

From: Communications <Communications@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca>
Date: September 5, 1996 12:14:35 AM PDT
To: "P=gc+internet; DDA.TYPE=RFC-822; DDA.VALUE=barry(a)corazon.com" <barry@corazon.com>
Cc: "Van Riel, Manon" <Manon.Van_Riel@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Wish to buy accident report

Our reports are free and you should receive a copy in the mail very soon.

Manon: could you please mail this report. Thank you.

Jacques Babin
Chief, Communications
Transportation Safety Board of Canada

From: P=gc+internet; DDA.TYPE=RFC-822;
DDA.VALUE=barry(a)corazon.com
To: Communications
Subject: Wish to buy accident report
Date: Saturday, 31 August, 1996 21:43

<<File Attachment: BDY2.P00>>
DATE: Aug 31 17:43:32 1996 GMT
IPMessageID: 322879C0.142D(a)corazon.com

FROM: [P=gc+internet; DDA.TYPE=RFC-822;
DDA.VALUE=barry(a)corazon.com]

TO: Communications

SUBJECT: Wish to buy accident report

IMPORTANCE: normal
AUTO FORWARDED: FALSE
PRIORITY:
ATTACHMENTS: c:\BDY2.P00

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Hi, I would like to purchase the accident report of Air India flight 182, destroyed 23 June 1985, from Toronto to London, 239 fatal, Boeing 747-237B. It is important. I will purchase any official information you have available. My phone is 408 659 3552. My email is barry@corazon.com. I live at 551 Country Club Drive, Carmel Valley, CA1. 93924. Thank you,
John Barry Smith

From: barry@corazon.com
Date: September 5, 1996 11:13:58 AM PDT
To: Communications@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
Subject: Real Responsive Humans in a government agency

Our reports are free and you should receive a copy in the mail very soon.

Thank you very much. I am still astonished by the prompt, courteous, fulfilling response. Really, I have been dealing with the FAA, the NTSB, the FBI, the Air Force, and other agencies that do nothing.

The reason the report which I will receive in the mail soon is important is because it is a link in a series of early model Boeing

747 crashes that have a similar mechanical cause, the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight. The door opens, gets torn off in slipstream, takes skin with it exposing large hole which gets larger in windstream and tears nose off, plane crashes, kills everyone. Yes, it sounds weird that I have a cause for a crash that others believe was a bomb. To me it's weird that everyone believes this weird paranoid conspiracy bomb terrorist thing when the cause is a door that has two Airworthiness Directives against it, causes the exact type of damage described, leaves similar evidence trails and is as ordinary as you leaving a door open, like me, and others, trivial really, unless you are going 300 knots at 31000 feet.

My web site has the documentation of official government reports to support hypothesis and compare accident reports. The insight of crash cause is only due to hindsight and the internet. <http://www.corazon.com> has the pages, reasoning, pictures, opinion, and emails from all over the world discussing the issue. I invite you to refer Canadian Air safety officials to the site for consideration and please email me a barry@corazon.com for comment. Thank you again for report of Air India Flight 182,
John Barry Smith

From: Securitas <Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca>

Date: February 27, 1997 3:18:35 AM PST

To: "P=gc+internet; DDA.TYPE=RFC-822; DDA.VALUE=barry(a) corazon.com" <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: RE: Crash cause of Air India Flight 182

Thank you for your report expressing concern about the opening of cargo doors on B-747 aircraft. During any aircraft crash, investigators examine

every piece of evidence, in order to determine cause. In the case of the Air India flight, the cargo door was in fact retrieved from the bottom of the ocean by the investigators. The latches were still in place, and there was no evidence on the edges of the door to indicate in-flight opening of that door.

On the other hand, there was other solid evidence indicating a bomb blast had occurred. Aircraft accident investigators are trained people. Anybody can say anything they want on the Internet. Put your money on the experts; you will win more often.

From: P=gc+internet; DDA.TYPE=RFC-822;
DDA.VALUE=barry(a)corazon.com
To: Securitas
Subject: Crash cause of Air India Flight 182
Date: Saturday, August 31, 1996 9:50PM

<<File Attachment: BDY3.P00>>
DATE: Aug 31 17:50:40 1996 GMT
IPMessageID: 32287B6A.1295(a)corazon.com

FROM: [P=gc+internet; DDA.TYPE=RFC-822;
DDA.VALUE=barry(a)corazon.com]

TO: Securitas

SUBJECT: Crash cause of Air India Flight 182

IMPORTANCE: normal

AUTO FORWARDED: FALSE

PRIORITY:

ATTACHMENTS: c:\BDY3.P00

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Dear Safety Person, The cause of the Air India flight 182 crash of a

Boeing 747-237B from Toronto to London in 1985 was an inadvertent opened

forward cargo door which then tore of skin which then tore of nose to

destruction of aircraft. Not a bomb. My safety concern to TSB Securitas

is that it can happen again. To properly assess the risk to Canadian air

passengers, visit the web site at <http://www.corazon.com> for a fully

documented presentation of the issue of inadvertently opening cargo

doors. Open doors causing destruction in early model Boeing 747s has

happened before, it has happened now, and it may happen again.

Please

assess door opening claim by visiting web site and evaluating documents

supporting hypothesis. John Barry Smith

From: barry@corazon.com
Date: February 27, 1997 4:01:49 PM PST
To: Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
Subject: Thank you for info, need more please

In the case of the Air India flight, the cargo door was in fact retrieved from the bottom of the ocean by the investigators. The latches were still in place, and there was no evidence on the edges of the door to indicate in-flight opening of that door.

Dear Securitas, Thank you for your reply to my safety concerns about forward cargo doors on high time Boeing 747s. In the above you state the cargo door was in fact retrieved from the bottom of the ocean. This is very important news to me. Can you give me the particulars?

I will update my page and make corrections with this relevant information. Can you tell when it was retrieved, by whom, and who examined it and concluded the latches were still in place. Was there an amendment to the Air India 182 Canadian Report to correct the information in it which stated the door was dropped and lost? Are there pictures of the door? I will pay whatever fees and postage necessary to obtain a copy of the revised report/ amendment/evaluation. Can you tell me all you know about that retrieved door and tell me where to go to get any information about it? My address is 551 Country Club Drive, Carmel Valley CA 93924

Sincerely, John Barry Smith

Date: 27 Feb 1997 15:18:35 +0400

From: Securitas <Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca>

To: "P=gc+internet; DDA.TYPE=RFC-822;

DDA.VALUE=barry(a)corazon.com" <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: RE: Crash cause of Air India Flight 182
Importance: normal
Autoforwarded: FALSE
Priority: normal

Thank you for your report expressing concern about the opening of cargo doors on B-747 aircraft. During any aircraft crash, investigators examine every piece of evidence, in order to determine cause. In the case of the Air India flight, the cargo door was in fact retrieved from the bottom of the ocean by the investigators. The latches were still in place, and there was no evidence on the edges of the door to indicate in-flight opening of that door.

On the other hand, there was other solid evidence indicating a bomb blast had occurred. Aircraft accident investigators are trained people. Anybody can say anything they want on the Internet. Put your money on the experts; you will win more often.

From: barry@corazon.com
Date: March 1, 1997 7:43:49 PM PST
To: Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca

Subject: Cargo door Flight 182

Thank you again for your email of 27 Feb 97 regarding the retrieved forward cargo door of Air India Flight 182 which crashed with all aboard in June of 1985, tragically killing many Canadians. Your email has encouraged me to research the official Indian statement about the cargo door and it says, 'An attempt to relocate the door was unsuccessful.' on page 84 of the Indian report, available for viewing on website page <http://www.corazon.com/182page84.html> or through www.corazon.com Page 84 also mentions the door was broken one quarter of the way from the bottom edge, so the door was in pieces. Apparently the larger piece was attempted to be retrieved when the cable broke and they lost it and failed in an attempt to relocate it, never mind retrieve it. It's lost. I hope I'm wrong and the report amended. Please tell me if the smaller piece was retrieved or they went back, found the big piece and retrieved it. It would be very good news indeed. Sincerely, John Barry Smith

Thank you for your report expressing concern about the opening of cargo doors on B-747 aircraft. During any aircraft crash, investigators examine every piece of evidence, in order to determine cause. In the case of the Air India flight, the cargo door was in fact retrieved from the bottom of the ocean by the investigators. The latches were still in place, and there was no evidence on the edges of the door to indicate in-flight opening of that door.

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From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: March 16, 1997 3:47:05 AM PST

To: Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca

Subject: Please comment AI 182 cargo door

Dear Security,

The below email was sent to me from you. It is either incorrect and needs correcting or it is right and is important requiring follow up.

Is it correct to say the AI 182 door was retrieved? If not, please tell me.

If so, please tell me when, where, and can I see it? It is a very important door.

If you are unable to reply about the door, can you refer me to the appropriate Canadian government agency?

Sincerely, John Barry Smith

Date: 27 Feb 1997 15:18:35 +0400

From: Securitas <Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca>

To: "P=gc+internet; DDA.TYPE=RFC-822;

DDA.VALUE=barry(a)corazon.com" <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: RE: Crash cause of Air India Flight 182

Importance: normal

Autoforwarded: FALSE

Priority: normal

Thank you for your report expressing concern about the opening of cargo doors on B-747 aircraft. During any aircraft crash, investigators examine every piece of evidence, in order to determine cause. In the case of the Air India flight, the cargo door was in fact retrieved from the bottom of the ocean by the investigators. The latches were still in place, and there was no evidence on the edges of the door to indicate in-flight opening of that door.

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From: P=gc+internet; DDA.TYPE=RFC-822;
DDA.VALUE=barry(a)corazon.com
To: Securitas
Subject: Crash cause of Air India Flight 182
Date: Saturday, August 31, 1996 9:50PM

<<File Attachment: BDY3.P00>>

DATE: Aug 31 17:50:40 1996 GMT

IPMessageID: 32287B6A.1295(a)corazon.com

FROM: [P=gc+internet; DDA.TYPE=RFC-822;
DDA.VALUE=barry(a)corazon.com]

TO: Securitas

SUBJECT: Crash cause of Air India Flight 182

IMPORTANCE: normal

AUTO FORWARDED: FALSE

PRIORITY:

ATTACHMENTS: c:\BDY3.P00

--

Dear Safety Person, The cause of the Air India flight 182 crash of
a

Boeing 747-237B from Toronto to London in 1985 was an
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forward cargo door which then tore of skin which then tore of
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destruction of aircraft. Not a bomb. My safety concern to TSB
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is that it can happen again. To properly assess the risk to
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passengers, visit the web site at <http://www.corazon.com> for a
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documented presentation of the issue of inadvertently opening
cargo

doors. Open doors causing destruction in early model Boeing
747s has

happened before, it has happened now, and it may happen again.

Please

assess door opening claim by visiting web site and evaluating documents supporting hypothesis. John Barry Smith

From: "Babin, Jacques" <Jacques.Babin@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca>
Date: March 25, 1997 12:58:55 AM PST
To: "P=gc+internet; DDA.TYPE=RFC-822; DDA.VALUE=barry(a)corazon.com" <barry@corazon.com>
Cc: "Van Riel, Manon" <Manon.Van_Riel@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca>
Subject: **RE: Please help, clarification requested.**

In reply to your e-mail:

If you wish more up-to-date information on the Air India inquiry, please contact the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Vancouver, British Columbia, Sgt. Peter Montague, (604) 264-2929.

If you want a printed copy of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board report, please contact Mrs. Manon Van Riel (see cc above).

Jacques Babin
Chief, Communications
Transportation Safety Board of Canada

From: P=gc+internet; DDA.TYPE=RFC-822;
DDA.VALUE=barry(a)corazon.com
To: Communications
Subject: Please help, clarification requested.

Date: Sunday, 16 March, 1997 15:55

<<File Attachment: BDY5.P00>>

DATE: Mar 16 03:55:50 1997 -08:00 relative to GMT

IPMessageID: 332B6FAF.59CB(a)corazon.com

FROM: [P=gc+internet; DDA.TYPE=RFC-822;
DDA.VALUE=barry(a)corazon.com]

TO: Communications

SUBJECT: Please help, clarification requested.

IMPORTANCE: normal

AUTO FORWARDED: FALSE

PRIORITY:

ATTACHMENTS: c:\BDY5.P00

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Please help me. Was the cargo door of Air India Flight 182
retrieved? A

recent email to me from TSB Security said it was and that is very
important if true. If false, the statement should be corrected. It is
a

very important door. The TSB is on record as saying something
that may

not be correct and if so, must be corrected.

The Securitas email was strange as it came seven months after
my

initial email to them and was in direct conflict with the TSB
accident

report of Air India 182 which said the forward cargo door was
lost on a

retrieval attempt and not relocated. Below is my most recent email

attempting clarification. Can you help me?

Sincerely, John Barry Smith, barry@corazon.com

Dear Security,

The below email was sent to me from you. It is either incorrect and needs

co

recting or it is right and is important requiring follow up.

Is it correct to say the AI 182 door was retrieved? If not, please tell

me.

If so, please tell me when, where, and can I see it? It is a very important door.

If you are unable to reply about the door, can you refer me to the appropriate

Canadian government agency?

Sincerely, John Barry Smith

Date: 27 Feb 1997 15:18:35 +0400

From: Securitas <Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca>

To: "P=gc+internet; DDA.TYPE=RFC-822;

DDA.VALUE=barry(a)corazon.com"

<[\[barry@corazon.com\]\(mailto:barry@corazon.com\)>](mailto:barry</p></div><div data-bbox=)

Subject: RE: Crash cause of Air India Flight 182

Importance: normal

Autoforwarded: FALSE

Priority: normal

Thank you for your report expressing concern about the opening of cargo doors on B-747 aircraft. During any aircraft crash, investigators examine every piece of evidence, in order to determine cause. In the case of the

Air India flight, the cargo door was in fact retrieved from the bottom of

the ocean by the investigators. The latches were still in place, and there

was no evidence on the edges of the door to indicate in-flight opening of

that door.

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From: P=gc+internet; DDA.TYPE=RFC-822;
DDA.VALUE=barry(a)corazon.com

To: Securitas
Subject: Crash cause of Air India Flight 182
Date: Saturday, August 31, 1996 9:50PM

<<File Attachment: BDY3.P00>>
DATE: Aug 31 17:50:40 1996 GMT
IPMessageID: 32287B6A.1295(a)corazon.com

FROM: [P=gc+internet; DDA.TYPE=RFC-822;
DDA.VALUE=barry(a)corazon.com]

TO: Securitas

SUBJECT: Crash cause of Air India Flight 182
IMPORTANCE: normal
AUTO FORWARDED: FALSE
PRIORITY:
ATTACHMENTS: c:\BDY3.P00

--

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Dear Safety Person, The cause of the Air India flight 182 crash of
a
Boeing 747-237B from Toronto to London in 1985 was an
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forward cargo door which then tore of skin which then tore of
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destruction of aircraft. Not a bomb. My safety concern to TSB
Securitas
is that it can happen again. To properly assess the risk to
Canadian air

passengers, visit the web site at <http://www.corazon.com> for a fully documented presentation of the issue of inadvertently opening cargo doors. Open doors causing destruction in early model Boeing 747s has happened before, it has happened now, and it may happen again. Please assess door opening claim by visiting web site and evaluating documents supporting hypothesis. John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: March 25, 1997 10:49:15 AM PST
To: Jacques.Babin@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
Subject: **Follow up to AI 182**

Jacques Babin
Chief, Communications
Transportation Safety Board of Canada

Monsieur Jacques Babin, Bon Soir,
Thank you for your reply to my query. Merci.
I shall do as you say.
Sincerely, John Barry Smith, Au Revoir.

If you wish more up-to-date information on the Air India inquiry, please contact the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Vancouver,

British Columbia,
Sgt. Peter Montague, (604) 264-2929.

If you want a printed copy of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board report,
please contact Mrs. Manon Van Riel (see cc above).

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: March 25, 1997 11:03:35 AM PST
To: Manon.Van_Riel@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
Subject: **Copy of CASB report**

Dear Mrs. Manon Van Riel,
I received the below email from Mr. Babin this morning. May I please have a printed copy of the Air India Flight 182 report of the crash of June 23, 1985? The report may also include the Indian report, may I have that also? There is a possibility that the report was revised based on new information upon a retrieved cargo door. May I please have the most recent revision of the AI 182 accident report?

Please send to me at John Barry Smith, 551 Country Club Drive, Carmel Valley, CA 93924. I will gladly pay any fees you assess for this service.

Thank you very much, John Barry Smith

If you want a printed copy of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board report,
please contact Mrs. Manon Van Riel (see cc above).

Jacques Babin
Chief, Communications
Transportation Safety Board of Canada

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: March 26, 1997 1:18:36 PM PST
To: Jacques.Babin@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
Subject: **Need accident referral, please, not police.**

Monsieur Babin,

Thank you for your referral to Sgt Peter Montague. He returned my call this morning and we had a nice chat. However, he is a policeman and convinced it was bomb. He knows nothing about a door. My position is over the past twelve years new evidence has surfaced and the possibility exists it was a mechanical failure that brought down Air India Flight 182 off the Irish coast in June of 1985.

In that regard, could you refer me to an accident investigator of the TSB? I would like to present my case in a short brief to a professional aviation crash investigator of the Canadian Transportation Safety Board for his consideration.

Thank you, John Barry Smith
408 659 3552 phone

barry@corazon.com email

www.corazon.com web site

551 Country Club

Drive

Carmel Valley, CA 93924

If you wish more up-to-date information on the Air India inquiry, please

contact the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Vancouver, British Columbia,

Sgt. Peter Montague, (604) 264-2929.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: April 10, 1997 3:50:50 PM PDT
To: Jacques.Babin@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
Subject: Need to talk to accident investigator

Mr. Babin, I was referred to the police regarding AI 182 and they are not interested in non bomb explanation. I believe there is a current risk to Canadian B747s destructing in the air based upon hindsight of twelve years and the ensuing similar three fatal 747 crashes. May I please speak to a TSB professional aircraft investigator about this matter?

Below email was sent a month ago. I did receive a copy of the accident report from the person you referred me to, thank you very much.

I will call at my expense but I must speak with a TSB aviation professional for a short time to present my case. It is literally life and death.

Sincerely,
John Barry Smith

My position is over the past twelve years new evidence has surfaced and the possibility exists it was a mechanical failure that brought down Air India Flight 182 off the Irish coast in June of 1985.

In that regard, could you refer me to an accident investigator of the TSB? I would like to present my case in a short brief to a professional aviation crash investigator of the Canadian Transportation Safety Board for his consideration.

Thank you, John Barry Smith
408 659 3552 phone

barry@corazon.com email

www.corazon.com web site

551 Country Club

Drive

Carmel Valley, CA 93924

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: April 17, 1997 9:11:02 PM PDT

To: Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca

Subject: Attention Mr John Garstang RE Air India 182

Mr. Garstang, this is John Barry Smith, discover of the cargo door explanation for the cause of the crash of AI 182. I just had a nice chat with Mr. John Schnieder of the Air India Task Force. He said he would get in touch with you to ask would you contact me to discuss the forward cargo door of AI 182. Mr. Schnieder is a police officer and referred me to you because you are an aircraft crash investigator and sent me the email about how the door was retrieved and latches latched. Well, since the door was not retrieved the latch status is still unknown and we must go to other evidence to explain the crash. After twelve years and three other similar crashes, a better explanation emerges, inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight. www.corazon.com has a thousand pages of documentation and analyis of the four crashes.

In addition Boeing is conducting its own investigation into the forward cargo door as shown by the remark of Mr. Rich Spruel of the Task Force that Boeing had also recently inquired about that forward cargo door of AI 182.

I trust that as a crash investigator your primary desire is to explain a crash so that it will not happen again and will examine all possibilities that are presented that are reasonable and documented, such as cargo door. Please contact me through email or phone so that I may present my case in a short brief,

enough to give you thought to either pursue the door theory or dismiss it. Please don't ignore it.

Sincerely, John Barry Smith 10408 659 3552

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: May 3, 1997 2:59:36 PM PDT

To: Jacques.Babin@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca

Subject: For Mr. John Garstang, TSB

Mr. Babin,

Mr. John Garstang, aircraft investigator for TSB, called me and asked if I had a way to electronically transmit some files. I do and one is attached to this email. Could you have him call me back and he can tell me exactly what he wants.

Sincerely, John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: November 5, 1997 10:12:07 PM PST

To: Jacques.Babin@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca

Subject: For Mr. John Garstang, CASB, regarding Air India 182

Please forward to Mr. John Garstang, CASB aircraft accident investigator.

Dear Mr. Garstang, 5 Nov 97

We spoke on the phone a few months ago regarding Air India 182. New analysis has connected AI 182 to TWA 800. Below is a copy of a letter to FAA Northwest Region that explains that connection.

AI 182 as you described it to me on the phone looks exactly like

the reconstruction photo of TWA 800 in the cargo door area. Very interesting.

Regards,
John Barry Smith
408 659 3552

Bob Brenerman,
FAA Structural Aerospace Engineer,
Federal Aviation Administration
Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100
1601 Lind Ave. S.W.
Renton, WA 98055-4056
(206) 227-2100
Ron Wojnar, Manager
Darrell Pederson, Assistant Manager
Tom McSweeney, Director ACS

Dear Mr. Brenerman,

5 Nov 97

Thank you for your 29 Oct 97 letter reference 97-120S-699. It was signed by Mr. Pederson for Mr. Wojnar but I'm assuming you wrote it and you are the "FAA structural engineer who

assisted the NTSB at the hangar in Calverton, New York..."

I would prefer to discuss with you, an airplane person with the hands on experience of TWA 800, the details of your letter.

First, the politics...why is the Northwest Region of the FAA given the task by Mr. McSweeney through my congressman to 'investigate Mr. Smith's concerns'? Would not the Office of Accident Investigation of the FAA be more appropriate?

Especially since the Northwest Region of the FAA is the only FAA authority to go on record as supporting the center tank as initial event with its own ignition theory?

"Worn Wiring May Have Had
Role In TWA Disaster

Chafing in

Fuel Tank Conduits Found

in Study of Early 747s

By Don

Phillips

Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, July 2, 1997; Page

A16

The Washington Post

Northwest

A theory, developed by the FAA's

unlikely chain of

Region in Seattle, involves an

problem causes a

events in which an electrical

tank to the

fire to burn outward from the wing

designed

wing tip through a vent tube that is

tank. At the
reverses
another vent

to allow vapors to escape from the
wing tip, the flame front then
direction and travels back down
tube into the center tank.

800
theory as only

The NTSB, conducting the TWA
investigation, played down the
one of many."

So, you see, Mr. Brenerman, my cargo door explanation was sent for evaluation to a group who already have their own contrary explanation for TWA 800, not exactly an open mind to an impartial forum for investigation. It's like asking someone to prove they're wrong. Few will attempt to overcome that set bias. I hope you can.

By the way, we are as one on chafed wiring as a problem. NTSB AAR 92/02 for UAL 811 had chafed wiring which shorted to turn on door motor which unlatched door. This explanation of why door ruptured/opened may well explain why fuselage ruptured at cargo door area for AI 182, PA 103, and TWA 800 also.

One last thing on politics: We are the good guys, we seek to prevent airplane crashes, we are open, we discuss the possibilities relying of real evidence that we can see, touch, and hear. If my style 'chafes' when I rebut or attempt to refute your

line of thinking, please don't take it personally. We are not indifferent; we care. We are on the same side with the same goal, as you state in your letter to me, "...the first priority of the ... (FAA) is ensuring the continued operational safety of aircraft."

In that regard let me dissect your letter of 29 Oct 97 very carefully and reply to each observation and conclusion you have made about TWA 800 and others.

Assumptions:

1. You are a FAA structural engineer and understand the Boeing 747 airframe.
2. I am a FAA licensed commercial pilot, instrument rated and previous FAA Part 135 certificate holder.
3. NTSB published documents such as AAR 92/02 shall be assumed to be correct unless otherwise noted.
4. UK AAIB and Canadian/Indian published government aircraft accident reports shall be assumed to be correct unless otherwise noted.
5. You have had hands on experience with TWA 800 and can confirm or refute deductions based upon personal experience lacking a published NTSB AAR for referral.
6. The color photograph of the reconstruction of TWA 800 is complete and accurate. (Photo included in letter and at www.corazon.com/800foreafthorreconweb.html.)
7. You may soon have internet access and can examine my web site at www.corazon.com which has scanned text of accident reports for referral. Email is available to you and you can correspond to me at barry@corazon.com
8. Hindsight is great and everybody makes mistakes once in a while.

29 Oct 97 letter to me from you:

Paragraph four, sentence two:

"However, when the wreckage of the nose section was recovered it became evident that the forward cargo door had not opened in flight or separated from the nose section prior to impact with water."

Well, sir, let's be picky. A door means a door and not pieces or segments or sections. The forward cargo door of TWA 800 is in tatters, it's shattered, it's in pieces; it's everything but a 'door'. It is so shattered that only 20% is recovered and reconstructed. What is the weight of a normal door? What is the weight of the recovered pieces? For the purposes of discussion I use 20%. If wrong, provide a more accurate number please. To base the conclusion, "...forward cargo door had not opened in flight or separated from the nose section..." based upon only 20% of the evidence is not valid.

Especially since I have pinpointed the location of door failure/rupture to the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door and that latch is not connected to the frame, as seen in reconstruction photo. The identification of the aft midspan latch as the point of failure is deduced by a. observing the large round hole in reconstruction photo of TWA 800, b. reading descriptive text about the AI 182 door rupture, and c. viewing the recovered door of UAL 811. The UAL 811 door shows a small door rupture at aft midspan latch area. The forward midspan latch pin was not damaged while the aft latch pin was. The UAL 811 door had a rupture hole straight through the door. That was an opening in the door. The door opened inside the door itself as well as at the latches.

(<http://www.corazon.com/811page35analydoor.html>
<http://www.corazon.com/811doorhalves.html> and

<http://www.corazon.com/811doorhalvesphoto.html> give URLs of pictures and text of UAL 811 and <http://www.corazon.com/182pixtext1web.html> gives text about forward cargo door area of AI 182.)

UAL 811 is the model for the three other accidents, AI 182, PA 103, and TWA 800. It always comes back to NTSB AAR 92/02. (Not the first UAL 811 NTSB AAR which was NTSB/AAR-90/01 and then superseded by NTSB AAR 92/02, written after door was recovered and conclusions changed. Everybody makes mistakes once in a while.)

The TWA 800 reconstruction photo shows other similarities to UAL 811 which will be discussed as we go along.

Paragraph five, sentence one:

"The FAA structural engineer who assisted the NTSB at the hangar in Calverton, New York, verified that the forward cargo door was recovered at the same location as the rest of the nose section."

Well sir, again, not door recovered but pieces were. Let us assume the bottom 5% of the door pieces with the bottom eight latches was found with the nose section and attached to the sill and fuselage of TWA 800 as seen in NTSB photo. (That matches the description of AI 182 from video film 6700 feet underwater also, [corazon.com/182pixtext1web.html](http://www.corazon.com/182pixtext1web.html).) Because 5% of the door of TWA 800 was found with the nose does not rule out door rupture at aft mid span latch. It does not rule out fuselage rupture caused by door failure. What it does do is say that bottom piece of door stayed with nose until water impact. Rupture at midspan latch still possible.

Paragraph five, sentence two:

"A further examination of the recovered wreckage showed that the upper hinge was still attached to the both the fuselage and the door."

Exactly! That is what the model shows too! UAL 811 had the door tear away with the top piece taking upper flange of the door and all the hinge and attachment bolts with it. The hinges of UAL 811 were in the same condition and attached to the door as TWA 800. (corazon.com/811page35analydoor.html) NTSB AAR 92/02 page 35 and 41: "The hinge pins and all hinge sections from N4713U's forward cargo door were intact; all hinge sections rotated relatively easily. All attach bolts from the hinge sections of the door remained attached..." The TWA 800 reconstruction photo shows a piece of fuselage skin attached to hinge. The fuselage skin that left with the door of UAL 811 was not recovered from ocean floor for examination.

Paragraph five, sentence four and five:

"In addition, the door latches at the bottom of the door were still attached to the fuselage lower sill structure. This indicates that the door was in the 'latched and locked' position at the time of impact with the water."

Well, sir, there are two latches unaccounted for out of ten, the mid span latches. The door may have been in the almost all latched and locked position when it hit the water but not totally. And it is in that area, specifically, the aft midspan latch area, where the evidence points to rupture.

It was an understandable conclusion to make that door did not rupture/open in flight when bottom latches were found latched and attached. It is an understandable conclusion to make that the

door did not rupture/detach when the hinge stayed attached to the door. However, both conclusions can be adjusted by viewing more of the door and relying on past precedent.

The answer to refute aft midspan latch rupture is to locate and identify the aft mid span latch and confirm it is latched around its pin, an impossibility when looking at the TWA 800 reconstruction photo with sharp, clean line at door frame where aft mid span latch is supposed to be latched and isn't.

Paragraph six, sentence one:

"The nose section of the airplane impacted the water on the right side, causing severe hydraulic damage with the result that the door structure did not remain completely intact."

Well, sir, is this an explanation of why the starboard side cargo door area is so shattered and the port side of fuselage is so smooth? You mentioned in our phone call that the skin appeared to be pushed inwards also. On page 41 of AAR 92/02 for UAL 811 it reads, "Examination of the outer skin contour of the upper door piece revealed that it had been crushed inward." So the cargo door of UAL 811 does give an appearance of inward crush on the door when top piece struck fuselage on its way up after explosive decompression. You may have noticed the same effect on the TWA 800 top piece of door. Regarding the rest of the nose having inward crushing, the TWA 800 reconstruction shows otherwise with large pieces of skin clearly showing an outward force with the skin peeled outwards. Regarding the many pieces of the cargo door area, that is to be expected when the fuselage ruptured in flight and the weakened nose tore off subjecting that now exposed and jagged area to 300 knots of slipstream.

Paragraph six, sentence two:

"However, wreckage for the entire door was recovered at the same location as the nose section and had the same impact damage as the surrounding fuselage structure on the right side."

Well, sir, I have to contest the use of the adjective, "entire." My online dictionary states; en'tire \in-'tr\ adj : complete, whole synonym: sound, perfect, intact, undamaged ~ en'tirely adv

No way was that entire door recovered period, anywhere, according to that TWA 800 reconstruction photo. I estimate 20% recovered and let us assume that was in the nose section debris field. That leaves most of door missing and in particular the accused aft midspan latch section of the door. In addition, the 20% recovered pieces shown in the reconstruction have all types of damage revealed; inward, outward, crushed, twisted, crumpled, torn, and frayed, which is dissimilar to damage only ten feet above cargo door area of the nose. (I am unable to comment on the forward part of the cargo door or the area forward as the only released photograph by NTSB is cropped short of the entire reconstruction.)

The many pieces of the door would explain the discrepancy in the newspapers, a computer simulation, and a Coast Guard Rear Admiral stating on the record that the forward cargo door was found closest to the event site, yet contradicted by your above statement. All may be correct, it depends upon which piece is talked about. The categorical statement by the officer in charge of recovery that the door was found closest to Kennedy Airport is probably true and implies that the critical midspan latches may in the piece of the door he is referring to. The statement by you that the door was found with nose section is true because you are referring to the pieces that stayed with the nose.

Please reconsider your appraisal of 'entire' and 'same impact damage' based upon close analysis of TWA 800 reconstruction photo.

Paragraph six, sentence three:

"This is additional verification that the forward cargo door had not opened in flight or separated from the airplane."

Well, sir, my explanation of TWA 800 is rupture in forward cargo door at aft mid span latch. A door can open at places other than the latches, some parts can separate and some can stay attached and yet door can still be said to have 'opened.' But 'open' implies turning doorknob and door opens. That's why I changed 'inadvertently opened' to 'ruptured'.

Now to paint smears. The red paint smears are real, there are a lot of them, and solid conclusions can be reached by that very real evidence. Their location is important, only above and slightly aft of the forward cargo door. Using NTSB AAR 92/02 as a model again, page, 41, "There were also many areas on the outer skin where blue and red paint transfer marks could be seen." The paint transfers for UAL 811 were from fuselage to door using blue and red paint of United Airlines. TWA 800 was the red of TWA from the door to the fuselage above. This indicates an outward expansion of the area below forcing the red colored door to slam upwards against the fuselage transferring red paint onto the white painted areas between the passenger windows. NTSB AAR 92/02 again, page, 41, "The forward cargo door can rotate open 143 degrees before the hinge would deform, permitting the door to contact the fuselage above."

The splotchy red painted skin above the door matches the splotchy red painted smears between windows, indicating the top

of the door slammed up, transferred paint and tore away. The red paint smears above cargo door indicated outward force not inward. The peeled open skin indicates outward movement. The outward means the unilateral starboard damage is not water impact. Not water impact means that center tank explosion is not viable as initial event since that would give bilateral damage and didn't. Outward unilateral damage strengthens rupture at cargo door area explanation as that is what would happen and did.

Paragraph seven, sentence two and three:

"There is even more compelling evidence resulting from the TWA flight 800 accident investigation that indicates that the forward cargo door did not cause the accident. However, it is up to the NTSB to share this information with you."

Well, sir, that hurts. NTSB sharing information with me? I think not. Secret information that cargo door didn't burst? I think not also.

Paragraph eight, sentence two and three:

"However, the accidents to which your refer, in particular the Pan Am flight 103 and the Air India flight 182 accidents, each had strong evidence of an internal explosion caused by high explosive materials (terrorist bomb). In each case there has been no evidence that the forward cargo door opened in flight causing the accident."

Well, sir, let me polite in disagreement. Not 'strong' evidence of bomb. Very weak is what the evidence shows and I have reviewed the evidence as described in UK, Canadian, and India accident reports over and over again. AI 182 and PA 103 as cargo door rupture is quite clear once the premise is made of fuselage rupture in flight in cargo door area. AI 182 said the fuselage

ruptured in flight at cargo door area and for want of a better explanation, said bomb did it. PA 103 also had fuselage rupture on left side of forward cargo hold while wreckage evidence shows much more damage and sooner on starboard side, at cargo door area. The evidence is in the reports and they are on web site www.corazon.com under the flight numbers.

Briefly, AI 182 summation leading to cargo door rupture is on web page <http://www.corazon.com/AI182essentials.html>. I will quote from only two of twenty statements about AI 182 here:

"As described earlier, the sudden nature of the occurrence indicates the possibility of a massive airframe structural failure or the detonation of an explosive device." Page 49. And then:

"The AIB report concluded that the analysis of the CVR and ATC recordings showed no evidence of a high-explosive device having been detonated on AI 182. It further states there is strong evidence to suggest a sudden explosive decompression of undetermined origin occurred." Page 24.

So, Mr. Brenerman, the official report actually gives 'strong evidence' to cargo door rupture and 'no evidence' to bomb.

PA 103 is similar; rupture at cargo door area is supported by factual evidence including the reconstruction of PA 103 on starboard side which matches the photograph of UAL 811 after landing. The essentials for cargo door for PA 103 are on page <http://www.corazon.com/PA103essentials.html>. The premise of bomb is based upon evidence which shows that a '...rather large shotgun had been fired at the inner surface of the fuselage at close range.' Pages 19 and 20 of AAIB report. The resulting hole was about 15 inches in diameter, not a bomb hole and not big enough to bring down a 747. There was a blast in PA 103 but after the rupture at cargo door, just as center tank explosion was after cargo door rupture for TWA 800. One last thing on PA 103,

the AAIB report never said bomb, only 'improvised explosive device.' The British are precise with language and they are right to be so. A door rupturing in flight becomes a device which wasn't meant to be but became an explosive causing agent, an explosive decompression. And residue that could be high explosive is now shown to be possibly benign with TWA 800 and the dog sniffing test. Bomb explanation for PA 103 is tenuous at best and will not stand up to scrutiny. I would love to go over every point of AI 182 and PA 103 with you but first become very familiar with the government accident reports as I have, they give the evidence. I encourage you to do so.

The bomb conclusions were political. As an engineer and pilot let us leave shadowy Sikh terrorists and secret Libyan agents putting bombs aboard planes to the politicians and let us examine evidence such as CVR, FDR, FOD, bodies, metal, and statistics. I full well know the immense claim of PA 103 not being a bomb. It is a myth airplane like the ship Titanic, the airship Hindenberg, and the ship Maine, all three of which had original accident causes modified over time, brittle steel, flammable skin, and coal dust.

Four high time Boeing 747s took off at night running late and suffered a fuselage rupture at forward cargo hold which left similar evidence of sudden loud sound on CVR, similar abrupt power cut to the FDR, similar Fodded engines, similar paint smears, similar wreckage pattern, similar in flight damage, similar destruction sequence, similar missing never recovered bodies, similar reconstruction patterns, and similar red herring of bomb.

All four, Mr. Brenerman, all four; and only those four of all 747 accidents. Only one came back to reveal the cause, inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight, rupture at aft midspan latch area, UAL 811 as described in text and pictures in NTSB AAR 92/02.

Paragraph nine, sentence two:

"A repetition of the events that caused the UAL flight 811 forward cargo door to open in flight is not likely to occur again because of modifications required by Airworthiness Directive (AD) T89-04-54."

Well sir, the cargo door was not supposed to open:

1. after certification.
2. After the first AD when lower sill damage was noticed.
3. After the second AD after door opened on PA 125.
4. After the third AD after UAL 811 cargo door opened.
5. After the fourth AD after the UAL preflight uncommanded opening.
6. After the fifth AD you mention.

And they are still opening, leaking and malfunctioning. Here's just one of ten non fatal openings, leakings and loss of pressurizations over the past three years. SDR: 27 November 1994 Discrepancy/Corrective Action: On rotation, aft cargo door opened. Replaced spring on lock pin and adj per MM52-34-12.

The cargo door is known to be dangerous, has failed in the past, is still failing, and I'm saying it's failed/ruptured on three previously undetected events, AI 182, PA 103, and TWA 800.

The modification you refer to is to replace the aluminium locking sectors with steel to prevent the lower eight latching cams from being back driven past the soft metal and unlatch the door. It's like making the barn door stronger against a horse when it may be a bull inside trying to get out.

And more important, the midspan latches have no locking sectors

at all so the modification does not apply to them at all. Is it not strange that the risk of latch cams becoming unlatched, and they have several times, is so great as to warrant locking sectors yet the two side midspan latches have none? And each of them holds in more door sill than the lower latches. That is an astonishing discovery: no locking sectors on all Boeing 747 forward cargo door latches which have rupture evidence at that midspan latch as shown on UAL 811 recovered door.

The absence of locking sectors for the midspan latches and the AD to strengthen the eight locking sectors for the lower eight latch cams explains much.

It probably solves how the forward cargo door of AI 182 and TWA 800 ruptured at aft midspan latch while the bottom latches remained latched in place: that is the locking sectors did their job on those two doors and prevented the eight lower latch cams from being driven into the unlatched position when chafed wires shorted and turned door motor on. Unfortunately the midspan latches had no such protection and were driven into the unlatched position enough for the internal pressure to rupture at that now weakened area leaving similar shattered door pieces and bottom latches still attached to lower sill for AI 182 and TWA 800.

For UAL 811 and Pan Am 103, the soft, pre-AD, locking sectors were overridden by door motor and all ten latches were driven into the unlatched position allowing the door to open completely and slam upward, breaking in two and tearing away, leaving the identical pattern of torn away fuselage skin and door broken in half longitudinally at midspan latches for each door.

Four aircraft, four door motors to unlocked position, two locking sectors held and two didn't; two partial openings/ruptures and

two total openings as reflected in the reconstructions and photographs of wreckage. AI 182 and TWA 800 had locking sectors hold so ruptures. PA 103 and UAL 811 had locking sectors overridden so entire door opened and came off.

Paragraph ten, sentence one:

"I hope that this information assures you that the tragedy of TWA flight 800 was not caused by the in-flight opening of the forward cargo door and that the FAA has taken measures to ensure that another occurrence similar to that of UAL flight 811 will not be repeated."

Well, sir, I am not assured that the tragedy of TWA 800 was not caused by the inflight opening of the forward cargo door and I am not assured that the actions of the FAA ensures another UAL 811 will not be repeated. On the contrary, I strongly believe that the tragedy of TWA 800 was caused by the inflight rupture of the fuselage at the forward cargo door at the aft midspan latch area and the actions of the FAA will not prevent such a reoccurrence.

Now, what to do about it. Eventually Boeing will have to fix the door again.

But first, FAA and NTSB are doing what they can prior to TWA 800 based upon the best evidence at the time. If the real cause of a failure is unknown, then the fault can't be fixed. If foreign governments insist on saying a bomb caused a crash, then it is a security matter, not a structural engineers' or accident investigators'.

Second, if the cause of a national aviation tragedy is unclear and ambiguous, then it is understandable for politicians to turn the cause to advantage, even if later proved wrong.

Third, accident investigating teams only had precedent to rely on

up to their crash. Hindsight and the subsequent similar crashes were not available to them for their analysis. They are for mine and now they are for yours. We are all doing the best we can with what we have.

Fourth, the internet with its research and communication abilities have sped up the citizen analysis of national accidents.

Fifth, I am the one to have discovered the cargo door cause because of circumstances:

1. Aircraft modeler.
2. Aircraft owner doing routine maintenance. Mooney M20C
3. Commercial pilot, instrument rated.
4. FAA Part 135 certificate holder, single pilot, single aircraft.
5. Enlisted aircrewman in SP-2E with 2000 hours in patrol aircraft maintaining and operating all electronic anti-submarine equipment with specialty of radar.
6. Officer as reconnaissance attack navigator in RA-5C going supersonic in combat during wartime flying off carriers.
7. Retired military officer with time, money, and motivation to devote to research into cargo door of Boeing 747s.
8. Survivor of sudden, night, fatal, fiery, jet airplane crash. June 14th, 1967.

I am qualified to give worthy explanation into other sudden, night, fatal, fiery jet airplane crashes, AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800: inadvertent opening/rupture of forward cargo door in flight at aft midspan latch area on high time Boeing 747s.

What I'm personally doing to prevent a reoccurrence of those accidents is mailing my analysis to you, talking on the telephone, emailing government officials and media, and being open and sharing all information I find that is relevant as soon as I can. Only through fast, open, and accurate communications can we stop these fuselages of high time Boeing 747s rupturing in flight

at forward cargo door.

What you can do, Mr. Brenerman, is up to you, as you see fit based upon the evidence that you have seen with your own eyes at Calverton, my analysis, NTSB and other government accident reports, and your own conscience. You have contacts with Boeing, NTSB, and FAA aircraft accident related groups. I encourage you to pass along my concerns and analysis for discussion and possible rebuttal. Please give me scientific rebuttal to this letter today, I'm sure there must be some inaccuracies, everybody makes mistakes once in a while.

And everybody gets it right once in a while, too.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith
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From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: November 28, 1997 10:30:56 PM PST

To: Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca

Subject: Cargo door rupture/NTSB TWA 800 Hearing

For Mr. John Schneider of RCMP and Mr. John Garstaing of CASB: Send this to both please,

Sincerely
John Barry Smith

November 28, 1997

CHARGES PENDING IN 1985 AIR INDIA BOMBING

By

SEAN DURKAN -- Parliamentary Bureau

The RCMP is preparing to lay charges in the 1985 Air India bombing which killed 329 people on a flight from Canada, says Canada's top Mountie.

"We have quite a large number of investigators working very diligently in finalizing that matter as quickly as possible," RCMP commissioner Phil Murray announced yesterday.

"It's our intention to lay charges, but we can't at this particular time divulge exactly what those charges are or who they will involve because

the matter is still ongoing," Murray told reporters.

Murray said the 12-year probe has been complicated because it involves jurisdictions in Japan, India and Britain.

"This is the most complex investigation in the history of Canada," Murray said.

John Schneider
RCMP
John Garstaing
CASB investigator

Dear Mr. Schneider and Mr. Garstaing

26 November 1997

Hello again, still trying...

We are allies, we are on the same side, we have the same goal. Let us use the upcoming public hearing in Baltimore to share our information. I will be there and look forward to meeting you.

I wish to prevent death by preventing airplane accidents by preventing fuselage disintegration in flight by preventing forward cargo door rupture at aft midspan latch on aging Boeing 747s. It's happened before and confirmed: UAL 811; and probably happened before on Pan Am 103, and before that Air India 182. It's probably happened again with TWA 800. The probable cause for all is the same, door rupture in flight.

The Chairman of NTSB has said the whole issue of aging aircraft will be examined. TWA 800 was certainly that.

Let's assume a few things about TWA 800, AI 182, PA 103, and UAL 811:

1. TWA 800 (93,000 hours), AI 182 (23,624 hours), PA 103 (72,464 hours), and UAL 811 (58,815 hours) were high time, aging early model Boeing 747-100, -200 aircraft.
2. Explosive decompression makes a sudden loud sound. If explosive decompression does not make a sudden loud sound then the cargo door explanation is not valid.
3. TWA 800, Air India 182, PA 103, and UAL 811 all had sudden loud sounds on the CVR at event time. If not, then cargo door explanation for that aircraft is not valid.
4. If the forward cargo door were to rupture in flight and do the

same damage as UAL 811, the nose could tear off, although it did not for UAL 811. If the nose of an aging 747 always stays on after forward door ruptures/opens, then the cargo door explanation is not valid.

4. Explosive decompression is an explosion.

5. Destructive force of 300 knots onto weakened structure is immense.

To explain TWA 800 from the top down is to match up four aging Boeing 747s which had fatal accidents with destruction starting in fuselage near leading edge of the wing, sudden loud sound on CVR, abrupt power cut to FDR, foddred engines, never recovered bodies, severe starboard side damage, similar wreckage plots, and all were thought to be a bomb for some time. Only four 747 accidents fit that pattern, UAL 811, AI 182, PA 103, and TWA 800. They belong to a group from which deductions can be made. The many other evidence matches of these four to each other are reported in the respective governments' AARs: UK AAIB 2/90, CASB and Indian Aviation Occurrence, and NTSB AAR 92/02; all available on web site www.corazon.com

To explain TWA 800 from the bottom up, the evidence pertaining to TWA 800 must be examined closely and deductions made. The following observations and explanations refer to TWA 800.

1. CVR sudden loud sound: Explosive decompression starts as air molecules rush against each other quickly. NTSB reported sudden loud sound.

2. FDR abrupt power cut: Severe disruption to cargo hold floor and adjacent main equipment compartment. NTSB reported abrupt power cut.

3. Streak: Top part of door with fuselage skin attached spinning away reflecting evening sunlight to ground observers appearing

as streak as it decelerates. Door is shiny metal object and light source was orange setting sun.

4. TWA 800 wreckage reconstruction can be seen at URL <http://www.corazon.com/presskit.html> and reveals the following: Red flags on top of door indicate it was found closest to airport. Top piece of door and fuselage skin were found closest to airport and far apart from its usual frame and nose: Door ruptured/opened in flight and pieces spun away first, landed first, and found closest.

5. Red paint smears between passenger windows only found above forward cargo door: Red paint from door below transferred when door opened out, up, and slammed into fuselage above. Paint transfer between door and white fuselage principle matches UAL 811.

6. Missing red paint on trim above cargo door: Red paint from trim scraped off by friction of metal bending and rubbing together.

7 Inward bending of top of cargo door: Inward bend occurs when top of door hits fuselage. Inward bending of top door matches UAL 811 top door piece inward bend.

8. Most of middle of cargo door, aft midspan latch, door frame, and outer skin missing: Missing material not available for examination. Door can rupture even when bottom eight latches hold because only two midspan latches hold sixteen feet of door closed and have no locking sectors to prevent inadvertent unlatching.

9. Door hinges are attached to door and appear near normal: Hinges match UAL 811 hinge description in appearance and function.

10. Outward petal bulge rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door: Outward bulge rupture suggests rupture at aft latch. Petal pattern indicated outward, not inward force of rupture.

11. Outward peeled upper fuselage skin: Outward indicates internal force pushed outward, not external force, such as water,

pushing inward.

12. Vertical tear line at station 741 between windows: Vertical tear line is nose cut off point and matches other two Boeing 747 nose cut off points, AI 182, and PA 103.

13. Starboard only shattered, torn, and frayed fuselage around forward cargo door: Unilateral rupture suggests explosive decompression caused by inadvertent rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door in flight and discounts center tank fire/explosion as initial event.

From top to bottom, TWA 800 crash cause is clear to see, hear, and touch; fuselage rupture forward of the wing on right side on a very old and worn aircraft. The cargo door explanation is plausible, it's mechanical, it's happened before, and it fits the evidence. It also incorporates the center tank fire/explosion explanation as happening as described by NTSB but a few seconds later and a few thousand feet lower than the initial event at 13700 feet/8:31 PM.

I first discovered the cargo door rupture problem on aging 747s after PA 103 in 1988 and confirmed for me by UAL 811 only three months later. My concerns were published first in an aviation newsletter in April, 1990 and in Flying magazine in July, 1992. I've had correspondence with a Pan Am 103 aviation insurance company representative in 1995 regarding the risk of another cargo door inadvertent opening. As soon as I heard that TWA 800 had disappeared from radar and disintegrated in flight shortly after takeoff I suspected cargo door and it was confirmed for me when the sudden loud sound and abrupt power cut to the FDR were reported by NTSB. All of the subsequent evidence confirms even stronger that the cause of TWA 800 was the aft midspan latch rupture in flight. This letter only describes a few of the linking clues, evidence, and closely reasoned deductions

based on the observations of the evidence.

To sum up specific, irrefutable evidence that leads to conclusion of cargo door rupture for TWA 800:

1. Sudden loud sound on CVR.
2. Abrupt power cut to FDR.
3. Red flags on top of door in wreckage reconstruction.
4. Red paint smears on white paint between passenger windows.
5. Most of middle door, aft latch, outer skin, and door frame missing.
6. Shattered, torn, and frayed starboard fuselage structure surrounds the blown apart cargo door yet the opposite port side is smooth and relatively undamaged.
7. Visible bulging outward opening rupture hole at missing aft midspan latch of forward cargo door.

A confirming exercise would be to closely examine the door hinge of TWA 800 to see if it has overtravel impressions on the opposite hinge which would match the overtravel impressions on the UAL 811 door hinge as reported in NTSB AAR 92/02 and seen at <http://www.corazon.com/811page40doorhinge.html>

Cargo door explanation for TWA 800 is worthy of intense investigation. My intentions at the public hearing are to support such an investigation. I have formally offered to speak before the fact finding panel as a qualified technical person with special knowledge. I will be offering literature to attendees including pictures and text from NTSB AAR 92/02 showing big hole in nose of UAL 811.

What can be done to stop fuselage ruptures in high time Boeing 747s?

1. Boeing must modify/fix the cargo doors again.

2. FAA can direct Boeing to fix the doors with a sixth Airworthiness Directive.
3. NTSB can confirm door explanation and make recommendations to FAA.
4. NTSB public fact finding hearing can determine cargo door explanation worthy of investigation and confirm probable cause if valid.
5. Families of victims and their representatives may be persuaded to investigate the door and make recommendations to authorities.
6. Elected officials may be persuaded to conduct a parallel door investigation.
7. Media can draw attention to cargo door explanation and bring it to the attention of all concerned.

In all my discussions with persons involved with TWA 800, one person asked the key question: "Why do the doors open?" That was asked of me by my Congressman, Sam Farr, in his office as I presented the cargo door explanation to him. It is a good question.

I will reply now, as I did then, "I don't know for three of them, but for UAL 811 it was chafed wires shorting to turn on door motor which overrode safety features and unlatched the door which opened outward, up, and away, taking fuselage paint with it, killing nine passengers whose bodies were never recovered, leaving a sudden loud sound on the CVR, an abrupt power cut to the FDR, severe starboard side damage, and the cause was thought to be a bomb. The other three are probably the same reason but there are lots of other possibilities that need to be investigated."

(Regarding the AD 'fix' installed after UAL 811, it affected locking sectors yet the two midspan latches have no locking

sectors to be 'fixed.' TWA 800 shattered door shows a midspan rupture with bottom latches in place. There were two pairs of door failure: UAL 811 and PA 103 had door rupture midspan and entire door open; AI 182 and TWA 800 had bottom latches hold and door ruptured/opened just at midspan latch.)

I hope to work with you, the authorities and all those concerned to confirm the probable cause of TWA 800. Please contact me with questions or rebuttal. My email is barry@corazon.com. I hope to see you at the NTSB public fact finding hearing about TWA 800 and aging aircraft.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

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Responded: 4 Nov 97

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Contacted: 12 Sep 96
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Responded: 29 Jul 96

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Contacted: 11 Nov 96
Responded: 11 Nov 96

John Garstaing
CASB investigator
Contacted: 18 Apr 97
Responded: 3 May 97

Jacques.Babin@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
CASB Official

Contacted: 10 Apr 97
Responded: 10 Apr 97

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Darrell Pederson, Assistant Manager
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Contacted: 30 Oct 97
Responded: 30 Oct 97

Bob Brenerman,
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Contacted: 30 Oct 97
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Responded: 13 Apr 97

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Responded: 20 Mar 97

Carmel Valley Sun
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Elizabeth Cowles
Contacted: 9 Jun 97
Responded: 9 Jun 97

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The following have not responded but have been contacted by
letter and email.

The Honorable John J. Duncan, Jr.
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Contacted 9 Aug 97

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Bernard Loeb
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Contacted: 12 Aug 96

John Warner
United States Senator
From: Senator@warner.senate.gov
Contacted: 07 Sep 96 11:56:32 EST

President, Bill Clinton
Chief of Staff, Leon Panetta
Secretary of Transportation, Federico Pe[^]a
Director, Federal Aviation Authority, David Hinson
Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, James Hall
Vice Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, Robert
Francis
Attorney General, Department of Justice, Janet Reno
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Louis Freeh
Agent, New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
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Cargo door mentioned
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Contacted: 29 Oct 97

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: November 28, 1997 10:31:05 PM PST
To: Jacques.Babin@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
Subject: **Cargo door rupture/NTSB TWA 800 Hearing**

For Mr. John Schneider of RCMP and Mr. John Garstaing of
CASB: Send this to both please,

Sincerely
John Barry Smith

November 28, 1997

CHARGES PENDING IN 1985 AIR INDIA BOMBING

By

SEAN DURKAN -- Parliamentary Bureau
The RCMP is preparing to lay charges in the 1985 Air India
bombing which killed 329 people on a flight from Canada, says

Canada's top
Mountie.

"We have quite a large number of investigators working very diligently in finalizing that matter as quickly as possible," RCMP commissioner Phil Murray announced yesterday.

"It's our intention to lay charges, but we can't at this particular time divulge exactly what those charges are or who they will involve because

the matter is still ongoing," Murray told reporters.

Murray said the 12-year probe has been complicated because it involves jurisdictions in Japan, India and Britain.

"This is the most complex investigation in the history of Canada," Murray said.

John Schneider
RCMP
John Garstaing
CASB investigator

Dear Mr. Schneider and Mr. Garstaing

26 November 1997

Hello again, still trying...

We are allies, we are on the same side, we have the same goal. Let us use the upcoming public hearing in Baltimore to share our information. I will be there and look forward to meeting you.

I wish to prevent death by preventing airplane accidents by preventing fuselage disintegration in flight by preventing forward cargo door rupture at aft midspan latch on aging Boeing 747s. It's happened before and confirmed: UAL 811; and probably

happened before on Pan Am 103, and before that Air India 182. It's probably happened again with TWA 800. The probable cause for all is the same, door rupture in flight.

The Chairman of NTSB has said the whole issue of aging aircraft will be examined. TWA 800 was certainly that.

Let's assume a few things about TWA 800, AI 182, PA 103, and UAL 811:

1. TWA 800 (93,000 hours), AI 182 (23,624 hours), PA 103 (72,464 hours), and UAL 811 (58,815 hours) were high time, aging early model Boeing 747-100, -200 aircraft.
2. Explosive decompression makes a sudden loud sound. If explosive decompression does not make a sudden loud sound then the cargo door explanation is not valid.
3. TWA 800, Air India 182, PA 103, and UAL 811 all had sudden loud sounds on the CVR at event time. If not, then cargo door explanation for that aircraft is not valid.
4. If the forward cargo door were to rupture in flight and do the same damage as UAL 811, the nose could tear off, although it did not for UAL 811. If the nose of an aging 747 always stays on after forward door ruptures/opens, then the cargo door explanation is not valid.
4. Explosive decompression is an explosion.
5. Destructive force of 300 knots onto weakened structure is immense.

To explain TWA 800 from the top down is to match up four aging Boeing 747s which had fatal accidents with destruction starting in fuselage near leading edge of the wing, sudden loud sound on CVR, abrupt power cut to FDR, foddred engines, never recovered bodies, severe starboard side damage, similar wreckage plots, and all were thought to be a bomb for some time.

Only four 747 accidents fit that pattern, UAL 811, AI 182, PA 103, and TWA 800. They belong to a group from which deductions can be made. The many other evidence matches of these four to each other are reported in the respective governments' AARs: UK AAIB 2/90, CASB and Indian Aviation Occurrence, and NTSB AAR 92/02; all available on web site www.corazon.com

To explain TWA 800 from the bottom up, the evidence pertaining to TWA 800 must be examined closely and deductions made. The following observations and explanations refer to TWA 800.

1. CVR sudden loud sound: Explosive decompression starts as air molecules rush against each other quickly. NTSB reported sudden loud sound.
2. FDR abrupt power cut: Severe disruption to cargo hold floor and adjacent main equipment compartment. NTSB reported abrupt power cut.
3. Streak: Top part of door with fuselage skin attached spinning away reflecting evening sunlight to ground observers appearing as streak as it decelerates. Door is shiny metal object and light source was orange setting sun.
4. TWA 800 wreckage reconstruction can be seen at URL <http://www.corazon.com/presskit.html> and reveals the following: Red flags on top of door indicate it was found closest to airport. Top piece of door and fuselage skin were found closest to airport and far apart from its usual frame and nose: Door ruptured/opened in flight and pieces spun away first, landed first, and found closest.
5. Red paint smears between passenger windows only found above forward cargo door: Red paint from door below transferred when door opened out, up, and slammed into fuselage above. Paint transfer between door and white fuselage principle matches UAL 811.
6. Missing red paint on trim above cargo door: Red paint from

trim scraped off by friction of metal bending and rubbing together.

7 Inward bending of top of cargo door: Inward bend occurs when top of door hits fuselage. Inward bending of top door matches UAL 811 top door piece inward bend.

8. Most of middle of cargo door, aft midspan latch, door frame, and outer skin missing: Missing material not available for examination. Door can rupture even when bottom eight latches hold because only two midspan latches hold sixteen feet of door closed and have no locking sectors to prevent inadvertent unlatching.

9. Door hinges are attached to door and appear near normal: Hinges match UAL 811 hinge description in appearance and function.

10. Outward petal bulge rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door: Outward bulge rupture suggests rupture at aft latch. Petal pattern indicated outward, not inward force of rupture.

11. Outward peeled upper fuselage skin: Outward indicates internal force pushed outward, not external force, such as water, pushing inward.

12. Vertical tear line at station 741 between windows: Vertical tear line is nose cut off point and matches other two Boeing 747 nose cut off points, AI 182, and PA 103.

13. Starboard only shattered, torn, and frayed fuselage around forward cargo door: Unilateral rupture suggests explosive decompression caused by inadvertent rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door in flight and discounts center tank fire/explosion as initial event.

From top to bottom, TWA 800 crash cause is clear to see, hear, and touch; fuselage rupture forward of the wing on right side on a very old and worn aircraft. The cargo door explanation is plausible, it's mechanical, it's happened before, and it fits the

evidence. It also incorporates the center tank fire/explosion explanation as happening as described by NTSB but a few seconds later and a few thousand feet lower than the initial event at 13700 feet/8:31 PM.

I first discovered the cargo door rupture problem on aging 747s after PA 103 in 1988 and confirmed for me by UAL 811 only three months later. My concerns were published first in an aviation newsletter in April, 1990 and in Flying magazine in July, 1992. I've had correspondence with a Pan Am 103 aviation insurance company representative in 1995 regarding the risk of another cargo door inadvertent opening. As soon as I heard that TWA 800 had disappeared from radar and disintegrated in flight shortly after takeoff I suspected cargo door and it was confirmed for me when the sudden loud sound and abrupt power cut to the FDR were reported by NTSB. All of the subsequent evidence confirms even stronger that the cause of TWA 800 was the aft midspan latch rupture in flight. This letter only describes a few of the linking clues, evidence, and closely reasoned deductions based on the observations of the evidence.

To sum up specific, irrefutable evidence that leads to conclusion of cargo door rupture for TWA 800:

1. Sudden loud sound on CVR.
2. Abrupt power cut to FDR.
3. Red flags on top of door in wreckage reconstruction.
4. Red paint smears on white paint between passenger windows.
5. Most of middle door, aft latch, outer skin, and door frame missing.
6. Shattered, torn, and frayed starboard fuselage structure surrounds the blown apart cargo door yet the opposite port side is smooth and relatively undamaged.
7. Visible bulging outward opening rupture hole at missing aft

midspan latch of forward cargo door.

A confirming exercise would be to closely examine the door hinge of TWA 800 to see if it has overtravel impressions on the opposite hinge which would match the overtravel impressions on the UAL 811 door hinge as reported in NTSB AAR 92/02 and seen at <http://www.corazon.com/811page40doorhinge.html>

Cargo door explanation for TWA 800 is worthy of intense investigation. My intentions at the public hearing are to support such an investigation. I have formally offered to speak before the fact finding panel as a qualified technical person with special knowledge. I will be offering literature to attendees including pictures and text from NTSB AAR 92/02 showing big hole in nose of UAL 811.

What can be done to stop fuselage ruptures in high time Boeing 747s?

1. Boeing must modify/fix the cargo doors again.
2. FAA can direct Boeing to fix the doors with a sixth Airworthiness Directive.
3. NTSB can confirm door explanation and make recommendations to FAA.
4. NTSB public fact finding hearing can determine cargo door explanation worthy of investigation and confirm probable cause if valid.
5. Families of victims and their representatives may be persuaded to investigate the door and make recommendations to authorities.
6. Elected officials may be persuaded to conduct a parallel door investigation.
7. Media can draw attention to cargo door explanation and bring it to the attention of all concerned.

In all my discussions with persons involved with TWA 800, one person asked the key question: "Why do the doors open?" That was asked of me by my Congressman, Sam Farr, in his office as I presented the cargo door explanation to him. It is a good question.

I will reply now, as I did then, "I don't know for three of them, but for UAL 811 it was chafed wires shorting to turn on door motor which overrode safety features and unlatched the door which opened outward, up, and away, taking fuselage paint with it, killing nine passengers whose bodies were never recovered, leaving a sudden loud sound on the CVR, an abrupt power cut to the FDR, severe starboard side damage, and the cause was thought to be a bomb. The other three are probably the same reason but there are lots of other possibilities that need to be investigated."

(Regarding the AD 'fix' installed after UAL 811, it affected locking sectors yet the two midspan latches have no locking sectors to be 'fixed.' TWA 800 shattered door shows a midspan rupture with bottom latches in place. There were two pairs of door failure: UAL 811 and PA 103 had door rupture midspan and entire door open; AI 182 and TWA 800 had bottom latches hold and door ruptured/opened just at midspan latch.)

I hope to work with you, the authorities and all those concerned to confirm the probable cause of TWA 800. Please contact me with questions or rebuttal. My email is barry@corazon.com. I hope to see you at the NTSB public fact finding hearing about TWA 800 and aging aircraft.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

Persons contacted and responded:

Mr. Sam Farr
17th District, California
House of Representatives
Congress of the United States
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samfarr@mail.house.gov
Contacted: 29 Oct 1996 09:10:09 EST
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Responded: Mon, 09 Sep 96 17:49:37 EST

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RCMP

Air India Flight 182 Task Force in Canada.

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Aircraft accident investigator

NPG School, Monterey

Navy Accident School

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Contacted: 18 July 97
Responded: 22 July 97

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U.S. House of Representatives
jkduncan@hr.house.gov
Contacted 9 Aug 97

Slade Gorton, Washington, Chairman
Subcommittee on Aviation
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
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Contacted 19 Feb 97

Bernard Loeb
NTSB Director, Office of Aviation Safety
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Contacted: 12 Aug 96

John Warner
United States Senator
From: Senator@warner.senate.gov
Contacted: 07 Sep 96 11:56:32 EST

President, Bill Clinton
Chief of Staff, Leon Panetta
Secretary of Transportation, Federico Pe^a
Director, Federal Aviation Authority, David Hinson
Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, James Hall
Vice Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, Robert Francis
Attorney General, Department of Justice, Janet Reno

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Louis Freeh
Agent, New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
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Wendell H. Ford
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NTSB investigator

Contacted: 11 Nov 96

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Contacted: 9 Sep 96

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National Transportation Safety Board

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Contacted: 10 Feb 97

Tom McSweeney

Director

FAA Aircraft Certification Service.

Contacted: 21 Oct 97

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Contacted:13 Aug 96

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Cargo door mentioned
Contacted 3 Sep 96

George Magazine
Cargo door mentioned
Contacted: 17 Nov 96

David Fuhlgrum
Reporter, Aviation Week
Cargo door mentioned
mangann@mcgraw-hill.com
Contacted: 29 Oct 97

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: December 1, 1997 12:13:09 PM PST
To: Jacques.Babin@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
Subject: Correction Noted

Dear Mr. Babin,

Thank you for forwarding my email about AI 182 to
Transportation Safety Board of Canada member John Garstang.

I don't have Mr. Schneider's email either. RCMP just had arrests
are imminent in AI 182 case.

CASB to TSB noted. Sorry, I work so much with 1985 CASB
report on AI 182, I forgot.

Thanks again for forwarding.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

This message is forwarded to John Garstang.

Message to Mr. Smith: Please note that CASB does not exist
anymore. The
name of our organization is Transportation Safety Board of
Canada (TSB)
since 1990. Also, please note that I did not forward your e-mail
to Mr.
John Schneider of the RCMP, since he does not work for us and I
don't
have his e-mail address.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 16, 1998 10:34:00 AM PDT
To: Communications@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
Subject: For Mr. John Garstang: Swissair match to UAL 811

For Mr. John Garstang, TSB investigator on Swissair 111:

Dear. Mr. Garstang, 16 Sep 98

This is John Barry Smith, we spoke on the phone a year ago regarding AI 182 and the possible rupture of the door in flight.

Well, Swissair appears to be electrical. When confirmed it is, then that matches the only other polyimide wired airliner fatal accident, UAL 811. UAL 811 was polyX wired electrically caused cargo door fatal event.

UAL 811 matches Swissair in electrical problems. UAL 811 matches AI 182 in sudden loud sound on CVR. AI 182 matches TWA 800 in sudden loud sound, abrupt power cut to the FDR and nose coming off.

All were fatal and all had the polyimide insulated wiring.

Sooner or later, the investigation into wiring will lead to UAL 811, the only fatal electrical crash of a wide body like Swissair 111.

Once to UAL 811 the matches to other fatal accidents will become apparent.

AI 182 is still an unresolved event, just like Swissair111. The

investigation continues, good luck.

Cheers,

John Barry Smith

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Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135
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US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.

US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.

Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.

Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C.

Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy

From: "Babin, Jacques" <Jacques.Babin@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca>

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<Barry.Mews#l#a#r#eclipse.com.au@x400.gc.ca>, "dan
mcglaun" <dan#l#a#r#mcglaun.com@x400.gc.ca>, "barry smith"
<barry#l#a#r#corazon.com@x400.gc.ca>, "jay miller"
<JNiessen#l#a#r#aol.com@x400.gc.ca>, "mike goldfein"
<mgoldfein#l#a#r#belo-dc.com@x400.gc.ca>, "lois legge"
<llegge#l#a#r#herald.ns.ca@x400.gc.ca>, "tim dobbyn"
<tim.dobbyn#l#a#r#reuters.com@x400.gc.ca>, "geffrey thomas"
<jade#l#a#r#wantree.com.au@x400.gc.ca>, "paul eddy"
<peddyxx#l#a#r#aol.com@x400.gc.ca>, "david evans"
<devans#l#a#r#phillips.com@x400.gc.ca>, "james bergquist"
<clittle#l#a#r#cari.net@x400.gc.ca>, "bob rowland"
<rwroland#l#a#r#aol.com@x400.gc.ca>, "john sampson"
<sampson#l#a#r#iinet.net.au@x400.gc.ca>, "res gehriger"
<res.gehriger#l#a#r#sfdrs.srg-ssr.ch@x400.gc.ca>, "Aart van der
Wal" <avanderwal#l#a#r#compuserve.com@x400.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: SR111: article in Wall Street Journal

To all:

Here is the text of a Statement by the TSB Investigator-in-Charge, Vic Gerden, released to the media January 22.

Jacques Babin
Chief, Communications
Transportation Safety Board of Canada

Remarks as delivered by Vic Gerden to a News Briefing
at Shearwater, Nova Scotia, 22 January 1999

The media has generally been responsible and circumspect in attempting to keep the public informed and in trying to get it right. Unfortunately at times you are all faced with a considerable amount of misinformation from various sources, other than the TSB investigation.

Some sources, in their attempt to analyse and draw conclusions from their appreciation of the facts or issues, sometimes present misleading interpretations or inadvertently introduce misinformation.

When I release information during this investigation I must do my best to ensure that information is accurate, based on fact, and it must be fair to all concerned. For some issues involving judgments, analysis and final conclusions, the TSBC process requires that a full fairness process that involves the Parties with Direct Interest (PDIs) being given an opportunity to review the findings and provide their input for Board consideration. The Board members then must decide on and approve the final conclusions of the investigations.

When uninformed speculation gets widely promulgated, it is unfair to the next-of-kin of the victims and can at times be prejudicial to the investigation. And it sometimes means the investigation team has to expend considerable effort in trying to correct and clarify the information.

To give you an example of this, we have just finished examining the available components of the copilots seat. This examination has revealed damage to the seat belt that is consistent with the co-pilot seat being occupied when the aircraft struck the water.

You probably remember the number of times that speculative stories appeared about the crew abandoning the cockpit. That type of speculation can cause undue hardship to the families of the crew and the victims families. This is just one example of misleading and inaccurate information that can be damaging and does not further the advancement of safety.

I must add here we have only recovered a small portion of the captain's seat and are unable to make any determinations about that seat. Of course, we are continuing our attempts to find and reconstruct that seat.

I can also say today that the conclusions and interpretations, as reported fairly widely in the last day or so, concerning what went on in the cockpit of the aircraft, are misleading and not accurate.

As you know, I cannot comment on or divulge the actual conversations recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder - that is prevented by Canadian law. But, I can say that the characterizations and the interpretations in the media of that conversation and events are misleading. Some of the facts concerning times and ATC conversations and events are accurate and you should know that the transcripts of the ATC tapes are available on the TSB web site. But, the interpretations of the interactions between the crew members are not only misleading and inaccurate, but are unfair.

Early on in the investigation the investigation team attempted to derive as much factual information as was possible from various sources. We did not have the aircraft wreckage at this point, but we did have the Air Traffic Control Services tape, Radar tape, and Flight recorders.

You'll remember me saying it would take some time to recover this aircraft from 200 feet below the ocean. When analysing that information, care was taken to avoid any premature conclusions in the preparation of documents for the investigation team.

We have a very large International team of investigators here. We do need to share information and that type of document is

produced as a composite and intended to contain just factual information as best we knew it at the time. That document has of course been updated and changed as the investigation proceeds.

We improve our information as we get it from various sources.

Whether or not some of the information currently being circulated came from such a document is not something I will pursue further, but I will say that there is much more additional information that we had to deal with and consider as time has progressed.

At any rate if you receive information concerning this investigation, and it has not been released by the TSB it may be speculative and unconfirmed.

Now, I understand there is significant thirst for information about this accident around the world. It is my intention to provide periodic updates as factual information becomes available. That information will also be placed on the TSB web site at: <http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca>.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: October 29, 2000 1:15:18 AM PDT

To: NTSB

Subject: AI 182 matches TWA 800 and PA 103 and UAL 811

Note jump in hits to www.corazon.com site after arrest of Sikhs for AI 182. Note that the AI 182 report was most asked for. Note email about that fact.

It may be that AI 182, the forgotten wiring/cargo door event yet the most deadly may yet break the case. I'm hoping that the Sikh defense team is more open minded than the PA 103 team or AAIB or NTSB. The RCMP and the TSB are as closed minded about bomb as the other authorities but.....you never know. It appears that the RCMP had the pressure to do about AI 182 what the British did about PA 103, find some foreigners to put on trial for a bombing long ago to justify the expense and time of the investigation.

Three high time 747 explosive decompressions in flight and the official explanations are unsatisfactory and incomplete and yet only wiring/cargo door explanation fills in the holes, so to speak.

Here's the pattern and it all comes back to UAL 811.

Cheers,
Barry

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

103 to 811 were both
aged
high flight time
poly x wired

early model Boeing 747
which took off in no sun
running late
and after takeoff
experienced a sudden initial event in the forward cargo hold
which left a
short
sudden
loud
sound on the cockpit voice recorder, an
abrupt data loss to the flight data recorder,
foreign object damage to starboard engines number 3
fire on engine number 3
engine three fadded number four
more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
at least nine never recovered bodies,
torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,
fracture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward
cargo door,
shattered fuselage shape on right side forward of the wing is
vertical large rectangle around forward cargo door.
door in two big halves split at longitudinal midline.
radar reflection from aircraft at event time

103 and 182 were both:
early model
poly x wired
Boeing 747
suffers hull rupture in forward cargo hold

engine three falls apart from other engines
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt power cut to FDR
sound does not match bomb sound
outward peeled skin in cargo door area
midspan latch status not determined
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door
inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as explanation during official inquiry
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

Pan Am 103 and TWA 800 were both:
aged
high time
early model
poly x wired
Boeing 747
shortly after take off
suffers hull rupture forward of the wing
fodded number three engine
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt power cut to FDR
outward peeled skin in cargo door area

midspan latch status not determined
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed two flights previous to final
fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off explanation is
still believed to be the correct probable cause at least for the last
nine years.
Non bomb structural failure offered as explanation for sudden
loud short sound on the CVR.
Non bomb structural failure rejected.
Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters not tried in court.
Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.

800 to 182
Forward Cargo door frayed
Door Skin shattered outward.
Bottom eight latches latched.
Midspan latch status undetermined.
early model
poly x wired
Boeing 747
shortly after take off
suffers hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side in cargo
door area
damaged number three engine

sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt power cut to FDR
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed at least one flight previous to final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off
explanation was thought to be explanation for at least seventeen months.
Forward cargo door opening in flight considered as explanation for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.
Forward cargo door opening in flight rejected.
Bomb planters would have been terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters not charged.
Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.
Conspiracy explanations considered seriously.

TWA 800 leads to UAL 811 which were both:
aged
high flight time
poly x wired
early model Boeing 747
which took off in no sun
running late
and shortly after takeoff

while climbing
experienced a sudden initial event in the forward cargo hold
which left a
short
sudden
loud
sound on the cockpit voice recorder, an
abrupt data loss to the flight data recorder,
foreign object damage to starboard engine #3
more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
smooth port side forward of the wing
at least nine never recovered bodies,
torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,
rupture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward
cargo door,
inadvertent opening of forward cargo door considered as
probable cause.
bare wires found in cargo door area.
destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.

And UAL 811 leads to Air India 182.

UAL 811 and AI 182 were both:
early model
poly x wired
Boeing 747
had previous problems with cargo doors.
experienced hull rupture forward of the wing on right side in
cargo door area

fodded number three engine
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt data loss to FDR
outward peeled skin in cargo door area
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door
inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as explanation during official inquiry
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

UAL 811

aged
non Section 41 retrofit
high flight time
early model
poly x wired
Boeing 747
had previous problems with forward cargo door.
experienced hull rupture forward of the wing on right side in cargo door area
fodded number three engine
on fire number three engine.
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt power cut to FDR

hoop stress found in cargo door area
outward peeled skin in cargo door area
longitudinal break at midline of the forward cargo door at
midspan latch,
midspan latch status not determined
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door
inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as
explanation during official inquiry
more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
port side smooth forward of the wing
torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,
rupture of forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.

PA 103

aged

non Section 41 retrofit

high time

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing in forward cargo

hold

nose came off

fodded number three engine
engine 3 falls apart from other three engines
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
sound does not match bomb sounds
abrupt power cut to FDR
outward peeled skin in cargo door area
longitudinal break at midline of the forward cargo door at
midspan latch,
midspan latch status not determined
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed two flights previous to final
fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off explanation is
still believed to be the correct probable cause for at least for the
last nine years.
Non bomb structural failure offered as explanation for sudden
loud short sound on the CVR.
Non bomb structural failure rejected.
Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters not tried in court.
Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.

TWA 800

aged

high flight time

non Section 41 retrofit
poly x wired
early model Boeing 747
which took off in no sun
running late
and shortly after takeoff
experienced hull rupture forward of the wing
nose came off
foreign object damage to starboard engines #3
more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
at least nine never recovered bodies,
torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,
post side smooth forward of the wing.
rupture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
bare wire found in cargo door area.
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward
cargo door, and
destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.
parts initially shed from just forward of the wing.
first pieces of structure to leave aircraft in flight from forward
cargo bay.
Forward Cargo door frayed
hoop stress found in cargo door area
Door Skin shattered outward.
Bottom eight latches latched.
Midspan latch status undetermined.
fodded number three engine
fire in number three engine
missing blades from number three engine.
stator blade in right horizontal stabilizer
red paint mark in right horizontal stabilizer

glitter in right horizontal stabilizer.
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt power cut to FDR
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed at least one flight previous to final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off
explanation was thought to be explanation for at least seventeen months.
Forward cargo door opening in flight considered as explanation for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.
Forward cargo door opening in flight rejected.
Bomb planters would have been terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters not charged.
Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.
Conspiracy explanations considered seriously.
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed one flight previous to final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off explanation considered probable cause for seventeen months
Cargo door failure offered as explanation for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.
Cargo door failure explanation rejected.
Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters are not identified

AI 182

non Section 41 retrofit

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

had previous problems with cargo door.

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing

damaged number three engine

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

nose came off

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door

inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as explanation during official inquiry

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

Forward Cargo door frayed

Door Skin shattered outward.

Bottom eight latches latched.

Midspan latch status undetermined.

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

bomb in forward cargo hold placed at least two flights previous to final fatal flight; exploding in flight and nose coming off

explanation was thought to be explanation for at least thirteen

years.

Forward cargo door opening in flight considered as explanation for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.

Forward cargo door opening in flight rejected.

Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.

Bomb planters not charged.

Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.

Conspiracy explanations considered seriously.

sound does not match bomb

From: root <root@mail.redshift.com>

Date: Sun, 29 Oct 2000 00:02:42 -0700

To: postmaster@corazon.com

Subject: Weekly Stats Report For corazon.com

Web Server Statistics for www.corazon.com

=====

Program started at Sun, Oct 29 2000 00:02.

Analyzed requests from Sun, Oct 22 2000 00:23 to Sun, Oct 29 2000 00:13

(6.99 days).

General Summary

Successful requests: 25,840

Average successful requests per day: 3,694

Successful requests for pages: 13,242

Average successful requests for pages per day: 1,893

Failed requests: 316

Distinct files requested: 1,848
Distinct hosts served: 4,140
Corrupt logfile lines: 3,327
Data transferred: 666.748 Mbytes
Average data transferred per day: 95.344 Mbytes

Daily Report

Each unit (+) represents 100 requests for pages or part thereof.

date:	#reqs:	#pages:	
Oct/22/00:	1726:	847:	+++++
Oct/23/00:	2669:	1240:	+++++
Oct/24/00:	2231:	1025:	+++++
Oct/25/00:	3173:	1759:	+++++
Oct/26/00:	1984:	952:	+++++
Oct/27/00:	5283:	2847:	+++++
			+
Oct/28/00:	8747:	4560:	+++++
			+++++

Referrer Report

Listing referring URLs with at least 1 request, sorted by the number of requests.

#reqs: URL

-----: ---

4675: <http://www.corazon.com/AirIndiareportcontents.html>
2280: <http://www.corazon.com/>

1008: [http://www.corazon.com/Boeing 747.html](http://www.corazon.com/Boeing_747.html)
620: <http://www.corazon.com/nosepicts.html>
506: <http://www.ntsب.org/>
390: <http://www.corazon.com/crashcontentspagelinks.html>
302: <http://www.corazon.com/Page2.html>
266: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecancoverCan.html>
185: <http://www.corazon.com/Missingbodies.html>
180: <http://www.corazon.com/811holesofftv.html>
175: <http://www.corazon.com/Damagelocation.html>
173: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan19.html>
166: <http://www.corazon.com/mountain.html>
165: <http://google.yahoo.com/bin/query>
164: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182essentials.html>
156: <http://www.corazon.com/UAL811essentials.html>
155: <http://www.google.com/search>
147: <http://www.corazon.com/811reportcontentpage.html>
145: [http://dailynews.yahoo.com/fc/World/
Air_India_Flight_182/](http://dailynews.yahoo.com/fc/World/Air_India_Flight_182/)
145: <http://www.corazon.com/Suddenloudsound.html>
143: <http://www.corazon.com/Skiescargodoor0pict.html>
136: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan20.html>
136: <http://www.corazon.com/reconstructmatches.html>
132: <http://www.corazon.com/747historycontents.html>
131: <http://www.corazon.com/DC-10crashcontents.html>
130: <http://www.corazon.com/103reportcontents.html>
123: <http://www.corazon.com/Radarblips.html>
118: <http://www.corazon.com/747specsheel.html>
115: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecancoverCan1.html>
115: <http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/5260/crash.html>
110: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan5.html>
105: <http://www.corazon.com/forwardcargodoorpicts.html>
104: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan9.html>
102: <http://www.corazon.com/314accidentreport.html>

99: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan21.html>

99: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan1.html>

Reply-To: "Liam Tully" <lrtully@sprint.ca>

From: "Liam Tully" <lrtully@sprint.ca>

To: <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: Air India Bombings - JUNE85.

Date: Sat, 28 Oct 2000 17:08:10 -0600

X-Priority: 3

Hi Barry.

As you may or may not be aware, charges were laid yesterday in Vancouver against too well known Sikh individuals.

Your site was the ONLY place I could find any REAL info. on the events that took place so long ago. GREAT WORK!

Stay tuned - I have no doubt this "saga" will drag on for another 15 years....

Rgds.

Liam/CYYC

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: October 29, 2000 1:15:26 AM PDT

To: FAA

Subject: AI 182 matches TWA 800 and PA 103 and UAL 811

Note jump in hits to www.corazon.com site after arrest of Sikhs for AI 182. Note that the AI 182 report was most asked for. Note email about that fact.

It may be that AI 182, the forgotten wiring/cargo door event yet the most deadly may yet break the case. I'm hoping that the Sikh defense team is more open minded than the PA 103 team or AAIB or NTSB. The RCMP and the TSB are as closed minded about bomb as the other authorities but.....you never know. It appears that the RCMP had the pressure to do about AI 182 what the British did about PA 103, find some foreigners to put on trial for a bombing long ago to justify the expense and time of the investigation.

Three high time 747 explosive decompressions in flight and the official explanations are unsatisfactory and incomplete and yet only wiring/cargo door explanation fills in the holes, so to speak.

Here's the pattern and it all comes back to UAL 811.

Cheers,
Barry

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

103 to 811 were both
aged
high flight time
poly x wired
early model Boeing 747
which took off in no sun
running late
and after takeoff
experienced a sudden initial event in the forward cargo hold
which left a
short
sudden
loud
sound on the cockpit voice recorder, an
abrupt data loss to the flight data recorder,
foreign object damage to starboard engines number 3
fire on engine number 3
engine three foddred number four
more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
at least nine never recovered bodies,
torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,
fracture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward
cargo door,
shattered fuselage shape on right side forward of the wing is
vertical large rectangle around forward cargo door.
door in two big halves split at longitudinal midline.
radar reflection from aircraft at event time

103 and 182 were both:

early model
poly x wired
Boeing 747
suffers hull rupture in forward cargo hold
engine three falls apart from other engines
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt power cut to FDR
sound does not match bomb sound
outward peeled skin in cargo door area
midspan latch status not determined
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door
inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as
explanation during official inquiry
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

Pan Am 103 and TWA 800 were both:
aged
high time
early model
poly x wired
Boeing 747
shortly after take off
suffers hull rupture forward of the wing
fodded number three engine
sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt power cut to FDR
outward peeled skin in cargo door area
midspan latch status not determined
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed two flights previous to final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off explanation is still believed to be the correct probable cause at least for the last nine years.
Non bomb structural failure offered as explanation for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.
Non bomb structural failure rejected.
Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters not tried in court.
Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.

800 to 182
Forward Cargo door frayed
Door Skin shattered outward.
Bottom eight latches latched.
Midspan latch status undetermined.
early model
poly x wired
Boeing 747

shortly after take off
suffers hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side in cargo door area
damaged number three engine
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt power cut to FDR
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed at least one flight previous to final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off
explanation was thought to be explanation for at least seventeen months.
Forward cargo door opening in flight considered as explanation for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.
Forward cargo door opening in flight rejected.
Bomb planters would have been terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters not charged.
Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.
Conspiracy explanations considered seriously.

TWA 800 leads to UAL 811 which were both:
aged
high flight time
poly x wired

early model Boeing 747
which took off in no sun
running late
and shortly after takeoff
while climbing
experienced a sudden initial event in the forward cargo hold
which left a
short
sudden
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more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
smooth port side forward of the wing
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torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,
rupture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward
cargo door,
inadvertent opening of forward cargo door considered as
probable cause.
bare wires found in cargo door area.
destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.

And UAL 811 leads to Air India 182.

UAL 811 and AI 182 were both:
early model
poly x wired

Boeing 747

had previous problems with cargo doors.
experienced hull rupture forward of the wing on right side in cargo door area
fodded number three engine
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt data loss to FDR
outward peeled skin in cargo door area
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door
inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as explanation during official inquiry
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

UAL 811

aged
non Section 41 retrofit
high flight time
early model
poly x wired
Boeing 747
had previous problems with forward cargo door.
experienced hull rupture forward of the wing on right side in cargo door area
fodded number three engine
on fire number three engine.

sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt power cut to FDR
hoop stress found in cargo door area
outward peeled skin in cargo door area
longitudinal break at midline of the forward cargo door at
midspan latch,
midspan latch status not determined
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door
inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as
explanation during official inquiry
more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
port side smooth forward of the wing
torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,
rupture of forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.

PA 103

aged

non Section 41 retrofit

high time

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing in forward cargo hold

nose came off

fodded number three engine

engine 3 falls apart from other three engines

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

sound does not match bomb sounds

abrupt power cut to FDR

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

longitudinal break at midline of the forward cargo door at midspan latch,

midspan latch status not determined

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

downward bent floor beams in cargo door area

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

bomb in forward cargo hold placed two flights previous to final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off explanation is still believed to be the correct probable cause for at least for the last nine years.

Non bomb structural failure offered as explanation for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.

Non bomb structural failure rejected.

Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.

Bomb planters not tried in court.

Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.

TWA 800

aged

high flight time

non Section 41 retrofit

poly x wired

early model Boeing 747

which took off in no sun

running late

and shortly after takeoff

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing

nose came off

foreign object damage to starboard engines #3

more severe inflight damage on starboard side,

at least nine never recovered bodies,

torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,

post side smooth forward of the wing.

rupture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,

outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,

downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,

bare wire found in cargo door area.

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward cargo door, and

destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.

parts initially shed from just forward of the wing.

first pieces of structure to leave aircraft in flight from forward cargo bay.

Forward Cargo door frayed

hoop stress found in cargo door area

Door Skin shattered outward.

Bottom eight latches latched.

Midspan latch status undetermined.

fodded number three engine

fire in number three engine
missing blades from number three engine.
stator blade in right horizontal stabilizer
red paint mark in right horizontal stabilizer
glitter in right horizontal stabilizer.
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt power cut to FDR
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed at least one flight previous to
final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off
explanation was thought to be explanation for at least seventeen
months.
Forward cargo door opening in flight considered as explanation
for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.
Forward cargo door opening in flight rejected.
Bomb planters would have been terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters not charged.
Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.
Conspiracy explanations considered seriously.
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed one flight previous to final
fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off explanation
considered probable cause for seventeen months
Cargo door failure offered as explanation for sudden loud short

sound on the CVR.

Cargo door failure explanation rejected.

Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.

Bomb planters are not identified

AI 182

non Section 41 retrofit

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

had previous problems with cargo door.

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing

damaged number three engine

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

nose came off

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door

inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as explanation during official inquiry

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

Forward Cargo door frayed

Door Skin shattered outward.

Bottom eight latches latched.

Midspan latch status undetermined.

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed at least two flights previous
to final fatal flight; exploding in flight and nose coming off
explanation was thought to be explanation for at least thirteen
years.

Forward cargo door opening in flight considered as explanation
for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.

Forward cargo door opening in flight rejected.

Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.

Bomb planters not charged.

Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.

Conspiracy explanations considered seriously.

sound does not match bomb

From: root <root@mail.redshift.com>

Date: Sun, 29 Oct 2000 00:02:42 -0700

To: postmaster@corazon.com

Subject: Weekly Stats Report For corazon.com

Web Server Statistics for www.corazon.com

=====

Program started at Sun, Oct 29 2000 00:02.

Analyzed requests from Sun, Oct 22 2000 00:23 to Sun, Oct 29
2000 00:13

(6.99 days).

General Summary

Successful requests: 25,840

Average successful requests per day: 3,694
Successful requests for pages: 13,242
Average successful requests for pages per day: 1,893
Failed requests: 316
Distinct files requested: 1,848
Distinct hosts served: 4,140
Corrupt logfile lines: 3,327
Data transferred: 666.748 Mbytes
Average data transferred per day: 95.344 Mbytes

Daily Report

Each unit (+) represents 100 requests for pages or part thereof.

date:	#reqs:	#pages:	
Oct/22/00:	1726:	847:	+++++++
Oct/23/00:	2669:	1240:	+++++++
Oct/24/00:	2231:	1025:	+++++++
Oct/25/00:	3173:	1759:	+++++++
Oct/26/00:	1984:	952:	+++++++
Oct/27/00:	5283:	2847:	+++++++
			+
Oct/28/00:	8747:	4560:	+++++++
			+++++++

Referrer Report

Listing referring URLs with at least 1 request, sorted by the number of requests.

#reqs: URL

-----: ---

4675: <http://www.corazon.com/AirIndiareportcontents.html>
2280: <http://www.corazon.com/>
1008: [http://www.corazon.com/Boeing 747.html](http://www.corazon.com/Boeing_747.html)
620: <http://www.corazon.com/nosepicts.html>
506: <http://www.ntsب.org/>
390: <http://www.corazon.com/crashcontentspagelinks.html>
302: <http://www.corazon.com/Page2.html>
266: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecancoverCan.html>
185: <http://www.corazon.com/Missingbodies.html>
180: <http://www.corazon.com/811holesofftv.html>
175: <http://www.corazon.com/Damagelocation.html>
173: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan19.html>
166: <http://www.corazon.com/mountain.html>
165: <http://google.yahoo.com/bin/query>
164: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182essentials.html>
156: <http://www.corazon.com/UAL811essentials.html>
155: <http://www.google.com/search>
147: <http://www.corazon.com/811reportcontentpage.html>
145: [http://dailynews.yahoo.com/fc/World/
Air_India_Flight_182/](http://dailynews.yahoo.com/fc/World/Air_India_Flight_182/)
145: <http://www.corazon.com/Suddenloudsound.html>
143: <http://www.corazon.com/Skiescargodoor0pict.html>
136: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan20.html>
136: <http://www.corazon.com/reconstructmatches.html>
132: <http://www.corazon.com/747historycontents.html>
131: <http://www.corazon.com/DC-10crashcontents.html>
130: <http://www.corazon.com/103reportcontents.html>
123: <http://www.corazon.com/Radarblips.html>
118: <http://www.corazon.com/747specsheel.html>
115: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecancoverCan1.html>
115: <http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/5260/crash.html>

110: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan5.html>
105: <http://www.corazon.com/forwardcargodoorpicts.html>
104: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan9.html>
102: <http://www.corazon.com/314accidentreport.html>
99: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan21.html>
99: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan1.html>

Reply-To: "Liam Tully" <lrtully@sprint.ca>
From: "Liam Tully" <lrtully@sprint.ca>
To: <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Air India Bombings - JUNE85.
Date: Sat, 28 Oct 2000 17:08:10 -0600
X-Priority: 3

Hi Barry.

As you may or may not be aware, charges were laid yesterday in Vancouver against too well known Sikh individuals.

Your site was the ONLY place I could find any REAL info. on the events that took place so long ago. GREAT WORK!

Stay tuned - I have no doubt this "saga" will drag on for another 15 years....

Rgds.
Liam/CYYC

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: October 29, 2000 1:16:34 AM PDT

To: newyork@fbi.gov

Subject: AI 182 matches TWA 800 and PA 103 and UAL 811

Note jump in hits to www.corazon.com site after arrest of Sikhs for AI 182. Note that the AI 182 report was most asked for. Note email about that fact.

It may be that AI 182, the forgotten wiring/cargo door event yet the most deadly may yet break the case. I'm hoping that the Sikh defense team is more open minded than the PA 103 team or AAIB or NTSB. The RCMP and the TSB are as closed minded about bomb as the other authorities but.....you never know. It appears that the RCMP had the pressure to do about AI 182 what the British did about PA 103, find some foreigners to put on trial for a bombing long ago to justify the expense and time of the investigation.

Three high time 747 explosive decompressions in flight and the official explanations are unsatisfactory and incomplete and yet only wiring/cargo door explanation fills in the holes, so to speak.

Here's the pattern and it all comes back to UAL 811.

Cheers,
Barry

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com

barry@corazon.com

103 to 811 were both
aged
high flight time
poly x wired
early model Boeing 747
which took off in no sun
running late
and after takeoff
experienced a sudden initial event in the forward cargo hold
which left a
short
sudden
loud
sound on the cockpit voice recorder, an
abrupt data loss to the flight data recorder,
foreign object damage to starboard engines number 3
fire on engine number 3
enginge three fodded number four
more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
at least nine never recovered bodies,
torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,
fracture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward
cargo door,
shattered fuselage shape on right side forward of the wing is
vertical large rectangle around forward cargo door.
door in two big halves split at longitudinal midline.

radar reflection from aircraft at event time

103 and 182 were both:

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

suffers hull rupture in forward cargo hold

engine three falls apart from other engines

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

sound does not match bomb sound

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

midspan latch status not determined

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door

inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as explanation during official inquiry

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

Pan Am 103 and TWA 800 were both:

aged

high time

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

shortly after take off
suffers hull rupture forward of the wing
fodded number three engine
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt power cut to FDR
outward peeled skin in cargo door area
midspan latch status not determined
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed two flights previous to final
fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off explanation is
still believed to be the correct probable cause at least for the last
nine years.
Non bomb structural failure offered as explanation for sudden
loud short sound on the CVR.
Non bomb structural failure rejected.
Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters not tried in court.
Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.

800 to 182

Forward Cargo door frayed
Door Skin shattered outward.
Bottom eight latches latched.

Midspan latch status undetermined.

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

shortly after take off

suffers hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side in cargo door area

damaged number three engine

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

bomb in forward cargo hold placed at least one flight previous to final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off

explanation was thought to be explanation for at least seventeen months.

Forward cargo door opening in flight considered as explanation for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.

Forward cargo door opening in flight rejected.

Bomb planters would have been terrorists of foreign countries.

Bomb planters not charged.

Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.

Conspiracy explanations considered seriously.

TWA 800 leads to UAL 811 which were both:
aged
high flight time
poly x wired
early model Boeing 747
which took off in no sun
running late
and shortly after takeoff
while climbing
experienced a sudden initial event in the forward cargo hold
which left a
short
sudden
loud
sound on the cockpit voice recorder, an
abrupt data loss to the flight data recorder,
foreign object damage to starboard engine #3
more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
smooth port side forward of the wing
at least nine never recovered bodies,
torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,
rupture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward
cargo door,
inadvertent opening of forward cargo door considered as
probable cause.
bare wires found in cargo door area.
destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.

And UAL 811 leads to Air India 182.

UAL 811 and AI 182 were both:
early model
poly x wired
Boeing 747
had previous problems with cargo doors.
experienced hull rupture forward of the wing on right side in
cargo door area
fodded number three engine
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt data loss to FDR
outward peeled skin in cargo door area
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door
inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as
explanation during official inquiry
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

UAL 811
aged
non Section 41 retrofit
high flight time
early model
poly x wired
Boeing 747
had previous problems with forward cargo door.

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing on right side in cargo door area
fodded number three engine
on fire number three engine.
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt power cut to FDR
hoop stress found in cargo door area
outward peeled skin in cargo door area
longitudinal break at midline of the forward cargo door at midspan latch,
midspan latch status not determined
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door
inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as explanation during official inquiry
more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
port side smooth forward of the wing
torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,
rupture of forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.

PA 103
aged

non Section 41 retrofit
high time
early model
poly x wired
Boeing 747
experienced hull rupture forward of the wing in forward cargo
hold
nose came off
fodded number three engine
engine 3 falls apart from other three engines
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
sound does not match bomb sounds
abrupt power cut to FDR
outward peeled skin in cargo door area
longitudinal break at midline of the forward cargo door at
midspan latch,
midspan latch status not determined
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed two flights previous to final
fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off explanation is
still believed to be the correct probable cause for at least for the
last nine years.
Non bomb structural failure offered as explanation for sudden
loud short sound on the CVR.

Non bomb structural failure rejected.
Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters not tried in court.
Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.

TWA 800

aged

high flight time

non Section 41 retrofit

poly x wired

early model Boeing 747

which took off in no sun

running late

and shortly after takeoff

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing

nose came off

foreign object damage to starboard engines #3

more severe inflight damage on starboard side,

at least nine never recovered bodies,

torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,

post side smooth forward of the wing.

rupture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,

outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,

downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,

bare wire found in cargo door area.

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward cargo door, and

destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.

parts initially shed from just forward of the wing.

first pieces of structure to leave aircraft in flight from forward cargo bay.

Forward Cargo door frayed

hoop stress found in cargo door area

Door Skin shattered outward.
Bottom eight latches latched.
Midspan latch status undetermined.
fodded number three engine
fire in number three engine
missing blades from number three engine.
stator blade in right horizontal stabilizer
red paint mark in right horizontal stabilizer
glitter in right horizontal stabilizer.
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt power cut to FDR
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed at least one flight previous to
final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off
explanation was thought to be explanation for at least seventeen
months.
Forward cargo door opening in flight considered as explanation
for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.
Forward cargo door opening in flight rejected.
Bomb planters would have been terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters not charged.
Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.
Conspiracy explanations considered seriously.
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

bomb in forward cargo hold placed one flight previous to final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off explanation considered probable cause for seventeen months
Cargo door failure offered as explanation for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.
Cargo door failure explanation rejected.
Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters are not identified

AI 182

non Section 41 retrofit

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

had previous problems with cargo door.

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing

damaged number three engine

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

nose came off

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door

inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as explanation during official inquiry

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

Forward Cargo door frayed
Door Skin shattered outward.
Bottom eight latches latched.
Midspan latch status undetermined.
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed at least two flights previous
to final fatal flight; exploding in flight and nose coming off
explanation was thought to be explanation for at least thirteen
years.
Forward cargo door opening in flight considered as explanation
for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.
Forward cargo door opening in flight rejected.
Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters not charged.
Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.
Conspiracy explanations considered seriously.
sound does not match bomb

From: root <root@mail.redshift.com>
Date: Sun, 29 Oct 2000 00:02:42 -0700
To: postmaster@corazon.com
Subject: Weekly Stats Report For corazon.com

Web Server Statistics for www.corazon.com

=====

Program started at Sun, Oct 29 2000 00:02.
Analyzed requests from Sun, Oct 22 2000 00:23 to Sun, Oct 29
2000 00:13
(6.99 days).

General Summary

Successful requests: 25,840
Average successful requests per day: 3,694
Successful requests for pages: 13,242
Average successful requests for pages per day: 1,893
Failed requests: 316
Distinct files requested: 1,848
Distinct hosts served: 4,140
Corrupt logfile lines: 3,327
Data transferred: 666.748 Mbytes
Average data transferred per day: 95.344 Mbytes

Daily Report

Each unit (+) represents 100 requests for pages or part thereof.

date: #reqs: #pages:

-----: -----: -----:

Oct/22/00: 1726: 847: ++++++++
Oct/23/00: 2669: 1240: ++++++++
Oct/24/00: 2231: 1025: ++++++++
Oct/25/00: 3173: 1759: ++++++++
Oct/26/00: 1984: 952: ++++++++
Oct/27/00: 5283: 2847: ++++++++
+
Oct/28/00: 8747: 4560: ++++++++
+++++++

Referrer Report

Listing referring URLs with at least 1 request, sorted by the number of requests.

#reqs: URL

-----: ---

4675: <http://www.corazon.com/AirIndiareportcontents.html>

2280: <http://www.corazon.com/>

1008: [http://www.corazon.com/Boeing 747.html](http://www.corazon.com/Boeing_747.html)

620: <http://www.corazon.com/nosepics.html>

506: <http://www.ntsب.org/>

390: <http://www.corazon.com/crashcontentspagelinks.html>

302: <http://www.corazon.com/Page2.html>

266: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecancoverCan.html>

185: <http://www.corazon.com/Missingbodies.html>

180: <http://www.corazon.com/811holesofftv.html>

175: <http://www.corazon.com/Damagelocation.html>

173: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan19.html>

166: <http://www.corazon.com/mountain.html>

165: <http://google.yahoo.com/bin/query>

164: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182essentials.html>

156: <http://www.corazon.com/UAL811essentials.html>

155: <http://www.google.com/search>

147: <http://www.corazon.com/811reportcontentpage.html>

145: <http://dailynews.yahoo.com/fc/World/>

[Air_India_Flight_182/](http://www.corazon.com/Air_India_Flight_182/)

145: <http://www.corazon.com/Suddenloudsound.html>

143: <http://www.corazon.com/Skiescargodoor0pict.html>

136: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan20.html>

136: <http://www.corazon.com/reconstructmatches.html>

132: <http://www.corazon.com/747historycontents.html>

131: <http://www.corazon.com/DC-10crashcontents.html>

130: <http://www.corazon.com/103reportcontents.html>

123: <http://www.corazon.com/Radarblips.html>
118: <http://www.corazon.com/747specsheel.html>
115: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecancoverCan1.html>
115: <http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/5260/crash.html>
110: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan5.html>
105: <http://www.corazon.com/forwardcargodoorpicts.html>
104: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan9.html>
102: <http://www.corazon.com/314accidentreport.html>
99: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan21.html>
99: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan1.html>

Reply-To: "Liam Tully" <lrtully@sprint.ca>
From: "Liam Tully" <lrtully@sprint.ca>
To: <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Air India Bombings - JUNE85.
Date: Sat, 28 Oct 2000 17:08:10 -0600
X-Priority: 3

Hi Barry.

As you may or may not be aware, charges were laid yesterday in Vancouver against too well known Sikh individuals.

Your site was the ONLY place I could find any REAL info. on the events that took place so long ago. GREAT WORK!

Stay tuned - I have no doubt this "saga" will drag on for another 15 years....

Rgds.

Liam/CYYC

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: October 29, 2000 1:28:58 AM PDT
To: Russell.Young@PSS.Boeing.com
Subject: **AI 182 matches TWA 800 and PA 103 and UAL 811**

Note jump in hits to www.corazon.com site after arrest of Sikhs for AI 182. Note that the AI 182 report was most asked for. Note email about that fact.

It may be that AI 182, the forgotten wiring/cargo door event yet the most deadly may yet break the case. I'm hoping that the Sikh defense team is more open minded than the PA 103 team or AAIB or NTSB. The RCMP and the TSB are as closed minded about bomb as the other authorities but.....you never know. It appears that the RCMP had the pressure to do about AI 182 what the British did about PA 103, find some foreigners to put on trial for a bombing long ago to justify the expense and time of the investigation.

Three high time 747 explosive decompressions in flight and the official explanations are unsatisfactory and incomplete and yet only wiring/cargo door explanation fills in the holes, so to speak.

Here's the pattern and it all comes back to UAL 811.

Cheers,
Barry

John Barry Smith

(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

103 to 811 were both
aged
high flight time
poly x wired
early model Boeing 747
which took off in no sun
running late
and after takeoff
experienced a sudden initial event in the forward cargo hold
which left a
short
sudden
loud
sound on the cockpit voice recorder, an
abrupt data loss to the flight data recorder,
foreign object damage to starboard engines number 3
fire on engine number 3
enginge three fodded number four
more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
at least nine never recovered bodies,
torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,
fracture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward

cargo door,
shattered fuselage shape on right side forward of the wing is
vertical large rectangle around forward cargo door.
door in two big halves split at longitudinal midline.
radar reflection from aircraft at event time

103 and 182 were both:

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

suffers hull rupture in forward cargo hold

engine three falls apart from other engines

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

sound does not match bomb sound

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

midspan latch status not determined

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door

inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as
explanation during official inquiry

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

Pan Am 103 and TWA 800 were both:

aged

high time
early model
poly x wired
Boeing 747
shortly after take off
suffers hull rupture forward of the wing
fodded number three engine
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt power cut to FDR
outward peeled skin in cargo door area
midspan latch status not determined
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed two flights previous to final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off explanation is still believed to be the correct probable cause at least for the last nine years.
Non bomb structural failure offered as explanation for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.
Non bomb structural failure rejected.
Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters not tried in court.
Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.

800 to 182

Forward Cargo door frayed

Door Skin shattered outward.

Bottom eight latches latched.

Midspan latch status undetermined.

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

shortly after take off

suffers hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side in cargo door area

damaged number three engine

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

bomb in forward cargo hold placed at least one flight previous to final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off
explanation was thought to be explanation for at least seventeen months.

Forward cargo door opening in flight considered as explanation for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.

Forward cargo door opening in flight rejected.

Bomb planters would have been terrorists of foreign countries.

Bomb planters not charged.

Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.

Conspiracy explanations considered seriously.

TWA 800 leads to UAL 811 which were both:

aged

high flight time

poly x wired

early model Boeing 747

which took off in no sun

running late

and shortly after takeoff

while climbing

experienced a sudden initial event in the forward cargo hold

which left a

short

sudden

loud

sound on the cockpit voice recorder, an

abrupt data loss to the flight data recorder,

foreign object damage to starboard engine #3

more severe inflight damage on starboard side,

smooth port side forward of the wing

at least nine never recovered bodies,

torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,

rupture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,

outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,

downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward cargo door,

inadvertent opening of forward cargo door considered as probable cause.

bare wires found in cargo door area.

destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.

And UAL 811 leads to Air India 182.

UAL 811 and AI 182 were both:

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

had previous problems with cargo doors.

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing on right side in cargo door area

fodded number three engine

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt data loss to FDR

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door

inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as explanation during official inquiry

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

UAL 811

aged

non Section 41 retrofit

high flight time

early model
poly x wired
Boeing 747
had previous problems with forward cargo door.
experienced hull rupture forward of the wing on right side in
cargo door area
fodded number three engine
on fire number three engine.
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt power cut to FDR
hoop stress found in cargo door area
outward peeled skin in cargo door area
longitudinal break at midline of the forward cargo door at
midspan latch,
midspan latch status not determined
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door
inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as
explanation during official inquiry
more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
port side smooth forward of the wing
torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,
rupture of forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.

PA 103

aged

non Section 41 retrofit

high time

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing in forward cargo

hold

nose came off

fodded number three engine

engine 3 falls apart from other three engines

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

sound does not match bomb sounds

abrupt power cut to FDR

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

longitudinal break at midline of the forward cargo door at

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midspan latch status not determined

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more severe inflight damage on starboard side

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still believed to be the correct probable cause for at least for the last nine years.

Non bomb structural failure offered as explanation for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.

Non bomb structural failure rejected.

Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.

Bomb planters not tried in court.

Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.

TWA 800

aged

high flight time

non Section 41 retrofit

poly x wired

early model Boeing 747

which took off in no sun

running late

and shortly after takeoff

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing

nose came off

foreign object damage to starboard engines #3

more severe inflight damage on starboard side,

at least nine never recovered bodies,

torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,

post side smooth forward of the wing.

rupture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,

outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,

downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,

bare wire found in cargo door area.

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward cargo door, and

destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.

parts initially shed from just forward of the wing.

first pieces of structure to leave aircraft in flight from forward cargo bay.

Forward Cargo door frayed

hoop stress found in cargo door area

Door Skin shattered outward.

Bottom eight latches latched.

Midspan latch status undetermined.

fodded number three engine

fire in number three engine

missing blades from number three engine.

stator blade in right horizontal stabilizer

red paint mark in right horizontal stabilizer

glitter in right horizontal stabilizer.

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

bomb in forward cargo hold placed at least one flight previous to final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off

explanation was thought to be explanation for at least seventeen months.

Forward cargo door opening in flight considered as explanation for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.

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Bomb planters would have been terrorists of foreign countries.

Bomb planters not charged.

Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.
Conspiracy explanations considered seriously.
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed one flight previous to final
fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off explanation
considered probable cause for seventeen months
Cargo door failure offered as explanation for sudden loud short
sound on the CVR.
Cargo door failure explanation rejected.
Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters are not identified

AI 182

non Section 41 retrofit

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

had previous problems with cargo door.

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing

damaged number three engine

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

nose came off

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo

door

inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as explanation during official inquiry

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

Forward Cargo door frayed

Door Skin shattered outward.

Bottom eight latches latched.

Midspan latch status undetermined.

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

bomb in forward cargo hold placed at least two flights previous to final fatal flight; exploding in flight and nose coming off explanation was thought to be explanation for at least thirteen years.

Forward cargo door opening in flight considered as explanation for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.

Forward cargo door opening in flight rejected.

Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.

Bomb planters not charged.

Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.

Conspiracy explanations considered seriously.

sound does not match bomb

From: root <root@mail.redshift.com>

Date: Sun, 29 Oct 2000 00:02:42 -0700

To: postmaster@corazon.com

Subject: Weekly Stats Report For corazon.com

Web Server Statistics for www.corazon.com

=====

Program started at Sun, Oct 29 2000 00:02.

Analyzed requests from Sun, Oct 22 2000 00:23 to Sun, Oct 29 2000 00:13
(6.99 days).

General Summary

Successful requests: 25,840
Average successful requests per day: 3,694
Successful requests for pages: 13,242
Average successful requests for pages per day: 1,893
Failed requests: 316
Distinct files requested: 1,848
Distinct hosts served: 4,140
Corrupt logfile lines: 3,327
Data transferred: 666.748 Mbytes
Average data transferred per day: 95.344 Mbytes

Daily Report

Each unit (+) represents 100 requests for pages or part thereof.

date:	#reqs:	#pages:	
Oct/22/00:	1726:	847:	+++++++
Oct/23/00:	2669:	1240:	+++++++
Oct/24/00:	2231:	1025:	+++++++
Oct/25/00:	3173:	1759:	+++++++
Oct/26/00:	1984:	952:	+++++++
Oct/27/00:	5283:	2847:	+++++++
+			
Oct/28/00:	8747:	4560:	+++++++

+++++

Referrer Report

Listing referring URLs with at least 1 request, sorted by the number of requests.

#reqs: URL

-----: ---

4675: <http://www.corazon.com/AirIndiareportcontents.html>

2280: <http://www.corazon.com/>

1008: [http://www.corazon.com/Boeing 747.html](http://www.corazon.com/Boeing_747.html)

620: <http://www.corazon.com/nosepics.html>

506: <http://www.ntsب.org/>

390: <http://www.corazon.com/crashcontentspagelinks.html>

302: <http://www.corazon.com/Page2.html>

266: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecancoverCan.html>

185: <http://www.corazon.com/Missingbodies.html>

180: <http://www.corazon.com/811holesofftv.html>

175: <http://www.corazon.com/Damagelocation.html>

173: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan19.html>

166: <http://www.corazon.com/mountain.html>

165: <http://google.yahoo.com/bin/query>

164: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182essentials.html>

156: <http://www.corazon.com/UAL811essentials.html>

155: <http://www.google.com/search>

147: <http://www.corazon.com/811reportcontentpage.html>

145: <http://dailynews.yahoo.com/fc/World/>

[Air_India_Flight_182/](#)

145: <http://www.corazon.com/Suddenloudsound.html>

143: <http://www.corazon.com/Skiescargodoor0pict.html>

136: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan20.html>

136: <http://www.corazon.com/reconstructmatches.html>
132: <http://www.corazon.com/747historycontents.html>
131: <http://www.corazon.com/DC-10crashcontents.html>
130: <http://www.corazon.com/103reportcontents.html>
123: <http://www.corazon.com/Radarblips.html>
118: <http://www.corazon.com/747specsheel.html>
115: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecancoverCan1.html>
115: <http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/5260/crash.html>
110: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan5.html>
105: <http://www.corazon.com/forwardcargodoorpics.html>
104: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan9.html>
102: <http://www.corazon.com/314accidentreport.html>
99: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan21.html>
99: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan1.html>

Reply-To: "Liam Tully" <lrtully@sprint.ca>
From: "Liam Tully" <lrtully@sprint.ca>
To: <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Air India Bombings - JUNE85.
Date: Sat, 28 Oct 2000 17:08:10 -0600
X-Priority: 3

Hi Barry.

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Stay tuned - I have no doubt this "saga" will drag on for another 15 years....

Rgds.
Liam/CYYC

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: October 29, 2000 1:33:39 AM PDT
To: Jacques.Babin@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
Subject: **AI 182 matches TWA 800 and PA 103 and UAL 811**

Note jump in hits to www.corazon.com site after arrest of Sikhs for AI 182. Note that the AI 182 report was most asked for. Note email about that fact.

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Here's the pattern and it all comes back to UAL 811.

Cheers,
Barry

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
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Carmel Valley, CA 93924
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103 to 811 were both
aged
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which left a
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loud
sound on the cockpit voice recorder, an
abrupt data loss to the flight data recorder,
foreign object damage to starboard engines number 3
fire on engine number 3
enginge three foddred number four
more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
at least nine never recovered bodies,
torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,

fracture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward
cargo door,
shattered fuselage shape on right side forward of the wing is
vertical large rectangle around forward cargo door.
door in two big halves split at longitudinal midline.
radar reflection from aircraft at event time

103 and 182 were both:

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

suffers hull rupture in forward cargo hold

engine three falls apart from other engines

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

sound does not match bomb sound

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

midspan latch status not determined

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door

inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as
explanation during official inquiry

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

Pan Am 103 and TWA 800 were both:

aged

high time

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

shortly after take off

suffers hull rupture forward of the wing

fodded number three engine

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

midspan latch status not determined

took off in no sun

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more severe inflight damage on starboard side

downward bent floor beams in cargo door area

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

bomb in forward cargo hold placed two flights previous to final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off explanation is still believed to be the correct probable cause at least for the last nine years.

Non bomb structural failure offered as explanation for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.

Non bomb structural failure rejected.

Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.

Bomb planters not tried in court.
Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.

800 to 182

Forward Cargo door frayed

Door Skin shattered outward.

Bottom eight latches latched.

Midspan latch status undetermined.

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

shortly after take off

suffers hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side in cargo door area

damaged number three engine

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

bomb in forward cargo hold placed at least one flight previous to final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off

explanation was thought to be explanation for at least seventeen months.

Forward cargo door opening in flight considered as explanation for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.

Forward cargo door opening in flight rejected.
Bomb planters would have been terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters not charged.
Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.
Conspiracy explanations considered seriously.

TWA 800 leads to UAL 811 which were both:

aged

high flight time

poly x wired

early model Boeing 747

which took off in no sun

running late

and shortly after takeoff

while climbing

experienced a sudden initial event in the forward cargo hold

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short

sudden

loud

sound on the cockpit voice recorder, an

abrupt data loss to the flight data recorder,

foreign object damage to starboard engine #3

more severe inflight damage on starboard side,

smooth port side forward of the wing

at least nine never recovered bodies,

torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,

rupture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,

outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,

downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward

cargo door,
inadvertent opening of forward cargo door considered as
probable cause.
bare wires found in cargo door area.
destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.

And UAL 811 leads to Air India 182.

UAL 811 and AI 182 were both:
early model
poly x wired
Boeing 747
had previous problems with cargo doors.
experienced hull rupture forward of the wing on right side in
cargo door area
fodded number three engine
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt data loss to FDR
outward peeled skin in cargo door area
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door
inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as
explanation during official inquiry
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

UAL 811

aged

non Section 41 retrofit

high flight time

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

had previous problems with forward cargo door.

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing on right side in cargo door area

fodded number three engine

on fire number three engine.

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

hoop stress found in cargo door area

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

longitudinal break at midline of the forward cargo door at midspan latch,

midspan latch status not determined

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door

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port side smooth forward of the wing

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outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.

PA 103

aged

non Section 41 retrofit

high time

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing in forward cargo
hold

nose came off

fodded number three engine

engine 3 falls apart from other three engines

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

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sound does not match bomb sounds

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aged

high flight time

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early model Boeing 747

which took off in no sun

running late

and shortly after takeoff

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing

nose came off

foreign object damage to starboard engines #3

more severe inflight damage on starboard side,

at least nine never recovered bodies,

torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,

post side smooth forward of the wing.

rupture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,

outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,

downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,

bare wire found in cargo door area.

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward cargo door, and
destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.
parts initially shed from just forward of the wing.
first pieces of structure to leave aircraft in flight from forward cargo bay.

Forward Cargo door frayed

hoop stress found in cargo door area

Door Skin shattered outward.

Bottom eight latches latched.

Midspan latch status undetermined.

fodded number three engine

fire in number three engine

missing blades from number three engine.

stator blade in right horizontal stabilizer

red paint mark in right horizontal stabilizer

glitter in right horizontal stabilizer.

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

took off in no sun

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at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door

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Forward cargo door opening in flight considered as explanation

for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.
Forward cargo door opening in flight rejected.
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fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off explanation
considered probable cause for seventeen months
Cargo door failure offered as explanation for sudden loud short
sound on the CVR.
Cargo door failure explanation rejected.
Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters are not identified

AI 182

non Section 41 retrofit
early model
poly x wired
Boeing 747
had previous problems with cargo door.
experienced hull rupture forward of the wing
damaged number three engine
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt power cut to FDR
nose came off
outward peeled skin in cargo door area
took off in no sun

running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door
inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as explanation during official inquiry
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
Forward Cargo door frayed
Door Skin shattered outward.
Bottom eight latches latched.
Midspan latch status undetermined.
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed at least two flights previous to final fatal flight; exploding in flight and nose coming off
explanation was thought to be explanation for at least thirteen years.
Forward cargo door opening in flight considered as explanation for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.
Forward cargo door opening in flight rejected.
Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters not charged.
Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.
Conspiracy explanations considered seriously.
sound does not match bomb

From: root <root@mail.redshift.com>
Date: Sun, 29 Oct 2000 00:02:42 -0700
To: postmaster@corazon.com
Subject: Weekly Stats Report For corazon.com

Web Server Statistics for www.corazon.com

Program started at Sun, Oct 29 2000 00:02.
Analyzed requests from Sun, Oct 22 2000 00:23 to Sun, Oct 29
2000 00:13
(6.99 days).

General Summary

Successful requests: 25,840
Average successful requests per day: 3,694
Successful requests for pages: 13,242
Average successful requests for pages per day: 1,893
Failed requests: 316
Distinct files requested: 1,848
Distinct hosts served: 4,140
Corrupt logfile lines: 3,327
Data transferred: 666.748 Mbytes
Average data transferred per day: 95.344 Mbytes

Daily Report

Each unit (+) represents 100 requests for pages or part thereof.

date:	#reqs:	#pages:	
Oct/22/00:	1726:	847:	+++++++
Oct/23/00:	2669:	1240:	+++++++
Oct/24/00:	2231:	1025:	+++++++
Oct/25/00:	3173:	1759:	+++++++

Oct/26/00: 1984: 952: ++++++++
Oct/27/00: 5283: 2847: ++++++++
+
Oct/28/00: 8747: 4560: ++++++++
+++++++

Referrer Report

Listing referring URLs with at least 1 request, sorted by the number of requests.

#reqs: URL

-----: ---

4675: <http://www.corazon.com/AirIndiareportcontents.html>
2280: <http://www.corazon.com/>
1008: <http://www.corazon.com/Boeing 747.html>
620: <http://www.corazon.com/nosepics.html>
506: <http://www.ntsب.org/>
390: <http://www.corazon.com/crashcontentspagelinks.html>
302: <http://www.corazon.com/Page2.html>
266: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecancoverCan.html>
185: <http://www.corazon.com/Missingbodies.html>
180: <http://www.corazon.com/811holesofftv.html>
175: <http://www.corazon.com/Damagelocation.html>
173: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan19.html>
166: <http://www.corazon.com/mountain.html>
165: <http://google.yahoo.com/bin/query>
164: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182essentials.html>
156: <http://www.corazon.com/UAL811essentials.html>
155: <http://www.google.com/search>
147: <http://www.corazon.com/811reportcontentpage.html>
145: <http://dailynews.yahoo.com/fc/World/>

Air_India_Flight_182/

145: <http://www.corazon.com/Suddenloudsound.html>
143: <http://www.corazon.com/Skiescargodoor0pict.html>
136: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan20.html>
136: <http://www.corazon.com/reconstructmatches.html>
132: <http://www.corazon.com/747historycontents.html>
131: <http://www.corazon.com/DC-10crashcontents.html>
130: <http://www.corazon.com/103reportcontents.html>
123: <http://www.corazon.com/Radarblips.html>
118: <http://www.corazon.com/747specsheets.html>
115: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecancoverCan1.html>
115: <http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/5260/crash.html>
110: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan5.html>
105: <http://www.corazon.com/forwardcargodoorpics.html>
104: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan9.html>
102: <http://www.corazon.com/314accidentreport.html>
99: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan21.html>
99: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan1.html>

Reply-To: "Liam Tully" <lrtully@sprint.ca>

From: "Liam Tully" <lrtully@sprint.ca>

To: <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: Air India Bombings - JUNE85.

Date: Sat, 28 Oct 2000 17:08:10 -0600

X-Priority: 3

Hi Barry.

As you may or may not be aware, charges were laid yesterday in Vancouver against too well known Sikh individuals.

Your site was the ONLY place I could find any REAL info. on the events that took place so long ago. GREAT WORK!

Stay tuned - I have no doubt this "saga" will drag on for another 15 years....

Rgds.
Liam/CYYC

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: October 29, 2000 1:33:46 AM PDT
To: Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
Subject: AI 182 matches TWA 800 and PA 103 and UAL 811

Note jump in hits to www.corazon.com site after arrest of Sikhs for AI 182. Note that the AI 182 report was most asked for. Note email about that fact.

It may be that AI 182, the forgotten wiring/cargo door event yet the most deadly may yet break the case. I'm hoping that the Sikh defense team is more open minded than the PA 103 team or AAIB or NTSB. The RCMP and the TSB are as closed minded about bomb as the other authorities but.....you never know. It appears that the RCMP had the pressure to do about AI 182 what the British did about PA 103, find some foreigners to put on trial for a bombing long ago to justify the expense and time of the investigation.

Three high time 747 explosive decompressions in flight and the official explanations are unsatisfactory and incomplete and yet

only wiring/cargo door explanation fills in the holes, so to speak.

Here's the pattern and it all comes back to UAL 811.

Cheers,
Barry

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

103 to 811 were both
aged
high flight time
poly x wired
early model Boeing 747
which took off in no sun
running late
and after takeoff
experienced a sudden initial event in the forward cargo hold
which left a
short
sudden
loud
sound on the cockpit voice recorder, an
abrupt data loss to the flight data recorder,
foreign object damage to starboard engines number 3
fire on engine number 3

engines three and four
more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
at least nine never recovered bodies,
torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,
fracture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward
cargo door,
shattered fuselage shape on right side forward of the wing is
vertical large rectangle around forward cargo door.
door in two big halves split at longitudinal midline.
radar reflection from aircraft at event time

103 and 182 were both:

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

suffers hull rupture in forward cargo hold

engine three falls apart from other engines

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

sound does not match bomb sound

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

midspan latch status not determined

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo

door

inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as explanation during official inquiry

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

Pan Am 103 and TWA 800 were both:

aged

high time

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

shortly after take off

suffers hull rupture forward of the wing

fodded number three engine

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

midspan latch status not determined

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

downward bent floor beams in cargo door area

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

bomb in forward cargo hold placed two flights previous to final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off explanation is still believed to be the correct probable cause at least for the last nine years.

Non bomb structural failure offered as explanation for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.

Non bomb structural failure rejected.

Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.

Bomb planters not tried in court.

Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.

800 to 182

Forward Cargo door frayed

Door Skin shattered outward.

Bottom eight latches latched.

Midspan latch status undetermined.

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

shortly after take off

suffers hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side in cargo door area

damaged number three engine

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

bomb in forward cargo hold placed at least one flight previous to final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off

explanation was thought to be explanation for at least seventeen months.

Forward cargo door opening in flight considered as explanation for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.

Forward cargo door opening in flight rejected.

Bomb planters would have been terrorists of foreign countries.

Bomb planters not charged.

Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.

Conspiracy explanations considered seriously.

TWA 800 leads to UAL 811 which were both:

aged

high flight time

poly x wired

early model Boeing 747

which took off in no sun

running late

and shortly after takeoff

while climbing

experienced a sudden initial event in the forward cargo hold

which left a

short

sudden

loud

sound on the cockpit voice recorder, an

abrupt data loss to the flight data recorder,

foreign object damage to starboard engine #3

more severe inflight damage on starboard side,

smooth port side forward of the wing

at least nine never recovered bodies,

torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,

rupture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward
cargo door,
inadvertent opening of forward cargo door considered as
probable cause.
bare wires found in cargo door area.
destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.

And UAL 811 leads to Air India 182.

UAL 811 and AI 182 were both:
early model
poly x wired
Boeing 747
had previous problems with cargo doors.
experienced hull rupture forward of the wing on right side in
cargo door area
fodded number three engine
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt data loss to FDR
outward peeled skin in cargo door area
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door
inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as

explanation during official inquiry
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

UAL 811

aged

non Section 41 retrofit

high flight time

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

had previous problems with forward cargo door.

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing on right side in
cargo door area

fodded number three engine

on fire number three engine.

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

hoop stress found in cargo door area

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

longitudinal break at midline of the forward cargo door at
midspan latch,

midspan latch status not determined

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door

inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as
explanation during official inquiry

more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
port side smooth forward of the wing
torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,
rupture of forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.

PA 103

aged

non Section 41 retrofit

high time

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing in forward cargo
hold

nose came off

fodded number three engine

engine 3 falls apart from other three engines

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

sound does not match bomb sounds

abrupt power cut to FDR

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

longitudinal break at midline of the forward cargo door at
midspan latch,

midspan latch status not determined

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed two flights previous to final
fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off explanation is
still believed to be the correct probable cause for at least for the
last nine years.
Non bomb structural failure offered as explanation for sudden
loud short sound on the CVR.
Non bomb structural failure rejected.
Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters not tried in court.
Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.

TWA 800

aged
high flight time
non Section 41 retrofit
poly x wired
early model Boeing 747
which took off in no sun
running late
and shortly after takeoff
experienced hull rupture forward of the wing
nose came off
foreign object damage to starboard engines #3
more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
at least nine never recovered bodies,
torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,
post side smooth forward of the wing.

rupture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
bare wire found in cargo door area.
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward
cargo door, and
destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.
parts initially shed from just forward of the wing.
first pieces of structure to leave aircraft in flight from forward
cargo bay.
Forward Cargo door frayed
hoop stress found in cargo door area
Door Skin shattered outward.
Bottom eight latches latched.
Midspan latch status undetermined.
fodded number three engine
fire in number three engine
missing blades from number three engine.
stator blade in right horizontal stabilizer
red paint mark in right horizontal stabilizer
glitter in right horizontal stabilizer.
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt power cut to FDR
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed at least one flight previous to

final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off
explanation was thought to be explanation for at least seventeen
months.

Forward cargo door opening in flight considered as explanation
for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.

Forward cargo door opening in flight rejected.

Bomb planters would have been terrorists of foreign countries.

Bomb planters not charged.

Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.

Conspiracy explanations considered seriously.

downward bent floor beams in cargo door area

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

bomb in forward cargo hold placed one flight previous to final

fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off explanation

considered probable cause for seventeen months

Cargo door failure offered as explanation for sudden loud short
sound on the CVR.

Cargo door failure explanation rejected.

Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.

Bomb planters are not identified

AI 182

non Section 41 retrofit

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

had previous problems with cargo door.

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing

damaged number three engine

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR
nose came off
outward peeled skin in cargo door area
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door
inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as explanation during official inquiry
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
Forward Cargo door frayed
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bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
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sound does not match bomb

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Date: Sun, 29 Oct 2000 00:02:42 -0700
To: postmaster@corazon.com
Subject: Weekly Stats Report For corazon.com

Web Server Statistics for www.corazon.com

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Analyzed requests from Sun, Oct 22 2000 00:23 to Sun, Oct 29
2000 00:13
(6.99 days).

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Average successful requests per day: 3,694
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Average successful requests for pages per day: 1,893
Failed requests: 316
Distinct files requested: 1,848
Distinct hosts served: 4,140
Corrupt logfile lines: 3,327
Data transferred: 666.748 Mbytes
Average data transferred per day: 95.344 Mbytes

Daily Report

Each unit (+) represents 100 requests for pages or part thereof.

date: #reqs: #pages:
-----: -----: -----:

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Oct/23/00: 2669: 1240: ++++++++
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Oct/27/00: 5283: 2847: ++++++++
+
Oct/28/00: 8747: 4560: ++++++++
+++++++

Referrer Report

Listing referring URLs with at least 1 request, sorted by the number of requests.

#reqs: URL

-----: ---

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145: [http://dailynews.yahoo.com/fc/World/
Air_India_Flight_182/](http://dailynews.yahoo.com/fc/World/Air_India_Flight_182/)
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110: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan5.html>
105: <http://www.corazon.com/forwardcargodoorpics.html>
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99: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan21.html>
99: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan1.html>

Reply-To: "Liam Tully" <lrtully@sprint.ca>
From: "Liam Tully" <lrtully@sprint.ca>
To: <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Air India Bombings - JUNE85.
Date: Sat, 28 Oct 2000 17:08:10 -0600
X-Priority: 3

Hi Barry.

As you may or may not be aware, charges were laid yesterday in Vancouver against too well known Sikh individuals.

Your site was the ONLY place I could find any REAL info. on the events that took place so long ago. GREAT WORK!

Stay tuned - I have no doubt this "saga" will drag on for another 15 years....

Rgds.
Liam/CYYC

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: October 29, 2000 1:33:57 AM PDT
To: Communications@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
Subject: For Mr. John Garstaing AI 182 matches TWA 800 and PA 103 and UAL 811

Note jump in hits to www.corazon.com site after arrest of Sikhs for AI 182. Note that the AI 182 report was most asked for. Note email about that fact.

It may be that AI 182, the forgotten wiring/cargo door event yet the most deadly may yet break the case. I'm hoping that the Sikh defense team is more open minded than the PA 103 team or AAIB or NTSB. The RCMP and the TSB are as closed minded about bomb as the other authorities but.....you never know. It appears that the RCMP had the pressure to do about AI 182 what the British did about PA 103, find some foreigners to put on trial

for a bombing long ago to justify the expense and time of the investigation.

Three high time 747 explosive decompressions in flight and the official explanations are unsatisfactory and incomplete and yet only wiring/cargo door explanation fills in the holes, so to speak.

Here's the pattern and it all comes back to UAL 811.

Cheers,
Barry

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

103 to 811 were both
aged
high flight time
poly x wired
early model Boeing 747
which took off in no sun
running late
and after takeoff
experienced a sudden initial event in the forward cargo hold
which left a
short
sudden

loud

sound on the cockpit voice recorder, an
abrupt data loss to the flight data recorder,
foreign object damage to starboard engines number 3
fire on engine number 3
engine three fiddled number four
more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
at least nine never recovered bodies,
torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,
fracture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward
cargo door,
shattered fuselage shape on right side forward of the wing is
vertical large rectangle around forward cargo door.
door in two big halves split at longitudinal midline.
radar reflection from aircraft at event time

103 and 182 were both:

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

suffers hull rupture in forward cargo hold

engine three falls apart from other engines

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

sound does not match bomb sound

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

midspan latch status not determined

took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door
inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as
explanation during official inquiry
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

Pan Am 103 and TWA 800 were both:

aged
high time
early model
poly x wired
Boeing 747
shortly after take off
suffers hull rupture forward of the wing
fodded number three engine
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt power cut to FDR
outward peeled skin in cargo door area
midspan latch status not determined
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed two flights previous to final
fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off explanation is
still believed to be the correct probable cause at least for the last
nine years.

Non bomb structural failure offered as explanation for sudden
loud short sound on the CVR.

Non bomb structural failure rejected.

Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.

Bomb planters not tried in court.

Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.

800 to 182

Forward Cargo door frayed

Door Skin shattered outward.

Bottom eight latches latched.

Midspan latch status undetermined.

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

shortly after take off

suffers hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side in cargo
door area

damaged number three engine

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

bomb in forward cargo hold placed at least one flight previous to final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off
explanation was thought to be explanation for at least seventeen months.

Forward cargo door opening in flight considered as explanation for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.

Forward cargo door opening in flight rejected.

Bomb planters would have been terrorists of foreign countries.

Bomb planters not charged.

Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.

Conspiracy explanations considered seriously.

TWA 800 leads to UAL 811 which were both:

aged

high flight time

poly x wired

early model Boeing 747

which took off in no sun

running late

and shortly after takeoff

while climbing

experienced a sudden initial event in the forward cargo hold

which left a

short

sudden

loud

sound on the cockpit voice recorder, an

abrupt data loss to the flight data recorder,

foreign object damage to starboard engine #3
more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
smooth port side forward of the wing
at least nine never recovered bodies,
torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,
rupture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward
cargo door,
inadvertent opening of forward cargo door considered as
probable cause.
bare wires found in cargo door area.
destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.

And UAL 811 leads to Air India 182.

UAL 811 and AI 182 were both:

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

had previous problems with cargo doors.

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing on right side in

cargo door area

fodded number three engine

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt data loss to FDR

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door
inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as
explanation during official inquiry
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

UAL 811

aged

non Section 41 retrofit

high flight time

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

had previous problems with forward cargo door.

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing on right side in
cargo door area

fodded number three engine

on fire number three engine.

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

hoop stress found in cargo door area

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

longitudinal break at midline of the forward cargo door at
midspan latch,

midspan latch status not determined

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door
inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as explanation during official inquiry
more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
port side smooth forward of the wing
torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,
rupture of forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.

PA 103

aged

non Section 41 retrofit

high time

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing in forward cargo hold

nose came off

fodded number three engine

engine 3 falls apart from other three engines

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

sound does not match bomb sounds

abrupt power cut to FDR

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

longitudinal break at midline of the forward cargo door at
midspan latch,
midspan latch status not determined
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed two flights previous to final
fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off explanation is
still believed to be the correct probable cause for at least for the
last nine years.
Non bomb structural failure offered as explanation for sudden
loud short sound on the CVR.
Non bomb structural failure rejected.
Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters not tried in court.
Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.

TWA 800

aged
high flight time
non Section 41 retrofit
poly x wired
early model Boeing 747
which took off in no sun
running late
and shortly after takeoff
experienced hull rupture forward of the wing
nose came off

foreign object damage to starboard engines #3
more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
at least nine never recovered bodies,
torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,
post side smooth forward of the wing.
rupture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
bare wire found in cargo door area.
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward
cargo door, and
destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.
parts initially shed from just forward of the wing.
first pieces of structure to leave aircraft in flight from forward
cargo bay.
Forward Cargo door frayed
hoop stress found in cargo door area
Door Skin shattered outward.
Bottom eight latches latched.
Midspan latch status undetermined.
fodded number three engine
fire in number three engine
missing blades from number three engine.
stator blade in right horizontal stabilizer
red paint mark in right horizontal stabilizer
glitter in right horizontal stabilizer.
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt power cut to FDR
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed at least one flight previous to final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off
explanation was thought to be explanation for at least seventeen months.
Forward cargo door opening in flight considered as explanation for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.
Forward cargo door opening in flight rejected.
Bomb planters would have been terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters not charged.
Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.
Conspiracy explanations considered seriously.
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed one flight previous to final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off explanation considered probable cause for seventeen months
Cargo door failure offered as explanation for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.
Cargo door failure explanation rejected.
Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters are not identified

AI 182

non Section 41 retrofit

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

had previous problems with cargo door.

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing
damaged number three engine
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt power cut to FDR
nose came off
outward peeled skin in cargo door area
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door
inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as
explanation during official inquiry
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
Forward Cargo door frayed
Door Skin shattered outward.
Bottom eight latches latched.
Midspan latch status undetermined.
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected
bomb in forward cargo hold placed at least two flights previous
to final fatal flight; exploding in flight and nose coming off
explanation was thought to be explanation for at least thirteen
years.
Forward cargo door opening in flight considered as explanation
for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.
Forward cargo door opening in flight rejected.
Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters not charged.
Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.
Conspiracy explanations considered seriously.

sound does not match bomb

From: root <root@mail.redshift.com>
Date: Sun, 29 Oct 2000 00:02:42 -0700
To: postmaster@corazon.com
Subject: Weekly Stats Report For corazon.com

Web Server Statistics for www.corazon.com

Program started at Sun, Oct 29 2000 00:02.
Analyzed requests from Sun, Oct 22 2000 00:23 to Sun, Oct 29
2000 00:13
(6.99 days).

General Summary

Successful requests: 25,840
Average successful requests per day: 3,694
Successful requests for pages: 13,242
Average successful requests for pages per day: 1,893
Failed requests: 316
Distinct files requested: 1,848
Distinct hosts served: 4,140
Corrupt logfile lines: 3,327
Data transferred: 666.748 Mbytes
Average data transferred per day: 95.344 Mbytes

Daily Report

Each unit (+) represents 100 requests for pages or part thereof.

date: #reqs: #pages:

-----: -----: -----:

Oct/22/00: 1726: 847: ++++++++
 Oct/23/00: 2669: 1240: ++++++++
 Oct/24/00: 2231: 1025: ++++++++
 Oct/25/00: 3173: 1759: ++++++++
 Oct/26/00: 1984: 952: ++++++++
 Oct/27/00: 5283: 2847: ++++++++
 +
 Oct/28/00: 8747: 4560: ++++++++
 ++++++++

Referrer Report

Listing referring URLs with at least 1 request, sorted by the number of requests.

#reqs: URL

-----: ---

4675: <http://www.corazon.com/AirIndiareportcontents.html>
 2280: <http://www.corazon.com/>
 1008: <http://www.corazon.com/Boeing 747.html>
 620: <http://www.corazon.com/nosepics.html>
 506: <http://www.ntsب.org/>
 390: <http://www.corazon.com/crashcontentspagelinks.html>
 302: <http://www.corazon.com/Page2.html>
 266: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecancoverCan.html>
 185: <http://www.corazon.com/Missingbodies.html>
 180: <http://www.corazon.com/811holesofftv.html>

175: <http://www.corazon.com/Damagelocation.html>
173: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan19.html>
166: <http://www.corazon.com/mountain.html>
165: <http://google.yahoo.com/bin/query>
164: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182essentials.html>
156: <http://www.corazon.com/UAL811essentials.html>
155: <http://www.google.com/search>
147: <http://www.corazon.com/811reportcontentpage.html>
145: [http://dailynews.yahoo.com/fc/World/
Air_India_Flight_182/](http://dailynews.yahoo.com/fc/World/Air_India_Flight_182/)
145: <http://www.corazon.com/Suddenloudsound.html>
143: <http://www.corazon.com/Skiescargodoor0pict.html>
136: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan20.html>
136: <http://www.corazon.com/reconstructmatches.html>
132: <http://www.corazon.com/747historycontents.html>
131: <http://www.corazon.com/DC-10crashcontents.html>
130: <http://www.corazon.com/103reportcontents.html>
123: <http://www.corazon.com/Radarblips.html>
118: <http://www.corazon.com/747specsheets.html>
115: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecancoverCan1.html>
115: <http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/5260/crash.html>
110: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan5.html>
105: <http://www.corazon.com/forwardcargodoorpics.html>
104: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan9.html>
102: <http://www.corazon.com/314accidentreport.html>
99: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan21.html>
99: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan1.html>

Reply-To: "Liam Tully" <lrtully@sprint.ca>
From: "Liam Tully" <lrtully@sprint.ca>
To: <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Air India Bombings - JUNE85.
Date: Sat, 28 Oct 2000 17:08:10 -0600

X-Priority: 3

Hi Barry.

As you may or may not be aware, charges were laid yesterday in Vancouver against too well known Sikh individuals.

Your site was the ONLY place I could find any REAL info. on the events that took place so long ago. GREAT WORK!

Stay tuned - I have no doubt this "saga" will drag on for another 15 years....

Rgds.
Liam/CYYC

From: "Babin, Jacques" <Jacques.Babin@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca>
Date: October 29, 2000 1:35:30 AM PDT
To: "John Barry Smith" <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Jacques Babin

Starting July 13, the Acting Manager of Communications at the TSB will be Johanne Ostiguy at Johanne.Ostiguy@bst.gc.ca, and from August 7on, it will be Jim Harris at Jim.Harris@tsb.gc.ca.

À compter du 13 juillet, le gestionnaire intérimaire des communications au BST sera Johanne Ostiguy (Johanne.Ostiguy@bst.gc.ca), et à compter du 7 août, ce sera Jim

Harris (Jim.Harris@tsb.gc.ca).

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: October 29, 2000 2:11:25 AM PST

To: Jim.Harris@tsb.gc.ca

Subject: Please forward to Mr. John Garstaing of TSB AI 182 matches TWA 800 and PA 103 and UAL 811

Note jump in hits to www.corazon.com site after arrest of Sikhs for AI 182. Note that the AI 182 report was most asked for. Note email about that fact.

It may be that AI 182, the forgotten wiring/cargo door event yet the most deadly may yet break the case. I'm hoping that the Sikh defense team is more open minded than the PA 103 team or AAIB or NTSB. The RCMP and the TSB are as closed minded about bomb as the other authorities but.....you never know. It appears that the RCMP had the pressure to do about AI 182 what the British did about PA 103, find some foreigners to put on trial for a bombing long ago to justify the expense and time of the investigation.

Three high time 747 explosive decompressions in flight and the official explanations are unsatisfactory and incomplete and yet only wiring/cargo door explanation fills in the holes, so to speak.

Here's the pattern and it all comes back to UAL 811.

Cheers,
Barry

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

103 to 811 were both
aged
high flight time
poly x wired
early model Boeing 747
which took off in no sun
running late
and after takeoff
experienced a sudden initial event in the forward cargo hold
which left a
short
sudden
loud
sound on the cockpit voice recorder, an
abrupt data loss to the flight data recorder,
foreign object damage to starboard engines number 3
fire on engine number 3
enginge three fodded number four
more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
at least nine never recovered bodies,
torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,

fracture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward
cargo door,
shattered fuselage shape on right side forward of the wing is
vertical large rectangle around forward cargo door.
door in two big halves split at longitudinal midline.
radar reflection from aircraft at event time

103 and 182 were both:

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

suffers hull rupture in forward cargo hold

engine three falls apart from other engines

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

sound does not match bomb sound

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

midspan latch status not determined

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door

inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as
explanation during official inquiry

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

Pan Am 103 and TWA 800 were both:

aged

high time

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

shortly after take off

suffers hull rupture forward of the wing

fodded number three engine

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

midspan latch status not determined

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

downward bent floor beams in cargo door area

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

bomb in forward cargo hold placed two flights previous to final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off explanation is still believed to be the correct probable cause at least for the last nine years.

Non bomb structural failure offered as explanation for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.

Non bomb structural failure rejected.

Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.

Bomb planters not tried in court.
Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.

800 to 182

Forward Cargo door frayed

Door Skin shattered outward.

Bottom eight latches latched.

Midspan latch status undetermined.

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

shortly after take off

suffers hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side in cargo door area

damaged number three engine

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

bomb in forward cargo hold placed at least one flight previous to final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off

explanation was thought to be explanation for at least seventeen months.

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Forward cargo door opening in flight rejected.
Bomb planters would have been terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters not charged.
Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.
Conspiracy explanations considered seriously.

TWA 800 leads to UAL 811 which were both:
aged
high flight time
poly x wired
early model Boeing 747
which took off in no sun
running late
and shortly after takeoff
while climbing
experienced a sudden initial event in the forward cargo hold
which left a
short
sudden
loud
sound on the cockpit voice recorder, an
abrupt data loss to the flight data recorder,
foreign object damage to starboard engine #3
more severe inflight damage on starboard side,
smooth port side forward of the wing
at least nine never recovered bodies,
torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,
rupture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,
outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward

cargo door,
inadvertent opening of forward cargo door considered as
probable cause.
bare wires found in cargo door area.
destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.

And UAL 811 leads to Air India 182.

UAL 811 and AI 182 were both:
early model
poly x wired
Boeing 747
had previous problems with cargo doors.
experienced hull rupture forward of the wing on right side in
cargo door area
fodded number three engine
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt data loss to FDR
outward peeled skin in cargo door area
took off in no sun
running late
more severe inflight damage on starboard side
at least nine never recovered bodies
vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo
door
inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as
explanation during official inquiry
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

UAL 811

aged

non Section 41 retrofit

high flight time

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

had previous problems with forward cargo door.

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing on right side in cargo door area

fodded number three engine

on fire number three engine.

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

hoop stress found in cargo door area

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

longitudinal break at midline of the forward cargo door at midspan latch,

midspan latch status not determined

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door

inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as explanation during official inquiry

more severe inflight damage on starboard side,

port side smooth forward of the wing

torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,

rupture of forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,

outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,
destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.

PA 103

aged

non Section 41 retrofit

high time

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing in forward cargo
hold

nose came off

fodded number three engine

engine 3 falls apart from other three engines

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

sound does not match bomb sounds

abrupt power cut to FDR

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

longitudinal break at midline of the forward cargo door at
midspan latch,

midspan latch status not determined

took off in no sun

running late

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

downward bent floor beams in cargo door area

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo

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Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.

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TWA 800

aged

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early model Boeing 747

which took off in no sun

running late

and shortly after takeoff

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing

nose came off

foreign object damage to starboard engines #3

more severe inflight damage on starboard side,

at least nine never recovered bodies,

torn off skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side,

post side smooth forward of the wing.

rupture at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch,

outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage,

downward bent floor beams in cargo door area,

bare wire found in cargo door area.

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward cargo door, and
destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb.
parts initially shed from just forward of the wing.
first pieces of structure to leave aircraft in flight from forward cargo bay.

Forward Cargo door frayed

hoop stress found in cargo door area

Door Skin shattered outward.

Bottom eight latches latched.

Midspan latch status undetermined.

fodded number three engine

fire in number three engine

missing blades from number three engine.

stator blade in right horizontal stabilizer

red paint mark in right horizontal stabilizer

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sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt power cut to FDR

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vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

bomb in forward cargo hold placed at least one flight previous to final fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off

explanation was thought to be explanation for at least seventeen months.

Forward cargo door opening in flight considered as explanation

for sudden loud short sound on the CVR.
Forward cargo door opening in flight rejected.
Bomb planters would have been terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters not charged.
Bomb planters deny they planted bomb.
Conspiracy explanations considered seriously.
downward bent floor beams in cargo door area
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bomb in forward cargo hold placed one flight previous to final
fatal flight exploding in flight and nose coming off explanation
considered probable cause for seventeen months
Cargo door failure offered as explanation for sudden loud short
sound on the CVR.
Cargo door failure explanation rejected.
Bomb planters are terrorists of foreign countries.
Bomb planters are not identified

AI 182

non Section 41 retrofit
early model
poly x wired
Boeing 747
had previous problems with cargo door.
experienced hull rupture forward of the wing
damaged number three engine
sudden sound on CVR
loud sound on the CVR
short duration sound on the CVR
abrupt power cut to FDR
nose came off
outward peeled skin in cargo door area
took off in no sun

running late
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(6.99 days).

