motor got power to turn on. NTSB exhibits list two previous cargo hold charred wire fires. NTSB AAR 92/02 lists two uncommanded cargo door opening on Boeing 747s caused by electrical problems, UAL preflight and UAL 811.

5. At 13700 feet MSL and 300 KCAS, the eight lower cam sectors were prevented from unlocking because of strengthened locking sectors. However, the two midspan latches have no locking sectors.

The eight bottom latches held tight to locking pins because of AD 88-12-04 which strengthened all the eight locking sectors. NTSB AAR 92/02 describes the AD, door, and all latches.

6. The slack in bellcranks, torque tubes, and high time worn cam latches allowed the aft midspan latch to rotate just past center allowing the 3.5 PSI internal pressure to rupture outward the forward cargo door at the aft midspan latch.

UAL 811 had small rupture at aft midspan latch as shown in photograph in NTSB AAR 92/02. NTSB exhibit lists 3.5 PSI pressure differential. TWA 800 was extremely old aircraft with over 93000 flight hours.

7. The nine foot by eight foot squarish door burst open at midspan latch sending the latch and door material spinning away in the setting sun which reflected upon the shiny metal as it spun away erratically and appeared as red-orange streak to ground observers moving all which ways.

Press reports reveal eyewitnesses say different colored streaks going every which way from all directions. Time of 8:31 PM and angle of low sun to aircraft in east and observers to the west had to be perfectly aligned for spinning falling shiny piece of metal to reflect as streak to observers.

8. The aft door frame was clean of attachment to door and bulged outward.

Aft midspan latch blown away at rupture time and caused outward bulge. NTSB reconstruction photograph shows bulge and missing latch.

9. Fuselage skin was torn vertically.

Explosive decompression bursts outward limited by stringers and bulkheads which are vertical and match the other cargo door accident, UAL 811. NTSB photograph shows the vertical tears of TWA 800.

10. The door fractured and shattered.

NTSB photograph shows the damage. 38000 pounds of force were suddenly released onto now weakened door and it burst apart. 99 inches times 110 inches times 3.5 PSI equals 38115 pounds of force on the ten latches and hinge.

11. The bottom eight latches held tight to the bottom eight latch pins on bottom sill while bottom external skin of door blew away.

The bottom of large door held tight while middle of door ruptured in a troublesome section of a high time Boeing 747, Section 41 and Section 42. TWA 800 had not yet had the Section 41 retrofit. NTSB exhibit states bottom eight latches latched.

12. The top piece of red topped cargo door opened out and up smashing into the white fuselage skin above it leaving the red paint of the door on the white paint between passenger windows above. The red paint of the trim was rubbed away showing the white paint underneath. The top piece of the door took the hinge with it and fuselage skin as it is tore away.

The loose red painted trim piece and top of door flew directly aft and impacted the right horizontal stabilizer leaving a red paint transfer mark on it.

The hinge still appears to be working normally likely having overtravel impression marks on the opposite hinge when door overextended to slam on fuselage above.

The top piece of the door shows inward damage when it hit fuselage above.

Sequence of door opening out and up and transferring paint above is described in text and drawing in NTSB AAR 92/02. Inward movement of top of door is described in AAR 92/02. Normal working hinge attached to top of door is described in AAR 92/02. Overtravel impression damage is described in text and picture in AAR 92/02.

13. The explosive decompression of the thirty eight thousand pounds of internal force on the door blew out a large hole about twenty feet wide and forty feet high on the right side of the nose forward of the wing.

NTSB photograph shows decompression rectangle zone on right side of nose.

14. Parts of the cargo hold structure were the first parts to leave the aircraft.

The first parts of plane to depart indicate trouble started there. NTSB exhibits show first parts to leave were from cargo structure.

15. The now uncompressed air molecules rushed out of the huge hole equalizing high pressure inside to low pressure outside while making a very loud noise.

NTSB AAR 92/02 states crew of UAL 811 heard a 'tremendous explosion,' when door opened in flight.

16. Fuselage skin was peeled outward at various places on the right side of the nose.

Outward peeling indicates force from within, not without. UAL 811 had same outward peeling of fuselage skin in cargo door area.

17. The sudden rushing air was recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder as a sudden loud sound.

Sound matches other Boeing 747 sudden loud sound of explosive decompression and a DC-10 cargo door decompression sound according to NTSB chart.

18. The explosive decompression of the forward cargo hold severely disrupted the nearby main equipment compartment which housed power cables and abruptly shut off power to the Flight Data Recorder.

Cables for power and signal run through the forward cargo hold to the adjacent MEC. The cargo floor is severely disrupted when explosive decompression occurs in cargo hold according to AAIB 2/90 report and will cut off power abruptly.

19. At least nine passenger's bodies were never found, only bone fragments.

Where did those bodies go? What happened to them to reduce them to bone fragments requiring DNA analysis to identify? At least nine bodies always disappear when explosive decompression occurs in high time Boeing 747s according to AAIB, NTSB, TSB and Indian reports.

20. The number three engine also ingested metal in baggage and started on fire from inefficient burning of fuel. The number three engine with pylon started to vibrate and a stator blade from the engine was spit out and impacted directly behind it in the right horizontal stabilizer.

NTSB AAR 92/02 describes the sequence of FOD into number three and also number four and the subsequent vibration and fire.

21. The floor beams above the cargo hold were bent downward, fractured and broken from the sudden decompression. The main structural members of door and frame were gone and compromised.

AAR 92/02, AAIB 2/90, and NTSB TWA 800 exhibits describe the downward movement of the floor beams above cargo compartment.

22. The flight attitude of the aircraft was askew to the left from reaction of explosive decompression to the right. Air rushed into the hole and weakened other skin and frame peeling skin outward.

AAR 92/02 describes the actions of the aircraft after door opened in flight.

23. The 300 knots of air pressed upon the weakened nose and crumpled it into the large hole.

AAIB and TSB/Indian reports describe how nose came off after explosion in forward cargo hold at 300 KCAS of two Boeing 747s.

24. The nose tore off and landed in a dense debris heap apart from the rest of the plane.

AAIB 2/90, TSB/Indian Court, and NTSB TWA 800 exhibits describe the dense nose debris field present when nose comes off in flight of three Boeing 747s.

25. The port side forward of the wing was smooth and unshattered while the starboard side forward of the wing was shattered, torn, and frayed at ruptured cargo door area and severely disturbed over twenty feet by forty foot explosive decompression zone. Outward petal shaped fuselage skin appeared at aft midspan latch from rupture. Aft midspan latch was blown away. Outward peeled skin appeared from blowout. Fuselage skin remained smooth next to blown out skin.

AAIB 2/90, TSB/Indian, and NTSB photographs describe the lesser damage port side nose compared to the more severely damaged starboard side as well as the outward peeled skin on nose of three Boeing 747s.

27. The rest of the plane without the nose suddenly decelerated from 300 knots and caused whiplash injuries to passengers. Passengers inside fuselage had baro-trauma to eardrums which ruptured trying to equalize middle ear pressure.

Passenger injuries are described in NTSB exhibits, TSB/Indian report, AAIB 2/90, and NTSB exhibits.

28. The plane maneuvered with huge gaping wound in front increasing drag. The wind force disintegrated the fuselage and wings. Fuel poured out of ruptured tanks as wreckage fell. The broken fuselage, the ruptured wings, the fuel cloud, the center tank, and the spinning, on fire engine number three met at 7500 feet and exploded into a bright loud fireball putting singe marks on the fuselage skin while leaving earlier departed nose burn and singe mark free. The center tank exploded as well as other nearby fuel tanks. Forward passengers were not burned because they were in the earlier separated nose. The debris fell and spread out from 7500 feet to sea level in windblown southeast direction, leaving a wide debris field. Ground observers heard the fireball explosion of the center tank and other fuel and looked up. They saw fire and smoke and falling debris.

NTSB exhibits describe the breakup sequence and NTSB video shows fireball seconds later and thousands of feet lower than initial event. Engine number three was on fire for AAIB 2/90 and number four was on fire for NTSB AAR 92/02 after cargo hold ruptures.

29. Explosive decompression at the forward cargo hold led to suspicion of bomb in cargo compartment but bomb later ruled out.

Debris ejected to the right from explosive decompression led to suspicion of missile exploding on left side of nose.

Streak of shiny metal object spinning away reflecting evening sun to ground observers led to suspicion of missile exhaust but later ruled out.

Fire/explosion of center tank into fireball led to suspicion of center tank explosion as initial event.

Press reports, FBI reports, and NTSB reports describe the bomb, missile and center tank explanations.

30. There were difficulties in determining ignition source, fuel volatility, unheard fuel explosion sound on CVR, unilateral fuselage damage, singe marks, and other evidence needed to corroborate center tank explosion as initial explosion.

NTSB public hearing reveals the gaps in the center tank as initial event explanation.

31. Fuselage rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door inflight is initially rejected because bottom eight latches are found latched around locking pins while two midspan latches are unexamined and status unreported.

The above was the wiring/latch/door/explosive decompression explanation which was evoked when I read the 12 Jan 98 NTSB letter to me. Let me analyze carefully that recent letter from the 'Safety Board' to me:

"Dear Mr. Smith: The Safety Board has received your letter to the Chairman, dated December 30, 1997, concerning the possibility that the TWA 800 accident was related to an in-flight opening of a cargo door. As conveyed to you in previous letters we have sent you, the Safety Board believes that sufficient facts have been gathered to rule out this possibility. Thank you for your interest in this subject. Sincerely, JF Wildey II Jim Wildey National Resource Specialist-Metallurgy"

1. "Thank you for your interest in this subject." You're very welcome, Safety Board, in your thanks to me for my interest in this subject. Let me thank you for your interest in this subject. Thank you, thank you, thank you.

2. "...the possibility that the TWA 800 accident was related to an in-flight opening of a cargo door."

a. 'A' cargo door? No, not 'a' cargo door, 'the forward' cargo door. Never has any of the other possible four cargo doors been raised as a possibility of causing TWA 800. The other cargo doors were brought into it when the Chairman said all doors were all latched and all locked and all doors intact at water

impact. Mr. Wildey II knows it is the forward cargo door in question because he wrote Exhibit 15C, Forward cargo door exhibit. There could be a nose cargo door, a port main side cargo door, an aft cargo door, and the starboard aft and forward cargo doors; five large cargo doors which are non-plug outward opening cargo doors. Only the forward cargo door is implicated in TWA 800. TWA 800 did not have the nose door, or the port main door, or the port aft door, only the starboard forward and aft cargo doors. The bulk door is not the same in function as the outward opening doors. So, for TWA 800, the choice is one of two, forward or aft. It's 'the forward' cargo door, not 'a' cargo door. The implication is that I am vague and unfocused in pinpointing the problem. Not true. Not only the forward door but the midspan latch, not only the midspan latch but the aft midspan latch. And then to get to chafed to bare wire bundle in forward cargo hold with door motor power in it is very specific.

b. Possibility? I do not say 'possibility,' I say 'probability,' as in 'probable cause' probability. I've been misquoted or misunderstood if 'possibility' is implied. It's 'probable the forward' cargo door is the cause, not it's 'possible a' door is the cause. And in fact, the forward door is just another innocent bystander who got caught, just like the center tank. The door was doing what it was told to do, open, when the door motor power came on. The culprit is chafed wiring being shorted to ground giving power to motor. To quote as 'possible' is to imply less certainty of probable cause of the forward cargo door rupture/opening in flight.

3. "As conveyed to you in previous letters..." That's not a note of exasperation in the tone, is it? Is it like I'm stupid and you have to tell me several times such an obvious thing before I get it? As I've told you in my previous letters, eight is not ten. Why was this repetition mentioned? Thank you for your previous letters, Safety Board. I am analyzing a current letter from you and I look forward to your future letters.

4. "...the Safety Board believes that sufficient facts have been gathered to rule out this possibility." Ah, the meat, a tiny morsel, but still meat.

1. Who is the 'Safety Board'? Is it a person? Is it the whole Board? Did Mr. Francis agree to that statement? Mr. Goglia? I don't think so. Who signed the letter speaking for the Board? A metallurgist? Is a metallurgist saying sufficient facts have been gathered to rule out 'an in-flight opening of a cargo door in an aircraft accident?' Speaking of metal, the rectangle explosive decompression zone on the starboard side of TWA 800 forward of the wing is like a high speed photograph of a drop of milk into a cup. The metal shards are frozen in time as they burst outward like a flower petal. In fact, I electronically reversed time and put the pieces back the way they were. The pieces fit perfectly at the rupture zone of aft midspan latch. (Pictures at end of this letter.) The upper outward burst metal skin is like the milk drop frozen by the camera, peeling back in a nice curve. The TWA 800 metal aft midspan pin will probably show heat and stress damage on the metal as the aft midspan pin did on UAL 811. The TWA 800 metal hinge will show metal overtravel impression damage, just like UAL 811. The metal stator blade in the metal horizontal stabilizer of TWA 800 will probably come from the metal P&W JTD-9. Metal is nice because it is real and can be examined. Easy to do with the TWA 800 reconstruction metal door hinge and metal aft latch and pin. Cheap, quick, easy, and so important. Why hasn't that been done? NTSB must not only be above reproach in lack of diligent effort to find probable cause, NTSB must be above the appearance of reproach. To not pick up the phone, call someone at Calverton to drag the stepladder over to the hinge and see if there is overtravel damage on the hinge gives the appearance of not being diligent when it is so easy to do.

2. A structural engineer, Mr. Breneman, and a metallurgist, Mr. Wildey II, have both given opinions about aircraft accident evidence and how it came to be. Fine. Where are the aircraft accident investigators in this aircraft accident? When an intact round fuselage lands on flat water the impact makes an oval, not a rectangle. Saying the clear shattered rectangle on the starboard side of TWA 800 forward of the wing with the outward peeled skin is water impact damage is funny, especially when it matches in text, drawing and photographs of other rectangle explosive decompressions forward of the wing on the right side, AI 182, PA 103, and UAL 811. It's equal to the CIA saying a nose off Boeing 747 climbs three thousand feet in twenty seconds. It's equal to a lawyer saying the streak was leaking fuel on fire. It's equal to a detective saying a strange radar blip is a P-3. It's equal to educated persons saying eight is ten.

Where are the aircraft accident investigators?

An aircraft person, not a cop or lawyer or engineer or analyst, would say, leaking fuel does not look like streak to persons ten miles away, it's something else; he would say water impact causes inward

damage not outward; he would say a plane with no nose, declining power and heavy after takeoff descends, not climbs; he would say the radar blip of the P-3 was always identified and the mystery blip must be something else; he would say eight is not ten, ten is ten.

I'm an aircraft person and I say those things.

Another different thing about this NTSB 12 Jan 98 letter is the style and tone. I watched and listened to Mr. Wildey for hours at the hearing. I have read his sequencing reports and transcripts of testimony at the hearing. We have exchanged emails. Mr. Wildey is polite, informative and precise, not cold, reticent and vague, as this letter is. The style of an opening sentence giving background, middle sentence making statement, (never asking questions) and final sentence of polite but insincere thanks is reminiscent of other emails and letters I have received from NTSB, but not Mr. Wildey. The only thing missing is the phrase, "Let me reassure you..." This letter from NTSB shows that the author is unclear on the concept of the relationship of civil servant to citizen. This letter is similar to WC Fields shaking off a distraction with the words, "Go away, kid, you bother me." This brushoff letter from NTSB is fine for a well meaning hourly worker who has an idea and scribbles a short note to an official address he found someplace. It is not appropriate for a aviation crewman, technician, navigator and pilot who has conducted nine years of research and sent several hundred pages of analysis supported by enclosed documentation to specific involved officials.

We are involved.

I am not out to hurt the government as the missile guys are when they say US Navy shot down TWA 800 and are covering it up and yet the missile guys get detailed rebuttals. I am not out to increase my budget as the bomb guys are when they say more stringent security is needed yet they get detailed rebuttals. I am on the government's side, I am on Boeing's side, I am on the side of the passengers of the future, just like NTSB. I am an ally, not an enemy. I do not like this adversary relationship which is similar to court trials. This is not a trial but an investigation. Investigations have questions. Where are the questions?

I agree with NTSB on TWA 800 with center tank explosion. I use NTSB documents, text, photographs, and testimony to backup the the initial event from fireball to center tank explosion to engine number three or four ignition source to falling wing, to nose off to explosive decompression to rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door, to unlatch motor on from short to chafed bare poly-x wire to ground via condensed water. And yet I get cursory, vague, and abrupt rejections of supported ideas. Cargo door rupture/opening/chafed wiring explanation deserves better.

Where the water came from is conjecture but water in the hold is true because I saw it. It could come from thunderstorm, leaking cargo, popped potable water tank or other unknown. I use the three other accidents for clues. Three took off in hot humid conditions and climbed up high where it is cold. Condensation is the one explanation that holds true for most. Aft latch rupture is probable because of the photo evidence, water source for shorting chafed wire is possible and needs confirmation.

4. If a patient goes to the doctor and presents with blood in urine which might be a kidney problem and the doctor examines one normal kidney and says, 'No problem, I have gathered sufficient facts to rule out that possibility,' would you say, 'Hey doc, check the other kidney?' Or would you say, 'What the hey, one is two, close enough.' I don't think so. You would say 'Check all my kidneys' as I say 'Check all the latches.' And I've added 'Check all the wiring in the forward cargo hold for chafed through to bare wire.' (What you might really say to the physician is, "Am I going to die? Can you fix it? How much longer to I have to live? Tell it to me straight.")

5. Enough about facts and specifics, let's get back to unsubstantiated generalities as shown by the 12 January letter. "...sufficient facts have been gathered..." Huh? Sufficient? How many? What facts? Gathered where? Can I see them? As I have researched the facts regarding cargo door in high time and cycle Boeing 747s for years and have about two thousand pages of text compared to two sentences, my opinion is that insufficient facts have been gathered to rule out possibility of door open in flight and sufficient facts have been gathered to rule in the probability. My list of sufficient facts was listed earli-

er and will be revised as my investigation continues. I'm showing you mine, will you show me yours...and I've already seen the bottom eight latches latched. What else do you have?

Here are the three official stated facts regarding cargo door from NTSB:

1. "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill." in Exhibit 15C signed by Mr. Wildey.
2. "The examinations of the TWA airplane, however, conclusively show that this door was latched and locked along its bottom edge through the entire break-up sequence." in testimony by Mr. Wildey at public hearing.
3. "...the Safety Board believes that sufficient facts have been gathered to rule out this possibility." in 12 January 98 letter signed by Mr. Wildey.

Not sufficient! Insufficient. Eight is not ten and never will be.

There may be sufficient wishful thinking to rule out cargo door rupture/open/explosive decompression but not sufficient facts.

Here's a clue that reveals the wishful thinking bias against door. If you lose your wallet and you think where may it be and you deduce it could be in the glove compartment of your car and you go running out to the garage to the car, open the door, open the glove compartment and look in to the mess and don't see the wallet, you don't feel relief, you feel disappointment and continue to rummage around the junk in there to look for the wallet possibly hidden by stuff like maps and glass cases and candy and pens.

When Mr. Breneman examined the pieces of twisted metal called the wreckage of TWA 800 looking for the forward cargo door because he suspected it might be the cause and found the bottom eight latches latched, he told me he felt relief. He was glad he was wrong at his suspicion of door problems. He did not want the wallet to be in the glove compartment. He did not want the door to be the problem so he wishfully thought that eight latches latched means they all must be latched and therefore the door was locked and all the shattered pieces of the door must have occurred at water impact. Wishful thinking ruled then and it rules now. It's a pleasant dream, not the unpleasant truth. Truth hurts; lies kill.

Let Mr. Breneman be the hero. He was there first with the suspicion the door was involved. He braved poor and dangerous working conditions to locate and identify very difficult to see dirty pieces of wreckage among many. He correctly evaluated the obvious problem based upon past accidents, the lower eight latch condition as latched and locked. He promptly reported his results to authority. He did everything that was asked of him under pressure conditions. There is now the luxury of time to review the past conclusions.

Explosive decompression has caused a lot of problems for jet airliners and the people connected with them from designers, manufacturers, operators, and investigators. Comet caused big problems to an entire industry, DC10 caused problems with manufacturer, UAL 811 caused problems for the investigators who got it wrong the first time but came back and corrected the error. It's understandable that the cargo door causes fear and is to be avoided and wishful thinking makes it go away when eight of the ten latches were latched.

More logic: Why the reluctance to consider this known killer of nine who left early the scene of the crime? Why not say the center tank exploded and blew the door open? Why the adamant nonsense of a now shattered door being intact at water impact while the reconstructed shattered skin is peeled outward? Why ignoring the many red paint smears that are easily visible and consistent with door open and slamming upward? Why ignoring stator blade? Why ignoring all the evidence which indicates door opened in flight when you could say, yes, the center tank explosion blew it open? Why ignore the two real fires a quarter inch from the center tank as ignition source when chafed wiring caused fires in two forward cargo holds of Boeing 747s? Why ignore the forward cargo hold, the cargo door, and the fuselage skin around it?

Only to avoid getting into the black hole of pressurized fuselage rupture in flight, that's why.

The Comet airliner crashes: After several inflight ruptures in which a bomb was thought to be the cause, the fleet was grounded and an investigation was begun on why the pressurized fuselage ruptured in flight. After a while, the ban was lifted and flights resumed. Another fuselage ruptured and all died. An industry was hurt and never recovered.

The DC-10 airliner crashes: After an aft cargo door opened in flight and almost killed all on board over Ontario, Canada in 1972 an investigation was started. Then another aft cargo door opened in 1974 and killed all on board. The DC-10 was hurt and never recovered, in fact, MacDac never recovered and recently merged. The investigation revealed memos concerning the risk of the open cargo door was known to officials but nothing was done.

Boeing 747 airliner crashes: After a forward cargo door opened in flight in 1987 on Pan Am 125, changes were ordered to prevent it happening again. It happened again. UAL 811 lost the door in 1989 and killed nine. The manufacturer, the airline, the FAA were all excoriated by NTSB for failing to do this and that and too slow too. Then NTSB got the cause of the door opening wrong, retrieved the evidence of the actual door, and wrote another AAR, 92/02 with the correct cause, electrical short to door motor to unlatch to rupture to open to explosive decompression and not improper latching, much to the relief of the baggage handler who had been blamed for the deaths. Boeing 747s are being sold off to foreign airlines and other airlines are cancelling orders. If another 747 mysteriously crashes, its reputation and Boeing's may never recover.

The two crash rule has been fulfilled for cargo door on high time Boeing 747s. The tombstone regulations didn't work.

Boeing may believe it is in their best interest to call TWA 800 a missile shutdown or even to take the full blame for a center tank explosion rather than take the partial blame for several cargo door caused accidents, AI 182, PA 103, and TWA 800. It's wrong thinking, as the best selling airplane is the one that doesn't mysteriously crash every few years, but that's their shortsighted call.

TWA may hope for missile or center tank as it exonerates them as the cause. Cargo door indicates operator error so would be avoided by the airline. It's shortsighted as the cargo door problem happens to all airlines and all airports, the common link is high cycle Boeing 747s.

Pilots, crew, and passengers may want to believe missile or bomb because then they can consider it a fluke and unlikely to happen again while a mechanical problem can reappear. It's hard to enjoy flying when you think the airplane may come apart mysteriously at any time.

The engine manufacturer may want to steer clear of any involvement of a disaster to avoid guilt by association but they should be volunteering to help, such as noting their stator blade is not where it should be and stating exactly which engine and where in the engine did the stator blade come from.

The lawyers and their clients may want to hope it's not the cheap guys' fault, the airline with limited liability, and hope for the deep pocket manufacturer's fault with unlimited liability.

The makers of the mystery ignition source, probes and pumps, will be interested eventually in any reasonable explanation supported by facts and official documents which clears them of responsibility but that will be much later during trials. There is not time to wait for the judicial process to uncover and examine alternative reasonable explanations for the fireball and initial event. Three noses have come off Boeing 747s in flight within eleven years, 1985 to 1996. That's one every four years at best. It's been a year and a half since TWA 800 and trials will not begin for a few more years.

NTSB and FAA may hope it's not the cargo door which will dredge up the UAL debacle but in fact it shows that NTSB is determined to find the cause of a crash regardless of fallout from the discovery. NTSB has shown that it is deliberate and comprehensive in the past with UAL 811. The accident happened in February 1989 and the final corrected report came out in 1992, about four years later. With

TWA 800, NTSB has only had the full responsibility of the investigation for a month, from December 1997 to January 1998. The hasty competitive race to find the cause against the FBI bomb or missile explanation led to hasty ruling out of forward cargo door and hasty ruling in of center tank explosion as initial event. Yes, the door popped for UAL 811, but why. NTSB got it wrong the first time and corrected themselves with additional evidence. Wasn't it the instigation of a citizen that persuaded NTSB to retrieve the 811 door? Who remembers his name? No one. Who remembers that the NTSB got an aircraft investigation right? Everyone. What's important? Getting the aircraft investigation probable cause right is what's important. Recheck 800 door as you did with the 811 door. You looked closely at the 811 door. Do it again with TWA 800. Please. Now. I beg you. Just once. Hinge, pin, paint, stator, cvr, explo decom rectangle, petal shape at aft latch.

NTSB and FAA were first on the scene to suspect the door as stated by Mr. Breneman who was asked by NTSB to examine the cargo door. The prime suspect was promptly interviewed. An initial evaluation was made based upon correct suspicions of the officials. NTSB and FAA did not miss the door explanation, they are just deliberate in their examination. Cargo door is not going anywhere. It is there for examination. NTSB has only had the total official investigation for just a month. It is an active investigation. Evidence is still being collected, sorted, and evaluated. To change position in the middle of an investigation is normal. To go back and check out old clues and hypotheses is normal. To respond to citizens answering a call for help from officials to the public in a public appeal is normal. To check out hard evidence such as hinges, pin, paint, stator, cvr, explo decom rectangle, petal shape at aft latch when the evidence is close by is normal.

Yes, the center tank exploded for TWA 800 but why. NTSB has it not exactly correct the first time with a mystery spark but will get it exactly correct with help from additional evidence, the wreckage reconstruction at Calverton. The evidence is the shattered door hanging there with missing latches, puffed out skin, and a red paint smeared hinge and an ignition source of a fodded engine number 3 which came apart and left stator blade behind it. To rewrite exhibits, to add an addendum to Exhibit 15C, to modify a sequencing report is normal during an extended investigation. It is better to make the minor adjustments now than to have to issue another entire AAR later on.

Do we agree on that?

Let's disagree on something.

There is supposed to be an independent agency which objectively looks at all possibilities of an accident regardless of political implications. That's the NTSB for TWA 800. The United States National Board of Transportation. All eyes look to NTSB when a plane crashes. It is an awesome responsibility. NTSB is supposed to be fair. NTSB is supposed to be forthright. NTSB is supposed to be quick. NTSB is supposed to be precise.

Personally, I don't see it. I saw a biased prosecution of a hastily decided cause of center tank explosion made within weeks of the accident and has held firm ever since in the face of ignored contrary evidence. Within eighteen hours it was known there was a fireball, soon thereafter the wreckage showed center tank had fire and explosion damage. So, it exploded. What happened just before it exploded? When an ignition source was not found, another explanation should have been considered but wasn't. The misfitting puzzle piece of center tank as initial event has been pounded into place with computer models, small size actual models, and blown up real 747s, and it still doesn't fit. It doesn't fit as initial event because it was not the initial event.

NTSB has not been fair and given all reasonable explanations a hearing as shown by three sentences for cargo door. NTSB is supposed to be upfront but suppresses already researched and written exhibits on eyewitnesses, power plants, and wreckage plot. NTSB was supposed to have public docket ready within a few months yet took a year and a half to produce a bowdlerized version. NTSB is supposed to be exact yet continues to insist eight latches checked of ten available means total.

Cargo door explanation has been avoided because it has a track record of hurting everyone one it touches, including me. It appears officials are afraid of getting burned again. Gentleman, of course we

are going to get burned again. That's just the way it goes. That's life in the mystery world of aircraft crash investigation dealing with hundreds of millions of dollars and intense grieving emotions. We have blood on our teeth for the event happening on our watch. We will have burned fingers when all the stories are written and statements are misquoted and biased opinions are stated as fact. And we will have gold in our hair when the correct explanation is determined. Any errors or lapses will be forgotten with success but remembered with failure.

The opinion of NTSB regarding a cargo door problem for a high time Boeing 747 that occurred shortly after takeoff and left a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut to the FDR was wrong in 1989 and was later corrected with AAR 92/02. Now in this 12 January letter 98 from NTSB to me, Mr. Wildey II wants me to accept the opinion of NTSB negating a cargo door problem for a high time Boeing 747 that occurred shortly after takeoff and left a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut to the FDR. With no facts, just a vague opinion from anonymous officials. No can do. I determine truth by responding to facts, evidence, and data, not opinion. As I ask you to do, put little value in my opinion but much in facts, evidence, data. Disregard the messenger and pay close attention to the message: Water, wire, ground, power, poof, pop, boom, splat.

I am never rebutted with facts, only opinions from persons with made up minds from long ago.

Here's the sequence of thought and reactions to the cargo door explanation by closed minds:

1. No.
2. You're wrong.
3. Your'e crazy.
4. Ignore.
5. Go away.
6. Intimidation.
7. Ask questions.

I've been getting '1' all along. This 12 Jan 98 letter is a '2.' The Chairman's opening statement putting cargo door along with laser beam cause is a '3.' A few letters and two sentences in response to hundreds of letters and thousands of sentences is '4'. Exasperated statements implying I'm bothering officials who have already told me about the door is a '5'. Being visited by armed strangers authorized to shoot to kill in civilian clothes in a civilian car unannounced and uninvited to my front door to interrogate me based upon a contrary opinion is '6'. The question of 'why so few burned passengers' is a 7.

Who asked that question and I know the answer to who asked and why so few passengers burned. James Hall, Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board asked that question several times at the hearing.

(Jim 1, as I think of James Hall, Jim 2 is James F. Wildey the II, Jim 3 is James Kallstrom, and Jim 4 is James Devany. I note similarities and detect patterns, just like AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800 all have SLS on the CVR, sudden loud sound on the cockpit voice recorder.)

To get officials to number seven is my goal. It is very difficult. I recognize state '7' questions right away. One was 'any hoop stresses found?' Another is NTSB Chart 12 which lists AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800 sudden loud sounds with abrupt stops. What does Chart 12, Exhibit 12B, say, is the state 7 question.

The six main open minded questions asked often are listed below and answered later in an included letter.

1. How and why does forward cargo door open in flight?
2. How does open door in flight cause nose to come off for AI 182, PA 103, and TWA 800?
3. Why did nose of UAL 811 stay on?
4. AI 182 and PA 103 not a bomb?
5. TWA 800 not center tank as initial event?

6. Explosive decompression enough to tear nose off?
7. Is there a conspiracy to keep cargo door explanation quiet?

The below is from testimony at the hearing:

WITNESS WILDEY: "I can safely say that this is some of the most examined metal there is anywhere in the world, especially between the nose section and the aft section. Every -- literally, every inch, every quarter inch of the fracture in the fuselage skin and the frames and the stringers and the center fuel tank in the wing center section, every inch of that structure has been examined in great detail."

JBS>Great! What about the overtravel impression damage on the forward cargo door hinge? What about the aft midspan latch pin heat damage? What about the smooth door frame and missing aft midspan latch? What about the red paint smears? What are your examination results?

Mr. Wildey> "Similarly, the forward cargo door which is just aft of station 520 on the lower side of the airplane has had some latching problems in the past. The examinations of the TWA airplane, however, conclusively show that this door was latched and locked along its bottom edge through the entire break-up sequence."

JBS>Great! The bottom eight latches were latched. Fine. Now, about the other two...were they latched at water impact? And the locking handle, locked? How about the two overpressure relief doors, open? And the torque tubes, and pins and skin, where are they? Why not hung on reconstruction? Latching problems in the past? Yes, problems in the past.

Mr. Wildey>"This was brought to our attention, and the reason that we examined this was that three of the four nose landing doors had a red tag and were recovered from the earliest part of the debris field and, similarly, around the nose landing gear area there were some fuselage pieces that were recovered that had a red tag on it and were supposedly recovered from the red — the red — earliest debris field.

Of course it became a very distinct question, well, what happened up there, how did these pieces, the fuselage pieces in the doors get into the red zone?

Well, our group took this as a task to look at. We made a report on it and we determined that, for example, on the doors themselves that, yes, those doors apparently did come off the airplane.

They had a lack of damage on them that was consistent with early departure. We developed some hypotheses and scenarios that could allow the doors to depart from the airplane very early in the sequence, and it is consistent with the factual observations we have made.

so, for the doors we said, yes, it appears as though we have a sequence that could account for the doors to come off early, and we also examined the fuselage pieces right around there that had red tags on

them, and we looked at all the features we could find, and for the fuselage pieces around there we said we find no physical evidence to suggest that those particular pieces actually departed the airplane early on in the sequence.

I think, if I remember our report, we said we believed that those particular pieces should be treated as yellow zone parts because we don't find any way that they could possibly have come off the airplane early in the sequence and actually have been found in the red debris field.

Just as a side note, I am aware that the tags on those particular fuselage pieces from around the nose area are the so-called 2,000 series tags, and that is not my area of expertise, but these are the — these tags had some questions about their pedigree, if you will.

But, that is really not our concern. We are saying, and our group said that we don't believe those are red zone parts and we would treat those as yellow zone parts for the purposes of analyzing the break-up sequence."

JBS>That's amazing testimony. That's changing the territory to fit the map. The pieces were in the red zone because they came off first not because they were wrongly tagged. They came off first because the area around the nose gear is near the forward cargo door and that went first during the explosive decompression. The access door and the nose doors and the fuselage pieces around the nose gear doors all left first because that is consistent with explosive decompression when forward cargo door ruptures. It is not consistent with center tank as initial event. To change the status of evidence, to disregard location of evidence to fit theory, is wrong. To put yellow tags on pieces of fuselage that were originally red zone is wrong. It is like filing the edges of a puzzle piece to get it to fit.

What the transcript reveals is a prosecution of the center tank to the extent of adjusting evidence by changing location status. Red zone pieces were considered yellow zone to fit the center tank explanation. Not good.

Mr. Wildey II> "I think, if I remember our report, we said we believed that those particular pieces should be treated as yellow zone parts because we don't find any way that they could possibly have come off the airplane early in the sequence and actually have been found in the red debris field."

JBS>Well, there is a way, Mr. Wildey; cargo door rupture to door open to explosive decompression to nose off. If your facts don't fit the explanation, find another explanation, don't change your facts. You have changed the facts by calling red zone pieces of fuselage skin near the forward cargo door yellow zone pieces. And then to buttress the violation of investigative technique, the capability and accuracy of the recovering forces is questioned, but not your initial event explanation of center tank explosion. 'Blame the other guy' is not right, especially since they were not there to defend themselves of the accusation of sloppy work.

Ah, if only all jurors could change the evidence location to fit their biased view of the defendant. They would be happy. It is sort of like saying a bloody glove, although found over here, should really be over there, so let's say it was and consider it as such. It leads to false conclusions and injustice.

NTSB with TWA 800 has one accident to find a consistent explanation; I have four, AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800. I can't change location of pieces of wreckage to fit cargo door explanation

in any of those accidents and haven't. Whenever I have a piece of the puzzle I have to find out where it fits in four 747 accidents. NTSB only has one with TWA 800. My model of course is AAR 92/02, UAL 811. I always go back to it. The extra effort put forth in 1992 to issue another AAR superseding a previous one now bears fruit six years later. It was worth the effort to retrieve the UAL 811 door and reconsider the conclusions based on new evidence. It put the clue of chafed wiring in the forefront and ruled out improper latching. It was worth the effort to reconstruct TWA 800 and to reconsider the earlier conclusions based on new evidence.

All my puzzle pieces fit into four accidents and are documented by official government accidents reports. Zany far out newspapers or underground ezines are not used, only NTSB, AAIB, Canadian and Indian government aviation documents. To read AI 182 report is to match TWA 800. To read AAIB PA 103 is to match UAL 811. All reports are available on web site [www.corazon.com](http://www.corazon.com).

The facts and evidence about wiring/cargo door are repeated because apparently they are not being taken seriously. I am as serious as seeing my dead pilot lying on the ground all crumpled up as if someone had thrown an old flight suit in the corner, and he was in it.

Am I funny? Is cargo door weird? To me, to say documented events which have happened before happened again to TWA 800 is not weird but common sense. To say a door did something it wasn't supposed to do is normal; it happens every day in cars, ferries and spaceships. They either jam open or closed or pop open or snap closed unexpectedly all the time. Doors have opened routinely in flight in pressurized airliners for years. It's normal to say a door popped, not weird. To say a door popped again in a high time Boeing 747 shortly after takeoff is normal if supported by facts.

To hear others say an event which has never happened before, a center tank explosion on a 747 in flight, or a missile shutdown of an airliner in US territory, happened to TWA 800 is weird. Tank fires and explosions have been designed against ever since the first flight over ninety years ago. They very rarely happen and even rarer with no clear ignition source. To match a new 737 on the ground to an old flying 747 for initial event is weird. To match an old flying 747 to an old flying 747 when both have an event occurring shortly after take off near the leading edge of the wing which killed nine people and left a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut to the FDR is normal.

I think it's time you stop making fun of me, trying to brush me off, disregarding my conclusions, and treat this survivor of a sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash with respect.

Or not. Your call.

The two most common causes of airliner crashes are mechanical problem or pilot error. Pilot error has been ruled out in TWA 800 because even if the pilot wanted to do what the evidence showed happened to TWA 800, he couldn't. Mechanical problem is then the most likely. Yet for a year and a half most effort was expended on the least likely event, bomb or missile. To look for something important which is where it always has been is smart but to look in places it has never been is weird. It's detached from reality thinking. It's denial of unpleasant truth. It's dreaming. It's wishful thinking.

Whenever mechanical cause was offered, only one was suggested, center tank explosion. There are lots of possible mechanical problems to go wrong on a 747, and have happened before, such as aft pressure bulkhead rupture, engine and pylon falling off, to cargo door opening in flight, yet only one was investigated thoroughly, center tank explosion as initial event which has never happened before.

I take the insults of being called names, being made fun of, brushed off with cursory letter from officials, and visits by armed agents because I have to. It's life or death and I've been there. I know the fuselages of high time Boeing 747s are rupturing in flight and I know why. I want to stop it from happening again. The water must not meet the bare chafed poly-x wiring to turn on door motor to unlatch aft midspan latch to cause rupture then opening of door to explosive decompression to nose off to center tank explosion in fireball to water impact.

It's worth the risk to rule in or rule out the door and then to pursue the problem to fix it. It turns out not

to be the door fault entirely but wiring, old faulty poly-x wiring that chafes to bare wire when subjected to prolonged vibration. And has several times before and has done it again.

AD of strengthened locking sectors was a partial band aid that didn't cover all the wound, it missed the two midspan latches. The symptom of unlatching in flight was treated but not the underlying cause, door motor power came on inadvertently.

I understand all the reasons for hoping against hope the cargo door is not implicated in TWA 800 crash. Hopes are rebutted by facts. The door is involved. It is shattered, pieces near it left first, latches are missing, petal shaped rupture is seen, and it's happened before.

There is a brave and also principled aircraft investigator out there. He will want to know just what the hell it was that crashed TWA 800 and he wants every 't' crossed and every 'i' dotted. He wants it explained and let the chips fall where they may. That investigator will be known by the questions he asks. They will be questions asked to which he will not know the answer but wants to know.

The following letter was sent to Mr. Wildey II and Mr. Streeter on 19 December 1997. It is worth repeating to all.

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I address you both as representing the United States government. You are officials and have the education, experience, and desire to investigate an aircraft accident of national importance. I know the differences between legislative branch and executive branch and NTSB and FAA, but in a matter of life and death, which this is, I prefer to address open minds, not fixed titles.

Mr. Streeter and Mr. Wildey, both of you asked a question regarding the cargo door rupture explanation for TWA 800 during the recent public inquiry. They were important questions and revealed an interest in an answer not yet known.

The formal question from Mr. Streeter to Mr. Wildey was, "Were there hoop stress fractures found on the wreckage of TWA 800 near the area of damage?" or words to that effect. The answer from Mr. Wildey was "Yes, and around stringer 40R," or words to that effect.

The informal question from Mr. Wildey to me was, "What did you think of the cargo door presentation?" or words to that effect. My answer to Mr. Wildey was "Very interesting, I wish to correspond with you about it."

I am now corresponding. I believe that discussion between an informed member of the public and officials about a matter of national importance, testimony on the public record, released public docket exhibits, and

previously released government accident reports is appropriate and acceptable, even necessary sometimes. It takes everyone to help solve this mystery. FAA web page states, "The Office of Accident Investigation (AAI) is the principal organization within the FAA with respect to aircraft accident investigation and all activities related to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)."

We were all at the TWA 800 fact finding inquiry in Baltimore. Were facts found? I certainly found some, important ones. I've put them together to attempt to persuade you that the forward cargo door aft midspan rupture explanation is a worthy line of investigation. The first goal is a comprehensive professional examination of that forward cargo door area to rule in or rule out rupture at aft midspan latch.

You can do that; I can't.

Specific suggestions:

1. Examine aft midspan latch pin for damage as was observed on UAL 811, NTSB AAR 92/02 page 33, "The forward midspan latch pin was relatively undamaged. The aft midspan latch pin had definite areas of damage. Both pins had wear areas where the cams would contact the pins during latching. (Encl 1)
2. Examine the TWA 800 door hinge for damage as was observed in AAR 92/02, page 35, "Several areas on the hinge sections, such as the fuselage hinge sections, showed evidence of contact from the door during overtravel (See figure 14.) In addition the fuselage forward hinge sections were slightly bent." (Encl 2) Figure 14 is on page 40 and shows photograph of the hinge overtravel damage. (Encl 3)
3. Examine two midspan latches from forward cargo door for damage. The criterion for determining if latches latched was to check to see if still locked and attached to adjacent fuselage sill or frame. The bottom eight latches of TWA 800 door were attached to sill so conclusion latched. The two midspan latches are unattached to frame so conclusion unlatched. The door frame is smooth where the aft midspan latch is supposed to be attached but isn't.
4. Examine forward and aft pull-in hooks of TWA 800 for compression and smearing damage as was observed in AAR 92/02, page 45. (Encl 4)
5. Examine door and fuselage for paint transfer from one to the other as was observed in AAR 92/02, page 41. (Encl 5) Red paint smears on TWA 800 on white paint between passenger windows above cargo door may have come from red paint on top of cargo door. The red paint smears are large and frequent only along the top of the cargo door area and not found on the other 460 feet of fuselage trim. This indicates door below opened outward and slammed upward into fuselage, giving overtravel over 143 degrees on the hinge and transferring red paint from door onto white paint between passenger windows. The opening door with hinge attached took red trim fuselage skin with it and that may have slammed upward also onto white painted skin. Red paint smears are not scraped away white paint revealing red underneath but red paint on top of white paint. White paint scraped away reveals green primer.
6. Examine outer skin contour of the upper door piece for inward crushing as was observed in AAR 92/02, page 41. (Encl 5) Door blows outward and top of door smashes into fuselage above giving inward crushing not by water impact. Photo of TWA 800 top door piece shows such damage. (Encl 6)
7. Examine master latch lock handle housing and trigger for position. AAR 92/02, page 41, found it relatively flush with door outer skin. (Encl 5)
8. Examine floor beams again of TWA 800 to confirm statement in Docket No.

SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Study, page 20, "Downward separation directions were noted at STA 900, 880, 840, 820, 800, and 780..." and ""The initial opening of the fuselage lower lobe (e.g. LF6A) would have the expected result of rapid depressurization accompanied by collapse of the main deck floor for some distance forward of STA 1000. The red area recovery of interior components as far forward as STA 600 would not be inconsistent with this floor collapse and associated structural breakup."

(Encl 7) This observation matches downward buckling as was reported in AAR 92/02, page 4, "The floor beams adjacent to and inboard of the cargo door area had been fractured and buckled downward." (Encl 8)

9. Confirm evidence on TWA 800 of direct circumferential tension or hoop stress tension found on lower right side skin in the red zone only, as stated in Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Chairman's Factual Report of Investigation, page 11. (Encl 9) This observation coincides with AAR 92/02 which states on page 11, "The cargo door and its associated hardware are designed to carry circumferential (hoop) load arising from pressurization of the airplane." (Encl 10) If cargo door was fully latched and intact until water impact then there should be no hoop tension fractures. If the door was missing in flight, hoop tension fractures could be expected to be found and they were on TWA 800 leading to conclusion door was missing in flight.

10. Confirm door frame of TWA 800 which abuts aft edge of door is curved outward in petal shaped bulge indicating outward force rupture. Aft midspan latch is unattached to aft midspan latch pin halfway up the door frame. Edge of door frame is smooth indicating door not missing by force but by unlatching of aft midspan latch. (Encl 6)

11. Establish large round rupture hole in TWA 800 photo centered at aft midspan latch is in fact a hole or something otherwise. (Encl 6)

12. Confirm outward peeled skin on TWA 800 upper skin as shown in photograph (Encl 6) which indicates outward force which matches AAR 92/02, page 6 photograph of peeled upper skin in same location. (Encl 11)

Essentially, Mr. Wildey and Mr. Streeter, TWA 800 can be matched to UAL 811 through NTSB AAR 92/02 and the TWA 800 public inquiry exhibits. UAL 811 was an inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight. TWA 800 may be also. A complete examination of the TWA 800 cargo door area should be done to compare with the UAL 811 cargo door area as reported in AAR 92/02. There are other things to examine in that TWA 800 door such as two overpressure relief doors for open or closed, torque tubes for bending, and viewing ports for direction of damage similar to AAR 92/02, page 44. (Encl 23)

Mr. Wildey, a complete examination of TWA 800 cargo door area requires more than the sentence from "Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit Number 15C, Report Number 97-82, Section 41/42 Joint, Forward Cargo Door, page 1, "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill." (Encl 12) The door is a known killer near the scene of its specialty crime, pressurized hull rupture. Exoneration of cargo door requires more than a cursory analysis.

Eight latches is not enough when ten exist. Twenty percent of door material is not enough when 100% exists. The incomplete early examination of the cargo door before reconstruction was completed has resulted in three distinct misinterpretations which continue to this day:

1. Entire door latched after initial event.
2. Door intact and attached to nose at water impact.
3. Water impact caused initial shattering of cargo door area.

Cargo door explanation proposes the door was not fully latched at water impact, it was mostly latched, only 80%. The door was not totally intact at water impact, it was partially intact; only the bottom 10% was attached to bottom sill of frame. The aft midspan rupture gave outward force to fuselage and door frame skin which burst outward. Explosive decompression and subsequent tearing off of nose caused initial shattering of cargo door area. The water impact gave any inward crushing damage to already shattered cargo door area.

Mr. Wildey, I noticed your name is author of report, No 97-82 of Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 15C, Section 41/42 Joint, Forward Cargo Door, although you must have relied on investigator Al Dickinson, AS-10 for input. The report is dated April 22, 1997, a month before the reconstruction was completed and the red paint smears, outward bulge at aft midspan latch and general shattered effect became apparent. Mr. Ron Schleede of NTSB was kind enough to report the cargo door was locked and latched to me in an email on August 11, 1996, ten months before reconstruction completed. (Encl 13) Cargo door area was among the last parts to be reconstructed according to the pictures on the CD-ROM from NTSB about TWA 800.

It is apparent a hasty conclusion was reached about the status of the forward cargo door based upon incomplete evidence available at the time of only eight bottom latches latched and that hasty conclusion has not been modified. In Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Report, page 30, you write: "It is therefore possible that new scenarios (sequences) may emerge as new information is acquired whether it be from newly identified parts, or simply a new interpretation of current information." (Encl 14)

Mr. Wildey, Yes, Yes, Yes! Can you do that? Can you write a new sequence as new information and new interpretation is acquired? Can you add an addendum/correction/errata sheet to Exhibit 15C, Section 41/42 Joint, Forward Cargo Door? It would be written after the reconstruction was completed in May which showed new evidence such as red paint smears which have allowed for a new interpretation of events. A further examination of the forward cargo door area is now warranted.

Mr. Streeter, as an accident investigator I believe you put value in finding similar accidents to the one under current investigation from which similarities may be observed and conclusions drawn. The NTSB has done that for TWA 800: Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 12-B, Sound Spectrum Study, page 21, Chart 12. (Encl 15) The sudden loud sound on the CVR which is followed by an abrupt power cut which occurred on four high time Boeing 747s is displayed for comparison. TWA 800, Pan Am 103, Air India 182, and United Airlines 811 are plotted together in that sequence by the NTSB. In addition, a Philippines 737 sound is added at the bottom.

The linchpin of the cargo door explanation is the sudden loud sound on the CVR. I believe that to be the sudden rushing sound of the air molecules as they push outward to equalize the higher inner pressure to the lower outside pressure. (The Air India 182 CVR sudden loud sound is matched to the CVR sudden loud sound on the DC-10 cargo door crash in the Canadian government accident report. (Encl 16))

It is apparent to me that the four Boeing 747 accidents shown in Chart 12 match in everything but duration and that is measured in microseconds. All are less than a second. All are followed by an abrupt power cut. The cargo

door explanation states all Boeing 747 sudden loud sounds are produced by explosive decompression followed by severe disruption of the adjacent main equipment compartment cutting off power to FDR and CVR. The initial disruptive force is the explosive decompression but the ultimate destructive force is the 300 knots slipstream tearing off the entire nose.

The sudden loud sound does not match bomb or center tank explosion and is left as unexplained or called a vague structural breakup sound. A decompression air rushing sound would explain the sound spectrum of rise time, frequency components and amplitude. The abrupt power cut could be explained by nearby cables in adjacent main equipment compartment disrupted by the explosive force of the decompression.

Gentlemen, another clue to accident cause is the sequence of breakup and that is determined from wreckage plot. What departs the aircraft first may well be near the initial event. The NTSB has provided a study: Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 22B, Trajectory Study Supporting Material, page 45 in faded numbers and page 30 in dark numbers. (Encl 17) Among all the charts of pieces of the plane coming off and when, there is one chart that shows the first to go, that is page 30 chart, Forward cargo door trajectories. The first item is A489, fwd lower cargo bay struct, FS 900. That item left even before the last ASR radar beacon to Islip radar. The next item to go before anything else in the entire plane is A470, R fwd lower cargo bay struct, FS 820. There are five other forward cargo bay structures which are plotted and leave soon thereafter. On dark page number 29 lower frame stringer 40L-42R is shown to leave very early. (Encl 18)

The overall appraisal was made by Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 22A, Trajectory Study, page 3: "The wreckage distribution shows that parts were initially shed from the area just forward of the wing." (Encl 19) Please carefully agree, gentleman, cargo door is just forward of the wing and the center tank is not.

There is another interesting observation in an exhibit: Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." (Encl 20) On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge. (Encl 21)

Engine number three is on the right side inboard and would be the engine to throw off a stator blade to penetrate the right horizontal stabilizer. Engine number four is too far outboard of stabilizer. The left side stabilizer had no such engine part penetration.

Cargo door explanation relies heavily on engine number three data. It is the one to catch on fire, lands apart from the other three, throws off FOD into number four, ingests humans, and is heavily damaged upon retrieval. Engine number three may well be the ignition source for the center tank fire/explosion according to the cargo door explanation. The door ruptures/opens out and tears off, big hole appears, starboard engines ingest foreign objects, 300 knots tears nose off, wings and fuel tanks and fuselage fall and disintegrate and foddod on-fire engine number three or four ignites fuel vapor cloud and center tank at 7500 feet many seconds and thousands of feet lower after initial event of door rupture.

The four engines hold vital accident clues. To ignore and omit that information is wrong. They are four vacuum cleaners at the scene of the crime. The door rupture or center tank explosion would send debris into the engines. How much debris, what kind it is, what did the engines do, and what happened to them is vitally important. Blade tip rubs and inlet cowling damage reports are extremely relevant. Pratt and Whitney was not even a party to the investigation and no exhibit item was released of the engine breakdown. This is a grievous error, gentleman, can you correct it?

A stator blade was embedded in the right horizontal stabilizer right behind engine number three. This indicates engine number three was foddled early on and threw off pieces which is consistent with cargo door explanation and inconsistent with center tank explosion in which engines windmill and fall intact to water.

NTSB AAR 92/02, page 2, has engine number three foddled by baggage debris and throwing off fod into engine number four which caught fire. Both engines had to be shut down. (Encl 22) Early news reports had TWA 800 engine number three foddled with inlet cowl material and the only engine to show burn damage. UAL 811 had dents in right horizontal stabilizer and torn, punctured, and dented inlet cowl material according to AAR 92/02, page 7. (Encl 24)

The engine breakdown report is vital and is connected to the TWA 800 investigation by the stator blade in right horizontal stabilizer. The engines are involved; they are not innocent bystanders. Engine number three may be the center tank mysterious ignition source. Can you get powerplant breakdown report exhibit released? Can you confirm for yourselves engine number three burnt, foddled, or otherwise different from 1, 2, or 4?

The cargo door rupture explanation is very detailed and explains the evidence, from streak to red paint smears to center tank explosion. Please inquire for more details or peruse [www.corazon.com](http://www.corazon.com). At this stage I believe you gentlemen are not yet that interested in 'how' but 'if' door shattered in flight or on water impact. We agree door area did shatter but 'when' is the question. We agree the center tank exploded but 'when' is the question.

NTSB currently has center tank explodes first, then door shatters later, I suggest door area shatters first, then center tank explodes later. Door, then tank; or tank, then door? There is our item of difference in a concise sentence.

I offer hard evidence to support 'yes, door did rupture/open in flight for TWA 800.' (When center tank exploded is for later.)

1. Floor beam downward movement.
2. Hoop stress fractures.
3. Red paint smears.
4. Curved outward smooth door frame at aft edge of missing door piece.
5. Outward peeled skin.
6. Petal shaped outward rupture hole at aft midspan latch.
7. Aft midspan latch not attached to latch pin.
8. Inward crush of top piece of door.

Possible hard evidence of door rupture in flight:

1. Hinge overtravel impression damage.
2. Aft midspan latch pin damage.
3. Other matching items to confirmed cargo door opening, UAL 811, may be discovered with exhaustive examination of cargo door area.

Mr. Streeter and Mr. Wildey, here is my big picture overview: (Everybody means us.)

1. Everybody knows the poly-X wiring in early model Boeing 747s, including TWA 800, had problems of easily chafing in vibration in the past. Cargo door explanation says that happened again to TWA 800.
2. Everybody knows that chafed wiring can cause a forward cargo door motor to go to the unlatched position with UAL 811. Cargo door explanation says that happened again to TWA 800.
3. Everybody knows that high cycle Boeing 747s have a weak structural area aft of the flight deck and forward of the wing called Section 41 which requires retrofit of structural strengthening after 20000 cycles. Cargo door explanation says TWA 800 at 18000+ cycles had not had that retrofit and cargo door area was thus weak.
4. Everybody knows that a forward cargo door opening on an (1) aged (2) high flight time/high cycles (3) early model Boeing 747, UAL 811 (4) which took off in dusk or darkness (5) running late (6) and during climb (7) experienced a sudden initial event near the leading edge of wing in fuselage which left a (8) short (9) sudden (10) loud (11) sound on the cockpit voice recorder, an (12) abrupt (13) power cut to the flight data recorder, (14) foreign object damage to starboard engine #3, (15) more severe inflight damage on starboard side, (16) nine never recovered bodies, (17) port fuselage side forward of the wing relatively undamaged, (18) shattered, torn, and frayed skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side, (19) unusual paint smears in forward cargo door area, (20) rupture appearance of skin at aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door, (21) outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage, (22) vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward cargo door, (23) had hinge stay attached to top piece of forward cargo door, (24) and destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb but (25) later conclusively ruled out. Cargo door explanation says that all twenty five happened again to TWA 800.

Everybody knows an aged aircraft, TWA 800, with problem wiring, poly-X, with a weak area, Section 41, which had a previous fatal electrical fault cargo door opening in same model and type, UAL 811, could have a similar problem. AAR 92/02, page 92. (Encl 25) Cargo door explanation and evidence says that happened again to TWA 800. But only one believes it. And now maybe you two gentleman.

At least believe the evidence enough to complete an exhaustive examination of the forward cargo door of TWA 800 on the wreckage reconstruction. Thank goodness it's there. The landing gear doors, which have never killed anyone, got twenty two paragraphs of damage description in Exhibit 7A; the forward cargo door which has nine confirmed kills, got one sentence in Exhibit 15C.

At least believe the evidence enough to request that the powerplant breakdown exhibit be released as part of the public docket so that the results may be examined and compared with other engine breakdown reports of similar accidents, UAL 811, AI 182, and PA 103, a grouping suggested by NTSB document Chart 12 in Exhibit 12-B.

At least believe the evidence enough to pursue the cargo door explanation by going to [www.corazon.com](http://www.corazon.com) and reviewing analysis of government accident reports and contact me at [barry@corazon.com](mailto:barry@corazon.com).

At least believe the current evidence enough to personally examine possible new evidence such as hinge and latch pin of TWA 800 door hanging on wreckage reconstruction.

Mr. Wildey, there were three large poster photographs of TWA 800 reconstruction behind you on the platform during the inquiry hearing. One was of hundreds of pieces of wreckage, one was of starboard side and one was of port side of wrecked aircraft. We three all saw those three pictures every day. They were real and included real things. I have discussed real things that were in those three pictures so close to us at the hearing: 1. Hinge, 2. Pins, 3. Peeled skin, 4. Door frame, 5. Red paint smears, 6. Round rupture hole, 7. Bottom latches, 8. Missing door material, 9. Downward floor beams, 10. Hoop stress fractures, 11. Shattered starboard skin, 12. Smooth port skin, 13. Door manual locking handle, 14. Door pull in hooks. 15. Center tank, 16. Vertical tears, 17. Right horizontal stabilizer.

During the hearing on the other side of the stage were rotated large poster photographs. For the first few days one photograph was of the CVR sudden loud sound showing rise time and frequency analysis. I have discussed that real thing and the real things connected to it by NTSB Chart 12 in Exhibit 12-B, which groups UAL 811, PA 103, and AI 182 and TWA 800 together.

The three photographs of wreckage showed a hangar floor with parts and reconstruction. Nearby were other rooms with real things in them. I have discussed those real things:

1. Flight Data Recorder, 2. Engines. 3. Cabin interior.

At the inquiry in front of us on tables were reams and reams of paper compiled into exhibits for review and analysis. I have discussed those exhibits:

1. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Study, page 20, "Downward separation directions were noted at STA 900, 880, 840, 820, 800, and 780..." and ""The initial opening of the fuselage lower lobe (e.g. LF6A) would have the expected result of rapid depressurization accompanied by collapse of the main deck floor for some distance forward of STA 1000. The red area recovery of interior components as far forward as STA 600 would not be inconsistent with this floor collapse and associated structural breakup."

2. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Chairman's Factual Report of Investigation, page 11 which discusses direct circumferential tension or hoop stress tension found on lower right side skin in the red zone only.

3. Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 15C, Report Number 97-82, Section 41/42 Joint, Forward Cargo Door, "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill."

4. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Report, page 30: "It is therefore possible that new scenarios (sequences) may emerge as new information is acquired whether it be from newly identified parts, or simply a new interpretation of current information."

5. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 12-B, Sound Spectrum Study, page 21, Chart 12. The sudden loud sound on the CVR which is followed by an abrupt power cut which occurred on four high time Boeing 747s is displayed for comparison. TWA 800, Pan Am 103, Air India 182, and United Airlines 811 are plotted together in that sequence.

6. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 22B, Trajectory Study Supporting Material, page 45 in faded numbers and page 30 in dark numbers. One chart that shows the first items to go, that is page 30 chart, Forward cargo door trajectories. The first item is A489, fwd lower cargo bay struct, FS 900. The next item to go before anything else in the entire plane is A470, R fwd lower cargo bay struct, FS 820. There are five other forward cargo bay structures which are plotted and leave soon thereafter. On dark page number 29 lower frame stringer 40L-40R is shown to leave very early.

7. Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 22A, Trajectory Study, page 3: "The wreckage distribution shows that parts were initially shed from the area just forward of the wing."

8. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge.

Other real evidence was discussed as stated in official government accident reports:

1. US NTSB AAR 92/02 UAL Flight 811.
2. Canadian and Indian Aviation Occurrence, Air India Flight 182.
3. UK AAIB 2/90 PA Flight 103.
4. US NTSB CD-ROM .jpg pictures of TWA 800.

I realize not everything stated in reports is exact. It is as precise as possible and when discussing thousands of pieces of wreckage of a catastrophic mystery airplane crash there is room for modification of conclusions. Cargo door explanation is constantly altering precise sequence to accommodate new evidence such as downward floor beams and hoop stresses in TWA 800 forward area.

For open minds there are seven basic questions. For closed minds there are none.

The open minds ask these questions in any order:

1. How and why does forward cargo door open in flight?
2. How does open door in flight cause nose to come off for AI 182, PA 103, and TWA 800?
3. Why did nose of UAL 811 stay on?
4. AI 182 and PA 103 not a bomb?
5. TWA 800 not center tank as initial event?
6. Explosive decompression enough to tear nose off?
7. Is there a conspiracy to keep cargo door explanation quiet?

Let me answer those basic questions briefly:

1. I don't know about AI 182, PA 103, or TWA 800, but UAL 811 door open cause was electrical short to door motor to unlatch position which overrode safety locking sectors and failed switch and door unlatched and opened. PA 103 and UAL 811 had total forward cargo door openings while AI 182 and TWA 800 had rupture at aft midspan latch with bottom eight latches holding tight. Door openings were probably a result of aging aircraft, out of rig door, chafed aging faulty poly-x wiring, weakened Section 41 area, design weakness of no locking sectors for midspan latches, AAR 92/02, page 12, (Encl 26) and only one latch per eight feet of vertical door. AI 182, PA 103, and TWA 800 had similar circumstances.
2. Cargo door opens and huge ten by thirty foot hole appears in nose,

structural members of door and frame are missing, floor beams are fractured, bent, and broken, aircraft direction is askew, flight control surfaces affected, engines damaged, and 300 knots, more than the fastest hurricane or force five tornado on earth, hits damaged area and tears nose off within three to five seconds.