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Corrupt logfile lines: 3,327
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Average data transferred per day: 95.344 Mbytes

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Oct/25/00:	3173:	1759:	+++++++

Oct/26/00: 1984: 952: ++++++++
Oct/27/00: 5283: 2847: ++++++++
+
Oct/28/00: 8747: 4560: ++++++++
+++++++

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390: <http://www.corazon.com/crashcontentspagelinks.html>
302: <http://www.corazon.com/Page2.html>
266: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecancoverCan.html>
185: <http://www.corazon.com/Missingbodies.html>
180: <http://www.corazon.com/811holesofftv.html>
175: <http://www.corazon.com/Damagelocation.html>
173: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan19.html>
166: <http://www.corazon.com/mountain.html>
165: <http://google.yahoo.com/bin/query>
164: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182essentials.html>
156: <http://www.corazon.com/UAL811essentials.html>
155: <http://www.google.com/search>
147: <http://www.corazon.com/811reportcontentpage.html>
145: <http://dailynews.yahoo.com/fc/World/>

Air_India_Flight_182/

145: <http://www.corazon.com/Suddenloudsound.html>
143: <http://www.corazon.com/Skiescargodoor0pict.html>
136: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan20.html>
136: <http://www.corazon.com/reconstructmatches.html>
132: <http://www.corazon.com/747historycontents.html>
131: <http://www.corazon.com/DC-10crashcontents.html>
130: <http://www.corazon.com/103reportcontents.html>
123: <http://www.corazon.com/Radarblips.html>
118: <http://www.corazon.com/747specsheel.html>
115: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecancoverCan1.html>
115: <http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/5260/crash.html>
110: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan5.html>
105: <http://www.corazon.com/forwardcargodoorpicts.html>
104: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan9.html>
102: <http://www.corazon.com/314accidentreport.html>
99: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan21.html>
99: <http://www.corazon.com/AI182pagecan1.html>

Reply-To: "Liam Tully" <lrtully@sprint.ca>

From: "Liam Tully" <lrtully@sprint.ca>

To: <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: Air India Bombings - JUNE85.

Date: Sat, 28 Oct 2000 17:08:10 -0600

X-Priority: 3

Hi Barry.

As you may or may not be aware, charges were laid yesterday in Vancouver against too well known Sikh individuals.

Your site was the ONLY place I could find any REAL info. on the events that took place so long ago. GREAT WORK!

Stay tuned - I have no doubt this "saga" will drag on for another 15 years....

Rgds.
Liam/CYYC

From: "Harris, Jim" <Jim.Harris@tsb.gc.ca>
Date: March 16, 2001 11:41:25 AM PST
To: "barry@corazon.com" <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: **FW: AI 182 bomb location**

Mr. Smith,

Since this is the subject of an RCMP investigation, and is in criminal court, it would be inappropriate for anyone at the TSB to discuss this matter. It would be recommended that your enquiry be directed to the RCMP at:

Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather Street
Vancouver, B.C.
V5Z 1K6

Regards

Jim Harris
Public Affairs Advisor
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
*819-994-8053
*jim.harris@tsb.gc.ca

-----Original Message-----

From: John Barry Smith
Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2001 11:07 PM
To: Securitas
Subject: Urgent for John Garstang of TSB re: AI 182 bomb location

Dear Sir or Madam in Security:

Please forward to Mr. John Garstang of Transportation Safety Board of Canada regarding Air India 182 bomb location.

Dear Mr. Garstang, 13 Mar 01

This John Barry Smith. We have corresponded in the past and you called me on the telephone at my home regarding Air India 182.

I now understand the bomb location in AI 182 has been changed from the forward cargo door compartment to the aft.

Will you please email me at barry@corazon.com or call me at 1 831 659 3552 for further discussion on this most important matter?

Sincerely,
Barry

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

At 3:18 PM +0400 2/27/97, Securitas wrote:

Thank you for your report expressing concern about the opening of cargo doors on B-747 aircraft. During any aircraft crash, investigators examine every piece of evidence, in order to determine cause. In the case of the Air India flight, the cargo door was in fact retrieved from the bottom of the ocean by the investigators. The latches were still in place, and there was no evidence on the edges of the door to indicate in-flight opening of that door.

On the other hand, there was other solid evidence indicating a bomb blast had occurred. Aircraft accident investigators are trained people. Anybody can say anything they want on the Internet. Put your money on

the
experts;
you will win more often. <<x400.txt>>

Attachment converted: Master:x400.txt (TEXT/TBB6)
(0004B01D)

This message has the following attachments:
file://localhost/Users/barry/Library/Mail/
Attachments/.DS_Store

From: "Harris, Jim" <Jim.Harris@tsb.gc.ca>
Date: March 22, 2001 12:50:41 PM PST
To: "John Barry Smith" <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: **RE: Clear and Present danger to the Canadian flying public**

Mr. Smith,

Since you are a United States citizen and your safety concerns stem from the occurrence involving an American registered and manufactured aircraft, UAL 811, which was investigated in detail by the NTSB, I recommend that you contact the NTSB and/or the FAA who are responsible for taking safety action in your country. The TSB has a close working relationship with the NTSB, and the NTSB has specifically looked into wiring issues for some time (e.g. TWA 800). We have exchanged information with them

on this
subject. Should the NTSB deem it necessary to take follow-up
safety action
based on your input, we would be informed of this through our
normal working
relations with them.

Jim Harris
Public Affairs Advisor
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
*819-994-8053
*jim.harris@tsb.gc.ca

-----Original Message-----

From: John Barry Smith [SMTP:barry@corazon.com]
Sent: 16-Mar-01 19:38
To: Harris, Jim
Subject: Clear and Present danger to the Canadian flying public

Dear Mr. Harris, thank you for your reply and referring me to the
RCMP,
which I shall do regarding any criminal aspects of this airplane
crash.

However, I would like to inform you and the TSB of a clear and
present
danger to the Canadian flying public as we speak. This danger is
known
faulty wiring (see Swiss Air 111 TSB investigation on polyimide
insulation) which is causing forward cargo doors of early model

Boeing 747

to open in flight. This conclusion is made by my research into Air India

182 accident in which the TSB (then CASB) reported in its finding:

4.0 CONCLUSIONS

The Canadian Aviation Safety Board respectfully submits as follows:

4.1 Cause-Related Findings

1. At 0714 GMT, 23 June 1985, and without warning, Air India Flight 182

was subjected to a sudden event at an altitude of 31,000 feet resulting in

its crash into the sea and the death of all on board.

2. The forward and aft cargo compartments ruptured before water impact.

3. The section aft of the wings of the aircraft separated from the forward portion before water impact.

4. There is no evidence to indicate that structural failure of the aircraft was the lead event in this occurrence.

5. There is considerable circumstantial and other evidence to indicate that the initial event was an explosion occurring in the forward

cargo compartment. This evidence is not conclusive. However, the evidence

does not support any other conclusion.

Mr. Harris, note the Canadians said 'an explosion occurring in the forward

cargo compartment." That is correct. There was an explosion and it was

explosive decompression.

There is now evidence to indicate structural failure was the lead event of this occurrence, UAL 811 of NTSB 92/02 which states: 'On February 24, 1989, United Airlines flight 811, a Boeing 747-122, experienced an explosive decompression as it was climbing between 22,000 and 23,000 feet after taking off from Honolulu, Hawaii, en route to Sydney, Australia with 3 flightcrew, 15 flight attendants, and 337 passengers aboard. The airplane made a successful emergency landing at Honolulu and the occupants evacuated the airplane. Examination of the airplane revealed that the forward lower lobe cargo door had separated in flight and had caused extensive damage to the fuselage and cabin structure adjacent to the door. Nine of the passengers had been ejected from the airplane and lost at sea. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the sudden opening of the forward lower lobe cargo door in flight and the subsequent explosive decompression. The door opening was attributed to a faulty switch or wiring in the door control system which permitted electrical actuation of the door latches toward the unlatched position after initial door closure and before takeoff.

This event of 1989 was not available to the TSB investigators of 1985. The matching of evidence of UAL 811 to AI 182, such as the sudden loud sound on the CVR and the abrupt power cut to the recorders on both airplanes, would have provided the investigators the answers to support an alternative mechanical explanation.

As we know now, the Poly X, Kapton type wiring in Boeing airliners such as AI 182 and UAL 811 is faulty but not yet blamed in more than nine deaths.

Based on the new evidence of UAL 811 and the matching of similar evidence to AI 182, it is now apparent that a clear and present danger exists to the flying public in Boeing 747s. An emergency AD to check the cargo door area wiring would be prudent.

Regardless, I report this immediate safety issue to you for your action and I request a meeting with TSB safety officials so that I may present my research and analysis for their consideration and to clarify any doubts as to this present hazard. I can meet with them in the Vancouver BC offices of the TSB as soon as practicable.

Please do not disregard this most urgent safety alert from a citizen to a public safety agency. I am available at any time for phone discussion or email correspondence.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

Mr. Smith,

Since this is the subject of an RCMP investigation, and is in criminal

court, it would be inappropriate for anyone at the TSB to discuss

this

matter. It would be recommended that your enquiry be directed to the

RCMP

at:

Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather Street

Vancouver, B.C.
V5Z 1K6

Regards

Jim Harris
Public Affairs Advisor
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
*819-994-8053

*jim.harris@tsb.gc.ca

From: Wallace Anne <anne.wallace@srg.caa.co.uk>
Date: March 28, 2001 1:50:17 AM PST
To: "barry@corazon.com" <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: **WARNING**

Dear Mr Smith

The UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch has forwarded your email of 17 March 2001. Please could you provide further details of the information you have?

Yours sincerely
Anne Wallace (Mrs)
Corporate Affairs
Safety Regulation Group
Civil Aviation Authority

(anne.wallace@srg.caa.co.uk)

This e-mail, and any files transmitted with it, are confidential.
If you are not the intended recipient, please notify our Help Desk
(e-mail: internet.postmaster@srg.caa.co.uk or phone:
+44-1293-573333)

immediately.

You should not copy or use this e-mail or attachments for any
purpose
nor disclose their contents to any other person.

From: Wallace Anne <anne.wallace@srg.caa.co.uk>
Date: March 29, 2001 2:10:48 AM PST
To: "'John Barry Smith'" <barry@corazon.com>
**Subject: RE: Warning/alert about wiring/cargo door/explosive
decompression**

Thank for the information which you have provided. I have
consulted the CAA
Safety Regulation Group Head of Safety Data and Investigation
Department.
He has advised me that examination of the wreckage proved that
the cargo
door was not the cause of PA 103 and TWA 800 accidents. The
judge decided
that on balance of probability the accident to AI182 was caused

by a bomb.

As we cannot take this matter any further we suggest that, if you have not already done so, you communicate your concerns to the FAA. I have copied the correspondence, by fax, to the FAA's Europe, Africa, & Middle East Office in Brussels.

From: John Barry Smith[SMTP:barry@corazon.com]
Sent: 28 March 2001 19:42
To: Wallace Anne
Subject: Warning/alert about wiring/cargo door/explosive decompression

Dear Mrs. Wallace, 28 Mar 2001

Thank you very much for following up on my warning that there exists a clear and present danger to the flying public.

This is not a 'bomb' threat, nor a 'sky is falling' exclamation nor a 'whispered anonymous' phone call, nor an hysterical 'conspiracy' plot.

This is a warning/alert about a mechanical, well documented, current, pervasive problem from an identified expert. I invite discussion and request that you contact me at my email, my telephone

number, or mail to my home for further details or refer me to professional accident investigators.

The problem is wiring. It's a problem well known by the AAIB but the severity of the problem is greatly under appreciated because few fatal accidents have been blamed on wiring. The symptoms of wiring failures have been 'fixed', but not the wiring cause.

Specifically, wiring causes forward cargo doors of early model Boeing 747s to rupture open in flight. The electrical problems in early model Boeing 747s have caused cargo door to open in flight before but only one resulted in fatalities, UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 90/01 and 92/02, summary below.

My twelve years of research and analysis have shown that ruptured open cargo door in flight events, which mimic a bomb explosion, have occurred three other times with many fatalities. The three flights are all controversial with conspiracy theories abounding to explain the mysterious inflight breakups of the aircraft, however, I can prove to you and investigators with documents, photographs, and charts that support the

tangible, circumstantial, and direct evidence that all three suffered a ruptured open forward cargo door in flight, probably caused by an electrical problem.

The flights are Air India Flight 182, Pan Am 103, and TWA 800.

Yes, they are have been called other probable causes, starting off with bomb explosions by terrorists.

No, they are not bombs.

Yes, they are a mechanical cause with precedent which the matching evidence among all four shows the pattern or electrically caused ruptured open forward cargo door in flight.

Air India Flight 182, Pan Am 103, and TWA 800 all match the confirmed and irrefutable probable cause of electrically caused ruptured open forward cargo door in flight for UAL 811.

I rely on the evidence to prove the wiring/cargo door/explosive decompression explanation. I must have an opportunity to present my research and analysis to air accident investigators who can evaluate my warning alert

of the danger of wiring faults in early model Boeing 747s. The problem is not clearly understood nor appreciated by the authorities.

An emergency AD to inspect the wiring in the forward cargo door areas of early model Boeing 747s must be issued before the event occurs again.

I assume AAIB has not attempted to brush me off to a corporate type who has no interest in aviation safety but assume they referred me to you because you know who to contact to properly review my data and evaluate the risk. (Further details on the wiring/cargo door/explosive decompression are at www.corazon.com)

Can you help?

Sincerely,
Barry

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate

holder.

US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.

US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.

Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy

Retired US Army Major MSC

Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.

Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On February 24, 1989, United Airlines flight 811, a Boeing 747-122,

experienced an explosive decompression as it was climbing between 22,000 and

23,000 feet after taking off from Honolulu, Hawaii, en route to Sydney,

Australia with 3 flightcrew, 15 flight attendants, and 337 passengers

aboard.

The airplane made a successful emergency landing at Honolulu and the

occupants evacuated the airplane. Examination of the airplane revealed that

the forward lower lobe cargo door had separated in flight and had caused

extensive damage to the fuselage and cabin structure adjacent to the door.

Nine of the passengers had been ejected from the airplane and lost at sea.

A year after the accident, the Safety Board was uncertain that the

cargo door would be located and recovered from the Pacific Ocean. The Safety Board decided to proceed with a final report based on the available evidence without the benefit of an actual examination of the door mechanism. The original report was adopted by the Safety Board on April 16, 1990, as NTSB/AAR-90/01.

Subsequently, on July 22, 1990, a search and recovery operation was begun by the U.S. Navy with the cost shared by the Safety Board, the Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing Aircraft Company, and United Airlines. The search and recovery effort was supported by Navy radar data on the separated cargo door, underwater sonar equipment, and a manned submersible vehicle. The effort was successful, and the cargo door was recovered in two pieces from the ocean floor at a depth of 14,200 feet on September 26 and October 1, 1990.

Before the recovery of the cargo door, the Safety Board believed that the door locking mechanisms had sustained damage in service prior to the accident flight to the extent that the door could have been closed and appeared to have been locked, when in fact the door was not fully latched. This belief was expressed in the report and was supported by the

evidence available at the time. However, upon examination of the door, the damage to the locking mechanism did not support this hypothesis. Rather, the evidence indicated that the latch cams had been backdriven from the closed position into a nearly open position after the door had been closed and locked. The latch cams had been driven into the lock sectors that deformed so that they failed to prevent the back-driving.

Thus, as a result of the recovery and examination of the cargo door, the Safety Board's original analysis and probable cause have been modified. This report incorporates these changes and supersedes NTSB/AAR-90/01.

The issues in this investigation centered around the design and certification of the B-747 cargo doors, the operation and maintenance to assure the continuing airworthiness of the doors, cabin safety, and emergency response.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the sudden opening of the forward lower lobe cargo door in flight and the subsequent explosive decompression. The door opening was attributed to a faulty switch or wiring in the door control

system which permitted electrical actuation of the door latches toward the unlatched position after initial door closure and before takeoff. Contributing to the cause of the accident was a deficiency in the design of the cargo door locking mechanisms, which made them susceptible to deformation, allowing the door to become unlatched after being properly latched and locked. Also contributing to the accident was a lack of timely corrective actions by Boeing and the FAA following a 1987 cargo door opening incident on a Pan Am B-747.

As a result of this investigation, the Safety Board issued safety recommendations concerning cargo doors and other nonplug doors on pressurized transport category airplanes, cabin safety, and emergency response.

Dear Mr Smith

The UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch has forwarded your email of 17

March 2001. Please could you provide further details of the information you have?

Yours sincerely
Anne Wallace (Mrs)
Corporate Affairs
Safety Regulation Group
Civil Aviation Authority

(anne.wallace@srg.caa.co.uk)

This e-mail, and any files transmitted with it, are confidential.

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immediately.

You should not copy or use this e-mail or attachments for any
purpose
nor disclose their contents to any other person.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: May 8, 2001 11:00:17 AM PDT
To: Trans Safety Board Canada:murphyd@tc.gc.ca,
pageota@tc.gc.ca, paulette.delorme@tsb.gc.ca, pettifg@tc.gc.ca,
plattsj@tc.gc.c, sweetd@tc.gc.ca;
**Subject: Mounties now say 'bomb' in aft of Air India Flight
182**

Yes, the Mounties are saying the 'bomb' was in the Aft
compartment of Air India Flight 182 and want to put three guys
in jail for life for putting it there.

Ha!

Can you do something about this nonsense?

Cheers,

John Barry Smith

(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: May 8, 2001 12:20:55 PM PDT
To: plattsj@tc.gc.ca
Subject: Mounties now say 'bomb' in aft of Air India Flight 182

Yes, the Mounties are saying the 'bomb' was in the Aft compartment of Air India Flight 182 and want to put three guys in jail for life for putting it there.

Ha!

Can you do something about this nonsense?

Cheers,

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: May 17, 2001 9:52:08 AM PDT
To: murphyd@tc.gc.ca, pageota@tc.gc.ca,

paulette.delorme@tsb.gc.ca, pettifg@tc.gc.ca, plattsj@tc.gc.ca,
sweetd@tc.gc.ca

Subject: Letter to RCMP

Dear TSB officials, 17 May 01

Attached as pdf file is my letter to the RCMP responding to their request for documents and a meeting with me regarding my shorted wiring/cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182.

TSB officials are specifically named in the letter and I would appreciate it if any of you could attend to give technical assistance to the non aviation expert minds of the police.

Sgt. Blachford should get the snail mail in a few days. He gave me no email address specifically for him.

TSB knowledge of AA Flight 92, Swiss Air 111 and Air India Flight 182 is invaluable and relevant. Each accident adds to the body of knowledge relating to aviation safety.

The CASB conclusions of 1986 were correct and TSB might welcome a chance to reevaluate those conclusions and refine them to explain the explosion in the forward cargo compartment based upon available hindsight and subsequent similar inflight events such as United Airlines Flight 811 of 1989 by issuing a supplemental AAR.

Cheers,

John Barry Smith

(831) 659-3552 phone

551 Country Club Drive,

Carmel Valley, CA 93924

www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: February 1, 2002 1:40:52 PM PST
To: Sgt. Bart Blachford@RCMP
Subject: Pan Am Flight 103 cargo door photographs analyses

Sgt. B. Blachford
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather St.
Vancouver, B. C.
V5Z 1K6

Dear Sgt. Bart Blachford, 1 Feb 02

Mr. Tucker of TSB has obtained very valuable photographs of the forward cargo door area of Pan Am Flight 103 which show clearly upward tearing of skin above the door, outwardly shattered and twisted metal skin in, above, and fore and aft of the door, and the general tangled mess of the fuselage forward of the wing on the right side. This photographic evidence of massive fuselage depressurization matches the photographic evidence of Trans World Airlines Flight 800 and United Airlines Flight 811 and the text of Air India Flight 182.

High quality photographs of that forward cargo door area of Air India Flight 182 exist under RCMP control; can you obtain them, view them, evaluate them to see if they match the same area with the same damage for Pan Am Flight 103, United Airlines Flight

811 , and Trans World Airlines Flight 800?

At this time I am convinced more than ever for Air India Flight 182 that there was no bomb explosion in the forward or the aft compartment. There was a huge explosion of decompression in the forward cargo hold at the door area probably caused by now known faulty Poly X wiring.

I've enclosed my analysis in three parts of the photographs for Pan Am Flight 103 to Mr. Tucker as well as my two letters to you after after meeting.

I have not heard back from you and worry that you did not get my follow up post meeting letters. I note that the Air India Flight 182 trial has been delayed for many months at the request of the Crown. Is that related to our meeting?

The photographs of the forward cargo door area of Pan Am Flight 103 could have ruled out the shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation but only corroborated it. The same can be said for the photographs and video for Air India Flight 182, but one way or the other, the possibility should and must be evaluated, in my humble opinion.

Cheers,
Barry

John Barry Smith
(831) 659 3552
541 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com

barry@corazon.com

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: February 27, 2002 12:03:17 PM PST

To: Sgt.BartBlachford@RCMP

Subject: Mr. Garstang follow up

Sgt. B. Blachford
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather St.
Vancouver, B. C.
V5Z 1K6

Dear Sgt. Bart Blachford, 27 Feb 02

Thank you for your letter of 18 Feb 02, file 85-3196 in which you state you have forwarded my previous correspondence to Mr. Garstang ('Our aviation investigator') for his consideration.

You further state that he has the photographs and film footage need to conduct any further follow up deemed necessary.

Well, that's fine. As you know, I had no way of knowing that the forward cargo door of PA 103 would match so carefully that of the forward cargo door of United Airlines Flight 811 with the peeled away skin from the aft midspan latch because those photos had never before been released to the public. That match alone is enough for Mr. Gartstang, who compared and matched Air India Flight 182 to Pan Am Flight 103 previously in his March 2001 supplemental Air India Flight 182 report, to conduct further follow up by comparing the Air India Flight 182 forward cargo door photographs, to which he has access, to United Airlines Flight 811 and others.

In addition, I have been in contact with the Campbells of New Zealand whose son died in United Airlines Flight 811. They were instrumental in getting the door retrieved from the ocean which allowed the authorities to correctly state the cause of its opening in flight: electrical and not bomb or improper latching as previously thought. They have sent me many pictures of the door area of United Airlines Flight 811 which match the text of the door area of Air India Flight 182. I make these photos available to you and Mr. Gartstang upon request to compare to the photos of Air India Flight 182 which you and Mr. Garstang have access to. I would send them via email but you nor Mr. Garstang have given me an email address.

As always I am available to Mr. Garstang and yourself for any follow up you may have as you continue your investigation into Air India Flight 182 as part of the Air India Task Force.

Cheers,
John Barry Smith
(831) 659 3552
541 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: March 3, 2002 8:21:26 AM PST
To: Sgt.BartBlachford@RCMP
Subject: Door of 182 like door of 811

Sgt. B. Blachford
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather St.
Vancouver, B. C.
V5Z 1K6

Dear Sgt. Bart Blachford, 3 Mar 02

Thank you for your letter of 26 Feb 02, file 85E-6410 tip 3196, in which you request I deal directly with Mr. Tucker of TSB. You then ask me to deal directly with you. My pleasure, Sergeant, and tip 3196 is the one that caught your culprit: Electrical, not human. The Mounties always get their man, even if it is a woman or parts of a machine.

I have no correspondence from the NTSB which states they said the forward cargo door of Air India Flight 182 was exactly like the door of United Airlines Flight 811 but I do have the correspondence from the actual person who met the actual NTSB official who said the actual words you are asking about.

Explained below:

First item below is from Kirpal Report on Air India Flight 182 which describes a Group (A Committee of Experts) which had access to all photos and film and, indeed, was specifically asked to evaluate same. Mr. James F. Wildey II, of NTSB was present in that Air India Flight 182 group. Also note that Mr. Wildey is predominantly included in the Trans World Airlines Flight 800 investigation and includes on his resume his work for the NTSB in the Pan Am Flight 103 investigation. He is still active in the NTSB, knows about cargo doors and is available for interview. Would you like his email?

"1.5.16 In order that there should be no undue delay the Court decided that a Group be constituted consisting of expert representatives of all the participants and also the nominees of the Court. This group was asked to carry out metallurgical and other examination of some of the critical pieces salvaged and give its report to the Court. The group constituted as a 'Committee of Experts' was as under :-

- a. Mr. A.J.W. Melson, Canadian Aviation Safety Board, Canada.
- b. Mr. R.K. Phillips, Canadian Pacific Air, Canada.
- c. Mr. T. Swift, Federal Aviation, Administration, USA.
- d. Mr. R.Q. Taylor, Boeing Commercial Airplane Co., USA.
- e. Mr. J.P. Tryzl, Boeing Commercial Airplane Co., USA.
- f. Mr. J.F. Wildey II, National Transportation Safety Board USA.
- g. Mr. S.N. Seshadri, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, India (Coordinator)."

Below is excerpt from an email sent to me from Mr. and Mrs. Campbell whose son was killed in United Airlines Flight 811 and who know more about why forward cargo doors open inadvertently in flight than most people on earth. They are experts in this matter and must be highly respected for their perseverance, research, and conclusions. He has been awarded high honors by the New Zealand government for his efforts in aviation safety. Mr. Campbell connected Air India Flight 182 to United Airlines Flight 811 in 1991 as excerpt shows below. They are available for interview and currently live in New Zealand. (Full email attached at end.)

"From: SMANDKJC@aol.com
Date: Sun, 22 Aug 1999 22:39:33 EDT
Subject: From Kevin Campbell

To: barry@corazon.com

We were in Hawaii for the search for the cargo door and I tried every avenue to be on that sub or even the recovery boat without success. I was phoned within an hour of the recovery of the door and told that they had a contingency plan , if the door revealed the NTSB were correct the door was to be released to the media in Hawaii ,if the door showed that the Campbells were correct the door was going straight to Boeing . He said that the door is going straight to Boeing . We flew to Seattle but were told we could not see the door , we drove to Washington to see the NTSB and as we entered the office we were told they could spare us 5 minutes,about 3 hours later we held a set of the recovered C locks and Lock sectors and they admitted we were correct , that they would ensure that the aircraft would be fixed but not to hold our breath waiting for a new report ever to be released . After lunch with them I asked " in light of what we now know on 811 do you still think that Air India was a bomb ?" The reply was that we never thought that Air India was a bomb in fact the video shows a cargo door exactly the same as 811. I wrote to both Air India and the Canadian Safety Board with my

findings on
811 but did not even have the courtesy of a reply ."

Sergeant Blachford, the points to be made here are: The Campbells are unimpeachable witnesses regarding who they spoke to and what they said, and, NTSB had access to the film and photos so their opinion about the forward cargo door of Air India Flight 182 is first hand. If NTSB said the Air India Flight 182 forward cargo door looks exactly like the forward cargo door of United Airlines Flight 811, that conclusion is based on personal viewing of the film and photos by an 'Expert'. Of course the dozens of words of text of the Kirpal report already describes a door that matches the United Airlines Flight 811 door but a picture tells a thousand words. The pictures are available to you for analysis and confirmation of the text.

Kirpal Report Excerpt below about forward cargo door which matches in text that of the picture of United Airlines Flight 811:

"2.11.4.6 Section 42

All cargo doors were found intact and attached to the fuselage structure except for the forward cargo door which had some fuselage and cargo floor attached. This door, located on the forward right side of the aircraft, was broken horizontally about one-quarter of the distance above the lower frame. The damage to the door and the fuselage skin near the door appeared to have been caused by an outward force. The fractured surface of the cargo door appeared to have been badly frayed. Because the damage appeared to be different than that seen on other wreckage pieces, an attempt to recover the door was made by CCGS John Cabot. Shortly after the wreckage broke clear of the water, the area of the door to which the lift cable was attached broke free

from the cargo door, and the wreckage settled back onto the sea bed. An attempt to relocate the door was unsuccessful."

To sum up past and current official opinion about Air India Flight 182:

CASB, forward cargo hold explosion on right side, unstated cause.

AAIB, forward cargo hold explosion on right side, not a bomb but cause yet to be determined.

Kirpal, forward cargo hold explosion on right side, cause a bomb.

NTSB, not a bomb and cargo door looks exactly like a door on a matching model aircraft which had an explosion in the forward cargo hold on the right side, not a bomb.

RCMP, aft cargo hold explosion, cause a bomb.

This private investigator agrees with the CASB, the AAIB, the NTSB and further refines the determined cause of the ruptured opening of the forward cargo door of Air India Flight 182 to be that of electrical, either known faulty Poly X wiring or Switch S2.

Are you not curious, Sgt. Blachford? Don't your detective skills cry out to see the actual evidence? Would you not like to see a pattern of cause and effect? You have the authority, access, and should have the motive to examine those photographs which have been kept these many years just for the purpose of someone of your character and position to examine for analysis and conclusions based upon similar subsequent events. United Airlines Flight 811 was a subsequent event.

By the way, all your questions to me are of the "Check out the messenger," type and not of the 'Check out the message,' type.

You are not asking about the door but what people are saying about the door. I must repeat, Air India Flight 182 was an airplane crash, first and foremost. Ask airplane crash type questions.

Cheers,

John Barry Smith
(831) 659 3552
541 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

From: SMANDKJC@aol.com
Date: Sun, 22 Aug 1999 22:39:33 EDT
Subject: From Kevin Campbell
To: barry@corazon.com
CC: rocketman@hawaii.rr.com

Dear Barry , Steve emailed on your reply , Thank you for your kind comments about our work. As you know we live in NZ but we own an apt here in Waikiki and usually spend from may till end sept here .This year we were late arriving as our first grandchild was due early may , He did not arrive until the 19th and we stayed to help out our daughter until the 1st june . Our son in law gave us a computer so they could email pictures of the

new baby . I
have resisted getting a computer as I cant type but seem to be
managing OK .
Anyway as soon as I got on line the first search I did was 811 and
got your
site , it all sounded very familiar to me and I could tell you had
obviously
done your homework . Steve had visited us in NZ in Feb just as
we moved into
our new apt there after selling our family home so I asked Steve
if he had
been in contact with you and what spurred your interest in cargo
doors { I
should have explored your site a bit more and I would have
found the reason
myself but I was just starting searching the web and only hit the
one page]
Steve did not know what your motives were so I thought I would
contact you
myself , however I had bought a lot of my documents over with
me this trip as
I had to fly on to Seattle to do an interview with the BBC
Panorama program
for a documentry on aircraft wiring problems following the
release to the
media of the Swissair wreckage , the doco is cofunded by the
Discovery
Channel and may show [Or a USA version of it] on TLC
depending on wether
they want to upset Boeing or not . The request to do this doco
followed a
very good doco done by Channel 9 Sydney on their Sunday
program titled "Fire

in the Sky" also about Kapton wire in Feb of this year .I had lent BBC some of my documents including my submission to the NTSB on the cause of 811 and also a document I had written in 1989 I called "Countdown to Disaster" detailing the sequence of events leading up to and beyond the 811 disaster . I still have not had them returned but Steve can email them to you if you have never seen them.

As you are probably aware we did an investigation on 811 and have appeared in the media many times . We had many stories about our efforts in NZ newspapers ,magazines and TVNZ followed us on one visit to the USA and did a Documentry on our investigation { the email from the guy in NZ that you sent Steve was from one of the team that was to do a computer simulation of my theory compared to the NTSB theory as soon as they tried to program the NTSB theory they could see it did not compute and it was then they realised I had to be correct and were behind me 100%. the same people did the Americas Cup simulations] The WALL STREET JOURNAL did a front page article on our efforts on 24th feb 1990 and I have done several articles with Byron Acihido of the Seattle Times among others . In all we took 7 trips to the USA investigating 811and they

started with a
look at the aircraft at Hickam AFB where we took many pictures
of the damage
and I was able to rule out corrosion as the cause . We attended the
NTSB
hearing at Seattle and managed to steal all of the documents from
the NTSB
metallurgists seat after the hearing ended . Initially they would
only give us
the list of witness`s but after complaining to the media at the first
recess
they gave us a press set and said we could have anything off the
press table
when the hearing ended two days later . At the end of
proceedings we gave an
interview to The Honolulu Advertiser and when it finished we
went back in to
get the stuff off the press table, as I was looking at it my wife
Susan
walked up to the top table and yelled out there was a good set of
stuff here
, we grabbed a box loaded it in and took off just as the NTSB
guys were
coming back in with a trolley to load it up . We hailed a taxi and
were off .
It took months to look at it and absorb it all but the result was "
Countdown
to Disaster"
We have stayed with both Dave Cronin and Al Slader many
times .On one visit
to the NTSB we got copies of all the passenger safety statements
and wrote to
everyone that had replied to the Questionair . Mainly they were

First and
Business class passengers with a few coach as well . We visited
everyone who
replied to us , Flying in to Seattle and driving to Denver New
York Florida
San Diego San Francisco Lake Tahoe and back up to Seattle .
Boeing would
never talk to us directly only through their legal people [Perkins
Coie] and
initially United would not talk to us either but a year after the
accident
when United had gone from the most popular to the carrier of
last resort for
NZ passengers we got an invitation to visit the United
maintenance base in
San Francisco . they were just going to do a PR job on us but it
did not work
out that way and we got stuck into each of the VP` s and told
them were they
had failed , when one broke down we knew we had them and it
ended up with the
Senior VP United Joe O Gorman giving us a personal escort
around the base
and getting answers to everything we wanted to know . We stood
in the cargo
bay of a 747 while they operated the door and I pointed to the
Conduit at the
top of the door and said that that was were I thought the Arc had
originated
from. as we walked back across the tarmac I spotted a newly
painted 747with a
number I did not recognise , when we got back to the motel I
checked my

records and there was no N4724U . so asked the next day if it was N4713U renumbered and they had to admit it was . We were in Hawaii for the search for the cargo door and I tried every avenue to be on that sub or even the recovery boat without success. I was phoned within an hour of the recovery of the door and told that they had a contingency plan , if the door revealed the NTSB were correct the door was to be released to the media in Hawaii ,if the door showed that the Campbells were correct the door was going straight to Boeing . He said that the door is going straight to Boeing . We flew to Seattle but were told we could not see the door , we drove to Washington to see the NTSB and as we entered the office we were told they could spare us 5 minutes,about 3 hours later we held a set of the recovered C locks and Lock sectors and they admitted we were correct , that they would ensure that the aircraft would be fixed but not to hold our breath waiting for a new report ever to be released . After lunch with them I asked " in light of what we now know on 811 do you still think that Air India was a bomb ?" The reply was that we never thought that Air India was a bomb in fact the video shows a cargo door exactly the same as 811.

I wrote to both Air India and the Canadian Safety Board with my findings on 811 but did not even have the courtesy of a reply . I was very upset to read your theory on TWA 800 as I thought we had the problem beat but it had never occurred to me that if the pull in hooks opened that the door could break in half , this is of course exactly what 811`'s did but I had put it down to the fact that it struck the side of the fuselage as it opened and levered out the hinge and the section above it . Fate intervened on 811 and the door opened on the 747 at JFK and they could no longer withhold the revised report on 811 . The new report however still does not admit that 811 got the signal to open right there at 23000 ft insisting it happened before takeoff . This is a much less scary scenario for Boeing and the NTSB as they still believe that other safeguards preclude it from getting a signal after shutdown of the APU and the ground switch which I believe is a load of baloney .Are you aware that the original door design for the 747 called for a warning light that would have advised the cockpit of a S2 switch failure and the fact that power was still available to the door latch actuators? I had the document that showed this system deleted by whiteout and no one would ever answer my question whether the

aircraft was certified with this system or not as it never made it into production . I lobbied very hard for this system to be reinstated but it wasn't , I guess that would have opened up liability problems for Boeing I lent the document to a journalist and have never got it back either . You probably have plenty of questions for me but I will run through the ones you asked Stuart Mc Clure and answer any that I can .

Dave Cronin PO Box 4263 Incline Village NV 89451-8320 Tel 702 831 7746 Fax 702 831 3615 . Dave was flying the plane manually getting the last bit of pleasure before he retired , as it blew he just let it go and it went up and sideways about 50 ft { I have the engine readouts and you can see that airflow was cut over the engine intakes } Dave and I both believe that had it been on autopilot it would have broken the nose off at the 41 section joint which is a known weak point { This is what happened to Pan Am 103 and TWA 800] all of the beams in the business section were broken and I actually stood in the cargo hold of N4713U at Hickam and lifted the floor off the temporary struts with one hand , the floor was only held up by the cargo containers after the door went . Actually the only bit of solid

floor left in
business class was where our son sat in 12H. But the shock wave
went from the
back past Lee moving the toilets beside him { forward of the
hole } forward
12" it bounced off the front of the plane came back and broke
his seat
off its legs or mountings, it also blew the eardrums of most of
the first
class passengers and in some cases blew up their teeth if they had
air
cavities in them. Dave is a very experienced glider pilot and
called on all
his skills to get the plane back but it was dropping at 1000 ft p/m
it was at
22000 ft 22 minutes out and at METO speed it crashed to a
perfect landing at
Honolulu International Airport it could never have gone around
for another
attempt { I have the CVR printout and it makes chilling
reading } What was
heard? The CVR has a thump followed 1.8 seconds later by a
loud explosion {
I failed in my bid to listen to the actual tape, I only wanted to
actually
hear the sound myself but was denied } Talking to the passengers
some of them
heard a hiss followed by an explosion described as being like "A
thousand
handclaps" no one saw the passengers go. One passenger in first
class { with
a Ph D in physics } nearest to the door said he heard something
start up

immediately prior to the thump . the NTSB never interviewed him and dismissed this as being the elevator to the galley but the steward was already in the galley at the time of the explosion and I dont think the elevator was moving . So the sequence was a whir a thump a hiss and then 1.8 seconds later the explosion . Dave had time to say " what the # was that " and Al replied "I don't know "between the thump and the explosion The CVR's power was then off for 21.4 seconds I have the all the NTSB photos and my own of the door frame area,the side frames and the sills are in perfect condition ,the 8 bottom pins are all gouged but otherwise OK the forward mid span pin is also gouged and the mtg bracket had moved outward on its bolts , the rear mid span pin was gouged and the bracket was held by one bolt the other 3 had broken . It takes 1.5 seconds for the 8 C Locks on the bottom of the door to open followed by the opening of the pull in hooks , with the 1.8 second time gap when the hiss was heard I take that to be the time that the door had blown off the 8 C Locks and it was held by the pull in hooks until they also opened sufficiently for the door to blow off them as well . Something had to be

different to PAN AM 10 out of London where the door was closed by the slipstream and they got back safely. At least one passenger was ingested by engine no 3 . I have the Coroners report on what they found and I have seen what they removed from the engine apart from the body bits . It was not our son as we had to give a DNA sample and the result was negative Steve recently spoke to someone who inspected the engine the day it happened and thought the red on the turbine was seat material until he touched it and realised what it was They told us that they gave the aircraft parts a Hawaiian burial at sea but I doubt it , they certainly did not give us the seat parts that we could have used in an action against the seat manufacturer [Weber Aircraft Co] We have photos of damage to the wings , the top of the aircraft and to the vertical stabiliser , we hope that one of these killed our son as we know he could have survived the fall to the sea 22000 ft and over 4 minutes below . parts were still falling out of the sky after 811 was back on the ground in Honolulu. We have the reports from all the services that attended the accident . We found they knew Lee was missing by about 4 AM local time but it was not till about 12 Hrs later that they phoned us from Chicago

and said he
was missing presumed dead .The damage to No3 engine was
caused by a body or
bodies , luggage and aircraft parts . Damage to No 4 was mainly
by luggage .
N4713U did not have the lock sectors strengthened by aluminium
{the first
fix]but I would think that PAN AM 103 would have as PAN AM
did not wait for
Boeing to supply the steel kits but made their own and fitted
them to their
fleet after the London incident , as they realised the implications
of not
doing so . As detailed in "Countdown " Boeing devised a one
time test to
check the integrity of the cargo door locking system , they told
the airlines
to hit the door open switch to see what happened , a day later
they stopped
the test as operators were calling to say it was damaging the
planes ,
obviously lots of aircraft had failed S2 switches and the actuators
were live
just waiting for a stray arc to doom the plane and the passengers
and the
FAA still gave up to 2 years to replace the lock sectors with steel
ones .
Regards Kevin and Susan Campbell

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: December 14, 2002 7:55:40 PM PST

To: barry@corazon.com

Subject: Fwd:

Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2002 09:35:11 -0800

To:

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Subject:

Cc:

Bcc:

X-Attachments:

Date: 27 Feb 1997 15:18:35 +0400

From: Securitas <Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca>

To: "P=gc+internet; DDA.TYPE=RFC-822;

DDA.VALUE=barry(a)corazon.com" <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: RE: Crash cause of Air India Flight 182

Importance: normal

Autoforwarded: FALSE

Priority: normal

Thank you for your report expressing concern about the opening of cargo

doors on B-747 aircraft. During any aircraft crash, investigators examine

every piece of evidence, in order to determine cause. In the case of the

Air India flight, the cargo door was in fact retrieved from the bottom of

the ocean by the investigators. The latches were still in place, and there

was no evidence on the edges of the door to indicate in-flight opening of

that door.

On the other hand, there was other solid evidence indicating a bomb blast had occurred. Aircraft accident investigators are trained people. Anybody can say anything they want on the Internet. Put your money on the experts; you will win more often.

From: P=gc+internet; DDA.TYPE=RFC-822;
DDA.VALUE=barry(a)corazon.com
To: Securitas
Subject: Crash cause of Air India Flight 182
Date: Saturday, August 31, 1996 9:50PM

<<File Attachment: BDY3.P00>>
DATE: Aug 31 17:50:40 1996 GMT
IPMessageID: 32287B6A.1295(a)corazon.com

FROM: [P=gc+internet; DDA.TYPE=RFC-822;
DDA.VALUE=barry(a)corazon.com]

TO: Securitas

SUBJECT: Crash cause of Air India Flight 182
IMPORTANCE: normal
AUTO FORWARDED: FALSE
PRIORITY:
ATTACHMENTS: c:\BDY3.P00

--
Dear Safety Person, The cause of the Air India flight 182 crash of

a

Boeing 747-237B from Toronto to London in 1985 was an inadvertent opened forward cargo door which then tore of skin which then tore of nose to destruction of aircraft. Not a bomb. My safety concern to TSB Securitas is that it can happen again. To properly assess the risk to Canadian air passengers, visit the web site at <http://www.corazon.com> for a fully documented presentation of the issue of inadvertently opening cargo doors. Open doors causing destruction in early model Boeing 747s has happened before, it has happened now, and it may happen again. Please assess door opening claim by visiting web site and evaluating documents supporting hypothesis. John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: December 14, 2002 7:55:42 PM PST
To: barry@corazon.com
Subject: **Fwd: Air India Flt. 182**

X-From_: Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca Thu May 24 15:21:34 2001
From: "Tucker, Bill" <Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca>
To: "John Barry Smith" <Barry@corazon.com>
Cc: "Delorme, Paulette" <Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca>
Subject: Air India Flt. 182

Date: Thu, 24 May 2001 18:22:47 -0400

Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for your e-mail messages of 2 May and 8 May (sent to Ms. P.

Delorme, Office of the Executive Director) concerning the crash of Air India

Flight 182 that occurred on 23 June 1985.

First, I must respond that the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB-C)

has no mandate to re-open the aviation safety investigation of the AI

Flt.182 occurrence. As you may be aware, the TSB-C was not established

until 1990, and the Aviation Occurrence Report you referred to was prepared

by the Canadian Aviation Safety Board, the predecessor to the TSB-C. More

importantly, in accordance with ICAO Annex 13, the investigation of that

accident was led by the Government of India; the CASB report was prepared as

input to India's investigation.

That said, we certainly have more than a passing interest in the circumstances of the AI Flt. 182 tragedy. We are interested because of the

very nature of our chosen careers. We are interested because quite a few

TSB staff were working for the CASB at the time (myself included), and many

of that group were involved in the AI Flt.182 investigation.

Above all, we

are interested because of the enormity of the tragedy, the links to Canada and the fact that there has not yet been closure on this matter - almost 16 years after the event. As you are aware, the RCMP have been conducting a criminal investigation into the circumstances of the crash ever since 1985.

In accordance with Canadian law, both the CASB and the TSB-C have provided the RCMP with copies of material from our file - excluding, of course, any information that is privileged under our Act. The information provided includes material that was produced by John Garstang.

In view of the foregoing, I forwarded a copy of your report to Sgt. Bart Blachford of the RCMP in Vancouver. The RCMP have as strong an interest as anyone in establishing what happened to AI Flight 182. I have also forwarded your report to the Director of Air Investigations, the Investigator-in-Charge of our SWR Flight 111 investigation, and the Director of Engineering for their information.

With respect to the brief message in your second e-mail (of 8 May), there is one point that I must clarify in reply. It is correct that the CASB investigators' report never said it was a bomb that caused the explosion; however, the report also never said that it wasn't a bomb. In fact,

to my
knowledge, there was nobody on the CASB team who didn't
consider a bomb to
be the most likely explanation. However, the aviation safety
investigation
conclusion on that point was, appropriately, left to the Kirpal
Commission
in India.

Thank you again for your messages.

W.T. (Bill) Tucker
Director General,
Investigation Operations

-----Original Message-----

From: John Barry Smith Eudora
[SMTP:Barry@corazon.com]
Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2001 11:37 PM
To: paulette.delorme@tsb.gc.ca
Subject: Air India Flight 182 Probable Cause

Transportation Safety Board of Canada

Dear Fellow aircraft accident investigators, 2 May 01

I am an independent investigator concentrating specifically
on early
model Boeing 747s that suffer inadvertent decompressions in
flight. After
years of research and analysis, my conclusion is that four fatal
Boeing 747
accidents were caused by faulty poly-x wiring shorting on the

forward cargo
door unlatch motor leading to the rupture of one or both of the
midspan
latches leading to explosive decompression which resulted in
amidships
breakup for three of the aircraft and a large hole on the right side
just
forward of the wing on the remaining aircraft. I refer to Air India
Flight
182, Pan Am 103, United Airlines Flight 811, and Trans World
Airlines Flight
800. UAL 811 is the aircraft that did not come totally apart and
landed with
its incontrovertible evidence that matches up with the other three
in so
many significant ways as to imply they all had the same probable
cause for
the initial event.

Regarding Air India Flight 182, an accident in which
Canadian public
safety organizations are intimately involved, I have written a
report
supporting my findings and have quoted extensively from the
Canadian
Aviation Occurrence Report of 1986 of the Canadian Aviation
Safety Bureau.

Please note that the Canadian aviation accident investigators
never
said it was a bomb that caused the agreed upon explosion in the
forward
cargo compartment of AI 182. The Canadian aviation accident

investigators
were absolutely correct in their conclusions of 1986 and only by
subsequent
similar accidents is the cause of that unexplained explosion now
clear.

I am sending by Word file my Smith AAR for AI 182 for
your
evaluation. Should you find the wiring/cargo door/explosive
decompression
explanation a plausible, reasonable, alternative explanation with
precedent
for the destruction of AI 182, then the issue of a clear and present
danger
to the Canadian flying public becomes apparent as the cargo door
wiring in
early model Boeing 747s has not been inspected for the tell tale
cracking
that the polyimide insulation shows before shorting.

I invite your queries to me for further details by phone or
email.
Regardless, a supplemental AAR for AI 182 is probably
warranted since TSB
has never actually given its official opinion regarding one the
most
celebrated of all tragic Canadian aviation accidents, equal to the
Arrow
Gander crash and Swiss Air 111.

Swiss Air 111 showed the vulnerability of widebody
airliners to the
faulty Kapton type wiring insulation which I conclude is the

probable cause
for Air India Flight 182. The 1972 DC-10 event over Windsor,
Ontario, when a
cargo door inadvertently opened, presaged the Paris Turkish
Airlines DC-10
cargo door accident. Therefore, when I say that faulty wiring is
causing
cargo doors to inadvertently rupture open in wide body airliners,
I believe
you will say it's possible but did it happen for AI 182 and ask for
the
evidence. That evidence is presented in my report.

Very Respectfully,

John Barry Smith
Independent Aircraft Accident Investigator
barry@corazon.com
www.corazon. <<http://www.corazon.com/>>
com <<http://www.corazon.com/>>831 659 3552
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA USA 93924

-----Original Message-----

From: John Barry Smith [SMTP:barry@corazon.com]
Sent: Tuesday, May 08, 2001 2:00 PM
To: Trans Safety Board Canada
Subject: Mounties now say 'bomb' in aft of Air India Flight
182

Yes, the Mounties are saying the 'bomb' was in the Aft
compartment

of Air India Flight 182 and want to put three guys in jail for life for putting it there.

Ha!

Can you do something about this nonsense?

Cheers,

John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: December 14, 2002 7:55:44 PM PST
To: barry@corazon.com
Subject: **Fwd: Pix of Air India Flight 182**

Date: Wed, 22 May 2002 03:28:28 -0800
To: "Tucker, Bill" <Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca>
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Pix of Air India Flight 182
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:

Dear Bill, 22 May 02

Air India Flight 182 was said by the CASB and the Kirpal Commission to have suffered an explosion on the right side forward of the wing in flight. Therefore, photographs of the right side forward of the wing are relevant and very important. It is to

be expected that photographs of that area be available for inspection as they are the fatal wound of the victim. Much time and expense was used to procure those photographs. They exist and held by the Crown authorities.

If the Director General, Investigation Operations, Transportation Safety Board of Canada asks to view those photographs and is rebuffed with excuses and delay, there is something fishy going on.

Why would Ron Schleede call you out of the blue? What did Ken Smart say that led to your decision to retire a few days later?

Bill, the whole sequence is fishy.

I believe you see the plausible and more likely explanation for Air India Flight 182 is mechanical rather than conspiracy.

In your bailing out email, as I call it, to me on 9 May 02, you refer to persons and titles and their opinions as to the cause of the accidents but never refer to facts, data, or evidence. You also never refer to United Airlines Flight 811 as if it never existed which is absolutely not fair since that is the model for the other three.

Well, that is how I know I'm right; never rebutted with facts, only the opinions of titles of persons who have been involved since 1985 and have much interest in maintaining the status quo, even in the face of conclusive contradictory evidence which abounds in the metal, cams, latches, engines, and recorders of United Airlines Flight 811.

For Ken Smart to imply that the forward cargo door area of Pan

Am Flight 103 opened in flight but that it happened after the 'bomb' explosion' is contrary to the AAIB wreckage distribution fuselage reconstruction which shows it happened at initial event time. The photographs show it happened in flight. The evidence is there.

But ignored and that's why it's fishy.

Bill, please do not retire until you get a look at the forward cargo door area of Air India Flight 182. Satisfy your own curiosity to see if the twisted metal matches the other three door areas of twisted metal.

Cheers,
Barry

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: December 14, 2002 7:55:43 PM PST
To: barry@corazon.com
Subject: Fwd: RE: Pix of Air India Flight 182

X-From_: Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca Tue Jun 25 15:22:17 2002
From: "Tucker, Bill" <Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca>
To: "'John Barry Smith'" <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: RE: Pix of Air India Flight 182
Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2002 18:23:49 -0400
Reply-By: Sun, 2 Jun 2002 17:00:00 -0400
X-Message-Flag: Follow up

Dear Barry,

I felt that this message from you below, dated 22 May, needed specific responses to several of your points. I'll get to your request for photos later in this response, but first I want to clear the air on some of your concerns - or at least try to.

- 1) - I am not being "rebuffed with excuses and delay".
- 2) - There is nothing fishy going on.
- 3) - Ron Schleede contacts me because he is a colleague and a friend. He worked for me here as Director of Investigations-Air for six months on an international exchange (and he did a great job).
- 4) - Ken Smart said nothing to influence my retirement, and I am shocked that you would suspect a connection. The fact is that my decision was made and relayed to my boss in late March, at least a month before Ken's visit.
- 5) - I do not believe the "more likely explanation for Air India Flight 182 is mechanical rather than conspiracy". Based on my direct knowledge from the AI 182 investigation, I saw mechanical failure as one plausible explanation. Adding my indirect knowledge at the time (back in the late 1980s), from others who were more directly involved, I

considered a bomb to be the more likely explanation and mechanical failure to be plausible, but unlikely. Adding in the additional knowledge I have acquired since then (which is almost all indirect in a pure accident investigation sense) I have become more convinced that a bomb brought down AI 182.

6) - The only reason that my recent e-mail referred to AI 182, PanAm 103, and TWA 800, but not to UA 811, was that I had less familiarity with the UA 811 investigation than the other three. However, I have absolutely no reason to doubt the eventual conclusion that the cargo door failed in UA 811.

7) - As I advised you last summer, this agency has no mandate to re-conduct an investigation of AI 182. Moreover, my personal opinion is that it would not be an appropriate use of our resources to do so.

Nevertheless, I did believe that the TSB should make John Garstang available to that investigation through periodic secondment to the RCMP, and I still feel that our doing so was an appropriate decision. I have high confidence in the integrity and the thoroughness of the RCMP investigation; and I sincerely hope that justice will be served by the pending trial - whatever its outcome.

Now to the matter of your request for photos of the forward right side of the AI 182 B747.

I spoke with John Garstang about your request. He advised that there are both photos and videos from the AI 182 investigation. However, with respect to the forward right side and the cargo door in particular, he is only certain about the video. They have pictures showing where the cargo door was in the debris field, and they also have a picture of the door at the ocean surface when it broke free during the recovery attempt; he is just not sure how much was video, or still frame from video, versus photographs..

To complicate matters, the video was deteriorating as time went by. Some years ago (estimate: around 1995), the RCMP took the magnetic tape video (which would be of even poorer quality by now) and made a digitized version.

The former is ours, the latter is theirs; however they need both for trial purposes (continuity of evidence, I assume). Moreover, they have advised that the matter is before the courts, that a publication ban is in effect, and that they do not want anything to be released that could be prejudicial

to the court process. Both the TSB's General Counsel and I have been notified that the RCMP Legal Services group believes that release of Air India wreckage photographs could be injurious to the RCMP's work and that, as such, release is exempted under Sec. 16(1) of Canada's Access to Information Act.

There may (far from certain) be some form of photo/video info that is still in the TSB's possession and that may (also far from certain) be releasable to you. To determine that will take considerable effort and, to be at all manageable, it will require the personal involvement of John Garstang. With his heavy workload, as we try to complete the report on the SWR111 investigation, we just can't give him any more tasks for the next few months. However, I have obtained a personal commitment from both the Director of Engineering and the Director of Air Investigations that they will follow-up on this at the end of the summer and see if there is anything that can be made available to you. To that end, I shall send both of them a copy of this message so that they can create a "bring forward" reminder to follow up. At the very worst, the TSB's photos/videos can certainly be made

available after the trial.

Meanwhile, I can assure you that the cargo door failure possibility was looked at in a rigorous and unbiased manner. In fact, I understand that part of that process was to specifically review the information and suggestions that you had provided. John G. told me that when he was asked by the RCMP to do work in that area, there was not the slightest hint of a desired outcome - only that all the information be reviewed thoroughly and objectively to find the truth.

As Sgt Blachford has indicated to both of us, the aircraft-related elements are only part of a huge investigation. The trial (which is expected to be the largest in Canada's history) will also bring out much evidence that was obtained through the RCMP's criminal investigation. You will no doubt be following the trial, as I will. Let us hope that the trial will not be delayed much longer and that it will culminate in a just outcome (whatever that may be)..

In closing, I can honestly say that I have enjoyed communicating with you - at least most of the time. (I must admit that there have been times when

you added to my stress level because I couldn't keep up with your correspondence; it is against my nature to ignore a sincere message or to respond to it without adequate consideration.) If I may offer some gratuitous advice, please don't let the cargo door issue consume you, and don't become like the conspiracy theorists. You have already raised awareness of the cargo door issue; but if you are seen as pushing it as the only credible explanation for so many accidents, people will not listen to what you have to say. I was, and still am, impressed with you. You have a good brain, a pleasant personality, good health, and a wonderful family and home; Don't miss out on enjoying all that in your retirement years.
Very sincerely,

Bill T..

-----Original Message-----

From: John Barry Smith [SMTP:barry@corazon.com]

Sent: Wednesday, May 22, 2002 7:28 AM

To: Tucker, Bill

Subject: Pix of Air India Flight 182

Dear Bill, 22 May 02

Air India Flight 182 was said by the CASB and the Kirpal Commission to have suffered an explosion on the right side forward of the wing in flight. Therefore, photographs of the right side forward of the wing are relevant and very important. It is to be expected that photographs of that area be available for inspection as they are the fatal wound of the victim. Much time and expense was used to procure those photographs. They exist and held by the Crown authorities.

If the Director General, Investigation Operations, Transportation Safety Board of Canada asks to view those photographs and is rebuffed with excuses and delay, there is something fishy going on.

Why would Ron Schleede call you out of the blue? What did Ken Smart say that led to your decision to retire a few days later?

Bill, the whole sequence is fishy.

I believe you see the plausible and more likely explanation for Air India Flight 182 is mechanical rather than conspiracy.

In your bailing out email, as I call it, to me on 9 May 02, you refer > to persons and titles and their opinions as to the cause of the accidents but never refer to facts, data, or evidence. You also never refer to United Airlines Flight 811 as if it never existed which is

absolutely not fair since that is the model for the other three.

Well, that is how I know I'm right; never rebutted with facts, only the opinions of titles of persons who have been involved since 1985

and have much interest in maintaining the status quo, even in the face of conclusive contradictory evidence which abounds in the metal,

cams, latches, engines, and recorders of United Airlines Flight 811.

For Ken Smart to imply that the forward cargo door area of Pan Am

Flight 103 opened in flight but that it happened after the 'bomb' explosion' is contrary to the AAIB wreckage distribution fuselage reconstruction which shows it happened at initial event time. The photographs show it happened in flight. The evidence is there.

But ignored and that's why it's fishy.

Bill, please do not retire until you get a look at the forward cargo door area of Air India Flight 182. Satisfy your own curiosity to see

if the twisted metal matches the other three door areas of twisted metal.

Cheers,
Barry

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: December 14, 2002 7:55:45 PM PST
To: barry@corazon.com
Subject: Fwd: RE: Sudden loud sound on CVR

X-From_: Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca Mon Jun 25 11:04:11 2001
From: "Tucker, Bill" <Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca>
To: "'John Barry Smith'" <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: RE: Sudden loud sound on CVR
Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2001 14:05:37 -0400

Dear Mr. Smith,

Your reponse below prompts a further reply from me. I appreciated the understanding demonstrated in your e-mail. I do have an open mind (or at least I hope and try to), and I will strive to retain it long after I retire from the TSB.

I am now up to date with your correspondence, except for one left to read that you sent me on 23 June. I have targetted specific elements to specific people (e.g, the Appendix on Wiring to our SWR 111 IIC (Yes, that's Vic Gerden) as well as to Dir of Inv. - Air). I shall forward this to all of them so they can note your addresses and your receptiveness to any follow-up queries they may have
Bill Tucker..

P.S. In one of the things I read, you indicated that John Garstang

had been
seconded to the RCMP for over a decade. That is not so; John G
was loaned
or seconded to the RCMP on several occasions (maybe 3 or 4)
for short terms
of about 1-2 months - most recently this spring. Otherwise, he
has
continued working as a valued employee in our Engineering
Branch.

-----Original Message-----

From: John Barry Smith [SMTP:barry@corazon.com]
Sent: Wednesday, June 20, 2001 9:43 PM
To: Tucker, Bill
Subject: Sudden loud sound on CVR

Dear Mr. Tucker, 20 June 01

Well, longest daylight of the year tonight, that's good.

>

>The TSB is not presently doing further investigation of the Air
India 182

>accident, nor is it planning to do so. We have limited resources
and a

>backlog of investigation work-in-process; we do not believe
that cargo

door

>or wiring problems were involved in that occurrence; and we
are confident

>that the RCMP are doing a thorough and unbiased investigation.
Therefore,

>we do not believe we would be justified in diverting our resources to that >occurrence.

I understand the way things are now, and of course, subject to change. There is that pesky trial coming up and the RCMP is saying bomb in aft cargo compartment and the CASB and Kirpal stated explosion in forward cargo compartment, not a trifling conflict. Just where was that bomb?

> I find that you have raised some interesting points that >have potential use for us in our work.

Thanks. UAL 811 is a big point.

> To that end, I am personally looking >through the material you send and forwarding copies, as I think appropriate, >to the Dir. of Investigations - Air, the Dir. of Engineering, and the IIC of >the SWR111 investigation. If you wish, I can also forward copies to Sgt. >Blachford or the RCMP, but it seems more appropriate for you to do that >yourself whenever you so choose.

Thanks. More eyeballs (or ears) is always good. I respect your personal opinion most of all. I can tell an open mind that will put

emphasis on the evidence. A sudden loud sound on the CVR is the only direct evidence that exists for Air India Flight 182, all the rest is circumstantial or tangible consequence. The sudden loud sound is everything and it says, 'Not a bomb explosion' but 'Explosive decompression that matches DC 10 cargo door event.'" When in doubt, I always come back to the sudden loud sound on the CVR's on all the four early model Boeing 747s that suffered the inflight explosions forward of the wing. The sound is incontrovertible.

>

>>From one of your e-mails, I now also understand the reason for your strong interest in advancing aviation safety, and I respect you for that.

Thanks. I met the sons of my savior pilot years later, three of the five children he left became Navy pilots.

> If you

>wish to continue sending material to me, I shall continue to process it, as

>outlined above, to the best of my ability.

Thanks, an open mind is all I ask. I would not expect detailed > replies, but welcome any queries from you or your staff should

they
come up.

> I
> simply want you to understand my position with respect to your
inputs.

I understand. Thanks again for your reply.

Sincerely,
Barry

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com
Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135
certificate
holder.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: December 14, 2002 7:55:46 PM PST
To: barry@corazon.com
Subject: Fwd: RE: Swiss Air 111 changes

X-From_: Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca Wed Jun 20 18:18:46 2001
From: "Tucker, Bill" <Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca>
To: "John Barry Smith" <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: RE: Swiss Air 111 changes
Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2001 21:20:48 -0400

Dear Mr. Smith,

This is in reply to your series of e-mails, and to clarify the TSB position in case there is a misunderstanding. I'm sorry I have not been able to reply sooner. I shall be away for the next two work days and I had a reply to you on my "must do" list before leaving tonight.

The TSB is not presently doing further investigation of the Air India 182 accident, nor is it planning to do so. We have limited resources and a backlog of investigation work-in-process; we do not believe that cargo door or wiring problems were involved in that occurrence; and we are confident that the RCMP are doing a thorough and unbiased investigation. Therefore, we do not believe we would be justified in diverting our resources to that occurrence.

That said, I am not suggesting that your concerns and your analysis are all invalid. In fact, I find that you have raised some interesting points that have potential use for us in our work. To that end, I am personally looking

through the material you send and forwarding copies, as I think appropriate, to the Dir. of Investigations - Air, the Dir. of Engineering, and the IIC of the SWR111 investigation. If you wish, I can also forward copies to Sgt. Blachford or the RCMP, but it seems more appropriate for you to do that yourself whenever you so choose.

From one of your e-mails, I now also understand the reason for your strong interest in advancing aviation safety, and I respect you for that.

If you wish to continue sending material to me, I shall continue to process it, as outlined above, to the best of my ability. However, I cannot promise immediate processing and I cannot engage in direct and detailed dialog on all the material you send me; I simply have too much other work to do.

Right now I have over 150 e-mails in my in-box to read and action; there will be well over 200 when I return next week. I am not complaining, I simply want you to understand my position with respect to your inputs.

Sincerely,

Bill Tucker.

-----Original Message-----

From: John Barry Smith [SMTP:barry@corazon.com]
Sent: Monday, June 18, 2001 11:59 AM
To: Tucker, Bill
Subject: Swiss Air 111 changes

W.T. (Bill) Tucker
Director General,
Investigation Operations

Dear Mr. Tucker, 18 June 01

Below shows the impact of a conscientious effort by investigators to find out what happened in an accident and the good faith efforts of an airline to prevent it from happening again. Good work by TSB and Swiss Air. Not good by reluctance of Boeing to implement the changes for all.

Note the cameras in the cargo holds; that is very good.

I look forward to the opinion of Mr. Vic Gerden to my Smith AAR for Air India Flight 182. I also have concluded wiring is causing problems that were not apparent.

Sincerely,
Barry

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,

Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

Sunday newspaper, 6-17-2001

Swissair optimizes MD-11-Cockpits with modifications to their electrical system - as a direct consequence of their Flight 111 Crash cause deliberations.

FROM TIM VAN BEVEREN ZURICH

Two and a half years later, the consequences of the crash of SR Flight 111 near Halifax N.S. have continued to affect Swissair. Their remaining 19 MD-11 airliners are being radically converted in modifications to the electrical system in the cockpit area. For over one million Swiss Francs per jet: "...primarily it's the electrical system that is to be significantly improved" according to Swissair documents made available to Sundays newspaper. There in Zurich the crash cause for the 111 and its 229 passengers is being assumed, despite the Canadian TSB Report being > anticipated for public release not before the beginning of 2002. Already many family members of Flight 111 victims have been "paid out". So now Swissair no longer wants to wait for the outcome of the final

report of
the Canadian accident investigation before implementing the
safety fixes
that it has identified. "Safety remains our highest priority "
claims
Swissair speaker Urs Peter Naef regarding the planned changes. "
Cost-saving measures never conflict with the required
expenditures on
flight safety, which underlie our "mode plus" modification
program
initiative."

In Canada Investigators of the Transportation Safety board (TSB)
express
themselves reservedly over the planned SR procedure.
Investigation leader
Vic Gerden: "Swissair's efforts to reduce potential safety
deficiencies
are well-known to us." As a crash cause, it is so far certain only
that an
electrical fire in the wiring-bundles was crucially responsible.
Because
of the fire, important systems in the cockpit failed in quick
succession,
without which captain Urs Zimmerman and Copilot Stephan
Loew could no
longer control their machine.

In a few days the technical modifications will begin and they will
naturally concentrate on the known SR111 trouble areas: -
significant
critical wire-bundles are to be separated out and fed, via a
routing with

greater electrical integrity and individual isolation, into the cockpit.

In SR111 these wiring harnesses ran through a single focal point described

as a critical node. It was specifically within this area in the ceiling

(just forward and aft of the cockpit/cabin bulkhead) that the fire had

devastatingly raged. It affected not only the emergency power systems but

the "last-ditch" power feeder lines to the batteries as well. Now that

these systems are to be split and segregated for greatest integrity, important protections will again be in place - for example the one that

controls the emergency power turbine (or ADG - air driven generator). This

propeller can be unfolded from a compartment in the fuselage in an

emergency and in the airflow produces current - like a hydroelectric

direct current generator. In SR111 the Canadian investigators found that

this critical emergency power turbine had given out no energy.

Despite the

crisis, its control functions had failed to deploy it - probably because,

by that time, the associated wiring had been consumed by the fire. Video

cameras and smoke detectors are also being installed by this "unique to

Swissair" modification program. CCTV Video cameras are being installed

everywhere: in the cargo-holds, in the electronics bay under the cockpit floor - as well as behind the cabin linings. allowing the pilots a never before possible view into potential fire zones. The pictures will come up on a small 14-centimeter monitor in the cockpit. In addition more smoke detectors are being strategically positioned. The objective is that crews would no longer be condemned to helpless seated inactivity in the case of fire. Fire extinguishing agents behind the cabin linings can squirt upon any detected fire.

All Swissair aircraft are to receive a new wholly integral emergency flight attitude instrument. It is to be operable from two separate power sources and will function reliably even if all other systems have broken down (as was the case with SR111 in its last few minutes of flight). Altogether the cockpit changes are to cost 20 to 23 million Swiss Francs according to calculations of a Swiss Aviation Expert. The extensive modifications are the result of ongoing Swissair internal investigations into the accident's most likely course of events.

Shortly after the crash on 3 September 1998 a Taskforce under

the leadership of retired Swissair Technical Chief Willy Schurter began its work, paralleling that being done by the official Canadian TSB Team. They sought to track down all possible causes of the disaster. The SR MD-11 Electrical Rework is in addition to other earlier measures (such as > changes in checklists and procedures) - but is seen as the most important outcome of these investigations. Although latterly consulting and then in close co-operation with the US manufacturing firm Boeing, Swissair engineers unilaterally sought to analyse all factors of the accident themselves - in order to identify any deficiencies in the original type-certificated design. In a further internal document Swissair explains: "We knew that it needed three prerequisites for the initiation and propagation of a fire: a potential ignition source (e.g. arcing wires), fuel (e.g. thermal/acoustic blankets) and oxygen (i.e. air-conditioning system ventilation or crew oxygen system lines)". As a consequence of its insights another risk-factors conclusion of the SR Halifax Taskforce presents a frightening new dimension to SR111: "We have clearly concluded that such contributing factors exist in each type of aircraft and that it is not simply a case of being type-specific to the MD-11." These were conclusions also reached by the TSB and

sent to the certifying authority (the US FAA). To date the only ramifications of SR111 reaching beyond the MD-11 are the new emergency rules retroactively affecting the STC's (Supplemental Type Certification) of Inflight Entertainment Systems on just about every type of airliner in service today.

Nevertheless, neither manufacturers Boeing nor the American FAA supervisory authority want to even recommend (let alone mandate) the new Swissair safety precautions for all remaining MD-11's. If this was to be done, such a program could then logically expand to include most other types of airline aircraft exhibiting the identical type-certification deficiencies. The first Swissair machine should be converted and ready for return to service at the end of June 2001. Before the SR MD-11 Fleet is permitted to carry passengers following the incorporation of these system safety adjustments, it must pass a strict test flight program in Zurich. Preliminary re-certification assessments would normally be monitored by representatives of the FAA (the American airworthiness regulatory authority). However these were carried out in the spring of 1999 so that

these changes could proceed without delay to SR Flight Services. But because manufacturer Boeing withheld its agreement to these changes for a long time, there have been extensive delays in their implementation. Boeing sees much of the program as "enhancements" and not necessarily as required safety modifications. These new Swissair safety initiatives have now become even more expensive: Three SR MD-11's have only just completed their heavy maintenance checks. But now they must return to the hangar yet again for extensive rework. But it's not necessarily a case of spending a dollar to save a penny. Once you look at the cost of SR111 and its potential for costing the airline industry as a whole, it may well have been the other way round.

From: "Delorme, Paulette" <Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca>
Date: July 3, 2003 6:09:38 AM PDT
To: "John Barry Smith" <barry@corazon.com>
Cc: "Burtch, Terry" <Terry.Burtch@tsb.gc.ca>
Subject: **RE: Air India Flight 182**

Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for your recent inquiry regarding the last

correspondence you had with Mr. Bill Tucker on the Air India file. Mr. Tucker's replacement is Mr. Terry Burtch, who joined us last October. I have forwarded your request to Mr. Burtch, who is pursuing it at present. You may also be interested to know that just before we received your request, both the Director of Investigations - Air and the Director, Engineering, retired from the Transportation Safety Board. Mr. Burtch is presently following up with other staff in those respective organizations, and will communicate directly with you at the earliest opportunity. We regret the delay in responding, but trust that this approach will be satisfactory.

Paulette G. Delorme

Executive Assistant / Adjointe ex/cutive

Transportation Safety Board of Canada/

Bureau de la s/curit/ des transports du Canada

Tel.: (819) 994-8002

FAX: (819) 994-9759

-----Original Message-----

From: John Barry Smith [mailto:barry@corazon.com]

Sent: Wednesday, May 28, 2003 1:42 AM

To: Delorme, Paulette

Subject: Air India Flight 182

Dear Ms. Delorme, Tuesday, May 27, 2003 10:33 PM

I believe you assisted me a few years ago in regard to my shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182.

You referred me to Mr. Bill Tucker. We had an extensive correspondence and a face to face meeting in my home in Carmel

Valley in December 2001.

Mr. Tucker told me just before retiring:

However, I have obtained a personal commitment from both the Director of Engineering and the Director of Air Investigations that they will follow-up on this at the end of the summer and see if there is anything that can be made available to you. To that end, I shall send both of them a copy of this message so that they can create a "bring forward" reminder to follow up.

Well, I have waited but have heard nothing from either of those Directors. Was I just brushed off? Was the 'personal commitment' genuine? There is much to contribute to the TSB regarding Air India Flight 182 based on the luxury of hindsight of 18 years.

Can you refer those gentlemen/women to me for further discussion? I am a non conspiracy person and always refer to facts, data, and evidence for Air India Flight 182. I believe the probable cause was a mechanical event with precedent. Every claim can be supported by official documents and evidence.

Can you bring forward the followup, please?

Cheers,
Barry Smith

John Barry Smith

541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
831 659 3552
barry@corazon.com
<http://www.corazon.com>

X-From_: Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca Tue Jun 25 15:22:17 2002
From: "Tucker, Bill" <Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca>
To: "John Barry Smith" <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: RE: Pix of Air India Flight 182
Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2002 18:23:49 -0400
Reply-By: Sun, 2 Jun 2002 17:00:00 -0400
X-Message-Flag: Follow up

Dear Barry,

I felt that this message from you below, dated 22 May, needed specific responses to several of your points. I'll get to your request for photos later in this response, but first I want to clear the air on some of your concerns - or at least try to.

- 1) - I am not being "rebuffed with excuses and delay".
- 2) - There is nothing fishy going on.
- 3) - Ron Schleede contacts me because he is a colleague and a friend. He worked for me here as Director of Investigations-Air for six months on an

international exchange (and he did a great job).

4) - Ken Smart said nothing to influence my retirement, and I am shocked that you would suspect a connection. The fact is that my decision was made and relayed to my boss in late March, at least a month before Ken's visit.

5) - I do not believe the "more likely explanation for Air India Flight 182 is mechanical rather than conspiracy". Based on my direct knowledge from the AI 182 investigation, I saw mechanical failure as one plausible explanation. Adding my indirect knowledge at the time (back in the late 1980s), from others who were more directly involved, I considered a bomb to be the more likely explanation and mechanical failure to be plausible, but unlikely. Adding in the additional knowledge I have acquired since then (which is almost all indirect in a pure accident investigation sense) I have become more convinced that a bomb brought down AI 182.

6) - The only reason that my recent e-mail referred to AI 182, PanAm 103, and TWA 800, but not to UA 811, was that I had less familiarity with the UA 811 investigation than the other three. However, I have absolutely no reason to doubt the eventual conclusion that the cargo door failed

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811.

7) - As I advised you last summer, this agency has no mandate to re-conduct an investigation of AI 182. Moreover, my personal opinion is that it would not be an appropriate use of our resources to do so. Nevertheless, I did believe that the TSB should make John Garstang available to that investigation through periodic secondment to the RCMP, and I still feel that our doing so was an appropriate decision. I have high confidence in the integrity and the thoroughness of the RCMP investigation; and I sincerely hope that justice will be served by the pending trial - whatever its outcome. Now to the matter of your request for photos of the forward right side of the AI 182 B747.

I spoke with John Garstang about your request. He advised that there are both photos and videos from the AI 182 investigation. However, with respect to the forward right side and the cargo door in particular, he is only certain about the video. They have pictures showing where the cargo door was in the debris field, and they also have a picture of the door at the ocean surface when it broke free during the recovery attempt; he is just not

sure how much was video, or still frame from video, versus photographs..

To complicate matters, the video was deteriorating as time went by. Some years ago (estimate: around 1995), the RCMP took the magnetic tape video

(which would be of even poorer quality by now) and made a digitized version.

The former is ours, the latter is theirs; however they need both for trial

purposes (continuity of evidence, I assume). Moreover, they have advised

that the matter is before the courts, that a publication ban is in effect,

and that they do not want anything to be released that could be prejudicial

to the court process. Both the TSB's General Counsel and I have been

notified that the RCMP Legal Services group believes that release of Air

India wreckage photographs could be injurious to the RCMP's work and that,

as such, release is exempted under Sec. 16(1) of Canada's Access to

Information Act.

There may (far from certain) be some form of photo/video info that is still

in the TSB's possession and that may (also far from certain) be releasable

to you. To determine that will take considerable effort and, to be at all

manageable, it will require the personal involvement of John

Garstang. With his heavy workload, as we try to complete the report on the SWR111 investigation, we just can't give him any more tasks for the next few months. However, I have obtained a personal commitment from both the Director of Engineering and the Director of Air Investigations that they will follow-up on this at the end of the summer and see if there is anything that can be made available to you. To that end, I shall send both of them a copy of this message so that they can create a "bring forward" reminder to follow up. At the very worst, the TSB's photos/videos can certainly be made available after the trial.

Meanwhile, I can assure you that the cargo door failure possibility was looked at in a rigorous and unbiased manner. In fact, I understand that part of that process was to specifically review the information and suggestions that you had provided. John G. told me that when he was asked by the RCMP to do work in that area, there was not the slightest hint of a desired outcome - only that all the information be reviewed thoroughly and objectively to find the truth.

As Sgt Blachford has indicated to both of us, the aircraft-related

elements
are only part of a huge investigation. The trial (which is
expected to be
the largest in Canada's history) will also bring out much evidence
that was
obtained through the RCMP's criminal investigation. You will
no doubt be
following the trial, as I will. Let us hope that the trial will not be
delayed much longer and that it will culminate in a just outcome
(whatever
that may be)..

In closing, I can honestly say that I have enjoyed communicating
with you -
at least most of the time. (I must admit that there have been
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you added to my stress level because I couldn't keep up with
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correspondence; it is against my nature to ignore a sincere
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respond to it without adequate consideration.) If I may offer
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gratuitous advice, please don't let the cargo door issue consume
you, and
don't become like the conspiracy theorists. You have already
raised
awareness of the cargo door issue; but if you are seen as pushing
it as the
only credible explanation for so many accidents, people will not
listen to
what you have to say. I was, and still am, impressed with you.
You have a
good brain, a pleasant personality, good health, and a wonderful
family and

home; Don't miss out on enjoying all that in your retirement years.

Very sincerely,
Bill T..

From: System Administrator <postmaster@tc.gc.ca>
Date: October 9, 2003 10:13:35 AM PDT
To: barry@corazon.com
**Subject: Undeliverable: TSB report on 727 open cargo door/
legal definition s of negligence....Plea for questions...**

Your message

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sweetd@tc.gc.ca;
Shyrone Kaur; Russell.Young@PSS.Boeing.com;
keithrh@telus.net; Gordon E.
Smith; EdwBlock@aol.com; Kevin & Susan Campbell
Subject: TSB report on 727 open cargo door/legal definitions of
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From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

To: Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca, hmalik@uniserve.com,
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Subject: TSB report on 727 open cargo door/legal definitions of negligence

....Plea for questions...

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Paulette G. Delorme

Executive Assistant / Adjointe executive

Transportation Safety Board of Canada

Bureau de la securite des transports du Canada

Nick Stoss

A/Director General

Investigation Operations

Place du Centre

200 Promenade du Portage

4th Floor

Gatineau, Quebec

K1A 1K8

Dear Ms. Delorme and Mr. Stoss, Thursday, October 9, 2003

9:18 AM

As the below report from TSB on a Boeing 727 inadvertently left open cargo

door by an electrical problem reveals, you have known that cargo doors open

inadvertently on Boeing airliners for over a year.

You know that recently a cargo door opened on a Cessna 421 after leaving a Canadian airport.

You know from a CASB AAR that a Boeing 747, Air India Flight 182, CVR heard a sudden loud sound before an inflight breakup, a sound that was analyzed by UK AAIB personnel to be not a bomb explosion but was matched to an explosive decompression when a cargo door opened in a fatal DC-10 accident.

You know that I have been reporting to you for years that my analysis for the probable cause for Air India Flight 182 rules out a bomb explosion and concludes that it was the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation. My PDF AAR on Air India Flight 182 has previously been sent to you for review.

You know that Bill Tucker, formerly of TSB, has felt sufficient evidence exists for the wiring/cargo door problem for Air India Flight 182 that a follow up by TSB was warranted after his retirement.

You know there is an active investigation currently underway by the RCMP

into the most important aviation accident in Canadian history, Air India Flight 182.

And yet you do nothing. You do not ask questions. You are silent. You standby and wait...and wait...and wait.

Speaking as a survivor of a sudden, night, fiery, fatal, jet airplane crash, I know there is no time; there is no luxury for contemplation when indications of an unsafe condition present themselves when flying. Checklists must be followed. Action must be taken now.

You are public servants. You have a duty to perform an investigation into aviation safety. Investigations require questions. By not doing your duty to ask questions of me, you are negligent, the degree of which is determined by the consequences of your failure to act.

Below:

1. Some legal definitions that are relevant to you,
2. TSB report on Boeing 727 open cargo door.
3. Comprehensive legal discussions on manslaughter and criminal negligence.

As usual, I await questions/queries/interrogation regarding my factual

report to you about a current safety hazard to the Canadian flying public.

Respectfully,
John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
831 659 3552
barry@corazon.com
<http://www.corazon.com>

Sec. 39.01. Definitions.

In this chapter:

(1) "Law relating to a public servant's office or employment"
means a law that specifically
applies to a person acting in the capacity of a public servant
and
that directly or indirectly:

(A) imposes a duty on the public servant; or

(B) governs the conduct of the public servant.

There are three conditions that must be fulfilled before the jury may find the defendant guilty of manslaughter by criminal negligence:

(i) that there had been an assumption of a duty to care for the deceased;

(ii) that the defendant had been grossly negligent in regard of his duty to take care;

(iii) that by reason of such negligence the person died: that is, the omission caused the death.

Penal Code

Sec. 6.01. Requirement of Voluntary Act or Omission.

(a) A person commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct, including an act, an omission, or possession.

(b) Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly obtains or receives the thing possessed or is aware of his control of the thing for a sufficient time to permit him to terminate his control.

(c) A person who omits to perform an act does not commit an offense unless a law as defined by Section 1.07 provides that the omission is an offense or otherwise provides that he has a duty

to perform the act.

The Quality of Negligence Required

A. The Meaning of "Criminal Negligence"

Early tests stress that a higher degree of negligence than that which is supports a civil action is required:

"The prosecution must satisfy the jury that the negligence or incompetence of the defendant went beyond a mere matter of compensation and showed

such a disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a

crime against the State and conduct deserving punishment":

Bateman (1925) 19

Cr.App.R. 8 at 13

In Nydam [1977] VR 430, 445 the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria

held that manslaughter by criminal negligence required the prosecution to

prove

that

(a) the act [or omission] which caused death was done by the defendant ,

(b) it was a conscious and voluntary act,

(c) that it was done in circumstances involving,

"...such a great falling short of the standard of care which a reasonable man would have exercised and which involved such a high risk that death or

GBH would follow that the doing of the act merited criminal punishment"

Both these statements are undesirable definitions of the conduct involved in criminal negligence manslaughter. It is conceptually confusing to use in the words

defining an offence terms such as "criminal" or "culpable". Such definitions

leave it to the jury to determine the type of conduct which should fall

within this

category of manslaughter. On the other hand, the phrase could offer some

assistance to the jury in understanding that the test of criminal negligence

is

qualitatively different from that used in the law of tort (see discussion

below). If the formulation only serves this educative function, then perhaps

it is not

necessary to include it as part of the substantive definition of criminal

negligence.

In *Andrews* [1937] AC 576 the House of Lords gave a list of appropriate synonyms including "culpable, criminal, gross, wicked clear and complete".

None of these words are any more illuminating.

B. The Standard of Negligence: "A high degree of negligence"

Lord Atkin in *Andrews* [1937] AC 576 reviewed the 19th century cases which had defined this category of manslaughter using epithets such as "criminal misconduct" and "criminal inattention". Lord Atkin conceded that the use of "the word criminal in any attempt to define a crime is perhaps not the most helpful". However, these early definitions had intended to convey that only a very high degree of negligence would suffice:

"Simple lack of care such as will constitute civil liability is not enough: for the purposes of the criminal law there are degrees of negligence: and a very high degree of negligence is required to be proved before the felony is established" per Lord Atkin in *Andrews* [1937] AC 576 at 583.

It is doubtful whether it is possible to have degrees of

inadvertence. An early academic paper on criminal negligence by JW Turner argued that since the defendant is inadvertent of the risks associated with his conduct, how is it possible to characterise that behaviour as highly inadvertent. In his opinion, since inadvertence is a negative state of mind it is nonsense to suggest that there are degrees of inadvertence.

The courts are primarily concerned with conduct which, objectively speaking, involves a high risk of death or GBH. If this is the case, it strengthens the case for assimilating manslaughter by unlawful/dangerous acts and criminal negligence.

(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care

that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

<http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/2001/A01f0094/A01f0094.asp>

Air 2001

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigated this occurrence for the purpose of advancing transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.

Aviation Investigation Report
Cargo Door Opening on Take-off
Bradley Air Services Ltd. (First Air)
Boeing 727-225 C-FIFA
Corcaigh International Airport, Ireland
20 July 2001

Report Number A01F0094

Summary

A First Air Boeing 727-225 aircraft, C-FIFA, serial number

20381, was on a regular scheduled cargo flight from Corcaigh International Airport, Ireland, to East Midland Airport, England. Shortly after take-off, as the landing gear was retracting, the aft cargo door light illuminated on the second officer's annunciator panel. He informed the other crew members of the anomaly as the aircraft climbed through 400 feet above ground level. Shortly thereafter, the No 3 engine experienced a series of compressor stalls. The captain shut down the engine (Pratt & Whitney JT8D-15) and requested an immediate return to Corcaigh Airport. The aircraft landed uneventfully; airport emergency response services were standing by. The aft cargo door was partially open, and the door-opening mechanism was damaged. No one was injured.

Ce rapport est/galement disponible en franais.

Other Factual Information

Boeing 727 C-FIFA was on extended chartered operations to Air Contractors Ireland Ltd. The aircrew arrived at Corcaigh Airport approximately 1? hours before a planned departure time of 2045 local time. 1The three crew members

- the captain, the first officer, and the second officer - had a full day of rest before the start of their duty day. They were certified and qualified for the flight in accordance with existing regulations. The aircraft was serviced and maintained in accordance with existing directives, and there was no indication of any system malfunction before the flight.

Reported weather at the time of the incident was as follows: broken ceiling at 3000 feet above ground level, tops at 5000 feet, light winds, and good visibility. All significant events - loading of the aircraft, engine start-up, take-off, and landing 34 minutes later - occurred during daylight conditions.

On arrival at the airport, the second officer proceeded to the aircraft to carry out pre-flight and pre-start duties. While conducting an external inspection, he noted that the aft cargo and main cargo doors were open in preparation for loading. The aft airstairs were also deployed. While the flight crew made their way to the cockpit in preparation for departure, ground personnel were getting ready to load the aircraft through the main cargo door on the left side and through the aft cargo door on the right side

by the N o 3 engine.

Servisair Ltd. provides aircraft ground handling 2in Corcaigh under the supervision of DHL Aviation, an international courier company operating on behalf of Air Contractors Ireland Ltd. While DHL Aviation is responsible for providing ground-handling operations at major airports, this responsibility is usually subcontracted to a third-party handling agent in smaller stations. In Corcaigh, the ground-handling responsibility was delegated to Servisair Ltd., but a local DHL Aviation staff member was responsible for building the loads, producing weight and balance forms, and supervising Servisair Ltd. Under the contract, Servisair Ltd. is responsible for securing and closing all aircraft cargo doors before engine start-up. Nevertheless, a local procedure at Corcaigh delegates the task of loading the aircraft through the aft cargo door to DHL Aviation.

The aircraft was loaded while all three flight crew members were in the cockpit going through their pre-start checklist procedures. A DHL Aviation staff member was loading the aft cargo area of the aircraft in accordance with established local procedures. While testing the annunciator panel for the first time, the second officer did not pay any attention to the

aft cargo or main cargo door lights because the aircraft was still being loaded. After completion of the aircraft loading through the aft and main cargo doors, a Servisair Ltd. agent handed the second officer a cargo form describing the nature and weight of the on-board cargo for weight and balance calculations. The second officer then interrupted his pre-start duties and exited the cockpit area to close and secure the main cargo door and the aft airstairs, as per established procedures. While stowing the airstairs, he did not observe the position of the aft cargo door because this area is often being loaded right up to engine start.

The second officer then re-entered the aircraft through the left side passenger door and proceeded back to the cockpit area to resume pre-start and start duties. At that time, he looked at the annunciator panel and noted that the main cargo and aft cargo lights on the annunciator panel were not illuminated; this confirmed that all cargo doors were secured. The three crew members then initiated the challenge and response "Clear to Start" checklist. Before the three engines were started, a Servisair Ltd. agent

standing next to the captain's window on the left side gave a thumbs-up to the crew, signifying that personnel were clear of the aircraft and that the crew were cleared to start. Because of the position of the aircraft on the ramp, a pushback was not required before taxi; therefore, the checklist items under "push back" were not actioned.

The Boeing 727 normal checklist calls for the second officer to visually check the annunciator light panel on three occasions: before engine start, after engine start, and before the aircraft takes off. The second officer visually checked the panel as per the checklist. Before take-off, the captain double-checked the panel to visually confirm that all lights were extinguished before departure. On all three occasions, the annunciator panel check requires the pushing of a button to illuminate all panel lights to confirm that they are serviceable and the subsequent release of the same button to verify that they will extinguish. If a door light does not extinguish after this check, the corresponding door is not properly closed and secured.

During take-off, the captain and the first officer moved their

attention
outward, and the second officer maintained a scan on the engine instruments,
his primary duty for that phase. Shortly after lift-off, as the gear was
selected up, the second officer leaned back and noticed that the aft cargo
door light on the annunciator panel was illuminated. After the first officer
reported the aircraft climbing through the take-off obstacle clearance
altitude, the second officer informed the crew that the aft cargo door light
was illuminated. The captain acknowledged this information. Following flap
retraction, the aircraft experienced a series of compressor stalls on the N
o 3 engine, located a few feet downstream from the aft cargo door. The
captain brought the engine N o 3 thrust lever to idle, levelled the aircraft
above the broken layer of cloud, and requested an immediate diversion back
to Corcaigh Airport. The "One Engine Inoperative" drill was carried out,
engine N o 3 was secured, and the aircraft landed uneventfully on two
engines. The aircraft stopped on the runway and was visually inspected by an
emergency response services crew who responded to the scene. Minutes later,
the emergency response services crew reported to the aircrew that the aft

cargo door was partially open, the hinge mechanism was slightly bent, and the door handle fully protracted. There was no apparent damage to the engine or the structure of the aircraft. The aircraft then taxied to the ramp.

After engine shutdown, the aircrew attempted to determine which of the two agencies, DHL Aviation or Servisair Ltd., was responsible for securing the aft cargo door. This responsibility could not be ascertained at that time.

Later, the DHL Aviation agent who loaded parcels through the aft cargo door could not recollect if he had closed the door upon completion of the loading. Two of the five parcels loaded in the aft cargo area remained on board; one was found on the runway just before the end, one was found on the grass area past the end of the runway, and the last was returned by a person who lived near the airport boundary.

The aft cargo door structure, door stops (latches), and hinge attach points were not damaged; however, the right and left hinge rods were bent, preventing the door from closing. The door warning mechanism - switch, wires, and warning light - was tested several times by forcefully moving the

electrical switch and wires, attempting to extinguish the warning panel aft cargo light with the door open and to recreate the possibility of such system malfunction. No faults were found. The hinges were dismantled to allow closing and securing the aft cargo door. The door was closed and the warning light extinguished. The aircraft rear cargo area was pressurized and retained pressure within an acceptable range, confirming that the door was properly secured.

On July 24, after receiving authorization from the Irish Aviation Authorities and Boeing, the aircraft was ferried, with one engine inoperative and the aft door secured, to Copenhagen, Denmark, for repairs.

These repairs included replacing the bent hinges and the locking mechanism (door switch) and some minor repairs to the inner case of the engine N o 3 turbine casing, damaged by the compressor stalls. No damage was found on the turbine blades. During or after the repair work, the door microswitch was inadvertently discarded and could not be found for analysis.

TSB was not informed of this reportable incident by the operator but received information from Transport Canada, System Safety, on July 24.

Through coordination with the Aircraft Accident Investigation

Agency in Ireland, the investigation was delegated to TSB on July 25.

The flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) were downloaded, and the data were sent to the TSB Engineering Laboratory for analysis. Annunciator door lights and status or condition of doors are not recorded in the FDR. The flight lasted 34 minutes after rotation. The speed averaged 200 knots, with peaks to approximately 240 knots for one minute. The flight portion of the 30-minute loop CVR was written over as power was kept on for more than one hour after the incident to allow the crew and maintenance personnel to diagnose the door locking mechanism and the warning system. The CVR did not contain data from pre-start to the occurrence.

The Boeing Aircraft Company provided information regarding previous inadvertent door openings in flight. Since December 1976, 10 cases of airborne inadvertent door openings have been reported to Boeing for the 727 type, including this occurrence. The causes are usually undetermined. However, the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigated and documented one event that occurred on 05 January 1999 (NTSB

Report N o

LAX99IA072). It was determined that a door opened because ground-handling personnel did not properly secure an aft cargo door and that a door warning light was intermittent due to contamination in proximity switch terminals.

In other cases where a precise cause could not be determined, suspected causes were generally related to improper latching of doors combined with, in some instances, a malfunctioning warning light electrical system and/or switch.

Faulty microswitch operation is usually caused by oil or water contamination, unclean cannon plugs, or wiring problems. If a switch is considered too difficult to clean, it will be discarded and replaced by a new one. These switches have no shelf life and are not included in any special inspection. They are simply replaced as needed. A few weeks after this occurrence, an undocumented case of aft cargo warning light malfunction occurred on the ramp of First Air / Bradley Air Services Ltd. at the Ottawa / Macdonald-Cartier International Airport, Ontario, with the same Boeing 727 type. Various aircraft systems were being tested, and it was noticed that the warning light was out while the aft cargo door was open,

indicating a malfunction of the concerned electrical system. The warning light was checked serviceable. The door microswitch was diagnosed as giving faulty indications. The switch was cleaned and reinstalled.

Aft cargo doors on Boeing 727's have been designed so that when properly closed and secured on the ground, the doors cannot inadvertently open in flight unless the whole door latching mechanism sustains a structural failure or breakdown. It is also physically impossible, by virtue of their design, to improperly close and secure the door. The door is opened in an upward direction by fully protracting the door handle, which then snaps and stays in that position. The door stay rod attached to the inside of the door is used to keep the door fully open for easy access.

To close and secure the aft cargo door, the stay rod is re-attached to the inside of the door, and the door is allowed to rotate downward by gravity, resting a few inches away from closing flat with the aircraft outer surface.

With the door handle fully protracted, the door is pushed completely in against the aircraft structure, then the door handle is pushed in so it is

flat with the surface of the aircraft's outer skin (fully retracted).

The

action of pushing in the door handle moves the four stops

outward in each

corner of the door. Provided that the door is resting against the

fuselage,

these male-type stops will first ramp up and then down into their

respective, elbow-shaped, female-type aircraft mounted door

stops (door

latches) to properly secure the door.

Once the handle is fully in, a plunger mechanism is forced into

the switch,

which makes electrical contact and extinguishes the aft cargo

warning light.

If the door handle is pushed in (that is, partially or fully flat with

the

door) before the door is pushed completely in against the aircraft

structure, extension of the moveable stops when the handle is

pushed in will

prevent these stops from locking in with the aircraft mounted

door latches.

This safety mechanism makes it impossible to close the door flat

with the

aircraft structure if the handle is retracted and eliminates any

possibility

of the plunger electrical contact being made and the warning

light being

extinguished. When the handle is in and the door is not fully

closed, the

door remains ajar by about two feet. If the stay rod is stored and

the door

handle is protracted, the door will naturally rest close to the fuselage, just a few inches away from being flat with the aircraft outer skin. In this position, the fact that the door is not fully and properly closed is hardly noticeable to a loading crew.

Analysis

The involved switch was discarded before it could be examined and tested by TSB; thus, it was not determined whether the switch was defective for the occurrence flight.

Because ground personnel are usually loading cargo up to the last minute before engine start, the second officer does not carry out a final, post-loading, pre-flight inspection of the aircraft before starting the engines, nor is it required by company procedures. The flight crew rely on cockpit annunciator warning lights to confirm the status of aircraft doors before engine start, taxi, and take-off. In a serviceable system, an illuminated light would indicate that an electrical contact is not being made inside the door microswitch, meaning that the door is not closed and secured. When aircraft systems are energized with the auxiliary power unit and the aft cargo door is partially or fully open, the light will be

illuminated. An extinguished aft cargo light after loading and before engine start confirms that the aft cargo door is properly closed and secured. It is concluded that the second officer likely could not have repeatedly missed the aft cargo warning light being illuminated on his annunciator panel before take-off. Even in bright and sunny conditions, an illuminated light on the second officer's console is obvious. Furthermore, the same light panel was visually verified "clear of lights" by the captain before take-off, as required in the pre-start checklist procedures.

This investigation revealed no damage to the aircraft mounted door latches, the door structure, and the door moveable stops. Only the door hinges were found bent and had to be changed. The nature of this damage, combined with the door design and the status of the door handle when first inspected by emergency response services personnel suggest that, after cargo loading was completed, the door was likely left in the down position with the door handle fully protracted and the door stay rod stowed away.

The locations of the three parcels on the runway provide further evidence that the door was not fully closed before take-off. The door likely began to

open as the aircraft initiated its rotation, and the force of the wind contributed directly to bending the door hinges. Although the aft cargo warning light was observed for the first time by the second officer as the gear was retracting, it is plausible that the light appeared earlier during the take-off roll. The second officer is required to turn his seat toward the front of the aircraft to monitor the engine instruments during the critical phase of the take-off roll and lift-off, he would not be looking at his annunciator panel. The advancement of thrust levers to full power, release of the brakes, take-off roll, rotation, and retraction of the landing gear are all conducive to airframe vibrations. These vibrations could have restored service to the aft cargo door microswitch mechanism. The subsequent engine compressor stalls coincided with raising the flaps. Airflow disruption, created by the closeness of an opened cargo door to the engine intake and redirected airflow resulting from a change of configuration most likely induced these stalls.

After working together at the local level for several years, Servisair Ltd. and DHL Aviation crews' direct responsibilities for loading an aircraft and securing all doors became ambiguous as both agencies worked to get the job

done in a timely manner. Although the contract gives Servisair Ltd. responsibility for loading an aircraft, the local DHL Aviation staff member usually loads packages into the aft cargo area without disrupting the Servisair Ltd. team's loading in the main cargo area.

Although effective, this local division of responsibilities procedure has weaknesses. Without a clearly defined set of tasks and/or responsibilities, confusion or miscommunication between two different loading crews (that is, agencies) eager to do the job in an efficient and timely manner may lead to an omission of safety-related duties, such as closing and securing the aft cargo door. With the door stay rod stowed away, a slightly open door is hardly noticeable. The only defence left against departing with a door open is a warning light on the second officer's panel. This light can become disabled as a result of electrical contamination or malfunction. Within the DHL Aviation and Servisair Ltd. organizations, the pre-flight walk-around inspection is considered to be the flight crew's responsibility. When the crew is informed in the cockpit that loading is complete and all doors are closed, the loading crew is not expected to perform a final walk-

around
because ramp dispatch is not part of the contract.

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors

The aft cargo door was most likely not closed and secured before engine start-up, taxi, and departure of the Boeing 727. As a result, the door opened during the take-off roll.

The aft cargo door microswitch likely malfunctioned, giving the crew an erroneous indication that the door was secured before take-off.

Findings as to Risk

Servisair Ltd. and DHL Aviation's local procedure for loading an aircraft and securing cargo doors might have led to the omission of properly closing the aft cargo door.

When different agencies perform the same work without a clearly defined set of tasks or responsibilities, there is a risk of confusion and miscommunication that may lead to an omission of safety-related duties, such as closing and securing doors.

Other Findings

This incident was reported to TSB four days after the event. By the time the investigation was delegated to TSB, critical information had been lost: the aft cargo door microswitch had been discarded and could not be examined or tested.

Safety Action Taken

On July 3rd 2002, a meeting was held between Bradley Air Services Ltd and Servisair, where it was agreed that Servisair staff will be solely responsible for securing cargo doors on DHL aircraft. All DHL staff in Cork have been advised and will not be involved in this responsibility in the future.

This report concludes the Transportation Safety Board's investigation into this occurrence. Consequently, the Board authorized the release of this report on 14 August 2002.

1. Local time is Coordinated Universal Time plus one hour.
2. Ground handling is the provision of contracted services during the arrival and subsequent departure of the same aircraft in accordance with a

standard agreement. Contracted services include, but are not limited to, marshalling the aircraft, loading and off-loading of the aircraft through the cargo doors, start-up procedures, and pushback operations when necessary.

MANSLAUGHTER

Overview

Terminology: Voluntary and Involuntary

Unlawful And Dangerous Conduct as Manslaughter

Dangerous Conduct Defined

Unresolved Issues in Wilson: The Meaning of Unlawfulness

The Relationship Between the Categories of Fault for Manslaughter

Criminal Negligence as Manslaughter

The Quality of Negligence Required

A. The Meaning of "Criminal Negligence"

B. The Standard of Negligence: "A high degree of negligence"

C. Using confusing synonyms: "recklessness" and indifference to obvious risks?

D. Placing the Reasonable Person in the Position of the Accused.

Omissions and Criminal Negligence

Overview

76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent or willfully";

"knowingly, or with knowledge"; "recklessly, or maliciously"; and

"criminal negligence or criminally negligent." A person engages in conduct:

(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.

(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and

degree that
its disregard
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an
ordinary
person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed
from the actor's
standpoint.

(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with
respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his
conduct when he
ought to be
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist
or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that
the failure to
perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
that an
ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as
viewed from the
actor's
standpoint.

Amended by Chapter 32, 1974 General Session
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In this section, we will consider the principal categories of culpability for manslaughter: unlawful dangerous conduct; and criminal negligence. We will explore the differences and similarities between these alternate fault elements.

Terminology: Voluntary and Involuntary

Manslaughter, broadly speaking, is a less culpable or blameworthy form of homicide than murder. The jury can always return a verdict of manslaughter to a charge of murder. This is said to be a "constitutional right", applying even when the trial judge excludes the possibility of manslaughter as a legitimate verdict on the facts. This right of the jury to mitigate the penalty for murder to manslaughter (in effect, exercising a prerogative of mercy) plays an important role in cases where the motive for the killing is regarded as less blameworthy. For example, in the present law there is no defence for "mercy killing", that is where a person commits involuntary euthanasia of another person in order to relieve

terminal suffering. This is formally murder irrespective of the
beneficial
motive. Juries
however are always reluctant to convict of murder in these
situations: see M
Otlowski, "Mercy Killing in the Australian Criminal Justice
System" (1993)
17(1)
Criminal Law Journal 10.

As well as these informal but recognised means of mitigating
culpability for
killing, the law formally recognises that killing in the face of
provocation
is less
culpable than murder. This is known as voluntary manslaughter.
It describes
homicides where the defendant satisfies the mental state for
murder, but the
availability of a defence (like provocation) operates so as to
reduce the
offence of murder to manslaughter. See sections examining the
defence of
provocation.
On the other hand, involuntary manslaughter is the term which is
traditionally used to describe all other culpable homicides not
amounting to
murder.

The leading High Court decision dealing with involuntary
manslaughter is
Wilson (1992), BWW 277, BFW 514. The facts of the case are
that the victim

was a wandering drunk who shouldered the defendant. The defendant claimed that he then saw the victim clench his fist and so the defendant hit him, not very hard and only once. The victim died from resulting brain damage consistent with his head striking the concrete. The defendant was charged with murder. The judge directed the jury as to both murder and manslaughter and the defendant was convicted of manslaughter.

Before the recent High Court decision of Wilson, the common law recognised three categories of manslaughter: unlawful dangerous act, criminal negligence and a third category of manslaughter called battery manslaughter, or intentional infliction of harm. In the third category the defendant would be guilty of manslaughter where he or she committed a battery and death resulted. In Holzer [1968] VR 481, the defendant's fatal blow was not intended to cause any serious harm - the defendant intended to "just cut his lip to tell him to wake up to himself". The victim fell backwards and hit his head

on the road
and died.

Smith J. recognised that it will be manslaughter where the defendant (a) intended to inflict some kind of physical injury (or pain) on the victim and (b) the injury (or pain) must be more than merely trivial or negligible. (a) intended to inflict some kind of physical injury (or pain) on the victim and (b) the injury (or pain) must be more than merely trivial or negligible.

Professor Glanville Williams concluded that from the viewpoint of policy the third category of manslaughter is hard to justify:

"No judge has explained on what ground of justice or policy a person who has made a minor assault can become guilty of manslaughter by reason of an unknown weakness of the victim"

The Victorian Law Reform Commission shared this view and also recommended that this category of manslaughter should be abolished: Report No. 40, Homicide (1991) Recommendation 32 at p. 116.

In Wilson, the majority (Mason CJ, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ.) examined the older authorities which commonly cited in support of the

existence of battery manslaughter. The High Court concluded that the authorities were uncertain, BWW 287, BFW 516. Moreover, even if the category did exist there were good reasons for its demise. The High Court held that battery manslaughter continues the rigour of the early common law and ought to play no role in modern law. Under this category, a person may be held liable for manslaughter for causing a death which is quite unexpected, whether the test applied in that respect is subjective or objective. Battery manslaughter does not reflect the principle that there should be a close correlation between moral culpability and legal responsibility: BWW at 288, BFW 516.

Unlawful And Dangerous Conduct as Manslaughter

Wilson established that there is only two categories of involuntary manslaughter: unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter and manslaughter by criminal negligence. Prior to Wilson, Professor Brent Fisse had doubted the ultimate status of unlawful dangerous act manslaughter in Australia: Howard's

Criminal

Law (5th ed.) at p. 124. Its status has now been resolved in Australia, and the High Court in *Wilson* identified this as a separate category of manslaughter.

The early common law provided that for a conviction of manslaughter all that was required was that the defendant caused the death of another by an unlawful act. In that respect it was similar to the felony-murder rule, except that the unlawful act did not have to be a felony. The unlawful act doctrine may well have originated as a constructive form of liability (a corollary of felony-murder): see discussion in *Wilson*. However, in the 19th Century the English courts restricted its operation to unlawful acts causing death which were also dangerous in the sense of "likely to injure another person": *Larkin* [1943] 1 All ER 217 at 219.

The existence of this category of manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act was affirmed in England by the House of Lords in *DPP v Newbury & Jones* [1976] 2 WLR 918.

There are 3 elements to this category of manslaughter (i) the defendant's

act must cause the death, (ii) the defendant 's act must be unlawful, (iii) the defendant 's act must be dangerous. Before Wilson there was controversy over the meaning of dangerous act. In New South Wales, the courts were directing juries in accordance with a formulation of dangerous act laid down in the English decisions of Larkin [1943] and Church [1966] 1 QB 59, refer to BWW at 282.

"...the unlawful act must be such as all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise must subject the other person to, at least, the risk of some harm resulting therefrom, albeit not serious" Church [1966] 1 QB 59 per Edmund-Davies.

In Victoria, prior to Wilson, the courts have applied a more stringent test. In Holzer [1968] VR 481, Smith J expressly rejected Larkin/Church formulation:

"Authorities differ as to the degree of danger which must be apparent in the act. The better view, however, is I think that the circumstances must be such that a reasonable man in the defendant 's position, performing the very act which the defendant performed, would have realised

that he was

exposing another or others to an appreciable risk of really serious injury" per Smith J.

Note that the Holzer test had been cited with approval by Menzies J (dissenting) in Pemble.

Dangerous Conduct Defined

In Wilson, the High Court had to choose between the two tests of dangerousness. The minority (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ.) preferred the simple formulation of dangerousness as "an act likely to injure" in Larkin. The majority, modifying the Holzer test slightly, formulated the test thus: A reasonable person in the defendant's position would have realised that the act carried with it an appreciable risk of serious injury to the deceased. The majority doubted the utility of the qualifier "really" in the Holzer test. Serious and really serious may have quite different connotations in some situations. In the context of manslaughter:

"it is better to speak of an unlawful and dangerous act

carrying
with it an appreciable risk of serious injury"

The majority concluded that the trial judge had misdirected the jury in

Wilson because he had only them to consider whether the defendant's act was dangerous,

without any explanation of what dangerous means. Thus the act must involve a

sufficient likelihood or risk of injury to enable the act to be characterised as

dangerous. Ultimately what amounts to a dangerous act is a matter of degree and a question for the jury.

Unresolved Issues in Wilson: The Meaning of Unlawfulness

The dangerous conduct must also be unlawful. At one time, the unlawful act

could consist of a tort. Later cases established that only criminally

unlawful acts

will suffice. However, in Howard's Criminal Law, it is noted that modern

statutes often attach criminal liability to breaches of a statutory duty,

for example

driving without insurance. In the author's view this is not the unlawfulness

which the courts envisage:

"...what the courts appear to have in mind is not an act which

is
dangerous and incidentally also unlawful but an act which is
unlawful
because it is
dangerous." [at p. 127]

The doctrine appears to be limited, in Howard's view, to "acts
which are
unlawful only because they are dangerous". [at p. 128]. He cites
Martin
(1983) 32
SASR 419 at 452 per White J in support of the proposition. [at p.
128, n.18]

The High Court in Wilson did not consider this issue. The VLRC
Report,
Homicide (1991) concluded that " ... the requirement of
unlawfulness had
nothing
relevant to add. Dangerousness is the key element and it is
satisfied by an
objective test": at par. 262 at p. 113.

It is important that the prosecution prove each element of the
unlawful act,
including mens rea, if required by the offence. In R. v. Lamb
[1967] 2 QB
981
(English Court of Appeal) the defendant shot and killed his best
friend
whilst fooling around with a revolver. It was conceded that the
defendant
was acting in

jest, with no intention to harm the victim. Neither the defendant nor the victim understood the operation of the revolver (that a shot may be fired even though the firing chamber may be empty: the chamber rotates as the trigger is pulled).

As to unlawful dangerous act doctrine, the trial judge held that the pulling of the trigger amounted to an unlawful act even though there was no intent to alarm or intent to injure. Even counsel for the Crown disagreed with the trial judge's conclusion that "it was unnecessary to involve the jury in any consideration of the niceties of whether the defendant's actions did or did not constitute an assault".

The Court of Appeal held that the Crown was correct in their contention that the defendant's actions must have amounted to at least a "technical assault". In this case there was no evidence of an assault of any kind. It was necessary to prove the mens rea of the unlawful act, "... in this case the element of intent without which there can be no assault".

A similar point was made in the High Court decision of *R. v. Pemble* [1971] ALR 762. The victim, the defendant's girlfriend, was sitting on the bonnet of a car in a hotel car park. The defendant approached her from behind with a shot gun, only intending to frighten her. The gun discharged and killed her. He claimed it went off accidentally when he stumbled. He was convicted of murder. The trial judge directed the jury as to both murder and manslaughter and said that the defendant's conduct was clearly unlawful constituting an assault.

The majority agreed that the jury had been misdirected as to the requirement of unlawful act. The majority held that the murder conviction should be quashed but a conviction for manslaughter be substituted. All the elements of the unlawful act (in this case an assault) must be proved to succeed under the unlawful dangerous act doctrine. There could be no assault in this case since the victim had her back to the defendant: an essential element of the assault "causing the victim to apprehend immediate violence" was absent. The

shooting itself
could not be a battery because the discharge of the weapon was
accidental.

However, the majority disagreed as to what constituted the
unlawful act.

Barwick CJ held that brandishing a shotgun "at least constituted
an attempt

to assault

her ... The appellant at the moment of discharge of the rifle doing
an act

which was immediately proximate to the assault he intended".

McTiernan J

held that the

defendant's unlawful act was a breach of s.75(1A) of the Police
and Police

Offences Ordinance 1923 (NT) which made it unlawful to
"discharge of any

firearm

without reasonable cause in a public place". Windeyer J held that
the

defendant was clearly guilty of manslaughter by criminal
negligence. Menzies

and Owen

JJ, dissenting, held that a new trial should be ordered.

Questions for consideration: Would the defendant's act be
unlawful if the

discharge had occurred in a private hotel car park? Should
culpability under

this fault

element turn on liability for other offences?

The Relationship Between the Categories of Fault for Manslaughter

Many cases of unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter may be dealt with under criminal negligence. Brett Waller and Williams suggest that "...it would not require a very bold judicial step to treat unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter as merging into negligent manslaughter. Certainly such a development would be desirable": Criminal Law Texts and Cases (1993) at 6.19, p 305.

In *Wills* [1983] 2 VR 201 (Supreme Court of Victoria) Lush J concluded that:

"The unlawfulness of the [unlawful and dangerous] act stands parallel with criminal negligence of negligent manslaughter and equally the risk factor relevant to manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act stands as an objective consideration parallel with the objective danger assessment of negligent manslaughter."

Although the High Court in *Wilson* acknowledged that there have been calls to

replace the two remaining categories with one, the majority rejected this because the test for dangerousness between the categories of manslaughter differ in two ways:

A. Different degrees of risk

For manslaughter by criminal negligence, the test is a high risk that death or grievous bodily harm would follow: *Nydam* [1977] VR 430, 445. Contrast unlawful and dangerous act which requires an appreciable risk of serious injury. But if the unamended *Holzer* test is followed ("really serious harm") the difference becomes insignificant.

B. The role of the unlawfulness requirement?

For manslaughter by criminal negligence, the defendant's act need not be unlawful: *Andrews* [1937] AC 576 see also *Larkin* [1943] 1 All ER 217. But this distinction is illusory - in relation to manslaughter by criminal negligence there is no requirement (or restriction) that the defendant's behaviour must be not be criminal.

Criminal Negligence as Manslaughter

This category of manslaughter requires the death to be caused by the defendant's criminally negligent conduct. The negligent conduct may be an act or an omission. The courts use negligence sparingly, and not every case of inadvertence to the risk of death or GBH which will suffice for criminal liability. In *Wilson*, the High Court had no cause to consider this category in depth, but affirmed in passing the test in *Nydam*.

The Quality of Negligence Required

A. The Meaning of "Criminal Negligence"

Early tests stress that a higher degree of negligence than that which is supports a civil action is required:

"The prosecution must satisfy the jury that the negligence or incompetence of the defendant went beyond a mere matter of compensation and showed

such a disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving punishment":
Bateman (1925) 19

Cr.App.R. 8 at 13

In Nydam [1977] VR 430, 445 the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria held that manslaughter by criminal negligence required the prosecution to prove that

(a) the act [or omission] which caused death was done by the defendant ,

(b) it was a conscious and voluntary act,

(c) that it was done in circumstances involving,

"...such a great falling short of the standard of care which a reasonable man would have exercised and which involved such a high risk that death or

GBH would follow that the doing of the act merited criminal punishment"

Both these statements are undesirable definitions of the conduct involved in criminal negligence manslaughter. It is conceptually confusing to use in the words defining an offence terms such as "criminal" or "culpable". Such definitions leave it to the jury to determine the type of conduct which should fall within this

category of manslaughter. On the other hand, the phrase could offer some assistance to the jury in understanding that the test of criminal negligence is qualitatively different from that used in the law of tort (see discussion below). If the formulation only serves this educative function, then perhaps it is not necessary to include it as part of the substantive definition of criminal negligence.

In *Andrews* [1937] AC 576 the House of Lords gave a list of appropriate synonyms including "culpable, criminal, gross, wicked clear and complete". None of these words are any more illuminating.

B. The Standard of Negligence: "A high degree of negligence"

Lord Atkin in *Andrews* [1937] AC 576 reviewed the 19th century cases which had defined this category of manslaughter using epithets such as "criminal misconduct" and "criminal inattention". Lord Atkin conceded that the use of "the word criminal in any attempt to define a crime is perhaps not the most helpful". However, these early definitions had intended to convey that only

a very high degree of negligence would suffice:

"Simple lack of care such as will constitute civil liability is not enough: for the purposes of the criminal law there are degrees of negligence: and a very high degree of negligence is required to be proved before the felony is established" per Lord Atkin in *Andrews* [1937] AC 576 at 583.

It is doubtful whether it is possible to have degrees of inadvertence. An early academic paper on criminal negligence by JW Turner argued that since the defendant is inadvertent of the risks associated with his conduct, how is it possible to characterise that behaviour as highly inadvertent. In his opinion, since inadvertence is a negative state of mind it is nonsense to suggest that there are degrees of inadvertence.

The courts are primarily concerned with conduct which, objectively speaking, involves a high risk of death or GBH. If this is the case, it strengthens the case for assimilating manslaughter by unlawful/dangerous acts and criminal negligence.

C. Using confusing synonyms: "recklessness" and indifference to obvious risks?

Several cases seem to suggest that the state of mind of the defendant is a relevant factor to be taken into account. In *Andrews* Lord Atkin said that "a very high degree of negligence is required to be proved before the felony is established. Probably of all the epithets that can be applied "reckless" most nearly covers the case."

This reference to recklessness was picked up in several subsequent cases. In *Lamb* [1967] 2 QB 981 Sachs LJ said

"When the gravamen of a charge is criminal negligence—often referred to as recklessness—of the defendant, the jury have to consider among other matters the state of mind his [or her] mind, and that includes whether or not he [or she] thought that that which he [or she] was doing was safe."

This may be regarded as importing a subjective element into manslaughter by criminal negligence. However, this view has been rejected in England in

Newbury & Jones [1976] 2 WLR 918 where Lord Salmon said that Lamb should not be viewed as support for the view that the correct test is anything but objective - all that is required is that the defendant had the intention to do the act i.e., that his acts were voluntary.

The confusion over the precise meaning of negligence persisted in Stone & Dobinson [1977] 1 QB 354. The Court of Appeal referred to Andrews and concluded that the defendant 's conduct (his failure to act) must be reckless:

"that is to say a reckless disregard of danger to the health and welfare of the infirm person. Mere inadvertence is not enough. The defendant must be proved to have been indifferent to an obvious risk of injury to health or actually have foreseen the risk but have determined nevertheless to run it"

The dicta relating to the standard of care is not good law in Australia for two reasons. First, the dicta in Stone suggests that the test is partially subjective - an approach expressly rejected in Taylor [1983]. Secondly, the case

suggests
that the risk associated with the defendant 's conduct (whether
determined
objectively
or subjectively) need only be of "injury to health or welfare",
rather than
"death or GBH".

Note however, that Stone was cited in Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR
(NSW Court of
Appeal) where Yeldham J referred to the above passage in Stone
which
suggested that the test was subjective and that the defendant must
have "a
reckless disregard to the health and welfare of the infirm person".
This is
unnecessarily
confusing for the jury and the term recklessness should not be
treated as a
synonym for criminal negligence.

In Australia, the better view is that adopted in Taylor (1983) 9 A
Crim R
358, Criminal Court of Appeal Victoria, namely that the
defendant 's state
of mind is
irrelevant to the determination of criminal negligence. The
defendant had
administered a lethal dosage of a sedative to her hyperactive 6
year old
child. The
normal dose had been 5ml but her doctor had told the defendant
that it was

safe to use a 'higher dosage' or 'a little bit more than 5ml'. The defendant was convicted and appealed. The issue on appeal was as follows: what circumstances are relevant to the determination that the defendant's conduct, which caused the death, was criminally negligent?

The Court held that the view expressed in Lamb (considered above) that the defendant's actual state of mind is relevant to criminal negligence is not good law in either England or Victoria. Whether the acts of the defendant were criminally negligent is to be objectively determined, without reference to the particular belief of the defendant.

However the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's direction had not been deficient. The essential issue was whether a reasonable hypothetical person placed in the same circumstances as the defendant (particularly having regard to the advice given by the doctor) would have appreciated the probability of death or serious bodily harm as a result of their actions. The jury are

entitled to
consider whether a reasonable person, in the defendant's
position, might
have entertained
the mistaken belief held by the defendant.

D. Placing the Reasonable Person in the Position of the Accused.

It is important to contextualise the position of the reasonable
person. It
is not simply whether the conduct was reasonable or
unreasonable. An example
of this
sloppy reasoning and the danger that it could lead to an unfair
conviction
is apparent in the comments of O'Bryan J. in Taylor. He
concluded that "On
no view
of the medical evidence could it be found that applicant had
laboured under
a mistaken belief that the dosage...would be reasonable and not
harmful".

This conclusion is, with respect, wrong for the following reasons.
The issue
is not whether the defendant's belief was a reasonable one or
not, but
whether a
reasonable person would, on the same facts, have appreciated the
risk of
death or GBH. Certainly no doctor, or person with the benefit of
hindsight,
would have

concluded that such a belief [as to the dose] was reasonable, but the standard being applied is the whether a reasonable person (who lacks such medical expertise) would have foreseen death or GBH as likely.

Omissions and Criminal Negligence

This is misleadingly described in some texts as a separate category (or sub-specie) of homicide called manslaughter by omission. It is misleading because many crimes, including manslaughter, may be committed by omission if certain conditions are satisfied. The law imposes liability for death (either on the basis of murder or manslaughter depending on the level of fault) where the defendant has failed to act in situations where the law has imposed upon him or her a duty (or responsibility) to act. The law is generally reluctant to impose liability for omissions but it will do so in exceptional cases.

Here are some further illustrations of the principle being applied in manslaughter cases. In Russell [1933] VLR 59 the defendant was charged with the murder

of his wife and his children. He had watched on as she drowned them and then drowned herself. His conviction for manslaughter was upheld on the basis that as a father and husband he had a duty to help (as a parent and spouse) which he had neglected.

Stone & Dobinson [1977] 1 QB 354, English Court of Appeal raises similar issues. The two defendant were described as "ineffectual and inadequate".

The man's sister came to stay as a lodger and through her own neglect (refusal to eat) she became ill and bedridden. The defendant tried unsuccessfully to obtain help from their doctor, but they did no more. She died from toxæmia, prolonged immobilisation and lack of food. If she had received proper medical care she would have probably survived.

There are three conditions that must be fulfilled before the jury may find the defendant guilty of manslaughter by criminal negligence:

(i) that there had been an assumption of a duty to care for the deceased;

(ii) that the defendant had been grossly negligent in regard of his duty to take care;

(iii) that by reason of such negligence the person died: that is, the omission caused the death.

The court rejected the argument that the two defendants were under no duty to act. In determining whether there had been the necessary assumption of duty, the following factors were relevant:

"Whether Fanny was a lodger or not she was a blood relation of Stone; she was occupying a room in his house; Dobinson had undertaken the duty of trying to wash her, of taking food to her as she required...They did make efforts to care. They tried to get a doctor; they tried to discover the previous doctor."

There is an interesting question arising here about the extent to which the law should impose upon individuals a legal duty to come to the aid of others, particularly where the person concerned is actively refusing assistance. In

the medical context, it is clear that health care practitioners are under a legal duty to treat their patients, and to use reasonable care and skill in the discharge of that duty. However, the law does not require medical treatment to be administered to unwilling over the protests of an unwilling patient. Similarly the law does not require prison authorities to force-feed prisoners who have decided to go on hunger strike: see English decision of *Home Secretary v Robb* [1995] 1 FLR 412.

The differing approach of the law in these contexts has been highlighted in a recent article by Hazel Biggs, "Euthanasia and Death with Dignity: Still Poised on the Fulcrum of Homicide" [1996] CrimLR 878. The author compares *Stone & Dobinson* with the later decision of *Airedale NHS Trust v Bland* [1993] 1 All ER 821. In *Bland*, the House of Lords held that the doctors were relieved of their legal responsibility to treat a patient in a irreversible coma (persistent vegetative state) when it was no longer in the patient's best interests to do so. The contrast between the two scenarios is stark:

" The duty of care, however, appears to adopt a different criminal significance depending on whether the potential defendant is a member of the public or a medical profession....

Why is it that a professionally imposed duty extended only as far as the best interests of a patient who could not consent, while the scope of the

voluntarily assumed duty in Stone and Dobinson included the obligation to overrule the autonomous wishes of the patient [Stone's sister, Fanny]?

Smith [1979] CrimLR suggests that a person is capable of rational decision-making could relieve a relative of a common law duty of care, but this

fails to reconcile conflicting dicta. Bland was incapable of making any decisions and his carers were absolved of responsibility, while Stone's sister

purposefully declined the provision of food and medical aid by her carers and they were culpable"

The issue of omission was also discussed in Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR (NSW

Court of Criminal Appeal). The defendant was an associate of R, the proprietor of a "dog shop" and a drug dealer. He asked the defendant to procure him two prostitutes. R rang the defendant later that night asking him to collect one of the girls who, according to R, had taken too much heroin. The defendant took her to his flat tried to awaken her by slapping her face, pumped her chest and gave mouth to mouth resuscitation. The following day R called a doctor, who pronounced her dead. At the trial there had been conflicting medical opinion as to the exact time of death. The defendant was convicted and on appeal the Court examined whether the defendant, by his actions, had assumed a duty of care.

Yeldham J held "with considerable hesitation" there was evidence to support the jury's conclusion that the defendant had assumed a legal duty to seek medical aid for the victim. He focused on the fact that the defendant had made an effort to care, as in *Stone*.

Carruthers J had no difficulties recognising a duty to care for the

victim
which "...flowed from his [the defendant 's] taking her [the
victim's]
unconscious body
into his exclusive custody and control and thereby removing her
from the
potentiality of appropriate aid from others."

Both Yeldham and Carruthers JJ agreed that the conviction
should be quashed
since the inconsistent medical evidence made it impossible to
determine
whether
the defendant 's conduct had amounted to criminal negligence
and whether
this conduct caused the death of the victim.

Questions for Consideration: The traditional view is that the
mere fact that
the defendant had the power to save another's life (the baby in
the pool of
water
scenario) is not sufficient to create a legal duty to act. Is this case
reconcilable with this proposition?

Penal Code

Sec. 6.02. Requirement of Culpability.

(a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), a person does not
commit
an offense unless he

intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence engages in conduct as the definition of the offense requires.

(b) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a culpable mental state is nevertheless required unless the definition plainly dispenses with any mental element.

(c) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, but one is nevertheless required under Subsection (b), intent, knowledge, or recklessness suffices to establish criminal responsibility.

(d) Culpable mental states are classified according to relative degrees, from highest to lowest, as follows:

- (1) intentional;
- (2) knowing;
- (3) reckless;
- (4) criminal negligence.

(e) Proof of a higher degree of culpability than that charged

constitutes proof of the culpability charged.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.

Amended

by Acts 1993, 73rd

Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff.

Penal Code

Sec. 6.03. Definitions of Culpable Mental States.

(a) A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.

(b) A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

(c) A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

(d) A person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally negligent, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended

by Acts 1993, 73rd
Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

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Sec. 6.01. Requirement of Voluntary Act or Omission.

(a) A person commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct, including an act, an omission, or possession.

(b) Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly obtains or receives the thing possessed or is aware of his control of the thing for a sufficient time to permit him to terminate his control.

(c) A person who omits to perform an act does not commit an offense unless a law as defined by Section 1.07 provides that the omission is an offense or otherwise

provides that he has a duty
to perform the act.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.

Amended

by Acts 1975, 64th

Leg., p. 913, ch. 342, Sec. 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1975; Acts 1993, 73rd
Leg., ch.

3, Sec. 1, eff. Feb. 25,

1993; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

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Sec. 6.04. Causation: Conduct and Results.

(a) A person is criminally responsible if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient.

(b) A person is nevertheless criminally responsible for causing a

result if the only difference
between what actually occurred and what he desired,
contemplated, or risked
is that:

(1) a different offense was committed; or

(2) a different person or property was injured, harmed, or
otherwise affected.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.

Amended

by Acts 1993, 73rd

Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

[Go To Best Hit]

Transportation Code

Sec. 69.053. Pilot Liability Limited.

(a) A pilot providing a pilot service is not liable for more
than
\$1,000 for damages or loss
caused by the pilot's error, omission, fault, or neglect in the
performance
of the pilot service.

(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to:

(1) damage or loss that arises because of the wilful
misconduct or gross negligence of the
pilot;

(2) liability for exemplary damages for gross negligence of the pilot and for which no other person is jointly or severally liable; or

(3) an act or omission related to the ownership and operation of a pilot boat unless the pilot boat is directly involved in pilot services other than the transportation of pilots.

(c) This section does not exempt the vessel or its owner or operator from liability for damage or loss caused by the ship to a person or property on the ground that:

(1) the ship was piloted by a pilot; or

(2) the damage or loss was caused by the error, omission, fault, or neglect of a pilot.

(d) In an action brought against a pilot for an act or omission for which liability is limited as provided by this section and in which other claims are made or anticipated with respect to the same act or omission, the court shall dismiss the proceedings as to the pilot to the extent the pleadings allege pilot liability that exceeds \$1,000.

Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 165, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1995.

Penal Code

Sec. 39.01. Definitions.

In this chapter:

(1) "Law relating to a public servant's office or employment" means a law that specifically applies to a person acting in the capacity of a public servant and that directly or indirectly:

(A) imposes a duty on the public servant; or

(B) governs the conduct of the public servant.

(2) "Misuse" means to deal with property contrary to:

(A) an agreement under which the public servant holds the property;

(B) a contract of employment or oath of office of a public servant;

(C) a law, including provisions of the General Appropriations Act specifically relating to government property, that prescribes the manner of

custody or disposition of
the property; or

(D) a limited purpose for which the property is delivered
or
received.

Added by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1,
1994.

Penal Code

Sec. 39.02. Abuse of Official Capacity.

(a) A public servant commits an offense if, with intent to
obtain a
benefit or with intent to harm
or defraud another, he intentionally or knowingly:

(1) violates a law relating to the public servant's office or
employment; or

(2) misuses government property, services, personnel, or
any
other thing of value

belonging to the government that has come into the public
servant's
custody or possession by
virtue of the public servant's office or employment.

(b) An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class A
misdemeanor.

(c) An offense under Subsection (a)(2) is:

(1) a Class C misdemeanor if the value of the use of the thing misused is less than \$20;

(2) a Class B misdemeanor if the value of the use of the thing misused is \$20 or more but less than \$500;

(3) a Class A misdemeanor if the value of the use of the thing misused is \$500 or more but less than \$1,500;

(4) a state jail felony if the value of the use of the thing misused is \$1,500 or more but less than \$20,000;

(5) a felony of the third degree if the value of the use of the thing misused is \$20,000 or more but less than \$100,000;

(6) a felony of the second degree if the value of the use of the thing misused is \$100,000 or more but less than \$200,000; or

(7) a felony of the first degree if the value of the use of the thing misused is \$200,000 or more.

(d) A discount or award given for travel, such as frequent flyer miles, rental car or hotel discounts, or food coupons, are not things of value belonging to the government for purposes of this section due to the administrative difficulty and cost involved in recapturing the discount or award for a governmental entity.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.

Amended

by Acts 1983, 68th

Leg., p. 3241, ch. 558, Sec. 7, eff. Sept. 1, 1983. Renumbered from Sec.

39.01 and amended by

Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: December 6, 2003 2:59:57 PM PST

To: letters@globeandmail.ca, nwnews@wic.ca, pfong@png.canwest.com, AMARDEEP@klse.com.my, hmalik@uniserve.com, hmalik@harrisonhotsprings.com, jsmalik@wwdb.org, beanbag@mbay.net, chrisolsson@btopenworld.com, spmayes@email.msn.com, swatson@core.com, smandkjc@internet.co.nz, mdornheim@att.net, maan100@worldonline.nl, Glenwood@mweb.co.za, murphyd@tc.gc.ca, paulette.delorme@tsb.gc.ca, pettifg@tc.gc.ca, plattsj@tc.gc.ca,

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Subject: Air India Flight 182 wiring/cargo door explanation

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Dear Mr. Burtch,
December 6, 2003

Saturday,

Thank you for your letter of 25 November, 2003 in which you reply to my previous letters and emails. Your letter was most interesting and deserves serious attention.

TB>"Since I have returned to the office this fall, I have had the opportunity to familiarize myself with this file, including a review of past correspondence and reports."

JBS>Welcome to your new position, Mr. Burtch, I assume this is the capping of a long and successful career in TSB. Thank you for your attention to my assertion that the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation deserves further investigation for the probable cause of Air India Flight 182.

TB>"I believe that as an organization we have given your materials and concerns full and unbiased consideration, including an opportunity for you to meet with Mr. Tucker at your home to present your materials and analyses."

JBS>Yes, that was very considerate of Mr. Tucker to travel from Ottawa to Carmel Valley and I appreciate that.

TB>"...materials you had requested are presently in the custody

of the Crown Counsel and the RCMP who have decided they will not be released while the present legal proceedings are underway."

JBS>Ah yes, the legal system and its convenient checks and balances to maintain fairness which must be observed.

TB>"..we would be pleased to consider your request again when these proceedings are completed, or when the materials are released to us."

JBS>Thank you for your offer of potential consideration should circumstances permit.

TB>I regret that I can not be more positive, but I trust that you will understand our position."

JBS>Ah, Mr. Burtch, don't feel so bad, you're doing the best you can and I now do understand your position. I did not earlier, but I do now.

Your responses to my entreaties for discussions with an actual aircraft safety investigator of TSB are smooth, polite, and firm. You effectively back up the statements of your colleagues, protect your staff, puff up your organization, and attempt to dismiss an annoyance. You are a smooth operator, a polished politician, and I'm sure a good father, brother, son, and buddy to your friends.

But...but...but...however... Mr. Burtch, you are not a politician, now are you? You are the Director General of Investigation Operations of the Transportation Safety Board of Canada. A politician is a smooth public relations person never making

waves and putting their constituency in the best light regardless of unpleasant facts. An investigator asks lots of embarrassing questions, turns over stones, rocks the boat, and lets the chips fall where they may. A politician never lets the chips land without directing the fall. An 'unbiased and full' investigation examines all plausible and reasonable explanations giving weight to all the evidence. A political investigation is an oxymoron as the conclusion is preordained.

The Canadian Aviation Safety Board (CASB) Aviation Accident Occurrence (AAO) for Air India Flight 182 in 1986 was a full and unbiased accident investigation. It was correct based upon what was known about Boeing 747 accidents in 1985. It took into account a subsequent similar accident, JAL 123, which occurred a few months later. The Canadian Aviation Safety Board of 1986 was cautious, prudent, unbiased, fair, and they got it right. They concluded Air India Flight 182 was an accident caused by an explosion of undetermined origin in the forward cargo compartment. The CASB of 1986 did not have the advantage, as I do and you do, Mr. Burtch, of United Airlines Flight 811 of 1989 and its many matches of data starting with the rare events of a sudden loud sound on the CVR followed by an abrupt power loss to the other recorders.

The Canadian aviation accident staff of 1986 were investigators; they were not politicians. And look what happened to them! They got disbanded!

I now understand your position, Mr. Burtch, of acting like a politician instead of the Director General of Investigation Operations of TSB. You want to retire, have a pension, and you want your organization to survive. You are doing what is necessary, as you see it, for the success of yourself, your

colleagues, your friends, your family, your organization, and your country.

And like all politicians, you believe wishful thinking instead of the hard cold facts that a real investigator sees every day. The political take on Air India Flight 182 is that strange looking men with funny accents and funny hats placed bombs on two aircraft out of Vancouver because of hatred of a foreign government's actions against their religion. Terrorists are everywhere and Canada is doing its part in prosecuting those terrible people. Millions of dollars have been spent by the RCMP and the investment must be justified with convictions. The manufacturer of the aircraft is fortunately blameless as the economic welfare of a Canadian province is at stake. Government oversight of aviation safety on airliners was satisfactory. Mr. Burtch, I now do understand your position. And it's wrong.

Here's why: 1. An aircraft manufacturer is not protected when defects in the manufacturing process are ignored and other parties are blamed. The airlines know that Boeing airliners are mysteriously disintegrating in flight every so often. The causes can't all be suicidal copilots, errant missiles, bombs, or spontaneous fuel tank fires with no ignition source. Consequently Boeing is in real trouble as nobody will buy their aircraft without buy backs, discounts, or political arm twisting. The public knows that Boeing airliners are mysteriously coming apart in the air and thus try to avoid that airline that flies them. It is no coincidence that Pan Am is bankrupt and gone after Pan American World Airways Flight 103, Air India would be dissolved if not a state airline, TWA is bankrupt and gone forever after Trans World Airlines Flight 800. (UAL is bankrupt too but that probably is a coincidence.) A safe aircraft flown by a safe airline is the best business model. Safer aircraft sell easier than unsafe ones.

Replacing the known defective Poly X wiring and making the cargo doors plug type is doable and would stop these inflight breakups. To ignore the possible fixes is not protecting Boeing or the airlines, it is ensuring their eventual dissolution.

As any slick politician who perceives contrary facts as evil, your letter to me is essentially one of: 1. See no evil as the thousands of photographs of the wreckage of Air India Flight 182 are blind to you; 2. Hear no evil as you have asked me to shut up, 3. Speak no evil as you now 'do not intend to respond further.'

As one who is in charge of investigators and one who ignores the contrary facts of CVR data, wreckage debris, and the luxury of hindsight of similar accidents, you are betraying the trust of those thousands of Canadians and millions of passengers who fly in airliners and specifically in early model Boeing 747s that may again suffer a sudden inflight breakup such as Air India Flight 182, Pan American World Airways Flight 103, United Airlines Flight 811, Trans World Airlines Flight 800, and possibly China Airlines Flight 611.

Let's assume you are not a politician and I will respond to your letter as if you were an investigator with an engineering background, Mr. Burtch.

TB>"Since I have returned to the office this fall, I have had the opportunity to familiarize myself with this file, including a review of past correspondence and reports."

JBS>The 'file' can be called the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182, or 'wiring/cargo door'. As you are familiar with my correspondence I then know that you know that

all the baggage from the Vancouver BC passenger went into the aft cargo compartment of Air India Flight 182, according to the Indian investigators. I know you know all the baggage from the Montreal passengers went into the forward cargo compartment, according to the Indian investigators. I know you know the explosion occurred in the forward cargo compartment of Air India Flight 182, according to the Canadian, Indian, and British investigators. I know you know the sudden loud sound on the CVR at initial event time for Air India Flight 182 was evaluated as a non-bomb sound but was matched to the sound of an explosive decompression in another widebody airliner when the cargo door ruptured open inflight, according to the Canadian and British investigators. Those are facts as determined by aircraft investigators from three countries during the intense investigation in 1985/1986. There has been no evidence presented since then to refute those facts and conclusions. I agree with those facts. I agree with the cautious Canadian investigators of the CASB who concluded the probable cause of Air India Flight 182 was an explosion of undetermined origin in the forward cargo compartment. Subsequent similar accidents have allowed the refinement of that probable cause to be faulty wiring and the location to be the forward cargo door at the midspan latches.

By standing by and allowing the trial of two persons who are accused of blowing up Air India Flight 182 with a bomb in the aft cargo compartment, you are tacitly agreeing that the investigators of three national safety boards were wrong yet offer no proof of rebuttal. Which is it? Forward or aft cargo compartment? It has to be one or the other and there is no physical connection between them. If aft cargo compartment then the accident investigations by three national safety organizations were blatantly wrong in their conclusion the explosion was in the

forward cargo compartment and they were just as certain there was no explosion of any kind in the aft cargo compartment. If in the forward, then the two accused are innocent. My assertion is that the Canadians, Indians, and British were correct by concluding on hard evidence the explosion occurred in the forward compartment and I further assert the accused are innocent because nobody did it; there was no crime and therefore no criminals. It was a mechanical event with precedent of United Airlines Flight 811 as seen by modern eyes.

TB>"I believe that as an organization we have given your materials and concerns full and unbiased consideration..."

JBS>Opinion noted. Your definition of "full and unbiased consideration" is different than mine. "Full" to me in the context of an investigation is that the investigator asks questions. A politician only asks questions he knows the answer to because he wants his position reaffirmed; an investigator ask questions because he wants to know the answers to his mysteries.

You never asked any questions, Mr. Burtch. Mr. Stoss never asked me any questions. Mr. Garstang never asked me any questions. Sgt. Bart Blachford never asked any questions. Mr. Tucker never asked any questions. Your aviation accident investigation organization has never asked me any questions. You tell me your opinions and offer support for those opinions by referring to other people's opinions. This is not a political caucus filled with emotion and debts called in. Air India Flight 182 is an airplane crash with fatalities. Facts, data, evidence are what count and yet you never discuss those issues but only the human interactions between Crown agencies, your staff, and the outside world.

Biased means one explanation is favored such as a bomb explosion. "Unbiased" means that all plausible and reasonable alternative explanations for Air India Flight 182 are evaluated. You have never evaluated the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation by a professional aircraft accident investigator. In fact, you have never evaluated the missile or spontaneous center tank explosion explanation either. (Or cargo shift, turbulence, or stowaway.) I have and ruled them out as described in my Smith AAR for Air India Flight 182 available in pdf format at www.corazon.com and sent previously by email.

TB>"...materials you had requested are presently in the custody of the Crown Counsel and the RCMP who have decided they will not be released while the present legal proceedings are underway."

JBS>Well, Mr. Burtch, it was Mr. Tucker of TSB who requested some 'materials' from RCMP and was rebuffed. Can not the TSB be trusted? What an insult to reject that request. He asked for pictures of the wreckage, not too onerous a request, one would think, coming from the Director General of Investigation Operations of a safety board mandated with the responsibility to find out how that wreckage came to be. The legal proceedings will be 'underway' for years and years as the appeals proceed. Air India Flight 182 is not a bank robbery and the criminals fled in an airplane, a case where the RCMP would have superior jurisdiction. Air India Flight 182 is an airplane crash first and the last official position of the Canadian aviation authorities is that there was no crime involved. For you, as representing the TSB, to defer to the RCMP in this matter is very strange. Well, smart for a politician wanting to go with the flow of revenge, but strange for a curious investigator. Wreckage out of sight,

wreckage out of mind. See no evil.

TB>"...unless new information becomes available to us, there is nothing more that we can provide to you and we do not intend to respond further."

JBS>Brushoff noted. Speak no evil.

TB>"I would also ask that you no longer communicate with Mrs. Delorme since she is unable to provide you with any assistance in these matters."

JBS>As it turns out, Mrs. Delorme is apparently the only one with a conscience and who gets actual results. Hear no evil.

Have you no curiosity, Mr. Burtch? Or is it curiosity killed the cat. If you have no curiosity then you are living a lie when you pretend to be an investigator in charge of investigators. Air India Flight 182 deserves an update of an AAO of eighteen years ago. The justice system of Canada should have the best evaluation of the cause of that crash upon which to make decisions that affect all of its citizens. The outcome of this trial and the resolution of Air India Flight 182 affects millions of Canadians, tens of millions in a religion, and hundreds of millions of flying passengers and crews worldwide for many decades to come. The reputation of Canadian justice and intelligence is at stake.

TSB has recently been accused of being slow with their AARs. I would reply that is not a bad thing when caution, deliberation, and accuracy is required. TSB is not lazy because it can not get to every accident but it should try to get to the most significant. I also understand about being short on manpower and low on budgets. Priorities are necessary and if any crash deserved the

highest priority it is certainly Air India Flight 182.

To not take advantage of time and use the luxury of hindsight is not smart, it is downright stupid. United Airlines Flight 811 matches Air India Flight 182 as well as other early model Boeing 747s as the chart on www.corazon.com shows. If United Airlines Flight 811 were caused by a bomb, as the flightcrew later stated inflight, then I would be saying Air India Flight 182 was bomb caused. But United Airlines Flight 811 was caused by a ruptured open forward cargo door inflight, as the flight crew stated just a few seconds after the event, according to the CVR. They were right the first time but their change was understandable when they then thought it was a bomb since the event occurred just two months after Pan American World Airways Flight 103 which was thought to be a bomb, probably based upon the erroneous conclusion that Air India Flight 182 was a bomb and all three Boeing 747 explosive decompressions were so similar.

Air India Flight 182, Pan American World Airways Flight 103, United Airlines Flight 811, Trans World Airlines Flight 800 and possibly China Airlines Flight 611 all had ruptured open cargo doors inflight. The cause can't all be bombs, or missiles, or fuel tank explosions with no ignition source, but they could all be an electrical problem such as shorted wiring or switch, as was concluded in the irrefutable event of United Airlines Flight 811. All airways lead back to United Airlines Flight 811.

TSB and RCMP have checked me out as a messenger and have shown me to be an experienced aviation crew member, mechanic, and commercial pilot. I'm a retired US military officer with wife and family. I'm an observant investigator as shown by my best guess that your secretary is left handed yet have never met her/him.

It's time to check out my message. The shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182 and others is available in pdf format at www.corazon.com. The Smith AARs for three accidents are detailed evaluations of all plausible probable causes for the inflight breakups of Air India Flight 182, Pan American World Airways Flight 103, and Trans World Airlines Flight 800. The official government AARs for those three plus the two NTSB AARs for United Airlines Flight 811 are also available for reference.

I have a question for you, Mr. Burtch: The RCMP states that a bomb was placed on CP 060 out of Vancouver to Toronto where it was transferred to a Boeing 747-200, Air India Flight 181, from Toronto to Montreal with flight number changing to Air India Flight 182 for flight to Delhi via London. Another bomb was placed on an aircraft at about the same time in Vancouver for a flight to Tokyo, CP 003. That flight was to land just before another Air India flight was to take off for Bangkok, Air India Flight 301. So, according to the RCMP, there were two bombs to be placed on four aircraft spread throughout the world flying out of four airports and timed to go off within an hour of each other. (Yes, conspiracy theories get very complicated very fast.) Now, I know that Air India Flight 182 was an early model Boeing 747 but what were the types of aircraft for CP 060, CP 003, and Air India Flight 301? May I assume they were all Boeing 747s? It's important as the wiring/cargo door explanation matches up only early model Boeing 747s and not Airbus or other Boeing airliners. The danger of shorted wiring causing another cargo door unlatch motor to short on exists to this day.

A politician would run away from controversy, avoid ruffling

feathers, and remaining ignorant and blind. A curious investigator would get into the case with both hands, eyes, and ears open. Mr. Burtch, fate has put you into a hot seat. There is a trial going on right now that involves you and your organization. There is contrary evidence which conflicts with conventional wisdom presented to you this very moment. There are five countries involved with the outcome; Canada, USA, UK, India, and Japan. There are several Crown organizations which have vital interests in Air India Flight 182; RCMP, CSIS, Crown prosecutors, and TSB. Don't run away. Stand and do your job. I can speak strongly because I am a survivor of a sudden fiery night fatal jet airplane crash.

I am curious, unbiased, and willing to give full consideration to contrary evidence. I remain available for discussions via telephone, email, or hard copy letter. I am willing to see evil, hear evil, and speak evil, if that will contribute to aviation safety.

Mr. Burtch, you are an engineer who must respect facts, data, and evidence. You should give scant weight to overheard conversations by jilted lovers years after an event given to support weird conspiracy notions. The evidence is there in reports and wreckage to give the solution to the mysteries presented by Air India Flight 182. A request to view photographs of the forward and aft cargo door areas is certainly justified and the TSB can be trusted to be discreet. See for yourself to solve the conflict of where the explosion occurred. It would also be prudent and certainly within the area of responsibility of TSB to conduct a review of Air India Flight 182 based upon subsequent similar accidents so that an updated supplement to the original AAO of eighteen years ago could be presented to the Crown officials for their best use as they see fit.

It's only fair and right.

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith

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<http://www.corazon.com>

Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.

US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.

US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.

Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy

Retired US Army Major MSC

Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.

Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

Excerpts from CVR transcript from United Airlines Flight 811.

1119 E WE'RE AT SIXTEEN THOUSAND COMIN'
DOWN

1120 E WE'RE GETTIN' WHAT WE GOT.

1121 C OKAY.

1123 F GO THROUGH THE PROCEDURE FOR
NUMBER ONE AH NUMBER THREE.

1127 X *

1129 F I THINK WE BLEW A DOOR (* THINK WE BLEW A) - OR SOMETHIN'.

1135 C TELL THE PA- THE AH FLIGHT ATTENDANT TO GET AH PREPARED FOR AN EVACUATION.

1153 C WE DON'T HAVE ANY FIRE INDICATIONS.

1156 E I DON'T HAVE NO I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING.

1159 C OKAY WE LOST NUMBER AH THREE.

1202 F (LOOKIT) EGT - MAYBE WE DIDN'T - THERE'S NO N1.

1753 C OKAY FOUR THOUSAND WE GOT A FIRE ON THE RIGHT SIDE

1755 C WE GOT A FIRE ON THE FIGHT SIDE

1357 C AH WE'RE ON TWO ENGINES NOW.

1753 E THE WHOLE RIGHT SIDE...

1759 E THE RIGHT SIDE IS GONE FROM ABOUT THE AH ONE RIGHT BACK IT'S JUST OPEN YOU'RE JUST LOOKIN' OUTSIDE

1759 R UNITED EIGHT ELEVEN HEAVY ROGER

1807 C WADDAYA MEAN PIECES-

1808 E LOOKS LIKE A BOMB

1809 F FUSELAGE-

1810 E YES FUSELAGE IT'S JUST OPEN

1812 C OKAY IT LOOKS LIKE WE GOT A BOMB AH
THAT WENT OFF ON THE RIGHT SIDE

1815 C AH THE WHOLE RIGHT SIDE IS GONE

1817 E FROM ABOUT ONE RIGHT BACK TO AH-

1820 F ANYBODY-

1822 E SOME PEOPLE ARE PROBABLY GONE - I
DON'T KNOW

1824 C WE GOT A REAL PROBLEM HERE

From CASB AAO for Air India Flight 182:

CP 060 Vancouver - Toronto Confirmed Scheduled to depart
Vancouver at 0900 PDT, 22 June 1985

AI 181 Toronto - Montreal Wait-listed Scheduled to depart
Toronto at 1835 EDT, 22 June 1985

AI 182 Montreal - Delhi Wait-listed Scheduled to depart
Montreal at 2020 EDT, 22 June 1985

CP 003 Vancouver - Tokyo Confirmed Scheduled to depart
Vancouver at 1315 PDT, 22 June 1985

Air India 301 Tokyo - Bangkok

2.11.4.6 Section 42

Portions of section 42, consisting of the forward cargo hold,

main deck passenger area, and the upper deck passenger area, were located near section 41. This area was severely damaged and some of section 42 was attached to section 44. Some of the structure identified from section 42 was the crown skin, the upper passenger compartment deck, the belly skin, and some of the cargo floor including roller tracks. The right-hand, number two passenger door including some of the upper and aft frame and outer skin was located beside section 44. Scattered on the sea bed near this area were a large number of suitcases and baggage as well as several badly damaged containers.

All cargo doors were found intact and attached to the fuselage structure except for the forward cargo door which had some fuselage and cargo floor attached. This door, located on the forward right side of the aircraft, was broken horizontally about one-quarter of the distance above the lower frame. The damage to the door and the fuselage skin near the door appeared to have been caused by an outward force. The fractured surface of the cargo door appeared to have been badly frayed. Because the damage appeared to be different than that seen on other wreckage pieces, an attempt to recover the door was made by CCGS John Cabot. Shortly after the wreckage broke clear of the water, the area of the door to which the lift cable was attached broke free from the cargo door, and the wreckage settled back onto the sea bed. An attempt to relocate the door was unsuccessful.

2.11.6.5 Target 47 - Aft Cargo Compartment

This portion of the aft cargo compartment roller floor was located between BS 1600 and BS 1760. Based on the direction of cleat rotation on the skin panel (target 7) and the crossbeam displacement on this structure, target 47 moved aft in relation to the lower skin panel when it was detached from the lower skin. No other significant observation was noted. There was no evidence to indicate characteristics of an explosion emanating

from the aft cargo compartment.

4.0 CONCLUSIONS

The Canadian Aviation Safety Board respectfully submits as follows:

4.1 Cause-Related Findings

1. At 0714 GMT, 23 June 1985, and without warning, Air India Flight 182 was subjected to a sudden event at an altitude of 31,000 feet resulting in its crash into the sea and the death of all on board.
2. The forward and aft cargo compartments ruptured before water impact.
3. The section aft of the wings of the aircraft separated from the forward portion before water impact.
4. There is no evidence to indicate that structural failure of the aircraft was the lead event in this occurrence.
5. There is considerable circumstantial and other evidence to indicate that the initial event was an explosion occurring in the forward cargo compartment. This evidence is not conclusive. However, the evidence does not support any other conclusion.

From the Kirpal Report for Air India Flight 182:

2.4.3.6 A question arose whether removal of the door stop fittings could have caused some difficulty in flight. From the video films of the wreckage it was found that the complete aft cargo door was intact and in its position except that it had come adrift slightly. The door was found latched at the bottom. The door was found lying along with the wreckage of the aft portion of the aircraft. This indicates that the door remained in position and did not cause any problem in flight. In the front cargo compartment, there were 16 containers out of which four were empty. Five containers had baggage of Delhi bound passengers.

Container at Position 13L had baggage of the first class and London passengers and container at position 13R had crew baggage. The entire baggage of passengers ex-Montreal was loaded in containers at positions 12R, 21R, 22R, 23R and 24R in the front cargo compartment. Container at position 24L contained fan blades in wooden boxes and the other components of the pod engine. Valuable container was at position 14R.

2.4.3.7 In the aft cargo compartment, there were four pallets containing parts of the fifth pod engine and two containers at positions 44L and 44R containing baggage of Delhi bound passengers. The bulk cargo compartment contained passenger baggage bound for Delhi and Bombay. All the baggage and engine parts in the aft and bulk cargo compartments were loaded at Toronto.

unbiased [adj.]

PRON: /&n'bi&st/

1. Without bias.

ETYM: Pref. un- + biased.

bias [n.]

PRON: /'bi&s/

FORMS: biases

1. A partiality that prevents objective consideration of an issue or situation; SYN. prejudice.

2. Especially: racial bias.

ETYM: French biasis, perh. from Late Lat. bifax two-faced;

Latin bis + facies face. Related to Bi-, Face.

bias [adj.]

PRON: /'bi&s/

1. Slanting diagonally across the grain of a fabric; "a bias fold."

biased [adj.]

PRON: /'bi&st/

1. Favoring one person or side over another; "a biased account of the trial"; SYN. colored, one-sided, slanted.

From: John Barry Smith <ceo@internetpagepublishing.com>
Date: May 4, 2005 6:59:07 PM PDT
To: grewag@parl.gc.ca
Subject: **Air India Flight 182**

Gurmant Grewal
Member of Parliament

Dear Mr. Grewal, Wednesday, May 4, 2005 6:58PM

There exists an alternative, reasonable, plausible mechanical explanation for Air India Flight 182; it's called the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation. There are no conspiracies, just bad wiring causing a door to open in flight. It's happened before with United Airlines Flight 811

Santokh Singh is a retired Boeing 747 pilot; you might ask him for his opinion, sir. Email at ssmaan44@yahoo.com

I have been studying this wiring/cargo door problem on early Boeing 747s for 15 years, I knew all along the accused were innocent because nobody put a bomb on board, it was a mechanical event.

With the acquittal, the mystery remains for the families. There is an answer and it's in the evidence.

Attached as pdf files are the Indian and Canadian governments accident reports and also my AAR on Air India Flight 182.

Regards,
Barry

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
831 659 3552
barry@qp6.com

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: August 19, 2006 8:48:44 PM PDT
To: barney.brucker@justice.gc.ca
Subject: **Application for standing appeal**

Ken Dickerson
Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Sunday, July 23, 2006

The Commissioner said he would accept written submissions from me to him. Below is a letter for the Commissioner regarding my fleeting time before him. I shall also send a hard copy to the Commission address. Can you print it out or email it to him, please?

I'm still trying for standing before the 25 July deadline, hope springs eternal.

Regards,

John Barry Smith

541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner

Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

P.O. Box 1298, Station B
Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5R3
CANADA

Dear Commissioner John C. Major, Q.C. Sunday, July 23, 2006

This is John Barry Smith who appeared before you briefly on 19
July, 2006, at the hearings to consider grants of standing before
the Commission.

Actually, I never got to the "John Barry Smith" part because
you interrupted me after 60 seconds and said you would not
listen to any of the remaining 14 minutes of my allotted 15
minutes because my content was not within the Terms of
Reference which violated the Rules included in your Mandate.

As you can imagine, I was quite distraught when I was rejected
only a few minutes into my presumed fifteen minute
presentation. I'm over that now. I now understand your position
and your reasons for my rejection. I hope by this last gasp letter
before the 25 July deadline for standing to persuade you that

your misgivings are unfounded.

Your kindly, patient demeanor indicated you regretted having to cut short my presentation but you had no choice as you were a loyal public servant just following your orders with rules. You do have a choice, sir.

Based upon the transcript of our few minutes of talking there are clear implications that:

1. You are persuaded I am worthy of being granted standing.
2. The Terms of Reference direct us to take into account those things that have already been determined.
3. Because Justice Josephson determined the cause of the explosion was a bomb any alternate explanation is moot.
4. My alternate theory may be correct but you do not know.
5. My explanation can not be considered as part of evidence because the Terms of Reference preclude its consideration.
6. If you could grant me standing within the Rules, you would.

Commissioner Major, permit me to demonstrate you can grant me standing because:

1. My explanation is within the Terms of Reference for at least one and possibly two Terms.
2. It has already been determined the cause of Air India Flight 182 was an explosion with cause not stated and can be taken into account.
2. Justice Josephson did not determine the cause was a bomb because the bomb cause was never disputed by the defense.
3. I can remove your doubts about my explanation being correct.
4. You can grant me standing based on grounds stated in the Terms and verbal suggestions from the Prime Minister.

To refresh our memory: Transcript from 19 July 2006 Hearings on Standings before the Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182.

"Mr. Smith: I have an alternate explanation for Air India 182. It's a mechanical explanation. I'll go into some detail during my presentation and my detail will not be to persuade you that my explanation is correct but to persuade you that my research has depth and is worthy of being granted standing.

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I don't think, Mr. Smith, that you need 15 minutes to persuade me of that. Here's the difficulty. The Terms of Reference direct us to take into account those things that have already been determined. Justice Josephson in Vancouver determined that there was a bomb in a certain compartment of the airplane and it was the bomb that caused the explosion that resulted in the death of these people.

You have an alternate theory. The alternate theory may over time prove to be correct. I don't know. What I do know is that we cannot consider it as part of the evidence in this Inquiry but what I can do is permit you to file any written material that substantiates your view and it will be part of the Air India record. It will be there for examination by people who look at this Inquiry in future years, but the Terms of Reference preclude our considering whether or not there was any cause for that explosion other than the bomb that is found by the Supreme Court of British Columbia.

So I can't do anything more for you than permit you to do what I have just suggested."

Reply today in this letter: Commissioner Major, it has already

been determined that there was an investigation into the bombing of Air India Flight 182 and yet, there is an inquiry into that investigation. Following that logic, it was determined that during the investigations from 1985 to 2005 the cause of the explosion was determined to be a bomb by Justice Kirpal and thus an inquiry into that issue is justified.

It has also been determined that during those investigations there are discrepancies between agencies such as a Court, CASB, TSB, and the RCMP as to the cause of the explosion and the location of that explosion, and therefore an inquiry into those determinations is justified. The investigation into the bombing of Air India Flight 182 certainly included whether there was a bomb or not and where it was; therefore, an inquiry into the investigation of the bombing should allow discussion on those matters.

Imagine if the judicial courts were to reject reconsidering cold case files as closed and reject any reconsideration or appeal. Imagine if the judicial courts were to reject without discussion the technological advancements of DNA testing and the internet in resolving cases, new and old.

Air India Flight 182 is a cold case file. I used the internet to access official government websites on aviation safety available to the public and was able to see a pattern for several matching accidents for early model Boeing 747s that suffered an explosion in flight near and in the forward cargo compartment which left a sudden loud sound on the cockpit voice recorder followed by an abrupt power cut to the flight data recorders with more severe inflight damage on the starboard side. All were initially thought to have been bomb explosions. The DNA of those four accidents matches Air India Flight 182.

At this time, please let me address each point specifically which warrants my granting of standing and your authority to do so:

1. You are persuaded I am worthy of being granted standing.

Reply: Thank you, sir.

2. The Terms of Reference direct us to take into account those things that have already been determined.

Reply: Yes, sir, and it has already been determined by those that are most qualified to give an opinion about Air India Flight 182 that the cause was an explosion....in the forward cargo compartment....of unstated cause.

The Canadian Aviation Safety Board respectfully submits as follows:

Ò4.1 Cause-Related Findings

5. There is considerable circumstantial and other evidence to indicate that the initial event was an explosion occurring in the forward cargo compartment.Ó

That finding from CASB is absolutely correct. It also does not conclude the destruction of the aircraft was caused by a bomb. It is specific on the location. There are several alternative explanations for that confirmed explosion, from fire in the cargo hold or hull rupture at a door, or bomb in baggage go boom. I agree there was an explosion in the forward cargo compartment, all the experts agreed on that point in 1986 for solid reasons. The cause and location of the explosion is now in disagreement between the Court, media, by the Indian government, the RCMP, the UK crash investigator, and me. All these disagreements

occurred during the investigation of the bombing which is the subject of the inquiry.

The Canadian and United Kingdom government experts in aircraft accident investigation for Air India Flight 182 did not state the cause was a bomb and in fact, the UK expert stated in 1986 it was not a bomb and gave strong evidence for his conclusion.

Mr. R.A. Davis, Head, Flight Recorder Section, Accidents Investigation Branch, Farnborough, U.K. 3.4.6.16 In conclusion, Mr. Davis reported as follows :- "It is considered that from the CVR and ATC recordings supplied for analysis, there is no evidence of a high explosive device having detonated on AI 182. There is strong evidence to suggest that a sudden explosive decompression occurred but the cause has not been identified. It must be concluded that without positive evidence of an explosive device from either the wreckage or pathological examinations, some other cause has to be established for the accident".

That 'other cause' was established by me in 1996 based on an event in 1989, UAL 811, plus other accidents. (And there is good reason why it is called an "explosive" decompression. It is an explosion that mimics a bomb.)

The Canadian crash experts (CASB) called Air India Flight 182 a 'crash'. It was. The word "bomb" was never used in relation with Air India Flight 182 in their entire CASB report. "Bomb" was used only once in reference to a different aircraft and event for comparison purposes. There was no match.

It has already been determined during the investigation there was an explosion and I wish to present in detail my explanation of

that explosion. My discussion would take into account a thing already determined as part of a Term of Reference: An explosion in Air India Flight 182 was determined during the investigation into the bombing. An inquiry into the investigation should include discussion regarding the explosion and its location.

To repeat the logic: An 'Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing' should allow discussion of what, how, when, where, and why a bomb explosion was determined during the investigation of the bombing and why other explanations were ruled out, especially when there is so much official expert disagreement in the bombing conclusion from Canadian government air accident investigators.

3. Because Justice Josephson determined the cause of the explosion was a bomb any alternate explanation is moot.

Reply: Criminal court judges and criminal defense attorneys may be expert in the evils of human nature but not in the faults of machines. Regarding Justice Josephson's belief in a bomb caused event, the criminal defense attorney for the two accused never disputed the bomb cause and quibbled about the specific location, but only that his clients did not plant it. The issue of an alternative explanation or general location was never raised. I'm sure the accused believe Air India Flight 182 was blown out of the sky by a bomb someplace in the plane but they did not plant it. Justice Josephson did not 'determine' the cause was a bomb, it was essentially stipulated by a criminal defense attorney and a prosecutor.

Below from "Reasons for Judgment" by Justice Josephson regarding Malik and Bagri.

I. OVERVIEW

[1] In the early morning hours of June 23, 1985, Air India Flight 182, carrying 329 people[1], was destroyed mid-flight by a bomb located in its rear cargo hold. Remnants of the plane and bodies of some of the victims were recovered from the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Ireland. There were no survivors.

H. Conclusion [190] It is agreed amongst the experts that the Kanishka was destroyed by the detonation of an explosive device within its left aft fuselage. The sole issue is the precise location of that device.

Reply: Is the trial of the two accused eligible for inclusion in the "Investigation" which is part of the Inquiry into the Investigation....? If no, then Justice Josephson's finding is irrelevant and precludes nothing. If yes, then the discrepancies between the experts of 1986 in accident reports and 2005 during trial can be included and justify an inquiry into the details of the disagreements.

During trial here was never any consideration of an alternative for the holes and bulges they discovered. There was never any consideration of the location of the explosion being in the forward part of the aircraft which was 'agreed amongst the experts' in 1986. There was some quibbling in 2005 about a few feet of location but never any substantive argument of where and what caused the explosion. There was never any discussion of several similar Boeing 747s accidents which matched Air India Flight 182.

The agreement amongst the experts in Canada, UK, and India in 1986 stated the explosion occurred in the forward cargo

compartment and yet in 2005 there was never any dispute about the cause being a bomb or its location nor any rebuttal to the experts of 1986.

From the 1986 CASB experts opinion: 2.11.6.5 Target 47 - Aft Cargo Compartment

No other significant observation was noted. There was no evidence to indicate characteristics of an explosion emanating from the aft cargo compartment.

From the 1986 Indian Kirpal report:

3.2.11.19 Target 47 - Aft Cargo Floor Structure

This portion of the aft cargo compartment was located between B S 1600 and B S 1760. No significant observation was noted.

There was no evidence to indicate characteristics of an explosion emanating from the aft cargo compartment.

An Inquiry into an investigation of a bombing could certainly inquire as to the unexplained discrepancy between two groups of experts declaring opposite opinions during the investigations after June 23, 1985.

I might add that the two documents which state the experts' opinions of an explosion in the forward cargo compartment are specifically suggested as source material for the Commission:

Terms of Reference: "...the Commissioner to conduct the Inquiry as he considers appropriate with respect to accepting as conclusive or giving weight to the findings of other examinations of the circumstances surrounding the bombing of Air India Flight 182, including

the report of the Honourable Mr. Justice B.N. Kirpal of the High Court of Delhi of February 26, 1986,

the Aviation Occurrence Report of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board into the crash involving Air India Flight 182 of January 22, 1986"

The Trial proceedings of Justice Josephson are noticeably absent which would imply they are outside the area of inquiry. In that case, sir, Justice Josephson's determination of a bomb does not preclude including discussion of an alternate explanation for the explosion in this inquiry.

4. My alternate theory may be correct but you do not know.

Reply: An honest statement expressing an open mind revealing an intellectual curiosity. I can remove your doubts, sir, if given the opportunity, by use of documents, charts, models, aircraft accident reports, and following strict rules of scientific exposition. I have had the luxury of technological advancements such as the internet and the benefit of hindsight based on several similar accidents.

5. My explanation can not be considered as part of evidence because the Terms of Reference preclude its consideration.

Reply: You can grant standing sir, should you choose to do so. Your criteria is whether my explanation fits into Terms of Reference.

Terms of Reference. 02. the Commissioner to conduct the Inquiry specifically for the purpose of making findings and recommendations with respect to the following, namely...,
2. if there were problems in the effective cooperation between government departments and agencies, including the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Royal Canadian Mounted

Police, in the investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182, either before or after June 23, 1985,

I can give one area of lack of effective cooperation between Canadian government agencies: A high ranking TSB Air official in June, 2002, Mr. Bill Tucker, officially requested (at my urging) photographs of the wreckage of Air India Flight 182 (photos held by the RCMP) to the RCMP Air India Task Force via Sgt. Bart Blachford who declined to cooperate and rejected the request thus keeping secret from Canadian aviation accident personnel important evidence of a Canadian aviation accident in which both agencies were interested. There was no cooperation between the RCMP Air India Task Force and the TSB Air investigators during a period after June 23, 1985. The history of Air India Flight 182 might very well have been different if the RCMP had given those vital photographs to TSB for evaluation as requested.

Terms of Reference. 7. whether further changes in practice or legislation are required to address the specific aviation security breaches associated with the Air India Flight 182 bombing, particularly those relating to the screening of passengers and their baggage;

The meaning of the word 'security' probably means protection from human killers while the general meaning of 'security' is protection from natural hazards, human hazards, or machine hazards. Changes in practice are required to address a specific aviation security breach in that the airplane hazard of maintaining faulty wiring still exists today for Canadian air passengers. Air India Flight 182 was after all, an airplane crash, not a bank robbery. I was about to present an issue that affected and still affects the physical security of all Canadian citizens who fly in early model Boeing 747s, of which 500 are early models

still in service which are similar to the model of Air India Flight 182. This security inclusion as a Term of Reference is a stretch but still fits in a general area of aviation security. If you are to err in discretion, Commissioner Major, please err on the side of too much inquiry, not too little.

My explanation is within the Terms of Reference in at least one area and probably two in addition to referring to a thing that has already been determined. My explanation thus can be considered as part of evidence should you choose to do so.

6. If you could grant me standing within the Rules, you would.

Reply: Sir, you can. Please do.

1. Your authority as directed by the Rules of Procedure:

D. STANDING

10. A person may be granted full or partial standing as a party by the Commissioner if the Commissioner is satisfied that the person is directly and substantially affected by the mandate of the Inquiry or portions thereof.

11. A person may be granted standing as an intervenor by the Commissioner if the Commissioner is satisfied that the person represents clearly ascertainable interests and perspectives essential to the Commissioner's mandate, which the Commissioner considers ought to be separately represented before the Inquiry, in which event the intervenor may participate in a manner to be determined by the Commissioner.

14. The Commissioner will determine any special conditions under which a person may participate and those parts of the Inquiry in which a person granted standing may participate.

15. From time to time, the Commissioner may, in his discretion,

at any time grant to or rescind standing from a person, or modify the status or conditions of the standing of a person.

16. The Commissioner will determine on what terms and in which parts of the Inquiry a party or intervenor may participate, and the nature and extent of such participation.

You may set special conditions, you may rescind standing, you may narrow the area of standing, you may modify status or conditions of standing, you may determine the nature and extent of the participation.

You can grant me standing sir, should you choose to do so.

I also have a unique perspective which would enhance the work of the Commission...I have actually been in a sudden fiery fatal jet airplane crash and I would be talking about a sudden fiery fatal jet airplane crash. I would call that a unique perspective.

A brief description of this messenger/applicant is appropriate at this time:

Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.

US Navy reconnaissance bombardier navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.

US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.

Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy

Retired US Army Major MSC

Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.

Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

I am not employed by a manufacturer, any airline, attorneys, family groups, or government agencies. I am thus able to be detached and objective.

On an informal note, Prime Minister Harper's concept of the Commission of Inquiry is stated below in excerpts:

Speech - Prime Minister Harper announces inquiry into Air India bombing

Ottawa, Ontario

Thank you Mr. Speaker.

On June 23, 1985, Air India Flight 182, on its way from Montreal to London, England, exploded in mid-air near the coast of Ireland.

In January of the following year, the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb.

It is our duty as Canadians to do everything in our power to prevent a similar tragedy from ever happening again,

A full public inquiry is required.

This inquiry will be launched immediately and led by an outstanding Canadian, retired Supreme Court Justice John Major. He has agreed to serve as Commissioner for this inquiry and I have every confidence that he will conduct a thorough and compassionate investigation into the events surrounding this tragedy.

This inquiry is about analyzing the evidence that has come to light since 1985 and applying it to the world we live in today.'

Nice speech. Nice guidance. Let me condense some of them:

1. Exploded in mid-air.
2. Do everything in our power to prevent similar tragedy.
3. Full public inquiry.
4. Outstanding Canadian, retired Supreme Court Justice John Major.
5. Commissioner...will conduct a thorough investigation into the

events surrounding this tragedy.

6. This inquiry is about analyzing the evidence since 1985 and applying it to today.

Those verbal suggestions from the Prime Minister are very broad and make sense. You have great power, Commissioner, to do everything in your power to conduct a thorough investigation into the events surrounding Flight 182 and to analyze the evidence since 1985 and apply it today. Your action to abruptly curtail my presentation was bewildering until I read the transcript.

There is much official encouragement to allow me to proceed as I present an explanation for the tragedy based on a thorough investigation into Air India Flight 182 and uses several similar accidents of early model Boeing 747s in 1988, 1989, 1996, and 2003.

I wish now to address the most insidious lie/error of fact with such disastrous consequences I have run up against in my short sweet life of sixty two years:

Here it is:

From Prime Minister Harper's speech to Parliament 1 May 2006:
ÒIn January of the following year, the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb.Ó

From Letter for Application for Partial Standing from Air India,
ÒThe Canadian Aviation Safety Board later determined that Air India Flight 182 and its passengers and crew had been the victims of an explosive device that was contained in baggage

stowed in the aircraft's cargo compartment.

From website of The Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182, opening statement: "Yet, it was not until the following January that the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb."

Wrong, wrong, wrong.

Here is the true and accurate statement from the Canadian Aviation Safety Board for Air India Flight 182:

The Canadian Aviation Safety Board respectfully submits as follows:

4.1 Cause-Related Findings

5. There is considerable circumstantial and other evidence to indicate that the initial event was an explosion occurring in the forward cargo compartment.

That finding from CASB is absolutely correct.

Here is the terrible logical conclusion of the false premise:
Unwitting Prime Minister Harper again:

"In January of the following year, the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb. Clearly, this was an act of terrorism - one that claimed hundreds of innocent lives."

That was a dangerous conclusion based upon a false premise and off we go to the 911 terrorists everywhere paranoia parade; "Take off your shoes, your belt, your jacket, empty your pockets and

stick out your arms; this is clearly for your own safety sir, your fellow passengers may be stone cold suicidal killers and welcome aboard, we hope you enjoy your flight."

There were real terrorists on airplanes in 2001 but none was present sixteen years earlier with Air India Flight 182. There was no bomb, no bombers, no conspiracies, no crime and no criminals: A huge machine exploded because a small part failed. The event was investigated and now there is an inquiry into that investigation which evaluated causes and locations of the already determined explosion. I wish to contribute to that inquiry into the investigation.

A good idea would be for the Commission to formally ask for an updated supplemental opinion about the twenty one year old Aviation Occurrence Report of the CASB. The request to the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Air, investigators regarding Flight 182 would give you a Crown respected opinion by air accident experts, not criminal attorneys, and TSB might be flattered at the request but need to be asked by competent authority which the Commission of Inquiry certainly is.

I support the Canadian institutions of safety and justice and inquiry. The Canadian Transport Safety Board represented by the CASB was correct, there was an explosion in the forward cargo compartment. The Canadian judicial system represented by Justice Josephson was correct, the accused did not do it because nobody did it. I even sympathize with the CSIS and the Gendarmerie royale du Canada. They could not catch anyone because there was no one to catch; they were chasing ghosts created by media and a foreign government for its own purposes.

In a court environment there is an adversarial relationship

between the parties while a commission is less formal and should be more of a cooperative style with the goal being the gaining of knowledge and possibly truth. I did not complain too much at the start of my show when you told this dog to sit and keep the pony in the corral. I am not your adversary, Commissioner Major, I am on the side of the Canadian aviation accident experts, on the side of Canadian Justice Josephson, and the side of Canadian Prime Minister Harper's thorough inquiry; I agree with all three. And yet I am excluded from presenting evidence and those that doubt the institutions are given full exposure. That's not fair or reasonable, sir. Please correct the injustice by allowing my explanation time in the sun.

In California I was given a scant five days to prepare my oral presentation to you in Ottawa and I learned a lot: I learned that flights booked with less than seven days notice cost a whole lot more than those booked with more than seven days and I learned to never ever fly in an Airbus 319 again unless I lose ten inches in length, starting at my feet.

I used those five days to rehearse about four hours every day, revising and revising. After the first day of hearing adjourned I stood in front of the podium looking at the Canadian flags on poles behind the empty Commissioner's dais and honed my speech to fifteen minutes. On the morning of the actual presentation I came early and repeated the dress rehearsal. I had my plastic model of a Boeing 747 to use as a visual aid. I had a large color photo of the actual aircraft, "Kanishka" taken a few years before its explosion. I had a pun, "votre a decouvrir." I was not going to bumble through, wander off, or read by rote with head down as other applicants did; no, I was going to maintain eye contact, stick to the facts, present a logical sequence of events, and not attempt to persuade you my

explanation was correct but to persuade you my research had depth, I had done my homework, my facts were compelling and I was thus justified a granting of standing as a person before the Commission which would give me an opportunity to present my explanation in detail at a later time.

I was told you could not allow my standing by mandate, yet upon review you could. I was told my content was not in the Terms of Reference, but upon review it is. I was told I could submit written documents for consideration and in that case, please consider this letter, although full of chaff, as a substitute for the twelve minutes I did not get earlier. Is the jury still out on my application for standing, Your Honor?

THE COMMISSIONER: I should say we appreciate the time you've taken to come as far as you've come to make this point.

Reply: You're welcome, sir. Ottawa is full of varied pleasant people and my visit to the Air Museum outside of town was a highlight. Spitfire, Hurricane, Komet, Starfighter, and Vampire were magnificent to see first time and close up.

I empathize with the victim's families; their grief is real regardless of the cause of the explosion of the aircraft their loved ones were in. Any beliefs they hold to relieve grief are justified. I would hope that my alternative mechanical explanation will give them some consolation and closure by explaining clearly, completely, and in detail what happened to their family members. 'Who, what, where, when, how much, how, and why' questions are all answered by the shorted wiring/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182.

You have a great opportunity, Commissioner Major, to solve a vexing problem that has haunted the Canadian consciousness for twenty one years. Physical mysteries are not resolved by closed minds based on stereotypes or raw emotions; they are solved by rules of science, accumulation of data, questions based on conjecture, and rigorous application of logic. Air India Flight 182 was an airplane crash first and always.

I trust that you will do everything in your power as Commissioner to conduct a thorough investigation into the surrounding events and to analyze the evidence since 1985 and apply it today during the term of the Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182.

Regards,

John Barry Smith
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1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
safety@ntsb.org

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: August 19, 2006 8:49:09 PM PDT
To: barney.brucker@justice.gc.ca
**Subject: Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 1,
Grievous Error of Fact Detected**

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Friday, July 28, 2006

Well, we make do with what is given us. I was granted leave by

the Commissioner to file materials I believe will be useful to the Commission.

"Disposition: Mr. Smith is denied standing. However, leave to file materials that he believes will be useful to the Commissioner is granted."

In that regard I wish at this time to file the material below to the Commission as 'Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected'.

Regards,
John Barry Smith
Useful Material Creator

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182
Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner
Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary
Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel
Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel
Ken Dickerson, Public Affairs

Dear Commissioner Major, Friday, July 28, 2006

Thank you for granting me leave to file materials I believe will be useful to the Commission. The following material is herewith submitted as 'Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected':

The decision to grant intervenor status to B'nai Brith by you is applauded. It appears you have taken the Prime Minister at his

word when he stated he wished the Commissioner to conduct a thorough investigation into the events surrounding this tragedy which is about analyzing the evidence since 1985 and applying it to today. It's a broad mandate which can certainly include an organization such as B'nai Brith, Canada, which is the independent voice of the Jewish community, representing its interests nationwide to government, NGO's and the wider Canadian public.

"B'nai Brith Canada Request by B'nai Brith Canada:
B'nai Brith Canada sought standing, either as a party or as an intervenor, with respect to the mandate of the Inquiry.
Disposition: Intervenor status is granted..."

"John Barry Smith Request by John Barry Smith:
Mr. Smith sought standing to make submissions on issues of aviation safety as well as on his assessment of the facts as they relate to the cause of the explosion that resulted in the Air India Flight 182 tragedy.
Disposition: Mr. Smith is denied standing. However, leave to file materials that he believes will be useful to the Commissioner is granted."

One might ask why an organization: That had no members on Air India Flight 182, was not investigated, not involved with the bombing, did not advocate the creation of the Commission and is otherwise not expert in airplane crashes, was granted the privileged status of intervenor while a person (me) who actually was personally investigated by the RCMP, who was a military bombardier and knows about bombings, is extremely familiar about Air India Flight 182 and the type of aircraft it was, who has actually been in a sudden fatal fiery jet airplane crash, and who has met the family members of that fatality, was denied person of

standing status in an inquiry into an investigation of a sudden fatal fiery jet airplane crash.

Possibly your inquiry could be called the Inquiry into the Emotions of Feelings of Persecution in Family Members of the Victims of Religious Discrimination and for Others Who Have Felt the Same Way.

We make do with what is given us, and in that regard your spoken words to me come back during that abbreviated oral submission period on 19 July 2006: "... what I can do is permit you to file any written material that substantiates your view and it will be part of the Air India record. It will be there for examination by people who look at this Inquiry in future years,..."

Future years...in aviation safety, Commissioner, we don't have future years and often, not even future minutes. But...I make do with what is granted and that is leave to file any written material that substantiates my view to the Commission and thus become part of the Air India record.

I am doing so at this time, thank you for that consolation, Commissioner. Your verbal statement to me implies no member of the Commission will look at this material, only those people from the future. I hope they can read other than French or Punjabi because this is written in, well, like, uh, you know, Californian-American-English...dude.

My first point is to repeat my observation made to the Commission in writing and in person several weeks ago that a grievous error of fact persists every day in the Commission's Opening Statement on the official website: June 21, 2006,

Background:

"Yet, it was not until the following January that the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb."

Not so. Absolutely incorrect. Terribly misleading. That error leads to a hysterical rant such as the next statement by the Commission: "This massive murder was the most insidious episode of cowardice and inhumanity in our history at the time,..."

The Canadian Aviation Safety Board made no such bombing conclusion.

Aviation Occurrence Report of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board for Air India Flight 182 of January 22, 1986

"4.0 CONCLUSIONS

The Canadian Aviation Safety Board respectfully submits as follows:

4.1 Cause-Related Findings

1. At 0714 GMT, 23 June 1985, and without warning, Air India Flight 182 was subjected to a sudden event at an altitude of 31,000 feet resulting in its crash into the sea and the death of all on board.

5. There is considerable circumstantial and other evidence to indicate that the initial event was an explosion occurring in the forward cargo compartment. This evidence is not conclusive. However, the evidence does not support any other conclusion."

When an error as serious as the false statement about the Canadian accident experts calling the explosion a bomb is allowed to persist, the erroneous deductions are compounded

over time. The Prime Minister even repeated the error to Parliament. There are several reasons with precedent for an explosion in the forward cargo compartment of a Boeing 747 with a bomb being a very unlikely cause and a mechanically caused explosive decompression very likely. To continue to misquote the Canadian Safety Board and call their conclusion a bombing is bewilderingly deceptive.

When the false statement (of bombing conclusion) is repeated while knowing that statement to be false, as the Commission has known for several weeks, that act is called perjury when under oath. I recommend, to uphold the highest integrity of the Commission, that the grievous error of fact be corrected as soon as possible and hopefully not years.

This completes "Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected" of material that substantiates my view that Air India Flight 182 was caused by the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation.

"Smith Submission 2 to follow: "Bombs Everywhere," (or Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage, go boom, boom, boom: The Official Versions)".

Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com

safety@ntsb.org

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Date: August 19, 2006 8:50:18 PM PDT

To: barney.brucker@justice.gc.ca

Subject: Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years:

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Thursday, August 17, 2006

Below is Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years:
Predicting the Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday,
August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28
July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why,
and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb,
in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please
ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type
of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8,
2006

Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/
ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/
inflight breakup explanation. (Please consider a plausible,
reasonable, electrical cause with precedent) Filed Tuesday,
August 8, 2006.

Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The

Layperson version. (It's not rocket science) Filed Friday, August 11, 2006

Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years: Predicting the Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

At the request of the Guptas, I have ceased sending them my submissions.

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner

Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publique

Dear Commissioner Major, Thursday, August 17, 2006

You to me: "You have an alternate theory. The alternate theory

may over time prove to be correct. I don't know. What I do know is that we cannot consider it as part of the evidence in this Inquiry but what I can do is permit you to file any written material that substantiates your view and it will be part of the Air India record. It will be there for examination by people who look at this Inquiry in future years,..."

Dear Person of the People in Future Years,

I figure you are probably a high school student here from some detention hall assignment doing a make work essay in early 21st century history. I was told a hundred years ago you might be examining my filed written material that substantiates my alternate theory for an airplane crash.

Well, where to start, my wayward student? What's it like in 2106 anyway? Still Scuba diving down to the tops of skyscrapers? Crowded on the high ground? Can you live on the wages of a solar mirror cleaner? I can only guess, but something tells me that travel between any two points more than a hundred miles apart will not require passports, ID papers, and strip searches as we had in 2006. Things will be better in 2106 and it's all because of a few brave men in high office.

What was it like in 2006 you ask? (Because you have to or you ain't leaving study hall?) It all started when a big airliner with 329 on board, called Air India Flight 182, blew up over the ocean and terrorists were blamed for putting a bomb on board. Exactly at what airport the bomb was loaded, where it was located in the plane, and how many bombs were facts in dispute by the various investigating agencies and everyone (except me) believed it was a bomb by terrorists and urgent, drastic actions needed to be taken to prevent another tragedy.

Of course real terrorists noticed all the tears, wailing, press coverage, expenses, disruptions, and political reaction and thought, "Hmmm...airplanes crashing really upsets our enemy." And then another large airliner blew up in the air and terrorists were again blamed (wrongly, from my research) and more tears, hair pulling, and rants against foreigners. Trials and punishments occurred. This time the terrorists knew they were really onto something, a way to really disrupt and hurt the industrial society they blamed for corrupting their own culture.

Now the terrorists knew they did not bomb those big 747s out of the air but figured their brothers in arms had done it. Everybody (except me) 'knew' they were bombed and tried very hard to find the bombers. The suspects and the convicted all turned out, naturally, to be non English speaking, dark skinned, foreign looking men with funny hats.

Real terrorists plotted on causing airplanes to crash, since the effect was so great for such little effort and risk. And on September 11, 2001, they struck with not one, but four crashes. All the security measures from 1985 on including X ray machines, strip searches, dogs, private security staff, random baggage searches, profiles were to no avail and all four planes crashed and the world was never the same.

Travel became hell. All the passengers were disarmed before boarding. All water or other beverages were removed before flight. Delays, aborted flights, cancelled trips, scares, and evacuations were commonplace.

But you are not living in that fearful, suspicious, inconvenient world of 2006 are you, lucky student, a former world of the

hysterical reaction to mass grief of 1985, 1988, and 1996 events which turned to anger, to hate, and to revenge against somebody, anybody. What changed the course of history? It was the judgments of a few brave men.

How did you come to this material on file to be examined by people in the future? Let me guess. You put "History 100 years ago" into a search engine which had indexed thirty trillion words in billions of websites. All the links you clicked on were "Server Busy" or "Error Page 404" except this material which was probably on an archived website deep in the Canadian Government basement of obsolete formatted filed material submitted for an Commission of Inquiry. And yet this filed material for people in future years has remained clear and available, why is that? It's because it is important.

Ah, 2006...there were two distinct types of people back then:

1. The Pie in the Skyers.
2. The Down to Earthers.

I was a Down to Earther or scientists as we called them. We looked at things we called reality such as twisted metal, broken parts, and recorded sounds. We detected patterns from which we made reasoned, logical conclusions. We conducted experiments to reconstruct the events for confirmation and invited others to replicate our experiments for objective observations to determine validity. Whether the conclusions or the implications of those conclusions gave us pleasure or pain was not our concern, only the explanation of reality. We wanted to know an accurate reality so we could plan ahead or to fix mistakes in the past. In my case it was to prevent other people dying in plane crashes since I had survived one myself and a plane crash is not a good thing even if you can walk away injured.

Then there were the Pie in the Skyers, or as I called them, The Bombs in the Skyers. They had different criteria for determining reality. Their main rules for validity of an idea were:

1. If it makes me feel good, it's right.
2. If it's right, it's true.
3. If someone tells me true things, he/she shall be rewarded with money and attention.
4. If it makes me feel bad, it's wrong.
5. If it's wrong, it's false.
6. If someone tells me a false thing, they are lying.
7. If someone lies to me, they shall be punished by rejection and scorn.

Emotion ruled the day! And Air India Flight 182 was the crash in 1985 that started it all.

The Bombs in the Sky guys loved the excitement of conspiracy stories with a Mr. X here and there, foreign countries, lots of airports, mistresses, lots of money changing hands, and political intrigue everywhere. How could the bomb stories not be correct? They made everybody happy: The manufacturer (it's not my fault) blamed the airport for letting the bombs get through. The airport (it's not my fault) blamed the terrorists. The airline (it's not my fault) blamed the bombers. The Government regulatory agency and safety boards (it's not my fault) blamed the crazy foreign religions. The family members (it's not my fault) blamed the evil in men's hearts. The newspapers and TV station (it's not my fault) sold the exciting story over and over again, adding bits and pieces here and there when necessary to keep the conflicting stories fresh.

The general belief of the public was, "Well, it's evil human

nature, flying is still safer than driving, they are doing all they can (and it's not the officials' fault) to stop the bombers from doing it again, it's OK to fly, keep on buying tickets, put your seatback in an upright position, and enjoy your flight."

Everyone was acting in their own perceived best interest and that was, 'It's not my fault, it's his fault, over there, put him in jail'. There were no conspiracies by the major parties involved to keep the real explanation for the crash secret, they just preferred, along with everyone else, the conspiracy explanation of the bombs in the sky since it made them feel good.

The Pie in the Skyers were in the majority since being absolved of blame and responsibility of multiple tragedies made them feel good, which means it's right, which means it's true. Everyone from the TV, radio, newspaper, magazines, books, government officials, who repeated the true, right, good feeling stories were rewarded with promotions, pay raises, and desirable assignments.

And the reality of travel became more and more unpleasant. More time was spent in the car to the airport than in the airplane and more time was spent on the airplane on the ground taxiing or waiting for a gate than was spent in the air in the airplane.

But everyone knew it wasn't their fault and that made them feel good so it was true.

Except for those pesky Down to Earthers.

This Down to Earther looked at the actual evidence of the airplane crash such as twisted metal, loud recordings, wreckage debris pattern, inflight damage, history of previous or subsequent similar events and concluded that the cause of those bombed

planes was not bombs but a mechanical systems fault such that the electrical system had failed, specifically the wiring had frayed and shorted on a motor that was supposed to stay off in flight.

Research showed bombs caused a tiny percentage of plane crashes. Bombs are a small part of a small subset of causes called 'Sabotage". Pilot error and mechanical failures cause about 90% of plane crashes with mechanical contributing about 40%. Wiring failures caused literally hundreds of fires, many failed instruments, and a few cargo doors to open in flight.

The scientists called government aviation accident investigators who actually knew why planes crashed did not conclude it was a bomb, just an explosion and another aviation accident investigator said the cause was an explosion that was not a bomb. They were just doing their job as objective, detached, logical, non emotional, investigators.

But...the news that the plane crashes were caused by faulty wiring and not bombs did not make everyone feel good. The non bomb/bad wiring explanation meant that everyone was responsible in some small or large way and that realization made them feel very, very bad. Because they felt bad, they knew the mechanical wiring explanation was wrong. Because it was wrong, it was false. And anybody who told them falsehoods was lying to them. Therefore the liar must be punished by stifling, rejection, and scorn to make him stop giving the pain of a wrong explanation.

The larger issue was myth versus science; wishful thinking versus reality. The ignorant, fearful population turned to exciting stories that made them feel good by exposing and smiting

enemies while glorifying themselves. The scientists were shunned, demoted, fired, or had funds cut off from their research. The politicians responded to the will of their citizens and told even more outrageous tales of heroism and sacrifice.

Wishful thinking ruled, reality lost. Myth won, science was trounced. Exciting stories were believed while boring details...well...bored.

The situation world wide was dangerous. Terrorists were everywhere. Relations among nations were on the cusp of a world war with all sides living myths and wanting to fight. Many politicians even declared World War III had begun. Tensions were very high as local outbreaks of war kept on popping up, threatening to spread wider.

The rule of law was under attack as the belief was that only sissies hired attorneys and played the game of cross examination of witnesses, confronting the accuser, and disclosure of evidence, when everyone knew that real men got their guns and started shooting and loaded up with bombs and started bombing. The court system was considered a game for shoplifting cases while the only system that worked included secret armies, paid mercenaries, widespread eavesdropping, and secret prisons.

Investigators became prosecutors and decided on guilt. Prosecutors became judges and decided on punishment. Judges became politicians and decided what the people wanted to hear. Politicians became businessmen seeking profits. Businessmen became priests giving advice on how to live. Priests became military leaders defending their followers by shooting others. Military leaders became assassins with remotely controlled and armed drones. Everyone was doing the job of others while

neglecting their own.

A new Dark Ages was appearing. Societies were splitting into smaller segregated groups based upon language, race, or religious criteria. Residential communities became gated fortresses. Suspicion, distrust, anger, fear, hate, and vendettas become normal attitudes.

But this Down to Earth scientist kept on telling his reasonable, plausible explanation for the initial plane crash that started it all in letters, websites, interviews and an appearance in front of a Commission of Inquiry into one of the plane crashes.

The crash of Air India Flight 182 was blamed on revenge seeking terrorist putting one or two bombs to blow up the plane in the aft or forward cargo compartment. But the stories did not sound right, there were important discrepancies in the multiple bomb explanations. Suspects were accused, and tried. Law enforcement agencies bickered as they chased ghosts around the world. And then entered one of the three brave enlightened men: Justice Ian Josephson. He evaluated the evidence and acquitted the two accused. He found they did not plant the bombs and he was right, they didn't do it, nobody did it.

Outrage was everywhere. The outraged citizens who had looked forward to revenge were upset and wanted punishment against someone, anyone, even those in law enforcement.

And then entered the next of the three brave enlightened men: Prime Minister Stephen Harper. He created a Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182. He said "It is our duty as Canadians to do everything in our power to prevent a similar tragedy from ever happening again, A

full public inquiry is required. This inquiry will be launched immediately and led by an outstanding Canadian, retired Supreme Court Justice John Major. He has agreed to serve as Commissioner for this inquiry and I have every confidence that he will conduct a thorough and compassionate investigation into the events surrounding this tragedy. This inquiry is about analyzing the evidence that has come to light since 1985 and applying it to the world we live in today."

Prime Minister Harper did indeed want a full public inquiry which would be thorough, compassionate, and analyze the evidence and events surrounding the tragedy.

And he got it.

Enter the third brave enlightened man, retired Supreme Court Justice John Major. He is the Commissioner who told me I would be examined by you in the future. Commissioner Major said to me personally, "... I can do is permit you to file any written material that substantiates your view and it will be part of the Air India record. It will be there for examination by people who look at this Inquiry in future years,..."

Commissioner Major also stated, "The nature of this Commission was to be very broad in the evidence that it heard, in order to put to rest the various theories, rumours and neglect that have occurred since the explosion in 1985."

And it was.

Commissioner Major patiently listened to everyone as they gave their opinions about the investigation, the bombing, the aircraft, the victims, and the victims' families. He listened to

representatives of various agencies explain why they did not get convictions of the accused terrorists, why information was lost, destroyed, or misplaced, turf battles, secret tapes, communication lapses, funding problems, and lack of cooperation among the many agencies tracking suspected terrorists. Fingers were pointed in every which direction. The Commissioner listened to various religious groups give their opinions and complaints about discrimination against them by terrorists.

And the curious Commissioner listened to this independent aircraft accident investigator who had an interesting explanation for the crash that was different from the conventional wisdom held by all the others. This civilian said the cause was not a bomb explosion; there were no bombers, no conspiracies, no crimes, and no criminals.

Well, my young chipmunk, that alternative explanation caused a stir and everyone involved wanted this civilian investigator to shut up, sit down, and go away.

But Commissioner Major held firm to his principals and those of the Prime Minister who both wanted a very broad full, public, and thorough inquiry. The Commissioner stated he wanted to 'put to rest various theories' for the accident and to do that, he had to listen to them, not reject them out of hand. He was pressured to keep the inquiry narrow, short, and focused on specific already agreed upon conclusions.

But, he stayed true to his calling of justice through law, not emotion. So, he listened to this civilian investigator give his oral presentation with audio visual aids, textbooks, accident reports, diagrams, pictures, and schematics. The Commissioner then read the various text submissions of the civilian that documented in

depth the evidence which led him to conclude the cause was not a bomb but the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation.

The Commissioner sought other modern expert opinion so he tasked the premier aviation accident investigation government team in Canada for their evaluation of the probable cause of the crash. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (Air) then evaluated the wiring/cargo door explanation and the evidence in 1989 of a similar accident, United Airlines Flight 811, and realized that the conspiracy stories of adulterous fraudulent terrorists were good stories but not grounded in fact, unlike the scientific explanation of the wiring/cargo door theory.

The TSB Air reported their findings to the Commissioner. He concluded that the earlier evaluation by the Canadian Safety Board was correct, that the police could not catch their culprits because there were no culprits, the prosecutors could not get a conviction because nobody did it, the judge who acquitted the accused followed the law and was vindicated, the family members rested easier knowing the details of the accident, and a clear danger to the flying public was removed when the faulty wiring was replaced and the design flaws in the cargo doors were fixed.

The anger, hate, and lust for revenge which had permeated Canadian attitudes for decades was removed. The hysteria about air travel and bombs was reduced somewhat. More attention was properly paid for training of pilots, maintenance of the aircraft, and safe design. Air travel was safer and more relaxed. The quality of life for millions of Canadian citizens and others worldwide improved.

And that is why the CN building in Toronto is called the "Harper Tower" and the route from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean through the Arctic archipelago of Canada is called "The Harper Passage."

The way of thinking that allowed for full, public, and thorough inquiries from many parties became normal, while the old style of fixed, predetermined, politically satisfying inquiry findings was rejected.

And that's why that way of thinking is called, "The Major Doctrine." Whenever mysteries and important events that demand explanation arise, the first response by the public is always, "Use the Major Doctrine!"

And that's why this filed material has been made clear and available to you, a person of a people in the future, so that you may marvel at the excessive fears and suspicions of the past, overcome any new fears, rely on scientific and fair inquiry into important reality events, coexist peacefully with spiritual neighbors, and act on conclusions based on reality, not good stories.

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/

ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/
inflight breakup explanation. (Please consider a plausible,
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Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Regards,

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From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrismith.com>
Date: August 19, 2006 8:50:52 PM PDT
To: barney.brucker@justice.gc.ca
**Subject: Smith Submission 10: The Elephant and Emperor
Kanishka**

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Saturday, August 19, 2006

Below is Smith Submission 10: The Elephant and Emperor Kanishka. (Easy to see, hard to talk about) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

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Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years: Predicting the Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non Cooperation. (Sorry, no can do.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 9: The Crash and Meeting the Family. (It happens so fast) Filed Friday, August 18, 2006

Smith Submission 10: The Elephant and Emperor Kanishka.
(Easy to see, hard to talk about) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
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Carmel Valley, California 93924

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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182
Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner
Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary
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Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel
Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publique

Dear Commissioner Major, Saturday,
August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 10: The Elephant and Emperor Kanishka.
(Easy to see, hard to talk about) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

Elephant in the room: Illustrates a large issue with influence over
a discussion that is not mentioned by the participants. The
expression "elephant in the room" refers to a situation where
something major is going on, it's on everyone's mind and
impossible to ignore -- like an elephant in the room. But nobody

talks about the "elephant" because nobody knows what to do about it.

Well, the elephant in the rotunda of the Commission hearing will be "No Bomb!"

During the commission hearings, there will be many speakers presenting their views. Many will know there is an elephant in the room: There exists a reasonable, plausible, mechanical alternative explanation for Air India Flight 182 with a solid precedent, United Airlines Flight 811. None will bring up the subject unless asked.

Various officials and citizens from the below agencies are aware of the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182.

Transportation Safety Board Canada
Terry Burtch, Bill Tucker (ret)
Director General,
Investigation Operations

Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Air India Task Force
Bart Blachford Sgt.
John Schnieder
Rich Spruel

Securitas branch of TSB
John Garstang

Air India Victims Families Association (AIVFA)

Susheel Gupta and Bal Gupta.

Globe and Mail Reporter
Robert Matas

Attorney for the accused Mr. Malik
Dave Crossin QC

Attorney for the accused Mr. Reyat
Ian Donaldson QC

The accused and acquitted:
Mr. Malik

A similar theme of the ignored elephant is "The emperor's new clothes." The emperor is naked but nobody wants to be the first to say so for fear of appearing different or stupid.

My revised version states Emperor Kanishka is not carrying a bomb under his clothes but his shoelaces are untied with the shoelaces representing the frayed wiring which represents a very real danger of tripping and falling while the imaginary bomb is not a threat. (Emperor Kanishka is the Air India name for Air India Flight 182.)

Emperor Kanishka's New Bomb
by Hans Christian Anderson and John Barry Smith

Once upon a time there lived a vain Emperor Kanishka whose only worry in life was to dress in elegant clothes and play with explosives which he carried around on him. He changed clothes and fired off explosives almost every hour and loved to show them off to his people.

Word of the Emperor's strange habits spread over his kingdom and beyond. Two scoundrels who had heard of the Emperor's vanity decided to take advantage of it. They introduced themselves at the gates of the palace with a scheme in mind.

"We are two very good bomb makers and after many years of research we have invented an extraordinary method to create a bomb so light and powerful that it is beautiful and very loud. As a matter of fact it is invisible and soundless to anyone who is too stupid and incompetent to appreciate its quality. The wise and intelligent will see it and hear it when it goes off."

The chief of the guards heard the bombmakers' strange story and sent for the court chamberlain. The chamberlain notified the prime minister, who ran to the Emperor and disclosed the incredible news. Emperor Kanishka's curiosity got the better of him and he decided to see the two bombmakers.

"Besides being very loud, your Highness, this bomb will be woven in colors and patterns created especially for you." The emperor gave the two men a bag of gold coins in exchange for their promise to begin working on the bomb immediately.

"Just tell us what you need to get started and we'll give it to you." The two terrorists asked for a loom, silk, gold thread and then pretended to begin working. Emperor Kanishka thought he had spent his money quite well: in addition to getting a new extraordinary bomb, he would discover which of his subjects were ignorant and incompetent who could not see or hear it. A few days later, he called the old and wise prime minister, who was considered by everyone as a man with common sense.

"Go and see how the work is proceeding," Emperor Kanishka told him, "and come back to let me know."

The prime minister was welcomed by the two terrorists.

"We're almost finished, but we need a lot more gold thread. Here, Excellency! Admire the colors, feel the softness!" The old man bent over the loom and tried to see the bomb that was not there. He felt cold sweat on his forehead.

"I can't see anything," he thought. "If I see nothing, that means I'm stupid! Or, worse, incompetent!" If the prime minister admitted that he didn't see anything, he would be discharged from his office.

"What a marvelous bomb, he said then. "I'll certainly tell the Emperor." The two terrorists rubbed their hands gleefully. They had almost made it. More gold thread was requested to finish the work.

Finally, the Emperor received the announcement that the two bombmakers had come to show off the new big bomb.

"Come in," the Emperor ordered. Even as they bowed, the two terrorists pretended to be holding the large bomb.

"Here it is your Highness, the result of our labour," the terrorists said. "We have worked night and day but, at last, the most powerful bomb in the world is ready for you. Look at the colors and feel how fine it is." Of course the Emperor did not see any colors and could not feel any bomb between his fingers. He panicked and felt like fainting. But luckily the throne was right behind him and he sat down. But when he realized that no one

could know that he did not see the bomb, he felt better. Nobody could find out he was stupid and incompetent.

The farce continued as the two terrorists had foreseen it. Once they had taken the measurements, the two began cutting the air with screwdrivers while sewing with their needles an invisible bomb under the the emperor's clothes.

"Your Highness, you'll have to put this sweater over this big bomb." The two terrorists gave the new bomb to him to hold under his sweater and then held up a mirror. Emperor Kanishka was embarrassed to see no bulge but since none of his bystanders were embarrassed, he felt relieved.

"Yes, this is a beautiful bomb and it looks very good on me," Emperor Kanishka said trying to look comfortable. "You've done a fine job."

"Your Majesty," the prime minister said, "we have a request for you. The people have found out about this extraordinary bomb and they are anxious to see you explode it." The Emperor was doubtful showing himself holding no bomb to the people, but then he abandoned his fears. After all, no one would know about it except the ignorant and the incompetent.

"All right," he said. "I will grant the people this privilege." He summoned his carriage and the ceremonial parade was formed. A group of dignitaries walked at the very front of the procession and anxiously scrutinized the faces of the people in the street. All the people had gathered in the main square, pushing and shoving to get a better look. Applause welcomed the regal procession.

Emperor Kanishka stood at the edge of the bomb explosion

pit, reached under his sweater and threw out the invisible and weightless bomb. The Emperor yelled, "Boom!" and everyone jumped back by the force of the word.

Everyone wanted to know how stupid or incompetent his or her neighbor was and, as Emperor Kanishka walked back from the bomb pit, a strange murmur rose from the crowd.

Everyone said, loud enough for the others to hear: "Look at the Emperor's new bomb explode. It was so powerful!"

"What a marvellous fuse, too!"

"And the colors! The colors of that beautiful bomb! I have never seen anything like it in my life!" They all tried to conceal their disappointment at not being able to see or hear the bomb, and since nobody was willing to admit his own stupidity and incompetence, they all behaved as the two terrorists had predicted.

However, an independent aviation accident investigator with thousands of hours of flight time and knew a lot about bombs, who had no official job. and could only see things as his eyes showed them and heard sounds as his ears heard them, went up to the carriage.

"My tape recorder recorded no sounds from the bomb, only the sound of Emperor's Kanishka's voice saying 'boom'. And I don't see any bomb. Emperor Kanishka, you have no bomb, and your shoelaces are untied, which is dangerous," the scientist investigator pilot said.

"Fool!" the court chamberlain reprimanded, running after

him. "Don't talk nonsense!" He told the investigator to sit down. But the investigator's remark, which had been heard by the bystanders, was repeated over and over again until the kingdom's investigators cried:

"The scientist is right! Emperor Kanishka has no bomb and his shoelaces are untied! It's true!"

Emperor Kanishka realized that the people were right but could not admit to that. He thought it better to continue the procession under the illusion that anyone who couldn't see or hear his bomb was either stupid or incompetent.

Regards,

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1 831 241 0631 Cell
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(Easy to see, hard to talk about) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

The Original Version

The Emperor's New Suit

by

Hans Christian Andersen

(1837)

MANY, many years ago lived an emperor, who thought so much
of new clothes that he spent all his money in order to obtain
them; his only ambition was to be always well dressed. He did
not care for his soldiers, and the theatre did not amuse him; the
only thing, in fact, he thought anything of was to drive out and
show a new suit of clothes. He had a coat for every hour of the
day; and as one would say of a king "He is in his cabinet," so

one could say of him, "The emperor is in his dressing-room."

The great city where he resided was very gay; every day many strangers from all parts of the globe arrived. One day two swindlers came to this city; they made people believe that they were weavers, and declared they could manufacture the finest cloth to be imagined. Their colours and patterns, they said, were not only exceptionally beautiful, but the clothes made of their material possessed the wonderful quality of being invisible to any man who was unfit for his office or unpardonably stupid.

"That must be wonderful cloth," thought the emperor. "If I were to be dressed in a suit made of this cloth I should be able to find out which men in my empire were unfit for their places, and I could distinguish the clever from the stupid. I must have this cloth woven for me without delay." And he gave a large sum of money to the swindlers, in advance, that they should set to work without any loss of time. They set up two looms, and pretended to be very hard at work, but they did nothing whatever on the looms. They asked for the finest silk and the most precious gold-cloth; all they got they did away with, and worked at the empty looms till late at night.

"I should very much like to know how they are getting on with the cloth," thought the emperor. But he felt rather uneasy when he remembered that he who was not fit for his office could not see it. Personally, he was of opinion that he had nothing to fear, yet he thought it advisable to send somebody else first to see how matters stood. Everybody in the town knew what a remarkable quality the stuff possessed, and all were anxious to see how bad or stupid their neighbours were.

"I shall send my honest old minister to the weavers," thought

the emperor. "He can judge best how the stuff looks, for he is intelligent, and nobody understands his office better than he."

The good old minister went into the room where the swindlers sat before the empty looms. "Heaven preserve us!" he thought, and opened his eyes wide, "I cannot see anything at all," but he did not say so. Both swindlers requested him to come near, and asked him if he did not admire the exquisite pattern and the beautiful colours, pointing to the empty looms. The poor old minister tried his very best, but he could see nothing, for there was nothing to be seen. "Oh dear," he thought, "can I be so stupid? I should never have thought so, and nobody must know it! Is it possible that I am not fit for my office? No, no, I cannot say that I was unable to see the cloth."

"Now, have you got nothing to say?" said one of the swindlers, while he pretended to be busily weaving.

"Oh, it is very pretty, exceedingly beautiful," replied the old minister looking through his glasses. "What a beautiful pattern, what brilliant colours! I shall tell the emperor that I like the cloth very much."

"We are pleased to hear that," said the two weavers, and described to him the colours and explained the curious pattern. The old minister listened attentively, that he might relate to the emperor what they said; and so he did.

Now the swindlers asked for more money, silk and gold-cloth, which they required for weaving. They kept everything for themselves, and not a thread came near the loom, but they continued, as hitherto, to work at the empty looms.

Soon afterwards the emperor sent another honest courtier to the weavers to see how they were getting on, and if the cloth was nearly finished. Like the old minister, he looked and looked but could see nothing, as there was nothing to be seen.

«Is it not a beautiful piece of cloth?» asked the two swindlers, showing and explaining the magnificent pattern, which, however, did not exist.

«I am not stupid,» said the man. «It is therefore my good appointment for which I am not fit. It is very strange, but I must not let any one know it;» and he praised the cloth, which he did not see, and expressed his joy at the beautiful colours and the fine pattern. «It is very excellent,» he said to the emperor.

Everybody in the whole town talked about the precious cloth. At last the emperor wished to see it himself, while it was still on the loom. With a number of courtiers, including the two who had already been there, he went to the two clever swindlers, who now worked as hard as they could, but without using any thread.

«Is it not magnificent?» said the two old statesmen who had been there before. «Your Majesty must admire the colours and the pattern.» And then they pointed to the empty looms, for they imagined the others could see the cloth.

«What is this?» thought the emperor, «I do not see anything at all. That is terrible! Am I stupid? Am I unfit to be emperor? That would indeed be the most dreadful thing that could happen to me.»

«Really,» he said, turning to the weavers, «your cloth has our most gracious approval;» and nodding contentedly he looked at

the empty loom, for he did not like to say that he saw nothing. All his attendants, who were with him, looked and looked, and although they could not see anything more than the others, they said, like the emperor, "It is very beautiful." And all advised him to wear the new magnificent clothes at a great procession which was soon to take place. "It is magnificent, beautiful, excellent," one heard them say; everybody seemed to be delighted, and the emperor appointed the two swindlers "Imperial Court weavers."

The whole night previous to the day on which the procession was to take place, the swindlers pretended to work, and burned more than sixteen candles. People should see that they were busy to finish the emperor's new suit. They pretended to take the cloth from the loom, and worked about in the air with big scissors, and sewed with needles without thread, and said at last: "The emperor's new suit is ready now."

The emperor and all his barons then came to the hall; the swindlers held their arms up as if they held something in their hands and said: "These are the trousers!" "This is the coat!" and "Here is the cloak!" and so on. "They are all as light as a cobweb, and one must feel as if one had nothing at all upon the body; but that is just the beauty of them."

"Indeed!" said all the courtiers; but they could not see anything, for there was nothing to be seen.

"Does it please your Majesty now to graciously undress," said the swindlers, "that we may assist your Majesty in putting on the new suit before the large looking-glass?"

The emperor undressed, and the swindlers pretended to put the

new suit upon him, one piece after another; and the emperor looked at himself in the glass from every side.

«How well they look! How well they fit!» said all. «What a beautiful pattern! What fine colours! That is a magnificent suit of clothes!»

The master of the ceremonies announced that the bearers of the canopy, which was to be carried in the procession, were ready.

«I am ready,» said the emperor. «Does not my suit fit me marvellously?» Then he turned once more to the looking-glass, that people should think he admired his garments.

The chamberlains, who were to carry the train, stretched their hands to the ground as if they lifted up a train, and pretended to hold something in their hands; they did not like people to know that they could not see anything.

The emperor marched in the procession under the beautiful canopy, and all who saw him in the street and out of the windows exclaimed: «Indeed, the emperor's new suit is incomparable! What a long train he has! How well it fits him!» Nobody wished to let others know he saw nothing, for then he would have been unfit for his office or too stupid. Never emperor's clothes were more admired.

«But he has nothing on at all,» said a little child at last. «Good heavens! listen to the voice of an innocent child,» said the father, and one whispered to the other what the child had said. «But he has nothing on at all,» cried at last the whole people. That made a deep impression upon the emperor, for it seemed to him that they were right; but he thought to himself, «Now I must bear up

to the end. Ó And the chamberlains walked with still greater dignity, as if they carried the train which did not exist.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Date: August 19, 2006 8:51:10 PM PDT

To: barney.brucker@justice.gc.ca

Subject: **Smith Submission 12. Last Gasp: Clutching at a Straw.**

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publiques

Dear Mr. Dickerson,

Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 12. Last Gasp: Grasping at a Straw. Filed

I have also sent copies of each submission to Mr. Brucker since he was so concerned about who is granted standing and all of the below are a result of my being denied standing.

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

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Smith Submission 12. Last Gasp: Grasping at a Straw. (Throw me a bone here, I'm dying) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

I will be sending relevant material to be filed that does not require the attention of the Commissioner but is necessary for a complete file. The items will be relevant accident reports from government safety boards and communications with safety officials. I hope my request is approved to post all the non classified written material submitted by the public during the public inquiry (including my submissions) on the Commission website, <http://www.majorcomm.ca/en/index.asp> The public area could be called the Public Docket.

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner

Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publique

Dear Commissioner Major, Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 12. Last Gasp: Grasping at a Straw. (Throw
me a bone here, I'm dying) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

A cliché for every occasion: Grasping at straws 1. Having little
or no options left. 2. Desperate.

It's hard being fair, if it were easy, everyone would be doing it.
Instead, we have judges who are trained to be detached,
objective, non emotional, rational, and fair.

It's easy to be biased, emotional, and unfair, it's why most people
are. The narrow and closed minded are unwilling to consider
alternatives that might alter their rigid internal belief structure.
It's hard to change.

It's hard to defend someone when there is a lynch mob outside the jail screaming for revenge. Lesser principled officials give in to the popular will.

Justice Josephson upheld his professional principles and came to the correct conclusions when he acquitted the two accused all the while knowing what the popular will was.

After sixteen years of research on early model Boeing 747s that disintegrate in flight I have found that my wiring/cargo door explanation is met with these responses in sequence:

1. No.
2. You are wrong.
3. You are crazy.
4. Go away.
5. I'm ignoring you.
6. Attack.
7. Ask a real question to check it out.
8. Take action on new knowledge acquired.

Interestingly enough, the same sequence was followed by the family members of Air India Flight 182 and others upon hearing the verdict of Justice Josephson.

First they said to themselves, no, it can't be. Then, they said he was wrong. Then they said he must be nuts to acquit them. Then they want his career to end by claiming he is incompetent in his conclusions. Now they ignore him. And at last the family members want the Commission to punish those they believe betrayed them: Justice Josephson, the RCMP, the CSIS, and anybody else involved, even extending to an independent

accident investigator. Public opinion will not get to stage seven and ask real questions about the crash.

The officials and family members apparently want the Commissioner to ask questions as long as they are hatchet questions to cast blame at inefficient and incompetent court and law enforcement systems. Then they want their revenge by a few demotions, firings, and forced early retirements of officials.

The basis for this sequence is fear. There is fear of change. All the parties have fear of change such that all their work of twenty years was in vain. There is a cliché for this: Barking up the wrong tree 1. Looking in the wrong place for the solution for a problem. 2. Thinking the answer is one thing when it is not. The hunter/prosecutors told the dogs/police to find the raccoon/terrorists and the dogs spent years and think they treed the raccoon but they didn't. The correct tree/mechanical cause is far away with only this puppy/investigator barking up it.

I find myself in an upside down world where I am begging an inquirer leading an inquiry to actually inquire, which is to say, ask questions of me.

It is an inside out world where I am supporting Canadian institutions such as the CASB, Justice Josephson, the RCMP, the CSIS while a government Commission is involved with disputing their findings and looking to discredit their competence by accusing them of failure.

It is a backward world when I am the rational scientist with loads of data and corroborative facts who is stifled and regarded as looney while the government is full of conspiracies, suspicions, finger pointing, and stories that don't make sense when examined

closely. I am the cooler head trying to prevail over hysterical elements of the government and media.

It is a strange world when I have to plead with the officials, who gain their authority through the power of doing what they say they are going to do, to actually do what they say they are going to do, that is, to hold a full, public, thorough, and broad inquiry to put to rest various theories.

It is a bewildering world when an official exclaims doubt by saying, "I don't know" and then rejects professional, specialized, Crown opinion that can allay his doubt and resolve serious contradictions in other reports.

It is a suspicious world when I point out an inflammatory and prejudicial written error stated by the Commission about a finding of bomb and the error remains uncorrected.

It is confusing to me that I have to plead with an official to be fair who has spent his entire long and distinguished career being just that.

It is weird to me to have to try to persuade someone to do what he was trained to do, swore to do, paid to do, was encouraged to do, was ordered to do, and I think, what he really wants to do: Be fair, solve a mystery, establish justice, and protect his fellow citizens.

I'm not asking for special treatment, nor an exemption or waiver, or mercy, or compensation. I'm asking for the rules to be followed, for the inquiry to inquire, and for promises to be kept.

I have not ignored contrary reports, I have considered both sides.

I did not pick and choose reports, I included all. I acted as an investigator, not a prosecutor. From Table of Contents of my Smith AAR for Air India Flight 182 below (Commission Exhibit S-18):

2. Premise Explanations for Air India Flight 182

2.1 Explosion in flight in the forward cargo compartment

2.1.1 Proponents

2.1.2 Analysis

2.1.3 Conclusion

2.2 Explosion of a bomb in the aft cargo compartment

2.2.1 Proponent

2.2.2 Analysis

2.2.3 Conclusion

2.3 Explosion in the forward cargo compartment with its cause unstated

2.3.1 Proponent

2.3.2 Analysis

2.3.3 Conclusion

2.4 Explosion in the forward cargo compartment, inclusive of a bomb detonation

2.4.1 Proponent

2.4.2 Analysis

2.4.3 Conclusions

2.5 Explosion in the forward cargo compartment caused by explosive decompression of undetermined cause, exclusive of a bomb detonation

2.5.1 Proponent

2.5.2 Analysis

2.5.3 Conclusions

2.6 Explosion in the forward cargo compartment caused by explosive decompression

caused by structural failure of ruptured open forward cargo door

at one or both of the midspan
latches caused by faulty electrical wiring

2.6.1 Proponent

2.6.2 Analysis

2.6.3 Conclusion

My conscience is clear; I have done the best I could to persuade authority that Air India Flight 182 was not a rare bomb event for a more common failing of a part, specifically a forward cargo door rupturing open in flight probably caused by a faulty electrical switch or wiring.

For persuasion I have of course ruled out threats, passed on wheedling and cajoling, and instead concentrated on corroborated expert opinions, rational, logical, a presentation of facts, data, evidence modestly punctuated with brilliant sparks of wit.

I have also begged and pleaded. I shall again.

1. Please grant me standing to present my mechanical non conspiracy explanation to you in depth.
2. Please ask TSB Air to provide an aircraft accident report to you on the probable cause of Air India Flight 182.
3. Please correct the highly prejudicial error on Commission website that states the CASB concluded it was a bomb; they did not. ("Yet, it was not until the following January that the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb.")
4. Please post all the non classified written material submitted to you by the public during the public inquiry (including my submissions) on the Commission website, <http://www.majorcomm.ca/en/index.asp> The public area could be called the Public Docket.

Commissioner Major, in an interview you said your concern was whether an event such as Air India Flight 182 could happen again. Well, sir, the answer is yes because the frayed wiring in the cargo door unlatch system still exists in the about five hundred early model Boeing 747s still in service today worldwide.

Have you ever wondered at the over reaction to the threat of an airplane crash? Many more people die weekly in car crashes than ever die yearly in airplane accidents and yet billions are spent in airline safety and security and relatively very little in vehicular safety. The answer is in the primitive responses of the brain at birth and infancy called reflexes. We are not born with the reflex to react to the smell of skidding rubber tires, of the feeling of a broken bone, or even the pain of fire. All those fears are learned through experience.

We are born with the fears of suffocation, dehydration, loud sounds, and falling. All these fears are present when flying in airplanes and the psyche knows the dangers regardless of the movie that's playing, the number of pillows, or the quality of the meal.

Sucking Reflex: The sucking reflex is initiated when something touches the roof of an infants mouth. Infants have a strong sucking reflex which helps to ensure they can latch onto a bottle or breast.

Startle Reflex: Infants will respond to sudden sounds or movements by throwing their arms and legs out, and throwing their heads back. Most infants will usually cry when startled and proceed to pull their limbs back into their bodies.

Breathing is the first reflex we have. As we get older we develop regulated breathing but we never lose our reflexive breathing. After the first breath comes the first cry.

Parachute Response: This is a protective response that protects an infant if he/she falls. Beginning at about 5-6 months, if an infant falls, he will extend his arms to try and 'catch' himself.

The thought of a loud bomb going off in an airplane which results in suffocating during a long fall while crying for help is a four fold horror nightmare at the basest levels of our personalities. Passengers will pay any amount of money and tolerate any restrictions on civil freedoms to reduce those four fears to manageable levels. Hysterical fear leading to panic is in the back of the mind of many passengers who have a fear of flying. (I have a rational worry of flying and it's based on the realities of the common hazards, bad weather, pilot error and mechanical fault.)

I will tell you a good story you may well remember forever about Air India Flight 182. This was told to me at the beginning of my research for AI 182 about ten years ago.

When the Boeing 747 called Air India Flight 182 disintegrated in flight at 31000 feet over the ocean, some passengers stayed in their seats all the way down, some were probably sucked into engines, and some were blown free and floated down in a few minutes to the ocean surface. All the men, women, and children died.

There was one very pregnant woman who was blown free and as she was falling she delivered/ejected her baby. They both fell to

the water. She died on impact but since the baby was lighter, the infant did not die, but floated for a bit on the water and then drowned. The baby died not from blunt trauma injuries but from salt water in the lungs.

Well, that image of a pregnant human female sensing imminent death and ejecting her baby from within herself as a last chance effort was very haunting to me. I recalled it perfectly.

As it turns out, about five years ago I had occasion to speak by telephone to Wing Commander Dr. I. R. Hill of the Accident Investigations Branch of the United Kingdom who contributed to the Air India Flight 182 reports. I asked Dr. Hill about the injuries to the passengers and any evidence of bomb damage. He replied, as he stated in the accident reports, that he found no explosion by bomb evidence on anyone. He did find explosive decompression injuries and impact damage.

I asked him about the pregnant woman/baby story. He replied that he did not find any evidence of that event occurring; there were no babies that drowned. His interview statements corroborated his written statements of years earlier. (A lot can be deduced from the below Medical Examiner's observations but that would be for a later time.)

From the CASB AOR:

"2.9 Medical Evidence There were 30 children recovered and they showed less overall injury. The average severity of injury increases from Zone C to E and is significantly less in C than in Zones D and E.

Flail pattern injuries were exhibited by eight bodies. Five of these were in Zone E, one in Zone D, two in Zone C and one

crew member. The significance of flail injuries is that it indicates that the victims came out of the aircraft at altitude before it hit the water.

There were 26 bodies that showed signs of hypoxia (lack of oxygen), including 12 children, 9 in Zones C, 6 in Zone D and 11 in Zone E. There were 25 bodies showing signs of decompression, including 7 children. They were evenly distributed throughout the zones, but with a tendency to be seated at the sides, particularly the right side (12 bodies).

Twenty-three bodies showed evidence of receiving injuries from a vertical force. They tended to be older, seated to the rear of the aircraft (4 in Zone C, 5 in Zone D, 11 in Zone E, 2 crew and 1 unknown), and 16 had little or no clothing.

Twenty-one bodies were found with no clothing, including three children. They tended to be seated to the rear and to the right (3 in Zone C, 5 in Zone D, 11 in Zone E and 2 unknown).

There were 49 cases showing signs of impact-type injuries, including 19 children (15 in Zone C, 15 in Zone D, 15 in Zone E, 1 crew member and 3 unknown).

There is a general absence of signs indicating the wearing of lap belts.

Pathological examination failed to reveal any injuries indicative of a fire or explosion."

The point, Commissioner Major, is that myth like tales are told about Air India Flight 182 and upon examination are totally false. There was no drowned in salt water infant. So it is with the

bombs in several places tales that are the official versions of Air India Flight 182. They are just not true although they are wonderful, emotion evoking, awe inspiring, mysterious, and satisfying in very primitive ways.

Frayed wiring shorting on a motor is not myth like. It's mundane. It does not hold interest. But it is usual, reasonable, plausible, and it has a precedent/antecedent with United Airlines Flight 811.

I know with more certainty than some life and death decisions I have made in the air regarding me and my crew that Air India Flight 182 was not caused by a bomb explosion in any compartment. I know there were no bombs, no bombers, no conspiracies, no crime, and no criminals. I do know for certain that the forward cargo door blew out at initial event time that caused the nose to come off leading to the inflight disintegration and the cause of that door rupture was probably an electrical switch or wiring based upon conclusions made regarding United Airlines Flight 811, TWA Flight 800, and Swiss Air 111.

I'm dead serious about airplane crashes, having survived a fatal one. Well, live and learn. When young and frustrated, we cry. When middle aged and outraged, we yell. And now, when old, at my age looking at foolishness, I laugh. Conspiracy nonsense is foolish.

I laugh at this fool who spent \$2500 and a week of travel to and from Ottawa for about twenty five seconds of original input to a Commission of Inquiry before being told my efforts were futile. That's a hundred dollars a second. I'm laughing.

John Major, this is Major John! I'm chuckling since I am a real Major John. I'm a retired US Army Major and my name is John

Smith. I have written 'Major John' many hundreds of times as you, sir, have written 'John Major.' Completely irrelevant but, what the heck, clever play on words and it made this audience of one smile.

I have done my best and it's time to close up shop.

Please don't prod me with your sword to walk the plank into quiet oblivion...

Ready, Aim, ...no blindfold necessary and I reject the last cigarette, bad for my health, you see...

Get ready to throw that switch to fry my brains and wipe out all my memories....

Why is the hangman hooded, who is the bad guy here.....

Strap me down, slip the needle in, it's time for dreamless sleep anyway...

Do I hear the crushing of acid crystals in this small chamber...is that fog..<gasp>, my throat, <gasp>, <gasp>, I can't talk, <gasp>, <gasp>, <gasp>...no more, no more, <gasp>, Au Revoir.....

Regards,

John Barry Smith
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From: <communications@tsb.gc.ca>

Date: August 20, 2006 2:39:26 PM PDT

To: <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Subject: Transportation Safety Board Auto-responder.

Dear John Barry Smith,

Thank you for your interest in Transportation Safety Board.

Your comments are important to us and we will address them as quickly as possible.

We have lots of information already available on-line which may be exactly what you need. Our e-mail service is now available. The subscription page lets you choose the documents for which you would like to receive a notification. When a type of document you have requested is posted on our Web site, an e-mail that includes a short summary and a link to the document on our Web site will be sent to you. Please use the following link to subscribe to our e-mail service (<http://listserv.tsb.gc.ca/en/subscribe/>).

We invite you to start by reading:

About the TSB (<http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/common/about.asp>);

FAQ (<http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/common/faq.asp>) where many of your questions may already have been addressed;

The Site Map (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/common/site_map.asp);
and

Search (<http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/search/query.asp>) pages are valuable tools to find specific information.

If you wish to contact a TSB employee, please use the GEDS Employee Directory at <http://direct.srv.gc.ca/cgi-bin/direct500/BE>.

Please note that personal information collected by TSB is protected.

Thank you for taking the time to provide us with your comments.

Communications Group
Transportation Safety Board
E-mail: communications@tsb.gc.ca
<http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/common/offices.asp>

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Date: August 20, 2006 3:22:49 PM PDT

To: mintc@tc.gc.ca

**Subject: Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 1,
Grievous Error of Fact Detected**

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Friday, July 28, 2006

Well, we make do with what is given us. I was granted leave by the Commissioner to file materials I believe will be useful to the Commission.

"Disposition: Mr. Smith is denied standing. However, leave to file materials that he believes will be useful to the Commissioner is granted."

In that regard I wish at this time to file the material below to the Commission as 'Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected'.

Regards,
John Barry Smith
Useful Material Creator

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182
Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner
Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary
Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel
Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel
Ken Dickerson, Public Affairs

Dear Commissioner Major, Friday, July 28, 2006

Thank you for granting me leave to file materials I believe will be useful to the Commission. The following material is herewith submitted as 'Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected':

The decision to grant intervenor status to B'nai Brith by you is applauded. It appears you have taken the Prime Minister at his word when he stated he wished the Commissioner to conduct a thorough investigation into the events surrounding this tragedy which is about analyzing the evidence since 1985 and applying it to today. It's a broad mandate which can certainly include an organization such as B'nai Brith, Canada, which is the independent voice of the Jewish community, representing its interests nationwide to government, NGO's and the wider Canadian public.

"B'nai Brith Canada Request by B'nai Brith Canada:
B'nai Brith Canada sought standing, either as a party or as an intervenor, with respect to the mandate of the Inquiry.
Disposition: Intervenor status is granted..."

"John Barry Smith Request by John Barry Smith:
Mr. Smith sought standing to make submissions on issues of aviation safety as well as on his assessment of the facts as they relate to the cause of the explosion that resulted in the Air India Flight 182 tragedy.
Disposition: Mr. Smith is denied standing. However, leave to file materials that he believes will be useful to the Commissioner is granted."

One might ask why an organization: That had no members on Air India Flight 182, was not investigated, not involved with the bombing, did not advocate the creation of the Commission and is

otherwise not expert in airplane crashes, was granted the privileged status of intervenor while a person (me) who actually was personally investigated by the RCMP, who was a military bombardier and knows about bombings, is extremely familiar about Air India Flight 182 and the type of aircraft it was, who has actually been in a sudden fatal fiery jet airplane crash, and who has met the family members of that fatality, was denied person of standing status in an inquiry into an investigation of a sudden fatal fiery jet airplane crash.

Possibly your inquiry could be called the Inquiry into the Emotions of Feelings of Persecution in Family Members of the Victims of Religious Discrimination and for Others Who Have Felt the Same Way.

We make do with what is given us, and in that regard your spoken words to me come back during that abbreviated oral submission period on 19 July 2006: "... what I can do is permit you to file any written material that substantiates your view and it will be part of the Air India record. It will be there for examination by people who look at this Inquiry in future years,..."

Future years...in aviation safety, Commissioner, we don't have future years and often, not even future minutes. But...I make do with what is granted and that is leave to file any written material that substantiates my view to the Commission and thus become part of the Air India record.

I am doing so at this time, thank you for that consolation, Commissioner. Your verbal statement to me implies no member of the Commission will look at this material, only those people from the future. I hope they can read other than French or

Punjabi because this is written in, well, like, uh, you know, Californian-American-English...dude.

My first point is to repeat my observation made to the Commission in writing and in person several weeks ago that a grievous error of fact persists every day in the Commission's Opening Statement on the official website: June 21, 2006, Background:

"Yet, it was not until the following January that the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb."

Not so. Absolutely incorrect. Terribly misleading. That error leads to a hysterical rant such as the next statement by the Commission: "This massive murder was the most insidious episode of cowardice and inhumanity in our history at the time,..."

The Canadian Aviation Safety Board made no such bombing conclusion.

Aviation Occurrence Report of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board for Air India Flight 182 of January 22, 1986

"4.0 CONCLUSIONS

The Canadian Aviation Safety Board respectfully submits as follows:

4.1 Cause-Related Findings

1. At 0714 GMT, 23 June 1985, and without warning, Air India Flight 182 was subjected to a sudden event at an altitude of 31,000 feet resulting in its crash into the sea and the death of all on board.
5. There is considerable circumstantial and other evidence to

indicate that the initial event was an explosion occurring in the forward cargo compartment. This evidence is not conclusive. However, the evidence does not support any other conclusion."

When an error as serious as the false statement about the Canadian accident experts calling the explosion a bomb is allowed to persist, the erroneous deductions are compounded over time. The Prime Minister even repeated the error to Parliament. There are several reasons with precedent for an explosion in the forward cargo compartment of a Boeing 747 with a bomb being a very unlikely cause and a mechanically caused explosive decompression very likely. To continue to misquote the Canadian Safety Board and call their conclusion a bombing is bewilderingly deceptive.

When the false statement (of bombing conclusion) is repeated while knowing that statement to be false, as the Commission has known for several weeks, that act is called perjury when under oath. I recommend, to uphold the highest integrity of the Commission, that the grievous error of fact be corrected as soon as possible and hopefully not years.

This completes "Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected" of material that substantiates my view that Air India Flight 182 was caused by the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation.

"Smith Submission 2 to follow: "Bombs Everywhere," (or Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage, go boom, boom, boom: The Official Versions)".

Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
safety@ntsb.org

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: August 20, 2006 3:23:10 PM PDT
To: mintc@tc.gc.ca
Subject: Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years:

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182
Ken Dickerson
Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Thursday, August 17, 2006

Below is Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years:
Predicting the Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday,
August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28
July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why,
and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb,
in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please
ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type
of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8,

2006

Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/ ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/ inflight breakup explanation. (Please consider a plausible, reasonable, electrical cause with precedent) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006.

Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The Layperson version. (It's not rocket science) Filed Friday, August 11, 2006

Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years: Predicting the Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

At the request of the Guptas, I have ceased sending them my submissions.

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182
Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner
Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary
Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel
Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publique

Dear Commissioner Major, Thursday, August 17, 2006

You to me: "You have an alternate theory. The alternate theory may over time prove to be correct. I don't know. What I do know is that we cannot consider it as part of the evidence in this Inquiry but what I can do is permit you to file any written material that substantiates your view and it will be part of the Air India record. It will be there for examination by people who look at this Inquiry in future years,..."

Dear Person of the People in Future Years,

I figure you are probably a high school student here from some detention hall assignment doing a make work essay in early 21st century history. I was told a hundred years ago you might be examining my filed written material that substantiates my alternate theory for an airplane crash.

Well, where to start, my wayward student? What's it like in 2106 anyway? Still Scuba diving down to the tops of skyscrapers? Crowded on the high ground? Can you live on the wages of a solar mirror cleaner? I can only guess, but something tells me that travel between any two points more than a hundred miles apart will not require passports, ID papers, and strip searches as we had in 2006. Things will be better in 2106 and it's all because of a few brave men in high office.

What was it like in 2006 you ask? (Because you have to or you ain't leaving study hall?) It all started when a big airliner with

329 on board, called Air India Flight 182, blew up over the ocean and terrorists were blamed for putting a bomb on board. Exactly at what airport the bomb was loaded, where it was located in the plane, and how many bombs were facts in dispute by the various investigating agencies and everyone (except me) believed it was a bomb by terrorists and urgent, drastic actions needed to be taken to prevent another tragedy.

Of course real terrorists noticed all the tears, wailing, press coverage, expenses, disruptions, and political reaction and thought, "Hmmm...airplanes crashing really upsets our enemy." And then another large airliner blew up in the air and terrorists were again blamed (wrongly, from my research) and more tears, hair pulling, and rants against foreigners. Trials and punishments occurred. This time the terrorists knew they were really onto something, a way to really disrupt and hurt the industrial society they blamed for corrupting their own culture.

Now the terrorists knew they did not bomb those big 747s out of the air but figured their brothers in arms had done it. Everybody (except me) 'knew' they were bombed and tried very hard to find the bombers. The suspects and the convicted all turned out, naturally, to be non English speaking, dark skinned, foreign looking men with funny hats.

Real terrorists plotted on causing airplanes to crash, since the effect was so great for such little effort and risk. And on September 11, 2001, they struck with not one, but four crashes. All the security measures from 1985 on including X ray machines, strip searches, dogs, private security staff, random baggage searches, profiles were to no avail and all four planes crashed and the world was never the same.

Travel became hell. All the passengers were disarmed before boarding. All water or other beverages were removed before flight. Delays, aborted flights, cancelled trips, scares, and evacuations were commonplace.

But you are not living in that fearful, suspicious, inconvenient world of 2006 are you, lucky student, a former world of the hysterical reaction to mass grief of 1985, 1988, and 1996 events which turned to anger, to hate, and to revenge against somebody, anybody. What changed the course of history? It was the judgments of a few brave men.

How did you come to this material on file to be examined by people in the future? Let me guess. You put "History 100 years ago" into a search engine which had indexed thirty trillion words in billions of websites. All the links you clicked on were "Server Busy" or "Error Page 404" except this material which was probably on an archived website deep in the Canadian Government basement of obsolete formatted filed material submitted for an Commission of Inquiry. And yet this filed material for people in future years has remained clear and available, why is that? It's because it is important.

Ah, 2006...there were two distinct types of people back then:

1. The Pie in the Skyers.
2. The Down to Earthers.

I was a Down to Earther or scientists as we called them. We looked at things we called reality such as twisted metal, broken parts, and recorded sounds. We detected patterns from which we made reasoned, logical conclusions. We conducted experiments to reconstruct the events for confirmation and invited others to replicate our experiments for objective observations to determine

validity. Whether the conclusions or the implications of those conclusions gave us pleasure or pain was not our concern, only the explanation of reality. We wanted to know an accurate reality so we could plan ahead or to fix mistakes in the past. In my case it was to prevent other people dying in plane crashes since I had survived one myself and a plane crash is not a good thing even if you can walk away injured.

Then there were the Pie in the Skyers, or as I called them, The Bombs in the Skyers. They had different criteria for determining reality. Their main rules for validity of an idea were:

1. If it makes me feel good, it's right.
2. If it's right, it's true.
3. If someone tells me true things, he/she shall be rewarded with money and attention.
4. If it makes me feel bad, it's wrong.
5. If it's wrong, it's false.
6. If someone tells me a false thing, they are lying.
7. If someone lies to me, they shall be punished by rejection and scorn.

Emotion ruled the day! And Air India Flight 182 was the crash in 1985 that started it all.

The Bombs in the Sky guys loved the excitement of conspiracy stories with a Mr. X here and there, foreign countries, lots of airports, mistresses, lots of money changing hands, and political intrigue everywhere. How could the bomb stories not be correct? They made everybody happy: The manufacturer (it's not my fault) blamed the airport for letting the bombs get through. The airport (it's not my fault) blamed the terrorists. The airline (it's not my fault) blamed the bombers. The Government regulatory agency and safety boards (it's not my fault) blamed the crazy

foreign religions. The family members (it's not my fault) blamed the evil in men's hearts. The newspapers and TV station (it's not my fault) sold the exciting story over and over again, adding bits and pieces here and there when necessary to keep the conflicting stories fresh.

The general belief of the public was, "Well, it's evil human nature, flying is still safer than driving, they are doing all they can (and it's not the officials' fault) to stop the bombers from doing it again, it's OK to fly, keep on buying tickets, put your seatback in an upright position, and enjoy your flight."

Everyone was acting in their own perceived best interest and that was, 'It's not my fault, it's his fault, over there, put him in jail'. There were no conspiracies by the major parties involved to keep the real explanation for the crash secret, they just preferred, along with everyone else, the conspiracy explanation of the bombs in the sky since it made them feel good.

The Pie in the Skyers were in the majority since being absolved of blame and responsibility of multiple tragedies made them feel good, which means it's right, which means it's true. Everyone from the TV, radio, newspaper, magazines, books, government officials, who repeated the true, right, good feeling stories were rewarded with promotions, pay raises, and desirable assignments.

And the reality of travel became more and more unpleasant. More time was spent in the car to the airport than in the airplane and more time was spent on the airplane on the ground taxiing or waiting for a gate than was spent in the air in the airplane.

But everyone knew it wasn't their fault and that made them feel good so it was true.

Except for those pesky Down to Earthers.

This Down to Earther looked at the actual evidence of the airplane crash such as twisted metal, loud recordings, wreckage debris pattern, inflight damage, history of previous or subsequent similar events and concluded that the cause of those bombed planes was not bombs but a mechanical systems fault such that the electrical system had failed, specifically the wiring had frayed and shorted on a motor that was supposed to stay off in flight.

Research showed bombs caused a tiny percentage of plane crashes. Bombs are a small part of a small subset of causes called 'Sabotage". Pilot error and mechanical failures cause about 90% of plane crashes with mechanical contributing about 40%. Wiring failures caused literally hundreds of fires, many failed instruments, and a few cargo doors to open in flight.

The scientists called government aviation accident investigators who actually knew why planes crashed did not conclude it was a bomb, just an explosion and another aviation accident investigator said the cause was an explosion that was not a bomb. They were just doing their job as objective, detached, logical, non emotional, investigators.

But...the news that the plane crashes were caused by faulty wiring and not bombs did not make everyone feel good. The non bomb/bad wiring explanation meant that everyone was responsible in some small or large way and that realization made them feel very, very bad. Because they felt bad, they knew the mechanical wiring explanation was wrong. Because it was wrong, it was false. And anybody who told them falsehoods was

lying to them. Therefore the liar must be punished by stifling, rejection, and scorn to make him stop giving the pain of a wrong explanation.

The larger issue was myth versus science; wishful thinking versus reality. The ignorant, fearful population turned to exciting stories that made them feel good by exposing and smiting enemies while glorifying themselves. The scientists were shunned, demoted, fired, or had funds cut off from their research. The politicians responded to the will of their citizens and told even more outrageous tales of heroism and sacrifice.

Wishful thinking ruled, reality lost. Myth won, science was trounced. Exciting stories were believed while boring details...well...bored.

The situation world wide was dangerous. Terrorists were everywhere. Relations among nations were on the cusp of a world war with all sides living myths and wanting to fight. Many politicians even declared World War III had begun. Tensions were very high as local outbreaks of war kept on popping up, threatening to spread wider.

The rule of law was under attack as the belief was that only sissies hired attorneys and played the game of cross examination of witnesses, confronting the accuser, and disclosure of evidence, when everyone knew that real men got their guns and started shooting and loaded up with bombs and started bombing. The court system was considered a game for shoplifting cases while the only system that worked included secret armies, paid mercenaries, widespread eavesdropping, and secret prisons.

Investigators became prosecutors and decided on guilt.

Prosecutors became judges and decided on punishment. Judges became politicians and decided what the people wanted to hear. Politicians became businessmen seeking profits. Businessmen became priests giving advice on how to live. Priests became military leaders defending their followers by shooting others. Military leaders became assassins with remotely controlled and armed drones. Everyone was doing the job of others while neglecting their own.

A new Dark Ages was appearing. Societies were splitting into smaller segregated groups based upon language, race, or religious criteria. Residential communities became gated fortresses. Suspicion, distrust, anger, fear, hate, and vendettas become normal attitudes.

But this Down to Earth scientist kept on telling his reasonable, plausible explanation for the initial plane crash that started it all in letters, websites, interviews and an appearance in front of a Commission of Inquiry into one of the plane crashes.

The crash of Air India Flight 182 was blamed on revenge seeking terrorist putting one or two bombs to blow up the plane in the aft or forward cargo compartment. But the stories did not sound right, there were important discrepancies in the multiple bomb explanations. Suspects were accused, and tried. Law enforcement agencies bickered as they chased ghosts around the world. And then entered one of the three brave enlightened men: Justice Ian Josephson. He evaluated the evidence and acquitted the two accused. He found they did not plant the bombs and he was right, they didn't do it, nobody did it.

Outrage was everywhere. The outraged citizens who had looked forward to revenge were upset and wanted punishment against

someone, anyone, even those in law enforcement.

And then entered the next of the three brave enlightened men: Prime Minister Stephen Harper. He created a Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182. He said "It is our duty as Canadians to do everything in our power to prevent a similar tragedy from ever happening again, A full public inquiry is required. This inquiry will be launched immediately and led by an outstanding Canadian, retired Supreme Court Justice John Major. He has agreed to serve as Commissioner for this inquiry and I have every confidence that he will conduct a thorough and compassionate investigation into the events surrounding this tragedy. This inquiry is about analyzing the evidence that has come to light since 1985 and applying it to the world we live in today."

Prime Minister Harper did indeed want a full public inquiry which would be thorough, compassionate, and analyze the evidence and events surrounding the tragedy.

And he got it.

Enter the third brave enlightened man, retired Supreme Court Justice John Major. He is the Commissioner who told me I would be examined by you in the future. Commissioner Major said to me personally, "... I can do is permit you to file any written material that substantiates your view and it will be part of the Air India record. It will be there for examination by people who look at this Inquiry in future years,..."

Commissioner Major also stated, "The nature of this Commission was to be very broad in the evidence that it heard, in order to put to rest the various theories, rumours and neglect that

have occurred since the explosion in 1985."

And it was.

Commissioner Major patiently listened to everyone as they gave their opinions about the investigation, the bombing, the aircraft, the victims, and the victims' families. He listened to representatives of various agencies explain why they did not get convictions of the accused terrorists, why information was lost, destroyed, or misplaced, turf battles, secret tapes, communication lapses, funding problems, and lack of cooperation among the many agencies tracking suspected terrorists. Fingers were pointed in every which direction. The Commissioner listened to various religious groups give their opinions and complaints about discrimination against them by terrorists.

And the curious Commissioner listened to this independent aircraft accident investigator who had an interesting explanation for the crash that was different from the conventional wisdom held by all the others. This civilian said the cause was not a bomb explosion; there were no bombers, no conspiracies, no crimes, and no criminals.

Well, my young chipmunk, that alternative explanation caused a stir and everyone involved wanted this civilian investigator to shut up, sit down, and go away.

But Commissioner Major held firm to his principals and those of the Prime Minister who both wanted a very broad full, public, and thorough inquiry. The Commissioner stated he wanted to 'put to rest various theories' for the accident and to do that, he had to listen to them, not reject them out of hand. He was pressured to keep the inquiry narrow, short, and focused on specific already

agreed upon conclusions.

But, he stayed true to his calling of justice through law, not emotion. So, he listened to this civilian investigator give his oral presentation with audio visual aids, textbooks, accident reports, diagrams, pictures, and schematics. The Commissioner then read the various text submissions of the civilian that documented in depth the evidence which led him to conclude the cause was not a bomb but the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation.

The Commissioner sought other modern expert opinion so he tasked the premier aviation accident investigation government team in Canada for their evaluation of the probable cause of the crash. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (Air) then evaluated the wiring/cargo door explanation and the evidence in 1989 of a similar accident, United Airlines Flight 811, and realized that the conspiracy stories of adulterous fraudulent terrorists were good stories but not grounded in fact, unlike the scientific explanation of the wiring/cargo door theory.

The TSB Air reported their findings to the Commissioner. He concluded that the earlier evaluation by the Canadian Safety Board was correct, that the police could not catch their culprits because there were no culprits, the prosecutors could not get a conviction because nobody did it, the judge who acquitted the accused followed the law and was vindicated, the family members rested easier knowing the details of the accident, and a clear danger to the flying public was removed when the faulty wiring was replaced and the design flaws in the cargo doors were fixed.

The anger, hate, and lust for revenge which had permeated

Canadian attitudes for decades was removed. The hysteria about air travel and bombs was reduced somewhat. More attention was properly paid for training of pilots, maintenance of the aircraft, and safe design. Air travel was safer and more relaxed. The quality of life for millions of Canadian citizens and others worldwide improved.

And that is why the CN building in Toronto is called the "Harper Tower" and the route from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean through the Arctic archipelago of Canada is called "The Harper Passage."

The way of thinking that allowed for full, public, and thorough inquiries from many parties became normal, while the old style of fixed, predetermined, politically satisfying inquiry findings was rejected.

And that's why that way of thinking is called, "The Major Doctrine." Whenever mysteries and important events that demand explanation arise, the first response by the public is always, "Use the Major Doctrine!"

And that's why this filed material has been made clear and available to you, a person of a people in the future, so that you may marvel at the excessive fears and suspicions of the past, overcome any new fears, rely on scientific and fair inquiry into important reality events, coexist peacefully with spiritual neighbors, and act on conclusions based on reality, not good stories.

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why,

and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)
Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb,
in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please
ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type
of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8,
2006

Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/
ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/
inflight breakup explanation. (Please consider a plausible,
reasonable, electrical cause with precedent) Filed Tuesday,
August 8, 2006.

Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The
Layperson version. (It's not rocket science) Filed Friday, August
11, 2006

Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The
DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August
15, 2006

Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years: Predicting the
Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
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1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrismith.com
safety@ntsb.org

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrismith.com>
Date: August 20, 2006 3:23:22 PM PDT

To: mintc@tc.gc.ca

Subject: Smith Submission 10: The Elephant and Emperor Kanishka

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Saturday, August 19, 2006

Below is Smith Submission 10: The Elephant and Emperor
Kanishka. (Easy to see, hard to talk about) Filed Saturday,
August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28
July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why,
and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

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Layperson version. (It's not rocket science) Filed Friday, August
11, 2006

Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The
DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August

15, 2006

Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years: Predicting the Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non Cooperation. (Sorry, no can do.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 9: The Crash and Meeting the Family. (It happens so fast) Filed Friday, August 18, 2006

Smith Submission 10: The Elephant and Emperor Kanishka. (Easy to see, hard to talk about) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner
Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publique

Dear Commissioner Major, Saturday,

August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 10: The Elephant and Emperor Kanishka.

(Easy to see, hard to talk about) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

Elephant in the room: Illustrates a large issue with influence over a discussion that is not mentioned by the participants. The expression "elephant in the room" refers to a situation where something major is going on, it's on everyone's mind and impossible to ignore -- like an elephant in the room. But nobody talks about the "elephant" because nobody knows what to do about it.

Well, the elephant in the rotunda of the Commission hearing will be "No Bomb!"

During the commission hearings, there will be many speakers presenting their views. Many will know there is an elephant in the room: There exists a reasonable, plausible, mechanical alternative explanation for Air India Flight 182 with a solid precedent, United Airlines Flight 811. None will bring up the subject unless asked.

Various officials and citizens from the below agencies are aware of the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182.

Transportation Safety Board Canada
Terry Burtch, Bill Tucker (ret)
Director General,
Investigation Operations

Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Air India Task Force
Bart Blachford Sgt.

John Schnieder
Rich Spruel

Securitas branch of TSB
John Garstang

Air India Victims Families Association (AIVFA)
Susheel Gupta and Bal Gupta.

Globe and Mail Reporter
Robert Matas

Attorney for the accused Mr. Malik
Dave Crossin QC

Attorney for the accused Mr. Reyat
Ian Donaldson QC

The accused and acquitted:
Mr. Malik

A similar theme of the ignored elephant is "The emperor's new clothes." The emperor is naked but nobody wants to be the first to say so for fear of appearing different or stupid.

My revised version states Emperor Kanishka is not carrying a bomb under his clothes but his shoelaces are untied with the shoelaces representing the frayed wiring which represents a very real danger of tripping and falling while the imaginary bomb is not a threat. (Emperor Kanishka is the Air India name for Air India Flight 182.)

Emperor Kanishka's New Bomb

by Hans Christian Anderson and John Barry Smith

Once upon a time there lived a vain Emperor Kanishka whose only worry in life was to dress in elegant clothes and play with explosives which he carried around on him. He changed clothes and fired off explosives almost every hour and loved to show them off to his people.

Word of the Emperor's strange habits spread over his kingdom and beyond. Two scoundrels who had heard of the Emperor's vanity decided to take advantage of it. They introduced themselves at the gates of the palace with a scheme in mind.

"We are two very good bomb makers and after many years of research we have invented an extraordinary method to create a bomb so light and powerful that it is beautiful and very loud. As a matter of fact it is invisible and soundless to anyone who is too stupid and incompetent to appreciate its quality. The wise and intelligent will see it and hear it when it goes off."

The chief of the guards heard the bombmakers' strange story and sent for the court chamberlain. The chamberlain notified the prime minister, who ran to the Emperor and disclosed the incredible news. Emperor Kanishka's curiosity got the better of him and he decided to see the two bombmakers.

"Besides being very loud, your Highness, this bomb will be woven in colors and patterns created especially for you." The emperor gave the two men a bag of gold coins in exchange for their promise to begin working on the bomb immediately.

"Just tell us what you need to get started and we'll give it to you." The two terrorists asked for a loom, silk, gold thread and

then pretended to begin working. Emperor Kanishka thought he had spent his money quite well: in addition to getting a new extraordinary bomb, he would discover which of his subjects were ignorant and incompetent who could not see or hear it. A few days later, he called the old and wise prime minister, who was considered by everyone as a man with common sense.

"Go and see how the work is proceeding," Emperor Kanishka told him, "and come back to let me know."

The prime minister was welcomed by the two terrorists.

"We're almost finished, but we need a lot more gold thread. Here, Excellency! Admire the colors, feel the softness!" The old man bent over the loom and tried to see the bomb that was not there. He felt cold sweat on his forehead.

"I can't see anything," he thought. "If I see nothing, that means I'm stupid! Or, worse, incompetent!" If the prime minister admitted that he didn't see anything, he would be discharged from his office.

"What a marvelous bomb, he said then. "I'll certainly tell the Emperor." The two terrorists rubbed their hands gleefully. They had almost made it. More gold thread was requested to finish the work.

Finally, the Emperor received the announcement that the two bombmakers had come to show off the new big bomb.

"Come in," the Emperor ordered. Even as they bowed, the two terrorists pretended to be holding the large bomb.

"Here it is your Highness, the result of our labour," the terrorists said. "We have worked night and day but, at last, the most powerful bomb in the world is ready for you. Look at the colors and feel how fine it is." Of course the Emperor did not see any colors and could not feel any bomb between his fingers. He panicked and felt like fainting. But luckily the throne was right behind him and he sat down. But when he realized that no one could know that he did not see the bomb, he felt better. Nobody could find out he was stupid and incompetent.

The farce continued as the two terrorists had foreseen it. Once they had taken the measurements, the two began cutting the air with screwdrivers while sewing with their needles an invisible bomb under the the emperor's clothes.

"Your Highness, you'll have to put this sweater over this big bomb." The two terrorists gave the new bomb to him to hold under his sweater and then held up a mirror. Emperor Kanishka was embarrassed to see no bulge but since none of his bystanders were embarrassed, he felt relieved.

"Yes, this is a beautiful bomb and it looks very good on me," Emperor Kanishka said trying to look comfortable. "You've done a fine job."

"Your Majesty," the prime minister said, "we have a request for you. The people have found out about this extraordinary bomb and they are anxious to see you explode it." The Emperor was doubtful showing himself holding no bomb to the people, but then he abandoned his fears. After all, no one would know about it except the ignorant and the incompetent.

"All right," he said. "I will grant the people this privilege." He

summoned his carriage and the ceremonial parade was formed. A group of dignitaries walked at the very front of the procession and anxiously scrutinized the faces of the people in the street. All the people had gathered in the main square, pushing and shoving to get a better look. Applause welcomed the regal procession.

Emperor Kanishka stood at the edge of the bomb explosion pit, reached under his sweater and threw out the invisible and weightless bomb. The Emperor yelled, "Boom!" and everyone jumped back by the force of the word.

Everyone wanted to know how stupid or incompetent his or her neighbor was and, as Emperor Kanishka walked back from the bomb pit, a strange murmur rose from the crowd.

Everyone said, loud enough for the others to hear: "Look at the Emperor's new bomb explode. It was so powerful!"

"What a marvellous fuse, too!"

"And the colors! The colors of that beautiful bomb! I have never seen anything like it in my life!" They all tried to conceal their disappointment at not being able to see or hear the bomb, and since nobody was willing to admit his own stupidity and incompetence, they all behaved as the two terrorists had predicted.

However, an independent aviation accident investigator with thousands of hours of flight time and knew a lot about bombs, who had no official job. and could only see things as his eyes showed them and heard sounds as his ears heard them, went up to the carriage.

"My tape recorder recorded no sounds from the bomb, only the sound of Emperor's Kanishka's voice saying 'boom'. And I don't see any bomb. Emperor Kanishka, you have no bomb, and your shoelaces are untied, which is dangerous," the scientist investigator pilot said.

"Fool!" the court chamberlain reprimanded, running after him. "Don't talk nonsense!" He told the investigator to sit down. But the investigator's remark, which had been heard by the bystanders, was repeated over and over again until the kingdom's investigators cried:

"The scientist is right! Emperor Kanishka has no bomb and his shoelaces are untied! It's true!"

Emperor Kanishka realized that the people were right but could not admit to that. He thought it better to continue the procession under the illusion that anyone who couldn't see or hear his bomb was either stupid or incompetent.

Regards,

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ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/
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reasonable, electrical cause with precedent) Filed Tuesday,
August 8, 2006.

Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The
Layperson version. (It's not rocket science) Filed Friday, August
11, 2006

Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The
DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August
15, 2006

Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years: Predicting the
Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non
Cooperation. (Sorry, no can do.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

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happens so fast) Filed Friday, August 18, 2006

Smith Submission 10: The Elephant and Emperor Kanishka.
(Easy to see, hard to talk about) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

The Original Version
The Emperor's New Suit
by
Hans Christian Andersen
(1837)

MANY, many years ago lived an emperor, who thought so much of new clothes that he spent all his money in order to obtain them; his only ambition was to be always well dressed. He did not care for his soldiers, and the theatre did not amuse him; the only thing, in fact, he thought anything of was to drive out and show a new suit of clothes. He had a coat for every hour of the day; and as one would say of a king "He is in his cabinet," so one could say of him, "The emperor is in his dressing-room."

The great city where he resided was very gay; every day many strangers from all parts of the globe arrived. One day two swindlers came to this city; they made people believe that they were weavers, and declared they could manufacture the finest cloth to be imagined. Their colours and patterns, they said, were not only exceptionally beautiful, but the clothes made of their material possessed the wonderful quality of being invisible to any man who was unfit for his office or unpardonably stupid.

"That must be wonderful cloth," thought the emperor. "If I were to be dressed in a suit made of this cloth I should be able to find out which men in my empire were unfit for their places, and I could distinguish the clever from the stupid. I must have this cloth woven for me without delay." And he gave a large sum of money to the swindlers, in advance, that they should set to work without any loss of time. They set up two looms, and pretended to be very hard at work, but they did nothing whatever on the looms. They asked for the finest silk and the most precious gold-cloth; all they got they did away with, and worked at the empty looms till late at night.

"I should very much like to know how they are getting on with the cloth," thought the emperor. But he felt rather uneasy when he remembered that he who was not fit for his office could not

see it. Personally, he was of opinion that he had nothing to fear, yet he thought it advisable to send somebody else first to see how matters stood. Everybody in the town knew what a remarkable quality the stuff possessed, and all were anxious to see how bad or stupid their neighbours were.

ÒI shall send my honest old minister to the weavers,Ó thought the emperor. ÒHe can judge best how the stuff looks, for he is intelligent, and nobody understands his office better than he.Ó

The good old minister went into the room where the swindlers sat before the empty looms. ÒHeaven preserve us!Ó he thought, and opened his eyes wide, ÒI cannot see anything at all,Ó but he did not say so. Both swindlers requested him to come near, and asked him if he did not admire the exquisite pattern and the beautiful colours, pointing to the empty looms. The poor old minister tried his very best, but he could see nothing, for there was nothing to be seen. ÒOh dear,Ó he thought, Òcan I be so stupid? I should never have thought so, and nobody must know it! Is it possible that I am not fit for my office? No, no, I cannot say that I was unable to see the cloth.Ó

ÒNow, have you got nothing to say?Ó said one of the swindlers, while he pretended to be busily weaving.

ÒOh, it is very pretty, exceedingly beautiful,Ó replied the old minister looking through his glasses. ÒWhat a beautiful pattern, what brilliant colours! I shall tell the emperor that I like the cloth very much.Ó

ÒWe are pleased to hear that,Ó said the two weavers, and described to him the colours and explained the curious pattern. The old minister listened attentively, that he might relate to the

emperor what they said; and so he did.

Now the swindlers asked for more money, silk and gold-cloth, which they required for weaving. They kept everything for themselves, and not a thread came near the loom, but they continued, as hitherto, to work at the empty looms.

Soon afterwards the emperor sent another honest courtier to the weavers to see how they were getting on, and if the cloth was nearly finished. Like the old minister, he looked and looked but could see nothing, as there was nothing to be seen.

“Is it not a beautiful piece of cloth?” asked the two swindlers, showing and explaining the magnificent pattern, which, however, did not exist.

“I am not stupid,” said the man. “It is therefore my good appointment for which I am not fit. It is very strange, but I must not let any one know it;” and he praised the cloth, which he did not see, and expressed his joy at the beautiful colours and the fine pattern. “It is very excellent,” he said to the emperor.

Everybody in the whole town talked about the precious cloth. At last the emperor wished to see it himself, while it was still on the loom. With a number of courtiers, including the two who had already been there, he went to the two clever swindlers, who now worked as hard as they could, but without using any thread.

“Is it not magnificent?” said the two old statesmen who had been there before. “Your Majesty must admire the colours and the pattern.” And then they pointed to the empty looms, for they imagined the others could see the cloth.

ÒWhat is this?Ó thought the emperor, ÒI do not see anything at all. That is terrible! Am I stupid? Am I unfit to be emperor? That would indeed be the most dreadful thing that could happen to me.Ó

ÒReally,Ó he said, turning to the weavers, Òyour cloth has our most gracious approval;Ó and nodding contentedly he looked at the empty loom, for he did not like to say that he saw nothing. All his attendants, who were with him, looked and looked, and although they could not see anything more than the others, they said, like the emperor, ÒIt is very beautiful.Ó And all advised him to wear the new magnificent clothes at a great procession which was soon to take place. ÒIt is magnificent, beautiful, excellent,Ó one heard them say; everybody seemed to be delighted, and the emperor appointed the two swindlers ÒImperial Court weavers.Ó

The whole night previous to the day on which the procession was to take place, the swindlers pretended to work, and burned more than sixteen candles. People should see that they were busy to finish the emperorÓs new suit. They pretended to take the cloth from the loom, and worked about in the air with big scissors, and sewed with needles without thread, and said at last: ÒThe emperorÓs new suit is ready now.Ó

The emperor and all his barons then came to the hall; the swindlers held their arms up as if they held something in their hands and said: ÒThese are the trousers!Ó ÒThis is the coat!Ó and ÒHere is the cloak!Ó and so on. ÒThey are all as light as a cobweb, and one must feel as if one had nothing at all upon the body; but that is just the beauty of them.Ó

ÒIndeed!Ó said all the courtiers; but they could not see anything,

for there was nothing to be seen.

“Does it please your Majesty now to graciously undress,” said the swindlers, “that we may assist your Majesty in putting on the new suit before the large looking-glass?”

The emperor undressed, and the swindlers pretended to put the new suit upon him, one piece after another; and the emperor looked at himself in the glass from every side.

“How well they look! How well they fit!” said all. “What a beautiful pattern! What fine colours! That is a magnificent suit of clothes!”

The master of the ceremonies announced that the bearers of the canopy, which was to be carried in the procession, were ready.

“I am ready,” said the emperor. “Does not my suit fit me marvellously?” Then he turned once more to the looking-glass, that people should think he admired his garments.

The chamberlains, who were to carry the train, stretched their hands to the ground as if they lifted up a train, and pretended to hold something in their hands; they did not like people to know that they could not see anything.

The emperor marched in the procession under the beautiful canopy, and all who saw him in the street and out of the windows exclaimed: “Indeed, the emperor’s new suit is incomparable! What a long train he has! How well it fits him!” Nobody wished to let others know he saw nothing, for then he would have been unfit for his office or too stupid. Never emperor’s clothes were more admired.

ÒBut he has nothing on at all,Ó said a little child at last. ÒGood heavens! listen to the voice of an innocent child,Ó said the father, and one whispered to the other what the child had said. ÒBut he has nothing on at all,Ó cried at last the whole people. That made a deep impression upon the emperor, for it seemed to him that they were right; but he thought to himself, ÒNow I must bear up to the end.Ó And the chamberlains walked with still greater dignity, as if they carried the train which did not exist.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrismith.com>
Date: August 20, 2006 3:23:29 PM PDT
To: mintc@tc.gc.ca
Subject: Smith Submission 12. Last Gasp: Clutching at a Straw.

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182
Ken Dickerson
Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 12. Last Gasp: Grasping at a Straw. Filed

I have also sent copies of each submission to Mr. Brucker since he was so concerned about who is granted standing and all of the below are a result of my being denied standing.

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

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Smith Submission 9: The Crash and Meeting the Family. (It happens so fast) Filed Friday, August 18, 2006

Smith Submission 10: The Elephant and Emperor Kanishka. (Easy to see, hard to talk about) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 11: Reconsideration of your denial of standing: Try Try Again. (Never give up) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 12. Last Gasp: Grasping at a Straw. (Throw me a bone here, I'm dying) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

I will be sending relevant material to be filed that does not require the attention of the Commissioner but is necessary for a complete file. The items will be relevant accident reports from

government safety boards and communications with safety officials. I hope my request is approved to post all the non classified written material submitted by the public during the public inquiry (including my submissions) on the Commission website, <http://www.majorcomm.ca/en/index.asp> The public area could be called the Public Docket.

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner
Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publique

Dear Commissioner Major, Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 12. Last Gasp: Grasping at a Straw. (Throw
me a bone here, I'm dying) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

A cliché for every occasion: Grasping at straws 1. Having little
or no options left. 2. Desperate.

It's hard being fair, if it were easy, everyone would be doing it.

Instead, we have judges who are trained to be detached, objective, non emotional, rational, and fair.

It's easy to be biased, emotional, and unfair, it's why most people are. The narrow and closed minded are unwilling to consider alternatives that might alter their rigid internal belief structure. It's hard to change.

It's hard to defend someone when there is a lynch mob outside the jail screaming for revenge. Lesser principled officials give in to the popular will.

Justice Josephson upheld his professional principles and came to the correct conclusions when he acquitted the two accused all the while knowing what the popular will was.

After sixteen years of research on early model Boeing 747s that disintegrate in flight I have found that my wiring/cargo door explanation is met with these responses in sequence:

1. No.
2. You are wrong.
3. You are crazy.
4. Go away.
5. I'm ignoring you.
6. Attack.
7. Ask a real question to check it out.
8. Take action on new knowledge acquired.

Interestingly enough, the same sequence was followed by the family members of Air India Flight 182 and others upon hearing the verdict of Justice Josephson.

First they said to themselves, no, it can't be. Then, they said he was wrong. Then they said he must be nuts to acquit them. Then they want his career to end by claiming he is incompetent in his conclusions. Now they ignore him. And at last the family members want the Commission to punish those they believe betrayed them: Justice Josephson, the RCMP, the CSIS, and anybody else involved, even extending to an independent accident investigator. Public opinion will not get to stage seven and ask real questions about the crash.

The officials and family members apparently want the Commissioner to ask questions as long as they are hatchet questions to cast blame at inefficient and incompetent court and law enforcement systems. Then they want their revenge by a few demotions, firings, and forced early retirements of officials.

The basis for this sequence is fear. There is fear of change. All the parties have fear of change such that all their work of twenty years was in vain. There is a cliché for this: Barking up the wrong tree 1. Looking in the wrong place for the solution for a problem. 2. Thinking the answer is one thing when it is not. The hunter/prosecutors told the dogs/police to find the raccoon/terrorists and the dogs spent years and think they treed the raccoon but they didn't. The correct tree/mechanical cause is far away with only this puppy/investigator barking up it.

I find myself in an upside down world where I am begging an inquirer leading an inquiry to actually inquire, which is to say, ask questions of me.

It is an inside out world where I am supporting Canadian institutions such as the CASB, Justice Josephson, the RCMP, the CSIS while a government Commission is involved with

disputing their findings and looking to discredit their competence by accusing them of failure.

It is a backward world when I am the rational scientist with loads of data and corroborative facts who is stifled and regarded as looney while the government is full of conspiracies, suspicions, finger pointing, and stories that don't make sense when examined closely. I am the cooler head trying to prevail over hysterical elements of the government and media.

It is a strange world when I have to plead with the officials, who gain their authority through the power of doing what they say they are going to do, to actually do what they say they are going to do, that is, to hold a full, public, thorough, and broad inquiry to put to rest various theories.

It is a bewildering world when an official exclaims doubt by saying, "I don't know" and then rejects professional, specialized, Crown opinion that can allay his doubt and resolve serious contradictions in other reports.

It is a suspicious world when I point out an inflammatory and prejudicial written error stated by the Commission about a finding of bomb and the error remains uncorrected.

It is confusing to me that I have to plead with an official to be fair who has spent his entire long and distinguished career being just that.

It is weird to me to have to try to persuade someone to do what he was trained to do, swore to do, paid to do, was encouraged to do, was ordered to do, and I think, what he really wants to do: Be fair, solve a mystery, establish justice, and protect his fellow

citizens.

I'm not asking for special treatment, nor an exemption or waiver, or mercy, or compensation. I'm asking for the rules to be followed, for the inquiry to inquire, and for promises to be kept.

I have not ignored contrary reports, I have considered both sides. I did not pick and choose reports, I included all. I acted as an investigator, not a prosecutor. From Table of Contents of my Smith AAR for Air India Flight 182 below (Commission Exhibit S-18):

2. Premise Explanations for Air India Flight 182

2.1 Explosion in flight in the forward cargo compartment

2.1.1 Proponents

2.1.2 Analysis

2.1.3 Conclusion

2.2 Explosion of a bomb in the aft cargo compartment

2.2.1 Proponent

2.2.2 Analysis

2.2.3 Conclusion

2.3 Explosion in the forward cargo compartment with its cause unstated

2.3.1 Proponent

2.3.2 Analysis

2.3.3 Conclusion

2.4 Explosion in the forward cargo compartment, inclusive of a bomb detonation

2.4.1 Proponent

2.4.2 Analysis

2.4.3 Conclusions

2.5 Explosion in the forward cargo compartment caused by explosive decompression of

undetermined cause, exclusive of a bomb detonation

2.5.1 Proponent

2.5.2 Analysis

2.5.3 Conclusions

2.6 Explosion in the forward cargo compartment caused by explosive decompression

caused by structural failure of ruptured open forward cargo door at one or both of the midspan

latches caused by faulty electrical wiring

2.6.1 Proponent

2.6.2 Analysis

2.6.3 Conclusion

My conscience is clear; I have done the best I could to persuade authority that Air India Flight 182 was not a rare bomb event for a more common failing of a part, specifically a forward cargo door rupturing open in flight probably caused by a faulty electrical switch or wiring.

For persuasion I have of course ruled out threats, passed on wheedling and cajoling, and instead concentrated on corroborated expert opinions, rational, logical, a presentation of facts, data, evidence modestly punctuated with brilliant sparks of wit.

I have also begged and pleaded. I shall again.

1. Please grant me standing to present my mechanical non conspiracy explanation to you in depth.
2. Please ask TSB Air to provide an aircraft accident report to you on the probable cause of Air India Flight 182.
3. Please correct the highly prejudicial error on Commission website that states the CASB concluded it was a bomb; they did not. ("Yet, it was not until the following January that the

Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb.")

4. Please post all the non classified written material submitted to you by the public during the public inquiry (including my submissions) on the Commission website, <http://www.majorcomm.ca/en/index.asp> The public area could be called the Public Docket.

Commissioner Major, in an interview you said your concern was whether an event such as Air India Flight 182 could happen again. Well, sir, the answer is yes because the frayed wiring in the cargo door unlatch system still exists in the about five hundred early model Boeing 747s still in service today worldwide.

Have you ever wondered at the over reaction to the threat of an airplane crash? Many more people die weekly in car crashes than ever die yearly in airplane accidents and yet billions are spent in airline safety and security and relatively very little in vehicular safety. The answer is in the primitive responses of the brain at birth and infancy called reflexes. We are not born with the reflex to react to the smell of skidding rubber tires, of the feeling of a broken bone, or even the pain of fire. All those fears are learned through experience.

We are born with the fears of suffocation, dehydration, loud sounds, and falling. All these fears are present when flying in airplanes and the psyche knows the dangers regardless of the movie that's playing, the number of pillows, or the quality of the meal.

Sucking Reflex: The sucking reflex is initiated when something touches the roof of an infants mouth. Infants have a strong

sucking reflex which helps to ensure they can latch onto a bottle or breast.

Startle Reflex: Infants will respond to sudden sounds or movements by throwing their arms and legs out, and throwing their heads back. Most infants will usually cry when startled and proceed to pull their limbs back into their bodies.

Breathing is the first reflex we have. As we get older we develop regulated breathing but we never lose our reflexive breathing. After the first breath comes the first cry.

Parachute Response: This is a protective response that protects an infant if he/she falls. Beginning at about 5-6 months, if an infant falls, he will extend his arms to try and 'catch' himself.

The thought of a loud bomb going off in an airplane which results in suffocating during a long fall while crying for help is a four fold horror nightmare at the basest levels of our personalities. Passengers will pay any amount of money and tolerate any restrictions on civil freedoms to reduce those four fears to manageable levels. Hysterical fear leading to panic is in the back of the mind of many passengers who have a fear of flying. (I have a rational worry of flying and it's based on the realities of the common hazards, bad weather, pilot error and mechanical fault.)

I will tell you a good story you may well remember forever about Air India Flight 182. This was told to me at the beginning of my research for AI 182 about ten years ago.

When the Boeing 747 called Air India Flight 182 disintegrated in flight at 31000 feet over the ocean, some passengers stayed in

their seats all the way down, some were probably sucked into engines, and some were blown free and floated down in a few minutes to the ocean surface. All the men, women, and children died.

There was one very pregnant woman who was blown free and as she was falling she delivered/ejected her baby. They both fell to the water. She died on impact but since the baby was lighter, the infant did not die, but floated for a bit on the water and then drowned. The baby died not from blunt trauma injuries but from salt water in the lungs.

Well, that image of a pregnant human female sensing imminent death and ejecting her baby from within herself as a last chance effort was very haunting to me. I recalled it perfectly.

As it turns out, about five years ago I had occasion to speak by telephone to Wing Commander Dr. I. R. Hill of the Accident Investigations Branch of the United Kingdom who contributed to the Air India Flight 182 reports. I asked Dr. Hill about the injuries to the passengers and any evidence of bomb damage. He replied, as he stated in the accident reports, that he found no explosion by bomb evidence on anyone. He did find explosive decompression injuries and impact damage.

I asked him about the pregnant woman/baby story. He replied that he did not find any evidence of that event occurring; there were no babies that drowned. His interview statements corroborated his written statements of years earlier. (A lot can be deduced from the below Medical Examiner's observations but that would be for a later time.)

From the CASB AOR:

"2.9 Medical Evidence There were 30 children recovered and they showed less overall injury. The average severity of injury increases from Zone C to E and is significantly less in C than in Zones D and E.

Flail pattern injuries were exhibited by eight bodies. Five of these were in Zone E, one in Zone D, two in Zone C and one crew member. The significance of flail injuries is that it indicates that the victims came out of the aircraft at altitude before it hit the water.

There were 26 bodies that showed signs of hypoxia (lack of oxygen), including 12 children, 9 in Zones C, 6 in Zone D and 11 in Zone E. There were 25 bodies showing signs of decompression, including 7 children. They were evenly distributed throughout the zones, but with a tendency to be seated at the sides, particularly the right side (12 bodies).

Twenty-three bodies showed evidence of receiving injuries from a vertical force. They tended to be older, seated to the rear of the aircraft (4 in Zone C, 5 in Zone D, 11 in Zone E, 2 crew and 1 unknown), and 16 had little or no clothing.

Twenty-one bodies were found with no clothing, including three children. They tended to be seated to the rear and to the right (3 in Zone C, 5 in Zone D, 11 in Zone E and 2 unknown).

There were 49 cases showing signs of impact-type injuries, including 19 children (15 in Zone C, 15 in Zone D, 15 in Zone E, 1 crew member and 3 unknown).

There is a general absence of signs indicating the wearing of lap belts.

Pathological examination failed to reveal any injuries indicative of a fire or explosion."

The point, Commissioner Major, is that myth like tales are told about Air India Flight 182 and upon examination are totally false. There was no drowned in salt water infant. So it is with the bombs in several places tales that are the official versions of Air India Flight 182. They are just not true although they are wonderful, emotion evoking, awe inspiring, mysterious, and satisfying in very primitive ways.

Frayed wiring shorting on a motor is not myth like. It's mundane. It does not hold interest. But it is usual, reasonable, plausible, and it has a precedent/antecedent with United Airlines Flight 811.

I know with more certainty than some life and death decisions I have made in the air regarding me and my crew that Air India Flight 182 was not caused by a bomb explosion in any compartment. I know there were no bombs, no bombers, no conspiracies, no crime, and no criminals. I do know for certain that the forward cargo door blew out at initial event time that caused the nose to come off leading to the inflight disintegration and the cause of that door rupture was probably an electrical switch or wiring based upon conclusions made regarding United Airlines Flight 811, TWA Flight 800, and Swiss Air 111.

I'm dead serious about airplane crashes, having survived a fatal one. Well, live and learn. When young and frustrated, we cry. When middle aged and outraged, we yell. And now, when old, at my age looking at foolishness, I laugh. Conspiracy nonsense is foolish.

I laugh at this fool who spent \$2500 and a week of travel to and from Ottawa for about twenty five seconds of original input to a Commission of Inquiry before being told my efforts were futile. That's a hundred dollars a second. I'm laughing.

John Major, this is Major John! I'm chuckling since I am a real Major John. I'm a retired US Army Major and my name is John Smith. I have written 'Major John' many hundreds of times as you, sir, have written 'John Major.' Completely irrelevant but, what the heck, clever play on words and it made this audience of one smile.

I have done my best and it's time to close up shop.

Please don't prod me with your sword to walk the plank into quiet oblivion...

Ready, Aim, ...no blindfold necessary and I reject the last cigarette, bad for my health, you see...

Get ready to throw that switch to fry my brains and wipe out all my memories....

Why is the hangman hooded, who is the bad guy here.....

Strap me down, slip the needle in, it's time for dreamless sleep anyway...

Do I hear the crushing of acid crystals in this small chamber...is that fog..<gasp>, my throat, <gasp>, <gasp>, I can't talk, <gasp>, <gasp>, <gasp>...no more, no more, <gasp>, Au Revoir.....

Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
safety@ntsb.org

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

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Smith Submission 11: Reconsideration of your denial of standing: Try Try Again. (Never give up) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006
Smith Submission 12. Last Gasp: Grasping at a Straw. (Throw me a bone here, I'm dying) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: August 20, 2006 3:28:20 PM PDT
To: mintc@tc.gc.ca
Subject: Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 and Transport Canada involvement Intro

The Honourable Lawrence Cannon
Minster of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities
Tower C - 330 Sparks St.
The Honourable Lawrence Cannon
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
K1A 0N5

Dear Mr. Cannon, Sunday, August 20, 2006

My name is John Barry Smith and I have a mechanical explanation for Air India Flight 182 which is supported by the evidence of a similar accident, United Airlines Flight 811. I contend the cause of both is the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation.

I applied for standing but was denied by the Commissioner for

the Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Air India Flight 182. I responded with an appeal and a suggestion to the Commissioner that he request from TSB an Aircraft Accident Report since one has never been done on the most famous airplane crash in Canadian history.

Well, wouldn't you know it, in 2006, the TSB has no email address, just phone, fax, and snail mail. (If you know of an email address for TSB, please tell me.)

Contact Us

Mailing address:

Transportation Safety Board of Canada

Head Office

200 Promenade du Portage

Place du Centre

4th Floor

Gatineau, Quebec K1A 1K8

Telephone: (819) 994-3741

Fax: (819) 997-2239

TDD: (819) 994-8030

"As an independent federal agency, the TSB is not associated with any of these organizations, although we do work in cooperation with them when conducting investigations and making safety recommendations."

"Transport Canada and the National Energy Board may investigate for any other purpose, such as regulatory infractions."

Well, I'll just have to mail a package to TSB mailing address. Transport Canada does have an email address (thank you) and is involved with the Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of

Air India Flight 182 as stated by the Attorney General representative, Mr. Barney Brucker, in his application for standing:

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE BOMBING OF AIR INDIA
FLIGHT 182
MOTION FOR STANDING BY THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

"The Involved Departments of the Government of Canada
3. Each item in the mandate of the Commission of Inquiry arches
over the
policy formation, governing legislation, protocols, current
activities and historical
record of several departments and agencies in the government of
Canada, some
of which are the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian
Security
Intelligence Service, Foreign Affairs Canada, Transport Canada,
the Canada
Revenue Agency, and the Department of Finance."

And in a personal appearance before the Commissioner on 18
July, 2006, Mr. Brucker again specifically included Transport
Canada:

MR. BRUCKER: Good morning. THE COMMISSIONER: I
think I can make your
job a little easier by saying that the government is
entitled to full standing. But what I would like is some
idea. The government is a large organization. What
departments as of today are you representing?

MR. BRUCKER: Well, as of today, I am representing all departments of the Government of Canada. I appreciate that many of those departments would not have material relevant to contribute to the Commission. Those that we have been dealing with so far together with Commission counsel include the RCMP, CSIS, DFAIT, the Canada Revenue Agency, Finance, FINTRAC; the Communications Security Establishment and there may have been Transport Canada. I think I have mentioned them all.

So, Transport Canada may investigate airplane crashes and is officially involved and included in the Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Air India Flight 182. In that regard, I am sending you material that I have researched regarding Air India Flight 182 and have presented to the Commission at the suggestion of the Commissioner:

1. "Disposition: Mr. Smith is denied standing. However, leave to file materials that he believes will be useful to the Commissioner is granted."
2. Commissioner Major at hearing to Smith: "...what I can do is permit you to file any written material that substantiates your view and it will be part of the Air India record."
3. Commissioner at hearing: "The best I can do is to repeat the offer I made and invite you to file in as much as detail as you choose whatever it is that supports your theory and it will be part of this record."
4. Commissioner: "You're free, Mr. Smith, as you probably know, to add to your filed material should you choose."

The filed material consists of 12 files, 1-12, which I will send separately to Transport Canada in one email each.

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Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

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Smith Submission 12. Last Gasp: Grasping at a Straw. (Throw me a bone here, I'm dying)

The Canadian Transportation Safety Board Air or Transport Canada has never given its official opinion in the probable cause of Air India Flight 182, the most famous airplane crash in Canadian history. Their specialized expert input is invaluable to the Commission. I have asked the Commissioner to ask TSB Air to provide to the Commission an updated supplement to the twenty year old CASB accident report on Air India Flight 182, a request justified by several subsequent similar accidents since 1985 to similar Boeing 747s and to resolve the explosion location conflict created by Justice Josephson and Justice Kirpal.

The wiring/cargo door explanation applauds Justice Josephson's finding of not guilty, it confirms the Canadian aviation accident investigators' conclusion, it exonerates the RCMP's failure to catch Snidely Whiplash, and justifies the expense and time of this Commission of Inquiry into events surrounding Air India Flight 182. It reinforces the confidence of the Canadian travelling public in the competence of Canadian government regulatory and safety institutions.

I have emailed the 12 files to the Commission of Inquiry, to Mr. Brucker of AG, to Minister Cannon of Transport Canada, and to the TSB (by mail) tomorrow.

There exists a clear hazard of faulty wiring in early model Boeing 747s which presents a current danger of causing another accident such as Air India Flight 182 and United Airlines Flight 811. Please read my submissions and investigate, preferably by aviation personnel, Air India Flight 182 was a plane crash, not a bank robbery, after all. I welcome questions of course.

Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
safety@ntsb.org

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: August 20, 2006 5:36:51 PM PDT
To: "Delorme, Paulette" <Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca>
Cc: "Burtch, Terry" <Terry.Burtch@tsb.gc.ca>
**Subject: Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 1,
Grievous Error of Fact Detected**

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Friday, July 28, 2006

Well, we make do with what is given us. I was granted leave by the Commissioner to file materials I believe will be useful to the Commission.

"Disposition: Mr. Smith is denied standing. However, leave to file materials that he believes will be useful to the Commissioner is granted."

In that regard I wish at this time to file the material below to the Commission as 'Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected'.

Regards,
John Barry Smith
Useful Material Creator

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner

Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson, Public Affairs

Dear Commissioner Major, Friday, July 28, 2006

Thank you for granting me leave to file materials I believe will be useful to the Commission. The following material is herewith submitted as 'Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected':

The decision to grant intervenor status to B'nai Brith by you is applauded. It appears you have taken the Prime Minister at his word when he stated he wished the Commissioner to conduct a thorough investigation into the events surrounding this tragedy which is about analyzing the evidence since 1985 and applying it to today. It's a broad mandate which can certainly include an organization such as B'nai Brith, Canada, which is the independent voice of the Jewish community, representing its interests nationwide to government, NGO's and the wider Canadian public.

"B'nai Brith Canada Request by B'nai Brith Canada:
B'nai Brith Canada sought standing, either as a party or as an intervenor, with respect to the mandate of the Inquiry.
Disposition: Intervenor status is granted..."

"John Barry Smith Request by John Barry Smith:

Mr. Smith sought standing to make submissions on issues of aviation safety as well as on his assessment of the facts as they relate to the cause of the explosion that resulted in the Air India Flight 182 tragedy.

Disposition: Mr. Smith is denied standing. However, leave to file materials that he believes will be useful to the Commissioner is granted."

One might ask why an organization: That had no members on Air India Flight 182, was not investigated, not involved with the bombing, did not advocate the creation of the Commission and is otherwise not expert in airplane crashes, was granted the privileged status of intervenor while a person (me) who actually was personally investigated by the RCMP, who was a military bombardier and knows about bombings, is extremely familiar about Air India Flight 182 and the type of aircraft it was, who has actually been in a sudden fatal fiery jet airplane crash, and who has met the family members of that fatality, was denied person of standing status in an inquiry into an investigation of a sudden fatal fiery jet airplane crash.

Possibly your inquiry could be called the Inquiry into the Emotions of Feelings of Persecution in Family Members of the Victims of Religious Discrimination and for Others Who Have Felt the Same Way.

We make do with what is given us, and in that regard your spoken words to me come back during that abbreviated oral submission period on 19 July 2006: "... what I can do is permit you to file any written material that substantiates your view and it will be part of the Air India record. It will be there for examination by people who look at this Inquiry in future

years,..."

Future years...in aviation safety, Commissioner, we don't have future years and often, not even future minutes. But...I make do with what is granted and that is leave to file any written material that substantiates my view to the Commission and thus become part of the Air India record.

I am doing so at this time, thank you for that consolation, Commissioner. Your verbal statement to me implies no member of the Commission will look at this material, only those people from the future. I hope they can read other than French or Punjabi because this is written in, well, like, uh, you know, Californian-American-English...dude.

My first point is to repeat my observation made to the Commission in writing and in person several weeks ago that a grievous error of fact persists every day in the Commission's Opening Statement on the official website: June 21, 2006, Background:

"Yet, it was not until the following January that the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb."

Not so. Absolutely incorrect. Terribly misleading. That error leads to a hysterical rant such as the next statement by the Commission: "This massive murder was the most insidious episode of cowardice and inhumanity in our history at the time,..."

The Canadian Aviation Safety Board made no such bombing conclusion.

Aviation Occurrence Report of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board for Air India Flight 182 of January 22, 1986

"4.0 CONCLUSIONS

The Canadian Aviation Safety Board respectfully submits as follows:

4.1 Cause-Related Findings

1. At 0714 GMT, 23 June 1985, and without warning, Air India Flight 182 was subjected to a sudden event at an altitude of 31,000 feet resulting in its crash into the sea and the death of all on board.

5. There is considerable circumstantial and other evidence to indicate that the initial event was an explosion occurring in the forward cargo compartment. This evidence is not conclusive. However, the evidence does not support any other conclusion."

When an error as serious as the false statement about the Canadian accident experts calling the explosion a bomb is allowed to persist, the erroneous deductions are compounded over time. The Prime Minister even repeated the error to Parliament. There are several reasons with precedent for an explosion in the forward cargo compartment of a Boeing 747 with a bomb being a very unlikely cause and a mechanically caused explosive decompression very likely. To continue to misquote the Canadian Safety Board and call their conclusion a bombing is bewilderingly deceptive.

When the false statement (of bombing conclusion) is repeated while knowing that statement to be false, as the Commission has known for several weeks, that act is called perjury when under oath. I recommend, to uphold the highest integrity of the Commission, that the grievous error of fact be corrected as soon as possible and hopefully not years.

This completes "Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected" of material that substantiates my view that Air India Flight 182 was caused by the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation.

"Smith Submission 2 to follow: "Bombs Everywhere," (or Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage, go boom, boom, boom: The Official Versions)".

Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
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barry@johnbarrysmith.com
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From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: August 20, 2006 5:37:09 PM PDT
To: "Delorme, Paulette" <Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca>
Cc: "Burtch, Terry" <Terry.Burtch@tsb.gc.ca>
Subject: Smith Submission 10: The Elephant and Emperor Kanishka

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182
Ken Dickerson
Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Saturday, August 19, 2006

Below is Smith Submission 10: The Elephant and Emperor Kanishka. (Easy to see, hard to talk about) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

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Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner

Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publique

Dear Commissioner Major, Saturday,

August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 10: The Elephant and Emperor Kanishka.

(Easy to see, hard to talk about) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

Elephant in the room: Illustrates a large issue with influence over a discussion that is not mentioned by the participants. The expression "elephant in the room" refers to a situation where something major is going on, it's on everyone's mind and impossible to ignore -- like an elephant in the room. But nobody talks about the "elephant" because nobody knows what to do

about it.

Well, the elephant in the rotunda of the Commission hearing will be "No Bomb!"

During the commission hearings, there will be many speakers presenting their views. Many will know there is an elephant in the room: There exists a reasonable, plausible, mechanical alternative explanation for Air India Flight 182 with a solid precedent, United Airlines Flight 811. None will bring up the subject unless asked.

Various officials and citizens from the below agencies are aware of the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182.

Transportation Safety Board Canada
Terry Burtch, Bill Tucker (ret)
Director General,
Investigation Operations

Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Air India Task Force
Bart Blachford Sgt.
John Schnieder
Rich Spruel

Securitas branch of TSB
John Garstang

Air India Victims Families Association (AIVFA)
Susheel Gupta and Bal Gupta.

Globe and Mail Reporter
Robert Matas

Attorney for the accused Mr. Malik
Dave Crossin QC

Attorney for the accused Mr. Reyat
Ian Donaldson QC

The accused and acquitted:
Mr. Malik

A similar theme of the ignored elephant is "The emperor's new clothes." The emperor is naked but nobody wants to be the first to say so for fear of appearing different or stupid.

My revised version states Emperor Kanishka is not carrying a bomb under his clothes but his shoelaces are untied with the shoelaces representing the frayed wiring which represents a very real danger of tripping and falling while the imaginary bomb is not a threat. (Emperor Kanishka is the Air India name for Air India Flight 182.)

Emperor Kanishka's New Bomb
by Hans Christian Anderson and John Barry Smith

Once upon a time there lived a vain Emperor Kanishka whose only worry in life was to dress in elegant clothes and play with explosives which he carried around on him. He changed clothes and fired off explosives almost every hour and loved to show them off to his people.

Word of the Emperor's strange habits spread over his kingdom and beyond. Two scoundrels who had heard of the Emperor's vanity decided to take advantage of it. They introduced themselves at the gates of the palace with a scheme in mind.

"We are two very good bomb makers and after many years of research we have invented an extraordinary method to create a bomb so light and powerful that it is beautiful and very loud. As a matter of fact it is invisible and soundless to anyone who is too stupid and incompetent to appreciate its quality. The wise and intelligent will see it and hear it when it goes off."

The chief of the guards heard the bombmakers' strange story and sent for the court chamberlain. The chamberlain notified the prime minister, who ran to the Emperor and disclosed the incredible news. Emperor Kanishka's curiosity got the better of him and he decided to see the two bombmakers.

"Besides being very loud, your Highness, this bomb will be woven in colors and patterns created especially for you." The emperor gave the two men a bag of gold coins in exchange for their promise to begin working on the bomb immediately.

"Just tell us what you need to get started and we'll give it to you." The two terrorists asked for a loom, silk, gold thread and then pretended to begin working. Emperor Kanishka thought he had spent his money quite well: in addition to getting a new extraordinary bomb, he would discover which of his subjects were ignorant and incompetent who could not see or hear it. A few days later, he called the old and wise prime minister, who was considered by everyone as a man with common sense.

"Go and see how the work is proceeding," Emperor Kanishka

told him, "and come back to let me know."

The prime minister was welcomed by the two terrorists.

"We're almost finished, but we need a lot more gold thread. Here, Excellency! Admire the colors, feel the softness!" The old man bent over the loom and tried to see the bomb that was not there. He felt cold sweat on his forehead.

"I can't see anything," he thought. "If I see nothing, that means I'm stupid! Or, worse, incompetent!" If the prime minister admitted that he didn't see anything, he would be discharged from his office.

"What a marvelous bomb, he said then. "I'll certainly tell the Emperor." The two terrorists rubbed their hands gleefully. They had almost made it. More gold thread was requested to finish the work.

Finally, the Emperor received the announcement that the two bombmakers had come to show off the new big bomb.

"Come in," the Emperor ordered. Even as they bowed, the two terrorists pretended to be holding the large bomb.

"Here it is your Highness, the result of our labour," the terrorists said. "We have worked night and day but, at last, the most powerful bomb in the world is ready for you. Look at the colors and feel how fine it is." Of course the Emperor did not see any colors and could not feel any bomb between his fingers. He panicked and felt like fainting. But luckily the throne was right behind him and he sat down. But when he realized that no one could know that he did not see the bomb, he felt better. Nobody

could find out he was stupid and incompetent.

The farce continued as the two terrorists had foreseen it. Once they had taken the measurements, the two began cutting the air with screwdrivers while sewing with their needles an invisible bomb under the the emperor's clothes.

"Your Highness, you'll have to put this sweater over this big bomb." The two terrorists gave the new bomb to him to hold under his sweater and then held up a mirror. Emperor Kanishka was embarrassed to see no bulge but since none of his bystanders were embarrassed, he felt relieved.

"Yes, this is a beautiful bomb and it looks very good on me," Emperor Kanishka said trying to look comfortable. "You've done a fine job."

"Your Majesty," the prime minister said, "we have a request for you. The people have found out about this extraordinary bomb and they are anxious to see you explode it." The Emperor was doubtful showing himself holding no bomb to the people, but then he abandoned his fears. After all, no one would know about it except the ignorant and the incompetent.

"All right," he said. "I will grant the people this privilege." He summoned his carriage and the ceremonial parade was formed. A group of dignitaries walked at the very front of the procession and anxiously scrutinized the faces of the people in the street. All the people had gathered in the main square, pushing and shoving to get a better look. Applause welcomed the regal procession.

Emperor Kanishka stood at the edge of the bomb explosion pit, reached under his sweater and threw out the invisible and

weightless bomb. The Emperor yelled, "Boom!" and everyone jumped back by the force of the word.

Everyone wanted to know how stupid or incompetent his or her neighbor was and, as Emperor Kanishka walked back from the bomb pit, a strange murmur rose from the crowd.

Everyone said, loud enough for the others to hear: "Look at the Emperor's new bomb explode. It was so powerful!"

"What a marvellous fuse, too!"

"And the colors! The colors of that beautiful bomb! I have never seen anything like it in my life!" They all tried to conceal their disappointment at not being able to see or hear the bomb, and since nobody was willing to admit his own stupidity and incompetence, they all behaved as the two terrorists had predicted.

However, an independent aviation accident investigator with thousands of hours of flight time and knew a lot about bombs, who had no official job. and could only see things as his eyes showed them and heard sounds as his ears heard them, went up to the carriage.

"My tape recorder recorded no sounds from the bomb, only the sound of Emperor's Kanishka's voice saying 'boom'. And I don't see any bomb. Emperor Kanishka, you have no bomb, and your shoelaces are untied, which is dangerous," the scientist investigator pilot said.

"Fool!" the court chamberlain reprimanded, running after him. "Don't talk nonsense!" He told the investigator to sit down.

But the investigator's remark, which had been heard by the bystanders, was repeated over and over again until the kingdom's investigators cried:

"The scientist is right! Emperor Kanishka has no bomb and his shoelaces are untied! It's true!"

Emperor Kanishka realized that the people were right but could not admit to that. He thought it better to continue the procession under the illusion that anyone who couldn't see or hear his bomb was either stupid or incompetent.