3. Nose of UAL 811 may have stayed on because pilot said he had just come off autopilot and did not fight plane as it gyrated, or plane was younger than others, or the time from door opening to tearing off was 1.5 seconds and allowed the pressurization to be relieved somewhat and six less feet of width of hole was torn off. Cargo door inadvertently opened on the ground during UAL preflight in 1991 and no damage was done. Cargo door opened in flight two inches on PA 125 in 1987 and stayed attached to fuselage and only damage was cost of fuel dumped. Cargo door opened in flight for UAL 811 in 1989 and nine died when door tore off. Cargo door explanation for AI 182, PA 103, and TWA 800 has door opening inflight, tearing off, and then nose tearing off leading to three similar accident wreckage patterns, debris fields and total destruction. Door openings have different consequences depending on altitude, speed and mode of flight.

4. Yes, not a bomb for AI 182 and PA 103 as initial event. Evidence refutes bomb explanation and is in government accident reports which careful analysis will reveal and documented on [www.corazon.com](http://www.corazon.com). Those accident investigators did not have the benefit of hindsight, the internet, or several subsequent similar accidents to compare and draw different conclusions.

5. Center tank exploded yes, but after door ruptured/opened, hole appeared in nose, nose torn off in wind, fuselage falling with disintegrating fuel tanks and ignited by fodded and on fire engine number 3 or 4 at 7500 feet thereby explaining the Chairman's question, "Why so few bodies burned?" The answer is they were not there to be burned. The nose came off with the passengers inside cabin and descended to ocean alone. The center tank exploded into nothingness not the passenger compartment.

6. Explosive decompression is enough to rupture pressurized hull at weak spot, one latch for eight feet of door, in a weak area, Section 41, but not enough to tear nose off. The ultimate destructive force is the 300 knots of slipstream, more powerful than any wind on earth. If cargo door popped in balloon, the large hole would appear but the nose would stay on. In a tornado, nose comes off within three to five seconds.

7. There is no conspiracy, no plot, no coverup by anyone involved with the cargo door explanation:

- a. No conspiracy of Sikh terrorists named Singh to put a bomb on AI 182; the door ruptured in flight.
- b. No conspiracy of Libyan terrorists or whoever to put a bomb on PA 103; the door ruptured in flight.
- c. No conspiracy to detonate a bomb on UAL 811 as the passengers thought, as the crew thought and told the tower who told the Coast Guard and crash crews on the ground as they prepared for a wounded 747 coming in after a bomb blast; the door ruptured in flight.
- d. No conspiracy to put a bomb on TWA 800, no conspiracy of terrorists to shoot a missile, no coverup by US Navy to hide accidental shootdown, no coverup by Boeing, NTSB, FAA, TWA who know the cargo door is the problem and are hiding that knowledge; the door ruptured in flight.

There is no conspiracy or cover up or plot but it is understandable for the public and others to believe that explanation: Cargo door cause is subtle.

1. The explosive decompression of door rupture mimics a bomb with noise and blast effects.
2. The events happen years apart in different jurisdictions with different

airlines.

3. Explosive decompression of door rupture leaves no direct evidence such as soot, only noise on CVR tape.

4. The cargo door manufacturer and operator are large and highly respected companies.

5. Explosive decompression causes secondary diversionary effects such as fireball from center tank explosion and relatively mild blast in cargo compartment of incendiary device.

6. A door opening and slipstream are considered trivial things by the public who thinks of a car trunk opening at highway speed not understanding high internal force of pressurization, large size of cargo door, and destructive force of 320 miles per hour on weakened structure.

7. Cargo door explanation assumes responsibility for rupture by manufacturer, operator, government, while bomb or missile can be blamed elsewhere.

Everybody involved is doing the best they can, including us, to find out what happened to TWA 800 based upon what we know, our experience, and the evidence.

So, gentleman, thank you for reading and thinking so far, let me end with respectful requests and an anecdote.

Please:

1. Conduct a complete examination of the forward cargo door area on the TWA 800 reconstruction and add an addendum to Exhibit 15C and then release the document to the public docket.

2. Request with good reasons that the powerplant group exhibit be released to the public docket.

3. Investigate the entire cargo door explanation for four high time Boeing 747 accidents by visiting [www.corazon.com](http://www.corazon.com), critically analyzing presentation and email comments to [barry@corazon](mailto:barry@corazon).

Here's a true story that just happened to me two weeks ago:

On the way to the NTSB hearing from SFO I noticed my assigned Boeing 757, not 747, come into the gate after a flight from Miami. As the baggage handler opened up the forward outward opening, non-plug cargo door, at least two pints of water rained down on him. He did not appear disturbed and then went about his business.

I deduced that the hot humid air in the cargo compartment condensed after take off from Miami into water on the cold metal fuselage skin and pooled inside until door opened and released outside on the ground in San Francisco. This much water on possibly chafed wire bundles in the forward cargo compartment would explain how wires got shorted out to turn on door motor to unlatch position for UAL 811 taking off from Honolulu. It would explain why three of the four 747s had door open in climb or shortly thereafter. We've all had the air conditioner turn on inside a hot humid car or passenger compartment and have water vapor condense into fog; or go out in the morning to have metal car covered in dew with no rain; or start descent in jet and have water vapor fill the cockpit. It is possible that enough fog and dew inside a large metal cargo door compartment could condense into two pints of water.

Water and chafed old faulty wiring in a known weak structure with a known faulty device is a dangerous combination. Let us make it safe.

Best Regards,

John Barry Smith

FAA commercial licensed pilot, instrument rated, former Part 135 certificate holder.

Light aircraft owner, Mooney M20C

2000 hours Navy aircrewman radar operator/electronics technician, P2V-5FS.

650 hours Navy reconnaissance navigator on carrier jet, RA-5C.

Survivor by ejection in sudden, night, fiery, fatal, jet airplane crash, June 14th, 1967.

(US Mail envelope with 26 formal enclosures and seven informal ones to be mailed tomorrow, 19 Dec, 97)

Above was letter to Mr. Wildey and Mr. Streeter.

Below is paragraph written in a long email of 19 Feb 97 from me which resulted in Secret Service interrogation. The Senator denies initiating the investigation and I believe him.

John Barry Smith> Please avoid the option to do nothing. In some cases that is wise, in this one it is not. The door hazard exists and can happen again with varying catastrophic consequences. May I be melodramatic, Senator? Why not. After the Tonkin Gulf incident in 1964, we attacked and bombed North Vietnam. After Pan Am 103 in 1988, we attacked and bombed Libya. After TWA 800 in 1996, we attacked and bombed Iraq; all for thought-to-be good reasons. Well, if Air Force One or any of the four E-4Bs (Airborne Command Posts) (all modified Boeing 747s with outward opening cargo doors) have that forward door open in flight tearing off fuselage skin allowing the 300 knot CAS slipstream to enter nose and tear it off leading to the death and destruction of all aboard including the President and other high officials, then we will attack and bomb somebody. And it would be wrong. Just fix the door again and prevent the crash is the answer. (The door has failed before.)

Below is excerpt from Newsday newspaper with Jessica Kowal writer. Although I repeated then, as I repeat now, there is no conspiracy, no coverup, and no plot about cargo door explanation, she still wrote I said there was a conspiracy. After the article was written, it is now known that the midspan latches have no locking sectors so were not fixed; and only eight of ten latches checked so not all latched; and event is so sudden there would be no time for discussion among the flight crew. Newsday did not respond to my immediate request for a retraction of the conspiracy accusation quote.

"John Barry Smith of Carmel Valley, Calif., said he's putting his theory on the Internet to save lives. After viewing pictures of a United Airlines 747 severely damaged when a forward cargo door opened during a 1989 flight, killing nine people, Smith decided cargo doors, not bombs, were the cause of explosions aboard Pan Am Flight 103, the 1985 Air India Flight, and now TWA Flight 800.

On his Web site, Smith uses photographs and documents to compare the United Airlines plane to the Pan Am and Air India planes and to conclude that malfunctioning cargo doors opened and ripped away the skin of the fuselages and then tore the noses off the planes. In an interview, Smith said he believes a door also fell off TWA Flight 800, and that the "streak of light" some say is a missile is actually the plane's falling cargo door reflecting light.

"This door is a prime suspect. This door has killed before," Smith said. "I didn't invent the cause of these crashes. The door popped open. It's not weird. It's a no-brainer. So that's when you get to the coverup."

The coverup, he said, is that Boeing and the federal government don't want to admit there's a major defect in the 747, potentially costing the company millions of dollars to fix and severely damaging the American economy.

Smith, who said he has been "sensitive" to doors since his finger was slammed in a car door when he was 5-years old, has contacted the White House, FBI, FAA, Air Force, NTSB, and airline insurance companies to alert them to his view of the problem.

"It's a case of human nature seeing what they want to see. They see a bomb, and they ignore what's in front of them," Smith said.

Several aviation officials dispute Smith's theory.

Boeing spokesman Doug Webb said the company knew of problems with 747 cargo doors a year before the United Airlines accident, and that the airlines have subsequently retrofitted them with steel-reinforced locks. NTSB spokeswoman Shelly Hazle said the agency examined TWA Flight 800's wreckage for a broken cargo door and discounted it as a cause of the crash. If the cargo door had opened in flight, a cockpit light would have gone on and the crew would have focused all their attention on the problem, Hazle said. Yet there is no discussion of the problem on the cockpit voice-recorder tapes, so the NTSB has ruled it out, she said. And, investigators said, Pan Am 103 and the Air India planes were both downed by bombs, not cargo doors."

The below was written in the New York Times, April 12th, 1997 by Matthew Purdy. The cargo door is put just before wacky explanation of laser beam, just as Chairman Hall did in opening remarks at public TWA 800 hearing.

"And they have hardly been bashful about relating their musings to investigators at the National Transportation Safety Board. One man writes at least once a week to the board, pushing his theory that the front cargo door blew off, setting in motion a catastrophic chain of events. Other amateur investigators have postulated that laser rays emitted from Long Island might have destroyed the plane."

Please, to compare cargo door to laser rays is an insult and I demand an apology. Or not. I'm joking. Laser rays are funny now but not in the future.

Cargo doors rupturing in flight are not funny now, never have been and won't be in the future.

Respectfully Submitted,

John Barry Smith  
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www.corazon.com



Aft midspan latch area of forward cargo door rupture area, petal of burst skin open above.



Aft midspan latch area of forward cargo door rupture area, petal of burst skin closed electronically above. The pieces retract perfectly into the original shape before rupture.



On left is curved outward, not inward, aft section of forward cargo door frame. Note smooth outward curve with no door pieces or aft midspan latch attached.



Red paint smears where they shouldn't be and white paint revealed where it shouldn't be.

There is also another red paint smear on the right horizontal stabilizer.





Two contrails overhead of Boeing 747s at sunset. Sun is reflected off fuselage into a bright flare obscuring wings and tail. If piece of fuselage, such as a door, were to fly off now, the ground observer would perceive a streak as the spinning metal object flew away erratically in a parabolic arc to the surface below, decelerating from 300 knots to zero in the horizontal plane and from zero to terminal velocity in the vertical plane.



Two more Boeing 747s at sunset reflecting red-orange light to observer below using digital camera with autoexposure. Bright reflection flare on fuselage at correct sun angle is actually much brighter than shown above.



The sun was shining thus on TWA 800 at 8:31 PM on July 17th 1996 when a piece of the fuselage burst off and spun away reflecting the sunlight to observers below. It is impossible to determine precisely where an object in space is moving based upon an observation on the ground. An upward streak could be an object moving down and vice versa. The Boeing 747 above appeared to me, the ground observer, to be climbing as it came toward me, that is, the contrail rose in a vertical path for fifteen minutes. The actual aircraft movement was probably level but it could have been descending. Apparent streak direction is independent of actual movement direction.



This is a Boeing 727 that had a mid-air collision. Fuel is leaking from the wing tanks and is on fire. Note there is no streak to leaking fuel on fire. Note fire stays close to aircraft. Note there is no explosion. Streak observed for TWA 800 was not leaking fuel on fire from center tank, it was shiny metal object spinning away in red-orange sunlight being perceived as streak to observers below.

James Hall  
Chairman,  
National Transportation Safety Board

Robert Francis II  
Vice Chairman  
National Transportation Safety Board

Sam Farr  
Member of Congress  
17th District, California  
House of Representatives  
Congress of the United States  
Washington, DC

John McCain  
Member of Congress  
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation  
United States Senate  
Washington, DC

Thomas E. Haueter  
Chief, Major Investigations Division  
National Transportation Safety Board

James F. Wildey II  
National Resource Specialist  
National Transportation Safety Board

Lyle Streeter  
FAA AAI  
Aircraft Accident Investigator  
FAA National Headquarters

Thomas McSweeney  
Director, Aircraft Certification Service  
FAA National Headquarters

Doug Kirkpatrick  
Aircraft Certification Service  
FAA National Headquarters

Neil Schalekamp  
Manager, Propulsion/Mechanical Systems and Cabin Safety Branch  
Transport Standards Staff  
Transport Airplane Directorate  
Aircraft Certification Service  
FAA, DOT

Ron Wojnar,  
Manager  
Federal Aviation Administration  
Transport Airplane Directorate,

Dear Chairman Hall,

9 Feb 98

I'm making a plea to you, sir; please interview me. Please interrogate me. Please question me. Please evaluate my intelligence analysis.

I quote you, sir, "The public hearing concluded on December 12, 1997, but the investigation will remain open. The Safety Board may at its discretion again reopen the hearing in order to make any new information part of the public record."

Please do that, Chairman Hall. Reopen the hearing, I suggest in Renton Washington or Calverton, and invite all the parties to include the engine manufacturer and examine all the exhibits to include the eyewitness, powerplant group, and wreckage plot.

Be a judge this time, not a prosecutor, and demand high standards of proof from each explanation group, CWT, bomb, missile, cargo door/wiring, and meteor. Please allow each explanation two hours. Give questions to rebut from your best investigators. Photographs, sounds, text, reports and idle speculation allowed. Stipulate all of the listed causes could have happened, but did they happen?

In the meantime, an important sequence event has been agreed upon by FAA: cargo door opened in flight for TWA 800.


Mr. Neil Schalekamp. Manager, Propulsion/Mechanical Systems and Cabin Safety Branch, the same directorate that earlier said forward cargo door all latched, all locked, and all intact until water impact has reevaluated that conclusion. Here is the new one in a 30 Jan 98 letter to me:

"While no one scenario has been categorically proven to be the cause, it is believed, based upon available data, that the center tank (CWT) explosion preceded any separation of the forward cargo door. The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT. Furthermore, you mentioned that the forward cargo door was recovered a considerable distance from the rest of the structure. This could be due to its aerodynamic characteristics and prevailing winds at the time of the accident, rather than attributing this as the primary cause of the accident."

This is coupled with your statement to me of 19 Dec 97 in which you said:

"However, to repeat, the investigation of the accident involving TWA flight 800 has revealed no evidence to suggest that a failure of a cargo door precipitated the event."

An important agreement has been reached: Forward cargo door opened in flight. The implications are profound.



As I read the implications of the two official statements:

1. Door opened and separated in flight.
2. Door opening and separation caused by CWT explosion.
3. Door flew far away.
4. Outward peeled skin and bulging at aft latch caused by outward force of CWT explosion which blew door open to separation.
5. Door area damage, structural deformation, not caused by water impact but by CWT explosion.
6. Shiny metal object was in air to reflect evening red orange sunlight.
7. CWT as initial event is 'believed,' 'based upon available data' to be correct but not certain and amenable with new data to be revised.

"...no evidence to suggest that a failure of a cargo door precipitated the event."

The implications of that statement are:

1. Cargo door failed in flight.
2. Failure of cargo door did not start the initial event.

To put the two statements together for current FAA and NTSB position:

1. Evidence shows cargo door opened in flight.
2. Belief is CWT explosion caused door to open in flight which caused paint markings and structural deformation.
3. Initial event which blew cargo door open was a CWT explosion.
4. Position is subject to change upon new evidence or interpretation of existing evidence.

The acceptance that the cargo door opened in flight may appear as a reasonable consequence to a large fuel explosion nearby. Fine. Let us agree solidly that the forward cargo door opened in flight and left paint markings and outward peeled skin as evidence. Why it opened is the next explanation sought. Here are the ones offered:

1. CWT blew door open which also blew nose off.
2. Bomb blew CWT up which blew door open and blew nose off.
3. Missile blew CWT up which blew door open and blew nose off.
4. Meteor blew CWT up which blew door open and blew nose off.
5. Electrical short from chafed poly x wiring turned on door motor to unlatch position which resulted in aft midspan latch rupture to door open to explosive decompression to blown away bottom of cargo hold to nose off to fireball and center tank explosion ignited by on fire engine number three or four to water impact.

May we agree to eliminate missile, meteor and bomb from lack of evidence in this discussion? Destruction sequence came from within, not without.

So, if CWT blew door open, it must have happened very quickly after explosion which means we are less than a second apart in agreement. If open door led to CWT explosion the time is still less than a minute. Altitude of initial event is within a few seconds also. Location in air of door opening is within a few miles. Location of initial event on TWA 800 is within a few feet. We are so close to agreement on initial event, Mr. Chairman.

After it is solidly agreed upon that door opened in flight, then many avenues of investigation open up, such as have there ever been any other high time Boeing 747s that shortly after take off suffered a door opening that left a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut to the FDR? Yes, of course, UAL 811. UAL 811 open door cause was chafed bare wire shorted to metal. I contend it happened again with TWA 800, known to have poly-x wiring and a non strengthened Section 41 retrofit.

NTSB Chart 12 of Exhibit 12B groups AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800, all of which had forward cargo door opening event and all have different reasons why it happened. The important thing is

cargo door opened in flight for those four. In fact, they all had aft midspan latch ruptures in the door, according to the government accident reports.

Which has more credence: a CWT as initial event and door blowing open as secondary event; or door opening as initial event and CWT explosion as secondary event. I contend the latter.

Boeing 747s suffer fireball and wing tank explosions as a secondary result of hull rupture, just recently the Saudi Airlines Boeing 747 burst into a fireball when hull ruptured by midair with a cargo plane. It has more credence to say fireball/fuel tank explosion happens after a catastrophic structural failure, not as the cause. I contend the center tank did explode on TWA 800 and it happened during the observed fireball; not before it nor after, but during. To say a center tank exploded during an observed fireball has more credence. To say the CWT explosion occurred before the fireball and was unseen has less credence.


CWT explosion as secondary event has more credence than initial event. As initial event CWT explosion has never happened on a 747. As secondary event fireballs have occurred before such as Saudi Airlines and PA 103 whose center wing tank and wing fell flaming down onto Lockerbie. Both wings were on fire and both secondary events to hull rupture in flight.

Now for door opening as secondary event to CWT explosion. When the CWT exploded it did not blow open the latched and locked passenger door nearby the shattered and opened forward cargo door of TWA 800. An all latched door to blow open at the door frame from a fluid explosion is rare. Or if the CWT explosion blew the forward cargo door open, why not the closer passenger door which is intact and in place on the wreckage reconstruction? The answer is the CWT was not the initial event.

It has more credence, based upon past accidents, that the initial event was door opening leading to structural failure leading to CWT explosion and observed fireball. It has less credence that initial event was CWT explosion leading to passenger door intact and further away cargo door all shattered and blown open. There are other reasons to believe door opened before CWT explosion:

A center tank explosion as initial event has lower credence because:

1. Above center tank is a long fuselage skin tear line one side of which has soot markings and the other side, an inch away, is pure white, untouched by flame. There was an explosion which sooted that white skin above tank but it had to happen after the nose separated. An initial event of CWT would have sooted the entire area, on both sides of tear line, not just one side.



2. A CWT explosion strong enough to blow door open and nose off would be picked up by CVR and wasn't. Sudden loud sound on CVR does not match fuel explosion but

does match previous cargo door explosive decompression in a DC-10 and UAL 811; and other high time Boeing 747 fatal accidents which were not center tank explosions, AI 182, PA 103, as shown by Chart 12 of NTSB exhibit 12B which groups them all with CVR printout of the that rare event of sudden loud sound followed by abrupt power cut to FDR. None was CWT explosion.

3. A CWT explosion pressure wave is slower than a bomb and the power cut to the FDR would not be as sudden as it was. The abrupt power cut matches abrupt power cut to UAL 811, a non CWT event.

4. A center tank explosion would give center damage, not unilateral. An explosion would give more or less equal in flight damage to both fuselage sides forward of the wing and yet the damage is unilateral with the port side very smooth, and the right side shattered. Key word is 'center' and it wasn't.

5. A CWT explosion as initial event which was strong enough to blow nose of 747 would burn those in the vicinity, that is, those passengers above and forward of the center tank. They weren't. They were not burned because they were not there to be burned.

6. CWT explosion would fodd engines more or less equally. The unconfirmed evidence shows only engine number three fodd, burnt, stator missing, and landing apart from other engines.

7. CWT explosion as initial event strong enough to blow nose off would be strong enough to blow up other fuel tanks, an event that took place 42 seconds later and thousands of feet lower at 7500 feet giving fireball observed by eyewitnesses, but not initially.

8. Leaking fuel on fire from aircraft does not present as streak, it presents as a fire close in to aircraft and white smoke, not a light streak far away from plane. Photo of midair with Boeing 727 shows leaking fuel tank fire close in to craft, white smoke, and no streak. Fire was secondary event, not initial.



9. CWT explosion can occur with midair. A structural breakup of a Boeing 747 which is disintegrating in flight can catch fire into a fireball as shown by the Saudi Arabian Airlines Boeing 747 involved in a midair over India. The initial event was not a center tank fire/explosion and yet there was a fireball.

10. Eyewitness pilot saw the fireball of TWA 800 and stated altitude of fireball was 7500 feet, yet the initial event for TWA 800 was at 13700 feet. No fireball at 13700 feet reported. A center tank explosion as initial event strong enough to blow off nose of 747 would have had to be silent, have no visible fire, weak enough to not blow up adjacent tanks, and leave strange soot marks. Very unlikely with low credence.

11. Center tank fire as secondary event has high credence. It was seen by observers, it was not heard on CVR because power had earlier been cut, the soot marks match the sooted skin above the tank but not above the earlier detached nose, the tank was torn apart by destructive wind forces as it fell, ignition sources were nearby to ignite the fuel vapor cloud as it dispersed from compromised wing, and the passengers were not burned because they were not there to be burned. They had earlier been thrown outside into the slipstream of the gaping hole where the nose had been while the forward passengers continued on with the nose to water impact, unburned.

An electrical short to door motor as initial event has higher credence because:

1. Explosive decompression produces loud sound and mimics a bomb for pressure damage on seats and baggage. The force of explosive decompression as a consequence of hull rupture at cargo door mimics the force of an internal fuel explosion on force of floor beams and stringers and outward force on skin. It is not unusual for the explosive decompression from an open door to be overlooked at first examination; the effects are subtle, the cause is compressed air molecules which leave no trace,

and it is an unpopular interpretation.

2. NTSB computer simulation traced inflight breakup of TWA 800 to above and forward of the wing on the right side, exactly where the hole is formed when the cargo door tears away with fuselage skin.

3. First objects to leave TWA 800 at event time came from the forward cargo hold, as described in Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 22B, Trajectory Study Supporting Material, page 45 in faded numbers and page 30 in dark numbers. Among all the charts of pieces of the plane coming off and when, there is one chart that shows the first to go, that is page 30 chart, Forward Cargo Structure trajectories. The first item is "A489, fwd lower cargo bay struct, FS 900." That item left even before the last ASR radar beacon to Islip radar. The next item to go before anything else in the entire plane is "A470, R fwd lower cargo bay struct, FS 820." There are five other forward cargo bay structures which are plotted and leave soon thereafter. The overall debris appraisal was made by Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 22A, Trajectory Study, page 3: "The wreckage distribution shows that parts were initially shed from the area just forward of the wing." Please agree, Mr. Schalekamp, cargo door is just forward of the wing and the center tank is not.

4. Cargo doors opening in flight are more common than inflight fuel tank explosions and thus have more credence because more likely to reoccur. A cargo door accident exists, UAL 811, with much evidence which matches TWA 800 and described in NTSB AAR 92/02. Two other Boeing 747 crashes exist, AI 182 and PA 103, with much evidence which matches TWA 800 and UAL 811, none of which was caused by a center tank fire. A left fuel tank fire accident of Iranian Boeing 747 exists which does not match TWA 800 in wreckage pattern, left wing alone, or extreme weather and lightning. A new Boeing 737 tank fire on the ground does not match an old Boeing 747 in flight. A KC-135 on the ground being serviced using JP fuel does not match a flying 747 using Jet-A.

5. Poly X wiring is known to be easily chafed from vibration and in aging aircraft cause fires and shorts as stated in NTSB public hearing on aging aircraft on Thursday in Baltimore. TWA 800 has poly-x wiring and was aged.

6. Section 41 is known to be a weak structural area on 747s and is strengthened at 20000 cycles. Section 41 is near the forward cargo door and TWA 800 had not yet had the strengthening retrofit with 'only' 15000+ cycles and 93000+ flight hours.

7. Right side of TWA 800 had more severe inflight damage than left indicating problem on right side, not center.

8. Stator blade in right horizontal stabilizer indicates engines not normal and fell to water windmilling but right side of aircraft near engine was spitting out fod. Engine number three is near forward cargo door on right side near the engine.

9. CVR of a previous 747 cargo door accident and two non center tank explosion 747 crashes match TWA 800 CVR.

10. FDR power cut of TWA 800 matches a 747 cargo door accident and two non 747 center tank explosion FDRs.

11. Sooting marks and abrupt stop of soot on fuselage above center tank show nose severed first and fire/explosion later. Only a mechanical problem to cause huge explosive decompression could cause such a catastrophe as the nose of a 747 to be torn off within three to five seconds.

12. Streak could be explained by shiny metal object spinning erratically away in evening red orange sunlight reflecting light to observers on ground who perceive surprised vision as streak. The time of day, the altitude of TWA 800, the angle of sun, the position of sun, plane, and observers is perfect for streak as shiny reflecting object.

13. Entire history of pressurized airliners rupturing in flight has been full of window/hatch/door open-

ings and rarely center tank explosions, while fuel tank explosions are common as secondary events when catastrophe occurs in flight. From the Comet to DC-10 to Boeing 747 UAL 811, hulls rupture in flight from inadvertent opening of the hull, not fuel tank explosions. Inadvertent opening has more credence as initial event than fuel tank explosion. Fuel tank explosion has high credence for secondary event.

14. Door opening in flight as result of fuel explosion is rare. If door properly secured it suffers same damage as nearby doors, not distinctly shattered. TWA 800 has shattered cargo door but nearby passenger door is intact.

15. Injuries of passengers is consistent with door open first then nose off then later fire/explosion after passengers are away from explosion.

16 Electrical fires have occurred in forward cargo hold of 747s before: Exhibit 9C, Attachments to the Systems Group Factual Report page 44, 45, 46:  
A. Nov 1, 1996, burning smell in forward cargo compartment, found damaged wiring shorted to ground, charring found.

B. Oct 12, 1996, Wire bundle arcing and resultant fire at aft bulkhead of forward lower lobe cargo hold on 747-200 freighter.



Wiring/door explanation is supported by evidence in the other cargo door open accidents, AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811 in official reports. Add TWA 800 and they all had the fuselage rupture forward of the wing and door burst open. Two governments imply bomb blew door open, one said electrical short, and another has CWT exploding. And they all have a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut at initial event time. They are all most likely the same cause, either all CWT explosions, all bombs, all meteors, all missiles, or all wiring short to door open motor.

A digression, Mr. Hall. I watched you sympathetically talk to the victim's families and their haughty reaction at the public hearing. When the victim's families ever complain again about the pace of the investigation, tell them that if Flight 800 had been all robot crew cargo plane that crashed in same spot, not much would have been done. But for their loved ones thousands of people have labored long and hard to find out the cause and spent millions of dollars, and anguished over it for a year and a half. For them is why we do it. It's all for them, not in spite of them. Their grief is disturbing their judgment. To assail those that wish to help is wrong. Yelling and calling out names may make them feel better but it does not solve the problem. Quiet conversation over charts, text, pictures, and drawings is best.

To summarize, recent letter by FAA branch manager from same directorate from which the initial dismissal of door came now says door opened in flight . The position that all cargo doors all latched and all locked at water impact is voided. The new position is door opened in flight and CWT explosion did it.

Let me present my case of electrical short from bad poly-x wiring to you or your expert representative, Chairman Hall. Give me my chance equal to missile and meteor guys.

Give me two hours and I can attempt to persuade you to electrical versus any other explanation such as tank explosion from mystery internal ignition source, or bomb that leaves no bomb sound or residue, or missile that has no corroborative evidence. The one that holds the evidence together is electrical short that shorted to metal and turned door unlatch motor on and aft midspan latch, with no locking sector, turns just a bit past dead center, and 38115 pounds of compressed air pressure on the aft midspan latch and it ruptured, then increasing fast moving molecules opened whole door leaving red paint smears above just before explosive decompression blew out twenty by forty feet of fuselage skin on the right side forward of the wing. Like it all happened before as described in NTSB AAR 92/02 for UAL 811.

Can I go down to Los Angeles to meet an NTSB representative who will give his full attention to the wiring/cargo door explanation?

An explanation that includes chafed wiring to cargo door to CWT explosion is an explanation that comes from NTSB gathered evidence over the years. It is only through the diligence of NTSB years ago that another similar accident can be matched, UAL 811 to TWA 800. NTSB has only had the full investigation for less than two months. Another approach is to start with a clean sheet of paper. Shake off the FBI and their inherent distrust and secrecy. This is an airplane crash, not a bank robbery.

The position that forward cargo door opened in flight for TWA 800 is the key to cracking the case. The case of TWA 800 called the fuselage was cracked when hull ruptured when small hole appeared and allowed explosive decompression to take out huge rectangle of skin which allowed the 300 knots to tear nose off which allowed wing to fall and disintegrate and be ignited by nearby fodded and on fire jet engines. Small hole appeared when chafed wire shorted door motor to on which attempted to unlatch door but bottom eight locking sectors held so only aft midspan latch, with no locking sector, was able to come partially unlatched which allowed the 38115 pounds of internal force to burst through latch area.

To substantiate above analysis requires pointing to pictures in AARs, reading text from NTSB Exhibits, and looking at drawings from AAIB report. I can do that in person with you or your representative either here in Carmel Valley California, Los Angeles, San Francisco, or even in Renton, Washington. Have I not earned the right to that consideration based upon my analysis that door opened in flight as determined by the evidence of TWA reconstruction and now agreed upon by authority? Can you set up an appointment with me with one of your NTSB investigators?

Very Respectfully Submitted,

John Barry Smith  
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James Hall  
Chairman,  
National Transportation Safety Board

Dear Chairman Hall,

11 Feb 98

An important new agreement has been implicitly agreed upon by FAA and NTSB regarding the forward cargo door of TWA 800: It opened in flight. It was not all latched and all locked and all intact at water impact but separated in flight. The new conjectured cause of the door opening in flight has been identified as the center tank explosion as the initial event. I offer evidence that the initial event was bare chafed wire shorting to ground and turning on door unlatch motor leading to rupture at aft midspan latch leading to explosive decompression leading to nose off leading to center tank explosion in observed fireball.

FAA and NTSB position is center tank explosion and soon thereafter forward cargo door separated in flight. I contend door separated in flight and soon thereafter the center tank exploded. The difference in agreement is which came first, the tank explosion, then the door separation; or door separated, then center tank explosion. The evidence on hand reveals the correct sequence.

Previously sent to you is a letter requesting to be interviewed by aircraft accident investigator profes-

sionals regarding this door first sequence. The letter lays out the reasons for door first then tank explosion, and against tank first, then door separation.

The conclusion of door opened in flight may appear reasonable and is. The implications of that conclusion are profound. It cracks the case for TWA 800. It explains the evidence. It matches other door opened in flight Boeing 747 accidents from which other conclusions may be drawn. It makes clear the forest of four cargo door separating in flight 747 accidents of which TWA 800 is but the latest and probably not the last.

Four fatal 747 accidents in which the aft midspan latch is ruptured and the forward cargo door separated in flight: AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800, and the cause is the same, either all bombs, or all missiles, or all center tank explosions or all meteors, or all chafed wire shorting to ground...as clearly described in NTSB AAR 92/02 for UAL 811, the tree in the forest that was not totally cut down and thus available to be examined closely for the cause that almost did it in.

Door separating first in flight explains streak, explains the non-burned bodies, explains the ignition source of the fireball, explains the abrupt stop of sooting on top of fuselage, explains intact passenger door and shattered nearby cargo door, explains location of cargo bay wreckage in red zone, explains sudden loud sound on CVR, and explains abrupt power cut to FDR.

The next step is to examine the wreckage reconstruction of TWA 800 for bare chafed wires in the forward cargo hold that match AAR 92/02 bare wires on page 54 with enlargement on page 55.

As always, I invite questions and demands for documentation to support my claims.

Very Respectfully Submitted,

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Mr. Sam Farr  
Member of Congress  
17th District, California  
House of Representatives  
Congress of the United States  
Washington, DC

Dear Congressman Farr,

23 Mar 98

Hello again so soon, but bad news. I had previously written the below to you last week:

"I'm putting my hopes the wiring/cargo door evidence will get a chance to be heard in a proposed upcoming meeting with NTSB officials face to face, as suggested by Senator McCain. My previous letter outlined that event."

That proposed meeting by Chairman McCain has been denied by Chairman Jim Hall of NTSB who wrote in 17 Mar 98 letter to me, "'Chairman John McCain has forwarded to the National Transportation Safety Board your correspondence dated February 13, 1998, requesting a meeting with Safety Board personnel.

As stated in our most recent letter dated March 10, 1998, the TWA flight 800 investigation team has gathered sufficient facts to rule out the possibility of an in-flight opening of a cargo door. We do not believe a meeting is necessary to further discuss this issue."

As you may imagine, Mr. Farr, this refusal of NTSB to meet a citizen to discuss matters of national safety is very, very disturbing on many levels.

The political level is an appointed lawyer to a safety board is refusing to comply with an elected official's request to meet with a citizen. What is going on? In a dictatorship, appointees rule; in a democracy elected officials rule. Yes?

After much thought on this failure to obtain a hearing with aviation experts who reject a meeting for unsubstantiated reasons about the forward cargo door of TWA 800, I believe I must now think politically and not technically. To learn politically I offer to be your intern, Mr. Farr.

May I offer myself for the position of intern to the Honorable Congressman from 17th District, California, with specific duty to be liaison with US Senate regarding aviation safety matters, specifically the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation which has the forward cargo door issue referred for review by the Chairman. This unpaid volunteer position would have limited duration and narrow duties, that is, to keep you informed of aviation matters concerning the House and Senate until the final report on TWA 800 is issued by the NTSB. Daily written reports required from intern.

As an intern learning the political ways of transportation policy and accident investigation I would of course be in close contact with the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and Subcommittee on Aviation, chaired by the Honorable John J. Duncan of Tennessee, with whom you have been in contact asking for his attention in the TWA 800 case.

It's an idea, Mr. Farr, and should you offer me the job, I'll gleefully accept. I'm a 54 year old retired married father who's never too old to learn. Politics seems interesting, yes?

It's apparent that NTSB will not take me seriously unless your authority is used. NTSB is a Congress mandated safety board, not an executive branch agency such as FAA. You are the boss of NTSB. This rejection by appointed Chairman Hall of the modest suggestion by elected Senator McCain is an affront to elected officials everywhere.

The civil servants, that's Mr. Hall, have taken over the mansion of democracy from the unworthy owners, citizens and their elected representatives, that's you and me, Congressman. It's a serious breach of consensual government rule of law.

Following your example of appending correspondence to keep the principals informed, I have included my strong response to Chairman Hall and Chairman McCain regarding the rebuff of Senator McCain's suggestion that NTSB and I meet to relate my concerns regarding the opening of the forward cargo door on TWA 800.

You asked one very important question of me, "What makes the doors open?" At the time, I could only answer for sure for one fatal accident, UAL 811. Now, after the public hearings, the release of data, and current analysis, I can report that the other three similar accidents had the same cause as the confirmed one; that is, chafed bare wire shorts on door motor to unlatch position and cargo door ruptures in flight causing explosive decompression which tears huge hole in side of nose. Wiring becoming frayed through time and shorting out is the larger problem than 747 cargo doors opening in flight. Cargo door opening is a symptom, not a cause.

But first, cargo door confirmed as opening in flight for TWA 800. I can do that with meetings with NTSB officials. They will not meet with a citizen or if they did under pressure, would give little weight to conclusions. They would meet with the intern liaison regarding aviation safety from Congressman's Sam Farr's office.

I can start immediately.

Best Regards,

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Attachment below:

1. Letter to Senator McCain.

John McCain, Arizona,  
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation  
United States Senate

Dear Senator McCain,

23 Mar 98

I've just received a very distressing letter from Jim Hall, Chairman of NTSB. He refuses to meet with me as suggested by you. My high hopes from your letter are dashed by his letter. His text to me in his 17 Mar letter states,

"Chairman John McCain has forwarded to the National Transportation Safety Board your cor-

dependence dated February 10, 1998, requesting a meeting with safety board personnel.

As stated in our most recent letter dated March 10, 1998, the TWA flight 800 investigation team has gathered sufficient facts to rule out the possibility of an in-flight opening of a cargo door. We do not believe a meeting is necessary to further discuss this issue."

Can you believe it? What to do? I have responded to Chairman Hall's no meeting 17 Mar letter with my letter attached to this one expressing my extreme dismay in clear terms. Bridges may have been burned.

I now believe one meeting with the Northwest Region NTSB representative in his office during normal working hours to discuss an agenda suggested by you, relating my concerns regarding the forward cargo door of TWA800, is not sufficient to present my nine years of research. It will take more than one meeting to open their closed minds, especially if they were now to meet me under duress.

May I suggest several possible solutions to this political face off:

1. You choose the time and place of a meeting, maintain your previous agenda, and let me invite a few aviation experts.
2. Tell Chairman Hall to reconsider his brash refusal to comply with your modest request for a meeting between NTSB representative and an informed citizen.
3. Accept me as a volunteer intern with specific duty as liaison between the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation and NTSB regarding a matter that has been referred by you to the committee for review, a possible cargo door mechanical cause for TWA 800. The liaison would only concern a narrow subject, forward cargo door possible mechanical cause for TW 800 and have a definite time limit to expire upon publishing of the completed Aircraft Accident Report for TWA 800.

The two letters from NTSB which state they will refuse to meet or respond to further inquiries about TWA 800 from me nor to accede to your request for discussion and a meeting are very, very disturbing. As a former Naval Officer, I respect the chain of command. Who is the senior Chairman? In a democracy, elected officials are always senior to appointed, yes? What is going on? Why rebuff you over such a trivial matter as setting up a meeting between citizen and public servant? It stinks. The civil servants, that's Mr. Hall, have taken over the mansion of democracy from the unworthy owners, citizens and their elected representatives, that's you and me, Senator. It's a serious breach of consensual government rule of law.

Political maneuvering is not my area; airplanes are. Let me, somehow, become involved with NTSB and the Committee regarding the narrow issue of TWA 800. I was going to report back to you after the meeting with facts, data, and evidence which led the attendees to some closely reasoned conclusions, the main one being whether inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door was a reasonable line of inquiry, or not. I was going to use descriptions and explanations that we, as former Navy aviator/flight officers, would understand. Let me do the same through stronger authority as an intern with duties as Committee Liaison to NTSB.

FAA has a NTSB liaison in Mr. Lyle Streeter of FAA HQ. His job is to inform FAA of all activities related to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). My offer is more constrained and only would apply to TWA 800 for a limited time. But just as necessary.

I'm a 54 year old retired married father who volunteers to be intern to the office of the Honorable Senator from Arizona; an intern to learn US government transportation workings with specialty in aviation and specific area of interest, TWA 800. As part of internship, a liaison assignment to NTSB and Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation could be made. Daily written reports from intern required. Scope and duration of unpaid internship liaison would be limited. As an intern I would be a neutral and provide mutual communication between NTSB and the committee. It's an idea, sir. I would certainly accept with much appreciation if offered the internship.

This is the second time Chairman Hall has rejected your suggestions. The first was passenger

representative on the TWA 800 investigation team that may have been prevented by him, but a meeting between official and citizen is not. NTSB has a closed mind on TWA 800 even though you have been patient, you advised me to wait, and I did, and still the investigation drags on with no satisfactory answers for manufacturer, FAA, or victim's families. And NTSB refuses to consider alternative explanations based on hindsight and new evidence. It is very distressing. A stronger solution is needed.

The evidence is the troubling part, not me. The evidence must be given a chance for fair appraisal. It has not yet been given that chance in 20 months while other explanations such as bomb, missile and mystery fuel tank explosion have, while wiring/cargo door patiently waited for its turn. It now appears that turn may never come.

Can you affect that fair appraisal of the evidence in TWA 800? I've attached some new hard evidence just gleaned from the recently released NTSB public docket exhibit 8A, powerplant report, which indicates engine number three, the one closest to cargo door, ingested 'soft bodies' and had a fire which produced 'soot'. It was the only engine to do so. The FOD and fire evidence is the type which requires fair appraisal.

It may already be too late. Cargo door problems for 747s have been traced to faulty wiring. Faulty wiring has recently been traced to uncommanded rudder movements resulting in almost uncontrollable rolls in 737s. The recent mystery Silk Air 737 crash is related to uncontrollable flight. Faulty wiring may be causing the 747 and 737 flight anomalies, one with open doors in flight for 747s and another with yaw dampers for 737s.

But one step at a time. First to confirm if cargo door opened in flight on TWA 800. I can do that if given the chance to present the evidence to aviation safety experts such as NTSB from a status that will bring serious attention, such as a liaison between the Committee and NTSB while serving as intern fulfilling assignment to review a matter in committee.

A meeting now with less status may not be productive because of their stated reluctant to hold it all.

What really bugs me is that if I were a former flight leader, squadron commander and elected over and over again to important positions of government power, then to rise to Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and an appointed lawyer chairman of a safety board figuratively told me, "No, Mr. Chairman, bad idea to meet citizen, no can do. Request for meeting denied. Goodbye." I would be very very upset, and I am.

Here would be a more pleasing letter from a mythical Chairman NTSB,  
"Dear Honorable Senator Chairman John McCain, thank you for contacting me personally regarding Mr. Smith's concerns relating to the forward cargo door of TWA flight 800. He wants a meeting. Consider it done. I have called Citizen Smith and am flying out there to meet with him to allay his concerns. I will report back to you on that evening with a progress report and any conclusions reached. Pilot Smith shall be satisfied.

I assume Mr. Smith asked us first, before disturbing your routine. If he and I have not yet met it may be because the NTSB believes sufficient facts have been gathered to rule out this possibility of an in-flight opening of a cargo door. But we will check again! Thank you for your suggestion we do.

It is such a pleasure to hear from you since the last time we spoke. I have had time to reflect on what you said and I now can say that I agree with you more than ever.

Thank you for your interest in aviation safety.

Chairman  
NTSB"

Forgive my satire of correspondence, it is my way of reducing tension created with the contradiction of my reality of political relationship between you and Jim Hall and what he thinks it

...  
We know what it was like to be a few seconds from disaster in a coming apart airplane, just as the 230 TWA 800 passengers knew. We are here to tell about it and try to prevent it from ever happening again.

When receiving rude and rejecting letters like the no meeting letter from Chairman Hall, I always go back to LCDR C. T. Butler for inspiration to continue. Mr. Butler was kind enough to think of me when he found himself 200 feet off the runway at night after a FCLP pass and the starboard engine foddred from a loose titanium bolt. We had completed our pass and were climbing to turn downwind. The engine caught on fire, lost thrust and started to descend. I knew none of this in my little cockpit behind the pilot. All I heard was a soft whooshing from the starboard engine. In that time of peril for his life, Mr. Butler thought enough of fellow crewman to tell me to eject. And I did. And he did. And I lived and he died because we high enough for my chute to open but two seconds later we were not high enough for Mr. Butler's chute to open.

So now I am thinking about others in peril. That's my motive, as best as I can describe it to myself.

Please help me. Please use my experience and knowledge. Please use your power.

Best Regards,

John Barry Smith

Attachments below:

1. Cargo door for TWA 800 to Committee for review.

19 December 1996, Senator John McCain R-AR, Chairman, Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, writes, "Thank you again for contacting me with your concerns regarding the potential hazards involving Boeing 747s. As you know, I have passed the information you sent to Chris Paul and he has informed me of your findings. I have since forwarded the material you sent to the Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee for their review."

2. Concerns to be related to NTSB when opportunity arises for discussion.

1. water in forward cargo bay.
2. chafed bare wire touched by water.
3. electrical short occurs.
4. forward door motor turns on to unlatch position.
5. aft midspan latch of forward cargo door partially unlatches.
6. pressurized hull ruptures at aft midspan latch.
7. cargo door tears into pieces, some pieces stay with nose, some don't.
8. explosive decompression occurs shattering cargo door area forward of the wing on right side exposing twenty foot by forty foot hole in nose producing sudden loud sound on CVR.
9. 300 knots slipstream tears weakened nose off.
10. ejected debris is ingested by starboard engines which catch fire.
11. wing and wing fuel tanks; engines, tail, and fuselage fall and disintegrate on way down.
12. fiery starboard engine ignites fuel vapor clouds from disintegrating tanks, including center tank.
13. fireball observed on the ground.
14. water impact of wreckage, cargo bay material among first to land.

3. New evidence and analysis which supports forward cargo door opening inflight and allowing foreign objects to be ingested into number 3 engine with resultant fire.

NTSB Docket SA 516, Exhibit 8A, Powerplants Group Chairman's Factual Report,

Page 2, paragraph 2, "After the engines were recovered, they were transported to the former Grumman facility at Calverton, New York, for disassembly. The disassembly of the engines commenced on August 12, 1996, in the presence of the Powerplants Group. The disassembly was completed on August 16, 1996."

Analysis by JBS>

1. Wrong to send to empty hangar, right to send to engine teardown facility. Wrong thing done in haste to examine engines at Calverton.
2. Five days for four engines? One day and a bit per engine is incredibly fast to disassemble one of the most complex and precise machines on the planet. It's not a bicycle. A forensic powerplant teardown is likely to require several man hundred hours per engine with several thousand hours of metallographic back up work. Additionally many specialized tools are required to do this. There should be many thousands of feet of tape or pictures. Haste is evident in a one day teardown per engine in an empty hangar with only one engine specialist present.

Page 2, paragraph 3, "The disassembly of the engines consisted of removing the cowling, external components, fan, and low pressure compressor (LPC) to expose the high pressure compressor (HPC), diffuser, combustor, high pressure turbine (HPT), low pressure turbine (LPT), and turbine exhaust cases. Engine No. 3 was disassembled further to remove and partially disassemble the HPC. The disassembly of the engines did not show any indications that any of the engines had sustained any uncontainments, case ruptures, fires, or penetrations."

Analysis by JBS>Why was only engine 3 disassembled further? What evidence was seen in No. 3 to warrant further investigation? Why were not the other three engines disassembled further? The four most important jet engines in an airplane crash in history were not given comprehensive teardowns. The conclusion statement of no uncontainments is contradicted by other exhibit which states 'stator blade' was found in right horizontal stabilizer. The conclusion statement of no fires in any engines is contradicted later in this same report with raw data indicating sooting in engine number 3. The conclusion statement of no penetrations of any engine is contradicted by raw data in this report indicating soft body impacts on blades. The conclusion statement of everything normal in the engines is contradicted by photograph of TWA 800 engine retrieval showing forward stator stage missing and irregular FDR EPR readings.

Pages 16 through 22 discuss fuel samples which are mainly irrelevant in a discussion about engines and teardown results. 33% of engine report is not about engines but about favored NTSB explanation of center tank fuel explosion as initial event.

Exhibit 8A, Page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and the tips outboard of the outer midspan shroud were bent forward slightly. About half of the fan blades had impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of the impact damage to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the midspan shroud on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body impacts along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body impact, which had some streaking extending rearward."

Analysis by JBS>Less than half of complete fan blades in the fan rotor were recovered, not the 95% recovered figure given by Chairman Hall about TWA 800 recovered wreckage. Only 58% of the fan blades were recovered so it is very possible 'stator blade' found in right horizontal stabilizer was from engine number three directly in front. "Almost all" of the 'impact damage,' was explained which implies some wasn't. All had soot. Soot means fire. Only engine number three had any sooting inside engine. One full blade and one partial blade had 'soft body impacts'. There is nothing normally soft inside a jet engine. Soft body impact means foreign object damage. FOD may mean fire. Fire means soot. Missing blades in engine and one found directly aft in right horizontal stabilizer means uncontainment. Uncontainment means engine not intact at water impact but inflight.

Analysis above on raw data gives conclusions engine number three alone had foreign object damage in flight, had fire, and had partial disintegration. Engine 3 was the only engine to give

... FOD to engine 3 when cargo door inadvertently opens in flight. A fodded and on fire engine number three could provide the mystery ignition source for the center tank fire/explosion/fireball.

5. Response letter to Chairman Hall after he refused meeting.

National Transportation Safety Board  
Office of the Chairman  
Jim Hall  
490 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W.  
Washington, DC 20594-2000

Dear Chairman Hall,  
March 1998

23

I've just received your 17 March 98 letter in which you decline to meet with me to relate my concerns about the forward cargo door of TWA 800. As you were writing to me on 17 March saying no meeting, I was writing to you on 17 March offering to meet your representative in his NTSB office during normal working hours on an agenda determined by higher authority, Senator John McCain.

It is now apparent that one meeting with a NTSB representative will be insufficient to adequately lay out my nine years of research into the wiring/cargo door rupture explanation for four Boeing 747 fatal accidents, including TWA 800. One meeting under duress will not be productive when one party is resentful.

Something more is needed. I shall go back to my elected representatives for advice.

The affront to Chairman McCain is astonishing. It is not as serious as disobeying a lawful order from a senior officer in combat during wartime which might result in court-martial and execution, but it is serious enough so that a possible reasonable mechanical explanation for a crash cause will remain unconfirmed and unfixed, therefore allowing the faulty door to repeat its killing, as it has done before.

In the meantime, I will respond to your 17 March 98 letter in detail, giving it the close scrutiny a letter from a senior appointed official of the United States government to a citizen deserves.

You write, "Chairman John McCain has forwarded to the National Transportation Safety Board your correspondence dated February 13, 1998, requesting a meeting with Safety Board personnel."

I note you refer to Senator McCain as 'Chairman'. Yes, sir, he is a chairman, Chairman of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the United States Senate. And he wanted you to meet with a person to relate concerns regarding the forward cargo door of TWA 800. Not a difficult thing to do. But failed to accomplish.

That's the second time you have rebuffed Chairman McCain's suggestions regarding this matter. You earlier declined his suggestion I assist the TWA 800 investigation team as a passenger representative. And now you refuse to follow his suggestion that an NTSB representative meet with me.

A basic civics lesson may be in order. NTSB is a Safety Board set up and guided by the legislative branch while funded by the executive branch. NTSB is overseen by Congress. Elected officials determine NTSB personnel and direction. Senator John McCain, as chairman of the committee that oversees transportation matters in the United States, is your boss. In a dictatorship, appointed officials rule; in a democracy, elected officials rule. You were appointed; John McCain was elected.

The chairman of the Senate transportation committee had earlier reviewed the forward cargo door explanation for TWA 800 and deemed it serious enough to refer to the full committee for review. Chairman McCain advised me to wait. I waited. The public hearings in Baltimore are long concluded with still no satisfactory explanation of the cause of TWA 800. Chairman McCain reviewed my appraisal of the evidence at the hearings and thought it serious enough to ask for followup. He suggested that NTSB and I have a meeting, at my request, to relate my concerns. You have summarily dismissed the suggestion. You not only rejected my request but Senator McCain's request.

The reason you give is in the next paragraph, "As stated in our most recent letter dated March 10, 1998, the TWA flight 800 investigation team has gathered sufficient facts to rule out the possibility of an in-flight opening of a cargo door."

Wrong. Not true. Error. Incorrect. Not 'sufficient.' Not "adequate, complete, finished, done, or work over."

The right answer is "insufficient, inadequate, incomplete, not finished, undone, work in progress."

I believe sufficient facts have been gathered to rule in the possibility of the in-flight opening of the forward cargo door of TWA 800. There are ten latches in the door and only eight have been checked.

And apparently, Chairman McCain thinks so too. That's why he asked for a meeting between me and a NTSB representative. Not a huge favor to ask. But still refused by you.

Sufficient means all ten of something checked when ten available. Insufficient means eight of ten checked when ten available. NTSB has checked eight latches of the forward cargo door when it has ten. You or Bernard Loeb may believe eight of ten is sufficient but former Naval aviator and flight officer McCain and Smith know that in high speed aircraft, ten of ten door latches checked and then checked again is barely sufficient. Eight of ten latches checked once and not rechecked is insufficient and if a student pilot conducted a preflight as sloppy as that, he would be grounded by his instructor.

You have written me that a letter previously told me sufficient facts had been gathered. You wrote me a team had gathered sufficient facts. But you never personally tell me that, do you? Let me hear you say, Chairman Hall, "I have gathered sufficient facts to rule out the possibility of an in-flight opening of the forward cargo door of TWA 800."

You can't do it because you know about the ten latches in the door and yet only eight checked. It's as if you are leaving an out, so that when the forward cargo door is shown to have opened in flight, you can blame the 'investigation team' for the error of judgment.

The 17 Mar 98 letter concludes, "We do not believe a meeting is necessary to further discuss this issue."

It is the word, 'further,' that has finally provoked me. You have never discussed this issue with me. Your 'investigation team' has never discussed 'this issue.' You have told me nonsense which, when rebutted with facts, is never replied to. You have told me generalities and unsubstantiated conclusions. You have never asked questions about 'this issue.' Any 'further' discussion from NTSB would be the 'first' discussion.

You are an aviation safety official refusing to talk about aviation safety with an informed citizen at the urging of an elected official. You refuse to have a meeting of minds to exchange ideas about the forward cargo door of TWA 800, a known killer of nine passengers. TWA 800 was a United States civilian airliner that crashed in peacetime in United States airspace killing 130 citizens and launching an investigation that has dragged on for twenty months now and still counting with no explanation to satisfy the manufacturer, the FAA, or the victim's families. The investigation is ongoing yet you refuse to consider a reasonable mechanical alterna-

...with proceeding. You refuse to honor suggestions from a former elected official in your administrative area. Your mind is shut and closed tight in the middle of an investigation. You are unclear on the concept of ongoing aircraft accident investigation. You have betrayed the public trust in aviation safety Congress has given you in appointing you Chairman of the NTSB.

I believe you are afraid of a meeting. You do not want to hear about an explanation that agrees with your appraisal of a center tank explosion but backs up in time to events prior to that explosion.

You are afraid of being wrong. Chairman Hall, yet you have already shown yourself personally to be wrong. In the "...most recent letter dated March 10, 1998..." NTSB states, "Should you continue to reiterate your position on this issue in future correspondence, you should expect no further response from the Safety Board." And yet, a week later, 17 Mar, you do give response. You did not do what you said you were going to do. Senator McCain told me in 4 Mar letter he 'contacted the NTSB' on my behalf about my concerns. He did. Senator McCain does what he says he will do.

You are afraid of looking bad, a worry for a politician but not for a diligent crash investigator. All investigations have errors, some trivial, some serious. The reputable investigators blush at the error and fix it.

NTSB was wrong in another Boeing 747 wiring/forward cargo door fatal accident, UAL 811 as written up in NTSB final aviation accident report 90/01 in which the probable cause was given as inadvertent forward cargo door opening in flight because of improper latching. Upon examination of new evidence, retrieval of actual door from ocean floor, the original probable cause was shown to be wrong and was changed to the correct cause, chafed wiring shorting on door motor to unlatch position which allowed forward cargo door to open in flight leading to explosion decompression, a huge hole in the side of the nose, and the loss of nine passenger's lives. The correct probable cause was given an entirely new NTSB AAR, 92/02. That important admitting of error and correction now shows its worth years later when another high time 747, TWA 800, suffered a hull rupture forward of the wing leaving a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut to the FDR, exactly like UAL 811.

I have the outlandish, cranky, weird claim it happened again. And apparently Chairman McCain thinks enough of the possibility to warrant further investigation which starts with a meeting between me and the NTSB. Which you have declined to provide.

For senior aviation safety officials to state that they will not respond to citizens giving documented substantiation for a supplemental explanation for a plane crash is bizarre. It's past bizarre; it is a breakdown in the democratic process of elected government. The civil servants, that's you, Mr. Hall, have taken over the mansion of democracy from the unworthy owners, citizens and their elected representatives, that's me and Senator McCain. It's a serious breach of government rule of law.

Chairman Hall, you have put yourself in a precarious political situation. You have put your career, the reputation of the NTSB, and the lives of passengers on Boeing 747s at risk by relying on opinion, not facts, that UAL 811 cause did not repeat, that all ten latches were latched, that the door did not open in flight, that the cargo door was intact at water impact, and that the open cargo door was not the initial event. And you have put everything to risk even when given hard evidence in NTSB photographs, charts, and text that the aft midspan latch ruptured, the door opened in flight, the door shattered in flight before water impact and the door rupture happened before center tank explosion. You have a closed mind impervious to facts, data, and evidence. And even impervious to suggestions by a:

1. Former jet pilot.
2. United States Senator.
3. Chairman of the transportation committee.
4. Survivor of a sudden disintegrating jet airplane crash.
5. Your elected leader.

You have made a serious error of judgment, Mr. Hall, by refusing to honor a request from

SENATOR MCCAIN HAS TO DECIDE FROM THE RESULTS OF THE WIRING/CARGO DOOR EXPLANATION FOR TWA 800.

The last three words in your 17 Mar letter in which you refuse to comply with a request for a meeting are "Honorable John McCain." Does the word 'honor' mean much to you, Chairman Hall? I know it means a lot to former Prisoner of War John McCain and it means a lot to decorated for valor in combat during wartime John Smith. We take the word seriously. It includes a lot of easy words to say but hard to fulfill such as fairness, loyalty, attention to detail, and best effort. You have not been fair in the evaluation of possible supplemental explanations for TWA 800, you have not been loyal to government process, you have accepted less detail than that available, and you have not given your best effort. You have been closed minded in defense of your explanation of center tank as initial event, you have subverted the democratic rule of authority to elected officials, and you have given up in seeking a complete explanation for TWA 800 by refusing to meet and discuss NTSB generated facts, data, and evidence with a citizen with a different idea. Not good. In fact, very bad.

Who is the senior chairman? NTSB is an independent board so maybe you can tell Senator McCain and Citizen Smith to go fish, you've done all the work you're going to do, and don't bother you anymore about cargo doors on 747s.

Maybe John McCain will shrug his shoulders and say, "Heck, if NTSB doesn't want to take a meeting, then they don't. Period." Maybe Chairman McCain should write a letter to Chairman Hall apologizing for bothering the chairman with an irrelevant request about something already taken care of.

I don't know much about real world politics, only real world airplanes and their crashes. So does Senator McCain. We both have been in sudden disintegrating jet plane crashes.

I do know about the way democracy is supposed work and how cargo doors are supposed to open and close. I do know why cargo doors fail and I'm learning now how relationships between government and citizen fail.

What to do? My options are limited. NTSB has told me over the months, "No, you're wrong, you're crazy to think different, you're annoying by continued writing to us, and we intend to ignore you in the future. You have not rebutted me with facts, data, and evidence, nor have you asked any questions except one, which I alone have answered for you, "Why so few bodies burnt?"

I understand your dislike of me. I offer an unpleasant truth, cargo doors on 747s have failed again, as they did in 1987, 1989, and 1991 with all three documented in NTSB AAR 92/02. Unpleasant truths are painful in the short run but best in the long one in flying. Pleasant lies are the more welcome news but have bad consequences in aviation.

The evidence is what is upsetting to you Chairman Hall, not me. The hard pieces of engine blade in right stabilizer, the many red paint smears, the outward twisted metal, the petal bulge at aft latch, the incomplete examination of door latches, and the internal foreign object damage and fire evidence in engine number three, all of which contradict center tank explosion as initial event but support wiring/cargo door rupture, are the realities that drive you to rebuff a powerful man's request to meet with an informed citizen, as is your duty.

If I am rude it is because I have been snubbed and a person I respect has been insulted.

My larger focus continues on preventing death by preventing plane crashes by preventing hull ruptures in flight of 747s by door openings by preventing chafed bare wire shorting on and turning door motor on to unlatch position, as it has done before. The focus is on aft midspan latch and pin, and any chafed wire found in wreckage.

New facts gleaned from NTSB public docket exhibits are appended to this letter. It's the details, Chairman Hall. The conclusion in the powerplant report says no fire, not uncontainments, and no FOD. The details for engine three reveal fire, uncontainment, and foreign object

Thank you for your interest in aviation safety.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith  
551 Country Club Drive  
Carmel Valley, CA 93924  
408 659 3552  
barry@corazon.com  
www.corazon.com

6. Immediate previous correspondence to Senator McCain:

To: JulieSwinglemccainsenategov  
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>  
Subject: TWA 800 cargo door/NTSB meeting thank you  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:

John McCain, Arizona,  
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation  
United States Senate

Dear Senator McCain, 17 Mar 98

I've just received your 4 Mar 98 letter to me stating that on my behalf you have contacted the NTSB regarding my concerns. Thank you very much, sir.

You mentioned my "... interest in meeting someone at the NTSB relating your concerns." I have thought about this at length and have offered the following suggestions to Chairman Hall to satisfy your implied request for a meeting between NTSB and me to relate my concerns about the forward cargo door of TWA 800.

I offer to travel to Seattle, Washington, from California to meet with NTSB officials in their offices. I suggest Wednesday, April 1, 1998 in Room 201 of NTSB NW Regional Office, Seattle, at 8 a.m.

My goal is to persuade NTSB that a reasonable line of inquiry, worthy of the same effort as that done for bomb, missile, and center tank, is the wiring/cargo door rupture explanation. The wiring/cargo door rupture concerns are:

1. water in forward cargo bay.
2. chafed bare wire touched by water.
3. electrical short occurs.
4. forward door motor turns on to unlatch position.
5. aft midspan latch of forward cargo door partially unlatches.
6. pressurized hull ruptures at aft midspan latch.
7. cargo door tears into pieces, some pieces stay with nose, some don't.
8. explosive decompression occurs shattering cargo door area forward of the wing on right side exposing twenty foot by forty foot hole in nose producing sudden loud sound on CVR.
9. 300 knots slipstream tears weakened nose off.
10. ejected debris is ingested by starboard engines which catch fire.
11. wing and wing fuel tanks; engines, tail, and fuselage fall and disintegrate on way down.
12. fiery starboard engine ignites fuel vapor clouds from disintegrating tanks, including center tank.
13. fireball observed on the ground.

I've attached my response letter to Chairman Hall to this letter.

I will report back to you with a summary, Senator; thank you again for arranging the meeting between NTSB and me. It's the wiring/cargo door's turn to justify itself.

Very Respectfully,

John Barry Smith  
551 Country Club Drive,  
Carmel Valley, CA 93924  
408 659 3552  
barry@corazon.com  
www.corazon.com

Attachment below:

Jim Hall  
Chairman NTSB  
National Transportation Safety Board  
Office of the Chairman  
490 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W.  
Washington, DC 20594-2000

Dear Chairman Hall,

17 Mar 98

I've just received a 4 Mar 98 letter to me from Senator John McCain stating, "I have received your letter regarding the forward cargo door of TWA Flight 800, and your interest in meeting with someone at the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) relating your concerns.

I have contacted the NTSB on your behalf, about your concerns. I have asked for a prompt response to be sent directly to you."

Chairman Hall, I interpret that to mean that Senator McCain wishes that the NTSB and I get together in a meeting to relate my concerns about the forward cargo door of TWA 800. That seems reasonable enough. To accurately and efficiently relate my concerns to NTSB, may I present the following suggestions:

I offer to travel to Seattle, Washington, from California to meet with NTSB officials in their offices. That's the closest office to me and previous government officials who have written to me regarding forward cargo door and TWA 800.

(From NTSB web site: NTSB Northwest Regional Office 8 a.m.-4:30 p.m.  
19518 Pacific Highway South  
Room 201  
Seattle, Washington 98188)

The sooner the better; may I suggest Wednesday, April 1, 1998 in Room 201 of NTSB NW Regional Office at 8 a.m.?

A meeting goal would be to discuss with me my concerns regarding the forward cargo door of TWA 800. My goal is to persuade NTSB that a reasonable line of inquiry, worthy of the same effort as that done for bomb, missile, and center tank, is the wiring/cargo door rupture explanation. The wiring/cargo door rupture concerns are:

1. water in forward cargo bay.

...times due to the failure of ...

3. electrical short occurs.
4. forward door motor turns on to unlatch position.
5. aft midspan latch of forward cargo door partially unlatches.
6. pressurized hull ruptures at aft midspan latch.
7. cargo door tears into pieces, some pieces stay with nose, some don't.
8. explosive decompression occurs shattering cargo door area forward of the wing on right side exposing twenty foot by forty foot hole in nose producing sudden loud sound on CVR.
9. 300 knots slipstream tears weakened nose off.
10. ejected debris is ingested by starboard engines which catch fire.
11. wing and wing fuel tanks; engines, tail, and fuselage fall and disintegrate on way down.
12. fiery starboard engine ignites fuel vapor clouds from disintegrating tanks, including center tank.
13. fireball observed on the ground.
14. water impact of wreckage, cargo bay material among first to land.

Every concern will be documented with US government and other official reports, exhibits, testimony, and charts. I will bring my laptop computer with internet access to reach NTSB TWA 800 website and other government sites for reference. All that will be required is an outside phone line, some chairs, a table, and some good lighting.

The main concern, as is the main concern of all aviation safety persons, is that can happen again unless wiring/cargo door rupture explanation is ruled in or out by a reasonable line of inquiry by NTSB which is my goal of the meeting which Senator McCain has suggested take place.

Senator McCain mentions, 'someone' at NTSB to meet with me. May I suggest several persons to be invited to the meeting?

1. NTSB Chief of Northwest Region and staff that are available.
2. Mr. Breneman of FAA who has hands on experience with the forward cargo door of TWA 800 assisting NTSB at Calverton.
3. Mr. Neil Schalekamp of FAA who offered conclusion of evidence of TWA 800 being outward explosion at cargo door area but later changed mind.

It's far away but I certainly invite you, Mr. Chairman, and would be honored should you attend, as well as Dr. Loeb, Mr. Wildey, Mr. Drake, Mr. Dickinson, and Mr. Schleede, all of whom are very familiar with wiring/cargo door explanation and would contribute much to resolving my concerns about the forward cargo door of TWA 800. Also most helpful would be Mr. Lyle Streeter, the FAA link to NTSB. Mr. Streeter is a professional aircraft accident investigator whose opinions about aircraft accidents carry weight. If not able to attend in person, then email, phone and letters are available of course to us.

This meeting of minds is a very welcome opportunity to clear the air and resolve some differences of opinion about TWA 800 and it's cause. Harsh letters between NTSB and me have crossed paths in the last few weeks. It's distracting from the mechanical explanation of TWA 800 which relies on facts, data and evidence which is what I shall address in the proposed meeting in Seattle.

I truly believe this meeting will be very fruitful, Mr. Chairman. Goals are to establish that the cargo door of TWA 800 opened in flight or did not, it's happened before to other 747s or has not, present new evidence which has shown up in wreckage reconstruction or has not; and therefore, a reasonable line of inquiry is the wiring/cargo door rupture explanation or it is not.

I will report back to Senator McCain with the evaluation of wiring/cargo door rupture explanation by NTSB in words a former US Navy carrier jet pilot will understand, which is to say, technical and makes sense.

Chairman Hall, NTSB and FAA went right to that suspicious forward cargo door of TWA 800 from day one. It's time to go back. There's a lot more there than meets the eye at first glance.

The whole story is more to answer your question on, "Why do few bodies remain?" The answer is basically, "They were not there to be burned. They were blown away by the first initial non-fiery explosive decompression and they were in the severed unburnt nose section. When the center tank finally did catch fire/explode, there were no passengers in front of the fiery explosion to be burnt."

To ask your question, sir, as you did about the unburnt passengers, is to understand the center tank as initial event does not ring all the way true. There is doubt about the actual initial event in your mind.

I can resolve it.

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith  
551 Country Club Drive,  
Carmel Valley, CA 93924  
408 659 3552  
barry@corazon.com  
www.corazon.com

Thomas McSweeney  
Director, Aircraft Certification Service  
FAA National Headquarters

Neil Schalekamp  
Manager, Propulsion & Mechanical Systems and Cabin Safety Branch  
Transport Standards Staff  
Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100  
1601 Lind Ave. S.W.  
Renton, WA 98055-4056

Bob Breneman,  
Aerospace Engineer,  
Federal Aviation Administration  
Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100  
1601 Lind Ave. S.W.  
Renton, WA 98055-4056

Dear Misters McSweeney, Schalekamp and Breneman, 9 Apr 98

Mr. Breneman, you got the cargo doors mixed up!

Mr. Schalekamp, you were right about the outward explosion shown by structural deformation and paint markings!

Mr. McSweeney, you should have checked the door wiring as suggested by NTSB!

The FAA structural engineer who made the examination and concluded forward door all latched and locked, could not have examined the forward door latches and locks because they were not recovered. They are not in the recovered wreckage database and they are not in the wreckage reconstruction in the hangar. The forward door is only 20% recovered and sill and latches are missing.

But in the terminal field (that includes the wings and rest of headless 747 fuselage and aft door) was found, on page 14 of 71 of wreckage database, "C122, RF45A 40 39 47.00 latitude, 72 37 27. 90 longitude, aft cargo door- lower sill latches & locks."

Exhibit 15 C "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill."

So in the hangar jumbled with wreckage days after crash, as wreckage was brought in, Bob Breneman of FAA looked at bottom latches of a cargo door and saw them locked and hastily said forward door all latched and locked. He got the two identical doors mixed up. He never corrected his error.

The forward door reconstruction shows all the pieces of those items found in database. Most of the forward door is missing in wreckage reconstruction and most of forward door is missing in database. The sill and latches and locks of forward door are missing in database and reconstruction. 80% of forward door is still out there someplace.

Front and top pieces of forward door pieces fell as expected in nose debris field. Aft cargo door pieces fell as expected in the terminal field with rest of wing and fuselage and engines. The aft cargo door sill, latches and locked fell in the terminal debris field with the other aft door skin pieces, so it's not a mislabeling or diver error.

The only two officials who examined the door apparently were Bob Breneman and Ron

Schleede. Their error of door mixup has misled all the higher ups into saying door all latched and all locked and all intact until water impact.

This serious error must be corrected by examining carefully the forward cargo door, especially around the midspan latch area which shows a petal outward rupture, and the red paint smears above door, and the hinge for overtravel impression damage. Then the wiring needs to be checked, as suggested by NTSB in safety bulletin.

Wiring caused door motor to short on and allowed door to unlatch and caused explosive decompression, exactly like UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 92/02.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

>From: Schleede Ron <SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov>

>To: barry <barry@corazon.com>

>Subject: RE: TWA crash cause

>Date: Sun, 11 Aug 1996 11:39:00 -0400

>Encoding: 13 TEXT

>Status:

>

>

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>I have examined the cargo door from twa 800--it is locked and latched!

>-----

>From: barry

>To: SCHLEDR

>Subject: TWA crash cause

>Date: Tuesday, 30 July, 1996 01:48

>

>

><http://www.corazon.com/TWA800PA103UA811.html> is my website for cargo door

>crash theory.

>To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

>From: barry@corazon.com

>Subject: Which cargo door and cam positions

>Cc:

>Bcc:

>X-Attachments:

>

>Mr. Schleede, thank you for your prompt response.

>>I have examined the cargo door from twa 800--it is locked and latched!

>There are three cargo doors on TWA 800, which one are you talking about.

>The front cargo door is reported to be in pieces, your sentence above implies one piece which would mean other than front cargo door checked.

>The lock sectors are locked, but the cams are unlocked. You do not mention cams.

> What are the positions of the cam locks of the forward cargo door? John Barry Smith

From: Schleede Ron <SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov>

To: barry <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: RE: TWA crash cause ATTN Robert Francis

Date: Mon, 29 Jul 1996 15:24:00 -0400

Encoding: 17 TEXT

Status:

Be assured that we are checking that. I was the investigator in charge of the UAL flight 811 case and fully knowledgeable in its causes and factors.

Thanks for the interest.

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From: barry  
To: schledr  
Subject: TWA crash cause ATTN Robert Francis  
Date: Sunday, July 28, 1996 9:58AM

Mr. Francis. The reasonable cause of the TWA crash is the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door. That is the mechanical cause that must be ruled out. Compare to United Flight 811 of Feb 1989.

NTSB Docket SA 516, Exhibit 8A, Powerplants Group Chairman's Factual Report,

Page 2, paragraph 2, "After the engines were recovered, they were transported to the former Grumman facility at Calverton, New York, for disassembly. The disassembly of the engines commenced on August 12, 1996, in the presence of the Powerplants Group. The disassembly was completed on August 16, 1996."

Analysis by John Barry Smith>1. Wrong to send to empty hangar, right to send to engine tear-down facility. Wrong thing done in haste to examine engines at Calverton. 2. Five days for four engines? One day and a bit per engine is incredibly fast to disassemble one of the most complex and precise machines on the planet. It's not a bicycle. Haste is evident.

Page 2, paragraph 3, "The disassembly of the engines consisted of removing the cowling, external components, fan, and low pressure compressor (LPC) to expose the high pressure compressor (HPC), diffuser, combustor, high pressure turbine (HPT), low pressure turbine (LPT), and turbine exhaust cases. Engine No. 3 was disassembled further to remove and partially disassemble the HPC. The disassembly of the engines did not show any indications that any of the engines had sustained any uncontainments, case ruptures, fires, or penetrations."

Analysis by John Barry Smith>Why was only engine 3 disassembled further? What evidence was seen in No. 3 to warrant further investigation? Why were not the other three engines disassembled further? The four most important jet engines in an airplane crash in history were not given comprehensive teardowns. The conclusion statement of no uncontainments is contradicted by other exhibit which states 'stator blade' was found in right horizontal stabilizer. The conclusion statement of no fires in any engines is contradicted later in same report with raw data indicating sooting in engine number 3. The conclusion statement of no penetrations of any engine is contradicted by raw data in same report indicating soft body impacts on blades. The conclusion statement of everything normal in the engines is contradicted by photograph of TWA 800 engine retrieval showing forward stator stage missing, and irregular FDR EPR readings.

Pages 16 through 22 discuss fuel samples, mainly irrelevant in discussion about engines and tear-down results. 33% of engine report is not about engines.

Page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and the tips outboard of the outer midspan shroud were bent forward slightly.

About half of the fan blades had impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of the impact damage to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the midspan shroud on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body impacts along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body impact, which had some streaking extending rearward. "

Analysis by John Barry Smith>Less than half of complete fan blades in the fan rotor were recovered, not the 95% recovered figure given by Chairman Hall about TWA 800 recovered wreckage. Only 58% of the fan blades were recovered so it is very possible 'stator blade' found in right horizontal stabilizer was from engine number three. All had soot. Soot means fire. Only engine number three had any sooting inside engine. One full blade and one partial blade had 'soft body impacts'. There is nothing normally soft inside a jet engine. Soft body impact means foreign object damage. FOD means fire. Fire means soot. Missing blades in engine and one found directly aft in right horizontal stabilizer means uncontainment. Uncontainment means engine not intact at water impact but inflight. Analysis above on raw data gives conclusions engine number three alone had foreign object damage in flight, had internal fire, and had partial disintegration. Engine 3 was the only engine to give such evidence. Engine number three is next to forward cargo hold, an area known to give FOD to engine 3 when cargo door inadvertently opens in flight.

### NTSB Safety Recommendation Brief

Data\_Source: U.S. NTSB Safety Recommendations

Rprt\_Nbr: A-91-83

Last Updated: 03-13-95

[O] On June 13, 1991, United Airlines (UAL) maintenance personnel were unable to electrically open the aft cargo door on a Boeing 747-222B, N152UA, at John F. Kennedy Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York. The airplane was one of two used exclusively on nonstop flights between Narita, Japan, and JFK. This particular airplane had accumulated 19,053 hours and 1,547 cycles at the time of the occurrence.

Recommendations:

A-91-83. Issue an Airworthiness Directive applicable to all Boeing 747 airplanes with a flexible conduit protecting the wiring bundle between the fuselage and aft cargo door to require an expedited inspection of:

- (1) the wiring bundle in the area normally covered by the conduit for the presence of damaged insulation (using either an electrical test method or visual examination);
- (2) the conduit support bracket and attached standoff pin on the upper arm of the forward lift actuator mechanism;
- (3) the flexible conduit for the presence of cracking in the convoluted innercore.

Wires with damaged insulation should be repaired before further service. Damage to the flexible conduit, conduit support bracket and standoff pin should result in an immediate replacement of the conduit as well as the damaged parts. The inspection should be repeated at an appropriate cyclic interval.

Sam Farr  
Member of Congress  
17th District, California  
House of Representatives  
Congress of the United States  
Washington, DC

John McCain III  
Member of Congress  
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation  
United States Senate  
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James Hall  
Chairman,  
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Robert Francis II  
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Dear Senator McCain,  
April 1998

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Please do what good investigators do, go back to the crime scene and look for more evidence that should be there. You have NTSB documents that reveal you don't have all of the TWA 800 wreckage and you have NTSB documents that reveal the missing cargo door sill is very important. So, I suggest, ask, insist, demand that you go back to the scene, look for it, find it, and get it. Call out the dredgers. Everyone will understand, it's what happens in thorough investigations, and TWA 800 is certainly going to be that.

To make a human error of hasty confusion over two identical shaped and sized objects such as the aft and forward cargo door sills of Boeing 747s is understandable and forgiven when corrected.

To not correct error when detected is inhuman and not forgiven.

The error of cargo door mixup was reported to you on April 8th and subsequent days. It is now April 20, twelve days later, almost two weeks, a hundred eternities to pilots, and still no effort is apparent to retrieve door.

What is going on? Time's a wastin'!

Wiring to be checked for bare wire chafing in TWA 800 and location to search for forward cargo door follow:

Plug P3 and Plug P4 at a distance between three to four inches from plug pin tips. The P4 damage location may correspond to wire bundle clamp positions. These areas are where the chafed bare wires shorted on the door latch actuator motor to the unlatch position for UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 92/02. Water also entered the door switches because water poured out of the switches when retrieved from the ocean.

Location on ocean floor to search, find, retrieve, examine, and determine ten latch status and eight locking sector status of forward cargo door of TWA 800: Forward door sill is probably within this one minute geographical coordinates of a box: 40:37:50 latitude north up to 40:38:50 degrees, minutes, seconds north by 72:39:20 west longitude over to 72:40:20 degrees, minutes, seconds of west longitude. This one mile square datum box estimate is based on NTSB wreckage database items plotted out and NTSB trajectory study items studied.

All radar track anomalies in NTSB Exhibit 13A of objects leaving TWA 800 should be plotted to ocean surface and searched at that spot.

There is much radar data on TWA 800 and the forward door can be tracked to 300 foot depth ocean probable location, just as was done with UAL 811 in which NTSB AAR 92/02, page 26, describes the procedure to track, search, locate, and retrieve the forward cargo door from the ocean floor. Radar returns, wind data, and ocean currents were used to retrieve the door from 14,200 feet on the first pass. Seven dives later they had the pieces of the forward cargo door from which the true cause of the inadvertent opening in flight as chafed bare wiring shorting on door motor to unlatch position was revealed.

The below information is from the NTSB investigator who helped locate the forward cargo door of UAL 811 in 1990:

Date: Sat, 17 Aug 1996 12:52:15 -0700  
From: wmor@ix.netcom.com (William M. O'Rourke)  
Subject: UAL811  
To: barry@corazon.com  
Status:

JBS:

I'll try to answer your questions here re. UAL811 but the answers may not be the ones you're looking for.

1. Ron Schleede was the Chief of the Accident Investigation Division at the time of the accident and oversaw much of the on-scene investigation. He is highly experienced and a reliable investigator. He started his career with

the NTSB at the Denver Field Office after flying F-100's with the USAF.

2. I never saw the actual door but was informed that it was in two pieces versus the single (entire) door we based our calculations on. I learned that the USN utilized our estimate of impact point & time and applied their detailed knowledge of under water current data. The result was that they drew a 5 NM box around a point they calculated would have been the resting place of the door. Their ship then entered at the NW corner of the box steaming on a track towards the SE corner. At about the half-way point, on the first run, they located the debris field on the ocean floor in approximately 14,000 feet of water.
3. I DID NOT SEE ANY BLIPS! What I did see was a computer printout of FAA and USN FACSAC ground based radars which listed all primary & secondary (transponder) returns covering the area we specified in our data reduction request.

Since the Navy's FACSAC processor (computer) was more state-of-the-art than the FAA system, plus it had more feeds, we utilized the USN data for the most accurate data presentation.

From the data in the printout, we could not tell which target was the door or which was debris. Further, we had no way of telling which was which. What the printout did tell us was whether it was a long-run length or short-run length target. Generally, you could say that a long-run target is a strong target while the short-run length was a weak target. However, the difference between the two is actually more of radar cross section of a target. As an example, picture a billboard of 15 feet high, 30 feet wide and 6 inches thick. If you look at the billboard straight on, you see its full 15x30 foot area or an object with a surface area of 450 sq. feet. However, when you view the same billboard from end-on, you see an object with a total area of 7.5 square feet. Hence, an excellent example of the primary difference between a long & short run length target.

With respect to the UAL811 incident, we were very lucky in that while the flight was climbing out of HNL, a WX balloon was also on its way up. This gave us very accurate winds which enabled us to validate winds aloft info recorded on the DFDR. The largest problem I had was to correlate the various timing involved from all of the data sets. Since the most accurate timing source was the FAA's ARTCC tapes, we had to adjust FAA & USN radar data, CVR, DFDR, NWS, and FAA tower tapes to one single time base.

The above are the same techniques we used in reconstruction of flight tracks of accident incident aircraft as well as the Shuttle Challenger accident.

Although my primary job was as an ATC investigator at the NTSB, I got stuck with doing radar data since I had a radar background going back to 1957 as a GCI controller, a brief stint on RC-121D's, TDY to a DDR and DER as well as TDY to VP-26 while at NQX (ASP-20).

If you give me your snail-mail address, I send you a copy of the Factual Report - Radar Reconstruction, that I completed on this case. I think I still have a copy of it around here somewhere.

I retired from NTSB in May 1991 after 34-years and do not even have a copy of the amended UAL811 report. I do know that they had to amend the report based on the information the recovered door revealed.

Mike O'Rourke  
wmor@ix.netcom.com

Below letter discusses the efforts to get door examined.

From: Chris Hinch <chris@dcc.govt.nz>  
To: "barry@corazon.com" <barry@corazon.com>  
Subject: Cargo Doors & UAL 811  
Date: Thu, 22 Aug 96 22:29:00 NZT  
Encoding: 90 TEXT  
Status:

Barry

Hang in there.

I was on a computer graphics team that developed computer animation sequences for a documentary about UAL811. The animation sequences showed how the door latching mechanisms work for the cargo door in question.

At that time, the official story was that a ground handler had damaged the latching mechanism and/or not closed the door properly. The father of a New Zealand teenager killed on the flight argued against this, and as a result, the TVNZ documentary was commissioned, presenting his theory that an electrical failure initiated the door opening sequence with the 'L' shape of the locking latches making them susceptible to deformation.

In order to create the animation sequences, we had to study and understand the issues involved. We then predicted that if the door was found, what the relative positions of the cams and interlocks would be, and that the L locking bars would be deformed by the backdriven cams.

The documentary was rebuffed by United, who said that that they were aware, prior to the accident, that the L locks could be deformed by initiating the door open sequence while locked, and that a modification had been issued to strengthen them. As that modification had \*apparently\* been fitted to 811, we were "therefore" wrong. In addition, local airlines said that a special 'strengthening' modification had been fitted to their fleet of B747's, "therefore" it was okay to keep flying.

But when the door was retrieved, the locks were deformed as predicted, and the cams were in the positions we predicted. Obviously, if fitted, the modification was not strong enough. This meant that it could happen again, and I was approached by TVNZ to say so on camera. I did so but did not realise the personal and professional cost that would occur as a result.

I was not aware that the NTSB had changed their position, and I cannot tell you the personal feeling of relief, vindication and resolution that I felt reading their revised executive summary at your web site. Thank you very, very much.

But now, the horrifying feeling that our words will continue to go unheeded, and that more people will die - especially when we hear airlines continuing to say that they are "okay" because they have fitted the "special" strengthening mod.

Can you confirm if 811 had the rivetted L plates modification added? Did 800? 103? Can you confirm or determine if any one has actually initiated the opening sequence on the ground, with the door fully closed, with the L plates modification fitted? Can Boeing/NTSB categorically demonstrate that the mod fitted will prevent deformation when the cams are backdriven?

I wish you the very very best of luck. Remain focused, persistent and rational in your arguments, and they cannot argue.

By the way - check 811's pilot statement (on record I believe) that the only reason the aircraft didn't come apart underneath him was that he had just taken it off AP and let go of the controls at the point of event - he felt that fighting the aircraft (or trying to keep it straight, as the AP would have done) would have resulted in catastrophic failure.

In the other accidents, were they on AP?

Cheers  
Chris Hinch  
chris@dcc.govt.nz

Dear gentleman, the ball is in your court. You have the facts presented to you. It is time for your action. To not act and not correct error when given startling information indicating serious error in investigative thinking is wrong.

To review:

1. Why forward cargo door pieces including sill are important to recover. It is shown in NTSB AAR 92/02 that the forward door can unlatch in flight and kill passengers in an early Boeing 747.
2. Why cargo door sill of TWA 800 is aft door sill: Because it was found in the aft fuselage debris field in which other aft cargo door pieces were found.
3. Why forward cargo door sill is missing: It was not found in the forward cargo bay debris field in which other forward cargo door pieces were found, it is not listed in the entire wreckage database, and it is not hung on wreckage reconstruction.
4. Where is it: Forward door sill is probably within this one minute geographical coordinates of a box: 40:37:50 latitude north up to 40:38:50 degrees, minutes, seconds north by 72:39:20 west longitude over to 72:40:20 degrees, minutes, seconds of west longitude.
5. Where is wire chafed: Plug P3 and Plug P4 at a distance between three to four inches from plug pin tips. The P4 damage location may correspond to wire bundle clamp positions.

To repeat: Correct error of cargo door mixup. Retrieve forward door. Bring me into the investigation; I know a lot about the problem, I can help in this life and death matter. Question me. To use assets that are available is smart. To reject proven assets who volunteer to assist is wrong. I have been right since day one of the TWA 800 accident, I'm still right, and I will be right as new questions come up. Time is not on your side; I am.

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith  
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Dear Senator McCain and US government officials involved with the TWA 800 investigation,  
22 April 1998

A. You know the forward cargo door of TWA 800 is very important:

1. You checked it first as the wreckage was brought into Calverton hangar for the very thing I say happened then and say now, unlatching in flight of the latching cams, specifically, the aft midspan latch.
2. The forward cargo door has unlatched several times before, one with fatal consequences, UAL 811, which has many significant matches of evidence including a sudden loud sound on the cockpit voice recorder and an abrupt power cut the Flight Data Recorder.

B. You know you don't have the forward cargo door main pieces to include the lower sill, latches, and locks, manual locking handle, overpressure relief doors, and the two midspan latches.

1. They are not listed in the wreckage database of items recovered.
2. They are not hung on the wreckage reconstruction in Calverton hangar.
3. They are never referred to correctly in any TWA 800 exhibits.

C. You know you made a misidentification mixup of aft cargo door sill latches and locks for the forward cargo door sill latches and locks.

1. They are both identical shaped and sized.
2. The aft door sill was found in the aft fuselage and aft cargo door pieces debris field.
3. The forward cargo door sill was not found in the nose and forward door parts debris field.
4. The misidentification was made in haste, under pressure, and is an understandable human error.

D. You know you need to have the forward cargo door sill, all latches and locks as well as manual locking handle.

1. It is necessary for a thorough examination of the hull rupture of TWA 800 that came apart first as shown by trajectory study and wreckage database, forward of the wing on the right side in the forward cargo bay.
2. The results of the examination of the forward cargo sill, latches and locks, and manual locking handle can change the entire probable cause of the TWA 800 accident, as was shown by the corrected AAR of UAL 811 after door was retrieved.

E. You know where it is:

1. There is extensive radar data that shows hundreds of small items that were ejected from TWA 800 and tracked to ocean surface.
2. The currents are known.
3. The winds are known.
4. The wreckage database shows latitude and longitude of various cargo door pieces and other items to leave first.
5. Forward door sill is probably within these one minute geographical coordinates of a box: 40:37:50 latitude north up to 40:38:50 degrees, minutes, seconds north by 72:39:20 west longitude over to 72:40:20 degrees, minutes, seconds of west longitude. This one mile square datum box estimate is based on NTSB wreckage database items plotted out and NTSB trajectory study items studied.

F. You know how to get it.

1. Thousands of items have already been recovered using known retrieval procedures.
2. US Navy dredges and recovery ships as well as personnel are available to continue their previous work.

G. You know what to do with it when you get it.

1. Examine the ten latches for unlatching around the latch cams.
2. Examine the latch pins for heat damage.
3. Examine the paint for transfer marks from fuselage.
4. Examine for outward peeled skin.
5. Examine for outward petal shaped rupture/bulge at aft midspan latch.
6. Examine for soot.
7. Examine for bare chafed wires.
8. Correlate found latitude/longitude location and incorporate in breakup sequence.
9. Match door latches, skin, cams, locking sectors, overpressure relief doors, viewing ports, torque tubes, and paint to similar evidence of same items in NTSB AAR 92/02.

H. You know when to get it.

1. As soon as you knew you did not have it.
2. As soon as you knew you need it.
3. As soon as you knew how to get it.
4. As soon as you knew where to get it.

That time was two weeks ago. Every day that goes by with no forward door sill latches and locks recovered and examined is compounding the understandable error of judgment into nonunderstandable error

of negligence.

When an outfielder misjudges his position and a ball whizzes by him next to the line, a run scores and he may get an error.

When safety officials and other officials responsible for the lives of the citizens misjudge their position and an accident occurs, someone dies and they may get an error.

When the outfielder consistently misjudges his position and refuses to act to correct his misjudgment even when told by coaches, fans, and the media, and a ball whizzes by him and a run scores, he is released from active duty or retired.

When safety officials and other officials responsible for the lives of the citizens they are sworn to protect continue to misjudge their position and refuse to act to correct the misjudgment even when pointed out by elected officials, newspapers, and an informed and experienced citizen, and an accident occurs, they are prosecuted for criminal negligence.

Why the difference? One is a game and the other is real life.

I have been in a sudden, night, fiery, fatal, jet airplane crash. It is no game. It is real life.

If the carrot of satisfaction of a job well done by thoroughness of an investigation into TWA 800 does not sway you into action, then the stick of punishment may.

As a former Naval Flight Officer who has flown low level navigation missions through Italy in training, I strongly disagree with the US prosecution for negligent homicide of the flight crew who misjudged their position and cut the cable. Apparently top level US government officials are sending a message to others in service that they are held accountable for screwups even while under orders and on duty. The crew and senior officers tried to cover it up but were quickly found out.

Quick action needs to be taken now. Search, locate, retrieve, and examine the complete forward cargo door of TWA 800 to include the sill, all ten latches, all eight locks, manual locking handle, viewing ports, overpressure relief doors, torque tubes, and missing skin.

While waiting for the recovery effort to produce the forward door sill, latches and locks:

A. Examine the extensive wreckage evidence you do have to consider as an explanation wiring short from bare wire to door unlatch motor to door rupture at aft midspan latch resulting in explosive decompression of thirty foot by forty foot hole in the nose of TWA 800 on the right side forward of the wing. The weakened nose would then be torn off by the 300 knot slipstream.

B. Check the wiring as described in Safety Recommendations Rprt\_Nbr: A-91-83 and -84

(1) the wiring bundle in the area normally covered by the conduit for the presence of damaged insulation (using either an electrical test method or visual examination);

(2) the conduit support bracket and attached standoff pin on the upper arm of the forward lift actuator mechanism;

(3) the flexible conduit for the presence of cracking in the convoluted innercore.

C. And check the wiring as described in NTSB AAR 92/02:

Plug P3 and Plug P4 at a distance between three to four inches from plug pin tips. The P4 damage location may correspond to wire bundle clamp positions. These areas are where the chafed bare wires shorted on the door latch actuator motor to the unlatch position for UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 92/02.

Retrieve Door! Time's a wastin'!

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith  
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Dear Officials involved with TWA 800 investigation, 29 April 1998

Will you please ask again for NTSB officials to meet with me so I can relate my concerns about the forward cargo door of TWA Flight 800, as you did in your 4 March 1998 letter to Chairman Hall? It's very important.

Serious confusion exists as to the location of the suspect ten latches, ten latching cams, and eight locking sectors of the forward cargo door of TWA 800. Conclusions about location and status of door parts in official exhibits and letters are totally contradicted by other official NTSB documents.

One NTSB official in charge of wreckage identification, David Mayer, recently said the forward cargo door sill is in three pieces and gave reference numbers, RF3A for the aft two latches, locks and sill; RF3G for the mid latches, locks and sill; and RF3H for the forward latches, locks and sill.

However:

RF3A in database has no reference to sill, latches and locks.

RF3G in database describes the piece as cargo door hinge and has no reference to sill, latches and locks.

RF3H in database is described as forward portion of lower right cargo door and has no reference to sill, latches, and locks.

There is no reference in the database to any forward cargo door sill, latches or locks.

The pieces of the forward cargo door in the database match the actual pieces hung on the wreckage reconstruction.

The photograph of the reconstruction shows the keel beam, pieces of the door, the door hinge, but the sill, latches and locks are apparently absent.

Exhibit 15C states forward cargo door sill is in one piece, not three.

Personal correspondence from an FAA official, Bob Breneman, who examined a cargo door sill, declared it to the forward door sill and all latched and locked, said it was in one piece, not three.

Why are there no references to forward cargo door sill, latches and locks in the wreckage database and yet the conclusion made that it was all latched and locked at water impact?

An explanation is possible: Mixup with the aft cargo door sill and latches:

The aft cargo door sill was found in one piece, registered in the database and had the latches and locks attached. The aft and forward cargo door sills are the same shape and size and function the same.

How does one distinguish between two identical pieces of shattered, twisted and dirty pieces of metal? A mistake is plausible.

Most of the very important pieces of the forward door are still missing and include the manual locking handle, two overpressure relief doors, two midspan latches and viewing ports.

Regardless of status of lower door sill latches and locks, the damage start location is the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door. This is shown by the outward petal shaped bulge in the metal door frame. It is shown as outward explosion by the outward peeled skin above cargo door. It is shown by the red paint smears between the passenger windows above cargo door. It is shown by the absence of most of the cargo door skin and most of the complex mechanisms in the door. The aft midspan latch area has the petal shaped outward bulge indicating an explosive decompression rupture. None of the midspan latches has been recovered, not the two from the forward door nor the two from the aft door. All of the forward cargo door material around the aft midspan latch is missing from database and from wreckage reconstruction.

There is enough doubt about the status of locks and latches in the forward cargo door to initiate a thorough examination and evaluation of a forward cargo door opening in flight for TWA 800. It was the prime suspect early on and it is still the prime suspect.

The evidence of paint smears, twisted outward metal, and shape of explosive shattered outward zone proves cargo door area opened in flight. The cause of that opening may then be determined.

There are 'alignment' devices in the door already, they are called, 'pull-in hooks', one hook on each side. The midspan latches do exactly that, latch. And they had to latch an eight foot slice in a pressurized hull against 38115 pounds of internal pressure for TWA 800. Proof that midspan latches latch is UAL 811 that has forward midspan latch pin showing no damage yet the aft midspan latch

pin showing extensive heat damage during the forward cargo door opening event. In fact, it may have been the 'latching' action of that aft midspan latch that held that door closed for the 1.5 seconds described in NTSB AAR 92/02 before door opened fully that allowed sufficient decompression so that only a ten foot by twenty foot piece of fuselage skin was ripped off, instead of the thirty by forty foot hole the other three planes had, thus allowing UAL 811 nose to stay on and the others to come off.

NTSB implies in the quote from Ms. Hazle that the two midspan latches have not been recovered but, not to worry, they are not important, but they are not in the database and NTSB tacitly admits they have not been recovered by saying they are not important anyway.

Latches latch. All ten latches in each cargo door are essential to hold door closed.

To the claim by NTSB and FAA officials that they have responded to my concerns in great detail numerous times, the attached excerpts reveal the few times I been responded to, and always at the behest of Senator John McCain or Congressman Sam Farr. The one detail is the reiteration of the NTSB explanation of center tank as initial event with no discussion of cargo door except to conclude that eight latches latched means all latched. The few NTSB opinions about the cargo doors are untrue and easily refuted with NTSB documents, exhibits, and photographs.

Two officials, Neil Schalekamp and David Mayer were forthcoming at first. Then, within days, both refused to talk further with an inquiring member of the public. Mr. Mayer, after being told to by Dr. Bernard Loeb, refused to even repeat public docket information he had said several days earlier.

Many high resolution pictures were taken in May 1997 of the forward cargo door in the wreckage reconstruction by Mr. Jan Staller for the New York Times but all photographs were kept by NTSB, the New York Times magazine has none. There are none of those high resolution photographs of the cargo door area in the NTSB CD-ROM which has many pictures of the TWA 800 reconstruction.

This is a civilian airliner accident during peacetime in US territorial waters with an incomplete public docket. To silence Neil Schalekamp of FAA and David Mayer of NTSB about data in the public docket is wrong and suspicious. To refuse to meet with me to discuss a safety matter supported by NTSB documents at the request of Senator McCain is strange. For Mr. Schalekamp of FAA and Mr. Drake of NTSB to point blank tell me they will not respond to me, a citizen speaking about aviation safety to safety officials, is very irregular, even negligent of their safety responsibility.

Total forward cargo door references in the wreckage database:

- B250 RF3A Stringer with attached cargo door.
- B008 RF3B Stringer with floor beam.
- B250 RF3C Stringers with rear top portion of forward cargo door.
- B189 RF3D Stringers with top right corner of forward cargo door.
- B221 RF3E Small section upper forward cargo door.
- B001 RF3F Stringer.
- B007 RF3G Cargo door hinge, 2 rollers.
- B2017 RF3H Forward portion lower right forward cargo door.

Missing items of forward door: Lower cargo door sill, eight bottom latches, eight bottom pins, eight locking sectors, two midspan latches, two midspan pins, eight viewing ports, two overpressure relieve doors, manual locking handle, torque tubes, and approximately seventy percent of door skin.

Total aft cargo door references in the wreckage database:

- C122 RF45A Aft cargo door lower sill latches and locks.
- C1080 RF45E Aft cargo door surround.
- C644 RF45F Piece of cargo door.
- C2133 RF45G Aft cargo door fragment.
- C111..... Aft cargo door cutout

.....RF54E Forward lower corner of aft cargo door cutout.  
C2155 RF98 Outer frame aft cargo door panel (aft upper main cargo door sill)  
C2162.....Aft cargo door doorstep.  
C2252 RF30A Stringer aft cargo door hinge.  
TG1.....Cargo door 7'x3'x1'.

Missing items of aft door: midspan latches, manual locking handle, torque tubes, viewing ports, two overpressure relieve doors, approximately twenty percent of door skin.

References to forward cargo door sill from FAA:

29 Oct 97 letter from Mr. Wojnar/Pederson/Breneman to JBS:

"In addition, the door latches at the bottom of the door were still attached to the fuselage lower sill structure. This indicates the door was in the 'latched and locked' position at the time of impact with the water." "However, wreckage for the entire door was recovered at the same location as the nose section and had the same impact damage as the surrounding fuselage structure on the right side. This is additional verification that the forward cargo door had not opened in flight or separated from the airplane."

18 Nov 96 letter from Mr. McSweeny/Kirkpatrick, FAA, to Congressman Farr:

"The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has no evidence that door failures played a role in the TWA flight 800 accident."

30 Jan 1998 letter from Neil Schalekamp, FAA, to JBS:

"While no scenario has been categorically proven to be the cause, it is believed, based upon available data, that the center wing tank (CWT) explosion preceded any separation of the forward cargo door. The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT. Furthermore, you mentioned that the forward cargo door was recovered a considerable distance from the rest of the structure. This could be due to its aerodynamic characteristics and prevailing winds at the time of the accident, rather than attributing this as the primary cause of the accident."

"You may not agree with the reasoning of the official accident investigators, but I want you to understand the evidence to date indicates that the CWT explosion preceded any fuselage breakup, including damage to the forward cargo door."

19 Feb 1998 letter from Mr. Neil Schalekamp to JBS:

"The theory of an explosive decompression, due to a sudden opening of the forward cargo door was one theory that was examined. However, it has been determined that this did not occur. Based upon the existing evidence, the National Transportation Safety Board, (NTSB), the agency in charge of the accident investigation, believes that the probable cause of the accident was a center wing fuel tank (CWT) explosion, due to an internal fuel tank ignition source. The FAA agrees with the NTSB on this matter.

You apparently believe that the forward cargo door precipitated the accident scenario by initially separating from the airplane. The evidence from the reconstructed 747 airplane reveals that the forward cargo door was attached to the forward section of the airplane and was latched in the closed position when this section of the plane impacted the ocean."

References about forward cargo door from NTSB:

24 Oct 1997 letter from Chairman Hall, NTSB to Congressman Farr:

"Please be assured that our team has examined all of the structure recovered from TWA flight 800, approximately 95%--including all of the cargo door mechanisms and structures. Early on in the investigation we determined conclusively that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water, and there was no evidence of any failure of any of the latching mechanisms on the doors."

20 November 1997 Letter from Peter Goelz of Sandy Hentges of Congressman's Farr's office:

"As Congressman Farr was advised by letter dated October 24, 1997, early in the investigation we determined conclusively that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water, and there was no evidence of any failure of any of the latching mechanisms on the doors."

19 December 1997 letter from Chairman Hall, NTSB to JBS:

"However, to repeat, the investigation of the accident involving TWA flight 800 has revealed no evidence to suggest that a failure of a cargo door precipitated the event."

12 January 1998 letter from Jim Wildey, NTSB, to JBS:

"The Safety Board has received your letter to the Chairman, dated December 30, 1997, concerning the possibility that the TWA 800 accident was related to an in-flight opening of a cargo door. As conveyed to you in previous letters we have sent you, the Safety Board believes that sufficient facts have been gathered to rule out this possibility."

10 March 1998 letter from John B. Drake, NTSB, to JBS:

"As we have stated in numerous previous responses, the investigation team has gathered sufficient facts to rule out this possibility."

17 March 1998 letter from Chairman Hall, NTSB, to JBS:

"As stated in our most recent letter dated March 10, 1998, the TWA flight 800 investigative team has gathered sufficient facts to rule out this possibility of an in-flight opening of a cargo door. We do not believe a meeting is necessary to further discuss this issue."

Responses to JBS regarding further communications:

10 March 1998 letter of John B. Drake of NTSB to JBS :

"We consider our correspondence on this subject to be complete. Should you continue to reiterate your position on this issue in future correspondence, you should expect no further response from the Safety Board."

30 Jan 1998 letter of Neil Schalekamp of FAA to JBS :

"Please note that this office will no longer be responding to your further inquiries about these same concerns, including your February 6 and February 9 letters that I just received."

17 March 1998 letter of Jim Hall of NTSB to JBS :

"We do not believe a meeting is necessary to further discuss this issue."

The above rejections directly contradict NTSB's recent statements on their website:

Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements

"...a program to increase the public's awareness of, and support for, action to adopt safety steps that can help prevent accidents and save lives."

I'm a member to the public, I'm aware and support action to adopt safety steps that can help prevent accidents and save lives.

Senator McCain, will you please ask NTSB again to meet with me so I can relate my concerns about the forward cargo door of TWA Flight 800, as you did before in your 4 March 1998 letter?

There is urgency according to my numbers:

June 23, 1985, AI 182, nose off at forward cargo bay, 329 dead. No forward sill recovered.

March 10, 1987, PA 125, forward cargo door open in flight, 0 dead. Latches unlatched on forward sill.

December 21, 1988, PA 103, nose off at forward cargo bay, 270 dead. No forward sill status reported.

February 24, 1989, UAL 811, forward cargo door open in flight, 9 dead. Latches unlatched on forward sill.

June 13, 1991, UAL preflight, uncommanded aft cargo door open on ground. 0 dead. Latches unlatched on aft sill.

July 17, 1996, TWA 800, nose off at forward cargo bay, 270 dead. No forward sill listed as recovered.

AI 182 to TWA 800 is approximately 3993 days.

Approximately 666 days between events.

Approximately 649 days since TWA 800.

Approximately 17 days to go, from April 29 to May 15.

65 days minimum; four years and eleven months for maximum between events.

0 deaths to 329 deaths as consequence.

The law of averages indicates an uncommanded opening of a starboard side cargo door will occur on an early model Boeing 747 with varying consequences from three months after July 17th, 1996 to June 23, 2001 with the mean occurring on May 15th, 1998. The airline with the most Boeing 747s, 41, and the oldest average at 19.9 years, is Northwest Airlines.

It would not be unusual for a NWA early model 747 to have an uncommanded cargo door opening with varying consequences in the next few months.

Quick action needs to be taken now. Search, locate, retrieve, and examine the complete forward cargo door of TWA 800 to include the sill, all ten latches, all eight locks, manual locking handle, viewing ports, overpressure relief doors, torque tubes, and missing skin.

While waiting for the recovery effort to produce the forward door sill, latches and locks:

A. Examine the extensive wreckage evidence to consider as an explanation: Wiring short from bare wire to door unlatch motor to door rupture at aft midspan latch resulting in explosive decompression of thirty foot by forty foot hole in the nose of TWA 800 on the right side forward of the wing. The weakened nose would then be torn off by the 300 knot slipstream.

B. Check the wiring as described in NTSB Safety Recommendations Rprt\_Nbr: A-91-83 and -84

(1) the wiring bundle in the area normally covered by the conduit for the presence of damaged insulation (using either an electrical test method or visual examination);

(2) the conduit support bracket and attached standoff pin on the upper arm of the forward lift actuator mechanism;

(3) the flexible conduit for the presence of cracking in the convoluted innercore.

C. Check the wiring as described in NTSB AAR 92/02 UAL 811 cargo door accident:

Plug P3 and Plug P4 at a distance between three to four inches from plug pin tips. The P4 damage location may correspond to wire bundle clamp positions. These areas are where the chafed bare wires shorted on the door latch actuator motor to the unlatch position.

For NTSB officials to refuse to talk with the missile or meteor proponents for TWA 800 is understandable based on the evidence and lack of precedent. To refuse to talk with the wiring/cargo door proponent is not understandable based on the wreckage evidence and the precedent of faulty wiring and previously opened inflight forward cargo doors in early model Boeing 747s.

To discuss in a meeting the wiring/cargo door explanation is reasonable and understandable. Please be reasonable and understanding.

Very Respectfully,

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Dear NTSB and FAA Officials involved with TWA 800 investigation,  
1998

12 May

Good work finding cracks in frayed wire in Boeing airliners and taking such quick action to investigate and confirm. As the mechanic reported frayed wires detected, I report frayed wires detected. Please take the same decisive action to investigate and confirm. I ask that you expand your investigation into frayed wiring to Boeing 747s based upon the following discovery of frayed to the core wiring in TWA 800.

"Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were

found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found." NTSB Public Docket Exhibit 9A page 116:

Please note that BMS13-42A is known faulty Poly-X wiring. Cargo door location is FS 560-670 and cracked wires are within that zone. Frayed wires in that area have shorted before and caused the forward cargo door to open in flight, NTSB AAR 92/02 UAL 811.

Other wiring events in 747 forward cargo holds:

A. 1996, burning smell in forward cargo compartment, found damaged wiring shorted to ground, charring found.

B. Oct 12, 1996, Wire bundle arcing and resultant fire at aft bulkhead of forward lower lobe cargo hold on 747-200 freighter.

Source: NTSB Exhibit 9C, Attachments to the Systems Group Factual Report page 44, 45, 46:

Please expand chafed Poly X wiring checks to Boeing 747s in the cargo door areas.

To review:

A. Examine the extensive wreckage evidence to consider as an explanation: Wiring short from bare wire to door unlatch motor to door rupture at aft midspan latch resulting in explosive decompression of thirty foot by forty foot hole in the nose of TWA 800 on the right side forward of the wing. The weakened nose would then be torn off by the 300 knot slipstream.

B. Check the cargo door wiring as described in NTSB Safety Recommendations Rprt\_Nbr: A-91-83 and -84

(1) the wiring bundle in the area normally covered by the conduit for the presence of damaged insulation (using either an electrical test method or visual examination);

(2) the conduit support bracket and attached standoff pin on the upper arm of the forward lift actuator mechanism;

(3) the flexible conduit for the presence of cracking in the convoluted innercore.

C. Check the cargo door wiring as described in NTSB AAR 92/02 UAL 811 cargo door accident: Plug P3 and Plug P4 at a distance between three to four inches from plug pin tips. The P4 damage location may correspond to wire bundle clamp positions. These areas are where the chafed bare wires shorted on the door latch actuator motor to the unlatch position.

D. Examine for wiring cracks five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 as described in TWA 800 Public Docket Exhibit 9A, page 116.

E. Check for damaged wiring in forward cargo compartment as described in NTSB Exhibit 9C.

Regarding the recent response of Shelly Hazle of NTSB with the below excerpt:

"For example, Mr. Smith claims that there are 10 latches on the cargo door and that the Board only discusses eight in the above mentioned report. While a superficial description of the door might imply that there are 10 latches, Mr. Smith is, in fact, incorrect in implying that they all hold the door onto the fuselage. The eight at the bottom of the door, which were discussed in the report actually hold the door closed - the other two, one on each side of the door are merely "alignment latches" and do not hold the door closed."

If you believe that four eight foot slices into a large sausage shaped pressurized hull do not need 'latches' then you are beyond reason. Please be reasonable. There are four eight foot slices in a 747 hull, two each for each cargo door. All four slices have one midspan latch to latch the door closed by its latching action of latching cam around the latching pin. One latch for eight feet of slice. And it has no locking sector to stop the latching cam from becoming unlatched around its latching pin

when the door unlatch motor turns on when cracked Poly X wiring shorts, as it has done exactly before. That one midspan latch cam around the latching pin may be sufficient provided there is no effort to unlatch it. If there is, it unlatches slightly and internal 3.5 pressure differential ruptures door at aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door, as it has done before. As the photograph of TWA 800 shows with outward peeled skin, red paint smears, and outward petal shaped bulge at aft midspan latch, that aft midspan latched and ruptured cargo door in flight, as it has done before.

Latches latch. All ten latches in each cargo door are essential to hold door closed. All midspan latches have not been recovered to be examined. The master locking handle has not been recovered to determine manual locking status.

Cracked wiring causes bad things to happen. You are checking the fuel tank explosion consequence, please check the cargo door opening in flight consequence. You now know that cracked to the bare core wiring was found in TWA 800 cargo door zone. You know that cracked wiring caused cargo door to open in flight before causing fatalities. You know that cracked wiring has caused fires in the forward cargo bay before, very close to center fuel tank. Please check out the cracked wiring caused forward cargo door to open in flight explanation for TWA 800.

I ask again for NTSB officials to meet with me so I can relate my concerns about the forward cargo door of TWA Flight 800.

Very Respectfully,

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Dear 21 May 1998

The missing eighty percent of the forward cargo door of TWA 800 may be in the Orange debris field. The retrieved items have tag numbers 9000 to 9999:

Public Docket SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Chairman's Factual Report of Investiga-

tion, page 5, "In addition, an area 2.7. nautical miles in radius, centered at 40 degrees 38 minutes 54 seconds North, 072 degrees 40 minutes 23 seconds West, was defined. The portions of this area that did not already lie in either the Red, Yellow or Green zone were designated the Orange Zone. The center of this zone corresponds to the last secondary radar return from the aircraft."

"The database created to track recovered parts is known as the TAGS database. A series of metal tags were issued to be attached to the recovered parts as durable identification tags. The metal tags were colored one of six possible colors."

"Orange Recovered from areas other than Areas 1, 2 or 3 during the trawling operation."

"9000-9999 Issued by the trawlers working the western half of the Orange zone."

Gentlemen, please note there are no Orange Zone pieces in the TAGS database. There is no mention anywhere of the pieces which were found in the Orange zone by trawlers and issued 9000 series metal identification tags. Eighty percent of the forward cargo door is missing. The NTSB Trajectory Study Exhibit, page 50, shows pieces from the forward cargo bay were the first to leave TWA 800 and left at the same time as the last secondary radar beacon was returned. It is very likely that the missing pieces of the forward cargo door are in the Orange zone and may have already been retrieved and tagged with 9000 series tags.

Where are the Orange zone pieces recovered from TWA 800? What pieces were they? Where did they come from on the aircraft? Where are the missing eighty per cent of the forward cargo door?

I direct the questions for answers to Mr. David Mayer, the person in charge of the wreckage database.

The larger point is this, chafed wiring to the core is reported on TWA 800 in NTSB Public Docket Exhibit 9A page 116:

"Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found."

Please note that BMS13-42A is known faulty Poly-X wiring. Cargo door location is FS 560-670 and cracked wires are within that zone. Frayed wires in that area have shorted before and caused the forward cargo door to open in flight, NTSB AAR 92/02 UAL 811.

Fuel tank wiring is shown to be chafed to bare wire. The TWA 800 NTSB document shows cargo door area wiring is chafed to bare wire also. FAA and NTSB officials are taking efforts to inspect fuel tank wiring. Cargo door wiring should also be inspected, especially since cargo door wiring is a known killer of nine in UAL 811 accident.

There's more reason to inspect cargo door wiring in 747s as stated in NTSB Exhibits:

"A. 1996, burning smell in forward cargo compartment, found damaged wiring shorted to ground, charring found.

B. Oct 12, 1996, Wire bundle arcing and resultant fire at aft bulkhead of forward lower lobe cargo hold on 747-200 freighter.

Source: NTSB Exhibit 9C, Attachments to the Systems Group Factual Report page 44, 45, 46."

These are real reports of real events showing real danger. They are reported to you, Mr. McSweeney.

To be blind to the red paint smears above the cargo door of TWA 800 is not right; your rods and

cones respond to color the same as mine. Those red paint smears indicate door opened in flight, just like paint smears indicated door opened in flight for UAL 811. Are they not there? Are there not many? Are they not red?

I see them and Mr. Schalekamp of FAA saw them, so I know they exist as well as being in pictures on the NTSB CD-ROM of TWA 800. They are not going to fade away with time.

The forward cargo door opened in flight for TWA 800. To disregard paint smears, outward peeled skin on the side and bottom of fuselage, and the petal shaped outward bulge at the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door is very strange, it's not right. It's not worthy of NTSB.

It's one thing to be forceful in prosecuting the center tank as the initial villain, but it's another thing to ignore a previous killer of nine that left very similar evidence to this crime as in another crime.

To check the cargo door wiring as well as the fuel tank wiring is wise and prudent. To not do so is reckless in the face of compelling evidence. I direct that opinion to Dr. Loeb.

A citizen has done much research into high time Boeing 747 accidents involving hull ruptures in flight. I ask that I be allowed a meeting during which I may present evidence for consideration and discussion to government aviation safety officials.

I pose that request to Congressman Farr and Senator McCain. It is apparent the aviation officials themselves will not comply without orders from above. I need help.

To me, the following is reasonable and prudent:

1. Check known faulty Poly X wiring in cargo door areas of early 747s for chafed to bare wires.
2. Offer explanation of red paint smears, outward peeled skin, and petal bulge at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door of TWA 800.
3. Locate missing eighty percent of forward cargo door by either finding it in Orange Zone, Calverton hangar, or locating it on the bottom of the ocean.
4. Meet with citizen, as the suggestion of a Senator, to discuss and consider real evidence as discovered in research of NTSB and FAA documents regarding wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800.

Will you please be reasonable and prudent?

I ask that question of all.

Respectfully,  
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Dear elected, appointed, and employed US government officials involved with TWA 800 investigation, 29 May 1998

Gentleman, I respectfully address all as if this were a cyberspace meeting and it is my turn to speak. Most of us have exchanged letters, emails, conversations in person or telephone calls in the past. The case for wiring/cargo door opening in flight as an explanation for the TWA accident

grows stronger every day with evidence such as this:

Quote from TWA 800 Public Docket 516A, Exhibit 9A Systems Group Chairman's Factual report of Investigation, Page 47, "A Boeing telefax of June 25, 1997, stated that: The Poly-X wire was used as general purpose wire on the RA164 (TWA 800) aircraft. Wire insulation known as Poly-X had three in-service problems:

-Abrasion of the insulation in bundles installed in high vibration areas.

(This problem was corrected by Boeing Service Bulletin No. 747-71-7105, Dated July 19, 1974)

-Random flaking of the topcoat.

-Insulation radial cracks in tight bend radii.

Radial cracking phenomenon of the Poly-X wire was mainly associated with mechanical stress. Bend radius is the largest contributor to mechanical stress in installed wire or cable. Presence of moisture in conjunction with mechanical stress is also a contributor."

The Systems Exhibit 9A continues on same page 47, "Evidence of arcing or short circuiting was found in the fuselage of N93119, (TWA 800) in addition to what was found in the wiring from the raceway below the left cabin floor and near the forward wing spar.

The Systems Exhibit 9A continues, page 116:

"Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found."

(Please note that BMS13-42A is Poly-X wiring. Cargo door location is FS 560-670 and cracked wires discovered are within that zone. Frayed wires in that area have shorted before and caused the forward cargo door to open in flight, NTSB AAR 92/02 UAL 811. Water has been seen pouring out of a forward cargo bay of a Boeing airliner. Water and leaking electricity make a powerful conductor. Both are known to exist in Boeing airliners.)

NTSB Exhibit 9C, Attachments to the Systems Group Factual Report, page 44:

"Response: There was one reported wire insulation abrasion on the 747 in 1996. There operator reported that a burning smell was noted during cargo loading in the forward cargo compartment. Cargo loading system wiring was found damaged and shorted to ground below the cargo floor at station 650, below the aft right corner of a large ball mat. A wiring loom "p" clip was found broken enabling the wire to chafe against structure. A hole was found burned through the bottom angle of the cargo floor cross member, where the wiring clip attached, and charring was evident in the surrounding insulation blanket. Repairs were made."

Page 44: "Response: There were seven reported wiring fires on the 747 in 1996."

Page 45: "f. 747-200 reported on October 12, 1996

Wire bundle arcing and resultant fire at aft bulkhead of forward lower lobe cargo hold on a 747-200 freighter. This occurred with the airplane on the ground, during post C-check functional test.

Note: Portions of the damaged wire bundles were forwarded to Boeing for evaluation in determining the cause of the damage. The results of the analysis indicated the primary conductor(s) sustained mechanical or thermal damage prior to the application of electrical power."

Page 46, "g. 747-400 reported on November 1, 1997, (see response to question 1)

There was one reported wire insulation abrasion on the 747 in 1996. There operator reported that a burning smell was noted during cargo loading in the forward cargo compartment. Cargo loading system wiring was found damaged and shorted to ground below the cargo floor at station 650, below the aft right corner of a large ball mat. A wiring loom "p" clip was found broken enabling the wire to chafe against structure. A hole was found burned through the bottom angle of the cargo floor cross member, where the wiring clip attached, and charring was evident in the surrounding insulation blanket. Repairs were made."

Page 57, Letter from Commander Naval Air Systems Command to National Electrical Manufacturers Association, 1 Oct 82, "As you know, the problems with poly-x wire are well known to headquarters and its use had been curtailed."

FAA Aircraft Certification Service Mission Statement:

<http://www.faa.gov/avr/air/hq/mission.htm>

"Aviation Safety Begins With Safe Aircraft

The Aircraft Certification Service is responsible for the safety of civil aircraft. The inherent safety of an aircraft is a function of its design integrity and its manufacturing quality. It is the mission of the Aircraft Certification Service to promote safety by:

Prescribing safety standards governing the design, production quality, and airworthiness of civil aeronautical products;

Administering design, production quality, and finished product certification programs in compliance with the prescribed safety standards;

Monitoring safety performance, and acting to provide continued operational safety of aircraft;

Working in partnership with aviation safety authorities of other countries to continuously improve the safety of the international air transportation system and achieve international harmonization of aircraft certification standards and practices.

Our program priorities are:

FIRST: Continued operational safety including surveillance.

SECOND: Safety standards, policies, and procedures.

THIRD: Type, production, and airworthiness certification."

Text of 1 May 98 letter from Congressman Farr:

"Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for contacting me recently regarding your ongoing interest in the forward cargo door of TWA flight 800. I appreciated hearing from you.

I am, of course, glad to help, and am therefore in touch with the appropriate government agency on your behalf. I will write to you again as soon as a response is available, but please let me know if there is anything further that I can do for you in the interim.

Sincerely,

Sam Farr  
Member of Congress

Text of 12/19/86 email Senator McCain:

Dear Mr. Smith,

Thank you again for contacting me with your concerns regarding the potential hazards involving Boeing 747s.

As you know, I have passed the information you sent to Chris Paul and he has informed me of your findings. I have since forwarded the material you sent to the Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee for their review.

Again, thank you for contacting me. I am always glad to have the opportunity to be of assistance.

Sincerely,  
John McCain  
U.S. Senator  
JM/jes

Excerpt of 4 Mar 98 letter from Senator John McCain to me: "I have received your letter regarding the forward cargo door of TWA Flight 800, and your interest in meeting with someone at the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) relating your concerns. I have contacted the NTSB on your behalf, about your concerns. I have asked for a prompt response to be sent directly to you."

FAA and NTSB and manufacturers are taking efforts to inspect fuel tank wiring on all airliners. Cargo door wiring on Boeing 747s should also be inspected. A wiring caused inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door of TWA 800 in flight should also be investigated.

It's prudent.

1. Check known faulty Poly X wiring in cargo door areas of early 747s for chafed to bare wires.
2. Figure out explanation of red paint smears, outward peeled skin, and petal bulge at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door of TWA 800.
3. Attempt to locate missing eighty percent of forward cargo door by either finding it in Orange Zone, Calverton hangar, or from the bottom of the ocean.
4. Meet face to face with a citizen, as the suggestion of Senator McCain, to discuss and consider real evidence as discovered in research of NTSB and FAA documents regarding wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800.

Following the example of Congressman Farr of open discussion of TWA 800 and the inclusion of relevant correspondence in letters, I have put all your correspondence to me on my web site [www.corazon.com](http://www.corazon.com). All emails and scanned letters are seen at [<http://www.corazon.com/correspondence.html>](http://www.corazon.com/correspondence.html)

Democracy and the internet in action.

Regards,

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Dear Official Persons who feel responsibility

in explaining TWA 800, 5 June 1998

There are cracked wires to the bare conductors in the cargo door area of TWA 800 as described by NTSB Systems Exhibit 9A, page 116:

"Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found." Page 47 also states, "Evidence of arcing or short circuiting was found in the fuselage of N93119, (TWA 800) in addition to what was found in the wiring from the raceway below the left cabin floor and near the forward wing spar.

That's a fact and NTSB told me so. To be prudent, determine if the forward cargo door unlatch motor power on wire is among those cracked to the bare wires located by NTSB in TWA 800. NTSB did it before with UAL 811 in AAR 92/02 where a bare chafed wire turned

on the forward cargo door unlatch motor. There is a precedent of bare wires in that area causing a fatal accident in a high time Boeing 747. It would be prudent to rule out that event happening again by checking the bare wires discovered by NTSB in TWA 800 wreckage in cargo door area to see if it is the door unlatch motor wire.

True power always wants to know if it may be wrong and immediately take steps to confirm or rebut. True power knows error is weakness and will immediately correct the error to become strong again. Fake power ignores any evidence of error. It is weak and will fail. NTSB discovers the cause and makes recommendations to FAA. FAA orders the manufacturer to fix the problem. The problem is old cracked wiring. I come to elected officials, NTSB, and FAA officials because only you have the power to persuade the manufacturer to replace defective, old, and chafed wiring if necessary and it is necessary.

Very many, very red, and very large red paint smears exist on TWA 800 above the forward cargo door area on top of normal white paint in

between the passenger windows. That's a fact and NTSB showed it to me by presenting the TWA 800 reconstruction photograph in which the many, large, red paint smears are clearly evident.