Regards,

John Barry Smith
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barry@johnbarrysmith.com
safety@ntsb.org

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The Original Version
The Emperor's New Suit
by
Hans Christian Andersen
(1837)

MANY, many years ago lived an emperor, who thought so much of new clothes that he spent all his money in order to obtain them; his only ambition was to be always well dressed. He did not care for his soldiers, and the theatre did not amuse him; the only thing, in fact, he thought anything of was to drive out and show a new suit of clothes. He had a coat for every hour of the day; and as one would say of a king "He is in his cabinet," so one could say of him, "The emperor is in his dressing-room."

The great city where he resided was very gay; every day many strangers from all parts of the globe arrived. One day two swindlers came to this city; they made people believe that they were weavers, and declared they could manufacture the finest cloth to be imagined. Their colours and patterns, they said, were not only exceptionally beautiful, but the clothes made of their material possessed the wonderful quality of being invisible to any man who was unfit for his office or unpardonably stupid.

“That must be wonderful cloth,” thought the emperor. “If I were to be dressed in a suit made of this cloth I should be able to find out which men in my empire were unfit for their places, and I could distinguish the clever from the stupid. I must have this cloth woven for me without delay.” And he gave a large sum of money to the swindlers, in advance, that they should set to work without any loss of time. They set up two looms, and pretended to be very hard at work, but they did nothing whatever on the looms. They asked for the finest silk and the most precious gold-cloth; all they got they did away with, and worked at the empty looms till late at night.

“I should very much like to know how they are getting on with the cloth,” thought the emperor. But he felt rather uneasy when he remembered that he who was not fit for his office could not see it. Personally, he was of opinion that he had nothing to fear, yet he thought it advisable to send somebody else first to see how matters stood. Everybody in the town knew what a remarkable quality the stuff possessed, and all were anxious to see how bad or stupid their neighbours were.

“I shall send my honest old minister to the weavers,” thought the emperor. “He can judge best how the stuff looks, for he is

intelligent, and nobody understands his office better than he.Ó

The good old minister went into the room where the swindlers sat before the empty looms. ÒHeaven preserve us!Ó he thought, and opened his eyes wide, ÒI cannot see anything at all,Ó but he did not say so. Both swindlers requested him to come near, and asked him if he did not admire the exquisite pattern and the beautiful colours, pointing to the empty looms. The poor old minister tried his very best, but he could see nothing, for there was nothing to be seen. ÒOh dear,Ó he thought, Òcan I be so stupid? I should never have thought so, and nobody must know it! Is it possible that I am not fit for my office? No, no, I cannot say that I was unable to see the cloth.Ó

ÒNow, have you got nothing to say?Ó said one of the swindlers, while he pretended to be busily weaving.

ÒOh, it is very pretty, exceedingly beautiful,Ó replied the old minister looking through his glasses. ÒWhat a beautiful pattern, what brilliant colours! I shall tell the emperor that I like the cloth very much.Ó

ÒWe are pleased to hear that,Ó said the two weavers, and described to him the colours and explained the curious pattern. The old minister listened attentively, that he might relate to the emperor what they said; and so he did.

Now the swindlers asked for more money, silk and gold-cloth, which they required for weaving. They kept everything for themselves, and not a thread came near the loom, but they continued, as hitherto, to work at the empty looms.

Soon afterwards the emperor sent another honest courtier to the

weavers to see how they were getting on, and if the cloth was nearly finished. Like the old minister, he looked and looked but could see nothing, as there was nothing to be seen.

«Is it not a beautiful piece of cloth?» asked the two swindlers, showing and explaining the magnificent pattern, which, however, did not exist.

«I am not stupid,» said the man. «It is therefore my good appointment for which I am not fit. It is very strange, but I must not let any one know it;» and he praised the cloth, which he did not see, and expressed his joy at the beautiful colours and the fine pattern. «It is very excellent,» he said to the emperor.

Everybody in the whole town talked about the precious cloth. At last the emperor wished to see it himself, while it was still on the loom. With a number of courtiers, including the two who had already been there, he went to the two clever swindlers, who now worked as hard as they could, but without using any thread.

«Is it not magnificent?» said the two old statesmen who had been there before. «Your Majesty must admire the colours and the pattern.» And then they pointed to the empty looms, for they imagined the others could see the cloth.

«What is this?» thought the emperor, «I do not see anything at all. That is terrible! Am I stupid? Am I unfit to be emperor? That would indeed be the most dreadful thing that could happen to me.»

«Really,» he said, turning to the weavers, «your cloth has our most gracious approval;» and nodding contentedly he looked at the empty loom, for he did not like to say that he saw nothing.

All his attendants, who were with him, looked and looked, and although they could not see anything more than the others, they said, like the emperor, "It is very beautiful." And all advised him to wear the new magnificent clothes at a great procession which was soon to take place. "It is magnificent, beautiful, excellent," one heard them say; everybody seemed to be delighted, and the emperor appointed the two swindlers Imperial Court weavers.

The whole night previous to the day on which the procession was to take place, the swindlers pretended to work, and burned more than sixteen candles. People should see that they were busy to finish the emperor's new suit. They pretended to take the cloth from the loom, and worked about in the air with big scissors, and sewed with needles without thread, and said at last: "The emperor's new suit is ready now."

The emperor and all his barons then came to the hall; the swindlers held their arms up as if they held something in their hands and said: "These are the trousers!" "This is the coat!" and "Here is the cloak!" and so on. "They are all as light as a cobweb, and one must feel as if one had nothing at all upon the body; but that is just the beauty of them."

"Indeed!" said all the courtiers; but they could not see anything, for there was nothing to be seen.

"Does it please your Majesty now to graciously undress," said the swindlers, "that we may assist your Majesty in putting on the new suit before the large looking-glass?"

The emperor undressed, and the swindlers pretended to put the new suit upon him, one piece after another; and the emperor

looked at himself in the glass from every side.

«How well they look! How well they fit!» said all. «What a beautiful pattern! What fine colours! That is a magnificent suit of clothes!»

The master of the ceremonies announced that the bearers of the canopy, which was to be carried in the procession, were ready.

«I am ready,» said the emperor. «Does not my suit fit me marvellously?» Then he turned once more to the looking-glass, that people should think he admired his garments.

The chamberlains, who were to carry the train, stretched their hands to the ground as if they lifted up a train, and pretended to hold something in their hands; they did not like people to know that they could not see anything.

The emperor marched in the procession under the beautiful canopy, and all who saw him in the street and out of the windows exclaimed: «Indeed, the emperor's new suit is incomparable! What a long train he has! How well it fits him!» Nobody wished to let others know he saw nothing, for then he would have been unfit for his office or too stupid. Never emperor's clothes were more admired.

«But he has nothing on at all,» said a little child at last. «Good heavens! listen to the voice of an innocent child,» said the father, and one whispered to the other what the child had said. «But he has nothing on at all,» cried at last the whole people. That made a deep impression upon the emperor, for it seemed to him that they were right; but he thought to himself, «Now I must bear up to the end.» And the chamberlains walked with still greater

dignity, as if they carried the train which did not exist.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: August 20, 2006 5:37:18 PM PDT
To: "Delorme, Paulette" <Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca>
Cc: "Burtch, Terry" <Terry.Burtch@tsb.gc.ca>
Subject: Smith Submission 12. Last Gasp: Clutching at a Straw.

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson,

Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 12. Last Gasp: Grasping at a Straw. Filed

I have also sent copies of each submission to Mr. Brucker since he was so concerned about who is granted standing and all of the below are a result of my being denied standing.

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006

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inflight breakup explanation. (Please consider a plausible, reasonable, electrical cause with precedent) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006.

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Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years: Predicting the Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non Cooperation. (Sorry, no can do.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

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Smith Submission 12. Last Gasp: Grasping at a Straw. (Throw me a bone here, I'm dying) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

I will be sending relevant material to be filed that does not require the attention of the Commissioner but is necessary for a complete file. The items will be relevant accident reports from government safety boards and communications with safety officials. I hope my request is approved to post all the non classified written material submitted by the public during the public inquiry (including my submissions) on the Commission website, <http://www.majorcomm.ca/en/index.asp> The public area could be called the Public Docket.

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner

Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publique

Dear Commissioner Major, Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 12. Last Gasp: Grasping at a Straw. (Throw
me a bone here, I'm dying) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

A cliché for every occasion: Grasping at straws 1. Having little
or no options left. 2. Desperate.

It's hard being fair, if it were easy, everyone would be doing it.
Instead, we have judges who are trained to be detached,
objective, non emotional, rational, and fair.

It's easy to be biased, emotional, and unfair, it's why most people
are. The narrow and closed minded are unwilling to consider
alternatives that might alter their rigid internal belief structure.
It's hard to change.

It's hard to defend someone when there is a lynch mob outside the jail screaming for revenge. Lesser principled officials give in to the popular will.

Justice Josephson upheld his professional principles and came to the correct conclusions when he acquitted the two accused all the while knowing what the popular will was.

After sixteen years of research on early model Boeing 747s that disintegrate in flight I have found that my wiring/cargo door explanation is met with these responses in sequence:

1. No.
2. You are wrong.
3. You are crazy.
4. Go away.
5. I'm ignoring you.
6. Attack.
7. Ask a real question to check it out.
8. Take action on new knowledge acquired.

Interestingly enough, the same sequence was followed by the family members of Air India Flight 182 and others upon hearing the verdict of Justice Josephson.

First they said to themselves, no, it can't be. Then, they said he was wrong. Then they said he must be nuts to acquit them. Then they want his career to end by claiming he is incompetent in his conclusions. Now they ignore him. And at last the family members want the Commission to punish those they believe betrayed them: Justice Josephson, the RCMP, the CSIS, and anybody else involved, even extending to an independent

accident investigator. Public opinion will not get to stage seven and ask real questions about the crash.

The officials and family members apparently want the Commissioner to ask questions as long as they are hatchet questions to cast blame at inefficient and incompetent court and law enforcement systems. Then they want their revenge by a few demotions, firings, and forced early retirements of officials.

The basis for this sequence is fear. There is fear of change. All the parties have fear of change such that all their work of twenty years was in vain. There is a cliché for this: Barking up the wrong tree 1. Looking in the wrong place for the solution for a problem. 2. Thinking the answer is one thing when it is not. The hunter/prosecutors told the dogs/police to find the raccoon/terrorists and the dogs spent years and think they treed the raccoon but they didn't. The correct tree/mechanical cause is far away with only this puppy/investigator barking up it.

I find myself in an upside down world where I am begging an inquirer leading an inquiry to actually inquire, which is to say, ask questions of me.

It is an inside out world where I am supporting Canadian institutions such as the CASB, Justice Josephson, the RCMP, the CSIS while a government Commission is involved with disputing their findings and looking to discredit their competence by accusing them of failure.

It is a backward world when I am the rational scientist with loads of data and corroborative facts who is stifled and regarded as looney while the government is full of conspiracies, suspicions, finger pointing, and stories that don't make sense when examined

closely. I am the cooler head trying to prevail over hysterical elements of the government and media.

It is a strange world when I have to plead with the officials, who gain their authority through the power of doing what they say they are going to do, to actually do what they say they are going to do, that is, to hold a full, public, thorough, and broad inquiry to put to rest various theories.

It is a bewildering world when an official exclaims doubt by saying, "I don't know" and then rejects professional, specialized, Crown opinion that can allay his doubt and resolve serious contradictions in other reports.

It is a suspicious world when I point out an inflammatory and prejudicial written error stated by the Commission about a finding of bomb and the error remains uncorrected.

It is confusing to me that I have to plead with an official to be fair who has spent his entire long and distinguished career being just that.

It is weird to me to have to try to persuade someone to do what he was trained to do, swore to do, paid to do, was encouraged to do, was ordered to do, and I think, what he really wants to do: Be fair, solve a mystery, establish justice, and protect his fellow citizens.

I'm not asking for special treatment, nor an exemption or waiver, or mercy, or compensation. I'm asking for the rules to be followed, for the inquiry to inquire, and for promises to be kept.

I have not ignored contrary reports, I have considered both sides.

I did not pick and choose reports, I included all. I acted as an investigator, not a prosecutor. From Table of Contents of my Smith AAR for Air India Flight 182 below (Commission Exhibit S-18):

2. Premise Explanations for Air India Flight 182

2.1 Explosion in flight in the forward cargo compartment

2.1.1 Proponents

2.1.2 Analysis

2.1.3 Conclusion

2.2 Explosion of a bomb in the aft cargo compartment

2.2.1 Proponent

2.2.2 Analysis

2.2.3 Conclusion

2.3 Explosion in the forward cargo compartment with its cause unstated

2.3.1 Proponent

2.3.2 Analysis

2.3.3 Conclusion

2.4 Explosion in the forward cargo compartment, inclusive of a bomb detonation

2.4.1 Proponent

2.4.2 Analysis

2.4.3 Conclusions

2.5 Explosion in the forward cargo compartment caused by explosive decompression of

undetermined cause, exclusive of a bomb detonation

2.5.1 Proponent

2.5.2 Analysis

2.5.3 Conclusions

2.6 Explosion in the forward cargo compartment caused by explosive decompression

caused by structural failure of ruptured open forward cargo door

at one or both of the midspan
latches caused by faulty electrical wiring

2.6.1 Proponent

2.6.2 Analysis

2.6.3 Conclusion

My conscience is clear; I have done the best I could to persuade authority that Air India Flight 182 was not a rare bomb event for a more common failing of a part, specifically a forward cargo door rupturing open in flight probably caused by a faulty electrical switch or wiring.

For persuasion I have of course ruled out threats, passed on wheedling and cajoling, and instead concentrated on corroborated expert opinions, rational, logical, a presentation of facts, data, evidence modestly punctuated with brilliant sparks of wit.

I have also begged and pleaded. I shall again.

1. Please grant me standing to present my mechanical non conspiracy explanation to you in depth.
2. Please ask TSB Air to provide an aircraft accident report to you on the probable cause of Air India Flight 182.
3. Please correct the highly prejudicial error on Commission website that states the CASB concluded it was a bomb; they did not. ("Yet, it was not until the following January that the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb.")
4. Please post all the non classified written material submitted to you by the public during the public inquiry (including my submissions) on the Commission website, <http://www.majorcomm.ca/en/index.asp> The public area could be called the Public Docket.

Commissioner Major, in an interview you said your concern was whether an event such as Air India Flight 182 could happen again. Well, sir, the answer is yes because the frayed wiring in the cargo door unlatch system still exists in the about five hundred early model Boeing 747s still in service today worldwide.

Have you ever wondered at the over reaction to the threat of an airplane crash? Many more people die weekly in car crashes than ever die yearly in airplane accidents and yet billions are spent in airline safety and security and relatively very little in vehicular safety. The answer is in the primitive responses of the brain at birth and infancy called reflexes. We are not born with the reflex to react to the smell of skidding rubber tires, of the feeling of a broken bone, or even the pain of fire. All those fears are learned through experience.

We are born with the fears of suffocation, dehydration, loud sounds, and falling. All these fears are present when flying in airplanes and the psyche knows the dangers regardless of the movie that's playing, the number of pillows, or the quality of the meal.

Sucking Reflex: The sucking reflex is initiated when something touches the roof of an infants mouth. Infants have a strong sucking reflex which helps to ensure they can latch onto a bottle or breast.

Startle Reflex: Infants will respond to sudden sounds or movements by throwing their arms and legs out, and throwing their heads back. Most infants will usually cry when startled and proceed to pull their limbs back into their bodies.

Breathing is the first reflex we have. As we get older we develop regulated breathing but we never lose our reflexive breathing. After the first breath comes the first cry.

Parachute Response: This is a protective response that protects an infant if he/she falls. Beginning at about 5-6 months, if an infant falls, he will extend his arms to try and 'catch' himself.

The thought of a loud bomb going off in an airplane which results in suffocating during a long fall while crying for help is a four fold horror nightmare at the basest levels of our personalities. Passengers will pay any amount of money and tolerate any restrictions on civil freedoms to reduce those four fears to manageable levels. Hysterical fear leading to panic is in the back of the mind of many passengers who have a fear of flying. (I have a rational worry of flying and it's based on the realities of the common hazards, bad weather, pilot error and mechanical fault.)

I will tell you a good story you may well remember forever about Air India Flight 182. This was told to me at the beginning of my research for AI 182 about ten years ago.

When the Boeing 747 called Air India Flight 182 disintegrated in flight at 31000 feet over the ocean, some passengers stayed in their seats all the way down, some were probably sucked into engines, and some were blown free and floated down in a few minutes to the ocean surface. All the men, women, and children died.

There was one very pregnant woman who was blown free and as she was falling she delivered/ejected her baby. They both fell to

the water. She died on impact but since the baby was lighter, the infant did not die, but floated for a bit on the water and then drowned. The baby died not from blunt trauma injuries but from salt water in the lungs.

Well, that image of a pregnant human female sensing imminent death and ejecting her baby from within herself as a last chance effort was very haunting to me. I recalled it perfectly.

As it turns out, about five years ago I had occasion to speak by telephone to Wing Commander Dr. I. R. Hill of the Accident Investigations Branch of the United Kingdom who contributed to the Air India Flight 182 reports. I asked Dr. Hill about the injuries to the passengers and any evidence of bomb damage. He replied, as he stated in the accident reports, that he found no explosion by bomb evidence on anyone. He did find explosive decompression injuries and impact damage.

I asked him about the pregnant woman/baby story. He replied that he did not find any evidence of that event occurring; there were no babies that drowned. His interview statements corroborated his written statements of years earlier. (A lot can be deduced from the below Medical Examiner's observations but that would be for a later time.)

From the CASB AOR:

"2.9 Medical Evidence There were 30 children recovered and they showed less overall injury. The average severity of injury increases from Zone C to E and is significantly less in C than in Zones D and E.

Flail pattern injuries were exhibited by eight bodies. Five of these were in Zone E, one in Zone D, two in Zone C and one

crew member. The significance of flail injuries is that it indicates that the victims came out of the aircraft at altitude before it hit the water.

There were 26 bodies that showed signs of hypoxia (lack of oxygen), including 12 children, 9 in Zones C, 6 in Zone D and 11 in Zone E. There were 25 bodies showing signs of decompression, including 7 children. They were evenly distributed throughout the zones, but with a tendency to be seated at the sides, particularly the right side (12 bodies).

Twenty-three bodies showed evidence of receiving injuries from a vertical force. They tended to be older, seated to the rear of the aircraft (4 in Zone C, 5 in Zone D, 11 in Zone E, 2 crew and 1 unknown), and 16 had little or no clothing.

Twenty-one bodies were found with no clothing, including three children. They tended to be seated to the rear and to the right (3 in Zone C, 5 in Zone D, 11 in Zone E and 2 unknown).

There were 49 cases showing signs of impact-type injuries, including 19 children (15 in Zone C, 15 in Zone D, 15 in Zone E, 1 crew member and 3 unknown).

There is a general absence of signs indicating the wearing of lap belts.

Pathological examination failed to reveal any injuries indicative of a fire or explosion."

The point, Commissioner Major, is that myth like tales are told about Air India Flight 182 and upon examination are totally false. There was no drowned in salt water infant. So it is with the

bombs in several places tales that are the official versions of Air India Flight 182. They are just not true although they are wonderful, emotion evoking, awe inspiring, mysterious, and satisfying in very primitive ways.

Frayed wiring shorting on a motor is not myth like. It's mundane. It does not hold interest. But it is usual, reasonable, plausible, and it has a precedent/antecedent with United Airlines Flight 811.

I know with more certainty than some life and death decisions I have made in the air regarding me and my crew that Air India Flight 182 was not caused by a bomb explosion in any compartment. I know there were no bombs, no bombers, no conspiracies, no crime, and no criminals. I do know for certain that the forward cargo door blew out at initial event time that caused the nose to come off leading to the inflight disintegration and the cause of that door rupture was probably an electrical switch or wiring based upon conclusions made regarding United Airlines Flight 811, TWA Flight 800, and Swiss Air 111.

I'm dead serious about airplane crashes, having survived a fatal one. Well, live and learn. When young and frustrated, we cry. When middle aged and outraged, we yell. And now, when old, at my age looking at foolishness, I laugh. Conspiracy nonsense is foolish.

I laugh at this fool who spent \$2500 and a week of travel to and from Ottawa for about twenty five seconds of original input to a Commission of Inquiry before being told my efforts were futile. That's a hundred dollars a second. I'm laughing.

John Major, this is Major John! I'm chuckling since I am a real Major John. I'm a retired US Army Major and my name is John

Smith. I have written 'Major John' many hundreds of times as you, sir, have written 'John Major.' Completely irrelevant but, what the heck, clever play on words and it made this audience of one smile.

I have done my best and it's time to close up shop.

Please don't prod me with your sword to walk the plank into quiet oblivion...

Ready, Aim, ...no blindfold necessary and I reject the last cigarette, bad for my health, you see...

Get ready to throw that switch to fry my brains and wipe out all my memories....

Why is the hangman hooded, who is the bad guy here.....

Strap me down, slip the needle in, it's time for dreamless sleep anyway...

Do I hear the crushing of acid crystals in this small chamber...is that fog..<gasp>, my throat, <gasp>, <gasp>, I can't talk, <gasp>, <gasp>, <gasp>...no more, no more, <gasp>, Au Revoir.....

Regards,

John Barry Smith
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Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

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Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years: Predicting the Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

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Smith Submission 12. Last Gasp: Grasping at a Straw. (Throw me a bone here, I'm dying) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: August 20, 2006 5:37:27 PM PDT
To: "Delorme, Paulette" <Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca>
Cc: "Burtch, Terry" <Terry.Burtch@tsb.gc.ca>
Subject: **Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years:**

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Thursday, August 17, 2006

Below is Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years:
Predicting the Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday,
August 17, 2006

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At the request of the Guptas, I have ceased sending them my submissions.

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner

Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publique

Dear Commissioner Major, Thursday, August 17, 2006

You to me: "You have an alternate theory. The alternate theory may over time prove to be correct. I don't know. What I do know is that we cannot consider it as part of the evidence in this Inquiry but what I can do is permit you to file any written material that substantiates your view and it will be part of the Air India record. It will be there for examination by people who look at this Inquiry in future years,..."

Dear Person of the People in Future Years,

I figure you are probably a high school student here from some detention hall assignment doing a make work essay in early 21st century history. I was told a hundred years ago you might be examining my filed written material that substantiates my alternate theory for an airplane crash.

Well, where to start, my wayward student? What's it like in 2106 anyway? Still Scuba diving down to the tops of skyscrapers? Crowded on the high ground? Can you live on the wages of a solar mirror cleaner? I can only guess, but something tells me that travel between any two points more than a hundred miles apart will not require passports, ID papers, and strip searches as we had in 2006. Things will be better in 2106 and it's all because of a few brave men in high office.

What was it like in 2006 you ask? (Because you have to or you ain't leaving study hall?) It all started when a big airliner with 329 on board, called Air India Flight 182, blew up over the ocean and terrorists were blamed for putting a bomb on board. Exactly at what airport the bomb was loaded, where it was located in the plane, and how many bombs were facts in dispute by the various investigating agencies and everyone (except me) believed it was

a bomb by terrorists and urgent, drastic actions needed to be taken to prevent another tragedy.

Of course real terrorists noticed all the tears, wailing, press coverage, expenses, disruptions, and political reaction and thought, "Hmmm...airplanes crashing really upsets our enemy." And then another large airliner blew up in the air and terrorists were again blamed (wrongly, from my research) and more tears, hair pulling, and rants against foreigners. Trials and punishments occurred. This time the terrorists knew they were really onto something, a way to really disrupt and hurt the industrial society they blamed for corrupting their own culture.

Now the terrorists knew they did not bomb those big 747s out of the air but figured their brothers in arms had done it. Everybody (except me) 'knew' they were bombed and tried very hard to find the bombers. The suspects and the convicted all turned out, naturally, to be non English speaking, dark skinned, foreign looking men with funny hats.

Real terrorists plotted on causing airplanes to crash, since the effect was so great for such little effort and risk. And on September 11, 2001, they struck with not one, but four crashes. All the security measures from 1985 on including X ray machines, strip searches, dogs, private security staff, random baggage searches, profiles were to no avail and all four planes crashed and the world was never the same.

Travel became hell. All the passengers were disarmed before boarding. All water or other beverages were removed before flight. Delays, aborted flights, cancelled trips, scares, and evacuations were commonplace.

But you are not living in that fearful, suspicious, inconvenient world of 2006 are you, lucky student, a former world of the hysterical reaction to mass grief of 1985, 1988, and 1996 events which turned to anger, to hate, and to revenge against somebody, anybody. What changed the course of history? It was the judgments of a few brave men.

How did you come to this material on file to be examined by people in the future? Let me guess. You put "History 100 years ago" into a search engine which had indexed thirty trillion words in billions of websites. All the links you clicked on were "Server Busy" or "Error Page 404" except this material which was probably on an archived website deep in the Canadian Government basement of obsolete formatted filed material submitted for an Commission of Inquiry. And yet this filed material for people in future years has remained clear and available, why is that? It's because it is important.

Ah, 2006...there were two distinct types of people back then:

1. The Pie in the Skyers.
2. The Down to Earthers.

I was a Down to Earther or scientists as we called them. We looked at things we called reality such as twisted metal, broken parts, and recorded sounds. We detected patterns from which we made reasoned, logical conclusions. We conducted experiments to reconstruct the events for confirmation and invited others to replicate our experiments for objective observations to determine validity. Whether the conclusions or the implications of those conclusions gave us pleasure or pain was not our concern, only the explanation of reality. We wanted to know an accurate reality so we could plan ahead or to fix mistakes in the past. In my case it was to prevent other people dying in plane crashes since I had

survived one myself and a plane crash is not a good thing even if you can walk away injured.

Then there were the Pie in the Skyers, or as I called them, The Bombs in the Skyers. They had different criteria for determining reality. Their main rules for validity of an idea were:

1. If it makes me feel good, it's right.
2. If it's right, it's true.
3. If someone tells me true things, he/she shall be rewarded with money and attention.
4. If it makes me feel bad, it's wrong.
5. If it's wrong, it's false.
6. If someone tells me a false thing, they are lying.
7. If someone lies to me, they shall be punished by rejection and scorn.

Emotion ruled the day! And Air India Flight 182 was the crash in 1985 that started it all.

The Bombs in the Sky guys loved the excitement of conspiracy stories with a Mr. X here and there, foreign countries, lots of airports, mistresses, lots of money changing hands, and political intrigue everywhere. How could the bomb stories not be correct? They made everybody happy: The manufacturer (it's not my fault) blamed the airport for letting the bombs get through. The airport (it's not my fault) blamed the terrorists. The airline (it's not my fault) blamed the bombers. The Government regulatory agency and safety boards (it's not my fault) blamed the crazy foreign religions. The family members (it's not my fault) blamed the evil in men's hearts. The newspapers and TV station (it's not my fault) sold the exciting story over and over again, adding bits and pieces here and there when necessary to keep the conflicting stories fresh.

The general belief of the public was, "Well, it's evil human nature, flying is still safer than driving, they are doing all they can (and it's not the officials' fault) to stop the bombers from doing it again, it's OK to fly, keep on buying tickets, put your seatback in an upright position, and enjoy your flight."

Everyone was acting in their own perceived best interest and that was, 'It's not my fault, it's his fault, over there, put him in jail'. There were no conspiracies by the major parties involved to keep the real explanation for the crash secret, they just preferred, along with everyone else, the conspiracy explanation of the bombs in the sky since it made them feel good.

The Pie in the Skyers were in the majority since being absolved of blame and responsibility of multiple tragedies made them feel good, which means it's right, which means it's true. Everyone from the TV, radio, newspaper, magazines, books, government officials, who repeated the true, right, good feeling stories were rewarded with promotions, pay raises, and desirable assignments.

And the reality of travel became more and more unpleasant. More time was spent in the car to the airport than in the airplane and more time was spent on the airplane on the ground taxiing or waiting for a gate than was spent in the air in the airplane.

But everyone knew it wasn't their fault and that made them feel good so it was true.

Except for those pesky Down to Earthers.

This Down to Earther looked at the actual evidence of the airplane crash such as twisted metal, loud recordings, wreckage

debris pattern, inflight damage, history of previous or subsequent similar events and concluded that the cause of those bombed planes was not bombs but a mechanical systems fault such that the electrical system had failed, specifically the wiring had frayed and shorted on a motor that was supposed to stay off in flight.

Research showed bombs caused a tiny percentage of plane crashes. Bombs are a small part of a small subset of causes called 'Sabotage'. Pilot error and mechanical failures cause about 90% of plane crashes with mechanical contributing about 40%. Wiring failures caused literally hundreds of fires, many failed instruments, and a few cargo doors to open in flight.

The scientists called government aviation accident investigators who actually knew why planes crashed did not conclude it was a bomb, just an explosion and another aviation accident investigator said the cause was an explosion that was not a bomb. They were just doing their job as objective, detached, logical, non emotional, investigators.

But...the news that the plane crashes were caused by faulty wiring and not bombs did not make everyone feel good. The non bomb/bad wiring explanation meant that everyone was responsible in some small or large way and that realization made them feel very, very bad. Because they felt bad, they knew the mechanical wiring explanation was wrong. Because it was wrong, it was false. And anybody who told them falsehoods was lying to them. Therefore the liar must be punished by stifling, rejection, and scorn to make him stop giving the pain of a wrong explanation.

The larger issue was myth versus science; wishful thinking

versus reality. The ignorant, fearful population turned to exciting stories that made them feel good by exposing and smiting enemies while glorifying themselves. The scientists were shunned, demoted, fired, or had funds cut off from their research. The politicians responded to the will of their citizens and told even more outrageous tales of heroism and sacrifice.

Wishful thinking ruled, reality lost. Myth won, science was trounced. Exciting stories were believed while boring details...well...bored.

The situation world wide was dangerous. Terrorists were everywhere. Relations among nations were on the cusp of a world war with all sides living myths and wanting to fight. Many politicians even declared World War III had begun. Tensions were very high as local outbreaks of war kept on popping up, threatening to spread wider.

The rule of law was under attack as the belief was that only sissies hired attorneys and played the game of cross examination of witnesses, confronting the accuser, and disclosure of evidence, when everyone knew that real men got their guns and started shooting and loaded up with bombs and started bombing. The court system was considered a game for shoplifting cases while the only system that worked included secret armies, paid mercenaries, widespread eavesdropping, and secret prisons.

Investigators became prosecutors and decided on guilt. Prosecutors became judges and decided on punishment. Judges became politicians and decided what the people wanted to hear. Politicians became businessmen seeking profits. Businessmen became priests giving advice on how to live. Priests became military leaders defending their followers by shooting others.

Military leaders became assassins with remotely controlled and armed drones. Everyone was doing the job of others while neglecting their own.

A new Dark Ages was appearing. Societies were splitting into smaller segregated groups based upon language, race, or religious criteria. Residential communities became gated fortresses. Suspicion, distrust, anger, fear, hate, and vendettas become normal attitudes.

But this Down to Earth scientist kept on telling his reasonable, plausible explanation for the initial plane crash that started it all in letters, websites, interviews and an appearance in front of a Commission of Inquiry into one of the plane crashes.

The crash of Air India Flight 182 was blamed on revenge seeking terrorist putting one or two bombs to blow up the plane in the aft or forward cargo compartment. But the stories did not sound right, there were important discrepancies in the multiple bomb explanations. Suspects were accused, and tried. Law enforcement agencies bickered as they chased ghosts around the world. And then entered one of the three brave enlightened men: Justice Ian Josephson. He evaluated the evidence and acquitted the two accused. He found they did not plant the bombs and he was right, they didn't do it, nobody did it.

Outrage was everywhere. The outraged citizens who had looked forward to revenge were upset and wanted punishment against someone, anyone, even those in law enforcement.

And then entered the next of the three brave enlightened men: Prime Minister Stephen Harper. He created a Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight

182. He said "It is our duty as Canadians to do everything in our power to prevent a similar tragedy from ever happening again, A full public inquiry is required. This inquiry will be launched immediately and led by an outstanding Canadian, retired Supreme Court Justice John Major. He has agreed to serve as Commissioner for this inquiry and I have every confidence that he will conduct a thorough and compassionate investigation into the events surrounding this tragedy. This inquiry is about analyzing the evidence that has come to light since 1985 and applying it to the world we live in today."

Prime Minister Harper did indeed want a full public inquiry which would be thorough, compassionate, and analyze the evidence and events surrounding the tragedy.

And he got it.

Enter the third brave enlightened man, retired Supreme Court Justice John Major. He is the Commissioner who told me I would be examined by you in the future. Commissioner Major said to me personally, "... I can do is permit you to file any written material that substantiates your view and it will be part of the Air India record. It will be there for examination by people who look at this Inquiry in future years,..."

Commissioner Major also stated, "The nature of this Commission was to be very broad in the evidence that it heard, in order to put to rest the various theories, rumours and neglect that have occurred since the explosion in 1985."

And it was.

Commissioner Major patiently listened to everyone as they gave

their opinions about the investigation, the bombing, the aircraft, the victims, and the victims' families. He listened to representatives of various agencies explain why they did not get convictions of the accused terrorists, why information was lost, destroyed, or misplaced, turf battles, secret tapes, communication lapses, funding problems, and lack of cooperation among the many agencies tracking suspected terrorists. Fingers were pointed in every which direction. The Commissioner listened to various religious groups give their opinions and complaints about discrimination against them by terrorists.

And the curious Commissioner listened to this independent aircraft accident investigator who had an interesting explanation for the crash that was different from the conventional wisdom held by all the others. This civilian said the cause was not a bomb explosion; there were no bombers, no conspiracies, no crimes, and no criminals.

Well, my young chipmunk, that alternative explanation caused a stir and everyone involved wanted this civilian investigator to shut up, sit down, and go away.

But Commissioner Major held firm to his principals and those of the Prime Minister who both wanted a very broad full, public, and thorough inquiry. The Commissioner stated he wanted to 'put to rest various theories' for the accident and to do that, he had to listen to them, not reject them out of hand. He was pressured to keep the inquiry narrow, short, and focused on specific already agreed upon conclusions.

But, he stayed true to his calling of justice through law, not emotion. So, he listened to this civilian investigator give his oral presentation with audio visual aids, textbooks, accident reports,

diagrams, pictures, and schematics. The Commissioner then read the various text submissions of the civilian that documented in depth the evidence which led him to conclude the cause was not a bomb but the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation.

The Commissioner sought other modern expert opinion so he tasked the premier aviation accident investigation government team in Canada for their evaluation of the probable cause of the crash. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (Air) then evaluated the wiring/cargo door explanation and the evidence in 1989 of a similar accident, United Airlines Flight 811, and realized that the conspiracy stories of adulterous fraudulent terrorists were good stories but not grounded in fact, unlike the scientific explanation of the wiring/cargo door theory.

The TSB Air reported their findings to the Commissioner. He concluded that the earlier evaluation by the Canadian Safety Board was correct, that the police could not catch their culprits because there were no culprits, the prosecutors could not get a conviction because nobody did it, the judge who acquitted the accused followed the law and was vindicated, the family members rested easier knowing the details of the accident, and a clear danger to the flying public was removed when the faulty wiring was replaced and the design flaws in the cargo doors were fixed.

The anger, hate, and lust for revenge which had permeated Canadian attitudes for decades was removed. The hysteria about air travel and bombs was reduced somewhat. More attention was properly paid for training of pilots, maintenance of the aircraft, and safe design. Air travel was safer and more relaxed. The quality of life for millions of Canadian citizens and others

worldwide improved.

And that is why the CN building in Toronto is called the "Harper Tower" and the route from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean through the Arctic archipelago of Canada is called "The Harper Passage."

The way of thinking that allowed for full, public, and thorough inquiries from many parties became normal, while the old style of fixed, predetermined, politically satisfying inquiry findings was rejected.

And that's why that way of thinking is called, "The Major Doctrine." Whenever mysteries and important events that demand explanation arise, the first response by the public is always, "Use the Major Doctrine!"

And that's why this filed material has been made clear and available to you, a person of a people in the future, so that you may marvel at the excessive fears and suspicions of the past, overcome any new fears, rely on scientific and fair inquiry into important reality events, coexist peacefully with spiritual neighbors, and act on conclusions based on reality, not good stories.

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8,

2006

Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation. (Please consider a plausible, reasonable, electrical cause with precedent) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006.

Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The Layperson version. (It's not rocket science) Filed Friday, August 11, 2006

Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years: Predicting the Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
safety@ntsb.org

From: "Delorme, Paulette" <Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca>

Date: August 20, 2006 5:42:28 PM PDT

To: "John Barry Smith" <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

**Subject: Out of Office AutoReply: Commission of Inquiry
Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected**

I'm away on annual leave. I will be back in the office Monday, 21 AUG 06. Should you need assistance, please contact Suzanne

L'vesque at 994-8074. Thank You.

Je suis en vacances. Veuillez noter que je serai de retour le lundi, 21 août 2006. Si vous avez besoin de renseignements, SVP contacter Suzanne L'vesque au 994-8074. Merci, Paulette

From: "Communications" <Communications@tsb.gc.ca>
Date: September 27, 2006 11:25:42 AM PDT
To: <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Subject: **RE: Web Form Comments/Question**

Good afternoon,

The Transportation Safety Board (TSB) has implemented SECURITAS, a confidential program through which you can report potentially unsafe acts or conditions relating to the Canadian transportation system that would not normally be reported through other channels.

For more information, please follow this link:
<http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/securitas/index.asp>

Thank you for your interest in the Transportation Safety Board of Canada.

Best regards,

Christian Plouffe
Communications Advisor
Transportation Safety Board of Canada

-----Original Message-----

From: barry@johnbarrysmith.com
[mailto:barry@johnbarrysmith.com]
Sent: Sunday, August 20, 2006 5:39 PM
To: Communications
Cc: Webmaster
Subject: Web Form Comments/Question

The following was submitted via the TSB webform.

Name: John Barry Smith
Phone: 831 659 3552
Address: 541 Country Club Drive Carmel Valley CA
93924
Language: English

The following comments were submitted:

Do you have an email address I may send material regarding a
clear and
present danger to the Canadian flying public?

Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
safety@ntsb.org

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: September 27, 2006 5:11:24 PM PDT
To: "Communications" <Communications@tsb.gc.ca>
**Subject: Notification for ``RE: Web Form Comments/
Question"**

Content-Type: multipart/report; boundary="_"
;report-type=disposition-notification

--_

Content-Type: text/plain

Your message of Wed, 27 Sep 2006 14:25:42 -0400 regarding
``RE: Web Form Comments/Question"
has been displayed by John Barry Smith.

--_

Content-Type: message/disposition-notification

Final-Recipient: rfc822; <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Original-Message-ID:
<E043ADA23E078E408A6350BDD1E4A92B85ED97@mailsrv
2.tsb.gc.ca>
Disposition: manual-action/MDN-sent-manually; displayed

--_--

From: "Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities / "
"Ministre des Transports, de l'infrastructure et des Co" llectivits

<MINTC@tc.gc.ca>

Date: September 28, 2006 11:58:12 AM PDT

To: <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Cc: <toews.v@parl.gc.ca>

Subject: Air India Flight 182

Mr. John Barry Smith
barry@johnbarrysmith.com

Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for your correspondence of August 20, 2006, to the Honourable Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, regarding Air India Flight 182. The Minister has asked me to reply on his behalf.

I have noted your comments with respect to this matter.

Although, as you indicate, the Attorney General of Canada is the Government of Canada's representative on the Commission of Inquiry into the investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182. This being the case, I have taken the liberty of forwarding a copy of your correspondence to the office of the Honourable Vic Toews, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, for consideration.

I trust that this action will prove satisfactory. Again, thank you for writing.

Yours truly,

Richard Stryde
Senior Special Assistant

c.c. Office of the Honourable Vic Toews, P.C. M.P.

<<INCOMING LETTER XAE-2006-325639.TIF>>

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XAE-2006-325639.TIF

Content-Disposition: attachment;

filename="INCOMING LETTER XAE-2006-325639.TIF"

Attachment converted: Kicked:INCOMING LETTER XAE-
#2CDC9F.TIF (TIFF/ÇICÈ) (002CDC9F)

From: "Prime Minister/Premier ministre" <pm@pm.gc.ca>

Date: October 3, 2006 7:09:31 AM PDT

To: "John Barry Smith" <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Subject: Office of the Prime Minister / Cabinet du Premier ministre

Please know that your e-mail message has been received in the Prime Minister's Office and that your comments have been noted.

Our office always welcomes hearing from correspondents and being made aware of their views.

Thank you for writing.

Sachez que le Cabinet du Premier ministre a bien reçu votre courriel et que nous avons pris bonne note de vos commentaires.

Nous aimons être bien informés de l'opinion des correspondants.

Je vous remercie d'avoir écrit au Premier ministre.

John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com> >>>

Office of the Prime Minister
80 Wellington Street
Ottawa
K1A 0A2

Dear Prime Minister Harper,
2006

Sunday, October 1,

I am officially protesting the actions of the Commissioner in the Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 by:

1. The continuing inclusion of an error of fact regarding the cause of Air India Flight 182 as stated on the Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 website:
<http://www.majorcomm.ca/en/openingstatement/>
'Yet, it was not until the following January that the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb.' That is wrong. The uncorrected misstatement is inflammatory to emotions and misleading as to what the CASB actually concluded in their Aviation Occurrence Report: '4.1

Cause-Related Findings 5. There is considerable circumstantial and other evidence to indicate that the initial event was an explosion occurring in the forward cargo compartment." Please note, sir, there are many potential causes for an explosion in a pressurized hull, the rarest of which is a bomb and a confirmed cause of an electrical fault.

2. The denial of my promised fifteen minutes of oral submission before Commissioner Major in the Hearing for Standing as provided in the Rules and Procedures: '13. Applicants for standing will be permitted to make oral submissions not exceeding 15 minutes at a public standing hearing...' I showed up on time, was well dressed, and polite yet was only granted four minutes. (Transcript enclosed.)

3. The denial by the Commissioner of the grant of standing as a person or intervenor before the Commission although:

a. I have complied with all the administrative deadlines and required forms.

b. I meet the stringent criteria in one and probably two Terms of Reference, 2.2, and 2.7.

c. I was investigated personally by a member of the RCMP Air India Task Force and an official of the TSB.

d. Specifically:

1. I have flown in Boeing 747s and about twenty other types of military and civilian aircraft during forty five years of

aviation experience accumulating thousands of hours of flight time.

2. My crew duties have included pilot in command, co-pilot, navigator, bombardier, flight crew, mechanic, and owner.

3. I am a qualified nuclear weapon loading officer/bombardier which means I know how to create, load, arm, deliver, and detonate nuclear weapons as well as conventional bombs.

4. I have dropped bombs.

5. I have investigated in depth the bombing of Air India Flight 182 and other explanations for the inflight breakup and have written a three hundred page aircraft accident report and built a thousand page website demonstrating a substantial interest. (Smith AAR for Air India Flight 182 is Exhibit S-18 in the Commission files and <http://www.ntsب.org> and <http://www.montereypeninsulaairport.com>)

6. I have been investigated by the RCMP, the Air India Task Force, and the security branch of Transport Canada during their investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182.

7. I am personally aware of a conflict between the RCMP and Transportation Safety Board of Canada which resulted in problems of effective cooperation which I believe adversely affected the investigation into the bombing of Air India Flight 182. (Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non Cooperation.)

8. I have been in a sudden fiery fatal jet airplane crash and suffered lifelong injuries. (Smith Submission 9: The Crash and Meeting the Family.)

9. I have seen the fatal victim in that crash.

10. I have visited and discussed the crash with the surviving family members of the victim.

11. I have discovered a clear and present hazard to the security and safety of Canadian passengers flying in early model Boeing 747s such as Air India Flight 182. (The shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup hazard)

Prime Minister, you are correct in excerpts below in your speech:

The one step that would have helped bring closure to the families of the victims, while providing answers to key questions that remain unsolved and could help prevent future terrorist acts against Canadian citizens. A full public inquiry is required.

He (Commissioner Harper) has agreed to serve as Commissioner for this inquiry and I have every confidence that he will conduct a thorough and compassionate investigation into the events surrounding this tragedy.

Yes, sir, a full public inquiry is required; thank you for convening one. The Commission of Inquiry can provide answers to key questions that

remain unsolved if the Commission actually inquires and conducts a thorough and compassionate investigation into the events surrounding the tragedy. Sometimes an inquiry leads to areas not expected, that's what inquiries do. In the case of Air India Flight 182, the inquiry has led to a down to earth mechanical explanation with precedent instead of the conspiracy mad turbaned terrorists bungled investigations explanation.

Commissioner Major seemed to agree with your guidance for the Commission in the first day of the hearings on standing:

THE COMMISSIONER: 'Yes. Well, I will confirm that. The nature of this Commission was to be very broad in the evidence that it heard, in order to put to rest the various theories, rumours and neglect that have occurred since the explosion in 1985.'

Well, sir, I have a well researched scientific explanation for Air India Flight 182; it's the shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation. Since the explanation is science and not emotional myth, the facts can be corroborated, the premises replicated, and the conclusions confirmed by official accident investigators such as those in the TSB (Air). (TSB (Air) has never given an official probable cause for Air India Flight 182)

I have asked Commissioner Major in writing and in person for four reasonable actions:

1. Please grant me standing to present my mechanical non conspiracy explanation to him in depth.
2. Please ask TSB Air to provide an aircraft accident report to him on the probable cause of Air India Flight 182.
3. Please correct the highly prejudicial error on Commission website that states the CASB concluded it was a bomb; they did not. ('Yet, it was not until the following January that the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb.')
4. Please post all the non classified written material submitted to him by the public during the public inquiry (including my submissions) on the Commission website.

The Commissioner gave me leave to submit material to the Commission and I have done so with fourteen Smith Submissions over a two month period. A pdf file of those submissions is attached for evaluation by your staff of the depth of my research, the respect of my demeanor, the logic of my reasoning, and the validity of my conclusions. (SmithSubmissions1-14.pdf)

I protest that Commissioner Major has:

1. Not yet granted me standing,
2. Not yet

Content-Type: application/octet-stream;

name="D14A00000029D6770000_SmithSubmission1-14.pdf"

Content-Description:

D14A00000029D6770000_SmithSubmission1-14.pdf

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filename="D14A00000029D6770000_SmithSubmission1-14.pdf"
"

Attachment converted:

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(002DDE61)

This message has the following attachments:

file://localhost/Users/barry/Library/Mail/
Attachments/.DS_Store

From: "Prime Minister/Premier ministre" <pm@pm.gc.ca>

Date: October 17, 2006 12:40:51 PM PDT

To: "John Barry Smith" <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Cc: "Vic Toews" <mcu@justice.gc.ca>

Subject: Office of the Prime Minister / Cabinet du Premier ministre

October 16, 2006

Mr. John Barry Smith
barry@johnbarrysmith.com

Dear Mr. Smith:

On behalf of the Prime Minister, I would like to thank you for your e-mail of October 2 regarding the Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Air India Flight 182. Please be assured that your comments have been carefully reviewed and are appreciated.

I have taken the liberty of forwarding your correspondence directly to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, the Honourable Vic Toews, within whose responsibilities this matter falls.

Once again, thank you for taking the time to write.

Sincerely,

Salpie Stepanian
Assistant to the Prime Minister

cc: Hon. Vic Toews, P.C., M.P., Minister of Justice and Attorney
General of
Canada

/dr

From : John Barry Smith barry@johnbarrysmith.com
Received : 02 Oct 2006 10:54:03 AM >>>

Office of the Prime Minister

80 Wellington Street
Ottawa
K1A 0A2

Dear Prime Minister Harper,
2006

Sunday, October 1,

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<http://www.majorcomm.ca/en/openingstatement/>

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Cause-Related Findings 5. There is considerable circumstantial and other evidence to indicate that the initial event was an explosion occurring in the forward cargo compartment." Please note, sir, there are many potential causes for an explosion in a pressurized hull, the rarest of which is a bomb and a confirmed cause of an electrical fault.

2. The denial of my promised fifteen minutes of

oral submission before Commissioner Major in the Hearing for Standing as provided in the Rules and Procedures: '13. Applicants for standing will be permitted to make oral submissions not exceeding 15 minutes at a public standing hearing...' I showed up on time, was well dressed, and polite yet was only granted four minutes. (Transcript enclosed.)

3. The denial by the Commissioner of the grant of standing as a person or intervenor before the Commission although:

a. I have complied with all the administrative deadlines and required forms.

b. I meet the stringent criteria in one and probably two Terms of Reference, 2.2, and 2.7.

c. I was investigated personally by a member of the RCMP Air India Task Force and an official of the TSB.

d. Specifically:

1. I have flown in Boeing 747s and about twenty other types of military and civilian aircraft during forty five years of aviation experience accumulating thousands of hours of flight time.

2. My crew duties have included pilot in command, co-pilot, navigator, bombardier, flight crew, mechanic, and owner.

3. I am a qualified nuclear weapon loading officer/bombardier which means I know how to create, load, arm, deliver, and detonate nuclear weapons as well as conventional bombs.

4. I have dropped bombs.

5. I have investigated in depth the bombing of Air India Flight 182 and other explanations for the inflight breakup and have written a three hundred page aircraft accident report and built a thousand page website demonstrating a substantial interest. (Smith AAR for Air India Flight 182 is Exhibit S-18 in the Commission files and <http://www.ntsب.org> and <http://www.montereypeninsulaairport.com>)

6. I have been investigated by the RCMP, the Air India Task Force, and the security branch of Transport Canada during their investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182.

7. I am personally aware of a conflict between the RCMP and Transportation Safety Board of Canada which resulted in problems of effective cooperation which I believe adversely affected the investigation into the bombing of Air India Flight 182. (Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non Cooperation.)

8. I have been in a sudden fiery fatal jet airplane crash and suffered lifelong injuries. (Smith Submission 9: The Crash and Meeting the Family.)

9. I have seen the fatal victim in that crash.

10. I have visited and discussed the crash with the surviving family members of the victim.

11. I have discovered a clear and present hazard to the security and safety of

Canadian passengers flying in early model Boeing 747s such as Air India Flight 182. (The shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup hazard)

Prime Minister, you are correct in excerpts below in your speech:

The one step that would have helped bring closure to the families of the victims, while providing answers to key questions that remain unsolved and could help prevent future terrorist acts against Canadian citizens. A full public inquiry is required.

He (Commissioner Harper) has agreed to serve as Commissioner for this inquiry and I have every confidence that he will conduct a thorough and compassionate investigation into the events surrounding this tragedy.

Yes, sir, a full public inquiry is required; thank you for convening one. The Commission of Inquiry can provide answers to key questions that remain unsolved if the Commission actually inquires and conducts a thorough and compassionate investigation into the events surrounding the tragedy. Sometimes an inquiry leads to areas not expected, that's what inquiries do. In the case of Air India Flight 182, the inquiry has led to a down to earth mechanical explanation with precedent instead of the conspiracy mad turbaned terrorists bungled investigations explanation.

Commissioner Major seemed to agree with your guidance for the Commission in the first day of the hearings on standing:

THE COMMISSIONER: 'Yes. Well, I will confirm that. The nature of this Commission was to be very broad in the evidence that it heard, in order to put to rest the various theories, rumours and neglect that have occurred since the explosion in 1985.'

Well, sir, I have a well researched scientific explanation for Air India Flight 182; it's the shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation. Since the explanation is science and not emotional myth, the facts can be corroborated, the premises replicated, and the conclusions confirmed by official accident investigators such as those in the TSB (Air). (TSB (Air) has never given an official probable cause for Air India Flight 182)

I have asked Commissioner Major in writing and in person for four reasonable actions:

1. Please grant me standing to present my mechanical non conspiracy explanation to him in depth.
2. Please ask TSB Air to provide an aircraft accident report to him on the probable cause of Air India Flight 182.
3. Please correct the highly prejudicial error on

Commission website that states the CASB concluded it was a bomb; they did not. ('Yet, it was not until the following January that the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb.')

4. Please post all the non classified written material submitted to him by the public during the public inquiry (including my submissions) on the Commission website.

The Commissioner gave me leave to submit material to the Commission and I have done so with fourteen Smith Submissions over a two month period. A pdf file of those submissions is attached for evaluation by your staff of the depth of my research, the respect of my demeanor, the logic of my reasoning, and the validity of my conclusions. (SmithSubmissions1-14.pdf)

I protest that Commissioner Major has:

1. Not yet granted me standing,
2. Not yet asked Transportation Safety Board Air for an updated supplement to the Canadian Aviation Safety Board Aviation Occurrence Report of twenty years ago,
3. Not yet corrected the misleading error of the CASB conclusion in the Commission website,
4. Not yet made available to the public all the public input to the full public inquiry Commission of Inquiry,
5. Not yet conducted a thorough investigation as you directed,
6. Not yet been 'very broad' in the evidence the

Commission of Inquiry heard in order to put to rest various theories as the Commissioner stated.

I have raised my concerns of the clear and present, although rare, danger to the flying public and reported my mechanical wiring/cargo door explanation for the accident to various Canadian agencies:

1. RCMP Air India Task Force
2. TSB (Air)
3. Attorney General representative Mr. Barney Brucker
4. Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Air India Flight 182
5. Securitas TSB
6. Minister of Transportation (reply enclosed that stated a copy of my correspondence was forwarded to the Minister of Justice)
7. Prime Minister of Canada.

Sir, if and when my substantiated mechanical explanation for Air India Flight 182 is confirmed by Crown experts in aircraft crashes (TSB Air investigators), the political consequences are very positive:

1. The caution and prudence of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board of 1986 will be revealed; their findings were correct, there was an explosion in the forward cargo compartment of Air India Flight 182 with an electrical cause only apparent four years later with United Airlines Flight 811.
2. The RCMP and CSIS will be exonerated for their failure to catch their men because there were no

men to catch. There was no bomb, there were no bombers, there was no conspiracy, there was no crime, there were no criminals; the small cause was faulty Poly-X wiring destroying a large machine, an early model Boeing 747.

3. The security of Canadian airports was intact and not penetrated because there was no bomb placed in a CP aircraft leaving Vancouver, BC, which then passed through Montreal and Toronto airports.

4. The wisdom of the Canadian judicial system will be reaffirmed as represented by Justice Josephson who found the two accused not guilty because they were.

5 The tenacity and bravery of the Prime Minister to order an Inquiry that eventually would reveal the probable cause for the two decade old tragedy whilst knowing that official Inquiries sometimes answer key questions that remain unsolved, could help prevent future aircraft accidents, but can cause turbulent changes in attitude amongst the public.

6. Reduction in the amount of fear, suspicion, and hate among Canadian citizens against themselves, a religion, an airline, and law enforcement.

Prime Minister Harper, I am officially requesting:

1. Please ask the Crown experts on the causes of aircraft accidents to provide an updated supplement to the twenty year old CASB (non-bomb conclusion) report to you on the probable cause

of Air India Flight 182.

2. Will you please use your influence to persuade Commissioner Harper to grant me standing before his Commission of Inquiry so that I may present my scientific mechanical explanation for the cause of Air India Flight 182 during the hearings?

Very Respectfully,

John Barry Smith

541 Country Club Drive

Carmel Valley, California 93924

1 831 659 3552

1 831 241 0631 Cell

barry@johnbarrysmith.com

safety@ntsb.org

Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.

US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.

US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.

Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy

Retired US Army Major MSC

Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.

Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

Enclosures:

1. Speech of Prime Minister Harper regarding Air India Flight 182
2. Transcript of Mr. Smith at hearing for standing.
3. Email from Minister of Transportation to Mr. Smith

Speech - Prime Minister Harper announces inquiry into Air India bombing

May 1, 2006

Ottawa, Ontario

Thank you Mr. Speaker.

On June 23, 1985, Air India Flight 182, on its way from Montreal to London, England, exploded in mid-air near the coast of Ireland.

A total of 329 passengers and crew members, including more than 80 children, perished as a result of this tragic incident.

In January of the following year, the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb.

Clearly, this was an act of terrorism - one that claimed hundreds of innocent lives.

Canadians, and indeed citizens of all countries around the world demanded that those who perpetrated such an act be brought to justice.

Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, this has not yet been possible, and we must tragically admit, may never come to pass

More than 20 years have passed since this terrible tragedy took place, and while Canadians

have not forgotten what took place, there has been a tendency to see this issues that surround this incident as a problem related to politics in India.

But we must never forget that the vast majority of those who perished on Flight 182 were citizens of our country. They were Canadians.

They and their families came here, just as our ancestors did, to seek a better life for themselves in a country with unlimited opportunity.

The stories and the dreams of those 329 men, women, and children, along with those of their families, were shattered on that terrible day back in 1985.

It is our duty, as Canadians, to do everything in our power to prevent a similar tragedy from ever happening again.

There have been numerous investigations into the bombing of Air India Flight 182.

But for reasons known best to themselves, previous governments failed to establish a formal public inquiry.

The one step that would have helped bring closure to the families of the victims, while providing answers to key questions that remain unsolved and

could help prevent future terrorist acts against Canadian citizens.

A full public inquiry is required.

That is what we promised to the families.

And now it is going to happen.

This inquiry will be launched immediately and led by an outstanding Canadian, retired Supreme Court Justice John Major.

Justice Major has met with the families in Ottawa, Vancouver and Toronto and has developed detailed terms of reference with their full support and cooperation.

He has agreed to serve as Commissioner for this inquiry and I have every confidence that he will conduct a thorough and compassionate investigation into the events surrounding this tragedy.

Mr. Speaker, I wish to point out that this inquiry is not about retribution.

Nor is it about replaying the criminal trials that took place surrounding this case in Vancouver from 2003 to 2005.

There is nothing that would be served by such a course of action.

What this inquiry is about, however, is finding answers to several key questions that have emerged over the past 20 years about the worst mass murder in Canadian history.

It is a reflection of our compassion as a nation to those who lost mothers, fathers, siblings, relatives and friends to this terrible act of terrorism.

It is our sincere hope that this action may bring a measure of closure to those who still grieve for their loved ones.

This inquiry is about analyzing the evidence that has come to light since 1985 and applying it to the world we live in today.

Now more than ever, the Government of Canada must be prepared to take action to protect our citizens from the threat of terrorism.

Under Justice Major's guidance, we hope that a focused and efficient inquiry will provide information that will help ensure that Canada's police agencies and procedures, its airport security systems and anti-terrorism laws are the most effective in the world.

In closing, I wish to acknowledge and honour the efforts of the families of the victims of Air India Flight 182 and their perseverance pursuing the launch of a full public inquiry.

Some of the spouses or parents of those who lost their lives in this tragedy have themselves died over the past two decades.

Their cause has, in many cases, been taken up by their children or other relatives.

Despite a long and agonizing wait, their faith and their commitment to seek the truth, no matter how painful it may be, has never wavered. They serve as an example to all of us..

Mr. Speaker, we cannot undo the past.

But we can provide some measure of closure to the families of those who lost loved ones on Flight 182.

And, by seeking answers and confronting shortcomings in our current system, we can ensure that we save lives in the future.

I would urge all honourable members to support our Government's efforts in this area.

Thank you.

**PUBLIC HEARING APPLICATION FOR STANDING
AUDIENCE PUBLIQUE (Smith)
INTERNATIONAL REPORTING INC.**

MR. FREIMAN: The next applicant for 1 standing is Mr. John Barry Smith. 2

--- APPLICATION FOR STANDING PRESENTED BY MR. SMITH: 3

MR. SMITH: Thank you, Commissioner Major, 4 for allowing me to supplement my written application for 5 standing. 6

I've come a long way and I'd like to use my 7 whole 15 minutes if I may be allotted that. I was here 8 yesterday. I was sitting in my white suit back there and 9 two participants were talking after the adjournment. I was 10 reading the materials that the Commission staff provided, 11 excellent materials, and one participant said to the other, 12 'Are you going to come tomorrow', meaning will you be here 13 today. The one participant looked at the list, shook his 14 head and said, 'Just crackpots'. 15

Well, some things may be and I am from 16 California but not in this. This is not a movie. This is 17 real life. This is life and death. I have an alternate 18 explanation for Air India 182. It's a mechanical 19 explanation. I'll go into some detail during my 20 presentation and my detail will not be to persuade you that 21 my explanation is correct but to persuade you that my 22 research has depth and is worthy of being granted standing. 23

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I don't think, Mr. 24 Smith, that you need 15 minutes to persuade me of that. 25 Here's the difficulty. 1

The Terms of Reference direct us to take 2 into account those things that have already been 3 determined. Justice Josephson in Vancouver determined that 4 there was a bomb in a certain compartment of the airplane 5 and it was the bomb that caused the explosion that resulted 6 in the death of these people. 7

You have an alternate theory. The alternate 8 theory may over time prove to be correct. I don't know. 9

What I do know is that we cannot consider it as part of the 10
evidence in this Inquiry but what I can do is permit you to 11
file any written material that substantiates your view and 12
it will be part of the Air India record. It will be there 13
for examination by people who look at this Inquiry in 14
future years, but the Terms of Reference preclude our 15
considering whether or not there was any cause for that 16
explosion other than the bomb that is found by the Supreme 17
Court of British Columbia. 18

So I can't do anything more for you than 19
permit you to do what I have just suggested. 20

MR. SMITH: May I correct a gross error that 21
appeared in the Air India application and in the Terms of 22
Reference for this hearing? I'd like to quote from the 23
Aviation Accident Report to correct a gross error. 24

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, you still have some 25
time. So get it on the record. 1

MR. SMITH: Thank you. 2

I wish to quote from two documents 3
specifically authorized by the Commission for 4
consideration: the report of the Honourable Justice Kirpal 5
and the Aviation Occurrence Report of the Canadian Aviation 6
Safety Board. 7

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I should -- just to 8
keep the record straight, these are not recommendations by 9
the Commission. These are directions to the Commission. 10

MR. SMITH: Right. 11

THE COMMISSIONER: This is the Order in 12
Council telling us what to do. 13

MR. SMITH: Okay. 14

THE COMMISSIONER: It's not -- those 15
directions do not come from the Commission. We're subject 16
to the directions. 17

MR. SMITH: Okay. The gross error is that 18
the Canadians have said that a bomb exploded in Air India 19
182. That is absolutely incorrect. It's not true. The 20
Indians did say that it was a bomb. I'll quote: 21
'After going through the entire record, 22
we find there is circumstantial as well 23
as direct evidence which directly 24
points to the cause of the accident as 25
being that of an explosion of a bomb in 1
the forward cargo hold of the 2
aircraft.' 3

That's the Indian opinion. That's fine. 4

The Canadian opinion is absolutely correct. 5

I agree with Judge Josephson and I agree with the Canadian 6
Aviation Safety Board of 1986. The Canadian Aviation 7
Safety Board respectfully submits as follows, 'Cause 8
related findings': 9

'There was no evidence to indicate the 10
structural failure of the aircraft was 11
a lead event. There is considerable 12
circumstantial and other evidence to 13
indicate that the initial event was an 14
explosion occurring in the forward 15
cargo compartment. This evidence is 16
not conclusive. However, the evidence 17
does not support any other conclusion.' 18

That is absolutely correct, sir. The 19

Canadians were prudent. They were cautious and they made a
20

professional decision based upon the evidence they had. 21
They knew about a bomb. There's many reasons and 22
explanations for an explosion in the forward cargo 23
compartment. It can be a fire. It can be lightning. It 24

can be a fuel tank or it could be an explosive 25
decompression. 1

The Canadians were correct. They said an 2
explosion and declined to give an explanation. They knew 3
it could have been a bomb but they declined it and the 4
reason they declined it was because of the evidence which 5
counteracted a bomb. 6

For instance, in the same report, they 7
turned the cockpit voice recorder, which is the only direct 8
evidence, not indirect or circumstantial -- they turned 9
that over to the British Aircraft Investigation Board for 10
analyzing. 11

Mr. Davis, the U.K. accident investigator, 12
reported: 13

'Considering the different acoustic 14
characteristics between a DC-10 and a 15
Boeing 747, the AIB analysis indicates 16
that there were distinct similarities 17
between the sound of the explosive 18
decompression of the DC-10 and the 19
sound recorded on the AI-182 CVR.' 20

He has matched the sound to a cargo door 21
caused DC-10 --- 22

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Smith, you're taking 23
us a bit afield. You're looking to the cause and I 24
understand your position but you have to understand ours 25
that we're saddled with certain findings and we have to 1
operate within those findings. The best I can do is to 2
repeat the offer I made and invite you to file in as much 3
as detail as you choose whatever it is that supports your 4
theory and it will be part of this record. 5

MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 6

THE COMMISSIONER: I should say we 7

appreciate the time you've taken to come as far as you've 8
come to make this point. 9

MR. SMITH: Thank you. 10

MR. FREIMAN: Mr. Commissioner, I propose to 11
make the application and the supplementary materials 12
provided by Mr. Smith as Exhibit S-18. 13

--- EXHIBIT NO./PIÉCE No. S-18: 14

Documentary package from Mr. John Barry 15
Smith 16

THE COMMISSIONER: You're free, Mr. Smith, 17
as you probably know, to add to your filed material should 18
you choose. 19

MR. FREIMAN: The next applicant for 20
standing will be the Canadian Jewish Congress. 21

Subject: Air India Flight 182

Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2006 14:58:12 -0400

Thread-Topic: Air India Flight 182

thread-index: AcbjMAuyjPbjMIWMT4yZeXx2whhjBA==

From: 'Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities / '

'Ministre des Transports, de l'infrastructure et des Co'

llectivit/s <MINTC@tc.gc.ca>

To: <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Cc: <toews.v@parl.gc.ca>

X-OriginalArrivalTime: 28 Sep 2006 18:58:13.0302

(UTC) FILETIME=[0C6CA560:01C6E330]

X-Nospam: None

Mr. John Barry Smith

barry@johnbarrysmith.com

Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for your correspondence of August 20, 2006, to the Honourable Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, regarding Air India Flight 182. The Minister has asked me to reply on his behalf.

I have noted your comments with respect to this matter. Although, as you indicate, the Attorney General of Canada is the Government of Canada's representative on the Commission of Inquiry into the investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182. This being the case, I have taken the liberty of forwarding a copy of your correspondence to the office of the Honourable Vic Toews, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, for consideration.

I trust that this action will prove satisfactory. Again, thank you for writing.

Yours truly,

Richard Stryde
Senior Special Assistant

c.c. Office of the Honourable Vic Toews, P.C. M.P.

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Attachments/.DS_Store

From: "Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities / "
"Ministre des Transports, de l'infrastructure et des Co" llectivits
<MINTC@tc.gc.ca>
Date: November 20, 2006 12:51:51 PM PST

To: <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Cc: <pm@pm.gc.ca>, <toews.v@parl.gc.ca>
Subject: **Air India Flight 182**

Mr. John Barry Smith
barry@johnbarrysmith.com

Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for your correspondence of October 22, 2006, to the Honourable Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, which was further to your previous correspondence with Transport Canada regarding Air India Flight 182. The Minister has asked me to reply on his behalf.

Minister Cannon appreciates being made aware of your concerns on this matter; however, the accidents cited in your e-mail have been investigated by competent investigative bodies, and the department is not aware of any findings that support your position. As such, Transport Canada will not be taking any action with respect to your statements.

Again, thank you for sharing your views with the federal government.

Yours truly,

Richard Stryde
Senior Special Assistant

c.c. Office of the Right Honourable Stephen Harper, P.C., M.P.
Office of the Honourable Vic Toews, P.C. M.P.

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From: "Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities / "
"Ministre des Transports, de l'infrastructure et des Co" llectivits
<MINTC@tc.gc.ca>

Date: January 25, 2007 7:15:19 AM PST

To: <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Subject: Accident Investigation Flight 182

Mr. John Barry Smith
barry@johnbarrysmith.com

Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for your e-mail of November 20, 2006, which was further to our previous exchange of correspondence regarding

Air India Flight 182.

As indicated in my November 20 e-mail to you, Transport Canada is not responsible for investigating accidents. Therefore, the department is not in a position to undertake an evaluation of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board and U.K. Aircraft Accident Investigation Board reports on the Air India accident.

In light of your safety concerns with the forward cargo door of the Boeing 747, Transport Canada has reviewed the aircraft's service history, accident reports, occurrence reports and the Service Difficulty Report database.

Transport Canada has concluded that corrective actions taken over the years by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, the Authority responsible for type design, have been effective in mitigating any safety issues related to the Boeing 747's forward cargo door. This being the case, Transport Canada does not have any safety concerns with respect to this door.

I trust that the foregoing has clarified the department's position with respect to this matter. Again, thank you for writing.

Yours truly,

Richard Stryde
Senior Special Assistant

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Date: October 28, 2008 10:07:07 AM PDT

To: pws@punjabmail.gov.in

Subject: Mechanical explanation for AI 182

Sardar Parkash Singh Badal
Chief Minister, Punjab

Dear Sir, please evaluate the shorted wiring/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for AI 182 during your new probe of the air crash. It is a mechanical explanation and can be confirmed by your aviation accident investigators because first of all, it was a 'plane crash' as you are quoted below. Support for the explanation is in the internet at www.nts.gov and www.montereypeninsulaairport.com.

Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
831 659 3552
831 392 5013
www.nts.gov
www.montereypeninsulaairport.com

The head of the Punjab government has publicly pledged

assistance to
the RCMP in its investigation of the 1985 Air India terrorist
bombing.

Punjab Chief Minister Parkash Singh Badal told a news
conference in
Chandigarh Thursday that Canadian investigators had requested
some
help in advancing their criminal probe and that police the
northern
Indian state would fully comply.

"The Punjab police will extend all possible help to the Canadian
authorities in probing the Air India Kanishka air crash again,"
Badal
was quoted as saying by the Press Trust of India.

Kanishka is the name Air India had given to the doomed 747,
which
exploded on June 23, 1985 off the coast of Ireland, killing all 329
aboard.

RCMP media officer Cons. Annie Linteau would only say
Thursday that
the Air India investigation is on-going and international in scope
with assistance coming from law enforcement agencies in many
countries.

"We continue to receive cooperation from everyone involved
including
Indian police," she said.
She said the investigation into the bombing remains one of the
largest and most complex ever undertaken by the RCMP.

The news out of Punjab was a hot topic on Metro Vancouver Punjabi radio stations Thursday. The Vancouver Sun earlier reported that the RCMP's Air India Task Force has asked the Indian government for permission to visit the South Asian country in August 2007.

The officer-in-charge of the task force, Supt. Lloyde Plante, said at the time that investigators met with Indian government representatives in Canada to update them on the ongoing criminal probe.

Plante said the criminal case remained active, despite the acquittals three years ago of key suspects Ripudaman Singh Malik and Ajaib Singh Bagri. Several other suspects, including people in India and England, were identified as unindicted co-conspirators during the 19-month trial of Malik and Bagri that ended with the not guilty verdicts in March 2005.

"Once they give us permission, we will send our team over there," Plante said of discussions with the Indian government.

Chief Minister Badal was asked about the RCMP's request by a reporter Thursday, who said that Canada had apparently not received any reply

from India. Linteau refused to comment on whether that was true.

Meanwhile, the only man convicted in the bombing, Inderjit Singh Reyat, remains out on bail pending a perjury trial early next year.

Prosecutors allege he lied 27 times while testifying as a Crown witness against Malik and Bagri back in September 2003. And the Air India commission report is still being prepared after 16 months of evidence was completed in Ottawa earlier this year. The report had been expected this fall, but is now not likely to be released until 2009.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT

To: Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca

Subject: Urgent for John Garstang of TSB re: AI 182 bomb location

Dear Sir or Madam in Security:

Please forward to Mr. John Garstang of Transportation Safety Board of Canada regarding Air India 182 bomb location.

Dear Mr. Garstang, 13 Mar 01

This John Barry Smith. We have corresponded in the past and you called me on the telephone at my home regarding Air India 182.

I now understand the bomb location in AI 182 has been changed from the forward cargo door compartment to the aft.

Will you please email me at barry@corazon.com or call me at 1 831 659 3552 for further discussion on this most important matter?

Sincerely,
Barry

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

At 3:18 PM +0400 2/27/97, Securitas wrote:

Thank you for your report expressing concern about the opening of cargo doors on B-747 aircraft. During any aircraft crash, investigators examine every piece of evidence, in order to determine cause. In the case of the Air India flight, the cargo door was in fact retrieved from the bottom of the ocean by the investigators. The latches were still in place, and there was no evidence on the edges of the door to indicate in-flight opening of that door.

On the other hand, there was other solid evidence indicating a bomb blast had occurred. Aircraft accident investigators are trained people. Anybody can say anything they want on the Internet. Put your money on the experts; you will win more often.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT

To: "Harris, Jim" <Jim.Harris@tsb.gc.ca>

Subject: Clear and Present danger to the Canadian flying public

Dear Mr. Harris, thank you for your reply and referring me to the RCMP, which I shall do regarding any criminal aspects of this airplane crash.

However, I would like to inform you and the TSB of a clear and present danger to the Canadian flying public as we speak. This danger is known faulty wiring (see Swiss Air 111 TSB investigation on polyimide insulation) which is causing forward cargo doors of early model Boeing 747 to open in flight. This conclusion is made by my research into Air India 182 accident in which the TSB (then CASB) reported in its finding:

4.0 CONCLUSIONS

The Canadian Aviation Safety Board respectfully submits as follows:

4.1 Cause-Related Findings

1. At 0714 GMT, 23 June 1985, and without warning, Air India Flight 182 was subjected to a sudden event at an altitude of

31,000 feet resulting in its crash into the sea and the death of all on board.

2. The forward and aft cargo compartments ruptured before water impact.

3. The section aft of the wings of the aircraft separated from the forward portion before water impact.

4. There is no evidence to indicate that structural failure of the aircraft was the lead event in this occurrence.

5. There is considerable circumstantial and other evidence to indicate that the initial event was an explosion occurring in the forward cargo compartment. This evidence is not conclusive. However, the evidence does not support any other conclusion.

Mr. Harris, note the Canadians said 'an explosion occurring in the forward cargo compartment.' That is correct. There was an explosion and it was explosive decompression.

There is now evidence to indicate structural failure was the lead event of this occurrence, UAL 811 of NTSB 92/02 which states: 'On February 24, 1989, United Airlines flight 811, a Boeing 747-122, experienced an explosive decompression as it was climbing between 22,000 and 23,000 feet after taking off from Honolulu, Hawaii, en route to Sydney, Australia with 3 flightcrew, 15 flight attendants, and 337 passengers aboard. The airplane made a successful emergency landing at Honolulu and the occupants evacuated the airplane. Examination of the airplane revealed that the forward lower lobe cargo door had separated in flight and had caused extensive damage to the fuselage and cabin structure adjacent to the door. Nine of the passengers had been ejected from the airplane and lost at sea. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the sudden opening of the forward lower lobe cargo door in flight and the subsequent

explosive decompression. The door opening was attributed to a faulty switch or wiring in the door control system which permitted electrical actuation of the door latches toward the unlatched position after initial door closure and before takeoff.

This event of 1989 was not available to the TSB investigators of 1985. The matching of evidence of UAL 811 to AI 182, such as the sudden loud sound on the CVR and the abrupt power cut to the recorders on both airplanes, would have provided the investigators the answers to support an alternative mechanical explanation.

As we know now, the Poly X, Kapton type wiring in Boeing airliners such as AI 182 and UAL 811 is faulty but not yet blamed in more than nine deaths.

Based on the new evidence of UAL 811 and the matching of similar evidence to AI 182, it is now apparent that a clear and present danger exists to the flying public in Boeing 747s. An emergency AD to check the cargo door area wiring would be prudent.

Regardless, I report this immediate safety issue to you for your action and I request a meeting with TSB safety officials so that I may present my research and analysis for their consideration and to clarify any doubts as to this present hazard. I can meet with them in the Vancouver BC offices of the TSB as soon as practicable.

Please do not disregard this most urgent safety alert from a citizen to a public safety agency. I am available at any time for phone discussion or email correspondence.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

Mr. Smith,

Since this is the subject of an RCMP investigation, and is in criminal court, it would be inappropriate for anyone at the TSB to discuss this matter. It would be recommended that your enquiry be directed to the RCMP at:

Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather Street
Vancouver, B.C.
V5Z 1K6

Regards

Jim Harris
Public Affairs Advisor
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
*819-994-8053

*jim.harris@tsb.gc.ca

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT
To: enquiries@aaib.gov.uk
Subject: **Warning about potential airline crash**

Dear Air Accidents Investigation Branch,

I am informing you as of 17 Mar 01 of a clear and present danger to the British flying public that requires immediate attention. This is not an anonymous telephone call about a 'bomb' threat, an act which impels you to immediate confirming action in the interest of public safety. This is a polite, reasoned, identified warning about the potential disintegration of an airliner by a mechanical fault which is a warning based on research, analysis, and precedent. Please contact me by phone or

email for further details. The prudent response is to check out the warning by contacting the person who gives you the warning. Please do not ignore this warning. I am available by phone or email for interview.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com

barry@corazon.com

Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former
FAA Part 135 certificate holder.

US Navy reconnaissance navigator,
RA-5C 650 hours.

US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000
hours.

Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy
Retired US Army Major MSC
Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.
Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet
plane crash in RA-5C

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT

To: "Harris, Jim" <Jim.Harris@tsb.gc.ca>

Subject: Still a Clear and Present danger to the Canadian flying public

Jim Harris

Public Affairs Advisor

Transportation Safety Board of Canada

Dear Mr. Harris, 22 Mar 01

Thank you for your prompt reply to my recent email giving warning about a potential airline accident; however, since you are a Canadian citizen and your safety responsibilities extend to occurrences involving a Canadian airline, Canadian airports, and Canadian citizens, I recommend you contact me regarding my warning of a clear a present danger that exists in Canadian commercial airliners at Canadian airports involving Canadian citizens which is not understood by TSB investigators and thereby may happen again.

Mr. Harris, please do not give me the brush off, the style of which I parodied above. My warning is worthy of your serious

attention with my well documented explanation of wiring/cargo door/explosive decompression events having taken place in several early model Boeing 747s, to include Air India Flight 182, the probable cause of which is currently in hot dispute.

You referred me to the RCMP. I have been there before and reported my warning again to them.

Now you refer me to the NTSB and FAA. I have been there before and repeated my warning again to them.

The TSB is the lead agency for this warning of a clear and present danger to the Canadian flying public.

The Canadian airlines for which you have safety responsibility carry Canadian citizens in early model Boeing 747s. I know of a present hazard to those type of aircraft which is not agreed upon by your investigators. I know this current hazard to be true and can prove it with official Indian, Canadian, UK, and US government documents, text, charts, and photographs.

I must have an opportunity to present my years of research and analysis to your aviation accident investigators for their evaluation and action if required.

It is only fair that when a polite survivor of a sudden night fiery fatal jet airplane crash with aviation experience, that's me, presents himself with a plausible reasonable mechanical explanation for an aircraft accident, with precedent, to a public safety official, that's you, that that messenger be given an audience with professional investigators who can then rule in or rule out his warning of current danger to the Canadian flying public.

Please refer me to TSB aircraft investigators, preferably those in Vancouver B.C., who have experience in Swiss Air 111 so that they will quickly see what I am warning them about.

You have my phone number, my address, and my email address. Please have an accident investigator contact me, if even only to listen.

Sincerely,
Barry

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.

US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.

US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.

Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy

Retired US Army Major MSC

Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.

Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

Mr. Smith,

Since you are a United States citizen and your safety concerns stem

from the occurrence involving an American registered and manufactured aircraft, UAL 811, which was investigated in detail by the NTSB, I recommend that you contact the NTSB and/or the FAA who are responsible for taking safety action in your country. The TSB has a close working relationship with the NTSB, and the NTSB has specifically looked into wiring issues for some time (e.g. TWA 800). We have exchanged information with them on this subject. Should the NTSB deem it necessary to take follow-up safety action based on your input, we would be informed of this through our normal working relations with them.

Jim Harris
Public Affairs Advisor
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
*819-994-8053
*jim.harris@tsb.gc.ca

> -----Original Message-----
> From: John Barry Smith [SMTP:barry@corazon.com]
> Sent: 16-Mar-01 19:38
> To: Harris, Jim
> Subject: Clear and Present danger to the Canadian flying public
>

>
> Dear Mr. Harris, thank you for your reply and referring me to
the RCMP,
> which I shall do regarding any criminal aspects of this airplane
crash.

>
> However, I would like to inform you and the TSB of a clear
and present
> danger to the Canadian flying public as we speak. This danger
is known
> faulty wiring (see Swiss Air 111 TSB investigation on
polyimide
> insulation) which is causing forward cargo doors of early
model Boeing 747
> to open in flight. This conclusion is made by my research into
Air India
> 182 accident in which the TSB (then CASB) reported in its
finding:

>

> Mr. Smith,

>

> Since this is the subject of an RCMP investigation, and is
in

> criminal

> court, it would be inappropriate for anyone at the TSB to
discuss

> this

> matter. It would be recommended that your enquiry be
directed to the

> RCMP

> at:

>

> Royal Canadian Mounted Police
> Air India Task Force
> 5255 Heather Street
> Vancouver, B.C.
> V5Z 1K6
>
> Regards
>
> Jim Harris
> Public Affairs Advisor
> Transportation Safety Board of Canada
> *819-994-8053
>
> *jim.harris@tsb.gc.ca
>
>

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT

To: Wallace Anne <anne.wallace@srg.caa.co.uk>

Subject: Warning/alert about wiring/cargo door/explosive decompression

Dear Mrs. Wallace, 28 Mar 2001

Thank you very much for following up on my warning that there exists a clear and present danger to the flying public.

This is not a 'bomb' threat, nor a 'sky is falling' exclamation nor a 'whispered anonymous' phone call, nor an hysterical 'conspiracy' plot.

This is a warning/alert about a mechanical, well documented, current, pervasive problem from an identified expert. I invite discussion and request that you contact me at my email, my telephone number, or mail to my home for further details or refer me to professional accident investigators.

The problem is wiring. It's a problem well known by the AAIB but the severity of the problem is greatly under appreciated because few fatal accidents have been blamed on wiring. The symptoms of wiring failures have been 'fixed', but not the wiring cause.

Specifically, wiring causes forward cargo doors of early model Boeing 747s to rupture open in flight. The electrical problems in early model Boeing 747s have caused cargo door to open in flight before but only one resulted in fatalities, UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 90/01 and 92/02, summary below.

My twelve years of research and analysis have shown that ruptured open cargo door in flight events, which mimic a bomb explosion, have occurred three other times with many fatalities. The three flights are all controversial with conspiracy theories abounding to explain the mysterious inflight breakups of the aircraft, however, I can prove to you and investigators with documents, photographs, and charts that support the tangible, circumstantial, and direct evidence that all three suffered a ruptured open forward cargo door in flight, probably caused by an electrical problem.

The flights are Air India Flight 182, Pan Am 103, and TWA 800.

Yes, they are have been called other probable causes, starting off with bomb explosions by terrorists.

No, they are not bombs.

Yes, they are a mechanical cause with precedent which the matching evidence among all four shows the pattern or electrically caused ruptured open forward cargo door in flight.

Air India Flight 182, Pan Am 103, and TWA 800 all match the confirmed and irrefutable probable cause of electrically caused ruptured open forward cargo door in flight for UAL 811.

I rely on the evidence to prove the wiring/cargo door/explosive decompression explanation. I must have an opportunity to present my research and analysis to air accident investigators who can evaluate my warning alert of the danger of wiring faults in early model Boeing 747s. The problem is not clearly understood nor appreciated by the authorities.

An emergency AD to inspect the wiring in the forward cargo door areas of early model Boeing 747s must be issued before the event occurs again.

I assume AAIB has not attempted to brush me off to a corporate type who has no interest in aviation safety but assume they referred me to you because you know who to contact to properly review my data and evaluate the risk. (Further details on the wiring/cargo door/explosive decompression are at www.corazon.com)

Can you help?

Sincerely,
Barry

John Barry Smith

(831) 659-3552 phone

551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924

www.corazon.com

barry@corazon.com

Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135
certificate holder.

US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.

US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.

Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy

Retired US Army Major MSC

Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.

Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On February 24, 1989, United Airlines flight 811, a Boeing 747-122, experienced an explosive decompression as it was climbing between 22,000 and 23,000 feet after taking off from Honolulu, Hawaii, en route to Sydney, Australia with 3 flightcrew, 15 flight attendants, and 337 passengers aboard.

The airplane made a successful emergency landing at Honolulu and the occupants evacuated the airplane. Examination of the airplane revealed that the forward lower lobe cargo door had separated in flight and had caused extensive damage to the fuselage and cabin structure adjacent to the door. Nine of the passengers had been ejected from the airplane and lost at sea. A year after the accident, the Safety Board was uncertain that the cargo door would be located and recovered from the Pacific

Ocean. The Safety Board decided to proceed with a final report based on the available evidence without the benefit of an actual examination of the door mechanism. The original report was adopted by the Safety Board on April 16, 1990, as NTSB/AAR-90/01.

Subsequently, on July 22, 1990, a search and recovery operation was begun by the U.S. Navy with the cost shared by the Safety Board, the Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing Aircraft Company, and United Airlines. The search and recovery effort was supported by Navy radar data on the separated cargo door, underwater sonar equipment, and a manned submersible vehicle. The effort was successful, and the cargo door was recovered in two pieces from the ocean floor at a depth of 14,200 feet on September 26 and October 1, 1990.

Before the recovery of the cargo door, the Safety Board believed that the door locking mechanisms had sustained damage in service prior to the accident flight to the extent that the door could have been closed and appeared to have been locked, when in fact the door was not fully latched. This belief was expressed in the report and was supported by the evidence available at the time. However, upon examination of the door, the damage to the locking mechanism did not support this hypothesis. Rather, the evidence indicated that the latch cams had been backdriven from the closed position into a nearly open position after the door had been closed and locked. The latch cams had been driven into the lock sectors that deformed so that they failed to prevent the back-driving.

Thus, as a result of the recovery and examination of the cargo door, the Safety Board's original analysis and probable cause have been modified. This report incorporates these changes and supersedes NTSB/AAR-90/01.

The issues in this investigation centered around the design and certification of the B-747 cargo doors, the operation and

maintenance to assure the continuing airworthiness of the doors, cabin safety, and emergency response.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the sudden opening of the forward lower lobe cargo door in flight and the subsequent explosive decompression. The door opening was attributed to a faulty switch or wiring in the door control system which permitted electrical actuation of the door latches toward the unlatched position after initial door closure and before takeoff. Contributing to the cause of the accident was a deficiency in the design of the cargo door locking mechanisms, which made them susceptible to deformation, allowing the door to become unlatched after being properly latched and locked. Also contributing to the accident was a lack of timely corrective actions by Boeing and the FAA following a 1987 cargo door opening incident on a Pan Am B-747.

As a result of this investigation, the Safety Board issued safety recommendations concerning cargo doors and other nonplug doors on pressurized transport category airplanes, cabin safety, and emergency response.

Dear Mr Smith

The UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch has forwarded your email of 17 March 2001. Please could you provide further details of the information you have?

Yours sincerely
Anne Wallace (Mrs)
Corporate Affairs
Safety Regulation Group

Civil Aviation Authority

(anne.wallace@srg.caa.co.uk)

This e-mail, and any files transmitted with it, are confidential.
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+44-1293-573333)

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purpose
nor disclose their contents to any other person.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT
To: Wallace Anne <anne.wallace@srg.caa.co.uk>
Subject: **Brushoff...again....as usual...**

Dear Mrs. Wallace, 29 March 2001

Thank you for your prompt reply to my plea for consideration of
my warning/alert to a clear and present danger to the flying
public in early model Boeing 747s.

Your reply, even lacking the traditional salutations, was rejection

of my plea, not by facts, but by opinion of the very group I am saying is wrong. I thought that was the job of safety people, to listen to citizens who report safety problems, not reject them out of hand because they conflict with authority point of view. Especially from someone who knows what he is talking about because he has been there, has official documents, and politely identifies himself.

But you checked with them, and they said, "Yup, we're right and he's wrong." The End. At least you did not give the insulting to injury bromide, "Thank you for your interest in aviation safety."

So, AAIB brushes me off to you and you brush me off to FAA.

Do not the British have a characteristic of being polite in all circumstances?

Do not the British have history of tolerating eccentrics and checking out their 'weird' stories?

I guess I could end with just a few facts to rebut your CAA Safety Regulation Group Head of Safety Data and Investigation Department who says, so serenely and self confidently that examination of the wreckage proved that the cargo door was not the cause of PA 103 and TWA 800 accidents.

The status of the PA 103 forward cargo door is not given. The other two doors are examined and declared latched and locked,

The status of the TWA 800 forward cargo door is not given. The status of two of the ten latches is not given.

The midspan latches of both forward cargo doors are not

reported as being recovered, examined or if they were latched or not.

The wiring/cargo door/explosive decompression explanation states that both forward cargo doors on both aircraft ruptured open at the midspan latches with photographs and drawings from NTSB and AAIB to prove it.

You say the cargo door was not the cause of PA 103 yet you and your group leader and AAIB do not know whether the cargo door were latched or not and reject all evidence it ruptured open in flight.

Ah, facts. You prefer opinions...

Note your group leader gave no facts, only opinion, as you did.

Too bad. You would think in this day of science that agencies such as yours would respect reality and turn aside wishful thinking when it conflicts with the evidence.

But, you tried, now go have a cup of tea. An action transferred is an action completed.

Note last line of my credentials, I'm an expert too, in some things.

Sincerely,
Barry

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,

Carmel Valley, CA 93924

www.corazon.com

barry@corazon.com

Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.

US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.

US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.

Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy

Retired US Army Major MSC

Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.

Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

Thank for the information which you have provided. I have consulted the CAA

Safety Regulation Group Head of Safety Data and Investigation Department.

He has advised me that examination of the wreckage proved that the cargo

door was not the cause of PA 103 and TWA 800 accidents. The judge decided

that on balance of probability the accident to AI182 was caused by a bomb.

As we cannot take this matter any further we suggest that, if you have not

already done so, you communicate your concerns to the FAA. I have copied

the correspondence, by fax, to the FAA's Europe, Africa, & Middle East Office in Brussels.

From: John Barry Smith[SMTP:barry@corazon.com]
Sent: 28 March 2001 19:42
To: Wallace Anne
Subject: Warning/alert about wiring/cargo door/explosive decompression

Dear Mrs. Wallace, 28 Mar 2001

Thank you very much for following up on my warning that there exists a clear and present danger to the flying public.

This is not a 'bomb' threat, nor a 'sky is falling' exclamation nor a 'whispered anonymous' phone call, nor an hysterical 'conspiracy' plot.

This is a warning/alert about a mechanical, well documented, current, pervasive problem from an identified expert. I invite discussion and request that you contact me at my email, my telephone number, or mail to my home for further details or refer me to professional accident investigators.

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Can you help?

Sincerely,
Barry

John Barry Smith
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A year after the accident, the Safety Board was uncertain that the cargo door would be located and recovered from the Pacific Ocean. The Safety Board decided to proceed with a final report based on the available evidence without the benefit of an actual examination of the door mechanism. The original report was adopted by the Safety Board on April 16, 1990, as

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Before the recovery of the cargo door, the Safety Board believed that the door locking mechanisms had sustained damage in service prior to the accident flight to the extent that the door could have been closed and appeared to have been locked, when in fact the door was not fully latched. This belief was expressed in the report and was supported by the evidence available at the time. However, upon examination of the door, the damage to the locking mechanism did not support this hypothesis. Rather, the evidence indicated that the latch cams had been backdriven from the closed position into a nearly open position after the door had been closed and

locked. The latch cams had been driven into the lock sectors that deformed so that they failed to prevent the back-driving.

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of timely
corrective actions by Boeing and the FAA following a 1987
cargo door opening
incident on a Pan Am B-747.

As a result of this investigation, the Safety Board issued
safety
recommendations concerning cargo doors and other nonplug
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pressurized transport category airplanes, cabin safety, and
emergency
response.

Dear Mr Smith

The UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch has
forwarded your
email of 17

March 2001. Please could you provide further details of the
information you
have?

Yours sincerely
Anne Wallace (Mrs)
Corporate Affairs
Safety Regulation Group
Civil Aviation Authority

(anne.wallace@srg.caa.co.uk)

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+44-1293-573333)

immediately.

You should not copy or use this e-mail or attachments for any purpose

nor disclose their contents to any other person.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT
To: SGT Blachford@redshift.com
Subject: Meeting about Air India Flight 182

Sgt. B. Blachford
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather St.
Vancouver, B. C.
V5Z 1K6

Dear Sergeant Blachford, 14 Nov 01

Thank you for your letter of 7 Nov 01 in which you would like to meet with me and discuss in detail my shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup for Air India Flight 182 and taking at least a day to do so.

Yes, of course, Sergeant. Let us work on the logistics.

I would prefer here in my home office with my computers and stacks of documents for referral as needed and the sooner the better. I put myself at your service regarding time and date.

I'll meet you at the Monterey Airport, or, if you drive, as I did in March to Vancouver, call me and I'll set you up with lodging. An alternative meeting place is possible.

I've also invited a representative of TSB, Mr. Bill Tucker, to join us as well as an attorney for the defence assigned by the Crown, Mr. Keith Hamilton. (Mr. Garstang being unavailable.) I'm

waiting for replies from them. If you prefer to meet alone, please tell me and that is fine with me. My approach is open and forthright with everyone informed. Please consult with them regarding the meeting.

Email for Mr. Tucker: Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca

W.T. (Bill) Tucker
Director General,
Investigation Operations
TSB

Email for Mr. Keith Hamilton: keithrh@telus.net
Defense Counsel assigned by the Crown for Mr. Bagri

The ideal meeting would include the law enforcement authority, (you of the RCMP AITF), a TSB aircraft safety investigator (Mr. Tucker or representative), defence counsel assigned by the Crown (Mr. Keith Hamilton), and this independent aircraft accident investigator, (John Barry Smith.)

It seems the mood has changed in the past few days after AA 587 and now the first speculation of a cause of an airliner crash is mechanical failure instead of a terrorist act (such as believed in 1985). It looks like facts, data, and evidence, are taking priority now and that is good. There are lots of those for support of a mechanical cause for Air India Flight 182 and I look forward to laying them out for you and answering all your queries.

Cheers,
Barry Smith

John Barry Smith

(831) 659 3552
541 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

Sgt. B. Blachford
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather St.
Vancouver, B. C.
V5Z 1K6

Dear Sergeant Blachford,
31 May 2001

Enclosed is hard copy of my Smith AAR for AI 182 and the appendices to it. These hard copy files should be the same as my PDF files sent to you electronically earlier from Mr. Tucker of TSB.

Also enclosed is a hard copy of my email I sent to you via the RCMP website yesterday.

Do you have a direct email other than the web based email for RCMP?

I invite discussion on this matter which I believe presents a danger to the flying public as well as clearing up a mystery of 16 years; telephone calls and emails are most welcome.

Cheers,

Barry

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT
To: airindia@istar.ca
Subject: For Sgt. B. Blachford Air India Task Force

Sgt. B. Blachford
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather St.
Vancouver, B. C.
V5Z 1K6

Dear Sergeant Blachford, 14 Nov 01

Thank you for your letter of 7 Nov 01 in which you would like to meet with me and discuss in detail my shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup for Air India Flight 182 and taking at least a day to do so.

Yes, of course, Sergeant. Let us work on the logistics.

I would prefer here in my home office with my computers and stacks of documents for referral as needed and the sooner the

better. I put myself at your service regarding time and date.

I'll meet you at the Monterey Airport, or, if you drive, as I did in March to Vancouver, call me and I'll set you up with lodging. An alternative meeting place is possible.

I've also invited a representative of TSB, Mr. Bill Tucker, to join us as well as an attorney for the defence assigned by the Crown, Mr. Keith Hamilton. (Mr. Garstang being unavailable.) I'm waiting for replies from them. If you prefer to meet alone, please tell me and that is fine with me. My approach is open and forthright with everyone informed. Please consult with them regarding the meeting.

Email for Mr. Tucker: Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca

W.T. (Bill) Tucker
Director General,
Investigation Operations
TSB

Email for Mr. Keith Hamilton: keithrh@telus.net
Defense Counsel assigned by the Crown for Mr. Bagri

The ideal meeting would include the law enforcement authority, (you of the RCMP AITF), a TSB aircraft safety investigator (Mr. Tucker or representative), defence counsel assigned by the Crown (Mr. Keith Hamilton), and this independent aircraft accident investigator, (John Barry Smith.)

It seems the mood has changed in the past few days after AA 587 and now the first speculation of a cause of an airliner crash is mechanical failure instead of a terrorist act (such as believed in

1985). It looks like facts, data, and evidence, are taking priority now and that is good. There are lots of those for support of a mechanical cause for Air India Flight 182 and I look forward to laying them out for you and answering all your queries.

Cheers,
Barry Smith

John Barry Smith
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Carmel Valley, CA 93924
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Sgt. B. Blachford
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather St.
Vancouver, B. C.
V5Z 1K6
Dear Sergeant Blachford,
31 May 2001

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RCMP?

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From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT
To: Sgt. Bart Blachford@redshift.com
Subject: The End of the Day

Sgt. B. Blachford
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather St.
Vancouver, B. C.
V5Z 1K6

Dear Sgt. Bart Blachford, 11 Dec 01

Thank you again for taking the time and effort to fly down here to my home from Vancouver. I trust you had a pleasant and safe flight home. Thank you for the RCMP badges you gave to my daughter, Laura Ashley; she treasures those very ornate and detailed emblems, so royal. I'm sending by separate post some of the documents I had prepared for you but neglected to give for your further review; they are mainly matching aircraft accident reports.

I've had a week to think about and digest our conversations regarding my shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182 and other Boeing 747s. Here are my thoughts:

1. You have not been on a wild goose chase these last six years, Sergeant. You said to me, "If I had thought that I has wasted these last six years..." and then trailed off. I took that to mean that for the first time, something I said led you to believe that actually the accused were not guilty and that all your investigative efforts to prove them guilty were for naught. Not true, sir! Your efforts have been fruitful. You have discovered the culprit. It's not human but then many villains are not; some are bacteria, some are lightning, and some are frayed wiring. If you consider yourself a prosecutor whose purpose is to convict three men, then you have been on a wild goose chase, but that is not your job, that is the Crown's prosecutor attorneys; your mandate is to find out the cause of a terrible event, regardless if human or not, and that you have done. You said words to the effect, "At the end of the day, you believe you can convince a jury that the three accused planted a bomb on Air India Flight 182." So what? You speak like a lawyer advising his client we can win because of your persuasive power to fellow humans, in this case the jury which will have all aviation experienced personnel rejected, only ignorant laypersons will be accepted. Their opinion about human

nature is requested and valuable, but their opinion about why an airplane crashed is worthless. Please raise your investigative goal to include all causes for Air India Flight 182, not just evil humans.

2. Please continue your investigation into the shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation as I now realize you have already started. You have received my report, you have interviewed me, you said when you left you 'had work to do', and I ask that you continue to evaluate my comments such as this letter.

3. I believe you to be a fair and determined public safety police officer, Sgt. Blachford. Your determination has been proven by your trip down here and your review of my documents. To be fair, please consider all possible suspects. To be fair, if you include Pan Am Flight 103 as a match to Air India Flight 182, as your 'expert' does, then please be fair and include other similar events, United Airlines Flight 811 and Trans World Airlines Flight 800. After using the analogy of a partial fingerprint of United Airlines Flight 811 that matches Air India Flight 182 and others, let me use the analogy of the line up. The AITF has said the probable cause of the event was a bomb explosion inside a Boeing 747 and uses two aircraft in the line up to see if they match: Air India Flight 182 and Pan Am Flight 103. Fine. They do match in evidence. We agree. I say to be fair, let's bring in the other suspected victims of the 'bomb' explosion: United Airlines Flight 811 and Trans World Airlines Flight 800, both also thought to have been bomb explosions for days to over a year. Based upon Trans World Airlines Flight 800, a center fuel tank explosion needs to be considered and ruled in or out for Air India Flight 182. I rule it out based on the evidence and lack of same to support a center fuel tank explosion as an initial event. The

burned and sooted pieces of wreckage do not support a finding of center tank explosion for Air India Flight 182 but the possibility needs to be considered and evaluated by professional aircraft accident investigators specializing in fuel/air explosions because of its similarity to Air India Flight 182. Then to United Airlines Flight 811 to see if it fits to Air India Flight 182. I believe you will find it does if given the same degree of attention as was given to match Pan Am Flight 103 to Air India Flight 182. To be fair all four similar events of Boeing 747s suffering fuselage breakup in flight leaving a sudden loud sound on the cockpit voice recorder and an abrupt power cut to the flight data recorders must be considered equally. To only pick and choose those events which support your/AITF explanation of bomb explosion is not fair and is a prosecutorial or defense type action, not investigative. Prosecutors and defense counsel are not supposed to be fair, they are supposed to be biased and one sided; investigators are not one sided, they are fair and investigate all stories of all potential victims or suspects. Please give consideration of a match to Air India Flight 182 from United Airlines Flight 811 and Trans World Airlines Flight 800 as well as your current match of Pan Am Flight 103.

4. Your questions were mainly of a 'check out the messenger' type; who was I, what was my research based on, etc. You agreed I 'was not a kook'. The messenger checked out; now to check out the message: Air India Flight 182 was not a criminal offense but a mechanical event with precedent; shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation which matches United Airlines Flight 811.

5. Specific items to check out: (These are ones I recall we discussed, I think you wrote down several more.)

a. Have bomb expert evaluate if bomb explosion or midspan

latch ruptures caused the outward force which frayed the forward cargo door of Air India Flight 182 as stated in the CASB and Kirpal reports. Are the torque tubes twisted or just blown away? Is there bluing on the latch pins which indicate rupture force similar to United Airlines Flight 811? These questions can be answered by close examination of the high quality 35 MM film and video of the forward cargo door area in RCMP custody.

b. Have bomb expert evaluate the finding of Mr. Garstang, not a bomb expert, that there was an explosion (not an overpressure) in the aft cargo compartment and that that explosion was caused by a bomb. When bombs explode they leave telltale signs, some of which should be present, such as pitting, gas washing, cratering, residue, etc. As far as my research goes, none of the required bomb explosion corroborating evidence was present in the aft area of Air India Flight 182 and it was closely examined for same, but a bomb expert should provide an opinion.

c. Find evidence to counter the specific findings in the previous reports based upon evidence that the sudden loud sound on the CVR was not a bomb sound but was in fact matched to the explosive decompression sound of another wide body airliner when its cargo door inadvertently opened in flight.

c. Find evidence to counter the specific finding in the previous reports based upon evidence that there was no explosion of any kind in the aft cargo compartment.

d. Find evidence to counter the specific and undisputed finding that Pan Am Flight 103 suffered an explosion in the forward cargo compartment but has been matched to Air India Flight 182 by Mr. Garstang, who incredulously states that that aircraft suffered an explosion in the aft cargo compartment, an event, which if it had occurred, would have left much different evidence such as a debris pattern which would have differentiated it from Pan Am Flight 103.

e. Consult with engineers to evaluate possibility that normal

overpressures from a broken up fuselage in flight can cause the evidence that exists for the aft section of Air India Flight 182 which would be a reasonable alternative explanation for the overpressures other than a bomb explosion.

f. Examine high quality photo and video to see if there are paint smears above forward cargo door which would indicate ruptured open and not exploded open and would match United Airlines Flight 811 and Trans World Airlines Flight 800, two non bomb events.

g. Ask Boeing to conduct computer simulations to evaluate what happens when various sized holes suddenly appear in the fuselage just forward of the wing; 20 inch hole on port side, nine foot by 15 foot, and 20 feet by 40 feet on the starboard side. Does the nose come off? Does the nose stay on? What noise would appear on the CVR? Would the electrical power shut off abruptly or not for each event? Where would the pieces of ejected debris impact on the aircraft in flight such as leading edges of the wings and horizontal and vertical stabilizers? Which engines would ingest FOD and what effects would occur, such as uncontainment and fire?

I know the specifics are detailed but, Sgt. Blachford, this is an airplane crash, not a bank robbery. First establish a crime, then find the criminals. In 1986 the CASB declined to describe Air India Flight 182 as a crime. You have engineers and aircraft investigators available for consultation although reluctant. You might check with Scotland Yard for their opinion about the starboard side of Pan Am Flight 103 blowing out first as that area is neglected in the AAIB report. Submit the mechanical explanation for Pan Am Flight 103 for their opinion, they may have one.

I have offered up other accident victims and accused the culprits,

electrical systems, faulty wiring, and a design flaw of outward opening nonplug cargo doors in a pressurized hull. (That cargo door has only one latch per nine foot slice of fuselage and it has no locking sector to prevent inadvertent opening inflight.) All of my accused have been found to have killed before in other similar aviation events. They are not above suspicion; they are dirty. As you heard from Mr. Tucker, wiring in early model Boeing 747s (and other airliners) has been found to be faulty, the electrical system has failed and killed before, and outward opening cargo doors are a design shortcoming that has killed many in DC 10 and Boeing 747 as well as other models such as DC-9.

Prosecutors have accused humans who may or may not have committed other crimes but I know they did not cause Air India Flight 182 because 'nobody' did; it was a mechanical event with its accused culprits who have committed other tragedies as well as Air India Flight 182: wiring, electrical system, and outward opening nonplug cargo doors.

Please look beyond your one tree (AI 182) in the forest of four Boeing 747 accidents (AI 182, PA 103, TWA 800, and UAL 811). Consider yourself not only a Canadian investigator but a world investigator. Include all four of the Boeing 747 events which are so often matched together because of their similarities: Air India Flight 182, Pan Am Flight 103, United Airlines Flight 811, and Trans World Airlines Flight 800. As you have delved so diligently into the three Sikh accused lives, delve with equal fervor into the other three: Pan Am Flight 103, United Airlines Flight 811, and Trans World Airlines Flight 800. Their histories are available as aircraft accident reports, and although not as spicy as human histories, still tell a fascinating tale of human life and death.

As always, Sgt. Blachford, I remain available anytime for further discussion and consultation to you and your fellow investigators as I consider this a life and death issue as the hazards I have identified remain today as they did sixteen years ago. Come down again and if it's my turn to come up and meet your staff, I certainly will try.

Cheers,
Barry

John Barry Smith
(831) 659 3552
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Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
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7.18 Summary of matching evidence between Air India Flight 182 and United Airlines Flight 811 specifically:

- A. Boeing 747
- B. Early model -100 or -200
- C. Polyimide wiring (Poly X type)
- D. Sudden airframe breakup in flight (partial or total)
- E. Breakup occurs amidships
- F. Section 41 retrofit not done
- G. At least medium flight time
- H. At least medium aged airframe
- I. Previous maintenance problems with forward cargo door
- J. Initial event at about 300 knots while proceeding normally in all parameters

- K. Initial event involves hull rupture in or near forward cargo door area
- L. Initial event starts with sudden sound
- M. Initial event sound is loud
- N. Initial event sound is audible to humans
- O. Initial event followed immediately by abrupt power cut to data recorders
- P. Initial event sound not matched to explosion of bomb sound
- Q. Initial event sound is matched to explosive decompression sound in wide body airliner
- R. Torn off skin on fuselage above forward cargo door area
- S. Evidence of explosion in forward cargo compartment
- T. Foreign object damage to engine or cowling of engine number three
- U. Foreign object damage to engine or cowling of engine number four
- V. Right wing leading edge damaged in flight
- W. Vertical stabilizer damaged in flight
- X. Right horizontal stabilizer damaged in flight
- Y. More severe inflight damage on starboard side than port side
- Z. Port side relatively undamaged by inflight debris
- AA. Vertical fuselage tear lines just aft or forward of the forward cargo door
- AB. Fracture/tear/rupture at a midspan latch of forward cargo door
- AC. Midspan latching status of forward cargo door not reported as latched
- AD. Airworthiness Directive 88-12-04 not implemented (stronger lock sectors)
- AE. Outwardly peeled skin on upper forward fuselage
- AF. Rectangular shape of shattered area around forward cargo door
- AG. Forward cargo door fractured in two longitudinally

AH. Status of aft cargo door as latched
AI. Passengers suffered decompression type injuries
AJ. At least nine missing and never recovered passenger bodies
AK. Initial unofficial speculation of probable cause as bomb explosion.
AL. Initial unofficial speculation modified from bomb explosion
AM. Structural failure considered for probable cause
AN. Inadvertently opened forward cargo door considered for probable cause

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT
To: SGT Blachford@redshift.com
Subject: **Trial delay opportunity**

Sgt. B. Blachford
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather St.
Vancouver, B. C.
V5Z 1K6

Dear Sgt. Bart Blachford, 17 Dec 01

Let us take advantage of this extra time to further check out the shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup for Air India Flight 182 and others.

I'm hoping this extra time will give you and AITF opportunity to interview me again as they check out the items of interest you discovered during our discussions such as paint smears and twisted

torque tubes.

Is there any chance we can view videotapes of that door area of Air India Flight 182 together to look for those matches to United Airlines Flight 811?

During our talks down here I mentioned that the family of one of the victims of United Airlines Flight 811, the Campbells, had quoted a NTSB investigator as saying the Air India Flight 182 door looked just like the United Airlines Flight 811 door which gives a further match to a wiring cause and not a bomb. Mr. Tucker said he believed that no NTSB investigator had access to the Air India Flight 182 photos and thus could give no opinion. I was able to research this further and discovered that, in fact, a NTSB investigator did have access to all of the Air India Flight 182 data and thus could state with accuracy that the Air India Flight 182 door matched the United Airlines Flight 811 forward cargo door. That investigator was no less than Jim Wildey, the person who ruled out the forward cargo door of Trans World Airlines Flight 800 based on only the examination of eight of the ten latches.

Below excerpt from the Campbells of New Zealand to me:

'We flew to Seattle but were told we could not see the door , we drove to Washington to see the NTSB and as we entered the office we were told they could spare us 5 minutes, about 3 hours later we held a set of the recovered C locks and Lock sectors and they admitted we were correct , that they would ensure that the aircraft would be fixed but not to hold our breath waiting for a new report ever to be released . After lunch with them I asked " in light of what we now know on 811 do you still think

that Air India was a bomb ?"

The reply was that we never thought that Air India was a bomb in fact the

video shows a cargo door exactly the same as 811.'

From Kirpal Report below on Air India Flight 182:

'1.5.16 The participant had all filed their affidavits by way of submissions. The Court indicated that formal hearings would be held for the purpose of cross-examining some of the witnesses about three weeks after the receipt of all the reports of the various groups. While in Cork, in the first week of November, 1985 some of the salvaged pieces of the wreckage were brought there. After they were inspected by all the participants and their advisers, who were present in Cork, it was decided by the Court that further detailed metallurgical and other examination of those pieces would be done at BARC, Bombay. In order that there should be no undue delay the Court decided that a Group be constituted consisting of expert representatives of all the participants and also the nominees

of the Court. This group was asked to carry out metallurgical and other examination of some of the critical pieces salvaged and give its report to the Court. The group constituted as a 'Committee of Experts' was as under :-

- a. Mr. A.J.W. Melson, Canadian Aviation Safety Board, Canada.
- b. Mr. R.K. Phillips, Canadian Pacific Air, Canada.
- c. Mr. T. Swift, Federal Aviation, Administration, USA.
- d. Mr. R.Q. Taylor, Boeing Commercial Airplane Co., USA.
- e. Mr. J.P. Tryzl, Boeing Commercial Airplane Co., USA.
- f. Mr. J.F. Wildey II, National Transportation Safety Board USA.
- g. Mr. S.N. Seshadri, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, India (Coordinator).'

The above suggests that for Air India Flight 182, the NTSB representative, Jim Wildey, said no bomb; the AAIB representative, Mr.

Roy Davis, said no bomb; the Canadian Aviation Safety Board, (CASB) declined to say bomb, and only a judicial officer, not an aircraft investigator, Judge Kirpal, said bomb, and even that opinion was given reluctantly:

From Kirpal Report:

'ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

4.1 From the evidence which is available what has now to be determined is as to what caused the accident.

4.2 Finding the cause of the accident is usually a deduction from known set of facts. In the present case known facts are not very many, but there are a number of possible events which might have happened which could have led to the crash.

4.3 The first task is to try and marshal the facts which may have a bearing as to the cause of the accident.

4.4 It is undisputed, and there is ample evidence on the record to prove it, that Air India's Kanishka had a normal and uneventful flight out of Montreal. The aircraft had been in air for about five hours and was cruising smoothly at an altitude of 31,000 feet. The readout from the CVR shows that there was no emergency on board till the catastrophic event had occurred. This is corroborated by the printout available from the DFDR. The event occurred at approximately 0714 Z and that brought the aircraft down, and it probably hit the surface of the sea within a distance of 5 miles. The time within which the plane came down at such a steep angle could not have been more than very few minutes. There was a sudden snapping of the communication between the aircraft and the ground. The aircraft had also suddenly disappeared from the radar.

4.5 It is evident that an event had occurred at 31,000 feet which had brought down 'Kanishka'. What could have possibly happened to it? The aircraft was apparently incapacitated and this was due either to it having been hit from outside; or due to some structural failure; or due to the detonation of an explosive device within the aircraft.

4.6 Evidence indicates that after the event had occurred, though the pilots did not or were not in a position to communicate with the ground, they nevertheless appeared to have taken some action. ...

4.7 It can further be speculated that if an explosion takes place in the forward cargo compartment, the oxygen stream might have been damaged so that when the pilots donned their masks as part of the emergency drill for explosive decompression, they were not breathing enriched oxygen and the time of useful consciousness at about 31,000 feet would be significantly less than 30 seconds under high stress and if the pilots became unconscious as a result of this, then the aircraft would have got out of control which would explain the subsequent events.

4.8 ... "The United States Norad/Space Command has confirmed that there was no incoming space debris in the vicinity of Ireland on June 23, 1985."

4.9 Thus we are left with only two of the possibilities viz., structural failure or accident having been caused due to a bomb having been placed inside the aircraft.

4.10 After going through the entire record we find that there is circumstantial as well as direct evidence which directly points to the cause of the accident as being that of an explosion of a bomb in the forward cargo hold of the aircraft. At the same time there is complete lack of evidence to indicate that there was any structural failure.'

So, Sgt. Blachford, that's two aviation accident investigation agencies giving an opinion that there was no bomb, one agency declining to say a bomb, and one judicial officer saying bomb out of two equal choices. That's three to one against supporting bomb. When Judge Kirpal said there 'is complete lack of evidence to indicate that there was any structural failure,' he was correct in 1986 because he did not know what a structural failure from an inadvertently opened cargo door in flight looks like on a Boeing 747, nobody did. But now we do know and the evidence matches United Airlines Flight 811, not a bomb event although initially thought to be by the crew.

I am available to travel up there to give a full presentation to Mr. Schneider and the rest of the AITF staff if you wish. It really is important, not just for justice for the three jailed men, but that my research shows that a current hazard exists for the Canadian public that needs to be corrected.

Cheers,
Barry

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http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow.asp?art_id=1836280357

A-I bombing trial postponed to Nov. 2002

VANCOUVER: The trial for three men charged with killing 329 passengers in the 1985 Air India bombing, expected to start in February, has been moved to November.

British Columbia Supreme Court justice Ian Bruce Josephson Friday rescheduled the trial, expected to be the most complex and longest in Canadian history, to allow more time for pretrial motions and jury selection.

The trial of Ripudaman Singh Malik, Ajaib Singh Bagri and Inderjit Singh Reyat had originally been set for February 4.

Josephson's ruling is outlined in a 25-page written brief that is banned from publication until at least Wednesday, when defence lawyers will advise whether they object to any part of the decision being published. The trial was expected to be delayed by construction of a new high-security courtroom scheduled to be ready in April.

Malik and Bagri were arrested October 27, 2000, and Reyat was added

to the indictment in June.

The three remain in custody in a Vancouver jail, and only Reyat appeared in court on Friday.

The three are alleged to have been militant Sikh separatists who targeted the airline in June 1985 to retaliate against the government for a raid on Amritsar's golden temple a year earlier.

(AFP)

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT

To: Sgt.Bart Blachford@RCMP

Subject: Analysis of PA 103 cargo door photo Part IV

Sgt. B. Blachford
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather St.
Vancouver, B. C.
V5Z 1K6

Dear Sgt. Bart Blachford, 10 Feb 02

Enclosed is analysis of PA 103 cargo door photo Part IV and recently sent to Mr. Tucker of TSB; Parts I, II, and III previously sent to you on February 1, 2002.

The key point here, Sgt. Blachford, is the visual irrefutable match in official photographs of the peeled back skin away from the aft midspan latch of United Airlines Flight 811 forward cargo door to the Pan Am Flight 103 forward cargo door. The photographs of Trans World Airlines Flight 800 also show this peeled back skin at the aft midspan latch. Air India Flight 182 states the, "damage to the door and the fuselage skin near the door appeared to have been caused by an outward force," but needs confirmation or ruling out by examination of the photographs

preserved all these years. You have access to these high quality 35 MM film and video for an opportunity to examine that area visually.

Can you do that, Sgt. Blachford? Can you match Air India Flight 182 forward cargo door area to Pan Am Flight 103 and to United Airlines Flight 811 to Trans World Airlines Flight 800 using photographs to examine closely the area around the latches to see if they do in fact match? Can I see the photographs for evaluation since I have been studying this area on Boeing 747 for over a decade and can assist in your conclusions? Can Mr. Tucker see the photographs of Air India Flight 182 forward cargo door area and have his professional accident investigators evaluate them?

Boeing 747 forward cargo door above in normal closed position.

Pan Am Flight 103 forward cargo door above show peeled back skin and hole at aft midspan latch in upper left of photo.

United Airlines Flight 811 forward cargo door above showing peeled back skin and hole at aft midspan latch forward center of photo.

Trans World Airlines Flight 800 forward cargo door aft midspan latch above with rupture hole shown at 'x'.

From the Kirpal report below, (need pictures to properly evaluate):

"2.11.4.6 All cargo doors were found intact and attached to the fuselage structure except for the forward cargo door which had some fuselage and cargo floor attached. This door, located on the forward right side of the aircraft, was broken horizontally about one-quarter of the distance above the lower frame. The damage to the door and the fuselage skin near the door appeared to have been caused by an outward force. The fractured surface of the cargo door appeared to have been badly frayed."

Sgt. Blachford, I believe you are willing to give equal time to all plausible explanations for the destruction of Air India Flight 182 in addition to the one your team has been pursuing all these years: Bomb! Please give equal time to another plausible explanation: Shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup. This mechanical explanation keeps on being confirmed as the investigation into it continues. It has not been refuted; in fact it has gained support and credibility.

Please look at the forward cargo doors of the three accident aircraft, read the text of another, and then compare all with the normal forward cargo door of a Boeing 747. All four accident aircraft had ruptures in and around the lower half of that known failure prone cargo door activated by now known faulty wiring. And we know why it happened for sure to only one of them, United Airlines Flight 811, the one that came back to tell its tale of why a sudden loud sound appeared on the cockpit voice recorder which was quickly followed by an abrupt power cut to the recorders.

Please take advantage of your opportunity to conduct further evaluation of Air India Flight 182 forward cargo door area in photos and video you have access to. Please avail yourself of the talent in aviation agencies you have access to. First and foremost; this was an airplane accident. It may not have been criminal although at first blush, it may appear to have been; just like Trans World Airlines Flight 800, just like United Airlines Flight 811, just like Pan Am Flight 103, and just like the Boeing 747 that brought us to meet, Air India Flight 182.

Sincerely,

Barry Smith

John Barry Smith
(831) 659 3552
541 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT
To: Sgt.BartBlachford@RCMP
Subject: Who are the TSB investigators?

Sgt. B. Blachford
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather St.
Vancouver, B. C.
V5Z 1K6

Dear Sgt. Bart Blachford, 17 Feb 02

Thank you for your letter of 11 Feb 02, scan below. I have a question, sir:

Who are '...the investigators at TSB,' to whom you 'passed on the information' provided by me? Was it Mr. Gartstang? Mr. Tucker? Mr. Gerden? Please inform me so that I may correspond with them on this urgent safety issue on Boeing 747s on which Canadian citizens fly.

My goal was not to persuade them that the cause of Air India Flight 182 was the shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation but to persuade you and them that a supplemental/updated accident report is warranted based on similar subsequent accidents. In fact, that supplemental investigation is underway with your visit and the recently obtained and analyzed pictures. Those cargo door pictures of Pan Am Flight 103 further confirm that the door opened inflight. Even after our meeting in December, the evidence, as it comes in, supports the wiring/cargo door explanation.

It is most important that the photographs of Air India Flight 182 forward cargo door area be evaluated for a match to the other three accident aircraft.

From the Campbells of New Zealand, email excerpt below:
(They had asked NTSB about Air India Flight 182 after the Campbells had persuaded the US Navy and NTSB to retrieve the cargo door of United Airlines Flight 811 from the bottom of the ocean.)

The reply was that we {NTSB} never thought that Air India was a bomb in fact the

video shows a cargo door exactly the same as 811.

So, for three Boeing 747s, all three show obvious rupture at the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door and there is hearsay evidence that the fourth aircraft, Air India Flight 182, had the same rupture. This is a very significant match. You have the photographs of Air India Flight 182 to confirm or rule out this aft midspan rupture. Can you send the photographs to TSB for evaluation, also?

A prosecutor might skip the actual photo evidence if it conflicted with his case, but a prudent investigator, which I believe you are, Sgt. Blachford, would pursue any plausible alternative explanation as long as the actual evidence supports that alternative. For the mechanical wiring/cargo door explanation, the actual new evidence keeps on supporting that explanation as it accumulates and warrants further evaluation.

Cheers,
Barry Smith
John Barry Smith
(831) 659 3552
541 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT
To: Sgt.BartBlachford@RCMP

Subject: Authority who said 182 door exactly same as 811 door

Sgt. B. Blachford
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather St.
Vancouver, B. C.
V5Z 1K6

Dear Sgt. Bart Blachford, Mr. Schneider, and all Air India Task Force personnel, 22 March 2002

This is a follow up letter to Sgt. Blachford's letter requesting information about the NTSB statement that the United Airlines Flight 811 forward cargo door looks exactly like the Air India Flight 182 forward cargo door with the implication being that if the shattered cargo door of one plane looks like the shattered cargo door of another, the cause may be the same, and the irrefutable truth of one is that it was caused by an electrical problem, not a bomb, so that both may be electrical.

John Barry Smith wrote:

Below is excerpt from an email sent to me from Mr. and Mrs. Campbell whose son was killed in United Airlines Flight 811 and who know more about why forward cargo doors open inadvertently in flight than most people on earth. They are experts in this matter and must be highly respected for their perseverance, research, and conclusions. He has been awarded high honors by the New Zealand government for his efforts in aviation safety. Mr. Campbell connected Air India Flight 182 to United Airlines Flight 811 in 1991 as excerpt shows below. They are available for interview and currently live in New Zealand.

"From: SMANDKJC@aol.com

Date: Sun, 22 Aug 1999 22:39:33 EDT

Subject: From Kevin Campbell
To: barry@corazon.com

After lunch with them I asked " in light of what we now know on 811 do you still think that Air India was a bomb ?"
The reply was that we never thought that Air India was a bomb in fact the video shows a cargo door exactly the same as 811. I wrote to both Air India and the Canadian Safety Board with my findings on 811 but did not even have the courtesy of a reply ."

At 11:07 AM +1300 3/4/02, Kevin & Susan Campbell wrote:
>X-From_: smandkjc@internet.co.nz Sun Mar 3 14:08:39 2002
>From: "Kevin & Susan Campbell" <smandkjc@internet.co.nz>
>To: "John Barry Smith" <barry@corazon.com>
>Subject: Re: 182 door exactly like 811 door
>Date: Mon, 4 Mar 2002 11:07:55 +1300
>X-Priority: 3
>

>Hi! The main guy we visited at the NTSB that day was Ron Schleede but there were at least 2 others involved in the meeting and lunch. Fairly sure it was Ron who made the comment but he may well deny it. Michael Marx was the Chief of the Materials Lab on 811 Jim Wildey was Senior Metallurgist but Susan recalls it was Ron and Michael we had lunch with.

>I have found a letter I wrote to Ron Schleede and Michael Marx after our meeting making reference to our discussion about AI 182 and will email that as well.
>Regards Kevin

Sgt. Blachford, in the letter referenced above there is a paragraph 4 which is referred to below:

At 5:38 PM -0800 3/3/02, John Barry Smith wrote:

>Ok, very very good, Kevin, thank you. Now Ron Schleede emailed me early on during the Trans World Airlines Flight 800 investigation to assure me that the cargo door was latched until water impact, weeks before the wreckage was recovered and months before it was hung on the reconstruction which showed the large outward opening petal shaped ruptures at the aft midspan latches. Mr. Schleede is known to Mr. Tucker and they are on recent speaking terms even though Mr. Schleede retired some time ago. But, Mr. Schleede is still available for interview to confirm it was him or Marx who made the comment.

>

>Now, regarding top paragraph of page 4:

>

>"With further regard to the Air India 747..." That implies you had earlier discussion about Air India 747. Was this in reference to the 'both doors looked alike statement? This confirms that your earlier conversation took place.

>

>"Is the video footage showing the two pieces of that cargo door in the possession of the N.T.S.B?" How did you know the Air India Flight 182 forward cargo door was in two pieces? Because of your earlier conversation? This confirms you had the conversation and that they (NTSB) said it was in two pieces.

At 10:02 AM +1300 3/5/02, Kevin & Susan Campbell wrote:

>> Now, regarding top paragraph of page 4:

>>

>> "With further regard to the Air India 747..." That implies you had earlier

>discussion about Air India 747. Was this in reference to the 'both doors

>looked alike statement? This confirms that your earlier

conversation took

>place.

>YES

>> "Is the video footage showing the two pieces of that cargo door in the

>possession of the N.T.S.B?" How did you know the Air India Flight 182

>forward cargo door was in two pieces? Because of your earlier conversation?

>This confirms you had the conversation and that they (NTSB) said it was in

>two pieces.

>YES

>Regards Kevin

To summarize:

The United Airlines Flight 811 forward cargo door looks like it does with its peeled back skin from the aft midspan latch and longitudinal split because an explosive decompression occurred at that point caused by faulty wiring or switch that tried to unlatch to door in flight.

Concur: NTSB, Smith.

Do not concur: None.

The Pan Am Flight 103 forward cargo door looks like it does with its peeled back skin from the aft midspan latch and longitudinal split because a bomb exploded on the other side of the cargo compartment.

Concur: NTSB, AAIB, Garstang, RCMP, FBI, CIA, and Scotland Yard.

Do not concur: Smith.

The Air India Flight 182 forward cargo door looks like it does with its peeled back skin from the aft midspan latch and longitudinal split because a bomb exploded on the starboard side of the cargo compartment.

Concur:

Indian Kirpal Report

Do not concur: CASB, AAIB, NTSB, Garstang, Smith, and RCMP.

The Trans World Airlines Flight 800 forward cargo door looks like it does with its peeled back skin from the aft midspan latch and longitudinal split because of a spontaneous fuel air explosion in the center fuel tank with unknown ignition source.

Concur: NTSB

Do not concur: Smith

Sgt. Blachford and members of the Air India Task Force of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police: What is going on? Are you detectives? Or are you politicians, bureaucrats, aircraft accident investigators, or attorneys?

When viewing the matching facts, data, and evidence of the four aircraft, Air India Flight 182, Pan Am Flight 103, United Airlines Flight 811, and Trans World Airlines Flight 800 each would have a response:

Significant Direct and Tangible Evidence Obtained for Four B747 Breakups in Flight

	AI 182	PA103	UAL 811	TWA 800
Boeing 747	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Early model -100 or -200			Yes	Yes
Polyimide wiring (Poly X type)			Yes	Yes

Sudden airframe breakup in flight (partial or total)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yes	Yes			
Breakup occurs amidships	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
High flight time (over 55,000 flight hours)	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yes				
Aged airframe (over 18 years of service)	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yes				
Previous maintenance problems with forward cargo door	Yes	Maybe	Yes	Maybe
Initial event within an hour after takeoff	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yes				
Initial event at about 300 knots while proceeding normally in all parameters	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yes	Yes			
Initial event has unusual radar contacts	Maybe	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yes				
Initial event involves hull rupture in or near forward cargo door area	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Initial event starts with sudden sound	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Initial event sound is loud	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Initial event sound is audible to humans	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yes				
Initial event followed immediately by abrupt power cut to data recorders	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yes				
Initial event sound matched to explosion of bomb sound	No	No	No	No
Initial event sound matched to explosive decompression sound in wide body airliner	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yes	Yes			
Torn off skin on fuselage above forward cargo door area	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Unusual paint smears on and above				

forward cargo door	Maybe	Maybe	Yes	Yes
Evidence of explosion in forward cargo compartment	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Foreign object damage to engine or cowling of engine number three			Yes	Yes
Yes	Yes			
Fire/soot in engine number three		Maybe	Yes	Yes
Yes				
Foreign object damage to engine or cowling of engine number four	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Right wing leading edge damaged in flight		Yes	Maybe	
Yes	Maybe			
Vertical stabilizer damaged in flight	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Maybe				
Right horizontal stabilizer damaged in flight	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Yes				
More severe inflight damage on starboard side than port side	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Port side relatively undamaged by inflight debris			Yes	
Yes	Yes	Yes		
Vertical fuselage tear lines just aft or forward of the forward cargo door	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Yes				
Fracture/tear/rupture at a midspan latch of forward cargo door	Maybe	Yes	Yes	Yes
Midspan latching status of forward cargo door reported as latched	No	No	No	No
Airworthiness Directive 88-12-04 implemented (stronger lock sectors)	No	No		
No	Yes			
Outwardly peeled skin on upper forward fuselage	Yes	Yes		
Yes	Yes			
Rectangular shape of shattered area				

around forward cargo door	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Forward cargo door fractured in two longitudinally	Yes			
Yes	Yes	Maybe		
Status of aft cargo door as intact and latched	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Maybe				
Passengers suffered decompression type injuries	Yes	Yes		
Yes	Yes			
At least nine missing and never recovered passenger bodies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wreckage debris field in two main areas, forward and aft sections of aircraft	Yes	Yes	No	
Yes				
Initial official opinion of probable cause as bomb explosion.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Initial official determination modified from bomb explosion	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Structural failure considered for probable cause			Yes	Yes
Yes	Yes			
Inadvertently opened forward cargo door considered for probable cause	Yes	No	Yes	
Yes				
Official probable cause as bomb explosion	Yes	Yes		
No	No			
Official probable cause as 'improvised explosive device'	No	Yes	No	No
Official probable cause as explosion by unstated cause	Yes	No	No	No
Official probable cause as explosion in center fuel tank				
with unknown ignition source	No	No	No	Yes
Official probable cause as improper latching of forward cargo door	No	No	Yes	No
Official probable cause as switch /wiring				

inadvertently opening forward cargo door No No
Yes No

Significant Direct and Tangible Evidence Obtained for Four B747 Breakups in Flight

AI 182 PA103 UAL 811 TWA 80

A politician would look at all the matching evidence among the four Boeing 747s and say to me, "It's obviously evil conspiracy plots by our enemies who managed to plant bombs in the cargo compartments of our planes and kill our innocent women children and it's not our fault for authorizing defectively wired aircraft with design flawed cargo doors that are nonplug and open outward. Give us more money to fight these evil monsters."

A bureaucrat would say to me, "This message may be monitored for quality control purposes. Don't talk to me. Go talk to that guy over there. I'm busy; my department has no budget, we need money, we are understaffed, and you may leave a message on my voice mail after the beep and I'll get back to you sooner or later."

An aircraft accident investigator would say to me and recently did, "What do you have, Smith; show me your evidence; why do you make the conclusions you make? Here's some photographs I have obtained for you of one of the aircraft in question; what do you think of the photos of the cargo door area of Pan Am Flight 103?"

An attorney would say, "We got convictions against a bomber already and we'll get convictions from a jury on this one and my fee is four hundred dollars an hour."

Now, what would a detective say? I don't know but I can only assume that a detective would say all of the above and add,

"Who told you this, where did you get this information, who are you, why do you say these things," and then start asking the real questions based upon several premises starting with the credibility of the messenger/tipster and once he is confirmed as credible, getting into the facts of the case.

Sgt. Blachford, you came down here to my house, met my family, looked at my personal documents and confirmed I have no ulterior motive for saying Air India Flight 182 was not a bomb but mechanical, that I am a rational adult married man and homeowner who retired from the US military and who also has thousands of flight hours as well as having a solid motive for aviation safety since I am a survivor of a sudden fiery fatal jet airplane crash and I'm talking about a sudden fiery fatal jet airplane crash.

This messenger/tipster checks out. Now to check out the message. Here is proof in pictures, drawings and text that the site of initial damage to Air India Flight 182 is the same as the initial site in three other Boeing 747s including the one key aircraft that did not totally destruction and was conclusively not a bomb, United Airlines Flight 811, thus warranting a further examination into the cause of Air India Flight 182 by examining and evaluating the photographs and film of the wreckage to confirm or rule out the match.

The modus operandi of the shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup sequence is the same for the four aircraft. The forensic evidence the event leaves is real and matching to other cases. The events happen over a period of years in different jurisdictions, apparently randomly to different airlines in different countries, and the symptom is always blamed first, not the underlying cause. It's the classic case

of a serial killer who is getting away with it. There is no central authority to put all the trees in order to see the forest. AITF can be that authority. Four airplane crashes with similar evidence. You are investigating one; check out the others.

Appearance of forward cargo door of the four Boeing 747s:

Above photo is normal forward cargo door in closed position.

Above photo from NTSB: The United Airlines Flight 811 forward cargo door looks like it does with its peeled back skin from the aft midspan latch and longitudinal split because an explosive decompression occurred at that point caused by faulty

wiring or switch that tried to unlatch to door in flight.

Above photo from AAIB: The Pan Am Flight 103 forward cargo door with its peeled back skin from the aft midspan latch and longitudinal split.

Above drawing from CASB report: The Air India Flight 182 forward cargo door looks like it does with its peeled back skin from the aft midspan latch and longitudinal split. Door is reported to look exactly like the United Airlines Flight 811 forward cargo door by NTSB officials who had access to all the photographs and film of Air India Flight 182 forward cargo door area.

From the Kirpal report about door above:

"2.11.4.6 All cargo doors were found intact and attached to the fuselage structure except for the forward cargo door which had some fuselage and cargo floor attached. This door, located on the forward right side of the aircraft, was broken horizontally about one-quarter of the distance above the lower frame. The damage to the door and the fuselage skin near the door appeared to have been caused by an outward force. The fractured surface of the cargo door appeared to have been badly frayed."

Above photo from NTSB: The Trans World Airlines Flight 800 forward cargo door with its peeled back skin from the aft midspan latch and longitudinal split.

Note that the port side of these aircraft, on the opposite side of the fuselage of these shattered areas, is relatively smooth and

undamaged except for small areas of disruption.

So, Sgt. Blachford, what does all this mean? It means that one initial event probably caused all four similar consequences and should be the first working assumption, not the last. That cause may be a bomb, or missile, or center tank explosion or space debris or the shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation. Regardless, for so many similar consequences to occur the most likely reason is the same for all, but not many different reasons such as center tank fuel explosion with unknown ignition source, bomb in aft cargo compartment, bomb in forward cargo compartment on port side, bomb in forward cargo compartment on starboard side, missile, improperly latched cargo door, or wiring or switch turning on the door unlatch motor inadvertently.

My vote for the similar cause for the similar evidence is the mechanical explanation with precedent, the shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation.

What is your primary duty? What are you dedicated to? What are you educated for, paid for, and sworn for? What is your professional goal in life?

What is the mandate of the AITF? To catch bad guys or to investigate the cause of a national tragedy and then catch the villains if a crime is confirmed? I know you know the case against the three accused is flawed, flimsy, and subject to criticism because I know no crime has been committed and thus no criminals. I know you figure it's the best you can do with what you have. It is the best you can do when you are searching for the ghosts of invisible killers with nonexistent bombs. But when you

go after solid things like facts, data, and evidence, the solution is clear and confirmable; it's mechanical and can be confirmed by forensic examination of photo and film examination, by reality, not shadowy elusive conspiracy plots. I think about tipster 3195...who was he/she? A person leaving an anonymous note saying they overheard a drunken conversation in a bar about men with turbans talking about revenge? What is the quality of your tips? Are they from experienced aviation pilots who give you quotes and photos from government accident investigations which check out every time you check them out?

What are you trying to do? That is a simple question with a complex answer when dealing with an internationally important event which has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of innocents.

I have tried to be objective, scientific, and calm during these 13 years of my research into explosive decompression events in Boeing 747s and interacting with government officials in my own country as well as others. I have believed that science and facts, data, evidence will eventually prevail as to determining the probable cause of these accidents/tragedies/crashes, but never crimes.

Well, it hasn't worked. One man is in jail for the rest of his life and his appeal was just rejected. Three men will be on trial for their life's freedoms in November. Lawsuits will be litigated against fuel tank manufacturers in amounts of hundreds of millions of dollars. I'm saying the Emperor Boeing has no clothes on and no authority wants to admit it because of the perceived dire consequences to their careers, reputations, and honor. Well, I'm saying it again to you, Boeing has made aircraft with now known faulty wiring which inadvertently ruptures open the design flawed outward opening non plug cargo door at the

midspan latches which have no locking sectors. It's happened before with United Airlines Flight 811 with the again reluctance at the time by authorities to admit the Emperor had no clothes on so blamed an improperly latched forward cargo door by a poor ground crew guy instead of the electrical system. It took the examination of the actual retrieved door for the authorities to finally see the truth; it was not a bomb or improperly latched door as previously thought, but electrical wiring or switch. And all hell temporarily broke loose; everyone was castigated by the investigating authority; the airline, the manufacturer, and the government oversight agency all were assessed some degree of blame. So be it. The safety of the citizen had the priority. I hope it still does because the hazard was not fixed; it still exists and is unacknowledged.

During these long years, as I have attempted to persuade the authorities to conduct a supplemental investigation into the cause from the point of view of the shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation, the facts, data, and evidence as shown above in my chart have been given short thrift because the implications are so profound. I understand the reluctance of authorities to disturb the wishful thinking of the senior officials and the desire for blood lust revenge by the populace. I might do the same if my job were on the line and the finances and security of my family were at stake. But they are not and that objectivity and detachment allows me to have perhaps a clearer and unbiased interpretation of the evidence.

No one was curious: Except Sgt. Blachford of RCMP AITF and Mr. Tucker of TSB. They have asked questions. They have read my material. They have visited me in my home. They have asked follow up questions. The last question from Sgt. Blachford was

why do I say the forward cargo door of Air India Flight 182 looks exactly like the forward cargo door of United Airlines Flight 811? I say it because the NTSB said it, that's why. And they had access to photos of the cargo doors of both events.

I appeal to the AITF to consider an alternative to conspiracy theories from this tipster 3196: I ask you to use your detective skills to rule in or rule out this intriguing possibility: Not a bomb, but something that sounds like, looks like, and smells like a bomb but isn't. It's called explosive decompression caused by accidental hull rupture in flight.

It's a plane crash, it's mechanical, it has happened before June 1985, and it's happened since; it's bad wiring specifically and it's already agreed that that type of wiring (Poly X) is bad generally. It's not bombs planted by strange foreign men with funny hats and accents. It's an accepted mechanical problem in a machine that has experienced it before and since.

I know the implications are profound, I know careers are affected, I know emotions run wild by all living person connected to the four fatal events, and I know the wishful thinking is always that it is not the good guys' fault, but the bad guys' fault.

That's politics. To me that mean finding what can we all agree on that is satisfactory so we can get on with the business of our lives. Politics has nothing to do with truth, or right or wrong, or even justice, but is trying to keep the peace and avoiding conflicts. If the sun has to go round the earth to keep the status quo, then the sun goes round the earth and you can see it move with your own eyes, so what's the problem?

Politics has no place in aircraft accident investigations, (nor criminal investigations for that matter,) but we know politics intrudes in all aspects of life so we have to accommodate as best we can while staying true to our principles and ideals.

Investigations by their very nature step on people's feet, ruffle feathers, rock the boat, make waves, rub the wrong way, and generally cause havoc. That's why there is so much political pressure to come to satisfying conclusions that keep everything running smoothly. The Kirpal Report was a political report as it cleared Air India of responsibility and the conclusion of bomb was wrong as to the cause which resulted in later accidents which killed hundreds. The Canadians were more cautious and non political, they reported what they discovered which was explosion in forward cargo compartment of unstated cause, and they were right. The Canadians at the time did not offer wishful thinking conjecture. Time has proven the Canadians of 1986 correct in their appraisal of the cause of Air India Flight 182. Time has refined their findings with United Airlines Flight 811 in 1989 showing the cause of the explosion in the forward cargo compartment of Air India Flight 182 to be electrical.

The RCMP is an investigative agency; the Crown prosecutors are the ones to prosecute, get convictions, and rebuff appeals, not the detectives who are charged with an objective, neutral investigation. It appears to me, and this is controversial nontechnical opinion which may be wrong, that the AITF has become political in that the conclusions determined by it are known to be consistent with the wishful thinking of the politicians in India, USA, and Canada but inconsistent with the facts, data, evidence. It appears that the AITF is agreeing with the senior officers of RCMP by seeking prosecution of three men who are considered to be unfavorable by thirteen years of being labeled terrorists for blowing up an aircraft by planting a bomb in

the...in the, well, just exactly where was that bomb on Air India Flight 182 and where was it loaded?

If you are saying the bomb was in the aft cargo compartment, as your lone aviation expert does, then you are refuting without evidence the conclusions of dozens and dozens of investigators from the Kirpal Commission, the AAIB, the NTSB, and the Canadian Aviation Safety Board who said an explosion occurred in the forward cargo compartment and definitely not in the aft cargo compartment. It appears that the bizarre conclusion that the 'bomb' was in the aft cargo compartment is to allow the 'bomb' to be loaded in Vancouver since all that baggage went into the aft cargo compartment and an explosion in the forward cargo compartment, which is agreed to by all government agencies, would rule out Vancouver as the loading point. In addition, and this is more serious, frivolously claiming, with no actual evidence such as photographs or data recorder information for support, that there was a powerful bomb in the aft cargo compartment, location unstated, is to take United Airlines Flight 811 out of consideration since that event happened in the forward cargo compartment.

But I digressed into facts, data, evidence again, as is my wont. Sorry, back to the subjective discussions which I have avoided for years but are now necessary in an attempt to break through this low wall of indifference that AITF has thrown up around the shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182. Please continue your investigation into the explanation and do not pass me off to another agency. You are the right agency, you are the Air India Task Force. You have the staff, budget, access, mandate, and authority to investigate. You have the means, opportunity, and motive to do the investigation right.

Are you investigators or are you prosecutors? The AITF and the RCMP appear to be doing a prosecutor's job such as giving pre trial press conferences to malign the accused as dirty phone callers, previously convicted bombers, and generally undesirable persons capable of blowing up an airplane full of crying women and children. That strategy is unworthy of the Gendarmerie royale du Canada.

Are you detectives? I think you think you are. I want to believe you are. Are you going for convictions at all costs or satisfying truth of an investigation leaving no stone unturned and then let the courts take over? The accused may or may not be terrible human beings but they did not put a bomb on Air India Flight 182 in any location because nobody did. There was no bomb. There was an explosive decompression which mimics a bomb.

detective adj 1 : fitted or used for detection 2 : of or relating to detectives

detect vb : to discover the nature, existence, presence, or fact of
~ detectable adj detection \- detector \-

To discover the nature, existence, presence or fact of...

Are you doing that with Air India Flight 182? Are you treating that as a plane crash or a bank robbery? Have you learned why planes crash and in particular why a huge airliner would suddenly come apart in the air? Like the Comet or DC-10 from years ago? Do you know why lightning strikes, why balloons pop and why your hand moves backwards when you stick it out the window of a car? If you do know those three basic things, and I think you do, then you will know why Air India Flight 182

exploded in flight.

I know you know the evil that lurks in men's hearts but do you know about lift, drag, and thrust? Do you know about the weight of air and the immense pressure exerted when compressed? Did you know that there was about 100000 pounds of pressure on that large eight foot by nine foot forward cargo door at 31000 feet? That's a lot of weight exerted on two midspan latches that each hold together an eight foot slice of fuselage....and they have no locking sectors as the bottom eight latches do which are there specifically to prevent an inadvertent opening in flight.

Sgt. Blachford has confirmed the facts of the sudden loud sound on the CVR which matches that of three other Boeing 747s. He has confirmed the presence of photographs and film of Air India Flight 182 which exist in vaults and available to be examined and evaluated for further matches to United Airlines Flight 811 which is the model, the victim, that just barely made it back to land and tell its tale which refuted the initial bomb explanation given by the flight crew and allowed the investigators to finally conclude it was not a bomb, nor an improperly latched forward cargo door, but faulty wiring or switch which started a sequence of events which caused a rupture at the aft midspan latch and a longitudinal split in that door; visual physical evidence with matches the forward cargo door of Air India Flight 182, according to those government aviation investigators who have seen photographs and film of both doors.

He has discovered the fact that this private citizen has given a tip number 3196 and this citizen is a homeowner, father, husband, retired military officer, pilot, and survivor of a sudden fiery fatal jet airplane crash. The messenger of the tip checks out as legitimate and now is the time to check out the message: shorted

wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/
inflight breakup is what caused the destruction of Air India Flight
182.

Every scientist has his tools: Pasteur his microscope, Galileo his telescope, Magellan his ship, and me, my photographs. I risked my life in Vietnam to bring back photos of North Vietnam to my ship as a reconnaissance attack navigator. I was also a photo interpreter and air intelligence officer. I evaluate photographs of wreckage. You have access to additional answers to the mystery of Air India Flight 182 in the detailed, high quality color photographs and film of the wreckage that were taken at great expense and saved for years for this very purpose:

Reexamination using hindsight and subsequent similar accidents to give refined evaluations. You have your photographs and I ask that you look at them. Look at the actual evidence to make your deductions, not whispered tapped telephone calls. Look at the forensic evidence of the event, the twisted metal, the gaping holes, the fractured ribs, the sudden loud sound on the cockpit voice recorder which is the best evidence since it is direct, it was there, it heard the initial event, and that sound was not a bomb, but of an explosive decompression which matched another explosive decompression caused by an open cargo door in a widebody airliner. At least that's what the investigating authorities stated in their report.

Above from the CASB report; DC-10 cargo door opened, made sudden loud sound on the CVR and then the aircraft crashed, killing all.

Respect the evidence. Look at it, please do not commit the sin of omission, do not pass the evaluation off to someone else as a

bureaucrat would, do not go for emotionally swaying a jury as an attorney, do not dig up dirt as a prosecutor's assistant would, do not give platitudes and puffery as a politician would, but look and evaluate objectively using all the detective and sleuthing skills that you have acquired, been trained for, and I think, long to use.

It is better to be temporarily embarrassed than permanently shamed. It's not too late to get it right. The AITF RCMP did find the culprit for Air India Flight 182 and it was not a person but metal and insulation and latches. For 15 years the RCMP was like a bloodhound relentlessly hunting down a path directed by politicians labelled bomb bomb bomb planted by outsiders, and directed away from a path which may lead to blame towards insiders such as the manufacturer and government oversight agencies. But Sgt. Blachford, probably acting under orders from above, did start down that path when he reviewed my research documents and visited me here at home. Please continue down that investigation path. And the further down the wiring path one goes, the more solid and wider the path gets. The more the photographs are reviewed, the stronger the objective case becomes for wiring/cargo door explanation and weaker and weaker becomes the case for bomb. As investigators, you are neutral to the actual cause as long as it is the most probable; let the prosecutors worry about criminal charges being dismissed or the politicians worry about red faces.

I must give a story that is relevant and told from personal experience as a jet navigator on board ship.