<<http://www.corazon.com/TWA800hullrupture.html> A precedent has been set of paint transfer marks in that area by UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 90/01 and AAR 92/02.

<<http://www.corazon.com/811page42paintondoor.html>

It would be prudent to confirm or rule out the red paint smears indicating an open cargo door in flight or not. One way would be to examine the cargo door hinge for overtravel impression damage, another precedent set by UAL 811 in NTSB in AAR 92/02.

<<http://www.corazon.com/811reportcontentpage.html>>

There is outward peeled skin high up on the right side of TWA 800, also more outward shattered skin on the belly, and most of all, there is outward peeled skin forward of the wing on the right side, centered around the

outward petal shaped bulge at the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door. That's a fact and I know that because NTSB presented the photograph of TWA 800 wreckage reconstruction and described the outward peeled skin in NTSB exhibits.

Main deck floor beams above the forward cargo hold were broken downward in UAL 811 during the explosive decompression. That also happened in TWA 800. An explanation was offered by Mr. James Wildey of NTSB: Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Study, page 20, "The initial opening of the fuselage lower lobe (e.g. LF6A) would have the expected result of rapid depressurization accompanied by collapse of the main deck floor for some distance forward of STA 1000. The red area recovery of interior components as far forward as STA 600 would not be inconsistent with this floor collapse and associated structural breakup."

The red paint smears and the outward peeled skin strongly indicate the forward cargo door opened in flight, an opinion shortly held by Mr. Fred Schalekamp of FAA:

30 Jan 1998 letter from Neil Schalekamp, FAA, to JBS: "The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT."

That's a fact and NTSB and FAA told me so in a letter and shown in sooting diagrams in exhibits. To not see the very red, very many, and very large unusual paint smears, and to not see the outward, not inward, peeled skin is to defy reality. The red smears, downward floor beams, and the outward skin are there and strongly indicate cargo door opened in flight based on physics and precedent.

The forward cargo door did open in flight, but not by the overpressure of a center tank explosion because the cargo door pieces were unsooted, just like the forward pieces of the center fuel tank.

What else could cause the forward cargo door to open inflight? There is a precedent, UAL 811, as described in NTSB AAR 90/01 and

AAR 92/02 in which a high time Boeing 747 suffered a hull rupture in flight forward of the wing which left a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut to the FDR, paint transfer marks in cargo door area, and outward peeled skin, all caused by chafed to bare wire conductor in the cargo door area.  
<<http://www.corazon.com/811reportcontentpage.html>>

TWA 800 had a hull rupture forward of the wing which left a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut to the FDR, paint transfer marks in cargo door area, outward peeled skin, and chafed to bare wire conductor discovered in cargo door area.

That is enough of a match to justify inspection of cargo door wiring in early Boeing 747s irrespective of other corroborative evidence of faulty Poly-X wiring discovered in Boeing airliners under NTSB and FAA orders.

Bare shorted wires have also caused fires in forward cargo holds of Boeing 747s before.

NTSB Exhibit 9C, Attachments to the Systems

Group Factual Report page 44, 45, 46. "1996, burning smell in forward cargo compartment, found damaged wiring shorted to ground, charring found.

B. Oct 12, 1996, Wire bundle arcing and resultant fire at aft bulkhead of forward lower lobe cargo hold on 747-200 freighter."

It would be prudent to inspect cargo door wiring in the forward cargo hold of early 747s since that wiring has been shown to be faulty in general, early Boeing airliner wiring has been shown to be faulty in particular, UAL 811, and faulty cargo door area wiring has shown up in the same area on a new fatal accident, TWA 800.

A solution to the mystery of the ignition source of the fireball and center tank fire may well be a fodded and on fire engine number 3 igniting disintegrating wing fuel tanks thousands of feet lower and seconds later than the initial event.

TWA 800 engine number three shows foreign object damage, fire, and uncontainment in the NTSB powerplant report and the structures report.

Exhibit 8A, page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and the tips outboard of the outer midspan shroud were bent forward slightly. About half of the fan blades had impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of the impact damage to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the midspan shroud on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body impacts along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body impact, which had some streaking extending rearward."

Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard

trailing edge.

A prudent action would be to rule in or rule out the precedent of UAL 811 applied to TWA 800. A risky action is to ignore many large red paint smears, downward broken floor beams, and much outward peeled skin and their clear implication of cargo door open in flight. The red paint smears will not fade away; they will always be many, large, and red in the photographs on the NTSB CD-ROM. The floorbeams will always be broken in Exhibit 18A. The outward peeled skin will always be shattered outward on the belly, the upper fuselage, and around the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door in the photographs of TWA 800 on the NTSB CD-ROM. Engine number three will always be sooted, blades missing, and have soft body impacts as shown by NTSB Exhibit 8A.

A more prudent action is to ground all Boeing 747s with Poly-X wiring for total inspections and replacement of that wiring. A total wiring inspection casts the net wider to catch faulty wiring. By inspecting all the wiring to include the fuel tank wiring, the yaw damper wiring,

and the known previously faulty cargo door power wiring, all wiring can all be cleared as intact and pose no danger of shorting on, as has happened before fatally.

I understand the difficulty and turmoil the grounding would cause. Boeing would have much work to rewire the planes if necessary. If not feasible, new airliners would have to be built and the grounded ones used for parts, similar to what the Navy has done with their Poly-X F-14 Tomcats.

Am I a traitor? Does my belief of a wiring cargo door fault for TWA 800 and other early 747s hurt my country? Specifically, the Northwest quadrant which has an economy derived from the design, manufacture, and selling of 747s.

Here's my answer to myself on that one. No, I am not a traitor, I am a patriot. Here's why.

Seattle is successful and must remain so. Seattle is successful because nearby is built successful airplanes. Successful airplanes are the best selling ones. The best selling ones are

the most made ones. The most made ones are the ones that make the most money. The ones that make the most money are the ones that fly the most. The ones that fly the most are the safest ones. The safest airplane is the most successful airplane. Period.

So, to present an explanation for an unsafe event, the crash of TWA 800, an early Boeing 747, is a good thing to do, even if proven wrong later. The goal is to make safe airplanes which will fly the most and be sold the most and be made the most, thereby keeping our country's economy thriving.

My personal goal is to prevent death by preventing airplane crashes by preventing hull ruptures in flight on early 747s by preventing cracked bare wires shorting on the door unlatch motor thereby allowing the aft midspan latch to rupture and allow the middle of the forward cargo door to burst open causing a large explosive decompression which allows the 300 knot slipstream to tear nose off. This inner goal was determined by the selfless action of my pilot who saved my life in a sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash years ago and which I

have never forgotten.

It is the duty of aviation professionals to strive to explain TWA 800. And yet, this loyal citizen is rebuffed when presenting to NTSB NTSB derived evidence of a supplemental explanation to TWA 800. Why is that?

If I can't have a real conversation with NTSB or FAA officials regarding TWA 800, here is an imaginary one that sums up the past two years.

JBS: "Hello, NTSB, I'm answering your plea for public assistance regarding the cause of TWA 800."

NTSB: "What do you want?"

"I believe the initial event is moisture meeting chafed to bare wire and shorting on cargo door motor to unlatch position causing rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door in flight leading to thirty by forty foot hole of explosive decompression which allows 300 knot slipstream to tear nose off which leads to disintegrating aft fuselage, wings, and tail

which ignite into fireball when fiery foddred engine number three meets vaporizing fuel thousands of feet lower and seconds later."

"No."

"There are many similarities to an event that happened before, UAL 811, and TWA 800."

"You're crazy. Who are you?"

"Commercial licensed pilot, instrument rated, 1000 PIC hours, Navy jet navigator, aircraft owner, FAA Part 135 certificate holder, avionics technician, and survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet airplane crash talking about a sudden night fiery fatal jet airplane crash."

"Go away."

"The evidence of red paint smears, outward peeled skin, and petal bulge at aft midspan latch support conclusion forward cargo door opened in flight, just like UAL 811."

"I'm ignoring you and will not respond to further comments."

"You are safety aviation officials who say you turn over every stone, who check out every explanation, who really want to know what happened to TWA 800, regardless of cause. Listen to me; talk to me."

"You are a wacky guy on the internet, you are bothering the real investigators and getting in the way, you have been told over and over again in great detail that you are wrong and we are right, you don't have your basic facts straight about the door, you should check with us before you say your nonsense to others, and you are a flake and we don't like you."

"Maybe, but so what? The messenger's style is independent of the truth of his content. Moisture and shorted wiring caused the crash of TWA 800. Why do you not ask questions to me, as real investigators do, as I ask you?"

"We don't ask questions of citizens that we don't already know the answers to, we just make statements such as this: No, you're wrong, you're crazy, go away, we will not respond, goodbye, and thank you your for your

interest in aviation safety."

Below is real:

10 March 1998 letter of John B. Drake of NTSB to JBS :

"We consider our correspondence on this subject to be complete. Should you continue to reiterate your position on this issue in future correspondence, you should expect no further response from the Safety Board."

30 Jan 1998 letter of Neil Schalekamp of FAA to JBS :

"Please note that this office will no longer be responding to your further inquiries about these same concerns, including your February 6 and February 9 letters that I just received."

17 March 1998 letter of Jim Hall of NTSB to JBS :

"We do not believe a meeting is necessary to further discuss this issue."

Summarized conversation between me and ordinary citizens who visit my web site:

Visitor: "What does NTSB and FAA say when

you tell them about wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800?"

JBS: "They write that all cargo doors were all latched, all locked, and all intact at water impact, they have told me that over and over again and they will not respond to any further inquiries from me."

"What do they say about the red paint smears?"

"They pretend they don't exist except one FAA official who did but changed his mind and now pretends they don't exist."

"What do they say about the outward peeled skin?"

"They say it was caused by inward water impact."

"What do they say about the petal outward bulge at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door?"

"They pretend it does not exist except one FAA official who did but changed his mind

and now pretends it doesn't exist."

"What do they say about the missing manual locking handle, the two overpressure relief doors, the viewing ports, the torque tubes, the two pull-in hooks, the midspan latches, and the other eighty percent of forward cargo door skin?"

"They say they are unimportant."

"What do they say about the Orange Zone pieces, the possible mixup in cargo door sills, the unsooted pieces of center fuel tank, the thirty by forty foot shattered skin zone forward of the wing on the right side, the chafed to bare wire discovery in cargo door area, and the many significant matches to UAL 811?"

"Nothing. They say nothing. Well, actually they told me to go away, and stay away."

"Have you gone to your congressman?"

"Yes, Sam Farr, and he has asked many time to NTSB and FAA for information."

"What happened?"

"They wrote to him that the door was all latched, all locked, all intact at water impact, they have told me that many times, and thanked him for his interest in aviation safety."

"Did you contact any other elected politician?"

"Yes, Senator John McCain, jet plane crash survivor and Chairman of the Committee that oversees NTSB."

"What happened?"

"He reviewed my data and submitted it to his committee for review. He asked me to wait until the hearings. He asked the NTSB to meet with me to related my concerns about the forward cargo door of TWA 800."

"What happened?"

"The Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation still has the matter under review, I waited until the hearings, I went to the hearings. The suggested meeting by

Senator McCain between NTSB officials and me was refused by Chairman Hall of NTSB saying there was sufficient evidence to rule out the cargo door opening in flight, he has told me that many times in great detail and a meeting was not necessary."

"Have you tried the press?"

"Yes, I've had several radio and TV interviews. Some get airplay and some don't."

"Have you tried Boeing?"

"Yes, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas both contacted before the merger. The two safety officers were polite and referred me to NTSB. Boeing engineers referred me to the Public Relations office of Boeing. The Boeing Public Relations office referred me to the NTSB. NTSB told me to go away."

"Have you tried the internet?"

Yes, I have a 1200 page, 100 meg website which has been online since July, 1996 and visited about 70000 times, according to page

counters."

"What are you doing now?"

"I'm continuing to write to appropriate officials presenting the evidence and trusting it will speak for itself. It's not going to go away."

"Have you tried calling them?"

"No, my wife and daughter were approached in my home by two armed federal agents within twenty four hours of me posting an email to Senator McCain about Air Force One crashing. Calling on the telephone out of the blue would be much too aggressive. Prior to the Secret Service interrogation, phone calls usually ended up with the official shouting and hanging up. So now I continue to write non-threatening, polite, full of facts letters and emails."

"Are you saying government public safety aviation officials in writing refuse to adequately respond to your request for a meeting to discuss facts, evidence, documents, photos, which clearly indicate a forward cargo

door opening in flight on TWA 800?"

"Yes."

"They will not call you, write to you, or respond to polite letters with sources listed?"

"Nope."

"Are these the same guys that say safety is priority number one, they will turn over every stone, never give up to get a full explanation, and respond to every public inquiry?"

"Yup."

"Who are you? A wacky guy on the 'net?"

"Maybe, although I use government AARs for sources, and I'm also a survivor of a sudden night fiery fatal jet airplane crash, a commercial licensed pilot, instrument rated, FAA Part 135 certificate holder, light aircraft owner, jet carrier navigator, avionics technician including radar operator, and a retired military officer in a converted garage with a computer and a phone line."

"And you've tried for almost two years to meet face to face with the public officials involved with TWA 800?"

"Yes."

What happened?

"Nothing yet. But I'm still trying. It's only been two years for TWA 800. The investigation is open and active. The evidence is not changing or going away."

And I am still trying:

Real facts presented by NTSB about TWA 800 in exhibits, photographs, text, drawings, and testimony:

1. right horizontal stab has red paint smear
2. stator blade in right horizontal stab behind engine number 3
3. inward crush top of cargo door
4. top of cargo door attached to hinge
5. petal shape of rupture area around aft midspan latch

6. missing pieces of forward cargo door include locking handle, latching pins, overpressure relief doors, midspan latches
7. rectangle visible of explosive decompression zone of outward peeled skin on right side forward of the wing on right side
8. downward movement of floor beams near cargo door
9. hoop stresses found
10. CVR sudden loud sound
11. FDR abrupt power cut
12. missing turbine blades in engine number 3.
13. soft body impacts on blades in engine number 3.
14. outward peeled skin near top of nose, under belly, and in cargo door area.
15. red paint smears above cargo door on white paint
16. soot on most blades of engine 3.
17. starboard side more damaged than port side
18. intact R2 door near shattered cargo door.
19. poly x is known to be susceptible to chafing and present
20. section 41 is known to be weak
21. history of cargo door openings in past in various airliners
22. EPR problems on aircraft before or during

fatal flight.

23. fires in forward cargo hold in the past on Boeing 747s.

24. vertical tears in fuselage skin forward of the wing on the right side

25. singe marks on right side of fuselage show burnt skin, then abruptly at tear line there are no singe marks

26. red paint rubbed off revealing white paint underneath on skin above cargo door area

27. first pieces off plane came from forward cargo hold just forward of the wing

28. at least nine missing never recovered bodies, just fragments

29. initially thought to be a bomb

30. wreckage debris shows cargo door shattered in many pieces

31. aft portion of forward door which includes aft midspan latch and locking handle missing from recovery effort

32. no soot on maintenance hatch

33. no soot on front spar of center wing tank

34. no burned bodies forward of the wing and very few burned at all

35. aft cargo door sill, latches, and locks recovered

36. forward cargo door sill, latches, and locks

not recorded in data base

37. no orange zone pieces recorded in database

38. no orange zone discussion in public record other than identification

39. chafed to bare wires found in cargo door area

40. wiring defects found on Boeing airliners

41. water observed pouring out of forward cargo hold of a Boeing airliner, cargo holds have bilges.

42. no soot on keel beam forward of the wing

43. compression fractures right side forward of the wing

44. tension fractures left side forward of the wing

45. seats in the rows in the explosive shatter zone above cargo door are in red zone and not sooted

46. aft cargo door sill is sooted

47. many witnesses said they saw downward streak that was red-orange

48. NTSB official said possibility of forward door popping open was intriguing.

49. FAA official said, then recanted, that paint smears and structural deformation indicated outward explosion.

50. initial event time was 20:31:12 at 13700 on

17 July 1996 eight miles off coast of Long Island.

Reasonable conclusions derived from facts above:

1. water in forward cargo bay.
2. chafed bare wire touched by water.
3. electrical short occurs.
4. forward door motor turns on to unlatch position.
5. aft midspan latch of forward cargo door partially unlatches.
6. pressurized hull ruptures at aft midspan latch.
7. cargo door tears into pieces, some pieces stay with nose, some don't.
8. shiny metal pieces spin away reflecting evening sunlight and perceived as red-orange streak to observers far away.
9. explosive decompression occurs shattering cargo door area forward of the wing on right side exposing twenty foot by forty foot hole in nose producing sudden loud sound on CVR.
10. 300 knots slipstream tears weakened nose off.
11. ejected debris is ingested by starboard engines which catch fire.

12. wing and wing fuel tanks; engines, tail, and fuselage fall and disintegrate on way down.
13. fiery starboard engine ignites fuel vapor clouds from disintegrating tanks, including center tank.
14. fireball observed on the ground.
15. water impact of wreckage, cargo bay material first to hit water.

I may not be alone: "NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilots saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said." AW&ST 3/10/97

Regarding the Aviation Week and Space Technology article quoted above, the following is supplied:  
<<http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html>>

Monica Warnock  
Washington Bureau  
Aviation Week & Space Technology

Dear Ms. Monica Warnock, 21 May 1998

You wrote to me: You must remove these articles and any other Aviation Week copyrighted material from your website immediately, or we will consider legal action.

I replied>Consider it done. And not because you threatened me, but because you may be right."

Ms. Warnock, I now believe you to be wrong.

I'm putting the 10 March 97 Aviation Week and Space Technology article in dispute back up on my web site at [www.corazon.com](http://www.corazon.com) at one minute after midnight on 1 June 1998.

Here's why: The content is everything and the content of the article is very, very important. I agree with the content. AvWeek agrees with content. The public officials quoted in your article agree with the content. The content quotes a public NTSB official who says that the cause of TWA 800 may have been forward

door popping open. It also said the streak seen before TWA 800 crash may have been reflection off the skin of aircraft. I agree with that. It is very important. Let us call it the door pop streak article.

Ms. Warnock, you have done your job well by searching the web for Avweek articles. You found one. You then followed orders and directed it be removed. It was removed. The problem is now above your level of authority. So I direct my comments to your boss: Mary Francis Koerner, the Manager of Bureaus.

Will you please see that this letter goes to her?

Dear Ms. Koerner, I am told several things:

1. Get the door pop streak article off my web site.
2. I should ask permission to put AvWeek articles on web site.
3. Permission will be denied.

I asked permission. It was denied. You were right.

You have done all you can do. The problem is now above your level of authority. I assume you would refer me to 'The Lawyers.' I direct my statements to the lawyers.

Will you please see that this letter goes to them?

Dear AvWeek lawyers:

Ah, copyright, don't you love it?

My name is John Barry Smith. I have a 1200 page, 100 meg website at [www.corazon.com](http://www.corazon.com) mainly devoted to high time Boeing 747 accidents in which the hull ruptures in flight forward of the wing. It contains mostly government scanned in aviation accident reports, AARs, and occasionally copyrighted material from media, such as yours.

Please note, let us stipulate:

1. My site is non profit. I have not made a penny on anything related to that website. In fact, much of my money has gone out, nothing has come in, a problem as my wife will attest.

2. It is research oriented with airplane crash related comments, investigations, reports, pictures, and text.

3. I give full and clear credit to the sources I quote. AvWeek was clearly stated as the author of the door pop streak 10 Mar 97 article in question. In fact, that is very important, that's why I quote clearly and give credit to Aviation Week by scanning in the entire article instead of paraphrasing, which would be quicker to download but not have the authority of the best aviation magazine on the planet, Aviation Week and Space Technology. And I omitted the advertising on the pages, too.

Now for argument:

1. I stole nothing from you.
2. It's fair use.
3. I can publish that article without your permission if certain conditions are met, and are: Non profit, small parts used, and credit given.

"Fair use and implied licenses.  
Fair use is a legal license to use others' work,

whether they approve or not. It constitutes one of the most important, and least clear cut, limits to copyright. The basic problem is that words like "fair" or "reasonable" cannot be defined with the precision non-lawyers (or many law students) would like. Until 20 years ago, fair use did not appear in U.S. legislation, but it now occupies about half of the copyright statute. In the U.S., partial or limited reproduction of another's work may be permitted under this doctrine.

On the one hand, fair use offers an especially liberal defense to uses that advance public interests such as education or scholarship. On the other hand, it is unlikely to be available if one fails to credit the original artist or author. It is not apt to be available to those who profit or interfere with original artists' or authors' ability to derive income from their works."

"© 1998 Franklin Pierce Law Center. All rights reserved." (I hope I have fair use to quote the above.)

I believe I advance the public interest in aviation safety, I credit the original speaker, the reporter, and the magazine, and I do not profit from it. I have fair use.

Conclusion: It will take a Judge to order me to remove the 10 March 97 AvWeek article from my website after it is put back up on 1 June 1998 or to permit me to continue to post it.

So, Lawyers, the problem is above your level of authority. I turn my attention to the Managing Editor:

Will you please see that this letter goes to him?

Dear Managing Editor,

What's the beef? You and your reporter, David Fulghum, have done a fine piece of work. You have pinpointed the cause of a mystery crash now under current investigation, TWA 800. It was the door popping open in flight. The NTSB official you quoted was correct. The streak was the skin spinning away reflecting evening red orange sunlight to observers below. The official was correct and he was quoted correctly by your aviation reporter. The implications of the truth you printed are profound. The cause now leads to chafed wiring shorting on cargo door unlatch motor

and allowing rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door which opened in flight. Exactly as has happened before with UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 92/02. The 300 knot slipstream tore the nose off TWA 800 because the explosive decompression shatter zone was much bigger on TWA 800 than on UAL 811, as shown by NTSB reconstruction photo of TWA 800 wreckage.

I encourage you to do a follow up story on the wiring/cargo door explanation as described on the website in question, [www.corazon.com](http://www.corazon.com). Mr. Fulghum and Mr. McKenna are familiar with the details of TWA 800 and wiring cargo door explanation.

Attached:

1. Correspondence between AvWeek Ms. Warnock and me.
2. Three .jpgs of the images published on website of 10 March door pop streak article.
3. Recent email to Government officials regarding this matter. Please note accurate

numbers and sources given.

So, I must publish your copyrighted material, the 10 March 97 article on my website at URL <http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html> on June 1, 1998.

I'm at email [barry@corazon.com](mailto:barry@corazon.com) or 408 659 3552 or 551 Country Club Drive, Carmel Valley, CA 93924.

I encourage discussion regarding this matter. It's a hot story even though almost two years old. Wiring is the main culprit, not the door, not the center tank. NSTB is in the right church but the wrong pew. Wiring is the problem and it's in places other than the fuel tank tubes. It's in the cargo door unlatching motor circuits.

Cheers,  
John Barry Smith

From: [monica\\_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com](mailto:monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com)  
Date: Thu, 14 May 98 10:24:37 -0500  
To: <[barry@corazon.com](mailto:barry@corazon.com)>  
Subject: Aviation Week

Mime-Version: 1.0

To: barry@corazon.com

Dear Sir,

Your website  
"http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html" contains

several scanned-in pictures of the Aviation Week & Space Technology article "ANG Pilot: TWA Hit By Object," March 10, 1997. Our records do not show that you requested permission to use these articles on your website.

Aviation Week & Space Technology is covered by copyright law which states that permission must be granted before our material is used.

Your website is in violation of this law. You must remove these articles and any other Aviation Week copyrighted material from your website immediately, or we will consider legal action.

Sincerely,  
Monica Warnock  
Washington Bureau  
Aviation Week & Space Technology  
monica\_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com  
(202)383-2314

To: monica\_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com  
From: John Barry Smith  
<barry@corazon.com>  
Subject: Request permission to present article  
on website.  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:

To: barry@corazon.com

Dear Sir,

Your website  
"<http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html>" contains  
several scanned-in pictures of the Aviation  
Week & Space Technology  
article "ANG Pilot: TWA Hit By Object,"

March 10, 1997. Our records do not show that you requested permission to use these articles on your website.

Dear Madam, 14 May 1998

A thousand pardons. I immediately request permission to reprint Aviation Week & Space Technology article "ANG Pilot: TWA Hit By Object," March 10, 1997 on my website, [www.corazon.com](http://www.corazon.com). (Corazon is my wife's name.)

The reason I scanned in exact image instead of paraphrasing text was to be precise and show source, very important for a research paper.

Should my request be denied, I shall of course, immediately comply with your request and remove the article from my web site.

AWST is a fine magazine and one which I have read diligently for over thirty years. I have watched AWST's web site mature as time goes on. <http://awgnet.com/awgnews.htm> is on my bookmarks list and I check it first thing

every morning. I'm in your database of subscribers. Keep up the good work!

Regarding this life and death matter of a sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash about which I have published a 1200 page website presenting my shorted wiring opening forward cargo door in flight explanation to the general public in a non profit effort:

1. You surely understand I can not alter my website just on an unsolicited email out of the blue from:

Monica Warnock  
Washington Bureau  
Aviation Week & Space Technology  
monica\_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com  
(202)383-2314

The absence of title indicates your request may be personal in nature and not official. Please confirm your official title which corresponds to your request that I delete an article from AWST from my site. You may be spoofing me and my asking for credentials is prudent and an established protocol.

2. Your response indicates an interest in the subject of TWA 800. Could you refer a reporter to me so I can present my wiring/cargo door explanation to him/her? I would appreciate the opinion of an aviation professional regarding my nine years of amateur research into hull ruptures of hour high time Boeing 747s. Your reporter, David Fuhlgum, in the referenced article, was able to elicit important material from NTSB officials regarding TWA 800; the forward door may have popped open in flight, and the streak may have been pieces of the aircraft reflecting evening sun. I am able to amplify those observations by an anonymous NTSB 'second official' using NTSB documents and photographs. It's a good story and one worthy of AWST's interest. FAA, NSTB, and Boeing are all saying wiring in older Boeing airliners is fraying and shorting causing problems, and so am I, long before the officials came to the realization.

3. >or we will consider legal action.

Why, O why did you threaten me? Your first

contact, out of the blue, and it contains a threat of 'legal action'. What does that mean? I don't think it means a good thing. It just sets a wrong tone. Is politeness gone from even presentations about a plane crash?

4. >Your website is in violation of this law.

Whoa! You are calling me a criminal? Just like that? I'm breaking the law? I'm a lawbreaker? This is very disturbing. Maybe that's the way AWST works with the big boys who only respond to threats, not to polite requests with explanation attached. I'm not a big boy. I'm a retired military officer working out of a converted garage in California. I don't like anybody telling me I'm breaking the law unless it's a policeman, judge, or jury. And I still don't like it, but I obey. I really can't tell my friends that I changed my cherished web site because of a strange unauthenticated email from some babe named Monica at McGraw-Hill, now can I? I mean, am I a man or a mouse?

See, a threat always turns a pleasant conversation into stressful one. Squeek,

squeek.

To review:

1. I respectfully request permission to display scanned in images of Aviation Week & Space Technology article "ANG Pilot: TWA Hit By Object," March 10, 1997 on my personal website, [www.corazon.com](http://www.corazon.com).

2. Please to show credentials, madam.

4. Refer reporter to me regarding a subject that you feel strongly enough to want to affect with correspondence, TWA 800.

5. Keep up the good work covering aviation subjects around the world.

Cheers,

John Barry Smith  
551 Country Club Drive,  
Carmel Valley, CA 93924  
408 659 3552  
[barry@corazon.com](mailto:barry@corazon.com)  
[www.corazon.com](http://www.corazon.com)

From: monica\_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com  
Date: Thu, 14 May 98 13:48:41 -0500  
To: <barry@corazon.com>  
Subject: Re: Request permission to present  
article on website.  
Mime-Version: 1.0

Dear Mr. Barry,

I am an editorial assistant in the  
Washington Bureau of Aviation Week  
& Space Technology. I work for Mary  
Francis Koerner. She is the  
Manager of Bureaus and she is the official  
contact for Reprints &  
Permission. We will periodically search  
the web for Aviation Week on  
outside websites and that is what brought  
me to your site.

Unfortunately, at present, Aviation Week &  
Space Technology does not  
allow its material to be reprinted on any  
websites other than our own.

We appreciate your interest in Aviation  
Week & Space Technology;

however, we must ask that you remove the article from your website, as you have indicated you are willing to do.

My interest in this regard is not related to TWA800 but protecting the magazine in general. Many people are not aware of the rules regarding copyright on the internet. You may reference the section "Photocopy and Rights & Permission" on the Contact Us page of Aviation Week if you have any future requests for permission.

James McKenna would be the best editor to send your correspondence to regarding TWA 800. He is located in the Washington bureau: 1200 G Street, NW Suite 922, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 383-2332.

I will mail you a hard copy of this letter on Aviation Week & Space Technology letterhead to satisfy any concerns you might have about my identity. Thank you for your understanding.

Monica Warnock  
Editorial Assistant, Washington Bureau  
Aviation Week & Space Technology

To: monica\_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com  
From: John Barry Smith  
<barry@corazon.com>  
Subject: Re: Request permission to present  
article on website.  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:

Dear Mr. Barry,

I am an editorial assistant in the  
Washington Bureau of Aviation Week  
& Space Technology. I work for Mary  
Francis Koerner. She is the  
Manager of Bureaus and she is the official  
contact for Reprints &  
Permission. We will periodically search  
the web for Aviation Week on  
outside websites and that is what brought  
me to your site.

Dear Ms. Monica,

Thank you for your prompt reply. I am saddened by the denial to present the AWST article on my web site. I shall search through it and delete it. Do I need permission to post your email in its place to explain why the article was deleted? I should explain why the article was removed to squelch any conspiracy coverup nonsense that pervades this TWA 800 investigation.

Unfortunately, at present, Aviation Week & Space Technology does not allow its material to be reprinted on any websites other than our own.

So sad.

We appreciate your interest in Aviation Week & Space Technology;  
however, we must ask that you remove the article from your website, as you have indicated you are willing to do.

As soon as I am finished with this upcoming TV interview about wiring/cargo door

explanation, I will. The TV station is KOMO-TV, Channel 4, ABC, in Seattle Washington and the arrive within the hour. I'm preparing for it so am unable now to find page, delete, change links, upload it to server right now. But how long to I have? Is 48 hours OK?

My interest in this regard is not related to TWA800 but protecting the magazine in general. Many people are not aware of the rules regarding copyright on the internet. You may reference the section "Photocopy and Rights & Permission" on the Contact Us page of Aviation Week if you have any future requests for permission.

Protecting the magazine? Well, OK, if you say so. I feel that quoting AWST in a non profit website about aviation safety helps AWST, but what do I know.

James McKenna would be the best editor to send your correspondence to regarding TWA 800. He is located in the Washington bureau: 1200 G

Street, NW Suite 922, Washington, DC  
20005. (202) 383-2332.

Thank you very much, ma'm, and I shall. I shall say you referred me, is that OK?

I will mail you a hard copy of this letter on Aviation Week & Space Technology letterhead to satisfy any concerns you might have about my identity. Thank you for your understanding.

Fine, can I put that on my website?

Let me get back to you on this. I will delete offending article and then send you URL of the new page so you can confirm I have cleansed the dirty deed.

Cheers,  
John Barry Smith

Monica Warnock  
Editorial Assistant, Washington Bureau  
Aviation Week & Space Technology

From: monica\_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com  
Date: Thu, 14 May 98 14:47:54 -0500  
To: <barry@corazon.com>  
Subject: Re[2]: Request permission to present  
article on website.  
Mime-Version: 1.0

Mr. Smith,

I will mail your letter today. When it  
arrives, you are welcome to  
place it on your website. We understand  
that you are busy right now-  
as long you are able to delete the pages by  
next Friday, that's fine  
with us. The complete URL is

<<http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html>>

If you do contact Mr. McKenna, you may  
tell him I referred you. Again,  
thank you for your interest in Aviation  
Week.

Monica Warnock  
Editorial Assistant, Washington Bureau  
Aviation Week & Space Technology

To: monica\_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com  
From: John Barry Smith  
<barry@corazon.com>  
Subject: Done  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:

Dear Ms. Warnock,

You must remove these  
articles and any other Aviation Week  
copyrighted material from your  
website immediately, or we will consider  
legal action.

Consider it done. And not because you  
threatened me, but because you may be right.

[http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.ht  
ml](http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html)

is the URL which now has deleted article.  
Completed 6:57PM 14 May 97, nine hours  
after your request. The TV interview went  
swimmingly. In fact, the interviewer from

KOMO TV ABC Seattle, asked that I send him an email of the article in question. He was interested to hear about your request.

I just want you to know that you have made an old man very very sad. I shall have to research the web, as is my wont, to find out for sure if the copyright laws exist to keep non profit websites from fairly using one article of a magazine to support an aviation safety hypothesis. I make no money from this site, on the contrary, it costs me money to keep it up. The site is 1200 pages deep with on one page assigned to article. The goal of the website is aviation safety, a common goal with Aviation Week. The officials quoted on the article are public officials whose comments are public.

It seems to me that permission should not be necessary for me to put your article on my website as long as I give credit to the author and make no money from it.

It seems to me that when permission was requested to put the article on my website, permission should have been granted.

You said 'protect your magazine,' as motive for requesting I delete the article. Protection from whom? Me? Aviation Week needs protection from me? I am a retired guy working out of a converted garage with a computer and a modem. You have nothing to fear from me, we are on the same side, aviation safety.

Regardless, the excellent article by David Fulghum in the March 10, 1997 issue has been deleted at your request. Should it become apparent that I do have the fair right to use your article under conditions which I fulfill, then, pop! up it goes again. I shall let you know in advance so you may attempt to dissuade me if you wish. It just seems that a guy ought to be able to pull out old magazine articles to quote from when he's trying to persuade visitors of an aviation safety point. In case I'm wrong, and I'm never wrong, I have erred on the side of safety and complied with your request.

Cheers,  
John Barry Smith

Mr. Smith,

I will mail your letter today. When it arrives, you are welcome to place it on your website. We understand that you are busy right now- as long you are able to delete the pages by next Friday, that's fine with us. The complete URL is

<<http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html>>

If you do contact Mr. McKenna, you may tell him I referred you. Again, thank you for your interest in Aviation Week.

Monica Warnock  
Editorial Assistant, Washington Bureau  
Aviation Week & Space Technology

DAVID A. FULGHUM/WASHINGTON

Two New York Air National Guard pilots, with the best view of the crash of TWA Flight 800 last July, are disagreeing about what they saw immediately

before destruction of the Boeing 747-131 jetliner.

One believes the airliner was struck by a fast-moving object coming from the east, while the other saw only a fiery trail from the west.

However, both believe a violent explosion ripped the aircraft apart, propelling some of its passengers high enough that they did not hit the water's surface until 3-4 min. after the initial explosion.

Maj. Frederick C. Meyer, pilot of an HH-60 helicopter from the ANG's 106th Rescue Wing, has just been freed from an FBI gag order preventing him from giving interviews about the 1996 disaster off Long Island, N.Y. The copilot, Capt. Christian Baur, remains under FBI restrictions not to speak about the accident. But two officials familiar with his testimony told Aviation Week & Space Technology in detail what he told investigators.

In the days immediately after the accident, before being ordered not to speak, Meyer discussed his initial impressions with news media (AW&ST July 29, 1996, p. 32). Last week, he chose Aviation Week as the first news organization to hear a detailed account of his recollections and his testimony to federal investigators.

Meyer and Baur were in one of the wing's two aircraft operating north of the crash site. The helicopter was operating over Long Island about 12 mi. north of the TWA crash site. Baur, the copilot, was at the controls practicing instrument approaches. The crew was awaiting darkness so they could begin training with night vision goggles.

The key point on which the two pilots disagree is whether a streak of light appeared from the opposite direction of the flight of TWA 800 (which was flying from west to east after takeoff from Kennedy Airport), a possible

indication of an intercepting missile or some other object.

Meyer's attention was first called to the area of the sky where the accident occurred "by a streak of light moving from my right (west) to my left (east)," the same direction as the TWA flight, he said.

Baur's account differs on this point. According to the two officials who have heard both pilots' accounts, Baur, on the left side of the cockpit, saw a streak moving from left to right toward the approaching TWA aircraft before the initial explosion.

"Almost due south [of the helicopter], there was a hard white light, like burning pyrotechnics, in level flight," Baur told investigators from the National Transportation Safety Board, FBI and a Federal anti-terrorist task force. "I was trying to figure out what it was. It was the wrong color for flares. It struck an object coming from the

right and made it explode."

Baur's first impression was that there had been a midair collision, possibly between two light aircraft that tow banners along the beach.

"They had witnessed these aircraft come very close to each other at that time of day, and that's what they assumed," the second official said.

NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilots saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said.

Meyer could not actually see the aircraft, but only the streak, and he admits that Baur, a younger man, has better eyesight. Moreover, Meyer adds, "Whatever Chris saw on the left side I didn't see because he blocked my

view." Baur disputes this, saying that the explosions and crash were virtually dead ahead of the aircraft.

The helicopter was executing a missed approach and was about halfway down Runway 24 at the Francis S. Gabreski International Airport at Westhampton Beach, N.Y. It had started a climbing left turn to the south when the accident occurred. The Sun had not yet set and the sky was still bright.

According to Meyer, the streak was about 15-20 deg. above his line of sight and perhaps 15 deg. left of the aircraft's centerline.

"I don't know if it was a missile that struck the airliner," Meyer said.

"Nothing at that moment said 'missile' to me. I spent a number of years in Vietnam and had seen missiles fired, some of them at me. But, that was 25-year-old missile technology, which left smoke trails. I understand today

that they are made with smokeless rocket fuel and don't leave trails. What I saw was a streak of light, not a smoke trail."

The streak of light that Meyer saw made a very shallow, gradually descending arc. He points out that he never saw the actual airframe of the TWA 747 within the streak or subsequent explosions or smoke trails. It was virtually identical to the trajectory of a meteor, with only a slight curve. But unlike a meteor, the streak was red-orange in color, he said.

Meyer observed the descending streak for 3-5 sec. Then there was what Meyer describes as a hard, very sudden, yellowish-white explosion that looked identical to the detonation of an anti-aircraft shell. He did not suggest an anti-aircraft weapon was fired at TWA Flight 800, however.

"It left a cloud of smoke just like a flak explosion does," Meyer said. "One to two seconds later, there was a second, hard

explosion almost pure white in color. The position of that explosion appeared to be slightly below and behind where one would have anticipated the streak of light to have gone. The trajectory at that point appeared to be slightly bent down and slowed."

A new detail in Meyer's story was that almost immediately there was a third explosion and fireball. Meyer doesn't remember if there was an explosion and fireball or if the third explosion turned into the fireball.

"That was a soft explosion unlike the first two," Meyer said. "It began as a tiny point and it grew very rapidly into a huge fireball four times the diameter of the Sun. I was dumbstruck."

Baur also saw three explosions. But he contends that they started from left (east) and went to right (west). He said the explosions created a "huge waterfall of flame that cascaded down," the first official said. "The column

of flame was being whipped around violently. First it was tumbling, and then it refined itself into a spiral. The explosions were all before the cascade of flame began."

In the helicopter, Baur spoke first, asking if it was pyrotechnics. ANG operations that night were to have included flares dropped by a HC-130 transport aircraft. The crew then called the Gabreski tower.

"We said we'd observed a fireball south of the field and we would like clearance to the beach to investigate," Meyer said. Baur actually made the call and reported a possible midair collision, the second official involved in the investigation said.

The crash time has been variously reported as being from 8:31 to 8:45 p.m., Meyer said. He believes the earlier time is more likely to be correct although he can't be sure.

Baur continued to fly the helicopter during the search while Meyer functioned as copilot and primary communicator. As they approached the crash site, after about 4 min. of flight, debris was still falling so they slowed to avoid being hit.

"As they got closer, within two or three miles, Baur could see the aircraft body, not tumbling, but in a vortex almost like inside a tornado," the second official said.

Meyer made another revelation that was the result of long reflection after the accident.

"I was looking ahead . . . as we approached the crash site," Meyer said. "I saw some debris at 1,200-1,300 ft. falling at terminal velocity and fuselage fragments tumbling at 40-50 mi. per hour. The things falling at high speed were bodies still strapped in their seats. That is logically inconsistent if they came from the same explosion at the

same time. On reflection, I have concluded that the bodies must have been blown upward before they came down. That indicates a violent explosion."

On this point, the two pilots' accounts agree, the officials said.

"Debris was falling like snow," according to Baur's testimony. "Among the particulate there was metal and paper, some of it glowing. Through all of that, things would come racing through -- two or three high-speed objects like sacks of potatoes. I believed them to be bodies that had been blown upward."

The pilots' opinion differ from the conclusion of inspectors that all the passengers were in the fuselage when it ripped apart from aerodynamic forces.

In an attempt to debunk the most egregious coverup and conspiracy theories, Meyer and other ANG officials remain adamant that their unit was not part of

any larger, undisclosed, multiservice operation. Operations the night of the crash were standard training flights to maintain currency with night vision goggles, rescue operations and in-air refueling.

The HH-60 flight was to be of about two hours' duration and would not extend more than 2 mi. off the Long Island southern coast. The HC-130 would drop flares, rafts and a para-rescueman and later refuel the helicopter in a communications-out, lights-out operation.

"No other people of other services were on the base at the time," Meyer said.

Nor were there indications of the operations of drone aircraft, another theory that has surfaced as the possible cause of the crash. "No, there would have been some kind of notice."

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Until the streak is adequately explained, the missile explanation will always be possible. I say missile explanation will always be could

be, but wasn't. The evidence refutes every missile explanation suggested event. Likewise for meteor and bomb explanations, they will always be could have been, but weren't.

The center tank did catch fire and there was a fireball, so center tank explanation will always be could have been and was, the only issue is when.

The wiring/ cargo door explanation explains the streak, refutes the bomb and meteor, and supplements the center tank explanation.

The wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 is the more correct, more complete explanation.

I urge that Boeing 747s with Poly-X wiring be grounded until wiring is checked in cargo door areas known to have been faulty in the past.

I again request to meet with NTSB officials to present my wiring/cargo door explanation.

Sincerely,

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Navigator: RA5C Vigilante  
Owner: Mooney M20C  
Survivor: Sudden night fiery fatal jet plane  
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Dear Official Persons who feel responsibility in explaining TWA 800,

Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 34, A section of the structure outboard of H7 exhibited evidence of red paint transfer marks on the upper skin (H8); only the remnants of the shattered logo light window remain in the window frame2.

The above details a red paint transfer mark on the right horizontal tail surface of TWA 800 directly

aft of the red painted trim in cargo door area. This area shows missing red paint clearly in NTSB photo displayed at URL <<http://www.corazon.com/redpaintsmearssoloprint.html>>

The NTSB photographs are clear in color and detail. The TWA 800 reconstruction photograph shows abnormal green, white and red paint on the right side forward of the wing.

Normal TWA red trim paint scheme is seen at <<http://www.corazon.com/twapaintpixweb.html>> Only above the forward cargo door of the reconstructed fuselage of TWA 800 is seen the abnormal red paint smears.

The sequence is thus: bare aluminum skin is cleaned, primed, base coat of white applied, then red trim on top of white, then decals. This sequence is basic painting for Boeing 747s and confirmed by aviation professionals.

It is not red paint trim on primer with overspray, mask off, then paint white base coat around the trim.

The red trim is always on top of white base coat and means that the many, red, and large red paint smears between the passenger windows are red paint transfer marks. The red paint marks are not red paint exposed when white above is worn away, it is always red on top of white, not underneath.

This is further proven by skin which has red paint missing and thus exposing white undercoat. This is seen at URL <<http://www.corazon.com/TWA800hullrupture.html>> The white is always underneath the red. The green is always underneath the white.

Additionally, the added red paint between the windows is next to the missing red paint in the trim above the cargo door. Red paint went from one area to another.

The many red and large red paint transfer marks above the forward cargo door of TWA 800 indicate the cargo door opened in flight. The precedent of cargo door paint transfer marks was set by UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 92/02, page 41.

The red paint transfer marks indicate the red door below ruptured/opened in flight and slammed into the white paint above, removing the red trim paint and transferring it on top of the white paint. This is clearly seen between the passenger windows.

The red paint evidence coupled with the outward peeled skin on the side, and in the door area, and in the belly proves an explosive event occurred inflight in the cargo door area.

The downward crushed main floor beams confirm the explosive event. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Study, page 20, "Downward separation directions were noted at STA 900, 880, 840, 820, 800, and 780..." and ""The initial opening of the fuselage lower lobe (e.g. LF6A) would have the expected result of rapid depressurization accompanied by collapse of the main deck floor for some distance forward of STA 1000. The red area recovery of interior components as far forward as STA 600 would not be inconsistent with this floor collapse and associated structural breakup."

The petal shaped outward bulge at the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door pinpoints the location of the initial rupture of the hull of TWA 800 as seen at URL <<http://www.corazon.com/petalbulge.html>> The aft latch is missing, the door frame is curved outward, and surrounding skin is shaped circular.

The analysis of red paint markings and structural deformation indicating an outward explosion was briefly held by FAA Branch Manager Neil Schalekamp of Northwest Region in a letter to me on 30 Jan 1998. "The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT."

The cause of the outward cargo door explosion being the center tank is refuted by the lack of soot on the few recovered forward cargo door pieces and other right side fuselage pieces.

Exhibit 20A page 129. Fire and Explosion Group Factual Report.

"RF2 C-004 No sooting No sooting

RF3A-H These pieces are part of the forward main cargo door.

Some have grimy corrosion inhibiting compound (CIC), but there is no apparent sooting.

These pieces are part of the forward main cargo door.

Some have grimy corrosion inhibiting compound (CIC), but there is no apparent sooting.

RF4 B-103 No sooting No sooting

RF5 A-071 No sooting No sooting

RF6A B-2004 No sooting No sooting

RF6B B-240 No sooting No sooting

RF6C B-318 No sooting No sooting

RF7 A-033 No sooting No sooting

RF8A No sooting No sooting

RF8B B-256 No sooting No sooting

RF8C B-263 No sooting No sooting

RF8D B-068 No sooting No sooting

RF8E B-268 No sooting No sooting

RF8F B-248 No sooting No sooting

RF9A C-117 No sooting No sooting

RF9B C-117 No sooting No sooting

RF9C C-259 No sooting No sooting"

NTSB investigators also are intrigued by the aircraft forward door popping open in flight, an explanation supported by red paint smears, outward peeled skin, downward floor beams, and petal shaped bulge at aft midspan latch. "NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilots saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said." AW&ST 3/10/97

Basic NTSB generated evidence for TWA 800 in photos, text, sooting diagrams, tables, and drawings, a NTSB produced report AAR 92/02, and your visual interpretations of NTSB photograph at <<http://www.corazon.com/redpaintsmearssoloprint.html>> and on NTSB CD-ROM proves that the forward cargo door of TWA 800 opened in flight.

The evidence above proves the the cargo door was not all latched, all locked, and all intact at water impact, as previously believed based upon examination of only eight of the ten cargo door latches. Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 15C, Report Number 97-82, Section 41/42 Joint, Forward Cargo Door, "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill."

The cause of the door opening in flight is probably the same as UAL 811, as described in AAR 92/02; chafed wiring shorting on door unlatch motor based upon NTSB evidence for TWA 800 in Docket Exhibit 9A page 116: "Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found."

NTSB agrees that a new explanation for the destruction sequence is possible based on new interpretations of the evidence such as shown by the red paint smears. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Report, page 30: "It is therefore possible that new scenarios (sequences) may emerge as new information is acquired whether it be from newly identified parts, or simply a new interpretation of current information."

The wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 must be thoroughly investigated to rule in or rule out the reasonable conclusions reached by the careful analysis of red paint smears, outward peeled skin, downward floor beams, petal shaped bulge at aft midspan latch, and cracked to bare conductor wires discovered in TWA 800 by NTSB.

The wreckage of TWA 800 is the victim at autopsy. It is the victim saying look at me, I exploded in flight, right there at the aft midspan latch. Just like I did before in 1989 with UAL 811 and left paint smears, outward peeled skin, aft midspan latch rupture, sudden loud sound on the CVR and power cut to the FDR. Don't ignore me; don't deny me; do something about me.

Sincerely,

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 Navigator: RA5C Vigilante  
 Owner: Mooney M20C  
 Survivor: Sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash.

Facts presented by NTSB about TWA 800 in exhibits, photographs, text, drawings, and testimony:

1. right horizontal stab has red paint smear
2. stator blade in right horizontal stab behind engine number 3
3. inward crush top of cargo door
4. top of cargo door attached to hinge
5. petal shape of rupture area around aft midspan latch
6. missing pieces of forward cargo door include locking handle, latching pins, overpressure relief doors, midspan latches
7. rectangle visible of explosive decompression zone of outward peeled skin on right side forward of the wing on right side
8. downward movement of floor beams near cargo door
9. hoop stresses found
10. CVR sudden loud sound
11. FDR abrupt power cut
12. missing turbine blades in engine number 3.
13. soft body impacts on blades in engine number 3.
14. outward peeled skin near top of nose, under belly, and in cargo door area.
15. red paint smears above cargo door on white paint
16. soot on most blades of engine 3.
17. starboard side more damaged than port side

18. intact R2 door near shattered cargo door.
19. poly x is known to be susceptible to chafing and present
20. section 41 is known to be weak
21. history of cargo door openings in past in various airliners
22. EPR problems on aircraft before or during fatal flight.
23. fires in forward cargo hold in the past on Boeing 747s.
24. vertical tears in fuselage skin forward of the wing on the right side
25. singe marks on right side of fuselage show burnt skin, then abruptly at tear line there are no singe marks
26. red paint rubbed off revealing white paint underneath on skin above cargo door area
27. first pieces off plane came from forward cargo hold just forward of the wing
28. at least nine missing never recovered bodies, just fragments
29. initially thought to be a bomb
30. wreckage debris shows cargo door shattered in many pieces
31. aft portion of forward door which includes aft midspan latch and locking handle missing from recovery effort
32. no soot on maintenance hatch
33. no soot on front spar of center wing tank
34. no burned bodies forward of the wing and very few burned at all
35. aft cargo door sill, latches, and locks recovered
36. forward cargo door sill, latches, and locks not recorded in data base
37. no orange zone pieces recorded in database
38. no orange zone discussion in public record other than identification
39. chafed to bare wires found in cargo door area
40. wiring defects found on Boeing airliners
41. water observed pouring out of forward cargo hold of a Boeing airliner, cargo holds have bilges.
42. no soot on keel beam forward of the wing
43. compression fractures right side forward of the wing
44. tension fractures left side forward of the wing
45. seats in the rows in the explosive shatter zone above cargo door are in red zone and not sooted
46. aft cargo door sill is sooted
47. many witnesses said they saw downward streak that was red-orange
48. NTSB official said possibility of forward door popping open was intriguing.
49. FAA official said, then recanted, that paint smears and structural deformation indicated outward explosion.
50. initial event time was 20:31:12 at 13700 on 17 July 1996 eight miles off coast of Long Island.

Reasonable conclusions derived from facts above:

1. water in forward cargo bay.
2. chafed bare wire touched by water.
3. electrical short occurs.
4. forward door motor turns on to unlatch position.
5. aft midspan latch of forward cargo door partially unlatches.
6. pressurized hull ruptures at aft midspan latch.
7. cargo door tears into pieces, some pieces stay with nose, some don't.
8. shiny metal pieces spin away reflecting evening sunlight and perceived as red-orange streak to observers far away.
9. explosive decompression occurs shattering cargo door area forward of the wing on right side exposing twenty foot by forty foot hole in nose producing sudden loud sound on CVR.
10. 300 knots slipstream tears weakened nose off.
11. ejected debris is ingested by starboard engines which catch fire.
12. wing and wing fuel tanks; engines, tail, and fuselage fall and disintegrate on way down.
13. fiery starboard engine ignites fuel vapor clouds from disintegrating tanks, including center tank.
14. fireball observed on the ground.
15. water impact of wreckage, cargo bay material first to hit water.

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Dear Official Persons who feel responsibility in explaining TWA 800,

NTSB just sent me a two page letter. It was indirectly from Dr. Bernard Loeb. The first page was a form letter from NTSB reporting that I had used the wrong zip code on my hand addressed letter to Dr. Bernard Loeb. The second page was a copy of the misaddressed letter which was my 13 March 1998 letter to everyone addressed above.

This recent letter from NTSB tells me much. It tells me Dr. Bernard Loeb received the letter all right because the correction came from NTSB which means NTSB received it all right and everyone in NTSB knows Dr. Bernard Loeb as the Director of Aviation Safety and point man for TWA 800. I assume that Director Loeb gives close scrutiny to my letters to catch a one digit zip code er-

ror from incorrect 20591 to correct 20594. I assume this is a way for Director Loeb to point out errors in my correspondence.

And he's right. It was an error. It may be trivial in this case but potentially catastrophic when flying. As a navigator I recognize a serious error and the lack of attention to detail in a wrong number. It is a mistake I shall remember always. Dr. Bernard Loeb has shown me the need to check my numbers. Accuracy is everything in aviation and one digit being wrong is enough to kill. It happened with a Korean flightcrewmember avoiding the digit '4' and putting in a different number into his inertial navigation computer which then led him, his plane and his passengers over enemy territory which led to a shootdown, KAL 007. It happened to me when hand addressing envelopes of hard copy letters to back up the electronic emails. I checked out the error and traced it to a mixup of zip codes between NTSB and FAA. NTSB is 20594 and FAA is 20591 and I mixed them up.

There is an additional error on my address to Dr. Bernard Loeb. I put "490 L'Enfant Plaza East SW" instead of the correct "490 L'Enfant Plaza SW."

The principle is the same: Errors kill and accuracy counts.

I shall follow the example of NTSB and recognize the error and correct it.

I may have made another error recently in regard to TWA 800: I said that the many large red paint marks between the passenger windows above the forward cargo door of TWA 800 wreckage were 'transfer marks'. I stated they were red marks from the red fuselage skin below coming up and smashing into the white and leaving the red paint on top, similar to UAL 811.

There is now serious dissent that states the many large red paint marks are red paint from overspray of the trim below. The red marks are revealed white paint between the passenger windows is peeled back, revealing the red underneath. Several painters of airliners give conflicting opinion. The conclusive evidence is on the wreckage of TWA 800.

I ask NTSB and Director Loeb, can you confirm the paint sequence for the many large red paint marks between the passenger windows as seen in URL <http://www.corazon.com/redpaintsmearssoloprint.html> and <http://www.corazon.com/TWA800hullrupture.html>? Are they red on top of white paint, or are they red underneath white paint? Is the red underneath or on top?

It's vitally important. If red is underneath white, then I have made another error and wish to correct it. If red on top of white then it appears that the red could have come from skin below opening up and slamming together causing paint transfer marks, thus confirming cargo door opened in flight.

There is no expense involved, only a short time for a metallurgist to climb up on a stepladder with a magnifying glass and look at the TWA 800 red paint marks.

As NTSB pointed out to me, numbers are to be accurate. I believe NTSB also respects numbers.

That's why eight is not ten. And never will be. That's why all ten of the forward cargo door latches must be recovered and examined and determined to have been operating normally before the cargo door is ruled out as culprit. That conclusive examination of all ten has not been done and that's why the forward cargo door can not be ruled out.

As NTSB told me to use the right numbers in my zip code, I ask NTSB to use the right numbers on the forward cargo door. There are ten identical latching pins and cams on that door and examining only eight is not good, not trivial, and wrong for NTSB.

For me to write NTSB zip code accurately is right for me. To check all ten latches is right for NTSB.

The two missing midspan latches that NTSB have not examined have been shown to carry loads as reported in AAR 92/02 where the aft midspan latch pin showed heat damage from hard contact. All ten latches are vital for proper operation of that door.

Only checking eight of ten is as bad as putting 20591 instead of 20594.

So, I acknowledge an error pointed out to me by NTSB and I remark on another error nearby, and corrected both.

I ask that NTSB do the same for themselves.

There is additional NTSB evidence which is perplexing if the center tank explosion as initial event is to be confirmed:

Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge." And same page: "A section of the structure outboard of H7 exhibited evidence of red paint transfer marks on the upper skin (H8); only the remnants of the shattered logo light window remain in the window frame."

Seat track, glitter, stator blade and red paint all had to come from up front because that's where they were. All of these items must have become embedded in the horizontal stabilizer in flight, because it's the only way they could have gotten there based upon the separation of nose and tail long before water impact. The only way for the stuff in front to get to the back in flight is for it to come out of the forward baggage hold. One very good way, a reasonable way, a way that's happened before, is for the forward cargo door to come open inflight and allow glitter contents of cargo bins, a seat track, and red painted door top to be blown aft. It also allows a fodded engine three to cause stator blade to be thrown out and back into right horizontal stabilizer.

A way to rule a repeat door opening event out is to examine the door and determine if it was functioning normally. That can not be done yet because only eight of ten latches have been recovered as well as on 20% of the door structure. Until door totally recovered it can not be totally ruled out. Until cargo door totally ruled out, TWA 800 investigation is not totally complete.

Examining many large red paint markings can assist in that determination. Are the red paint marks on top of the white paint or underneath the white paint between the passenger windows above the forward cargo door?

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith  
 551 Country Club Drive  
 Carmel Valley, CA 93924  
 408 659 3552  
 barry@corazon.com  
 www.corazon.com  
 Citizen: USA  
 Major: US Army Retired  
 Pilot: Commercial, instrument rated, FAA Part 135 certificate.  
 Navigator: RA5C Vigilante  
 Owner: Mooney M20C  
 Survivor: Sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash

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July 2, 1998

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Not true. There are ten latches on each door and only eight of the forward door were examined because only eight were recovered. Above quote also implies some latches opened but not in flight. What is the status of the forward midspan latches? Found? Open or closed? Damaged? They are not in the wreckage database, they are not hung on wreckage reconstruction, and they are not discussed in the forward cargo door exhibit, 15C.

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John Barry Smith

To: hazles-NTSB.gov

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: Response to Chairman Hall's letter to Congressman Farr.

Cc:

Bcc:

X-Attachments:

Dear Ms. Hazle, please forward to below gentleman.

James Hall

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Thomas E. Haueter

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Cheers,

John Barry Smith

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Line by line rebuttal to Chairman Hall's June 8, 1998 letter to Congressman Sam Farr:

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44. tension fractures left side forward of the wing
45. seats in the rows in the explosive shatter zone above cargo door are in red zone and not sooted
46. aft cargo door sill sooted
47. many witnesses said they saw downward streak that was red-orange
48. NTSB official said possibility of forward door popping open was intriguing.
49. FAA official said, then recanted, that paint smears and structural deformation indicated outward explosion.

Chairman Hall in a letter to Elaine Scarry, "However, please be assured that the Safety Board is considering every possible event that could have led to this accident, including EMI or HIRF."

Apparently Chairman Hall considers one sentence in Exhibit 15C about five percent of a door, the lower sill, as fulfilling the obligation. That door is a confirmed killer of nine, UAL 811, and gets one sentence and an hour of examination of a small portion.

Methane gas has killed no airliner passenger and yet got the NTSB ordered attention of four scientists for a day to consider it.

HIRF has killed no airliner passengers and yet has at least ten months of NTSB ordered consideration.

Center tank blowing up spontaneously in a 747 has never killed an airliner passenger and yet gets two years and millions of dollars of NTSB investigation.

And the prime, early on suspect, the forward cargo door, gets one sentence and no discussion from an outside source. That's hardly 'consideration' more like wishful hasty rejection.

By the way, what exactly is the address of NTSB. The letter from NTSB which told me I had the wrong ZIP code included the 'correct' address which omitted the 'East' after 490 L'Enfant Plaza and yet 'East' is used as the address. Is 'East' included or not? If so, the 'correction' sheet sent out by NTSB to correct my error is wrong. If not, then sent Ms. Scarry a correction notice because she included 'East' also.

Ms. Scarry uses this address, just like I did before I received the 'correction notice.'  
 "National Transportation Safety Board  
 490 L'Enfant Plaza East, S.W.  
 Washington, D.C. 20594"

By the way, the official probable cause for UAL 811 as listed in the current NTSB accident database is improper latching which is wrong. The forward cargo door of UAL 811 was properly latched. The error of probable cause was corrected with AAR 92/02 and it's time to correct the NTSB accident database to reflect that correction.

Normally, personal discussion is not warranted in an official letter but I will take my cue from NTSB spokesperson Shelly Hazle who wrote behind my back to a reporter how misinformed I was, how superficial my research was, and how I didn't know what I was talking about.

So, my personal comments to personal people:

I believe you to be hard working, dedicated public servants who are ordinary people caught up in

extraordinary circumstances. There is no coverup of wiring/cargo door cause for TWA 800. There is no conspiracy to refuse to thoroughly investigate the original belief of inadvertent opening of forward cargo door in flight for TWA 800. There is no plot to hide a design defect of a large outward opening non-plug cargo door in wide body airliners. There is no laziness to examine the wreckage evidence for overtravel impression damage on the door hinge, the large red paint markings, outward peeled skin, and petal bulge at aft midspan latch for confirmation of forward cargo door opening in flight. There is no fear that years of work into PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800 will be for nought.

I believe that the TWA 800 investigation by NTSB has been a zealous prosecution of center tank explosion as initial event by unknown ignition source to the exclusion of other reasonable mechanical explanations with precedent.

I keep on thinking about the baggage handler for UAL 811 that lived for two years with the knowledge that everyone around him thought him to be responsible for the deaths for nine and serious injuries to five passengers because he did not close a door properly, and he knows he did. I keep thinking of the father of the dead teenage son on UAL 811 that pressed to have the door recovered from the bottom of the ocean which revealed the true cause of the door opening in flight, not improper latching but chafed wire to bare conductor to short door unlatch motor on.

I keep thinking of the same cracked to bare conductor wiring found in the same cargo door area of TWA 800, another high time early model Boeing 747.

I keep thinking about the FAA engineer who said that the paint markings and structural deformation indicated an outward explosion in cargo door area and later said he agreed with others who said it was water impact damage but said nothing about paint markings and structural deformation.

I keep hearing Chairman Hall asking, "Why were not more passengers burnt?" and then not listening to the answer that they were not there to be burnt.

I keep hearing Jim Wildey saying words to the effect, "Yes, there were hoop stresses found in the cargo door area," hoop stresses that would not be there is the door had been intact to water impact.

I keep reading Jim Wildey's explanation of downward fractured floor beams as an initial opening of the fuselage lower lobe, a description that exactly fits the wiring/cargo door explanation.

I keep reading of the first objects to leave TWA 800 were forward of the wing, not in the wing.

I keep thinking of the right horizontal stabilizer that had a red paint transfer mark, glitter, and an engine 'stator blade' embedded in it.

I keep thinking about the NTSB 'second official' who was intrigued by the thought that the forward door popping open could have cause the streak of light.

I keep hearing senior government officials reiterating how safety is number one priority and no stone will be left unturned in pursuit of the truth of TWA 800.

All Dickinson says A depressurization event most certainly would have been noted by the crew and recorded on the CVR.

Ron Schleede saying>I have examined the cargo door from twa 800--it is locked and latched!

All the while knowing both cargo door are in shattered pieces and most of the forward door still missing.

Shelly Hazle saying>Although Mr. Smith does display some knowledge of the Boeing 747, he has

a basic misunderstanding of the facts. For example, Mr. Smith claims that there are 10 latches on the cargo door and that the Board only discusses eight in the above mentioned report.

Knowing all the while there are ten and the Board only discusses eight.

18 Nov 96 letter from Mr. McSweeney/Kirkpatrick, FAA, to Congressman Farr:

"The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has no evidence that door failures played a role in the TWA flight 800 accident."

All the while knowing FAA Bob Breneman only examined the lower eight and did not know the status of the two midspan latches.

24 Oct 1997 letter from Chairman Hall, NTSB to Congressman Farr:

"Please be assured that our team has examined all of the structure recovered from TWA flight 800, approximately 95%--including all of the cargo door mechanisms and structures. Early on in the investigation we determined conclusively that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water, and there was no evidence of any failure of any of the latching mechanisms on the doors."

Knowing all the while all the cargo door mechanisms and structures were not recovered to be examined.

20 November 1997 Letter from Peter Goelz of Sandy Hentges of Congressman's Farr's office:

"As Congressman Farr was advised by letter dated October 24, 1997, early in the investigation we determined conclusively that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water, and there was no evidence of any failure of any of the latching mechanisms on the doors."

Knowing all the while it is impossible to conclusively rule out cargo door opening in flight with 80% of the door still missing.

19 December 1997 letter from Chairman Hall, NTSB to JBS:

"However, to repeat, the investigation of the accident involving TWA flight 800 has revealed no evidence to suggest that a failure of a cargo door precipitated the event."

All the while knowing Chairman Hall and NTSB officials refuse to meet with me to allow me to present evidence.

17 March 1998 letter from Chairman Hall, NTSB, to JBS:

"As stated in our most recent letter dated March 10, 1998, the TWA flight 800 investigative team has gathered sufficient facts to rule out this possibility of an in-flight opening of a cargo door. We do not believe a meeting is necessary to further discuss this issue."

Responses to JBS regarding further communications:

10 March 1998 letter of John B. Drake of NTSB to JBS :

"We consider our correspondence on this subject to be complete. Should you continue to reiterate your position on this issue in future correspondence, you should expect no further response from the Safety Board."

30 Jan 1998 letter of Neil Schalekamp of FAA to JBS :

"Please note that this office will no longer be responding to your further inquiries about these same concerns, including your February 6 and February 9 letters that I just received."

And most of all I keep on hearing in my head and seeing on paper the sudden loud sound on the CVR followed by the abrupt power cut to the FDR on four high time Boeing 747s in flight, AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800, a rare and difficult event to reproduce.

NTSB Identification: DCA89MA027 For details, refer to NTSB microfiche number 37772A  
Scheduled 14 CFR 121 operation of UNITED AIRLINES (D.B.A. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.)

Accident occurred FEB-24-89 at HONOLULU, HI

Aircraft: BOEING 747-122, registration: N4713U

Injuries: 9 Fatal, 5 Serious, 33 Minor, 309 Uninjured.

FTL #811 WAS A SCHEDULED PASSENGER FLIGHT FROM LOS ANGELES TO SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA, WITH STOPS IN HONOLULU (HNL), HI, AND AUCKLAND, NEW ZEALAND. THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL UNTIL AFTER DEPARTURE FROM HNL. WHILE CLIMBING FROM FL220 TO FL230 THE CREW HEARD A "THUMP" FOLLOWED BY AN EXPLOSION. AN EXPLOSIVE DECOMPRESSION WAS EXPERIENCED AND THE #3 AND #4 ENGS WERE SHUTDOWN BECAUSE OF FOD. THE FLT RETURNED TO HNL AND PASSENGERS WERE EVACUATED. INSPECTION REVEALED THE FORWARD LOWER LOBE CARGO DOOR DEPARTED INFLT CAUSING EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO THE FUSELAGE AND CABIN ADJACENT TO THE DOOR. NINE PASSENGERS WERE EJECTED AND LOST AT SEA. INVESTIGATION CENTERED AROUND DESIGN AND CERTIFICATION OF THE DOOR WHICH ALLOWED IT TO BE IMPROPERLY LATCHED, AND THE OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE TO ASSURE AIRWORTHINESS OF THE DOOR AND LATCHING MECHANISM. (SEE NTSB/AAR-90/01)

Probable Cause

THE SUDDEN OPENING OF THE IMPROPERLY LATCHED FORWARD LOBE CARGO DOOR IN FLIGHT AND THE SUBSEQUENT EXPLOSIVE DECOMPRESSION. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS A DEFICIENCY IN THE DESIGN OF THE CARGO DOOR LOCKING MECHANISMS, WHICH MADE THEM SUSCEPTIBLE TO INSERVICE DAMAGE, AND WHICH ALLOWED THE DOOR TO BE UNLATCHED, YET TO SHOW A PROPERLY LATCHED AND LOCKED POSITION. ALSO CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS THE LACK OF PROPER MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION OF THE CARGO DOOR BY UNITED AIRLINES, AND A LACK OF TIMELY CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BY BOEING AND THE FAA FOLLOWING A PREVIOUS DOOR OPENING INCIDENT.

Index for Feb 1989 | Index of Months

1. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Study, page 20, "Downward separation directions were noted at STA 900, 880, 840, 820, 800, and 780..." and "The initial opening of the fuselage lower lobe (e.g. LF6A) would have the expected result of rapid depressurization accompanied by collapse of the main deck floor for some distance forward of STA 1000. The red area recovery of interior components as far forward as STA 600 would not be inconsistent with this floor collapse and associated structural breakup."

Quote from TWA 800 Public Docket 516A, Exhibit 9A Systems Group Chairman's Factual report of Investigation, Page 47, "A Boeing telefax of June 25, 1997, stated that: The Poly-X wire was used as general purpose wire on the RA164 (TWA 800) aircraft. Wire insulation known as Poly-X had three in-service problems:

-Abrasion of the insulation in bundles installed in high vibration areas.

(This problem was corrected by Boeing Service Bulletin No. 747-71-7105, Dated July 19, 1974)

-Random flaking of the topcoat.

-Insulation radial cracks in tight bend radii.

Radial cracking phenomenon of the Poly-X wire was mainly associated with mechanical stress. Bend radius is the largest contributor to mechanical stress in installed wire or cable. Presence of moisture in conjunction with mechanical stress is also a contributor."

The Systems Exhibit 9A continues on same page 47, "Evidence of arcing or short circuiting was found in the fuselage of N93119, (TWA 800) in addition to what was found in the wiring from the raceway below the left cabin floor and near the forward wing spar.

The Systems Exhibit 9A continues, page 116:

"Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found."

(Please note that BMS13-42A is Poly-X wiring. Cargo door location is FS 560-670 and cracked wires discovered are within that zone. Frayed wires in that area have shorted before and caused the forward cargo door to open in flight, NTSB AAR 92/02 UAL 811. Water has been seen pouring out of a forward cargo bay of a Boeing airliner. Water and leaking electricity make a powerful conductor. Both are known to exist in Boeing airliners.)

Neil Schalekamp>"The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT"

NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilots saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said

Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 22B, Trajectory Study Supporting Material, page 45 in faded numbers and page 30 in dark numbers. One chart that shows the first items to go, that is page 30 chart, Forward cargo door trajectories. The first item is A489, fwd lower cargo bay struct, FS 900. The next item to go before anything else in the entire plane is A470, R fwd lower cargo bay struct, FS 820. There are five other forward cargo bay structures which are plotted and leave soon thereafter. On dark page number 29 lower frame stringer 40L-40R is shown to leave very early.

Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 22A, Trajectory Study, page 3: "The wreckage distribution shows that parts were initially shed from the area just forward of the wing."5. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 12-B, Sound Spectrum Study, page 21, Chart 12. The sudden loud sound on the CVR which is followed by an abrupt power cut which occurred on four high time Boeing 747s is displayed for comparison. TWA 800, Pan Am 103, Air India 182, and United Airlines 811 are plotted together in that sequence.

8. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge

Exhibit 8A, Page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and the tips outboard of the outer midspan shroud were bent forward slightly. About half of the fan blades had impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of the impact damage to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the midspan shroud on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body impacts along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body impact, which had some streaking extending rearward."

FAA LTR DTD: 4/5/93 Since the issuance of this NPRM, the FAA has further reviewed the circumstances surrounding this door opening incident and has confirmed that an inadvertent in-flight opening of the cargo door cannot be caused solely by wire chafing.

>From: Schleede Ron <SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov>  
>To: barry <barry@corazon.com>  
>Subject: RE: TWA crash cause  
>Date: Sun, 11 Aug 1996 11:39:00 -0400  
>Encoding: 13 TEXT  
>Status:  
>  
>  
>  
>I have examined the cargo door from twa 800--it is locked and latched!

From: Dickinson Al <DICKINA@ntsb.gov>  
To: barry <barry@corazon.com>  
Subject: RE: mechanical crash cause  
Date: Thu, 19 Sep 1996 19:04:00 -0400  
Encoding: 129 TEXT  
Status:

Mr. Smith, thank you for your message concerning the TWA 800 crash investigation. We have recovered many of the door/hatch/access panel/windows from the sea floor and none of them indicate that they came off the aircraft prior to the event which lead to the crash. In addition, both the CVR and the FDR do not have any information that indicates any of the above things departed the aircraft prior to the event. A depressurization event most certainly would have been noted by the crew and recorded on the CVR. We will continue to look for any indications leading to the source of the event and definitely pay attention to items mentioned in your letter.  
Thank you for your interest in aviation safety.

Sam Farr  
Member of Congress  
17th District, California  
House of Representatives  
Congress of the United States  
1117 Longworth Bldg  
Washington, DC 20515-2861

John McCain III  
Member of Congress  
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation  
United States Senate  
241 Russell Senate Office Bldg  
Washington, DC 20510-0303

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Chairman,  
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Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100  
1601 Lind Ave. S.W.  
Renton, WA 98055-4056

Dear Elected and appointed officials involved with the investigation of TWA 800, 30 July 1998

Thank you for your interest in aviation safety.

But no thank you for calling me a peddler. Are you trying to distract me with insults? (Fifty facts, data, and evidence to support wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 are attached. The message is the important thing, not the style of the messenger.)

"ped•dle \ˈped-el\ vb ped•dled; ped•dling : to sell or offer for sale from place to place ó ped•dler also ped•lar \ˈped-ler\ n "

Who called me a 'peddler'? Well, NTSB did. "Mr. Smith has not accepted our findings and has taken his theory, an electrical failure that results in the separation of the forward cargo door, and repeatedly tried to peddle it as the answer to the TWA tragedy."

This is a grievous insult. It is actually Mr. Mason acting for Mr. Goelz acting for Mr. Wildey acting for Dr. Loeb acting for Chairman Jim Hall said I 'peddle'. So it is, in effect, Chairman Jim Hall calling a citizen investigator a 'peddler' regarding an explanation for the partial obliteration of TWA 800 offered to authority for consideration, not for sale.

Chairman Jim Hall, I address you directly, my wiring/cargo door explanation includes a center tank explosion and rules out missile explanation while explaining the streak. I offer a solution to the wiring/cargo door problem by grounding all high time Boeing 747s for emergency repair to include: 1. Replacing all the wiring. Or better yet, go wireless. 2. Turning all outward opening non-plug cargo doors into plug type cargo doors. Or better yet, sealing all big holes cut in pressurized hulls and leave the small passenger plug doors intact.

NTSB also called me 'persistent' in the same statement as 'peddle'. Thank you. I trust that 'persistent' is not yet a dirty word. I trust that 'persistent' is not yet a dirty word. It's true and attached are year 1996 emails to Mr Dickinson of NTSB to show my persistence.

per•sist \per-"sist, -"zist\ vb 1 : to go on resolutely or stubbornly in spite of difficulties 2 : to continue to exist ó per•sis•tence \-"sis-tens, -"zis-\ n ó per•sis•ten•cy \-ten-se\ n ó per•sis•tent \-tent\ adj ó per•sis•tent•ly adv

To call my wiring/cargo door explanation an insignificant piece of almost trash with few buyers insults yourself too, Chairman Hall, because I say center tank did explode, debunk missile theory, and conclude with bad polyX wiring and you say all those things too. To demean wiring/cargo door explanation is to demean yourself.

To call wiring/cargo door explanation unworthy of serious consideration is to demean Representative Sam Farr and Senator John McCain, both elected officials who have expressed interest in writings to NTSB (attached).

Why do you or your representative not meet me face to face, Chairman Hall? Why do you refuse to respond to my detailed evidence? I'm on your side. Your actions towards me are in direct contradiction of your recent words (attached) "to pursue many avenues of inquiry in assembling the definitive report on the circumstances surrounding the accident."

Chairman Hall, you have insulted me personally. Calling someone a 'peddler' is an insult, with my apologies to the real peddlers of this world. And you did it behind my back. Twice behind my back have you insulted me through your chain of command for TWA 800. Why the personal disparage-

ment?

1. "Mr. Smith has not accepted our findings and has taken his theory, an electrical failure that results in the separation of the forward cargo door, and repeatedly tried to peddle it as the answer to the TWA tragedy." Mr. Mason, NTSB.

2. "Although Mr. Smith does display some knowledge of the Boeing 747, he has a basic misunderstanding of the facts." Shelley Hazle, NTSB.

Tell me where my 'basic understanding of the facts' are. Tell me one fact I have wrong of the hundreds I have reported to you and specifically in the fifty (attached) that directly support wiring/cargo door explanation and were culled from NTSB, FAA, and other government documents.

Tell me why you think I'm trying to 'peddle' my wiring/cargo door explanation. To whom? The insult is deep because it implies I am trying to make money off misery and taking advantage of the grieving. I make no money off wiring/cargo door explanation and I have a very good basic understanding of the facts. I have spent nine years researching hull ruptures in high time Boeing 747s and have never received one penny while expending thousands of dollars. I have compiled thousands of pages of documents, photographs, drawings, for research and analysis.

I ask for the respect due a citizen air crash survivor and commercial pilot that you not call me bad names behind my back, Chairman Hall. Either tell me to my face, or tell your staff to stick to the facts and omit personal attacks on the messenger. It's not me that irritates you; it's the evidence that contradicts center tank as initial event and puts wiring/cargo door in plain view.

So, Chairman Hall from Tennessee, is it up to me to be the Southern gentleman to take the high road and always be polite even when insulted with lies? I would accept as an adequate apology a meeting with your representatives to present my evidence for discussion at a time and place of your convenience. I stick to the facts, data, and evidence and leave the name calling to the missile guys.

Chairman Hall, you recently stated in a letter to Elaine Scarry, "However, please be assured that the Safety Board is considering every possible event that could have led to this accident, including EMI or HIRF."

Apparently you consider one sentence in Exhibit 15C about five percent of a door, the lower sill, as fulfilling the obligation 'to consider every possible event'. That door is a confirmed killer of nine, UAL 811, and gets one sentence and an hour of examination of a small portion of it.

Methane gas has killed no airliner passenger and yet got the NTSB ordered attention of four scientists for a day to consider it.

HIRF has killed no airliner passengers and yet has at least ten months of NTSB ordered consideration.

Center tank blowing up spontaneously in a 747 has never killed an airliner passenger and yet gets two years and millions of dollars of NTSB investigation.

You are formal with CDR Donaldson and his unsubstantiated missile explanation. You are polite to Ms. Scarry with her never before HIRF explanation. You checked out the bizarre methane gas explanation. Meteor explanation received time and serious consideration at the hearings. All these explanations have never caused a fatal hull rupture of an early model 747 in flight but you still devote time and respectful discourse with the proponents.

And yet you are rude to me, Chairman Hall, the person with a consistent explanation with precedent, UAL 811, which you initially agreed with, inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight. So, why are you calling me names and being polite with others?

And the prime, early on suspect, the forward cargo door, gets one sentence and no discussion permitted from a citizen investigator. That's hardly 'consideration'.

(By the way, the official probable cause for UAL 811 as listed in the current NTSB accident database is improper latching which is wrong. The forward cargo door of UAL 811 was properly latched. The error of probable cause was corrected with AAR 92/02 and it's time to correct the NTSB accident database to reflect that correction.)

Normally, personal discussion is not warranted in official correspondence but I will take my cue from NTSB spokespersons Ms. Hazle and Mr. Mason who wrote behind my back to a reporter how misinformed I was, how superficial my research was, how I didn't know what I was talking about, and how I was trying to profit from grief.

So, my personal comments to personal people:

I believe you to be hard working, dedicated public servants who are ordinary people caught up in extraordinary circumstances. There is no coverup of wiring/cargo door cause for TWA 800. There is no conspiracy to refuse to thoroughly investigate the original suspicion of inadvertent opening of forward cargo door in flight for TWA 800. There is no plot to hide a design defect of a large outward opening non-plug cargo door in wide body airliners. There is no laziness to examine the wreckage evidence for overtravel impression damage on the door hinge, the large red paint markings, outward peeled skin, and petal bulge at aft midspan latch for confirmation of forward cargo door opening in flight. There is no fear that years of work into PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800 will be for nought.

I believe that the TWA 800 investigation by NTSB has been a zealous prosecution of center tank explosion by an unknown ignition source as initial event to the exclusion of another reasonable mechanical explanation with precedent, wiring/cargo door.

I keep thinking about the baggage handler for UAL 811 that lived for two years with the knowledge that everyone around him thought him to be responsible for the deaths for nine and serious injuries to five passengers because he did not close a door properly, and he knows he did.

I keep thinking of the father of the dead teenage son on UAL 811 that pressed to have the door recovered from the bottom of the ocean which revealed the true cause of the cargo door opening in flight, not improper latching but chafed wire to bare conductor to short door unlatch motor on.

I keep thinking about FAA Neil Schalekamp who said that the paint markings and structural deformation indicated an outward explosion in cargo door area and later said he agreed with others who said it was not.

I keep hearing Chairman Hall asking in effect, "Why were not more passengers burnt?"

All the while knowing he heard the answer that they were not there to be burnt because the nose had already separated before the center tank explosion.

I keep hearing Jim Wildey saying words to the effect, "Yes, there were hoop stresses found in the cargo door area."

All the while knowing hoop stresses would not be there if the door had been intact to water impact.

I keep reading Jim Wildey's explanation of downward fractured floor beams as an initial opening of the fuselage lower lobe matches the evidence.

All the while knowing that description exactly fits the wiring/cargo door explanation of explosive

decompression pulling floor beams down, not blowing them upwards as a center tank explosion would.

I keep reading Jim Wildey's report on engine number three that had missing blades, sooted blades, and soft body impacts.

All the while knowing that engine number three was on fire, had uncontainment, and ingested FOD from the nearby and open cargo hold which caused the fire and provided the ignition source for the fireball and probably center tank explosion.

I keep reading the NTSB investigator's evaluation of the first objects to leave TWA 800 were forward of the wing, not in the wing.

All the while knowing the forward cargo hold is forward of the wing and the center tank is not.

I keep thinking of the NTSB investigator who discovered the cracked to bare conductor wiring found in the cargo door area of TWA 800, the same type chafed wire in the same area of the same high time early model Boeing 747, UAL 811.

I keep thinking of the NTSB investigator who painstakingly examined the right horizontal stabilizer that had a red paint transfer mark, glitter, and an engine 'stator blade' embedded in it.

All the while knowing the engines were said to have no uncontainments, glitter was in the forward cargo hold, and red painted metal was above the cargo door, directly in front of the stabilizer.

I keep thinking about the NTSB 'second official' who was intrigued by the thought that the forward door popping open could have caused the streak of light.

All the while knowing he may have been sent to Miami for another accident to investigate after report in Aviation Week was published.

I keep hearing senior government officials reiterating how safety is number one priority and no stone will be left unturned in pursuit of the truth of TWA 800.

All the while knowing that wiring/cargo door explanation has been on the table for consideration since 48 hours after the event and was ruled out with one sentence about eight of ten latches checked.

I keep reading that Mr. Dickinson says 'A depressurization event most certainly would have been noted by the crew and recorded on the CVR.'

All the while knowing how sudden and catastrophic UAL 811 was when that forward door popped.

I keep reading that Ron Schleede wrote, "I have examined the cargo door from twa 800--it is locked and latched!"

All the while knowing both cargo doors are in shattered pieces and most of the forward door is still missing, including the two midspan latches.

I keep reading Shelly Hazle writing: "Although Mr. Smith does display some knowledge of the Boeing 747, he has a basic misunderstanding of the facts. For example, Mr. Smith claims that there are 10 latches on the cargo door and that the Board only discusses eight in the above mentioned report."

All the while knowing there are ten and the Board only discusses eight; basic facts clearly understood.

I keep reading a 18 Nov 96 letter from FAA Mr. McSweeney, to Congressman Farr: "The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has no evidence that door failures played a role in the TWA flight 800 accident."

All the while knowing FAA Bob Breneman only examined the lower eight and did not know the status of the two midspan latches and FAA Mr. Schalekamp believed that the door area opened outward in flight.

I keep reading 24 Oct 1997 letter from Chairman Hall, NTSB to Congressman Farr: "Please be assured that our team has examined all of the structure recovered from TWA flight 800, approximately 95%--including all of the cargo door mechanisms and structures. Early on in the investigation we determined conclusively that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water, and there was no evidence of any failure of any of the latching mechanisms on the doors."

Knowing all the while all most the cargo door mechanisms and structures where not recovered to be examined to be concluded they were all latched and locked at water impact.

I keep on reading the 20 November 1997 Letter from Peter Goelz to Sandy Hentges of Congressman's Farr's office:

"As Congressman Farr was advised by letter dated October 24, 1997, early in the investigation we determined conclusively that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water, and there was no evidence of any failure of any of the latching mechanisms on the doors."

Knowing all the while it is impossible to conclusively rule out cargo door opening in flight with 80% of the door still missing and shattered door pieces as evidence of failure of something in that door especially since the area has outward peeled skin, outward petal bulge at latch, and water impact gives 'pillowing' effect, not shattering.

I keep on reading the 19 December 1997 letter from Chairman Hall, NTSB to me: "However, to repeat, the investigation of the accident involving TWA flight 800 has revealed no evidence to suggest that a failure of a cargo door precipitated the event."

All the while knowing Chairman Hall and NTSB officials refuse to meet with me to allow me to present evidence to show precisely that; 'a failure of a cargo door precipitated the event' while chafed wiring probably precipitated the rupture/failure of the door.

I keep on reading the 17 March 1998 letter from Chairman Hall to me: "As stated in our most recent letter dated March 10, 1998, the TWA flight 800 investigative team has gathered sufficient facts to rule out this possibility of an in-flight opening of a cargo door. We do not believe a meeting is necessary to further discuss this issue."

All the while knowing that Senator McCain thought it a good idea to have a meeting and the wiring/cargo door explanation warrants further discussion.

I keep on reading responses to me regarding further communications from public safety officials: 10 March 1998 letter of John B. Drake of NTSB to JBS :

"We consider our correspondence on this subject to be complete. Should you continue to reiterate your position on this issue in future correspondence, you should expect no further response from the Safety Board."

30 Jan 1998 letter of Neil Schalekamp of FAA to JBS :

"Please note that this office will no longer be responding to your further inquiries about these same concerns, including your February 6 and February 9 letters that I just received."

All the while knowing they are public safety officials rebuffing a retired military officer, a crash

survivor, and one who documents every statement to support wiring/cargo door explanation for a fatal crash that can happen again, the cause of which is under active investigation with a significant event officially unexplained, the ignition source.

And most of all I keep on hearing in my head and seeing on paper the very rare events of sudden loud sound on the CVR followed by the abrupt power cut to the FDR on four high time Boeing 747s in flight, AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800, a difficult event to reproduce. Only four Boeing 747 accidents have that sequence, and one of them is TWA 800. Only one of them has conclusive evidence of the cause, chafed wiring to door unlatch motor, UAL 811.

Lastly, because it happened yesterday, 29 July 1998, I think of Peter Goelz, Managing Director of NTSB saying, "Due to the press of this and other responsibilities, it is unlikely that the Safety Board will be able to respond to Mr. Smith's inquiries in depth."

Which is upfront admission that wiring/cargo door explanation has had only shallow consideration, not the 'in depth' investigation it warrants.

I ask again for a meeting with NTSB and FAA officials to present my evidence for wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 and other hull ruptures in flight of high time Boeing 747s.

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith  
831 659 3552  
551 Country Club Drive,  
Carmel Valley, CA 93924  
barry@corazon.com  
www.corazon.com

Attachments below to support statements made in body of text:

1. right horizontal stab has red paint smear
2. stator blade in right horizontal stab behind engine number 3
3. inward crush top of cargo door
4. top of cargo door attached to hinge
5. petal shape of rupture area around aft midspan latch
6. missing pieces of forward cargo door include locking handle, latching pins, overpressure relief doors, midspan latches
7. rectangle visible of explosive decompression zone of outward peeled skin on right side forward of the wing on right side
8. downward movement of floor beams near cargo door
9. hoop stresses found
10. CVR sudden loud sound
11. FDR abrupt power cut
12. missing turbine blades in engine number 3.
13. soft body impacts on blades in engine number 3.
14. outward peeled skin near top of nose, under belly, and in cargo door area.
15. red paint smears above cargo door on white paint
16. soot on most blades of engine 3.
17. starboard side more damaged than port side
18. intact R2 door near shattered cargo door.
19. poly x is known to be susceptible to chafing and present
20. section 41 is known to be weak
21. history of cargo door openings in past in various airliners
22. EPR problems on aircraft before or during fatal flight.
23. fires in forward cargo hold in the past on Boeing 747s.

24. vertical tears in fuselage skin forward of the wing on the right side
25. singe marks on right side of fuselage show burnt skin, then abruptly at tear line there are no singe marks
26. red paint rubbed off revealing white paint underneath on skin above cargo door area
27. first pieces off plane came from forward cargo hold just forward of the wing
28. at least nine missing never recovered bodies, just fragments
29. initially thought to be a bomb
30. wreckage debris shows cargo door shattered in many pieces
31. aft portion of forward door which includes aft midspan latch and locking handle missing from recovery effort
32. no soot on maintenance hatch
33. no soot on front spar of center wing tank
34. no burned bodies forward of the wing and very few burned at all
35. aft cargo door sill, latches, and locks recovered
36. forward cargo door sill, latches, and locks not recorded in data base
37. no orange zone pieces recorded in database
38. no orange zone discussion in public record other than identification
39. chafed to bare wires found in cargo door area
40. wiring defects found on Boeing airliners
41. water observed pouring out of forward cargo hold of a Boeing airliner, cargo holds have bilges.
42. no soot on keel beam forward of the wing
43. compression fractures right side forward of the wing
44. tension fractures left side forward of the wing
45. seats in the rows in the explosive shatter zone above cargo door are in red zone and not sooted
46. aft cargo door sill is sooted
47. many witnesses said they saw downward streak that was red-orange
48. NTSB official said possibility of forward door popping open was intriguing.
49. FAA official said, then recanted, that paint smears and structural deformation indicated outward explosion.
50. initial event time was 20:31:12 at 13700 on 17 July 1996 eight miles off coast of Long Island.

Reasonable conclusions derived from facts above:

1. water in forward cargo bay.
2. chafed bare wire touched by water.
3. electrical short occurs.
4. forward door motor turns on to unlatch position.
5. aft midspan latch of forward cargo door partially unlatches.
6. pressurized hull ruptures at aft midspan latch.
7. cargo door tears into pieces, some pieces stay with nose, some don't.
8. shiny metal pieces spin away reflecting evening sunlight and perceived as red-orange streak to observers far away.
9. explosive decompression occurs shattering cargo door area forward of the wing on right side exposing twenty foot by forty foot hole in nose producing sudden loud sound on CVR.
10. 300 knots slipstream tears weakened nose off.
11. ejected debris is ingested by starboard engines which catch fire.
12. wing and wing fuel tanks; engines, tail, and fuselage fall and disintegrate on way down.
13. fiery starboard engine ignites fuel vapor clouds from disintegrating tanks, including center tank.
14. fireball observed on the ground.
15. water impact of wreckage, cargo bay material first to hit water.

Evidence available to check to rule in or rule out cargo door involvement.

1. hinge overtravel impression damage to match AAR 92/02
2. aft midspan latch pin for heat damage to match AAR 92/02
3. aft midspan latch for damage
4. put door back together from shattered pieces to show petal rupture

5. stator blade from which engine
6. red paint matching from cargo door area to right horizon stab
7. chafed wire bundles to bare wire in forward cargo hold to match AAR 92/02

Below is current incorrect NTSB explanation for UAL 811 on NTSB website and requires correction from improper latching to chafed wiring.

"NTSB Identification: DCA89MA027 For details, refer to NTSB microfiche number 37772A Scheduled 14 CFR 121 operation of UNITED AIRLINES (D.B.A. UNITED AIRLINES,INC.)

Accident occurred FEB-24-89 at HONOLULU, HI

Aircraft: BOEING 747-122, registration: N4713U

Injuries: 9 Fatal, 5 Serious, 33 Minor, 309 Uninjured.

FTL #811 WAS A SCHEDULED PASSENGER FLIGHT FROM LOS ANGELES TO SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA, WITH STOPS IN HONOLULU (HNL), HI, AND AUCKLAND, NEW ZEALAND. THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL UNTIL AFTER DEPARTURE FROM HNL. WHILE CLIMBING FROM FL220 TO FL230 THE CREW HEARD A "THUMP" FOLLOWED BY AN EXPLOSION. AN EXPLOSIVE DECOMPRESSION WAS EXPERIENCED AND THE #3 AND #4 ENGS WERE SHUTDOWN BECAUSE OF FOD. THE FLT RETURNED TO HNL AND PASSENGERS WERE EVACUATED. INSPECTION REVEALED THE FORWARD LOWER LOBE CARGO DOOR DEPARTED INFLT CAUSING EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO THE FUSELAGE AND CABIN ADJACENT TO THE DOOR. NINE PASSENGERS WERE EJECTED AND LOST AT SEA. INVESTIGATION CENTERED AROUND DESIGN AND CERTIFICATION OF THE DOOR WHICH ALLOWED IT TO BE IMPROPERLY LATCHED, AND THE OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE TO ASSURE AIRWORTHINESS OF THE DOOR AND LATCHING MECHANISM. (SEE NTSB/AAR-90/01)

Probable Cause

THE SUDDEN OPENING OF THE IMPROPERLY LATCHED FORWARD LOBE CARGO DOOR IN FLIGHT AND THE SUBSEQUENT EXPLOSIVE DECOMPRESSION. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS A DEFICIENCY IN THE DESIGN OF THE CARGO DOOR LOCKING MECHANISMS, WHICH MADE THEM SUSCEPTIBLE TO INSERVICE DAMAGE, AND WHICH ALLOWED THE DOOR TO BE UNLATCHED, YET TO SHOW A PROPERLY LATCHED AND LOCKED POSITION. ALSO CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS THE LACK OF PROPER MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION OF THE CARGO DOOR BY UNITED AIRLINES, AND A LACK OF TIMELY CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BY BOEING AND THE FAA FOLLOWING A PREVIOUS DOOR OPENING INCIDENT.

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Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Study, page 20, "Downward separation directions were noted at STA 900, 880, 840, 820, 800, and 780..." and "The initial opening of the fuselage lower lobe (e.g. LF6A) would have the expected result of rapid depressurization accompanied by collapse of the main deck floor for some distance forward of STA 1000. The red area recovery of interior components as far forward as STA 600 would not be inconsistent with this floor collapse and associated structural breakup."

Quote from TWA 800 Public Docket 516A, Exhibit 9A Systems Group Chairman's Factual report of Investigation, Page 47, "A Boeing telefax of June 25, 1997, stated that: The Poly-X wire was used as general purpose wire on the RA164 (TWA 800) aircraft. Wire insulation known as Poly-X had three in-service problems:

-Abrasion of the insulation in bundles installed in high vibration areas.

(This problem was corrected by Boeing Service Bulletin No. 747-71-7105, Dated July 19, 1974)

-Random flaking of the topcoat.

-Insulation radial cracks in tight bend radii.

Radial cracking phenomenon of the Poly-X wire was mainly associated with mechanical stress. Bend radius is the largest contributor to mechanical stress in installed wire or cable. Presence of moisture in conjunction with mechanical stress is also a contributor."

The Systems Exhibit 9A continues on same page 47, "Evidence of arcing or short circuiting was found in the fuselage of N93119, (TWA 800) in addition to what was found in the wiring from the raceway below the left cabin floor and near the forward wing spar.

The Systems Exhibit 9A continues, page 116:

"Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found."

(Please note that BMS13-42A is Poly-X wiring. Cargo door location is FS 560-670 and cracked wires discovered are within that zone. Frayed wires in that area have shorted before and caused the forward cargo door to open in flight, NTSB AAR 92/02 UAL 811.

Neil Schalekamp>"The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT"

"NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilots saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said."

Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 22B, Trajectory Study Supporting Material, page 45 in faded numbers and page 30 in dark numbers. One chart that shows the first items to go, that is page 30 chart, Forward cargo door trajectories. The first item is A489, fwd lower cargo bay struct, FS 900. The next item to go before anything else in the entire plane is A470, R fwd lower cargo bay struct, FS 820. There are five other forward cargo bay structures which are plotted and leave soon thereafter. On dark page number 29 lower frame stringer 40L-40R is shown to leave very early.

Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 22A, Trajectory Study, page 3: "The wreckage distribution shows that parts were initially shed from the area just forward of the wing."5. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 12-B, Sound Spectrum Study, page 21, Chart 12. The sudden loud sound on the CVR which is followed by an abrupt power cut which occurred on four high time Boeing 747s is displayed for comparison. TWA 800, Pan Am 103, Air India 182, and United Airlines 811 are plotted together in that sequence.

8. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge

Exhibit 8A, Page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and the tips outboard of the outer midspan shroud were bent forward slightly. About half of the fan blades had impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of the impact damage to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the midspan shroud on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body impacts along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body impact, which had some streaking extending rearward."

FAA LTR DTD: 4/5/93 Since the issuance of this NPRM, the FAA has further reviewed the circumstances surrounding this door opening incident and has confirmed that an inadvertent in-flight opening of the cargo door cannot be caused solely by wire chafing.

>From: Schleede Ron <SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov>

>To: barry <barry@corazon.com>

>Subject: RE: TWA crash cause

>Date: Sun, 11 Aug 1996 11:39:00 -0400  
 >Encoding: 13 TEXT  
 >Status:

>I have examined the cargo door from twa 800--it is locked and latched!

From: Dickinson AI <DICKINA@ntsb.gov>  
 To: barry <barry@corazon.com>  
 Subject: RE: mechanical crash cause  
 Date: Thu, 19 Sep 1996 19:04:00 -0400  
 Encoding: 129 TEXT  
 Status:

Mr. Smith, thank you for your message concerning the TWA 800 crash investigation. We have recovered many of the door/hatch/access panel/windows from the sea floor and none of them indicate that they came off the aircraft prior to the event which lead to the crash. In addition, both the CVR and the FDR do not have any information that indicates any of the above things departed the aircraft prior to the event. A depressurization event most certainly would have been noted by the crew and recorded on the CVR. We will continue to look for any indications leading to the source of the event and definitely pay attention to items mentioned in your letter.  
 Thank you for your interest in aviation safety.

NTSB Public Affairs Office: (202) 314-6100 The following statement was released today by Jim Hall, Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, following the issuance yesterday of a final report by Congressman Jim Traficant of Ohio, on the investigation of the crash of TWA flight 800:

"I am gratified that, after an exhaustive review of the federal government's investigation of the tragic loss of TWA flight 800, Congressman Traficant has agreed that the inquiry has been thorough and forthcoming, and that the evidence has supported our belief that an explosion of the aircraft's center fuel tank was the event that brought the plane down.

"I am particularly pleased that the Congressman's report endorses the integrity and hard work of the men and women of the National Transportation Safety Board and the many other government agencies that have been selflessly pursuing the cause of this accident for two years.

"I want to thank Congressman Traficant, a senior member of the House Transportation Committee, Chairman John Duncan and the committee staff who entered this review in an attempt to sort out the many alternative theories proposed by parties outside the investigation.

"As we approach the 2nd anniversary of this tragedy, I want to assure the family members of those who perished, as well as all the American people, that the Safety Board is continuing to pursue many avenues of inquiry in assembling the definitive report on the circumstances surrounding the accident."

- 30 -

Neil Schalekamp of FAA> "The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT"

1. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Study, page 20, "Downward separation directions were noted at STA 900, 880, 840, 820, 800, and 780..." and ""The initial opening of the fuselage lower lobe (e.g. LF6A) would have the expected result of rapid depressurization accompanied by collapse of the main deck floor for some distance forward of STA 1000. The red area recovery of interior components as far forward as STA 600 would not be inconsistent with this floor collapse and associated structural breakup."

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"Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge.

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The overall debris appraisal was made by Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 22A, Trajectory Study, page 3: "The wreckage distribution shows that parts were initially shed from the area just forward of the wing."

Dear Dr. Wills,

Your proposed article is incorrect. First of all, Senator McCain did not request that the NTSB meet with Mr. Smith. The Senator asked that the Board respond to Mr. Smith's concerns, which we have done numerous times and in great detail.

Secondly, Mr. Smith is simply wrong. There is absolutely no physical evidence to support his personal theory that the forward cargo door came unlatched. In fact, there is considerable evidence to the contrary. As stated in the Metallurgist's Factual Report, Exhibit 15C (which, of course, is a public document and available at our web site [www.nts.gov](http://www.nts.gov)):

Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill.

Overall examination of the forward portion of the airplane showed that sections 41 and 42 contained uniform crushing damage that extended from S-39L across the bottom of the fuselage and up above the right side main cabin window belt to S-14R. This crushing damage is consistent with the intact forward portion of the airplane (including section 41 and 42) impacting the water with a right wing low attitude. The lower lobe forward cargo door was in the crush area.

Although Mr. Smith does display some knowledge of the Boeing 747, he has a basic misunderstanding of the facts. For example, Mr. Smith claims that there are 10 latches on the cargo door and that the Board only discusses eight in the above mentioned report. While a superficial description of the door might imply that there are 10 latches, Mr. Smith is, in fact, incorrect in implying that they all hold the door onto the fuselage. The eight at the bottom of the door, which were discussed in the report actually hold the door closed - the other two, one on each side of the door are merely "alignment latches" and do not hold the door closed.

We receive numerous inquiries from the public, many with their own extensively developed theories, and we try to be responsive to all. You

are free to request copies of the correspondence between Mr. Smith and the Safety Board, a prudent step, I believe, before publishing such an article.

If you have further questions or concerns, please feel free to contact us.

Sincerely,

Shelly Hazle

July 29, 1998

Mr. Jonathan Wills  
Jonathan.wills@virgin.net

The National Transportation Safety Board and apparently numerous others have been receiving communications from Mr. Smith for about 2 years. The Safety Board has considered Mr. Smith's theory and has found no evidence to support it. We have responded to Mr. Smith on a number of occasions outlining to him our findings. Mr. Smith has not accepted our findings and has taken his theory, an electrical failure that results in the separation of the forward cargo door, and repeatedly tried to peddle it as the answer to the TWA tragedy. The Safety Board is well aware of past cargo door failures in transport category aircraft and we did examine early in the investigative process the possibility of such a failure on flight 800. The physical evidence simply does not support Mr. Smith's theory.

Mr. Smith's style and persistence does not mask the fundamental flaw in his approach. He apparently embarked on his quest with his conclusion firmly locked in place and unfortunately no amount of factual evidence will dissuade him. Let me reiterate, our investigative team believes that Mr. Smith is wrong. There is no evidence of a cargo door failure on flight 800. There is evidence that a fuel air explosion took place in the heated, almost empty center wing tank causing the structural failure of the aircraft. The investigation is continuing in an effort to determine the source of ignition.

Due to the press of this and other responsibilities, it is unlikely that the Safety Board will be able to respond to Mr. Smith's inquiries in depth.

Sincerely,

Peter Goelz  
Managing Director

Text of 1 May 98 letter from Congressman Farr:

"Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for contacting me recently regarding your ongoing interest in the forward cargo door of TWA flight 800. I appreciated hearing from you.

I am, of course, glad to help, and am therefore in touch with the appropriate government agency on your behalf. I will write to you again as soon as a response is available, but please let me know if there is anything further that I can do for you in the interim.

Sincerely,

Sam Farr

Member of Congress

Excerpt of 4 Mar 98 letter from Senator John McCain to me: "I have received your letter regarding the forward cargo door of TWA Flight 800, and your interest in meeting with someone at the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) relating your concerns.

I have contacted the NTSB on your behalf, about your concerns. I have asked for a prompt response to be sent directly to you."

Below emails through September 1996

9/12/96

To: DICKINA@ntsb.gov  
 From: barry@corazon.com  
 Subject: Prime suspect  
 Cc:  
 Bcc:  
 X-Attachments:

Please rule out cargo door as the cause of TWA Flight 800. It is a matter of life and death. It is a prime suspect with two ADs against it and it was at the scene of destruction, on the right side forward of the wing. It has already killed nine passengers in UAL Flight 811.

To come upon a crime scene with 230 dead people stabbed to death and a bloody knife is in plain sight and to not pursue that bloody knife as the killer weapon is not good. To continue to look for a bomb that stabbed all the victims to death is not good.

Investigation on a mechanical object that may have failed and led to the killing of the people is good. Especially if the object has documented failures three times before, two Airworthiness Directives to try to stop failure, and the mechanical object is located extremely near the scene of the start of the destruction of the aircraft, forward right side, and the death of all aboard. The mechanical object is the forward cargo door. It is the prime suspect and it is guilty.

It is an extremely important discovery.

If true. Is it true? Did the outward opening cargo doors inadvertently open on early model Boeing 747s which were torn off in the 333 mile per hour slipstream pulling fuselage skin with it a exposing large nine foot by fifteen foot gash in right side of nose just forward of the wing allowing wind forces to tear whole plane's nose off, thereby leaving short, loud sound on the cockpit voice recorder, cutting off power abruptly, throwing debris into the number three engine, forcing decapitated nose to crash to the surface, allowing the rest of the aircraft to disintegrate to the surface, resulting in the aircraft destroyed and all crew and passengers dead?

Did it that happen that way for Air India Flight 182 in 1985, Pan Am 103 in 1988, and TWA 800 in 1996? And almost happen for UAL 811 in 1989, nine dead, where the only difference from the others is the nose did not come all the way off and only nine passengers were swept out of their seats to their deaths?

I say yes, yes, yes, yes and can document every step of the way. No exaggerations, no slanting; only facts and conservative logic. It is on my website. <http://www.corazon.com> You must review/scan/browse the pages for the explanation. It is all there.

I say this with a smile on my face to hide my fear, but this is a matter of life or death. Hundreds of these 747s are flying right now with the potential of the door to tear off and cause another large gaping hole in the side of the nose which may or may not lead to the destruction of the aircraft and the death of all aboard. Sincerely, John Barry Smith call 4086593552

To: DICKINA@ntsb.gov  
 From: barry@corazon.com  
 Subject: mechanical crash cause  
 Cc:  
 Bcc:  
 X-Attachments:

Mr. Dickinson, when a door/hatch/access panel/window is at the scene of a breakup, that door/hatch/access panel/window must be investigated. That is a basic tenet of crash investigation starting with the British Comet which had metal fatigue around the square passenger windows. The Comet is a good example of a mystery crash that could have been called a bomb but wasn't because of outstanding accident investigation. The Comet was another explosive decompression accident, just like Air India 182, Pan Am 103, and TWA 800 that looked like a bomb and wasn't.

The basic tenet of checking the holes in the hull near breakup is being ignored in TWA 800. The computer located scene of destruction in TWA 800 is the exact spot on the aircraft where the cargo door hole exists when the door comes off, as in UAL 811 picture, ([http:// www.corazon.com/](http://www.corazon.com/)). On the right side, forward of the wing is your location of destruction and the cargo door is right there. To not thoroughly investigate the forward cargo door is to betray the profession of aircraft accident investigation.

You are being handed the solution to three of the biggest aircraft crash mysteries ever, Air India 182, Pan Am 103, and now TWA 800. They were all brought down when the nose tore off when a huge gaping hole in the right side of their nose was exposed when the outward opening forward cargo door cracked open and tore off in the slipstream taking fuselage skin with it. UAL 811 is the key and your report of UAL 811 has the answers to TWA 800.

The question as to why the doors open is also mostly answered in the UAL 811 report which states on three occasions the doors opened uncommanded when an electrical short affected frayed wire bundles to the door.

Why this investigation is so important is that there are 747s still flying as we write that are at risk to coming apart. The NTSB is dawdling with bombs and missiles and other exciting stuff while ignoring the basics, mechanical failure. One such failure is door opening in flight.

My question is: why is such an obvious avenue of investigation not being pursued? It is so obvious that a mechanical cargo door system with two ADs against it found at the scene of the destruction must be ruled in or out immediately, and the fact that nothing has been mentioned about the defective item for seven weeks is very suspicious. Can it truly be ignorance? Are the wild goose chases of bombs and missiles really misleading you? Of course there was a fuel tank explosion; it happened later and five thousand feet lower; it is not the cause of the crash but an effect of what happens when a forward cargo door opens in flight, tears of nose, rest of plane disintegrates on the way down, just like Pan Am 103.

Does the claim of door for 103 scare you off? The bomb cause can easily be debunked by a careful review of the AAIB report on the crash. It is all there, it was a small blast after the door caused explosive decompression but the blast did not bring the plane down. It was a red herring which was followed by the avid bomb fishermen.

I was interviewed by Newsday recently for a story to run on Sunday and I go on the New York radio station WBAI again Wednesday night to talk about the cargo door theory. It's only drops in the bucket to persuade the NTSB to go down the avenue of mechanical malfunction of the cargo door as cause.

You are the most important person there, can you request that the door be ruled out as a cause just because it would be following good accident investigation procedure? The formal accident reports all have weather, crew experience, airplane flight hours, and any corrosion found, etc. It would be obvious to ask were there any proven defective mechanical systems at the scene of destruction? Well, yes, there was, the forward cargo door. Was it ruled out?

The claim of the cause of TWA 800 being cargo door is being made by me, a commercial pilot, instrument rated, Part 135 certificate holder, military aircrewman and navigator, combat experienced, jet crash survivor, and internet user. My web site at <http://www.corazon.com> has hundreds of pages of documentation. This is a substantial effort on my part reflecting years of aircraft intelligence officer training and flying experience.

Why ignore an informed, concerned member of the public who is answering your agency's appeal for public help? This is not wartime with a secret airplane. This is peacetime with a civilian airplane. All the secrecy is not good. All the non interaction with the public is not good. Staged briefings are not good. Ignoring basic investigation procedures is not good.

The investigation of TWA 800 so far is not good and is shown by not having determined the cause seven weeks after the event.

The cause is there; it is the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight, as has hap-

pened before, happened now, and will happen again.

John Barry Smith

To: DICKINA@ntsb.gov  
 From: barry@corazon.com  
 Subject: Thank you for saying thank you  
 Cc:  
 Bcc:  
 X-Attachments:

Mr. Dickinson, thank you for replying, my faith in a responsive government official to an informed concerned citizen is about to be restored.

I'm reading and re-reading your email very carefully. Permit me to be picky.

>We have recovered many of the door/hatch/access

>panel/windows from the sea floor and none of them indicate that they came

>off the aircraft prior to the event which lead to the crash.

To be specific:

1. Did you get the forward cargo door? Was the forward cargo door found closest to the event site indicating it came off with the first batch of debris? Initial news reports indicated this was so. Does the forward cargo door have the latch cams in the unlocked position while the lock sectors are in the locked position? That was the way of UAL 811. The FBI may have altered the position of the latches while examining for residue.

2. Do the main floor beams bend downward as in explosive decompression or upward as in bomb blast?

3. Does engine number 3 show EPR blip just before destruction, as did Pan Am 103?

4. Is radar blip anomaly of 800 on right side of track similar to Pan Am 103 just before destruction?

5. Is engine number three the only fodd engine? What kind of fod? Pan Am 103 had engine cowling fod also.

6. Does short loud sound of TWA 800 match short loud sounds of Air India 182, Pan Am 103, and UAL 811. Short loud sound on Air India is described in Canadian report as matching short loud sound of explosive decompression of DC-10.

Do the unrecovered bodies match the seating of the unrecovered bodies UAL 811, and Pan 103, all of whom sat in about the same rows at TWA 800.

> In

>addition, both the CVR and the FDR do not have any information that

>indicates any of the above things departed the aircraft prior to the

>event.

The event is catastrophic and almost instantaneous. The short loud sound indicates something happened. I offer door opened, tore off large patch of skin allowing 300 knot force air to blow out other side of fuselage tearing off nose severing power supply allowing only short loud sound of CVR and abrupt power cut on FDR.

>A depressurization event most certainly would have been noted by

>the crew and recorded on the CVR.

Yes, sir, and only when the nose does not tear off and allows the copilot to report a bomb went off to the tower, as happened to UAL 811. The explosive decompression of door opening and the subsequent explosion of fuel air mix later mimic bomb. It is the classic red herring, in this case two red herrings.

When the depressurization event such as Pan Am 125 and UAL 811 do not tear nose off quickly the crew does notice comes around and lands safely. When an older airframe by 35000 hours (TWA 800 had 93000 hours) has door open, the nose comes off and there is no time for crew to talk about it or for cvr or fdr to record consequences.

>We will continue to look for any

>indications leading to the source of the event and definitely pay

>attention to items mentioned in your letter.

Thank you. Your questions indicate an open mind. Thank goodness this bomb/missile exciting

nonsense is waning and the basic difficult work of real problems can be checked out. I realize the immense implications of the cargo door and not bombs on Air India 182, Pan Am 103, and TWA 800. I can show cargo door on Pan Am 103 and debunk the bomb too, a mean feat. My web has the cold hard data and I invite you, sir, to peruse at leisure and respond with best criticism to my theory of frayed wire door control bundle, worn latches, damaged door cams, and fuselage flex and door motor gets power which unlatches door which pops open, tears out and up taking skin with it exposing nine foot by 15 foot hole which allows 300 knots wind force to blow in and blow out other side of fuselage tearing off entire nose to land in separate debris trail, allowing fuselage and wings to fall and disintegrate later and form own debris trail. The door opening caused explosive decompression which spewed baggage and passengers outside and then they were sucked into number 3 engine fodding it. The door and debris are picked up on radar.

That is the mold of UAL 811 into which the other crashes fit. The mystery now for me is why do doors open in flight? The web site has several possible explanations from cargo shift to VHF transmitters triggering power to door actuator. But that is conjecture.

To be sure, door openings have caused the noses to be torn off Air India 182, Pan Am 103, and TWA 800, and almost UAL 811. All the clues match. Why and when and how the doors opened is a current mystery. The cause is still out there and another early model 747 with outward opening forward cargo door may again disintegrate in flight. I suggest emergency AD to weld forward cargo door shut until investigation of TWA 800 complete and door is cleared or not cleared.

Mr. Dickinson, indulge me a primitive analogy: imagine a soda can with the tab pressing on round partially cut aluminum. Pressing thumb against round area inside scribe mark can not open can but once tab using lever action cracks scribe area, poof, soda/debris is ejected, and round area can now be pushed down/open with little finger. Add a 300 knot slipstream on lip of area and you don't need little finger to push open, the air does. The integrity of the pressurized hull, soda can/747 is impeached by tab/door open and nature's laws take over, pressure equalizing, wind force, tearing action, weight; aerodynamic changes engineers never figured would happen and are not supposed to happen. Crack the pressurized hull of 747 exposing large nine foot by 15 foot hole, as in UAL 811, and by golly, nose coming off in ensuing 300 knot wind is plausible and warrants further investigation. Especially since that door has killed before for sure.

My morale is lifted significantly, sir, I now believe the investigation will focus on plausible reality and start ruling out mechanical causes. Let's put than damn door at the top of the list.

Please visit my extensive web site at <<http://www.corazon.com>> I welcome comments and criticism. The cause must be found and quickly before it happens again.  
Sincerely, John Barry Smith

9/19/96

To: DICKINA@ntsb.gov

From: barry@corazon.com

Subject: The Pattern, the Cause.

Cc:

Bcc:

X-Attachments:

Well, the first blush of excitement has passed after receiving a communication from you, a member of the investigation team. My quick reply was to establish contact and to confirm I am vitally interested in everything you have to say. Now that I am relaxed other thoughts have occurred to me.

Other ideas have been rebutted but one of mine has not. Can it be rebutted? I offer the explanation of the streak being the cargo door ejected and spinning away from 800 just before destruction. I contend that at that altitude, 13700 feet, at 830PM on July 17th, past Long Island in lat/long that indeed a metal object spinning, descending, reflecting dusk sunlight, would be perceived as a streak by human eyes. If that can be rejected by sun angle, black non reflective door, too small, too high, too low, or whatever, please do it. If not, then please put the streak as door as a possible answer. Put it in the 'could be' category.

The radar anomaly of 800 before destruction...can that be put in the 'could be' category also? Pan Am 103 also had the radar anomaly at same time. Would a metal object the size of a cargo door

give primary radar return? I say yes.

I contend the door was seen visually, seen on radar, heard on cvr, and felt in engine number three. Please rebut if possible.

There is another angle that may put your hairs on end. Air India 182 and Pan Am 103 were transmitting on VHF when event occurred. Can you confirm for me what exactly the pilot/copilot of TWA 800 were doing at event time, to the second? If either of the flight crew were transmitting then something very very interesting is going on. Then confirm through raw notes, if you can, what exactly, to the second, the flight crew of UAL 800 were doing at the time the door tore loose. If transmitting then the clues point for certain to some interaction in the avionics bay between VHF power supply/transmitting antenna and door actuator motor. One plane transmitting at event is ordinary, Air India 182, two planes AI 182 and PA 103 is coincidence, three planes would be amazing and four would be a certain connection. I am very interested in the actions of the crews at instant of event. Were they transmitting?

This raises the other point I wanted to mention: The internet and hindsight have permitted me to look at the forest of early 747s crashes and see the pattern. Just looking at the tree of each crash is not revealing. Each government, India, Canada, UK, and USA look at the fallen tree and can't explain why it fell so the political answer is given which is to offend the least and to benefit the most. In the case of Air India 182, Pan Am 103, and maybe TWA 800 that reason is outside evil forces such as foreign bombers. They did not have the advantage of hindsight and did the best they could.

The pattern is this, similar models of early Boeing 747s with outward opening doors have these documented events occur:

UAL preflight has uncommanded door opening traced to faulty wiring.

Pan Am 125 has uncommanded door opening in flight traced to faulty wiring.

UAL 811 has uncommanded door opening in flight traced to faulty wiring which leaves nine never recovered dead in certain seats, fod in number three engine, radar blips at destruction, short loud sound on cvr, abrupt power loss, explosive decompression in forward cargo hold, and crew thinking a bomb had gone off.

Pan Am 103 has event occur in flight near cargo door, leaving ten never recovered bodies in certain seats, fod in number three engine, radar blips at destruction, short loud sound on cvr, abrupt power loss, explosion in cargo hold, nose torn off, and people on ground thinking a bomb had gone off.

Air India 182 has event occur in flight near cargo door, fod in engines, short loud sound on cvr described as explosive decompression, abrupt power loss, explosion in cargo hold, nose torn off, and people on ground thinking a bomb had gone off.

TWA 800 has event occur in flight near cargo door, leaving so far seventeen never recovered bodies in certain seats, fod in number three engine, radar blips at destruction, short loud sound on cvr, abrupt power loss, explosion in cargo hold, nose torn off, and people on ground thinking a bomb had gone off.

The pattern is there, the links are there. It goes directly from uncommanded door opening on ground with no damage to uncommanded door openings in flight with total damage.

There are more potentially relevant clues which fit the pattern of UAL 811, night takeoffs, talking on the radios, sequence of destruction, bent floor beams, similar damage to tail and wings, deployment of oxygen masks, and blow out of pressure equalizing doors in fuselage and door.

The forest of six linked fallen trees make up the forest. One fallen tree is explained. By looking at the other trees alone the cause is unknown but looking at the forest of them all the cause is plain to see because the pattern matches the explained fallen tree.

That's why, sir, I have been able to connect the crashes to determine the common cause as inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight.

Debunking the bomb in 103 is relatively easy now that TWA 800 evidence has shown that traces of explosive on fragments can be benign. There was a blast in the cargo hold of 103 but not a bomb big enough to bring down the plane. It was another red herring. My web site provides pictures of the reconstruction of 103 to see the pattern of destruction starting at the cargo door. The text of the UK report also describes the mild blast in the cargo hold.

Regardless, the issue at the moment is the cause of the crash of TWA 800 and I propose a full effort to rule out or rule in the forward cargo door, that villain with three ADs against it who has killed nine already and was near the scene of the recent crime.

The messenger, me, should not be confused with the message, cargo door, but the messenger must be considered so here I am: Regarding airplanes: models at 12, control line models at 13. Navy enlisted aircrewman at age 17-21 operating, maintaining avionics and radar on P2V antisubmarine plane, two burnin' and two churnin', Navy officer navigator bombardier on twin jet carrier RA5C age 22-26, private pilot, then commercial pilot, instrument rated, with Part 135 certificate holder. Air intelligence officer in Navy Reserve.

Involved in fatal jet crash, on web site as crash of Buno 149314.

US Army major as audiologist retiring in 1984.

I have to get the information out and web site is mode of the day, six years ago it was newsletter when I was president of EAA chapter 204 when I first published column stating 103 was not bomb but cargo door. Then writing letters in 1992 to Flying magazine where editor commented on my theory. Writing to insurance agency in 1995. Finally, the internet! With search engines and email and ftp and web sites.

So either stone tablets, hand press, or skywriting, the story will go out, inadvertent opening of forward cargo doors in early model 747s is causing catastrophic crashes. Fix the doors; weld them shut. Now. Please.

I predicted a crash like TWA 800 in writing in 1990. It happened, I don't want it to happen again.

Mr. Dickinson, I again invite you to my extensive web site with official accident reports of Air India 182, UAL 811, Pan Am 103, Navy 149314, and news reports of TWA 800. There are also a few fiction stories regarding this matter written to relieve my frustration in getting through to important official government agents, such as yourself. Your opinion counts much more than mine or the press. I really want to know what you think about this cargo door theory.

Another idea to throw out is to put video cameras in the cargo holds of early model 747s and watch how the door moves in and out during pressure changes. It may move a lot or not at all. If it fluctuates at all then something is wrong such as loose latches or worn cams, just waiting for door open motor to turn on for a few seconds, enough to crack the door to allow the slipstream to tear it away...

Mr. Dickinson, as a retired military officer, a middle class family man, aviation enthusiast, I offer the feet on the ground documented cause of door popping open when it shouldn't as cause of crash of TWA 800 and others. Please reply.

Sincerely, John Barry Smith

From: Dickinson Al <DICKINA@ntsb.gov>

To: barry <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: RE: mechanical crash cause

Date: Thu, 19 Sep 1996 19:04:00 -0400

Encoding: 129 TEXT

Status:

Mr. Smith, thank you for your message concerning the TWA 800 crash investigation. We have recovered many of the door/hatch/access panel/windows from the sea floor and none of them indicate that they came off the aircraft prior to the event which lead to the crash. In addition, both the CVR and the FDR do not have any information that indicates any of the above things departed the aircraft prior to the event. A depressurization event most certainly would have been noted by the crew and recorded on the CVR. We will continue to look for any indications leading to the source of the event and definitely pay attention to items mentioned in your letter.

Thank you for your interest in aviation safety.

To: DICKINA@ntsb.gov

From: barry@corazon.com

Subject: Cargo door, what else?  
 Cc:  
 Bcc:  
 X-Attachments:

Mr. Dickinson, your 'Thanks for your interest in aviation safety' bromide triggered off this email. I needed the kickstart. John Barry Smith

Robert Francis, Vice Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, Wash, DC webmaster@ntsb.gov  
 Ron Schleede, Investigator, National Transportation Safety Board, Wash, DC webmaster@ntsb.gov  
 Al Dickinson, Investigator, National Transportation Safety Board, Wash, DC webmaster@ntsb.gov  
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 Byron Acohido, Reporter, Seattle Times, AVsig member, Seattle, USA, baco-new@seattimes.com  
 Bob Kaputa, Managing Editor, AVsig member Cyberspace help@avweb.com  
 Jessica Kowal, Reporter, Newsday, Long Island, USA, plugin@newsday.com

Messrs. and Ms. Francis, Schleede, Dickinson, Knight, Busch, Fielding, Acohido, Kaputa, and Kowal,  
 23 Sep 96

I have established contact via email with you before so I know you are receiving my information. Mr. Kaputa and Mr. Francis have direct conversation links to Mr. Busch and Mssrs, Schleede and Dickinson so are included in this email.

Determining the cause of the crash of TWA Flight 800 is urgent. Several hundred of the same type of early model Boeing 747 are flying with passengers as I type. The US government flies four E-4B and Air Force One, all modified Boeing 747-200s. All those 747s are at risk from a cause of officially unknown at this time.

I know the cause. It is the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight. This cause is documented at my website <<http://www.corazon.com>> with over 50 megabytes of data extracted from four government accident reports, news articles and based on thirty five years of flying experience.

You have sent me emails regarding this possible cause. Your replies would be adequate from a layman who has a passing interest in plane crashes but totally unsatisfactory from aviation career professionals or investigative journalists.

Let's go through them, it shan't take long.

"From Mr. Schleede on 29 July 96:

Be assured that we are checking that. I was the investigator in charge of the UAL flight 811 case and fully knowledgeable in its causes and factors. Thanks for the interest.