On an aircraft carrier there are about 100 planes and about 150 pilots of all ranks and titles, from an Ensign assistant operations officer to a Commander who is an Air Wing Commander. There

is also someone called the LSO, Landing Signal Officer, of which there were about ten on board. These were the elite pilots among the elite pilots in the world. They were usually young Lieutenants or Lieutenant Commanders with several cruises of experience. One of them would always be at the end of the ship, near the arresting wires, and watch every approach and landing of every plane. He would then judge the landing and write down the approach and which wire was caught. The number three wire was best with an OK pass; number one, two, or four wire was poor and risky. After flight operations ceased and all pilots and crews were in the ready rooms debriefing, the LSO would go around to each pilot and give his report on the pilot's performance on landing such as high in groove, low in close, needed power, fair two wire. Every pilot intently listened to this feedback report and remembered it on the next landing. In this way bad habits were caught early and corrected. The point of the story is this: Rank and status made absolutely no difference to the pilots. They were talking reality about life and death in their profession. It was not personal criticism but a professional critique. The junior officer was in effect telling the senior pilot that he made a bad landing and described why. The senior pilot listened and obeyed because they both knew it was not personal but integral to completion of the mission. It was objective and supported by the TV videotape from the camera embedded in the flight deck which monitored every cat shot and every trap.

It's never too late to start all over again. Start with the rare luxury of hindsight, the knowledge of similar subsequent events to the event under investigation and stay strictly with the facts, data, and evidence, and try to ignore wishful thinking suggested from higher ups. Match up the events by looking for the pattern which groups them all: Sudden loud sound on the CVR followed by an abrupt power cut to the recorders, an event so rare it has only

happened four times in Boeing 747s in flight, Air India Flight 182, Pan Am Flight 103, United Airlines Flight 811, and Trans World Airlines Flight 800.

Above chart from NTSB public docket for Trans World Airlines Flight 800 matching the sudden loud sound on the CVR to four Boeing 747s and a 737.

Disregard the emotional buzz words of flight numbers and think of them as machine victims with a construction number and in service and accident dates:

Air India Flight 182 was the 330th 747 made, construction number 21473 and entered service on 19 June 1978 and came apart in flight on 23 June 1985.

#15, 19646, B747-121, 25 Jan 70, PA103 event date 21 Dec 88

#89, 19875, B747-122, 20 Oct 70, UAL 811 event date, 23 Feb 89

#153, 20083,, B747-131, 18 Aug 71 TWA 800, event date, 17 July 96

#330, 21473 , B747-237b 19 Jun 78 AI 182 , event date June 23 1985

The evidence dictated the flight numbers, not me. There are no more Boeing 747 accidents with a sudden loud sound on the cockpit voice recorder followed by an abrupt power cut because I've checked all hull losses and serious accidents, but if there were, that construction number, in service date, and emotional

flight number would be added to the above list.

Air India Flight 182 was a plane crash, not a bank robbery. One good thing about being a detective is that you get to learn a lot about a lot of things; for instance, in a bank robbery, you get to learn all about bank vaults and those big thick heavy metal doors, how they open, close, and how they come open when they shouldn't. You can do the same for cargo doors in pressurized hulls which keep safe much more important things than colored pieces of paper.

You can learn why the forward cargo door ruptured open when it shouldn't in Air India Flight 182, as the Kirpal Report and the Canadian Aviation Safety Board and the Air Accidents Investigation Board reported but disagreed on why, a mystery that remains to this day and which I contend the AITF has solved, faulty wiring causing the door unlatch motor to turn on.

You have solved the mystery of Air India Flight 182 and although the answer is not what you expected nor sought, you have it right, you got it from a tipster, you checked it out and apparently it needs further checking out by examining evidence you have access to such as photographs to overcome your incredulity at the immense implications of the solution to the mystery since it also solves other mysteries in two other aircraft accidents which have their own immense implications.

It's never too late, until it's too late, and then it's too late.

Respectfully,

Barry Smith

John Barry Smith

(831) 659 3552

541 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924

www.corazon.com

barry@corazon.com

Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135
certificate holder.

US Navy reconnaissance bombardier navigator, RA-5C 650
hours.

US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.

Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy

Retired US Army Major MSC

Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.

Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT
To: Sgt. Bart Blachford@RCMP
Subject: Smith AAR for Pan Am Flight 103

Sgt. B. Blachford
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather St.
Vancouver, B. C.
V5Z 1K6

Dear Sgt. Bart Blachford, 1 May 02

Enclosed is the Smith AAR for Pan Am Flight 103 which has relevance to the Air India Flight 182 investigation as it shows the cause for both to be the shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation.

It is in four parts. The appendices are available upon request. I think you'll find the report comprehensive.

Essentially:

Shotgun firing misled investigators with red herring of bomb explosion.
Real culprit is shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation.
Hazard exists today.
Supplemental investigation by professionals warranted.

Cheers,
Barry

John Barry Smith
(831) 659 3552
541 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT
To: barry@corazon.com
Subject: **Fwd:**

Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2002 09:35:11 -0800

To:

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Subject:

Cc:

Bcc:

X-Attachments:

Date: 27 Feb 1997 15:18:35 +0400

From: Securitas <Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca>

To: "P=gc+internet; DDA.TYPE=RFC-822;

DDA.VALUE=barry(a)corazon.com" <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: RE: Crash cause of Air India Flight 182

Importance: normal

Autoforwarded: FALSE

Priority: normal

Thank you for your report expressing concern about the opening of cargo

doors on B-747 aircraft. During any aircraft crash, investigators examine

every piece of evidence, in order to determine cause. In the case of the

Air India flight, the cargo door was in fact retrieved from the bottom of

the ocean by the investigators. The latches were still in place, and there

was no evidence on the edges of the door to indicate in-flight opening of that door.

On the other hand, there was other solid evidence indicating a bomb blast had occurred. Aircraft accident investigators are trained people. Anybody can say anything they want on the Internet. Put your money on the experts; you will win more often.

From: P=gc+internet; DDA.TYPE=RFC-822;
DDA.VALUE=barry(a)corazon.com
To: Securitas
Subject: Crash cause of Air India Flight 182
Date: Saturday, August 31, 1996 9:50PM

<<File Attachment: BDY3.P00>>
DATE: Aug 31 17:50:40 1996 GMT
IPMessageID: 32287B6A.1295(a)corazon.com

FROM: [P=gc+internet; DDA.TYPE=RFC-822;
DDA.VALUE=barry(a)corazon.com]

TO: Securitas

SUBJECT: Crash cause of Air India Flight 182
IMPORTANCE: normal
AUTO FORWARDED: FALSE
PRIORITY:
ATTACHMENTS: c:\BDY3.P00

--
Dear Safety Person, The cause of the Air India flight 182 crash of
a
Boeing 747-237B from Toronto to London in 1985 was an
inadvertent opened
forward cargo door which then tore of skin which then tore of
nose to
destruction of aircraft. Not a bomb. My safety concern to TSB
Securitas
is that it can happen again. To properly assess the risk to
Canadian air
passengers, visit the web site at <http://www.corazon.com> for a
fully
documented presentation of the issue of inadvertently opening
cargo
doors. Open doors causing destruction in early model Boeing
747s has
happened before, it has happened now, and it may happen again.
Please
assess door opening claim by visiting web site and evaluating
documents
supporting hypothesis. John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT

To: barry@corazon.com

Subject: Fwd: Air India Flt. 182

X-From_: Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca Thu May 24 15:21:34 2001

From: "Tucker, Bill" <Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca>

To: "'John Barry Smith'" <Barry@corazon.com>

Cc: "Delorme, Paulette" <Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca>

Subject: Air India Flt. 182

Date: Thu, 24 May 2001 18:22:47 -0400

Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for your e-mail messages of 2 May and 8 May (sent to Ms. P.

Delorme, Office of the Executive Director) concerning the crash of Air India

Flight 182 that occurred on 23 June 1985.

First, I must respond that the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB-C)

has no mandate to re-open the aviation safety investigation of the AI

Flt.182 occurrence. As you may be aware, the TSB-C was not established

until 1990, and the Aviation Occurrence Report you referred to was prepared

by the Canadian Aviation Safety Board, the predecessor to the TSB-C. More

importantly, in accordance with ICAO Annex 13, the investigation of that

accident was led by the Government of India; the CASB report was prepared as

input to India's investigation.

That said, we certainly have more than a passing interest in the circumstances of the AI Flt. 182 tragedy. We are interested because of the

very nature of our chosen careers. We are interested because quite a few

TSB staff were working for the CASB at the time (myself

included), and many of that group were involved in the AI Flt.182 investigation. Above all, we are interested because of the enormity of the tragedy, the links to Canada and the fact that there has not yet been closure on this matter - almost 16 years after the event. As you are aware, the RCMP have been conducting a criminal investigation into the circumstances of the crash ever since 1985. In accordance with Canadian law, both the CASB and the TSB-C have provided the RCMP with copies of material from our file - excluding, of course, any information that is privileged under our Act. The information provided includes material that was produced by John Garstang.

In view of the foregoing, I forwarded a copy of your report to Sgt. Bart Blachford of the RCMP in Vancouver. The RCMP have as strong an interest as anyone in establishing what happened to AI Flight 182. I have also forwarded your report to the Director of Air Investigations, the Investigator-in-Charge of our SWR Flight 111 investigation, and the Director of Engineering for their information.

With respect to the brief message in your second e-mail (of 8 May), there is one point that I must clarify in reply. It is correct that the CASB

investigators' report never said it was a bomb that caused the explosion;
however, the report also never said that it wasn't a bomb. In fact, to my knowledge, there was nobody on the CASB team who didn't consider a bomb to be the most likely explanation. However, the aviation safety investigation conclusion on that point was, appropriately, left to the Kirpal Commission in India.

Thank you again for your messages.

W.T. (Bill) Tucker
Director General,
Investigation Operations

-----Original Message-----

From: John Barry Smith Eudora
[SMTP:Barry@corazon.com]
Sent: Wednesday, May 02, 2001 11:37 PM
To: paulette.delorme@tsb.gc.ca
Subject: Air India Flight 182 Probable Cause

Transportation Safety Board of Canada

Dear Fellow aircraft accident investigators, 2 May 01

I am an independent investigator concentrating specifically on early model Boeing 747s that suffer inadvertent decompressions in

flight. After years of research and analysis, my conclusion is that four fatal Boeing 747 accidents were caused by faulty poly-x wiring shorting on the forward cargo door unlatch motor leading to the rupture of one or both of the midspan latches leading to explosive decompression which resulted in amidships breakup for three of the aircraft and a large hole on the right side just forward of the wing on the remaining aircraft. I refer to Air India Flight 182, Pan Am 103, United Airlines Flight 811, and Trans World Airlines Flight 800. UAL 811 is the aircraft that did not come totally apart and landed with its incontrovertible evidence that matches up with the other three in so many significant ways as to imply they all had the same probable cause for the initial event.

Regarding Air India Flight 182, an accident in which Canadian public safety organizations are intimately involved, I have written a report supporting my findings and have quoted extensively from the Canadian Aviation Occurrence Report of 1986 of the Canadian Aviation Safety Bureau.

Please note that the Canadian aviation accident investigators

never
said it was a bomb that caused the agreed upon explosion in the
forward
cargo compartment of AI 182. The Canadian aviation accident
investigators
were absolutely correct in their conclusions of 1986 and only by
subsequent
similar accidents is the cause of that unexplained explosion now
clear.

I am sending by Word file my Smith AAR for AI 182 for
your
evaluation. Should you find the wiring/cargo door/explosive
decompression
explanation a plausible, reasonable, alternative explanation with
precedent
for the destruction of AI 182, then the issue of a clear and present
danger
to the Canadian flying public becomes apparent as the cargo door
wiring in
early model Boeing 747s has not been inspected for the tell tale
cracking
that the polyimide insulation shows before shorting.

I invite your queries to me for further details by phone or
email.
Regardless, a supplemental AAR for AI 182 is probably
warranted since TSB
has never actually given its official opinion regarding one the
most
celebrated of all tragic Canadian aviation accidents, equal to the
Arrow
Gander crash and Swiss Air 111.

Swiss Air 111 showed the vulnerability of widebody airliners to the faulty Kapton type wiring insulation which I conclude is the probable cause for Air India Flight 182. The 1972 DC-10 event over Windsor, Ontario, when a cargo door inadvertently opened, presaged the Paris Turkish Airlines DC-10 cargo door accident. Therefore, when I say that faulty wiring is causing cargo doors to inadvertently rupture open in wide body airliners, I believe you will say it's possible but did it happen for AI 182 and ask for the evidence. That evidence is presented in my report.

Very Respectfully,

John Barry Smith
Independent Aircraft Accident Investigator
barry@corazon.com
www.corazon.com <<http://www.corazon.com/>>
com <<http://www.corazon.com/>>831 659 3552
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA USA 93924

-----Original Message-----

From: John Barry Smith [SMTP:barry@corazon.com]
Sent: Tuesday, May 08, 2001 2:00 PM
To: Trans Safety Board Canada
Subject: Mounties now say 'bomb' in aft of Air India

Flight
182

Yes, the Mounties are saying the 'bomb' was in the Aft compartment of Air India Flight 182 and want to put three guys in jail for life for putting it there.

Ha!

Can you do something about this nonsense?

Cheers,

John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT
To: barry@corazon.com
Subject: Fwd: RE: Pix of Air India Flight 182

X-From_: Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca Tue Jun 25 15:22:17 2002
From: "Tucker, Bill" <Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca>
To: "'John Barry Smith'" <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: RE: Pix of Air India Flight 182
Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2002 18:23:49 -0400
Reply-By: Sun, 2 Jun 2002 17:00:00 -0400
X-Message-Flag: Follow up
Dear Barry,

I felt that this message from you below, dated 22 May, needed

specific

responses to several of your points. I'll get to your request for photos

later in this response, but first I want to clear the air on some of your

concerns - or at least try to.

1) - I am not being "rebuffed with excuses and delay".

2) - There is nothing fishy going on.

3) - Ron Schleede contacts me because he is a colleague and a friend. He

worked for me here as Director of Investigations-Air for six months on an

international exchange (and he did a great job).

4) - Ken Smart said nothing to influence my retirement, and I am shocked

that you would suspect a connection. The fact is that my decision was made

and relayed to my boss in late March, at least a month before Ken's visit.

5) - I do not believe the "more likely explanation for Air India Flight 182

is mechanical rather than conspiracy". Based on my direct knowledge from

the AI 182 investigation, I saw mechanical failure as one plausible

explanation. Adding my indirect knowledge at the time (back in the late

1980s), from others who were more directly involved, I

considered a bomb to be the more likely explanation and mechanical failure to be plausible, but unlikely. Adding in the additional knowledge I have acquired since then (which is almost all indirect in a pure accident investigation sense) I have become more convinced that a bomb brought down AI 182.

6) - The only reason that my recent e-mail referred to AI 182, PanAm 103, and TWA 800, but not to UA 811, was that I had less familiarity with the UA 811 investigation than the other three. However, I have absolutely no reason to doubt the eventual conclusion that the cargo door failed in UA 811.

7) - As I advised you last summer, this agency has no mandate to re-conduct an investigation of AI 182. Moreover, my personal opinion is that it would not be an appropriate use of our resources to do so. Nevertheless, I did believe that the TSB should make John Garstang available to that investigation through periodic secondment to the RCMP, and I still feel that our doing so was an appropriate decision. I have high confidence in the integrity and the thoroughness of the RCMP investigation; and I sincerely hope that justice will be served by the pending trial - whatever its

outcome.

Now to the matter of your request for photos of the forward right side of the AI 182 B747.

I spoke with John Garstang about your request. He advised that there are both photos and videos from the AI 182 investigation. However, with respect to the forward right side and the cargo door in particular, he is only certain about the video. They have pictures showing where the cargo door was in the debris field, and they also have a picture of the door at the ocean surface when it broke free during the recovery attempt; he is just not sure how much was video, or still frame from video, versus photographs..

To complicate matters, the video was deteriorating as time went by. Some years ago (estimate: around 1995), the RCMP took the magnetic tape video (which would be of even poorer quality by now) and made a digitized version.

The former is ours, the latter is theirs; however they need both for trial purposes (continuity of evidence, I assume). Moreover, they have advised that the matter is before the courts, that a publication ban is in

effect,
and that they do not want anything to be released that could be
prejudicial
to the court process. Both the TSB's General Counsel and I have
been
notified that the RCMP Legal Services group believes that
release of Air
India wreckage photographs could be injurious to the RCMP's
work and that,
as such, release is exempted under Sec. 16(1) of Canada's Access
to
Information Act.

There may (far from certain) be some form of photo/video info
that is still
in the TSB's possession and that may (also far from certain) be
releasable
to you. To determine that will take considerable effort and, to be
at all
manageable, it will require the personal involvement of John
Garstang. With
his heavy workload, as we try to complete the report on the
SWR111
investigation, we just can't give him any more tasks for the next
few
months. However, I have obtained a personal commitment from
both the
Director of Engineering and the Director of Air Investigations
that they
will follow-up on this at the end of the summer and see if there is
anything
that can be made available to you. To that end, I shall send both
of them a

copy of this message so that they can create a "bring forward" reminder to follow up. At the very worst, the TSB's photos/videos can certainly be made available after the trial.

Meanwhile, I can assure you that the cargo door failure possibility was looked at in a rigorous and unbiased manner. In fact, I understand that part of that process was to specifically review the information and suggestions that you had provided. John G. told me that when he was asked by the RCMP to do work in that area, there was not the slightest hint of a desired outcome - only that all the information be reviewed thoroughly and objectively to find the truth.

As Sgt Blachford has indicated to both of us, the aircraft-related elements are only part of a huge investigation. The trial (which is expected to be the largest in Canada's history) will also bring out much evidence that was obtained through the RCMP's criminal investigation. You will no doubt be following the trial, as I will. Let us hope that the trial will not be delayed much longer and that it will culminate in a just outcome (whatever that may be)..

In closing, I can honestly say that I have enjoyed communicating with you - at least most of the time. (I must admit that there have been times when you added to my stress level because I couldn't keep up with your correspondence; it is against my nature to ignore a sincere message or to respond to it without adequate consideration.) If I may offer some gratuitous advice, please don't let the cargo door issue consume you, and don't become like the conspiracy theorists. You have already raised awareness of the cargo door issue; but if you are seen as pushing it as the only credible explanation for so many accidents, people will not listen to what you have to say. I was, and still am, impressed with you. You have a good brain, a pleasant personality, good health, and a wonderful family and home; Don't miss out on enjoying all that in your retirement years.

Very sincerely,

Bill T..

> -----Original Message-----

> From: John Barry Smith [SMTP:barry@corazon.com]

> Sent: Wednesday, May 22, 2002 7:28 AM

> To: Tucker, Bill
> Subject: Pix of Air India Flight 182
>
> Dear Bill, 22 May 02
>
> Air India Flight 182 was said by the CASB and the Kirpal
Commission
> to have suffered an explosion on the right side forward of the
wing
> in flight. Therefore, photographs of the right side forward of
the
> wing are relevant and very important. It is to be expected that
> photographs of that area be available for inspection as they are
the
> fatal wound of the victim. Much time and expense was used to
procure
> those photographs. They exist and held by the Crown
authorities.
>
> If the Director General, Investigation Operations,
Transportation
> Safety Board of Canada asks to view those photographs and is
rebuffed
> with excuses and delay, there is something fishy going on.
>
> Why would Ron Schleede call you out of the blue? What did
Ken Smart
> say that led to your decision to retire a few days later?
>
> Bill, the whole sequence is fishy.
>
> I believe you see the plausible and more likely explanation for
Air

> India Flight 182 is mechanical rather than conspiracy.
>
> In your bailing out email, as I call it, to me on 9 May 02, you refer
> to persons and titles and their opinions as to the cause of the
> accidents but never refer to facts, data, or evidence. You also
never
> refer to United Airlines Flight 811 as if it never existed which
is
> absolutely not fair since that is the model for the other three.
>
> Well, that is how I know I'm right; never rebutted with facts,
only
> the opinions of titles of persons who have been involved since
1985
> and have much interest in maintaining the status quo, even in
the
> face of conclusive contradictory evidence which abounds in the
metal,
> cams, latches, engines, and recorders of United Airlines Flight
811.
>
> For Ken Smart to imply that the forward cargo door area of
Pan Am
> Flight 103 opened in flight but that it happened after the 'bomb'
> explosion' is contrary to the AAIB wreckage distribution
fuselage
> reconstruction which shows it happened at initial event time.
The
> photographs show it happened in flight. The evidence is there.
>
> But ignored and that's why it's fishy.
>

> Bill, please do not retire until you get a look at the forward
cargo
> door area of Air India Flight 182. Satisfy your own curiosity to
see
> if the twisted metal matches the other three door areas of
twisted
> metal.
>
> Cheers,
> Barry

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT
To: barry@corazon.com
Subject: Fwd: RE: Sudden loud sound on CVR

X-From_: Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca Mon Jun 25 11:04:11 2001
From: "Tucker, Bill" <Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca>
To: "John Barry Smith" <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: RE: Sudden loud sound on CVR
Date: Mon, 25 Jun 2001 14:05:37 -0400
Dear Mr. Smith,

Your reponse below prompts a further reply from me. I
appreciated the
understanding demonstrated in your e-mail. I do have an open
mind (or at
least I hope and try to), and I will strive to retain it long after I
retire
from the TSB.

I am now up to date with your correspondence, except for one

left to read
that you sent me on 23 June. I have targetted specific elements
to specific
people (e.g, the Appendix on Wiring to our SWR 111 IIC (Yes,
that's Vic
Gerden) as well as to Dir of Inv. - Air). I shall forward this to all
of
them so they can note your addresses and your receptiveness to
any follow-up
queries they may have

Bill Tucker..

P.S. In one of the things I read, you indicated that John Garstang
had been
seconded to the RCMP for over a decade. That is not so; John G
was loaned
or seconded to the RCMP on several occasions (maybe 3 or 4)
for short terms
of about 1-2 months - most recently this spring. Otherwise, he
has
continued working as a valued employee in our Engineering
Branch.

> -----Original Message-----

> From: John Barry Smith [SMTP:barry@corazon.com]

> Sent: Wednesday, June 20, 2001 9:43 PM

> To: Tucker, Bill

> Subject: Sudden loud sound on CVR

>

> Dear Mr. Tucker, 20 June 01

>

> Well, longest daylight of the year tonight, that's good.
>
>>
>>The TSB is not presently doing further investigation of the
Air India 182
>>accident, nor is it planning to do so. We have limited
resources and a
>>backlog of investigation work-in-process; we do not believe
that cargo
> door
>>or wiring problems were involved in that occurrence; and we
are confident
>>that the RCMP are doing a thorough and unbiased
investigation.
> Therefore,
>>we do not believe we would be justified in diverting our
resources to
> that
>>occurrence.
>
> I understand the way things are now, and of course, subject to
> change. There is that pesky trial coming up and the RCMP is
saying
> bomb in aft cargo compartment and the CASB and Kirpal
stated
> explosion in forward cargo compartment, not a trifling conflict.
Just
> where was that bomb?
>
>> I find that you have raised some interesting points that
>>have potential use for us in our work.
>
> Thanks. UAL 811 is a big point.

>
>> To that end, I am personally looking
>>through the material you send and forwarding copies, as I
think
> appropriate,
>>to the Dir. of Investigations - Air, the Dir. of Engineering, and
the IIC
> of
>>the SWR111 investigation. If you wish, I can also forward
copies to Sgt.
>>Blachford or the RCMP, but it seems more appropriate for you
to do that
>>yourself whenever you so choose.
>
>
> Thanks. More eyeballs (or ears) is always good. I respect your
> personal opinion most of all. I can tell an open mind that will
put
> emphasis on the evidence. A sudden loud sound on the CVR is
the only
> direct evidence that exists for Air India Flight 182, all the rest
is
> circumstantial or tangible consequence. The sudden loud sound
is
> everything and it says, 'Not a bomb explosion' but 'Explosive
> decompression that matches DC 10 cargo door event.' When in
doubt, I
> always come back to the sudden loud sound on the CVR's on
all the
> four early model Boeing 747s that suffered the inflight
explosions
> forward of the wing. The sound is incontrovertible.
>

> >

> >>From one of your e-mails, I now also understand the reason for your

> strong

> >interest in advancing aviation safety, and I respect you for that.

>

> Thanks. I met the sons of my savior pilot years later, three of the

> five children he left became Navy pilots.

>

>

> > If you

> >wish to continue sending material to me, I shall continue to process it,

> as

> >outlined above, to the best of my ability.

>

>

> Thanks, an open mind is all I ask. I would not expect detailed
> replies, but welcome any queries from you or your staff should they

> come up.

>

> > I

> >simply want you to understand my position with respect to your inputs.

>

>

> I understand. Thanks again for your reply.

>

> Sincerely,

> Barry

>
> John Barry Smith
> (831) 659-3552 phone
> 551 Country Club Drive,
> Carmel Valley, CA 93924
> www.corazon.com
> barry@corazon.com
> Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135
certificate
> holder.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT

To: barry@corazon.com

Subject: Fwd: RE: Swiss Air 111 changes

X-From_: Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca Wed Jun 20 18:18:46 2001

From: "Tucker, Bill" <Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca>

To: "John Barry Smith" <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: RE: Swiss Air 111 changes

Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2001 21:20:48 -0400

Dear Mr. Smith,

This is in reply to your series of e-mails, and to clarify the TSB
position

in case there is a misunderstanding. I'm sorry I have not been
able to

reply sooner. I shall be away for the next two work days and I
had a reply

to you on my "must do" list before leaving tonight.

The TSB is not presently doing further investigation of the Air

India 182

accident, nor is it planning to do so. We have limited resources and a backlog of investigation work-in-process; we do not believe that cargo door or wiring problems were involved in that occurrence; and we are confident that the RCMP are doing a thorough and unbiased investigation. Therefore, we do not believe we would be justified in diverting our resources to that occurrence.

That said, I am not suggesting that your concerns and your analysis are all invalid. In fact, I find that you have raised some interesting points that have potential use for us in our work. To that end, I am personally looking through the material you send and forwarding copies, as I think appropriate, to the Dir. of Investigations - Air, the Dir. of Engineering, and the IIC of the SWR111 investigation. If you wish, I can also forward copies to Sgt. Blachford or the RCMP, but it seems more appropriate for you to do that yourself whenever you so choose.

>From one of your e-mails, I now also understand the reason for your strong interest in advancing aviation safety, and I respect you for that. If you

wish to continue sending material to me, I shall continue to process it, as outlined above, to the best of my ability. However, I cannot promise immediate processing and I cannot engage in direct and detailed dialog on all the material you send me; I simply have too much other work to do.

Right now I have over 150 e-mails in my in-box to read and action; there will be well over 200 when I return next week. I am not complaining, I simply want you to understand my position with respect to your inputs.

Sincerely,

Bill Tucker.

> -----Original Message-----

> From: John Barry Smith [SMTP:barry@corazon.com]

> Sent: Monday, June 18, 2001 11:59 AM

> To: Tucker, Bill

> Subject: Swiss Air 111 changes

>

> W.T. (Bill) Tucker

> Director General,

> Investigation Operations

>

> Dear Mr. Tucker, 18 June 01

>

> Below shows the impact of a conscientious effort by investigators to find

> out what happened in an accident and the good faith efforts of
an airline
> to prevent it from happening again. Good work by TSB and
Swiss Air. Not
> good by reluctance of Boeing to implement the changes for all.
>
> Note the cameras in the cargo holds; that is very good.
>
> I look forward to the opinion of Mr. Vic Gerden to my Smith
AAR for Air
> India Flight 182. I also have concluded wiring is causing
problems that
> were not apparent.
>
> Sincerely,
> Barry
>
> John Barry Smith
> (831) 659-3552 phone
> 551 Country Club Drive,
> Carmel Valley, CA 93924
> www.corazon.com
> barry@corazon.com
>
> Sunday newspaper, 6-17-2001
>
> Swissair optimizes MD-11-Cockpits with modifications to their
electrical
> system - as a direct consequence of their Flight 111 Crash
cause
> deliberations.
>
> FROM TIM VAN BEVEREN ZURICH

- >
- > Two and a half years later, the consequences of the crash of SR Flight 111
- > near Halifax N.S. have continued to affect Swissair. Their remaining 19
- > MD-11 airliners are being radically converted in modifications to the
- > electrical system in the cockpit area. For over one million Swiss Francs
- > per jet: " ...primarily it's the electrical system that is to be
- > significantly improved " according to Swissair documents made available to
- > Sundays newspaper. There in Zurich the crash cause for the 111 and its 229
- > passengers is being assumed, despite the Canadian TSB Report being
- > anticipated for public release not before the beginning of 2002. Already
- > many family members of Flight 111 victims have been "paid out". So now
- > Swissair no longer wants to wait for the outcome of the final report of
- > the Canadian accident investigation before implementing the safety fixes
- > that it has identified. "Safety remains our highest priority " claims
- > Swissair speaker Urs Peter Naef regarding the planned changes. "
- > Cost-saving measures never conflict with the required expenditures on
- > flight safety, which underlie our "mode plus" modification program
- > initiative."

>

> In Canada Investigators of the Transportation Safety board (TSB) express

> themselves reservedly over the planned SR procedure.

Investigation leader

> Vic Gerden: "Swissair's efforts to reduce potential safety deficiencies

> are well-known to us." As a crash cause, it is so far certain only that an

> electrical fire in the wiring-bundles was crucially responsible.

Because

> of the fire, important systems in the cockpit failed in quick succession,

> without which captain Urs Zimmerman and Copilot Stephan Loew could no

> longer control their machine.

>

> In a few days the technical modifications will begin and they will

> naturally concentrate on the known SR111 trouble areas: - significant

> critical wire-bundles are to be separated out and fed, via a routing with

> greater electrical integrity and individual isolation, into the cockpit.

> In SR111 these wiring harnesses ran through a single focal point described

> as a critical node. It was specifically within this area in the ceiling

> (just forward and aft of the cockpit/cabin bulkhead) that the fire had

> devastatingly raged. It affected not only the emergency power systems but

- > the "last-ditch" power feeder lines to the batteries as well. Now that
- > these systems are to be split and segregated for greatest integrity,
- > important protections will again be in place - for example the one that
- > controls the emergency power turbine (or ADG - air driven generator). This
- > propeller can be unfolded from a compartment in the fuselage in an
- > emergency and in the airflow produces current - like a hydroelectric
- > direct current generator. In SR111 the Canadian investigators found that
- > this critical emergency power turbine had given out no energy. Despite the
- > crisis, its control functions had failed to deploy it - probably because,
- > by that time, the associated wiring had been consumed by the fire. Video
- > cameras and smoke detectors are also being installed by this "unique to
- > Swissair" modification program. CCTV Video cameras are being installed
- > everywhere: in the cargo-holds, in the electronics bay under the cockpit
- > floor - as well as behind the cabin linings. allowing the pilots a never
- > before possible view into potential fire zones. The pictures will come up
- > on a small 14-centimeter monitor in the cockpit. In addition more smoke
- > detectors are being strategically positioned. The objective is

that crews

> would no longer be condemned to helpless seated inactivity in the case of

> fire. Fire extinguishing agents behind the cabin linings can squirt upon

> any detected fire.

>

> All Swissair aircraft are to receive a new wholly integral emergency

> flight attitude instrument. It is to be operable from two separate power

> sources and will function reliably even if all other systems have broken

> down (as was the case with SR111 in its last few minutes of flight).

> Altogether the cockpit changes are to cost 20 to 23 million Swiss Francs

> according to calculations of a Swiss Aviation Expert. The extensive

> modifications are the result of ongoing Swissair internal investigations

> into the accident's most likely course of events.

>

> Shortly after the crash on 3 September 1998 a Taskforce under the

> leadership of retired Swissair Technical Chief Willy Schurter began its

> work, paralleling that being done by the official Canadian TSB Team. They

> sought to track down all possible causes of the disaster. The SR MD-11

> Electrical Rework is in addition to other earlier measures (such as

- > changes in checklists and procedures) - but is seen as the most important
- > outcome of these investigations. Although latterly consulting and then in
- > close co-operation with the US manufacturing firm Boeing, Swissair
- > engineers unilaterally sought to analyse all factors of the accident
- > themselves - in order to identify any deficiencies in the original
- > type-certificated design. In a further internal document Swissair
- > explains: "We knew that it needed three prerequisites for the initiation
- > and propagation of a fire: a potential ignition source (e.g. arcing
- > wires), fuel (e.g. thermal/acoustic blankets) and oxygen (i.e.
- > air-conditioning system ventilation or crew oxygen system lines) ". As a
- > consequence of its insights another risk-factors conclusion of the SR
- > Halifax Taskforce presents a frightening new dimension to SR111: "We have
- > clearly concluded that such contributing factors exist in each type of
- > aircraft and that it is not simply a vase of being type-specific to the
- > MD-11." These were conclusions also reached by the TSB and sent to the
- > certifying authority (the US FAA). To date the only ramifications of SR111
- > reaching beyond the MD-11 are the new emergency rules retroactively
- > affecting the STC's (Supplemental Type Certification) of

Inflight

- > Entertainment Systems on just about every type of airliner in service
- > today.
- >
- > Nevertheless, neither manufacturers Boeing nor the American FAA
- > supervisory authority want to even recommend (let alone mandate) the new
- > Swissair safety precautions for all remaining MD-11's. If this was to be
- > done, such a program could then logically expand to include most other
- > types of airline aircraft exhibiting the identical type-certification
- > deficiencies. The first Swissair machine should be converted and ready for
- > return to service at the end of June 2001. Before the SR MD-11 Fleet is
- > permitted to carry passengers following the incorporation of these system
- > safety adjustments, it must pass a strict test flight program in Zurich.
- > Preliminary re-certification assessments would normally be monitored by
- > representatives of the FAA (the American airworthiness regulatory
- > authority). However these were carried out in the spring of 1999 so that
- > these changes could proceed without delay to SR Flight Services. But
- > because manufacturer Boeing withheld its agreement to these changes for a

- > long time, there have been extensive delays in their implementation.
- > Boeing sees much of the program as "enhancements" and not necessarily as
- > required safety modifications. These new Swissair safety initiatives have
- > now become even more expensive: Three SR MD-11's have only just completed
- > their heavy maintenance checks. But now they must return to the hangar yet
- > again for extensive rework. But it's not necessarily a case of spending a
- > dollar to save a penny. Once you look at the cost of SR111 and its
- > potential for costing the airline industry as a whole, it may well have
- > been the other way round.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT

To: "Delorme, Paulette" <Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca>

Cc: Terry.Burtch@tsb.gc.ca

Subject: RE: Air India Flight 182

Mr. Burtch is presently following up with other staff in those respective organizations, and will communicate directly with you at the earliest opportunity. We regret the delay in responding, but trust that this approach will be satisfactory.

Dear Ms. Delorme, Thursday, July 3, 2003 9:27 AM

Thank you, madam, for your information. All is not lost. My information I have to offer Mr. Burtch is technical and does not conflict with any trial restrictions. It is a mechanical explanation with precedent. The safety hazards revealed by the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation are still present in other early model Boeing 747s flown by Canadian airlines and others.

I eagerly await communication from Mr. Burtch and will be prepared to answer any questions he may have for me.

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
831 659 3552
barry@corazon.com
<http://www.corazon.com>

Merci, Madame, For Your Information. Tout n'est pas d'ruit.

Mon

information que je dois offrir M. Burtch est technique et n'est en conflit avec aucune restriction d'essai. C'est une explication m/canique avec le pr/c/dent. Les risques en mati@re de s/curit/ indiqu/s par l'explication ouverte court-circuit/e de dissolution de la cargaison door/explosive decompression/inflight de wiring/ ruptured sont encore pr/sents dans autre Boeing mod@le t't 747s au vol par des lignes a/riennes de Canadian et d'autres.

J'attends ardemment la transmission de M. Burtch et serai dispos/
√

r/pondre ✓ toutes les questions qu'il peut prendre pour moi.

Avec respect,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
831 659 3552
barry@corazon.com
<http://www.corazon.com>

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT
To: Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca
Cc: Terry.Burtch@tsb.gc.ca
Subject: **Air India Flight 182 shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation**

Paulette G. Delorme
Executive Assistant / Adjointe executive
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
Bureau de la securite des transports du Canada

Dear Ms. Delorme, Monday, August 4, 2003 5:22 PM

Below is an electronic copy of a hard copy letter I am sending to Mr. Stoss in reply to his hard copy letter to me of 25 July 2003. Attached is the Smith AAR for Air India Flight 182 which should be of interest to him.

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
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831 659 3552
barry@corazon.com
<http://www.corazon.com>

Nick Stoss
A/Director General
Investigation Operations
Place du Centre
200 Promenade du Portage
4th Floor
Gatineau, Quebec
K1A 1K8

Dear Mr. Stoss, Monday, August 4, 2003 4:57 PM

Thank you for your letter of 25 July 2003 in which you state it would be inappropriate for the TSB to be discussing evidence related to Air India Flight 182 and also referring me to the RCMP.

Well, where to start?

My first thought was, "Oh, another investigator who never asks questions," and "Ah, another politician telling me things he is vaguely aware of."

Mr. Stoss, you talked to the RCMP but you did not talk with Mr. Bill Tucker, recently of the TSB and the former Director General of Investigations Operations. Are you a policeman or an aircraft

accident investigator? When Bill and I talked in my computer room, it became apparent he was concerned about why planes crash. He asked questions. He subsequently procured for me a very revealing photograph of another early model Boeing 747 that suffered an inflight breakup after a sudden loud sound on the CVR followed by an abrupt power cut to the recorders. Bill Tucker cared about airplane crashes.

Let me analyze your letter to me carefully:

A/DG (Acting Director General) Nick Stoss> "...and that one individual entered a guilty plea to charges related to the destruction of Air India Flight 182."

The below is actually what Mr. Reyat pleaded guilty to:

"Text of the agreed statement of facts submitted in B.C. Supreme Court"

"In May and Jun. 1985, in the province of British Columbia, Mr. Reyat

acquired various materials for the purpose of aiding others in the making of the explosive devices. Mr. Reyat was told and believed that

the explosive devices would be transported to India in order to blow up

property such as a car, a bridge or something 'heavy.' Although Mr.

Reyat acquired materials for this purpose, he did not make or arm an

explosive device, nor did he place an explosive device on an airplane,

nor does he know who did or did not do so. At no time did Mr.

Reyat

intend by his actions to cause death to any person or believe that such consequences were likely to occur. However, unbeknownst to Mr. Reyat the items that he acquired were used by another person or persons to help make an explosive device that, on or about Jun. 23, 1985, destroyed Air India Flight 182, killing all 329 people on board."

Mr. Reyat did not plead guilty to the destruction of Air India Flight 182, as you imply. He has always denied involvement with the Narita explosion.

This technique of guilt by association and exaggeration is worthy of interrogators for the RCMP but inappropriate for an aircraft accident investigator. Air India Flight 182 was an airplane crash, not a bank robbery by a gang of criminals. The Canadian Aviation Safety Board in 1986 released an AAR in which no crime was alleged. That report is still the official position of the Canadian aviation safety authorities until amended or updated.

In your letter, Mr. Stoss, you refer to the RCMP, a trial, an RCMP sergeant, prosecution, and legal processes, yet nothing about an early model Boeing 747 suffering an explosive decompression leading to an inflight breakup above 30000 feet. I ask again, are you a policeman looking for revenge or a public safety official concerned with the safety of airline passengers?

I have written to you and the TSB about an airplane exploding in flight leading to an inflight breakup. I know why. I know why because I have used the luxury of hindsight which has provided

similar accidents to similar aircraft types under similar circumstances, specifically, United Airlines Flight 811. I have submitted documents supporting the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182. They are official reports and are composed of facts, data, and evidence. They may be dry but carry more weight for persuasion than exciting conspiracy intrigues in two attempted mass murders thousands of miles apart. I have attached as PDF file the Smith AAR for Air India Flight 182 which addresses all reasonable and plausible explanations. It is quite detailed but lengthy so I shall email it to Ms. Delorme for your review instead of mailing hard copy to your direct.

In his report entitled "Aircraft Occurrence Investigation Report" dated 16 March 2001, John H. Garstang, an official assigned to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Air India Task Force (AITF) declared with little supporting evidence, that the explosion in Air India Flight 182 occurred in the aft cargo compartment and the cause was a bomb. This finding is in conflict with previous conclusions: The Canadian Aviation Safety Board (Canadian Aviation Occurrence Report) concluded in their 1986 Aviation Occurrence Report of an explosion, cause unstated, in the forward cargo compartment as the probable cause for the breakup of Air India Flight 182. Unless updated by the Indian government, the Kirpal Report findings of an explosion by a bomb in the forward cargo compartment is the current position of the Indian government.

I know you know that the Canadian aviation authorities of the time, the CASB, the Indian Kirpal inquiry, and the UK AAIB all agreed without dissent that an explosion occurred in the forward cargo compartment of Air India Flight 182. The CASB and the

Kirpal report also conclusively rule out any type of explosion in the aft cargo compartment. And yet, the TSB is standing by as the Crown, represented by the RCMP and its seconded official John Garstang, now say the explosion occurred in the aft cargo compartment, a conclusion soundly refuted by actual evidence of metal, panels, and beams.

When it comes to the cause of an aircraft accident, whose opinion carries more weight, the police, a civilian law judge, or the professional Canadian aviation accident investigators?

Just to quote a little from the Air India Flight 182 AAR: "2.11.6.5 Target 47 - Aft Cargo Compartment

This portion of the aft cargo compartment roller floor was located between BS 1600 and BS 1760. Based on the direction of cleat rotation on the skin panel (target 7) and the crossbeam displacement on this structure, target 47 moved aft in relation to the lower skin panel when it was detached from the lower skin. No other significant observation was noted. There was no evidence to indicate characteristics of an explosion emanating from the aft cargo compartment."

The prosecution now blithely states, with no rebuttal, that the explosion occurred in the aft cargo compartment. The attorneys for the accused are all criminal attorneys and know little about how airplanes fly or why they crash. As I was talking with Dave (Dave Crossin who represents Mr. Malik) in his law office I realized very quickly he did not know much about lift, drag, or thrust but knew a lot about conspiracies and interrogating suspects. He was another of those that never asked any questions about why airplanes crash but was willing to talk about 'bombs' all day long. The defense assumes it was a bomb, location unimportant, but their clients did not place it there. Dave Crossin

said to me that the RCMP would only be interested in seeing how strong their case was and would have no interest in a non-bomb event. He was right. He knows the thinking of the RCMP, as a competent criminal attorney would. He also told me the TSB would not be interested. I now realize he may have been right on that too, although I strongly disagreed at the time and continue to hope he was wrong.

Others can stand by when erroneous conclusions are reached about an airplane accident, but not public safety officials entrusted and given the authority to correct those errors. John Garstang has been wrong before about Air India Flight 182: Email to me 27 February 1997 from Mr. Garstang:

Thank you for your report expressing concern about the opening of cargo doors on B-747 aircraft. During any aircraft crash, investigators examine every piece of evidence, in order to determine cause. In the case of the Air India flight, the cargo door was in fact retrieved from the bottom of the ocean by the investigators. The latches were still in place, and there was no evidence on the edges of the door to indicate in-flight opening of that door.

On the other hand, there was other solid evidence indicating a bomb blast had occurred. Aircraft accident investigators are trained people. Anybody can say anything they want on the Internet. Put your money on

the experts;
you will win more often.

The above, in addition to its stunning arrogance, is incorrect about the cargo door. It was not retrieved, the latches were not in place, and there was evidence of in-flight opening of the door as shown by text describing photographs (photographs now refused to be given to the TSB at the request of Mr. Tucker) and there is no solid evidence of a bomb blast anywhere on that aircraft wreckage. Mr. Garstang called me on the phone and corrected his errors about the door as expressed in his email. After a few minutes of discussion he hung up in a fury and has subsequently refused any discussion. Mr. Garstang was wrong then about the cargo door and he's wrong now about the location and cause of the explosion in Air India Flight 182.

I have reported something important to you, your Board, your flying public, and to your country. Your duty, Mr. Stoss, is to check it out, not bypass, to brush off, to ignore, or to transfer responsibility. An action transferred is not an action completed as so many government officials believe. You are not using the luxury of hindsight. You act as if nothing has been learned about aviation safety regarding Poly X wiring or sudden inflight breakups of early model Boeing 747s in 18 years. You of all people should know about bad aircraft wiring after Swiss Air 111. You are responsible for investigating aircraft accidents/crashes, not the police.

As Bart (Sgt Bart Blachford) and I were sitting at my dinner table talking about Air India Flight 182, I realized he knew little about why planes crash but a lot about why people rob banks. He had no interest in a non-crime event. He never asked questions. The RCMP is not the lead agency in why Air India Flight 182

crashed, the TSB is. There was no crime, there are no criminals, it was a mechanical event which has happened since. The danger still exists as I type, in fact, China Airlines Flight 611 may be cargo door related event as it was another early model Boeing 747 that suffered an inflight breakup after a sudden loud sound on the CVR and a power cut to the recorders.

Email below from lead investigator for China Airlines Flight 611, Mr. Kay Yong:

At 11:26 AM +0800 6/11/03, kayyong@asc.gov.tw wrote:
X-From_: kayyong@asc.gov.tw Tue Jun 10 20:26:19 2003
Subject: ~ñΔM™ F New CI 611 factual report analysis
supports the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive
decompression/inflight breakup explanation
To: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Cc: philtai@asc.gov.tw, david@asc.gov.tw, tracy@asc.gov.tw
From: kayyong@asc.gov.tw
Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2003 11:26:10 +0800

Dear John,

Thanks you so much of your analysis on the potential causal factors of the CI611 breakup sequence. What we presented in the published "Factual Data Report" merely represents the observation from the wreckage examination as recovered from the ocean floor. So far, we have just commenced our analysis effort and we have not ruled out anything that could be of suspicion

(doors included). Your analysis based on your professional opinion, as well as your keen knowledge re. the aircraft structure (especially the doors) and United Fl. 811 are very timely and greatly appreciated.

I must apologize some of the wording in the report such as the paragraph "The condition and position of the hinge and door mechanisms >indicates that the forward cargo door did not open prior to airplane >breakup", as it should be appeared in the analysis. As a new investigation organization with only five years of existence, we, the ASC needs the veterans such as you to constantly give us advices, especially the complex case such as CI611.

Thank you again and talk to you soon.
Kay

Don't run away, Mr. Stoss. Don't sidestep. Don't transfer, stall, evade, or ignore. Do your job. Do what you swore you would do, are paid to do, and were educated to do; investigate aircraft accidents, in particular, an inflight breakup of an airliner which killed many Canadian citizens. Or to be precise, oversee the technical investigations of your Board. Update Air India Flight 182 AAR. Check out reports of possible reasonable alternatives with precedent. Do not be intimidated by the police or political appointees.

I know the probable cause of Air India Flight 182, it was the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation and detailed at www.corazon.com. That conclusion is supported by documents, reports, photographs, drawings, schematics, and several similar type events. The wiring/cargo door conclusion was not reached by tapped telephones of disgruntled employees years after the event, or by press reports, or by wishful thinking of airlines or manufacturer. The conclusion was reached after literally years of research and analysis backed by forty years of flying experience.

You may not wish to believe that the cause of Air India Flight 182 was faulty wiring, or the stupidity of non plug doors, or the design flaw of no locking sectors on the two midspan latches of the cargo doors. You may wish to believe that the cause was several crazy terrorists acting out of hate and revenge. You may wish to believe that the responsibility lies with lax security procedures at an airport and not with the manufacturer. You may wish to believe Air India Flight 182 was a one-off event and not the industry wide problem of aging wiring in Boeing 747s causing things to turn on when they shouldn't.

If it's one thing I know about airplane crashes, having lived through a sudden, night, jet, fatal airplane crash, is that there is no wishful thinking involved when it comes to machines like airplanes, They have to do what they have to do according to physical laws of aerodynamics which leave ample hard evidence to show what happened such as data recorders, twisted metal, and debris fields.

Investigations dredge up unpleasant stuff; that's why safety boards are created to be as independent as possible, to be immune from political influence. The TSB is now acting in a

political way, trying not to step on toes or get involved in turf battles; trying to go along to get along. Well, safety issues are often contentious, costly, and difficult to prove and correct. If you want to be a pleasant government official, well liked by all, bringing smiles to the people you serve, get another job. A Director General of Investigations stirs up problems, ruins people's days, causes sleepless nights for employees, and may cause additional anguish for victims and their families. Real investigators are driven by a curiosity to find out what happened and not driven by a desire to fade into the background and watch what self interested parties have to say.

If you are trying to be a nice guy, you are in the wrong position, Mr. Stoss. I came to the TSB to discuss important safety issues which are present to this day and constitute a present danger to the Canadian flying public. Where are your questions about my potentially profound discoveries?

I don't have any information about overheard drunken conversations in bars with suspected terrorists with different hats on, that's meat for the RCMP. I do have official aviation safety accident reports which have tremendous relevance to Air India Flight 182. Refer me to someone who cares about aviation safety and not agency public relations: Someone who cares who will ask questions when confronted with solid evidence which contradicts the conventional wisdom; please do not refer me to someone who does not care but gets out of the way and mumbles.

The evidence shows you that an explosion took place in the forward cargo compartment of Air India Flight 182 and not the aft. Of course, that's what the Canadian investigators stated in 1986. The CASB is actually vindicated by their refusal to call the

cause a bomb but left the cause of that obvious explosion in the forward cargo compartment to be determined later, as it was by the subsequent accident to United Airlines Flight 811. That's the benefit of hindsight.

The Concorde crashed because of problems that had occurred several times previous. The Shuttle Columbia crashed because of problems that had occurred several times previous. The Turkish Airlines DC 10 that crashed outside Paris in 1974 because of explosive decompression when a cargo door ruptured open was preceded by a similar event to an American Airlines flight outside Windsor Ontario in 1972. So it is with other Boeing 747s that suffer a sudden loud sound on the CVR followed by an abrupt power loss to the recorders followed by much similar evidence when the cargo door ruptures open in flight. The best example is United Airlines Flight 811.

Another short quote of excerpts from the Air India Flight 182 AAR: 2.10.2 Analysis by Accidents Investigation Branch (AIB), United Kingdom.

"An analysis of the CVR audio found no significant very low frequency content which would be expected from the sound created by the detonation of a high explosive device. A comparison with CVRs recording an explosive decompression on a DC-10, a bomb in the cargo hold of a B737, and a gun shot on the flight deck of a B737 was made. Considering the different acoustic characteristics between a DC-10 and a B747, the AIB analysis indicates that there were distinct similarities between the sound of the explosive decompression on the DC-10 and the sound recorded on the AI 182 CVR."

It has occurred to me, Mr. Stoss, that you may not be technically familiar with United Airlines Flight 811, that is, you have not

read the two NTSB AARs on that accident. (The NTSB had to prepare another AAR after the first AAR was found to be incorrect.) You may also not have read the AAIB AAR for Pan American World Airways Flight 103, or the NTSB AAR for Trans World Airlines Flight 800, or the CASB and Kirpal AARs for Air India Flight 182. You may be relying on press reports of the cause being a 'bombing' for the last 18 years. You may also not believe the catastrophic consequences which occur when a cargo or baggage door opens in flight. (Recent NTSB Preliminary report enclosed.)

Can you match me up with an accident investigation professional who does know the intimate details of those four inflight breakups of early model Boeing 747s that left a sudden loud sound on the CVR followed by an abrupt power cut to the recorders.....Can you ask me questions which would quickly reveal to you the validity or nonsense of my conclusions?

Or will you tell me how sorry you are, how overworked your staff is, how after 911 all resources are stretched, how budget restraints have left you short handed, how this is an old accident with nothing new to learn, how this is a police matter, or how you have washed your hands of the entire matter because the worst aviation accident and the most publicized in Canadian history is none of your business?

My criticisms:

1. TSB is not using the hindsight available. TSB has not done an update on an event of 18 years ago and now the subject of intense current scrutiny.
2. TSB is not asking questions of someone who has reported serious safety issues with current safety implications.
3. TSB is standing by as obvious erroneous conclusions about an

airplane accident are presented by the Crown prosecutors.

Regarding my persuasive style, such as it is:

1. Charm should not be necessary in science and technical studies such as Aircraft Accident Reports.
2. Over the years I have been rude, polite, factual, funny , wheedling, begging, respectful, familiar, emotional, and objective. What works with you? How are you persuaded in a scientific matter? Do you depend on your boss to guide you? Do you decide on physical questions of why planes crash based on the stature of the speaker, who he represents, or on the facts, data, and evidence?

What works with you?

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
831 659 3552
barry@corazon.com
<http://www.corazon.com>

CC: Paulette G. Delorme
Executive Assistant / Adjointe executive
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
Bureau de la securite des transports du Canada

Enclosure 1:

NTSB Identification: **ANC03FA066**
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation

Accident occurred Thursday, July 03, 2003 in Sitka, AK
Aircraft: Cessna 421, registration: N777DX
Injuries: 5 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On July 3, 2003, about 1600 Alaska daylight time, a Cessna 421 airplane, N777DX, was destroyed when it collided with terrain about 4 miles north of Sitka, Alaska, during an instrument approach to the Sitka Airport. The airplane was being operated by the pilot as a instrument flight rules (IFR) personal cross country flight under Title 14, CFR Part 91, at the time of the accident. The pilot and the four passengers were fatally injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight plan was filed. The flight departed Prince Rupert, British Columbia, en route to Anchorage, Alaska, about 1430.

During a telephone conversation with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC), on July 3, a technician at the Sitka FAA Flight Service Station (FSS) said the pilot of the accident airplane reported to air traffic control (ATC) that a forward baggage door had come open, and that he wanted to land at Sitka and inspect the door. The pilot was cleared for the GPS runway 11 instrument approach to Sitka. The technician said the pilot of the airplane reported he was final approach fix inbound on the instrument approach, but the airplane never arrived at the airport. A search for the airplane was initiated.

On July 4, about 1200 the wreckage of the airplane was located by search personnel. The airplane was located on a steep heavily

wooded hillside, and a post crash fire had consumed most of the fuselage. The accident site was inside the final approach fix, 3 miles from the missed approach point, and about 2 miles north of the course centerline. Elevation at the accident site was about 1100 feet msl.

[Index for Jul2003](#) | [Index of months](#)

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT

To: Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca

Cc: Terry.Burtch@tsb.gc.ca

Subject: Cargo doors on Air India Flight 182, AA Flight 96, and N777DX, all with Canadian jurisdiction.

Paulette G. Delorme

Executive Assistant / Adjointe executive

Transportation Safety Board of Canada

Bureau de la securite des transports du Canada

Dear Ms. Delorme, Tuesday, August 5, 2003 10:30 AM

Below is an electronic copy of a hard copy letter I am sending to Mr. Stoss regarding three aviation accidents with Canadian TSB implications which should be of assistance to him.

I've also attached as PDF file the NTSB AAR for United Airlines Flight 811, NTSB AAR 92/02, which should be of interest to Mr. Stoss. Other AARs are available from me upon request. It's only fair since TSB has been so responsive to my requests for AAR over the past few years. (The original AAR for Air India Flight 182 was sent by TSB in 1996 to me. I scanned it and put it on the

web a month later. I'd like to think I was the first to have an entire AAR on the web, now there are many. I still get every week hundreds of downloads of that important AAR.)

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
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831 659 3552
barry@corazon.com
<http://www.corazon.com>

Nick Stoss
A/Director General
Investigation Operations
Place du Centre
200 Promenade du Portage
4th Floor
Gatineau, Quebec
K1A 1K8

Dear Mr. Stoss, Tuesday, August 5, 2003 9:49 AM

I've been thinking about that Cessna 421 that took off from Prince Rupert, British Columbia, on the way to Anchorage and had the baggage door opened in flight, diverted to Sitka and crashed so short of the field. Why? Why did the plane make it so far just to crash so close to the field?

Possible explanations:

1. Improper latching before takeoff from Prince Ruppert Airfield

BC.

2. Baggage inside compartment vibrated loose when gear was lowered and impacted propeller or horizontal stabilizer.
3. Aerodynamic forces with gear and flaps down and baggage door open made aircraft unstable low and slow.
4. Pilot distraction resulted in loss of situational awareness.
5. Pilot procedural error by not dropping gear and flaps after safe landing assured.
6. Unknown.

The relevance to this is that there are three accidents which are within Canadian aviation authority jurisdiction which have baggage door implications.

Mr. Stoss, it may be that the Cessna 421 accident investigation will focus initially on improper latching out of Prince Rupert. A baggage door has come open on a 421 before in flight. That may lead to an airliner baggage door opening on DC 10 over Windsor, Ontario which was improperly latched. That may lead to Air India Flight 182 and its forward cargo door which shows evidence of opening inflight for unknown reasons. Details enclosed below.

Therefore an additional, supplemental, updated investigation into Air India Flight 182 and its forward cargo door can be justified as relevant to a current accident, the Cessna 421 open baggage door multiple fatality accident.

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
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<http://www.corazon.com>

For Air India Flight 182 after takeoff from Montreal:

2.11.4.6 Section 42

All cargo doors were found intact and attached to the fuselage structure except for the forward cargo door which had some fuselage and cargo floor attached. This door, located on the forward right side of the aircraft, was broken horizontally about one-quarter of the distance above the lower frame. The damage to the door and the fuselage skin near the door appeared to have been caused by an outward force. The fractured surface of the cargo door appeared to have been badly frayed. Because the damage appeared to be different than that seen on other wreckage pieces, an attempt to recover the door was made by CCGS John Cabot. Shortly after the wreckage broke clear of the water, the area of the door to which the lift cable was attached broke free from the cargo door, and the wreckage settled back onto the sea bed. An attempt to relocate the door was unsuccessful.

For AA Flight 96 over Windsor Ontario:

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.

MCDONNELL DOUGLAS DC-10-10, N103AA I NEAR
WINDSOR, ONTARIO, CANADA 1 JUNE 12, 1972

ADOPTED: FEBRUARY 28.1973 /

Abstract: The aft bulk cargo compartment door separated from the aircraft in flight approximately 11,750 feet mean sea level. The separation caused rapid decompression, which, in turn, caused failure of the cabin floor over the bulk cargo compartment. DC-10, was damaged substantially, The separated door caused minor damage to the fuselage above the door and

substantial damage to the leading edge and upper surface of the left horizontal stabilizer. There were 56 passengers and a crew of 11 aboard the aircraft. The probable cause of this accident was the improper engagement of the latching mechanism for the aft bulk cargo compartment door.

For Cessna 421 after takeoff from Prince Rupert, BC:

NTSB Identification: ANC03FA066

14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation

Accident occurred Thursday, July 03, 2003 in Sitka, AK

Aircraft: Cessna 421, registration: N777DX

Injuries: 5 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On July 3, 2003, about 1600 Alaska daylight time, a Cessna 421 airplane, N777DX, was destroyed when it collided with terrain about 4 miles north of Sitka, Alaska, during an instrument approach to the Sitka Airport. The airplane was being operated by the pilot as a instrument flight rules (IFR) personal cross country flight under Title 14, CFR Part 91, at the time of the accident. The pilot and the four passengers were fatally injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight plan was filed. The flight departed Prince Rupert, British Columbia, en route to Anchorage, Alaska, about 1430.

During a telephone conversation with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC), on July 3, a technician at the Sitka FAA Flight Service Station (FSS) said the pilot of the accident airplane reported to air traffic control (ATC) that a forward baggage door had come

open, and that he wanted to land at Sitka and inspect the door. The pilot was cleared for the GPS runway 11 instrument approach to Sitka. The technician said the pilot of the airplane reported he was final approach fix inbound on the instrument approach, but the airplane never arrived at the airport. A search for the airplane was initiated.

On July 4, about 1200 the wreckage of the airplane was located by search personnel. The airplane was located on a steep heavily wooded hillside, and a post crash fire had consumed most of the fuselage. The accident site was inside the final approach fix, 3 miles from the missed approach point, and about 2 miles north of the course centerline. Elevation at the accident site was about 1100 feet msl.

NTSB Identification: **CHI98LA302** . The docket is stored in the (offline) NTSB Imaging System.

Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Thursday, August 06, 1998 in COLUMBUS,
IN

Probable Cause Approval Date: 7/2/99

Aircraft: Cessna 421B, registration: N5MJ

Injuries: 2 Serious, 4 Minor.

CHI98LA302

On August 6, 1998, at 0450 central standard time, a Cessna 421B, N5MJ, operated by Rhodes Aviation, collided with the terrain at the Columbus Municipal Airport while attempting to return to land shortly after takeoff. The airline transport rated pilot, the co-pilot, and two passengers received minor injuries. The remaining two passengers were seriously injured. The airplane was substantially damaged by impact with the terrain and a post impact fire. The 14 CFR Part 135 flight was operating

in visual meteorological conditions on an IFR flight plan. The intended destination of the flight was Detroit, Michigan.

The pilot-in-command (PIC) reported that shortly after takeoff, upon reaching an altitude of about 400 feet above the ground, the left side nose baggage compartment door opened. He reported he informed the co-pilot that the door was opened and that they were going to return to land on runway 14. They had departed on runway 05. He reported he raised the gear and made a maximum power turn the left. He rolled the wings level and lowered the nose. He reported that at this time he thought perhaps the right side nose baggage door opened. He reported, "...knew I was going down so I put gear down tried to land in field. Landed and left wheel caught rut and broke landing gear causing left tip tank to hit ground catching fire and sliding sideways." He reported that after coming to a stop he went into the back of the airplane, opened the door and got everyone out.

The co-pilot reported that after takeoff she heard the PIC say something about the door. She reported she turned around, looked at the rear door, and told the PIC that it looked fine. She continued to report that the PIC started a left turn at which time the stall warning came on and the PIC stated they were "going down." She reported that she did not see the field which the airplane impacted. She reported that after the impact there was fire on the left wing. The PIC then opened the rear door and everyone exited the airplane.

Post accident inspection of the airplane was conducted by Inspectors from the Federal Aviation Administration Indianapolis, Indiana Flight Standards District Office. They reported the airplane touched down in the field on a northerly heading. It then slid around coming to rest on a southwesterly

heading. They reported all three landing gear were separated from the airplane. The airplane had sustained severe fire damage. The left nose baggage door was open.

The investigation revealed that both pilots were qualified to act as PIC of the flight and both had completed portions of the aircraft preflight. This flight would have normally been a single pilot operation; however, the company whose employees were being transported requested two pilots for the flight. The operator did not have any written procedures regarding the division of duties for a two pilot operation for this type of aircraft.

Request Report

Listing files, sorted by the number of requests.

#reqs:	%bytes:	last time:	file
-----:	-----:	-----:	----
1313:	27.56%:	Aug/ 2/03 11:26 PM:	www.corazon.com/ 285: 41.01%: Aug/ 2/03 10:47 PM: www.corazon.com/ AirIndiareportcontents.html
95:	1.70%:	Aug/ 2/03 12:18 PM:	www.corazon.com/ 747specsheel.html
90:	0.55%:	Aug/ 2/03 6:32 PM:	www.corazon.com/Boeing 747.html
85:	0.12%:	Aug/ 2/03 10:32 PM:	www.corazon.com/ nosepicts.html
60:	0.08%:	Aug/ 2/03 3:59 PM:	www.corazon.com/ forwardcargodoorpicts.html
58:	0.05%:	Aug/ 2/03 5:58 PM:	www.corazon.com/ Skiescargodoor0pict.html
58:	0.20%:	Aug/ 2/03 11:33 PM:	www.corazon.com/ Foddedengines.html

55: 0.86%: Aug/ 2/03 6:44 PM: www.corazon.com/
747crashes.html

52: 0.58%: Aug/ 2/03 8:55 PM: www.corazon.com/
Page2.html

51: 0.04%: Aug/ 2/03 10:33 PM: www.corazon.com/
811holesofftv.html

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT

To: "Delorme, Paulette" <Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca>

Cc: Terry.Burtch@tsb.gc.ca

Subject: **Air India Flight 182 questions**

From Bill Tucker, former Director of Investigations TSB.

However, I have obtained a personal commitment from both the Director of Engineering and the Director of Air Investigations that they will follow-up on this at the end of the summer and see if there is anything that can be made available to you.

Paulette G. Delorme

Executive Assistant / Adjointe executive

Transportation Safety Board of Canada

Bureau de la securite des transports du Canad

Dear Ms. Delorme, Tuesday, September 2, 2003 6:15 PM

I'm at my wits end. Desperate thinking men do desperate thinking things. My desperate thinking thing, Ms. Delorme, is to appeal directly to you via email and metaphor. I don't know your

background, responsibility, or authority but I do know you are in the chain of command for aviation accidents in Canada for probable causes.

I wish to report to you a danger which exists as I type. The danger is to passengers in early model Boeing 747s, some of which belong to Canadian airlines and fly Canadians. The danger of fatalities is because of defective wiring and non plug cargo doors. I can prove that assertion in general and specifically for Air India Flight 182, if given the opportunity.

I've tried facts, data, and evidence in support of the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation but have received no queries from aviation safety officials in the TSB. Air India Flight 182 was not a bank robbery but an airplane crash but I have been referred to the RCMP which would normally be for criminal matters not airplane crashes.

Sooooo..... Ms. Delorme, I, as a witness, am going to appeal to you, as police officer, using a metaphor of crime. The crime is rape.

The Metaphor: I am a witness to a rape and I am reporting the crime to the RCMP. I am saying who is being raped, who the rapist is, where it is occurring, and why. I am saying to the rape police that the culprit they think they have is not the culprit. I have identified a different culprit rapist. I can prove this rapist has done the rapes.

The sergeant in charge of the Rape Squad looks at me and refers me to astronomers because the events took place at night. I protest to the police and say it's impossible for the culprit you

think you have to have done the crime because he has an airtight alibi. The Sergeant ignores me and asks no questions.

I present evidence which was obtained by the RCMP itself of the alibi. The Sergeant ignores me and asks no questions.

I submit much official evidence of the previous rapes by the rapist, evidence of the mode of operation in several other rapes, and in particular I present much official evidence in support of the accusation of the new rapist. The Sergeant ignores me and asks no questions.

I tell the sergeant I have been raped myself by a different rapist earlier in my life and I know what I'm talking about when I talk about rape and rapists. The Sergeant ignores me and asks no questions.

Who can I go to? The astronomers? The police not expert in rape cases? Private Detectives, politicians, the media? Who cares?

Yes, who cares.

The metaphor of a crime of rape related to Air India Flight 182 is explained:

I was in a fatal jet sudden airplane crash. My pilot died. I have discovered through years of research and analysis that a mechanical problem and a design flaw in early model Boeing 747s is killing passengers and crew. I am reporting to the TSB the killings occurred off Ireland on June 23, 1985 in which 329 persons died. It occurred because machines have to obey the laws of nature regarding pressure equalization and electrical discharges. The culprits are faulty wiring and non plug doors. I

am reporting it to the government officials in charge of aviation safety. The official in charge of aviation safety refers me to the police who know little about why airplanes crash.

I present evidence that the accused culprit of terrorists is innocent because all luggage from Vancouver was loaded into the aft cargo compartment and the explosion occurred in the forward cargo compartment. The two compartments are solidly separated in the air and on the ground. The Canadians and the Indians agree that the explosion occurred in the forward cargo compartment and did not occur in the aft cargo compartment. The accused are said to have loaded a bomb onto Air India Flight 182 at Vancouver airport which then could not have caused the explosive decompression/inflight breakup, something else did. The official in charge of aviation safety ignores me and asks no questions.

I present evidence to the TSB of the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182 using aircraft accidents reports submitted by Indian, Canadian, American, and British aviation safety authorities. I show pictures, charts, text, diagrams, schematics, and tables. The official in charge of aviation safety ignores me and asks no questions.

I present evidence of my own airplane accident of June 14th, 1967 and state I know what I'm talking about when I talk about airplane crashes and their causes. The official in charge of aviation safety ignores me and asks no questions.

Who can I go to? The RCMP? The safety experts whose specialty is trains? Private Detectives, politicians, the media? Who cares?

Ms. Delorme, I'm hoping against hope that you care.

Regarding the police and the sergeant in my rape metaphor:

Would you accuse the police of negligence for not asking any questions to check out the story of the witness who is reporting a rape?

Would you accuse the sergeant of negligence for not asking any questions to the witness about the evidence he has submitted regarding the location, the duration, and the severity of the rape and indeed, names the rapist himself?

Would you not feel frustration, especially if you had been raped yourself, at the nonchalance and indifference of the police as you report a very very serious crime of which you have ample proof?

Well, if you do, please ask me questions about my report to you of faulty wiring and a design flaw in early model Boeing 747s and in particular, Air India Flight 182. I can be as sophisticated or as basic as you wish, Ms. Delorme.

Will you ask others to ask me questions? Mr. Terry Burtch, Mr. Nick Stoss, Mr. Vic Gergen, Mr. John Garstang, and the Director of Engineering should be able with just a few questions each be able to determine if my report of a potential existing aviation danger is real and worthy of action or not real and should be rejected.

The negligence of the RCMP in not investigating the rape metaphor above is not that they made an error in the accusation of the culprit but they did not check out an alternative

explanation with precedent by a reputable witness. They have a responsibility to investigate all reported crimes under their jurisdiction and rape qualifies.

I am reporting to the TSB that the accused did not commit the bombing crime because 'nobody did it'; it was a mechanical explanation, the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182 and the precedent is United Airlines Flight 811. I believe that the TSB has a responsibility to investigate all reported probable causes to aviation accidents that occur with Canadians aboard and Air India Flight 182 qualifies.

I await questions from the aviation accident investigators.

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith

541 Country Club Drive

Carmel Valley, California 93924

831 659 3552

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<http://www.corazon.com>

Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.

US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.

US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.

Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy

Retired US Army Major MSC

Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.

Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT
To: Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca
Subject: **Delays...questions and answers.**

Paulette G. Delorme
Executive Assistant / Adjointe executive
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
Bureau de la securite des transports du Canada

Nick Stoss
A/Director General
Investigation Operations
Place du Centre
200 Promenade du Portage
4th Floor
Gatineau, Quebec
K1A 1K8

Dear Ms. Delorme and Mr. Stoss, Monday, October 6, 2003
12:09 PM

I understand the time it takes to do an accurate and unbiased AAR. It's best to do it right the first time and not have to re do another AAR as NTSB had to do with United Airlines Flight 811 after it found the first probable cause was incorrect; AAR 90/01 was updated/superseded by 92/02. Cargo door problems are not easy to detect, they do mimic a bomb going off.

Although you have staff and budget constraints, there is certainly time to ask a few questions regarding the most important aviation accident in Canadian history, Air India Flight 182.

I have reported a safety problem that currently presents a danger to the Canadian flying public, faulty wiring leading to ruptured open cargo doors in early model Boeing 747s. That explanation is supported by official documents including your very own, CASB report of 1986 and never updated or modified and the Swiss Air 111 report.

Questions that take a few minutes can have answers that last for years. Ask your questions. Here's a couple. How could Air India Flight 182 suffer an inflight breakup by the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation and not by a bomb?

How could the Canadian aviation accident authorities be right in 1986 when they said the explosion occurred in the forward cargo compartment from an undetermined cause when the press for the last 17 years and the RCMP say it was caused by a bomb in the aft cargo compartment?

Yes, how could the Canadian accident investigators be so right so long ago?

Cheers,
Barry Smith

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
831 659 3552
barry@corazon.com
<http://www.corazon.com>

Oct. 5, 2003. 04:03 PM

Transportation Safety Board criticized for delays

OTTAWA (CP) Ñ For the second time in three years, key players in Canada's transportation industry have slammed the Transportation Safety Board for its stale reports on major accidents.

"With only a few exceptions, everyone complained about the length of time between an investigation and the availability of the occurrence report," says a summary of a survey of 125 experts.

"They felt that the information comes out too late to be really useful to individual organizations and the industry as a whole.

"Some deemed the timeliness to be totally unacceptable given that there is no communication during the report writing process until the release of the draft report."

The survey results were compiled in late February this year by

Sage Research Corp., which was hired by the board to get feedback from industry experts. A copy was obtained after a request under the Access to Information Act.

The poll mirrors another survey of 127 players carried out in 2000 by Goldfarb Consultants.

"Recommendations on these reports when they are finally delivered are not regarded as useful due to the fact that they are either out of date or they have been implemented . . . already," said the earlier survey.

The board's most famously delayed report was on the Swissair crash of Sept. 2, 1998, which cost \$56.8 million in special funding to investigate.

The final document was released March 27 this year Ñ more than 4 1/2 years after the disaster that killed 229 people.

But the board also has a massive backlog of other files. At the end of August, there were 154 active investigations, of which 74 were more than a year old.

The board's policy is to complete all but the most complex investigations within a year. But the average completion time is currently about one year and eight months.

"We recognize that timeliness is a factor," Terry Burtch, director-general of investigation operations, said in an interview.

Since delivery of the latest survey, the board has decided to spend \$3.6 million and hire 13 more staff to eat away at the backlog, Burtch said.

Even so, that money will cut the average time to complete a report by three months by March 2005 Ñ to one year and five months, still a long way off from the target of one year.

The Sage survey suggested the board release interim reports on investigations Ñ which Burtch said the board has rejected Ñ and that it investigate more of the 4,000 incidents reported each year.

The board has become highly selective in what it will probe, restricting itself to about 90 incidents each year. Previously, hundreds of files were opened annually, including one on every accident in which someone was killed.

The board's new policy is to select only those accidents where ``there's a good likelihood that (the investigation) will be identifying safety deficiencies and things we can use to advance transportation safety," said Burtch.

"We will investigate those that we think will bear some fruit," said Maury Hill, manager of macroanalysis. "We certainly do a far more in-depth look these days."

Nevertheless, the board is reviewing how it chooses which accidents are worth the time and money, Burtch said.

The board, created in 1990, currently has 249 staff and an annual budget of \$32.8 million.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT

To: Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca, hmalik@uniserve.com, aniljitsingh@hotmail.com, hmalik@harrisonhotsprings.com, jsmalik@wwdb.org, npsingh@wans.net,

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<KaurSingh@webtv.net>, Russell.Young@PSS.Boeing.com,
keithrh@telus.net, "Gordon E. Smith" <gesmith@ee.net>,
EdwBlock@aol.com, Kevin & Susan Campbell
<smandkjc@internet.co.nz>

**Subject: TSB report on 727 open cargo door/legal definitions
of negligence....Plea for questions...**

Paulette G. Delorme
Executive Assistant / Adjointe executive
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
Bureau de la securite des transports du Canada

Nick Stoss
A/Director General
Investigation Operations
Place du Centre
200 Promenade du Portage
4th Floor
Gatineau, Quebec
K1A 1K8

Dear Ms. Delorme and Mr. Stoss, Thursday, October 9, 2003
9:18 AM

As the below report from TSB on a Boeing 727 inadvertently left

open cargo door by an electrical problem reveals, you have known that cargo doors open inadvertently on Boeing airliners for over a year.

You know that recently a cargo door opened on a Cessna 421 after leaving a Canadian airport.

You know from a CASB AAR that a Boeing 747, Air India Flight 182, CVR heard a sudden loud sound before an inflight breakup, a sound that was analyzed by UK AAIB personnel to be not a bomb explosion but was matched to an explosive decompression when a cargo door opened in a fatal DC-10 accident.

You know that I have been reporting to you for years that my analysis for the probable cause for Air India Flight 182 rules out a bomb explosion and concludes that it was the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation. My PDF AAR on Air India Flight 182 has previously been sent to you for review.

You know that Bill Tucker, formerly of TSB, has felt sufficient evidence exists for the wiring/cargo door problem for Air India Flight 182 that a follow up by TSB was warranted after his retirement.

You know there is an active investigation currently underway by the RCMP into the most important aviation accident in Canadian history, Air India Flight 182.

And yet you do nothing. You do not ask questions. You are silent. You standby and wait...and wait...and wait.

Speaking as a survivor of a sudden, night, fiery, fatal, jet airplane

crash, I know there is no time; there is no luxury for contemplation when indications of an unsafe condition present themselves when flying. Checklists must be followed. Action must be taken now.

You are public servants. You have a duty to perform an investigation into aviation safety. Investigations require questions. By not doing your duty to ask questions of me, you are negligent, the degree of which is determined by the consequences of your failure to act.

Below:

1. Some legal definitions that are relevant to you,
2. TSB report on Boeing 727 open cargo door.
3. Comprehensive legal discussions on manslaughter and criminal negligence.

As usual, I await questions/queries/interrogation regarding my factual report to you about a current safety hazard to the Canadian flying public.

Respectfully,
John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
831 659 3552
barry@corazon.com
<http://www.corazon.com>

Sec. 39.01. Definitions.

In this chapter:

(1) "Law relating to a public servant's office or employment" means a law that specifically applies to a person acting in the capacity of a public servant and that directly or indirectly:

(A) imposes a duty on the public servant; or

(B) governs the conduct of the public servant.

There are three conditions that must be fulfilled before the jury may find the defendant guilty of manslaughter by criminal negligence:

(i) that there had been an assumption of a duty to care for the deceased;

(ii) that the defendant had been grossly negligent in regard of his duty to take care;

(iii) that by reason of such negligence the person died: that is, the omission caused the death.

Penal Code

Sec. 6.01. Requirement of Voluntary Act or Omission.

(a) A person commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct, including an act, an omission, or possession.

(b) Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly obtains or receives the thing possessed or is aware of his control of the thing for a sufficient time to permit him to terminate his control.

(c) A person who omits to perform an act does not commit an offense unless a law as defined by Section 1.07 provides that the omission is an offense or otherwise provides that he has a duty to perform the act.

The Quality of Negligence Required

A. The Meaning of "Criminal Negligence"

Early tests stress that a higher degree of negligence than that which supports a civil action is required:

"The prosecution must satisfy the jury that the negligence or incompetence of the defendant went beyond a mere matter of compensation and showed

such a disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving punishment": Bateman (1925) 19

Cr.App.R. 8 at 13

In Nydam [1977] VR 430, 445 the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria held that manslaughter by criminal negligence required the prosecution to prove

that

(a) the act [or omission] which caused death was done by the defendant ,

(b) it was a conscious and voluntary act,

(c) that it was done in circumstances involving,

"...such a great falling short of the standard of care which a reasonable man would have exercised and which involved such a high risk that death or

GBH would follow that the doing of the act merited criminal punishment"

Both these statements are undesirable definitions of the conduct involved in criminal negligence manslaughter. It is conceptually confusing to use in the words

defining an offence terms such as "criminal" or "culpable". Such definitions leave it to the jury to determine the type of conduct which should fall within this

category of manslaughter. On the other hand, the phrase could offer some assistance to the jury in understanding that the test of criminal negligence is

qualitatively different from that used in the law of tort (see discussion below). If the formulation only serves this educative function, then perhaps it is not

necessary to include it as part of the substantive definition of criminal negligence.

In *Andrews* [1937] AC 576 the House of Lords gave a list of appropriate synonyms including "culpable, criminal, gross, wicked clear and complete". None of

these words are any more illuminating.

B. The Standard of Negligence: "A high degree of negligence"

Lord Atkin in *Andrews* [1937] AC 576 reviewed the 19th century cases which had defined this category of manslaughter using epithets such as "criminal misconduct" and "criminal inattention". Lord Atkin conceded that the use of "the word criminal in any attempt to define a crime is perhaps not the most helpful". However, these early definitions had intended to convey that only a very high degree of negligence would suffice:

"Simple lack of care such as will constitute civil liability is not enough: for the purposes of the criminal law there are degrees of negligence: and a very high degree of negligence is required to be proved before the felony is established" per Lord Atkin in *Andrews* [1937] AC 576 at 583.

It is doubtful whether it is possible to have degrees of inadvertence. An early academic paper on criminal negligence by JW Turner argued that since the defendant is inadvertent of the risks associated with his conduct, how is it possible to characterise that behaviour as highly inadvertent. In his opinion, since inadvertence is a negative state of mind it is nonsense to suggest that there are degrees of inadvertence.

The courts are primarily concerned with conduct which, objectively speaking, involves a high risk of death or GBH. If this is the case, it strengthens the case for assimilating manslaughter by unlawful/dangerous acts and

criminal negligence.

(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

<http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/reports/air/2001/A01f0094/A01f0094.asp>

Air 2001

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigated this occurrence for the purpose of advancing transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.

Aviation Investigation Report
Cargo Door Opening on Take-off
Bradley Air Services Ltd. (First Air)
Boeing 727-225 C-FIFA
Corcaigh International Airport, Ireland
20 July 2001

Report Number A01F0094

Summary

A First Air Boeing 727-225 aircraft, C-FIFA, serial number 20381, was on a regular scheduled cargo flight from Corcaigh International Airport, Ireland, to East Midland Airport, England. Shortly after take-off, as the landing gear was retracting, the aft cargo door light illuminated on the second officer's annunciator panel. He informed the other crew members of the anomaly as the aircraft climbed through 400 feet above ground level. Shortly thereafter, the No 3 engine experienced a series of compressor stalls. The captain shut down the engine (Pratt & Whitney JT8D-15) and requested an immediate return to Corcaigh Airport. The aircraft landed uneventfully; airport emergency response services were standing by. The aft cargo door was partially open, and the door-opening mechanism was damaged. No one was injured.

Ce rapport est/galement disponible en franais.

Other Factual Information

Boeing 727 C-FIFA was on extended chartered operations to Air Contractors Ireland Ltd. The aircrew arrived at Corcaigh Airport approximately 1? hours before a planned departure time of 2045 local time. 1The three crew members - the captain, the first officer, and the second officer - had a full day of rest before the start of their duty day. They were certified and qualified for the flight in accordance with existing regulations. The aircraft was serviced and maintained in accordance with existing directives, and there was no indication of any system malfunction before the flight.

Reported weather at the time of the incident was as follows: broken ceiling at 3000 feet above ground level, tops at 5000 feet, light winds, and good visibility. All significant events - loading of the aircraft, engine start-up, take-off, and landing 34 minutes later - occurred during daylight conditions.

On arrival at the airport, the second officer proceeded to the aircraft to carry out pre-flight and pre-start duties. While conducting an external inspection, he noted that the aft cargo and main cargo doors were open in preparation for loading. The aft airstairs were also deployed. While the flight crew made their way to the cockpit in preparation for departure, ground personnel were getting ready to load the aircraft through the main cargo door on the left side and through the aft cargo door on the right side by the N o 3 engine.

Servisair Ltd. provides aircraft ground handling 2in Corcaigh under the supervision of DHL Aviation, an international courier company operating on behalf of Air Contractors Ireland Ltd. While DHL Aviation is responsible for providing ground-handling operations at major airports, this responsibility is usually subcontracted to a third-party handling agent in smaller stations. In Corcaigh, the ground-handling responsibility was delegated to Servisair Ltd., but a local DHL Aviation staff member was responsible for building the loads, producing weight and balance forms, and supervising Servisair Ltd. Under the contract, Servisair Ltd. is responsible for securing and closing all aircraft cargo doors before engine start-up. Nevertheless, a local procedure at Corcaigh delegates the task of loading the aircraft through the aft cargo door to DHL Aviation.

The aircraft was loaded while all three flight crew members were

in the cockpit going through their pre-start checklist procedures. A DHL Aviation staff member was loading the aft cargo area of the aircraft in accordance with established local procedures. While testing the annunciator panel for the first time, the second officer did not pay any attention to the aft cargo or main cargo door lights because the aircraft was still being loaded. After completion of the aircraft loading through the aft and main cargo doors, a Servisair Ltd. agent handed the second officer a cargo form describing the nature and weight of the on-board cargo for weight and balance calculations. The second officer then interrupted his pre-start duties and exited the cockpit area to close and secure the main cargo door and the aft airstairs, as per established procedures. While stowing the airstairs, he did not observe the position of the aft cargo door because this area is often being loaded right up to engine start.

The second officer then re-entered the aircraft through the left side passenger door and proceeded back to the cockpit area to resume pre-start and start duties. At that time, he looked at the annunciator panel and noted that the main cargo and aft cargo lights on the annunciator panel were not illuminated; this confirmed that all cargo doors were secured. The three crew members then initiated the challenge and response "Clear to Start" checklist. Before the three engines were started, a Servisair Ltd. agent standing next to the captain's window on the left side gave a thumbs-up to the crew, signifying that personnel were clear of the aircraft and that the crew were cleared to start. Because of the position of the aircraft on the ramp, a pushback was not required before taxi; therefore, the checklist items under "push back" were not actioned.

The Boeing 727 normal checklist calls for the second officer to visually check the annunciator light panel on three occasions:

before engine start, after engine start, and before the aircraft takes off. The second officer visually checked the panel as per the checklist. Before take-off, the captain double-checked the panel to visually confirm that all lights were extinguished before departure. On all three occasions, the annunciator panel check requires the pushing of a button to illuminate all panel lights to confirm that they are serviceable and the subsequent release of the same button to verify that they will extinguish. If a door light does not extinguish after this check, the corresponding door is not properly closed and secured.

During take-off, the captain and the first officer moved their attention outward, and the second officer maintained a scan on the engine instruments, his primary duty for that phase. Shortly after lift-off, as the gear was selected up, the second officer leaned back and noticed that the aft cargo door light on the annunciator panel was illuminated. After the first officer reported the aircraft climbing through the take-off obstacle clearance altitude, the second officer informed the crew that the aft cargo door light was illuminated. The captain acknowledged this information. Following flap retraction, the aircraft experienced a series of compressor stalls on the N o 3 engine, located a few feet downstream from the aft cargo door. The captain brought the engine N o 3 thrust lever to idle, levelled the aircraft above the broken layer of cloud, and requested an immediate diversion back to Corcaigh Airport. The "One Engine Inoperative" drill was carried out, engine N o 3 was secured, and the aircraft landed uneventfully on two engines. The aircraft stopped on the runway and was visually inspected by an emergency response services crew who responded to the scene. Minutes later, the emergency response services crew reported to the aircrew that the aft cargo door was partially open, the hinge mechanism was

slightly bent, and the door handle fully protracted. There was no apparent damage to the engine or the structure of the aircraft. The aircraft then taxied to the ramp.

After engine shutdown, the aircrew attempted to determine which of the two agencies, DHL Aviation or Servisair Ltd., was responsible for securing the aft cargo door. This responsibility could not be ascertained at that time. Later, the DHL Aviation agent who loaded parcels through the aft cargo door could not recollect if he had closed the door upon completion of the loading. Two of the five parcels loaded in the aft cargo area remained on board; one was found on the runway just before the end, one was found on the grass area past the end of the runway, and the last was returned by a person who lived near the airport boundary.

The aft cargo door structure, door stops (latches), and hinge attach points were not damaged; however, the right and left hinge rods were bent, preventing the door from closing. The door warning mechanism - switch, wires, and warning light - was tested several times by forcefully moving the electrical switch and wires, attempting to extinguish the warning panel aft cargo light with the door open and to recreate the possibility of such system malfunction. No faults were found. The hinges were dismantled to allow closing and securing the aft cargo door. The door was closed and the warning light extinguished. The aircraft rear cargo area was pressurized and retained pressure within an acceptable range, confirming that the door was properly secured.

On July 24, after receiving authorization from the Irish Aviation Authorities and Boeing, the aircraft was ferried, with one engine inoperative and the aft door secured, to Copenhagen, Denmark, for repairs. These repairs included replacing the bent hinges and

the locking mechanism (door switch) and some minor repairs to the inner case of the engine N o 3 turbine casing, damaged by the compressor stalls. No damage was found on the turbine blades. During or after the repair work, the door microswitch was inadvertently discarded and could not be found for analysis.

TSB was not informed of this reportable incident by the operator but received information from Transport Canada, System Safety, on July 24. Through coordination with the Aircraft Accident Investigation Agency in Ireland, the investigation was delegated to TSB on July 25.

The flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) were downloaded, and the data were sent to the TSB Engineering Laboratory for analysis. Annunciator door lights and status or condition of doors are not recorded in the FDR. The flight lasted 34 minutes after rotation. The speed averaged 200 knots, with peaks to approximately 240 knots for one minute. The flight portion of the 30-minute loop CVR was written over as power was kept on for more than one hour after the incident to allow the crew and maintenance personnel to diagnose the door locking mechanism and the warning system. The CVR did not contain data from pre-start to the occurrence.

The Boeing Aircraft Company provided information regarding previous inadvertent door openings in flight. Since December 1976, 10 cases of airborne inadvertent door openings have been reported to Boeing for the 727 type, including this occurrence. The causes are usually undetermined. However, the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigated and documented one event that occurred on 05 January 1999 (NTSB Report N o LAX99IA072). It was determined that a door opened because ground-handling personnel did not properly secure an aft

cargo door and that a door warning light was intermittent due to contamination in proximity switch terminals. In other cases where a precise cause could not be determined, suspected causes were generally related to improper latching of doors combined with, in some instances, a malfunctioning warning light electrical system and/or switch.

Faulty microswitch operation is usually caused by oil or water contamination, unclean cannon plugs, or wiring problems. If a switch is considered too difficult to clean, it will be discarded and replaced by a new one. These switches have no shelf life and are not included in any special inspection. They are simply replaced as needed. A few weeks after this occurrence, an undocumented case of aft cargo warning light malfunction occurred on the ramp of First Air / Bradley Air Services Ltd. at the Ottawa / Macdonald-Cartier International Airport, Ontario, with the same Boeing 727 type. Various aircraft systems were being tested, and it was noticed that the warning light was out while the aft cargo door was open, indicating a malfunction of the concerned electrical system. The warning light was checked serviceable. The door microswitch was diagnosed as giving faulty indications. The switch was cleaned and reinstalled.

Aft cargo doors on Boeing 727's have been designed so that when properly closed and secured on the ground, the doors cannot inadvertently open in flight unless the whole door latching mechanism sustains a structural failure or breakdown. It is also physically impossible, by virtue of their design, to improperly close and secure the door. The door is opened in an upward direction by fully protracting the door handle, which then snaps and stays in that position. The door stay rod attached to the inside of the door is used to keep the door fully open for easy access.

To close and secure the aft cargo door, the stay rod is re-attached to the inside of the door, and the door is allowed to rotate downward by gravity, resting a few inches away from closing flat with the aircraft outer surface. With the door handle fully protracted, the door is pushed completely in against the aircraft structure, then the door handle is pushed in so it is flat with the surface of the aircraft's outer skin (fully retracted). The action of pushing in the door handle moves the four stops outward in each corner of the door. Provided that the door is resting against the fuselage, these male-type stops will first ramp up and then down into their respective, elbow-shaped, female-type aircraft mounted door stops (door latches) to properly secure the door.

Once the handle is fully in, a plunger mechanism is forced into the switch, which makes electrical contact and extinguishes the aft cargo warning light. If the door handle is pushed in (that is, partially or fully flat with the door) before the door is pushed completely in against the aircraft structure, extension of the moveable stops when the handle is pushed in will prevent these stops from locking in with the aircraft mounted door latches.

This safety mechanism makes it impossible to close the door flat with the aircraft structure if the handle is retracted and eliminates any possibility of the plunger electrical contact being made and the warning light being extinguished. When the handle is in and the door is not fully closed, the door remains ajar by about two feet. If the stay rod is stored and the door handle is protracted, the door will naturally rest close to the fuselage, just a few inches away from being flat with the aircraft outer skin. In this position, the fact that the door is not fully and properly closed is hardly noticeable to a loading crew.

Analysis

The involved switch was discarded before it could be examined and tested by TSB; thus, it was not determined whether the switch was defective for the occurrence flight.

Because ground personnel are usually loading cargo up to the last minute before engine start, the second officer does not carry out a final, post-loading, pre-flight inspection of the aircraft before starting the engines, nor is it required by company procedures. The flight crew rely on cockpit annunciator warning lights to confirm the status of aircraft doors before engine start, taxi, and take-off. In a serviceable system, an illuminated light would indicate that an electrical contact is not being made inside the door microswitch, meaning that the door is not closed and secured. When aircraft systems are energized with the auxiliary power unit and the aft cargo door is partially or fully open, the light will be illuminated. An extinguished aft cargo light after loading and before engine start confirms that the aft cargo door is properly closed and secured. It is concluded that the second officer likely could not have repeatedly missed the aft cargo warning light being illuminated on his annunciator panel before take-off. Even in bright and sunny conditions, an illuminated light on the second officer's console is obvious. Furthermore, the same light panel was visually verified "clear of lights" by the captain before take-off, as required in the pre-start checklist procedures.

This investigation revealed no damage to the aircraft mounted door latches, the door structure, and the door moveable stops. Only the door hinges were found bent and had to be changed. The nature of this damage, combined with the door design and the status of the door handle when first inspected by emergency response services personnel suggest that, after cargo loading was

completed, the door was likely left in the down position with the door handle fully protracted and the door stay rod stowed away.

The locations of the three parcels on the runway provide further evidence that the door was not fully closed before take-off. The door likely began to open as the aircraft initiated its rotation, and the force of the wind contributed directly to bending the door hinges. Although the aft cargo warning light was observed for the first time by the second officer as the gear was retracting, it is plausible that the light appeared earlier during the take-off roll. The second officer is required to turn his seat toward the front of the aircraft to monitor the engine instruments during the critical phase of the take-off roll and lift-off, he would not be looking at his annunciator panel. The advancement of thrust levers to full power, release of the brakes, take-off roll, rotation, and retraction of the landing gear are all conducive to airframe vibrations. These vibrations could have restored service to the aft cargo door microswitch mechanism. The subsequent engine compressor stalls coincided with raising the flaps. Airflow disruption, created by the closeness of an opened cargo door to the engine intake and redirected airflow resulting from a change of configuration most likely induced these stalls.

After working together at the local level for several years, Servisair Ltd. and DHL Aviation crews' direct responsibilities for loading an aircraft and securing all doors became ambiguous as both agencies worked to get the job done in a timely manner. Although the contract gives Servisair Ltd. responsibility for loading an aircraft, the local DHL Aviation staff member usually loads packages into the aft cargo area without disrupting the Servisair Ltd. team's loading in the main cargo area.

Although effective, this local division of responsibilities

procedure has weaknesses. Without a clearly defined set of tasks and/or responsibilities, confusion or miscommunication between two different loading crews (that is, agencies) eager to do the job in an efficient and timely manner may lead to an omission of safety-related duties, such as closing and securing the aft cargo door. With the door stay rod stowed away, a slightly open door is hardly noticeable. The only defence left against departing with a door open is a warning light on the second officer's panel. This light can become disabled as a result of electrical contamination or malfunction. Within the DHL Aviation and Servisair Ltd. organizations, the pre-flight walk-around inspection is considered to be the flight crew's responsibility. When the crew is informed in the cockpit that loading is complete and all doors are closed, the loading crew is not expected to perform a final walk-around because ramp dispatch is not part of the contract.

Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors

The aft cargo door was most likely not closed and secured before engine start-up, taxi, and departure of the Boeing 727. As a result, the door opened during the take-off roll.

The aft cargo door microswitch likely malfunctioned, giving the crew an erroneous indication that the door was secured before take-off.

Findings as to Risk

Servisair Ltd. and DHL Aviation's local procedure for loading an aircraft and securing cargo doors might have led to the omission of properly closing the aft cargo door.

When different agencies perform the same work without a clearly defined set of tasks or responsibilities, there is a risk of confusion and miscommunication that may lead to an omission of safety-related duties, such as closing and securing doors.

Other Findings

This incident was reported to TSB four days after the event. By the time the investigation was delegated to TSB, critical information had been lost: the aft cargo door microswitch had been discarded and could not be examined or tested.

Safety Action Taken

On July 3rd 2002, a meeting was held between Bradley Air Services Ltd and Servisair, where it was agreed that Servisair staff will be solely responsible for securing cargo doors on DHL aircraft. All DHL staff in Cork have been advised and will not be involved in this responsibility in the future.

This report concludes the Transportation Safety Board's investigation into this occurrence. Consequently, the Board authorized the release of this report on 14 August 2002.

1. Local time is Coordinated Universal Time plus one hour.
2. *Ground handling* is the provision of contracted services during the arrival and subsequent departure of the same aircraft in accordance with a standard agreement. *Contracted services* include, but are not limited to, marshalling the aircraft, loading and off-loading of the aircraft through the cargo doors, start-up

procedures, and pushback operations when necessary.
MANSLAUGHTER

Overview

Terminology: Voluntary and Involuntary

Unlawful And Dangerous Conduct as Manslaughter

Dangerous Conduct Defined
Unresolved Issues in Wilson: The Meaning of Unlawfulness
The Relationship Between the Categories of Fault for
Manslaughter

Criminal Negligence as Manslaughter

The Quality of Negligence Required
A. The Meaning of "Criminal Negligence"
B. The Standard of Negligence: "A high degree of
negligence"
C. Using confusing synonyms: "recklessness" and
indifference to obvious risks?
D. Placing the Reasonable Person in the Position of the
Accused.

Omissions and Criminal Negligence

Overview

76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent or
willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge"; "recklessly, or
maliciously"; and

"criminal negligence or criminally negligent." A person engages in conduct:

(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.

(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

Amended by Chapter 32, 1974 General Session
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Last revised: Friday, October 03, 1997

In this section, we will consider the principal categories of culpability for manslaughter: unlawful dangerous conduct; and criminal negligence. We will explore the differences and similarities between these alternate fault elements.

Terminology: Voluntary and Involuntary

Manslaughter, broadly speaking, is a less culpable or blameworthy form of homicide than murder. The jury can always return a verdict of manslaughter to a charge of murder. This is said to be a "constitutional right", applying even when the trial judge excludes the possibility of manslaughter as a legitimate verdict on the facts. This right of the jury to mitigate the penalty for murder to manslaughter (in effect, exercising a prerogative of mercy) plays an important role in cases where the motive for the killing is regarded as less blameworthy. For example, in the present law there is no defence for "mercy killing", that is where a person commits involuntary euthanasia of another person in order to relieve terminal suffering. This is formally murder irrespective of the beneficent motive. Juries

however are always reluctant to convict of murder in these situations: see M Otlowski, "Mercy Killing in the Australian Criminal Justice System" (1993) 17(1) Criminal Law Journal 10.

As well as these informal but recognised means of mitigating culpability for killing, the law formally recognises that killing in the face of provocation is less culpable than murder. This is known as voluntary manslaughter. It describes homicides where the defendant satisfies the mental state for murder, but the availability of a defence (like provocation) operates so as to reduce the offence of murder to manslaughter. See sections examining the defence of provocation.

On the other hand, involuntary manslaughter is the term which is traditionally used to describe all other culpable homicides not amounting to murder.

The leading High Court decision dealing with involuntary manslaughter is *Wilson* (1992), BWW 277, BFW 514. The facts of the case are that the victim was a wandering drunk who shouldered the defendant. The defendant claimed that he then saw the victim clench his fist and so the defendant hit him, not very hard and only once. The victim died from resulting brain damage consistent with his head striking the concrete. The defendant was charged with murder. The judge directed the jury as to both murder and manslaughter and the defendant was convicted of manslaughter.

Before the recent High Court decision of *Wilson*, the common law recognised three categories of manslaughter: unlawful dangerous act, criminal negligence

and a third category of manslaughter called battery manslaughter, or intentional infliction of harm. In the third category the defendant would be guilty of manslaughter where he or she committed a battery and death resulted. In *Holzer* [1968] VR 481, the defendant's fatal blow was not intended to cause any serious harm - the defendant intended to "just cut his lip to tell him to wake up to himself". The victim fell backwards and hit his head on the road and died.

Smith J. recognised that it will be manslaughter where the defendant (a) intended to inflict some kind of physical injury (or pain) on the victim and (b) the injury (or pain) must be more than merely trivial or negligible. (a) intended to inflict some kind of physical injury (or pain) on the victim and (b) the injury (or pain) must be more than merely trivial or negligible.

Professor Glanville Williams concluded that from the viewpoint of policy the third category of manslaughter is hard to justify:

"No judge has explained on what ground of justice or policy a person who has made a minor assault can become guilty of manslaughter by reason of an unknown weakness of the victim"

The Victorian Law Reform Commission shared this view and also recommended that this category of manslaughter should be abolished: Report No. 40, Homicide (1991) Recommendation 32 at p. 116.

In *Wilson*, the majority (Mason CJ, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ.) examined the older authorities which commonly cited in support of the existence of

battery manslaughter. The High Court concluded that the authorities were uncertain, BWW 287, BFW 516. Moreover, even if the category did exist there were good reasons for its demise. The High Court held that battery manslaughter continues the rigour of the early common law and ought to play no role in modern law. Under this category, a person may be held liable for manslaughter for causing a death which is quite unexpected, whether the test applied in that respect is subjective or objective. Battery manslaughter does not reflect the principle that there should be a close correlation between moral culpability and legal responsibility: BWW at 288, BFW 516.

Unlawful And Dangerous Conduct as Manslaughter

Wilson established that there is only two categories of involuntary manslaughter: unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter and manslaughter by criminal negligence. Prior to Wilson, Professor Brent Fisse had doubted the ultimate status of unlawful dangerous act manslaughter in Australia: Howard's Criminal Law (5th ed.) at p. 124. Its status has now been resolved in Australia, and the High Court in Wilson identified this as a separate category of manslaughter.

The early common law provided that for a conviction of manslaughter all that was required was that the defendant caused the death of another by an unlawful act. In that respect it was similar to the felony-murder rule, except that the unlawful act did not have to be a felony. The unlawful act doctrine may well have originated as a constructive form of liability (a corollary of

felony-murder): see discussion in Wilson. However, in the 19th Century the English courts restricted its operation to unlawful acts causing death which were also dangerous in the sense of "likely to injure another person": Larkin [1943] 1 All ER 217 at 219. The existence of this category of manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act was affirmed in England by the House of Lords in DPP v Newbury & Jones [1976] 2 WLR 918.

There are 3 elements to this category of manslaughter (i) the defendant 's act must cause the death, (ii) the defendant 's act must be unlawful, (iii) the defendant 's act must be dangerous. Before Wilson there was controversy over the meaning of dangerous act. In New South Wales, the courts were directing juries in accordance with a formulation of dangerous act laid down in the English decisions of Larkin [1943] and Church [1966] 1 QB 59, refer to BWW at 282.

"...the unlawful act must be such as all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise must subject the other person to, at least, the risk of some harm resulting therefrom, albeit not serious" Church [1966] 1 QB 59 per Edmund-Davies.

In Victoria, prior to Wilson, the courts have applied a more stringent test. In Holzer [1968] VR 481, Smith J expressly rejected Larkin/Church formulation:

"Authorities differ as to the degree of danger which must be apparent in the act. The better view, however, is I think that the circumstances must be

such that a reasonable man in the defendant 's position, performing the very act which the defendant performed, would have realised that he was

exposing another or others to an appreciable risk of really serious injury" per Smith J.

Note that the Holzer test had been cited with approval by Menzies J (dissenting) in Pemble.

Dangerous Conduct Defined

In Wilson, the High Court had to choose between the two tests of dangerousness. The minority (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ.) preferred the simple formulation of dangerousness as "an act likely to injure" in Larkin. The majority, modifying the Holzer test slightly, formulated the test thus: A reasonable person in the defendant 's position would have realised that the act carried with it an appreciable risk of serious injury to the deceased. The majority doubted the utility of the qualifier "really" in the Holzer test. Serious and really serious may have quite different connotations in some situations. In the context of manslaughter:

"it is better to speak of an unlawful and dangerous act carrying with it an appreciable risk of serious injury"

The majority concluded that the trial judge had misdirected the jury in Wilson because he had only them to consider whether the defendant's act was dangerous, without any explanation of what dangerous means. Thus the act must involve a sufficient likelihood or risk of injury to enable the

act to be characterised as dangerous. Ultimately what amounts to a dangerous act is a matter of degree and a question for the jury.

Unresolved Issues in Wilson: The Meaning of Unlawfulness

The dangerous conduct must also be unlawful. At one time, the unlawful act could consist of a tort. Later cases established that only criminally unlawful acts will suffice. However, in Howard's Criminal Law, it is noted that modern statutes often attach criminal liability to breaches of a statutory duty, for example driving without insurance. In the author's view this is not the unlawfulness which the courts envisage:

"...what the courts appear to have in mind is not an act which is dangerous and incidentally also unlawful but an act which is unlawful because it is dangerous." [at p. 127]

The doctrine appears to be limited, in Howard's view, to "acts which are unlawful only because they are dangerous". [at p. 128]. He cites Martin (1983) 32 SASR 419 at 452 per White J in support of the proposition. [at p. 128, n.18]

The High Court in Wilson did not consider this issue. The VLRC Report, Homicide (1991) concluded that " ... the requirement of unlawfulness had nothing relevant to add. Dangerousness is the key element and it is satisfied by an objective test": at par. 262 at p. 113.

It is important that the prosecution prove each element of the

unlawful act, including mens rea, if required by the offence. In *R. v. Lamb* [1967] 2 QB 981 (English Court of Appeal) the defendant shot and killed his best friend whilst fooling around with a revolver. It was conceded that the defendant was acting in jest, with no intention to harm the victim. Neither the defendant nor the victim understood the operation of the revolver (that a shot may be fired even though the firing chamber may be empty: the chamber rotates as the trigger is pulled). As to unlawful dangerous act doctrine, the trial judge held that the pulling of the trigger amounted to an unlawful act even though there was no intent to alarm or intent to injure. Even counsel for the Crown disagreed with the trial judge's conclusion that "it was unnecessary to involve the jury in any consideration of the niceties of whether the defendant's actions did or did not constitute an assault".

The Court of Appeal held that the Crown was correct in their contention that the defendant's actions must have amounted to at least a "technical assault". In this case there was no evidence of an assault of any kind. It was necessary to prove the mens rea of the unlawful act, "... in this case the element of intent without which there can be no assault".

A similar point was made in the High Court decision of *R. v. Pemble* [1971] ALR 762. The victim, the defendant's girlfriend, was sitting on the bonnet of a car in a hotel car park. The defendant approached her from behind with a shot gun, only intending to frighten her. The gun discharged and killed her. He claimed

it went off accidentally when he stumbled. He was convicted of murder. The trial judge directed the jury as to both murder and manslaughter and said that the defendant's conduct was clearly unlawful constituting an assault.

The majority agreed that the jury had been misdirected as to the requirement of unlawful act. The majority held that the murder conviction should be quashed but a conviction for manslaughter be substituted. All the elements of the unlawful act (in this case an assault) must be proved to succeed under the unlawful dangerous act doctrine. There could be no assault in this case since the victim had her back to the defendant: an essential element of the assault "causing the victim to apprehend immediate violence" was absent. The shooting itself could not be a battery because the discharge of the weapon was accidental.

However, the majority disagreed as to what constituted the unlawful act. Barwick CJ held that brandishing a shotgun "at least constituted an attempt to assault her ... The appellant at the moment of discharge of the rifle doing an act which was immediately proximate to the assault he intended". McTiernan J held that the defendant's unlawful act was a breach of s.75(1A) of the Police and Police Offences Ordinance 1923 (NT) which made it unlawful to "discharge of any firearm without reasonable cause in a public place". Windeyer J held that the defendant was clearly guilty of manslaughter by criminal negligence. Menzies and Owen JJ, dissenting, held that a new trial should be ordered.

Questions for consideration: Would the defendant's act be

unlawful if the discharge had occurred in a private hotel car park? Should culpability under this fault element turn on liability for other offences?

The Relationship Between the Categories of Fault for Manslaughter

Many cases of unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter may be dealt with under criminal negligence. Brett Waller and Williams suggest that "...it would not require a very bold judicial step to treat unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter as merging into negligent manslaughter. Certainly such a development would be desirable": Criminal Law Texts and Cases (1993) at 6.19, p 305.

In Wills [1983] 2 VR 201 (Supreme Court of Victoria) Lush J concluded that:

"The unlawfulness of the [unlawful and dangerous] act stands parallel with criminal negligence of negligent manslaughter and equally the risk factor relevant to manslaughter by unlawful and dangerous act stands as an objective consideration parallel with the objective danger assessment of negligent manslaughter."

Although the High Court in Wilson acknowledged that there have been calls to replace the two remaining categories with one, the majority rejected this because the test for dangerousness between the categories of manslaughter differ in two ways:

A. Different degrees of risk

For manslaughter by criminal negligence, the test is a high risk that death or grievous bodily harm would follow: *Nydam* [1977] VR 430, 445. Contrast unlawful and dangerous act which requires an appreciable risk of serious injury. But if the unamended *Holzer* test is followed ("really serious harm") the difference becomes insignificant.

B. The role of the unlawfulness requirement?

For manslaughter by criminal negligence, the defendant's act need not be unlawful: *Andrews* [1937] AC 576 see also *Larkin* [1943] 1 All ER 217. But this distinction is illusory - in relation to manslaughter by criminal negligence there is no requirement (or restriction) that the defendant's behaviour must be not be criminal.

Criminal Negligence as Manslaughter

This category of manslaughter requires the death to be caused by the defendant's criminally negligent conduct. The negligent conduct may be an act or an omission. The courts use negligence sparingly, and not every case of inadvertence to the risk of death or GBH which will suffice for criminal liability. In *Wilson*, the High Court had no cause to consider this category in depth, but affirmed in passing the test in *Nydam*.

The Quality of Negligence Required

A. The Meaning of "Criminal Negligence"

Early tests stress that a higher degree of negligence than that which supports a civil action is required:

"The prosecution must satisfy the jury that the negligence or incompetence of the defendant went beyond a mere matter of compensation and showed

such a disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving punishment": Bateman (1925) 19

Cr.App.R. 8 at 13

In Nydam [1977] VR 430, 445 the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria held that manslaughter by criminal negligence required the prosecution to prove that

(a) the act [or omission] which caused death was done by the defendant ,

(b) it was a conscious and voluntary act,

(c) that it was done in circumstances involving,

"...such a great falling short of the standard of care which a reasonable man would have exercised and which involved such a high risk that death or

GBH would follow that the doing of the act merited criminal punishment"

Both these statements are undesirable definitions of the conduct involved in criminal negligence manslaughter. It is conceptually

confusing to use in the words defining an offence terms such as "criminal" or "culpable". Such definitions leave it to the jury to determine the type of conduct which should fall within this category of manslaughter. On the other hand, the phrase could offer some assistance to the jury in understanding that the test of criminal negligence is qualitatively different from that used in the law of tort (see discussion below). If the formulation only serves this educative function, then perhaps it is not necessary to include it as part of the substantive definition of criminal negligence.

In *Andrews* [1937] AC 576 the House of Lords gave a list of appropriate synonyms including "culpable, criminal, gross, wicked clear and complete". None of these words are any more illuminating.

B. The Standard of Negligence: "A high degree of negligence"

Lord Atkin in *Andrews* [1937] AC 576 reviewed the 19th century cases which had defined this category of manslaughter using epithets such as "criminal misconduct" and "criminal inattention". Lord Atkin conceded that the use of "the word criminal in any attempt to define a crime is perhaps not the most helpful". However, these early definitions had intended to convey that only a very high degree of negligence would suffice:

"Simple lack of care such as will constitute civil liability is not enough: for the purposes of the criminal law there are degrees of negligence: and a very high degree of negligence is required to be proved

before the felony is established" per Lord Atkin in Andrews [1937] AC 576 at 583.

It is doubtful whether it is possible to have degrees of inadvertence. An early academic paper on criminal negligence by JW Turner argued that since the defendant is inadvertent of the risks associated with his conduct, how is it possible to characterise that behaviour as highly inadvertent. In his opinion, since inadvertence is a negative state of mind it is nonsense to suggest that there are degrees of inadvertence.

The courts are primarily concerned with conduct which, objectively speaking, involves a high risk of death or GBH. If this is the case, it strengthens the case for assimilating manslaughter by unlawful/dangerous acts and criminal negligence.

C. Using confusing synonyms: "recklessness" and indifference to obvious risks?

Several cases seem to suggest that the state of mind of the defendant is a relevant factor to be taken into account. In Andrews Lord Atkin said that "a very high degree of negligence is required to be proved before the felony is established. Probably of all the epithets that can be applied "reckless" most nearly covers the case."

This reference to recklessness was picked up in several subsequent cases. In Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981 Sachs LJ said

"When the gravaman of a charge is criminal negligence-

often referred to as recklessness-of the defendant, the jury have to consider among other

matters the state of mind his [or her] mind, and that includes whether or not he [or she] thought that that which he [or she] was doing was safe."

This may be regarded as importing a subjective element into manslaughter by criminal negligence. However, this view has been rejected in England in *Newbury & Jones* [1976] 2 WLR 918 where Lord Salmon said that *Lamb* should not be viewed as support for the view that the correct test is anything but objective - all that is required is that the defendant had the intention to do the act i.e., that his acts were voluntary.

The confusion over the precise meaning of negligence persisted in *Stone & Dobinson* [1977] 1 QB 354. The Court of Appeal referred to *Andrews* and concluded that the defendant 's conduct (his failure to act) must be reckless:

"that is to say a reckless disregard of danger to the health and welfare of the infirm person. Mere inadvertence is not enough. The defendant must be

proved to have been indifferent to an obvious risk of injury to health or actually have foreseen the risk but have determined nevertheless to run it"

The dicta relating to the standard of care is not good law in Australia for two reasons. First, the dicta in *Stone* suggests that the test is partially subjective - an approach expressly rejected in *Taylor* [1983]. Secondly, the case suggests that the risk associated with the defendant 's conduct

(whether determined objectively or subjectively) need only be of "injury to health or welfare", rather than "death or GBH".

Note however, that Stone was cited in Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR (NSW Court of Appeal) where Yeldham J referred to the above passage in Stone which suggested that the test was subjective and that the defendant must have "a reckless disregard to the health and welfare of the infirm person". This is unnecessarily confusing for the jury and the term recklessness should not be treated as a synonym for criminal negligence.

In Australia, the better view is that adopted in Taylor (1983) 9 A Crim R 358, Criminal Court of Appeal Victoria, namely that the defendant's state of mind is irrelevant to the determination of criminal negligence. The defendant had administered a lethal dosage of a sedative to her hyperactive 6 year old child. The normal dose had been 5ml but her doctor had told the defendant that it was safe to use a 'higher dosage' or 'a little bit more than 5ml'. The defendant was convicted and appealed. The issue on appeal was as follows: what circumstances are relevant to the determination that the defendant's conduct, which caused the death, was criminally negligent?

The Court held that the view expressed in Lamb (considered above) that the defendant's actual state of mind is relevant to criminal negligence is not good law in either England or Victoria. Whether the acts of the defendant were criminally negligent is to be objectively determined, without reference to the particular

belief of the defendant.

However the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's direction had not been deficient. The essential issue was whether a reasonable hypothetical person placed in the same circumstances as the defendant (particularly having regard to the advice given by the doctor) would have appreciated the probability of death or serious bodily harm as a result of their actions. The jury are entitled to consider whether a reasonable person, in the defendant's position, might have entertained the mistaken belief held by the defendant.

D. Placing the Reasonable Person in the Position of the Accused.

It is important to contextualise the position of the reasonable person. It is not simply whether the conduct was reasonable or unreasonable. An example of this sloppy reasoning and the danger that it could lead to an unfair conviction is apparent in the comments of O'Bryan J. in Taylor. He concluded that "On no view of the medical evidence could it be found that applicant had laboured under a mistaken belief that the dosage...would be reasonable and not harmful".

This conclusion is, with respect, wrong for the following reasons. The issue is not whether the defendant's belief was a reasonable one or not, but whether a reasonable person would, on the same facts, have appreciated the risk of death or GBH. Certainly no doctor, or person with the benefit of hindsight, would have concluded that such a belief [as to the dose] was reasonable, but the standard being applied is the whether a reasonable person

(who lacks such medical expertise)
would have foreseen death or GBH as likely.

Omissions and Criminal Negligence

This is misleadingly described in some texts as a separate category (or sub-specie) of homicide called manslaughter by omission. It is misleading because many crimes, including manslaughter, may be committed by omission if certain conditions are satisfied. The law imposes liability for death (either on the basis of murder or manslaughter depending on the level of fault) where the defendant has failed to act in situations where the law has imposed upon him or her a duty (or responsibility) to act. The law is generally reluctant to impose liability for omissions but it will do so in exceptional cases.

Here are some further illustrations of the principle being applied in manslaughter cases. In *Russell* [1933] VLR 59 the defendant was charged with the murder of his wife and his children. He had watched on as she drowned them and then drowned herself. His conviction for manslaughter was upheld on the basis that as a father and husband he had a duty to help (as a parent and spouse) which he had neglected.

Stone & Dobinson [1977] 1 QB 354, English Court of Appeal raises similar issues. The two defendant were described as "ineffectual and inadequate". The man's sister came to stay as a lodger and through her own neglect (refusal to eat) she became ill and bedridden. The defendant tried unsuccessfully to obtain help from their doctor, but they did no more. She died from toxæmia,

prolonged immobilisation and lack of food. If she had received proper medical care she would have probably survived.

There are three conditions that must be fulfilled before the jury may find the defendant guilty of manslaughter by criminal negligence:

(i) that there had been an assumption of a duty to care for the deceased;

(ii) that the defendant had been grossly negligent in regard of his duty to take care;

(iii) that by reason of such negligence the person died: that is, the omission caused the death.

The court rejected the argument that the two defendants were under no duty to act. In determining whether there had been the necessary assumption of duty, the following factors were relevant:

"Whether Fanny was a lodger or not she was a blood relation of Stone; she was occupying a room in his house; Dobinson had undertaken the duty of trying to wash her, of taking food to her as she required...They did make efforts to care. They tried to get a doctor; they tried to discover the previous doctor."

There is an interesting question arising here about the extent to which the law should impose upon individuals a legal duty to come to the aid of others,

particularly where the person concerned is actively refusing assistance. In the medical context, it is clear that health care practitioners are under a legal duty to treat their patients, and to use reasonable care and skill in the discharge of that duty. However, the law does not require medical treatment to be administered to unwilling over the protests of an unwilling patient. Similarly the law does not require prison authorities to force-feed prisoners who have decided to go on hunger strike: see English decision of *Home Secretary v Robb* [1995] 1 FLR 412.

The differing approach of the law in these contexts has been highlighted in a recent article by Hazel Biggs, "Euthanasia and Death with Dignity: Still Poised on the Fulcrum of Homicide" [1996] CrimLR 878. The author compares *Stone & Dobinson* with the later decision of *Airedale NHS Trust v Bland* [1993] 1 All ER 821. In *Bland*, the House of Lords held that the doctors were relieved of their legal responsibility to treat a patient in a irreversible coma (persistent vegetative state) when it was no longer in the patient's best interests to do so. The contrast between the two scenarios is stark:

" The duty of care, however, appears to adopt a different criminal significance depending on whether the potential defendant is a member of the public or a medical profession....

Why is it that a professionally imposed duty extended only as far as the best interests of a patient who could not consent, while the scope of the

voluntarily assumed duty in Stone and Dobinson included the obligation to overrule the autonomous wishes of the patient [Stone's sister, Fanny]?

Smith [1979] CrimLR suggests that a person is capable of rational decision-making could relieve a relative of a common law duty of care, but this

fails to reconcile conflicting dicta. Bland was incapable of making any decisions and his carers were absolved of responsibility, while Stone's sister

purposefully declined the provision of food and medical aid by her carers and they were culpable"

The issue of omission was also discussed in Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR (NSW Court of Criminal Appeal). The defendant was an associate of R, the proprietor of a "dog shop" and a drug dealer. He asked the defendant to procure him two prostitutes. R rang the defendant later that night asking him to collect one of the girls who, according to R, had taken too much heroin. The defendant took her to his flat tried to awaken her by slapping her face, pumped her chest and gave mouth to mouth resuscitation. The following day R called a doctor, who pronounced her dead. At the trial there had been conflicting medical opinion as to the exact time of death. The defendant was convicted and on appeal the Court examined whether the defendant, by his actions, had assumed a duty of care.

Yeldham J held "with considerable hesitation" there was evidence to support the jury's conclusion that the defendant had assumed a legal duty to seek medical aid for the victim. He focused on the fact that the defendant had made an effort to care, as in Stone.

Carruthers J had no difficulties recognising a duty to care for the victim which "...flowed from his [the defendant 's] taking her [the victim's] unconscious body into his exclusive custody and control and thereby removing her from the potentiality of appropriate aid from others."

Both Yeldham and Carruthers JJ agreed that the conviction should be quashed since the inconsistent medical evidence made it impossible to determine whether the defendant 's conduct had amounted to criminal negligence and whether this conduct caused the death of the victim.

Questions for Consideration: The traditional view is that the mere fact that the defendant had the power to save another's life (the baby in the pool of water scenario) is not sufficient to create a legal duty to act. Is this case reconcilable with this proposition?

Penal Code

Sec. 6.02. Requirement of Culpability.

(a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), a person does not commit an offense unless he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence engages in conduct as the definition of the offense requires.

(b) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a culpable mental state is nevertheless required unless the definition plainly

dispenses with any mental element.

(c) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state, but one is nevertheless required under Subsection (b), intent, knowledge, or recklessness suffices to establish criminal responsibility.

(d) Culpable mental states are classified according to relative degrees, from highest to lowest, as follows:

- (1) intentional;
- (2) knowing;
- (3) reckless;
- (4) criminal negligence.

(e) Proof of a higher degree of culpability than that charged constitutes proof of the culpability charged.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd
Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff.

Penal Code

Sec. 6.03. Definitions of Culpable Mental States.

(a) A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.

(b) A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

(c) A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

(d) A person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally negligent, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk

must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd
Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

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[Sec. 6.01. Requirement of Voluntary Act or Omission.](#)

(a) A person commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct, including an act, an omission, or possession.

(b) Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly obtains or receives the thing possessed or is aware of his control of the thing for a sufficient time to permit him to terminate his control.

(c) A person who omits to perform an act does not commit an offense unless a law as defined by Section 1.07 provides that the omission is an offense or otherwise provides that he has a duty to perform the act.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 913, ch. 342, Sec. 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1975; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 3, Sec. 1, eff. Feb. 25, 1993; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

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Sec. 6.04. Causation: Conduct and Results.

(a) A person is criminally responsible if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient.

(b) A person is nevertheless criminally responsible for causing a result if the only difference between what actually occurred and what he desired, contemplated, or risked is that:

(1) a different offense was committed; or

(2) a different person or property was injured, harmed, or otherwise affected.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.

Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd

Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

[Go To Best Hit]

Transportation Code

Sec. 69.053. Pilot Liability Limited.

(a) A pilot providing a pilot service is not liable for more than \$1,000 for damages or loss caused by the pilot's error, omission, fault, or neglect in the performance of the pilot service.

(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to:

(1) damage or loss that arises because of the wilful misconduct or gross negligence of the pilot;

(2) liability for exemplary damages for gross negligence of the pilot and for which no other person is jointly or severally liable; or

(3) an act or omission related to the ownership and operation of a pilot boat unless the pilot boat is directly involved in pilot services other than

the transportation of pilots.

(c) This section does not exempt the vessel or its owner or operator from liability for damage or loss caused by the ship to a person or property on the ground that:

(1) the ship was piloted by a pilot; or

(2) the damage or loss was caused by the error, omission, fault, or neglect of a pilot.

(d) In an action brought against a pilot for an act or omission for which liability is limited as provided by this section and in which other claims are made or anticipated with respect to the same act or omission, the court shall dismiss the proceedings as to the pilot to the extent the pleadings allege pilot liability that exceeds \$1,000.

Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 165, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1995.

Penal Code

Sec. 39.01. Definitions.

In this chapter:

(1) "Law relating to a public servant's office or employment" means a law that specifically applies to a person acting in the capacity of a public servant and that directly or indirectly:

(A) imposes a duty on the public servant; or

(B) governs the conduct of the public servant.

(2) "Misuse" means to deal with property contrary to:

(A) an agreement under which the public servant holds the property;

(B) a contract of employment or oath of office of a public servant;

(C) a law, including provisions of the General Appropriations Act specifically relating to government property, that prescribes the manner of custody or disposition of the property; or

(D) a limited purpose for which the property is delivered or received.

Added by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Penal Code

Sec. 39.02. Abuse of Official Capacity.

(a) A public servant commits an offense if, with intent to obtain a benefit or with intent to harm or defraud another, he intentionally or knowingly:

(1) violates a law relating to the public servant's office or employment; or

(2) misuses government property, services, personnel, or any other thing of value

belonging to the government that has come into the public servant's custody or possession by virtue of the public servant's office or employment.

(b) An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor.

(c) An offense under Subsection (a)(2) is:

(1) a Class C misdemeanor if the value of the use of the thing misused is less than \$20;

(2) a Class B misdemeanor if the value of the use of the thing misused is \$20 or more but less than \$500;

(3) a Class A misdemeanor if the value of the use of the thing misused is \$500 or more but less than \$1,500;

(4) a state jail felony if the value of the use of the thing misused is \$1,500 or more but less than \$20,000;

(5) a felony of the third degree if the value of the use of the thing misused is \$20,000 or more but less than \$100,000;

(6) a felony of the second degree if the value of the use of the thing misused is \$100,000 or more but less than \$200,000; or

(7) a felony of the first degree if the value of the use of the thing misused is \$200,000 or more.

(d) A discount or award given for travel, such as frequent flyer miles, rental car or hotel discounts, or food coupons, are not things of value belonging to the government for purposes of this section due to the administrative difficulty and cost involved in recapturing the discount or award for a governmental entity.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974.
Amended by Acts 1983, 68th
Leg., p. 3241, ch. 558, Sec. 7, eff. Sept. 1, 1983. Renumbered
from Sec. 39.01 and amended by
Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT

To: mintc@tc.gc.ca

**Subject: Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 3: The
Official Versions:**

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Below is Submission 3 for the Commissioner of the Commission. 'The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom.'

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182
Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner
Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel
Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel
Ken Dickerson, Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publiques

Dear Commissioner Major, Tuesday, August 8, 2006

1. "Disposition: Mr. Smith is denied standing. However, leave to file materials that he believes will be useful to the Commissioner is granted."

2. Commissioner Major at hearing to Smith: "...what I can do is permit you to file any written material that substantiates your view and it will be part of the Air India record."

3. Commissioner at hearing: "The best I can do is to repeat the offer I made and invite you to file in as much as detail as you choose whatever it is that supports your theory and it will be part of this record."

4. Commissioner: "You're free, Mr. Smith, as you probably know, to add to your filed material should you choose."

Yes, sir, I can take a hint. Thank you for your urgings. I am submitting as fast as I can and will continue to file material I believe will be useful to you regarding the Inquiry, the investigation, the bombing, Air India Flight 182, what's it like to be a victim of a sudden fatal jet airplane crash, and the emotions when meeting the family members of that fatal victim.

The key focus is the crashed aircraft. If Air India Flight 182 had not crashed and landed safely, then there would be no grieving family members, no victims, no bombing, no investigation, and no inquiry. The core is the airplane and why it crashed. If the official crash causes are confused and contradictory the inquiry

conclusions will be also.

Thus enter the bomb bomb bomb explanations (not lies) provided by others who think they are pointing you...

There is one scenario that unites the five official versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom.

1. The first official determination is the Narita Event is from the Japanese police point of view.

"At 0541 GMT, 23 June 1985, CP Air Flight 003 arrived at Narita Airport, Tokyo, Japan, from Vancouver. At 0619 GMT a bag from this flight exploded on a baggage cart in the transit area of the airport within an hour of the Air India occurrence. Two persons were killed and four were injured... Baggage cart explodes in transit area... The explosion of a bag from CP 003 at Narita Airport, Tokyo, took place 55 minutes before the AI 182 accident...the site where the blast had taken place was inspected which gave some, though very vague, idea of the detonating power of the blast."

To sum up: "A bag from a Vancouver flight exploded on a baggage cart in a transit area from a vague power of a blast."

The Narita Event is officially determined by the police to be a bomb which caused the blast of vague power in a bag as part of the baggage on a baggage cart in a transit area of a major airport hub. The first official bomb in the baggage goes boom.

2. The next official determination of the Air India Flight 182 Event is from an Indian judge's point of view.

Kirpal Report: "4.10 After going through the entire record we find that there is circumstantial as well as direct evidence which directly points

to the cause of the accident as being that of an explosion of a bomb in the forward cargo hold of the aircraft."

"All cargo doors were found intact and attached to the fuselage structure, except for the forward cargo door which had some fuselage and cargo floor attached. This door, located on the forward right side of the aircraft, was broken horizontally about one-quarter of the distance above the lower frame. The damage to the door and the fuselage skin near the door appeared to have been caused by an outward force. The fractured surface of the cargo door appeared to have been badly frayed. Because the damage appeared to be different from that seen on other wreckage pieces,..."

The Air India Flight 182 Event is officially determined by an Indian judge to be caused by a bomb in the baggage in the forward cargo hold possibly on the right side. (No physical connection between the forward and aft cargo holds which are several hundred feet apart.) That is the second official bomb in the baggage go boom.

3. The next official determination of the Air India Flight 182 Event is from a Canadian judge's point of view.

Below from "Reasons for Judgment" by Justice Josephson regarding Malik and Bagri.

I. Overview [1] In the early morning hours of June 23, 1985, Air India Flight 182, carrying 329 people[1], was destroyed mid-flight by a bomb located in its rear cargo hold.

H. Conclusion [190] It is agreed amongst the experts that the Kanishka was destroyed by the detonation of an explosive device within its left aft fuselage.

The Air India Flight 182 Event is officially determined by a Canadian judge to be a bomb in the baggage in the aft cargo hold on the left side. That is the third official bomb in the baggage go boom.

4. The next official determination of the Air India Flight 182 Event is from the Canadian aviation accident investigators point of view:

The Canadian Aviation Safety Board respectfully submits as follows:

Ò4.1 Cause-Related Findings

5. There is considerable circumstantial and other evidence to indicate that the initial event was an explosion occurring in the forward cargo compartment.Ó

"The forward cargo door which had some fuselage and cargo floor attached was located on the sea bed. The door was broken horizontally about one-quarter of the distance above the lower frame. The damage to the door and the fuselage skin near the door appeared to have been caused by an outward force and the fracture surfaces of the door appeared to be badly frayed. This damage was different from that seen on other wreckage pieces. A failure of this door in flight would explain the impact damage to the right wing areas. The door failing as an initial event would cause an explosive decompression leading to a downward force on the cabin floor as a result of the difference in pressure between the upper and lower portions of the aircraft."

The Air India Flight 182 Event is officially determined by

Canadian aviation accident investigators to be an explosion of unknown cause in the forward cargo compartment probably on the right side. Another explosion in the forward cargo compartment goes kaboom. (Bombs go boom, unknown caused explosive decompressions go kaboom.)

5. The next official determination for Air India Flight 182 is from the United Kingdom aircraft accident investigator point of view.

"Mr. R.A. Davis, Head, Flight Recorder Section, Accidents Investigation Branch, Farnborough, U.K. 3.4.6.16 In conclusion, Mr. Davis reported as follows :- "It is considered that from the CVR and ATC recordings supplied for analysis, there is no evidence of a high explosive device having detonated on AI 182. There is strong evidence to suggest that a sudden explosive decompression occurred but the cause has not been identified. It must be concluded that without positive evidence of an explosive device from either the wreckage or pathological examinations, some other cause has to be established for the accident".

The Air India Flight 182 Event is officially determined by a British aviation accident investigator to be something, not a bomb, somewhere, causes an explosive decompression. That is the fifth explanation for an explosion go kaboom.

Those are the five official determinations of explosions related to Air India Flight 182 by five official investigations in three countries over two decades.

1. A vaguely powerful explosion of a bag on a baggage cart with bags in a major transit area hub airport determined by the Japanese police in 1985.
2. A very powerful explosion of a bomb in a bag in the baggage

in the forward cargo hold, possibly on the right side, of Air India Flight 182 determined by the Indian Justice Kirpal in 1986.

3. A very powerful explosion of a bomb in a bag in the baggage in the aft cargo hold on the left side of Air India Flight 182 determined by the Canadian Justice Josephson, in 2005.

4. An explosion of unknown cause in the forward cargo compartment, probably on the right side, of Air India Flight 182 determined by the Canadian aircraft accident investigators of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board, CASB in 1986.

5. A very powerful explosive decompression, not a bomb, someplace in Air India Flight 182, determined by the British aircraft accident investigator R. A. Davis of U.K. Accidents Investigations Branch in 1986.

There is no consensus on any significant issue by any officials other than explosive events occurred on a baggage cart and on an airplane thousands of miles apart and within the hour.

There is official disagreement in the determinations of whether it was a bomb or something else, how many bombs were involved, where the bombs were loaded, how powerful the bombs were, what container the bomb was in, which major section of the aircraft the bomb was placed, on what side of the aircraft the bomb was located, or what caused an explosive decompression that was not a bomb. (Not counted are the disagreements of who put the bombs there and why.)

There was no official direct evidence determined for bombs with three fuses, three bomb casings, three bomb residues, three shrapnel wounds, or three timers in any of the three locations stated as having bombs exploded which are the Narita airport and the aft and forward cargo compartments of Air India Flight 182.

There is one official cause to unite them all: Three bombs. Assuming that an explosion means only one thing and that is bomb explosion and assuming that official determinations after official investigations are correct the following scenario can explain what happened:

{Commissioner Major, please bear with me on this story telling, I did not make the contradictory determinations which require unification, well meaning officials did. Confusing statements ask for humor to diffuse the frustration. (My plausible straightforward mechanical explanation with precedent is contained in Submission 4: The shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation).}

The one scenario that unites the five official determinations: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom.

Two of the bombs were surreptitiously placed on two Boeing 747s at Vancouver airport on 22 June 1985, the day before they blew up. The third bomb was placed into one of the Boeing 747s at the Montreal airport later that same day.

The official versions united:

Bomb 1: One bomb was loaded on CP 003 which flew to Tokyo with no detonation of the bomb during the long flight across the Pacific. This bomb was then unloaded in a busy airport, put on a baggage cart which was wheeled through a 'transit' area with many other bags from many other flights, and only then did the vaguely powerful bomb detonate at 0619Z, not from an altimeter fuze but from a timing fuze which went off when it was not

supposed to for an aircraft terrorist bombing. No fuze or parts of any bomb or the suitcase were reported to have been discovered. No match of any debris parts of this bomb were made to other bombs by same terrorist group. No claims of responsibility or confessions were obtained. (The Japanese police determined bomb.)

Bomb 2: At the same time the Narita bomb was loaded at Vancouver onto CP 003 on the afternoon of 22 June 1985, another bomb was loaded onto CP 060, also in Vancouver, and successfully slipped past the extensive security of men, dogs, and machines. CP 060 then flew to Toronto without the bomb going off by timer or altimeter fuse. At Toronto, the bomb was then off loaded from CP 060 and sent, along with some passengers, to a different aircraft, a Boeing 747 which was Flight 181 which, after another flight to Montreal, would change to Flight 182. At Toronto, all the baggage from Vancouver on CP 060, including the bomb, was placed in the aft cargo hold of the Boeing 747. This aircraft, called Flight 181, took off and flew to Montreal with the bomb still not detonating by altimeter or timing fuze. The timer was set to go off at 0714Z. (The Judge Josephson determined bomb.)

Bomb 3: After the Boeing 747 called Flight 181 landed in Montreal with the bomb from Vancouver still in the aft cargo hold, the flight number of the same Boeing 747 changed to Air India Flight 182, and more passengers and baggage were put on board. All their baggage was placed into the forward cargo hold. A new aircraft bomb was thus loaded into the forward cargo compartment with the timer set to go off at 0714Z. (The Judge Kirpal determined bomb.)

There were many delays involved with loading parts of a large

engine into the aft cargo compartment which did not set off the bomb in that compartment. Finally, the aft and forward cargo compartment bomb laden Boeing 747 now called Air India Flight 182 took off from Montreal for its third flight in many hours, flew for five hours across the Atlantic and then a fuze for the Montreal loaded bomb activated and exploded in the forward cargo compartment, not by an altimeter fuze because the aircraft was level at 31000 feet and had been so for hours, but by a timer fuze. The Vancouver bomb, first loaded in Vancouver and transferred to the aft cargo compartment of the doomed aircraft in Toronto, detonated at exactly the same time, 0714Z. The two bombs blew holes in the pressurized hull causing an explosive decompression.

Thus explains and unites the Japanese police bomb, the Justice Kirpal bomb, the Justice Josephson bomb, the CASB explosion, and the UK AIB explosive decompression events.

The official determinations assume inefficient ticketing agents, dull-witted security forces, and malfunctioning X ray machines in four large metropolitan airports in two industrialized nations. It assumes incompetent terrorists who can't set a bomb to go off on time. It assumes quiet bombs in an aircraft that leave no sound when they go off. It assumes three stealthy bombs that managed to slip through sniffing dogs, portable metal detectors, X-Ray machines, private security teams, and yet leave no trace of their fuzes, timers, explosive material, or containers.

Officially the terrorists were of two groups; one group in Vancouver to check the bomb in the baggage which was placed in the aft cargo compartment of Air India Flight 182 to explode according to the Canadian judge. Another terrorist group in Montreal checked their bomb in baggage which was placed in

the forward cargo compartment of Air India Flight 182 to explode there according to the Indian judge. The Vancouver terrorist group also checked in another bomb in the baggage of another aircraft to explode later on a baggage cart at Narita airport, according to the Indian judge.

Three bombs to explode: one at Narita airport, one in the forward cargo compartment and another in the aft cargo compartment of Air India Flight 182. (There is no physical connection between the two very far apart cargo compartments of a Boeing 747.)

The terrorists were stupid because:

1. The bombs did not go off when a real aircraft bomb usually goes off, shortly after takeoff climb on the initially loaded flight.
2. The fuzes were three timers set to go off at odd times such as 0619, 0714, and 0714 many hours later after being set.
3. They did not claim responsibility to advertise their cause.

The terrorists were smart because:

1. They were able to construct bombs which left no fuse, no casings, no timer evidence and were silent.
2. They were able to smuggle three bombs through tight security at four large airports in two countries.
3. They coordinated two bombs on the same aircraft loaded in different locations at two airports to go off at same time to ensure destruction.

The terrorists were lucky because;

1. The four takeoffs and landings and turbulence did not detonate the amateur improvised bombs.
2. The changing of two planes and movement of baggage from plane to transit area did not detonate the bombs.
3. Their bomb laden baggage was not misplaced or misdirected

by the airline.

4. The many unexpected schedule delays and aircraft changes still allowed the bombs to go off to kill innocent people instead of in an unoccupied hangar or baggage storage area.

This is the official unified determination to explain the Narita airport transit area and Air India Flight 182 bombings: Revenge seeking terrorist groups managed to place three stealthy bombs in three aircraft and on one baggage cart through four airports in one day. Three bombs in three bags in three baggage areas go boom boom boom.

Commissioner Major, yes, it's a convoluted, illogical, bizarre story but then, conspiracy stories usually are. When accepted as truth by wishful thinking noncritical listeners, the conspiracy stories are exciting, pleasing, and repeated; when examined by skeptics, the stories usually blow up in the tellers' faces, as the bomb, bomb, bomb determinations do.

The Canadian Transportation Safety Board Air has never given its official opinion in the probable cause of Air India Flight 182, the most famous airplane crash in Canadian history. Their specialized expert input is invaluable to the Commission. Will you please ask TSB Air to provide to the Commission an updated supplement to the twenty year old CASB accident report on Air India Flight 182, a request justified by several subsequent similar accidents since 1985 to similar Boeing 747s and to resolve the explosion location conflict created by Justice Josephson and Justice Kirpal?

My down to earth mechanical explanation follows in my next Submission to the Commission. The wiring/cargo door explanation applauds Justice Josephson's finding of not guilty, it

confirms the Canadian aviation accident investigators' conclusion, it exonerates the RCMP's failure to catch Snidely Whiplash, and justifies the expense and time of this Commission of Inquiry into events surrounding Air India Flight 182.

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type of explosion and where it occurred.)

Respectfully,

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From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT

To: mintc@tc.gc.ca

Subject: Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version:

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Below is Submission 4 for the Commissioner of the Commission: Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation. (Please consider a plausible, reasonable, electrical cause with precedent) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006.

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith

541 Country Club Drive
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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner

Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson, Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publiques

Dear Commissioner Major, Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/
ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/
inflight breakup explanation.

Below is the scientific explanation for Air India Flight 182 in
narrative form based on direct, circumstantial, tangible, deduced,
historical, and inferred evidence obtained through government
aircraft accident reports and testimony under oath, 1953-2006.
All statements of fact can be corroborated as having occurred in
Air India Flight 182 or other similar Boeing 747s under similar
circumstances.

Pressurized hulls of jet airliners have been blowing up since
1953 with the Comet.

03/03/1953

location: Karachi, Pakistan

carrier: Canadian Pacific flight:

aircraft: comet registry:
aboard: fatal: 11 ground:
details: First fatal crash of a commercial jet aircraft

05/02/1953

location: near Jagalogori West Bengal, India
carrier: British Overseas Airlines flight: 783/057
aircraft: De Havilland comet 1 registry: g-alyv
aboard: 43 fatal: 43 ground:
details: broke up in flight during a violent thunderstorm. Metal fatigue due to design flaw.

01/10/1954

location: Elba, Italy
carrier: British Overseas Airlines flight:
aircraft: De Havilland comet 1 registry:
aboard: fatal: 35 ground:
details: broke up in flight. Metal fatigue due to design flaw.

04/08/1954

location: stromboli, italy
carrier: South African Airways flight:
aircraft: De Havilland comet 1 registry:
aboard: fatal: 21 ground:
details: broke up in flight. Metal fatigue due to design flaw.

Hull ruptures in flight leading to sudden explosive decompressions have occurred in over fifty airliners over the years. The causes can be bombs, metal fatigue, cargo shifts, inadvertent door openings from improperly latched to electrical faults, cockpit windows being broken by bird strikes, fuel tank explosion, missile hits, corrosion, faulty repair of damaged bulkhead, midair collisions, thunderstorms, and improperly fitted

pressure relief valves.

Air India Flight 182 fits into one of those categories, the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup one.

There are literally hundreds of pressurization problems that occur in airliners that are not sudden explosions but slow failures. These events rarely lead to fatalities while the sudden loud events usually do.

In an historical and statistical sense Air India Flight 182 was a normal aircraft accident: The cause was mechanical and not unusual. There have been several subsequent explosive decompressions in Boeing 747s similar to Air India Flight 182 that left similar evidence.

The forward cargo door of Air India Flight 182 opened inadvertently in flight for certain, the cause of that opening was probably faulty wiring.

Regards,

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Sequence of Destruction for Air India Flight 182:

Background:

On 18 July, 1984 a high lift vehicle damaged the fuselage skin near the forward cargo door of a Boeing 747-237B, construction number 330, operated by Air India airlines. The fuselage skin had wiring routed on the inside which became bent from the impact and subsequently cracked to bare wire, a characteristic of the polyimide type insulated Poly X wiring installed in the aircraft. The forward cargo door had non-steel locking sectors to keep the bottom eight latching cams from being back driven which would allow the door to open in flight causing explosive decompression which would be a catastrophic event well known to aircraft designers.

In June of 1986 several passengers changed their flight plans and their baggage routing for various flights through Canada to overseas destinations probably from Vancouver.

On 22 June, 1986, two aircraft had baggage loaded aboard them at the Vancouver B. C. airport; one flight was called CP 003 and the other CP 060. Flight 003 took off and flew uneventfully to the extremely busy Narita airport near Tokyo, Japan. After the baggage was unloaded from the flight, it was put on a baggage cart which was wheeled through a transit area of many other baggage carts containing many other bags from many other flights. An explosion of unspecified cause, unknown fuzing, unknown container, and unknown material occurred on the baggage cart which killed two people and injured others. The airport had high security because of previous terrorist attacks on it resulting in fatalities over the years.

The other flight, CP 060, flew uneventfully to Toronto Airport. The baggage was unloaded from CP 060 and those bags continuing on to London on Air India Flight 181/182 were

loaded into the aft cargo compartment of the Boeing 747-237B, construction number 330. The flight, now called Air India Flight 181, then flew uneventfully to Mirabel Airport in Montreal. After landing, some baggage of the departing passengers was unloaded from the aft compartment. Parts of a broken engine were placed in the aft cargo compartment for ferry back to India. New passengers and new baggage from Montreal for the next flight of the same aircraft, construction number 330 and now called Air India Flight 182, were loaded with all the new baggage going into the forward baggage compartment. The baggage from Vancouver on CP 060 and reloaded at Toronto remained in the aft cargo compartment of the Boeing 747-237B now called Air India Flight 182.

The forward cargo compartment was filled with summer night air, warm and moist. When flying at altitude the air would be cooled by the air conditioning and the very cold outside air would cool the fuselage skin thus condensing out moisture along the inside of the compartment which would run through the wiring bundles and down into the cargo door bilge.

Air India Flight 182 took off from Montreal for London at 0218 Z on 23 June 1985 and flew uneventfully for about five hours and while at 31000 feet at 296 knots and about 115 miles west of Ireland a tragic sequence of events began at 0714 Z. The pressure differential between outside and inside air was at its maximum design limit, 8.9 pounds per square inch.

The Event:

Water may have met the cracked insulated wire which may have been previously damaged by the high lift accident to the cargo door area. The now exposed and bare wire shorted against the metal fuselage. The electricity then flowed around safety

cutout switches and powered on the cargo door actuator unlatch electric motor which attempted to rotate all ten cam sectors to unlocked positions around their ten latching pins. The eight lower cam sectors may have been prevented from unlatching around the latching pins because of the bottom eight locking sectors. However, the two midspan latches had no locking sectors to prevent the inadvertent rotation of the midspan latching cams around the midspan latching pins.

The lower eight cams probably overcame the weaker locking sectors to just turn past center and allow the door to unlatch in flight, a defect known years later in two other Boeing 747 flights, Pan Am Flight 125 and United Airlines Flight 811. The midspan cams turned just past center with no locking sectors to prevent the backdriving of the cams, an operation only supposed to be allowed on the ground. Possibly other factors such as an out of rig cargo door, a poor repair job on the door area, the slack in bellcranks, torque tubes, and worn latch pins may have contributed to have allowed the two midspan latches to rotate just past center permitting the almost 100,000 pounds of internal pressure on the 99 inch by 110 inch door to rupture outward inflight relieving the maximum pressure differential on the internal fuselage.

The nine foot by eight foot squarish forward cargo door would have instantly burst open at the midspan and bottom latches sending the latches, door material, and large pieces of fuselage skin spinning away. The forward cargo compartment would have spewed its contents outward onto the starboard side of the fuselage. It was as if a huge mylar balloon had popped. The severe explosion of explosive decompression caused the forward cargo door to be fractured and shattered into a few large pieces and many small pieces which gave a frayed appearance

from an outward force. Many small bits of metal from the explosion were embedded into the cargo door area metal fuselage structure.

The top part of the door swung outward and upward on its hinge and then separated taking large vertical pieces of fuselage skin with it, exposing stringers and bulkheads. The very lower part of the door sill with its eight bottom latches may have stuck to fuselage skin. The resulting damage zone appeared as a huge rectangle of shattered door, skin, and stringers. Some pieces of the door and fuselage skin flew directly aft and impacted the leading edge of the right wing, the vertical stabilizer and the right horizontal stabilizer in flight.

This explosion of explosive decompression blew out a large hole about thirty feet wide and forty feet high on the starboard side of the nose forward of the wing. It looked as if a bomb had gone off inside the forward cargo hold. Fuselage skin was peeled outward at various places on the starboard side of the nose.

The forward cargo door had some fuselage and cargo floor attached. This door, located on the forward starboard side of the aircraft, was broken horizontally about one-quarter of the distance above the lower frame. The damage to the door and the fuselage skin near the door appeared to have been caused by an outward force. The fractured surface of the cargo door appeared to have been badly frayed. The cargo door pieces and the adjacent skin had holes, flaps, fractures, inward concavity, tears, deformities, outward bent petals, curls, missing pieces, cracks, separations, curved fragments, spikes, and folds. The fast and powerful explosion of the explosive decompression would have caused a metallurgical effect called "winning" on a few fragments of pieces of wreckage.

The now uncompressed air molecules rushed out of the huge hole equalizing the high pressure inside the fuselage to the low pressure outside the aircraft while making a sudden very loud audible sound. This sudden rushing outward air was recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder as a sudden loud sound. The sound did not accurately match any bomb explosion sounds on other aircraft but did match the explosive decompression sound on another wide body airliner, a DC-10 cargo door open event.