-----  
 From: barry  
 To: schledr  
 Subject: TWA crash cause ATTN Robert Francis  
 Date: Sunday, July 28, 1996 9:58AM

Mr. Francis. The reasonable cause of the TWA crash is the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door. That is the mechanical cause that must be ruled out. Compare to United Flight 811 of Feb 1989."  
 end email.

Well, Mr. Schleede, I am not assured you are checking that, in fact, I am quite unassured you are not checking that.

Another email:

"From: Schleede Ron <[SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov](mailto:SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov)>

To: barry <barry@corazon.com>  
 Subject: RE: TWA crash cause  
 Date: Sun, 11 Aug 1996 11:39:00 -0400  
 Encoding: 13 TEXT  
 Status:

I have examined the cargo door from twa 800--it is locked and latched!"  
 end email.

Mr. Schleede, there are three cargo doors on 800, you never replied to my question of which one; did you check?

an email from Mr. Dickinson:

"Mr. Smith, thank you for your message concerning the TWA 800 crash investigation. We have recovered many of the door/hatch/access panel/windows from the sea floor and none of them indicate that they came off the aircraft prior to the event which lead to the crash. In addition, both the CVR and the FDR do not have any information that indicates any of the above things departed the aircraft prior to the event. A depressurization event most certainly would have been noted by the crew and recorded on the CVR. We will continue to look for any indications leading to the source of the event and definitely pay attention to items mentioned in your letter.

Thank you for your interest in aviation safety."  
 end email.

Mr. Dickinson, thank you for your interest in aviation safety. Spelling error indicates you never proof read your email and two verb tense errors indicate you may not know better. And yes, the crew would have noticed depressurization event when their eardrums blew out. Did you check their bodies for baro-trauma? And yes, the event was recorded on the CVR as short loud sound.

email from Mr. Busch:  
 "Speculation like this is fascinating, but it has no place in responsible reporting. As a journalist, I have to grit my teeth and wait until sufficient hard data is available to draw a conclusion."  
 end email.

Like another mystery crash and 300 more dead to add to the 838 dead and four crashes already, before sufficient hard data is available to draw a conclusion?

an AVweb ezine comment:

"This one could find its way onto "The X-files." Speculation that an errant missile launched by a U.S. warship or aircraft downed TWA 800 abounds in cyberspace; ditto theories purporting that a baggage door came open in-flight, or that ET did it -- actually, that a meteorite pierced the plane. Of course, it's all being covered up by the government, many say."  
 end excerpt.

Between a missile and an alien fits the cargo door; birds that fly together flock together, weirdos love company.

an excerpt from print article, Ms. Kowal,

"Smith, who said he has been "sensitive" to doors since his finger was slammed in a car door when he was 5-years old, has contacted the White House, FBI, FAA, Air Force, NTSB, and airline insurance companies to alert them to his view of the problem."  
 end excerpt.

Well, I knew that when the questions referred to my smashed finger and ignored 800 dead persons, this was not a serious interview, and I never said "coverup."

an email from Mr. Acohido:

"I agree your thesis is plausible."  
 end excerpt of email.

What? What? Plausible? And then Mr. Acohido asked reasonable, relevant, and probing questions regarding that thesis. Hope lives!  
 an email from Mr. Knight.

"This is one of the most cogent malfunction scenarios I have encountered so far, especially since the detail reported by REUTERS, the NY Times and others on 30 Jul 96 that a cargo door fell into the sea well ahead of the fuselage and the decapitated cabin of TW800."

Ah! Articulate reasoning!

Yes, gentlemen and lady, hope lives that reason, logic, and clear thinking will prevail and the truth of the cargo door will emerge, one way or the other.

See, if I'm wrong, and I could be wrong about the cargo door cause, no one dies. If you are wrong, someone dies. And will, the clock is ticking.

The time between Pan Am 103 and UAL 811 was 65 days. The time between uncommanded door opening of UAL preflight and TWA 800 was almost five years. It's been 77 days since TWA 800 and counting as I type this.

I'm assuming you know about the uncommanded cargo door opening of June 13, 1991, on a UAL preflight where the cargo door started to open by itself and the ground crew could not stop it until the circuit breakers were pulled in the cockpit? Put that on the list of times the door opened when it shouldn't. The list includes that one plus Pan Am 125, UAL 811, Air India 182, Pan Am 103, and TWA 800.

Well, maybe you don't know about it. I'm assuming that government officials assigned to investigate one of the more serious accidents to occur in the country's history are well qualified by education, experience, and demeanor. But I could be wrong. The evidence as shown by correspondence is of inarticulate, incoherent bumlbers who don't have any focus on what they are doing. At best the response to detailed and reasonable documented evidence about the accident cause presented by an informed citizen responding to a public appeal for help has been a vague brush off. I am left with the impression that the priority of government investigators is not the urgent mystery solution but figuring out how to get on the next boondoggle flight to London, or Paris, or Athens. What is the per diem in Paris, anyway, must be a bunch.

The press, ah, the press. Gives me chills to think of the First Amendment. And stomach cramps to realize what that means in reality. It means that the press is now a shill to government press releases and a copy machine for TV sound bites and photo ops.

I'm assuming that press and radio reporters are interested in their subject, curious, and feel satisfaction when presenting all aspects of an issue. But I could be wrong. The evidence as shown by correspondence and several articles is of meek, narrow minded, uninformed sensationalists. (With one exception yet to be fully tested and one still on the fence.) I am left with the impression of reporters who look at computer screens and cut and paste what other reporters have cut and pasted from manufacturer and government pufferies. As soon as an original idea passes into your consciousness you cut and run. Safer on the fence, in the cave, don't commit.

You are not doing your job, gentlemen and lady. You are failing. You are betraying your professions. You are living a lie.

You have had your asses kissed so often you think your shit don't stink.

The proof is that today, this minute, the cause of the crash of TWA 800 is officially unknown. The proof is that today, the only explanation given any depth of investigation in the papers, ezines, TV, and radio is bomb, bomb, bomb.

One focus, one failure, and that's it. 77 days and 7 million dollars and what do you have? Another day older and deeper in debt.

OK, let's sit down and have a meeting now that the pleasantries are over.

It's a round table. My name is John Barry Smith. We've all flown supersonic in combat, ejected from flaming jet aircraft, landed on pitching carrier decks at night, flown passengers for hire, written aviation articles for pay, and constructed extensive web sites on the internet, haven't we? Oh, we haven't? Am I the only one to have done all those things? Well, then I guess I will open the meeting.

I've discovered something. I didn't invent it. Through hindsight and the internet I've discovered a link to several Boeing 747 crashes over a period of eleven years. It is the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door inflight. It is a common type of mechanical malfunction. It has happened before on this type aircraft. The event is well documented on cockpit tapes and data recorders. The consequences of the event are clearly shown on wreckage. The event has been seen visually,

tracked on radar, heard on audio tapes, felt by engines and passengers bodies, and thought about by many people.

It is a mystery no more. The cause of the crashes of Air India 182, Pan 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800 was the forward cargo door opening outward when it shouldn't, tearing off skin forming nine foot by 15 foot gash in the side of the nose of the early model Boeing 747 allowing a 300 knot airstream to flow into the fractured and broken floor beam compartments and snapping off the nose leaving a short loud sound of explosive decompression on the audio tape, abrupt power loss to data recorder, foddng of number three engine, and at least nine missing bodies.

After we get over the mental hurdle of the cargo door causing the crashes, the next mystery is why do the doors open inadvertently. There are twelve possible reasons and many more to be discovered. That is the proper focus, why do doors open?

But back to the cargo door cause. What is it that makes you reluctant to consider the door as culprit? Too ordinary? Not exciting enough?

I think of a musical hook in a song...what can be the hook for the cargo door theory. It is not enough to discover a great truth, but it must be presented in a persuasive manner.

The O rings were put into a glass of ice water to show brittleness.

I can use a soda can as a pressurized hull. If the integrity of the can/hull is not cracked, it is impossible to open can/hull by pressing down with fingers/wind on round drink opening. But when cracked by tab lever/open door, the soda/baggage spews out into face/engine 3. Then the cracked drink hole/nose can be easily pushed open by finger/airstream.

You are not plumbers who know not the force of 300 knot slipstream. You are not a movie viewer who watches Arnold Schwarzenegger in movie "Erasers" holds on to the outside of a flying jet passenger airplane with his bare hands and believes it. You know that 300 knots of slipstream is twice as much force as any natural force on earth, twice as powerful as the recent hurricane Fran that tore roofs off and leveled houses. And they were sealed up.

You are not the car driver who hears baggage door and thinks car trunk. You know that a forward cargo door of a Boeing 747 is huge, eight feet by nine feet, and when that poorly designed door opens outward into the 300 knot slipstream it gets torn up and away leaving an even larger nine foot by fifteen foot hole in the nose. When the combination of the large hole and forceful air come together, the nose gets snapped off in an instant.

The picture of UAL 811 with the huge gash in the nose after it landed may be the hook for you, but not for me. For me the connecting event which ties it all together is the .6 second loud sound on the cockpit voice recorders. This is the link inside the links.

It started with the DC-10 cargo door explosive decompression event recorded on tape. That short loud sound matched the short loud sound on the cockpit tape of Air India 182. The short loud sound on the tape of Pan Am 103 and TWA 800 are similar also. The loud sound does not have the short rise time of a bomb explosion. The sound is followed by an abrupt power loss. The sound is explained by acoustic experts as describing a structural breakup or explosive decompression.

Structural breakup or explosive decompression is what happens when the forward cargo door comes off in flight based upon the events of UAL 811.

Once the link of the short sound and abrupt power loss connects AI 182, Pan Am 103, and TWA 800, then the similarities of the consequences match UAL 811 which is a confirmed, explained forward cargo door opening in flight with foddng engines, missing bodies, wreckage patterns, radar blips, and breakup locations.

What else is there, gentlemen, before you start a vigorous investigation? Can you overcome the horror of falling down into the abyss of killing men woman and children by incorrectly giving accident cause of Air India 182, Pan Am 103 and maybe TWA 800 as bombs? Are you afraid of the dominoes falling on you as the cargo door cause ripples out to Boeing, FAA, DOT, the President, NTSB, FBI, and the airlines?

Maybe you are and maybe you shouldn't be. The government system gives you protection to defend you against that fear. The NTSB is an independent board aloof from political influence. The press is protected by the First Amendment which allows conjecture, speculation, and hypothesizing without fear of censorship.

The two institutions you represent, the press and independent boards, are acting as if the police were standing outside your offices with handcuffs.

And that's why it is always the guy in the converted garage, me, who finds out all this interesting

neat stuff first, before the guys who are supposed to find it first and tell all these rest of us about it.

Facts, facts, facts. My hypothesis, which is documented by facts, is never rebutted by facts but by attacking the messenger. Hey, easy target, this messenger is telling you unpleasant truths, not the pleasant lies you are used to. The type of messenger who tells unpleasant truths, me, is not the kind of guy you like and want to be friends with. So what? You're not gonna like me anymore? You never liked me, so what? Cargo doors don't fall in love and they don't read Airworthiness Directives.

I assume you know about AD 88-12-04 ("To Insure That Inadvertent Opening Of The Lower Cargo Door Will Not Occur In Flight,") issued on May 13, 1988? And (AD) ADT 89-05-54 which superseded AD 88-12-04?

Ah, the cargo door, protected by friends in high places, Boeing; convicted of killing nine in UAL 811, suspected as culprit in AI 182, ignored as suspect in Pan Am 103, and idly mentioned in TWA 800 although the villain was on the scene of the crime, as stated by investigators, forward of the wing on the right side, and left first.

The invisible suspect: A great big hunk of malfunctioning piece of aluminum complex mechanical system that happens to be right there at the scenes of destruction of similar model aircraft, forward cargo hold Air India 182, forward cargo hold Pan Am 103, forward cargo hold TWA 800.

Well, let's us the word coverup here as a word to consider. I reject the word. I believe from day one there is no coverup, no plot, and no conspiracy to protect the killer from identification.

The reason the obvious suspect has not been fully investigated is blind self interest by the detectives and fear of their supervisors who definitely do not want the suspect named. The President of the United States, the boss of all of us has stated, "These terrorist acts..." referring to the Olympic village bombing and the crash of TWA 800. He thinks it's not a cargo door. He thinks it's a bomb; who are we to disagree with a person who holds our lives in his hands?

Well, I do. Mr. Clinton is not a pilot, he's not a sound expert, he's never crashed in a plane, he's never stuck his hand out into a fast moving slipstream while flying, and he's not an avionics technician. Well, I am, and I disagree that it was a terrorist act. It was not a bomb or missile or alien. It was the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight. Of course the President does not want a cargo door fault, he's a politician and this cargo door cause is trouble politically. Well, too bad, that's his problem and his job to solve it. My problem is to find out why TWA 800 crashed and I solved it.

You can too. This is how. Go to the website at <http://corazon.com> and review the literature. I've just added about thirty pages from the Canadian and Indian accident report of Air India Flight 182. The documentation for the description of the short sound as explosive decompression and not bomb sound is there on page 23.

Obtain the thick official accident reports from the governments of US, Canada, India, and UK.

<http://www.open.gov.uk/aaib/aaibhome.htm> will lead you to 103.

<http://bst-tsb.gc.ca/english.html> will lead you to 182

<http://www.nts.gov/> will lead you to 811

I encourage the NTSB to put technical data of the 800 crash on the TWA 800 link on the NTSB homepage; things like engine breakdown info, wreckage plot of items found, cvr and fdr tape print-outs.

Compare all the many similarities in the reports to all the crashes: loud sound, type model A/C, fod, wreckage, passenger injuries, missing bodies, abrupt power loss, crew activity, destruction datum, and many many more, some trivial and some possibly significant. The crashes of UAL 811, AI 182, PA 103, and TWA 800 are inextricably linked together by many clues and one event, the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight.

Get to where I am on the mental ledge to the peak of understanding these crashes, the door openings are causing the crashes but why do the doors open when they shouldn't? Could be bomb, could be cargo shift, could be transient electronic interference to door motor, could be nine other possibilities and I want to hear more.

Review, investigate, think, write, discuss, conclude, commit. Get to it.

See, gentlemen and lady, if I am wrong, I am the bad person and I'm sorry. If you are wrong, people die, you are the bad persons and sorry doesn't help. You have to prove me wrong. You can not ignore cargo door as possibility. Rule the door out. Prove me wrong. Do not ignore. Respond. Interact. Now. Any questions? Meeting adjourned until next time.

John Barry Smith, Amateur Sleuth  
 SSN: 562 58 2308  
 Phone: 408 659 3552  
 email: barry@corazon.com  
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 Carmel Valley, CA 93924

To: DICKINA@ntsb.gov  
 From: barry@corazon.com  
 Subject: Re-create streak  
 Cc:  
 Bcc:  
 X-Attachments:

To re-create streak, charter C-130, take up some old cargo doors, open back cargo door (the way cargo doors should be), determine time that would match sun angle from July 17 to present time, get to 13700 feet, up to 300 knots, toss out door, make another pass toss out door, ask witnesses on ground if they saw streak. I say yes. John Barry Smith

To: DICKINA@ntsb.gov  
 From: barry@corazon.com  
 Subject: Cargo door theory waiting in line  
 Cc:  
 Bcc:  
 X-Attachments:

Dear Mr. Al Dickinson and Mr. Ron Schleede, John Barry Smith here waiting patiently in line for my theory to be considered as a cause for TWA 800. I've watched as bomb came and went, missile came and went, fuel center tank came and went, and now toying around with unexplained. Is it my turn yet? The cargo door theory? Well, there is no conspiracy, no coverup, no plot to conceal the truth of the cause of TWA 800, it's just a matter of time, of waiting my turn. Is it the cargo door turn yet? Please call me when it is. I know you will leave no stone unturned in your pursuit of the true cause of that crash.

How about pilot error? I personally believe not but it must be considered and ruled out because it is the number one cause of all aircraft accidents. Can a pilot crash a 747? Of course by flying straight down to the ground. Can a pilot crash a 747 and leave the clues left by TWA 800? Radar blips, short loud sound, fodded engine, abrupt power loss, nose torn off, and streak? I say no but let's look. Let's say a pilot jammed full left rudder, pulled the stick all the way aft, gave full right wing down on yoke, and then pulled power all the way back to idle. Plane yaws left, goes nose up, right wing down, stalls, spins, crashes but not in .6 second of loud sound on tape and abrupt power loss on flight data recorder with nothing unusual before that. So, I say that after consideration there is no way a pilot or flight crew member can cause a 747 to destroy itself within the evidence constraints of TWA 800. The cargo door can.

The mechanical malfunction that you have been saying for two months is the right answer. You have the right answer. Cargo door. Pictures on web site [www.corazon.com](http://www.corazon.com) from your report, NTSB on UAL 811 show it all.

Let the cargo door have its turn in the spotlight. Offer it up for consideration as a plausible mechanical explanation for TWA 800.

I have been reading about another theorist about the cause and he said he had a vicious exchange with NTSB investigators. Well, that's not right. I was wrong also. I couldn't help it. If you believed you knew the cause of airplane crashes and the cause was still there and could happen any minute, then you would be impatient too.

So, I am patient, is it cargo door turn yet?

FBI said bomb, you said maybe mechanical and you are right. You have always been right. It is

mechanical and specifically, the door closing and opening mechanism on the forward cargo door.

I await the cargo door turn for investigation. Sincerely, John Barry Smith

Oct 96

To: DICKINA@ntsb.gov

From: barry@corazon.com

Subject: A lawyer from Justice has the answer!

Cc:

Bcc:

X-Attachments:

What is going on here? The Justice Department is now making decisions about TWA 800? And she's right! How about a nine foot by 15 foot hole could cause a crash...and did...when the forward cargo door opened in flight. Is the cargo door turn yet to be investigated? Is bomb done, and missile done, and unexplained done, and center fuel tank done? Time for the obvious yet?

John Barry Smith

>WASHINGTON (Reuter) - Investigators may dredge the Atlantic Ocean floor for more wreckage of TWA Flight 800 in an effort to learn what caused the plane

>to crash, U.S. Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick said Thursday.

>

>"We are considering dredging," she told the weekly Justice Department news conference when asked about the investigation into the July 17 explosion of the

>Paris-bound jetliner shortly after takeoff from Kennedy International Airport.

>

>"Even a small hole in the plane could cause the crash...and it is for that reason that recovery of as much of the plane -- wreckage -- as possible is necessary,"

>Gorelick said. She added that it could be an eight-inch or 10-inch hole.

To: DICKINA@ntsb.gov

From: barry@corazon.com

Subject: Mantra

Cc:

Bcc:

X-Attachments:

>"It's looking more and more like mechanical failure because of the lack of other evidence," said one senior law enforcement official. "It's important to

> understand that the NTSB is not just chanting a mantra when they say they are looking into mechanical causes."

Mantra, cargo door, cargo door, cargo door...

Mechanical causes is plural, fuel tank explosion is singular, what other mechanical causes are you looking into? A nine foot by 15 foot hole in side of nose at 300 knots? Called the cargo door theory?

Well, still waiting patiently in line for cargo door theory turn.

I got the following off your web site...

>

>The Safety Board conducts an accident investigation in a public environment. For a major accident, press briefings are held on scene in the days immediately

>following the accident. A public docket containing factual information about the accident is available within a few months. Usually within a year, the Board

>Members will review a draft of the accident report in a public meeting at Safety Board headquarters in Washington, D.C. Soon after the meeting, the Board's

>Public Affairs Office issues an abstract containing the Board's conclusions, probable cause statement, and safety recommendations from the accident

>report. The final report of a major accident is subsequently printed for public distribution.

Looking forward to the public docket and public meeting in DC. Do you take questions from the floor, like cargo door cause? Check it out, that's all the request is and will be. Check it out. John Barry Smith

To: DICKINA@ntsb.gov  
 From: barry@corazon.com  
 Subject: Mechanical cause Cargo Door  
 Cc:  
 Bcc:  
 X-Attachments:

Yes, it is a mechanical problem.

Please examine cargo door for steel rods to confirm AD 88-12-04 complied with on TWA 800.  
 Please examine cargo door for status of cam latches, unlocked or locked.  
 Please examine cargo door lock sectors, unlocked or locked.  
 Please note condition of cargo door, in how many pieces.  
 Please note position of cargo door when found, close to event site or far away.  
 John Barry Smith

>Dr. Bernard S. Loeb, director of aviation safety for the National Transportation Safety Board, reflected the new stance of many in his agency  
 > when he said last week that the missile and bomb theories were now "lower probability."  
 He added, "That means there is a higher probability  
 > that it's a mechanical issue."

To: DICKINA@ntsb.gov  
 From: barry@corazon.com  
 Subject: balloon popping, public docket, cargo door  
 Cc:  
 Bcc:  
 X-Attachments:

Mr. Dickinson, a hole is cut in a balloon. A patch is put on the hole in balloon. The balloon is blown up and deflated 20000 times. The next time the balloon pops. The site of the popping is at the patch. The patch has trouble before. The patch is not examined? The patch is not examined closely? An experienced balloon investigator would go right to the patch as the cause of the popping and rule it in or out. And check out previous balloon poppings.  
 Please examine forward cargo door for steel rods to confirm AD 88-12-04 complied with on TWA 800.  
 Please examine cargo door for status of cam latches, unlocked or locked.  
 Please examine cargo door lock sectors, unlocked or locked.  
 Please note condition of cargo door, in how many pieces and if skin attached to it.  
 Please note position of cargo door when found, close to event site or far away.  
 John Barry Smith  
 When will the public docket be available?

The following was emailed to me.

>Yesterday, Tuesday  
 >  
 >At Boeing Commercial Aircraft, The 747 engineering team discounted any  
 >possibility of a center or other fuel tank problems as a failure site for  
 >TWA:800..

&gt;

To: DICKINA@ntsb.gov  
 From: barry@corazon.com  
 Subject: rebuild cargo door area  
 Cc:  
 Bcc:  
 X-Attachments:

- > Alfred W. Dickinson, the lead investigator on the crash for the National Transportation Safety Board, said examining a rebuilt plane would
- > give investigators a different perspective from examining pieces.
- Yes, and be sure to rebuild the forward cargo door area, just like Pan Am 103.

Reasons why center tank fire not initial event but happened later.

1. Center tank fire would give equal destruction to both sides of aircraft, not right side as reconstruction will show and early evaluation reported. More severe right side damage is consistent with open cargo door and other 747 cargo door crashes.
2. Wreckage trail would be one big one, not two trails with one small with nose inside closest to event site, and the other large and further away which is consistent with cargo door opening and similar with other cargo door 747 crashes.
3. All engines would be fodded equally and they aren't.
4. CVR and FDR would be different than that which exists now, which match other 747 cargo door crashes. TWA 800 should match Iran 747 center tank fire but won't. Also destruction pattern of Iran 747 is different than 800, wreckage pattern is different with left wing apart from rest of debris. There was a center tank fire but after the initial event which was prime suspect cargo door doing what it has done before, opened in flight, causing nose to separate and rest of fuselage to fall and disintegrate into fuel vapor and spinning hot jet engines.
5. Eyewitness reports of fireball at 7500 feet and initial event at 13700 feet.
6. Fire evidence would be on nose section and isn't because nose separated before fire happened. The final Pan Am 103 report had the radar anomaly just before destruction, is TWA 800 going to report the same anomaly? The Pan Am 103 reconstruction had the entire fuselage including the forward cargo door, is TWA 800?

Pan Am 103 omitted the condition of the forward cargo door but did report the status of the CRAF door and the aft door, is TWA 800 going to omit that vital data also?

Maintenance history was omitted in Pan Am 103, is TWA 800 going to omit that also?

A first order of business when an aircraft breaks up in flight is to locate locus of damage. When that site is near a large door known to have failed before with deathly results the maintenance history of that particular door must be investigated for compliance with ADs and previous gripes against the door.

1 Was TWA 800 in compliance with 88-12-04?

2 Did it have previous cargo door gripes against it?

3 Were the lock sectors locked and the cam sectors unlocked in the door? The door has been recovered in pieces, why not walk out there and check the door cam and lock sectors.

The cargo door theory relies on facts and things which can be checked. Why have you not checked out the matching CVR tapes to UAL 811, AI 182, PA 103, and the explosive decompression of a DC-10 which was matched to AI 182 which was matched to PA 103 which matched to TWA 800?

Is the horror of a structural defect in a production aircraft so horrible that it can't even be checked out and the wishful thinking cause of a one time cause driving on the investigation?

To not consider the cargo door seriously as the cause of TWA 800 is more than oversight, more than negligence, it would be intentional, and I can't believe that. John Barry Smith

To: DICKINA@ntsb.gov  
 From: barry@corazon.com  
 Subject: One Consistent Theory, Cargo Door  
 Cc:

Bcc:

X-Attachments:

From day one, July 18th, one crash cause theory has been consistently correct, inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight. It fits all the evidence as it becomes available during the investigation.

1. Radar anomaly just before destruction...cargo door spinning away within primary radar range.
2. Streak...cargo door spinning away at dusk at 13700 feet.
3. Short loud sound on CVR, explosive decompression sound matches PA 103, which matches AI 182 which matches DC-10 cargo door explosive decompression on CVR.
4. Abrupt power loss on FDR indicating nose separating instantly which would occur when nine foot by 15 foot gash is exposed when cargo door rips away and allows 300 knot slipstream to enter.
5. At least nine missing bodies sitting in same general area above and aft of cargo door which indicates bodies swept out and into jet engines vaporizing bodies which can't be found even after extensive, lengthy, and comprehensive searches.
6. Fodded engine number three when cargo door opens and jet sucks in contents.
7. Two wreckage trails, one of nose and the other of rest of aircraft which indicates nose came off first when decapitated by 300 knot slipstream into gash.
8. More severe flying object damage on right side of aircraft, the cargo door side.
9. Locus of destruction above and forward of the wing on the right side, exactly where the hole appears when cargo door rips away.
10. Fire in center tank after nose separates and rest of severed fuselage and disintegrating wing fall into ball of fuel vapor and spinning jet engines.

Gentleman, Dr. Bernard Loeb, Mr. Alfred W. Dickinson, Mr. Ron Schleede, let me use this use of cyberspace to address you directly. TWA 800 is a tree in a forest of four; TWA 800, AI 182, PA 103, and UAL 811. Lift your gaze up from TWA 800 to the other crashes.

How many Boeing 747s have ever crashed and left a short loud sound on the CVR? Four. AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800.

How many Boeing 747s have crashed, left a short loud sound on the CVR and then had an abrupt power loss? Four. AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800.

How many Boeing 747s have crashed, left a short loud sound on the CVR, had an abrupt power loss, and have at least nine never recovered bodies? Four. AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800.

How many Boeing 747s have crashed, left a short loud sound on the CVR, had an abrupt power loss, had at least nine never recovered bodies, had high flight time airframe, fodded engines, and outward opening cargo doors with four Airworthiness Directives? Four. AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800.

How many Boeing 747s have totally destructed, left a short loud sound on the CVR, had an abrupt power loss, had at least nine never recovered bodies, had high flight time airframe, fodded engines, outward opening cargo doors , and left two wreckage trails? Three. AI 182, PA 103, and TWA 800.

AI 182, PA 103, and TWA 800 are three similar trees in the forest of crashed and destroyed Boeing 747s. They have the same cause.

The cargo door must be thoroughly investigated as the cause since it is known to be defective, was at the scene of destruction, and when it malfunctions can cause the total destruction event.

When the cause is determined to be the cargo door the credit for the discovery can go to the experts in AI 182 investigation in 1985 who suggested the loud sound on the CVR matches the decompression of the DC-10 and the sound would occur in an explosive decompression such as an opening forward cargo door. The cargo door idea existed in 1985 in the official report of AI 182. The expert was right then and I am right now and you can be right tomorrow.

You have said, and I have said, since day one this TWA crash cause could be mechanical. We are right. Now that the sabotage and accidental shooting have been ruled out, the mechanical takes center stage. Yes there was a fire, but after the event of door opening which occurred after the initial event of...ah, the mystery to be solved...why the doors are opening inadvertently. UAL 811 has several possible reasons, one of which is electrical short. Many questions are raised on the issue though, why and when does the door become unlocked? There is a sticky issue and worthy of the

best aircraft investigators in the world, far above my humble observations.

So, as a 35 year aviation professional, a jet crash survivor, and an informed member of the public answering a call for help made by the authorities, I, John Barry Smith, urge you gentlemen, Dr. Bernard Loeb, Director, Office of Aviation Safety, NTSB; Mr. Alfred W. Dickinson, lead investigator-TWA 800; Mr. Ron Schleede, investigator-TWA 800; check out the forward cargo door.  
John Barry Smith

To: DICKINA@ntsb.gov  
From: barry@corazon.com  
Subject: Now try cargo door theory  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:

Flight 800 Fuel Probe Shows No  
Sign of Sparks  
7:55pm EST, 10/30/96

NEW YORK - Tests on two sections of fuel probes from TWA Flight 800 that might have provided clues to why the plane crashed in July revealed no signs of mechanical failure, investigators said Wednesday.

The two sections showed no evidence of electrical arcing, or sparking, which would have indicated a power surge in the Boeing 747's center fuel tank.

Mr. Dickinson, now will you try out the cargo door theory? No bomb, no missile, no ignition source for initial fire event, now to alternative mechanical problem, inadvertent opening of forward cargo door in flight. John Barry Smith

November 1996

To: DICKINA@ntsb.gov  
From: barry@corazon.com  
Subject: clues and money  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
X-Attachments:

>WASHINGTON, Oct. 31 (UPI) \_ Investigators are searching (Thursday) for new promising clues to what destroyed TWA Flight 800 after two fuel probes showed no signs of having caused the deadly explosion that killed 230 people. The probes, which carry a tiny electrical current, had been considered a possible source of a spark that could have caused the 747's center fuel tank to blow up.

Yes, Mr. Dickinson, new clues. New clues match old clues in other Boeing 747 accidents, CVR, FDR, missing bodies, inflight damage, destruction start location, fodded engines, missing bodies, and unlocked cam sectors, and are the same for the crashes. Same everything. New clues can be found in the official accident reports of Air India 182, Pan Am 103, UAL 811 which are on my web site and available for review at a click. The new clues are there.

The sudden loud sound on the CVR of a DC-10 explosive decompression is matched to Air India 182 which is matched to Pan Am 103 which is matched to TWA 800. The clues and links are there to show the cause of the crashes was the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight. Now is the time to investigate the cargo door as initial cause.

> SMITHTOWN, N.Y. — The cost of the

TWA Flight 800 investigation has ballooned to \$23.9 million, four times the amount Congress set aside for the non-criminal side of the probe, according to documents and sources.

Mr. Dickinson, instead of blowing up a plane, take just the cargo doors and throw them out of a C-130 at 13700 feet at the same sun angle as July 17th at same location and observe streak as door spins away in the setting orange sun. Also observe on radar as spinning door gives strange radar anomaly return on scopes.

Time to get to square one and do research. Compare official government safety agency reports of AI 182, Pan Am 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800 all side by side and note similarities of CVR, FDR, FOD, damage start location, missing bodies and seating, and inflight damage sequence on right side, the cargo door side. Time for a scholarly approach to solving mystery. My web site has charts with all similarities shown. It is remarkable, either they were all brought down by bombs, center tank fires, or cargo doors but it is one cause for all four.

A forward cargo door investigation can be justified to save money as cheaper to check out and it is reasonable to investigate a previously malfunctioning complex mechanical object close to scene of destruction.

As you reconstruct the fuselage you will see the similarities of the skin tearing to Pan Am 103 and AI 182 and UAL 811. You will solve the TWA mystery and two others at the same time. Big mysteries have big solutions. Forward cargo door. John Barry Smith

To: DICKINA@ntsb.gov  
 From: barry@corazon.com  
 Subject: Garage Door, Cargo Door in the Lineup  
 Cc:  
 Bcc:  
 X-Attachments:

Amendment to suggestion to take a couple of cargo doors and toss them out of C-130 at same sun angle as July 17th near NYC...add another seven feet of metal to door to approximate the nine foot by 15 foot piece of metal of door and fuselage skin that tears off when door opens. The size of the object that created the streak is the same size as hole in side of 811, a double car garage door. In fact, take a double car garage door, bend it a little, paint it white and silver, then throw it out of a C-130 going as fast as it can to get to close to 300 knots and watch streak appear. Then have ground radar pick up double car garage door as it goes out of C-130 and spins to ocean. Both visual and radar returns will be seen from that double car garage door as it falls from 13700 feet at sun angle of July 17th, 8:35PM off East Moriches.

Dr. Loeb, I appeal to your respect for education and research. I have an advanced degree from a university. I was an Air Intelligence Officer in the Navy. I have done a study of studies and extracted similarities, made conclusions and produced my own study, it's called the cargo door website. The studies were the official accident reports of AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and my own blazing jet crash, BUNO 149314 and all are on the website.

Although I do not have hands on experience with the actual evidence of the TWA crash, I can deduce the evidence as it was being discovered based upon the documented sequence of Air India 182, Pan Am 103, and UAL 811 described in the studies. I can deduce that the floor beams above the cargo door of TWA 800 will be bent down. I can induce that the accident will happen again to another early model high time Boeing 747 when the door pops again.

Four crashes with similarities and one is explained. Moderately damaged UAL 811 was the one almost destroyed plane that made it back to tell what happened. The other three total destruction crashes have matches on all the important parameters, CVR, FDR, FOD, missing bodies, damage start location, destruction sequence, and other clues. All four have the same reproducible mechanical cause.

To put it another way, how many Boeing 747 crashes have ever ended with a short loud sound? Four. That match puts the four airplanes in a group. How many Boeing 747 crashes have abrupt power cut? Four, and it's the same four so the group is tight. Then add the similarities of foddled engines, damage location start at forward cargo hold, more severe inflight damage on right side, at

least nine missing bodies, radar blips at time of destruction, and the four crashes of the same type aircraft are inextricably linked together like cookies from a tin pattern. The name of the pattern is inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight. The cookies are UAL 811, AI 182, PA 103, and TWA 800.

It's the cargo door theory's turn for TWA 800. The fringe thinkers had friendly missile fire theory. It was an entertaining story based on true streak observation. It was investigated and discounted from lack of evidence, I believe. The FBI had bomb theory and that was based on the true fact there was an explosion, an explosive decompression which mimics a bomb. That theory has been discounted, I believe from lack of evidence. The NTSB had center tank fire which is true, there was a fire after disintegrating fuselage and wing mixed fuel and hot jet engines. The fire as initial event is discounted, I believe from lack of evidence.

Now is the time to investigate another reasonable cause theory, with evidence, the mechanical problem theory of inadvertent opening cargo door in flight leading to large gash in nose the size of double car garage door allowing twice hurricane force winds to enter and tear off weakened nose in a second leaving evidence of visual streak, radar blips, FOD, sudden loud sound on tape, abrupt power cut to FDR, same missing bodies in general same seating, same inflight damage to right side of aircraft in leading edges of wing and horizontal stabilizer, damage start location of forward cargo hold in front of the wing on the right side, and it's happened before. It's no weird coincidence that four airplanes have same destruction evidence, they had the same cause, cargo door. The cargo door theory has corroborative evidence of real things that can be touched, listened to, and felt.

Mr. Dickinson, I appeal to your respect for hands on evidence. Pick up the pieces of the forward cargo door of TWA 800, do they have the steel lock sectors to replace the aluminum as per AD 88-12-04? Are the cam sectors in the locked or unlocked position? Are the lock sectors and cam sectors worn or gouged? What is the condition of the manual locking handle? Is there any frayed wiring around the motor actuators? What are the computer simulations of 300 knot wind entering nine foot by 15 foot hole in side of weakened nose of 747 with 93000 hours on airframe? What would a large metal sheet look like being ejected from an aircraft at 13700 feet at dusk to observers on the ground? Would radar pick it up? Are the floor beams bent down just above the cargo door?

You are lead investigator on TWA 800, do you call the shots on the direction the investigation takes? I suggest the cargo door direction to ensure a complete investigation to leave no stone unturned, no door unopened, no avenue unexplored...

Mr. Schleede, fortunately you were the lead investigator on UAL 811 and can offer confirmation of matches of evidence to TWA 800. Does the sudden loud sound on CVR of 811 match sudden loud sound TWA 800? Does the engine breakdown of FOD in engines 3 and 4 match 811? Why the same missing bodies in same general seating of 811 and 800? Is the inflight damage sequence of 800 the same as 811 damage to leading edges, root fillet, flaps, and tail?

Gentlemen, an inflight structural breakup of a pressurized aircraft hull has occurred and the locus of destruction is near a hole cut in the hull and patched with a door. The patch failed. The British Comets had a pressurized hull with cut holes that disintegrated at passenger windows. The patch failed. Meet the new boss, same as the old boss, hole cut in pressurized hull that failed to plug, outward opening forward cargo door on high time early Boeing 747 that opened when it shouldn't.

The real mystery right now is why the doors are opening. It's happened, in my opinion, six times in eleven years, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1991, 1996. The events just listed are all documented on my web site which is a study of those events based upon studies by government safety boards and quotations of safety board members to the reputable press.

Cargo door's time in the investigative spotlight; put cargo door in the lineup. Let's see if truth picks it. John Barry Smith

To: DICKINA@ntsb.gov

From: barry@corazon.com

Subject: TWA 800 mechanical cause analysis, door versus fire

Cc:

Bcc:

X-Attachments:

Dear Mr. Al Dickinson, please consider the following analysis...  
Friday, 15 November, 1996

Crash of TWA 800: Analysis of two possible causes.

Not a bomb.

Not a missile, friendly or enemy.

Not a meteor/space debris.

Not pilot or other crew error.

Not environment/weather factors.

Not air traffic control.

Not other aircraft/midair.

What else is there?

Mechanical/equipment failure.

What failed?

What is the evidence?

Yes, aircraft was in climb.

Yes, visual streak observed at event.

Yes, primary radar return recorded just before event.

Yes, secondary radar return disappeared abruptly.

Yes, sudden loud sound heard on cockpit voice recorder, CVR.

Yes, abrupt power cut to flight data recorder, FDR.

Yes, fifteen never recovered bodies after extensive search.

Yes, nose separated from rest of aircraft.

Yes, one or more engines exhibited foreign object damage, FOD.

Yes, fireball observed.

Yes, center fuel tank exploded.

Yes, explosive damage on wreckage.

Yes, two main wreckage trails.

Yes, nose wreckage was closer to event than rest of aircraft wreckage.

Yes, breakup started at forward part of fuselage, over or just in front of wing.

Yes, aircraft was high time/high cycles Boeing 747-131.

Yes, 230 people died.

What initial mechanical/equipment failure caused the crash and still satisfies the evidence?

There are only two; center fuel tank explosion and inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door.

Which is more likely? Let us examine them side by side.

Climb: Fuel tank contents were same as takeoff, climb should have no effect on explosion. Or:

Climb is pressure changing mode of flight and might assist in popping cargo door.

Streak: Fuel streaming out of wing and somehow catching fire leading to explosion. Or: Shiny metal cargo door with white fuselage skin attached spinning away at orange dusk on clear summer night at 13700 feet.

Radar blip anomaly just before event: Tank fire doesn't fit. Or: Large metal cargo door with fuselage skin attached spinning away at 13700 feet close to ground radar site.

Secondary radar return disappeared abruptly. Center fuel tank exploded and cut off power to transponder. Or: Cargo door opened and with fuselage skin tore away and allowed 300 knot wind to enter gash on right side which tore off nose severing power to main equipment compartment housing transponder.

Sudden loud sound on CVR. Tank explodes and sound is recorded on cockpit voice recorder before power is severed. Or: Cargo door with fuselage skin tore away causing explosive decompression loud sound to be recorded on cockpit voice recorder before power is severed.

Abrupt power cut to flight data recorder. Center fuel tank exploded and cut off power to FDR. Cargo door with fuselage skin tore away and allowed 300 knot wind to enter gash on right side which tore off nose severing power to main equipment compartment housing FDR.

Fifteen never recovered bodies: Center tank explosion cremated passengers sitting in explosion area. Or: Cargo door and fuselage skin tore away exposing passengers who were ejected in decompression and sucked into number 3 jet engine and cremated.

Nose separated from rest of aircraft: Center tank explosion cuts fuselage in two just forward of

the wing. Or: Cargo door with fuselage skin tore away and allowed 300 knot wind to enter gash on right side which tore off nose just forward of the wing.

One or more engines foreign object damage. Center tank explosion ejects debris into running engines. Or: Cargo door tore away exposing baggage compartment which explosive decompression ejects material into engines.

Center fuel tank exploded into fireball. Center tank explodes from unknown ignition source. Or: Cargo door with fuselage skin tore away and allowed 300 knot wind to enter gash on right side which tore off nose allowing rest of wing and fuselage to fall and disintegrate into mass of fuel vapor and spinning jet engines which exploded.

Explosive damage on wreckage. Center tank explodes. Or: Cargo door with fuselage skin tore away allowing explosive decompression to occur in passenger compartment and cargo hold which mimics explosion.

Two main wreckage trails. Center tank explodes, severs nose which falls into tight wreckage pattern and rest of aircraft disintegrates into a larger wreckage trail. Or: Cargo door with fuselage skin tore away and allowed 300 knot wind to enter gash on right side which tore off nose which fell into tight wreckage trail and rest of aircraft fell and disintegrated into larger wreckage trail.

Nose wreckage was closer to event than rest of aircraft wreckage. Center tank explodes, severs nose which falls into tight wreckage pattern and rest of aircraft disintegrates into a larger wreckage trail. Or: Cargo door with fuselage skin tore away and allowed 300 knot wind to enter gash on right side which tore off nose which fell into tight wreckage trail and rest of aircraft fell and disintegrated into larger wreckage trail.

Breakup started at forward part of fuselage, over on just in front of wing. Center tank near forward part of wing explodes. Or: Cargo door and fuselage skin tears away just forward of the wing. Aircraft was high time/cycles Boeing 747-131.

Two hundred thirty people died.

So, two theories exist which explain much of the evidence. Here is why the cargo door theory is more credible than the center tank explosion theory.

Mechanical/equipment failure. Both are mechanical/equipment failure, Center tank has yet to be discovered essential ignition source which isn't supposed to be ignition source while cargo door is a complicated, previously known to fail and kill, mechanical system with four airworthiness directives against it. Cargo door more likely failure.

Streak at event. Metal door with metal skin spinning away could be reflected orange dusk light and appear as streak. Time of year, altitude, clear night, sun angle, and type of object all fit streak as spinning door. Tank fire with streaming fuel on fire is less likely. Cargo door more likely streak.

Primary radar return before event. Metal door with metal skin spinning away could be primary radar return recorded on nearby ground radar. Center tank would not give return. Cargo door more likely radar return.

Secondary radar return disappeared abruptly. Center tank explosion and nose separating when nine foot by 15 foot gash appears allowing 300 knot wind to enter and tear off nose would both cause abrupt secondary radar return to disappear. Tie.

Sudden loud sound on CVR. Center tank explosion and cargo door would both give sudden loud sound on CVR. Tie until sound matched to fuel tank explosion or explosive decompression.

Abrupt power cut to FDR. Center tank explosion and cargo door causing nose separation would both cause abrupt to FDR. Tie.

Fifteen missing bodies. Center tank explosion and cargo door would both cause missing never to be recovered bodies. Tie.

Nose separated from rest of aircraft. Center tank explosion would cause nose to separate. Cargo door with fuselage skin tore away and allowed 300 knot wind to enter gash on right side which tore off nose just forward of the wing. Tie.

One or more engines foreign object damage. Center tank explosion and cargo door opening would both cause engines to be foddled. Tie.

Fireball. Center tank explosion and cargo door opening leading to fuselage disintegration would both cause fireball. Tie.

Center fuel tank exploded. Center tank explosion and cargo door would both cause center tank to explode. Tie.

Explosive damage on wreckage. Center tank explosion and cargo door opening would both cause

explosive type damage on wreckage. Tie unless no fire explosive damage found on nose section.

Two main wreckage trails. Center tank explosion and cargo door opening would both cause two main wreckage trails. Tie.

Nose wreckage was closer to event than rest of aircraft wreckage. Center tank explosion and cargo door would both cause nose wreckage to be closer to rest of aircraft wreckage. Tie.

Aircraft was high time/cycles Boeing 747-131. Center tank fire and cargo door more likely on aging aircraft. Tie.

Breakup started at forward part of fuselage, over on just in front of wing. Center tank explosion and cargo door opening would cause breakup at forward part of fuselage. Tie unless breakup is traced to above and forward of the wing on the right side, nearer to the cargo door.

Yes, 230 people died. Center tank explosion and cargo door could both cause the deaths of all passengers. Tie.

Many of the evidence explanations are ties, a few go to cargo door and none alone go to center tank fire. Cargo door theory is more likely.

Additional statements to support cargo door theory.

A structural breakup of a Boeing 747 which is disintegrating in flight can catch fire into a fireball as shown by the Saudi Arabian Airlines Boeing 747 involved in a midair over India. The initial event was not a center tank fire and yet there was fireball.

Eyewitness pilot saw the fireball of TWA 800 and stated altitude of fireball was 7500 feet, initial event for TWA 800 was at 13700 feet. Center tank fire was secondary event.

Foreign object damage can be cowling material or baggage or human material.

Explosive decompression produces loud sound and mimics a bomb for pressure damage on seats and baggage.

NTSB computer simulation traced inflight breakup of TWA 800 to above and forward of the wing on the right side, exactly where the hole is formed when the cargo door tears away with fuselage skin.

Cargo doors opening in flight are more common than inflight fuel tank explosions.

A cargo door accident exists, UAL 811, with much evidence which matches TWA 800. Two other Boeing 747 crashes exist with much evidence which matches TWA 800 and UAL 811, none of which was caused by a center tank fire.

Tank fire accident of Iranian Boeing 747 exists which does not match TWA 800 in wreckage pattern, left wing alone, or extreme weather and lightning.

A Boeing 737 tank fire on the ground does match a Boeing 747 in flight.

Cargo door theory includes center tank explosion.

Additional statement to support center tank explosion. It happened, there was a center tank explosion.

Forward cargo door theory can be proved or disproved easily by examination, experiment and observation:

1. examine forward cargo door for steel rods to confirm AD 88-12-04 complied with on TWA 800.
2. examine cargo door for status of cam latches, unlocked or locked.
3. examine cargo door lock sectors, unlocked or locked.
4. examine cargo door lock sectors and cam sectors for wear and gouging.
5. examine cargo door manual locking bar for locking position.
6. examine all door electrical switches for proper operation.
7. check maintenance history of TWA 800 for previous cargo door problems.
8. note condition of cargo door, in how many pieces to match UAL 811.
9. note position of cargo door when found, close to event site or far away indicating time it left aircraft.
9. detect frayed wiring in door control system.
10. examine direction of buckled floor beams, up or down indicating decompression or explosion.
11. match TWA 800 evidence with other similar crashes leaving similar evidence.
12. check for presence or non presence of evidence of fire/explosion on separated nose.
13. match sudden on loud sound on CVR to sound library of in flight aircraft explosions and decompressions.
14. match abrupt end of tape signals on FDR to two other abrupt end of tape Boeing 747 crashes.
15. confirm by computer simulation that 300 knot wind blowing into nine foot by 15 foot hole in

right side of weakened nose will tear nose off in a second.

16. examine wreckage for more severe in flight debris damage on right side of aircraft to include wing fillet, leading edges of wing and horizontal stabilizer and vertical stabilizer, engine cowls and pylons.

A low cost experiment to reproduce the streak and radar anomaly is to take several two car garage doors painted silver and white and push them out the back of a C-130 going as fast as it can at 13700 feet on clear evening with same sun angle as July 17th near New York and look for streak and radar primary return. They will be there, two mysteries explained at reasonable cost.

Analogies:

1. A hole is cut in a balloon. A patch is put on the hole in balloon. The balloon is blown up and deflated 20000 times. The next inflation the balloon pops. The site of the popping is at the patch. The patch has failed before. The patch is a likely cause of the balloon popping.

2. A soda can has a semi cut hole in the top to drink out of. The can is the pressurized hull and quite strong. The semi cut hole can not be opened by pressing on it with fingers. But once the semi cut hole/door seal is broken by pressing on the hole with the metal tab using leverage, the soda fluid/debris escapes in the explosive decompression and flies into face/engines. Now the semi cut hole can easily be pressed down further with little force from finger because the structural integrity of the soda can/hull has been cracked.

Now is the time to investigate another reasonable mechanical cause theory, with evidence, the real possibility of inadvertent opening cargo door in flight. This event leads to a large gash in nose the size of double car garage door allowing twice hurricane force winds to enter and tear off weakened nose in a second leaving evidence of visual streak, radar blips, FOD, sudden loud sound on tape, abrupt power cut to FDR, same missing bodies in general same seating, damage start location of forward cargo hold in front of the wing on the right side, wreckage trails, and it happened to TWA Flight 800, it happened before to UAL Flight 811, and it will happen again.

Disregard the demeanor of the discoverer/messenger, examine the message of cargo door, and exploit the medium of internet to email [barry@corazon.com](mailto:barry@corazon.com) and study cargo door web site at [www.corazon.com](http://www.corazon.com). Sincerely, John Barry Smith

To: DICKINA@ntsb.gov  
 From: [barry@corazon.com](mailto:barry@corazon.com)  
 Subject: Safety responsibility  
 Cc:  
 Bcc:  
 X-Attachments:

Mr. Dickinson, an important mission may fail because a door did not do what it was supposed to do; just like cargo doors which are supposed to stay closed but don't. An inadvertent opening cargo door is not a science fiction/weirdo explanation for an explosive decompression on a 747. It happens all the time.

Every fire fighter has to respond to a 'fire' call even though that firefighter may believe it is a false alarm. He can not ignore the 'fire' call because it is his duty, regardless of his personal feelings.

I contend that the person assigned to the NTSB (S means Safety) must respond to a call of "Danger" even though he may believe it is a false alarm.

I report to you that there is 'danger' in high time Boeing 747s in which the forward cargo door may open. As evidence of the event happening in the past I refer to AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800. (Documentation on web site [www.corazon.com](http://www.corazon.com))

Deductions from those crashes lead to the conclusion that TWA 800 had an inadvertently opened cargo door. Inductions from those crashes lead to the conclusion that it can happen again to other similar high time Boeing 747s, approximately 650 now flying.

I urge you, as I would urge a firefighter to check out a fire that I believe was caused by an event and may cause another fire until fixed, to check out the crash of TWA 800 being caused by an inadvertently opened forward cargo door that may cause other Boeing 747s to crash until fixed.

The cargo door did what it was not supposed to do, just like the Columbia space Shuttle mission now flying overhead with its malfunctioning door. High time spacecraft=malfunctioning door; high time 747=malfunctioning door.

>CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. - NASA officials are due to meet  
 > Saturday morning to discuss a jammed hatch on Columbia that  
 > has kept astronauts leaving the shuttle for planned space walks.> The most likely explanation was that two of the six latches on  
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5. examine cargo door manual locking bar for locking position.
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7. check maintenance history of TWA 800 for previous cargo door problems.
8. note condition of cargo door, in how many pieces to match UAL 811.
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 If I should not send my inquiries from the public, that's me, to you, NTSB investigator, who should I send them to?

Sincerely, John Barry Smith

December 1996

To: DICKINA@ntsb.gov  
 From: barry@corazon.com  
 Subject: You're right  
 Cc:  
 Bcc:  
 X-Attachments:

Mr. Al Dickinsin, if you are the senior investigator, you are right. Static electricity is a cop out. There is no evidence of it. There is however evidence that engine number 3 was the ignition source as it is burnt, the only engine to show burn damage. It was falling with the rest of the disintegrating fuselage and wing and ignited the vaporizing fuel. All this fireball stuff was after the nose came off after the 300 knot wind blew in big hole made by departing cargo door.  
 I make my plea again, please check out inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight as

the cause of TWA 800. It fits all the evidence. Converse with me. Read my documentation on my web site at [www.corazon.com](http://www.corazon.com). Email questions. The facts speak for themselves once they are assembled in a coherent fashion. Cargo door opened, plane crashed. Balloon popped.

Door explains streak, radar anomaly, fireball, wreckage plot, inflight damage, missing bodies, engine fod, CVR and FDR data. It's all there, Mr. Dickinson, really. John Barry Smith

>The senior investigator working on the wreckage, who insisted on anonymity, said crash investigators had recovered only a few

> pieces of the pipe in question, "but nothing you could draw any conclusion from."

>

> The pipe is called the cross-feed manifold, and the safety board officials in Washington said on Friday that they believed a flaw

> in the pipe might have allowed static electricity to build, resulting in a spark that could have ignited fuel vapors in the plane's

> center fuel tank.

>

> But the senior investigator, who said he was speaking for other safety board investigators in the Calverton, N.Y., hangar, said the

> theory was purely hypothetical and not based on any evidence. In fact, he added, investigators have recovered so few pieces of

> the pipe that they have not even added it to a reconstruction of the center fuel tank wreckage.

>

> "Static is not something we are confident of," this investigator said.

To: DICKINA@ntsb.gov

From: barry@corazon.com

Subject: Safety responsibility

Cc:

Bcc:

X-Attachments:

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If I should not send my inquiries from the public, that's me, to you, NTSB investigator, who should I send them to?

Sincerely, John Barry Smith

To: DICKINA@ntsb.gov  
 From: barry@corazon.com  
 Subject: TWA 800 report  
 Cc:  
 Bcc:  
 X-Attachments:

Mr. Dickinson, I'm trying to save the 747 from extinction. No one will fly in an airplane that might blow up if you scuff your shoes on the carpet. They will fly in the 747 that had a problem but is now fixed. The problem would be the forward cargo door comes open when it shouldn't. Fix for real on the fifth AD on that door. It's not like it's a surprise the door is failing and causing the crashes of 800 and others. Non plug outward opening doors are well known as killers.

Mr. Alfred Dickinson, lead investigator to the TWA 800 crash, writer of the accident report, I beg/invite you to listen/investigate the forward cargo door as cause.

When you write the report, if you go with center tank fire, which is true, there was a center tank fire/explosion, you will have trouble as fire/explosion as initial event. The problem is not the ignition source (engine number 3, the burnt one,) but the timing. First nose separates, rest falls to 7500 feet and fireball. Time between nose separating and fireball about 24 seconds. Plus eyewitnesses said fireball later, and seen from the air at 7500 feet, and seen on radar.

So, if not fire/explosion as initial event, what? I respectfully submit the previous identified killer of mechanical defect, like your center tank fire killer, of ...forward right side lower lobe outward opening, four Airworthiness Directives against, great big vulnerable cargo door...which just opened a little bit, but got caught up in the slipstream, torn away, taking skin with it, reflecting in evening sun, picked up on radar, and so weakening the nose with missing structural members, bent and fractured floor beams, that the 300 knot wind blew in and blew nose off, just like that, cutting off power, too.

Full support and documentation for this mechanical fault explanation on [www.corazon.com](http://www.corazon.com)

Mr. Dickinson, really, please, exhaust all reasonable explanations before committing. Cargo door is reasonable. It merits a chance. Please investigate as cause. Why door opened I can not say. That is mystery to me. That answer is important and is found by experts like you and your crew after identifying the door as faulty. I can do that. Contact me at 408 659 3552 phone or email at [barry@corazon.com](mailto:barry@corazon.com). I can factually explain any confusion or refute any doubts you may have.

This is a matter of life and death, as we speak, hundreds of planes are flying with this hazard. I realize the gravity of the situation.

John Barry Smith

End of 1996

Sam Farr  
Member of Congress  
17th District, California  
House of Representatives  
Congress of the United States  
1117 Longworth Bldg  
Washington, DC 20515-2861

John McCain III  
Member of Congress  
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation  
United States Senate  
241 Russell Senate Office Bldg  
Washington, DC 20510-0303

James Hall  
Chairman,  
National Transportation Safety Board  
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.  
Washington, DC 20594

Robert Francis II  
Vice Chairman  
National Transportation Safety Board  
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Bernard Loeb,  
Director of Aviation Safety  
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Thomas E. Haueter  
Chief, Major Investigations Division  
National Transportation Safety Board  
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Division Chief  
Aviation Engineering Division  
National Transportation Safety Board  
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Al Dickinson,  
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Ron Schleede,  
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Bob Breneman,  
Aerospace Engineer,  
Federal Aviation Administration

Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100  
 1601 Lind Ave. S.W.  
 Renton, WA 98055-4056

Dear Elected and appointed officials involved with the investigation of TWA 800, 13 August 1998

Thank you for your interest in aviation safety.

"If we were able to pinpoint what ignited T.W.A. Flight 800, and fix that ignition source, there are still the other ignition sources we've identified as possibilities, and the ones we haven't even thought of," said James Hall, chairman of the safety board.

Well, it was likely engine number three with its fiery exhaust entering the torn apart center wing tank through the hole from the missing maintenance hatch which ignited the vapors.

"I want to be sure we do as complete an investigation as we can," Chairman Hall.

Right. (Engine number three was foddred and on fire and probably ignited the vapors in center tank by the fiery exhaust entering through the open maintenance hatch. It's worth checking out.)

But, based on two years of NTSB refusals to talk or meet with me and recent insults in writing to a foreign news organization, I believe that the minds of US government officials are closed to any reasonable mechanical explanation with precedent for the cause of TWA 800 such as forward cargo door opening in flight probably initiated by shorted wiring.

Based on the annoyed tone of NTSB responses to US government officials inquiring about the cargo door explanation, it appears that NTSB appointed officials are emotionally attached to center tank as initial event and unable to consider the center tank did explode but a few seconds later and a few thousand feet lower.

NTSB officials will not talk to me; will not write to me, will not meet with me. Written statements by Chairman Hall, Mr. Drake of NTSB and Mr. Schalekamp of FAA are attempts to pretend I don't exist.

I am not the problem, government officials: The evidence is the problem. Turning your back on the discover/messenger does not make the evidence go away. However, you can try: Pretend the following reality of evidence does not exist.

Mr. Farr, pretend you never asked me why the cargo doors open in flight when we met for fifteen minutes when I was able to show you my photographs and text evidence in the only meeting ever granted me by an official, elected or appointed, in two years of asking.

Senator McCain, pretend you never referred my cargo door concerns to your committee for review and you never recommended to NTSB that they meet with me, two events that have yet to happen.

Chairman Hall, pretend you never asked why the passengers above and in front of the exploding center tank showed no evidence of serious burns. If you can, then the lungs of the victims will finally show smoke inhalation and their skin and clothes finally show soot.

Dr. Loeb, pretend you never said on a UK TV documentary your mind was made up about the center tank exploding as initial event within a month or two of the crash and before the reconstruction was complete and all evidence recovered. If you can, then you waited for all the evidence to come in before making up your mind while seriously considering a reasonable mechanical explanation with precedent for the cause of TWA 800 such as forward cargo door opening in flight probably initiated by shorted wiring.

Mr. Wildey, pretend you never wrote that an initial opening of the fuselage lower lobe, where the cargo door sits, would explain the evidence in the reconstruction to include the downward bent floorbeams, floorbeams which would have been bent upward if the center tank had exploded first. Pretend you checked all ten of the latches instead of just the eight you reported in Exhibit 15C. Pretend your report on the forward cargo door included the status of the manual locking handle, the two midspan latches, the viewing ports, the two overpressure relief doors, the torque tubes, and the other eighty percent of the door skin. Pretend that the ID tags on some of the forward fuselage pieces were not changed from one site to another to better fit the center tank explanation. Pretend that your powerplant report did not say that in engine number three there were missing blades, sooted blades, and soft body impacts. Pretend you did not say hoop stresses were found in the cargo door area. Pretend you did not say that new scenarios (sequences) may emerge as new information is acquired whether it be from newly identified parts, or simply a new interpretation of current information. If you can, then the door becomes one intact door with all pieces recovered and present, the floor beams straighten out, the ID tags go back where they belong, the engine number three missing blades reappear, the soot disappears, the four soft body impacts are removed, and no reasonable mechanical explanation with precedent for the cause of TWA 800 such as forward cargo door opening in flight probably initiated by shorted wiring emerged.

Mr. Drake, pretend you did not say that you consider your correspondence on this subject to be complete while the TWA 800 investigation is still an active investigation. If you can, then your Board will show it has an open mind until all the evidence is in, including the most recent request to a Norwegian company for center tank blast location data.

Mr. Streeter, pretend you did not ask about hoop stresses to Mr. Wildey at the hearing and heard his positive response of hoop stresses in the cargo door area. If you can, then the hoop stresses which should not have been there if the door had been intact until water impact will disappear.

Mr. McSweeny, pretend you did not say old wiring in early Boeing 747s is a problem. If you can, then the reasonable mechanical explanation with precedent of UAL 811 for the cause of TWA 800 such as forward cargo door opening in flight probably initiated by shorted wiring becomes nonsense.

Mr. Francis, pretend you did not say the the TWA 800 investigation would be slow, deliberate, and based upon all the evidence. If you can, then the quick conclusion made by Dr. Loeb only a month or so after the crash that the center tank exploded on its own will be correct and that the hasty conclusion by Mr. Breneman only a few weeks after the event that the forward door was all latched and locked will also become correct.

Mr. Dickinson, pretend you did not say that the CVR had no information the door came off in flight, and that a depressurization event would be noted by crew. If you can, then that sudden loud sound on the CVR that matches another 747 depressurization event will go silent and the suddenness of that event will be gradual instead of the 'tremendous explosion' as reported by UAL 811 flight crew.

Pretend that the TWA 800 investigation team that you lead did not find that wreckage distribution shows that parts were initially shed from the area just forward of the wing. If you can, then the center wing tank moves out of the wing into the forward cargo bay which is just forward of the wing.

Pretend your team did not group Air India 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800 CVR data into a matching chart for an exhibit for the public docket. If you can then the sudden loud sounds on the CVRs of those flights shown on Chart 12 will be all different.

Pretend your team did not find glitter, seat track, and an engine stator blade in the right horizontal stabilizer. If you can, then the forward cargo hold did not rupture in flight and fod engine number three which allowed a stator blade to impact directly behind it, a cargo bin to rupture and spew glitter into the slipstream, and a seat track to be explosively expelled in flight thereby making all the

glitter, the engine blade, and the seat track disappear.

Pretend your team's reconstruction of TWA 800 shows bilateral damage forward of the wing from a center tank explosion. If you can, then the smooth port side becomes shattered to match the starboard, or the shattered starboard side becomes smooth to match the port.