The tremendous explosive force in the forward cargo hold severely disrupted the adjacent main equipment compartment which housed power cables and abruptly shut off power to the Flight Data Recorders. The resulting data tapes showed a sudden loud audible sound followed by an abrupt power cut to the flight data recorder, the cockpit voice recorder and transponder.

The number three engine and cowling, closest to the forward cargo compartment, were damaged by inflight debris from material ejected from the now exposed compartment and cabin above, debris which also damaged the number four engine cowling by a displaced turbine blade from number three engine. The resulting vibration from the internal damage to engine number three caused the nacelle and engine to fall away from the wing, as designed, and land apart from the other three engines.

The floor beams above the forward cargo hold were sucked downward, and were fractured and broken from the sudden decompression. The floor panels were stationary but gave the appearance of separating upward by the suddenly moving downward floor beams.

The flight attitude of the aircraft was askew to the left from reaction of explosive decompression from the right. Air rushed

into the large hole and weakened other skin and frames thus peeling skin further outward and rupturing the aft part of the aircraft to include the aft cargo compartment and the aft pressure bulkhead. There was no evidence of an explosion of any source in the aft cargo compartment.

The 296 knots of wind force pressed upon the weakened airframe and broke it in half amidships. This wind force was larger than any wind force the surface of the earth had ever experienced. The nose portion and wings tore off and landed in a dense debris heap apart from the debris field of the aft part.

The rest of the plane without the forward section suddenly decelerated from 296 knots and caused whiplash injuries to passengers. After the breakup, the passengers who were not wearing their seatbelts were scattered to far distances. They suffered explosion type injuries such as pieces of metal embedded in them from flying debris in the cabin. They were not burned because there was no fire nor explosion from a bomb explosion. The passengers had no other bomb explosion evidence. The passengers and crew were ejected from the disintegrating aircraft to tumble to the water and suffer upward impact physical damage to their bodies. Some remained in their seats and were trapped in the fuselage underwater. Some had decompression type injuries of hypoxia from the high altitude aircraft breakup.

The passengers fell to the sea and some floated and some sank. The baggage from Vancouver passengers and loaded into the aft cargo compartment fell to the sea and some floated and some sank. The baggage from Montreal passengers and loaded into the forward cargo compartment fell to the sea and some floated and some sank. The aircraft fell in pieces and some pieces

floated and some sank.

The pilots may have been conscious for a few seconds and adjusted the trim controls out of habit. The communications radio may have been activated by the disturbances in the cockpit and transmitted for a few seconds to air traffic control.

The port side forward of the wing was relatively smooth and undamaged from inflight debris while the starboard side forward of the wing was shattered, torn, and frayed at the ruptured cargo door area.

A few local fires appeared on the surface of the ocean from the jet kerosene fuel and singed some seat cushions and floating passengers.

All was quiet as the ground controllers tried to contact Air India Flight 182 as the flight crew did not respond to radio calls. Rescue teams were sent. Authorities became aware of the tragedy of 329 men, women, and children dying in a sudden plane crash.

Aftermath:

Explanations were sought as to what happened. Immediately the suggestion was made by authorities that a bomb explosion had caused the accident because of the sudden and catastrophic nature of the immediate evidence.

The Canadian aviation accident investigation authorities became involved since the aircraft had taken off from Canada and had many Canadian citizens aboard. Indian authorities became involved since the airline, Air India, has government ties. The Indian authorities quickly dismissed their aviation experts and assigned a Judge of the Court to oversee the investigation.

After a period of investigation, much of which was conducted to confirm the bomb explosion explanation and identify the culprits, the Indian judge made a finding in 1986 that a bomb in the forward cargo compartment had caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182 and ruled out any type of explosion in the aft cargo compartment.

After a period of investigation, during which the opinion of the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch representative of an explosive decompression not caused by a bomb but a cause as yet to be determined was given, the Canadian Aviation Safety Board made a conclusion in 1986 that an explosion of unstated cause in the forward cargo compartment had caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182 while also ruling out any explosion of any type in the aft cargo compartment.

The immediate finding by the Indians of a bomb explosion in the forward cargo compartment was accepted and remained the probable cause for Air India Flight 182 twenty one years later although subsequent accidents of a similar type aircraft in similar circumstances leaving similar evidence now resolutely contradicted that finding although confirming the Indian finding of an explosion on the starboard side of the forward cargo compartment and no explosion in the aft.

The Canadian probable cause of an explosion in the forward cargo compartment of an undetermined cause has been proven to be correct by subsequent accidents of a similar type aircraft in similar circumstances leaving similar evidence which do reveal the cause of the explosion: faulty wiring causing the forward cargo door to rupture open inflight at the latches leading to a tremendous explosion of explosive decompression causing Air India Flight 182 to totally breakup in flight.

In 2001 three men were arrested for involvement in the unproved bombing. One pled guilty on a bomb making charge and went to prison while denying any involvement with Air India Flight 182.

In 2005 two of the accused were found not guilty by a Canadian judge in British Columbia. The other man remains in prison and charged with perjury in that trial. The Canadian judge determined that an explosion occurred in the aft cargo compartment in the left side and the cause was a bomb. No explanations were offered to rebut the original findings of explosion in the forward cargo compartment on the right side and no explosion of any source in the aft cargo compartment.

In 2006 a Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 was appointed. The shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation was presented to the Commissioner at an open hearing on 19 July, 2006. Excerpts below:

Application for Standing presented by Mr. Smith: Mr. Smith: Thank you, Commissioner Major, for allowing me to supplement my written application for standing...I have an alternate explanation for Air India 182. It's a mechanical explanation. I'll go into some detail during my presentation and my detail will not be to persuade you that my explanation is correct but to persuade you that my research has depth and is worthy of being granted standing.

The Commissioner: Well, I don't think, Mr. Smith, that you need 15 minutes to persuade me of that. Here's the difficulty...You have an alternate theory. The alternate theory may

over time prove to be correct. I don't know...but the Terms of Reference preclude our considering whether or not there was any cause for that explosion other than the bomb that is found by the Supreme Court of British Columbia.

Hindsight:

In 1985, when Air India Flight 182 suffered an inflight breakup from an explosion, it was believed that an explosive decompression in an early model Boeing 747 could not cause an abrupt power cut to the data flight recorders. That belief was cited by the Indian Kirpal Report as a reason to reject the explosive decompression explanation because, in fact, Air India Flight 182 had suffered an abrupt power cut to the data recorders. The Indian Kirpal Reports states: "It was not possible that any rapid decompression caused by a structural failure could have disrupted the entire electrical power supply from the MEC compartment." The later event of United Airlines Flight 811 showed that it was possible, and indeed, did happen, that an explosive decompression caused by a structural failure could and did cause an abrupt electrical cutoff to the recorders.

The reason for the Indians in 1986 to rule out explosive decompression by structural failure was negated by the reality of United Airlines Flight 811 in 1989. If the Indians had the foreknowledge of United Airlines Flight 811 and the explosive decompression which cut off abruptly the power to the recorders, it is most probable they would have sustained the findings of the Canadians and the British who said that a explosion in the forward cargo compartment occurred and all would have then known the solution to the mystery posed by the AAIB investigator: "...but the cause has not been identified." The cause was identified in 1989 and demonstrated by United Airlines Flight 811 in NTSB AAR 92/02: The National Transportation

Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the sudden opening of the forward lower lobe cargo door in flight and the subsequent explosive decompression.'

The evidence that was unavailable to the Air India Flight 182 CASB, AAIB, and Indian accident investigators in 1985 that became available in the ensuing 16 years that would have been invaluable in assisting them in determining the probable cause was:

- A. Evidence that an explosive decompression could cause an abrupt power cut to the data recorders.
- B. Evidence that floor panels can appear to separate upwards when in fact the floor beneath were pulled down.
- C. Testimony that twinning can occur in explosions other than bombs, such as an aviation fuel explosion, or explosive decompression.
- D. Evidence that the type of wiring installed, Poly-X, was defective in that it cracked to bare wire easily, especially in the presence of moisture.
- E. Visible ruptures in flight in forward cargo doors of other early model Boeing 747s that suffered the same events in flight.
- F. Several Airworthiness Directives for defects in and around the forward cargo doors of Boeing 747s that if uncorrected could lead to inadvertent opening of the cargo door in flight leading to catastrophic explosive decompression.

The evidence that was available to the Air India Flight 182 CASB, AAIB, and Indian accident investigators in 1985 was such to lead them to conclude that an explosion had taken place on the starboard side in the forward cargo compartment which was picked up by the cockpit voice recorder and cut off the

electrical power in the adjacent main electrical equipment compartment. The cause of the explosion was given as either unknown, structural failure of explosive decompression, or a bomb explosion. Since the event in 1989 with United Airlines Flight 811 had not happened yet, the understandable decision of the Indians, based on three assumptions later proven unreliable, was to state the cause of the explosion in the forward cargo compartment a bomb whilst the cautious Canadian CASB and the British AAIB left the cause unstated or unidentified.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT
To: mintc@tc.gc.ca
Subject: Smith Submission 11: Reconsideration of your denial of standing:

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 11: Reconsideration of your denial of standing: Try Try Again. (Never give up)

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/ ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/ inflight breakup explanation. (Please consider a plausible, reasonable, electrical cause with precedent) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006.

Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The Layperson version. (It's not rocket science) Filed Friday, August 11, 2006

Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years: Predicting the Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non Cooperation. (Sorry, no can do.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 9: The Crash and Meeting the Family. (It happens so fast) Filed Friday, August 18, 2006

Smith Submission 10: The Elephant and Emperor Kanishka. (Easy to see, hard to talk about) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 11: Reconsideration of your denial of standing: Try Try Again. (Never give up) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182
Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner

Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Commissioner Major, Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 11: Reconsideration of your denial of standing: Try Try Again. (Never give up) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

1. "Disposition: Mr. Smith is denied standing. However, leave to file materials that he believes will be useful to the Commissioner is granted."

I believe I can be useful to you regarding the Inquiry, the investigation, the bombing, Air India Flight 182, what's it like to be a victim of a sudden fatal jet airplane crash, and the emotions when meeting the family members of that fatal victim.

I believe, from his statements, Prime Minister Harper desires a full, thorough, and compassionate public inquiry into the events surrounding Air India Flight 182 by analyzing the evidence that has come to light since 1985.

I believe, from your statements, that the nature of the Commission is to be very broad in the evidence that it heard, in order to put to rest the various theories, rumours and neglect that have occurred since the explosion in 1985. I have a theory based on an event in February 1989, United Airlines Flight 811. It will not rest.

You have shown willingness to be broad minded by receiving my evidence, submissions, or information which you have considered to be helpful in fulfilling your mandate whether or not such evidence or information would be admissible in court.

I interpret the goals of the Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 to be to inquire into:

1. The investigation of the bombing.
2. The bombing.
3. Air India Flight 182.
4. The victims.
5. The family members of the victims.

As I understand the Rules and Procedures, sir, you have the authority to grant standing to a person who has a clearly ascertainable interest or perspective which would enhance the work of the Commissioner, determine any special conditions under which that person may participate, rescind the standing, and determine in which parts of the inquiry and the nature and extent of that person may participate. You are also authorized to grant to any other person who satisfies him that he or she has a substantial and direct interest in the subject matter of the Inquiry an opportunity for appropriate participation in the Inquiry.

In other words, as you know, you are granted broad powers to conduct your inquiry. You have told me that your criteria are the Terms of Reference, for example, if there were problems in the effective cooperation between government departments and agencies in the investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182. Please reconsider your previous denial of my request for standing and grant it now with whatever special conditions,

limitations, restrictions, and the extent of my contributions you determine.

I believe I have fulfilled your requirements of being useful and fulfilling a Term of Reference and thus worthy of being granted standing because:

1. I have flown in Boeing 747s and about twenty other types of military and civilian aircraft during forty five years of aviation experience accumulating thousands of hours of flight time.
2. My crew duties have included pilot in command, co-pilot, navigator, bombardier, flight crew, mechanic, and owner.
3. I am a qualified nuclear weapon loading officer/bombardier which means I know how to create, load, arm, deliver, and detonate nuclear weapons as well as conventional bombs.
4. I have dropped bombs.
5. I have investigated in depth the bombing of Air India Flight 182 and other explanations for the inflight breakup and have written a three hundred page aircraft accident report and built a thousand page website demonstrating a substantial interest. (Smith AAR for Air India Flight 182 and Exhibit S-18 in the Commission files)
6. I have been investigated by the RCMP, the Air India Task Force, and the security branch of Transport Canada during their investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182.
7. I am personally aware of a conflict between the RCMP and Transportation Safety Board of Canada which resulted in problems of effective cooperation which I believe adversely affected the investigation into the bombing of Air India Flight 182. (Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non Cooperation.)
8. I have been in a sudden fiery fatal jet airplane crash and suffered lifelong injuries. (Smith Submission 9: The Crash and

Meeting the Family.)

9. I have seen the fatal victim in that crash.

10. I have visited and discussed the crash with the surviving family members of the victim.

11. I have discovered a clear and present hazard to the security and safety of Canadian passengers flying in early model Boeing 747s such as Air India Flight 182. (The shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup hazard)

My supporting documents for the above statements are the Commission referenced documents of the report of the Honourable Mr. Justice B.N. Kirpal of the High Court of Delhi of February 26, 1986 and the Aviation Occurrence Report of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board into the crash involving Air India Flight 182 of January 22, 1986. (On file with the Commission)

In additional support, there are dozens of emails and letters between me and John Schneider and Sgt. Bart Blachford of the RCMP AITF, between me and Mr. Bill Tucker (now retired), Director General of Investigative Operations of the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, and between me and Mr. John Garstang of the Securitas branch of Transport Canada. (Filed earlier as Emails in PDF files.)

I have included the narrative of my sudden fiery fatal jet airplane crash in which I ejected at night at low level when our starboard engine ingested a titanium bolt and caught fire. My pilot told me to eject and we both did. I lived and he died. (Smith Submission 9: The Crash and Meeting the Family.)

I have included a narrative of my meeting two of his surviving

sons who grew up to be US Navy pilots, like their dad.

For the reasons above, Commissioner Major, I believe I have fulfilled the formal and informal requirements for standing before your commission. Please reconsider your previous denial of my request for standing and grant it now with whatever special conditions, limitations, restrictions, and the extent of my contributions you determine.

Please allow me the opportunity to present my mechanical explanation for the airplane crash called Air India Flight 182.

To review my pleas:

1. Please grant me standing to present my mechanical non conspiracy explanation to you in depth.
2. Please ask TSB Air to provide an aircraft accident report to you on the probable cause of Air India Flight 182.
3. Please correct the highly prejudicial error on Commission website that states the CASB concluded it was a bomb; they did not. ("Yet, it was not until the following January that the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb.")
4. Please post all the non classified written material submitted to you by the public during the public inquiry (including my submissions) on the Commission website, <http://www.majorcomm.ca/en/index.asp>

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
safety@ntsb.org

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

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Smith Submission 11: Reconsideration of your denial of standing: Try Try Again. (Never give up) Saturday, August 19, 2006

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT

To: mintc@tc.gc.ca

Subject: Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry:

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Thursday, August 3, 2006

Below is Submission 2 for the Commissioner of the
Commission.

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why,
and will you.

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith

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barry@johnbarrysmith.com

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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner

Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson, Public Affairs

Dear Commissioner Major,

Thursday, August 3, 2006

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182... the words are a mouthful for sure. Permit
me to examine them closely as words are our tools to
understanding and the more precise they are, the deeper the
understanding. I am inquiring about the inquiry, but first,
research.

"Disposition: Mr. Smith is denied standing. However, leave to
file materials that he believes will be useful to the Commissioner
is granted."

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why,
and will you.

1. commission [n.]

1. A fee for services rendered based on a percentage of an
amount received or collected or agreed to be paid (as
distinguished from a salary); "he works on commission."

2. A formal statement of a command or injunction to do
something; SYN. charge, direction.

3. An official document issued by a government and conferring
on the recipient the rank of an officer in the armed forces; SYN.

military commission.

4. The act of granting authority to undertake certain functions; SYN. commissioning.

5. The state of being in good working order and ready for operation; "put the ships into commission"; "the motor was out of commission."

It appears that definition 2 and 4 fit the best. The Commission has a command to do something with authority.

2. inquiry [n.]

1. A search for knowledge; SYN. enquiry, research.

2. A systematic investigation of a matter of public interest; SYN. enquiry.

3. A legal investigation into a crime or wrongdoing; "the police have opened an inquiry"; SYN. enquiry.

It appears that all three definitions fit. The Commission has a command and the authority to search for knowledge and conduct a systematic investigation of a matter of public interest.

3. investigation [n.]

1. The work of inquiring into something thoroughly and systematically; SYN. investigating

An investigation appears to be an inquiry. The Commission has a command and the authority to search for knowledge and conduct an inquiry into an inquiry.

4. bombing [n.]

An attack by dropping bombs; SYN. bombardment.

bomb [n.]

1. An explosive device fused to denote under specific conditions.

2. A film or play that is a resounding failure; "that movie was a real bomb."

The Commission has a command and the authority to search for knowledge and conduct an inquiry into an investigation of an explosive device. (The Inquiry shall not bomb during its performances.)

5. Air India Flight 182.

Not in the dictionary so let's use my definition: Air India Flight 182 was a Boeing 747-237B assigned to the airline Air India, registration VT-EFO, first flight on 19 June 1978, construction number was 21473, and line number 330. It was on a flight from Mirabel to London when it disappeared from the radar scope at a position of latitude 51°O'N and longitude 12°50'W at 0714 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), 23 June 1985, and crashed into the ocean about 110 miles west of Cork, Ireland. There were no survivors among the 329 passengers and crew members.

Basic Specifications of a Boeing 747:

Wing Span 211 feet 5 inches (64.44 m)

Overall Length 231 feet 10.25 inches (70.66 m)

Tail Height 63 feet 8 inches (19.41 m)

Body Width

Outside 21 feet 4 inches (6.5 m)

Inside 20 feet (6.1 m)

The Commission has a command and the authority to search for knowledge and conduct an investigation into an investigation of an explosive device which affected a Boeing 747.

6. Unstated focus of the Commission 1:

victim [n.]

FORMS: victims

1. A person who is tricked or swindled; SYN. dupe.
2. An unfortunate person who suffers from some adverse circumstance.

The Commission has a command and the authority to search for knowledge and conduct an inquiry into an investigation of an explosive device which affected a Boeing 747 and the unfortunate persons who died in it.

7. Unstated focus of the Commission 2:

family [n.]

FORMS: families

1. Primary social group; parents and children; "he wanted to have a good job before starting a family"; SYN. family unit.
2. People descended from a common ancestor; "his family had lived in Massachusetts since the Mayflower"; SYN. family line, folk, kinfolk, kinsfolk,
3. A social unit living together; "he moved his family to Virginia"; SYN. household, house, home, menage.
4. An association of people who share common beliefs or activities; "the message was addressed not just to employees but to every member of the company family"; SYN. fellowship.

The Commission has a command and the authority to search for knowledge and conduct an inquiry into an investigation of an explosive device which affected a Boeing 747 and the unfortunate persons who died in it and the emotional consequences upon the surviving people who share a common belief and activities.

Inquiry question 1: What is the focus and number one inquiry

priority of the Commission? The investigation, the bombing, the aircraft, the victims, or the family members? What has the last priority?

Speech excerpts - Prime Minister Harper announces inquiry into Air India bombing

"A full public inquiry is required. This inquiry will be launched immediately and led by an outstanding Canadian, retired Supreme Court Justice John Major. He has agreed to serve as Commissioner for this inquiry and I have every confidence that he will conduct a thorough and compassionate investigation into the events surrounding this tragedy. This inquiry is about analyzing the evidence that has come to light since 1985 and applying it to the world we live in today."

The Prime Minister desires a full, thorough, and compassionate public inquiry into the events surrounding Air India Flight 182 by analyzing the evidence that has come to light since 1985.

Your own words, Commissioner Major, reflect that guidance, from transcript of 18 July 2006, Hearing on Standing:

THE COMMISSIONER: "Yes. Well, I will confirm that. The nature of this Commission was to be very broad in the evidence that it heard, in order to put to rest the various theories, rumours and neglect that have occurred since the explosion in 1985."

The direction for the Commission is pointed by the two leading authorities to be full, thorough, and broad, but earlier statements that morning had taken a darker turn.

"MR. BRUCKER: I just wanted to indicate to you, Commissioner, that I have provided this morning to Mrs. Cook

and to Commission counsel a brief submission that we had prepared just on the general test for standing and issues that we submit you will be taking into account.

THE COMMISSIONER: You can't do much better than get standing, though, can you?

MR. BRUCKER: No, we can't, but we are concerned about the focus of the Inquiry. When I attended here and listened to your Opening Statement I was struck by one comment that you made and I will paraphrase that, perhaps not accurately, but what I took from your comments was that you intended to conduct a thorough but efficient inquiry and that an efficient inquiry does not mean that it has to take a great deal of time. We have, in my submission to you, a very compressed time schedule in which we have to get things done and my submissions simply highlight that in that environment, a matter which is of interest to all Canadians, that there should be some judicious consideration of who will get standing and who won't or who may be an intervenor and who won't, and that to ensure that the process is thorough and efficient I have offered some general principles that I submit might be of assistance to you.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. That's been filed and will be looked at."

Commissioner Major, forgive me my suspicions but now I see why those excluded from a public inquiry begin to think of skullduggery afoot. The Prime Minister and you both proclaim publicly your intentions for a broad, full, and thorough inquiry to put to rest the various theories, rumours, and neglect that have occurred since the explosion in 1985. And yet...I read that the Attorney General representative is indicating time is short and your inquiry does not need a great deal of time. He even generously offers principles and a general test to assist you in

some judicious consideration of who will get standing and who won't or who may be an intervenor and who won't. It appears he's not concerned about himself being granted standing but is concerned about others. Apparently he's trying to influence the direction of the inquiry by guiding your decisions on who presents before you.

It appears to me he is afraid that you, sir, in fact, will conduct a broad, full, and thorough inquiry and is trying to make it narrow and short by controlling who is given standing and who is not. Out of nineteen applicants who 'demandes de participation', sixteen were granted and three denied of which I am one, sad to say. I did not demand, I applied and am still applying.

My better reasoning self tells me that the Attorney General representative of Canada can not possibly concern himself with this wacko from California with a zany theory about Air India Flight 182 being mechanical and whose application of standing, available to read by all, describes the theory. And yet...who else among the applicants is controversial? The World Sikh Organization? B'nai Brith? Who is the AG representative referring to in his 'general test' of inclusion or exclusion for standing? How did I fail a test of inclusion when I did not know the test questions?

It also appears that Mr. Brucker is trying to assist your decision in whether to ask Transport Canada Air for an updated aviation accident report on the twenty one year old crash by claiming time is short, efficiency does not need time and implies his agencies such as Transport Canada have a busy schedule. Press reports state the final report is due September 2007; a year is ample time to listen for an hour or two to me and my theory as well as Transport Canada to squeeze in some aviation accident investigation update time for the most famous aviation event in

Canadian history. Let TSB Air resolve the glaring discrepancy between Justice Kirpal's forward cargo compartment location for the explosion and Justice Josephson's determination of the aft cargo compartment. Two bombs going off at the same time would explain away the anomaly....or something else.

Will you please ask TSB Air to provide to the Commission an updated supplement to the twenty one year old accident report on Air India Flight 182 based on several subsequent similar accidents to similar Boeing 747s since 1985 and resolve the explosion location conflict?

My friends told me, when the Commission was announced, that it was just another government whitewash to get and keep votes by placating irate citizens. I demurred and trusted in the open minded and fairness of the Canadian reputation as shown by the CASB report of Air India Flight 182 and Justice Josephson's findings in acquitting the two accused. I might have to apologize to my friends for doubting their political astuteness while acknowledging my own naivete.

I am perplexed. My mechanical explanation supports Canadian institutions.

1. The CASB was correct, there was an explosion and they did not yet understand the cause because the answer only became apparent four years later with United Airlines Flight 811.
2. Justice Josephson was correct, the two accused did not put a bomb on board, nobody did.
3. There were no lapses in security that led to Air India Flight 182's bombing that need to be rectified because there was no bombing.
4. The Mounties did not get their man because there were no men

to get.

5. There will be closure for the families when they can clearly understand through science what happened and why.

6. A divisive issue of anger, hate, and revenge will be removed from the Canadian psyche.

7. This Commission of Inquiry can examine and put to rest the various theories, rumours and neglect that have occurred since the explosion in 1985 if it is very broad in the evidence it hears.

Why would the Canadian government not welcome an explanation for Air India Flight 182 that is reasonable, plausible, with precedent and confirms the intelligence and wisdom of Canadian aviation, law enforcement, and justice institutions?

And yet...it appears that I am to be denied an opportunity to present my detailed analysis with supporting documents to the Commission of Inquiry. I've already been cut off after a few minutes of oral submission and can only resort to supplemental text to be filed with the record such as this plaint. There is to be no cross examination of my points, no questioning of my reasoning for my conclusions, and no public debate.

I'm even more confused when such peripheral organizations such as religious groups are granted standing while I, who has been investigated in the bombing of Air India Flight 182, who has written extensively about the crash, who has survived a fatal jet crash, and who fits a Term of Reference for personal knowledge of agency non cooperation, am denied.

If religious groups are willingly caught in the wide net of a broad investigation, please let the small fishes of scientists like myself, Transport Canada, and the Transportation Safety Board (Air) be ensnared also. Air India Flight 182 was an airplane crash not an

exorcism, after all.

The words of promise of 'public, full, thorough, broad' inquiry are empty when it comes to actually implementing them in my case and I don't know why. As a flight crewmember I put my life in the hands of my pilot. There were many men who looked like pilots, talked like pilots, and thought they were good pilots, but I judge always on performance. I was often surprised when the most unlikely looking men and women turned out to be the best pilots. Many men talk a good game but fall down during play. I assume you have also been surprised at the performance of some attorneys before you in court. I'm trusting the Commission fulfills its high ideals as stated by Prime Minister Harper and yourself, sir, in its performance.

My Inquiry into the Inquiry asks questions:

1. What is the focus and number one priority of the Commission of Inquiry? The investigation, the bombing, the aircraft, the victims, or the family members?
2. Why was I denied standing when I was qualified when others less qualified were granted standing?
3. Are you going to do a full, broad, and thorough inquiry as you have stated or are you going to do a short, narrow, efficient one as suggested by Mr. Brucker?
4. What were the 'general principles' and the 'general test' Mr. Brucker offered to you to "ensure the process (granting standing) is thorough and efficient"?
5. Why would the Canadian government not welcome an explanation for Air India Flight 182 that is reasonable, plausible, with precedent and confirms the intelligence and wisdom of Canadian aviation, law enforcement, and justice institutions as well as bringing peace of mind to many of its citizens?
6. Will you please ask TSB Air to provide to the Commission an

updated supplement to the twenty one year old accident report on Air India Flight 182 based on several subsequent similar accidents to similar Boeing 747s since 1985 and resolve the discrepancy of explosion location?

7. Will you reconsider and use the authority given to you in Rules of Procedure to grant me standing as a person of unique perspective who can enhance the work of the Commission? (15. From time to time, the Commissioner may, in his discretion, at any time grant to or rescind standing from a person, or modify the status or conditions of the standing of a person.)

Summary of Submissions:

Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected Filed 28 July, 2006. Canadians did not conclude it was a bomb. TSB Air should be asked for their opinion.

Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you. Filed Thursday, August 3, 2006 Wiring/cargo door explanation should be fully considered.

Upcoming:

Submission 3: Bomb explanations are contradictory.

Submission 4: Correct probable cause is the wiring/cargo door explanation.

Submission 5: Clear and present danger exists to Canadian and other passengers flying in early model Boeing 747s.

Submission 6: Action should be taken now, not later, to fix design and manufacturing problems.

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell

barry@johnbarrysmith.com
safety@ntsb.org

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT
To: mintc@tc.gc.ca
**Subject: Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference:
Non Cooperation.**

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Thursday, August 17, 2006

Below is Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non
Cooperation. (Sorry, no can do.) Thursday, August 17, 2006

I have attached three pdf files for the Commissioner to
substantiate my claims, one for Mr. Garstang, one for Sgt.
Blachford, and one for Mr. Tucker.

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28
July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why,
and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb,
in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please
ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type
of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8,
2006

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Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August 15, 2006

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Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non Cooperation. (Sorry, no can do.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner

Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires

publique

Terms of Reference: the Commissioner to conduct the Inquiry specifically for the purpose of making findings and recommendations with respect to the following, namely, if there were problems in the effective cooperation between government departments and agencies, including the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, in the investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182, either before or after June 23, 1985, whether any changes in practice or legislation are required to prevent the recurrence of similar problems of cooperation in the investigation of terrorism offences in the future.

Dear Commissioner Major,
August 17, 2006

Thursday,

There was a problem in the effective cooperation between Canadian government agencies, RCMP and TSB (Transportation Safety Board), in the investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182 from 1997 through 2002 and a change in practice is required to prevent the recurrence of similar problems of cooperation in the investigation of terrorism offences in the future.

Names and titles of persons referenced below:

Terry Burtch
Director General,
Investigation Operations
Transportation Safety Board Canada

Bill Tucker (Retired)
Director General,

Investigation Operations
Transportation Safety Board Canada

Bart Blachford Sgt.
John Schnieder
Rich Spruel
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Air India Task Force

Keith Hamilton
Crown sponsored attorney for the accused Bagri

John Garstang
Securitas branch of TSB

Ken Smart
Chief Inspector of Accidents,
Air Accident Investigations Branch
AAIB
DRA Farnborough
Hants GU14 6TD
United Kingdom

I was personally investigated by the RCMP Air India Task Force during their investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182. I was personally questioned by the TSB about the events surrounding the bombing of Air India Flight 182. I received erroneous information from Securitas of the TSB. The two agencies did not cooperate based upon the information I gave them.

1. In response to my email to Securitas of TSB I received the erroneous information from John Garstang of TSB: The cargo

door was not retrieved from the bottom of the ocean.

At 3:18 PM +0400 2/27/97, Securitas wrote:

Date: 27 Feb 1997 15:18:35 +0400

From: Securitas <Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Crash cause of Air India Flight 182

Thank you for your report expressing concern about the opening of cargo

doors on B-747 aircraft. During any aircraft crash, investigators examine

every piece of evidence, in order to determine cause. In the case of the

Air India flight, the cargo door was in fact retrieved from the bottom of

the ocean by the investigators. The latches were still in place, and there

was no evidence on the edges of the door to indicate in-flight opening of

that door.

On the other hand, there was other solid evidence indicating a bomb blast

had occurred. Aircraft accident investigators are trained people.

Anybody

can say anything they want on the Internet. Put your money on the experts;

you will win more often.

2. In response I wrote the below email for members of the Air India Task Force, John Schnieder and Rich Spruel, and to John Garstang of Securitas. (Emails attached as pdf file)

At 9:11 PM +0000 4/17/97, John Barry Smith wrote:

To: Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: Attention Mr John Garstang RE Air India 182

Mr. Garstang, this is John Barry Smith, discover of the cargo door explanation for the cause of the crash of AI 182. I just had a nice chat with Mr. John Schnieder of the Air India Task Force. He said he would get in touch with you to ask would you contact me to discuss the forward cargo door of AI 182. Mr. Schnieder is a police officer and referred me to you because you are an aircraft crash investigator and sent me the email about how the door was retrieved and latches latched. Well, since the door was not retrieved the latch status is still unknown and we must go to other evidence to explain the crash. After twelve years and three other similar crashes, a better explanation emerges, inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight. www.corazon.com has a thousand pages of documentation and analysis of the four crashes.

In addition Boeing is conducting its own investigation into the forward cargo door as shown by the remark of Mr. Rich Spruel of the Task Force that Boeing had also recently inquired about that forward cargo door of AI 182.

I trust that as a crash investigator your primary desire is to explain a crash so that it will not happen again and will examine all possibilities that are presented that are reasonable and documented, such as cargo door. Please contact me through email or phone so that I may present my case in a short brief, enough to give you thought to either pursue the door theory or dismiss it. Please don't ignore it.

Sincerely, John Barry Smith 10408 659 3552

3. Several years later I heard from Sgt. Bart Blachford of the RCMP AITF and I responded below and provided him with my accident reports: (Emails attached as pdf file)

At 10:56 PM -0800 11/14/01,
To: SGT Blachford@redshift.com
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Meeting about Air India Flight 182

Sgt. B. Blachford
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather St.
Vancouver, B. C.
V5Z 1K6

Dear Sergeant Blachford, 14 Nov 01

Thank you for your letter of 7 Nov 01 in which you would like to meet with me and discuss in detail my shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup for Air India Flight 182 and taking at least a day to do so.

Yes, of course, Sergeant. Let us work on the logistics.

I would prefer here in my home office with my computers and stacks of documents for referral as needed and the sooner the better. I put myself at your service regarding time and date.

I'll meet you at the Monterey Airport, or, if you drive, as I did in March to Vancouver, call me and I'll set you up with lodging. An alternative meeting place is possible.

I've also invited a representative of TSB, Mr. Bill Tucker, to join us as well as an attorney for the defence assigned by the Crown,

Mr. Keith Hamilton. (Mr. Garstang being unavailable.) I'm waiting for replies from them. If you prefer to meet alone, please tell me and that is fine with me. My approach is open and forthright with everyone informed. Please consult with them regarding the meeting.

Email for Mr. Tucker: Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca

W.T. (Bill) Tucker
Director General,
Investigation Operations
TSB

Email for Mr. Keith Hamilton: keithrh@telus.net
Defense Counsel assigned by the Crown for Mr. Bagri

The ideal meeting would include the law enforcement authority, (you of the RCMP AITF), a TSB aircraft safety investigator (Mr. Tucker or representative), defence counsel assigned by the Crown (Mr. Keith Hamilton), and this independent aircraft accident investigator, (John Barry Smith.)

It seems the mood has changed in the past few days after AA 587 and now the first speculation of a cause of an airliner crash is mechanical failure instead of a terrorist act (such as believed in 1985). It looks like facts, data, and evidence, are taking priority now and that is good. There are lots of those for support of a mechanical cause for Air India Flight 182 and I look forward to laying them out for you and answering all your queries.

Cheers,
Barry Smith

John Barry Smith
(831) 659 3552
541 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

4. I sent my files to Sgt Blachford and note that Mr. Bill Tucker of TSB was cooperating with the RCMP AITF by providing them with my files. Sgt. Blachford declined to provide me with an email address.

Sgt. B. Blachford
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather St.
Vancouver, B. C.
V5Z 1K6

Dear Sergeant Blachford,
31 May 2001

Enclosed is hard copy of my Smith AAR for AI 182 and the appendices to it. These hard copy files should be the same as my PDF files sent to you electronically earlier from Mr. Tucker of TSB.

Also enclosed is a hard copy of my email I sent to you via the RCMP website yesterday.

Do you have a direct email other than the web based email for RCMP?

I invite discussion on this matter which I believe presents a

danger to the flying public as well as clearing up a mystery of 16 years; telephone calls and emails are most welcome.

Cheers,

Barry

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

5. Sgt Bart Blachford and Mr. Bill Tucker of TSB Air visited me in my home in early December 2001 and stayed for a day listening to my presentation. I stated to them that viewing the evidence of Air India Flight 182 via the videotapes would be most helpful to the investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182. I quoted a family member of a victim of United Airlines Flight 811 as saying a USA NTSB official who had seen both as saying the cargo doors of Air India Flight 182 and United Airlines Flight 811 matched visually. Sgt. Blachford never replied. Mr. Garstang and Mr. Hamilton chose not to attend.

At 8:56 AM -0800 12/17/01, John Barry Smith wrote:

Sgt. B. Blachford
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather St.
Vancouver, B. C.
V5Z 1K6

Dear Sgt. Bart Blachford, 17 Dec 01

Let us take advantage of this extra time to further check out the shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup for Air India Flight 182 and others.

I'm hoping this extra time will give you and AITF opportunity to interview me again as they check out the items of interest you discovered during our discussions such as paint smears and twisted torque tubes.

Is there any chance we can view videotapes of that door area of Air India Flight 182 together to look for those matches to United Airlines Flight 811?

During our talks down here I mentioned that the family of one of the victims of United Airlines Flight 811, the Campbells, had quoted a NTSB investigator as saying the Air India Flight 182 door looked just like the United Airlines Flight 811 door which gives a further match to a wiring cause and not a bomb. Mr. Tucker said he believed that no NTSB investigator had access to the Air India Flight 182 photos and thus could give no opinion. I was able to research this further and discovered that, in fact, a NTSB investigator did have access to all of the Air India Flight 182 data and thus could state with accuracy that the Air India Flight 182 door matched the United Airlines Flight 811 forward cargo door. That investigator was no less than Jim Wildey, the person who ruled out the forward cargo door of Trans World Airlines Flight 800 based on only the examination of eight of the ten latches.

Below excerpt from the Campbells of New Zealand to me:

'We flew to Seattle but were told we could not see the door , we drove to Washington to see the NTSB and as we entered the office we were told they could spare us 5 minutes, about 3 hours later we held a set of the recovered C locks and Lock sectors and they admitted we were correct , that they would ensure that the aircraft would be fixed but not to hold our breath waiting for a new report ever to be released . After lunch with them I asked " in light of what we now know on 811 do you still think that Air India was a bomb ?" The reply was that we never thought that Air India was a bomb in fact the video shows a cargo door exactly the same as 811.'

From Kirpal Report below on Air India Flight 182:

'1.5.16 The participant had all filed their affidavits by way of submissions. The Court indicated that formal hearings would be held for the purpose of cross-examining some of the witnesses about three weeks after the receipt of all the reports of the various groups. While in Cork, in the first week of November, 1985 some of the salvaged pieces of the wreckage were brought there. After they were inspected by all the participants and their advisers, who were present in Cork, it was decided by the Court that further detailed metallurgical and other examination of those pieces would be done at BARC, Bombay. In order that there should be no undue delay the Court decided that a Group be

constituted consisting of expert representatives of all the participants and also the nominees of the Court. This group was asked to carry out metallurgical and other examination of some of the critical pieces salvaged and give its report to the Court. The group constituted as a 'Committee of Experts' was as under :-

- a. Mr. A.J.W. Melson, Canadian Aviation Safety Board, Canada.
- b. Mr. R.K. Phillips, Canadian Pacific Air, Canada.
- c. Mr. T. Swift, Federal Aviation, Administration, USA.
- d. Mr. R.Q. Taylor, Boeing Commercial Airplane Co., USA.
- e. Mr. J.P. Tryzl, Boeing Commercial Airplane Co., USA.
- f. Mr. J.F. Wildey II, National Transportation Safety Board USA.
- g. Mr. S.N. Seshadri, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, India (Coordinator).'

The above suggests that for Air India Flight 182, the NTSB representative, Jim Wildey, said no bomb; the AAIB representative, Mr. Roy Davis, said no bomb; the Canadian Aviation Safety Board, (CASB) declined to say bomb, and only a judicial officer, not an aircraft investigator, Judge Kirpal, said bomb, and even that opinion was given reluctantly:

From Kirpal Report:

'ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

4.1 From the evidence which is available what has now to be determined is as to what caused the accident.

4.2 Finding the cause of the accident is usually a deduction from known set of facts. In the present case known facts are not very many, but there are a number of possible events which might have happened which could have led to the crash.

4.3 The first task is to try and marshal the facts which may have

a bearing as to the cause of the accident.

4.4 It is undisputed, and there is ample evidence on the record to prove it, that Air India's Kanishka had a normal and uneventful flight out of Montreal. The aircraft had been in air for about five hours and was cruising smoothly at an altitude of 31,000 feet. The readout from the CVR shows that there was no emergency on board till the catastrophic event had occurred. This is corroborated by the printout available from the DFDR. The event occurred at approximately 0714 Z and that brought the aircraft down, and it probably hit the surface of the sea within a distance of 5 miles. The time within which the plane came down at such a steep angle could not have been more than very few minutes. There was a sudden snapping of the communication between the aircraft and the ground. The aircraft had also suddenly disappeared from the radar.

4.5 It is evident that an event had occurred at 31,000 feet which had brought down 'Kanishka'. What could have possibly happened to it? The aircraft was apparently incapacitated and this was due either to it having been hit from outside; or due to some structural failure; or due to the detonation of an explosive device within the aircraft.

4.6 Evidence indicates that after the event had occurred, though the pilots did not or were not in a position to communicate with the ground, they nevertheless appeared to have taken some action. ...

4.7 It can further be speculated that if an explosion takes place in the forward cargo compartment, the oxygen stream might have been damaged so that when the pilots donned their masks as part of the emergency drill for explosive decompression, they were not breathing enriched oxygen and the time of useful consciousness at about 31,000 feet would be significantly less than 30 seconds under high stress and if the pilots became unconscious as a result of this, then the aircraft would have got

out of control which would explain the subsequent events.

4.8 ..."The United States Norad/Space Command has confirmed that there was no incoming space debris in the vicinity of Ireland on June 23, 1985."

4.9 Thus we are left with only two of the possibilities viz., structural failure or accident having been caused due to a bomb having been placed inside the aircraft.

4.10 After going through the entire record we find that there is circumstantial as well as direct evidence which directly points to the cause of the accident as being that of an explosion of a bomb in the forward cargo hold of the aircraft. At the same time there is complete lack of evidence to indicate that there was any structural failure.'

So, Sgt. Blachford, that's two aviation accident investigation agencies giving an opinion that there was no bomb, one agency declining to say a bomb, and one judicial officer saying bomb out of two equal choices. That's three to one against supporting bomb. When Judge Kirpal said there 'is complete lack of evidence to indicate that there was any structural failure,' he was correct in 1986 because he did not know what a structural failure from an inadvertently opened cargo door in flight looks like on a Boeing 747, nobody did. But now we do know and the evidence matches United Airlines Flight 811, not a bomb event although initially thought to be by the crew.

I am available to travel up there to give a full presentation to Mr. Schneider and the rest of the AITF staff if you wish. It really is important, not just for justice for the three jailed men, but that my research shows that a current hazard exists for the Canadian public that needs to be corrected.

Cheers,

Barry

(831) 659 3552
541 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

6. Mr. Bill Tucker and I had an extensive email correspondence before he retired. (Emails attached as pdf file)

At 6:23 PM -0400 6/25/02, Tucker, Bill wrote:
X-From_: Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca Tue Jun 25 15:22:17 2002
From: "Tucker, Bill" <Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca>
To: "John Barry Smith" <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: RE: Pix of Air India Flight 182
Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2002 18:23:49 -0400
Reply-By: Sun, 2 Jun 2002 17:00:00 -0400
X-Message-Flag: Follow up

Dear Barry,

I felt that this message from you below, dated 22 May, needed specific responses to several of your points. I'll get to your request for photos later in this response, but first I want to clear the air on some of your concerns - or at least try to.

- 1) - I am not being "rebuffed with excuses and delay".
- 2) - There is nothing fishy going on.

3) - Ron Schleede contacts me because he is a colleague and a friend. He worked for me here as Director of Investigations-Air for six months on an international exchange (and he did a great job).

4) - Ken Smart said nothing to influence my retirement, and I am shocked that you would suspect a connection. The fact is that my decision was made and relayed to my boss in late March, at least a month before Ken's visit.

5) - I do not believe the "more likely explanation for Air India Flight 182 is mechanical rather than conspiracy". Based on my direct knowledge from the AI 182 investigation, I saw mechanical failure as one plausible explanation. Adding my indirect knowledge at the time (back in the late 1980s), from others who were more directly involved, I considered a bomb to be the more likely explanation and mechanical failure to be plausible, but unlikely. Adding in the additional knowledge I have acquired since then (which is almost all indirect in a pure accident investigation sense) I have become more convinced that a bomb brought down AI 182.

6) - The only reason that my recent e-mail referred to AI 182,

PanAm 103,
and TWA 800, but not to UA 811, was that I had less familiarity
with the UA
811 investigation than the other three. However, I have
absolutely no
reason to doubt the eventual conclusion that the cargo door failed
in UA
811.

7) - As I advised you last summer, this agency has no mandate to
re-conduct
an investigation of AI 182. Moreover, my personal opinion is
that it would
not be an appropriate use of our resources to do so.
Nevertheless, I did
believe that the TSB should make John Garstang available to that
investigation through periodic secondment to the RCMP, and I
still feel that
our doing so was an appropriate decision. I have high confidence
in the
integrity and the thoroughness of the RCMP investigation; and I
sincerely
hope that justice will be served by the pending trial - whatever its
outcome.

Now to the matter of your request for photos of the forward right
side of
the AI 182 B747.

I spoke with John Garstang about your request. He advised that
there are
both photos and videos from the AI 182 investigation. However,

with respect to the forward right side and the cargo door in particular, he is only certain about the video. They have pictures showing where the cargo door was in the debris field, and they also have a picture of the door at the ocean surface when it broke free during the recovery attempt; he is just not sure how much was video, or still frame from video, versus photographs..

To complicate matters, the video was deteriorating as time went by. Some years ago (estimate: around 1995), the RCMP took the magnetic tape video (which would be of even poorer quality by now) and made a digitized version. The former is ours, the latter is theirs; however they need both for trial purposes (continuity of evidence, I assume). Moreover, they have advised that the matter is before the courts, that a publication ban is in effect, and that they do not want anything to be released that could be prejudicial to the court process. Both the TSB's General Counsel and I have been notified that the RCMP Legal Services group believes that release of Air India wreckage photographs could be injurious to the RCMP's work and that, as such, release is exempted under Sec. 16(1) of Canada's Access

to
Information Act.

There may (far from certain) be some form of photo/video info that is still in the TSB's possession and that may (also far from certain) be releasable to you. To determine that will take considerable effort and, to be at all manageable, it will require the personal involvement of John Garstang. With his heavy workload, as we try to complete the report on the SWR111 investigation, we just can't give him any more tasks for the next few months. However, I have obtained a personal commitment from both the Director of Engineering and the Director of Air Investigations that they will follow-up on this at the end of the summer and see if there is anything that can be made available to you. To that end, I shall send both of them a copy of this message so that they can create a "bring forward" reminder to follow up. At the very worst, the TSB's photos/videos can certainly be made available after the trial.

Meanwhile, I can assure you that the cargo door failure possibility was looked at in a rigorous and unbiased manner. In fact, I understand that

part of that process was to specifically review the information and suggestions that you had provided. John G. told me that when he was asked by the RCMP to do work in that area, there was not the slightest hint of a desired outcome - only that all the information be reviewed thoroughly and objectively to find the truth.

As Sgt Blachford has indicated to both of us, the aircraft-related elements are only part of a huge investigation. The trial (which is expected to be the largest in Canada's history) will also bring out much evidence that was obtained through the RCMP's criminal investigation. You will no doubt be following the trial, as I will. Let us hope that the trial will not be delayed much longer and that it will culminate in a just outcome (whatever that may be)..

In closing, I can honestly say that I have enjoyed communicating with you - at least most of the time. (I must admit that there have been times when you added to my stress level because I couldn't keep up with your correspondence; it is against my nature to ignore a sincere message or to respond to it without adequate consideration.) If I may offer some

gratuitous advice, please don't let the cargo door issue consume you, and don't become like the conspiracy theorists. You have already raised awareness of the cargo door issue; but if you are seen as pushing it as the only credible explanation for so many accidents, people will not listen to what you have to say. I was, and still am, impressed with you. You have a good brain, a pleasant personality, good health, and a wonderful family and home; Don't miss out on enjoying all that in your retirement years.

Very sincerely,

Bill T..

> -----Original Message-----

> From: John Barry Smith [SMTP:barry@corazon.com]

> Sent: Wednesday, May 22, 2002 7:28 AM

> To: Tucker, Bill

> Subject: Pix of Air India Flight 182

>

> Dear Bill, 22 May 02

>

> Air India Flight 182 was said by the CASB and the Kirpal Commission

> to have suffered an explosion on the right side forward of the wing

> in flight. Therefore, photographs of the right side forward of

the

> wing are relevant and very important. It is to be expected that
> photographs of that area be available for inspection as they are
the

> fatal wound of the victim. Much time and expense was used to
procure

> those photographs. They exist and held by the Crown
authorities.

>

> If the Director General, Investigation Operations,
Transportation

> Safety Board of Canada asks to view those photographs and is
rebuffed

> with excuses and delay, there is something fishy going on.

>

> Why would Ron Schleede call you out of the blue? What did
Ken Smart

> say that led to your decision to retire a few days later?

>

> Bill, the whole sequence is fishy.

>

> I believe you see the plausible and more likely explanation for
Air

> India Flight 182 is mechanical rather than conspiracy.

>

> In your bailing out email, as I call it, to me on 9 May 02, you
refer

> to persons and titles and their opinions as to the cause of the

> accidents but never refer to facts, data, or evidence. You also
never

> refer to United Airlines Flight 811 as if it never existed which
is

> absolutely not fair since that is the model for the other three.

>

> Well, that is how I know I'm right; never rebutted with facts, only

> the opinions of titles of persons who have been involved since 1985

> and have much interest in maintaining the status quo, even in the

> face of conclusive contradictory evidence which abounds in the metal,

> cams, latches, engines, and recorders of United Airlines Flight 811.

>

> For Ken Smart to imply that the forward cargo door area of Pan Am

> Flight 103 opened in flight but that it happened after the 'bomb'

> explosion' is contrary to the AAIB wreckage distribution fuselage

> reconstruction which shows it happened at initial event time.

The

> photographs show it happened in flight. The evidence is there.

>

> But ignored and that's why it's fishy.

>

> Bill, please do not retire until you get a look at the forward cargo

> door area of Air India Flight 182. Satisfy your own curiosity to see

> if the twisted metal matches the other three door areas of twisted

> metal.

>

> Cheers,

> Barry

7. The key segment of the above correspondence from Mr. Bill Tucker of TSB Air talking to John Garstang and the RCMP AITF regarding the visual evidence is that:

A. The video evidence is deteriorating over time.

B. Mr. John Garstang has a busy workload.

C. Both the TSB's General Counsel and Mr. Tucker have been notified that the RCMP Legal Services group believes that release of Air India wreckage photographs could be injurious to the RCMP's work and that, as such, release is exempted under Sec. 16(1) of Canada's Access to Information Act.

D. Mr. Tucker obtained a personal commitment from both the Director of Engineering and the Director of Air Investigations that they will follow-up on this at the end of the summer and see if there is anything that can be made available to you.

E. At the very worst, the TSB's photos/videos can certainly be made available after the trial.

8. I followed up with TSB.

At 12:47 PM -0700 7/14/03, John Barry Smith wrote:

To: Terry.Burtch@tsb.gc.ca

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: Air India Flight 182 update

Cc: Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca

Bcc:

X-Attachments:

At 9:09 AM -0400 7/3/03, Delorme, Paulette wrote:

Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for your recent inquiry regarding the last

correspondence you had with Mr. Bill Tucker on the Air India file. Mr. Tucker's replacement is Mr. Terry Burtch, who joined us last October. I have forwarded your request to Mr. Burtch, who is pursuing it at present. You may also be interested to know that just before we received your request, both the Director of Investigations - Air and the Director, Engineering, retired from the Transportation Safety Board. Mr. Burtch is presently following up with other staff in those respective organizations, and will communicate directly with you at the earliest opportunity. We regret the delay in responding, but trust that this approach will be satisfactory.

Paulette G. Delorme
Executive Assistant / Adjointe exÉcutive
Transportation Safety Board of Canada/
Bureau de la sÚcuritÚ des transports du Canada
Tel.: (819) 994-8002
FAX: (819) 994-9759

Terry Burtch
Director General,
Investigation Operations
Transportation Safety Board Canada

Dear Mr. Burtch, Monday, July 14, 2003 12:23 PM

John Barry Smith here following up on Ms. Delorme's email of a few weeks ago.

Essentially my premise is that Air India Flight 182 and others were brought down by a mechanical cause with precedent. There are no conspiracies, just a machine obeying the physical laws of

nature.

My proof is in official documents, photographs, and the wonderful luxury of hindsight of 18 years.

The issue is important because the mechanical problems exist to this day and the danger exists of a reoccurrence of the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation.

There also exists the trial of two men accused of causing the inflight breakup. Would it not be prudent for TSB to conduct an update of the AAR of so many years ago? The CASB report and the Kirpal report were conducted without the benefit of subsequent similar accidents to similar type aircraft and model under similar circumstances.

An update would be most beneficial since the latest Canadian opinion as to the probable cause of Air India Flight 182 was an explosion of undetermined origin in the forward cargo compartment, an opinion I concur with as time has revealed the cause of the explosion.

It's not a bomb. Nobody 'blew' it up. It was an explosion all right, an explosive decompression.

John Garstang has been seconded to the RCMP and his opinion does not reflect that of the TSB, does it? If so, then there are many inconsistencies and contradictions in his opinion that a bomb in the aft cargo compartment caused the breakup.

The Crown is in the position of arguing against itself in the pursuit of justice for the 329 deaths in Air India Flight 182. For

instance, CASB and the Kirpal Report both conclusively agree the explosion was in the forward cargo compartment. The reports offer ample evidence to support that conclusion. Yet the Crown now postulates the explosion occurred in the aft cargo compartment, a premise easily refuted with the Crown's own evidence.

If the explosion occurred in the forward cargo compartment, the accused are innocent as all the baggage from the Vancouver passengers were loaded in the aft cargo compartment. The Montreal passengers' baggage was loaded into the forward cargo compartment.

If the explosion occurred in the aft cargo compartment, the CASB and the Kirpal Report are incorrect in a basic finding. If so, that error must be explained by data, facts, and evidence. That has not been done.

Just exactly where did the explosion occur? The lives of the accused and flying passenger's today are dependent on that conclusion.

Once determined where, then the question is why. I believe I have found the answer and it is the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182 and others.

This is quite controversial and refutes conventional wisdom/wishful thinking of many years. However the facts are there. I can present them to you at your convenience, Mr. Burch.

Many facts can be deduced from the actual photographs of the actual wreckage of Air India Flight 182. Apparently the RCMP

has those photographs and will not release them to TSB, according to Mr. Bill Tucker.

That's not right. That's wrong when an aviation safety board can not look at accident photographs. Could you look at the photographs and high quality video to see if the forward cargo door area of Air India Flight 182 matches the photographs of United Airlines Flight 811? Could you update the AAR for Air India Flight 182 to include the knowledge gained by hindsight and similar accidents in early model Boeing 747s?

Could you assign a staff person to listen to me as I present my research and analysis that concludes the probable cause of the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182 was the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation?

Cheers,
Barry Smith

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
831 659 3552
barry@corazon.com
<http://www.corazon.com>

9. The TSB never received any visual evidence of Air India Flight 182 from RCMP as requested.

10. The TSB never followed up by questioning me as Mr. Tucker indicated.

11. The visual evidence continues to deteriorate.
12. TSB will not respond to my requests.

To sum up, Commissioner Major, regarding the term of reference of non cooperation that I am personally involved in which justifies my request for grant of standing: There was noncooperation between TSB Air and the RCMP AITF regarding relevant and important visual evidence in the form of videotapes and 35 MM color film of the wreckage of Air India Flight 182. The Canadian air accident investigating board was denied visual evidence of an airplane crash by the police authorities who claimed an exemption to law to justify the denial.

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
safety@ntsb.org

Email list to authorities below for Tucker, Garstang, Smart, and Blachford:

F	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	3:22 PM 5/24/01
7			Air India Flt. 182	
S	(Normal)	y	Tucker, Bill	1:32 AM 5/25/01
41			Supplemental TSB report for Air India Flight 182	
S	(Normal)	y	Tucker, Bill	11:32 AM
5/26/01		0	Smith AAR Appendices A, B, C, D, E	
S	(Normal)	y	Tucker, Bill	11:33 AM

5/26/01 0 Smith AAR Appendix I
S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:37 AM 5/26/01
0 Smith AAR Appendices F, G, H, J,
S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:37 AM
5/26/01 0 Official AI 182 Reports in PDF
S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:38 AM 5/26/01
0 UAL 811 NTSB AAR in PDF
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 12:12 PM
5/26/01 9 Supplemental thoughts
S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 7:15 PM 5/30/01 0
PDF of Smith AAR for AI 182
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 7:17 PM 5/30/01 3
Sgt Blachford contacted me
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:32 AM 6/14/01
11 So true...
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:59 AM 6/18/01
9 Swiss Air 111 changes
F (Normal) Tucker, Bill 6:20 PM 6/20/01 11
Re: Swiss Air 111 changes
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 6:43 PM 6/20/01
4 Sudden loud sound on CVR
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:04 PM 6/22/01
13 Startle/falling reflex
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:06 PM 6/24/01 22
DI-Air, DE, IIC, AITF
F (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:05 AM 6/25/01
5 Re: Sudden loud sound on CVR
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:14 PM 6/25/01 2
Re: Sudden loud sound on CVR
S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:59 AM 7/2/01 0
Part One in PDF file
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:00 AM 7/2/01 32
Consensus on Location of explosion in Air India Flight

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:16 PM 7/5/01 32
Consensus on Cause of explosion in Air India Flight 18

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 8:17 PM 7/5/01
0 PDF Consensus on Cause of explosion in Air India Fligh

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 4:45 PM 7/6/01
0 PDF of Conclusions, Recommendations, and Implications

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:46 PM 7/6/01 31
Conclusions, Recommendations, and Implications of wiri

R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:38 PM 7/13/01 2
Re: Consensus on Cause of explosion in Air India Fligh

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 6:15 PM 7/13/01 2
Re: Consensus on Cause of explosion in Air India Fligh

(Normal) Tucker, Bill 6:58 PM 7/13/01 2
Re: Consensus on Cause of explosion in Air India Fligh

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:17 PM 7/22/01 8
Startling SDR

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:03 PM 7/23/01 12
Two matched events of uncommanded cargo door openings,

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:43 AM 7/26/01
14 Electrical cause of uncommanded forward cargo door ope

R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:24 PM 8/3/01 7
Re: Startling SDR

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:17 PM 8/3/01
14 Government of India reconsideration of Air India Flight

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:56 AM 8/9/01 12
Warning/Alert/Interview me/Placentia

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:53 AM 8/10/01
46 Defence team contact

- (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:13 PM 8/12/01
7 From CASB member Les Filotas

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:17 AM 8/24/01
9 What are opinions of your aviation experts about Air I

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:25 AM 8/26/01 4

A330 fuel starvation Azores

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:38 PM 8/28/01
10 Faulty wires in SWR 111 and Air India Flight 182
R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:11 PM 9/7/01
38 Re: Defence team contact
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:24 PM
9/10/01 2 Re: Defence team contact
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 2:28 PM
11/14/01 4 Request from RCMP AITF
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:53 PM 11/14/01
1 More info for meeting:
(Normal) Tucker, Bill 2:08 PM 11/20/01
4 Re: Request from RCMP AITF
(Normal) Tucker, Bill 2:08 PM 11/20/01
1 Recall: Request from RCMP AITF
R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 2:14 PM 11/20/01
4 Re: Request from RCMP AITF
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:46 PM
11/20/01 3 December 5 fine for meeting.
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 12:34 PM 12/1/01
2 Confirming 4/5+December meeting
R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:39 AM
12/3/01 3 Re: Confirming 4/5+December meeting
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 12:28 PM 12/3/01
1 Re: Confirming 4/5+December meeting
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:44 PM 12/5/01 1
Debrief
(Normal) Tucker, Bill 6:46 AM
12/11/01 3 Re: Debrief
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 1:52 PM
12/11/01 46 The End of the Day
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 2:55 PM
12/11/01 51 Garstang Report in text, unable to send PDF

- (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 2:56 PM 12/11/01
0 Garstang PDF Report
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 12:57 PM
12/12/01 4 Sixteen years ago today...
R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:46 PM
12/12/01 3 Re: Sixteen years ago today...
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:13 PM 12/12/01
18 Small world..
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:13 AM 12/13/01
2 Whoa, Nelly....
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:58 AM
12/15/01 13 Recent forward cargo door crunch on Boeing
747 at Heat
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:55 AM 12/17/01
10 NTSB was with 182/Trial delay
(Normal) y Tucker, Bill 4:41 PM 1/29/02 2
Fwd: Lockerbie Cago Door Photos
F (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:04 PM 1/30/02
7 Analysis of PA 103 cargo door photo Part II
F (Normal) Tucker, Bill 2:42 PM 2/1/02 10
Analysis of PA 103 cargo door photo Part III
(Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:30 PM 2/1/02 1
Re: Analysis of PA 103 cargo door photo Part III
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:52 PM
2/10/02 5 PA 103 analysis: Note to Sgt. Blachford
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:27 AM
2/15/02 5 Despair
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:51 PM
2/15/02 23 Retirement, Not!
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:17 PM 2/22/02
7 Got UAL 811 photos
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:18 PM 2/22/02
0 811 pix 2

S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:18 PM 2/22/02
0	811 pix 3			
S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:19 PM 2/22/02
0	811 pix 4			
S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:19 PM 2/22/02
0	811 pix 5			
S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:19 PM 2/22/02
0	811 pix 1			
S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:20 PM 2/22/02
0	811 pix 6			
S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:20 PM 2/22/02
0	811 pix 7			
S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:20 PM 2/22/02
0	811 pix 8			
S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:20 PM 2/22/02
0	811 pix 9			
S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:21 PM 2/22/02
0	811 pix 10			
S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:21 PM 2/22/02
0	811 pix 11			
S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:21 PM 2/22/02
0	811 pix 12			
S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:30 PM 2/22/02
4	Photos and film in TSB hands.			
S	(Normal)	y	Tucker, Bill	11:51 AM 2/27/02
0	Pic 4 exhibit list			
S	(Normal)	y	Tucker, Bill	11:51 AM
2/27/02	0	Pic 1 article		
S	(Normal)	y	Tucker, Bill	11:51 AM 2/27/02
0	Incident page 5			
S	(Normal)	y	Tucker, Bill	11:51 AM
2/27/02	0	Incident page 4		
S	(Normal)	y	Tucker, Bill	11:51 AM

2/27/02 0 Incident page 3
S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:51 AM
2/27/02 0 Incident page 2
S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:52 AM
2/27/02 0 Incident page 1
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 1:05 PM 2/27/02
7 811 pix from inside/missing seats/floor damage
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:24 AM 3/3/02 29
Door of 182 like door of 811
F (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:04 PM 3/5/02 6
Re: Photos and film in TSB hands.
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:33 PM 3/5/02
1 Re: Photos and film in TSB hands.
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 2:30 PM 3/17/02
0 Welcome Back
R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:52 PM 3/22/02 1
Re: Welcome Back
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:36 PM 3/22/02
0 Re: Welcome Back
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:36 PM
3/22/02 0 Campbell page 2
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:36 PM
3/22/02 0 Campbell page 3
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:37 PM
3/22/02 0 Campbell page 4
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:58 PM
3/22/02 3 Campbell page 1 Significance
S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:58 PM 3/22/02
0 Door Story in pdf
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:21 AM
3/23/02 5 Door overview and closeups
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:08 AM
3/24/02 54 Copy of letter to Sgt Blachford AITF, 22 Mar

02

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:59 AM 3/28/02

0 Funny but shouldn't be

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:13 AM 4/4/02 2

Short landing and takeoff platform...

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:05 AM 4/11/02

1 Mr. Ken Smart

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:01 AM 4/16/02

24 Letter to Mr. Ken Smart enclosed.

R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:48 PM 4/16/02

1 Re: Letter to Mr. Ken Smart enclosed.

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 6:30 PM 4/16/02 1

I'm on call for any questions you may have/come visit

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:43 AM 4/18/02

5 Note from Mr. Smart and my response:

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:29 PM 4/18/02 3

Resend of Note from Mr. Smart and my response:

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:19 AM 4/20/02 5

Resend just in case

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:04 AM 4/22/02

55 My reply to Mr. Smart's email

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:26 AM 4/30/02 0

Smith AAR PA 103, Appendix L

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:26 AM 4/30/02 0

Smith AAR PA 103, Appendix M

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:27 AM 4/30/02 0

Smith AAR PA 103, Appendices A-K

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:27 AM 4/30/02

0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part I

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:27 AM 4/30/02

0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part IV

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:27 AM 4/30/02

0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part III

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:27 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part II

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:31 AM 4/30/02
1 Smith AAR for PA 103 completed and sent

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 1:05 PM 5/1/02
12 Additional considerations to AAR PA 103, Smith

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:42 AM 5/5/02 253
TWA 800 justification for reconsideration

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:34 AM 5/9/02
3 And so it goes...

(Normal) Tucker, Bill 1:46 PM 5/9/02
130 Re: TWA 800 justification for reconsideration 1/2

(Normal) Tucker, Bill 1:46 PM 5/9/02
130 Re: TWA 800 justification for reconsideration 2/2

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:48 AM 5/10/02
0 Pictures

F (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:28 AM 5/22/02
2 Pix of Air India Flight 182

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 7:56 AM 5/25/02 2
Maybe again?

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:32 PM 5/29/02 3
To Mr. Chou: China Airlines Flight 611 Black Box resul

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:22 AM 5/30/02 38
Written before and after Trans World Airlines Flight 8

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:40 AM 5/30/02 4
Stay and fight, Bill, you are needed and most importan

R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:22 AM 5/30/02
5 Re: Stay and fight, Bill, you are needed and most impo

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:11 AM 5/30/02
2 182pix/sweet retirement

R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:48 PM 5/30/02
3 Fwd: My email to Mr. Chou for China Airlines Flight 611

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:26 PM 5/30/02

66 I do consider all alternatives, I ask others do also.
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:53 PM 6/2/02 283
Sent to Mr. Smart: Last ditch effort, clutching at str
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:34 AM 6/7/02 11
From Ken Smart
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:15 PM 6/10/02 105
To Ken Smart: Line of communication open Pan Am Flight
R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:01 AM 6/24/02 6
Re: Please notify Chinese Authorities about the wiring
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:13 AM 6/24/02 3
Re: Please notify Chinese Authorities about the wiring
F (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:23 PM 6/25/02 10
Re: Pix of Air India Flight 182
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:50 PM 6/25/02
20 Summary of exit briefing...
S (Normal) y aaib-dot@dircon.co.uk 10:01
AM 4/16/02 24 Mr. Bill Tucker/wiring/cargo door for PA
103
F (Normal) Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca 11:32 AM
1/30/02 20 Analysis of PA 103 cargo door pictures
F (Normal) Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca 11:25 AM
2/6/02 11 Analysis of PA 103 cargo door photo Part IV
S (Normal) Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca,
ksmart@aaib.gov.uk 10:12 AM 5/26/02 41 China
Airlines 611
S (Normal) Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca,
ksmart@aaib.gov.uk 10:01 AM 5/29/02 23 My email
to Mr. Chou for China Airlines Flight 611
S (Normal) Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca,
ksmart@aaib.gov.uk 7:13 PM 6/23/02 4 Please notify
Chinese Authorities about the wiring/car

R (Normal) Ken Smart 9:41 AM 4/18/02
199 Mr. Bill Tucker/wiring/cargo door for PA 103 message

R (Normal) Ken Smart 9:41 AM 4/18/02
199 Mr. Bill Tucker/wiring/cargo door for PA 103 message

S (Normal) Ken Smart 10:43 AM 4/18/02
4 Thank you for email, detailed reply to follow.

S (Normal) Ken Smart 8:04 AM 4/22/02 55
PA 103 reply to your email, Mr. Smart

S (Normal) y Ken Smart 9:26 AM 4/30/02 0
Smith AAR PA 103, Appendices A-K

S (Normal) y Ken Smart 9:26 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Appendix M

S (Normal) y Ken Smart 9:26 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Appendix L

S (Normal) y Ken Smart 9:26 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part IV

S (Normal) y Ken Smart 9:26 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part III

S (Normal) y Ken Smart 9:26 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part II

S (Normal) y Ken Smart 9:26 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part I

S (Normal) Ken Smart 9:31 AM 4/30/02
1 Smith AAR for PA 103 completed and sent

S (Normal) y Ken Smart 1:05 PM 5/1/02
12 Additional considerations to AAR PA 103, Smith

S (Normal) Ken Smart 9:22 AM 5/30/02 38
Written before and after Trans World Airlines Flight 8

S (Normal) Ken Smart 8:46 PM 6/2/02 293
Conscience/Comet/Wiring/Doors

(Normal) Ken Smart 2:33 AM 6/7/02 1
Re: Conscience/Comet/Wiring/Doors

R (Normal) Ken Smart 2:33 AM 6/7/02

151 Re: Conscience/Comet/Wiring/Doors
F (Normal) y Ken Smart 10:00 PM 6/9/02
97 Line of communication open Pan Am Flight 103
R (Normal) Ken Smart 2:31 AM 6/25/02
5 Re: Please notify Chinese Authorities about the wiring
S (Normal) Ken Smart 12:18 AM 6/26/02
7 Pattern emerging
S (Normal) Ken Smart 11:30 PM
8/16/03 6 Investigators ask questions....
S (Normal) y ksmart@aaib.gov.uk 8:04 AM
4/22/02 0 Smith AAR for Air India Flight 182/103
S (Normal) y ksmart@aaib.gov.uk 8:05 AM
4/22/02 0 AAR United Airlines Flight 811 92/02 NTSB
S (Normal) ksmart@aaib.gov.uk 5:33 PM
5/29/02 2 To Mr. Chou: China Airlines Flight 611 Black Box
resul
S (Normal) ksmart@aaib.gov.uk,
Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca, kfch 11:27 AM 6/29/02 3 Maybe
not open cargo door....

(Normal) Securitas 4:18 AM 2/27/97 3
Re: Crash cause of Air India Flight 182
- (Normal) Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
9:01 AM 2/27/97 2 Thank you for info, need more please
- (Normal) Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca 12:43
PM 3/1/97 1 Cargo door Flight 182
- (Normal) Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca 8:47
PM 3/15/97 2 Please comment AI 182 cargo door
- (Normal) Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
2:11 PM 4/17/97 1 Attention Mr John Garstang RE Air India
182
- (Normal) Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca 3:30

PM 11/28/97 17 Cargo door rupture/NTSB TWA 800
 Hearing
 S (Normal) Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
 2:33 AM 10/29/00 16 AI 182 matches TWA 800 and PA
 103 and UAL 811
 S (Normal) Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
 9:05 PM 3/13/01 2 Urgent for John Garstang of TSB re: AI
 182 bomb locati

 - (Normal) SGT Blachford@redshift.com
 11:56 PM 11/14/01 5 Meeting about Air India Flight 182
 - (Normal) SGT Blachford@redshift.com
 9:56 AM 12/17/01 10 Trial delay opportunity
 - (Normal) Sgt. Bart Blachford@RCMP
 2:40 PM 2/1/02 2 Pan Am Flight 103 cargo door
 photographs analyses
 - (Normal) Sgt. Bart Blachford@RCMP
 4:30 PM 5/1/02 2 Smith AAR for Pan Am Flight 103
 X (Normal) Sgt. Bart
 Blachford@redshift.com 1:46 PM 12/11/01 16 The
 End of the Day
 - (Normal) Sgt.Bart Blachford@RCMP 11:43
 PM 2/10/02 5 Analysis of PA 103 cargo door photo Part
 IV
 - (Normal) Sgt.BartBlachford@RCMP 12:51
 PM 2/16/02 3 Who are the TSB investigators?
 - (Normal) Sgt.BartBlachford@RCMP 1:03 PM
 2/27/02 2 Mr. Garstang follow up
 - (Normal) Sgt.BartBlachford@RCMP 9:21 AM
 3/3/02 21 Door of 182 like door of 811
 - (Normal) Sgt.BartBlachford@RCMP 9:34 AM
 3/24/02 52 Authority who said 182 door exactly same as 811
 door

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT
To: mintc@tc.gc.ca
Subject: Smith Submission 9 The Crash and Meeting the Family.

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Friday, August 18, 2006

Below is Smith Submission 9 The Crash and Meeting the
Family. (It happens so fast) Filed Friday, August 18, 2006

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28
July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why,
and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb,
in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please
ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type
of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8,
2006

Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/
ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/
inflight breakup explanation. (Please consider a plausible,
reasonable, electrical cause with precedent) Filed Tuesday,
August 8, 2006.

Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The

Layperson version. (It's not rocket science) Filed Friday, August 11, 2006

Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years: Predicting the Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non Cooperation. (Sorry, no can do.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 9 The Crash and Meeting the Family. (It happens so fast) Filed Friday, August 18, 2006

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner

Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publique

Dear Commissioner Major, Friday, August 18, 2006

To review my pleas:

1. Please grant me standing to present my mechanical non conspiracy explanation to you in depth.
2. Please ask TSB Air to provide an aircraft accident report to you on the probable cause of Air India Flight 182.
3. Please correct the highly prejudicial error on Commission website that states the CASB concluded it was a bomb; they did not. ("Yet, it was not until the following January that the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb.")

And a new one:

4. Please post all the non classified written material submitted to you by the public during the public inquiry (including my submissions) on the Commission website, <http://www.majorcomm.ca/en/index.asp>

As I understand it, you are conducting a public, broad, and full inquiry into the events surrounding:

1. The investigation of the bombing.
2. The bombing.
3. Air India Flight 182.
4. The victims.
5. The family members of the victims.

According to the family members, the Commission of Inquiry was created because of the 329 victims and the distress the surviving family members felt in their grief.

As justification that I can contribute information to the Commission to enhance its work and thus eligible for a grant of standing, I submit the following information of what leads up to and during a sudden night fatal jet airplane crash from this

survivor. I offer the Commission a unique perspective of a sudden inflight fatal jet airplane crash.

I then add what it's like to meet the surviving family members of the fatality.

Field Carrier Landing Practice FCLP (Two articles I wrote and were published in the Pacific Flyer 1990)

I popped up my canopy by toggling the switch on the left console. The aluminum clamshell with two small side windows whooshed up and locked. The warm night air of central Florida rushed into the cockpit displacing the cool forced conditioned air on my forehead while I still breathed the cold oxygen from my mask. The dull roar of the two idling jet engines hit me through my helmet; the intakes were just two feet away on my left and right, I was in the middle. I was strapped into the back seat of an RA-5C Vigilante at 2300 hours on a concrete ramp at Sanford Naval Air Station on 14 June 1967. We were conducting Night Field Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP) on Runway 27 with five other aircraft in the pattern. Wind was calm and temperature about 85 degrees. The sky was clear with only the flashing lights of the other aircraft as they went around and around the pattern to be seen.

My regular training pilot climbed out of his front cockpit and wiggled down the ladder attached to the fuselage and the new pilot climbed up and in. The fifty thousand pound airplane with its two fifteen thousand pound thrust idling engines sat in its chocks and vibrated as it was being refueled by a yellow truck off to the side. Flashing lights were everywhere but it was all orderly and the pilot switch and hot refueling was going off without a hitch. I took off my mask and instantly the smell of exhausted jet fuel came into the cockpit. I relaxed and enjoyed it.

It was all very exciting. The new pilot came up on hot mike and said, "OK, Smitty, how do you read?" He knew that his regularly assigned Reconnaissance Attack Navigator (RAN) had been replaced by me for this evening FCLP only. "Loud and clear, sir," I replied, putting my mask back on and talking into the microphone embedded in it. I toggled down my canopy and it closed with a reassuring thump and clunked locked. The air cooled down and the noise eased for a bit.

My regular pilot walked away without a look back. He had just practiced twelve landings and would do so again tomorrow night. He was an unmarried thirty eight year old Navy Commander who had been flying single seat jet reconnaissance fighters (F-8) off carriers for years and had had one combat tour in the new war in Vietnam. He was now preparing to carrier qualify in this type aircraft before he went back to war in Vietnam. It was his first time flying in a two seat carrier jet.

I was a single, twenty three year old Ensign navigator who had had little jet experience, little navigator experience and had never been in combat or even on a carrier. I was in awe of him. We had been assigned as a crew and we flew all our missions together. We were due to qualify in the RA-5C in one month on the USS Ranger, one of the large supercarriers of the time, and then on to combat in six months over North Vietnam flying from Yankee Station in the Gulf of Tonkin. But first we had to practice crew coordination and the techniques and procedures to land the largest and heaviest carrier aircraft on a flight deck. This was the pilot's time.

For the past several months I had been navigating low level, medium speed photo missions throughout Florida, Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee, learning how to take pictures of small

bridges, roads, power plants, and prisons, while maneuvering up and down and all around at four hundred and eighty knots. The hardest part was not throwing up while thinking ahead of the airplane and putting in very small number new target coordinates into the computer. Now it was FCLP and all pilot technique and skill to get this airplane at a certain spot on the earth, in a certain attitude, at a certain speed, at a certain weight, and at a certain time. It had to be done right. We were doing OK. "Any gripes?" my new pilot asked, referring to any problems the airplane might have developed during the previous two FCLP periods.

"No problems ," I answered. My new pilot was a Lieutenant Commander, also thirty eight, and had had much experience in combat and RA-5C carrier flying. He was married and had five children. I addressed him as Mr. Butler. I was more respectful to him than in awe, but also felt much more friendly towards him. He had recently returned from a Western Pacific (WestPac) cruise and a harrowing combat tour. He was now undergoing refresher training before going out for another combat cruise with a different squadron than mine. I had volunteered to fly these two hops with him because I knew him to be safe and instructive.

"Call for taxi," he directed. I made all the radio calls but the incoming instructions were for the pilot who was listening and had his hands full trying to precisely place this ungainly airplane onto a spot of runway about twenty yards wide by twenty yards long. The A-5, like most supersonic aircraft, was a clumsy, underpowered buffalo when it was slow and dirty with flaps, droops, and landing gear down, but cleaned up it was a beautiful, graceful, speeding demon.

"Ground control, 201, taxi," I said into the oxygen mask as I pressed down on a button on right right footrest after first

confirming I had the correct frequency set in the small window at eye level. We were flying one of twelve aircraft assigned to the only Navy tactical reconnaissance training squadron, RVAH-3. Our call sign was Commanche Trail 201 which I had shortened to 201. I would have shortened it to 01 but there was another 01 in the pattern and I did not want to be confused with him.

"201, Ground, cleared to taxi runway 27, wind calm, altimeter two niner niner two," the tower replied. "Ground," was short for "ground control" which was the title of the person in the tower who monitored aircraft movements on the ramp just prior to takeoff. The same person might be called, "Tower," after we were airborne.

The engines revved up and we started to slowly taxi toward the duty runway. We were only partially loaded with fuel because we would be landing shorty after takeoff and the landing gear would not support the weight of a fully loaded landing aircraft. The A-5 usually held thirty thousand pounds of jet fuel, about five thousand gallons, but for our touch and go's we usually took off with about seven thousand pounds of JP-4, or about a thousand gallons.

That amount of fuel was sufficient for about twenty five minutes of six crash and dashes before we would stop and hot refuel again. Each pilot would then have had two exhausting periods of twelve field carrier landing practices on the night runway which had landing lights which simulated a carrier's angled flight deck. They usually emerged from the cockpit soaked in sweat. There was a Landing Signal Officer (LSO) standing by the end of the runway to talk to the pilots as they made their approach. The LSO, "Paddles," as he was called, was an experienced RA-5C pilot who made recommendations to the squadron commander as

to whether a particular pilot was qualified to fly out to the ship for landing qualifications which would enable that pilot to go on the cruise. A thumbs down by Paddles was a serious thing for a pilot and his career.

"Take off checklist," my pilot intoned.

"Compass," I quickly promptly as I was expecting the request. I had only flown with Mr. Butler one other time, a day low-level hop through mountains in southern Tennessee. It was the only time I had ever tried the Terrain Following Radar (TFR) which allowed the plane to be guided below mountain tops by the navigator interpreting special radar signals. No one trusted the radar enough to use it for real. On that day the radar worked fine and I respected the pilot for at least showing his trust for me and the system. For that reason I had volunteered to stay and fly the extra two periods instead of getting out and leaving with my regular pilot who had completed his two periods. "Set," the pilot answered the expected reply. "Hook," I said.

"Up," he answered.

"IFF," I said, and then answered my own query, "set to standby." Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) was not required since we never left the air station control area, but we always went through every checklist item anyway.

"Canopy," I said.

"Down and locked, lights out," he answered.

"Harness," I said.

"Locked," he replied.

"OK, flaps and take off power to go," I said as we neared the end of the runway." The takeoff ritual was proceeding exactly as usual. We never engaged in idle chitchat.

There was so much information coming into us from different sources that it required all our concentration to monitor and interpret it so we didn't have any time for non-life threatening conversation. We were closely watching dials telling us engine temperatures, flap position, radio frequency, fuel flow, hydraulic status lights and also listening to the tower, the LSO, and five other aircraft in the pattern. Our senses were alive with processing information, figuring out which calls were for us and which required responses. We had engine noise and radio noise also interfering with hearing clearly. Internal communication was kept to a minimum.

We waited for a minute as another aircraft came in for his approach. It was no use calling for take off yet and the common frequency was busy enough with six airplanes all communicating where they were, their intentions, their fuel states, and listening to the LSO give final landing instructions. I checked the inside of my small cockpit. My left elbow could touch the aluminum skin of the left side and my right elbow could touch the right. My arm partially bent forward could touch the front console. I had a little one foot by one foot window high up on the left and right side of my canopy. In front of me there was a fold-down desk and a full instrument panel including radar, viewfinder, altimeters and many other electronic controls. It was cramped but comfortable once I knew where everything was. The seat was a hard beige plastic which was the bottom of the ejection seat which also went up my back and over the top of my head. The seat had to be hard

to exert the correct forces without hurting the back. No cushions were allowed. I could not see nor touch my pilot in his equally small cockpit in front of me.

I figured that in an hour and a half I would be having a cold can of beer and a Florida lobster and baked potato dinner at my favorite Sanford restaurant. I watched out my little right side window as the landing A-5 wobbled lower and lower. The A-5 came down in its flared position, wings rocking back and forth, and slammed down in front of us and then with a roar took back off again, then slowly turned right to prepare for its next touch and go. It was said that a carrier landing was nothing more than a controlled crash. One reason Air Force type aircraft were unsuitable for carrier landings is that the landing gear were never strong enough.

"OK, call for take off," my pilot said. We were on hot mike which allowed everything we said to be heard by each other. His breathing increased.

"Tower, 201 for takeoff," I quickly radioed. "201, tower, cleared for takeoff, wind calm," the tower crisply responded. All the players were correctly anticipating each other.

"201, roger," I acknowledged.

As we quickly taxied into position at the end of the runway, I called off the last checklist item, "Flaps." A crew had once attempted to take off with flaps at zero. The plane never got airborne. It was such a small thing with such serious consequences. "Flaps ten," he said, "OK, power coming up." The engines now started their whining up to full roar. He released the brakes as soon as the engines were at one hundred percent and

then kicked in the afterburners. We had to takeoff soon and leave room for the next A-5 now on final for landing. We started to roll. "All temperatures normal," the pilot said as we gathered speed. Our takeoff roll was short because of our light fuel load and we were soon airborne and turning downwind to prepare to land in just a few minutes. He left the flaps at ten and the landing gear down. The afterburners were shut off and the power slightly reduced to maintain our speed of one hundred sixty knots downwind at six hundred feet. We would fly the whole six passes never getting higher than six hundred feet nor further away from the runway than a mile.

"201 abeam," I called as we passed parallel the runway. Each plane called various positions in the pattern to let everyone know where they were. The critical interval was how soon each pilot turned base which would determine how long his final approach would be. My regular pilot would often make fun of other pilots who preferred a longer approach than he did. My pilot tonight made no such derogatory statements; he just adjusted into the pattern.

"201 turning final, state 6.7," I called. We had 6700 pounds of fuel left, enough for five more passes after this one for a total of twenty five minutes of flight time.

"Landing checklist, flaps," I said to the pilot.

"Flaps full down," he replied in between heavy grunts. As usual it sounded as if the pilot was wrestling with a low, slow, clumsy, and very dangerous monster. The vibration increased at the airflow responded to the added drag of the huge flaps hanging full down into the airstream.

"Gear," I prompted.

"Three down and locked," he answered and then added, "I've got the ball, 6.0."

"Checklist complete," I said to the pilot and then stepped on my mike button and said, "201 ball, state 6.0," I let the LSO know we had the meatball in sight which was a reflected image in a mirror which let the pilot know his angle of approach toward the simulated end of the carrier. The mirror system and the lighting pattern were identical to that of the ship giving the pilots accurate simulation of a carrier night landing. Fuel state was critical information around the ship because most of the jets were always within minutes of flaming out if they did not land successfully. At a certain point the aircraft was diverted to a land runway if it was felt the plane could not make it aboard.

"Roger ball," the LSO acknowledged that we were on final, had the field and ball in sight and we had six thousand pounds of fuel left.

Our RA-5C wiggled its wings and the engines surged up and down as we got closer and closer to the cement runway.

"Little power," the LSO advised. No reply was expected. The whine grew louder as the pilot added a little power. "Going high," the LSO's reassuring calm voice told us. I felt the power ease up. My radar altimeter and pressure altimeter wound down lower and lower. Then came the expected thump of the landing as we hit approximately where we wanted to on the runway. During the FCLP debriefing the LSO would describe each pass to the pilot and give criticism. The LSO had the authority to wave

off a plane from landing and his recommendation whether to divert a plane or not carried weight. As soon as the thump of the landing occurred the engines went to full non-afterburning power and we almost immediately were airborne again and turning downwind quickly to keep the pattern tight. I noted the time of the landing, fuel state and any comments for later debrief on my pad.

This time upwind my pilot raised the landing gear and the flaps to ten degrees. Having to lower the gear for landing made the FCLP more realistic. The first night FCLP was the hardest for each pilot and now that we had that one over, I relaxed and went into the routine. I settled into the small cockpit, checked my pad of paper clamped to the desktop with the record of landings and fuel states. I cinched up my harness, checked my clear visor down and gloves on tight. I was wearing a new silver flight suit that was undergoing testing. It had the parachute harness integrated into the suit, unlike the regular flight suit that had the harness added on as a separate item. The plane tossed and turned; it was a little like an amusement ride at a carnival. Again downwind I called, "201 abeam."

"Landing checklist, flaps," I quickly said. We both knew what the other was about to say and also knew the expected response.

"Flaps full," he replied.

"Gear," I prompted.

"Three down and locked, state 5.0," he answered just after the small thumps of the landing gear locking in place were felt.

"Checklist complete," I said to the pilot, and to the LSO I said,

"201, on final, state 5.0." The plane began its usual last minute maneuverings. This particular plane, Bureau Number 149314, was on its second full day of flight operations after having been returned from a Progressive Aircraft Rework (PAR) program which updated all the systems and repainted the aircraft inside and out. It gave the feeling of flying in a brand new airplane. We also carried a million dollar camera in the reconnaissance pod. Normally the camera would not be used on the rough FCLP but this plane was up, flyable, and needed. The Navy policy of aircraft usage was when a plane was ready to fly, a crew was found to fly it. The constant pounding of the landings was hard going on camera mounts and internal parts.

"I've got the ball, 4.8" my pilot said calmly.

"201, ball 4.8," I reported to the LSO.

"Roger ball," the LSO answered.

We staggered along as usual and made a nice pass with no comments from the LSO. The plane thumped its usual thump and accelerated as the pilot applied full takeoff power. We started to climb. I started to write down the landing and the fuel state on my pad in the well-lit small cockpit when I heard a sudden soft rushing sound off to my right.

Just then my pilot said, in a slightly exasperated voice, "Oh, shit, starboard engine." I immediately asked, as I started to put my pencil into its holder still listening to the whooshing on my right, "What's the matter?"

My pilot quickly answered me. "Standby, eject," he said in a terse, level tone of voice. I immediately reached up with both

hands and pulled the face curtain all the way down over my face and upper body.

Nothing happened.

The rushing sound continued as I looked down to see what was wrong and started to think that we were low and wouldn't have much time to do any of the manual procedures such as blowing off my canopy, unhooking myself from the seat, and jumping out. As it turned out, the delay was caused by the normal functioning of the seat firing sequence which allowed three quarters of a second for the seat to be set in the full down position. Since I was tall, I always had it in the full down position. I was still looking down when the rocket ejection seat fired. The cockpit was immediately filled with bright flame and I was ejected upwards. The original ejection seats were fired with explosive charges, but too many pilots suffered back injuries so the seat was improved by having this seat propelled by a small rocket charge that reduced the initial shock on the back. The ride up was smooth.

After the bright flash of the rocket firing I had just enough time to think that I hoped everything worked normally. I knew the complicated sequence that had to be followed precisely for me to live through this. Just then I felt a great tug and felt warm black sky all around so the knee restraints had retracted normally, the seat had bottomed out, my canopy had blown off, the seat had fired, the knee restraints had been popped off, the bladder behind me had inflated separating me from the six hundred pound ejection seat, my drogue parachute had deployed immediately since we were below twelve thousand feet, my main parachute had opened, my face curtain was gone with the seat and I was coming down to earth under a parachute while breathing oxygen

from my ten minute bailout bottle. My new silver flight suit had held and was comfortable. I did not know what had happened to my pilot. His ejection sequence is delayed one and three quarter seconds to permit my ejection sequence to complete itself before his sequence commences. Without the delay there would be a chance of his canopy blowing away into me as I was ejected upward.

As soon as I had realized that the chute had opened I saw a brilliant yellow flash down and to my left as my airplane hit the ground. I thought, "Just like in the movies." It hit and smeared a yellow flash in the night. After a maximum of three seconds in the calm air after the chute opened I abruptly hit the ground in a standing position and crumpled down into a heap.

During training I was taught to roll upon landing using the fleshy parts of my body to cushion the landing. They never mentioned what to do on a pitch dark night when the ground was invisible. As soon as I hit, I felt a sharp pain in my back but quickly got up and looked around. The burning plane was about forty yards away, upside down, and making explosive noises. I was on a hard, flat, grassy field. I kept the oxygen mask on because the gas was cool and I knew it was clean. I put my blinking flashlight on my harness, as instructed in my training classes, and started to walk away to look for my pilot. I then took off the oxygen mask and breathed in the warm Florida night air. I laughed and thought, "I did it and this is really something to talk about, I can't wait to tell the guys."

I shouted, "Mr. Butler, Mr. Butler." There was no answer, just the crackling of the burning airplane. I walked around a bit, still exhilarated but very aware of my situation. It had only been a minute since the sudden rushing noise, but it had seemed like a

lifetime. A Navy fire truck drove up with some fireman hanging onto the sides. It stopped and the fireman asked me if I was all right and I said sure, why not, and laughed. They didn't laugh. The plane had crashed just next to the runway. I climbed into a yellow Navy pickup truck that soon came up and we drove to a central grouping spot. I asked about my pilot but got no answer.

I got out and walked over to a circle of men standing around a parachute I knew wasn't mine. I walked over to my pilot's parachute and it looked to me as if the flight suit attached to it had just been thrown into a heap on the grassy ground. I guessed he had unzipped his flight suit and had squirmed out of the suit, leaving it attached to the parachute which was laying all strewn out. I again asked where my pilot was, but there was no answer, only silence, as everyone just stood around and looked.

There was no activity other than silent standing around. The plane was going to burn itself out and there was no searching going on. I realized then that my pilot was still inside his flight suit and he was dead. I wasn't happy anymore and didn't look forward to telling the guys all about it anymore either. I sighed and went back to the truck and asked to be taken back to the tower.

My back was starting to hurt whenever I bent over. I rode back silently to the tower where my regular pilot and our squadron commander were already waiting. I told them we lost the starboard engine and we ejected. I told them my pilot was dead but they didn't seem to want to believe it. They said I was in shock and to relax. The safety officer was there and suggested I tell everything I knew into a tape recorder for the accident investigation. I agreed and sat down with him and told the whole story as close as I could remember it.

I then went back to the locker room, changed my clothes and went home to bed. The next day I woke up and my back was really hurting from a compression fracture of thoracic vertebrae six from the abrupt parachute landing. I went to work, was sent to the Dispensary where I was given some muscle relaxants for my back, and took two days off. I resumed flying and completed my training.

The accident report revealed that a loose clamp, probably undone or not correctly tightened during the Progressive Rework, had become loose and was ingested into the starboard engine causing Foreign Object Damage (FOD) and a fire. The pilot's ejection sequence was normal but he was too low or the angle was not vertical enough for the parachute to inflate after it was pulled from the ejection seat by the drogue. It was guessed that he was too low because the aircraft had rolled slightly to the right while waiting for my ejection sequence to complete and thus changed the trajectory of the seat from the vertical to the horizontal. He died of massive internal injuries. It was reported that he should have used the alternate ejection handles on each armrest instead of the face curtain because that way he could have maintained the aircraft in level flight instead of taking his hands off the control stick to reach up and pull the face curtain. Up until that crash it was believed that the Vigilante could maintain altitude and even climb if an engine out situation developed when low, slow, and dirty. NATOPS was changed to have the A-5 reach five hundred feet before turning downwind. I believe that my pilot did everything right from quickly identifying the source of the noise, to deciding the airplane was not airworthy, informing his crew with instructions, and following the correct ejection sequence. And he still died and I lived.

The family members...

June 14th, 1967 1130 PM, Sanford Florida, ejection from RA-5C during Field Carrier Landing Practice, (FCLP) killing the pilot, LCDR C.T. Butler, and injuring the Reconnaissance Attack Navigator (RAN), Ensign John Barry Smith. The dead pilot leaves a wife and five children of whom three are boys, the oldest age eight.

July 1990, Pacific Flyer prints an article written by the navigator. A picture from his cruisebook of an A-5 with an A-3 coincidentally on the backside was also submitted. August, September, October, 1990. Letters pour in to Pacific Flyer regarding mixup in photos.

November 1st 1990. A letter from Pacific Flyer arrives at the navigator's home. I open it and find another letter inside, addressed to me, John Barry Smith, Care of Pacific Flyer. The contents of the letter, handwritten in ink, follow.

Start letter: "Dear Mr Smith, My name is Richard Butler, C.T. Butler was my father. You can imagine my surprise when I came across your "Night of Terror" article in the July Pacific Flyer and realized your pilot in that accident was my father. It was even more strange because a couple of nights before I told a friend that I would like to learn more about my father's accident.

I am now a Navy pilot myself. I am attached to VF-51, flying F-14's at Miramar. We were returning from a WestPac deployment and the USS Carl Vinson was in port at Pearl Harbor, I was SDO sitting in the ready room while everyone else enjoyed the beaches when I happened to find a copy of the Pacific Flyer. What caught my eye was that they put a picture of an A-3 instead of an A-5. When I started to read the article I got a shiver down my back when I read the date and place in the first

paragraph and then saw my father's name. I can still vividly remember that next morning, when I was eight years old, and there were several strange women at my house and my mother wouldn't get out of bed. My mother has yet to remarry and did a heroic job raising five kids. We all turned out pretty well. John, the next oldest boy to me is also a Navy pilot at Miramar flying with VF-126, the adversary squadron .

We would both like a chance to meet you. Your article was a good one, answered a lot of questions I had about that accident 23 years ago. If you would like to get together with John and I sometime please give me a call or write. I look forward to hearing from you. Sincerely, Richard Butler." End letter.

I held the letter in my hand, stunned and amazed. The past had come alive. There was a string of life which had continued all these years. I immediately made plans to meet the Butler boys.

I had received the letter on a Wednesday and had already planned to fly in my Mooney to San Antonio on Tuesday for a week. I had learned not to make too firm of commitments while flying light airplanes and sent the following letter to Richard Butler.

Start letter: "Dear Richard Butler, Monday, November 5, 1990, Thank you for your letter. We must meet at a convenient time.

I was talking to a retired Navy Captain today who also knew your father. Small world.

It's amazing you and your brother are Navy pilots; it's quite an accomplishment. I met your uncle the day after the crash. I knew there were five children.

After the article appeared a reader wrote in and said he was in the pattern during the crash that night.

In 1969 I was in Sigonella filing a flight plan for an A-5 and the First Class at the tower said he watched one crash. I enquired where and when and it turned out he was the tower operator the night of the crash. He said they were all surprised anyone lived because it happened so suddenly.

Well, I lived because your Dad thought about me back there and told me to eject.

I volunteered for the hop because the previous times I had flown with him I had learned a lot. He was very helpful and patient to a 23 year old Ensign. Maybe he was that way because of his five kids.

I'm off tomorrow to San Antonio in my Mooney for a week. I will return about the 14th of November. I'll call you to set up a rendezvous. The pilot who climbed out of the plane just before your father climbed in lives in San Diego. I'll coordinate with him so we can all get together.

I just got my Commercial license with instrument rating and this is my first IFR cross country.

You might write me here at home and give me and your brother in-port schedule. Sincerely, John Barry Smith." End letter.

The trip to San Antonio to visit friends was an annual event but the first in my airplane. A year earlier in San Antonio I had first sat in a Mooney and decided I wanted one. Four days later, after arriving back in Carmel Valley, I had bought my Mooney in

Hollister. Now I had it fixed up and was proudly flying it back to show off while exercising my new instrument rating.

I took off in clear weather and a fine running machine to fly direct to Bullhead City to stay in the Flamingo Hilton, courtesy of Baron Hilton who had sent me a free three night certificate, as he had done to many other pilots.

The flight was nice, the Hotel and casino were fine, and the airport was terrible. In a thirty knot wind there was no assistance to push back the plane to parking, no help tying down nor chocks available.

They would not bring a gas truck out to refuel unless I walked in and signed a gas chit. The gas truck was slow to get there and there was no ride to and from the plane to office. I was charged for two nights of tie down although I was only there 23 hours. But the room was great, which is to say it was free and I had a view of the airport with my plane on it.

I gambled a little and drank none; the next day was to be a grueling, rugged three leg, nine hour flight to San Antonio. I planned on refueling in Deming, NM, and Fort Stockton Texas.

That night I checked the weather via a phone line to Reno. A low pressure air mass had moved in during the day bringing snow, rain, and freezing rain from Phoenix to El Paso to San Antonio.

I was faced with the common problem, bad weather and what to do. I couldn't go around it to the south because Mexico was down there. To go around to the north would require a detour as far north as Denver over some really high mountains. I had the new instrument rating and was willing to fly in clouds and rain

and snow, but not freezing rain. My Mooney had no pitot heat, nor radar, nor de ice.

I did have two more free nights in the hotel, I could wait it out and push it to make the Saturday night party in San Antonio, or I could just follow the front, flying behind it in the rain but avoiding the freezing rain. When it got too bad, I could land and wait it out.

And then I thought of flying to San Diego to meet the Butlers. I gave a call to Richard's home in San Diego from the casino lobby with one of my many quarters. Richard's wife Lana responded by saying Richard was on a mission to Fallon bombing range but would be back the next night and we set up a dinner meeting.

So the attraction of meeting the sons of the man who saved my life years ago turned me away from a huge weather system and towards San Diego.

I had a tailwind and was finally able to see 200 knots on the groundspeed readout. I was in the yellow sailing along when I hit a bit of moderate to severe near Julian and lost 500 feet. I was way above maneuvering speed so I pulled the power back to slow down. Center called and asked what was going on and I replied turbulence. Another plane, a Boeing 737, heard and asked where. Center replied it was just a light plane and wasn't important. The 737 replied he didn't ask what but where.

The next day, I called my regular pilot, Burton J. Larkins, Capt (Ret.) and explained the situation and we agreed to meet that day for lunch and dinner.

We went for a ride on his beautiful forty foot sailboat up and

down the San Diego Harbor. We rode by the tied up USS Ranger, where we carrier qualified (carqualled) in RA-5Cs July 1967, three weeks after my ejection. To land on the Ranger in a Vigilante was why we were practicing FCLP that fateful night.

We rode by all the Navy ships in port with the thoughts of the impending Gulf war on our minds. The sister ships to the Iwo Jima were there. The Iwo Jima was a Marine helicopter carrier and the ship that ninety percent of my boot camp class went to after graduation. I went to an electronics school in Memphis because I told the man in the third week of boot camp I liked flying so he made me into an aviation recruit while the others became seamen recruits. We sailed by Navy boot camp and the bridge connecting Camp Nimitz which I recall marching over so often. Also visible was the USS Recruit, a landbound destroyer, where I learned to tie knots. We saw landing craft which were taking recruits to visit a ship as part of their training. Helicopters were frequently flying over us as they landed at North Island.

And we were meeting a pilot who was on a practice bombing mission in Nevada.

Captain Larkins and I were at the Cafe Machado at Montgomery Field a little early to wait for Richard and John Butler to arrive. They walked up and I immediately recognized them as Navy pilots. We made the introductions and sat down to dinner and conversation.

I offered a toast, "To C. T. Butler, a man who created your lives and saved mine." Richard's voice was just like his dad's, sort of a soft southern drawl. Richard was of medium height, sandy hair, and bore a strong resemblance to his father. John was taller and slightly younger. Both of the young men were calm, deliberate,

and thoughtful. The saying, "You can tell a fighter pilot, but you can't tell him much," was not true in this case. I had to revise my image of the elite of Naval Aviation.

John had gone to the Naval Academy, then to a short preflight, and then to flight training. He was now flying F-16s, F/A-18s, and F-5s in an adversarial role against F-14s. Richard was flying F-14s in an active Navy fighter squadron. So in professional life the two men were sibling rivals but in their personal lives I saw mutual respect and love.

I remarked that it was possible that C.T. Butler was so patient and willing to teach a 23 year old Ensign named John was because he had a son named John, age six, whom he was teaching also.

Richard had graduated from the University of Kentucky and gone to Preflight in Pensacola. He discussed the landing difficulties of FCLP at San Clemente Island, a practice carrier landing site off San Diego. There are no drop lights, there is always a right crosswind, and the landing pattern is reversed. It turns out the practice for night carrier landings is harder than the real thing.

Captain Larkins explained after he climbed out of the plane and was walking back to the ready room, he saw the flash of the explosion.

Richard mentioned there was a third brother, Paul, who had just gotten married. He said that their mother was a dental hygienist who had gone back to work to help support the raising of five young children.

We reviewed Navy career patterns the way it is now and the way it was then. We were actually representing Naval aviation from the early fifties to the early nineties. We agreed it hasn't changed that much, actually. There are still sea tours, shore tours, school tours, ship's company tours, and exchange tours.

Captain Larkins offered to take Richard and John sailing some time which was accepted. I offered my house for a place to stay if they should come up this way. We all walked out to the ramp to look at my Mooney.

I'm quite proud of N79807, a 1965 M20C, but I knew that compared to a F-14 or F-16, it must have looked like a toy model. But, as Richard said, "It was all mine."

We had enjoyed the meal, the talk of the past, present, and future and agreed we would like to get together again, sometime.

I was flying back to the Salinas airport the next day and thinking about the meeting. Naval aviation is in good hands if there are pilots like Richard and John flying. They were polite, mature, reasoning, and intelligent. The Butler family must be one really sharp family.

I wondered what went through their mother's mind when her two sons told her they wanted to be Navy pilots, just like dad. I thought of her lying in bed the morning of the crash, unable to get up, the nightmare come true, no husband, no father, no future. And yet, she did get up, and she succeeded.

It was a beautiful flight from San Diego to LAX to Point Magu,

to San Luis Obispo, to Big Sur, to Salinas. The visibility was 200 miles. I could see the Space Shuttle lake bed landing strip at Edwards Air Force Base while over downtown LA at 10000 feet.

The trip up the coast was striking with surf, boats, caves, and windy highways to look at in the clear smooth weather.

And then, my airplane veered off to the left while on the two axis pneumatic autopilot Mooneys have. It then veered off to the right. I checked the vacuum gauge; it was zero. I had had a catastrophic vacuum pump failure and no standby system. While straight and level my attitude gyro showed me in a level, gradual climb and the directional gyro showed me in a right turn. Then they began to spin faster and faster. They ended up just going around and around. I did an ILS into Salinas in VFR under partial panel and realized it is necessary to cover up the defective instruments to avoid distraction because the scan took me right back to them every few seconds.

I taxied up to my hangar and shut down. I sat in the cockpit and reflected on what had happened. The vacuum pump had failed four flight hours out of Bullhead City. If I had gone to San Antonio, as planned, instead of San Diego to see Richard and John Butler, I would have lost my primary flight instruments while in the soup over somewhere near Deming, New Mexico, where mountains are high, radar coverage is poor, and airfields far apart.

C. T. Butler may have saved my tail again. The End.

Commissioner Major, as justification that I can contribute information to the Commission to enhance its work and thus eligible for a grant of standing, I have submitted the above

narrative of what leads up to and during a sudden night fatal jet airplane crash from this survivor as well as meeting the surviving family members.

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith
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Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/ ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/ inflight breakup explanation. (Please consider a plausible, reasonable, electrical cause with precedent) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006.

Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The Layperson version. (It's not rocket science) Filed Friday, August 11, 2006

Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years: Predicting the Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006
Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non Cooperation. (Sorry, no can do.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006
Smith Submission 9 The Crash and Meeting the Family. (It happens so fast) Filed Friday, August 18, 2006

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT
To: mintc@tc.gc.ca
Subject: Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The Layperson Explanation

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Sunday, August 13, 2006

Below is Submission 5 for the Commissioner of the Commission: Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The Layperson Explanation

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Unofficial Version: The Layperson Explanation (It's not rocket
science) Filed Sunday, August 13, 2006

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner
Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publique

Dear Commissioner

Major,

Sunday, August 13, 2006

Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The
Layperson Explanation

One excuse I am given by those unwilling to evaluate the hard evidence that supports the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182 is that it is 'too technical'.

Well, it's not too technical; below is the explanation for laypersons who have a basic education in science. If a person knows why lightning strikes, why balloons pop, the power of wind, and why gravity pulls, then that person can understand what happened to Air India Flight 182.

Lightning Strikes

Balloon Pops

Wind Power

Gravity Pulls

Lightning strikes because of an imbalance between the negative electrically charged particles and the further away positively charged particles. When sufficient negative and positive charges gather, and when the electric field becomes sufficiently strong, an electrical discharge (the bolt of lightning) occurs within clouds or between clouds and the ground. Lightning occurs because the bottom of a thundercloud becomes negatively charged. The ground becomes positively charged. Simple physics says that opposite charges attract, so boom, the lightning takes a one way trip to the closest positively charged item- usually a tree, phone pole, or other high object.

In a Boeing 747 the opening and closing of the cargo doors is

done by an electric current through a latching or unlatching motor controlled by a switch. When the switch is open/off, there is no current to turn the motor which would turn the latching cams around the latching pins. When the switch is closed/on the circuit between the negatively charged particles and the positively charged is closed and current flows through the resistive motor which turns torque tubes which turn cams to surround pins which closes and holds the door tight against the fuselage.

When the aircraft is airborne a switch is opened/off which prevents any current from inadvertently turning on the cargo door unlatch motor. There is no way to turn on the unlatch motor to open the cargo door from inside the cockpit.

However, when faulty wiring such as Poly X type, which was used in Air India Flight 182, chafes and cracks to bare wire to short on the metal fuselage, the voltage has a path to complete the circuit and the lightning strikes; that is, the safety feature of a switch is bypassed and the now flowing current turns on the cargo door unlatch motor. The imbalance between the charged electrons which was held steady by the safety switch is now allowed to discharge/equalize through the shorted wire through the resistive motor which turns on as it is supposed to do when receiving current. The latching cams now turn around the latching pins into the unlock/unlatch direction thus releasing their hold on the closed cargo door. The faulty wire which allowed the motor to turn on when it was supposed to stay off was installed during manufacture of the aircraft. The defective wiring is a manufacturing error.

The bare wire shorted on the cargo door unlatch motor which turned the cams to the unlatch position. Lightning struck and the

unlatch motor turned on and started to allow the cargo door to open in flight.

Balloon pops:

Air tends to move in a straight line from a high-pressure area to a low pressure area. As balloons reach maximum expansion they get to a point where the latex runs out of stretch and gets stiff and resists further stretching. This is obvious in a fresh, over inflated balloon. It will become stiffer and get very rigid as all the latex molecules all become oriented in the tensile stress directions. This increase in stiffness will cause balloons, unlike soap bubbles, to increase in internal air pressure just before bursting.

Even small balloons like nine inch rounds can produce a very big bang if they are strong high quality balloons and are blown up to the limit. They can develop fantastically high tensions. Of course a larger balloon blown up to a similar extreme tension all over would make an even bigger bang.

The hull of a Boeing 747 such as Air India Flight 182 can be considered a huge balloon when pressurized. As the aircraft climbs the air molecules outside are further apart and have less pressure than those that were inside the aircraft at takeoff. If the aircraft is not pressurized, the air molecules inside and outside the aircraft are the same and there is no differential. The hull is not inflated and there would be no inside high pressure trying to equalize with the outside lower pressure.

But the hull of the Boeing 747 in flight with crew and passengers aboard can not remain unpressurized as the air would be too thin to sustain life so oxygenated air is pumped into the hull and the balloon/hull inflates. There now exists a distance difference

between the air molecules inside the aircraft to those outside of the airplane. There is an imbalance. There is now pressure to equalize the air molecules but the sealed metal fuselage skin prevents the equalization. The hull stays inflated.

As the plane climbs higher, the pressure inside is kept constant at a comfortable level for the passengers while the pressure outside continues to decline the higher the aircraft goes. When the aircraft is about 20000 feet, the pressure on the inside of the fuselage is about 3.5 PSI or pounds per square inch. At cruise altitude of about 31000 feet, the pressure on each square inch on the inside of the inflated balloon called the hull is 8.9 PSI.

The Boeing 747 has two cargo doors 110 by 99 inches in size. The pressure on the cargo doors of Air India Flight 182 when cruising at 31000, when the initial event occurred, was 96921 pounds pressing on each of the nine foot by eight foot doors held in place only by a long hinge, eight rotating lower latching cams around latching pins and two midspan rotating latching cams around latching pins.

An analogy: Imagine a large under inflated balloon with no holes in it. Then cut six small holes in the balloon and two large square holes. Then, if you could, put patches over the six small holes from the inside of the balloon so that when the balloon is inflated, the inside high pressure would press the patch tighter into the balloon and seal the hole tighter. That is called a 'plug type' patch. But...then put patches over the two large square cut holes on the outside of the balloon so that when the balloon is inflated, the high air pressure inside the balloon presses against

the outside patch to push it outward. That is called a 'non plug type' patch.

Another analogy for the patch is a band aid wound dressing on an arm. The arm has the cut hole/wound and the patch is the band aid to stop the bleeding wound. A band aid on the inside of the arm would be more effective but impractical so band aids are put on the outside of the arm and often are pulled off inadvertently.

Air India Flight 182 has those several small holes cut into the pressurized hull and then patched from the inside. They are called plug type passenger doors. When airborne and at altitude, those passenger entry and exit doors can not be opened in flight because the inside air pressure presses them tight against the metal fuselage. Only if the pilot depressurizes the inside of the hull can those doors be opened, such as on the ground. The wounds are small and the band aid is sufficient to stop the bleeding since the patch is in the inside and the blood pressure actually prevents bleeding.

However, the two huge cargo doors which were cut from the metal fuselage and then patched back are non-plug type. It's as if they are patched from the outside so that as the inside pressure grows higher and the outside pressure goes lower, the pressure differential increases and about 97000 pounds of air presses on the eight by nine foot door to burst it open. The door does not press on the inside of the fuselage tighter because it is not a plug type. The only things holding the door closed are the hinge and the ten latches around the ten latch pins. The latch cams are not told to unlatch in flight because there is no current to the unlatch motor. The non plug cargo doors are a design error; they should be plug type. The wounds are large and the band aid is not sticky

enough to stop the bleeding as the blood pressure pushes outward.

A hull rupture in flight can be a catastrophic event so safety efforts are made to prevent its occurrence. As the cams are turned around the pins, a locking sector is then manually placed against the latch pin to prevent the inadvertent unlatching should electrical current turn the unlatch motor on. The locking sector would stop the cam from turning to the open position and the unlatch motor would burn itself out trying.

However, while the lower eight latches have eight locking sectors as a safety measure, the two midspan latches have no locking sectors at all. That is another design error; the midspan latches need locking sectors similar to the eight lower ones. The band aid over the wound was too small.

(As it turns out, years after Air India Flight 182 crashed, it was shown that the eight locking sectors themselves were too weak to stop the cams from unlatching when the unlatch motor did in fact inadvertently receive power and unlatched in flight. The eight locking sectors were then strengthened but the midspan latches had no locking sectors to strengthen.)

For Air India Flight 182, the faulty bare wire shorted on the power for the cargo door unlatch motor which turned the cams to the unlatch position after bypassing the safety switch. The eight lower latching cams overrode the weak lower eight locking sectors. Just past dead center of the pins the 97000 pounds of internal pressure finally popped the balloon of a pressurized hull at the forward cargo door. The result was an explosive decompression which occurred in an instant. Explosive decompression is an aviation term used to mean a sudden and

rapid loss of cabin pressurization.

The sudden and powerful rushing out of the higher pressure air inside the pressurized hull of Air India Flight 182 mimicked a bomb in sound and fury. The sound of the explosion was so loud it was picked up on the cockpit voice recorder. The forward cargo door split into two parts and burst apart as it tore out and up taking further fuselage skin with it. The contents of the forward cargo hold were blown out and into the nearby starboard engines number three and four causing foreign object damage to the nacelles and turbine blades inside the engines. The ensuing hole in the starboard side of the fuselage forward of the wing centered around the forward cargo door of Air India Flight 182 in the wreckage reconstruction below was now about thirty feet tall and twenty feet wide, target 204 and cross hatch skin above it.

The manufacturing flaw of installing defective wiring had exploited the design flaw of a non plug door coupled with the design flaw of no locking sectors on the mid span latches allowing the door to inadvertently open in flight causing a massive explosive decompression which created a huge hole in the nose of Air India Flight 182.

Lightning struck and the unlatch motor turned on. The balloon popped when the forward cargo door unlatched and ruptured open.

Wind Power:

From the CVR and DFDR, AI 182 was proceeding normally en route from Montreal to London at an altitude of 31,000 feet and

an indicated airspeed of 296 knots when the cockpit area microphone detected a sudden loud sound: 296 knots is 341 miles per hour or 549 km/h.

If the newly created huge hole in the nose of Air India Flight 182 had occurred while the aircraft were motionless in the calm air, the nose would have stayed on and the aircraft would not have broken up in flight. However, the wind force on the now compromised formerly streamlined hull was higher than any natural wind on earth.

Category V Hurricane, Catastrophic >155 mph

Shrubs and trees blown down and uprooted; considerable damage to roofs of all buildings; all signs down. Very severe and extensive damage to windows and doors. Complete failure of roofs on several residences and industrial buildings. Extensive shattering of glass from pressure variation and blown debris.

Some complete building failures. Smaller buildings are overturned or destroyed. Complete destruction of mobile homes. F3 Tornado, Fujita Scale 3 158-206 mph, strongly built schools, homes, and businesses have outside walls blown away; weaker homes completely swept away,

F4 Tornado, Fujita Scale 4 207-260 mph, strongly built homes have all interior and exterior walls blown apart; cars thrown 300 yards or more in the air

F5 Tornado, Fujita Scale 5 261-318 mph, strongly built homes are completely blown away

An intact egg is strong when pressed on its small end but after the shell is cracked, the strength is gone and it crumbles. So it was with Air India Flight 182.

The wind force of 341 miles per hour tore the gashed nose off

which fell first in the debris pattern on the ocean floor. The wind force tore into the rest of the tubular, now unpressurized hull, and ruptured open the rest of the fuselage and other compartments. The debris was blown aft and hit the starboard wing and stabilizer causing inflight damage. The engines and wings came off and mixed with the rest of the disintegrating aircraft.

Lightning struck and the unlatch motor turned on. The balloon popped when the forward cargo door unlatched and ruptured open. The enormous wind power tore the nose off and disintegrated the rest of the aircraft.

Gravity grabs.

Gravity is one of four known fundamental forces of nature. Gravity is by far the weakest of the four, yet it dominates on the scale of large space objects. Gravity cannot be shielded in any way. Intervening objects, whatever their make-up, have no effect whatsoever on the attraction between two separated objects.

If Air India Flight 182 were in far outer space the thousands of broken parts would just float around but those debris pieces were affected by the gravity of Earth and caused the aircraft parts to flutter down to the sea and further down to the ocean floor 6500 feet under the water surface.

Lightning struck and the unlatch motor turned on. The balloon popped when the forward cargo door unlatched and ruptured open. The enormous wind tore the nose off and disintegrated the rest. Gravity pulled the pieces downward to the bottom of the ocean.

Lightning Struck

Balloon Popped
Wind Powered
Gravity Pulled

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/ ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/ inflight breakup explanation. (Please consider a plausible, reasonable, electrical cause with precedent) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006.

Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The Layperson Explanation. (It's not rocket science) Filed Sunday, August 13, 2006

Respectfully,

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From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT
To: mintc@tc.gc.ca
**Subject: Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version:
The DNA Match**

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Below is Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial
Version: The DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed
Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28
July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why,
and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

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of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8,
2006

Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/
ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/
inflight breakup explanation. (Please consider a plausible,
reasonable, electrical cause with precedent) Filed Tuesday,
August 8, 2006.

Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The
Layperson version. (It's not rocket science) Filed Friday, August
11, 2006

Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The

DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

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Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publique

Dear Commissioner Major, Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Commissioner to me: "You're free, Mr. Smith, as you probably
know, to add to your filed material should you choose."

I'm adding sir, I'm adding! I will continue to add material I
believe will be useful to you regarding the Inquiry, the
investigation, the bombing, Air India Flight 182, what's it like to
be a victim of a sudden fatal jet airplane crash, and the emotions
when meeting the family members of that fatal victim.

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the
Unofficial Version: The DNA Match.

DNA forms genes, the hereditary material of the cell. DNA is a macromolecule present in the cells of all living beings. All the cells of an individual contain the same DNA, creating a specific identity for the individual. When cells divide, DNA produces an identical copy of itself. A gene is a part of an individual's DNA.

The Emperor Kanishka had no bombs concealed in his clothes.

If the DNA can be used as an analogy for specific evidence discovered for one event and that specific evidence is matched in another event, it can be said the DNA matches. The DNA of Air India Flight 182 was first and last an airplane that crashed:

1. An early model Boeing 747,
2. Did not have the Section 41 retrofit,
3. Had Poly X wiring installed.
4. Had previous problems with the cargo door.
5. Experienced hull rupture explosive decompression forward of the wing on right side in cargo door area.
6. Damaged engine number three and engine number four fan cowl.
7. Sudden sound on Cockpit Voice Recorder.
8. Loud sound on Cockpit Voice Recorder.
9. Sudden loud sound is not a bomb explosion sound.
10. Sudden loud sound was quickly followed by an abrupt power cut the other flight data recorders.
11. There was outward peeled skin in the forward cargo door area.
12. Had more inflight damage on the starboard side of aircraft.
13. Had at least nine never recovered bodies.
14. Had vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of

cargo door.

15. Forward cargo door metal skin was frayed and shattered outward.
16. Forward cargo door split longitudinally.
17. Attempts to retrieve forward cargo door made because of its uniqueness.
18. Identical aft cargo door intact and latched.
19. Bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected.

And all of the above specific evidence is present in United Airlines Flight 811, another early model Boeing 747 that came apart in flight leading to fatalities but was able to land mostly intact so its DNA evidence could be examined and indisputably stated:

"Executive Summary from USA NTSB AAR 92/02 of March 1992:

On February 24, 1989, United Airlines flight 811, a Boeing 747-122, experienced an explosive decompression as it was climbing between 22,000 and 23,000 feet after taking off from Honolulu, Hawaii, en route to Sydney, Australia with 3 flightcrew, 15 flight attendants, and 337 passengers aboard.

The airplane made a successful emergency landing at Honolulu and the occupants evacuated the airplane. Examination of the airplane revealed that the forward lower lobe cargo door had separated in flight and had caused extensive damage to the fuselage and cabin structure adjacent to the door. Nine of the passengers had been ejected from the airplane and lost at sea.

A year after the accident, the Safety Board was uncertain that the cargo door would be located and recovered from the Pacific Ocean. The Safety Board decided to proceed with a final report based on the available evidence without the benefit of an actual examination of the door mechanism. The original report was adopted by the Safety Board on April 16, 1990, as NTSB/AAR-90/01.

Subsequently, on July 22, 1990, a search and recovery operation was begun by the U.S. Navy with the cost shared by the Safety Board, the Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing Aircraft Company, and United Airlines. The search and recovery effort was supported by Navy radar data on the separated cargo door, underwater sonar equipment, and a manned submersible vehicle. The effort was successful, and the cargo door was recovered in two pieces from the ocean floor at a depth of 14,200 feet on September 26 and October 1, 1990.

Before the recovery of the cargo door, the Safety Board believed that the door locking mechanisms had sustained damage in service prior to the accident flight to the extent that the door could have been closed and appeared to have been locked, when in fact the door was not fully latched. This belief was expressed in the report and was supported by the evidence available at the time. However, upon examination of the door, the damage to the locking mechanism did not support this hypothesis. Rather, the evidence indicated that the latch cams had been backdriven from the closed position into a nearly open position after the door had been closed and locked. The latch cams had been driven into the lock sectors that deformed so that they failed to prevent the back-driving.

Thus, as a result of the recovery and examination of the cargo door, the Safety Board's original analysis and probable cause have been modified. This report incorporates these changes and supersedes NTSB/AAR-90/01.

The issues in this investigation centered around the design and certification of the B-747 cargo doors, the operation and maintenance to assure the continuing airworthiness of the doors, cabin safety, and emergency response.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the sudden opening of the forward lower lobe cargo door in flight and the subsequent explosive decompression. The door opening was attributed to a faulty switch or wiring in the door control system which permitted electrical actuation of the door latches toward the unlatched position after initial door closure and before takeoff. Contributing to the cause of the accident was a deficiency in the design of the cargo door locking mechanisms, which made them susceptible to deformation, allowing the door to become unlatched after being properly latched and locked. Also contributing to the accident was a lack of timely corrective actions by Boeing and the FAA following a 1987 cargo door opening incident on a Pan Am B-747. As a result of this investigation, the Safety Board issued safety recommendations concerning cargo doors and other nonplug doors on pressurized transport category airplanes, cabin safety, and emergency response."

Commissioner Major, please note above that the first probable cause was incorrect so the NTSB issued another AAR based upon new evidence. The same can be done by TSB Air for Air India Flight 182 based upon the subsequent new evidence. I have had the benefit of hindsight to research all Boeing 747 hull losses

for matches to the evidence retrieved regarding Air India Flight 182. There have been five matches, including Air India Flight 182. All are controversial while United Airlines Flight 811 is the only aircraft that was able to land after the shorted switch or wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup occurred. The DNA evidence and probable cause for United Airlines Flight 811 is irrefutable.

In none of the five official investigations for Air India Flight 182 listed in Smith Submission 3 was United Airlines Flight 811 considered. For four of those investigations, United Airlines Flight 811 had not occurred yet; for the fifth, the attorneys and law enforcement agencies chose not to refer to it.

For the Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182, this Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Matches, is the first to consider the match between Air India Flight 182 and United Airlines Flight 811.

What happened to Air India Flight 182 happened to United Airlines Flight 811 and others. The cause of United Airlines Flight 811 is the same cause for Air India Flight 182. The sequence is the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation.

The linchpin DNA match to all five Boeing 747 accidents is the sudden loud sound on the Cockpit Voice Recorder followed by the abrupt power cut to the Flight Data Recorder. The CVR and FDR data is the only direct evidence available and it is the best.

NTSB AAR, United Airlines Flight 811:

"The CVR revealed normal communication before the

decompression. At 0209:09:2 HST, a loud bang could be heard on the CVR. The loud bang was about 1.5 seconds after a "thump" was heard on the CVR for which one of the flightcrew made a comment. The electrical power to the CVR was lost for approximately 21.4 seconds following the loud bang. NTSB Accident Report 92-02 Page 25

CASB AOR, Air India Flight 182:

"From the CVR and DFDR, AI 182 was proceeding normally en route from Montreal to London at an altitude of 31,000 feet and an indicated airspeed of 296 knots when the cockpit area microphone detected a sudden loud sound. The sound continued for about 0.6 seconds, and then almost immediately, the line from the cockpit area microphone to the cockpit voice recorder at the rear of the pressure cabin was most probably broken. This was followed by a loss of electrical power to the recorder." Canadian Aviation Safety Board Air India 23 June 1985, page 21

Kirpal Report: "Mr. R.A. Davis, Head, Flight Recorder Section, Accidents Investigation Branch, Farnborough, U.K. 3.4.6.16 In conclusion, Mr. Davis reported as follows :- "It is considered that from the CVR and ATC recordings supplied for analysis, there is no evidence of a high explosive device having detonated on AI 182. There is strong evidence to suggest that a sudden explosive decompression occurred but the cause has not been identified. It must be concluded that without positive evidence of an explosive device from either the wreckage or pathological examinations, some other cause has to be established for the accident"

Premise Explanation for Air India Flight 182: Explosion in the forward cargo compartment caused by explosive decompression caused by structural failure of ruptured open forward cargo door at one or both of the midspan latches caused by faulty electrical

wiring:

Analysis: There is close agreement with the opinions of the two aviation authorities (CASB and AAIB), the judicial finding of Judge Kirpal, and this independent aircraft accident investigator in the specific location in the aircraft and consequences of the explosion with the only difference being the cause of the explosion on the starboard side of the forward cargo compartment of Air India Flight 182:

A. CASB: There was an explosion, which could have been a bomb explosion, on the starboard side of the forward cargo compartment near the forward cargo door which caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182.

B. AAIB: There was an explosion, cause not identified but not a bomb explosion, which caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182.

C. Justice Kirpal: There was an explosion, a bomb explosion, on the starboard side of the forward cargo compartment near the forward cargo door which caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182.

D. Justice Josephson: There was an explosion, a bomb explosion, on the port side of the aft cargo compartment opposite the aft cargo door which caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182.

E. John Barry Smith: There was an explosion, an explosive decompression when faulty wiring shorted on the forward cargo door unlatch motor which allowed one or both of the midspan latches to rupture open in the forward cargo door on the starboard side of the forward cargo compartment, which caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182.

F. Transportation Safety Board of Canada (Air): Yet to be asked for opinion.

To determine the pattern in early model Boeing 747 accidents that suffered breakups in flight, it was necessary to evaluate carefully all the official accident reports concerning them. A pattern was detected of similar significant evidence among only five of the over forty hull damages or losses, two of which are Air India Flight 182 and United Airlines Flight 811.

Summary of specific matching evidence between Air India Flight 182 and United Airlines Flight 811: (The DNA evidence listed below applies to both aircraft)

- A. Boeing 747
- B. Early model
- C. Polyimide wiring (Poly X type)
- D. Sudden airframe breakup in flight
- E. Breakup occurs forward of the wing
- F. Section 41 retrofit not done
- G. At least medium flight time
- H. At least medium aged airframe
- I. Previous maintenance problems with forward cargo door
- J. Initial event at about 300 knots while proceeding normally in all parameters
- K. Initial event involves hull rupture in or near forward cargo door area
- L. Initial event starts with sudden sound
- M. Initial event sound is loud
- N. Initial event sound is audible to humans
- O. Initial event followed immediately by abrupt power cut to data recorders
- P. Initial event sound not matched to explosion of bomb sound
- Q. Initial event sound is matched to explosive decompression sound in wide body airliner

- R. Torn off skin on fuselage above forward cargo door area
- S. Evidence of explosion in forward cargo compartment
- T. Foreign object damage to engine or cowling of engine number three
- U. Foreign object damage to engine or cowling of engine number four
- V. Right wing leading edge damaged in flight
- W. Vertical stabilizer damaged in flight
- X. Right horizontal stabilizer damaged in flight
- Y. More severe inflight damage on starboard side than port side
- Z. Port side relatively undamaged by inflight debris
- AA. Vertical fuselage tear lines just aft and forward of the forward cargo door
- AB. Fracture/tear/rupture at a midspan latch of forward cargo door
- AC. Midspan latching status of forward cargo door not reported as latched
- AD. Airworthiness Directive 88-12-04 not implemented (stronger lock sectors)
- AE. Outwardly peeled skin on upper forward fuselage
- AF. Rectangular shape of shattered area around forward cargo door
- AG. Forward cargo door fractured in two longitudinally
- AH. Status of aft cargo door as latched
- AI. Passengers suffered decompression type injuries
- AJ. At least nine missing and never recovered passenger bodies
- AK. Initial official determination of probable cause as bomb explosion.
- AL. Initial official determination modified from bomb explosion
- AM. Structural failure considered for probable cause
- AN. Inadvertently opened forward cargo door considered for probable cause

AO. Takeoff after sunset on fatal flight

AP. Takeoff after scheduled takeoff time on fatal flight

A few of the above matches may be common, trivial, or irrelevant but most are rare and critical.

The important DNA matches that determine the certainty that both aircraft:

1. Were similar model and type of early model Boeing 747s..
2. Had the same appearance for each longitudinally fractured forward cargo doors
3. Had sudden loud sounds which were an explosive decompression sound and not a bomb explosion sound.
4. Had an abrupt power cut to the flight data recorders after the sudden loud sound.
5. Had the same damaged areas around the forward cargo door.
6. Had relatively smooth fuselage skin on port side opposite the shattered starboard cargo door side.
7. Had similar inflight damage to the starboard engines and flight surfaces.
8. Had at least nine never recovered bodies.
9. Had explosions in the forward cargo compartment which were initially thought to have been bombs but the opinions were later somewhat modified.

There are many reasonable possible explanations for an explosion or explosive decompression near the forward cargo door of an early model Boeing 747, only one of which is a rare bomb explosion:

A. Bomb explosion. (Considered for both, ruled out in one, should be ruled out for both.)

- B. Crew or passenger error. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- C. Electrical fault in switch or wiring. (Ruled in for one.)
- D. Pneumatic overpressure. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- E. Cargo shift. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- F. Compressed air tank explosion. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- G. Fire. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- H. Missile strike. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- I. Midair collision. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- J. Fuel tank explosion. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- K. Stowaway. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- L. Electromagnetic interference. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- M. Comet or meteor. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- N. Space debris. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- O. Turbulence. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- P. Out of rig door. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- Q. Lightning. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- R. Metal fatigue. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- S. Improperly latched. (Initially accepted for one flight, then ruled out for both flights.)
- T. Design error. (Accepted for one flight)
- U. Repair error. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- V. Maintenance error. (Ruled out for both flights.)

General Conclusion: Based upon the indisputable probable cause of electrical fault for United Airlines Flight 811 and the many matches of evidence to Air India Flight 182, the discovered common cause for United Airlines Flight 811 and Air India Flight 182 is the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation which is a mechanical explanation for an explosion on the starboard side in the forward cargo compartment of explosive decompression when the forward cargo door ruptured open in flight, probably at one or both of the midspan latches and

probably caused by faulty wiring inadvertently turning on the door unlatch motor.

Specific Conclusions for Air India Flight 182:

These conclusions are based on evidence available after 1985.

A. While proceeding normally, an inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182 occurred suddenly and catastrophically at 0714Z at 31000 feet at 300 knots TAS about 110 miles west of Cork, Ireland on 23 June, 1985. There were no survivors.

B. The breakup was caused by an explosion in the forward cargo compartment.

C. The explosion was a severe and sudden explosive decompression.

D. The explosive decompression was caused by the suddenly ruptured open forward cargo door probably at one or both of the midspan latches.

E. The ruptured open forward cargo door was probably caused by faulty wiring which turned on the door unlatch motor which unlatched the latching cams from around the latching pins in flight.

F. The wiring fault was probably the Poly X wiring with inferior insulation which easily cracked to bare wire especially in the presence of moisture.

G. There was no bomb explosion in any cargo compartment, crew cabin, passenger cabin, or anywhere else on the aircraft.

H. There was no explosion from any source in the aft cargo compartment.

I. The sudden loud sound on the cockpit voice recorder was the sound of the air rushing out during the explosive decompression in the forward cargo compartment.

J. The abrupt power cut to the recorders was caused by the explosive effects of the decompression affecting the power cables in the adjacent main equipment compartment to the forward cargo compartment.

Contributing causes:

- A. Water or moisture in the forward cargo compartment.
- B. Weak locking sectors on the bottom eight latches of the cargo doors.
- C. Poor design of one midspan latch per each eight foot side of the cargo doors.
- D. Poor design of no locking sector for each midspan latch of the cargo doors.
- E. Poor design of outward opening, nonplug type, large, square cargo doors in a highly pressurized hull.

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation. (Please consider a plausible, reasonable, electrical cause with precedent) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006.

Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The Layperson version. (It's not rocket science) Filed Friday, August 11, 2006

Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The

DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith
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Carmel Valley, California 93924
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safety@ntsb.org

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrismith.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT
To: Transportation Safety Board of Canada Head Office@tsb.gc.ca
Subject: I am contacting you

Contact Us
Mailing address:
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
Head Office
200 Promenade du Portage
Place du Centre
4th Floor
Gatineau, Quebec K1A 1K8

Telephone: (819) 994-3741
Fax: (819) 997-2239
TDD: (819) 994-8030

Dear Transportation Safety Board of Canada Head Office, Sunday, August 20, 2006

The Canadian Transportation Safety Board Air has never given its official opinion in the probable cause of Air India Flight 182, the most famous airplane crash in Canadian history. Their specialized expert input is invaluable to the Commission. I

have asked the Commissioner to ask TSB Air to provide to the Commission an updated supplement to the twenty year old CASB accident report on Air India Flight 182, a request justified by several subsequent similar accidents since 1985 to similar Boeing 747s and to resolve the explosion location conflict created by Justice Josephson and Justice Kirpal.

The wiring/cargo door explanation applauds Justice Josephson's finding of not guilty, it confirms the Canadian aviation accident investigators' conclusion, it exonerates the RCMP's failure to catch Snidely Whiplash, and justifies the expense and time of this Commission of Inquiry into events surrounding Air India Flight 182. It reinforces the confidence of the Canadian travelling public in the competence of Canadian government regulatory and safety institutions.

There is much official confusion as to the probable cause of Air India Flight 182 and a related event that only you may officially resolve:

1. The first official determination is the Narita Event is from the Japanese police point of view.

"At 0541 GMT, 23 June 1985, CP Air Flight 003 arrived at Narita Airport, Tokyo, Japan, from Vancouver. At 0619 GMT a bag from this flight exploded on a baggage cart in the transit area of the airport within an hour of the Air India occurrence. Two persons were killed and four were injured... Baggage cart explodes in transit area... The explosion of a bag from CP 003 at Narita Airport, Tokyo, took place 55 minutes before the AI 182 accident...the site where the blast had taken place was inspected which gave some, though very vague, idea of the detonating power of the blast."

To sum up: "A bag from a Vancouver flight exploded on a baggage cart in a transit area from a vague power of a blast."

The Narita Event is officially determined by the police to be a bomb which caused the blast of vague power in a bag as part of the baggage on a baggage cart in a transit area of a major airport hub. The first official bomb in the baggage goes boom.

2. The next official determination of the Air India Flight 182 Event is from an Indian judge's point of view.

Kirpal Report: "4.10 After going through the entire record we find that there is circumstantial as well as direct evidence which directly points to the cause of the accident as being that of an explosion of a bomb in the forward cargo hold of the aircraft."

"All cargo doors were found intact and attached to the fuselage structure, except for the forward cargo door which had some fuselage and cargo floor attached. This door, located on the forward right side of the aircraft, was broken horizontally about one-quarter of the distance above the lower frame. The damage to the door and the fuselage skin near the door appeared to have been caused by an outward force. The fractured surface of the cargo door appeared to have been badly frayed. Because the damage appeared to be different from that seen on other wreckage pieces,..."

The Air India Flight 182 Event is officially determined by an Indian judge to be caused by a bomb in the baggage in the forward cargo hold possibly on the right side. (No physical connection between the forward and aft cargo holds which are several hundred feet apart.) That is the second official bomb in the baggage go boom.

3. The next official determination of the Air India Flight 182 Event is from a Canadian judge's point of view.

Below from "Reasons for Judgment" by Justice Josephson regarding Malik and Bagri.

I. Overview [1] In the early morning hours of June 23, 1985, Air India Flight 182, carrying 329 people[1], was destroyed mid-flight by a bomb located in its rear cargo hold.

H. Conclusion [190] It is agreed amongst the experts that the Kanishka was destroyed by the detonation of an explosive device within its left aft fuselage.

The Air India Flight 182 Event is officially determined by a Canadian judge to be a bomb in the baggage in the aft cargo hold on the left side. That is the third official bomb in the baggage go boom.

4. The next official determination of the Air India Flight 182 Event is from the Canadian aviation accident investigators point of view:

The Canadian Aviation Safety Board respectfully submits as follows:

04.1 Cause-Related Findings

5. There is considerable circumstantial and other evidence to indicate that the initial event was an explosion occurring in the forward cargo compartment.Ó

"The forward cargo door which had some fuselage and cargo floor attached was located on the sea bed. The door was broken horizontally about one-quarter of the distance above the lower frame. The damage to the door and the fuselage skin near the door appeared to have been caused by an outward force and the fracture surfaces of the door appeared to be badly frayed. This damage was different from that seen on other wreckage pieces. A failure of this door in flight would explain the impact damage to the right wing areas. The door failing as an initial event would

cause an explosive decompression leading to a downward force on the cabin floor as a result of the difference in pressure between the upper and lower portions of the aircraft."

The Air India Flight 182 Event is officially determined by Canadian aviation accident investigators to be an explosion of unknown cause in the forward cargo compartment probably on the right side. Another explosion in the forward cargo compartment goes kaboom. (Bombs go boom, unknown caused explosive decompressions go kaboom.)

5. The next official determination for Air India Flight 182 is from the United Kingdom aircraft accident investigator point of view.

"Mr. R.A. Davis, Head, Flight Recorder Section, Accidents Investigation Branch, Farnborough, U.K. 3.4.6.16 In conclusion, Mr. Davis reported as follows :- "It is considered that from the CVR and ATC recordings supplied for analysis, there is no evidence of a high explosive device having detonated on AI 182. There is strong evidence to suggest that a sudden explosive decompression occurred but the cause has not been identified. It must be concluded that without positive evidence of an explosive device from either the wreckage or pathological examinations, some other cause has to be established for the accident".

The Air India Flight 182 Event is officially determined by a British aviation accident investigator to be something, not a bomb, somewhere, causes an explosive decompression. That is the fifth explanation for an explosion go kaboom.

Those are the five official determinations of explosions related to Air India Flight 182 by five official investigations in three countries over two decades.

1. A vaguely powerful explosion of a bag on a baggage cart with bags in a major transit area hub airport determined by the Japanese police in 1985.
2. A very powerful explosion of a bomb in a bag in the baggage in the forward cargo hold, possibly on the right side, of Air India Flight 182 determined by the Indian Justice Kirpal in 1986.
3. A very powerful explosion of a bomb in a bag in the baggage in the aft cargo hold on the left side of Air India Flight 182 determined by the Canadian Justice Josephson, in 2005.
4. An explosion of unknown cause in the forward cargo compartment, probably on the right side, of Air India Flight 182 determined by the Canadian aircraft accident investigators of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board, CASB in 1986.
5. A very powerful explosive decompression, not a bomb, someplace in Air India Flight 182, determined by the British aircraft accident investigator R. A. Davis of U.K. Accidents Investigations Branch in 1986.

My explanation is the mechanical one: the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation. United Airlines

Flight 811 is the model.

I have emailed the 12 files of my research to the Commission of Inquiry, to Mr. Brucker of AG, to Minister Cannon of Transport Canada, and now to TSB Air by mail. TSB Air is mentioned in most of the files, as well as CASB.

For the record, the CASB is correct: They did not conclude it was a bomb and the explosion was in the forward, not the aft, cargo compartment. The clues of United Airlines Flight 811 did not appear until four years later.

The Canadian Aviation Safety Board respectfully submits as follows:

Ò4.1 Cause-Related Findings

5. There is considerable circumstantial and other evidence to indicate that the initial event was an explosion occurring in the forward cargo compartment.Ó

There exists a clear hazard of faulty wiring in early model Boeing 747s which presents a current danger of causing another accident such as Air India Flight 182 and United Airlines Flight 811. Please read my submissions and investigate, preferably by aviation personnel, Air India Flight 182 was a plane crash, not a bank robbery, after all. I welcome questions of course.

Regards,

John Barry Smith
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1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
safety@ntsb.org

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT
To: "Delorme, Paulette" <Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca>
Cc: "Burtch, Terry" <Terry.Burtch@tsb.gc.ca>
Subject: Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions:

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Below is Submission 3 for the Commissioner of the
Commission. 'The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the
baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom.'

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Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission
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Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith

541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner

Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson, Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publiques

Dear Commissioner Major, Tuesday, August 8, 2006

1. "Disposition: Mr. Smith is denied standing. However, leave to file materials that he believes will be useful to the Commissioner is granted."

2. Commissioner Major at hearing to Smith: "...what I can do is permit you to file any written material that substantiates your view and it will be part of the Air India record."

3. Commissioner at hearing: "The best I can do is to repeat the offer I made and invite you to file in as much as detail as you choose whatever it is that supports your theory and it will be part of this record."

4. Commissioner: "You're free, Mr. Smith, as you probably know, to add to your filed material should you choose."

Yes, sir, I can take a hint. Thank you for your urgings. I am submitting as fast as I can and will continue to file material I believe will be useful to you regarding the Inquiry, the investigation, the bombing, Air India Flight 182, what's it like to be a victim of a sudden fatal jet airplane crash, and the emotions when meeting the family members of that fatal victim.

The key focus is the crashed aircraft. If Air India Flight 182 had not crashed and landed safely, then there would be no grieving family members, no victims, no bombing, no investigation, and no inquiry. The core is the airplane and why it crashed. If the official crash causes are confused and contradictory the inquiry conclusions will be also.

Thus enter the bomb bomb bomb explanations (not lies) provided by others who think they are pointing you...

There is one scenario that unites the five official versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom.

1. The first official determination is the Narita Event is from the Japanese police point of view.

"At 0541 GMT, 23 June 1985, CP Air Flight 003 arrived at Narita Airport, Tokyo, Japan, from Vancouver. At 0619 GMT a bag from this flight exploded on a baggage cart in the transit area of the airport within an hour of the Air India occurrence. Two persons were killed and four were injured... Baggage cart explodes in transit area... The explosion of a bag from CP 003 at Narita Airport, Tokyo, took place 55 minutes before the AI 182 accident...the site where the blast had taken place was inspected which gave some, though very vague, idea of the detonating

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5. A very powerful explosive decompression, not a bomb, someplace in Air India Flight 182, determined by the British aircraft accident investigator R. A. Davis of U.K. Accidents Investigations Branch in 1986.

There is no consensus on any significant issue by any officials other than explosive events occurred on a baggage cart and on an airplane thousands of miles apart and within the hour.

There is official disagreement in the determinations of whether it was a bomb or something else, how many bombs were involved, where the bombs were loaded, how powerful the bombs were,

what container the bomb was in, which major section of the aircraft the bomb was placed, on what side of the aircraft the bomb was located, or what caused an explosive decompression that was not a bomb. (Not counted are the disagreements of who put the bombs there and why.)

There was no official direct evidence determined for bombs with three fuses, three bomb casings, three bomb residues, three shrapnel wounds, or three timers in any of the three locations stated as having bombs exploded which are the Narita airport and the aft and forward cargo compartments of Air India Flight 182.

There is one official cause to unite them all: Three bombs. Assuming that an explosion means only one thing and that is bomb explosion and assuming that official determinations after official investigations are correct the following scenario can explain what happened:

{Commissioner Major, please bear with me on this story telling, I did not make the contradictory determinations which require unification, well meaning officials did. Confusing statements ask for humor to diffuse the frustration. (My plausible straightforward mechanical explanation with precedent is contained in Submission 4: The shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation).}

The one scenario that unites the five official determinations:
Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom.

Two of the bombs were surreptitiously placed on two Boeing 747s at Vancouver airport on 22 June 1985, the day before they

blew up. The third bomb was placed into one of the Boeing 747s at the Montreal airport later that same day.

The official versions united:

Bomb 1: One bomb was loaded on CP 003 which flew to Tokyo with no detonation of the bomb during the long flight across the Pacific. This bomb was then unloaded in a busy airport, put on a baggage cart which was wheeled through a 'transit' area with many other bags from many other flights, and only then did the vaguely powerful bomb detonate at 0619Z, not from an altimeter fuze but from a timing fuze which went off when it was not supposed to for an aircraft terrorist bombing. No fuze or parts of any bomb or the suitcase were reported to have been discovered. No match of any debris parts of this bomb were made to other bombs by same terrorist group. No claims of responsibility or confessions were obtained. (The Japanese police determined bomb.)

Bomb 2: At the same time the Narita bomb was loaded at Vancouver onto CP 003 on the afternoon of 22 June 1985, another bomb was loaded onto CP 060, also in Vancouver, and successfully slipped past the extensive security of men, dogs, and machines. CP 060 then flew to Toronto without the bomb going off by timer or altimeter fuse. At Toronto, the bomb was then off loaded from CP 060 and sent, along with some passengers, to a different aircraft, a Boeing 747 which was Flight 181 which, after another flight to Montreal, would change to Flight 182. At Toronto, all the baggage from Vancouver on CP 060, including the bomb, was placed in the aft cargo hold of the Boeing 747. This aircraft, called Flight 181, took off and flew to Montreal with the bomb still not detonating by altimeter or timing fuze. The timer was set to go off at 0714Z. (The Judge Josephson

determined bomb.)

Bomb 3: After the Boeing 747 called Flight 181 landed in Montreal with the bomb from Vancouver still in the aft cargo hold, the flight number of the same Boeing 747 changed to Air India Flight 182, and more passengers and baggage were put on board. All their baggage was placed into the forward cargo hold. A new aircraft bomb was thus loaded into the forward cargo compartment with the timer set to go off at 0714Z. (The Judge Kirpal determined bomb.)

There were many delays involved with loading parts of a large engine into the aft cargo compartment which did not set off the bomb in that compartment. Finally, the aft and forward cargo compartment bomb laden Boeing 747 now called Air India Flight 182 took off from Montreal for its third flight in many hours, flew for five hours across the Atlantic and then a fuze for the Montreal loaded bomb activated and exploded in the forward cargo compartment, not by an altimeter fuze because the aircraft was level at 31000 feet and had been so for hours, but by a timer fuze. The Vancouver bomb, first loaded in Vancouver and transferred to the aft cargo compartment of the doomed aircraft in Toronto, detonated at exactly the same time, 0714Z. The two bombs blew holes in the pressurized hull causing an explosive decompression.

Thus explains and unites the Japanese police bomb, the Justice Kirpal bomb, the Justice Josephson bomb, the CASB explosion, and the UK AIB explosive decompression events.

The official determinations assume inefficient ticketing agents, dull-witted security forces, and malfunctioning X ray machines in four large metropolitan airports in two industrialized nations.

It assumes incompetent terrorists who can't set a bomb to go off on time. It assumes quiet bombs in an aircraft that leave no sound when they go off. It assumes three stealthy bombs that managed to slip through sniffing dogs, portable metal detectors, X-Ray machines, private security teams, and yet leave no trace of their fuzes, timers, explosive material, or containers.

Officially the terrorists were of two groups; one group in Vancouver to check the bomb in the baggage which was placed in the aft cargo compartment of Air India Flight 182 to explode according to the Canadian judge. Another terrorist group in Montreal checked their bomb in baggage which was placed in the forward cargo compartment of Air India Flight 182 to explode there according to the Indian judge. The Vancouver terrorist group also checked in another bomb in the baggage of another aircraft to explode later on a baggage cart at Narita airport, according to the Indian judge.

Three bombs to explode: one at Narita airport, one in the forward cargo compartment and another in the aft cargo compartment of Air India Flight 182. (There is no physical connection between the two very far apart cargo compartments of a Boeing 747.)

The terrorists were stupid because:

1. The bombs did not go off when a real aircraft bomb usually goes off, shortly after takeoff climb on the initially loaded flight.
2. The fuzes were three timers set to go of at odd times such as 0619, 0714, and 0714 many hours later after being set.
3. They did not claim responsibility to advertise their cause.

The terrorists were smart because:

1. They were able to construct bombs which left no fuse, no casings, no timer evidence and were silent.

2. They were able to smuggle three bombs through tight security at four large airports in two countries.
3. They coordinated two bombs on the same aircraft loaded in different locations at two airports to go off at same time to ensure destruction.