Pretend that your team recovered all the bodies. If you can, then the bone fragments which revealed DNA for identification become a human body and not something which could have been ingested into engine number three and mulched into bone fragments.

Pretend your team did not find cracked bare wires in the forward cargo door area of TWA 800. If you can, then the bare wires discovered in the same area as UAL 811 will become solid and not allow water or a short to occur to turn door motor on.

Pretend that your team found all the pieces of the center tank sooted. If you can, then the pieces of the center tank which left TWA 800 first, as well as the seats, keel beam, passengers, and cargo bay pieces which left first become sooted from the center tank fuel explosion and the sooting diagrams which report otherwise are wrong.

Pretend that one of your team did not say to an Aviation Week reporter many months after Dr. Loeb said he knew that the center tank exploded first that your team member was intrigued by the streak being part of the fuselage and that the forward door might have popped open in flight. If you can, then Aviation Week misquoted an anonymous NTSB official in its 10 March 1997 edition.

Mr. Schleede, pretend you did not say you were the lead investigator in charge of the UAL 811 and fully knowledgeable in its causes and factors and that you examined the cargo door from TWA 800 and reported it latched and locked. If you can then you can ignore dozens of significant similarities to UAL 811 and the dozens of shattered pieces of cargo door with 80% still missing will become whole into the forward 'door', and not possibly the aft identical cargo door.

Mr. Schalekamp, pretend you did not say that the paint markings and structural deformation indicate an outward explosion for TWA 800. Pretend you did not say that your office will no longer be responding to my further inquiries about these same concerns. If you can then the red paint markings turn white and the outward peeled skin smoothes out and the FAA shows itself to patient and waits for the investigation to be complete before refusing to respond to a reasonable mechanical explanation with precedent for the cause of TWA 800 such as forward cargo door opening in flight probably initiated by shorted wiring.

Mr. Breneman, pretend you did not tell me the status of the two midspan latches was unknown when you concluded the forward cargo door was latched and locked at water impact. If you can, then you checked the bottom eight and the two midspan latches as well as the manual locking handle and other mechanisms of the door, as well as checked the debris field from which the parts came because there are two identical doors and a mixup is possible. Then you waited until the reconstruction was complete months later before making the final conclusion instead of making it within a week of the event.

Ms. Hazle, pretend you did not write that the two midspan latches do not latch but only align. If you can, then the two midspan latches do not have latching cams that go around latching pins to complete a latching action which is exactly the same pieces of hardware, function, and on the same door as the lower eight latches which have latching cams to go around latching pins to complete the latching action.

Mr. Goelz, pretend you did not write to a foreign news agency implying I am trying to profit from grief by exploiting tragedy by trying to peddle my wiring/cargo door explanation. Pretend that you did not write that the NTSB investigation into wiring/cargo door explanation has not been in depth. If you can, then a US government agency has not slandered a US citizen to a foreign aviation cor-

respondent and NTSB will have done an in depth investigation into a reasonable mechanical explanation with precedent for the cause of TWA 800 such as forward cargo door opening in flight probably initiated by shorted wiring.

Government officials, it's easy to pretend my reality does not exist when you refuse to talk, write, or meet with me. It should then be easy to pretend that dozens of NTSB exhibits are wrong, red paint is white, outward is inward, loud is quiet, sudden is gradual, hasty is deliberate, and a similar matching high time Boeing 747 hull ruptures forward of the wing do not exist either.

If you pretend reality does not exist, the following can happen:

The red paint markings between passenger windows turn to white, the outward peeled skin turns flat, the petal shaped outward bulge closes up, the two midspan latches get found and they are locked, the stator blade in the right horizontal stabilizer disappears and gets put back into engine number three with missing blades, the soot on the engine blades disappears, the soft body impacts disappear, the downward bent floor beams straighten out, the unsooted parts of the CWT which are supposed to be at the scene of a fuel tank explosion get sooted, the passengers and door pieces get burnt and sooted, the sudden loud sound on CVR disappears, the abrupt power cut to the FDR becomes gradual, the red paint transfer mark on the right horizontal stabilizer disappears, the glitter on the right horizontal stabilizer disappears, the 80% of the forward cargo door shows up, the dozens of shattered pieces of door magically come together into one intact door, the missing manual locking handle, the overpressure relief doors, are found and work normally, and a center tank explosion magically happened by itself but no one saw it and the CVR did not hear it.

If you can't pretend, then face reality and go through the implications of fifty facts below.

1. right horizontal stab has red paint smear
2. stator blade in right horizontal stab behind engine number 3
3. inward crush top of cargo door
4. top of cargo door attached to hinge
5. petal shape of rupture area around aft midspan latch
6. missing pieces of forward cargo door include locking handle, latching pins, overpressure relief doors, midspan latches
7. rectangle visible of explosive decompression zone of outward peeled skin on right side forward of the wing on right side
8. downward movement of floor beams near cargo door
9. hoop stresses found
10. CVR sudden loud sound
11. FDR abrupt power cut
12. missing turbine blades in engine number 3.
13. soft body impacts on blades in engine number 3.
14. outward peeled skin near top of nose, under belly, and in cargo door area.
15. red paint smears above cargo door on white paint
16. soot on most blades of engine 3.
17. starboard side more damaged than port side
18. intact R2 door near shattered cargo door.
19. poly x is known to be susceptible to chafing and present
20. section 41 is known to be weak
21. history of cargo door openings in past in various airliners
22. EPR problems on aircraft before or during fatal flight.
23. fires in forward cargo hold in the past on Boeing 747s.
24. vertical tears in fuselage skin forward of the wing on the right side
25. singe marks on right side of fuselage show burnt skin, then abruptly at tear line there are no singe marks
26. red paint rubbed off revealing white paint underneath on skin above cargo door area
27. first pieces off plane came from forward cargo hold just forward of the wing

28. at least nine missing never recovered bodies, just fragments
29. initially thought to be a bomb
30. wreckage debris shows cargo door shattered in many pieces
31. aft portion of forward door which includes aft midspan latch and locking handle missing from recovery effort
32. no soot on maintenance hatch
33. no soot on front spar of center wing tank
34. no burned bodies forward of the wing and very few burned at all
35. aft cargo door sill, latches, and locks recovered
36. forward cargo door sill, latches, and locks not recorded in data base
37. no orange zone pieces recorded in database
38. no orange zone discussion in public record other than identification
39. chafed to bare wires found in cargo door area
40. wiring defects found on Boeing airliners
41. water observed pouring out of forward cargo hold of a Boeing airliner, cargo holds have bilges.
42. no soot on keel beam forward of the wing
43. compression fractures right side forward of the wing
44. tension fractures left side forward of the wing
45. seats in the rows in the explosive shatter zone above cargo door are in red zone and not sooted
46. aft cargo door sill is sooted
47. many witnesses said they saw downward streak that was red-orange
48. NTSB official said possibility of forward door popping open was intriguing.
49. FAA official said, then recanted, that paint smears and structural deformation indicated outward explosion.
50. initial event time was 20:31:12 at 13700 on 17 July 1996 eight miles off coast of Long Island.

Dear officials, if you pretend all of the above did not happen then I'll try to pretend UAL 811 did not happen too. My problem in pretending that the sudden night fiery fatal jet plane accident of UAL 811 did not occur is that I have been in a sudden night fatal jet plane accident in a RA-5C and it is very hard to pretend it did not exist, especially when I get recent emails from the sons of the dead father RA-5C pilots asking for information about their dads.

If any of you had been in a sudden night fatal jet airplane crash, such as TWA 800 or a RA-5C, you would not dismiss a crash survivor's opinion as quickly as you do.

Walk in my shoes and understand how sudden and final airplane crashes are. When you do, then I will believe you when you jump to conclusions about a cargo door being all intact and latched after only checking some of the latches, some of the shattered skin and some of the other hardware of the door.

Since none of you has been in a sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash, you would be reasonable and prudent to meet with someone who has and is presenting evidence to you about another sudden night fiery fatal jet airplane crash, TWA 800.

I again request a meeting with government officials involved with TWA 800 crash investigation to present my evidence of wiring/cargo door conclusions for discussion.

Respectfully,  
 John Barry Smith  
 831 659 3552  
 551 Country Club Drive,  
 Carmel Valley, CA 93924  
 barry@corazon.com  
 www.corazon.com

Attachments below:

Neil Schalekamp> "The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT"

Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit 15C, Section 41/42, Forward Cargo Door, dated 22 April 1997, with Mr. Al Dickinson, AS-10, listed as investigator and Mr. Wildey as author, states, "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill."

Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge

James Wildey>"...there were some fuselage pieces that were recovered that had a red tag on it and were supposedly recovered from the red — the red — earliest debris field...." "...we also examined the fuselage pieces right around there that had red tags on them, and we looked at all the features we could find, and for the fuselage pieces around there we said we find no physical evidence to suggest that those particular pieces actually departed the airplane early on in the sequence. I think, if I remember our report, we said we believed that those particular pieces should be treated as yellow zone parts because we don't find any way that they could possibly have come off the airplane early in the sequence and actually have been found in the red debris field."

Exhibit 8A, Page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and the tips outboard of the outer midspan shroud were bent forward slightly. About half of the fan blades had impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of the impact damage to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the midspan shroud on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body impacts along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body impact, which had some streaking extending rearward."

>From: Schleede Ron <SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov>  
 >To: barry <barry@corazon.com>  
 >Subject: RE: TWA crash cause  
 >Date: Sun, 11 Aug 1996 11:39:00 -0400  
 >Encoding: 13 TEXT  
 >Status:  
 >  
 >I have examined the cargo door from twa 800--it is locked and latched!  
 > -----

From: Dickinson Al <DICKINA@ntsb.gov>  
 To: barry <barry@corazon.com>  
 Subject: RE: mechanical crash cause  
 Date: Thu, 19 Sep 1996 19:04:00 -0400  
 Encoding: 129 TEXT  
 Status:

Mr. Smith, thank you for your message concerning the TWA 800 crash investigation. We have recovered many of the door/hatch/access panel/windows from the sea floor and none of them indicate that they came off the aircraft prior to the event which lead to the crash. In addition, both the CVR and the FDR do not have any information that indicates any of the above things departed the aircraft prior to the event. A depressurization event most certainly would have been noted by the crew and recorded on the CVR. We will continue to look for any indications leading to the source of the event and definitely pay attention to items mentioned in your letter.

Thank you for your interest in aviation safety.

Dear Dr. Wills,

Your proposed article is incorrect. First of all, Senator McCain did not request that the NTSB meet with Mr. Smith. The Senator asked that the Board respond to Mr. Smith's concerns, which we have done numerous times and in great detail.

Secondly, Mr. Smith is simply wrong. There is absolutely no physical evidence to support his personal theory that the forward cargo door came unlatched. In fact, there is considerable evidence to the contrary. As stated in the Metallurgist's Factual Report, Exhibit 15C (which, of course, is a public document and available at our web site [www.nts.gov](http://www.nts.gov)):

Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill.

Overall examination of the forward portion of the airplane showed that sections 41 and 42 contained uniform crushing damage that extended from S-39L across the bottom of the fuselage and up above the right side main cabin window belt to S-14R. This crushing damage is consistent with the intact forward portion of the airplane (including section 41 and 42) impacting the water with a right wing low attitude. The lower lobe forward cargo door was in the crush area.

Although Mr. Smith does display some knowledge of the Boeing 747, he has a basic misunderstanding of the facts. For example, Mr. Smith claims that there are 10 latches on the cargo door and that the Board only discusses eight in the above mentioned report. While a superficial description of the door might imply that there are 10 latches, Mr. Smith is, in fact, incorrect in implying that they all hold the door onto the fuselage. The eight at the bottom of the door, which were discussed in the report actually hold the door closed - the other two, one on each side of the door are merely "alignment latches" and do not hold the door closed.

We receive numerous inquiries from the public, many with their own extensively developed theories, and we try to be responsive to all. You are free to request copies of the correspondence between Mr. Smith and the Safety Board, a prudent step, I believe, before publishing such an article.

If you have further questions or concerns, please feel free to contact

us.

Sincerely,

Shelly Hazle

Mime-Version: 1.0

Date: Thu, 19 Dec 1996 09:53:05 -0500

From: Julie Swingle <Julie\_Swingle@mccain.senate.gov>

Subject: Boeing 747 Information

To: barry@corazon.com

Dear Mr. Smith,

Thank you again for contacting me with your concerns regarding the potential hazards involving Boeing 747s.

As you know, I have passed the information you sent to Chris Paul and he has informed me of your findings. I have since forwarded the material you sent to the Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee for their review.

Again, thank you for contacting me. I am always glad to have the opportunity to be of assistance.

Sincerely,

John McCain  
U.S. Senator

JM/jes

Total forward cargo door references in the wreckage database:

B250 RF3A Stringer with attached cargo door.

B008 RF3B Stringer with floor beam.

B250 RF3C Stringers with rear top portion of forward cargo door.

B189 RF3D Stringers with top right corner of forward cargo door.

B221 RF3E Small section upper forward cargo door.

B001 RF3F Stringer.

B007 RF3G Cargo door hinge, 2 rollers.

B2017 RF3H Forward portion lower right forward cargo door.

Missing items of forward door: Lower cargo door sill, eight bottom latches, eight bottom pins, eight locking sectors, two midspan latches, two midspan pins, eight viewing ports, two overpressure relieve doors, manual locking handle, torque tubes, and approximately eighty percent of door skin.

29 Oct 97 letter from Mr. Wojnar/Pederson/Breneman to JBS:

"In addition, the door latches at the bottom of the door were still attached to the fuselage lower sill structure. This indicates the door was in the 'latched and locked' position at the time of impact with the water." "However, wreckage for the entire door was recovered at the same location as the nose section and had the same impact damage as the surrounding fuselage structure on the right side. This is additional verification that the forward cargo door had not opened in flight or separated from the airplane."

24 Oct 1997 letter from Chairman Hall, NTSB to Congressman Farr:

"Please be assured that our team has examined all of the structure recovered from TWA flight 800, approximately 95%--including all of the cargo door mechanisms and structures. Early on in the investigation we determined conclusively that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water, and there was no evidence of any failure of any of the latching mechanisms on the doors."

20 November 1997 Letter from Peter Goelz of Sandy Hentges of Congressman's Farr's office:

"As Congressman Farr was advised by letter dated October 24, 1997, early in the investigation we determined conclusively that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water, and there was no evidence of any failure of any of the latching mechanisms on the doors."

4 Mar 98 letter to me from Senator John McCain stating, "I have received your letter regarding the forward cargo door of TWA Flight 800, and your interest in meeting with someone at the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) relating your concerns.

I have contacted the NTSB on your behalf, about your concerns. I have asked for a prompt response to be sent directly to you."

17 March 1998 letter from Chairman Hall, NTSB, to JBS:

"As stated in our most recent letter dated March 10, 1998, the TWA flight 800 investigative team has gathered sufficient facts to rule out this possibility of an in-flight opening of a cargo door. We do not believe a meeting is necessary to further discuss this issue."

Responses to JBS regarding further communications:

10 March 1998 letter of John B. Drake of NTSB to JBS :

"We consider our correspondence on this subject to be complete. Should you continue to reiterate your position on this issue in future correspondence, you should expect no further response from the Safety Board."

30 Jan 1998 letter of Neil Schalekamp of FAA to JBS :

"Please note that this office will no longer be responding to your further inquiries about these same concerns, including your February 6 and February 9 letters that I just received."

17 March 1998 letter of Jim Hall of NTSB to JBS :

"We do not believe a meeting is necessary to further discuss this issue."

#### SYSTEMS GROUP CHAIRMAN'S

#### FACTUAL REPORT OF INVESTIGATION page 116

Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found.

"A. 1996, burning smell in forward cargo compartment, found damaged wiring shorted to ground, charring found.

B. Oct 12, 1996, Wire bundle arcing and resultant fire at aft bulkhead of forward lower lobe cargo hold on 747-200 freighter.

Source: NTSB Exhibit 9C, Attachments to the Systems Group Factual Report page 44, 45, 46."

NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilots saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said.

12. 19 May 1997, Mr. Ron Schleede emails me and states, "As I have told you before, the cargo

door was locked and latched at impact."

Mr. Jonathan Wills  
Jonathan.wills@virgin.net

The National Transportation Safety Board and apparently numerous others have been receiving communications from Mr. Smith for about 2 years. The Safety Board has considered Mr. Smith's theory and has found no evidence to support it. We have responded to Mr. Smith on a number of occasions outlining to him our findings. Mr. Smith has not accepted our findings and has taken his theory, an electrical failure that results in the separation of the forward cargo door, and repeatedly tried to peddle it as the answer to the TWA tragedy. The Safety Board is well aware of past cargo door failures in transport category aircraft and we did examine early in the investigative process the possibility of such a failure on flight 800. The physical evidence simply does not support Mr. Smith's theory.

Mr. Smith's style and persistence does not mask the fundamental flaw in his approach. He apparently embarked on his quest with his conclusion firmly locked in place and unfortunately no amount of factual evidence will dissuade him. Let me reiterate, our investigative team believes that Mr. Smith is wrong. There is no evidence of a cargo door failure on flight 800. There is evidence that a fuel air explosion took place in the heated, almost empty center wing tank causing the structural failure of the aircraft. The investigation is continuing in an effort to determine the source of ignition.

Due to the press of this and other responsibilities, it is unlikely that the Safety Board will be able to respond to Mr. Smith's inquiries in depth.

Sincerely,

Peter Goelz  
Managing Director

4. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Report, page 30: "It is therefore possible that new scenarios (sequences) may emerge as new information is acquired whether it be from newly identified parts, or simply a new interpretation of current information."

Thirty significant matches to UAL 811

- (1) aged
- (2) high flight time
- (3) early model Boeing 747
- (4) which took off near darkness
- (5) running late
- (6) and during climb
- (7) experienced a sudden initial event near the leading edge of wing in fuselage which left a
- (8) short
- (9) sudden
- (10) loud
- (11) sound on the cockpit voice recorder, an
- (12) abrupt
- (13) power cut to the flight data recorder,
- (14) foreign object damage to starboard engine #3,
- (15) more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
- (16) at least nine never recovered bodies,
- (17) port fuselage side forward of the wing relatively undamaged, (18) shattered, torn, and frayed skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,
- (19) unusual paint smears in forward cargo door area,
- (20) rupture appearance of skin at aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door, (21) outward peeled

skin on upper forward fuselage,  
 (22) vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward cargo door,  
 (23) had hinge stay attached to detached top piece of forward cargo door,  
 (24) downward bent floor beams above forward cargo hold,  
 (25) unsooted cargo door pieces,  
 (26) never recovered fuselage skin in cargo door area,  
 (27) inflight fire to engine number 3,  
 (28) bare electrical wire found in cargo door area,  
 (29) and destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb but  
 (30) later conclusively ruled out.

7. Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 22A, Trajectory Study, page 3: "The wreckage distribution shows that parts were initially shed from the area just forward of the wing."

Date: Mon, 10 Aug 1998 13:38:59 -0400  
 From: dana white <dwhite@cnsports.com>  
 Reply-To: dwhite@cnsports.com  
 Organization: conde nast sports for women  
 MIME-Version: 1.0  
 To: barry@corazon.com  
 Subject: my dad  
 X-URL: <http://www.corazon.com/eject.html>

Hello, I came across your website while searching the web for information on the RA-5C. My father flew that plane during the Vietnam conflict. In fact, I was wondering if you remember him. He also trained as a reconnaissance pilot at Sanford in 1967. His name was Danforth E. White. He was a LCDR at the time. He'd just come back from France, where he was in Intelligence officer. He was shot down over Laos in 1969 on a mission, and I'm trying to find men who served with him. Just thought I would give it a shot. Thanks!

Dana White

From: MarkHuber1@aol.com  
 Date: Mon, 13 Jul 1998 17:59:44 EDT  
 To: barry@corazon.com  
 Mime-Version: 1.0  
 Subject: RA-5C

Hello -

I saw your web-site, re: RA-5C flight operations. The story about your crash brings back strong memories. My name is Mark Huber, son of the late CDR John J. Huber Jr. My father was Commanding Officer of RVAH-12 in Albany, GA when he was killed in a crash of his aircraft. The date of the crash was March 5, 1970. Do you know of my father and/or have any information on the crash?

My brothers and I are interested in any additional information on my father. Additionally, his best friend, Robert Dunn, has been collecting information about his career, possibly for some future publication. Any information you have would be greatly appreciated.

Thank you  
 Mark Huber  
 e-mail:MarkHuber1@aol.com

Sam Farr  
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17th District, California  
House of Representatives  
Congress of the United States  
1117 Longworth Bldg  
Washington, DC 20515-2861

John McCain III  
Member of Congress  
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation  
United States Senate  
241 Russell Senate Office Bldg  
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Bob Breneman,  
Aerospace Engineer,  
Federal Aviation Administration

Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100  
 1601 Lind Ave. S.W.  
 Renton, WA 98055-4056

Dear Elected and appointed officials involved with the investigation of TWA 800, 13 August 1998

Two new photographs have been received of the TWA 800 cargo door area from a relative of a victim. They are high resolution and reveal previously undetected evidence. Many questions are raised by the new evidence and I solicit your opinions. My response to Mr. Seaman and preliminary analysis is below:

Dear Mr. John Seaman, this afternoon I received your two photographs of the forward cargo door forward section of TWA 800. Both of the photos were scanned and uploaded to corazon.com. <http://www.corazon.com/Forwarddoorblowupphoto.html> Download time is less than a minute.

Thank you very much. You have done a great service. These are very important. It's what NTSB should have done.

The pictures are very revealing while tantalizing for what is just out of frame. The photos are high quality and will hold together when blown up many times.

My caption of the photos reads:

Above two photographs are of TWA 800 forward cargo door forward section and windows above it. Note: 1. Red paint markings where it should be white paint. 2. White paint where it should be red. 3. Evenly spaced horizontal white dots among the red paint. 4. Lower right door area has difference between door piece and frame damage. 5. Outward peeled skin in door area, under belly, and forward of door area. 6. Inward crushed skin. 7. Missing door skin, manual locking handle, forward midspan latch and viewing ports. 8. Different tone of white to gray on lower part of piece of door. 9. Red tags with the yellow tags.

Discussion:

Important questions are raised by the photos: Calling all photo interpreters, mechanics, pilots, modelers, painters, metallurgists and astute observers; I solicit your opinions. The pictures are very complex and require much analysis.

Below is rough analysis based on a few minutes' observation.

1. Red paint markings between windows: Are they red on top of white or red underneath white? I claim red on top of white based on style of smearing which matches scuffing, not peeling. There is also a small area which blown up reveals a dark circle of primer, then white, then red. However, the rings around the windows are unmarked. Either the ring is recessed, or aluminum which does not take smears, or the white is peeled revealing white. Regardless, this strange pattern of red paint markings only occurs above, forward, and aft of the forward cargo door and must be explained. The red is not supposed to be there, and is, why is that?

2. Missing white paint underneath the windows. The peeling is usually clean, as opposed to the streaking red paint markings above. This is what peeled paint looks like. The TWA paint scheme is supposed to be white between windows and for about three inches below, then two foot horizontal red band, then a white horizontal band for about eight inches, then a broad horizontal red band of about two feet. The top of door is red and the bottom is white. The missing red paint is only evident above the cargo door area and must be explained. The red is supposed to be there and isn't, why is that?

3. Mystery white dots are interspersed among red paint, they are horizontal and evenly spaced. They may be rivet heads underneath subjected to stress and peeled paint above. What is causing

the horizontal even spaced white dots?

4. Lower right door area shows different damage to adjacent door frame which indicates the door was not in place at water impact. Contrast this door area with R2 door which is intact and matches door to frame. <http://www.corazon.com/TWA800hullrupture.html>

5. Outward peeled skin shows violent explosion, not crushing pillowing water impact. Both mid-span latch areas show this outward peeled skin.

6. Inward crushed, pillowed skin is what water impact would look like and exists on bottom of door and adjacent area. It contrasts to shattered outward skin in belly, in door area, and up high on fuselage, roughly a rectangle and would fit an explosive decompression zone of PA 103, AI 182, and UAL 811.

7. The door is not a 'door', it is pieces of door with most pieces missing. This is a door which has obviously suffered a catastrophic shattering event. Most of the heavy hardware is missing, not recovered, and not hung. Contrasted to exact opposite side on nose, the skin is smooth and not shattered with skin intact. The outward shattered skin shows why a bomb is always suspected in explosive decompression events.

8. The color of door pieces and adjacent skin changes from bright white to gray. Gray matches singe color. Is the gray a factor of shadow in hangar, or normal paint scheme, or soot. If soot, then the aft cargo door sill has been confused with forward and placed incorrectly in the forward door position. The aft sill was reported sooted while all the other door pieces are unsooted. Is the gray soot? Unlikely TWA had gradual color of bright white to gray. Lighting in hangar for these pictures is such as to not give shadows. Why is lower part of fuselage gray?

9. Red tags are supposed to mean found in the red zone but the few pieces of cargo door were reported to be in yellow zone, yet red tags are hanging on pieces around door hinge. Why are the red tags there and what do they mean? Also note the yellow tag number '76' under the yellow tag 'RF 25'. All other tags have a letter prefix denoting location on aircraft such as right fuselage, RF, or left fuselage, LF. What does "76" mean?

This is a rough analysis. Opinions welcomed.

Again, I would like to thank Mr. John Seaman for these very valuable photographs of a critical area of TWA 800. If any more are available of any skin area of the right side of TWA 800, they would be appreciated and also immediately posted on the site for all to see and analyze.

Bear in mind that this area, forward of the wing on the right side was the prime suspect as long as the bomb idea in forward cargo bay was in play. The computer simulation of ejected material pinpointed the initial event as occurring at this precise location. When the residue evidence for bomb explanation by FBI was not confirmed, the evidence was ignored and an alternate to explain all the shattered skin was not pursued. Also, the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door was the prime suspect for FAA and NTSB who inspected the wreckage as it came into the hangar but when the lower sill of a cargo door was found to be still latched, it was assumed the sill was from the forward door and that the entire door was latched and locked so FAA and NTSB looked elsewhere for initial event.

To look at these photographs and state that all the latches are latched, the door was functioning normally, the door was intact and in its frame at water impact is nonsense and confounds common sense. The paint markings, the outward peeled skin, the mismatch of door and frame, the missing hardware including locking handles and latches speak otherwise.

Any more closeup photographs of this most important area would be most appreciated. Thank you again, Mr. Seaman.

Respectfully,  
John Barry Smith

End Letter to Mr. Seaman.

Dear officials, further contemplation of photos reveals:

1. The mystery horizontal white even dispersed dots may be dimples where the rivets have pulled in the outside skin a small amount, enough that when the red painted metal from below slammed upward the dimpled white area did not get the red paint transfer.
2. There are no labels on the lower cargo door pieces while all other large pieces have labels. The lower part of the door pieces including the sill latches and locks may have been mixed up with the reported finding of the aft cargo door sill and therefore the forward lower door pieces needs confirmed location label.
3. One of the two overpressure relief doors may be hung on the wreckage but the open or closed status is not able to be determined.
4. There are apparently two outward peeled skin ruptures in the forward cargo door area, one at the aft midspan latch and the other at the forward midspan latch, and both latches are still missing from the database nor hung on the reconstruction. Both forward and aft door frames immediately adjacent to the midspan latches show deformed outward peeled and shattered skin consistent with explosive decompression and inconsistent with water impact damage.
5. The cargo door hinge shows evidence of overtravel impression damage with some fuselage hinge knuckles showing bare metal while some of the door knuckles keep its red paint.
6. The mystery '76' tag is probably 'RF 70" described as 'Avionics Bay' piece.

Questions which are raised which can be answered by FAA or NTSB officials closely examining the cargo door evidence are:

1. Why the gray color on lower cargo door pieces? Is it soot?
2. Are the red paint markings between the passenger windows above forward cargo door on top of the white indicating transfer or are they underneath indicating peeled white paint? Regardless, what caused the unusual markings?
3. Why are the red paint markings where they shouldn't be and why is the red paint missing from below the windows?
4. Is there overtravel impression damage on the hinge knuckles?
5. How many of the twenty cargo door latches have been recovered and examined?
6. What is the status of the one recovered overpressure relief door, open or closed?
7. Have the midspan latch pins been recovered and does the aft pin show heat damage?
8. Have the two identical cargo door sills been recovered and do both have all the lower eight latches latched and locked?
9. Why are the lower cargo door pieces not labeled and what are the labels?
10. Why is port side forward of the wing so smooth and the starboard, cargo door side so shattered outward?

Can you turn your talents and skill to answer those questions for me?

Gentleman, these are real photographs of a real wreckage reconstruction of real shattered outward skin, real paint markings, and real big holes where an intact door is supposed to be. It's reality.

I understand the reluctance to bring the ghost of UAL 811 back to life. It was a distressing investi-

gation with all parties being excoriated by each other. But, the reality matches are there:

(1) aged (2) high flight time (3) early model Boeing 747 (4) which took off near darkness (5) running late (6) and during climb (7) experienced a sudden initial event near the leading edge of wing in fuselage which left a (8) short (9) sudden (10) loud (11) sound on the cockpit voice recorder, an (12) abrupt (13) power cut to the flight data recorder, (14) foreign object damage to starboard engine #3, (15) more severe inflight damage on starboard side, (16) at least nine never recovered bodies, (17) port fuselage side forward of the wing relatively undamaged, (18) shattered, torn, and frayed skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side, (19) unusual paint smears in forward cargo door area, (20) rupture appearance of skin at aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door, (21) outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage, (22) vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward cargo door, (23) had hinge stay attached to detached top piece of forward cargo door, (24) downward bent floor beams above forward cargo hold, (25) unsooted cargo door pieces, (26) never recovered fuselage skin in cargo door area, (27) inflight fire to engine number 3, (28) bare electrical wire found in cargo door area, (29) and destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb but (30) later conclusively ruled out.

UAL 811 was an inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight caused by shorted wiring; TWA 800 is probably the same and requires an in depth investigation to rule in or rule out that reasonable mechanical cause for the current investigation to be called 'complete', as the NTSB Chairman has promised.

I again request a meeting with officials in the TWA 800 investigation to present my evidence of wiring/cargo door conclusions for discussion. I will travel to Seattle to meet in the offices of the officials at your convenience. Just tell me where and when.

Respectfully,

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Dear Officials, August 25 1998

Facts, data, evidence: Below are URLs with photographs of TWA 800:  
<http://www.corazon.com/Forwarddoorblowupphoto.html>  
<http://www.corazon.com/TWA800hullrupture.html>

The photographs contains several smoking guns and bullets.

Why red paint between passenger windows ? Transferred red paint on top of white or peeled white paint exposing red; regardless, very unusual and supports outward explosion in flight in cargo door area.

Why white paint where red trim paint was? Red peeled paint exposing white from a strong unusual force.

Why outward peeled skin? Internal explosive decompression when forward cargo door inadvertently opened in flight.

Why downward floor beams? Internal explosive decompression when forward cargo door inadvertently opened in flight.

Why two outward petal shaped ruptures of skin at midspan latches of forward cargo door. Internal explosive decompression when forward cargo door inadvertently opened in flight.

Explosive decompression event matches 182, 103, 811, and 800, all hull ruptures forward of the wing in flight of high time Boeing 747 leaving sudden loud sound and abrupt data loss to flight recorders. That's a match.

It's been almost a year since NTSB has been notified of the unusual 'paint markings and structural deformation' as FAA official Mr. Neil Schalekamp called it, yet no acknowledgement or comment from NTSB about this important evidence. Why is that?

Below was sent September 13th, 1997: (Note below was sent before bottom eight latches reported in Exhibit 15C on December 8th, 1997 as being latched.)

To: DICKINAntsbgov  
 From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>  
 Subject: Paint/hinges/half door/streak  
 Cc:  
 Bcc:  
 X-Attachments:

Mr. Dickinson,

Analysis of NTSB photo of starboard side of TWA 800 reveals match of UAL 811 as shown in pictures and text in AAR 92/02, specifically:

1. The red paint which is not normally present is between the windows of 800. The paint was transferred from door top to fuselage when door slammed upwards, the same way fuselage paint got on the UAL 811 door. The two pieces of metal met at high force.

2. The hinges of 800 are intact and appear to be in working order, just as UAL 811 hinges were reported to be. <http://www.corazon.com/811page35analydoor.html> has whole hinge analysis, next page too, from NTSB report.

<http://www.corazon.com/811page40doorhinge.html> has picture of 811 hinge that looks like 800 hinge.

3. Top half of door of 800 is attached to hinge and fuselage skin which is then torn away, just as described in UAL 811 report. This piece may be the piece seen as streak as it fell from high and slowed down from fast and reflected evening sunlight to observers on ground.

4. Bottom half of door of 800 is missing, just as bottom half of UAL 811 was broken in half longitude wise at mid span latches.

Overall the picture of damage area of TWA 800, which is supposed to be start of event, shows evidence consistent with bottom of cargo door unlatching, being blown out and away by internal pressure and 300 knot slipstream, the top half peeling upwards taking hinges and skin with it. Paint from door is transferred to area between windows. 300 knots then hits weakened nose and tears it off and rest of damage ensues.

The extensive damage to door area of TWA 800 compared to UAL 811 can be explained that nose of UAL 811 did not come off, only the door and hinge and skin, while TWA 800, nose came off and exposed rest of fuselage to 300 knots.

Forward cargo door area, a worthy place for intense examination.

End email.

Dear Officials, any fire is a three legged stool, requiring ignition source, material to burn, and air. TWA 800 center tank explanation is a three legged stool with only two legs, material and air; the leg of ignition source is missing. A stool can not stand alone on two legs alone and wishful thinking for the missing third leg does not support any weight.

At this time, when terrorist activity is suspected, if another hull rupture forward of the wing of a high time Boeing 747 occurs resulting in fatalities, as it has four times before, a terrorist bomb will immediately be blamed, as it has four times before, and there will be no seventeen months of luxury time to rule it out, as was done with TWA 800. It could be the start of a war for the wrong reasons with the wrong enemy. The correct enemy is time which ages wires and metal to failure.

It is important that the wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 and others be seriously considered. The evidence says so: Red paint markings and structural deformations and bent floor beams are there and they are real.

Why the red paint markings between passenger windows only above the forward cargo door area? I'd send pictures of the evidence, NTSB evidence, but government servers do not yet accept pictures so I'll again give the URLs of pages containing the pictures. It's just a click away:

<http://www.corazon.com/Forwarddoorblowupphoto.html>  
<http://www.corazon.com/TWA800hullrupture.html>

Is there anybody here who looks at the pictures of the forward cargo door area of TWA 800 and says, 'Yes, that's a door, no doubt, there's the hinge, there's the bottom latches, there's the mid latches, there's the manual locking handle, there's the two overpressure relief doors, there's the torque tubes, there's the viewing ports, there's most of the skin, and there's the door frame,' tell me, because I must be blind.

I see a big hole with missing latches, missing locking handle, missing torque tubes, missing 80% of skin, missing viewing ports, and it was all supposed to be in one small debris area on the bottom of the ocean because it was supposed to be all intact at water impact. It wasn't.

If you see a cargo door, what do the midspan latches look like? The overpressure relief doors? The outside skin? The door frame fore and aft? What position is the manual door locking handle in? I assume the manual locking handle you are looking at in your 'door' is locked before you say the 'door' is locked and latched to frame. I assume before NTSB would conclusively say a door is latched, locked, and intact at water impact the investigating team would have the all the latches, the locks and the 'door'. You don't.

When NTSB continues to call that big hole with a few pieces of skin, hinges and latches a 'cargo door' it defies perception of reality. It's like calling an arm and a toe a 'body.' It's pieces of a door and pieces of a body but not a 'door' and not a 'body.' TWA 800 has both, pieces of doors and piec-

es of bodies. And both times they are called a 'door' and a 'body'. That's not true.

"Forward cargo door area, a worthy place for intense examination." That was said eleven months ago based on cargo door evidence seen in pictures; it's still true today.

Respectfully,

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Dear Officials, 28 August 1998

Dr. Loeb of NTSB has recently commented on the importance of matching similar number of incidents in a recent story about the Comair icing crash:

"Perhaps most damning of all was an FAA engineer's memo from 1996 that noted the large number of incidents and suggested that the EMB-120's minimum recommended speed while holding

for landing was too low.

"I have correspondence from the FAA that this is just one engineer's opinion," said an exasperated Bernard Loeb, NTSB director of aviation safety. The memo was marked draft and appears to have only circulated to a few other FAA staff."

I offer three instances of matching similarities to TWA 800, an accident under active investigation:

Pan Am 103 leads to TWA 800. The match is too complete to be dismissed without discussion.

Pan Am 103 and TWA 800 were both:

aged  
 high time  
 early model  
 poly x wired  
 Boeing 747  
 shortly after take off  
 suffers hull rupture forward of the wing  
 foddred number three engine  
 sudden sound on CVR  
 loud sound on the CVR  
 short duration sound on the CVR  
 abrupt power cut to FDR  
 outward peeled skin in cargo door area  
 midspan latch status not determined  
 took off in no sun  
 running late  
 more severe inflight damage on starboard side  
 downward bent floor beams in cargo door area  
 at least nine never recovered bodies  
 vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door  
 bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

PA 103 and TWA 800 are the same above and both thought to be bombs and one of them wasn't!

TWA 800 leads to UAL 811 which were both:

aged  
 high flight time  
 poly x wired  
 early model Boeing 747  
 which took off in no sun  
 running late  
 and shortly after takeoff  
 experienced a sudden initial event in the forward cargo hold which left a  
 short  
 sudden  
 loud  
 sound on the cockpit voice recorder, an  
 abrupt data loss to the flight data recorder,  
 foreign object damage to starboard engines #3  
 more severe inflight damage on starboard side,  
 nine never recovered bodies,  
 torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,  
 rupture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,  
 outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,  
 downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,  
 vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward cargo door, and

destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.

PA103, TWA 800, and UAL 811 were all initially thought to be bombs yet two of them were not!

And UAL 811 leads to Air India 182.

UAL 811 and AI 182 were both:

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

suffers hull rupture forward of the wing

fodded number three engine

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

midspan latch status not determined

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door

inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as explanation during official inquiry

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

PA 103, TWA 800, UAL 811, and AI 182, all initially thought to be bombs...and two of them were not!

If NTSB is going to blame FAA for not noticing a number of similar incidents for the Comair accident, they leave themselves wide open for criticism from FAA for ignoring the number of similar accidents to TWA 800. I ask NTSB to avoid the same criticism by noticing the similar accidents.

NTSB denials of wiring/cargo door explanation and refusing to meet with me to discuss the explanation have been discussed in a recent letter to me by my Congressman, the Honorable Sam Farr, 17th District, D-California. The letter can be seen at URL <http://www.corazon.com/correspondence.html> and <http://www.corazon.com/farr22.html> as are all your letters to me placed on the web.

My reply to Mr. Farr is enclosed.

I again request a meeting with NTSB or FAA officials to present my evidence from official reports that indicate the forward cargo door of TWA 800 opened in flight and the cargo door area should be thoroughly investigated to rule in or rule out that event based upon a number of similar accidents.

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith

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 US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.  
 Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.  
 Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C.

Enclosure below:

Sam Farr  
 Member of Congress  
 17th District, California  
 House of Representatives  
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Dear Congressman Farr,                      28 August 1998

You are my elected representative in the finest political body on the planet, the United States Congress to include the House of Representatives. You wrote me a letter on 18 August 1998 which I received today. It has caused me much thought.

I put your letter on my website at:

<http://www.corazon.com/correspondence.html> leads to  
<http://www.corazon.com/farr22.html>

Thank you for your reply to my request to arrange a meeting between NTSB and me. Here is my thoughtful reply to your quotes:

You state: "Although I recognize that you feel injured by recent statements from the NTSB, it would not be profitable to continue to seek a meeting for you with agency officials."

Reading that is like a steel stake through my heart. 'Profitable'? I have spent thousands of dollars of my own money and years of research and have yet to receive a penny from private or government sources. I assume, Mr. Farr, you mean 'profitable' in the figurative sense, not the financial sense.

Well, 'profitable' for a meeting with NTSB... Well, sir, I say it would and you say it wouldn't. It would be pilot to pilot, aviation talking to aviation about aviation. It would work. "Continue to seek meeting"...well, only Senator McCain has asked NTSB to meet with me and they rebuffed him. They may accede to your request. Let's try it.

How else then to persuade the NTSB to take another look at the forward cargo door area of TWA 800 if they ignore my emails and refuse a face to face meeting in order to present my evidence for discussion?

"Injured..." Well, just pride and I'm a big boy, I will get over it. The injured is NTSB's reputation for neutrality by denigrating a US citizen to a foreigner in official correspondence. I'm talking evidence of red paint markings and missing latches and they are talking slurs of 'peddling'. Why is that? What was the purpose of that?

You write: "I have been glad to help you communicate with the NTSB, but the agency's continued denial of your theory does not provide any encouragement that further communications will be worthwhile."

Give it a try, sir! You have power. To further communicate with NTSB will be worthwhile to you. They do not ignore you as they do me. They respond to you. Ask NTSB specific questions. I sug-

gest why the red paint markings between the passenger windows above the cargo door exist, or where is the missing 80% of the door, how many forward cargo door latches have they recovered, or why is door shattered outward.

NTSB and I disagree on very small points, about 50 seconds and six thousand feet, and when door opened. We agree the center tank exploded but NTSB says it happened 50 seconds earlier and six thousand feet higher than when and where I say it happened. I say door opened in flight; they say it opened after water impact. We are so close, could you mediate our differences, Mr. Farr? Would you attend the meeting between NTSB investigators and me to resolve minor differences of time and distance in this major investigation?

By the way, NTSB has given denials before regarding a forward cargo door fatal accident, UAL 811, and corrected itself to its credit. NTSB denied for a year that the forward cargo door of UAL 811 was opened in flight by an electrical problem and steadfastly proclaimed that improper latching did it...until they recovered all of the door pieces and discovered it was chafed to bare wire that caused it to open in flight, not improper latching. NTSB then issued a new NTSB AAR, 92/02, to replace the erroneous one, AAR 90/01. The benefit of NTSB admitting the error of probable cause and correcting it is shown today by me using that corrected AAR to match to TWA 800.

NTSB denials have a precedent of being wrong about forward cargo doors on high time Boeing 747s that suffer a hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side, just like TWA 800. Only the evidence counts and it says forward cargo door opened in flight. Even a FAA engineer agreed for a while with that conclusion.

You wrote: "Although it is clear that you disagree with the NTSB, I am not trained in any profession which would give me the expert knowledge needed to evaluate your theory or NTSB's arguments against it."

Don't denigrate your thinking abilities, Mr. Farr! You have all the expert knowledge needed to evaluate my theory or NTSB's arguments against it. Let me be the judge of your ability and I judge you more than capable to judge my theory for TWA 800, which is identical to NTSB's theory for UAL 811, wiring/cargo door initial event.

May I please remind you of a question you asked of me during my short presentation in our meeting, "What causes the door to open?" you asked.

That is a great question. It got right to the core of the problem. You understood exactly the problem of explosive decompression blowing out big hole in side of airplane nose and the 300 knot slipstream tearing nose off. That's basic physics and you already understand all the principles of my wiring/cargo door explanation.

I think the cause for door opening in flight for TWA 800 was bad wiring, exactly like UAL 811, but it could have been something else. That's why a thorough investigation into the cargo door area is required.

Chafed wiring to bare metal was found in the cargo door area of TWA 800, just like UAL 811. How many more smoking guns need to go off?

Mr. Farr, stick with me on this, please. Can you arrange a meeting with NTSB for all three of us? Will they consent to meet with you, I dare ask? NTSB received the suggestion of Senator McCain to meet with me and rejected it.

I assume you are following the local Monterey County Herald series about the inability of public citizens to access public information as required by California law. It's now a federal problem. Not only do local and state officials deny access to public records by members of the public, federal officials deny access to themselves for discussion by the same public citizens. Is this the government

we have today? Secretive and unwilling to talk to a reasonable, experienced, polite citizen pilot talking about real evidence in a plane crash?

You approved my posting on my website of NTSB Exhibit 4A which indicates you believe in a free exchange of ideas between government and citizen with exceptions of national security. TWA 800 is a civilian airliner in US airspace with no VIPs on board during peacetime and not caused by a criminal act. How open can it be?

For the record, it's been two years, hundreds of emails, thousands of pages, dozens of photographs, many repeated over and over again requests, and still no meeting with FAA or NTSB officials. Why is that? My explanation is all factual and based on precedent; there are no weird bombs or missiles or coverups in it. And yet, no meeting. What is the big deal about meeting with a citizen to talk about an airplane crash, you did it, sir.

Mr. Farr, you also told me in our meeting that 'you admired my passion because you feel that is what made our country great.' Is that true, or is my cynical self saying that's just political flattery? Well, regardless, I got chill bumps, so it worked for me. I am a Vietnam air combat veteran and my sense of duty and loyalty to my country is strong. I seek no favors from officialdom, no grants of government funds, no special dispensation for any clients; I am a citizen who seeks to meet and talk and reason with public officials about a matter of national interest under current investigation.

I come to the government because I respect its power. I want my government to be powerful. I also want it to be smart. To be smart is to be open minded. I want it to be open minded.

Is open minded refusing to meet with me? Is NTSB open minded on this, Mr. Farr?

To review your August 18 letter, Congressman, you say that a meeting between NTSB and me would not be profitable; communications from you to NTSB will not be worthwhile; and you are not trained enough to understand me or NTSB.

Mr. Farr, I disagree on all three.

A meeting between NTSB and me would be profitable, it depends on who I meet with. Communication between you and NTSB will be worthwhile, it depends on what you write. You are way trained enough to understand my theory and NTSBs arguments against it. You've shown that already.

You have never said you don't agree with me, only that others do. Do you remember my pictures of that blown outward shattered skin with bulges, paint markings and missing pieces of the forward cargo door area of TWA 800? It was the first suspected area by FAA and NTSB. It has failed before. It has very suspicious paint markings. Well, my request for a meeting with NTSB is to persuade them that that area deserves a second look.

Can you arrange that? Can you request that cargo door area review yourself? Can I meet with you to further clarify my theory if you are unclear on it?

Below are pictures on website to substantiate my text about evidence.

<http://www.corazon.com/TWA800hullrupture.html>  
<http://www.corazon.com/Forwarddoorblowupphoto.html>  
<http://www.corazon.com/TWA800wreckageredpaint.html>

The national interest in TWA 800 is about to turn international. There will be a trial of the next century with terrorism as the accused in the Pan Am 103 event.

And of course Pan Am 103 leads to TWA 800. The match is too complete to be dismissed without

discussion.

Pan Am 103 and TWA 800 were both:

aged  
 high time  
 early model  
 poly x wired  
 Boeing 747  
 shortly after take off  
 suffers hull rupture forward of the wing  
 fodded number three engine  
 sudden sound on CVR  
 loud sound on the CVR  
 short duration sound on the CVR  
 abrupt power cut to FDR  
 outward peeled skin in cargo door area  
 midspan latch status not determined  
 took off in no sun  
 running late  
 more severe inflight damage on starboard side  
 downward bent floor beams in cargo door area  
 at least nine never recovered bodies  
 vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door  
 bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

PA 103 and TWA 800 are the same above and both thought to be bombs and one of them wasn't!

TWA 800 leads to UAL 811 which were both:

aged  
 high flight time  
 poly x wired  
 early model Boeing 747  
 which took off in no sun  
 running late  
 and shortly after takeoff  
 experienced a sudden initial event in the forward cargo hold which left a  
 short  
 sudden  
 loud  
 sound on the cockpit voice recorder, an  
 abrupt data loss to the flight data recorder,  
 foreign object damage to starboard engines #3  
 more severe inflight damage on starboard side,  
 nine never recovered bodies,  
 torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,  
 rupture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,  
 outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,  
 downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,  
 vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward cargo door, and  
 destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.

PA103, TWA 800, and UAL 811 were all initially thought to be bombs yet two of them were not!

And UAL 811 leads to Air India 182.

UAL 811 and AI 182 were both:

early model  
 poly x wired  
 Boeing 747  
 suffers hull rupture forward of the wing  
 foddred number three engine  
 sudden sound on CVR  
 loud sound on the CVR  
 short duration sound on the CVR  
 abrupt power cut to FDR  
 outward peeled skin in cargo door area  
 midspan latch status not determined  
 took off in no sun  
 running late  
 more severe inflight damage on starboard side  
 at least nine never recovered bodies  
 vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door  
 inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as explanation during official inquiry  
 bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

PA 103, TWA 800, UAL 811, and AI 182, all initially thought to be bombs...and two of them were not!

One of those still thought to be a bomb, AI 182, has an active investigation going on with no resolution in sight. The other suspected bombing is soon to be on trial with international repercussions, PA 103. They both are linked by evidence to TWA 800, an accident still under active investigation. The four fatal accidents match; I claim they have one common cause, the NTSB cause for one of them, UAL 811, wiring/cargo door explanation.

I ask you, sir, to become involved. Americans are intimately involved in the upcoming international trial from the FBI, the State Department, Boeing, to most of the victims, all Americans.

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith

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Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.

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US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.

Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.

Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C.

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Dear Officials,

Below are recent quotes from senior NTSB officials about the icing Comair crash and how they relate to TWA 800:

"Any time we see an accident like this repeating itself, on information we should have already

learned, it's an indictment of the whole system," said James Hall, chairman of the safety board.

That's so true. Hull ruptures forward of the wing on the right side are accidents repeating themselves, four times to be exact, AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800. One of them was caused by chafed bare wire shorting on door unlatch motor, UAL 811. Information NTSB learned about TWA 800 shows bare wire in same cargo door area below:

The Systems Exhibit 9A continues, page 116:

"Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found."

To not evaluate that information that NTSB has already learned is an indictment of the whole system.

"I have correspondence from the FAA that this is just one engineer's opinion," said an exasperated Bernard Loeb, NTSB director of aviation safety.

"One engineer's opinion..." Well, here is one FAA engineer's opinion, "While no scenario has been categorically proven to be the cause, it is believed, based upon available data, that the center wing tank (CWT) explosion preceded any separation of the forward cargo door. The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT." 30 Jan 1998 letter from Neil Schalekamp, FAA engineer, to JBS:

To not evaluate that information from one FAA engineer is an indictment of the whole system.

Electrical problems causing fires and shorts exist in cargo holds of wide body airliners according to FAA and NTSB. It's happened before. To not evaluate that information that NTSB has already learned and apply it to TWA 800 is an indictment of the whole system.

If the Swissair 111 crash, a wide body airliner, turns out to be electrical problems in the cargo hold area, then the TWA 800 crash explanation as electrical problems in the cargo hold should be reinvestigated. To not do so would be an indictment of the whole system.

I again request a meeting with US government officials to present my evidence for discussion concerning bare wiring in the forward cargo hold of TWA 800, a problem repeating itself as learned by NTSB.

Respectfully,

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Dear Officials, 14 Sep 98

I quote,

"WASHINGTON (AP) -- The government is preparing to increase inspections of airliner wiring -- suspect in the crash of Swissair Flight 111 -- as part of an effort to tighten supervision of older aircraft."

And, "An electrical fault remains the prime suspect in the 1996 crash of a TWA plane soon after leaving New York on its way to Paris. Fuel and air fumes in the Boeing 747 center fuel tank exploded killing all 230 passengers and crew.

Earlier this year a large portion of the Boeing 737 fleet was grounded by the FAA for immediate inspection of wires travelling through the wing tanks to fuel pumps.

Garvey said she would announce in the next few weeks a joint initiative with the airline industry to address electrical problems. "It will be a multi-pronged approach including more research but we will also have some more immediate steps," she said before testifying to a Senate panel on Year 2000 computer problems."

Dear officials, will someone in authority please note that NTSB discovered bad wiring in TWA 800 cargo door area, a Poly X polyimide wired plane?

"Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found."

NTSB also discovered Poly X wiring in UAL 811. UAL 811 was an electrical caused fatal Boeing 747 accident. TWA 800 and Swissair 111 are suspected electrical caused fatal accidents.

Will somebody in authority acknowledge UAL 811 existed and killed nine people and is the only confirmed and documented electrically caused fatal accident in a polyimide wired airliner? The cargo door gets blamed but it did what it was told, unlatch. The PolyX polyimide wiring is the culprit.

Everybody looked bad with UAL 811, Boeing for design, United for record keeping, FAA for delay, and then NTSB for getting the initial probable cause incomplete requiring AAR 90/01 to be superseded with AAR 92/02.

Everybody looked good by acknowledging the problems and attempting to fix them.

Although UAL 811 was horrible, it must be revisited.

To investigate cargo door area wiring in all early PolyX wired Boeing 747s based upon Swissair 111, UAL 965, UAL 811, and TWA 800 is prudent, in accordance with senior officials' suggestions, and fits the facts.

When the wiring review is conducted by FAA, sooner or later UAL 811 will come up because it is a confirmed PolyX/polyimide switch/wiring caused fatal accident in a commercial wide body. Then the matches of UAL 811 to TWA 800 will become apparent. Then the PolyX bare wires in the cargo door area of TWA 800 will be recognized for the significant discovery they are. Then the wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 will receive the thorough investigation it deserves.

At least, that's the logic.

UAL 811 is the key to many mystery crashes. It's on website of course, [www.corazon.com/811page90conclusions1.html](http://www.corazon.com/811page90conclusions1.html)

I know all the answers but nobody asks me the questions.

(Passengers on Swissair probably took video of events inside cabin of Swissair 111 before it went in. That very valuable evidence is in the water and can be retrieved and analyzed.)

The Bournemouth Boeing 737 with rudder problems was caused by fluid in a yaw damper electrical connection. There have been other fatal rudder related Boeing 737 problems.

The Valujet 592 MD80 was a fire in the cargo bay. There have been other cargo bay fires caused by electrical problems.

UAL 811 was an electrical caused hull rupture forward of the wing on a Boeing 747. There have been three other Boeing 747s with hull ruptures forward of the wing, all four leaving a sudden loud sound on the CVR and abrupt data loss to the recorders, including TWA 800.

Discerning a pattern is the first sign of intelligence. I have discerned a pattern of hull ruptures forward of the wing in high time Boeing 747s that leave many significant similarities which indicate the forward cargo door ruptured in flight. That's one pattern; hull ruptures and forward cargo door.

Another pattern is mysterious accidents in many airliners that can be explained as electrical problems supported by confirmed previous electrical causes giving similar evidence.

FAA is about to conduct a thorough review of electrical problems in airliners. Please consider a known fatal electrical caused accident in depth, UAL 811. Please match UAL 811 to TWA 800 as hull ruptures forward of the wing in flight. Please investigate TWA 800 as an electrical caused hull rupture. Please contact me for further clarification.

I again request a meeting with FAA or NTSB officials to present my evidence for discussion regarding electrical problems, past, present, and future, in Boeing 747s that suffer hull ruptures in flight forward of the wing.

Citizens can contribute to aviation safety. First, they must be heard, then considered, then questioned.

I await your call.

Respectfully,

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US Navy Air Intelligence Officer

Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C.

Quote from TWA 800 Public Docket 516A, Exhibit 9A Systems Group Chairman's Factual report

of Investigation, Page 47, "A Boeing telefax of June 25, 1997, stated that: The Poly-X wire was used as general purpose wire on the RA164 (TWA 800) aircraft. Wire insulation known as Poly-X had three in-service problems:

-Abrasion of the insulation in bundles installed in high vibration areas.

(This problem was corrected by Boeing Service Bulletin No. 747-71-7105, Dated July 19, 1974)

-Random flaking of the topcoat.

-Insulation radial cracks in tight bend radii.

Radial cracking phenomenon of the Poly-X wire was mainly associated with mechanical stress. Bend radius is the largest contributor to mechanical stress in installed wire or cable. Presence of moisture in conjunction with mechanical stress is also a contributor."

The Systems Exhibit 9A continues on same page 47, "Evidence of arcing or short circuiting was found in the fuselage of N93119, (TWA 800) in addition to what was found in the wiring from the raceway below the left cabin floor and near the forward wing spar.

The Systems Exhibit 9A continues, page 116:

"Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found."

Please note that BMS13-42A is Poly-X wiring. Cargo door location is FS 560-670 and cracked wires discovered are within that zone. Frayed wires in that area have shorted before and caused the forward cargo door to open in flight, NTSB AAR 92/02 UAL 811.

UAL 811 matches TWA 800

aged

high flight time

poly x wired

early model Boeing 747

and shortly after takeoff

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt data loss to FDR

foreign object damage to starboard engines #3

fire in number three engine

more severe inflight damage on starboard side,

at least nine never recovered bodies,

torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,

post side smooth forward of the wing.

rupture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,

outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,

downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,

bare wire found in cargo door area.

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing

parts initially shed from just forward of the wing.

first pieces of structure to leave aircraft in flight from forward cargo bay.

forward cargo door frayed

hoop stress found in cargo door area

door skin shattered outward.

inadvertent opening of forward cargo door in flight considered

initially thought to be a bomb

but later ruled out.

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Dear Officials,

23 Sep 98

According to AAIB 2/90, Pan Am 103, the plastic fragment which is supposed to be the cassette recorder into which a plastic explosive was placed turns out to have been discovered on the outside of the baggage container, not the inside.

A piece of real evidence for a bombing for PA 103 is a fingernail sized fragment of plastic. It now turns out that that fragment was located in a place that rules out it being part of a circuit board that is part of a cassette which is part of a bomb placed by terrorists in the baggage container of the forward cargo bay. The fragment is likely not related to any bomb because the fragment was found on the outside of the container, not the inside.

The proof is in the evidence. Figure F-5 of AAIB 02/92 shows the 'bombed' baggage container AVE 4041 PA having a rectangular plate affixed in the upper left quadrant with the letter 'c' inside it. The text explanation which corresponds to 'c' reads, "Container manufacturer's data plate containing burnt piece of material which itself contained a fragment of circuit board."

The text on page F-2 states, "While this work was in progress a buckled section of skin from container 4041 was found by an AAIB Inspector to contain, trapped within its folds, an item which was subsequently identified by forensic scientists at the Royal Armaments Research and Development Establishment (RARDE) as belonging to a specific type of radio-cassette player and that this had been fitted with an improvised explosive device."

Figure F-13 also shows this container manufacturer's data plate as a rectangle in the same location as Figure F-5 with the location of the IED pinpointed on the inside of the container ten inches above the floor.

Figure F-2 shows a photograph of a normal container with the manufacturer's name plate clearly visible on the outside of the container in the upper left quadrant.

There is much other evidence to rule out a bomb based on the evidence of the baggage container. The actual damage shows a directed, mild, sooty blast of twenty five inches long through clothes, suitcase, and metal baggage container to fuselage skin at which point the directed energy blasted a small hole twenty inches by twenty inches. A plastic high explosive would not leave soot in the initial pressure wave, would be spherical, and would certainly directly make a hole larger than twenty inches by twenty inches in the fuselage skin.

To put it another way, a high explosive device would have left no soot in initial pressure wave, be spherical, and do massive damage to anything with a few feet. That evidence is not there for high explosive device.

The evidence of the reconstructed baggage container of PA 103 clearly shows it was a much smaller device that caused the sooting and small hole in the skin than a high explosive plastic bomb placed twenty five inches away.

What could it be then, it not a bomb? Well, it could have been a rather large shotgun or a boat flare gun, both items if fired inadvertently would fit the evidence of mild, directed, sooty blast of twenty five inches.

The only piece of hard evidence to support bomb explanation for PA 103 is a fragment of plastic which was found in a position that makes it very unlikely that it was part of bomb or other device that ignited in the forward cargo hold of PA 103 at the initial event time.

The corroborating evidence of the rest of the pieces of the baggage container confirm the small size of the charge, the sooty low explosive nature, and the short directed blast that makes it gun type damage and not bomb type damage.

There is much other corroborative evidence that explains that PA 103 was probably an explosive decompression event forward of the wing as a result of a hull rupture in the forward cargo door area.

Regarding Pan Am 103 and the 'bombers':

Accused are innocent until proven guilty.

Goal is to save American passenger's lives by preventing another PA 103 type accident.

Justice for the not guilty means cleared of unjust accusation.

Justice for the guilty means replacing old wiring and securing cargo doors.

I've been trying US authorities for years to give serious consideration to wiring/cargo door explanation for PA 103 and others but have been rejected.

I am now attempting to contact Libyan officials regarding the wiring/cargo door explanation for Pan Am 103 because it was not a bomb. Nobody put a bomb on board. Their guys did not do it because nobody did it. Justice is justice. I will defend Sikh terrorists from the accusation of bombing Air India 182 and I will defend the United States Navy of the accusation of accidentally shooting down TWA 800 and covering it up. There is no conspiracy, coverup or plot to destroy Boeing 747s by placing bombs in the forward cargo hold.

This is life and death. Wiring is causing cargo doors to open in flight on high time Boeing 747s including PA 103.

Please forward this email to appropriate State Department officials. I consider this email notification to the US Government of my intent to contact Libyan authorities regarding a plane crash and its cause. I encourage State Department officials to contact me at their earliest convenience.

I again request a meeting with US aviation officials or US law enforcement officials to present my research for discussion regarding the wiring/cargo door explanation for PA 103, AI 182, UAL 811, and TWA 800.

News Report: "...the Federal Aviation Administration is preparing to order the inspection and replacement of wiring that could cause fires in aging airplanes."

Wiring has caused fires in Boeing 747 cargo holds before:

"A. 1996, burning smell in forward cargo compartment, found damaged wiring shorted to ground, charring found.

B. Oct 12, 1996, Wire bundle arcing and resultant fire at aft bulkhead of forward lower lobe cargo hold on 747-200 freighter. Page 45, 747-200 reported on October 12, 1996: Wire bundle arcing and resultant fire at aft bulkhead of forward lower lobe cargo hold on a 747-200 freighter. This occurred with the airplane on the ground, during post C-check functional test.

Note: Portions of the damaged wire bundles were forwarded to Boeing for evaluation in determining the cause of the damage. The results of the analysis indicated the primary conductor(s) sustained mechanical or thermal damage prior to the application of electrical power."

Source: NTSB Exhibit 9C, Attachments to the Systems Group Factual Report page 44, 45, 46.

Bare wires were found in TWA 800 cargo door area:

"The Systems Exhibit 9A continues, page 116:

"Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found."

PolyX/Kapton/polyimide insulation have caused problems before in Navy aircraft.

"Page 57, Letter from Commander Naval Air Systems Command to National Electrical Manufac-

turers Association, 1 Oct 82, "As you know, the problems with poly-x wire are well known to headquarters and its use had been curtailed."

Bare wires in the cargo door area and the electrical system have caused fatalities in a Boeing 747 before, UAL 811 described in AAR 92/02:

"Plug P3 and Plug P4 at a distance between three to four inches from plug pin tips. The P4 damage location may correspond to wire bundle clamp positions. These areas are where the chafed bare wires shorted on the door latch actuator motor to the unlatch position."

NTSB recognizes the danger of bad polyimide wiring in Boeing 747 cargo bays and recommended inspections before:

"Data\_Source: U.S. NTSB Safety Recommendations

Rprt\_Nbr: A-91-83

Last Updated: 03-13-95

[O] On June 13, 1991, United Airlines (UAL) maintenance personnel were unable to electrically open the aft cargo door on a Boeing 747-222B, N152UA, at John F. Kennedy Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York. The airplane was one of two used exclusively on nonstop flights between Narita, Japan, and JFK. This particular airplane had accumulated 19,053 hours and 1,547 cycles at the time of the occurrence.

Recommendations:

A-91-83. Issue an Airworthiness Directive applicable to all Boeing 747 airplanes with a flexible conduit protecting the wiring bundle between the fuselage and aft cargo door to require an expedited inspection of:

- (1) the wiring bundle in the area normally covered by the conduit for the presence of damaged insulation (using either an electrical test method or visual examination);
- (2) the conduit support bracket and attached standoff pin on the upper arm of the forward lift actuator mechanism;
- (3) the flexible conduit for the presence of cracking in the convoluted innercore."

The precedents are clear, dear Government Officials, bad polyimide wiring causes problems, TWA 800 had polyimide wiring; bad polyimide wiring in electrical system in cargo door area causes fatalities, TWA 800 had bad polyimide wiring in cargo door area; NTSB recommends checking wiring in cargo door area of Boeing 747s, and FAA is preparing to order the inspection and replacement of wiring that could cause fires in aging airplanes.

The conclusion is clear: wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 and other high time Boeing 747 that suffer hull rupture forward of the wing in flight needs to be seriously considered. I repeat: I again request a meeting with US aviation officials or US law enforcement officials to present my research for discussion regarding the wiring/cargo door explanation for PA 103, AI 182, UAL 811, and TWA 800.

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith  
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Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.

US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.

US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.

Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.

US Navy Air Intelligence Officer  
Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C.

### Checking up on Kapton

Airplane wiring is a source of suspicion

BY MARGARET LOFTUS

As investigators of the recent Swissair 111 crash focus on evidence of an electrical fire, the Federal Aviation Administration is preparing to order the inspection and replacement of wiring that could cause fires in aging airplanes.

While the inspections will focus on the older planes, many aviation safety experts say the FAA's plan won't alleviate their concerns over wiring used in newer planes flying today. The wiring is insulated with Kapton, a polymer that scientists have found is prone to rare but catastrophic "arc tracking." When the wire is subjected to chafing, vibration, and moisture, the insulator may crack, allowing the current to jump to other wires in the bundle, which become fuel for a fire. The Navy and Air Force no longer use Kapton as a primary wire insulator. The FAA refused comment on Kapton, but it has said in the past that arc tracking has not been a problem on commercial aircraft. In the early 1990s, Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas (now merged) phased out Kapton in favor of new Teflon-coated Kapton. A Boeing spokeswoman says: "We've never found anything that indicates a problem with the wiring."

Wiring is made to last the anticipated life of a plane. But about 2,500 commercial planes in the United States are flying beyond their original design life. "Wiring is becoming the new villain of air safety," says David Evans, editor of Air Safety Week, "and it has been brought to light by a relatively young aircraft."

### Canadian and Indian report on Air India Flight 182 reports:

"The examination of the floating and the other wreckage shows that the right hand wing leading edge, the No. 3 engine fan cowl, right hand inboard mid flap leading edge and the leading edge of the right hand stabilizer were damaged in flight. This damage could have occurred only if objects had been ejected from the front portion of the aircraft when it was still in the air. The cargo door of the front cargo compartment was also found ruptured from above. This also indicates that the explosion perhaps occurred in the forward cargo compartment causing the objects to come out and thereby damaging the components on the right hand side."

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Dear Officials,                      28 Sep 98

"McSweeny Named To FAA Office-Thomas E. McSweeny, the director of FAA's Aircraft Certification Service, was named by FAA Administrator Jane Garvey to succeed Guy Gardner as associate administrator for regulation and certification. "

Congratulations, Mr. McSweeny. Can you turn your attention to aircraft wiring? Big picture:

Bad polyimide style wiring causes bad problems.

Polyimide type wiring causes fires in cargo bays. Shown by NTSB exhibits for Boeing 747 cargo bay fires. Valujet has much evidence that polyimide type fire occurred in cargo bay.

Polyimide type wiring causes yaw damper to move erratically. Shown by AAIB report of Boeing 737 calling Mayday for seven minutes as fluid in connector with polyimide wiring caused rudder to flap back and forth, very similar to the two unexplained 737 crashes still under investigation.

Polyimide type wiring causes cargo doors to open inadvertently. Shown by NTSB AAR 92/02 in which the electrical system composed of polyimide type wiring caused the fatal accident when cargo door opened in flight.

Polyimide type wiring suspected of causing cockpit fires. Shown by TSB reports electrical problems for Swissair Flight 111.

Quote from TWA 800 Public Docket 516A, Exhibit 9A Systems Group Chairman's Factual report of Investigation, Page 47, "A Boeing telefax of June 25, 1997, stated that: The Poly-X wire was used as general purpose wire on the RA164 (TWA 800) aircraft. Wire insulation known as Poly-X had three in-service problems:

-Abrasion of the insulation in bundles installed in high vibration areas.

(This problem was corrected by Boeing Service Bulletin No. 747-71-7105, Dated July 19, 1974)

-Random flaking of the topcoat.

-Insulation radial cracks in tight bend radii.

Radial cracking phenomenon of the Poly-X wire was mainly associated with mechanical stress. Bend radius is the largest contributor to mechanical stress in installed wire or cable. Presence of moisture in conjunction with mechanical stress is also a contributor."

The Systems Exhibit 9A continues on same page 47, "Evidence of arcing or short circuiting was found in the fuselage of N93119, (TWA 800) in addition to what was found in the wiring from the raceway below the left cabin floor and near the forward wing spar.

The Systems Exhibit 9A continues, page 116:

"Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found."

(Please note that BMS13-42A is Poly-X wiring. Cargo door location is FS 560-670 and cracked wires discovered are within that zone. Frayed wires in that area have shorted before and caused the forward cargo door to open in flight, NTSB AAR 92/02 UAL 811. Water has been seen pouring out of a forward cargo bay of a Boeing airliner. Water and leaking electricity make a powerful conductor. Both are known to exist in Boeing airliners.)

I again request a meeting with NTSB and FAA safety officials to present my research for discussion.

Respectfully,

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www.corazon.com

Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.

US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.

US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.

Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.

US Navy Air Intelligence Officer

Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C.

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Manager, Propulsion & Mechanical Systems

and Cabin Safety Branch

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Aerospace Engineer,

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Renton, WA 98055-4056

Dear Officials,

FAA Urges Airlines To Replace Insulation -  
Report

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration recommended that the insulation of almost all of the world's 12,000 passenger jets be replaced because new tests are likely to find that it can catch fire when exposed to high heat, the Washington Post reported Thursday.

The recommendation, made Wednesday, grew out of the investigation of Swissair Flight 111, which crashed off the coast of Nova Scotia last month, the newspaper said. The Post noted that while the cause of the crash was not known, there were indications that some of the wreckage had been subjected to heat, and possibly a fire.

FAA administrator Jane Garvey told the Post in

an interview that the agency did not consider the insulation fire threat serious enough to issue an "airworthiness directive" ordering immediate replacement.

But she said the FAA may change its position if further research showed the threat to be greater than expected. For now, the FAA recommends replacement at "any reasonable maintenance opportunity," the Post said.

"We've gone round and round on that question," Garvey told the Post. But the record of aircraft fires involving insulation did not indicate a widespread or immediate safety threat, she said.

Jim Hall, chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, told the newspaper he was pleased the FAA had initiated a program to look into the fire safety issue "which has been of concern to some in the aviation community for at least several years."

Successful requests: 22,147

Average successful requests per day: 3,215

Successful requests for pages: 10,533

Average successful requests for pages per day:

1,529  
Failed requests: 229  
Redirected requests: 3  
Distinct files requested: 2,129  
Distinct hosts served: 2,068  
Corrupt logfile lines: 3  
Data transferred: 671,882 kbytes  
Average data transferred per day: 97,550  
kbytes

6: 0.04%:  
gatekeeper.volpe.dot.gov  
102: 0.38%:  
enduser.faa.gov  
2: :  
defender.fda.gov  
7: 0.06%:  
vasfw01.fdic.gov  
5: 0.02%:  
viper.gao.gov  
9: 0.07%:  
host.207-123-128-62.gsa.gov  
11: 0.05%:  
amc000proxy4.mpb.jccbi.gov  
1: :  
proxyout.maricopa.gov  
1: :

ecn1733337.gsfc.nasa.gov

2: :

ecn1824572-ce.gsfc.nasa.gov

2: :

daleth.larc.nasa.gov

6: 0.03%:

tgraziano.nws.noaa.gov

3: :

firewall.nts.gov

2: :

hkc.xdoe.ornl.gov

21: 0.06%:

tcs-gateway3.treas.gov

1: :

wdcsun1.usdoj.gov

1: 0.01%:

wdcsun2.usdoj.gov

10: 0.04%:

red-internet.uspis.gov

1: 0.01%:

gk-east.usps.gov

2: :

gk-east2.usps.gov

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report of Investigation, Page 47, "A Boeing

telefax of June 25, 1997, stated that: The Poly-X wire was used as general purpose wire on the RA164 (TWA 800) aircraft. Wire insulation known as Poly-X had three in-service problems:

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The Systems Exhibit 9A continues on same page 47, "Evidence of arcing or short circuiting was found in the fuselage of N93119, (TWA 800) in addition to what was found in the wiring from the raceway below the left cabin floor and near the forward wing spar.

The Systems Exhibit 9A continues, page 116:  
"Some wires found in the section of W480  
from forward of station 570 and identified as  
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570-900 were insulation cracks found."

I again request a meeting with NTSB and FAA  
safety officials to present my research for  
discussion.

<http://www.nts.gov/Aviation/DCA/89A027.htm>

NTSB Identification: DCA89MA027 For  
details, refer to NTSB microfiche number  
37772A

Scheduled 14 CFR 121 operation of UNITED  
AIRLINES (D.B.A. UNITED  
AIRLINES, INC.)

Accident occurred FEB-24-89 at  
HONOLULU, HI

Aircraft: BOEING 747-122, registration:  
N4713U

Injuries: 9 Fatal, 5 Serious, 33 Minor, 309  
Uninjured.

FTL #811 WAS A SCHEDULED PASSENGER FLIGHT FROM LOS ANGELES TO SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA, WITH STOPS IN HONOLULU (HNL), HI, AND AUCKLAND, NEW ZEALAND. THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL UNTIL AFTER DEPARTURE FROM HNL. WHILE CLIMBING FROM FL220 TO FL230 THE CREW HEARD A "THUMP" FOLLOWED BY AN EXPLOSION. AN EXPLOSIVE DECOMPRESSION WAS EXPERIENCED AND THE #3 AND #4 ENGS WERE SHUTDOWN BECAUSE OF FOD. THE FLT RETURNED TO HNL AND PASSENGERS WERE EVACUATED. INSPECTION REVEALED THE FORWARD LOWER LOBE CARGO DOOR DEPARTED INFLT CAUSING EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO THE FUSELAGE AND CABIN ADJACENT TO THE DOOR. NINE PASSENGERS WERE EJECTED AND LOST AT SEA. INVESTIGATION CENTERED AROUND DESIGN AND CERTIFICATION OF THE

DOOR WHICH ALLOWED IT TO BE IMPROPERLY LATCHED, AND THE OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE TO ASSURE AIRWORTHINESS OF THE DOOR AND LATCHING MECHANISM. (SEE NTSB/AAR-90/01)

Probable Cause

THE SUDDEN OPENING OF THE IMPROPERLY LATCHED FORWARD LOBE CARGO DOOR IN FLIGHT AND THE SUBSEQUENT EXPLOSIVE DECOMPRESSION. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS A DEFICIENCY IN THE DESIGN OF THE CARGO DOOR LOCKING MECHANISMS, WHICH MADE THEM SUSCEPTIBLE TO INSERVICE DAMAGE, AND WHICH ALLOWED THE DOOR TO BE UNLATCHED, YET TO SHOW A PROPERLY LATCHED AND LOCKED POSITION. ALSO CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS THE LACK OF PROPER MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION OF THE CARGO DOOR BY UNITED AIRLINES, AND A LACK OF TIMELY CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BY BOEING AND THE FAA FOLLOWING A PREVIOUS DOOR OPENING INCIDENT.

## Index for Feb 1989 | Index of Months

Crash probe reveals flaw Wiring flaw in crash probe

by Chuck Taylor and James V. Grimaldi  
Seattle Times staff reporters

In thoroughly examining 747s after the TWA Flight 800 disaster, federal investigators have discovered the potential for an electrical problem inside fuel tanks that could - under what Boeing considers extraordinary circumstances - lead to an explosion. Boeing plans to urge airlines to inspect older-model 747s and replace an outdated component in some tanks, although the company calls the chance for danger astronomically remote.

Tiny punctures in wire insulation, found inside an old, out-of-service 747-100, are the first hard evidence of a potential problem inside a tank that engineers have designed to be virtually spark-proof.

The discovery might account for a crucial link in a chain of failures necessary to ignite a

particular mix of jet fumes inside the aircraft's 20-by-20-foot center wing tank - the location of the blast that brought down the TWA 747-100 on the evening of July 17, 1996.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found the punctured wire insulation near contacts on terminal blocks, where the wires were attached to fuel-measuring probes inside the tank. Contact between the wires and the rough surface of the plastic terminal block apparently caused the punctures.

Exposed wires alone could not cause an explosion, according to Boeing engineers.

That's just one of three conditions that would have to be present to spark fumes in the tank.

But the worn-insulation discovery is expected to be a focus at a safety board hearing the week of Dec. 8 in Baltimore, at which evidence will be presented and testimony heard on the TWA crash. At the NTSB offices in Washington, D.C., workers are compiling documents - including color photographs of fuel-probe terminal blocks.

Boeing, meanwhile, intends to issue a service bulletin early next year, recommending that 747 operators replace older versions of fuel probes. The design for newer probes and the

probes used on other models circumvent the problem, said spokesman Doug Webb.

Flight 800 exploded 13 minutes after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York, 2 1/2 miles above the Atlantic Ocean. All 230 people aboard were killed.

This month, the FBI ruled out criminal action or friendly fire by the military. An official finding by the NTSB isn't expected for months.

The 25-year-old TWA jet, bound for Paris, had a nearly empty center wing tank, a normal condition for all but the longest 747 flights.

Since fumes are more volatile than fuel, empty tanks are more dangerous than full ones. From the dawn of aviation, airplanes have been designed to eliminate the risk of an ignition source, rather than reduce fuel-tank explosiveness.

However, there is electricity inside fuel tanks, and electricity is capable of creating sparks.

Fuel probes measure quantity with very low-energy current - too low, Boeing engineers contend, to set off an explosion in the event of a short circuit.

Besides the failure of the wire insulation at the terminal block, two other conditions would

have to be present simultaneously to cause a catastrophic spark, the Boeing engineers said. First, two exposed wires at the terminal block would have to virtually come in contact with one another to enable the arcing of current, the engineers said. This could be debated at the upcoming NTSB hearing.

Because the terminal block, where the abrasion occurred, is designed to hold wires apart, it would be necessary for the gap between them to be closed - perhaps by a maintenance worker inadvertently moving the wires together, or by the presence of electricity-conducting debris.

Second, the low-energy fuel-measuring circuit would have to be charged with much higher voltage.

Another NTSB theory comes into play here. For months, investigators have been considering the possibility that a short circuit outside the tank could enable high-voltage current from another system to arc into the lower-voltage fuel-measuring circuit.

Wires from various systems are bundled together on jetliners, and chafed insulation on high-voltage and lower-voltage wires could enable such a short circuit.

So an explosion would depend on two simultaneous short circuits, one inside the tank that could create a spark and one outside that could supply high-voltage current. "We don't believe those two things taken together are going to occur on the airplane over its life," said one Boeing engineer.

Last June, Boeing issued a service bulletin urging 747 operators to visually inspect wiring, grounding straps, fuel pumps and fuel-line fittings, and to check the electrical bonding of center-wing tank equipment. Results for about 50 of an estimated in-service fleet of more than 1,000 have come in. Boeing said nothing unusual has been found.

The small punctures found in the retired 747's wires, however, could be seen only with magnification, Boeing engineers said.

Although the NTSB sees a possible connection to the TWA 800 crash, Boeing is not expediting the fuel-probe service bulletin because of the other factors necessary for an explosion to occur. Moreover, preparing a service bulletin takes time and planning, engineers said.

But with the NTSB closely studying a fuel-probe theory, and with the TWA accident

set to be revisited during next month's hearing, Boeing could find itself under pressure to issue a service bulletin sooner.

Safety board officials declined to comment on Boeing's plan for a service bulletin. But a service bulletin seen as too narrow in scope is likely to come under criticism from the board, which has recently been at odds with manufacturers and the Federal Aviation Administration.

If it's determined to involve safety, a manufacturer's service bulletin is accompanied by an airworthiness directive by the FAA, mandating action by aircraft operators. Boeing expects an airworthiness directive with issuance of its fuel-probe service bulletin.

The FAA always consults manufacturers in issuing airworthiness directives but could compel the company to act sooner if it determines a problem warrants it.

Tim Pile, a spokesman at the FAA's Transport Airplane Directorate in Renton, said, "We're very much aware of the situation and we're evaluating it now, and we'll determine an appropriate course of action shortly." Chuck Taylor's phone message number is 206-464-2465. His e-mail address is:

ctay-new@seatimes.com.

## FAA tightens safety criteria for older aircraft

October 1, 1998

Web posted at: 5:34 p.m. EDT (2134 GMT)

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Inspections of electrical and other systems of older aircraft are too general and their maintenance sometimes haphazard, according to federal officials, who announced a new safety effort Thursday targeting older aircraft.

Federal Aviation Administration Chief Jane Garvey said no reasons were found to ground any aircraft, based on a review which began last year.

But she said that the FAA would implement improvements in how certain systems are inspected, repaired and documented as an aircraft ages.

"We found that the criteria in place today do not adequately address the issues posed by aging systems," Garvey said ( 374 K/21 sec. AIFF or WAV sound).

Garvey said the initiative is the result of a 1997 White House report on aviation safety, that recommended expanding the structural

inspections of older aircraft to include non-structural systems.

Last year, a team of experts was formed to determine how the expansion should proceed. The team took an in-depth look at five older aircraft, including three DC-10s, one DC-9 and one B-727, Garvey said.

The team recommended better inspection criteria for corrosion on some flight control and hydraulic components, Garvey said.

Garvey

"Some flight control components were difficult to get at. Because of that difficulty, the team found they were not getting inspected as much as we would like," she said.

The team also detected deterioration in some of the wiring bundles of the aircraft, as well as contamination of the wiring by metal shavings, dust and fluids, Garvey said.

It developed a plan to improve the safety of the aircraft systems, which includes establishing an advisory committee to oversee its implementation.

Garvey said the plan draws on the expertise of NASA, the Department of Defense, aircraft operators and manufacturers and the joint aviation authorities of Europe.

She said the initiative will begin programs to put improved practices and criteria in place, as well as establish specific completion dates.

The plan also requires aircraft manufacturers to review fuel system safety design, fuel tank maintenance practices addressing the integrity of fuel tank wiring, and ways to prevent power surges in fuel quality measuring devices.

"Next year we plan to have in place an improved system for reporting wire failures.

We'll also add database to the FAA's National Aviation Safety Data Analysis Center," Garvey said.

The FAA's previous focus on maintaining the structure of older aircraft was prompted by a 1988 incident in which an Aloha Airlines 737 lost a section of its upper fuselage during flight.

But the dangers of electrical problems were highlighted by the 1996 crash of a TWA plane near New York that killed all 230 people on board when a spark touched off an explosion in the elderly Boeing 747's center fuel tank.

Efforts by the FAA and the aviation industry since that crash have uncovered problems in much younger aircraft.

Just this week, FAA lowered the threshold for

inspections of Boeing 737s for abrasion of fuel pump wires to planes with as few as 20,000 hours.

The probe of the September 2 crash of a Swissair plane off the coast of Nova Scotia has also focused on a possible electrical problem. The crew reported smoke in the cockpit and power ceased altogether before the plane hit the ocean.

Garvey has promised immediate action in conjunction with more research on the wiring issue but has denied the timing of Thursday's announcement was influenced by the Swissair accident.

"The whole issue of wiring is something that people have been focused on for a while," Garvey said.

The FAA's recommendation first was reported Wednesday in The Washington Post. The FAA is recommending insulation wrapped in a film made with a chemical called polyimide, which is sold commercially as Kapton, because it has high heat resistance. The agency said that when it issues

the new regulations it will "grandfather" any aircraft that installs the Kapton-covered insulation now.

## Airliner checkups to include wiring

Sunday, September 27, 1998

By DOUG MOST

Staff Writer

Every second of every day, a plane takes off from somewhere. Maybe a 747 with 300 passengers flies from Newark Airport to San Francisco. Or an ATR-42 takes 50 passengers on a commuter flight from La Guardia to Boston.

Hidden inside the guts of those planes is a spaghetti maze of electrical wires crisscrossing the body, running from the cockpit, through the cabin, to the engines, the bathrooms, and everything else that requires power. In some planes, there's enough wiring to stretch the entire 173 miles of the Garden State Parkway -- and even reach a few miles into the ocean. But since the beginning of air travel, no law, agency, or governing body has required airlines to regularly inspect that wiring, which

can weigh more than 8,000 pounds. Now, with wiring at the heart of the investigations into the 1996 explosion of TWA Flight 800 that killed 230 people, and the Sept. 2 crash of Swissair Flight 111 that took 229 lives in Canada, things are changing.

The Federal Aviation Administration this week is expected to announce regulations that would require more thorough inspections of aircraft wiring than the simple visual checks that are done now.

"We have had no mandated, periodic wiring inspections until this," said Les Dorr, a spokesman for the FAA.

The new program, which will cover such systems as aircraft wiring, control systems, hydraulics, and pumps, stems from a White House commission on aviation and security. The commission recommended last year that aviation inspections be expanded beyond the structure of planes to include wiring.

While the wiring inside airplanes is more heavily insulated than the wiring in a household toaster, blender, or air conditioner, it is still vulnerable to the same bending, cracking, chafing, sparking, and other troubles that can strike ordinary appliances.

The difference, of course, is the result. Although investigators still have not determined a cause for either the TWA explosion or the Swissair crash, wiring flaws are suspected in each.

As a result, airplane manufacturers have found themselves defending their wiring, specifically the insulation that protects it. A focus of the new inspections is expected to be the wirecoating found on commercial jets. In most planes, it is an aromatic and volatile tape known as Kapton.

Kapton-coated wiring was blamed for the 1990 crash of a Navy Hawkeye surveillance plane in Puerto Rico, prompting the Navy to ban the material from its planes. NASA also has stopped using it because of its tendency to crack under extreme vibrations or when it is bent sharply.

Wiring experts say the chief complaint about Kapton is that it is prone to a phenomenon called arc tracking, when sparks jump from a damaged wire to a conductor such as a metal bulkhead. The insulation can conduct electricity, which could spread to other wire bundles and result in smoke or fire.

Aircraft manufacturers, however, have been

steadfast in their confidence in Kapton's safety and say their planes do not put the same stress on the insulation as the Navy or NASA.

"In a commercial plane, we don't have that environment," said Ron Hinderberger, the director of air safety investigation for Boeing Corp., the world's largest manufacturer of commercial aircraft. "Our space allows us very generous bend radiuses with our wires."

However, Patrick Price, a retired wiring technician for Boeing, has called Kapton "the most explosive wire that they can put on an airplane."

Boeing defends its use of the material. "We constantly track our airplanes and have never seen a problem with it," Boeing spokesman Doug Webb said of the insulation. "Is [Price] a wire expert? I don't know. I do know our wire experts have found no problems."

And if a problem was found, Dorr said it would have to be reported to the FAA. "We have not seen that wiring as a serious problem in the U.S. fleet," he said. "There is no trend."

But Dorr still said the wiring needs more regular inspections. "We think it's a prudent thing to do," he said. No details on the FAA's new regulations were available.

Hinderberger agreed. "I'm not aware of any dedicated wiring inspections, per se," he said. "Most of what we do comes as a result of trouble-shooting."

But waiting for trouble is waiting for disaster, some critics say.

"All government agencies are reactive, not proactive," said Vernon L. Grose, a former member of the National Transportation Safety Board who was an expert on the White House Gore Commission on Aviation Safety and Security.

He said the FAA never has had its own team of experts to study the chemical, mechanical, and electrical aspects of airplane wiring, and the agency has never ordered manufacturers to have their own experts.

"Wiring is like the veins in your hand," Grose said. "Everyone figures that once it's there, it's probably OK and you don't have to worry about it. That's wrong. And in the meantime, you're diddling with safety in the air."

Julia Johns, a manager with Lectromechanical Design Co. in Sterling, Va., a research and development firm that has studied airplane wiring, said airlines have inspected wiring only visually. Manufacturers have never had to

do more than that and are "afraid it's going to cost a lot of money," she said.

But the FAA's Dorr and Boeing officials disputed that money is an issue in safety decisions. The FAA's safety agenda, Dorr said, is driven by its data.

"You see what the data says, your most critical causes of accidents and incidents, and go after those problems," Dorr said. "The data does not show a serious problem with wiring in the U.S. fleet."

The FAA issues some 400 airworthiness directives a year stemming from someone detecting a potential problem. The MD-11, in particular -- the same type airliner that Swissair lost off Nova Scotia this month -- has been targeted in recent years by a number of directives about its wiring.

In 1995, the FAA ordered airlines to inspect wiring in the electronics compartment under the floor of the cockpit -- where computers and other avionics are kept. The order came after a fire was reportedly sparked by wiring that chafed when a bundle worked free from a clamp.

Last year, the FAA issued another directive for the MD-11 calling for inspections of possible

wire damage or chafing in wire bundles behind a panel in the cockpit. That order was prompted by a report of a circuit breaker tripping during a flight because of faulty wiring. The FAA said the condition could have caused a fire and filled a cockpit with smoke -- a condition aboard Swissair 111 just before it crashed.

Despite more than 40 service difficulty reports mentioning smoke or fire for the MD-11 in recent years, Hinderberger said: "If we were concerned about the wiring, we would be doing something about it today."

Still, recent debate about airline safety has focused on wiring. Canadian investigators are looking at what caused the smoke in the Swissair cockpit.

"I don't have any concerns with the wiring we have in the airplanes rolling off the assembly lines today, 10 years ago, or 20 years ago," Hinderberger said. He was one of the original engineers on the MD-11. "If a plane has a wiring problem, it manifests itself in some sort of cockpit alert; either a light goes on or a circuit-breaker trips."

Vibrations force plane to return to Toledo

October 15, 1998 BY TOM HENRY  
BLADE STAFF WRITER A U.S. Airways flight that left Toledo Express Airport with 20 passengers on board turned around in midair Tuesday night and went back to the airport for an unscheduled landing after the pilot felt unusual vibrations.

The Federal Aviation Administration said the problem was related to a luggage compartment door being ajar.

Flight 7002, a DC-9 scheduled to go from Toledo to Pittsburgh with a 12-minute stop along the way in Akron, landed safely at 8:27 p.m. at Toledo Express, where it had taken off a half-hour earlier, officials said.

A right front baggage door wasn't properly closed. It popped open when the plane landed, strewing luggage across the runway, David Castelveter, U.S. Airways spokesman, said. No one was hurt. The FAA is investigating whether the problem was related to human or mechanical error, Don Zochert, agency spokesman, said.

Mr. Castelveter said the pilot made the decision to turn around after determining there was a problem with the cargo door.

The door was in an open, latched position, ``indicating the door was never closed before the aircraft taxied out and took off," according to a report filed by the Toledo-Lucas County Port Authority's airport police and fire unit. Of 15 bags loaded, only one was believed to be missing. Two others were found on the runway last night, the report said.

The airplane was repaired, and cleared to depart that night. It skipped the Akron stop, and got into Pittsburgh at 11:30 p.m., nearly 2 1/2 hours later than originally scheduled, Mr. Castelveter said.

Only crew members made that trip. Passengers went on different flights yesterday, he said.

While somewhat rare, baggage doors occasionally are not closed properly or pop open, Mr. Zochert said. ``It seldom happens, given the hundreds of thousands of flights, but it has happened before," he said.

According to FAA records, mechanics reported in September, 1990, a similar problem with the DC-9 that was involved Tuesday. Those records show that the crew, upon takeoff from the airport in Columbia, S.C., reported a light indicating a problem with the rear cargo door. The plane would not pressurize and the pilots

returned safely to the Columbia airport. The crew then found the door was not shut properly. The DC-9-31 was built in 1969. It is a twin-engine jet aircraft that had 85 seats.

[4910-13-U]

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 97-NM-272-AD]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model

747-100, -200, and -

300 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration,

DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

SUMMARY: This document proposes the adoption of a new

airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to all

Boeing Model 747-100, -200, and -300 series airplanes. This

proposal would require the installation of components for

the suppression of electrical transients and/or the installation of shielding and separation of the electrical wiring of the fuel quantity indication system (FQIS). This proposal is prompted by testing results, which revealed that excessive energy levels in the electrical wiring and probes of the fuel system could be induced by electrical transients. The actions specified by the proposed AD are intended to prevent electrical transients induced by electromagnetic interference (EMI) or electrical short circuit conditions from causing arcing of the FQIS electrical wiring or probes in the fuel tank, which could result in a source of ignition in the fuel tank. DATES: Comments must be received by [insert date 90 days after date of publication in the Federal Register].

**ADDRESSES:** Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-103, Attention: Rules Docket No. 97-NM-272-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056. Comments may be inspected at this location between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

Information concerning this proposal may be obtained from or examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. **FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Chris Hartonas, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (425)

227-2864; fax  
(425) 227-1181.

## SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

### Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in the

making of the proposed rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire.

### Communications

shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in

triplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for

comments, specified above, will be considered before taking

action on the proposed rule. The proposals contained in

this notice may be changed in light of the comments received.

Comments are specifically invited on the overall

regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of

the proposed rule. All comments submitted

will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this notice must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Docket Number 97-NM-272-AD." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.

#### Availability of NPRMs

Any person may obtain a copy of this NPRM by submitting a request to the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-103, Attention: Rules Docket No.

97-NM-272-AD, 1601 Lind  
Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington  
98055-4056.

### Discussion

On July 17, 1996, a Boeing Model 747 series airplane was involved in an accident shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport in Jamaica, New York. In support of the subsequent accident investigation, the FAA participated in testing of the fuel quantity indication system (FQIS). Results of that testing revealed that excessive energy could be induced by high transient voltage levels in the electrical wiring and probes of the fuel system. These excessive levels occurred when the wiring of the FQIS was subjected to electrical transient testing. These electrical transients may be caused in the airplane when switching electrical loads in the wiring

adjacent to  
the FQIS wiring.

The FQIS was tested to determine its performance in accordance with airplane electromagnetic interference (EMI) requirements. In this test, conductive debris, such as steel wool and lockwire, was used to bridge the FQIS probes to simulate debris that has been found during inspections of transport category airplanes. Results of this test indicated that transient voltage levels induced in the FQIS wiring and probes could be in excess of 800 volts, and the resulting energy levels in the FQIS wiring and probes could be greater than the energy required to ignite fuel vapor inside a fuel tank.

In addition, recent inspections of the fuel probe wiring in Model 747 fuel tanks revealed damaged wiring

insulation, which exposed the conductors inside the fuel tank. This condition, together with the introduction of induced transients or short circuit conditions, increases the likelihood for potential ignition sources in the fuel tank.

The conditions described above, if not corrected, could result in excessive levels of energy in the FQIS wiring and a consequent potential source of ignition in the fuel tank.

#### FAA's Conclusions

While none of the above conditions have been identified at this time as the cause of the accident discussed previously, the FAA concludes that results of the tests and inspections that have been performed indicate that modifications are required to limit the energy level induced in the FQIS wiring and probes. Further, the

FAA has determined that shielding and separation of the FQIS electrical wiring from adjacent wiring is necessary to provide protection from wire-to-wire electrical short circuit conditions, which are a potential source of ignition in the fuel tank.

#### Explanation of Requirements of Proposed Rule

Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other products of this same type design, the proposed AD would require the installation of components for the suppression of electrical transients and/or the installation of shielding and separation of the electrical wiring of the FQIS. The actions would be required to be accomplished in accordance with a method approved by the FAA.

Cost Impact

There are approximately 650 Model 747-100, -200, and -300 series airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 167 airplanes of U.S. registry would be affected by this proposed AD.

Since the manufacturer has not yet developed a modification commensurate with the requirements of this proposal, the FAA is unable at this time to provide specific information as to the number of work hours or the cost of parts that would be required to accomplish the proposed modification. A further problem in developing a specific cost estimate is the fact that modification costs are expected to vary from operator to operator and from airplane to airplane depending upon airplane configuration. The proposed compliance time of 12 months should

provide ample time for the development, approval, and installation of an appropriate modification.

However, based on similar modifications accomplished previously on other airplane models, the FAA can reasonably estimate that the proposed modification would require 40 work hours to accomplish, at an average labor rate of \$60 per work hour. The cost of required parts is estimated to be \$10,000 per airplane. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the proposed AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be \$2,070,800, or \$12,400 per airplane.

As indicated earlier in this preamble, the FAA specifically invites the submission of comments and other data regarding this economic aspect of proposal.

The cost impact figure discussed above is based on assumptions that no operator has yet

accomplished any of the proposed requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted.

### Regulatory Impact

The regulations proposed herein would not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this proposal would not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this proposed regulation (1) is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not

a  
insignificant rule under the DOT Regulatory  
Policies and  
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);  
and (3) if  
promulgated, will not have a significant  
economic impact,  
positive or negative, on a substantial number  
of small  
entities under the criteria of the Regulatory  
Flexibility  
Act. A copy of the draft regulatory evaluation  
prepared for  
this action is contained in the Rules Docket. A  
copy of it  
may be obtained by contacting the Rules  
Docket at the  
location provided under the caption  
ADDRESSES.  
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39  
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety,  
Safety.  
The Proposed Amendment  
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority  
delegated to me  
by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation  
Administration

proposes to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:  
**PART 39 - AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES**

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to

read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following

new airworthiness directive:

**BOEING: Docket 97-NM-272-AD.**

Applicability: All Model 747-100, -200, and -300

series airplanes, certificated in any category.

NOTE 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in

the preceding applicability provision,

regardless of whether

it has been otherwise modified, altered, or repaired in the

area subject to the requirements of this AD.

For airplanes

that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the

performance of the requirements of this AD is

affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To prevent electrical transients induced by electromagnetic interference (EMI) or electrical short circuit conditions from causing arcing of the fuel quantity indication system (FQIS) electrical wiring or probes in the fuel tank, which could result in a source of ignition in the fuel tank, accomplish the following:

(a) Within 12 months after the effective date of this AD, install components for the suppression of electrical transients and/or install shielding and separation of the wiring of the FQIS, in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate.

(b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle ACO, FAA. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.

NOTE 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if

any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO.

(c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on November 26, 1997.

Boeing hopes wiring problem won't slow down production

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SEATTLE (October 21, 1998 2:08 p.m. EDT <http://www.nandotimes.com>) -- Boeing Co. officials say they're evaluating whether defective wiring components in some jetliners will cause new delays on the company's production lines.

Company officials said Wednesday no planes

with suspect parts, known as Burndy blocks, had been delivered to customers. They were unable to say how many planes were affected.

The problem was detected after Boeing received a shipment of 18,000 of the parts and some failed testing in the wiring shop before being installed, company officials said.

Company officials decided not to use any Burndy blocks from the shipment, but some had already been installed on planes and managers didn't know which aircraft were affected.

A Burndy block is an electrical connector that splices together wiring, Wolf Glende, chief engineer for 777 systems, said Wednesday.

In an internal communication to several managers at Boeing's Everett plant last week, Kevin Gould, a wiring manager, said, "I think we have a severe problem with several lots of bad Burndy blocks," the Seattle Post-Intelligencer reported Wednesday.

"I am alerting you because I think this could have some widespread production implications," the memo said.

Glende said the company had not experienced any delivery delays on the airplanes that have

been inspected, but that the possible effect upon production targets was still under evaluation.

Company officials said they were "absolutely confident" the defective parts were contained within the production system. "No suspect parts have been delivered to the best of our knowledge," Glende said.

"The parts have been used for several years. They have been reliable," Glende said, adding that the defect did not represent a safety issue at this stage.

The company said it could not estimate how many airplanes were still awaiting inspection. Glende estimated two or three 777 jetliners still had not been inspected.

Inspection of the 380 Burndy blocks in a 777 takes about five hours, he said.

Burndy blocks are found on Boeing's new-model 737s, as well as the 747, 757, 767 and 777 airplanes and on the MD-90 and MD-11. They are not found on older 737 models, the MD-80 or the 717.

The number of Burndy blocks varies from 570 in newer 737 models to 6 in a 767.

In a statement Tuesday, Boeing said the defective parts had been identified by date

code and lot size. The blocks came from an approved Boeing supplier, which was not identified, and were delivered in August and September.

By LAURENCE M. CRUZ, The Associated Press

Stewart R. Miller, Acting Manager,  
Transport Airplane Directorate,  
Aircraft Certification Service.

9

Respectfully,

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650 hours.

US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000  
hours.

Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.

US Navy Air Intelligence Officer

Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane  
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Dear elected and appointed officials, manufacturer spokesman, reporters, and attorney, 26 Oct 98

NTSB evidence. TWA 800 reconstructs pictures clearly show the midspan latch areas of the forward cargo door. The outward peeled skin, red paint markings and petal shaped ruptures at both midspan latches are clearly visible. <http://www.corazon.com/Forwarddoorblowupphoto.html>

Friday August 30 1996 7:24 AM EDT  
 Computer Simulation Pinpoints TWA Blast - NYT  
 NEW YORK (Reuter) - A computer simulation of the final moments of Trans World Airlines Flight 800 has placed the blast that downed the plane in a small site on the jet's right side, The New York Times reported Friday. The simulation shows that almost everything in the first spray of metal, luggage and other material blown from the plane came from a confined area above and ahead of the right wing.

Significance. TWA 800 had hull rupture in flight forward of the wing on the right side.

NTSB explanation: 'Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the sudden opening of the forward lower lobe cargo door in flight and the subsequent explosive decompression. The door opening was attributed to a faulty switch or wiring in the door control system which permitted electrical actuation of the door latches toward the unlatched position after initial door closure and before takeoff.' NTSB AAR 92/02

NTSB missile debunking: 'NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilots saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said.' Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 10, 1997 Issue.

NTSB admission of error and correcting it.: Before the recovery of the cargo door, the Safety Board believed that the door locking mechanisms had sustained damage in service prior to the accident flight to the extent that the door could have been closed and appeared to have been locked, when in fact the door was not fully latched. This belief was expressed in the report and was supported by the evidence available at the time. However, upon examination of the door, the damage to the locking mechanism did not support this hypothesis. Rather, the evidence indicated that the latch cams had been backdriven from the closed position into a nearly open position after the door had been closed and locked. The latch cams had been driven into the lock sectors that deformed so that they failed to prevent the back-driving. Thus, as a result of the recovery and examination of the cargo door, the Safety Board's original analysis and probable cause have been modified. This report incorporates these changes and supersedes NTSB/AAR-90/01. From NTSB/AAR-92/02.

Significance: NTSB made a mistake about probable cause and corrected it.

NTSB, AAIB, TSB Evidence:

"The CVR revealed normal communication before the decompression. At 0209:09:2 HST, a loud bang could be heard on the CVR. The loud bang was about 1.5 seconds after a "thump" was heard on the CVR for which one of the flightcrew made a comment. The electrical power to the CVR was lost for approximately 21.4 seconds following the loud bang. The CVR returned to normal operation at 0209:29 HST, and cockpit conversation continued to be recorded in a normal manner. NTSB Accident Report 92-02 Page 25

Air India Flight 182:

"From the CVR and DFDR, AI 182 was proceeding normally en route from Montreal to London at an altitude of 31,000 feet and an indicated airspeed of 296 knots when the cockpit area microphone detected a sudden loud sound. The sound continued for about 0.6 seconds, and then almost immediately, the line from the cockpit area microphone to the cockpit voice recorder at the rear of the pressure cabin was most probably broken. This was followed by a loss of electrical power to the recorder." Canadian Aviation Safety Board Air India 23 June 1985, page 21

Pan Am Flight 103:

"The CVR tape was listened to for its full duration and there was no indication of anything abnormal with the aircraft, or unusual crew behaviour. The tape record ended, at 19:02:50 hrs +/- second, with a sudden loud sound on the CAM channel followed almost immediately by the cessation of recording whilst the crew were copy-

ing their transatlantic clearance from Shanwick ATC." UK AAIB Report 2/90 Page 15 "It is not clear if the sound at the end of the recording is the result of the explosion or is from the break-up of the aircraft structure. The short period between the beginning of the event and the loss of electrical power suggests that the latter is more likely to be the case." UK AAIB Report 2/90 Page 38

Trans World Airlines Flight 800:

NTSB public Docket: The recording appeared to terminate very abruptly with a very loud sound. This termination did not appear to be preceded by any event or events on the recording. Both of these areas were the subject of further examination.

Significance: A rare event has been matched, sudden loud sound on CVR at event time, to four Boeing 747s, all of which had a hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side. One probable cause has been confirmed, polyimide electrical system/wiring which caused forward cargo door to open in flight.

NTSB AAR 92/02 describing normal door operation: "Normally, the cargo doors are operated electrically by means of a switch located on the exterior of the fuselage, just forward of the door opening. The switch controls the opening and closing and the latching of the door. If at any time the switch is released, the switch will return to a neutral position, power is removed from all actuators, and movement of the actuators ceases.

In order to close the cargo door, the door switch is held to the "closed" position, energizing the closing actuator, and the door moves toward the closed position. After the door has reached the near closed position, the hook position switch transfers the electrical control power to the pull-in hook actuator, and the cargo door is brought to the closed position by the pull-in hooks. When the pull-in hooks reach their fully closed position, the hook-closed switch transfers electrical power to the latch actuator. The latch actuator rotates the eight latch cams, mounted on the lower portion of the door, around the eight latch pins, attached to the lower door sill. At the same time, the two midspan latch cams, located on the sides of the door rotate around the two midspan latch pins located on the sides of the door frame. When the eight latch cams and the two mid-span cams reach their fully closed position, electrical power is removed from the latch actuator by the latch-closed switch. This completes the electrically powered portion of the door closing operation. The door can also be operated in the same manner electrically by a switch located inside the cargo compartment adjacent to the door.

The final securing operation is the movement of lock sectors across the latch cams. These are manually moved in place across the open mouth of each of the eight lower cams through mechanical linkages to the master latch lock handle. The position of the lock sectors is indicated indirectly by noting visually the closed position of the two pressure relief doors located on the upper section of each cargo door. The pres-

sure relief doors are designed to relieve any residual pressure differential before the cargo doors are opened after landing, and to prevent pressurization of the airplane should the airplane depart with the cargo doors not properly secured. The pressure relief doors are mechanically linked to the movement of the lock sectors. This final procedure also actuates the master latch

lock switch, removing electrical control power from the opening and closing control circuits, and also extinguishes the cockpit cargo door warning light through a switch located on one of the pressure relief doors. Opening the cargo door is accomplished by reversing the above procedure."

NTSB email to reporter:

Your proposed article is incorrect First of all, Senator McCain did not request that the NTSB meet with Mr. Smith. The Senator asked that the Board respond to Mr. Smith's concerns, which we have done numerous times and in great detail.

Secondly, Mr. Smith is simply wrong. There is absolutely no physical evidence to support his personal theory that the forward cargo door came unlatched. In fact, there is considerable evidence to the contrary. As stated in the Metallurgist's Factual Report, Exhibit 15C (which, of course, is a public document and available at our web site [www.nts.gov](http://www.nts.gov)):

Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill.

Overall examination of the forward portion of the airplane showed that sections 41 and 42 contained uniform crushing damage that extended from S-39L across the bottom of the fuselage and up above the right side main cabin window belt to S-14R. This crushing damage is consistent with the intact forward portion of the airplane (including section 41 and 42) impacting the water with a right wing low attitude. The lower lobe forward cargo door was in the crush area.

Although Mr. Smith does display some knowledge of the Boeing 747, he has a basic misunderstanding of the facts. For example, Mr. Smith claims that there are 10 latches on the cargo door and that the Board only discusses eight in the above mentioned report. While a superficial description of the door might imply that there are 10 latches, Mr. Smith is, in fact, incorrect in implying that they all hold the door onto the fuselage. The eight at the bottom of the door, which were discussed in the report actually hold the door closed - the other two, one on each side of the door are merely "alignment latches" and do not hold the door

closed.

We receive numerous inquiries from the public, many with their own extensively developed theories, and we try to be responsive to all. You are free to request copies of the correspondence between Mr. Smith and the Safety Board, a prudent step, I believe, before publishing such an article.

If you have further questions or concerns, please feel free to contact us.

Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 15C, Report Number 97-82, Section 41/42 Joint, Forward Cargo Door, "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill."

Significance: NTSB appears to be unclear on the concept of 'latch' 'latching cam' 'centering guide' and 'pull-in hooks' for the forward cargo door, a complex device using mechanical and electrical means to open and close. Midspan latches 'latch. Pull in hook 'pull in', and centering guide 'aligns. The two midspan latches are missing. It can not accurately be said that the forward cargo door was all latched and all intact until water impact without that missing evidence to examine.

NTSB Public Docket 516S: Systems Exhibit 9A, page 116:

"Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found."

NTSB public docket 516A: 1. Exhibit 9C, Attachments to the Systems Group Factual Report page 44, 45, 46:

A. 1996, burning smell in forward cargo compartment, found damaged wiring shorted to ground, charring found.

B. Oct 12, 1996, Wire bundle arcing and resultant fire at aft bulkhead of forward lower lobe cargo hold on 747-200 freighter.

NTSB Public Docket 516A, Exhibit 9A Systems Group Chairman's Factual report of Investigation, Page 47, "A Boeing telefax of June 25, 1997, stated that: The Poly-X wire was used as general purpose wire on the RA164 (TWA 800) aircraft. Wire insulation known as Poly-X had three in-service problems:

-Abrasion of the insulation in bundles installed in high vibration areas.

(This problem was corrected by Boeing Service Bulletin No. 747-71-7105, Dated July 19, 1974)

-Random flaking of the topcoat.

-Insulation radial cracks in tight bend radii.

Radial cracking phenomenon of the Poly-X wire was mainly associated with mechanical stress. Bend radius is the largest contributor to mechanical stress in installed wire or cable. Presence of moisture in conjunction with mechanical stress is also a contributor."

The Systems Exhibit 9A continues on same page 47, "Evidence of arcing or short circuiting was found in the fuselage of N93119, (TWA 800) in addition to what was found in the wiring from the raceway below the left cabin floor and near the forward wing spar.

NTSB AAR 92/02:

Plug P3 and Plug P4 at a distance between three to four inches from plug pin tips.

The P4 damage location may correspond to wire bundle clamp positions. These areas are where the chafed bare wires shorted on the door latch actuator motor to the unlatch position for UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 92/02.

FAA action: Web posted at: 5:34 p.m. EDT (2134 GMT) October 1, 1998

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Inspections of electrical and other systems of older aircraft are too general and their maintenance sometimes haphazard, according to federal officials, who announced a new safety effort Thursday targeting older aircraft.

### NTSB Safety Recommendation Brief

Data\_Source: U.S. NTSB Safety Recommendations

Rprt\_Nbr: A-91-83

Last Updated: 03-13-95

[O] On June 13, 1991, United Airlines (UAL) maintenance personnel were unable to electrically open the aft cargo door on a Boeing 747-222B, N152UA, at John F. Kennedy Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York. The airplane was one of two used exclusively on nonstop flights between Narita, Japan, and JFK. This particular airplane had accumulated 19,053 hours and 1,547 cycles at the time of the occurrence.

Recommendations:

A-91-83. Issue an Airworthiness Directive applicable to all Boeing 747 airplanes with a flexible conduit protecting the wiring bundle between the fuselage and aft cargo door to require an expedited inspection of:

(1) the wiring bundle in the area normally covered by the conduit for the presence of damaged insulation (using either an electrical test method or visual examination);

(2) the conduit support bracket and attached standoff pin on the upper arm of the forward lift actuator mechanism;

(3) the flexible conduit for the presence of cracking in the convoluted innercore.

Wires with damaged insulation should be repaired before further service. Damage to the flexible conduit, conduit support bracket and standoff pin should result in an immediate replacement of the conduit as well as the damaged parts. The inspection should be repeated at an appropriate cyclic interval.

SEATTLE (October 21, 1998 2:08 p.m. EDT <http://www.nandotimes.com>) -- Boeing Co. officials say they're evaluating whether defective wiring components in some jetliners will cause new delays on the company's production lines. A Burndy block is an electrical connector that splices together wiring, Wolf Glende, chief engineer for 777 systems, said Wednesday.

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration recommended that the insulation of almost all of the world's 12,000 passenger jets be replaced because new tests are likely to find that it can catch fire when exposed to high heat, the Washington Post reported Thursday.

Crash probe reveals flaw Wiring flaw in crash probe  
by Chuck Taylor and James V. Grimaldi  
Seattle Times staff reporters

In thoroughly examining 747s after the TWA Flight 800 disaster, federal investigators have discovered the potential for an electrical problem inside fuel tanks that could - under what Boeing considers extraordinary circumstances - lead to an explosion.

Boeing plans to urge airlines to inspect older-model 747s and replace an outdated component in some tanks, although the company calls the chance for danger astronomically remote.

Tiny punctures in wire insulation, found inside an old, out-of-service 747-100, are the first hard evidence of a potential problem inside a tank that engineers have designed to be virtually spark-proof. Crash probe reveals flaw Wiring flaw in crash probe

Another NTSB theory comes into play here. For months, investigators have been considering the possibility that a short circuit outside the tank could enable high-voltage current from another system to arc into the lower-voltage fuel-measuring circuit.

Wires from various systems are bundled together on jetliners, and chafed insulation on high-voltage and lower-voltage wires could enable such a short circuit.

Significance: Four Boeing 747s that had hull ruptures in flight forward of the wing on the right side and all had polyimide insulated wiring with one conclusive cause being electrical/wiring causing forward cargo door to open inflight. Bare wires were found in cargo door area of TWA 800. Bare wires were found in the cargo door area

of UAL 811.

October 15, 1998 BY TOM HENRY BLADE STAFF WRITER A U.S. Airways flight that left Toledo Express Airport with 20 passengers on board turned around in midair Tuesday night and went back to the airport for an unscheduled landing after the pilot felt unusual vibrations.

The Federal Aviation Administration said the problem was related to a luggage compartment door being ajar.

Flight 7002, a DC-9 scheduled to go from Toledo to Pittsburgh with a 12-minute stop along the way in Akron, landed safely at 8:27 p.m. at Toledo Express, where it had taken off a half-hour earlier, officials said.

A right front baggage door wasn't properly closed. It popped open when the plane landed, strewn luggage across the runway, David Castelveter, U.S. Airways spokesman, said.

No one was hurt. The FAA is investigating whether the problem was related to human or mechanical error, Don Zochert, agency spokesman, said.

Mr. Castelveter said the pilot made the decision to turn around after determining there was a problem with the cargo door.

The door was in an open, latched position, "indicating the door was never closed before the aircraft taxied out and took off," according to a report filed by the Toledo-Lucas County Port Authority's airport police and fire unit.

NTSB Docket Number SA-516, TWA 800 Exhibit No. 22A, Trajectory Study, page 3: "The wreckage distribution shows that parts were initially shed from the area just forward of the wing."

Significance: The forward cargo door is forward of the wing on the right side and continue to open inadvertently on airliners.

NTSB Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge

Exhibit 8A, Page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and the tips outboard of the outer midspan shroud were bent forward slightly. About half of the fan blades had impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of the impact dam-

age to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the midspan shroud on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body impacts along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body impact, which had some streaking extending rearward."

Significance: Probably on fire Fodded engine number three was mystery igniton source for center tank explosion.

NTSB: United Airlines Flight 811:

"However, the decompression event caused a data loss of approximately 2 1/2 seconds. When the data resumed being recorded, all values appeared valid with the exception of the pitch and roll parameters. Lateral acceleration showed a sharp increase immediately following the decompression. Vertical acceleration showed a sharp, rapid change just after the decompression and a slight increase as the airplane began its descent." NTSB AAR 92/02. page 25

Air India Flight 182:

"From the CVR and DFDR, AI 182 was proceeding normally en route from Montreal to London at an altitude of 31,000 feet and an indicated airspeed of 296 knots when the cockpit area microphone detected a sudden loud sound. The sound continued for about 0.6 seconds, and then almost immediately, the line from the cockpit area microphone to the cockpit voice recorder at the rear of the pressure cabin was most probably broken. This was followed by a loss of electrical power to the recorder." Canadian Aviation Safety Board Air India 23 June 1985, page 21 "When synchronized with other recordings it was determined, within the accuracy that the procedure permitted, that the DFDR stopped recording simultaneously with the CVR."

"Irregular signals were observed over the last 0.27 inches of the DFDR tape. Laboratory tests indicated that the irregular signals most likely occurred as a result of the recorder being subjected to sharp angular accelerations about the lateral axis of the recorder, causing rapid changes in tape speed over the record head." Canadian Aviation Safety Board Air India 23 June 1985, page 22

Pan Am Flight 103:

"The analysis of the recording from the DFDR fitted to N739PA, which is detailed in Appendix C, showed that the recorded data simply stopped. Following careful examination and correlation of the various sources of recorded information, it was concluded that this occurred because the electrical power supply to the recorder had been interrupted at 19:02:50 +- second." UK AAIB Report 2/90 Page 37 "The analysis of the cockpit voice recording, which is detailed in Appendix C, concluded that there were valid signals available to the DVR when it stopped at 19:02.50 +- second because the power supply to the recorder was interrupted. It is not clear if the sound at the end of the recording is the result of the explosion or is from the break-up of the aircraft structure." UK AAIB Report 2/90 Page 38

Trans World Airlines Flight 800:

"The wire that carried electrical power from the cockpit to the tape recorder mounted in the rear of TWA Flight 800 ran down the right side of he airplane. The wire that

carried power to the flight data recorder ran down the left side. Yet the two were severed within an instant, without any warning." News Reports

Significance: Abrupt data loss to FDR matches four Boeing 747 hull ruptures in flight forward of the wing on the right side, AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800. One probable cause has been confirmed, polyimide electrical system/wiring which caused forward cargo door to open in flight.

To review:

1. NTSB and FAA state polyimide insulation wiring is being investigated for failing in aging airliners in new study.
2. AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, TWA 800 had polyimide insulation wiring.
3. NTSB recommends that aft cargo door wiring be inspected in 'A 91-83.'
4. Recent airliner accident indicates wiring involved with scorched insulation and smoke in the cockpit.
5. Recent airliner incident has forward cargo door opening and strewing baggage outside.
6. Four Boeing 747s had sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt data loss to the FDR while having a hull rupture in flight forward of the wing on the right side.
7. TWA 800 had hull rupture in flight forward of the wing on the right side.
8. Engine number three: Was on fire causing soot on blades, had missing blades, threw out blade to impact behind on right horizontal stabilizer, fire could have caused nearby center tank explosion, and fod caused by ingesting baggage from adjacent open cargo bay or metal skin from explosive decompression from ruptured cargo door.
9. Bare wires found in TWA 800 cargo door area.
- 10 Bare wires found in UAL 811 cargo door area.

Recommendations:

1. Check cargo door area wiring for bare wire in early model Boeing 747s.
2. Confirm TWA 800 door opened in flight by checking door hinge, locking handle, viewing ports, and two midspan latches.
3. Meet, call, email citizen researcher to discuss evidence.

Respectfully,

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Dear elected and appointed officials, manufacturer spokesman, reporters, and attorney, 26 Oct 98

AAIB 2/90 PA 103

NTSB AAR 92/02 UAL 811

Actual UAL 811 door pieces after recovery showing rupture at aft midspan latch area.

Significance:  
Shape of explosive decompression zone of PA 103 generally matches UAL 811.

TWA 800 wreckage:

Significance: Red paint markings where there should only be white. There is also white paint where there should be red. The red paint markings only appear on the fuselage above the cargo door area and indicate outward bulge of fuselage skin during explosive decompression.

US Air Force photo of E4B, showing improper use of stepladder on cargo door sill.

Lurid print media drawing of UAL 811.

Significance. High government officials, including the President, fly in Boeing 747s with outward opening forward cargo doors. The danger is real to officials, passengers, and crew.

To review:

1. Explosive decompression zone in Boeing 747s in flight at forward cargo door have a distinctive shape and PA 103 matches UAL 811.
2. Red paint markings above cargo door for TWA 800 indicate explosive decompression.
3. There is a real danger to government officials who fly in E4B or AF 1 to another inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight.

Recommendations:

1. Check cargo door area wiring for bare wire in early model Boeing 747s.
2. Confirm TWA 800 door opened in flight by checking door hinge, locking handle, viewing ports, and two midspan latches.
3. Meet, call, email citizen investigator to discuss evidence.

Respectfully,

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Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C.

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Dear elected and appointed officials, manufacturer spokesman, reporters, and attorney, 2 Nov 98

Tomorrow is election day for politicians. Senator McCain, Congressmen Farr and Oberstar are up for reelection. Mr. Sam Farr is the only one of the three I can vote for and will. Here's why: <http://www.corazon.com/farr12.html> is the letter from Mr. Farr to me giving permission to put NTSB Public Docket 516A Exhibit 4A, Eyewitness Group Report, on my web site. It represents to me Mr. Farr's understanding of public information being public and respect for a citizen to actually publish that information on a web site. It shows me that Mr. Farr actually interacts with a citizen for a public safety matter, airline safety.

I hope Senator McCain is reelected from Arizona; I would vote for him if I could and will for President if given the chance.

Oliver Stone is going to do a TV Special on the missile explanation for TWA 800. I can debunk missile explanation in every way. Streak, residue, and mystery radar blips can all be explained. There was no missile shutdown of TWA 800. There is no conspiracy, coverup or plot about TWA 800. As long as the streak is not officially and satisfactorily explained, the missile explanation will live in myth. That myth shall impugn the honor of the US Navy forever as being a suspect in an accidental shutdown. Wiring/cargo door satisfactorily explains the streak phenomenon. It was not a missile but was the red-orange reflection of the setting sun off a large shiny

piece of fuselage skin of TWA 800 as it started to disintegrate. The up and down and level reported streaks can be explained to anyone with a knowledge of 3D space and the perceived movements of objects in it by a stationary ground observer.

NTSB also considered the shiny piece of metal reflecting sunlight giving streak explanation:

"NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilots saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said. " Aviation Week, 10 March 1997.

NTSB has offered the wiring/cargo door explanation for a probable cause for another high time 747 that suffered a hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side leaving a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt data loss to the FDR, UAL 811: "The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the sudden opening of the forward lower lobe cargo door in flight and the subsequent explosive decompression. The door opening was attributed to a faulty switch or wiring in the door control system which permitted electrical actuation of the door latches toward the unlatched position after initial door closure and before takeoff. Contributing to the cause of the accident was a deficiency in the design of the cargo door locking mechanisms, which made them susceptible to deformation, allowing the door to become unlatched after being properly latched and locked. Also contributing to the accident was a lack of timely corrective actions by Boeing and the FAA following a 1987 cargo door opening incident on a Pan Am B-747." NTSB AAR 92/02.

NTSB is not wacky to think the streak was reflected metal in evening sun. NTSB was not wacky to offer wiring/cargo door explanation for fatal 747 accident. NTSB was not wacky to put AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800 together in Chart 12 of Sound Spectrum Study for Public Docket 516A because they were so similar. NTSB was not wacky examining the wiring in TWA 800 closely and finding bare wires in the cargo door area. NTSB was not wacky to conduct a day of hearings on aging airliners during which the problems of polyimide insulation type wiring, PolyX, were made public. NTSB was not wacky to report an engine stator blade embedded in the right horizontal stabilizer. NTSB was not wacky to breakdown number 3 engine and observe missing blades and soot.

Well, gentleman, I say: The PolyX wiring in TWA 800 probably cracked in the cargo door area and caused the forward cargo door to rupture in flight. The streak was a large shiny metal object reflecting evening red-orange sunlight. The sudden loud sound was the explosive decompression. The abrupt data loss was the disruption of cables in the adjacent main equipment compartment by the 'tremendous explosion' as described by UAL 811 crew when forward cargo door ruptured/opened in flight. The ignition source for the center tank explosion was the fodded on fire number three engine.

Now, when I say conclusions based on NTSB facts and conclusions, am I wacky? Am I so fringe that I do not warrant the respect of a meeting in which I may present my data and conclusions? Why do missile and HIRF and bomb and meteor proponents all have their turns for investigation and I don't? Why do officials duck me? What is so horrific about my data and conclusions? It comes from NTSB, FAA, AAIB, TSB, and Indian aviation authorities. Is it pride? Is it the 'Not Invented Here' syndrome? Well, the wiring/cargo door explanation was invented by NTSB; it is NTSB.

Wiring/cargo door explanation for a high time 747 that suffered a hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side leaving a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt data loss to the FDR is the NTSB explanation for UAL 811.

It's also my explanation for TWA 800, another high time 747 that suffered a hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side leaving a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt data loss to the FDR.

I again ask for some sort of dialogue with government aviation safety officials regarding TWA 800. I offer face to face, email, phone, or letter. I have been in a fatal night jet crash and I understand the importance of action now.

Respectfully,

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