The terrorists were lucky because;

1. The four takeoffs and landings and turbulence did not detonate the amateur improvised bombs.
2. The changing of two planes and movement of baggage from plane to transit area did not detonate the bombs.
3. Their bomb laden baggage was not misplaced or misdirected by the airline.
4. The many unexpected schedule delays and aircraft changes still allowed the bombs to go off to kill innocent people instead of in an unoccupied hangar or baggage storage area.

This is the official unified determination to explain the Narita airport transit area and Air India Flight 182 bombings: Revenge seeking terrorist groups managed to place three stealthy bombs in three aircraft and on one baggage cart through four airports in one day. Three bombs in three bags in three baggage areas go boom boom boom.

Commissioner Major, yes, it's a convoluted, illogical, bizarre story but then, conspiracy stories usually are. When accepted as truth by wishful thinking noncritical listeners, the conspiracy stories are exciting, pleasing, and repeated; when examined by skeptics, the stories usually blow up in the tellers' faces, as the bomb, bomb, bomb determinations do.

The Canadian Transportation Safety Board Air has never given its official opinion in the probable cause of Air India Flight 182,

the most famous airplane crash in Canadian history. Their specialized expert input is invaluable to the Commission. Will you please ask TSB Air to provide to the Commission an updated supplement to the twenty year old CASB accident report on Air India Flight 182, a request justified by several subsequent similar accidents since 1985 to similar Boeing 747s and to resolve the explosion location conflict created by Justice Josephson and Justice Kirpal?

My down to earth mechanical explanation follows in my next Submission to the Commission. The wiring/cargo door explanation applauds Justice Josephson's finding of not guilty, it confirms the Canadian aviation accident investigators' conclusion, it exonerates the RCMP's failure to catch Snidely Whiplash, and justifies the expense and time of this Commission of Inquiry into events surrounding Air India Flight 182.

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type of explosion and where it occurred.)

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith
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From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT
To: "Delorme, Paulette" <Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca>
Cc: "Burtch, Terry" <Terry.Burtch@tsb.gc.ca>
Subject: Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version:

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Below is Submission 4 for the Commissioner of the
Commission: Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The
shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive
decompression/inflight breakup explanation

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Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

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Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
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Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson, Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publiques

Dear Commissioner Major, Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/
ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/
inflight breakup explanation.

Below is the scientific explanation for Air India Flight 182 in

narrative form based on direct, circumstantial, tangible, deduced, historical, and inferred evidence obtained through government aircraft accident reports and testimony under oath, 1953-2006. All statements of fact can be corroborated as having occurred in Air India Flight 182 or other similar Boeing 747s under similar circumstances.

Pressurized hulls of jet airliners have been blowing up since 1953 with the Comet.

03/03/1953

location: Karachi, Pakistan

carrier: Canadian Pacific flight:

aircraft: comet registry:

aboard: fatal: 11 ground:

details: First fatal crash of a commercial jet aircraft

05/02/1953

location: near Jagallogori West Bengal, India

carrier: British Overseas Airlines flight: 783/057

aircraft: De Havilland comet 1 registry: g-alyv

aboard: 43 fatal: 43 ground:

details: broke up in flight during a violent thunderstorm. Metal fatigue due to design flaw.

01/10/1954

location: Elba, Italy

carrier: British Overseas Airlines flight:

aircraft: De Havilland comet 1 registry:

aboard: fatal: 35 ground:

details: broke up in flight. Metal fatigue due to design flaw.

04/08/1954

location: stromboli, italy
carrier: South African Airways flight:
aircraft: De Havilland comet 1 registry:
aboard: fatal: 21 ground:
details: broke up in flight. Metal fatigue due to design flaw.

Hull ruptures in flight leading to sudden explosive decompressions have occurred in over fifty airliners over the years. The causes can be bombs, metal fatigue, cargo shifts, inadvertent door openings from improperly latched to electrical faults, cockpit windows being broken by bird strikes, fuel tank explosion, missile hits, corrosion, faulty repair of damaged bulkhead, midair collisions, thunderstorms, and improperly fitted pressure relief valves.

Air India Flight 182 fits into one of those categories, the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup one.

There are literally hundreds of pressurization problems that occur in airliners that are not sudden explosions but slow failures. These events rarely lead to fatalities while the sudden loud events usually do.

In an historical and statistical sense Air India Flight 182 was a normal aircraft accident: The cause was mechanical and not unusual. There have been several subsequent explosive decompressions in Boeing 747s similar to Air India Flight 182 that left similar evidence.

The forward cargo door of Air India Flight 182 opened inadvertently in flight for certain, the cause of that opening was probably faulty wiring.

Regards,

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Sequence of Destruction for Air India Flight 182:

Background:

On 18 July, 1984 a high lift vehicle damaged the fuselage skin near the forward cargo door of a Boeing 747-237B, construction number 330, operated by Air India airlines. The fuselage skin had wiring routed on the inside which became bent from the impact and subsequently cracked to bare wire, a characteristic of the polyimide type insulated Poly X wiring installed in the aircraft. The forward cargo door had non-steel locking sectors to keep the bottom eight latching cams from being back driven which would allow the door to open in flight causing explosive decompression which would be a catastrophic event well known to aircraft designers.

In June of 1986 several passengers changed their flight plans and their baggage routing for various flights through Canada to overseas destinations probably from Vancouver.

On 22 June, 1986, two aircraft had baggage loaded aboard them at the Vancouver B. C. airport; one flight was called CP 003

and the other CP 060. Flight 003 took off and flew uneventfully to the extremely busy Narita airport near Tokyo, Japan. After the baggage was unloaded from the flight, it was put on a baggage cart which was wheeled through a transit area of many other baggage carts containing many other bags from many other flights. An explosion of unspecified cause, unknown fuzing, unknown container, and unknown material occurred on the baggage cart which killed two people and injured others. The airport had high security because of previous terrorist attacks on it resulting in fatalities over the years.

The other flight, CP 060, flew uneventfully to Toronto Airport. The baggage was unloaded from CP 060 and those bags continuing on to London on Air India Flight 181/182 were loaded into the aft cargo compartment of the Boeing 747-237B, construction number 330. The flight, now called Air India Flight 181, then flew uneventfully to Mirabel Airport in Montreal. After landing, some baggage of the departing passengers was unloaded from the aft compartment. Parts of a broken engine were placed in the aft cargo compartment for ferry back to India. New passengers and new baggage from Montreal for the next flight of the same aircraft, construction number 330 and now called Air India Flight 182, were loaded with all the new baggage going into the forward baggage compartment. The baggage from Vancouver on CP 060 and reloaded at Toronto remained in the aft cargo compartment of the Boeing 747-237B now called Air India Flight 182.

The forward cargo compartment was filled with summer night air, warm and moist. When flying at altitude the air would be cooled by the air conditioning and the very cold outside air would cool the fuselage skin thus condensing out moisture along the inside of the compartment which would run through the wiring bundles and down into the cargo door bilge.

Air India Flight 182 took off from Montreal for London at 0218 Z on 23 June 1985 and flew uneventfully for about five hours and while at 31000 feet at 296 knots and about 115 miles west of Ireland a tragic sequence of events began at 0714 Z. The pressure differential between outside and inside air was at its maximum design limit, 8.9 pounds per square inch.

The Event:

Water may have met the cracked insulated wire which may have been previously damaged by the high lift accident to the cargo door area. The now exposed and bare wire shorted against the metal fuselage. The electricity then flowed around safety cutout switches and powered on the cargo door actuator unlatch electric motor which attempted to rotate all ten cam sectors to unlocked positions around their ten latching pins. The eight lower cam sectors may have been prevented from unlatching around the latching pins because of the bottom eight locking sectors. However, the two midspan latches had no locking sectors to prevent the inadvertent rotation of the midspan latching cams around the midspan latching pins.

The lower eight cams probably overcame the weaker locking sectors to just turn past center and allow the door to unlatch in flight, a defect known years later in two other Boeing 747 flights, Pan Am Flight 125 and United Airlines Flight 811. The midspan cams turned just past center with no locking sectors to prevent the backdriving of the cams, an operation only supposed to be allowed on the ground. Possibly other factors such as an out of rig cargo door, a poor repair job on the door area, the slack in bellcranks, torque tubes, and worn latch pins may have contributed to have allowed the two midspan latches to rotate just past center permitting the almost 100,000 pounds of

internal pressure on the 99 inch by 110 inch door to rupture outward inflight relieving the maximum pressure differential on the internal fuselage.

The nine foot by eight foot squarish forward cargo door would have instantly burst open at the midspan and bottom latches sending the latches, door material, and large pieces of fuselage skin spinning away. The forward cargo compartment would have spewed its contents outward onto the starboard side of the fuselage. It was as if a huge mylar balloon had popped. The severe explosion of explosive decompression caused the forward cargo door to be fractured and shattered into a few large pieces and many small pieces which gave a frayed appearance from an outward force. Many small bits of metal from the explosion were embedded into the cargo door area metal fuselage structure.

The top part of the door swung outward and upward on its hinge and then separated taking large vertical pieces of fuselage skin with it, exposing stringers and bulkheads. The very lower part of the door sill with its eight bottom latches may have stuck to fuselage skin. The resulting damage zone appeared as a huge rectangle of shattered door, skin, and stringers. Some pieces of the door and fuselage skin flew directly aft and impacted the leading edge of the right wing, the vertical stabilizer and the right horizontal stabilizer inflight.

This explosion of explosive decompression blew out a large hole about thirty feet wide and forty feet high on the starboard side of the nose forward of the wing. It looked as if a bomb had gone off inside the forward cargo hold. Fuselage skin was peeled outward at various places on the starboard side of the nose.

The forward cargo door had some fuselage and cargo floor attached. This door, located on the forward starboard side of the aircraft, was broken horizontally about one-quarter of the distance above the lower frame. The damage to the door and the fuselage skin near the door appeared to have been caused by an outward force. The fractured surface of the cargo door appeared to have been badly frayed. The cargo door pieces and the adjacent skin had holes, flaps, fractures, inward concavity, tears, deformities, outward bent petals, curls, missing pieces, cracks, separations, curved fragments, spikes, and folds. The fast and powerful explosion of the explosive decompression would have caused a metallurgical effect called ÔtwinningÕ on a few fragments of pieces of wreckage.

The now uncompressed air molecules rushed out of the huge hole equalizing the high pressure inside the fuselage to the low pressure outside the aircraft while making a sudden very loud audible sound. This sudden rushing outward air was recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder as a sudden loud sound. The sound did not accurately match any bomb explosion sounds on other aircraft but did match the explosive decompression sound on another wide body airliner, a DC-10 cargo door open event.

The tremendous explosive force in the forward cargo hold severely disrupted the adjacent main equipment compartment which housed power cables and abruptly shut off power to the Flight Data Recorders. The resulting data tapes showed a sudden loud audible sound followed by an abrupt power cut to the flight data recorder, the cockpit voice recorder and transponder.

The number three engine and cowling, closest to the forward cargo compartment, were damaged by inflight debris from material ejected from the now exposed compartment and cabin

above, debris which also damaged the number four engine cowling by a displaced turbine blade from number three engine. The resulting vibration from the internal damage to engine number three caused the nacelle and engine to fall away from the wing, as designed, and land apart from the other three engines.

The floor beams above the forward cargo hold were sucked downward, and were fractured and broken from the sudden decompression. The floor panels were stationary but gave the appearance of separating upward by the suddenly moving downward floor beams.

The flight attitude of the aircraft was askew to the left from reaction of explosive decompression from the right. Air rushed into the large hole and weakened other skin and frames thus peeling skin further outward and rupturing the aft part of the aircraft to include the aft cargo compartment and the aft pressure bulkhead. There was no evidence of an explosion of any source in the aft cargo compartment.

The 296 knots of wind force pressed upon the weakened airframe and broke it in half amidships. This wind force was larger than any wind force the surface of the earth had ever experienced. The nose portion and wings tore off and landed in a dense debris heap apart from the debris field of the aft part.

The rest of the plane without the forward section suddenly decelerated from 296 knots and caused whiplash injuries to passengers. After the breakup, the passengers who were not wearing their seatbelts were scattered to far distances. They suffered explosion type injuries such as pieces of metal embedded in them from flying debris in the cabin. They were not burned because there was no fire nor explosion from a bomb explosion. The passengers had no other bomb explosion

evidence. The passengers and crew were ejected from the disintegrating aircraft to tumble to the water and suffer upward impact physical damage to their bodies. Some remained in their seats and were trapped in the fuselage underwater. Some had decompression type injuries of hypoxia from the high altitude aircraft breakup.

The passengers fell to the sea and some floated and some sank. The baggage from Vancouver passengers and loaded into the aft cargo compartment fell to the sea and some floated and some sank. The baggage from Montreal passengers and loaded into the forward cargo compartment fell to the sea and some floated and some sank. The aircraft fell in pieces and some pieces floated and some sank.

The pilots may have been conscious for a few seconds and adjusted the trim controls out of habit. The communications radio may have been activated by the disturbances in the cockpit and transmitted for a few seconds to air traffic control.

The port side forward of the wing was relatively smooth and undamaged from inflight debris while the starboard side forward of the wing was shattered, torn, and frayed at the ruptured cargo door area.

A few local fires appeared on the surface of the ocean from the jet kerosene fuel and singed some seat cushions and floating passengers.

All was quiet as the ground controllers tried to contact Air India Flight 182 as the flight crew did not respond to radio calls. Rescue teams were sent. Authorities became aware of the tragedy of 329 men, women, and children dying in a sudden plane crash.

Aftermath:

Explanations were sought as to what happened. Immediately the suggestion was made by authorities that a bomb explosion had caused the accident because of the sudden and catastrophic nature of the immediate evidence.

The Canadian aviation accident investigation authorities became involved since the aircraft had taken off from Canada and had many Canadian citizens aboard. Indian authorities became involved since the airline, Air India, has government ties. The Indian authorities quickly dismissed their aviation experts and assigned a Judge of the Court to oversee the investigation.

After a period of investigation, much of which was conducted to confirm the bomb explosion explanation and identify the culprits, the Indian judge made a finding in 1986 that a bomb in the forward cargo compartment had caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182 and ruled out any type of explosion in the aft cargo compartment.

After a period of investigation, during which the opinion of the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch representative of an explosive decompression not caused by a bomb but a cause as yet to be determined was given, the Canadian Aviation Safety Board made a conclusion in 1986 that an explosion of unstated cause in the forward cargo compartment had caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182 while also ruling out any explosion of any type in the aft cargo compartment.

The immediate finding by the Indians of a bomb explosion in the forward cargo compartment was accepted and remained the probable cause for Air India Flight 182 twenty one years later although subsequent accidents of a similar type aircraft in similar

circumstances leaving similar evidence now resolutely contradicted that finding although confirming the Indian finding of an explosion on the starboard side of the forward cargo compartment and no explosion in the aft.

The Canadian probable cause of an explosion in the forward cargo compartment of an undetermined cause has been proven to be correct by subsequent accidents of a similar type aircraft in similar circumstances leaving similar evidence which do reveal the cause of the explosion: faulty wiring causing the forward cargo door to rupture open inflight at the latches leading to a tremendous explosion of explosive decompression causing Air India Flight 182 to totally breakup in flight.

In 2001 three men were arrested for involvement in the unproved bombing. One pled guilty on a bomb making charge and went to prison while denying any involvement with Air India Flight 182.

In 2005 two of the accused were found not guilty by a Canadian judge in British Columbia. The other man remains in prison and charged with perjury in that trial. The Canadian judge determined that an explosion occurred in the aft cargo compartment in the left side and the cause was a bomb. No explanations were offered to rebut the original findings of explosion in the forward cargo compartment on the right side and no explosion of any source in the aft cargo compartment.

In 2006 a Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 was appointed. The shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation was presented to the Commissioner at an open hearing on 19 July, 2006. Excerpts

below:

Application for Standing presented by Mr. Smith: Mr. Smith: Thank you, Commissioner Major, for allowing me to supplement my written application for standing...I have an alternate explanation for Air India 182. It's a mechanical explanation. I'll go into some detail during my presentation and my detail will not be to persuade you that my explanation is correct but to persuade you that my research has depth and is worthy of being granted standing.

The Commissioner: Well, I don't think, Mr. Smith, that you need 15 minutes to persuade me of that. Here's the difficulty...You have an alternate theory. The alternate theory may over time prove to be correct. I don't know...but the Terms of Reference preclude our considering whether or not there was any cause for that explosion other than the bomb that is found by the Supreme Court of British Columbia.

Hindsight:

In 1985, when Air India Flight 182 suffered an inflight breakup from an explosion, it was believed that an explosive decompression in an early model Boeing 747 could not cause an abrupt power cut to the data flight recorders. That belief was cited by the Indian Kirpal Report as a reason to reject the explosive decompression explanation because, in fact, Air India Flight 182 had suffered an abrupt power cut to the data recorders. The Indian Kirpal Reports states: "It was not possible that any rapid decompression caused by a structural failure could have disrupted the entire electrical power supply from the MEC compartment." The later event of United Airlines Flight 811 showed that it was possible, and indeed, did happen, that an explosive decompression caused by a structural failure could and

did cause an abrupt electrical cutoff to the recorders.

The reason for the Indians in 1986 to rule out explosive decompression by structural failure was negated by the reality of United Airlines Flight 811 in 1989. If the Indians had the foreknowledge of United Airlines Flight 811 and the explosive decompression which cut off abruptly the power to the recorders, it is most probable they would have sustained the findings of the Canadians and the British who said that a explosion in the forward cargo compartment occurred and all would have then known the solution to the mystery posed by the AAIB investigator: "...but the cause has not been identified." The cause was identified in 1989 and demonstrated by United Airlines Flight 811 in NTSB AAR 92/02: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the sudden opening of the forward lower lobe cargo door in flight and the subsequent explosive decompression.'

The evidence that was unavailable to the Air India Flight 182 CASB, AAIB, and Indian accident investigators in 1985 that became available in the ensuing 16 years that would have been invaluable in assisting them in determining the probable cause was:

- A. Evidence that an explosive decompression could cause an abrupt power cut to the data recorders.
- B. Evidence that floor panels can appear to separate upwards when in fact the floor beneath were pulled down.
- C. Testimony that twinning can occur in explosions other than bombs, such as an aviation fuel explosion, or explosive decompression.
- D. Evidence that the type of wiring installed, Poly-X, was defective in that it cracked to bare wire easily, especially in the presence of moisture.

E. Visible ruptures in flight in forward cargo doors of other early model Boeing 747s that suffered the same events in flight.

F. Several Airworthiness Directives for defects in and around the forward cargo doors of Boeing 747s that if uncorrected could lead to inadvertent opening of the cargo door in flight leading to catastrophic explosive decompression.

The evidence that was available to the Air India Flight 182 CASB, AAIB, and Indian accident investigators in 1985 was such to lead them to conclude that an explosion had taken place on the starboard side in the forward cargo compartment which was picked up by the cockpit voice recorder and cut off the electrical power in the adjacent main electrical equipment compartment. The cause of the explosion was given as either unknown, structural failure of explosive decompression, or a bomb explosion. Since the event in 1989 with United Airlines Flight 811 had not happened yet, the understandable decision of the Indians, based on three assumptions later proven unreliable, was to state the cause of the explosion in the forward cargo compartment a bomb whilst the cautious Canadian CASB and the British AAIB left the cause unstated or unidentified.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT

To: "Delorme, Paulette" <Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca>

Cc: "Burtch, Terry" <Terry.Burtch@tsb.gc.ca>

Subject: Smith Submission 11: Reconsideration of your denial of standing:

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique
Dear Mr. Dickerson, Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 11: Reconsideration of your denial of standing: Try Try Again. (Never give up)

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/ ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/ inflight breakup explanation. (Please consider a plausible, reasonable, electrical cause with precedent) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006.

Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The Layperson version. (It's not rocket science) Filed Friday, August 11, 2006

Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years: Predicting the Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non Cooperation. (Sorry, no can do.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 9: The Crash and Meeting the Family. (It happens so fast) Filed Friday, August 18, 2006

Smith Submission 10: The Elephant and Emperor Kanishka. (Easy to see, hard to talk about) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 11: Reconsideration of your denial of standing: Try Try Again. (Never give up) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner

Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publique

Dear Commissioner Major, Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 11: Reconsideration of your denial of standing: Try Try Again. (Never give up) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

1. "Disposition: Mr. Smith is denied standing. However, leave to file materials that he believes will be useful to the Commissioner is granted."

I believe I can be useful to you regarding the Inquiry, the investigation, the bombing, Air India Flight 182, what's it like to be a victim of a sudden fatal jet airplane crash, and the emotions

when meeting the family members of that fatal victim.

I believe, from his statements, Prime Minister Harper desires a full, thorough, and compassionate public inquiry into the events surrounding Air India Flight 182 by analyzing the evidence that has come to light since 1985.

I believe, from your statements, that the nature of the Commission is to be very broad in the evidence that it heard, in order to put to rest the various theories, rumours and neglect that have occurred since the explosion in 1985. I have a theory based on an event in February 1989, United Airlines Flight 811. It will not rest.

You have shown willingness to be broad minded by receiving my evidence, submissions, or information which you have considered to be helpful in fulfilling your mandate whether or not such evidence or information would be admissible in court.

I interpret the goals of the Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 to be to inquire into:

1. The investigation of the bombing.
2. The bombing.
3. Air India Flight 182.
4. The victims.
5. The family members of the victims.

As I understand the Rules and Procedures, sir, you have the authority to grant standing to a person who has a clearly ascertainable interest or perspective which would enhance the work of the Commissioner, determine any special conditions

under which that person may participate, rescind the standing, and determine in which parts of the inquiry and the nature and extent of that person may participate. You are also authorized to grant to any other person who satisfies him that he or she has a substantial and direct interest in the subject matter of the Inquiry an opportunity for appropriate participation in the Inquiry.

In other words, as you know, you are granted broad powers to conduct your inquiry. You have told me that your criteria are the Terms of Reference, for example, if there were problems in the effective cooperation between government departments and agencies in the investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182. Please reconsider your previous denial of my request for standing and grant it now with whatever special conditions, limitations, restrictions, and the extent of my contributions you determine.

I believe I have fulfilled your requirements of being useful and fulfilling a Term of Reference and thus worthy of being granted standing because:

1. I have flown in Boeing 747s and about twenty other types of military and civilian aircraft during forty five years of aviation experience accumulating thousands of hours of flight time.
2. My crew duties have included pilot in command, co-pilot, navigator, bombardier, flight crew, mechanic, and owner.
3. I am a qualified nuclear weapon loading officer/bombardier which means I know how to create, load, arm, deliver, and detonate nuclear weapons as well as conventional bombs.
4. I have dropped bombs.
5. I have investigated in depth the bombing of Air India Flight 182 and other explanations for the inflight breakup and have written a three hundred page aircraft accident report and built a

thousand page website demonstrating a substantial interest. (Smith AAR for Air India Flight 182 and Exhibit S-18 in the Commission files)

6. I have been investigated by the RCMP, the Air India Task Force, and the security branch of Transport Canada during their investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182.

7. I am personally aware of a conflict between the RCMP and Transportation Safety Board of Canada which resulted in problems of effective cooperation which I believe adversely affected the investigation into the bombing of Air India Flight 182. (Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non Cooperation.)

8. I have been in a sudden fiery fatal jet airplane crash and suffered lifelong injuries. (Smith Submission 9: The Crash and Meeting the Family.)

9. I have seen the fatal victim in that crash.

10. I have visited and discussed the crash with the surviving family members of the victim.

11. I have discovered a clear and present hazard to the security and safety of Canadian passengers flying in early model Boeing 747s such as Air India Flight 182. (The shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup hazard)

My supporting documents for the above statements are the Commission referenced documents of the report of the Honourable Mr. Justice B.N. Kirpal of the High Court of Delhi of February 26, 1986 and the Aviation Occurrence Report of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board into the crash involving Air India Flight 182 of January 22, 1986. (On file with the Commission)

In additional support, there are dozens of emails and letters

between me and John Schneider and Sgt. Bart Blachford of the RCMP AITF, between me and Mr. Bill Tucker (now retired), Director General of Investigative Operations of the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, and between me and Mr. John Garstang of the Securitas branch of Transport Canada. (Filed earlier as Emails in PDF files.)

I have included the narrative of my sudden fiery fatal jet airplane crash in which I ejected at night at low level when our starboard engine ingested a titanium bolt and caught fire. My pilot told me to eject and we both did. I lived and he died. (Smith Submission 9: The Crash and Meeting the Family.)

I have included a narrative of my meeting two of his surviving sons who grew up to be US Navy pilots, like their dad.

For the reasons above, Commissioner Major, I believe I have fulfilled the formal and informal requirements for standing before your commission. Please reconsider your previous denial of my request for standing and grant it now with whatever special conditions, limitations, restrictions, and the extent of my contributions you determine.

Please allow me the opportunity to present my mechanical explanation for the airplane crash called Air India Flight 182.

To review my pleas:

1. Please grant me standing to present my mechanical non conspiracy explanation to you in depth.
2. Please ask TSB Air to provide an aircraft accident report to you on the probable cause of Air India Flight 182.
3. Please correct the highly prejudicial error on Commission website that states the CASB concluded it was a bomb; they did

not. ("Yet, it was not until the following January that the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb.")

4. Please post all the non classified written material submitted to you by the public during the public inquiry (including my submissions) on the Commission website, <http://www.majorcomm.ca/en/index.asp>

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith
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barry@johnbarrysmith.com
safety@ntsb.org

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

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Smith Submission 11: Reconsideration of your denial of standing: Try Try Again. (Never give up) Saturday, August 19, 2006

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT

To: "Delorme, Paulette" <Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca>

Cc: "Burtch, Terry" <Terry.Burtch@tsb.gc.ca>

Subject: Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry:

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Thursday, August 3, 2006

Below is Submission 2 for the Commissioner of the Commission.

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why,
and will you.

Thanks and Regards,

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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182
Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner
Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary
Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel
Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel
Ken Dickerson, Public Affairs

Dear Commissioner Major,
Thursday, August 3, 2006

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182... the words are a mouthful for sure. Permit
me to examine them closely as words are our tools to
understanding and the more precise they are, the deeper the
understanding. I am inquiring about the inquiry, but first,
research.

"Disposition: Mr. Smith is denied standing. However, leave to file materials that he believes will be useful to the Commissioner is granted."

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you.

1. commission [n.]

1. A fee for services rendered based on a percentage of an amount received or collected or agreed to be paid (as distinguished from a salary); "he works on commission."

2. A formal statement of a command or injunction to do something; SYN. charge, direction.

3. An official document issued by a government and conferring on the recipient the rank of an officer in the armed forces; SYN. military commission.

4. The act of granting authority to undertake certain functions; SYN. commissioning.

5. The state of being in good working order and ready for operation; "put the ships into commission"; "the motor was out of commission."

It appears that definition 2 and 4 fit the best. The Commission has a command to do something with authority.

2. inquiry [n.]

1. A search for knowledge; SYN. enquiry, research.

2. A systematic investigation of a matter of public interest; SYN. enquiry.

3. A legal investigation into a crime or wrongdoing; "the police have opened an inquiry"; SYN. enquiry.

It appears that all three definitions fit. The Commission has a

command and the authority to search for knowledge and conduct a systematic investigation of a matter of public interest.

3. investigation [n.]

1. The work of inquiring into something thoroughly and systematically; SYN. investigating

An investigation appears to be an inquiry. The Commission has a command and the authority to search for knowledge and conduct an inquiry into an inquiry.

4. bombing [n.]

An attack by dropping bombs; SYN. bombardment.

bomb [n.]

1. An explosive device fused to denote under specific conditions.

2. A film or play that is a resounding failure; "that movie was a real bomb."

The Commission has a command and the authority to search for knowledge and conduct an inquiry into an investigation of an explosive device. (The Inquiry shall not bomb during its performances.)

5. Air India Flight 182.

Not in the dictionary so let's use my definition: Air India Flight 182 was a Boeing 747-237B assigned to the airline Air India, registration VT-EFO, first flight on 19 June 1978, construction number was 21473, and line number 330. It was on a flight from Mirabel to London when it disappeared from the radar scope at a position of latitude 51°O'N and longitude 12°50'W at 0714 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), 23 June 1985, and crashed into the ocean about 110 miles west of Cork, Ireland. There were no

survivors among the 329 passengers and crew members.

Basic Specifications of a Boeing 747:

Wing Span 211 feet 5 inches (64.44 m)

Overall Length 231 feet 10.25 inches (70.66 m)

Tail Height 63 feet 8 inches (19.41 m)

Body Width

Outside 21 feet 4 inches (6.5 m)

Inside 20 feet (6.1 m)

The Commission has a command and the authority to search for knowledge and conduct an investigation into an investigation of an explosive device which affected a Boeing 747.

6. Unstated focus of the Commission 1:

victim [n.]

FORMS: victims

1. A person who is tricked or swindled; SYN. dupe.
2. An unfortunate person who suffers from some adverse circumstance.

The Commission has a command and the authority to search for knowledge and conduct an inquiry into an investigation of an explosive device which affected a Boeing 747 and the unfortunate persons who died in it.

7. Unstated focus of the Commission 2:

family [n.]

FORMS: families

1. Primary social group; parents and children; "he wanted to have a good job before starting a family"; SYN. family unit.
2. People descended from a common ancestor; "his family had lived in Massachusetts since the Mayflower"; SYN. family line,

folk, kinfolk, kinsfolk,

3. A social unit living together; "he moved his family to Virginia"; SYN. household, house, home, menage.

4. An association of people who share common beliefs or activities; "the message was addressed not just to employees but to every member of the company family"; SYN. fellowship.

The Commission has a command and the authority to search for knowledge and conduct an inquiry into an investigation of an explosive device which affected a Boeing 747 and the unfortunate persons who died in it and the emotional consequences upon the surviving people who share a common belief and activities.

Inquiry question 1: What is the focus and number one inquiry priority of the Commission? The investigation, the bombing, the aircraft, the victims, or the family members? What has the last priority?

Speech excerpts - Prime Minister Harper announces inquiry into Air India bombing

"A full public inquiry is required. This inquiry will be launched immediately and led by an outstanding Canadian, retired Supreme Court Justice John Major. He has agreed to serve as Commissioner for this inquiry and I have every confidence that he will conduct a thorough and compassionate investigation into the events surrounding this tragedy. This inquiry is about analyzing the evidence that has come to light since 1985 and applying it to the world we live in today."

The Prime Minister desires a full, thorough, and compassionate public inquiry into the events surrounding Air India Flight 182 by analyzing the evidence that has come to light since 1985.

Your own words, Commissioner Major, reflect that guidance, from transcript of 18 July 2006, Hearing on Standing:

THE COMMISSIONER: "Yes. Well, I will confirm that. The nature of this Commission was to be very broad in the evidence that it heard, in order to put to rest the various theories, rumours and neglect that have occurred since the explosion in 1985."

The direction for the Commission is pointed by the two leading authorities to be full, thorough, and broad, but earlier statements that morning had taken a darker turn.

"MR. BRUCKER: I just wanted to indicate to you, Commissioner, that I have provided this morning to Mrs. Cook and to Commission counsel a brief submission that we had prepared just on the general test for standing and issues that we submit you will be taking into account.

THE COMMISSIONER: You can't do much better than get standing, though, can you?

MR. BRUCKER: No, we can't, but we are concerned about the focus of the Inquiry. When I attended here and listened to your Opening Statement I was struck by one comment that you made and I will paraphrase that, perhaps not accurately, but what I took from your comments was that you intended to conduct a thorough but efficient inquiry and that an efficient inquiry does not mean that it has to take a great deal of time. We have, in my submission to you, a very compressed time schedule in which we have to get things done and my submissions simply highlight that in that environment, a matter which is of interest to all Canadians, that there should be some judicious consideration of who will get standing and who won't or who may be an

intervenor and who won't, and that to ensure that the process is thorough and efficient I have offered some general principles that I submit might be of assistance to you.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. That's been filed and will be looked at."

Commissioner Major, forgive me my suspicions but now I see why those excluded from a public inquiry begin to think of skullduggery afoot. The Prime Minister and you both proclaim publicly your intentions for a broad, full, and thorough inquiry to put to rest the various theories, rumours, and neglect that have occurred since the explosion in 1985. And yet....I read that the Attorney General representative is indicating time is short and your inquiry does not need a great deal of time. He even generously offers principles and a general test to assist you in some judicious consideration of who will get standing and who won't or who may be an intervenor and who won't. It appears he's not concerned about himself being granted standing but is concerned about others. Apparently he's trying to influence the direction of the inquiry by guiding your decisions on who presents before you.

It appears to me he is afraid that you, sir, in fact, will conduct a broad, full, and thorough inquiry and is trying to make it narrow and short by controlling who is given standing and who is not. Out of nineteen applicants who 'demandes de participation', sixteen were granted and three denied of which I am one, sad to say. I did not demand, I applied and am still applying.

My better reasoning self tells me that the Attorney General representative of Canada can not possibly concern himself with this wacko from California with a zany theory about Air India Flight 182 being mechanical and whose application of standing,

available to read by all, describes the theory. And yet...who else among the applicants is controversial? The World Sikh Organization? B'nai Brith? Who is the AG representative referring to in his 'general test' of inclusion or exclusion for standing? How did I fail a test of inclusion when I did not know the test questions?

It also appears that Mr. Brucker is trying to assist your decision in whether to ask Transport Canada Air for an updated aviation accident report on the twenty one year old crash by claiming time is short, efficiency does not need time and implies his agencies such as Transport Canada have a busy schedule. Press reports state the final report is due September 2007; a year is ample time to listen for an hour or two to me and my theory as well as Transport Canada to squeeze in some aviation accident investigation update time for the most famous aviation event in Canadian history. Let TSB Air resolve the glaring discrepancy between Justice Kirpal's forward cargo compartment location for the explosion and Justice Josephson's determination of the aft cargo compartment. Two bombs going off at the same time would explain away the anomaly....or something else.

Will you please ask TSB Air to provide to the Commission an updated supplement to the twenty one year old accident report on Air India Flight 182 based on several subsequent similar accidents to similar Boeing 747s since 1985 and resolve the explosion location conflict?

My friends told me, when the Commission was announced, that it was just another government whitewash to get and keep votes by placating irate citizens. I demurred and trusted in the open minded and fairness of the Canadian reputation as shown by the CASB report of Air India Flight 182 and Justice Josephson's findings in acquitting the two accused. I might have to apologize

to my friends for doubting their political astuteness while acknowledging my own naivete.

I am perplexed. My mechanical explanation supports Canadian institutions.

1. The CASB was correct, there was an explosion and they did not yet understand the cause because the answer only became apparent four years later with United Airlines Flight 811.
2. Justice Josephson was correct, the two accused did not put a bomb on board, nobody did.
3. There were no lapses in security that led to Air India Flight 182's bombing that need to be rectified because there was no bombing.
4. The Mounties did not get their man because there were no men to get.
5. There will be closure for the families when they can clearly understand through science what happened and why.
6. A divisive issue of anger, hate, and revenge will be removed from the Canadian psyche.
7. This Commission of Inquiry can examine and put to rest the various theories, rumours and neglect that have occurred since the explosion in 1985 if it is very broad in the evidence it hears.

Why would the Canadian government not welcome an explanation for Air India Flight 182 that is reasonable, plausible, with precedent and confirms the intelligence and wisdom of Canadian aviation, law enforcement, and justice institutions?

And yet...it appears that I am to be denied an opportunity to present my detailed analysis with supporting documents to the Commission of Inquiry. I've already been cut off after a few minutes of oral submission and can only resort to supplemental

text to be filed with the record such as this plaint. There is to be no cross examination of my points, no questioning of my reasoning for my conclusions, and no public debate.

I'm even more confused when such peripheral organizations such as religious groups are granted standing while I, who has been investigated in the bombing of Air India Flight 182, who has written extensively about the crash, who has survived a fatal jet crash, and who fits a Term of Reference for personal knowledge of agency non cooperation, am denied.

If religious groups are willingly caught in the wide net of a broad investigation, please let the small fishes of scientists like myself, Transport Canada, and the Transportation Safety Board (Air) be ensnared also. Air India Flight 182 was an airplane crash not an exorcism, after all.

The words of promise of 'public, full, thorough, broad' inquiry are empty when it comes to actually implementing them in my case and I don't know why. As a flight crewmember I put my life in the hands of my pilot. There were many men who looked like pilots, talked like pilots, and thought they were good pilots, but I judge always on performance. I was often surprised when the most unlikely looking men and women turned out to be the best pilots. Many men talk a good game but fall down during play. I assume you have also been surprised at the performance of some attorneys before you in court. I'm trusting the Commission fulfills its high ideals as stated by Prime Minister Harper and yourself, sir, in its performance.

My Inquiry into the Inquiry asks questions:

1. What is the focus and number one priority of the Commission of Inquiry? The investigation, the bombing, the aircraft, the

victims, or the family members?

2. Why was I denied standing when I was qualified when others less qualified were granted standing?

3. Are you going to do a full, broad, and thorough inquiry as you have stated or are you going to do a short, narrow, efficient one as suggested by Mr. Brucker?

4. What were the 'general principles' and the 'general test' Mr. Brucker offered to you to "ensure the process (granting standing) is thorough and efficient"?

5. Why would the Canadian government not welcome an explanation for Air India Flight 182 that is reasonable, plausible, with precedent and confirms the intelligence and wisdom of Canadian aviation, law enforcement, and justice institutions as well as bringing peace of mind to many of its citizens?

6. Will you please ask TSB Air to provide to the Commission an updated supplement to the twenty one year old accident report on Air India Flight 182 based on several subsequent similar accidents to similar Boeing 747s since 1985 and resolve the discrepancy of explosion location?

7. Will you reconsider and use the authority given to you in Rules of Procedure to grant me standing as a person of unique perspective who can enhance the work of the Commission? (15. From time to time, the Commissioner may, in his discretion, at any time grant to or rescind standing from a person, or modify the status or conditions of the standing of a person.)

Summary of Submissions:

Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected Filed 28 July, 2006. Canadians did not conclude it was a bomb. TSB Air should be asked for their opinion.

Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you. Filed Thursday, August 3, 2006 Wiring/cargo door explanation should be fully considered.

Upcoming:

Submission 3: Bomb explanations are contradictory.

Submission 4: Correct probable cause is the wiring/cargo door explanation.

Submission 5: Clear and present danger exists to Canadian and other passengers flying in early model Boeing 747s.

Submission 6: Action should be taken now, not later, to fix design and manufacturing problems.

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
safety@ntsb.org

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT

To: "Delorme, Paulette" <Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca>

Cc: "Burtch, Terry" <Terry.Burtch@tsb.gc.ca>

**Subject: Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference:
Non Cooperation.**

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Thursday, August 17, 2006

Below is Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non Cooperation. (Sorry, no can do.) Thursday, August 17, 2006

I have attached three pdf files for the Commissioner to substantiate my claims, one for Mr. Garstang, one for Sgt. Blachford, and one for Mr. Tucker.

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/ ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/ inflight breakup explanation. (Please consider a plausible, reasonable, electrical cause with precedent) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006.

Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The Layperson version. (It's not rocket science) Filed Friday, August 11, 2006

Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years: Predicting the Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non Cooperation. (Sorry, no can do.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner
Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publique

Terms of Reference: the Commissioner to conduct the Inquiry specifically for the purpose of making findings and recommendations with respect to the following, namely, if there were problems in the effective cooperation between government departments and agencies, including the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, in the investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182, either before or after June 23, 1985, whether any changes in practice or legislation are required to prevent the recurrence of similar problems of cooperation in the investigation of terrorism offences in the future.

Dear Commissioner Major,
August 17, 2006

Thursday,

There was a problem in the effective cooperation between

Canadian government agencies, RCMP and TSB (Transportation Safety Board), in the investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182 from 1997 through 2002 and a change in practice is required to prevent the recurrence of similar problems of cooperation in the investigation of terrorism offences in the future.

Names and titles of persons referenced below:

Terry Burtch
Director General,
Investigation Operations
Transportation Safety Board Canada

Bill Tucker (Retired)
Director General,
Investigation Operations
Transportation Safety Board Canada

Bart Blachford Sgt.
John Schnieder
Rich Spruel
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Air India Task Force

Keith Hamilton
Crown sponsored attorney for the accused Bagri

John Garstang
Securitas branch of TSB

Ken Smart
Chief Inspector of Accidents,

Air Accident Investigations Branch
AAIB
DRA Farnborough
Hants GU14 6TD
United Kingdom

I was personally investigated by the RCMP Air India Task Force during their investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182. I was personally questioned by the TSB about the events surrounding the bombing of Air India Flight 182. I received erroneous information from Securitas of the TSB. The two agencies did not cooperate based upon the information I gave them.

1. In response to my email to Securitas of TSB I received the erroneous information from John Garstang of TSB: The cargo door was not retrieved from the bottom of the ocean.

At 3:18 PM +0400 2/27/97, Securitas wrote:

Date: 27 Feb 1997 15:18:35 +0400

From: Securitas <Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Crash cause of Air India Flight 182

Thank you for your report expressing concern about the opening of cargo doors on B-747 aircraft. During any aircraft crash, investigators examine every piece of evidence, in order to determine cause. In the case of the Air India flight, the cargo door was in fact retrieved from the bottom of the ocean by the investigators. The latches were still in place, and there

was no evidence on the edges of the door to indicate in-flight opening of that door.

On the other hand, there was other solid evidence indicating a bomb blast had occurred. Aircraft accident investigators are trained people. Anybody can say anything they want on the Internet. Put your money on the experts; you will win more often.

2. In response I wrote the below email for members of the Air India Task Force, John Schnieder and Rich Spruel, and to John Garstang of Securitas. (Emails attached as pdf file)

At 9:11 PM +0000 4/17/97, John Barry Smith wrote:

To: Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: Attention Mr John Garstang RE Air India 182

Mr. Garstang, this is John Barry Smith, discover of the cargo door explanation for the cause of the crash of AI 182. I just had a nice chat with Mr. John Schnieder of the Air India Task Force. He said he would get in touch with you to ask would you contact me to discuss the forward cargo door of AI 182. Mr. Schnieder is a police officer and referred me to you because you are an aircraft crash investigator and sent me the email about how the door was retrieved and latches latched. Well, since the door was not retrieved the latch status is still unknown and we must go to other evidence to explain the crash. After twelve years and three other similar crashes, a better explanation emerges, inadvertent

opening of the forward cargo door in flight. www.corazon.com has a thousand pages of documentation and analysis of the four crashes.

In addition Boeing is conducting its own investigation into the forward cargo door as shown by the remark of Mr. Rich Spruel of the Task Force that Boeing had also recently inquired about that forward cargo door of AI 182.

I trust that as a crash investigator your primary desire is to explain a crash so that it will not happen again and will examine all possibilities that are presented that are reasonable and documented, such as cargo door. Please contact me through email or phone so that I may present my case in a short brief, enough to give you thought to either pursue the door theory or dismiss it. Please don't ignore it.

Sincerely, John Barry Smith 10408 659 3552

3. Several years later I heard from Sgt. Bart Blachford of the RCMP AITF and I responded below and provided him with my accident reports: (Emails attached as pdf file)

At 10:56 PM -0800 11/14/01,

To: SGT Blachford@redshift.com

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: Meeting about Air India Flight 182

Sgt. B. Blachford
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather St.
Vancouver, B. C.
V5Z 1K6

Dear Sergeant Blachford, 14 Nov 01

Thank you for your letter of 7 Nov 01 in which you would like to

meet with me and discuss in detail my shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup for Air India Flight 182 and taking at least a day to do so.

Yes, of course, Sergeant. Let us work on the logistics.

I would prefer here in my home office with my computers and stacks of documents for referral as needed and the sooner the better. I put myself at your service regarding time and date.

I'll meet you at the Monterey Airport, or, if you drive, as I did in March to Vancouver, call me and I'll set you up with lodging. An alternative meeting place is possible.

I've also invited a representative of TSB, Mr. Bill Tucker, to join us as well as an attorney for the defence assigned by the Crown, Mr. Keith Hamilton. (Mr. Garstang being unavailable.) I'm waiting for replies from them. If you prefer to meet alone, please tell me and that is fine with me. My approach is open and forthright with everyone informed. Please consult with them regarding the meeting.

Email for Mr. Tucker: Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca

W.T. (Bill) Tucker
Director General,
Investigation Operations
TSB

Email for Mr. Keith Hamilton: keithrh@telus.net
Defense Counsel assigned by the Crown for Mr. Bagri

The ideal meeting would include the law enforcement authority,

(you of the RCMP AITF), a TSB aircraft safety investigator (Mr. Tucker or representative), defence counsel assigned by the Crown (Mr. Keith Hamilton), and this independent aircraft accident investigator, (John Barry Smith.)

It seems the mood has changed in the past few days after AA 587 and now the first speculation of a cause of an airliner crash is mechanical failure instead of a terrorist act (such as believed in 1985). It looks like facts, data, and evidence, are taking priority now and that is good. There are lots of those for support of a mechanical cause for Air India Flight 182 and I look forward to laying them out for you and answering all your queries.

Cheers,
Barry Smith

John Barry Smith
(831) 659 3552
541 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

4. I sent my files to Sgt Blachford and note that Mr. Bill Tucker of TSB was cooperating with the RCMP AITF by providing them with my files. Sgt. Blachford declined to provide me with an email address.

Sgt. B. Blachford
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather St.
Vancouver, B. C.

V5Z 1K6

Dear Sergeant Blachford,
31 May 2001

Enclosed is hard copy of my Smith AAR for AI 182 and the appendices to it. These hard copy files should be the same as my PDF files sent to you electronically earlier from Mr. Tucker of TSB.

Also enclosed is a hard copy of my email I sent to you via the RCMP website yesterday.

Do you have a direct email other than the web based email for RCMP?

I invite discussion on this matter which I believe presents a danger to the flying public as well as clearing up a mystery of 16 years; telephone calls and emails are most welcome.

Cheers,

Barry

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

5. Sgt Bart Blachford and Mr. Bill Tucker of TSB Air visited me in my home in early December 2001 and stayed for a day

listening to my presentation. I stated to them that viewing the evidence of Air India Flight 182 via the videotapes would be most helpful to the investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182. I quoted a family member of a victim of United Airlines Flight 811 as saying a USA NTSB official who had seen both as saying the cargo doors of Air India Flight 182 and United Airlines Flight 811 matched visually. Sgt. Blachford never replied. Mr. Garstang and Mr. Hamilton chose not to attend.

At 8:56 AM -0800 12/17/01, John Barry Smith wrote:

Sgt. B. Blachford
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather St.
Vancouver, B. C.
V5Z 1K6

Dear Sgt. Bart Blachford, 17 Dec 01

Let us take advantage of this extra time to further check out the shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup for Air India Flight 182 and others.

I'm hoping this extra time will give you and AITF opportunity to interview me again as they check out the items of interest you discovered during our discussions such as paint smears and twisted torque tubes.

Is there any chance we can view videotapes of that door area of Air India Flight 182 together to look for those matches to United Airlines Flight 811?

During our talks down here I mentioned that the family of one of the victims of United Airlines Flight 811, the Campbells, had quoted a NTSB investigator as saying the Air India Flight 182 door looked just like the United Airlines Flight 811 door which gives a further match to a wiring cause and not a bomb. Mr. Tucker said he believed that no NTSB investigator had access to the Air India Flight 182 photos and thus could give no opinion. I was able to research this further and discovered that, in fact, a NTSB investigator did have access to all of the Air India Flight 182 data and thus could state with accuracy that the Air India Flight 182 door matched the United Airlines Flight 811 forward cargo door. That investigator was no less than Jim Wildey, the person who ruled out the forward cargo door of Trans World Airlines Flight 800 based on only the examination of eight of the ten latches.

Below excerpt from the Campbells of New Zealand to me:

'We flew to Seattle but were told we could not see the door , we drove to Washington to see the NTSB and as we entered the office we were told they could spare us 5 minutes, about 3 hours later we held a set of the recovered C locks and Lock sectors and they admitted we were correct , that they would ensure that the aircraft would be fixed but not to hold our breath waiting for a new report ever to be released . After lunch with them I asked " in light of what we now know on 811 do you still think that Air India was a bomb ?" The reply was that we never thought that Air India was a bomb in

fact the video shows a cargo door exactly the same as 811.'

From Kirpal Report below on Air India Flight 182:

'1.5.16 The participant had all filed their affidavits by way of submissions. The Court indicated that formal hearings would be held for the purpose of cross-examining some of the witnesses about three weeks after the receipt of all the reports of the various groups. While in Cork, in the first week of November, 1985 some of the salvaged pieces of the wreckage were brought there. After they were inspected by all the participants and their advisers, who were present in Cork, it was decided by the Court that further detailed metallurgical and other examination of those pieces would be done at BARC, Bombay. In order that there should be no undue delay the Court decided that a Group be constituted consisting of expert representatives of all the participants and also the nominees

of the Court. This group was asked to carry out metallurgical and other examination of some of the critical pieces salvaged and give its report to the Court. The group constituted as a 'Committee of Experts' was as under :-

- a. Mr. A.J.W. Melson, Canadian Aviation Safety Board, Canada.
- b. Mr. R.K. Phillips, Canadian Pacific Air, Canada.
- c. Mr. T. Swift, Federal Aviation, Administration, USA.
- d. Mr. R.Q. Taylor, Boeing Commercial Airplane Co., USA.
- e. Mr. J.P. Tryzl, Boeing Commercial Airplane Co., USA.
- f. Mr. J.F. Wildey II, National Transportation Safety Board USA.
- g. Mr. S.N. Seshadri, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, India (Coordinator).'

The above suggests that for Air India Flight 182, the NTSB

representative, Jim Wildey, said no bomb; the AAIB representative, Mr. Roy Davis, said no bomb; the Canadian Aviation Safety Board, (CASB) declined to say bomb, and only a judicial officer, not an aircraft investigator, Judge Kirpal, said bomb, and even that opinion was given reluctantly:

From Kirpal Report:

'ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

4.1 From the evidence which is available what has now to be determined is as to what caused the accident.

4.2 Finding the cause of the accident is usually a deduction from known set of facts. In the present case known facts are not very many, but there are a number of possible events which might have happened which could have led to the crash.

4.3 The first task is to try and marshal the facts which may have a bearing as to the cause of the accident.

4.4 It is undisputed, and there is ample evidence on the record to prove it, that Air India's Kanishka had a normal and uneventful flight out of Montreal. The aircraft had been in air for about five hours and was cruising smoothly at an altitude of 31,000 feet. The readout from the CVR shows that there was no emergency on board till the catastrophic event had occurred. This is corroborated by the printout available from the DFDR. The event occurred at approximately 0714 Z and that brought the aircraft down, and it probably hit the surface of the sea within a distance of 5 miles. The time within which the plane came down at such a steep angle could not have been more than very few minutes. There was a sudden snapping of the communication between the aircraft and the ground. The aircraft had also suddenly disappeared from the radar.

4.5 It is evident that an event had occurred at 31,000 feet which had brought down 'Kanishka'. What could have possibly

happened to it? The aircraft was apparently incapacitated and this was due either to it having been hit from outside; or due to some structural failure; or due to the detonation of an explosive device within the aircraft.

4.6 Evidence indicates that after the event had occurred, though the pilots did not or were not in a position to communicate with the ground, they nevertheless appeared to have taken some action. ...

4.7 It can further be speculated that if an explosion takes place in the forward cargo compartment, the oxygen stream might have been damaged so that when the pilots donned their masks as part of the emergency drill for explosive decompression, they were not breathing enriched oxygen and the time of useful consciousness at about 31,000 feet would be significantly less than 30 seconds under high stress and if the pilots became unconscious as a result of this, then the aircraft would have got out of control which would explain the subsequent events.

4.8 ..."The United States Norad/Space Command has confirmed that there was no incoming space debris in the vicinity of Ireland on June 23, 1985."

4.9 Thus we are left with only two of the possibilities viz., structural failure or accident having been caused due to a bomb having been placed inside the aircraft.

4.10 After going through the entire record we find that there is circumstantial as well as direct evidence which directly points to the cause of the accident as being that of an explosion of a bomb in the forward cargo hold of the aircraft. At the same time there is complete lack of evidence to indicate that there was any structural failure.'

So, Sgt. Blachford, that's two aviation accident investigation agencies giving an opinion that there was no bomb, one agency declining to say a bomb, and one judicial officer saying bomb out

of two equal choices. That's three to one against supporting bomb. When Judge Kirpal said there 'is complete lack of evidence to indicate that there was any structural failure,' he was correct in 1986 because he did not know what a structural failure from an inadvertently opened cargo door in flight looks like on a Boeing 747, nobody did. But now we do know and the evidence matches United Airlines Flight 811, not a bomb event although initially thought to be by the crew.

I am available to travel up there to give a full presentation to Mr. Schneider and the rest of the AITF staff if you wish. It really is important, not just for justice for the three jailed men, but that my research shows that a current hazard exists for the Canadian public that needs to be corrected.

Cheers,
Barry

(831) 659 3552
541 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

6. Mr. Bill Tucker and I had an extensive email correspondence before he retired. (Emails attached as pdf file)

At 6:23 PM -0400 6/25/02, Tucker, Bill wrote:

X-From_: Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca Tue Jun 25 15:22:17 2002

From: "Tucker, Bill" <Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca>

To: "John Barry Smith" <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: RE: Pix of Air India Flight 182

Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2002 18:23:49 -0400

Reply-By: Sun, 2 Jun 2002 17:00:00 -0400

X-Message-Flag: Follow up

Dear Barry,

I felt that this message from you below, dated 22 May, needed specific responses to several of your points. I'll get to your request for photos later in this response, but first I want to clear the air on some of your concerns - or at least try to.

- 1) - I am not being "rebuffed with excuses and delay".
- 2) - There is nothing fishy going on.
- 3) - Ron Schleede contacts me because he is a colleague and a friend. He worked for me here as Director of Investigations-Air for six months on an international exchange (and he did a great job).
- 4) - Ken Smart said nothing to influence my retirement, and I am shocked that you would suspect a connection. The fact is that my decision was made and relayed to my boss in late March, at least a month before Ken's visit.
- 5) - I do not believe the "more likely explanation for Air India Flight 182 is mechanical rather than conspiracy". Based on my direct

knowledge from the AI 182 investigation, I saw mechanical failure as one plausible explanation. Adding my indirect knowledge at the time (back in the late 1980s), from others who were more directly involved, I considered a bomb to be the more likely explanation and mechanical failure to be plausible, but unlikely. Adding in the additional knowledge I have acquired since then (which is almost all indirect in a pure accident investigation sense) I have become more convinced that a bomb brought down AI 182.

6) - The only reason that my recent e-mail referred to AI 182, PanAm 103, and TWA 800, but not to UA 811, was that I had less familiarity with the UA 811 investigation than the other three. However, I have absolutely no reason to doubt the eventual conclusion that the cargo door failed in UA 811.

7) - As I advised you last summer, this agency has no mandate to re-conduct an investigation of AI 182. Moreover, my personal opinion is that it would not be an appropriate use of our resources to do so. Nevertheless, I did believe that the TSB should make John Garstang available to that investigation through periodic secondment to the RCMP, and I

still feel that our doing so was an appropriate decision. I have high confidence in the integrity and the thoroughness of the RCMP investigation; and I sincerely hope that justice will be served by the pending trial - whatever its outcome.

Now to the matter of your request for photos of the forward right side of the AI 182 B747.

I spoke with John Garstang about your request. He advised that there are both photos and videos from the AI 182 investigation. However, with respect to the forward right side and the cargo door in particular, he is only certain about the video. They have pictures showing where the cargo door was in the debris field, and they also have a picture of the door at the ocean surface when it broke free during the recovery attempt; he is just not sure how much was video, or still frame from video, versus photographs..

To complicate matters, the video was deteriorating as time went by. Some years ago (estimate: around 1995), the RCMP took the magnetic tape video (which would be of even poorer quality by now) and made a

digitized version.

The former is ours, the latter is theirs; however they need both for trial purposes (continuity of evidence, I assume). Moreover, they have advised that the matter is before the courts, that a publication ban is in effect, and that they do not want anything to be released that could be prejudicial to the court process. Both the TSB's General Counsel and I have been notified that the RCMP Legal Services group believes that release of Air India wreckage photographs could be injurious to the RCMP's work and that, as such, release is exempted under Sec. 16(1) of Canada's Access to Information Act.

There may (far from certain) be some form of photo/video info that is still in the TSB's possession and that may (also far from certain) be releasable to you. To determine that will take considerable effort and, to be at all manageable, it will require the personal involvement of John Garstang. With his heavy workload, as we try to complete the report on the SWR111 investigation, we just can't give him any more tasks for the next few months. However, I have obtained a personal commitment from both the

Director of Engineering and the Director of Air Investigations that they will follow-up on this at the end of the summer and see if there is anything that can be made available to you. To that end, I shall send both of them a copy of this message so that they can create a "bring forward" reminder to follow up. At the very worst, the TSB's photos/videos can certainly be made available after the trial.

Meanwhile, I can assure you that the cargo door failure possibility was looked at in a rigorous and unbiased manner. In fact, I understand that part of that process was to specifically review the information and suggestions that you had provided. John G. told me that when he was asked by the RCMP to do work in that area, there was not the slightest hint of a desired outcome - only that all the information be reviewed thoroughly and objectively to find the truth.

As Sgt Blachford has indicated to both of us, the aircraft-related elements are only part of a huge investigation. The trial (which is expected to be the largest in Canada's history) will also bring out much evidence that was obtained through the RCMP's criminal investigation. You will

no doubt be following the trial, as I will. Let us hope that the trial will not be delayed much longer and that it will culminate in a just outcome (whatever that may be)..

In closing, I can honestly say that I have enjoyed communicating with you - at least most of the time. (I must admit that there have been times when you added to my stress level because I couldn't keep up with your correspondence; it is against my nature to ignore a sincere message or to respond to it without adequate consideration.) If I may offer some gratuitous advice, please don't let the cargo door issue consume you, and don't become like the conspiracy theorists. You have already raised awareness of the cargo door issue; but if you are seen as pushing it as the only credible explanation for so many accidents, people will not listen to what you have to say. I was, and still am, impressed with you. You have a good brain, a pleasant personality, good health, and a wonderful family and home; Don't miss out on enjoying all that in your retirement years.

Very sincerely,

Bill T..

> -----Original Message-----

> From: John Barry Smith [SMTP:barry@corazon.com]

> Sent: Wednesday, May 22, 2002 7:28 AM

> To: Tucker, Bill

> Subject: Pix of Air India Flight 182

>

> Dear Bill, 22 May 02

>

> Air India Flight 182 was said by the CASB and the Kirpal
Commission

> to have suffered an explosion on the right side forward of the
wing

> in flight. Therefore, photographs of the right side forward of
the

> wing are relevant and very important. It is to be expected that

> photographs of that area be available for inspection as they are
the

> fatal wound of the victim. Much time and expense was used to
procure

> those photographs. They exist and held by the Crown
authorities.

>

> If the Director General, Investigation Operations,
Transportation

> Safety Board of Canada asks to view those photographs and is
rebuffed

> with excuses and delay, there is something fishy going on.

>

> Why would Ron Schleede call you out of the blue? What did
Ken Smart

> say that led to your decision to retire a few days later?
>
> Bill, the whole sequence is fishy.
>
> I believe you see the plausible and more likely explanation for
Air
> India Flight 182 is mechanical rather than conspiracy.
>
> In your bailing out email, as I call it, to me on 9 May 02, you
refer
> to persons and titles and their opinions as to the cause of the
> accidents but never refer to facts, data, or evidence. You also
never
> refer to United Airlines Flight 811 as if it never existed which
is
> absolutely not fair since that is the model for the other three.
>
> Well, that is how I know I'm right; never rebutted with facts,
only
> the opinions of titles of persons who have been involved since
1985
> and have much interest in maintaining the status quo, even in
the
> face of conclusive contradictory evidence which abounds in the
metal,
> cams, latches, engines, and recorders of United Airlines Flight
811.
>
> For Ken Smart to imply that the forward cargo door area of
Pan Am
> Flight 103 opened in flight but that it happened after the 'bomb'
> explosion' is contrary to the AAIB wreckage distribution
fuselage

> reconstruction which shows it happened at initial event time.
The
> photographs show it happened in flight. The evidence is there.
>
> But ignored and that's why it's fishy.
>
> Bill, please do not retire until you get a look at the forward
cargo
> door area of Air India Flight 182. Satisfy your own curiosity to
see
> if the twisted metal matches the other three door areas of
twisted
> metal.
>
> Cheers,
> Barry

7. The key segment of the above correspondence from Mr. Bill Tucker of TSB Air talking to John Garstang and the RCMP AITF regarding the visual evidence is that:

- A. The video evidence is deteriorating over time.
- B. Mr. John Garstang has a busy workload.
- C. Both the TSB's General Counsel and Mr. Tucker have been notified that the RCMP Legal Services group believes that release of Air India wreckage photographs could be injurious to the RCMP's work and that, as such, release is exempted under Sec. 16(1) of Canada's Access to Information Act.
- D. Mr. Tucker obtained a personal commitment from both the Director of Engineering and the Director of Air Investigations that they will follow-up on this at the end of the summer and see if there is anything that can be made available to you.

E. At the very worst, the TSB's photos/videos can certainly be made available after the trial.

8. I followed up with TSB.

At 12:47 PM -0700 7/14/03, John Barry Smith wrote:

To: Terry.Burtch@tsb.gc.ca

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: Air India Flight 182 update

Cc: Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca

Bcc:

X-Attachments:

At 9:09 AM -0400 7/3/03, Delorme, Paulette wrote:

Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for your recent inquiry regarding the last correspondence you had with Mr. Bill Tucker on the Air India file. Mr. Tucker's replacement is Mr. Terry Burtch, who joined us last October. I have forwarded your request to Mr. Burtch, who is pursuing it at present. You may also be interested to know that just before we received your request, both the Director of Investigations - Air and the Director, Engineering, retired from the Transportation Safety Board. Mr. Burtch is presently following up with other staff in those respective organizations, and will communicate directly with you at the earliest opportunity. We regret the delay in responding, but trust that this approach will be satisfactory.

Paulette G. Delorme

Executive Assistant / Adjointe exÉcutive

Transportation Safety Board of Canada/

Bureau de la sÚcuritÚ des transports du Canada

Tel.: (819) 994-8002

FAX: (819) 994-9759

Terry Burtch
Director General,
Investigation Operations
Transportation Safety Board Canada

Dear Mr. Burtch, Monday, July 14, 2003 12:23 PM

John Barry Smith here following up on Ms. Delorme's email of a few weeks ago.

Essentially my premise is that Air India Flight 182 and others were brought down by a mechanical cause with precedent. There are no conspiracies, just a machine obeying the physical laws of nature.

My proof is in official documents, photographs, and the wonderful luxury of hindsight of 18 years.

The issue is important because the mechanical problems exist to this day and the danger exists of a reoccurrence of the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation.

There also exists the trial of two men accused of causing the inflight breakup. Would it not be prudent for TSB to conduct an update of the AAR of so many years ago? The CASB report and the Kirpal report were conducted without the benefit of subsequent similar accidents to similar type aircraft and model under similar circumstances.

An update would be most beneficial since the latest Canadian opinion as to the probable cause of Air India Flight 182 was an explosion of undetermined origin in the forward cargo compartment, an opinion I concur with as time has revealed the cause of the explosion.

It's not a bomb. Nobody 'blew' it up. It was an explosion all right, an explosive decompression.

John Garstang has been seconded to the RCMP and his opinion does not reflect that of the TSB, does it? If so, then there are many inconsistencies and contradictions in his opinion that a bomb in the aft cargo compartment caused the breakup.

The Crown is in the position of arguing against itself in the pursuit of justice for the 329 deaths in Air India Flight 182. For instance, CASB and the Kirpal Report both conclusively agree the explosion was in the forward cargo compartment. The reports offer ample evidence to support that conclusion. Yet the Crown now postulates the explosion occurred in the aft cargo compartment, a premise easily refuted with the Crown's own evidence.

If the explosion occurred in the forward cargo compartment, the accused are innocent as all the baggage from the Vancouver passengers were loaded in the aft cargo compartment. The Montreal passengers' baggage was loaded into the forward cargo compartment.

If the explosion occurred in the aft cargo compartment, the CASB and the Kirpal Report are incorrect in a basic finding. If so, that error must be explained by data, facts, and evidence. That has not been done.

Just exactly where did the explosion occur? The lives of the accused and flying passenger's today are dependent on that conclusion.

Once determined where, then the question is why. I believe I have found the answer and it is the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182 and others.

This is quite controversial and refutes conventional wisdom/wishful thinking of many years. However the facts are there. I can present them to you at your convenience, Mr. Burch.

Many facts can be deduced from the actual photographs of the actual wreckage of Air India Flight 182. Apparently the RCMP has those photographs and will not release them to TSB, according to Mr. Bill Tucker.

That's not right. That's wrong when an aviation safety board can not look at accident photographs. Could you look at the photographs and high quality video to see if the forward cargo door area of Air India Flight 182 matches the photographs of United Airlines Flight 811? Could you update the AAR for Air India Flight 182 to include the knowledge gained by hindsight and similar accidents in early model Boeing 747s?

Could you assign a staff person to listen to me as I present my research and analysis that concludes the probable cause of the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182 was the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation?

Cheers,
Barry Smith

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
831 659 3552
barry@corazon.com
<http://www.corazon.com>

9. The TSB never received any visual evidence of Air India Flight 182 from RCMP as requested.
10. The TSB never followed up by questioning me as Mr. Tucker indicated.
11. The visual evidence continues to deteriorate.
12. TSB will not respond to my requests.

To sum up, Commissioner Major, regarding the term of reference of non cooperation that I am personally involved in which justifies my request for grant of standing: There was noncooperation between TSB Air and the RCMP AITF regarding relevant and important visual evidence in the form of videotapes and 35 MM color film of the wreckage of Air India Flight 182. The Canadian air accident investigating board was denied visual evidence of an airplane crash by the police authorities who claimed an exemption to law to justify the denial.

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive

Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
safety@ntsb.org

Email list to authorities below for Tucker, Garstang, Smart, and Blachford:

F (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:22 PM 5/24/01
7 Air India Flt. 182
S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 1:32 AM 5/25/01
41 Supplemental TSB report for Air India Flight 182
S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:32 AM
5/26/01 0 Smith AAR Appendices A, B, C, D, E
S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:33 AM
5/26/01 0 Smith AAR Appendix I
S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:37 AM 5/26/01
0 Smith AAR Appendices F, G, H, J,
S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:37 AM
5/26/01 0 Official AI 182 Reports in PDF
S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:38 AM 5/26/01
0 UAL 811 NTSB AAR in PDF
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 12:12 PM
5/26/01 9 Supplemental thoughts
S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 7:15 PM 5/30/01 0
PDF of Smith AAR for AI 182
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 7:17 PM 5/30/01 3
Sgt Blachford contacted me
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:32 AM 6/14/01
11 So true...
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:59 AM 6/18/01
9 Swiss Air 111 changes

F (Normal) Tucker, Bill 6:20 PM 6/20/01 11
 Re: Swiss Air 111 changes

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 6:43 PM 6/20/01
 4 Sudden loud sound on CVR

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:04 PM 6/22/01
 13 Startle/falling reflex

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:06 PM 6/24/01 22
 DI-Air, DE, IIC, AITF

F (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:05 AM 6/25/01
 5 Re: Sudden loud sound on CVR

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:14 PM 6/25/01 2
 Re: Sudden loud sound on CVR

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:59 AM 7/2/01
 0 Part One in PDF file

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:00 AM 7/2/01 32
 Consensus on Location of explosion in Air India Flight

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:16 PM 7/5/01 32
 Consensus on Cause of explosion in Air India Flight 18

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 8:17 PM 7/5/01
 0 PDF Consensus on Cause of explosion in Air India Fligh

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 4:45 PM 7/6/01
 0 PDF of Conclusions, Recommendations, and Implications

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:46 PM 7/6/01 31
 Conclusions, Recommendations, and Implications of wiri

R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:38 PM 7/13/01 2
 Re: Consensus on Cause of explosion in Air India Fligh

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 6:15 PM 7/13/01 2
 Re: Consensus on Cause of explosion in Air India Fligh

(Normal) Tucker, Bill 6:58 PM 7/13/01 2
 Re: Consensus on Cause of explosion in Air India Fligh

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:17 PM 7/22/01 8
 Startling SDR

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:03 PM 7/23/01 12

Two matched events of uncommanded cargo door openings,
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:43 AM 7/26/01
14 Electrical cause of uncommanded forward cargo door ope
R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:24 PM 8/3/01 7
Re: Startling SDR
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:17 PM 8/3/01
14 Government of India reconsideration of Air India Fligh
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:56 AM 8/9/01 12
Warning/Alert/Interview me/Placentia
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:53 AM 8/10/01
46 Defence team contact
- (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:13 PM 8/12/01
7 From CASB member Les Filotas
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:17 AM 8/24/01
9 What are opinions of your aviation experts about Air I
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:25 AM 8/26/01 4
A330 fuel starvation Azores
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:38 PM 8/28/01
10 Faulty wires in SWR 111 and Air India Flight 182
R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:11 PM 9/7/01
38 Re: Defence team contact
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:24 PM
9/10/01 2 Re: Defence team contact
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 2:28 PM
11/14/01 4 Request from RCMP AITF
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:53 PM 11/14/01
1 More info for meeting:
(Normal) Tucker, Bill 2:08 PM 11/20/01
4 Re: Request from RCMP AITF
(Normal) Tucker, Bill 2:08 PM 11/20/01
1 Recall: Request from RCMP AITF
R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 2:14 PM 11/20/01
4 Re: Request from RCMP AITF

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:46 PM
11/20/01 3 December 5 fine for meeting.
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 12:34 PM 12/1/01
2 Confirming 4/5+December meeting
R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:39 AM
12/3/01 3 Re: Confirming 4/5+December meeting
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 12:28 PM 12/3/01
1 Re: Confirming 4/5+December meeting
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:44 PM 12/5/01 1
Debrief
(Normal) Tucker, Bill 6:46 AM
12/11/01 3 Re: Debrief
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 1:52 PM
12/11/01 46 The End of the Day
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 2:55 PM
12/11/01 51 Garstang Report in text, unable to send PDF
- (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 2:56 PM 12/11/01
0 Garstang PDF Report
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 12:57 PM
12/12/01 4 Sixteen years ago today...
R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:46 PM
12/12/01 3 Re: Sixteen years ago today...
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:13 PM 12/12/01
18 Small world..
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:13 AM 12/13/01
2 Whoa, Nelly....
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:58 AM
12/15/01 13 Recent forward cargo door crunch on Boeing
747 at Heat
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:55 AM 12/17/01
10 NTSB was with 182/Trial delay
(Normal) y Tucker, Bill 4:41 PM 1/29/02 2
Fwd: Lockerbie Cago Door Photos

F (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:04 PM 1/30/02
 7 Analysis of PA 103 cargo door photo Part II
 F (Normal) Tucker, Bill 2:42 PM 2/1/02 10
 Analysis of PA 103 cargo door photo Part III
 (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:30 PM 2/1/02 1
 Re: Analysis of PA 103 cargo door photo Part III
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:52 PM
 2/10/02 5 PA 103 analysis: Note to Sgt. Blachford
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:27 AM
 2/15/02 5 Despair
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:51 PM
 2/15/02 23 Retirement, Not!
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:17 PM 2/22/02
 7 Got UAL 811 photos
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:18 PM 2/22/02
 0 811 pix 2
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:18 PM 2/22/02
 0 811 pix 3
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:19 PM 2/22/02
 0 811 pix 4
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:19 PM 2/22/02
 0 811 pix 5
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:19 PM 2/22/02
 0 811 pix 1
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:20 PM 2/22/02
 0 811 pix 6
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:20 PM 2/22/02
 0 811 pix 7
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:20 PM 2/22/02
 0 811 pix 8
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:20 PM 2/22/02
 0 811 pix 9
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:21 PM 2/22/02

0 811 pix 10
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:21 PM 2/22/02
 0 811 pix 11
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:21 PM 2/22/02
 0 811 pix 12
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:30 PM 2/22/02
 4 Photos and film in TSB hands.
 S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:51 AM 2/27/02
 0 Pic 4 exhibit list
 S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:51 AM
 2/27/02 0 Pic 1 article
 S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:51 AM 2/27/02
 0 Incident page 5
 S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:51 AM
 2/27/02 0 Incident page 4
 S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:51 AM
 2/27/02 0 Incident page 3
 S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:51 AM
 2/27/02 0 Incident page 2
 S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:52 AM
 2/27/02 0 Incident page 1
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 1:05 PM 2/27/02
 7 811 pix from inside/missing seats/floor damage
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:24 AM 3/3/02 29
 Door of 182 like door of 811
 F (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:04 PM 3/5/02 6
 Re: Photos and film in TSB hands.
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:33 PM 3/5/02
 1 Re: Photos and film in TSB hands.
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 2:30 PM 3/17/02
 0 Welcome Back
 R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:52 PM 3/22/02 1
 Re: Welcome Back

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:36 PM 3/22/02
0 Re: Welcome Back

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:36 PM
3/22/02 0 Campbell page 2

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:36 PM
3/22/02 0 Campbell page 3

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:37 PM
3/22/02 0 Campbell page 4

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:58 PM
3/22/02 3 Campbell page 1 Significance

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:58 PM 3/22/02
0 Door Story in pdf

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:21 AM
3/23/02 5 Door overview and closeups

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:08 AM
3/24/02 54 Copy of letter to Sgt Blachford AITF, 22 Mar
02

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:59 AM 3/28/02
0 Funny but shouldn't be

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:13 AM 4/4/02 2
Short landing and takeoff platform...

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:05 AM 4/11/02
1 Mr. Ken Smart

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:01 AM 4/16/02
24 Letter to Mr. Ken Smart enclosed.

R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:48 PM 4/16/02
1 Re: Letter to Mr. Ken Smart enclosed.

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 6:30 PM 4/16/02 1
I'm on call for any questions you may have/come visit

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:43 AM 4/18/02
5 Note from Mr. Smart and my response:

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:29 PM 4/18/02 3
Resend of Note from Mr. Smart and my response:

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:19 AM 4/20/02 5
Resend just in case

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:04 AM 4/22/02
55 My reply to Mr. Smart's email

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:26 AM 4/30/02 0
Smith AAR PA 103, Appendix L

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:26 AM 4/30/02 0
Smith AAR PA 103, Appendix M

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:27 AM 4/30/02 0
Smith AAR PA 103, Appendices A-K

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:27 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part I

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:27 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part IV

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:27 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part III

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:27 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part II

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:31 AM 4/30/02
1 Smith AAR for PA 103 completed and sent

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 1:05 PM 5/1/02
12 Additional considerations to AAR PA 103, Smith

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:42 AM 5/5/02 253
TWA 800 justification for reconsideration

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:34 AM 5/9/02
3 And so it goes...

(Normal) Tucker, Bill 1:46 PM 5/9/02
130 Re: TWA 800 justification for reconsideration 1/2

(Normal) Tucker, Bill 1:46 PM 5/9/02
130 Re: TWA 800 justification for reconsideration 2/2

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:48 AM 5/10/02
0 Pictures

F (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:28 AM 5/22/02

2 Pix of Air India Flight 182
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 7:56 AM 5/25/02 2
Maybe again?
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:32 PM 5/29/02 3
To Mr. Chou: China Airlines Flight 611 Black Box resul
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:22 AM 5/30/02 38
Written before and after Trans World Airlines Flight 8
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:40 AM 5/30/02
4 Stay and fight, Bill, you are needed and most importan
R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:22 AM 5/30/02
5 Re: Stay and fight, Bill, you are needed and most impo
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:11 AM 5/30/02
2 182pix/sweet retirement
R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:48 PM 5/30/02
3 Fwd: My email to Mr. Chou for China Airlines Flight 611
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:26 PM 5/30/02
66 I do consider all alternatives, I ask others do also.
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:53 PM 6/2/02 283
Sent to Mr. Smart: Last ditch effort, clutching at str
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:34 AM 6/7/02 11
From Ken Smart
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:15 PM 6/10/02 105
To Ken Smart: Line of communication open Pan Am Flight
R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:01 AM 6/24/02 6
Re: Please notify Chinese Authorities about the wiring
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:13 AM 6/24/02 3
Re: Please notify Chinese Authorities about the wiring
F (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:23 PM 6/25/02 10
Re: Pix of Air India Flight 182
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:50 PM 6/25/02
20 Summary of exit briefing...
S (Normal) y aaib-dot@dircon.co.uk 10:01
AM 4/16/02 24 Mr. Bill Tucker/wiring/cargo door for PA

103

F (Normal) Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca 11:32 AM
1/30/02 20 Analysis of PA 103 cargo door pictures
F (Normal) Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca 11:25 AM
2/6/02 11 Analysis of PA 103 cargo door photo Part IV
S (Normal) Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca,
ksmart@aaib.gov.uk 10:12 AM 5/26/02 41 China
Airlines 611
S (Normal) Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca,
ksmart@aaib.gov.uk 10:01 AM 5/29/02 23 My email
to Mr. Chou for China Airlines Flight 611
S (Normal) Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca,
ksmart@aaib.gov.uk 7:13 PM 6/23/02 4 Please notify
Chinese Authorities about the wiring/car

R (Normal) Ken Smart 9:41 AM 4/18/02
199 Mr. Bill Tucker/wiring/cargo door for PA 103 message
R (Normal) Ken Smart 9:41 AM 4/18/02
199 Mr. Bill Tucker/wiring/cargo door for PA 103 message
S (Normal) Ken Smart 10:43 AM 4/18/02
4 Thank you for email, detailed reply to follow.
S (Normal) Ken Smart 8:04 AM 4/22/02 55
PA 103 reply to your email, Mr. Smart
S (Normal) y Ken Smart 9:26 AM 4/30/02 0
Smith AAR PA 103, Appendices A-K
S (Normal) y Ken Smart 9:26 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Appendix M
S (Normal) y Ken Smart 9:26 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Appendix L
S (Normal) y Ken Smart 9:26 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part IV
S (Normal) y Ken Smart 9:26 AM 4/30/02

0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part III
S (Normal) y Ken Smart 9:26 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part II
S (Normal) y Ken Smart 9:26 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part I
S (Normal) Ken Smart 9:31 AM 4/30/02
1 Smith AAR for PA 103 completed and sent
S (Normal) y Ken Smart 1:05 PM 5/1/02
12 Additional considerations to AAR PA 103, Smith
S (Normal) Ken Smart 9:22 AM 5/30/02 38
Written before and after Trans World Airlines Flight 8
S (Normal) Ken Smart 8:46 PM 6/2/02 293
Conscience/Comet/Wiring/Doors
(Normal) Ken Smart 2:33 AM 6/7/02 1
Re: Conscience/Comet/Wiring/Doors
R (Normal) Ken Smart 2:33 AM 6/7/02
151 Re: Conscience/Comet/Wiring/Doors
F (Normal) y Ken Smart 10:00 PM 6/9/02
97 Line of communication open Pan Am Flight 103
R (Normal) Ken Smart 2:31 AM 6/25/02
5 Re: Please notify Chinese Authorities about the wiring
S (Normal) Ken Smart 12:18 AM 6/26/02
7 Pattern emerging
S (Normal) Ken Smart 11:30 PM
8/16/03 6 Investigators ask questions....
S (Normal) y ksmart@aaib.gov.uk 8:04 AM
4/22/02 0 Smith AAR for Air India Flight 182/103
S (Normal) y ksmart@aaib.gov.uk 8:05 AM
4/22/02 0 AAR United Airlines Flight 811 92/02 NTSB
S (Normal) ksmart@aaib.gov.uk 5:33 PM
5/29/02 2 To Mr. Chou: China Airlines Flight 611 Black Box
resul
S (Normal) ksmart@aaib.gov.uk,

Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca, kfch 11:27 AM 6/29/02 3 Maybe
not open cargo door....

(Normal) Securitas 4:18 AM 2/27/97 3
Re: Crash cause of Air India Flight 182
- (Normal) Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
9:01 AM 2/27/97 2 Thank you for info, need more please
- (Normal) Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca 12:43
PM 3/1/97 1 Cargo door Flight 182
- (Normal) Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca 8:47
PM 3/15/97 2 Please comment AI 182 cargo door
- (Normal) Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
2:11 PM 4/17/97 1 Attention Mr John Garstang RE Air India
182
- (Normal) Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca 3:30
PM 11/28/97 17 Cargo door rupture/NTSB TWA 800
Hearing
S (Normal) Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
2:33 AM 10/29/00 16 AI 182 matches TWA 800 and PA
103 and UAL 811
S (Normal) Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
9:05 PM 3/13/01 2 Urgent for John Garstang of TSB re: AI
182 bomb locati

- (Normal) SGT Blachford@redshift.com
11:56 PM 11/14/01 5 Meeting about Air India Flight 182
- (Normal) SGT Blachford@redshift.com
9:56 AM 12/17/01 10 Trial delay opportunity
- (Normal) Sgt. Bart Blachford@RCMP
2:40 PM 2/1/02 2 Pan Am Flight 103 cargo door
photographs analyses
- (Normal) Sgt. Bart Blachford@RCMP

4:30 PM 5/1/02 2 Smith AAR for Pan Am Flight 103
X (Normal) Sgt. Bart
Blachford@redshift.com 1:46 PM 12/11/01 16 The
End of the Day
- (Normal) Sgt.Bart Blachford@RCMP 11:43
PM 2/10/02 5 Analysis of PA 103 cargo door photo Part
IV
- (Normal) Sgt.BartBlachford@RCMP 12:51
PM 2/16/02 3 Who are the TSB investigators?
- (Normal) Sgt.BartBlachford@RCMP 1:03 PM
2/27/02 2 Mr. Garstang follow up
- (Normal) Sgt.BartBlachford@RCMP 9:21 AM
3/3/02 21 Door of 182 like door of 811
- (Normal) Sgt.BartBlachford@RCMP 9:34 AM
3/24/02 52 Authority who said 182 door exactly same as 811
door

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT
To: "Delorme, Paulette" <Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca>
Cc: "Burtch, Terry" <Terry.Burtch@tsb.gc.ca>
Subject: **Smith Submission 9 The Crash and Meeting the Family.**

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Friday, August 18, 2006

Below is Smith Submission 9 The Crash and Meeting the Family. (It happens so fast) Filed Friday, August 18, 2006

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/ ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/ inflight breakup explanation. (Please consider a plausible, reasonable, electrical cause with precedent) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006.

Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The Layperson version. (It's not rocket science) Filed Friday, August 11, 2006

Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years: Predicting the Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non Cooperation. (Sorry, no can do.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 9 The Crash and Meeting the Family. (It happens so fast) Filed Friday, August 18, 2006

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner

Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publique

Dear Commissioner Major, Friday, August 18, 2006

To review my pleas:

1. Please grant me standing to present my mechanical non conspiracy explanation to you in depth.
2. Please ask TSB Air to provide an aircraft accident report to you on the probable cause of Air India Flight 182.
3. Please correct the highly prejudicial error on Commission website that states the CASB concluded it was a bomb; they did not. ("Yet, it was not until the following January that the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb.")

And a new one:

4. Please post all the non classified written material submitted to you by the public during the public inquiry (including my

submissions) on the Commission website, <http://www.majorcomm.ca/en/index.asp>

As I understand it, you are conducting a public, broad, and full inquiry into the events surrounding:

1. The investigation of the bombing.
2. The bombing.
3. Air India Flight 182.
4. The victims.
5. The family members of the victims.

According to the family members, the Commission of Inquiry was created because of the 329 victims and the distress the surviving family members felt in their grief.

As justification that I can contribute information to the Commission to enhance its work and thus eligible for a grant of standing, I submit the following information of what leads up to and during a sudden night fatal jet airplane crash from this survivor. I offer the Commission a unique perspective of a sudden inflight fatal jet airplane crash.

I then add what it's like to meet the surviving family members of the fatality.

Field Carrier Landing Practice FCLP (Two articles I wrote and were published in the Pacific Flyer 1990)

I popped up my canopy by toggling the switch on the left console. The aluminum clamshell with two small side windows whooshed up and locked. The warm night air of central Florida rushed into the cockpit displacing the cool forced conditioned air on my forehead while I still breathed the cold oxygen from my mask. The dull roar of the two idling jet engines hit me through

my helmet; the intakes were just two feet away on my left and right, I was in the middle. I was strapped into the back seat of an RA-5C Vigilante at 2300 hours on a concrete ramp at Sanford Naval Air Station on 14 June 1967. We were conducting Night Field Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP) on Runway 27 with five other aircraft in the pattern. Wind was calm and temperature about 85 degrees. The sky was clear with only the flashing lights of the other aircraft as they went around and around the pattern to be seen.

My regular training pilot climbed out of his front cockpit and wiggled down the ladder attached to the fuselage and the new pilot climbed up and in. The fifty thousand pound airplane with its two fifteen thousand pound thrust idling engines sat in its chocks and vibrated as it was being refueled by a yellow truck off to the side. Flashing lights were everywhere but it was all orderly and the pilot switch and hot refueling was going off without a hitch. I took off my mask and instantly the smell of exhausted jet fuel came into the cockpit. I relaxed and enjoyed it. It was all very exciting. The new pilot came up on hot mike and said, "OK, Smitty, how do you read?" He knew that his regularly assigned Reconnaissance Attack Navigator (RAN) had been replaced by me for this evening FCLP only. "Loud and clear, sir," I replied, putting my mask back on and talking into the microphone embedded in it. I toggled down my canopy and it closed with a reassuring thump and clunked locked. The air cooled down and the noise eased for a bit.

My regular pilot walked away without a look back. He had just practiced twelve landings and would do so again tomorrow night. He was an unmarried thirty eight year old Navy Commander who had been flying single seat jet reconnaissance fighters (F-8) off carriers for years and had had one combat tour in the new war

in Vietnam. He was now preparing to carrier qualify in this type aircraft before he went back to war in Vietnam. It was his first time flying in a two seat carrier jet.

I was a single, twenty three year old Ensign navigator who had had little jet experience, little navigator experience and had never been in combat or even on a carrier. I was in awe of him. We had been assigned as a crew and we flew all our missions together. We were due to qualify in the RA-5C in one month on the USS Ranger, one of the large supercarriers of the time, and then on to combat in six months over North Vietnam flying from Yankee Station in the Gulf of Tonkin. But first we had to practice crew coordination and the techniques and procedures to land the largest and heaviest carrier aircraft on a flight deck. This was the pilot's time.

For the past several months I had been navigating low level, medium speed photo missions throughout Florida, Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee, learning how to take pictures of small bridges, roads, power plants, and prisons, while maneuvering up and down and all around at four hundred and eighty knots. The hardest part was not throwing up while thinking ahead of the airplane and putting in very small number new target coordinates into the computer. Now it was FCLP and all pilot technique and skill to get this airplane at a certain spot on the earth, in a certain attitude, at a certain speed, at a certain weight, and at a certain time. It had to be done right. We were doing OK. "Any gripes?" my new pilot asked, referring to any problems the airplane might have developed during the previous two FCLP periods.

"No problems ," I answered. My new pilot was a Lieutenant Commander, also thirty eight, and had had much experience in combat and RA-5C carrier flying. He was married and had five

children. I addressed him as Mr. Butler. I was more respectful to him than in awe, but also felt much more friendly towards him. He had recently returned from a Western Pacific (WestPac) cruise and a harrowing combat tour. He was now undergoing refresher training before going out for another combat cruise with a different squadron than mine. I had volunteered to fly these two hops with him because I knew him to be safe and instructive.

"Call for taxi," he directed. I made all the radio calls but the incoming instructions were for the pilot who was listening and had his hands full trying to precisely place this ungainly airplane onto a spot of runway about twenty yards wide by twenty yards long. The A-5, like most supersonic aircraft, was a clumsy, underpowered buffalo when it was slow and dirty with flaps, droops, and landing gear down, but cleaned up it was a beautiful, graceful, speeding demon.

"Ground control, 201, taxi," I said into the oxygen mask as I pressed down on a button on right right footrest after first confirming I had the correct frequency set in the small window at eye level. We were flying one of twelve aircraft assigned to the only Navy tactical reconnaissance training squadron, RVAH-3. Our call sign was Commanche Trail 201 which I had shortened to 201. I would have shortened it to 01 but there was another 01 in the pattern and I did not want to be confused with him.

"201, Ground, cleared to taxi runway 27, wind calm, altimeter two niner niner two," the tower replied. "Ground," was short for "ground control" which was the title of the person in the tower who monitored aircraft movements on the ramp just prior to takeoff. The same person might be called, "Tower," after we were airborne.

The engines revved up and we started to slowly taxi toward the duty runway. We were only partially loaded with fuel because we would be landing shortly after takeoff and the landing gear would not support the weight of a fully loaded landing aircraft. The A-5 usually held thirty thousand pounds of jet fuel, about five thousand gallons, but for our touch and go's we usually took off with about seven thousand pounds of JP-4, or about a thousand gallons.

That amount of fuel was sufficient for about twenty five minutes of six crash and dashes before we would stop and hot refuel again. Each pilot would then have had two exhausting periods of twelve field carrier landing practices on the night runway which had landing lights which simulated a carrier's angled flight deck. They usually emerged from the cockpit soaked in sweat. There was a Landing Signal Officer (LSO) standing by the end of the runway to talk to the pilots as they made their approach. The LSO, "Paddles," as he was called, was an experienced RA-5C pilot who made recommendations to the squadron commander as to whether a particular pilot was qualified to fly out to the ship for landing qualifications which would enable that pilot to go on the cruise. A thumbs down by Paddles was a serious thing for a pilot and his career.

"Take off checklist," my pilot intoned.

"Compass," I quickly promptly as I was expecting the request. I had only flown with Mr. Butler one other time, a day low-level hop through mountains in southern Tennessee. It was the only time I had ever tried the Terrain Following Radar (TFR) which allowed the plane to be guided below mountain tops by the navigator interpreting special radar signals. No one trusted the radar enough to use it for real. On that day the radar worked fine

and I respected the pilot for at least showing his trust for me and the system. For that reason I had volunteered to stay and fly the extra two periods instead of getting out and leaving with my regular pilot who had completed his two periods. "Set," the pilot answered the expected reply. "Hook," I said.

"Up," he answered.

"IFF," I said, and then answered my own query, "set to standby." Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) was not required since we never left the air station control area, but we always went through every checklist item anyway.

"Canopy," I said.

"Down and locked, lights out," he answered.

"Harness," I said.

"Locked," he replied.

"OK, flaps and take off power to go," I said as we neared the end of the runway." The takeoff ritual was proceeding exactly as usual. We never engaged in idle chitchat.

There was so much information coming into us from different sources that it required all our concentration to monitor and interpret it so we didn't have any time for non-life threatening conversation. We were closely watching dials telling us engine temperatures, flap position, radio frequency, fuel flow, hydraulic status lights and also listening to the tower, the LSO, and five other aircraft in the pattern. Our senses were alive with processing information, figuring out which calls were for us and

which required responses. We had engine noise and radio noise also interfering with hearing clearly. Internal communication was kept to a minimum.

We waited for a minute as another aircraft came in for his approach. It was no use calling for take off yet and the common frequency was busy enough with six airplanes all communicating where they were, their intentions, their fuel states, and listening to the LSO give final landing instructions. I checked the inside of my small cockpit. My left elbow could touch the aluminum skin of the left side and my right elbow could touch the right. My arm partially bent forward could touch the front console. I had a little one foot by one foot window high up on the left and right side of my canopy. In front of me there was a fold-down desk and a full instrument panel including radar, viewfinder, altimeters and many other electronic controls. It was cramped but comfortable once I knew where everything was. The seat was a hard beige plastic which was the bottom of the ejection seat which also went up my back and over the top of my head. The seat had to be hard to exert the correct forces without hurting the back. No cushions were allowed. I could not see nor touch my pilot in his equally small cockpit in front of me.

I figured that in an hour and a half I would be having a cold can of beer and a Florida lobster and baked potato dinner at my favorite Sanford restaurant. I watched out my little right side window as the landing A-5 wobbled lower and lower. The A-5 came down in its flared position, wings rocking back and forth, and slammed down in front of us and then with a roar took back off again, then slowly turned right to prepare for its next touch and go. It was said that a carrier landing was nothing more than a controlled crash. One reason Air Force type aircraft were unsuitable for carrier landings is that the landing gear were never

strong enough.

"OK, call for take off," my pilot said. We were on hot mike which allowed everything we said to be heard by each other. His breathing increased.

"Tower, 201 for takeoff," I quickly radioed. "201, tower, cleared for takeoff, wind calm," the tower crisply responded. All the players were correctly anticipating each other.

"201, roger," I acknowledged.

As we quickly taxied into position at the end of the runway, I called off the last checklist item, "Flaps." A crew had once attempted to take off with flaps at zero. The plane never got airborne. It was such a small thing with such serious consequences. "Flaps ten," he said, "OK, power coming up." The engines now started their whining up to full roar. He released the brakes as soon as the engines were at one hundred percent and then kicked in the afterburners. We had to takeoff soon and leave room for the next A-5 now on final for landing. We started to roll. "All temperatures normal," the pilot said as we gathered speed. Our takeoff roll was short because of our light fuel load and we were soon airborne and turning downwind to prepare to land in just a few minutes. He left the flaps at ten and the landing gear down. The afterburners were shut off and the power slightly reduced to maintain our speed of one hundred sixty knots downwind at six hundred feet. We would fly the whole six passes never getting higher than six hundred feet nor further away from the runway than a mile.

"201 abeam," I called as we passed parallel the runway. Each plane called various positions in the pattern to let everyone know

where they were. The critical interval was how soon each pilot turned base which would determine how long his final approach would be. My regular pilot would often make fun of other pilots who preferred a longer approach than he did. My pilot tonight made no such derogatory statements; he just adjusted into the pattern.

"201 turning final, state 6.7," I called. We had 6700 pounds of fuel left, enough for five more passes after this one for a total of twenty five minutes of flight time.

"Landing checklist, flaps," I said to the pilot.

"Flaps full down," he replied in between heavy grunts. As usual it sounded as if the pilot was wrestling with a low, slow, clumsy, and very dangerous monster. The vibration increased at the airflow responded to the added drag of the huge flaps hanging full down into the airstream.

"Gear," I prompted.

"Three down and locked," he answered and then added, "I've got the ball, 6.0."

"Checklist complete," I said to the pilot and then stepped on my mike button and said, "201 ball, state 6.0," I let the LSO know we had the meatball in sight which was a reflected image in a mirror which let the pilot know his angle of approach toward the simulated end of the carrier. The mirror system and the lighting pattern were identical to that of the ship giving the pilots accurate simulation of a carrier night landing. Fuel state was critical information around the ship because most of the jets were always

within minutes of flaming out if they did not land successfully. At a certain point the aircraft was diverted to a land runway if it was felt the plane could not make it aboard.

"Roger ball," the LSO acknowledged that we were on final, had the field and ball in sight and we had six thousand pounds of fuel left.

Our RA-5C wiggled its wings and the engines surged up and down as we got closer and closer to the cement runway.

"Little power," the LSO advised. No reply was expected. The whine grew louder as the pilot added a little power. "Going high," the LSO's reassuring calm voice told us. I felt the power ease up. My radar altimeter and pressure altimeter wound down lower and lower. Then came the expected thump of the landing as we hit approximately where we wanted to on the runway. During the FCLP debriefing the LSO would describe each pass to the pilot and give criticism. The LSO had the authority to wave off a plane from landing and his recommendation whether to divert a plane or not carried weight. As soon as the thump of the landing occurred the engines went to full non-afterburning power and we almost immediately were airborne again and turning downwind quickly to keep the pattern tight. I noted the time of the landing, fuel state and any comments for later debrief on my pad.

This time upwind my pilot raised the landing gear and the flaps to ten degrees. Having to lower the gear for landing made the FCLP more realistic. The first night FCLP was the hardest for each pilot and now that we had that one over, I relaxed and went into the routine. I settled into the small cockpit, checked my pad of paper clamped to the desktop with the record of landings and

fuel states. I cinched up my harness, checked my clear visor down and gloves on tight. I was wearing a new silver flight suit that was undergoing testing. It had the parachute harness integrated into the suit, unlike the regular flight suit that had the harness added on as a separate item. The plane tossed and turned; it was a little like an amusement ride at a carnival. Again downwind I called, "201 abeam."

"Landing checklist, flaps," I quickly said. We both knew what the other was about to say and also knew the expected response.

"Flaps full," he replied.

"Gear," I prompted.

"Three down and locked, state 5.0," he answered just after the small thumps of the landing gear locking in place were felt.

"Checklist complete," I said to the pilot, and to the LSO I said, "201, on final, state 5.0." The plane began its usual last minute maneuverings. This particular plane, Bureau Number 149314, was on its second full day of flight operations after having been returned from a Progressive Aircraft Rework (PAR) program which updated all the systems and repainted the aircraft inside and out. It gave the feeling of flying in a brand new airplane. We also carried a million dollar camera in the reconnaissance pod. Normally the camera would not be used on the rough FCLP but this plane was up, flyable, and needed. The Navy policy of aircraft usage was when a plane was ready to fly, a crew was found to fly it. The constant pounding of the landings was hard going on camera mounts and internal parts.

"I've got the ball, 4.8" my pilot said calmly.

"201, ball 4.8," I reported to the LSO.

"Roger ball," the LSO answered.

We staggered along as usual and made a nice pass with no comments from the LSO. The plane thumped its usual thump and accelerated as the pilot applied full takeoff power. We started to climb. I started to write down the landing and the fuel state on my pad in the well-lit small cockpit when I heard a sudden soft rushing sound off to my right.

Just then my pilot said, in a slightly exasperated voice, "Oh, shit, starboard engine." I immediately asked, as I started to put my pencil into its holder still listening to the whooshing on my right, "What's the matter?"

My pilot quickly answered me. "Standby, eject, " he said in a terse, level tone of voice. I immediately reached up with both hands and pulled the face curtain all the way down over my face and upper body.

Nothing happened.

The rushing sound continued as I looked down to see what was wrong and started to think that we were low and wouldn't have much time to do any of the manual procedures such as blowing off my canopy, unhooking myself from the seat, and jumping out. As it turned out, the delay was caused by the normal functioning of the seat firing sequence which allowed three quarters of a second for the seat to be set in the full down position. Since I was tall, I always had it in the full down position. I was still looking down when the rocket ejection seat

fired. The cockpit was immediately filled with bright flame and I was ejected upwards. The original ejection seats were fired with explosive charges, but too many pilots suffered back injuries so the seat was improved by having this seat propelled by a small rocket charge that reduced the initial shock on the back. The ride up was smooth.

After the bright flash of the rocket firing I had just enough time to think that I hoped everything worked normally. I knew the complicated sequence that had to be followed precisely for me to live through this. Just then I felt a great tug and felt warm black sky all around so the knee restraints had retracted normally, the seat had bottomed out, my canopy had blown off, the seat had fired, the knee restraints had been popped off, the bladder behind me had inflated separating me from the six hundred pound ejection seat, my drogue parachute had deployed immediately since we were below twelve thousand feet, my main parachute had opened, my face curtain was gone with the seat and I was coming down to earth under a parachute while breathing oxygen from my ten minute bailout bottle. My new silver flight suit had held and was comfortable. I did not know what had happened to my pilot. His ejection sequence is delayed one and three quarter seconds to permit my ejection sequence to complete itself before his sequence commences. Without the delay there would be a chance of his canopy blowing away into me as I was ejected upward.

As soon as I had realized that the chute had opened I saw a brilliant yellow flash down and to my left as my airplane hit the ground. I thought, "Just like in the movies." It hit and smeared a yellow flash in the night. After a maximum of three seconds in the calm air after the chute opened I abruptly hit the ground in a standing position and crumpled down into a heap.

During training I was taught to roll upon landing using the fleshy parts of my body to cushion the landing. They never mentioned what to do on a pitch dark night when the ground was invisible. As soon as I hit, I felt a sharp pain in my back but quickly got up and looked around. The burning plane was about forty yards away, upside down, and making explosive noises. I was on a hard, flat, grassy field. I kept the oxygen mask on because the gas was cool and I knew it was clean. I put my blinking flashlight on my harness, as instructed in my training classes, and started to walk away to look for my pilot. I then took off the oxygen mask and breathed in the warm Florida night air. I laughed and thought, "I did it and this is really something to talk about, I can't wait to tell the guys."

I shouted, "Mr. Butler, Mr. Butler." There was no answer, just the crackling of the burning airplane. I walked around a bit, still exhilarated but very aware of my situation. It had only been a minute since the sudden rushing noise, but it had seemed like a lifetime. A Navy fire truck drove up with some fireman hanging onto the sides. It stopped and the fireman asked me if I was all right and I said sure, why not, and laughed. They didn't laugh. The plane had crashed just next to the runway. I climbed into a yellow Navy pickup truck that soon came up and we drove to a central grouping spot. I asked about my pilot but got no answer.

I got out and walked over to a circle of men standing around a parachute I knew wasn't mine. I walked over to my pilot's parachute and it looked to me as if the flight suit attached to it had just been thrown into a heap on the grassy ground. I guessed he had unzipped his flight suit and had squirmed out of the suit, leaving it attached to the parachute which was laying all strewn out. I again asked where my pilot was, but there was no answer,

only silence, as everyone just stood around and looked.

There was no activity other than silent standing around. The plane was going to burn itself out and there was no searching going on. I realized then that my pilot was still inside his flight suit and he was dead. I wasn't happy anymore and didn't look forward to telling the guys all about it anymore either. I sighed and went back to the truck and asked to be taken back to the tower.

My back was starting to hurt whenever I bent over. I rode back silently to the tower where my regular pilot and our squadron commander were already waiting. I told them we lost the starboard engine and we ejected. I told them my pilot was dead but they didn't seem to want to believe it. They said I was in shock and to relax. The safety officer was there and suggested I tell everything I knew into a tape recorder for the accident investigation. I agreed and sat down with him and told the whole story as close as I could remember it.

I then went back to the locker room, changed my clothes and went home to bed. The next day I woke up and my back was really hurting from a compression fracture of thoracic vertebrae six from the abrupt parachute landing. I went to work, was sent to the Dispensary where I was given some muscle relaxants for my back, and took two days off. I resumed flying and completed my training.

The accident report revealed that a loose clamp, probably undone or not correctly tightened during the Progressive Rework, had become loose and was ingested into the starboard engine causing Foreign Object Damage (FOD) and a fire. The pilot's ejection sequence was normal but he was too low or the angle was not

vertical enough for the parachute to inflate after it was pulled from the ejection seat by the drogue. It was guessed that he was too low because the aircraft had rolled slightly to the right while waiting for my ejection sequence to complete and thus changed the trajectory of the seat from the vertical to the horizontal. He died of massive internal injuries. It was reported that he should have used the alternate ejection handles on each armrest instead of the face curtain because that way he could have maintained the aircraft in level flight instead of taking his hands off the control stick to reach up and pull the face curtain. Up until that crash it was believed that the Vigilante could maintain altitude and even climb if an engine out situation developed when low, slow, and dirty. NATOPS was changed to have the A-5 reach five hundred feet before turning downwind. I believe that my pilot did everything right from quickly identifying the source of the noise, to deciding the airplane was not airworthy, informing his crew with instructions, and following the correct ejection sequence. And he still died and I lived.

The family members...

June 14th, 1967 1130 PM, Sanford Florida, ejection from RA-5C during Field Carrier Landing Practice, (FCLP) killing the pilot, LCDR C.T. Butler, and injuring the Reconnaissance Attack Navigator (RAN), Ensign John Barry Smith. The dead pilot leaves a wife and five children of whom three are boys, the oldest age eight.

July 1990, Pacific Flyer prints an article written by the navigator. A picture from his cruisebook of an A-5 with an A-3 coincidentally on the backside was also submitted. August, September, October, 1990. Letters pour in to Pacific Flyer regarding mixup in photos.

November 1st 1990. A letter from Pacific Flyer arrives at the

navigator's home. I open it and find another letter inside, addressed to me, John Barry Smith, Care of Pacific Flyer. The contents of the letter, handwritten in ink, follow.

Start letter: "Dear Mr Smith, My name is Richard Butler, C.T. Butler was my father. You can imagine my surprise when I came across your "Night of Terror" article in the July Pacific Flyer and realized your pilot in that accident was my father. It was even more strange because a couple of nights before I told a friend that I would like to learn more about my father's accident.

I am now a Navy pilot myself. I am attached to VF-51, flying F-14's at Miramar. We were returning from a WestPac deployment and the USS Carl Vinson was in port at Pearl Harbor, I was SDO sitting in the ready room while everyone else enjoyed the beaches when I happened to find a copy of the Pacific Flyer. What caught my eye was that they put a picture of an A-3 instead of an A-5. When I started to read the article I got a shiver down my back when I read the date and place in the first paragraph and then saw my father's name. I can still vividly remember that next morning, when I was eight years old, and there were several strange women at my house and my mother wouldn't get out of bed. My mother has yet to remarry and did a heroic job raising five kids. We all turned out pretty well. John, the next oldest boy to me is also a Navy pilot at Miramar flying with VF-126, the adversary squadron .

We would both like a chance to meet you. Your article was a good one, answered a lot of questions I had about that accident 23 years ago. If you would like to get together with John and I sometime please give me a call or write. I look forward to hearing from you. Sincerely, Richard Butler." End letter.

I held the letter in my hand, stunned and amazed. The past had come alive. There was a string of life which had continued all these years. I immediately made plans to meet the Butler boys.

I had received the letter on a Wednesday and had already planned to fly in my Mooney to San Antonio on Tuesday for a week. I had learned not to make too firm of commitments while flying light airplanes and sent the following letter to Richard Butler.

Start letter: "Dear Richard Butler, Monday, November 5, 1990,
Thank you for your letter. We must meet at a convenient time.

I was talking to a retired Navy Captain today who also knew your father. Small world.

It's amazing you and your brother are Navy pilots; it's quite an accomplishment. I met your uncle the day after the crash. I knew there were five children.

After the article appeared a reader wrote in and said he was in the pattern during the crash that night.

In 1969 I was in Sigonella filing a flight plan for an A-5 and the First Class at the tower said he watched one crash. I enquired where and when and it turned out he was the tower operator the night of the crash. He said they were all surprised anyone lived because it happened so suddenly.

Well, I lived because your Dad thought about me back there and told me to eject.

I volunteered for the hop because the previous times I had flown with him I had learned a lot. He was very helpful and patient to a

23 year old Ensign. Maybe he was that way because of his five kids.

I'm off tomorrow to San Antonio in my Mooney for a week. I will return about the 14th of November. I'll call you to set up a rendezvous. The pilot who climbed out of the plane just before your father climbed in lives in San Diego. I'll coordinate with him so we can all get together.

I just got my Commercial license with instrument rating and this is my first IFR cross country.

You might write me here at home and give me and your brother in-port schedule. Sincerely, John Barry Smith." End letter.

The trip to San Antonio to visit friends was an annual event but the first in my airplane. A year earlier in San Antonio I had first sat in a Mooney and decided I wanted one. Four days later, after arriving back in Carmel Valley, I had bought my Mooney in Hollister. Now I had it fixed up and was proudly flying it back to show off while exercising my new instrument rating.

I took off in clear weather and a fine running machine to fly direct to Bullhead City to stay in the Flamingo Hilton, courtesy of Baron Hilton who had sent me a free three night certificate, as he had done to many other pilots.

The flight was nice, the Hotel and casino were fine, and the airport was terrible. In a thirty knot wind there was no assistance to push back the plane to parking, no help tying down nor chocks available.

They would not bring a gas truck out to refuel unless I walked in

and signed a gas chit. The gas truck was slow to get there and there was no ride to and from the plane to office. I was charged for two nights of tie down although I was only there 23 hours. But the room was great, which is to say it was free and I had a view of the airport with my plane on it.

I gambled a little and drank none; the next day was to be a grueling, rugged three leg, nine hour flight to San Antonio. I planned on refueling in Deming, NM, and Fort Stockton Texas.

That night I checked the weather via a phone line to Reno. A low pressure air mass had moved in during the day bringing snow, rain, and freezing rain from Phoenix to El Paso to San Antonio.

I was faced with the common problem, bad weather and what to do. I couldn't go around it to the south because Mexico was down there. To go around to the north would require a detour as far north as Denver over some really high mountains. I had the new instrument rating and was willing to fly in clouds and rain and snow, but not freezing rain. My Mooney had no pitot heat, nor radar, nor de ice.

I did have two more free nights in the hotel, I could wait it out and push it to make the Saturday night party in San Antonio, or I could just follow the front, flying behind it in the rain but avoiding the freezing rain. When it got too bad, I could land and wait it out.

And then I thought of flying to San Diego to meet the Butlers. I gave a call to Richard's home in San Diego from the casino lobby with one of my many quarters. Richard's wife Lana responded by saying Richard was on a mission to Fallon bombing range but would be back the next night and we set up a dinner meeting.

So the attraction of meeting the sons of the man who saved my life years ago turned me away from a huge weather system and towards San Diego.

I had a tailwind and was finally able to see 200 knots on the groundspeed readout. I was in the yellow sailing along when I hit a bit of moderate to severe near Julian and lost 500 feet. I was way above maneuvering speed so I pulled the power back to slow down. Center called and asked what was going on and I replied turbulence. Another plane, a Boeing 737, heard and asked where. Center replied it was just a light plane and wasn't important. The 737 replied he didn't ask what but where.

The next day, I called my regular pilot, Burton J. Larkins, Capt (Ret.) and explained the situation and we agreed to meet that day for lunch and dinner.

We went for a ride on his beautiful forty foot sailboat up and down the San Diego Harbor. We rode by the tied up USS Ranger, where we carrier qualified (carqualled) in RA-5Cs July 1967, three weeks after my ejection. To land on the Ranger in a Vigilante was why we were practicing FCLP that fateful night.

We rode by all the Navy ships in port with the thoughts of the impending Gulf war on our minds. The sister ships to the Iwo Jima were there. The Iwo Jima was a Marine helicopter carrier and the ship that ninety percent of my boot camp class went to after graduation. I went to an electronics school in Memphis because I told the man in the third week of boot camp I liked flying so he made me into an aviation recruit while the others became seamen recruits. We sailed by Navy boot camp and the bridge connecting Camp Nimitz which I recall marching over so

often. Also visible was the USS Recruit, a landbound destroyer, where I learned to tie knots. We saw landing craft which were taking recruits to visit a ship as part of their training. Helicopters were frequently flying over us as they landed at North Island.

And we were meeting a pilot who was on a practice bombing mission in Nevada.

Captain Larkins and I were at the Cafe Machado at Montgomery Field a little early to wait for Richard and John Butler to arrive. They walked up and I immediately recognized them as Navy pilots. We made the introductions and sat down to dinner and conversation.

I offered a toast, "To C. T. Butler, a man who created your lives and saved mine." Richard's voice was just like his dad's, sort of a soft southern drawl. Richard was of medium height, sandy hair, and bore a strong resemblance to his father. John was taller and slightly younger. Both of the young men were calm, deliberate, and thoughtful. The saying, "You can tell a fighter pilot, but you can't tell him much," was not true in this case. I had to revise my image of the elite of Naval Aviation.

John had gone to the Naval Academy, then to a short preflight, and then to flight training. He was now flying F-16s, F/A-18s, and F-5s in an adversarial role against F-14s. Richard was flying F-14s in an active Navy fighter squadron. So in professional life the two men were sibling rivals but in their personal lives I saw mutual respect and love.

I remarked that it was possible that C.T. Butler was so patient and willing to teach a 23 year old Ensign named John was because he had a son named John, age six, whom he was

teaching also.

Richard had graduated from the University of Kentucky and gone to Preflight in Pensacola. He discussed the landing difficulties of FCLP at San Clemente Island, a practice carrier landing site off San Diego. There are no drop lights, there is always a right crosswind, and the landing pattern is reversed. It turns out the practice for night carrier landings is harder than the real thing.

Captain Larkins explained after he climbed out of the plane and was walking back to the ready room, he saw the flash of the explosion.

Richard mentioned there was a third brother, Paul, who had just gotten married. He said that their mother was a dental hygienist who had gone back to work to help support the raising of five young children.

We reviewed Navy career patterns the way it is now and the way it was then. We were actually representing Naval aviation from the early fifties to the early nineties. We agreed it hasn't changed that much, actually. There are still sea tours, shore tours, school tours, ship's company tours, and exchange tours.

Captain Larkins offered to take Richard and John sailing some time which was accepted. I offered my house for a place to stay if they should come up this way. We all walked out to the ramp to look at my Mooney.

I'm quite proud of N79807, a 1965 M20C, but I knew that compared to a F-14 or F-16, it must have looked like a toy model. But, as Richard said, "It was all mine."

We had enjoyed the meal, the talk of the past, present, and future and agreed we would like to get together again, sometime.

I was flying back to the Salinas airport the next day and thinking about the meeting. Naval aviation is in good hands if there are pilots like Richard and John flying. They were polite, mature, reasoning, and intelligent. The Butler family must be one really sharp family.

I wondered what went through their mother's mind when her two sons told her they wanted to be Navy pilots, just like dad. I thought of her lying in bed the morning of the crash, unable to get up, the nightmare come true, no husband, no father, no future. And yet, she did get up, and she succeeded.

It was a beautiful flight from San Diego to LAX to Point Magu, to San Luis Obispo, to Big Sur, to Salinas. The visibility was 200 miles. I could see the Space Shuttle lake bed landing strip at Edwards Air Force Base while over downtown LA at 10000 feet.

The trip up the coast was striking with surf, boats, caves, and windy highways to look at in the clear smooth weather.

And then, my airplane veered off to the left while on the two axis pneumatic autopilot Mooneys have. It then veered off to the right. I checked the vacuum gauge; it was zero. I had had a catastrophic vacuum pump failure and no standby system. While straight and level my attitude gyro showed me in a level, gradual climb and the directional gyro showed me in a right turn. Then they began to spin faster and faster. They ended up just going

around and around. I did an ILS into Salinas in VFR under partial panel and realized it is necessary to cover up the defective instruments to avoid distraction because the scan took me right back to them every few seconds.

I taxied up to my hangar and shut down. I sat in the cockpit and reflected on what had happened. The vacuum pump had failed four flight hours out of Bullhead City. If I had gone to San Antonio, as planned, instead of San Diego to see Richard and John Butler, I would have lost my primary flight instruments while in the soup over somewhere near Deming, New Mexico, where mountains are high, radar coverage is poor, and airfields far apart.

C. T. Butler may have saved my tail again. The End.

Commissioner Major, as justification that I can contribute information to the Commission to enhance its work and thus eligible for a grant of standing, I have submitted the above narrative of what leads up to and during a sudden night fatal jet airplane crash from this survivor as well as meeting the surviving family members.

Respectfully,

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Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28

July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

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Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The Layperson version. (It's not rocket science) Filed Friday, August 11, 2006

Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years: Predicting the Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non Cooperation. (Sorry, no can do.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 9 The Crash and Meeting the Family. (It happens so fast) Filed Friday, August 18, 2006

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:51 PM PDT

To: "Delorme, Paulette" <Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca>

Cc: "Burtch, Terry" <Terry.Burtch@tsb.gc.ca>

Subject: Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The Layperson Explanation

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Sunday, August 13, 2006

Below is Submission 5 for the Commissioner of the
Commission: Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial
Version: The Layperson Explanation

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Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission
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Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial
Version: The shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/
explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation. (Please
consider a plausible, reasonable, electrical cause with precedent)
Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006.

Commission of Inquiry Submission 5: Substantiating the
Unofficial Version: The Layperson Explanation (It's not rocket
science) Filed Sunday, August 13, 2006

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith

541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner
Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publique

Dear Commissioner

Major,

Sunday, August 13, 2006

Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The
Layperson Explanation

One excuse I am given by those unwilling to evaluate the hard
evidence that supports the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward
cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation
for Air India Flight 182 is that it is 'too technical'.

Well, it's not too technical; below is the explanation for
laypersons who have a basic education in science. If a person
knows why lightning strikes, why balloons pop, the power of
wind, and why gravity pulls, then that person can understand
what happened to Air India Flight 182.

Lightning Strikes

Balloon Pops
Wind Power
Gravity Pulls

Lightning strikes because of an imbalance between the negative electrically charged particles and the further away positively charged particles. When sufficient negative and positive charges gather, and when the electric field becomes sufficiently strong, an electrical discharge (the bolt of lightning) occurs within clouds or between clouds and the ground. Lightning occurs because the bottom of a thundercloud becomes negatively charged. The ground becomes positively charged. Simple physics says that opposite charges attract, so boom, the lightning takes a one way trip to the closest positively charged item- usually a tree, phone pole, or other high object.

In a Boeing 747 the opening and closing of the cargo doors is done by an electric current through a latching or unlatching motor controlled by a switch. When the switch is open/off, there is no current to turn the motor which would turn the latching cams around the latching pins. When the switch is closed/on the circuit between the negatively charged particles and the positively charged is closed and current flows through the resistive motor which turns torque tubes which turn cams to surround pins which closes and holds the door tight against the fuselage.

When the aircraft is airborne a switch is opened/off which prevents any current from inadvertently turning on the cargo door unlatch motor. There is no way to turn on the unlatch motor

to open the cargo door from inside the cockpit.

However, when faulty wiring such as Poly X type, which was used in Air India Flight 182, chafes and cracks to bare wire to short on the metal fuselage, the voltage has a path to complete the circuit and the lightning strikes; that is, the safety feature of a switch is bypassed and the now flowing current turns on the cargo door unlatch motor. The imbalance between the charged electrons which was held steady by the safety switch is now allowed to discharge/equalize through the shorted wire through the resistive motor which turns on as it is supposed to do when receiving current. The latching cams now turn around the latching pins into the unlock/unlatch direction thus releasing their hold on the closed cargo door. The faulty wire which allowed the motor to turn on when it was supposed to stay off was installed during manufacture of the aircraft. The defective wiring is a manufacturing error.

The bare wire shorted on the cargo door unlatch motor which turned the cams to the unlatch position. Lightning struck and the unlatch motor turned on and started to allow the cargo door to open in flight.

Balloon pops:

Air tends to move in a straight line from a high-pressure area to a low pressure area. As balloons reach maximum expansion they get to a point where the latex runs out of stretch and gets stiff and resists further stretching. This is obvious in a fresh, over inflated balloon. It will become stiffer and get very rigid as all the latex molecules all become oriented in the tensile stress directions. This increase in stiffness will cause balloons, unlike soap bubbles, to increase in internal air pressure just before bursting.

Even small balloons like nine inch rounds can produce a very big bang if they are strong high quality balloons and are blown up to the limit. They can develop fantastically high tensions. Of course a larger balloon blown up to a similar extreme tension all over would make an even bigger bang.

The hull of a Boeing 747 such as Air India Flight 182 can be considered a huge balloon when pressurized. As the aircraft climbs the air molecules outside are further apart and have less pressure than those that were inside the aircraft at takeoff. If the aircraft is not pressurized, the air molecules inside and outside the aircraft are the same and there is no differential. The hull is not inflated and there would be no inside high pressure trying to equalize with the outside lower pressure.

But the hull of the Boeing 747 in flight with crew and passengers aboard can not remain unpressurized as the air would be too thin to sustain life so oxygenated air is pumped into the hull and the balloon/hull inflates. There now exists a distance difference between the air molecules inside the aircraft to those outside of the airplane. There is an imbalance. There is now pressure to equalize the air molecules but the sealed metal fuselage skin prevents the equalization. The hull stays inflated.

As the plane climbs higher, the pressure inside is kept constant at a comfortable level for the passengers while the pressure outside continues to decline the higher the aircraft goes. When the aircraft is about 20000 feet, the pressure on the inside of the fuselage is about 3.5 PSI or pounds per square inch. At cruise altitude of about 31000 feet, the pressure on each square inch on the inside of the inflated balloon called the hull is 8.9 PSI.

The Boeing 747 has two cargo doors 110 by 99 inches in size. The pressure on the cargo doors of Air India Flight 182 when cruising at 31000, when the initial event occurred, was 96921 pounds pressing on each of the nine foot by eight foot doors held in place only by a long hinge, eight rotating lower latching cams around latching pins and two midspan rotating latching cams around latching pins.

An analogy: Imagine a large under inflated balloon with no holes in it. Then cut six small holes in the balloon and two large square holes. Then, if you could, put patches over the six small holes from the inside of the balloon so that when the balloon is inflated, the inside high pressure would press the patch tighter into the balloon and seal the hole tighter. That is called a 'plug type' patch. But...then put patches over the two large square cut holes on the outside of the balloon so that when the balloon is inflated, the high air pressure inside the balloon presses against the outside patch to push it outward. That is called a 'non plug type' patch.

Another analogy for the patch is a band aid wound dressing on an arm. The arm has the cut hole/wound and the patch is the band aid to stop the bleeding wound. A band aid on the inside of the arm would be more effective but impractical so band aids are put on the outside of the arm and often are pulled off inadvertently.

Air India Flight 182 has those several small holes cut into the pressurized hull and then patched from the inside. They are called plug type passenger doors. When airborne and at altitude,

those passenger entry and exit doors can not be opened in flight because the inside air pressure presses them tight against the metal fuselage. Only if the pilot depressurizes the inside of the hull can those doors be opened, such as on the ground. The wounds are small and the band aid is sufficient to stop the bleeding since the patch is in the inside and the blood pressure actually prevents bleeding.

However, the two huge cargo doors which were cut from the metal fuselage and then patched back are non-plug type. It's as if they are patched from the outside so that as the inside pressure grows higher and the outside pressure goes lower, the pressure differential increases and about 97000 pounds of air presses on the eight by nine foot door to burst it open. The door does not press on the inside of the fuselage tighter because it is not a plug type. The only things holding the door closed are the hinge and the ten latches around the ten latch pins. The latch cams are not told to unlatch in flight because there is no current to the unlatch motor. The non plug cargo doors are a design error; they should be plug type. The wounds are large and the band aid is not sticky enough to stop the bleeding as the blood pressure pushes outward.

A hull rupture in flight can be a catastrophic event so safety efforts are made to prevent its occurrence. As the cams are turned around the pins, a locking sector is then manually placed against the latch pin to prevent the inadvertent unlatching should electrical current turn the unlatch motor on. The locking sector would stop the cam from turning to the open position and the unlatch motor would burn itself out trying.

However, while the lower eight latches have eight locking sectors as a safety measure, the two midspan latches have no

locking sectors at all. That is another design error; the midspan latches need locking sectors similar to the eight lower ones. The band aid over the wound was too small.

(As it turns out, years after Air India Flight 182 crashed, it was shown that the eight locking sectors themselves were too weak to stop the cams from unlatching when the unlatch motor did in fact inadvertently receive power and unlatched in flight. The eight locking sectors were then strengthened but the midspan latches had no locking sectors to strengthen.)

For Air India Flight 182, the faulty bare wire shorted on the power for the cargo door unlatch motor which turned the cams to the unlatch position after bypassing the safety switch. The eight lower latching cams overrode the weak lower eight locking sectors. Just past dead center of the pins the 97000 pounds of internal pressure finally popped the balloon of a pressurized hull at the forward cargo door. The result was an explosive decompression which occurred in an instant. Explosive decompression is an aviation term used to mean a sudden and rapid loss of cabin pressurization.

The sudden and powerful rushing out of the higher pressure air inside the pressurized hull of Air India Flight 182 mimicked a bomb in sound and fury. The sound of the explosion was so loud it was picked up on the cockpit voice recorder. The forward cargo door split into two parts and burst apart as it tore out and up taking further fuselage skin with it. The contents of the forward cargo hold were blown out and into the nearby starboard engines number three and four causing foreign object damage to the nacelles and turbine blades inside the engines. The ensuing hole in the starboard side of the fuselage forward of the wing centered around the forward cargo door of Air India Flight 182 in

the wreckage reconstruction below was now about thirty feet tall and twenty feet wide, target 204 and cross hatch skin above it.

The manufacturing flaw of installing defective wiring had exploited the design flaw of a non plug door coupled with the design flaw of no locking sectors on the mid span latches allowing the door to inadvertently open in flight causing a massive explosive decompression which created a huge hole in the nose of Air India Flight 182.

Lightning struck and the unlatch motor turned on. The balloon popped when the forward cargo door unlatched and ruptured open.

Wind Power:

From the CVR and DFDR, AI 182 was proceeding normally en route from Montreal to London at an altitude of 31,000 feet and an indicated airspeed of 296 knots when the cockpit area microphone detected a sudden loud sound: 296 knots is 341 miles per hour or 549 km/h.

If the newly created huge hole in the nose of Air India Flight 182 had occurred while the aircraft were motionless in the calm air, the nose would have stayed on and the aircraft would not have broken up in flight. However, the wind force on the now compromised formerly streamlined hull was higher than any natural wind on earth.

Category V Hurricane, Catastrophic >155 mph
Shrubs and trees blown down and uprooted; considerable

damage to roofs of all buildings; all signs down. Very severe and extensive damage to windows and doors. Complete failure of roofs on several residences and industrial buildings. Extensive shattering of glass from pressure variation and blown debris. Some complete building failures. Smaller buildings are overturned or destroyed. Complete destruction of mobile homes. F3 Tornado, Fujita Scale 3 158-206 mph, strongly built schools, homes, and businesses have outside walls blown away; weaker homes completely swept away, F4 Tornado, Fujita Scale 4 207-260 mph, strongly built homes have all interior and exterior walls blown apart; cars thrown 300 yards or more in the air F5 Tornado, Fujita Scale 5 261-318 mph, strongly built homes are completely blown away

An intact egg is strong when pressed on its small end but after the shell is cracked, the strength is gone and it crumbles. So it was with Air India Flight 182.

The wind force of 341 miles per hour tore the gashed nose off which fell first in the debris pattern on the ocean floor. The wind force tore into the rest of the tubular, now unpressurized hull, and ruptured open the rest of the fuselage and other compartments. The debris was blown aft and hit the starboard wing and stabilizer causing inflight damage. The engines and wings came off and mixed with the rest of the disintegrating aircraft.

Lightning struck and the unlatch motor turned on. The balloon popped when the forward cargo door unlatched and ruptured open. The enormous wind power tore the nose off and disintegrated the rest of the aircraft.

Gravity grabs.

Gravity is one of four known fundamental forces of nature. Gravity is by far the weakest of the four, yet it dominates on the scale of large space objects. Gravity cannot be shielded in any way. Intervening objects, whatever their make-up, have no effect whatsoever on the attraction between two separated objects.

If Air India Flight 182 were in far outer space the thousands of broken parts would just float around but those debris pieces were affected by the gravity of Earth and caused the aircraft parts to flutter down to the sea and further down to the ocean floor 6500 feet under the water surface.

Lightning struck and the unlatch motor turned on. The balloon popped when the forward cargo door unlatched and ruptured open. The enormous wind tore the nose off and disintegrated the rest. Gravity pulled the pieces downward to the bottom of the ocean.

Lightning Struck
Balloon Popped
Wind Powered
Gravity Pulled

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Respectfully,

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To: "Delorme, Paulette" <Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca>
Cc: "Burtch, Terry" <Terry.Burtch@tsb.gc.ca>
Subject: Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Match

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Below is Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial

Version: The DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

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Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner

Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publique

Dear Commissioner Major, Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Commissioner to me: "You're free, Mr. Smith, as you probably
know, to add to your filed material should you choose."

I'm adding sir, I'm adding! I will continue to add material I
believe will be useful to you regarding the Inquiry, the
investigation, the bombing, Air India Flight 182, what's it like to
be a victim of a sudden fatal jet airplane crash, and the emotions
when meeting the family members of that fatal victim.

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the
Unofficial Version: The DNA Match.

DNA forms genes, the hereditary material of the cell. DNA is a
macromolecule present in the cells of all living beings. All the
cells of an individual contain the same DNA, creating a specific
identity for the individual. When cells divide, DNA produces an
identical copy of itself. A gene is a part of an individual's DNA.

The Emperor Kanishka had no bombs concealed in his clothes.

If the DNA can be used as an analogy for specific evidence

discovered for one event and that specific evidence is matched in another event, it can be said the DNA matches. The DNA of Air India Flight 182 was first and last an airplane that crashed:

1. An early model Boeing 747,
2. Did not have the Section 41 retrofit,
3. Had Poly X wiring installed.
4. Had previous problems with the cargo door.
5. Experienced hull rupture explosive decompression forward of the wing on right side in cargo door area.
6. Damaged engine number three and engine number four fan cowl.
7. Sudden sound on Cockpit Voice Recorder.
8. Loud sound on Cockpit Voice Recorder.
9. Sudden loud sound is not a bomb explosion sound.
10. Sudden loud sound was quickly followed by an abrupt power cut the other flight data recorders.
11. There was outward peeled skin in the forward cargo door area.
12. Had more inflight damage on the starboard side of aircraft.
13. Had at least nine never recovered bodies.
14. Had vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door.
15. Forward cargo door metal skin was frayed and shattered outward.
16. Forward cargo door split longitudinally.
17. Attempts to retrieve forward cargo door made because of its uniqueness.
18. Identical aft cargo door intact and latched.
19. Bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected.

And all of the above specific evidence is present in United Airlines Flight 811, another early model Boeing 747 that came apart in flight leading to fatalities but was able to land mostly

intact so its DNA evidence could be examined and indisputably stated:

"Executive Summary from USA NTSB AAR 92/02 of March 1992:

On February 24, 1989, United Airlines flight 811, a Boeing 747-122, experienced an explosive decompression as it was climbing between 22,000 and 23,000 feet after taking off from Honolulu, Hawaii, en route to Sydney, Australia with 3 flightcrew, 15 flight attendants, and 337 passengers aboard.

The airplane made a successful emergency landing at Honolulu and the occupants evacuated the airplane. Examination of the airplane revealed that the forward lower lobe cargo door had separated in flight and had caused extensive damage to the fuselage and cabin structure adjacent to the door. Nine of the passengers had been ejected from the airplane and lost at sea.

A year after the accident, the Safety Board was uncertain that the cargo door would be located and recovered from the Pacific Ocean. The Safety Board decided to proceed with a final report based on the available evidence without the benefit of an actual examination of the door mechanism. The original report was adopted by the Safety Board on April 16, 1990, as NTSB/AAR-90/01.

Subsequently, on July 22, 1990, a search and recovery operation was begun by the U.S. Navy with the cost shared by the Safety Board, the Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing Aircraft

Company, and United Airlines. The search and recovery effort was supported by Navy radar data on the separated cargo door, underwater sonar equipment, and a manned submersible vehicle. The effort was successful, and the cargo door was recovered in two pieces from the ocean floor at a depth of 14,200 feet on September 26 and October 1, 1990.

Before the recovery of the cargo door, the Safety Board believed that the door locking mechanisms had sustained damage in service prior to the accident flight to the extent that the door could have been closed and appeared to have been locked, when in fact the door was not fully latched. This belief was expressed in the report and was supported by the evidence available at the time. However, upon examination of the door, the damage to the locking mechanism did not support this hypothesis. Rather, the evidence indicated that the latch cams had been backdriven from the closed position into a nearly open position after the door had been closed and locked. The latch cams had been driven into the lock sectors that deformed so that they failed to prevent the back-driving.

Thus, as a result of the recovery and examination of the cargo door, the Safety Board's original analysis and probable cause have been modified. This report incorporates these changes and supersedes NTSB/AAR-90/01.

The issues in this investigation centered around the design and certification of the B-747 cargo doors, the operation and maintenance to assure the continuing airworthiness of the doors, cabin safety, and emergency response.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the sudden opening of the forward lower lobe cargo door in flight and the subsequent

explosive decompression. The door opening was attributed to a faulty switch or wiring in the door control system which permitted electrical actuation of the door latches toward the unlatched position after initial door closure and before takeoff. Contributing to the cause of the accident was a deficiency in the design of the cargo door locking mechanisms, which made them susceptible to deformation, allowing the door to become unlatched after being properly latched and locked. Also contributing to the accident was a lack of timely corrective actions by Boeing and the FAA following a 1987 cargo door opening incident on a Pan Am B-747. As a result of this investigation, the Safety Board issued safety recommendations concerning cargo doors and other nonplug doors on pressurized transport category airplanes, cabin safety, and emergency response."

Commissioner Major, please note above that the first probable cause was incorrect so the NTSB issued another AAR based upon new evidence. The same can be done by TSB Air for Air India Flight 182 based upon the subsequent new evidence. I have had the benefit of hindsight to research all Boeing 747 hull losses for matches to the evidence retrieved regarding Air India Flight 182. There have been five matches, including Air India Flight 182. All are controversial while United Airlines Flight 811 is the only aircraft that was able to land after the shorted switch or wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup occurred. The DNA evidence and probable cause for United Airlines Flight 811 is irrefutable.

In none of the five official investigations for Air India Flight 182 listed in Smith Submission 3 was United Airlines Flight 811 considered. For four of those investigations, United Airlines Flight 811 had not occurred yet; for the fifth, the attorneys and

law enforcement agencies chose not to refer to it.

For the Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182, this Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Matches, is the first to consider the match between Air India Flight 182 and United Airlines Flight 811.

What happened to Air India Flight 182 happened to United Airlines Flight 811 and others. The cause of United Airlines Flight 811 is the same cause for Air India Flight 182. The sequence is the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation.

The linchpin DNA match to all five Boeing 747 accidents is the sudden loud sound on the Cockpit Voice Recorder followed by the abrupt power cut to the Flight Data Recorder. The CVR and FDR data is the only direct evidence available and it is the best.

NTSB AAR, United Airlines Flight 811:

"The CVR revealed normal communication before the decompression. At 0209:09:2 HST, a loud bang could be heard on the CVR. The loud bang was about 1.5 seconds after a "thump" was heard on the CVR for which one of the flightcrew made a comment. The electrical power to the CVR was lost for approximately 21.4 seconds following the loud bang. NTSB Accident Report 92-02 Page 25

CASB AOR, Air India Flight 182:

"From the CVR and DFDR, AI 182 was proceeding normally en route from Montreal to London at an altitude of 31,000 feet and an indicated airspeed of 296 knots when the cockpit area microphone detected a sudden loud sound. The sound continued

for about 0.6 seconds, and then almost immediately, the line from the cockpit area microphone to the cockpit voice recorder at the rear of the pressure cabin was most probably broken. This was followed by a loss of electrical power to the recorder." Canadian Aviation Safety Board Air India 23 June 1985, page 21

Kirpal Report: "Mr. R.A. Davis, Head, Flight Recorder Section, Accidents Investigation Branch, Farnborough, U.K. 3.4.6.16 In conclusion, Mr. Davis reported as follows :- "It is considered that from the CVR and ATC recordings supplied for analysis, there is no evidence of a high explosive device having detonated on AI 182. There is strong evidence to suggest that a sudden explosive decompression occurred but the cause has not been identified. It must be concluded that without positive evidence of an explosive device from either the wreckage or pathological examinations, some other cause has to be established for the accident"

Premise Explanation for Air India Flight 182: Explosion in the forward cargo compartment caused by explosive decompression caused by structural failure of ruptured open forward cargo door at one or both of the midspan latches caused by faulty electrical wiring:

Analysis: There is close agreement with the opinions of the two aviation authorities (CASB and AAIB), the judicial finding of Judge Kirpal, and this independent aircraft accident investigator in the specific location in the aircraft and consequences of the explosion with the only difference being the cause of the explosion on the starboard side of the forward cargo compartment of Air India Flight 182:

A. CASB: There was an explosion, which could have been a bomb explosion, on the starboard side of the forward

cargo compartment near the forward cargo door which caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182.

B. AAIB: There was an explosion, cause not identified but not a bomb explosion, which caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182.

C. Justice Kirpal: There was an explosion, a bomb explosion, on the starboard side of the forward cargo compartment near the forward cargo door which caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182.

D. Justice Josephson: There was an explosion, a bomb explosion, on the port side of the aft cargo compartment opposite the aft cargo door which caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182.

E. John Barry Smith: There was an explosion, an explosive decompression when faulty wiring shorted on the forward cargo door unlatch motor which allowed one or both of the midspan latches to rupture open in the forward cargo door on the starboard side of the forward cargo compartment, which caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182.

F. Transportation Safety Board of Canada (Air): Yet to be asked for opinion.

To determine the pattern in early model Boeing 747 accidents that suffered breakups in flight, it was necessary to evaluate carefully all the official accident reports concerning them. A pattern was detected of similar significant evidence among only five of the over forty hull damages or losses, two of which are Air India Flight 182 and United Airlines Flight 811.

Summary of specific matching evidence between Air India Flight 182 and United Airlines Flight 811: (The DNA evidence listed below applies to both aircraft)

- A. Boeing 747
- B. Early model
- C. Polyimide wiring (Poly X type)
- D. Sudden airframe breakup in flight
- E. Breakup occurs forward of the wing
- F. Section 41 retrofit not done
- G. At least medium flight time
- H. At least medium aged airframe
- I. Previous maintenance problems with forward cargo door
- J. Initial event at about 300 knots while proceeding normally in all parameters
- K. Initial event involves hull rupture in or near forward cargo door area
- L. Initial event starts with sudden sound
- M. Initial event sound is loud
- N. Initial event sound is audible to humans
- O. Initial event followed immediately by abrupt power cut to data recorders
- P. Initial event sound not matched to explosion of bomb sound
- Q. Initial event sound is matched to explosive decompression sound in wide body airliner
- R. Torn off skin on fuselage above forward cargo door area
- S. Evidence of explosion in forward cargo compartment
- T. Foreign object damage to engine or cowling of engine number three
- U. Foreign object damage to engine or cowling of engine number four
- V. Right wing leading edge damaged in flight
- W. Vertical stabilizer damaged in flight
- X. Right horizontal stabilizer damaged in flight
- Y. More severe inflight damage on starboard side than port side
- Z. Port side relatively undamaged by inflight debris
- AA. Vertical fuselage tear lines just aft and forward of the

forward cargo door

AB. Fracture/tear/rupture at a midspan latch of forward cargo door

AC. Midspan latching status of forward cargo door not reported as latched

AD. Airworthiness Directive 88-12-04 not implemented (stronger lock sectors)

AE. Outwardly peeled skin on upper forward fuselage

AF. Rectangular shape of shattered area around forward cargo door

AG. Forward cargo door fractured in two longitudinally

AH. Status of aft cargo door as latched

AI. Passengers suffered decompression type injuries

AJ. At least nine missing and never recovered passenger bodies

AK. Initial official determination of probable cause as bomb explosion.

AL. Initial official determination modified from bomb explosion

AM. Structural failure considered for probable cause

AN. Inadvertently opened forward cargo door considered for probable cause

AO. Takeoff after sunset on fatal flight

AP. Takeoff after scheduled takeoff time on fatal flight

A few of the above matches may be common, trivial, or irrelevant but most are rare and critical.

The important DNA matches that determine the certainty that both aircraft:

1. Were similar model and type of early model Boeing 747s..
2. Had the same appearance for each longitudinally fractured forward cargo doors

3. Had sudden loud sounds which were an explosive decompression sound and not a bomb explosion sound.
4. Had an abrupt power cut to the flight data recorders after the sudden loud sound.
5. Had the same damaged areas around the forward cargo door.
6. Had relatively smooth fuselage skin on port side opposite the shattered starboard cargo door side.
7. Had similar inflight damage to the starboard engines and flight surfaces.
8. Had at least nine never recovered bodies.
9. Had explosions in the forward cargo compartment which were initially thought to have been bombs but the opinions were later somewhat modified.

There are many reasonable possible explanations for an explosion or explosive decompression near the forward cargo door of an early model Boeing 747, only one of which is a rare bomb explosion:

- A. Bomb explosion. (Considered for both, ruled out in one, should be ruled out for both.)
- B. Crew or passenger error. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- C. Electrical fault in switch or wiring. (Ruled in for one.)
- D. Pneumatic overpressure. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- E. Cargo shift. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- F. Compressed air tank explosion. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- G. Fire. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- H. Missile strike. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- I. Midair collision. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- J. Fuel tank explosion. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- K. Stowaway. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- L. Electromagnetic interference. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- M. Comet or meteor. (Ruled out for both flights.)

- N. Space debris. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- O. Turbulence. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- P. Out of rig door. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- Q. Lightning. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- R. Metal fatigue. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- S. Improperly latched. (Initially accepted for one flight, then ruled out for both flights.)
- T. Design error. (Accepted for one flight)
- U. Repair error. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- V. Maintenance error. (Ruled out for both flights.)

General Conclusion: Based upon the indisputable probable cause of electrical fault for United Airlines Flight 811 and the many matches of evidence to Air India Flight 182, the discovered common cause for United Airlines Flight 811 and Air India Flight 182 is the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation which is a mechanical explanation for an explosion on the starboard side in the forward cargo compartment of explosive decompression when the forward cargo door ruptured open in flight, probably at one or both of the midspan latches and probably caused by faulty wiring inadvertently turning on the door unlatch motor.

Specific Conclusions for Air India Flight 182:

These conclusions are based on evidence available after 1985.

A. While proceeding normally, an inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182 occurred suddenly and catastrophically at 0714Z at 31000 feet at 300 knots TAS about 110 miles west of Cork, Ireland on 23 June, 1985. There were no survivors.

B. The breakup was caused by an explosion in the forward

cargo compartment.

C. The explosion was a severe and sudden explosive decompression.

D. The explosive decompression was caused by the suddenly ruptured open forward cargo door probably at one or both of the midspan latches.

E. The ruptured open forward cargo door was probably caused by faulty wiring which turned on the door unlatch motor which unlatched the latching cams from around the latching pins in flight.

F. The wiring fault was probably the Poly X wiring with inferior insulation which easily cracked to bare wire especially in the presence of moisture.

G. There was no bomb explosion in any cargo compartment, crew cabin, passenger cabin, or anywhere else on the aircraft.

H. There was no explosion from any source in the aft cargo compartment.

I. The sudden loud sound on the cockpit voice recorder was the sound of the air rushing out during the explosive decompression in the forward cargo compartment.

J. The abrupt power cut to the recorders was caused by the explosive effects of the decompression affecting the power cables in the adjacent main equipment compartment to the forward cargo compartment.

Contributing causes:

A. Water or moisture in the forward cargo compartment.

B. Weak locking sectors on the bottom eight latches of the cargo doors.

C. Poor design of one midspan latch per each eight foot side of the cargo doors.

D. Poor design of no locking sector for each midspan latch of the cargo doors.

E. Poor design of outward opening, nonplug type, large, square cargo doors in a highly pressurized hull.

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Respectfully,

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From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:52 PM PDT
To: "Delorme, Paulette" <Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca>,
Cc: "Burtch, Terry" <Terry.Burtch@tsb.gc.ca>
Subject: **TSB Air and Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Air India Flight 182**

Paulette Delorme
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Dear Ms. Delorme, Sunday, August 20, 2006

Our last communication was over three years ago. Thank you for your previous help. I am again sending material to TSB Air for your consideration. I shall be sending 12 files by separate emails for forwarding to appropriate persons. The files relate to the Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 and will have subject line "Smith Submission X".

There exists a clear hazard of faulty wiring in early model Boeing 747s which presents a current danger of causing another accident such as Air India Flight 182 and United Airlines Flight

811. Please read my submissions and investigate. I welcome questions of course.

At 9:09 AM -0400 7/3/03, Delorme, Paulette wrote:

Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for your recent inquiry regarding the last correspondence you had with Mr. Bill Tucker on the Air India file.

The Canadian Transportation Safety Board Air has never given its official opinion in the probable cause of Air India Flight 182, the most famous airplane crash in Canadian history. Their specialized expert input is invaluable to the Commission. I have asked the Commissioner of the Inquiry to ask TSB Air to provide to the Commission an updated supplement to the twenty year old CASB accident report on Air India Flight 182, a request justified by several subsequent similar accidents since 1985 to similar Boeing 747s and to resolve the explosion location conflict created by Justice Josephson and Justice Kirpal.

The wiring/cargo door explanation applauds Justice Josephson's finding of not guilty, it confirms the Canadian aviation accident investigators' conclusion, it exonerates the RCMP's failure to catch Snidely Whiplash, and justifies the expense and time of this Commission of Inquiry into events surrounding Air India Flight 182. It reinforces the confidence of the Canadian travelling public in the competence of Canadian government regulatory and safety institutions.

There is much official confusion as to the probable cause of Air India Flight 182 and a related event that only you may officially resolve:

1. The first official determination is the Narita Event is from the Japanese police point of view.

"At 0541 GMT, 23 June 1985, CP Air Flight 003 arrived at Narita Airport, Tokyo, Japan, from Vancouver. At 0619 GMT a bag from this flight exploded on a baggage cart in the transit area of the airport within an hour of the Air India occurrence. Two persons were killed and four were injured... Baggage cart explodes in transit area... The explosion of a bag from CP 003 at Narita Airport, Tokyo, took place 55 minutes before the AI 182 accident...the site where the blast had taken place was inspected which gave some, though very vague, idea of the detonating power of the blast."

To sum up: "A bag from a Vancouver flight exploded on a baggage cart in a transit area from a vague power of a blast."

The Narita Event is officially determined by the police to be a bomb which caused the blast of vague power in a bag as part of the baggage on a baggage cart in a transit area of a major airport hub. The first official bomb in the baggage goes boom.

2. The next official determination of the Air India Flight 182 Event is from an Indian judge's point of view.

Kirpal Report: "4.10 After going through the entire record we find that there is circumstantial as well as direct evidence which directly points to the cause of the accident as being that of an explosion of a bomb in the forward cargo hold of the aircraft."

"All cargo doors were found intact and attached to the fuselage

structure, except for the forward cargo door which had some fuselage and cargo floor attached. This door, located on the forward right side of the aircraft, was broken horizontally about one-quarter of the distance above the lower frame. The damage to the door and the fuselage skin near the door appeared to have been caused by an outward force. The fractured surface of the cargo door appeared to have been badly frayed. Because the damage appeared to be different from that seen on other wreckage pieces,..."

The Air India Flight 182 Event is officially determined by an Indian judge to be caused by a bomb in the baggage in the forward cargo hold possibly on the right side. (No physical connection between the forward and aft cargo holds which are several hundred feet apart.) That is the second official bomb in the baggage go boom.

3. The next official determination of the Air India Flight 182 Event is from a Canadian judge's point of view.

Below from "Reasons for Judgment" by Justice Josephson regarding Malik and Bagri.

I. Overview [1] In the early morning hours of June 23, 1985, Air India Flight 182, carrying 329 people[1], was destroyed mid-flight by a bomb located in its rear cargo hold.

H. Conclusion [190] It is agreed amongst the experts that the Kanishka was destroyed by the detonation of an explosive device within its left aft fuselage.

The Air India Flight 182 Event is officially determined by a Canadian judge to be a bomb in the baggage in the aft cargo hold on the left side. That is the third official bomb in the baggage go boom.

4. The next official determination of the Air India Flight 182 Event is from the Canadian aviation accident investigators point of view:

The Canadian Aviation Safety Board respectfully submits as follows:

4.1 Cause-Related Findings

5. There is considerable circumstantial and other evidence to indicate that the initial event was an explosion occurring in the forward cargo compartment.

"The forward cargo door which had some fuselage and cargo floor attached was located on the sea bed. The door was broken horizontally about one-quarter of the distance above the lower frame. The damage to the door and the fuselage skin near the door appeared to have been caused by an outward force and the fracture surfaces of the door appeared to be badly frayed. This damage was different from that seen on other wreckage pieces. A failure of this door in flight would explain the impact damage to the right wing areas. The door failing as an initial event would cause an explosive decompression leading to a downward force on the cabin floor as a result of the difference in pressure between the upper and lower portions of the aircraft."

The Air India Flight 182 Event is officially determined by Canadian aviation accident investigators to be an explosion of unknown cause in the forward cargo compartment probably on the right side. Another explosion in the forward cargo compartment goes kaboom. (Bombs go boom, unknown caused explosive decompressions go kaboom.)

5. The next official determination for Air India Flight 182 is from the United Kingdom aircraft accident investigator point of view.

"Mr. R.A. Davis, Head, Flight Recorder Section, Accidents Investigation Branch, Farnborough, U.K. 3.4.6.16 In conclusion, Mr. Davis reported as follows :- "It is considered that from the CVR and ATC recordings supplied for analysis, there is no evidence of a high explosive device having detonated on AI 182. There is strong evidence to suggest that a sudden explosive decompression occurred but the cause has not been identified. It must be concluded that without positive evidence of an explosive device from either the wreckage or pathological examinations, some other cause has to be established for the accident".

The Air India Flight 182 Event is officially determined by a British aviation accident investigator to be something, not a bomb, somewhere, causes an explosive decompression. That is the fifth explanation for an explosion go kaboom.

Those are the five official determinations of explosions related to Air India Flight 182 by five official investigations in three countries over two decades.

1. A vaguely powerful explosion of a bag on a baggage cart with bags in a major transit area hub airport determined by the Japanese police in 1985.
2. A very powerful explosion of a bomb in a bag in the baggage in the forward cargo hold, possibly on the right side, of Air India Flight 182 determined by the Indian Justice Kirpal in 1986.
3. A very powerful explosion of a bomb in a bag in the baggage in the aft cargo hold on the left side of Air India Flight 182 determined by the Canadian Justice Josephson, in 2005.
4. An explosion of unknown cause in the forward cargo compartment, probably on the right side, of Air India Flight 182 determined by the Canadian aircraft accident investigators of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board, CASB in 1986.
5. A very powerful explosive decompression, not a bomb,

someplace in Air India Flight 182, determined by the British aircraft accident investigator R. A. Davis of U.K. Accidents Investigations Branch in 1986.

My explanation is the mechanical one: the shorted wiring/ ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/ inflight breakup explanation. United Airlines Flight 811 is the model.

I have emailed the 12 files of my research to the Commission of Inquiry, to Mr. Brucker of AG, to Minister Cannon of Transport Canada, and now to TSB Air. TSB Air is mentioned in most of the files, as well as CASB.

For the record, the CASB is correct: They did not conclude it was a bomb and the explosion was in the forward, not the aft, cargo compartment. The clues of United Airlines Flight 811 did not appear until four years later.

The Canadian Aviation Safety Board respectfully submits as follows:

04.1 Cause-Related Findings

5. There is considerable circumstantial and other evidence to indicate that the initial event was an explosion occurring in the forward cargo compartment.Ó

There exists a clear hazard of faulty wiring in early model Boeing 747s which presents a current danger of causing another accident such as Air India Flight 182 and United Airlines Flight 811. Please read my submissions and investigate, preferably by aviation personnel, Air India Flight 182 was a plane crash, not a bank robbery, after all. I welcome questions of course.

Regards,

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Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years: Predicting the Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non

Cooperation. (Sorry, no can do.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 9: The Crash and Meeting the Family. (It happens so fast) Filed Friday, August 18, 2006

Smith Submission 10: The Elephant and Emperor Kanishka. (Easy to see, hard to talk about) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 11: Reconsideration of your denial of standing: Try Try Again. (Never give up) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 12. Last Gasp: Grasping at a Straw. (Throw me a bone here, I'm dying) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

At 9:09 AM -0400 7/3/03, Delorme, Paulette wrote:

[Dear Mr. Smith:](#)

Thank you for your recent inquiry regarding the last correspondence you had with Mr. Bill Tucker on the Air India file. Mr. Tucker's replacement is Mr. Terry Burtch, who joined us last October. I have forwarded your request to Mr. Burtch, who is pursuing it at present. You may also be interested to know that just before we received your request, both the Director of Investigations - Air and the Director, Engineering, retired from the Transportation Safety Board. Mr. Burtch is presently following up with other staff in those respective organizations, and will communicate directly with you at the earliest opportunity. We regret the delay in responding, but trust that this approach will be satisfactory.

Paulette G. Delorme

Executive Assistant / Adjointe ex/cutive

Transportation Safety Board of Canada/

Bureau de la s/curit/des transports du Canada

Tel.: (819) 994-8002

FAX: (819) 994-9759

-----Original Message-----

From: John Barry Smith [mailto:barry@corazon.com]

Sent: Wednesday, May 28, 2003 1:42 AM

To: Delorme, Paulette

Subject: Air India Flight 182

Dear Ms. Delorme, Tuesday, May 27, 2003 10:33 PM

I believe you assisted me a few years ago in regard to my shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182.

You referred me to Mr. Bill Tucker. We had an extensive correspondence and a face to face meeting in my home in Carmel Valley in December 2001.

Mr. Tucker told me just before retiring:

However, I have obtained a personal commitment from both the Director of Engineering and the Director of Air Investigations that they will follow-up on this at the end of the summer and see if there is anything that can be made available to you. To that end, I shall send both of them a copy of this message so that they can create a "bring forward" reminder to follow up.

Well, I have waited but have heard nothing from either of those Directors. Was I just brushed off? Was the 'personal commitment' genuine? There is much to contribute to the TSB regarding Air India Flight 182 based on the luxury of hindsight of 18 years.

Can you refer those gentlemen/women to me for further discussion? I am a non conspiracy person and always refer to facts, data, and evidence for Air India Flight 182. I believe the probable cause was a mechanical event with precedent. Every claim can be supported by official documents and evidence.

Can you bring forward the followup, please?

Cheers,
Barry Smith

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
831 659 3552
barry@corazon.com
<http://www.corazon.com>

X-From_: Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca Tue Jun 25 15:22:17 2002
From: "Tucker, Bill" <Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca>
To: "John Barry Smith" <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: RE: Pix of Air India Flight 182
Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2002 18:23:49 -0400
Reply-By: Sun, 2 Jun 2002 17:00:00 -0400
X-Message-Flag: Follow up

Dear Barry,

I felt that this message from you below, dated 22 May, needed specific

responses to several of your points. I'll get to your request for photos later in this response, but first I want to clear the air on some of your concerns - or at least try to.

1) - I am not being "rebuffed with excuses and delay".

2) - There is nothing fishy going on.

3) - Ron Schleede contacts me because he is a colleague and a friend. He worked for me here as Director of Investigations-Air for six months on an international exchange (and he did a great job).

4) - Ken Smart said nothing to influence my retirement, and I am shocked that you would suspect a connection. The fact is that my decision was made and relayed to my boss in late March, at least a month before Ken's visit.

5) - I do not believe the "more likely explanation for Air India Flight 182 is mechanical rather than conspiracy". Based on my direct knowledge from the AI 182 investigation, I saw mechanical failure as one plausible explanation. Adding my indirect knowledge at the time (back in the late 1980s), from others who were more directly involved, I considered a bomb to

be the more likely explanation and mechanical failure to be plausible, but unlikely. Adding in the additional knowledge I have acquired since then (which is almost all indirect in a pure accident investigation sense) I have become more convinced that a bomb brought down AI 182.

6) - The only reason that my recent e-mail referred to AI 182, PanAm 103, and TWA 800, but not to UA 811, was that I had less familiarity with the UA 811 investigation than the other three. However, I have absolutely no reason to doubt the eventual conclusion that the cargo door failed in UA 811.

7) - As I advised you last summer, this agency has no mandate to re-conduct an investigation of AI 182. Moreover, my personal opinion is that it would not be an appropriate use of our resources to do so. Nevertheless, I did believe that the TSB should make John Garstang available to that investigation through periodic secondment to the RCMP, and I still feel that our doing so was an appropriate decision. I have high confidence in the integrity and the thoroughness of the RCMP investigation; and I sincerely hope that justice will be served by the pending trial - whatever its outcome.

Now to the matter of your request for photos of the forward right side of the AI 182 B747.

I spoke with John Garstang about your request. He advised that there are both photos and videos from the AI 182 investigation. However, with respect to the forward right side and the cargo door in particular, he is only certain about the video. They have pictures showing where the cargo door was in the debris field, and they also have a picture of the door at the ocean surface when it broke free during the recovery attempt; he is just not sure how much was video, or still frame from video, versus photographs..

To complicate matters, the video was deteriorating as time went by. Some years ago (estimate: around 1995), the RCMP took the magnetic tape video

(which would be of even poorer quality by now) and made a digitized version.

The former is ours, the latter is theirs; however they need both for trial

purposes (continuity of evidence, I assume). Moreover, they have advised

that the matter is before the courts, that a publication ban is in effect,

and that they do not want anything to be released that could be prejudicial

to the court process. Both the TSB's General Counsel and I have been notified that the RCMP Legal Services group believes that release of Air India wreckage photographs could be injurious to the RCMP's work and that, as such, release is exempted under Sec. 16(1) of Canada's Access to Information Act.

There may (far from certain) be some form of photo/video info that is still in the TSB's possession and that may (also far from certain) be releasable to you. To determine that will take considerable effort and, to be at all manageable, it will require the personal involvement of John Garstang. With his heavy workload, as we try to complete the report on the SWR111 investigation, we just can't give him any more tasks for the next few months. However, I have obtained a personal commitment from both the Director of Engineering and the Director of Air Investigations that they will follow-up on this at the end of the summer and see if there is anything that can be made available to you. To that end, I shall send both of them a copy of this message so that they can create a "bring forward" reminder to follow up. At the very worst, the TSB's photos/videos can

certainly be made
available after the trial.

Meanwhile, I can assure you that the cargo door failure possibility was looked at in a rigorous and unbiased manner. In fact, I understand that part of that process was to specifically review the information and suggestions that you had provided. John G. told me that when he was asked by the RCMP to do work in that area, there was not the slightest hint of a desired outcome - only that all the information be reviewed thoroughly and objectively to find the truth.

As Sgt Blachford has indicated to both of us, the aircraft-related elements are only part of a huge investigation. The trial (which is expected to be the largest in Canada's history) will also bring out much evidence that was obtained through the RCMP's criminal investigation. You will no doubt be following the trial, as I will. Let us hope that the trial will not be delayed much longer and that it will culminate in a just outcome (whatever that may be)..

In closing, I can honestly say that I have enjoyed communicating with you - at least most of the time. (I must admit that there have been

times when
you added to my stress level because I couldn't keep up with
your
correspondence; it is against my nature to ignore a sincere
message or to
respond to it without adequate consideration.) If I may offer
some
gratuitous advice, please don't let the cargo door issue consume
you, and
don't become like the conspiracy theorists. You have already
raised
awareness of the cargo door issue; but if you are seen as pushing
it as the
only credible explanation for so many accidents, people will not
listen to
what you have to say. I was, and still am, impressed with you.
You have a
good brain, a pleasant personality, good health, and a wonderful
family and
home; Don't miss out on enjoying all that in your retirement
years.

Very sincerely,
Bill T..

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:52 PM PDT
To: barney.brucker@justice.gc.ca
Subject: You can't do much better than get standing,
though, can you?

Mr. Barney Brucker
Attorney General of Canada
Department of Justice
Ontario Regional Office
The Exchange Tower
130 King St. W.
Suite 3400, Box 36
Toronto, ON
M5X 1 K6
(4 1 6) 954-62 14
(4 1 6) 952-8437 (fax)
barney.brucker@justice.gc.ca

Dear Mr. Brucker, Saturday, August 19, 2006

Hi, this is John Barry Smith who applied for standing before the Commission of Inquiry....

I put in dots because I'm not really sure what the Inquiry is inquiring about. Is it:

1. The investigation of the bombing.
2. The bombing.
3. Air India Flight 182.
4. The victims.
5. The family members of the victims.
6. None of the above.
7. All of the above.

There are some that know more about a specific area but none know more than I do about all five areas, I've lived them all in real life and in principle.

I'm hoping the Inquiry is not a whitewash show to placate angry

voters by saying, yes, yes, yes, mistakes were made, some people got demoted or retired, some new regulations were written, and everything is better now.

Things are not better now because an event such as Air India Flight 182 can happen again, not from terrorists, but from simple mechanical problems that do actually cause most aircraft accidents, in this case, the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup problem. I report to you a clear and present flight hazard in the faulty wiring in the five hundred early model Boeing 747s still in service, the same model and type as Air India Flight 182.

I'm writing to you since you appear to prefer a narrow, short, efficient inquiry instead of the full, thorough, and broad kind that Prime Minister Harper and Commissioner Major have stated they intended.

Speech excerpts - Prime Minister Harper announces inquiry into Air India bombing

"A full public inquiry is required. This inquiry will be launched immediately and led by an outstanding Canadian, retired Supreme Court Justice John Major. He has agreed to serve as Commissioner for this inquiry and I have every confidence that he will conduct a thorough and compassionate investigation into the events surrounding this tragedy. This inquiry is about analyzing the evidence that has come to light since 1985 and applying it to the world we live in today."

The Prime Minister desires a full, thorough, and compassionate public inquiry into the events surrounding Air India Flight 182 by analyzing the evidence that has come to light since 1985.

THE COMMISSIONER: "Yes. Well, I will confirm that. The

nature of this Commission was to be very broad in the evidence that it heard, in order to put to rest the various theories, rumours and neglect that have occurred since the explosion in 1985."

The direction for the Commission is pointed by the two leading authorities to be full, thorough, and broad, but earlier statements that morning had taken a darker turn.

"MR. BRUCKER: I just wanted to indicate to you, Commissioner, that I have provided this morning to Mrs. Cook and to Commission counsel a brief submission that we had prepared just on the general test for standing and issues that we submit you will be taking into account.

THE COMMISSIONER: You can't do much better than get standing, though, can you?

MR. BRUCKER: No, we can't, but we are concerned about the focus of the Inquiry. When I attended here and listened to your Opening Statement I was struck by one comment that you made and I will paraphrase that, perhaps not accurately, but what I took from your comments was that you intended to conduct a thorough but efficient inquiry and that an efficient inquiry does not mean that it has to take a great deal of time. We have, in my submission to you, a very compressed time schedule in which we have to get things done and my submissions simply highlight that in that environment, a matter which is of interest to all Canadians, that there should be some judicious consideration of who will get standing and who won't or who may be an intervenor and who won't, and that to ensure that the process is thorough and efficient I have offered some general principles that I submit might be of assistance to you.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. That's been filed and will be looked at."

Mr. Brucker, I wrote of my concerns in a submission to
Commissioner Major,

"Commissioner Major, forgive me my suspicions but now I see why those excluded from a public inquiry begin to think of skullduggery afoot. The Prime Minister and you both proclaim publicly your intentions for a broad, full, and thorough inquiry to put to rest the various theories, rumours, and neglect that have occurred since the explosion in 1985. And yet...I read that the Attorney General representative is indicating time is short and your inquiry does not need a great deal of time. He even generously offers principles and a general test to assist you in some judicious consideration of who will get standing and who won't or who may be an intervenor and who won't. It appears he's not concerned about himself being granted standing but is concerned about others. Apparently he's trying to influence the direction of the inquiry by guiding your decisions on who presents before you.

It appears to me he is afraid that you, sir, in fact, will conduct a broad, full, and thorough inquiry and is trying to make it narrow and short by controlling who is given standing and who is not. Out of nineteen applicants who 'demande de participation', sixteen were granted and three denied of which I am one, sad to say. I did not demand, I applied and am still applying.

My better reasoning self tells me that the Attorney General representative of Canada can not possibly concern himself with this wacko from California with a zany theory about Air India Flight 182 being mechanical and whose application of standing, available to read by all, describes the theory. And yet...who else among the applicants is controversial? The World Sikh Organization? B'nai Brith? Who is the AG representative

referring to in his 'general test' of inclusion or exclusion for standing? How did I fail a test of inclusion when I did not know the test questions?

It also appears that Mr. Brucker is trying to assist your decision in whether to ask Transport Canada Air for an updated aviation accident report on the twenty one year old crash by claiming time is short, efficiency does not need time and implies his agencies such as Transport Canada have a busy schedule. Press reports state the final report is due September 2007; a year is ample time to listen for an hour or two to me and my theory as well as Transport Canada to squeeze in some aviation accident investigation update time for the most famous aviation event in Canadian history. Let TSB Air resolve the glaring discrepancy between Justice Kirpal's forward cargo compartment location for the explosion and Justice Josephson's determination of the aft cargo compartment. Two bombs going off at the same time would explain away the anomaly....or something else.

Will you please ask TSB Air to provide to the Commission an updated supplement to the twenty one year old accident report on Air India Flight 182 based on several subsequent similar accidents to similar Boeing 747s since 1985 and resolve the explosion location conflict?

My friends told me, when the Commission was announced, that it was just another government whitewash to get and keep votes by placating irate citizens. I demurred and trusted in the open minded and fairness of the Canadian reputation as shown by the CASB report of Air India Flight 182 and Justice Josephson's findings in acquitting the two accused. I might have to apologize to my friends for doubting their political astuteness while acknowledging my own naivete.

I am perplexed. My mechanical explanation supports Canadian institutions.

1. The CASB was correct, there was an explosion and they did not yet understand the cause because the answer only became apparent four years later with United Airlines Flight 811.
2. Justice Josephson was correct, the two accused did not put a bomb on board, nobody did.
3. There were no lapses in security that led to Air India Flight 182's bombing that need to be rectified because there was no bombing.
4. The Mounties did not get their man because there were no men to get.
5. There will be closure for the families when they can clearly understand through science what happened and why.
6. A divisive issue of anger, hate, and revenge will be removed from the Canadian psyche.
7. This Commission of Inquiry can examine and put to rest the various theories, rumours and neglect that have occurred since the explosion in 1985 if it is very broad in the evidence it hears. Why would the Canadian government not welcome an explanation for Air India Flight 182 that is reasonable, plausible, with precedent and confirms the intelligence and wisdom of Canadian aviation, law enforcement, and justice institutions?"

Mr. Brucker, yes, why would the Attorney General not welcome the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182? I repeat: I support the Canadian institutions of safety and justice and inquiry. The Canadian Transport Safety Board represented by the CASB was correct, there was an explosion in the forward cargo compartment. The Canadian judicial system represented by Justice Josephson was correct, the accused did not

do it because nobody did it. I even sympathize with the CSIS and the Gendarmerie royale du Canada. They could not catch anyone because there was no one to catch; they were chasing ghosts created by media and a foreign government for its own purposes.

It is an inside out world where I am supporting Canadian institutions such as the CASB, Justice Josephson, the RCMP, the CSIS while a government Commission is involved with disputing their findings and looking to discredit their competence by accusing them of failure.

It is a backward world when I am the rational scientist with loads of data and corroborative facts who is stifled and regarded as looney while the government is full of conspiracies, suspicions, finger pointing, and stories that don't make sense when examined closely. I am the cooler head trying to prevail over hysterical elements of the government and media.

It is a strange world when I have to plead with the officials, who gain their authority through the power of doing what they say they are going to do, to actually do what they say they are going to do, that is, to hold a full, public, thorough, and broad inquiry to put to rest various theories.

I'm not asking for special treatment, nor an exemption or waiver, or mercy, or compensation. I'm asking for the rules to be followed, for the inquiry to inquire, and for promises to be kept.

Mr. Brucker, If you are serious about inquiring into the events surrounding Air India Flight 182 then you will ask me questions. I am open and available.

I am sending by separate emails each of the twelve submissions I have submitted at the suggestion of Commissioner Major to the

Commission. These submissions were created in response to my denial of standing and you have shown interest in who is and who is not granted standing.

1. "Disposition: Mr. Smith is denied standing. However, leave to file materials that he believes will be useful to the Commissioner is granted."

2. Commissioner Major at hearing to Smith: "...what I can do is permit you to file any written material that substantiates your view and it will be part of the Air India record."

3. Commissioner at hearing: "The best I can do is to repeat the offer I made and invite you to file in as much as detail as you choose whatever it is that supports your theory and it will be part of this record."

4. Commissioner: "You're free, Mr. Smith, as you probably know, to add to your filed material should you choose."

Mr. Brucker, you state, "...that there should be some judicious consideration of who will get standing and who won't or who may be an intervenor and who won't, and that to ensure that the process is thorough and efficient I have offered some general principles that I submit might be of assistance to you."

What were those general principles? Was I excluded and why?
Can you include me now?

Even curious prosecutors ask questions they don't know the answer to once in a while.

Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
safety@ntsb.org

To be sent by separate emails:

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/ ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/ inflight breakup explanation. (Please consider a plausible, reasonable, electrical cause with precedent) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006.

Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The Layperson version. (It's not rocket science) Filed Friday, August 11, 2006

Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years: Predicting the Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non

Cooperation. (Sorry, no can do.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006
Smith Submission 9: The Crash and Meeting the Family. (It happens so fast) Filed Friday, August 18, 2006

Smith Submission 10: The Elephant and Emperor Kanishka. (Easy to see, hard to talk about) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006
Smith Submission 11: Reconsideration of your denial of standing: Try Try Again. (Never give up) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 12. Last Gasp: Grasping at a Straw. (Throw me a bone here, I'm dying) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:52 PM PDT

To: barney.brucker@justice.gc.ca

Subject: Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry:

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Thursday, August 3, 2006

Below is Submission 2 for the Commissioner of the
Commission.

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why,
and will you.

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith

541 Country Club Drive
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1 831 241 0631 Cell
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safety@ntsb.org

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182
Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner
Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary
Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel
Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel
Ken Dickerson, Public Affairs

Dear Commissioner Major,
Thursday, August 3, 2006

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182... the words are a mouthful for sure. Permit
me to examine them closely as words are our tools to
understanding and the more precise they are, the deeper the
understanding. I am inquiring about the inquiry, but first,
research.

"Disposition: Mr. Smith is denied standing. However, leave to
file materials that he believes will be useful to the Commissioner
is granted."

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why,
and will you.

1. commission [n.]

1. A fee for services rendered based on a percentage of an amount received or collected or agreed to be paid (as distinguished from a salary); "he works on commission."
2. A formal statement of a command or injunction to do something; SYN. charge, direction.
3. An official document issued by a government and conferring on the recipient the rank of an officer in the armed forces; SYN. military commission.
4. The act of granting authority to undertake certain functions; SYN. commissioning.
5. The state of being in good working order and ready for operation; "put the ships into commission"; "the motor was out of commission."

It appears that definition 2 and 4 fit the best. The Commission has a command to do something with authority.

2. inquiry [n.]

1. A search for knowledge; SYN. enquiry, research.
2. A systematic investigation of a matter of public interest; SYN. enquiry.
3. A legal investigation into a crime or wrongdoing; "the police have opened an inquiry"; SYN. enquiry.

It appears that all three definitions fit. The Commission has a command and the authority to search for knowledge and conduct a systematic investigation of a matter of public interest.

3. investigation [n.]

1. The work of inquiring into something thoroughly and systematically; SYN. investigating

An investigation appears to be an inquiry. The Commission has a command and the authority to search for knowledge and conduct an inquiry into an inquiry.

4. bombing [n.]

An attack by dropping bombs; SYN. bombardment.

bomb [n.]

1. An explosive device fused to denote under specific conditions.
2. A film or play that is a resounding failure; "that movie was a real bomb."

The Commission has a command and the authority to search for knowledge and conduct an inquiry into an investigation of an explosive device. (The Inquiry shall not bomb during its performances.)

5. Air India Flight 182.

Not in the dictionary so let's use my definition: Air India Flight 182 was a Boeing 747-237B assigned to the airline Air India, registration VT-EFO, first flight on 19 June 1978, construction number was 21473, and line number 330. It was on a flight from Mirabel to London when it disappeared from the radar scope at a position of latitude 51°O'N and longitude 12°50'W at 0714 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), 23 June 1985, and crashed into the ocean about 110 miles west of Cork, Ireland. There were no survivors among the 329 passengers and crew members.

Basic Specifications of a Boeing 747:

Wing Span 211 feet 5 inches (64.44 m)

Overall Length 231 feet 10.25 inches (70.66 m)

Tail Height 63 feet 8 inches (19.41 m)

Body Width

Outside 21 feet 4 inches (6.5 m)

Inside 20 feet (6.1 m)

The Commission has a command and the authority to search for knowledge and conduct an investigation into an investigation of an explosive device which affected a Boeing 747.

6. Unstated focus of the Commission 1:

victim [n.]

FORMS: victims

1. A person who is tricked or swindled; SYN. dupe.
2. An unfortunate person who suffers from some adverse circumstance.

The Commission has a command and the authority to search for knowledge and conduct an inquiry into an investigation of an explosive device which affected a Boeing 747 and the unfortunate persons who died in it.

7. Unstated focus of the Commission 2:

family [n.]

FORMS: families

1. Primary social group; parents and children; "he wanted to have a good job before starting a family"; SYN. family unit.
2. People descended from a common ancestor; "his family had lived in Massachusetts since the Mayflower"; SYN. family line, folk, kinfolk, kinsfolk,
3. A social unit living together; "he moved his family to Virginia"; SYN. household, house, home, menage.
4. An association of people who share common beliefs or activities; "the message was addressed not just to employees but to every member of the company family"; SYN. fellowship.

The Commission has a command and the authority to search for knowledge and conduct an inquiry into an investigation of an explosive device which affected a Boeing 747 and the unfortunate persons who died in it and the emotional consequences upon the surviving people who share a common belief and activities.

Inquiry question 1: What is the focus and number one inquiry priority of the Commission? The investigation, the bombing, the aircraft, the victims, or the family members? What has the last priority?

Speech excerpts - Prime Minister Harper announces inquiry into Air India bombing

"A full public inquiry is required. This inquiry will be launched immediately and led by an outstanding Canadian, retired Supreme Court Justice John Major. He has agreed to serve as Commissioner for this inquiry and I have every confidence that he will conduct a thorough and compassionate investigation into the events surrounding this tragedy. This inquiry is about analyzing the evidence that has come to light since 1985 and applying it to the world we live in today."

The Prime Minister desires a full, thorough, and compassionate public inquiry into the events surrounding Air India Flight 182 by analyzing the evidence that has come to light since 1985.

Your own words, Commissioner Major, reflect that guidance, from transcript of 18 July 2006, Hearing on Standing:

THE COMMISSIONER: "Yes. Well, I will confirm that. The nature of this Commission was to be very broad in the evidence

that it heard, in order to put to rest the various theories, rumours and neglect that have occurred since the explosion in 1985."

The direction for the Commission is pointed by the two leading authorities to be full, thorough, and broad, but earlier statements that morning had taken a darker turn.

"MR. BRUCKER: I just wanted to indicate to you, Commissioner, that I have provided this morning to Mrs. Cook and to Commission counsel a brief submission that we had prepared just on the general test for standing and issues that we submit you will be taking into account.

THE COMMISSIONER: You can't do much better than get standing, though, can you?

MR. BRUCKER: No, we can't, but we are concerned about the focus of the Inquiry. When I attended here and listened to your Opening Statement I was struck by one comment that you made and I will paraphrase that, perhaps not accurately, but what I took from your comments was that you intended to conduct a thorough but efficient inquiry and that an efficient inquiry does not mean that it has to take a great deal of time. We have, in my submission to you, a very compressed time schedule in which we have to get things done and my submissions simply highlight that in that environment, a matter which is of interest to all Canadians, that there should be some judicious consideration of who will get standing and who won't or who may be an intervenor and who won't, and that to ensure that the process is thorough and efficient I have offered some general principles that I submit might be of assistance to you.

THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. That's been filed and will be looked at."

Commissioner Major, forgive me my suspicions but now I see why those excluded from a public inquiry begin to think of skullduggery afoot. The Prime Minister and you both proclaim publicly your intentions for a broad, full, and thorough inquiry to put to rest the various theories, rumours, and neglect that have occurred since the explosion in 1985. And yet....I read that the Attorney General representative is indicating time is short and your inquiry does not need a great deal of time. He even generously offers principles and a general test to assist you in some judicious consideration of who will get standing and who won't or who may be an intervenor and who won't. It appears he's not concerned about himself being granted standing but is concerned about others. Apparently he's trying to influence the direction of the inquiry by guiding your decisions on who presents before you.

It appears to me he is afraid that you, sir, in fact, will conduct a broad, full, and thorough inquiry and is trying to make it narrow and short by controlling who is given standing and who is not. Out of nineteen applicants who 'demandes de participation', sixteen were granted and three denied of which I am one, sad to say. I did not demand, I applied and am still applying.

My better reasoning self tells me that the Attorney General representative of Canada can not possibly concern himself with this wacko from California with a zany theory about Air India Flight 182 being mechanical and whose application of standing, available to read by all, describes the theory. And yet...who else among the applicants is controversial? The World Sikh Organization? B'nai Brith? Who is the AG representative referring to in his 'general test' of inclusion or exclusion for standing? How did I fail a test of inclusion when I did not know the test questions?

It also appears that Mr. Brucker is trying to assist your decision in whether to ask Transport Canada Air for an updated aviation accident report on the twenty one year old crash by claiming time is short, efficiency does not need time and implies his agencies such as Transport Canada have a busy schedule. Press reports state the final report is due September 2007; a year is ample time to listen for an hour or two to me and my theory as well as Transport Canada to squeeze in some aviation accident investigation update time for the most famous aviation event in Canadian history. Let TSB Air resolve the glaring discrepancy between Justice Kirpal's forward cargo compartment location for the explosion and Justice Josephson's determination of the aft cargo compartment. Two bombs going off at the same time would explain away the anomaly....or something else.

Will you please ask TSB Air to provide to the Commission an updated supplement to the twenty one year old accident report on Air India Flight 182 based on several subsequent similar accidents to similar Boeing 747s since 1985 and resolve the explosion location conflict?

My friends told me, when the Commission was announced, that it was just another government whitewash to get and keep votes by placating irate citizens. I demurred and trusted in the open minded and fairness of the Canadian reputation as shown by the CASB report of Air India Flight 182 and Justice Josephson's findings in acquitting the two accused. I might have to apologize to my friends for doubting their political astuteness while acknowledging my own naivete.

I am perplexed. My mechanical explanation supports Canadian institutions.

1. The CASB was correct, there was an explosion and they did not yet understand the cause because the answer only became apparent four years later with United Airlines Flight 811.
2. Justice Josephson was correct, the two accused did not put a bomb on board, nobody did.
3. There were no lapses in security that led to Air India Flight 182's bombing that need to be rectified because there was no bombing.
4. The Mounties did not get their man because there were no men to get.
5. There will be closure for the families when they can clearly understand through science what happened and why.
6. A divisive issue of anger, hate, and revenge will be removed from the Canadian psyche.
7. This Commission of Inquiry can examine and put to rest the various theories, rumours and neglect that have occurred since the explosion in 1985 if it is very broad in the evidence it hears.

Why would the Canadian government not welcome an explanation for Air India Flight 182 that is reasonable, plausible, with precedent and confirms the intelligence and wisdom of Canadian aviation, law enforcement, and justice institutions?

And yet...it appears that I am to be denied an opportunity to present my detailed analysis with supporting documents to the Commission of Inquiry. I've already been cut off after a few minutes of oral submission and can only resort to supplemental text to be filed with the record such as this plaint. There is to be no cross examination of my points, no questioning of my reasoning for my conclusions, and no public debate.

I'm even more confused when such peripheral organizations such as religious groups are granted standing while I, who has been

investigated in the bombing of Air India Flight 182, who has written extensively about the crash, who has survived a fatal jet crash, and who fits a Term of Reference for personal knowledge of agency non cooperation, am denied.

If religious groups are willingly caught in the wide net of a broad investigation, please let the small fishes of scientists like myself, Transport Canada, and the Transportation Safety Board (Air) be ensnared also. Air India Flight 182 was an airplane crash not an exorcism, after all.

The words of promise of 'public, full, thorough, broad' inquiry are empty when it comes to actually implementing them in my case and I don't know why. As a flight crewmember I put my life in the hands of my pilot. There were many men who looked like pilots, talked like pilots, and thought they were good pilots, but I judge always on performance. I was often surprised when the most unlikely looking men and women turned out to be the best pilots. Many men talk a good game but fall down during play. I assume you have also been surprised at the performance of some attorneys before you in court. I'm trusting the Commission fulfills its high ideals as stated by Prime Minister Harper and yourself, sir, in its performance.

My Inquiry into the Inquiry asks questions:

1. What is the focus and number one priority of the Commission of Inquiry? The investigation, the bombing, the aircraft, the victims, or the family members?
2. Why was I denied standing when I was qualified when others less qualified were granted standing?
3. Are you going to do a full, broad, and thorough inquiry as you have stated or are you going to do a short, narrow, efficient one as suggested by Mr. Brucker?

4. What were the 'general principles' and the 'general test' Mr. Brucker offered to you to "ensure the process (granting standing) is thorough and efficient"?

5. Why would the Canadian government not welcome an explanation for Air India Flight 182 that is reasonable, plausible, with precedent and confirms the intelligence and wisdom of Canadian aviation, law enforcement, and justice institutions as well as bringing peace of mind to many of its citizens?

6. Will you please ask TSB Air to provide to the Commission an updated supplement to the twenty one year old accident report on Air India Flight 182 based on several subsequent similar accidents to similar Boeing 747s since 1985 and resolve the discrepancy of explosion location?

7. Will you reconsider and use the authority given to you in Rules of Procedure to grant me standing as a person of unique perspective who can enhance the work of the Commission? (15. From time to time, the Commissioner may, in his discretion, at any time grant to or rescind standing from a person, or modify the status or conditions of the standing of a person.)

Summary of Submissions:

Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected Filed 28 July, 2006. Canadians did not conclude it was a bomb. TSB Air should be asked for their opinion.

Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you. Filed Thursday, August 3, 2006 Wiring/cargo door explanation should be fully considered.

Upcoming:

Submission 3: Bomb explanations are contradictory.

Submission 4: Correct probable cause is the wiring/cargo door explanation.

Submission 5: Clear and present danger exists to Canadian and other passengers flying in early model Boeing 747s.

Submission 6: Action should be taken now, not later, to fix

design and manufacturing problems.

Respectfully,

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From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:52 PM PDT

To: barney.brucker@justice.gc.ca

Subject: Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions:

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Below is Submission 3 for the Commissioner of the
Commission. 'The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the
baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom.'

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of
Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission
website.)

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner

Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson, Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publiques

Dear Commissioner Major, Tuesday, August 8, 2006

1. "Disposition: Mr. Smith is denied standing. However, leave to file materials that he believes will be useful to the Commissioner is granted."

2. Commissioner Major at hearing to Smith: "...what I can do is permit you to file any written material that substantiates your view and it will be part of the Air India record."

3. Commissioner at hearing: "The best I can do is to repeat the offer I made and invite you to file in as much as detail as you choose whatever it is that supports your theory and it will be part of this record."

4. Commissioner: "You're free, Mr. Smith, as you probably know, to add to your filed material should you choose."

Yes, sir, I can take a hint. Thank you for your urgings. I am submitting as fast as I can and will continue to file material I believe will be useful to you regarding the Inquiry, the investigation, the bombing, Air India Flight 182, what's it like to be a victim of a sudden fatal jet airplane crash, and the emotions when meeting the family members of that fatal victim.

The key focus is the crashed aircraft. If Air India Flight 182 had not crashed and landed safely, then there would be no grieving family members, no victims, no bombing, no investigation, and no inquiry. The core is the airplane and why it crashed. If the official crash causes are confused and contradictory the inquiry conclusions will be also.

Thus enter the bomb bomb bomb explanations (not lies) provided by others who think they are pointing you...

There is one scenario that unites the five official versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom.

1. The first official determination is the Narita Event is from the Japanese police point of view.

"At 0541 GMT, 23 June 1985, CP Air Flight 003 arrived at Narita Airport, Tokyo, Japan, from Vancouver. At 0619 GMT a bag from this flight exploded on a baggage cart in the transit area of the airport within an hour of the Air India occurrence. Two persons were killed and four were injured... Baggage cart explodes in transit area... The explosion of a bag from CP 003 at Narita Airport, Tokyo, took place 55 minutes before the AI 182 accident...the site where the blast had taken place was inspected which gave some, though very vague, idea of the detonating power of the blast."

To sum up: "A bag from a Vancouver flight exploded on a baggage cart in a transit area from a vague power of a blast."

The Narita Event is officially determined by the police to be a bomb which caused the blast of vague power in a bag as part of the baggage on a baggage cart in a transit area of a major airport hub. The first official bomb in the baggage goes boom.

2. The next official determination of the Air India Flight 182 Event is from an Indian judge's point of view.

Kirpal Report: "4.10 After going through the entire record we find that there is circumstantial as well as direct evidence which directly points

to the cause of the accident as being that of an explosion of a bomb in the forward cargo hold of the aircraft."

"All cargo doors were found intact and attached to the fuselage structure, except for the forward cargo door which had some

fuselage and cargo floor attached. This door, located on the forward right side of the aircraft, was broken horizontally about one-quarter of the distance above the lower frame. The damage to the door and the fuselage skin near the door appeared to have been caused by an outward force. The fractured surface of the cargo door appeared to have been badly frayed. Because the damage appeared to be different from that seen on other wreckage pieces,..."

The Air India Flight 182 Event is officially determined by an Indian judge to be caused by a bomb in the baggage in the forward cargo hold possibly on the right side. (No physical connection between the forward and aft cargo holds which are several hundred feet apart.) That is the second official bomb in the baggage go boom.

3. The next official determination of the Air India Flight 182 Event is from a Canadian judge's point of view.

Below from "Reasons for Judgment" by Justice Josephson regarding Malik and Bagri.

I. Overview [1] In the early morning hours of June 23, 1985, Air India Flight 182, carrying 329 people[1], was destroyed mid-flight by a bomb located in its rear cargo hold.

H. Conclusion [190] It is agreed amongst the experts that the Kanishka was destroyed by the detonation of an explosive device within its left aft fuselage.

The Air India Flight 182 Event is officially determined by a Canadian judge to be a bomb in the baggage in the aft cargo hold on the left side. That is the third official bomb in the baggage go boom.

4. The next official determination of the Air India Flight 182 Event is from the Canadian aviation accident investigators point of view:

The Canadian Aviation Safety Board respectfully submits as follows:

Ò4.1 Cause-Related Findings

5. There is considerable circumstantial and other evidence to indicate that the initial event was an explosion occurring in the forward cargo compartment.Ó

"The forward cargo door which had some fuselage and cargo floor attached was located on the sea bed. The door was broken horizontally about one-quarter of the distance above the lower frame. The damage to the door and the fuselage skin near the door appeared to have been caused by an outward force and the fracture surfaces of the door appeared to be badly frayed. This damage was different from that seen on other wreckage pieces. A failure of this door in flight would explain the impact damage to the right wing areas. The door failing as an initial event would cause an explosive decompression leading to a downward force on the cabin floor as a result of the difference in pressure between the upper and lower portions of the aircraft."

The Air India Flight 182 Event is officially determined by Canadian aviation accident investigators to be an explosion of unknown cause in the forward cargo compartment probably on the right side. Another explosion in the forward cargo compartment goes kaboom. (Bombs go boom, unknown caused explosive decompressions go kaboom.)

5. The next official determination for Air India Flight 182 is from the United Kingdom aircraft accident investigator point of view.

"Mr. R.A. Davis, Head, Flight Recorder Section, Accidents Investigation Branch, Farnborough, U.K. 3.4.6.16 In conclusion, Mr. Davis reported as follows :- "It is considered that from the CVR and ATC recordings supplied for analysis, there is no evidence of a high explosive device having detonated on AI 182. There is strong evidence to suggest that a sudden explosive decompression occurred but the cause has not been identified. It must be concluded that without positive evidence of an explosive device from either the wreckage or pathological examinations, some other cause has to be established for the accident".

The Air India Flight 182 Event is officially determined by a British aviation accident investigator to be something, not a bomb, somewhere, causes an explosive decompression. That is the fifth explanation for an explosion go kaboom.

Those are the five official determinations of explosions related to Air India Flight 182 by five official investigations in three countries over two decades.

1. A vaguely powerful explosion of a bag on a baggage cart with bags in a major transit area hub airport determined by the Japanese police in 1985.
2. A very powerful explosion of a bomb in a bag in the baggage in the forward cargo hold, possibly on the right side, of Air India Flight 182 determined by the Indian Justice Kirpal in 1986.
3. A very powerful explosion of a bomb in a bag in the baggage in the aft cargo hold on the left side of Air India Flight 182 determined by the Canadian Justice Josephson, in 2005.
4. An explosion of unknown cause in the forward cargo compartment, probably on the right side, of Air India Flight 182 determined by the Canadian aircraft accident investigators of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board, CASB in 1986.

5. A very powerful explosive decompression, not a bomb, someplace in Air India Flight 182, determined by the British aircraft accident investigator R. A. Davis of U.K. Accidents Investigations Branch in 1986.

There is no consensus on any significant issue by any officials other than explosive events occurred on a baggage cart and on an airplane thousands of miles apart and within the hour.

There is official disagreement in the determinations of whether it was a bomb or something else, how many bombs were involved, where the bombs were loaded, how powerful the bombs were, what container the bomb was in, which major section of the aircraft the bomb was placed, on what side of the aircraft the bomb was located, or what caused an explosive decompression that was not a bomb. (Not counted are the disagreements of who put the bombs there and why.)

There was no official direct evidence determined for bombs with three fuses, three bomb casings, three bomb residues, three shrapnel wounds, or three timers in any of the three locations stated as having bombs exploded which are the Narita airport and the aft and forward cargo compartments of Air India Flight 182.

There is one official cause to unite them all: Three bombs. Assuming that an explosion means only one thing and that is bomb explosion and assuming that official determinations after official investigations are correct the following scenario can explain what happened:

{Commissioner Major, please bear with me on this story telling, I did not make the contradictory determinations which require unification, well meaning officials did. Confusing statements ask

for humor to diffuse the frustration. (My plausible straightforward mechanical explanation with precedent is contained in Submission 4: The shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation).}

The one scenario that unites the five official determinations: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom.

Two of the bombs were surreptitiously placed on two Boeing 747s at Vancouver airport on 22 June 1985, the day before they blew up. The third bomb was placed into one of the Boeing 747s at the Montreal airport later that same day.

The official versions united:

Bomb 1: One bomb was loaded on CP 003 which flew to Tokyo with no detonation of the bomb during the long flight across the Pacific. This bomb was then unloaded in a busy airport, put on a baggage cart which was wheeled through a 'transit' area with many other bags from many other flights, and only then did the vaguely powerful bomb detonate at 0619Z, not from an altimeter fuze but from a timing fuze which went off when it was not supposed to for an aircraft terrorist bombing. No fuze or parts of any bomb or the suitcase were reported to have been discovered. No match of any debris parts of this bomb were made to other bombs by same terrorist group. No claims of responsibility or confessions were obtained. (The Japanese police determined bomb.)

Bomb 2: At the same time the Narita bomb was loaded at Vancouver onto CP 003 on the afternoon of 22 June 1985,

another bomb was loaded onto CP 060, also in Vancouver, and successfully slipped past the extensive security of men, dogs, and machines. CP 060 then flew to Toronto without the bomb going off by timer or altimeter fuse. At Toronto, the bomb was then off loaded from CP 060 and sent, along with some passengers, to a different aircraft, a Boeing 747 which was Flight 181 which, after another flight to Montreal, would change to Flight 182. At Toronto, all the baggage from Vancouver on CP 060, including the bomb, was placed in the aft cargo hold of the Boeing 747. This aircraft, called Flight 181, took off and flew to Montreal with the bomb still not detonating by altimeter or timing fuze. The timer was set to go off at 0714Z. (The Judge Josephson determined bomb.)

Bomb 3: After the Boeing 747 called Flight 181 landed in Montreal with the bomb from Vancouver still in the aft cargo hold, the flight number of the same Boeing 747 changed to Air India Flight 182, and more passengers and baggage were put on board. All their baggage was placed into the forward cargo hold. A new aircraft bomb was thus loaded into the forward cargo compartment with the timer set to go off at 0714Z. (The Judge Kirpal determined bomb.)

There were many delays involved with loading parts of a large engine into the aft cargo compartment which did not set off the bomb in that compartment. Finally, the aft and forward cargo compartment bomb laden Boeing 747 now called Air India Flight 182 took off from Montreal for its third flight in many hours, flew for five hours across the Atlantic and then a fuze for the Montreal loaded bomb activated and exploded in the forward cargo compartment, not by an altimeter fuze because the aircraft was level at 31000 feet and had been so for hours, but by a timer fuze. The Vancouver bomb, first loaded in Vancouver and

transferred to the aft cargo compartment of the doomed aircraft in Toronto, detonated at exactly the same time, 0714Z. The two bombs blew holes in the pressurized hull causing an explosive decompression.

Thus explains and unites the Japanese police bomb, the Justice Kirpal bomb, the Justice Josephson bomb, the CASB explosion, and the UK AIB explosive decompression events.

The official determinations assume inefficient ticketing agents, dull-witted security forces, and malfunctioning X ray machines in four large metropolitan airports in two industrialized nations. It assumes incompetent terrorists who can't set a bomb to go off on time. It assumes quiet bombs in an aircraft that leave no sound when they go off. It assumes three stealthy bombs that managed to slip through sniffing dogs, portable metal detectors, X-Ray machines, private security teams, and yet leave no trace of their fuzes, timers, explosive material, or containers.

Officially the terrorists were of two groups; one group in Vancouver to check the bomb in the baggage which was placed in the aft cargo compartment of Air India Flight 182 to explode according to the Canadian judge. Another terrorist group in Montreal checked their bomb in baggage which was placed in the forward cargo compartment of Air India Flight 182 to explode there according to the Indian judge. The Vancouver terrorist group also checked in another bomb in the baggage of another aircraft to explode later on a baggage cart at Narita airport, according to the Indian judge.

Three bombs to explode: one at Narita airport, one in the forward cargo compartment and another in the aft cargo compartment of Air India Flight 182. (There is no physical connection between

the two very far apart cargo compartments of a Boeing 747.)

The terrorists were stupid because:

1. The bombs did not go off when a real aircraft bomb usually goes off, shortly after takeoff climb on the initially loaded flight.
2. The fuzes were three timers set to go off at odd times such as 0619, 0714, and 0714 many hours later after being set.
3. They did not claim responsibility to advertise their cause.

The terrorists were smart because:

1. They were able to construct bombs which left no fuse, no casings, no timer evidence and were silent.
2. They were able to smuggle three bombs through tight security at four large airports in two countries.
3. They coordinated two bombs on the same aircraft loaded in different locations at two airports to go off at same time to ensure destruction.

The terrorists were lucky because;

1. The four takeoffs and landings and turbulence did not detonate the amateur improvised bombs.
2. The changing of two planes and movement of baggage from plane to transit area did not detonate the bombs.
3. Their bomb laden baggage was not misplaced or misdirected by the airline.
4. The many unexpected schedule delays and aircraft changes still allowed the bombs to go off to kill innocent people instead of in an unoccupied hangar or baggage storage area.

This is the official unified determination to explain the Narita airport transit area and Air India Flight 182 bombings: Revenge seeking terrorist groups managed to place three stealthy bombs in three aircraft and on one baggage cart through four airports in

one day. Three bombs in three bags in three baggage areas go boom boom boom.

Commissioner Major, yes, it's a convoluted, illogical, bizarre story but then, conspiracy stories usually are. When accepted as truth by wishful thinking noncritical listeners, the conspiracy stories are exciting, pleasing, and repeated; when examined by skeptics, the stories usually blow up in the tellers' faces, as the bomb, bomb, bomb determinations do.

The Canadian Transportation Safety Board Air has never given its official opinion in the probable cause of Air India Flight 182, the most famous airplane crash in Canadian history. Their specialized expert input is invaluable to the Commission. Will you please ask TSB Air to provide to the Commission an updated supplement to the twenty year old CASB accident report on Air India Flight 182, a request justified by several subsequent similar accidents since 1985 to similar Boeing 747s and to resolve the explosion location conflict created by Justice Josephson and Justice Kirpal?

My down to earth mechanical explanation follows in my next Submission to the Commission. The wiring/cargo door explanation applauds Justice Josephson's finding of not guilty, it confirms the Canadian aviation accident investigators' conclusion, it exonerates the RCMP's failure to catch Snidely Whiplash, and justifies the expense and time of this Commission of Inquiry into events surrounding Air India Flight 182.

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the

Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006

(Please grant me standing.)

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 3: The Official
Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage
go boom, boom, boom. (Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to
resolve official conflicts of type of explosion and where it
occurred.)

Respectfully,

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From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:52 PM PDT

To: barney.brucker@justice.gc.ca

**Subject: Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 4: The
Unofficial Version:**

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Below is Submission 4 for the Commissioner of the

Commission: Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation. (Please consider a plausible, reasonable, electrical cause with precedent) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006.

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182
Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner
Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel
Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel
Ken Dickerson, Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publiques

Dear Commissioner Major, Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/
ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/
inflight breakup explanation.

Below is the scientific explanation for Air India Flight 182 in
narrative form based on direct, circumstantial, tangible, deduced,
historical, and inferred evidence obtained through government
aircraft accident reports and testimony under oath, 1953-2006.
All statements of fact can be corroborated as having occurred in
Air India Flight 182 or other similar Boeing 747s under similar
circumstances.

Pressurized hulls of jet airliners have been blowing up since
1953 with the Comet.

03/03/1953

location: Karachi, Pakistan

carrier: Canadian Pacific flight:

aircraft: comet registry:

aboard: fatal: 11 ground:

details: First fatal crash of a commercial jet aircraft

05/02/1953

location: near Jagalgori West Bengal, India

carrier: British Overseas Airlines flight: 783/057

aircraft: De Havilland comet 1 registry: g-alyv

aboard: 43 fatal: 43 ground:

details: broke up in flight during a violent thunderstorm. Metal fatigue due to design flaw.

01/10/1954

location: Elba, Italy

carrier: British Overseas Airlines flight:

aircraft: De Havilland comet 1 registry:

aboard: fatal: 35 ground:

details: broke up in flight. Metal fatigue due to design flaw.

04/08/1954

location: Stromboli, Italy

carrier: South African Airways flight:

aircraft: De Havilland comet 1 registry:

aboard: fatal: 21 ground:

details: broke up in flight. Metal fatigue due to design flaw.

Hull ruptures in flight leading to sudden explosive decompressions have occurred in over fifty airliners over the years. The causes can be bombs, metal fatigue, cargo shifts, inadvertent door openings from improperly latched to electrical faults, cockpit windows being broken by bird strikes, fuel tank explosion, missile hits, corrosion, faulty repair of damaged bulkhead, midair collisions, thunderstorms, and improperly fitted pressure relief valves.

Air India Flight 182 fits into one of those categories, the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup one.

There are literally hundreds of pressurization problems that occur in airliners that are not sudden explosions but slow failures. These events rarely lead to fatalities while the sudden loud

events usually do.

In an historical and statistical sense Air India Flight 182 was a normal aircraft accident: The cause was mechanical and not unusual. There have been several subsequent explosive decompressions in Boeing 747s similar to Air India Flight 182 that left similar evidence.

The forward cargo door of Air India Flight 182 opened inadvertently in flight for certain, the cause of that opening was probably faulty wiring.

Regards,

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Sequence of Destruction for Air India Flight 182:

Background:

On 18 July, 1984 a high lift vehicle damaged the fuselage skin near the forward cargo door of a Boeing 747-237B, construction number 330, operated by Air India airlines. The fuselage skin had wiring routed on the inside which became bent from the impact and subsequently cracked to bare wire, a characteristic of the polyimide type insulated Poly X wiring installed in the aircraft. The forward cargo door had non-steel locking sectors to

keep the bottom eight latching cams from being back driven which would allow the door to open in flight causing explosive decompression which would be a catastrophic event well known to aircraft designers.

In June of 1986 several passengers changed their flight plans and their baggage routing for various flights through Canada to overseas destinations probably from Vancouver.

On 22 June, 1986, two aircraft had baggage loaded aboard them at the Vancouver B. C. airport; one flight was called CP 003 and the other CP 060. Flight 003 took off and flew uneventfully to the extremely busy Narita airport near Tokyo, Japan. After the baggage was unloaded from the flight, it was put on a baggage cart which was wheeled through a transit area of many other baggage carts containing many other bags from many other flights. An explosion of unspecified cause, unknown fuzing, unknown container, and unknown material occurred on the baggage cart which killed two people and injured others. The airport had high security because of previous terrorist attacks on it resulting in fatalities over the years.

The other flight, CP 060, flew uneventfully to Toronto Airport. The baggage was unloaded from CP 060 and those bags continuing on to London on Air India Flight 181/182 were loaded into the aft cargo compartment of the Boeing 747-237B, construction number 330. The flight, now called Air India Flight 181, then flew uneventfully to Mirabel Airport in Montreal. After landing, some baggage of the departing passengers was unloaded from the aft compartment. Parts of a broken engine were placed in the aft cargo compartment for ferry back to India. New passengers and new baggage from Montreal for the next flight of the same aircraft, construction number 330 and now called Air India Flight 182, were loaded with all the new baggage going

into the forward baggage compartment. The baggage from Vancouver on CP 060 and reloaded at Toronto remained in the aft cargo compartment of the Boeing 747-237B now called Air India Flight 182.

The forward cargo compartment was filled with summer night air, warm and moist. When flying at altitude the air would be cooled by the air conditioning and the very cold outside air would cool the fuselage skin thus condensing out moisture along the inside of the compartment which would run through the wiring bundles and down into the cargo door bilge.

Air India Flight 182 took off from Montreal for London at 0218 Z on 23 June 1985 and flew uneventfully for about five hours and while at 31000 feet at 296 knots and about 115 miles west of Ireland a tragic sequence of events began at 0714 Z. The pressure differential between outside and inside air was at its maximum design limit, 8.9 pounds per square inch.

The Event:

Water may have met the cracked insulated wire which may have been previously damaged by the high lift accident to the cargo door area. The now exposed and bare wire shorted against the metal fuselage. The electricity then flowed around safety cutout switches and powered on the cargo door actuator unlatch electric motor which attempted to rotate all ten cam sectors to unlocked positions around their ten latching pins. The eight lower cam sectors may have been prevented from unlatching around the latching pins because of the bottom eight locking sectors. However, the two midspan latches had no locking sectors to prevent the inadvertent rotation of the midspan latching cams around the midspan latching pins.

The lower eight cams probably overcame the weaker locking sectors to just turn past center and allow the door to unlatch in flight, a defect known years later in two other Boeing 747 flights, Pan Am Flight 125 and United Airlines Flight 811. The midspan cams turned just past center with no locking sectors to prevent the backdriving of the cams, an operation only supposed to be allowed on the ground. Possibly other factors such as an out of rig cargo door, a poor repair job on the door area, the slack in bellcranks, torque tubes, and worn latch pins may have contributed to have allowed the two midspan latches to rotate just past center permitting the almost 100,000 pounds of internal pressure on the 99 inch by 110 inch door to rupture outward in flight relieving the maximum pressure differential on the internal fuselage.

The nine foot by eight foot squarish forward cargo door would have instantly burst open at the midspan and bottom latches sending the latches, door material, and large pieces of fuselage skin spinning away. The forward cargo compartment would have spewed its contents outward onto the starboard side of the fuselage. It was as if a huge mylar balloon had popped. The severe explosion of explosive decompression caused the forward cargo door to be fractured and shattered into a few large pieces and many small pieces which gave a frayed appearance from an outward force. Many small bits of metal from the explosion were embedded into the cargo door area metal fuselage structure.

The top part of the door swung outward and upward on its hinge and then separated taking large vertical pieces of fuselage skin with it, exposing stringers and bulkheads. The very lower part of the door sill with its eight bottom latches may have stuck to fuselage skin. The resulting damage zone appeared as a huge

rectangle of shattered door, skin, and stringers. Some pieces of the door and fuselage skin flew directly aft and impacted the leading edge of the right wing, the vertical stabilizer and the right horizontal stabilizer in flight.

This explosion of explosive decompression blew out a large hole about thirty feet wide and forty feet high on the starboard side of the nose forward of the wing. It looked as if a bomb had gone off inside the forward cargo hold. Fuselage skin was peeled outward at various places on the starboard side of the nose.

The forward cargo door had some fuselage and cargo floor attached. This door, located on the forward starboard side of the aircraft, was broken horizontally about one-quarter of the distance above the lower frame. The damage to the door and the fuselage skin near the door appeared to have been caused by an outward force. The fractured surface of the cargo door appeared to have been badly frayed. The cargo door pieces and the adjacent skin had holes, flaps, fractures, inward concavity, tears, deformities, outward bent petals, curls, missing pieces, cracks, separations, curved fragments, spikes, and folds. The fast and powerful explosion of the explosive decompression would have caused a metallurgical effect called "twinning" on a few fragments of pieces of wreckage.

The now uncompressed air molecules rushed out of the huge hole equalizing the high pressure inside the fuselage to the low pressure outside the aircraft while making a sudden very loud audible sound. This sudden rushing outward air was recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder as a sudden loud sound. The sound did not accurately match any bomb explosion sounds on other aircraft but did match the explosive decompression sound on another wide body airliner, a DC-10 cargo door open event.

The tremendous explosive force in the forward cargo hold severely disrupted the adjacent main equipment compartment which housed power cables and abruptly shut off power to the Flight Data Recorders. The resulting data tapes showed a sudden loud audible sound followed by an abrupt power cut to the flight data recorder, the cockpit voice recorder and transponder.

The number three engine and cowling, closest to the forward cargo compartment, were damaged by inflight debris from material ejected from the now exposed compartment and cabin above, debris which also damaged the number four engine cowling by a displaced turbine blade from number three engine. The resulting vibration from the internal damage to engine number three caused the nacelle and engine to fall away from the wing, as designed, and land apart from the other three engines.

The floor beams above the forward cargo hold were sucked downward, and were fractured and broken from the sudden decompression. The floor panels were stationary but gave the appearance of separating upward by the suddenly moving downward floor beams.

The flight attitude of the aircraft was askew to the left from reaction of explosive decompression from the right. Air rushed into the large hole and weakened other skin and frames thus peeling skin further outward and rupturing the aft part of the aircraft to include the aft cargo compartment and the aft pressure bulkhead. There was no evidence of an explosion of any source in the aft cargo compartment.

The 296 knots of wind force pressed upon the weakened airframe and broke it in half amidships. This wind force was larger than any wind force the surface of the earth had ever

experienced. The nose portion and wings tore off and landed in a dense debris heap apart from the debris field of the aft part.

The rest of the plane without the forward section suddenly decelerated from 296 knots and caused whiplash injuries to passengers. After the breakup, the passengers who were not wearing their seatbelts were scattered to far distances. They suffered explosion type injuries such as pieces of metal embedded in them from flying debris in the cabin. They were not burned because there was no fire nor explosion from a bomb explosion. The passengers had no other bomb explosion evidence. The passengers and crew were ejected from the disintegrating aircraft to tumble to the water and suffer upward impact physical damage to their bodies. Some remained in their seats and were trapped in the fuselage underwater. Some had decompression type injuries of hypoxia from the high altitude aircraft breakup.

The passengers fell to the sea and some floated and some sank. The baggage from Vancouver passengers and loaded into the aft cargo compartment fell to the sea and some floated and some sank. The baggage from Montreal passengers and loaded into the forward cargo compartment fell to the sea and some floated and some sank. The aircraft fell in pieces and some pieces floated and some sank.

The pilots may have been conscious for a few seconds and adjusted the trim controls out of habit. The communications radio may have been activated by the disturbances in the cockpit and transmitted for a few seconds to air traffic control.

The port side forward of the wing was relatively smooth and undamaged from inflight debris while the starboard side forward

of the wing was shattered, torn, and frayed at the ruptured cargo door area.

A few local fires appeared on the surface of the ocean from the jet kerosene fuel and singed some seat cushions and floating passengers.

All was quiet as the ground controllers tried to contact Air India Flight 182 as the flight crew did not respond to radio calls. Rescue teams were sent. Authorities became aware of the tragedy of 329 men, women, and children dying in a sudden plane crash.

Aftermath:

Explanations were sought as to what happened. Immediately the suggestion was made by authorities that a bomb explosion had caused the accident because of the sudden and catastrophic nature of the immediate evidence.

The Canadian aviation accident investigation authorities became involved since the aircraft had taken off from Canada and had many Canadian citizens aboard. Indian authorities became involved since the airline, Air India, has government ties. The Indian authorities quickly dismissed their aviation experts and assigned a Judge of the Court to oversee the investigation.

After a period of investigation, much of which was conducted to confirm the bomb explosion explanation and identify the culprits, the Indian judge made a finding in 1986 that a bomb in the forward cargo compartment had caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182 and ruled out any type of explosion in the aft cargo compartment.

After a period of investigation, during which the opinion of the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch representative of an

explosive decompression not caused by a bomb but a cause as yet to be determined was given, the Canadian Aviation Safety Board made a conclusion in 1986 that an explosion of unstated cause in the forward cargo compartment had caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182 while also ruling out any explosion of any type in the aft cargo compartment.

The immediate finding by the Indians of a bomb explosion in the forward cargo compartment was accepted and remained the probable cause for Air India Flight 182 twenty one years later although subsequent accidents of a similar type aircraft in similar circumstances leaving similar evidence now resolutely contradicted that finding although confirming the Indian finding of an explosion on the starboard side of the forward cargo compartment and no explosion in the aft.

The Canadian probable cause of an explosion in the forward cargo compartment of an undetermined cause has been proven to be correct by subsequent accidents of a similar type aircraft in similar circumstances leaving similar evidence which do reveal the cause of the explosion: faulty wiring causing the forward cargo door to rupture open inflight at the latches leading to a tremendous explosion of explosive decompression causing Air India Flight 182 to totally breakup in flight.

In 2001 three men were arrested for involvement in the unproved bombing. One pled guilty on a bomb making charge and went to prison while denying any involvement with Air India Flight 182.

In 2005 two of the accused were found not guilty by a Canadian judge in British Columbia. The other man remains in prison and charged with perjury in that trial. The Canadian judge

determined that an explosion occurred in the aft cargo compartment in the left side and the cause was a bomb. No explanations were offered to rebut the original findings of explosion in the forward cargo compartment on the right side and no explosion of any source in the aft cargo compartment.

In 2006 a Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 was appointed. The shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation was presented to the Commissioner at an open hearing on 19 July, 2006. Excerpts below:

Application for Standing presented by Mr. Smith: Mr. Smith: Thank you, Commissioner Major, for allowing me to supplement my written application for standing...I have an alternate explanation for Air India 182. It's a mechanical explanation. I'll go into some detail during my presentation and my detail will not be to persuade you that my explanation is correct but to persuade you that my research has depth and is worthy of being granted standing.

The Commissioner: Well, I don't think, Mr. Smith, that you need 15 minutes to persuade me of that. Here's the difficulty...You have an alternate theory. The alternate theory may over time prove to be correct. I don't know...but the Terms of Reference preclude our considering whether or not there was any cause for that explosion other than the bomb that is found by the Supreme Court of British Columbia.

Hindsight:

In 1985, when Air India Flight 182 suffered an inflight breakup from an explosion, it was believed that an explosive

decompression in an early model Boeing 747 could not cause an abrupt power cut to the data flight recorders. That belief was cited by the Indian Kirpal Report as a reason to reject the explosive decompression explanation because, in fact, Air India Flight 182 had suffered an abrupt power cut to the data recorders. The Indian Kirpal Reports states: "It was not possible that any rapid decompression caused by a structural failure could have disrupted the entire electrical power supply from the MEC compartment." The later event of United Airlines Flight 811 showed that it was possible, and indeed, did happen, that an explosive decompression caused by a structural failure could and did cause an abrupt electrical cutoff to the recorders.

The reason for the Indians in 1986 to rule out explosive decompression by structural failure was negated by the reality of United Airlines Flight 811 in 1989. If the Indians had the foreknowledge of United Airlines Flight 811 and the explosive decompression which cut off abruptly the power to the recorders, it is most probable they would have sustained the findings of the Canadians and the British who said that a explosion in the forward cargo compartment occurred and all would have then known the solution to the mystery posed by the AAIB investigator: "...but the cause has not been identified." The cause was identified in 1989 and demonstrated by United Airlines Flight 811 in NTSB AAR 92/02: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the sudden opening of the forward lower lobe cargo door in flight and the subsequent explosive decompression.'

The evidence that was unavailable to the Air India Flight 182 CASB, AAIB, and Indian accident investigators in 1985 that became available in the ensuing 16 years that would have been invaluable in assisting them in determining the probable cause was:

A. Evidence that an explosive decompression could cause an abrupt power cut to the data recorders.

B. Evidence that floor panels can appear to separate upwards when in fact the floor beneath were pulled down.

C. Testimony that twinning can occur in explosions other than bombs, such as an aviation fuel explosion, or explosive decompression.

D. Evidence that the type of wiring installed, Poly-X, was defective in that it cracked to bare wire easily, especially in the presence of moisture.

E. Visible ruptures in flight in forward cargo doors of other early model Boeing 747s that suffered the same events in flight.

F. Several Airworthiness Directives for defects in and around the forward cargo doors of Boeing 747s that if uncorrected could lead to inadvertent opening of the cargo door in flight leading to catastrophic explosive decompression.

The evidence that was available to the Air India Flight 182 CASB, AAIB, and Indian accident investigators in 1985 was such to lead them to conclude that an explosion had taken place on the starboard side in the forward cargo compartment which was picked up by the cockpit voice recorder and cut off the electrical power in the adjacent main electrical equipment compartment. The cause of the explosion was given as either unknown, structural failure of explosive decompression, or a bomb explosion. Since the event in 1989 with United Airlines Flight 811 had not happened yet, the understandable decision of the Indians, based on three assumptions later proven unreliable, was to state the cause of the explosion in the forward cargo compartment a bomb whilst the cautious Canadian CASB and the British AAIB left the cause unstated or unidentified.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:52 PM PDT
To: barney.brucker@justice.gc.ca
**Subject: Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version:
The Layperson Explanation**

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Sunday, August 13, 2006

Below is Submission 5 for the Commissioner of the
Commission: Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial
Version: The Layperson Explanation

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of
Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission
website.)

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the
Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006
(Please grant me standing.)

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 3: The Official
Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage
go boom, boom, boom. (Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to
resolve official conflicts of type of explosion and where it
occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial
Version: The shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/
explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation. (Please
consider a plausible, reasonable, electrical cause with precedent)
Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006.

Commission of Inquiry Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The Layperson Explanation (It's not rocket science) Filed Sunday, August 13, 2006

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner

Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Commissioner

Major,

Sunday, August 13, 2006

Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The Layperson Explanation

One excuse I am given by those unwilling to evaluate the hard evidence that supports the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182 is that it is 'too technical'.

Well, it's not too technical; below is the explanation for laypersons who have a basic education in science. If a person knows why lightning strikes, why balloons pop, the power of wind, and why gravity pulls, then that person can understand what happened to Air India Flight 182.

Lightning Strikes

Balloon Pops

Wind Power

Gravity Pulls

Lightning strikes because of an imbalance between the negative electrically charged particles and the further away positively charged particles. When sufficient negative and positive charges gather, and when the electric field becomes sufficiently strong, an electrical discharge (the bolt of lightning) occurs within clouds or between clouds and the ground. Lightning occurs because the bottom of a thundercloud becomes negatively charged. The ground becomes positively charged. Simple physics says that opposite charges attract, so boom, the lightning takes a one way trip to the closest positively charged item- usually a tree, phone pole, or other high object.

In a Boeing 747 the opening and closing of the cargo doors is done by an electric current through a latching or unlatching motor controlled by a switch. When the switch is open/off, there is no current to turn the motor which would turn the latching cams around the latching pins. When the switch is closed/on the circuit between the negatively charged particles and the positively charged is closed and current flows through the

resistive motor which turns torque tubes which turn cams to surround pins which closes and holds the door tight against the fuselage.

When the aircraft is airborne a switch is opened/off which prevents any current from inadvertently turning on the cargo door unlatch motor. There is no way to turn on the unlatch motor to open the cargo door from inside the cockpit.

However, when faulty wiring such as Poly X type, which was used in Air India Flight 182, chafes and cracks to bare wire to short on the metal fuselage, the voltage has a path to complete the circuit and the lightning strikes; that is, the safety feature of a switch is bypassed and the now flowing current turns on the cargo door unlatch motor. The imbalance between the charged electrons which was held steady by the safety switch is now allowed to discharge/equalize through the shorted wire through the resistive motor which turns on as it is supposed to do when receiving current. The latching cams now turn around the latching pins into the unlock/unlatch direction thus releasing their hold on the closed cargo door. The faulty wire which allowed the motor to turn on when it was supposed to stay off was installed during manufacture of the aircraft. The defective wiring is a manufacturing error.

The bare wire shorted on the cargo door unlatch motor which turned the cams to the unlatch position. Lightning struck and the unlatch motor turned on and started to allow the cargo door to open in flight.

Balloon pops:

Air tends to move in a straight line from a high-pressure area to a

low pressure area. As balloons reach maximum expansion they get to a point where the latex runs out of stretch and gets stiff and resists further stretching. This is obvious in a fresh, over inflated balloon. It will become stiffer and get very rigid as all the latex molecules all become oriented in the tensile stress directions. This increase in stiffness will cause balloons, unlike soap bubbles, to increase in internal air pressure just before bursting.

Even small balloons like nine inch rounds can produce a very big bang if they are strong high quality balloons and are blown up to the limit. They can develop fantastically high tensions. Of course a larger balloon blown up to a similar extreme tension all over would make an even bigger bang.

The hull of a Boeing 747 such as Air India Flight 182 can be considered a huge balloon when pressurized. As the aircraft climbs the air molecules outside are further apart and have less pressure than those that were inside the aircraft at takeoff. If the aircraft is not pressurized, the air molecules inside and outside the aircraft are the same and there is no differential. The hull is not inflated and there would be no inside high pressure trying to equalize with the outside lower pressure.

But the hull of the Boeing 747 in flight with crew and passengers aboard can not remain unpressurized as the air would be too thin to sustain life so oxygenated air is pumped into the hull and the balloon/hull inflates. There now exists a distance difference between the air molecules inside the aircraft to those outside of the airplane. There is an imbalance. There is now pressure to equalize the air molecules but the sealed metal fuselage skin prevents the equalization. The hull stays inflated.

As the plane climbs higher, the pressure inside is kept constant at

a comfortable level for the passengers while the pressure outside continues to decline the higher the aircraft goes. When the aircraft is about 20000 feet, the pressure on the inside of the fuselage is about 3.5 PSI or pounds per square inch. At cruise altitude of about 31000 feet, the pressure on each square inch on the inside of the inflated balloon called the hull is 8.9 PSI.

The Boeing 747 has two cargo doors 110 by 99 inches in size. The pressure on the cargo doors of Air India Flight 182 when cruising at 31000, when the initial event occurred, was 96921 pounds pressing on each of the nine foot by eight foot doors held in place only by a long hinge, eight rotating lower latching cams around latching pins and two midspan rotating latching cams around latching pins.

An analogy: Imagine a large under inflated balloon with no holes in it. Then cut six small holes in the balloon and two large square holes. Then, if you could, put patches over the six small holes from the inside of the balloon so that when the balloon is inflated, the inside high pressure would press the patch tighter into the balloon and seal the hole tighter. That is called a 'plug type' patch. But....then put patches over the two large square cut holes on the outside of the balloon so that when the balloon is inflated, the high air pressure inside the balloon presses against the outside patch to push it outward. That is called a 'non plug type' patch.

Another analogy for the patch is a band aid wound dressing on an arm. The arm has the cut hole/wound and the patch is the band aid to stop the bleeding wound. A band aid on the inside of

the arm would be more effective but impractical so band aids are put on the outside of the arm and often are pulled off inadvertently.

Air India Flight 182 has those several small holes cut into the pressurized hull and then patched from the inside. They are called plug type passenger doors. When airborne and at altitude, those passenger entry and exit doors can not be opened in flight because the inside air pressure presses them tight against the metal fuselage. Only if the pilot depressurizes the inside of the hull can those doors be opened, such as on the ground. The wounds are small and the band aid is sufficient to stop the bleeding since the patch is in the inside and the blood pressure actually prevents bleeding.

However, the two huge cargo doors which were cut from the metal fuselage and then patched back are non-plug type. It's as if they are patched from the outside so that as the inside pressure grows higher and the outside pressure goes lower, the pressure differential increases and about 97000 pounds of air presses on the eight by nine foot door to burst it open. The door does not press on the inside of the fuselage tighter because it is not a plug type. The only things holding the door closed are the hinge and the ten latches around the ten latch pins. The latch cams are not told to unlatch in flight because there is no current to the unlatch motor. The non plug cargo doors are a design error; they should be plug type. The wounds are large and the band aid is not sticky enough to stop the bleeding as the blood pressure pushes outward.

A hull rupture in flight can be a catastrophic event so safety efforts are made to prevent its occurrence. As the cams are turned around the pins, a locking sector is then manually placed against

the latch pin to prevent the inadvertent unlatching should electrical current turn the unlatch motor on. The locking sector would stop the cam from turning to the open position and the unlatch motor would burn itself out trying.

However, while the lower eight latches have eight locking sectors as a safety measure, the two midspan latches have no locking sectors at all. That is another design error; the midspan latches need locking sectors similar to the eight lower ones. The band aid over the wound was too small.

(As it turns out, years after Air India Flight 182 crashed, it was shown that the eight locking sectors themselves were too weak to stop the cams from unlatching when the unlatch motor did in fact inadvertently receive power and unlatched in flight. The eight locking sectors were then strengthened but the midspan latches had no locking sectors to strengthen.)

For Air India Flight 182, the faulty bare wire shorted on the power for the cargo door unlatch motor which turned the cams to the unlatch position after bypassing the safety switch. The eight lower latching cams overrode the weak lower eight locking sectors. Just past dead center of the pins the 97000 pounds of internal pressure finally popped the balloon of a pressurized hull at the forward cargo door. The result was an explosive decompression which occurred in an instant. Explosive decompression is an aviation term used to mean a sudden and rapid loss of cabin pressurization.

The sudden and powerful rushing out of the higher pressure air inside the pressurized hull of Air India Flight 182 mimicked a bomb in sound and fury. The sound of the explosion was so loud it was picked up on the cockpit voice recorder. The forward

cargo door split into two parts and burst apart as it tore out and up taking further fuselage skin with it. The contents of the forward cargo hold were blown out and into the nearby starboard engines number three and four causing foreign object damage to the nacelles and turbine blades inside the engines. The ensuing hole in the starboard side of the fuselage forward of the wing centered around the forward cargo door of Air India Flight 182 in the wreckage reconstruction below was now about thirty feet tall and twenty feet wide, target 204 and cross hatch skin above it.

The manufacturing flaw of installing defective wiring had exploited the design flaw of a non plug door coupled with the design flaw of no locking sectors on the mid span latches allowing the door to inadvertently open in flight causing a massive explosive decompression which created a huge hole in the nose of Air India Flight 182.

Lightning struck and the unlatch motor turned on. The balloon popped when the forward cargo door unlatched and ruptured open.

Wind Power:

From the CVR and DFDR, AI 182 was proceeding normally en route from Montreal to London at an altitude of 31,000 feet and an indicated airspeed of 296 knots when the cockpit area microphone detected a sudden loud sound: 296 knots is 341 miles per hour or 549 km/h.

If the newly created huge hole in the nose of Air India Flight 182 had occurred while the aircraft were motionless in the calm air,

the nose would have stayed on and the aircraft would not have broken up in flight. However, the wind force on the now compromised formerly streamlined hull was higher than any natural wind on earth.

Category V Hurricane, Catastrophic >155 mph

Shrubs and trees blown down and uprooted; considerable damage to roofs of all buildings; all signs down. Very severe and extensive damage to windows and doors. Complete failure of roofs on several residences and industrial buildings. Extensive shattering of glass from pressure variation and blown debris.

Some complete building failures. Smaller buildings are overturned or destroyed. Complete destruction of mobile homes. F3 Tornado, Fujita Scale 3 158-206 mph, strongly built schools, homes, and businesses have outside walls blown away; weaker homes completely swept away,

F4 Tornado, Fujita Scale 4 207-260 mph, strongly built homes have all interior and exterior walls blown apart; cars thrown 300 yards or more in the air

F5 Tornado, Fujita Scale 5 261-318 mph, strongly built homes are completely blown away

An intact egg is strong when pressed on its small end but after the shell is cracked, the strength is gone and it crumbles. So it was with Air India Flight 182.

The wind force of 341 miles per hour tore the gashed nose off which fell first in the debris pattern on the ocean floor. The wind force tore into the rest of the tubular, now unpressurized hull, and ruptured open the rest of the fuselage and other compartments. The debris was blown aft and hit the starboard wing and stabilizer causing inflight damage. The engines and wings came off and mixed with the rest of the disintegrating aircraft.

Lightning struck and the unlatch motor turned on. The balloon popped when the forward cargo door unlatched and ruptured open. The enormous wind power tore the nose off and disintegrated the rest of the aircraft.

Gravity grabs.

Gravity is one of four known fundamental forces of nature. Gravity is by far the weakest of the four, yet it dominates on the scale of large space objects. Gravity cannot be shielded in any way. Intervening objects, whatever their make-up, have no effect whatsoever on the attraction between two separated objects.

If Air India Flight 182 were in far outer space the thousands of broken parts would just float around but those debris pieces were affected by the gravity of Earth and caused the aircraft parts to flutter down to the sea and further down to the ocean floor 6500 feet under the water surface.

Lightning struck and the unlatch motor turned on. The balloon popped when the forward cargo door unlatched and ruptured open. The enormous wind tore the nose off and disintegrated the rest. Gravity pulled the pieces downward to the bottom of the ocean.

Lightning Struck
Balloon Popped
Wind Powered
Gravity Pulled

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/ ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/ inflight breakup explanation. (Please consider a plausible, reasonable, electrical cause with precedent) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006.

Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The Layperson Explanation. (It's not rocket science) Filed Sunday, August 13, 2006

Respectfully,

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From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrismith.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:52 PM PDT

To: barney.brucker@justice.gc.ca

Subject: Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Match

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of

Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Below is Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

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Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The Layperson version. (It's not rocket science) Filed Friday, August 11, 2006

Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith

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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner

Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publique

Dear Commissioner Major, Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Commissioner to me: "You're free, Mr. Smith, as you probably
know, to add to your filed material should you choose."

I'm adding sir, I'm adding! I will continue to add material I
believe will be useful to you regarding the Inquiry, the
investigation, the bombing, Air India Flight 182, what's it like to
be a victim of a sudden fatal jet airplane crash, and the emotions
when meeting the family members of that fatal victim.

Commission of Inquiry Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the
Unofficial Version: The DNA Match.

DNA forms genes, the hereditary material of the cell. DNA is a
macromolecule present in the cells of all living beings. All the
cells of an individual contain the same DNA, creating a specific
identity for the individual. When cells divide, DNA produces an
identical copy of itself. A gene is a part of an individual's DNA.

The Emperor Kanishka had no bombs concealed in his clothes.

If the DNA can be used as an analogy for specific evidence discovered for one event and that specific evidence is matched in another event, it can be said the DNA matches. The DNA of Air India Flight 182 was first and last an airplane that crashed:

1. An early model Boeing 747,
2. Did not have the Section 41 retrofit,
3. Had Poly X wiring installed.
4. Had previous problems with the cargo door.
5. Experienced hull rupture explosive decompression forward of the wing on right side in cargo door area.
6. Damaged engine number three and engine number four fan cowl.
7. Sudden sound on Cockpit Voice Recorder.
8. Loud sound on Cockpit Voice Recorder.
9. Sudden loud sound is not a bomb explosion sound.
10. Sudden loud sound was quickly followed by an abrupt power cut the other flight data recorders.
11. There was outward peeled skin in the forward cargo door area.
12. Had more inflight damage on the starboard side of aircraft.
13. Had at least nine never recovered bodies.
14. Had vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door.
15. Forward cargo door metal skin was frayed and shattered outward.
16. Forward cargo door split longitudinally.
17. Attempts to retrieve forward cargo door made because of its uniqueness.

18. Identical aft cargo door intact and latched.

19. Bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected.

And all of the above specific evidence is present in United Airlines Flight 811, another early model Boeing 747 that came apart in flight leading to fatalities but was able to land mostly intact so its DNA evidence could be examined and indisputably stated:

"Executive Summary from USA NTSB AAR 92/02 of March 1992:

On February 24, 1989, United Airlines flight 811, a Boeing 747-122, experienced an explosive decompression as it was climbing between 22,000 and 23,000 feet after taking off from Honolulu, Hawaii, en route to Sydney, Australia with 3 flightcrew, 15 flight attendants, and 337 passengers aboard.

The airplane made a successful emergency landing at Honolulu and the occupants evacuated the airplane. Examination of the airplane revealed that the forward lower lobe cargo door had separated in flight and had caused extensive damage to the fuselage and cabin structure adjacent to the door. Nine of the passengers had been ejected from the airplane and lost at sea.

A year after the accident, the Safety Board was uncertain that the cargo door would be located and recovered from the Pacific Ocean. The Safety Board decided to proceed with a final report based on the available evidence without the benefit of an actual examination of the door mechanism. The original report was

adopted by the Safety Board on April 16, 1990, as NTSB/AAR-90/01.

Subsequently, on July 22, 1990, a search and recovery operation was begun by the U.S. Navy with the cost shared by the Safety Board, the Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing Aircraft Company, and United Airlines. The search and recovery effort was supported by Navy radar data on the separated cargo door, underwater sonar equipment, and a manned submersible vehicle. The effort was successful, and the cargo door was recovered in two pieces from the ocean floor at a depth of 14,200 feet on September 26 and October 1, 1990.

Before the recovery of the cargo door, the Safety Board believed that the door locking mechanisms had sustained damage in service prior to the accident flight to the extent that the door could have been closed and appeared to have been locked, when in fact the door was not fully latched. This belief was expressed in the report and was supported by the evidence available at the time. However, upon examination of the door, the damage to the locking mechanism did not support this hypothesis. Rather, the evidence indicated that the latch cams had been backdriven from the closed position into a nearly open position after the door had been closed and locked. The latch cams had been driven into the lock sectors that deformed so that they failed to prevent the back-driving.

Thus, as a result of the recovery and examination of the cargo door, the Safety Board's original analysis and probable cause have been modified. This report incorporates these changes and supersedes NTSB/AAR-90/01.

The issues in this investigation centered around the design and

certification of the B-747 cargo doors, the operation and maintenance to assure the continuing airworthiness of the doors, cabin safety, and emergency response.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the sudden opening of the forward lower lobe cargo door in flight and the subsequent explosive decompression. The door opening was attributed to a faulty switch or wiring in the door control system which permitted electrical actuation of the door latches toward the unlatched position after initial door closure and before takeoff. Contributing to the cause of the accident was a deficiency in the design of the cargo door locking mechanisms, which made them susceptible to deformation, allowing the door to become unlatched after being properly latched and locked. Also contributing to the accident was a lack of timely corrective actions by Boeing and the FAA following a 1987 cargo door opening incident on a Pan Am B-747. As a result of this investigation, the Safety Board issued safety recommendations concerning cargo doors and other nonplug doors on pressurized transport category airplanes, cabin safety, and emergency response."

Commissioner Major, please note above that the first probable cause was incorrect so the NTSB issued another AAR based upon new evidence. The same can be done by TSB Air for Air India Flight 182 based upon the subsequent new evidence. I have had the benefit of hindsight to research all Boeing 747 hull losses for matches to the evidence retrieved regarding Air India Flight 182. There have been five matches, including Air India Flight 182. All are controversial while United Airlines Flight 811 is the only aircraft that was able to land after the shorted switch or wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup occurred. The DNA evidence

and probable cause for United Airlines Flight 811 is irrefutable.

In none of the five official investigations for Air India Flight 182 listed in Smith Submission 3 was United Airlines Flight 811 considered. For four of those investigations, United Airlines Flight 811 had not occurred yet; for the fifth, the attorneys and law enforcement agencies chose not to refer to it.

For the Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182, this Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Matches, is the first to consider the match between Air India Flight 182 and United Airlines Flight 811.

What happened to Air India Flight 182 happened to United Airlines Flight 811 and others. The cause of United Airlines Flight 811 is the same cause for Air India Flight 182. The sequence is the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation.

The linchpin DNA match to all five Boeing 747 accidents is the sudden loud sound on the Cockpit Voice Recorder followed by the abrupt power cut to the Flight Data Recorder. The CVR and FDR data is the only direct evidence available and it is the best.

NTSB AAR, United Airlines Flight 811:

"The CVR revealed normal communication before the decompression. At 0209:09:2 HST, a loud bang could be heard on the CVR. The loud bang was about 1.5 seconds after a "thump" was heard on the CVR for which one of the flightcrew made a comment. The electrical power to the CVR was lost for approximately 21.4 seconds following the loud bang. NTSB Accident Report 92-02 Page 25

CASB AOR, Air India Flight 182:

"From the CVR and DFDR, AI 182 was proceeding normally en route from Montreal to London at an altitude of 31,000 feet and an indicated airspeed of 296 knots when the cockpit area microphone detected a sudden loud sound. The sound continued for about 0.6 seconds, and then almost immediately, the line from the cockpit area microphone to the cockpit voice recorder at the rear of the pressure cabin was most probably broken. This was followed by a loss of electrical power to the recorder." Canadian Aviation Safety Board Air India 23 June 1985, page 21

Kirpal Report: "Mr. R.A. Davis, Head, Flight Recorder Section, Accidents Investigation Branch, Farnborough, U.K. 3.4.6.16 In conclusion, Mr. Davis reported as follows :- "It is considered that from the CVR and ATC recordings supplied for analysis, there is no evidence of a high explosive device having detonated on AI 182. There is strong evidence to suggest that a sudden explosive decompression occurred but the cause has not been identified. It must be concluded that without positive evidence of an explosive device from either the wreckage or pathological examinations, some other cause has to be established for the accident"

Premise Explanation for Air India Flight 182: Explosion in the forward cargo compartment caused by explosive decompression caused by structural failure of ruptured open forward cargo door at one or both of the midspan latches caused by faulty electrical wiring:

Analysis: There is close agreement with the opinions of the two aviation authorities (CASB and AAIB), the judicial finding of Judge Kirpal, and this independent aircraft accident investigator in the specific location in the aircraft and consequences of the

explosion with the only difference being the cause of the explosion on the starboard side of the forward cargo compartment of Air India Flight 182:

A. CASB: There was an explosion, which could have been a bomb explosion, on the starboard side of the forward cargo compartment near the forward cargo door which caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182.

B. AAIB: There was an explosion, cause not identified but not a bomb explosion, which caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182.

C. Justice Kirpal: There was an explosion, a bomb explosion, on the starboard side of the forward cargo compartment near the forward cargo door which caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182.

D. Justice Josephson: There was an explosion, a bomb explosion, on the port side of the aft cargo compartment opposite the aft cargo door which caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182.

E. John Barry Smith: There was an explosion, an explosive decompression when faulty wiring shorted on the forward cargo door unlatch motor which allowed one or both of the midspan latches to rupture open in the forward cargo door on the starboard side of the forward cargo compartment, which caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182.

F. Transportation Safety Board of Canada (Air): Yet to be asked for opinion.

To determine the pattern in early model Boeing 747 accidents that suffered breakups in flight, it was necessary to evaluate carefully all the official accident reports concerning them. A pattern was detected of similar significant evidence among only five of the over forty hull damages or losses, two of which are

Air India Flight 182 and United Airlines Flight 811.

Summary of specific matching evidence between Air India Flight 182 and United Airlines Flight 811: (The DNA evidence listed below applies to both aircraft)

- A. Boeing 747
- B. Early model
- C. Polyimide wiring (Poly X type)
- D. Sudden airframe breakup in flight
- E. Breakup occurs forward of the wing
- F. Section 41 retrofit not done
- G. At least medium flight time
- H. At least medium aged airframe
- I. Previous maintenance problems with forward cargo door
- J. Initial event at about 300 knots while proceeding normally in all parameters
- K. Initial event involves hull rupture in or near forward cargo door area
- L. Initial event starts with sudden sound
- M. Initial event sound is loud
- N. Initial event sound is audible to humans
- O. Initial event followed immediately by abrupt power cut to data recorders
- P. Initial event sound not matched to explosion of bomb sound
- Q. Initial event sound is matched to explosive decompression sound in wide body airliner
- R. Torn off skin on fuselage above forward cargo door area
- S. Evidence of explosion in forward cargo compartment
- T. Foreign object damage to engine or cowling of engine number three
- U. Foreign object damage to engine or cowling of engine number four

- V. Right wing leading edge damaged in flight
- W. Vertical stabilizer damaged in flight
- X. Right horizontal stabilizer damaged in flight
- Y. More severe inflight damage on starboard side than port side
- Z. Port side relatively undamaged by inflight debris
- AA. Vertical fuselage tear lines just aft and forward of the forward cargo door
- AB. Fracture/tear/rupture at a midspan latch of forward cargo door
- AC. Midspan latching status of forward cargo door not reported as latched
- AD. Airworthiness Directive 88-12-04 not implemented (stronger lock sectors)
- AE. Outwardly peeled skin on upper forward fuselage
- AF. Rectangular shape of shattered area around forward cargo door
- AG. Forward cargo door fractured in two longitudinally
- AH. Status of aft cargo door as latched
- AI. Passengers suffered decompression type injuries
- AJ. At least nine missing and never recovered passenger bodies
- AK. Initial official determination of probable cause as bomb explosion.
- AL. Initial official determination modified from bomb explosion
- AM. Structural failure considered for probable cause
- AN. Inadvertently opened forward cargo door considered for probable cause
- AO. Takeoff after sunset on fatal flight
- AP. Takeoff after scheduled takeoff time on fatal flight

A few of the above matches may be common, trivial, or irrelevant but most are rare and critical.

The important DNA matches that determine the certainty that both aircraft:

1. Were similar model and type of early model Boeing 747s..
2. Had the same appearance for each longitudinally fractured forward cargo doors
3. Had sudden loud sounds which were an explosive decompression sound and not a bomb explosion sound.
4. Had an abrupt power cut to the flight data recorders after the sudden loud sound.
5. Had the same damaged areas around the forward cargo door.
6. Had relatively smooth fuselage skin on port side opposite the shattered starboard cargo door side.
7. Had similar inflight damage to the starboard engines and flight surfaces.
8. Had at least nine never recovered bodies.
9. Had explosions in the forward cargo compartment which were initially thought to have been bombs but the opinions were later somewhat modified.

There are many reasonable possible explanations for an explosion or explosive decompression near the forward cargo door of an early model Boeing 747, only one of which is a rare bomb explosion:

- A. Bomb explosion. (Considered for both, ruled out in one, should be ruled out for both.)
- B. Crew or passenger error. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- C. Electrical fault in switch or wiring. (Ruled in for one.)
- D. Pneumatic overpressure. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- E. Cargo shift. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- F. Compressed air tank explosion. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- G. Fire. (Ruled out for both flights.)

- H. Missile strike. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- I. Midair collision. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- J. Fuel tank explosion. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- K. Stowaway. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- L. Electromagnetic interference. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- M. Comet or meteor. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- N. Space debris. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- O. Turbulence. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- P. Out of rig door. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- Q. Lightning. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- R. Metal fatigue. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- S. Improperly latched. (Initially accepted for one flight, then ruled out for both flights.)
- T. Design error. (Accepted for one flight)
- U. Repair error. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- V. Maintenance error. (Ruled out for both flights.)

General Conclusion: Based upon the indisputable probable cause of electrical fault for United Airlines Flight 811 and the many matches of evidence to Air India Flight 182, the discovered common cause for United Airlines Flight 811 and Air India Flight 182 is the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation which is a mechanical explanation for an explosion on the starboard side in the forward cargo compartment of explosive decompression when the forward cargo door ruptured open in flight, probably at one or both of the midspan latches and probably caused by faulty wiring inadvertently turning on the door unlatch motor.

Specific Conclusions for Air India Flight 182:

These conclusions are based on evidence available after

1985.

A. While proceeding normally, an inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182 occurred suddenly and catastrophically at 0714Z at 31000 feet at 300 knots TAS about 110 miles west of Cork, Ireland on 23 June, 1985. There were no survivors.

B. The breakup was caused by an explosion in the forward cargo compartment.

C. The explosion was a severe and sudden explosive decompression.

D. The explosive decompression was caused by the suddenly ruptured open forward cargo door probably at one or both of the midspan latches.

E. The ruptured open forward cargo door was probably caused by faulty wiring which turned on the door unlatch motor which unlatched the latching cams from around the latching pins in flight.

F. The wiring fault was probably the Poly X wiring with inferior insulation which easily cracked to bare wire especially in the presence of moisture.

G. There was no bomb explosion in any cargo compartment, crew cabin, passenger cabin, or anywhere else on the aircraft.

H. There was no explosion from any source in the aft cargo compartment.

I. The sudden loud sound on the cockpit voice recorder was the sound of the air rushing out during the explosive decompression in the forward cargo compartment.

J. The abrupt power cut to the recorders was caused by the explosive effects of the decompression affecting the power cables in the adjacent main equipment compartment to the forward cargo compartment.

Contributing causes:

A. Water or moisture in the forward cargo compartment.

B. Weak locking sectors on the bottom eight latches of the cargo doors.

C. Poor design of one midspan latch per each eight foot side of the cargo doors.

D. Poor design of no locking sector for each midspan latch of the cargo doors.

E. Poor design of outward opening, nonplug type, large, square cargo doors in a highly pressurized hull.

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/ ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/ inflight breakup explanation. (Please consider a plausible, reasonable, electrical cause with precedent) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006.

Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The Layperson version. (It's not rocket science) Filed Friday, August 11, 2006

Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith

541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
safety@ntsb.org

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:52 PM PDT
To: barney.brucker@justice.gc.ca
**Subject: Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference:
Non Cooperation.**

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Thursday, August 17, 2006

Below is Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non
Cooperation. (Sorry, no can do.) Thursday, August 17, 2006

I have attached three pdf files for the Commissioner to
substantiate my claims, one for Mr. Garstang, one for Sgt.
Blachford, and one for Mr. Tucker.

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28
July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why,
and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb,
in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please
ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type

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Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years: Predicting the Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non Cooperation. (Sorry, no can do.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182
Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner
Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary
Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel
Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publique

Terms of Reference: the Commissioner to conduct the Inquiry specifically for the purpose of making findings and recommendations with respect to the following, namely, if there were problems in the effective cooperation between government departments and agencies, including the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, in the investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182, either before or after June 23, 1985, whether any changes in practice or legislation are required to prevent the recurrence of similar problems of cooperation in the investigation of terrorism offences in the future.

Dear Commissioner Major,
August 17, 2006

Thursday,

There was a problem in the effective cooperation between Canadian government agencies, RCMP and TSB (Transportation Safety Board), in the investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182 from 1997 through 2002 and a change in practice is required to prevent the recurrence of similar problems of cooperation in the investigation of terrorism offences in the future.

Names and titles of persons referenced below:

Terry Burtch
Director General,
Investigation Operations
Transportation Safety Board Canada

Bill Tucker (Retired)
Director General,
Investigation Operations
Transportation Safety Board Canada

Bart Blachford Sgt.
John Schnieder
Rich Spruel
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Air India Task Force

Keith Hamilton
Crown sponsored attorney for the accused Bagri

John Garstang
Securitas branch of TSB

Ken Smart
Chief Inspector of Accidents,
Air Accident Investigations Branch
AAIB
DRA Farnborough
Hants GU14 6TD
United Kingdom

I was personally investigated by the RCMP Air India Task Force during their investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182. I was personally questioned by the TSB about the events surrounding the bombing of Air India Flight 182. I received erroneous information from Securitas of the TSB. The two agencies did not cooperate based upon the information I gave them.

1. In response to my email to Securitas of TSB I received the erroneous information from John Garstang of TSB: The cargo door was not retrieved from the bottom of the ocean.

At 3:18 PM +0400 2/27/97, Securitas wrote:

Date: 27 Feb 1997 15:18:35 +0400

From: Securitas <Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Crash cause of Air India Flight 182

Thank you for your report expressing concern about the opening of cargo doors on B-747 aircraft. During any aircraft crash, investigators examine every piece of evidence, in order to determine cause. In the case of the Air India flight, the cargo door was in fact retrieved from the bottom of the ocean by the investigators. The latches were still in place, and there was no evidence on the edges of the door to indicate in-flight opening of that door.

On the other hand, there was other solid evidence indicating a bomb blast had occurred. Aircraft accident investigators are trained people. Anybody can say anything they want on the Internet. Put your money on the experts; you will win more often.

2. In response I wrote the below email for members of the Air

India Task Force, John Schnieder and Rich Spruel, and to John Garstang of Securitas. (Emails attached as pdf file)

At 9:11 PM +0000 4/17/97, John Barry Smith wrote:

To: Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: Attention Mr John Garstang RE Air India 182

Mr. Garstang, this is John Barry Smith, discover of the cargo door explanation for the cause of the crash of AI 182. I just had a nice chat with Mr. John Schnieder of the Air India Task Force. He said he would get in touch with you to ask would you contact me to discuss the forward cargo door of AI 182. Mr. Schnieder is a police officer and referred me to you because you are an aircraft crash investigator and sent me the email about how the door was retrieved and latches latched. Well, since the door was not retrieved the latch status is still unknown and we must go to other evidence to explain the crash. After twelve years and three other similar crashes, a better explanation emerges, inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight. www.corazon.com has a thousand pages of documentation and analysis of the four crashes.

In addition Boeing is conducting its own investigation into the forward cargo door as shown by the remark of Mr. Rich Spruel of the Task Force that Boeing had also recently inquired about that forward cargo door of AI 182.

I trust that as a crash investigator your primary desire is to explain a crash so that it will not happen again and will examine all possibilities that are presented that are reasonable and documented, such as cargo door. Please contact me through email or phone so that I may present my case in a short brief, enough to give you thought to either pursue the door theory or dismiss it. Please don't ignore it.

Sincerely, John Barry Smith 10408 659 3552

3. Several years later I heard from Sgt. Bart Blachford of the RCMP AITF and I responded below and provided him with my accident reports: (Emails attached as pdf file)

At 10:56 PM -0800 11/14/01,
To: SGT Blachford@redshift.com
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Meeting about Air India Flight 182

Sgt. B. Blachford
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather St.
Vancouver, B. C.
V5Z 1K6

Dear Sergeant Blachford, 14 Nov 01

Thank you for your letter of 7 Nov 01 in which you would like to meet with me and discuss in detail my shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup for Air India Flight 182 and taking at least a day to do so.

Yes, of course, Sergeant. Let us work on the logistics.

I would prefer here in my home office with my computers and stacks of documents for referral as needed and the sooner the better. I put myself at your service regarding time and date.

I'll meet you at the Monterey Airport, or, if you drive, as I did in March to Vancouver, call me and I'll set you up with lodging. An alternative meeting place is possible.

I've also invited a representative of TSB, Mr. Bill Tucker, to join us as well as an attorney for the defence assigned by the Crown, Mr. Keith Hamilton. (Mr. Garstang being unavailable.) I'm waiting for replies from them. If you prefer to meet alone, please tell me and that is fine with me. My approach is open and forthright with everyone informed. Please consult with them regarding the meeting.

Email for Mr. Tucker: Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca

W.T. (Bill) Tucker
Director General,
Investigation Operations
TSB

Email for Mr. Keith Hamilton: keithrh@telus.net
Defense Counsel assigned by the Crown for Mr. Bagri

The ideal meeting would include the law enforcement authority, (you of the RCMP AITF), a TSB aircraft safety investigator (Mr. Tucker or representative), defence counsel assigned by the Crown (Mr. Keith Hamilton), and this independent aircraft accident investigator, (John Barry Smith.)

It seems the mood has changed in the past few days after AA 587 and now the first speculation of a cause of an airliner crash is mechanical failure instead of a terrorist act (such as believed in 1985). It looks like facts, data, and evidence, are taking priority now and that is good. There are lots of those for support of a mechanical cause for Air India Flight 182 and I look forward to laying them out for you and answering all your queries.

Cheers,

Barry Smith

John Barry Smith
(831) 659 3552
541 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

4. I sent my files to Sgt Blachford and note that Mr. Bill Tucker of TSB was cooperating with the RCMP AITF by providing them with my files. Sgt. Blachford declined to provide me with an email address.

Sgt. B. Blachford
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather St.
Vancouver, B. C.
V5Z 1K6
Dear Sergeant Blachford,
31 May 2001

Enclosed is hard copy of my Smith AAR for AI 182 and the appendices to it. These hard copy files should be the same as my PDF files sent to you electronically earlier from Mr. Tucker of TSB.

Also enclosed is a hard copy of my email I sent to you via the RCMP website yesterday.

Do you have a direct email other than the web based email for RCMP?

I invite discussion on this matter which I believe presents a danger to the flying public as well as clearing up a mystery of 16 years; telephone calls and emails are most welcome.

Cheers,

Barry

John Barry Smith
(831) 659-3552 phone
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

5. Sgt Bart Blachford and Mr. Bill Tucker of TSB Air visited me in my home in early December 2001 and stayed for a day listening to my presentation. I stated to them that viewing the evidence of Air India Flight 182 via the videotapes would be most helpful to the investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182. I quoted a family member of a victim of United Airlines Flight 811 as saying a USA NTSB official who had seen both as saying the cargo doors of Air India Flight 182 and United Airlines Flight 811 matched visually. Sgt. Blachford never replied. Mr. Garstang and Mr. Hamilton chose not to attend.

At 8:56 AM -0800 12/17/01, John Barry Smith wrote:

Sgt. B. Blachford
Air India Task Force
5255 Heather St.

Vancouver, B. C.
V5Z 1K6

Dear Sgt. Bart Blachford, 17 Dec 01

Let us take advantage of this extra time to further check out the shorted wiring/forward cargo door rupture/explosive decompression/inflight breakup for Air India Flight 182 and others.

I'm hoping this extra time will give you and AITF opportunity to interview me again as they check out the items of interest you discovered during our discussions such as paint smears and twisted torque tubes.

Is there any chance we can view videotapes of that door area of Air India Flight 182 together to look for those matches to United Airlines Flight 811?

During our talks down here I mentioned that the family of one of the victims of United Airlines Flight 811, the Campbells, had quoted a NTSB investigator as saying the Air India Flight 182 door looked just like the United Airlines Flight 811 door which gives a further match to a wiring cause and not a bomb. Mr. Tucker said he believed that no NTSB investigator had access to the Air India Flight 182 photos and thus could give no opinion. I was able to research this further and discovered that, in fact, a NTSB investigator did have access to all of the Air India Flight 182 data and thus could state with accuracy that the Air India Flight 182 door matched the United Airlines Flight 811 forward cargo door. That investigator was no less than Jim Wildey, the person who ruled out the forward cargo door of Trans World Airlines Flight 800 based on only the examination of eight of the

ten latches.

Below excerpt from the Campbells of New Zealand to me:

'We flew to Seattle but were told we could not see the door , we drove to Washington to see the NTSB and as we entered the office we were told they could spare us 5 minutes,about 3 hours later we held a set of the recovered C locks and Lock sectors and they admitted we were correct , that they would ensure that the aircraft would be fixed but not to hold our breath waiting for a new report ever to be released . After lunch with them I asked " in light of what we now know on 811 do you still think that Air India was a bomb ?" The reply was that we never thought that Air India was a bomb in fact the video shows a cargo door exactly the same as 811.'

From Kirpal Report below on Air India Flight 182:

'1.5.16 The participant had all filed their affidavits by way of submissions. The Court indicated that formal hearings would be held for the purpose of cross-examining some of the witnesses about three weeks after the receipt of all the reports of the various groups. While in Cork, in the first week of November, 1985 some of the salvaged pieces of the wreckage were brought there. After they were inspected by all the participants and their advisers, who were present in Cork, it was decided by the Court that further detailed metallurgical and other examination of those

pieces would be done at BARC, Bombay. In order that there should be no undue delay the Court decided that a Group be constituted consisting of expert representatives of all the participants and also the nominees of the Court. This group was asked to carry out metallurgical and other examination of some of the critical pieces salvaged and give its report to the Court. The group constituted as a 'Committee of Experts' was as under :-

- a. Mr. A.J.W. Melson, Canadian Aviation Safety Board, Canada.
- b. Mr. R.K. Phillips, Canadian Pacific Air, Canada.
- c. Mr. T. Swift, Federal Aviation, Administration, USA.
- d. Mr. R.Q. Taylor, Boeing Commercial Airplane Co., USA.
- e. Mr. J.P. Tryzl, Boeing Commercial Airplane Co., USA.
- f. Mr. J.F. Wildey II, National Transportation Safety Board USA.
- g. Mr. S.N. Seshadri, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, India (Coordinator).'

The above suggests that for Air India Flight 182, the NTSB representative, Jim Wildey, said no bomb; the AAIB representative, Mr. Roy Davis, said no bomb; the Canadian Aviation Safety Board, (CASB) declined to say bomb, and only a judicial officer, not an aircraft investigator, Judge Kirpal, said bomb, and even that opinion was given reluctantly:

From Kirpal Report:

'ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

4.1 From the evidence which is available what has now to be determined is as to what caused the accident.

4.2 Finding the cause of the accident is usually a deduction from known set of facts. In the present case known facts are not very many, but there are a number of possible events which

might have happened which could have led to the crash.

4.3 The first task is to try and marshal the facts which may have a bearing as to the cause of the accident.

4.4 It is undisputed, and there is ample evidence on the record to prove it, that Air India's Kanishka had a normal and uneventful flight out of Montreal. The aircraft had been in air for about five hours and was cruising smoothly at an altitude of 31,000 feet. The readout from the CVR shows that there was no emergency on board till the catastrophic event had occurred. This is corroborated by the printout available from the DFDR. The event occurred at approximately 0714 Z and that brought the aircraft down, and it probably hit the surface of the sea within a distance of 5 miles. The time within which the plane came down at such a steep angle could not have been more than very few minutes. There was a sudden snapping of the communication between the aircraft and the ground. The aircraft had also suddenly disappeared from the radar.

4.5 It is evident that an event had occurred at 31,000 feet which had brought down 'Kanishka'. What could have possibly happened to it? The aircraft was apparently incapacitated and this was due either to it having been hit from outside; or due to some structural failure; or due to the detonation of an explosive device within the aircraft.

4.6 Evidence indicates that after the event had occurred, though the pilots did not or were not in a position to communicate with the ground, they nevertheless appeared to have taken some action. ...

4.7 It can further be speculated that if an explosion takes place in the forward cargo compartment, the oxygen stream might have been damaged so that when the pilots donned their masks as part of the emergency drill for explosive decompression, they were not breathing enriched oxygen and the time of useful consciousness at about 31,000 feet would be significantly less

than 30 seconds under high stress and if the pilots became unconscious as a result of this, then the aircraft would have got out of control which would explain the subsequent events.

4.8 ..."The United States Norad/Space Command has confirmed that there was no incoming space debris in the vicinity of Ireland on June 23, 1985."

4.9 Thus we are left with only two of the possibilities viz., structural failure or accident having been caused due to a bomb having been placed inside the aircraft.

4.10 After going through the entire record we find that there is circumstantial as well as direct evidence which directly points to the cause of the accident as being that of an explosion of a bomb in the forward cargo hold of the aircraft. At the same time there is complete lack of evidence to indicate that there was any structural failure.'

So, Sgt. Blachford, that's two aviation accident investigation agencies giving an opinion that there was no bomb, one agency declining to say a bomb, and one judicial officer saying bomb out of two equal choices. That's three to one against supporting bomb. When Judge Kirpal said there 'is complete lack of evidence to indicate that there was any structural failure,' he was correct in 1986 because he did not know what a structural failure from an inadvertently opened cargo door in flight looks like on a Boeing 747, nobody did. But now we do know and the evidence matches United Airlines Flight 811, not a bomb event although initially thought to be by the crew.

I am available to travel up there to give a full presentation to Mr. Schneider and the rest of the AITF staff if you wish. It really is important, not just for justice for the three jailed men, but that my research shows that a current hazard exists for the Canadian public that needs to be corrected.

Cheers,
Barry

(831) 659 3552
541 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
www.corazon.com
barry@corazon.com

6. Mr. Bill Tucker and I had an extensive email correspondence before he retired. (Emails attached as pdf file)

At 6:23 PM -0400 6/25/02, Tucker, Bill wrote:
X-From_: Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca Tue Jun 25 15:22:17 2002
From: "Tucker, Bill" <Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca>
To: "John Barry Smith" <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: RE: Pix of Air India Flight 182
Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2002 18:23:49 -0400
Reply-By: Sun, 2 Jun 2002 17:00:00 -0400
X-Message-Flag: Follow up

Dear Barry,

I felt that this message from you below, dated 22 May, needed specific responses to several of your points. I'll get to your request for photos later in this response, but first I want to clear the air on some of your concerns - or at least try to.

1) - I am not being "rebuffed with excuses and delay".

2) - There is nothing fishy going on.

3) - Ron Schleede contacts me because he is a colleague and a friend. He worked for me here as Director of Investigations-Air for six months on an international exchange (and he did a great job).

4) - Ken Smart said nothing to influence my retirement, and I am shocked that you would suspect a connection. The fact is that my decision was made and relayed to my boss in late March, at least a month before Ken's visit.

5) - I do not believe the "more likely explanation for Air India Flight 182 is mechanical rather than conspiracy". Based on my direct knowledge from the AI 182 investigation, I saw mechanical failure as one plausible explanation. Adding my indirect knowledge at the time (back in the late 1980s), from others who were more directly involved, I considered a bomb to be the more likely explanation and mechanical failure to be plausible, but unlikely. Adding in the additional knowledge I have acquired since then (which is almost all indirect in a pure accident investigation sense) I have become more convinced that a bomb brought down AI 182.

6) - The only reason that my recent e-mail referred to AI 182, PanAm 103, and TWA 800, but not to UA 811, was that I had less familiarity with the UA 811 investigation than the other three. However, I have absolutely no reason to doubt the eventual conclusion that the cargo door failed in UA 811.

7) - As I advised you last summer, this agency has no mandate to re-conduct an investigation of AI 182. Moreover, my personal opinion is that it would not be an appropriate use of our resources to do so. Nevertheless, I did believe that the TSB should make John Garstang available to that investigation through periodic secondment to the RCMP, and I still feel that our doing so was an appropriate decision. I have high confidence in the integrity and the thoroughness of the RCMP investigation; and I sincerely hope that justice will be served by the pending trial - whatever its outcome.

Now to the matter of your request for photos of the forward right side of the AI 182 B747.

I spoke with John Garstang about your request. He advised that

there are both photos and videos from the AI 182 investigation. However, with respect to the forward right side and the cargo door in particular, he is only certain about the video. They have pictures showing where the cargo door was in the debris field, and they also have a picture of the door at the ocean surface when it broke free during the recovery attempt; he is just not sure how much was video, or still frame from video, versus photographs..

To complicate matters, the video was deteriorating as time went by. Some years ago (estimate: around 1995), the RCMP took the magnetic tape video (which would be of even poorer quality by now) and made a digitized version.

The former is ours, the latter is theirs; however they need both for trial purposes (continuity of evidence, I assume). Moreover, they have advised that the matter is before the courts, that a publication ban is in effect, and that they do not want anything to be released that could be prejudicial to the court process. Both the TSB's General Counsel and I have been notified that the RCMP Legal Services group believes that release of Air India wreckage photographs could be injurious to the RCMP's

work and that,
as such, release is exempted under Sec. 16(1) of Canada's Access
to
Information Act.

There may (far from certain) be some form of photo/video info
that is still
in the TSB's possession and that may (also far from certain) be
releasable
to you. To determine that will take considerable effort and, to be
at all
manageable, it will require the personal involvement of John
Garstang. With
his heavy workload, as we try to complete the report on the
SWR111
investigation, we just can't give him any more tasks for the next
few
months. However, I have obtained a personal commitment from
both the
Director of Engineering and the Director of Air Investigations
that they
will follow-up on this at the end of the summer and see if there is
anything
that can be made available to you. To that end, I shall send both
of them a
copy of this message so that they can create a "bring forward"
reminder to
follow up. At the very worst, the TSB's photos/videos can
certainly be made
available after the trial.

Meanwhile, I can assure you that the cargo door failure
possibility was

looked at in a rigorous and unbiased manner. In fact, I understand that part of that process was to specifically review the information and suggestions that you had provided. John G. told me that when he was asked by the RCMP to do work in that area, there was not the slightest hint of a desired outcome - only that all the information be reviewed thoroughly and objectively to find the truth.

As Sgt Blachford has indicated to both of us, the aircraft-related elements are only part of a huge investigation. The trial (which is expected to be the largest in Canada's history) will also bring out much evidence that was obtained through the RCMP's criminal investigation. You will no doubt be following the trial, as I will. Let us hope that the trial will not be delayed much longer and that it will culminate in a just outcome (whatever that may be)..

In closing, I can honestly say that I have enjoyed communicating with you - at least most of the time. (I must admit that there have been times when you added to my stress level because I couldn't keep up with your correspondence; it is against my nature to ignore a sincere message or to

respond to it without adequate consideration.) If I may offer some gratuitous advice, please don't let the cargo door issue consume you, and don't become like the conspiracy theorists. You have already raised awareness of the cargo door issue; but if you are seen as pushing it as the only credible explanation for so many accidents, people will not listen to what you have to say. I was, and still am, impressed with you. You have a good brain, a pleasant personality, good health, and a wonderful family and home; Don't miss out on enjoying all that in your retirement years.

Very sincerely,

Bill T..

> -----Original Message-----

> From: John Barry Smith [SMTP:barry@corazon.com]

> Sent: Wednesday, May 22, 2002 7:28 AM

> To: Tucker, Bill

> Subject: Pix of Air India Flight 182

>

> Dear Bill, 22 May 02

>

> Air India Flight 182 was said by the CASB and the Kirpal Commission

> to have suffered an explosion on the right side forward of the

wing

> in flight. Therefore, photographs of the right side forward of the

> wing are relevant and very important. It is to be expected that > photographs of that area be available for inspection as they are the

> fatal wound of the victim. Much time and expense was used to procure

> those photographs. They exist and held by the Crown authorities.

>

> If the Director General, Investigation Operations, Transportation

> Safety Board of Canada asks to view those photographs and is rebuffed

> with excuses and delay, there is something fishy going on.

>

> Why would Ron Schleede call you out of the blue? What did Ken Smart

> say that led to your decision to retire a few days later?

>

> Bill, the whole sequence is fishy.

>

> I believe you see the plausible and more likely explanation for Air

> India Flight 182 is mechanical rather than conspiracy.

>

> In your bailing out email, as I call it, to me on 9 May 02, you refer

> to persons and titles and their opinions as to the cause of the

> accidents but never refer to facts, data, or evidence. You also never

> refer to United Airlines Flight 811 as if it never existed which

is

> absolutely not fair since that is the model for the other three.

>

> Well, that is how I know I'm right; never rebutted with facts, only

> the opinions of titles of persons who have been involved since 1985

> and have much interest in maintaining the status quo, even in the

> face of conclusive contradictory evidence which abounds in the metal,

> cams, latches, engines, and recorders of United Airlines Flight 811.

>

> For Ken Smart to imply that the forward cargo door area of Pan Am

> Flight 103 opened in flight but that it happened after the 'bomb'

> explosion' is contrary to the AAIB wreckage distribution fuselage

> reconstruction which shows it happened at initial event time.

The

> photographs show it happened in flight. The evidence is there.

>

> But ignored and that's why it's fishy.

>

> Bill, please do not retire until you get a look at the forward cargo

> door area of Air India Flight 182. Satisfy your own curiosity to see

> if the twisted metal matches the other three door areas of twisted

> metal.

>

> Cheers,
> Barry

7. The key segment of the above correspondence from Mr. Bill Tucker of TSB Air talking to John Garstang and the RCMP AITF regarding the visual evidence is that:

- A. The video evidence is deteriorating over time.
- B. Mr. John Garstang has a busy workload.
- C. Both the TSB's General Counsel and Mr. Tucker have been notified that the RCMP Legal Services group believes that release of Air India wreckage photographs could be injurious to the RCMP's work and that, as such, release is exempted under Sec. 16(1) of Canada's Access to Information Act.
- D. Mr. Tucker obtained a personal commitment from both the Director of Engineering and the Director of Air Investigations that they will follow-up on this at the end of the summer and see if there is anything that can be made available to you.
- E. At the very worst, the TSB's photos/videos can certainly be made available after the trial.

8. I followed up with TSB.

At 12:47 PM -0700 7/14/03, John Barry Smith wrote:

To: Terry.Burtch@tsb.gc.ca

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: Air India Flight 182 update

Cc: Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca

Bcc:

X-Attachments:

At 9:09 AM -0400 7/3/03, Delorme, Paulette wrote:

Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for your recent inquiry regarding the last correspondence you had with Mr. Bill Tucker on the Air India file. Mr. Tucker's replacement is Mr. Terry Burtch, who joined us last October. I have forwarded your request to Mr. Burtch, who is pursuing it at present. You may also be interested to know that just before we received your request, both the Director of Investigations - Air and the Director, Engineering, retired from the Transportation Safety Board. Mr. Burtch is presently following up with other staff in those respective organizations, and will communicate directly with you at the earliest opportunity. We regret the delay in responding, but trust that this approach will be satisfactory.

Paulette G. Delorme
Executive Assistant / Adjointe exÉcutive
Transportation Safety Board of Canada/
Bureau de la sÚcuritÚ des transports du Canada
Tel.: (819) 994-8002
FAX: (819) 994-9759

Terry Burtch
Director General,
Investigation Operations
Transportation Safety Board Canada

Dear Mr. Burtch, Monday, July 14, 2003 12:23 PM

John Barry Smith here following up on Ms. Delorme's email of a few weeks ago.

Essentially my premise is that Air India Flight 182 and others

were brought down by a mechanical cause with precedent. There are no conspiracies, just a machine obeying the physical laws of nature.

My proof is in official documents, photographs, and the wonderful luxury of hindsight of 18 years.

The issue is important because the mechanical problems exist to this day and the danger exists of a reoccurrence of the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation.

There also exists the trial of two men accused of causing the inflight breakup. Would it not be prudent for TSB to conduct an update of the AAR of so many years ago? The CASB report and the Kirpal report were conducted without the benefit of subsequent similar accidents to similar type aircraft and model under similar circumstances.

An update would be most beneficial since the latest Canadian opinion as to the probable cause of Air India Flight 182 was an explosion of undetermined origin in the forward cargo compartment, an opinion I concur with as time has revealed the cause of the explosion.

It's not a bomb. Nobody 'blew' it up. It was an explosion all right, an explosive decompression.

John Garstang has been seconded to the RCMP and his opinion does not reflect that of the TSB, does it? If so, then there are many inconsistencies and contradictions in his opinion that a bomb in the aft cargo compartment caused the breakup.

The Crown is in the position of arguing against itself in the pursuit of justice for the 329 deaths in Air India Flight 182. For instance, CASB and the Kirpal Report both conclusively agree the explosion was in the forward cargo compartment. The reports offer ample evidence to support that conclusion. Yet the Crown now postulates the explosion occurred in the aft cargo compartment, a premise easily refuted with the Crown's own evidence.

If the explosion occurred in the forward cargo compartment, the accused are innocent as all the baggage from the Vancouver passengers were loaded in the aft cargo compartment. The Montreal passengers' baggage was loaded into the forward cargo compartment.

If the explosion occurred in the aft cargo compartment, the CASB and the Kirpal Report are incorrect in a basic finding. If so, that error must be explained by data, facts, and evidence. That has not been done.

Just exactly where did the explosion occur? The lives of the accused and flying passenger's today are dependent on that conclusion.

Once determined where, then the question is why. I believe I have found the answer and it is the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182 and others.

This is quite controversial and refutes conventional wisdom/wishful thinking of many years. However the facts are there. I can present them to you at your convenience, Mr. Burtch.

Many facts can be deduced from the actual photographs of the actual wreckage of Air India Flight 182. Apparently the RCMP has those photographs and will not release them to TSB, according to Mr. Bill Tucker.

That's not right. That's wrong when an aviation safety board can not look at accident photographs. Could you look at the photographs and high quality video to see if the forward cargo door area of Air India Flight 182 matches the photographs of United Airlines Flight 811? Could you update the AAR for Air India Flight 182 to include the knowledge gained by hindsight and similar accidents in early model Boeing 747s?

Could you assign a staff person to listen to me as I present my research and analysis that concludes the probable cause of the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182 was the shorted wiring/ruptured open cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation?

Cheers,
Barry Smith

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
831 659 3552
barry@corazon.com
<http://www.corazon.com>

9. The TSB never received any visual evidence of Air India Flight 182 from RCMP as requested.

10. The TSB never followed up by questioning me as Mr. Tucker indicated.
11. The visual evidence continues to deteriorate.
12. TSB will not respond to my requests.

To sum up, Commissioner Major, regarding the term of reference of non cooperation that I am personally involved in which justifies my request for grant of standing: There was noncooperation between TSB Air and the RCMP AITF regarding relevant and important visual evidence in the form of videotapes and 35 MM color film of the wreckage of Air India Flight 182. The Canadian air accident investigating board was denied visual evidence of an airplane crash by the police authorities who claimed an exemption to law to justify the denial.

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
safety@ntsb.org

Email list to authorities below for Tucker, Garstang, Smart, and Blachford:

F	(Normal)	Tucker, Bill	3:22 PM 5/24/01
7	Air India Flt. 182		
S	(Normal) y	Tucker, Bill	1:32 AM 5/25/01
41	Supplemental TSB report for Air India Flight 182		
S	(Normal) y	Tucker, Bill	11:32 AM

5/26/01 0 Smith AAR Appendices A, B, C, D, E
S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:33 AM
5/26/01 0 Smith AAR Appendix I
S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:37 AM 5/26/01
0 Smith AAR Appendices F, G, H, J,
S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:37 AM
5/26/01 0 Official AI 182 Reports in PDF
S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:38 AM 5/26/01
0 UAL 811 NTSB AAR in PDF
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 12:12 PM
5/26/01 9 Supplemental thoughts
S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 7:15 PM 5/30/01 0
PDF of Smith AAR for AI 182
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 7:17 PM 5/30/01 3
Sgt Blachford contacted me
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:32 AM 6/14/01
11 So true...
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:59 AM 6/18/01
9 Swiss Air 111 changes
F (Normal) Tucker, Bill 6:20 PM 6/20/01 11
Re: Swiss Air 111 changes
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 6:43 PM 6/20/01
4 Sudden loud sound on CVR
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:04 PM 6/22/01
13 Startle/falling reflex
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:06 PM 6/24/01 22
DI-Air, DE, IIC, AITF
F (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:05 AM 6/25/01
5 Re: Sudden loud sound on CVR
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:14 PM 6/25/01 2
Re: Sudden loud sound on CVR
S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:59 AM 7/2/01 0
Part One in PDF file

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:00 AM 7/2/01 32
Consensus on Location of explosion in Air India Flight

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:16 PM 7/5/01 32
Consensus on Cause of explosion in Air India Flight 18

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 8:17 PM 7/5/01
0 PDF Consensus on Cause of explosion in Air India Fligh

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 4:45 PM 7/6/01
0 PDF of Conclusions, Recommendations, and Implications

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:46 PM 7/6/01 31
Conclusions, Recommendations, and Implications of wiri

R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:38 PM 7/13/01 2
Re: Consensus on Cause of explosion in Air India Fligh

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 6:15 PM 7/13/01 2
Re: Consensus on Cause of explosion in Air India Fligh

(Normal) Tucker, Bill 6:58 PM 7/13/01 2
Re: Consensus on Cause of explosion in Air India Fligh

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:17 PM 7/22/01 8
Startling SDR

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:03 PM 7/23/01 12
Two matched events of uncommanded cargo door openings,

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:43 AM 7/26/01
14 Electrical cause of uncommanded forward cargo door ope

R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:24 PM 8/3/01 7
Re: Startling SDR

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:17 PM 8/3/01
14 Government of India reconsideration of Air India Fligh

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:56 AM 8/9/01 12
Warning/Alert/Interview me/Placentia

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:53 AM 8/10/01
46 Defence team contact

- (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:13 PM 8/12/01
7 From CASB member Les Filotas

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:17 AM 8/24/01

9 What are opinions of your aviation experts about Air I
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:25 AM 8/26/01 4
A330 fuel starvation Azores
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:38 PM 8/28/01
10 Faulty wires in SWR 111 and Air India Flight 182
R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:11 PM 9/7/01
38 Re: Defence team contact
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:24 PM
9/10/01 2 Re: Defence team contact
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 2:28 PM
11/14/01 4 Request from RCMP AITF
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:53 PM 11/14/01
1 More info for meeting:
(Normal) Tucker, Bill 2:08 PM 11/20/01
4 Re: Request from RCMP AITF
(Normal) Tucker, Bill 2:08 PM 11/20/01
1 Recall: Request from RCMP AITF
R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 2:14 PM 11/20/01
4 Re: Request from RCMP AITF
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:46 PM
11/20/01 3 December 5 fine for meeting.
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 12:34 PM 12/1/01
2 Confirming 4/5+December meeting
R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:39 AM
12/3/01 3 Re: Confirming 4/5+December meeting
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 12:28 PM 12/3/01
1 Re: Confirming 4/5+December meeting
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:44 PM 12/5/01 1
Debrief
(Normal) Tucker, Bill 6:46 AM
12/11/01 3 Re: Debrief
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 1:52 PM
12/11/01 46 The End of the Day

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 2:55 PM
12/11/01 51 Garstang Report in text, unable to send PDF
- (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 2:56 PM 12/11/01
0 Garstang PDF Report
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 12:57 PM
12/12/01 4 Sixteen years ago today...
R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:46 PM
12/12/01 3 Re: Sixteen years ago today...
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:13 PM 12/12/01
18 Small world..
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:13 AM 12/13/01
2 Whoa, Nelly....
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:58 AM
12/15/01 13 Recent forward cargo door crunch on Boeing
747 at Heat
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:55 AM 12/17/01
10 NTSB was with 182/Trial delay
(Normal) y Tucker, Bill 4:41 PM 1/29/02 2
Fwd: Lockerbie Cago Door Photos
F (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:04 PM 1/30/02
7 Analysis of PA 103 cargo door photo Part II
F (Normal) Tucker, Bill 2:42 PM 2/1/02 10
Analysis of PA 103 cargo door photo Part III
(Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:30 PM 2/1/02 1
Re: Analysis of PA 103 cargo door photo Part III
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:52 PM
2/10/02 5 PA 103 analysis: Note to Sgt. Blachford
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:27 AM
2/15/02 5 Despair
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:51 PM
2/15/02 23 Retirement, Not!
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:17 PM 2/22/02
7 Got UAL 811 photos

S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:18 PM 2/22/02
0	811 pix 2			
S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:18 PM 2/22/02
0	811 pix 3			
S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:19 PM 2/22/02
0	811 pix 4			
S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:19 PM 2/22/02
0	811 pix 5			
S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:19 PM 2/22/02
0	811 pix 1			
S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:20 PM 2/22/02
0	811 pix 6			
S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:20 PM 2/22/02
0	811 pix 7			
S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:20 PM 2/22/02
0	811 pix 8			
S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:20 PM 2/22/02
0	811 pix 9			
S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:21 PM 2/22/02
0	811 pix 10			
S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:21 PM 2/22/02
0	811 pix 11			
S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:21 PM 2/22/02
0	811 pix 12			
S	(Normal)		Tucker, Bill	4:30 PM 2/22/02
4	Photos and film in TSB hands.			
S	(Normal)	y	Tucker, Bill	11:51 AM 2/27/02
0	Pic 4 exhibit list			
S	(Normal)	y	Tucker, Bill	11:51 AM
2/27/02	0	Pic 1 article		
S	(Normal)	y	Tucker, Bill	11:51 AM 2/27/02
0	Incident page 5			
S	(Normal)	y	Tucker, Bill	11:51 AM

2/27/02 0 Incident page 4
 S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:51 AM
 2/27/02 0 Incident page 3
 S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:51 AM
 2/27/02 0 Incident page 2
 S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:52 AM
 2/27/02 0 Incident page 1
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 1:05 PM 2/27/02
 7 811 pix from inside/missing seats/floor damage
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:24 AM 3/3/02 29
 Door of 182 like door of 811
 F (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:04 PM 3/5/02 6
 Re: Photos and film in TSB hands.
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:33 PM 3/5/02
 1 Re: Photos and film in TSB hands.
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 2:30 PM 3/17/02
 0 Welcome Back
 R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:52 PM 3/22/02 1
 Re: Welcome Back
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:36 PM 3/22/02
 0 Re: Welcome Back
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:36 PM
 3/22/02 0 Campbell page 2
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:36 PM
 3/22/02 0 Campbell page 3
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:37 PM
 3/22/02 0 Campbell page 4
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:58 PM
 3/22/02 3 Campbell page 1 Significance
 S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 11:58 PM 3/22/02
 0 Door Story in pdf
 S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:21 AM
 3/23/02 5 Door overview and closeups

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:08 AM
3/24/02 54 Copy of letter to Sgt Blachford AITF, 22 Mar
02

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:59 AM 3/28/02
0 Funny but shouldn't be

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:13 AM 4/4/02 2
Short landing and takeoff platform...

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:05 AM 4/11/02
1 Mr. Ken Smart

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:01 AM 4/16/02
24 Letter to Mr. Ken Smart enclosed.

R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:48 PM 4/16/02
1 Re: Letter to Mr. Ken Smart enclosed.

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 6:30 PM 4/16/02 1
I'm on call for any questions you may have/come visit

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:43 AM 4/18/02
5 Note from Mr. Smart and my response:

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:29 PM 4/18/02 3
Resend of Note from Mr. Smart and my response:

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:19 AM 4/20/02 5
Resend just in case

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:04 AM 4/22/02
55 My reply to Mr. Smart's email

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:26 AM 4/30/02 0
Smith AAR PA 103, Appendix L

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:26 AM 4/30/02 0
Smith AAR PA 103, Appendix M

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:27 AM 4/30/02 0
Smith AAR PA 103, Appendices A-K

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:27 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part I

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:27 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part IV

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:27 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part III

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 9:27 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part II

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:31 AM 4/30/02
1 Smith AAR for PA 103 completed and sent

S (Normal) y Tucker, Bill 1:05 PM 5/1/02
12 Additional considerations to AAR PA 103, Smith

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:42 AM 5/5/02 253
TWA 800 justification for reconsideration

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:34 AM 5/9/02
3 And so it goes...

(Normal) Tucker, Bill 1:46 PM 5/9/02
130 Re: TWA 800 justification for reconsideration 1/2

(Normal) Tucker, Bill 1:46 PM 5/9/02
130 Re: TWA 800 justification for reconsideration 2/2

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:48 AM 5/10/02
0 Pictures

F (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:28 AM 5/22/02
2 Pix of Air India Flight 182

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 7:56 AM 5/25/02 2
Maybe again?

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:32 PM 5/29/02 3
To Mr. Chou: China Airlines Flight 611 Black Box resul

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:22 AM 5/30/02 38
Written before and after Trans World Airlines Flight 8

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:40 AM 5/30/02 4
Stay and fight, Bill, you are needed and most importan

R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 10:22 AM 5/30/02
5 Re: Stay and fight, Bill, you are needed and most impo

S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 11:11 AM 5/30/02
2 182pix/sweet retirement

R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:48 PM 5/30/02

3 Fwd: My email to Mr. Chou for China Airlines Flight 611
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:26 PM 5/30/02

66 I do consider all alternatives, I ask others do also.
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 8:53 PM 6/2/02 283
Sent to Mr. Smart: Last ditch effort, clutching at str
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:34 AM 6/7/02 11
From Ken Smart
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 4:15 PM 6/10/02 105
To Ken Smart: Line of communication open Pan Am Flight
R (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:01 AM 6/24/02 6
Re: Please notify Chinese Authorities about the wiring
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 9:13 AM 6/24/02 3
Re: Please notify Chinese Authorities about the wiring
F (Normal) Tucker, Bill 3:23 PM 6/25/02 10
Re: Pix of Air India Flight 182
S (Normal) Tucker, Bill 5:50 PM 6/25/02

20 Summary of exit briefing...
S (Normal) y aaib-dot@dircon.co.uk 10:01
AM 4/16/02 24 Mr. Bill Tucker/wiring/cargo door for PA
103
F (Normal) Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca 11:32 AM
1/30/02 20 Analysis of PA 103 cargo door pictures
F (Normal) Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca 11:25 AM
2/6/02 11 Analysis of PA 103 cargo door photo Part IV
S (Normal) Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca,
ksmart@aaib.gov.uk 10:12 AM 5/26/02 41 China
Airlines 611
S (Normal) Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca,
ksmart@aaib.gov.uk 10:01 AM 5/29/02 23 My email
to Mr. Chou for China Airlines Flight 611
S (Normal) Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca,
ksmart@aaib.gov.uk 7:13 PM 6/23/02 4 Please notify
Chinese Authorities about the wiring/car

R (Normal) Ken Smart 9:41 AM 4/18/02
199 Mr. Bill Tucker/wiring/cargo door for PA 103 message
R (Normal) Ken Smart 9:41 AM 4/18/02
199 Mr. Bill Tucker/wiring/cargo door for PA 103 message
S (Normal) Ken Smart 10:43 AM 4/18/02
4 Thank you for email, detailed reply to follow.
S (Normal) Ken Smart 8:04 AM 4/22/02 55
PA 103 reply to your email, Mr. Smart
S (Normal) y Ken Smart 9:26 AM 4/30/02 0
Smith AAR PA 103, Appendices A-K
S (Normal) y Ken Smart 9:26 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Appendix M
S (Normal) y Ken Smart 9:26 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Appendix L
S (Normal) y Ken Smart 9:26 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part IV
S (Normal) y Ken Smart 9:26 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part III
S (Normal) y Ken Smart 9:26 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part II
S (Normal) y Ken Smart 9:26 AM 4/30/02
0 Smith AAR PA 103, Part I
S (Normal) Ken Smart 9:31 AM 4/30/02
1 Smith AAR for PA 103 completed and sent
S (Normal) y Ken Smart 1:05 PM 5/1/02
12 Additional considerations to AAR PA 103, Smith
S (Normal) Ken Smart 9:22 AM 5/30/02 38
Written before and after Trans World Airlines Flight 8
S (Normal) Ken Smart 8:46 PM 6/2/02 293
Conscience/Comet/Wiring/Doors
(Normal) Ken Smart 2:33 AM 6/7/02 1

Re: Conscience/Comet/Wiring/Doors

R (Normal) Ken Smart 2:33 AM 6/7/02
151 Re: Conscience/Comet/Wiring/Doors
F (Normal) y Ken Smart 10:00 PM 6/9/02
97 Line of communication open Pan Am Flight 103
R (Normal) Ken Smart 2:31 AM 6/25/02
5 Re: Please notify Chinese Authorities about the wiring
S (Normal) Ken Smart 12:18 AM 6/26/02
7 Pattern emerging
S (Normal) Ken Smart 11:30 PM
8/16/03 6 Investigators ask questions....
S (Normal) y ksmart@aaib.gov.uk 8:04 AM
4/22/02 0 Smith AAR for Air India Flight 182/103
S (Normal) y ksmart@aaib.gov.uk 8:05 AM
4/22/02 0 AAR United Airlines Flight 811 92/02 NTSB
S (Normal) ksmart@aaib.gov.uk 5:33 PM
5/29/02 2 To Mr. Chou: China Airlines Flight 611 Black Box
resul
S (Normal) ksmart@aaib.gov.uk,
Bill.Tucker@tsb.gc.ca, kfch 11:27 AM 6/29/02 3 Maybe
not open cargo door....

(Normal) Securitas 4:18 AM 2/27/97 3
Re: Crash cause of Air India Flight 182
- (Normal) Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
9:01 AM 2/27/97 2 Thank you for info, need more please
- (Normal) Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca 12:43
PM 3/1/97 1 Cargo door Flight 182
- (Normal) Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca 8:47
PM 3/15/97 2 Please comment AI 182 cargo door
- (Normal) Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
2:11 PM 4/17/97 1 Attention Mr John Garstang RE Air India

182
- (Normal) Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca 3:30
PM 11/28/97 17 Cargo door rupture/NTSB TWA 800
Hearing
S (Normal) Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
2:33 AM 10/29/00 16 AI 182 matches TWA 800 and PA
103 and UAL 811
S (Normal) Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca
9:05 PM 3/13/01 2 Urgent for John Garstang of TSB re: AI
182 bomb locati

- (Normal) SGT Blachford@redshift.com
11:56 PM 11/14/01 5 Meeting about Air India Flight 182
- (Normal) SGT Blachford@redshift.com
9:56 AM 12/17/01 10 Trial delay opportunity
- (Normal) Sgt. Bart Blachford@RCMP
2:40 PM 2/1/02 2 Pan Am Flight 103 cargo door
photographs analyses
- (Normal) Sgt. Bart Blachford@RCMP
4:30 PM 5/1/02 2 Smith AAR for Pan Am Flight 103
X (Normal) Sgt. Bart
Blachford@redshift.com 1:46 PM 12/11/01 16 The
End of the Day
- (Normal) Sgt.Bart Blachford@RCMP 11:43
PM 2/10/02 5 Analysis of PA 103 cargo door photo Part
IV
- (Normal) Sgt.BartBlachford@RCMP 12:51
PM 2/16/02 3 Who are the TSB investigators?
- (Normal) Sgt.BartBlachford@RCMP 1:03 PM
2/27/02 2 Mr. Garstang follow up
- (Normal) Sgt.BartBlachford@RCMP 9:21 AM
3/3/02 21 Door of 182 like door of 811
- (Normal) Sgt.BartBlachford@RCMP 9:34 AM

3/24/02 52 Authority who said 182 door exactly same as 811 door

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:52 PM PDT
To: barney.brucker@justice.gc.ca
Subject: Smith Submission 9 The Crash and Meeting the Family.

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Friday, August 18, 2006

Below is Smith Submission 9 The Crash and Meeting the Family. (It happens so fast) Filed Friday, August 18, 2006

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/ ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/

inflight breakup explanation. (Please consider a plausible, reasonable, electrical cause with precedent) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006.

Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The Layperson version. (It's not rocket science) Filed Friday, August 11, 2006

Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years: Predicting the Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non Cooperation. (Sorry, no can do.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 9 The Crash and Meeting the Family. (It happens so fast) Filed Friday, August 18, 2006

Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner

Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires

publique

Dear Commissioner Major, Friday, August 18, 2006

To review my pleas:

1. Please grant me standing to present my mechanical non conspiracy explanation to you in depth.
2. Please ask TSB Air to provide an aircraft accident report to you on the probable cause of Air India Flight 182.
3. Please correct the highly prejudicial error on Commission website that states the CASB concluded it was a bomb; they did not. ("Yet, it was not until the following January that the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb.")

And a new one:

4. Please post all the non classified written material submitted to you by the public during the public inquiry (including my submissions) on the Commission website, <http://www.majorcomm.ca/en/index.asp>

As I understand it, you are conducting a public, broad, and full inquiry into the events surrounding:

1. The investigation of the bombing.
2. The bombing.
3. Air India Flight 182.
4. The victims.
5. The family members of the victims.

According to the family members, the Commission of Inquiry was created because of the 329 victims and the distress the surviving family members felt in their grief.

As justification that I can contribute information to the Commission to enhance its work and thus eligible for a grant of standing, I submit the following information of what leads up to and during a sudden night fatal jet airplane crash from this survivor. I offer the Commission a unique perspective of a sudden inflight fatal jet airplane crash.

I then add what it's like to meet the surviving family members of the fatality.

Field Carrier Landing Practice FCLP (Two articles I wrote and were published in the Pacific Flyer 1990)

I popped up my canopy by toggling the switch on the left console. The aluminum clamshell with two small side windows whooshed up and locked. The warm night air of central Florida rushed into the cockpit displacing the cool forced conditioned air on my forehead while I still breathed the cold oxygen from my mask. The dull roar of the two idling jet engines hit me through my helmet; the intakes were just two feet away on my left and right, I was in the middle. I was strapped into the back seat of an RA-5C Vigilante at 2300 hours on a concrete ramp at Sanford Naval Air Station on 14 June 1967. We were conducting Night Field Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP) on Runway 27 with five other aircraft in the pattern. Wind was calm and temperature about 85 degrees. The sky was clear with only the flashing lights of the other aircraft as they went around and around the pattern to be seen.

My regular training pilot climbed out of his front cockpit and wiggled down the ladder attached to the fuselage and the new pilot climbed up and in. The fifty thousand pound airplane with its two fifteen thousand pound thrust idling engines sat in its chocks and vibrated as it was being refueled by a yellow truck

off to the side. Flashing lights were everywhere but it was all orderly and the pilot switch and hot refueling was going off without a hitch. I took off my mask and instantly the smell of exhausted jet fuel came into the cockpit. I relaxed and enjoyed it. It was all very exciting. The new pilot came up on hot mike and said, "OK, Smitty, how do you read?" He knew that his regularly assigned Reconnaissance Attack Navigator (RAN) had been replaced by me for this evening FCLP only. "Loud and clear, sir," I replied, putting my mask back on and talking into the microphone embedded in it. I toggled down my canopy and it closed with a reassuring thump and clunked locked. The air cooled down and the noise eased for a bit.

My regular pilot walked away without a look back. He had just practiced twelve landings and would do so again tomorrow night. He was an unmarried thirty eight year old Navy Commander who had been flying single seat jet reconnaissance fighters (F-8) off carriers for years and had had one combat tour in the new war in Vietnam. He was now preparing to carrier qualify in this type aircraft before he went back to war in Vietnam. It was his first time flying in a two seat carrier jet.

I was a single, twenty three year old Ensign navigator who had had little jet experience, little navigator experience and had never been in combat or even on a carrier. I was in awe of him. We had been assigned as a crew and we flew all our missions together. We were due to qualify in the RA-5C in one month on the USS Ranger, one of the large supercarriers of the time, and then on to combat in six months over North Vietnam flying from Yankee Station in the Gulf of Tonkin. But first we had to practice crew coordination and the techniques and procedures to land the largest and heaviest carrier aircraft on a flight deck. This was the pilot's time.

For the past several months I had been navigating low level, medium speed photo missions throughout Florida, Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee, learning how to take pictures of small bridges, roads, power plants, and prisons, while maneuvering up and down and all around at four hundred and eighty knots. The hardest part was not throwing up while thinking ahead of the airplane and putting in very small number new target coordinates into the computer. Now it was FCLP and all pilot technique and skill to get this airplane at a certain spot on the earth, in a certain attitude, at a certain speed, at a certain weight, and at a certain time. It had to be done right. We were doing OK. "Any gripes?" my new pilot asked, referring to any problems the airplane might have developed during the previous two FCLP periods.

"No problems ," I answered. My new pilot was a Lieutenant Commander, also thirty eight, and had had much experience in combat and RA-5C carrier flying. He was married and had five children. I addressed him as Mr. Butler. I was more respectful to him than in awe, but also felt much more friendly towards him. He had recently returned from a Western Pacific (WestPac) cruise and a harrowing combat tour. He was now undergoing refresher training before going out for another combat cruise with a different squadron than mine. I had volunteered to fly these two hops with him because I knew him to be safe and instructive.

"Call for taxi," he directed. I made all the radio calls but the incoming instructions were for the pilot who was listening and had his hands full trying to precisely place this ungainly airplane onto a spot of runway about twenty yards wide by twenty yards long. The A-5, like most supersonic aircraft, was a clumsy, underpowered buffalo when it was slow and dirty with flaps, droops, and landing gear down, but cleaned up it was a beautiful,

graceful, speeding demon.

"Ground control, 201, taxi," I said into the oxygen mask as I pressed down on a button on right right footrest after first confirming I had the correct frequency set in the small window at eye level. We were flying one of twelve aircraft assigned to the only Navy tactical reconnaissance training squadron, RVAH-3. Our call sign was Commanche Trail 201 which I had shortened to 201. I would have shortened it to 01 but there was another 01 in the pattern and I did not want to be confused with him.

"201, Ground, cleared to taxi runway 27, wind calm, altimeter two niner niner two," the tower replied. "Ground," was short for "ground control" which was the title of the person in the tower who monitored aircraft movements on the ramp just prior to takeoff. The same person might be called, "Tower," after we were airborne.

The engines revved up and we started to slowly taxi toward the duty runway. We were only partially loaded with fuel because we would be landing shorty after takeoff and the landing gear would not support the weight of a fully loaded landing aircraft. The A-5 usually held thirty thousand pounds of jet fuel, about five thousand gallons, but for our touch and go's we usually took off with about seven thousand pounds of JP-4, or about a thousand gallons.

That amount of fuel was sufficient for about twenty five minutes of six crash and dashes before we would stop and hot refuel again. Each pilot would then have had two exhausting periods of twelve field carrier landing practices on the night runway which had landing lights which simulated a carrier's angled flight deck. They usually emerged from the cockpit soaked in sweat. There

was a Landing Signal Officer (LSO) standing by the end of the runway to talk to the pilots as they made their approach. The LSO, "Paddles," as he was called, was an experienced RA-5C pilot who made recommendations to the squadron commander as to whether a particular pilot was qualified to fly out to the ship for landing qualifications which would enable that pilot to go on the cruise. A thumbs down by Paddles was a serious thing for a pilot and his career.

"Take off checklist," my pilot intoned.

"Compass," I quickly promptly as I was expecting the request. I had only flown with Mr. Butler one other time, a day low-level hop through mountains in southern Tennessee. It was the only time I had ever tried the Terrain Following Radar (TFR) which allowed the plane to be guided below mountain tops by the navigator interpreting special radar signals. No one trusted the radar enough to use it for real. On that day the radar worked fine and I respected the pilot for at least showing his trust for me and the system. For that reason I had volunteered to stay and fly the extra two periods instead of getting out and leaving with my regular pilot who had completed his two periods. "Set," the pilot answered the expected reply. "Hook," I said.

"Up," he answered.

"IFF," I said, and then answered my own query, "set to standby." Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) was not required since we never left the air station control area, but we always went through every checklist item anyway.

"Canopy," I said.

"Down and locked, lights out," he answered.

"Harness," I said.

"Locked," he replied.

"OK, flaps and take off power to go," I said as we neared the end of the runway." The takeoff ritual was proceeding exactly as usual. We never engaged in idle chitchat.

There was so much information coming into us from different sources that it required all our concentration to monitor and interpret it so we didn't have any time for non-life threatening conversation. We were closely watching dials telling us engine temperatures, flap position, radio frequency, fuel flow, hydraulic status lights and also listening to the tower, the LSO, and five other aircraft in the pattern. Our senses were alive with processing information, figuring out which calls were for us and which required responses. We had engine noise and radio noise also interfering with hearing clearly. Internal communication was kept to a minimum.

We waited for a minute as another aircraft came in for his approach. It was no use calling for take off yet and the common frequency was busy enough with six airplanes all communicating where they were, their intentions, their fuel states, and listening to the LSO give final landing instructions. I checked the inside of my small cockpit. My left elbow could touch the aluminum skin of the left side and my right elbow could touch the right. My arm partially bent forward could touch the front console. I had a little one foot by one foot window high up on the left and right side of my canopy. In front of me there was a fold-down desk and a full instrument panel including radar, viewfinder, altimeters and

many other electronic controls. It was cramped but comfortable once I knew where everything was. The seat was a hard beige plastic which was the bottom of the ejection seat which also went up my back and over the top of my head. The seat had to be hard to exert the correct forces without hurting the back. No cushions were allowed. I could not see nor touch my pilot in his equally small cockpit in front of me.

I figured that in an hour and a half I would be having a cold can of beer and a Florida lobster and baked potato dinner at my favorite Sanford restaurant. I watched out my little right side window as the landing A-5 wobbled lower and lower. The A-5 came down in its flared position, wings rocking back and forth, and slammed down in front of us and then with a roar took back off again, then slowly turned right to prepare for its next touch and go. It was said that a carrier landing was nothing more than a controlled crash. One reason Air Force type aircraft were unsuitable for carrier landings is that the landing gear were never strong enough.

"OK, call for take off," my pilot said. We were on hot mike which allowed everything we said to be heard by each other. His breathing increased.

"Tower, 201 for takeoff," I quickly radioed. "201, tower, cleared for takeoff, wind calm," the tower crisply responded. All the players were correctly anticipating each other.

"201, roger," I acknowledged.

As we quickly taxied into position at the end of the runway, I called off the last checklist item, "Flaps." A crew had once attempted to take off with flaps at zero. The plane never got

airborne. It was such a small thing with such serious consequences. "Flaps ten," he said, "OK, power coming up." The engines now started their whining up to full roar. He released the brakes as soon as the engines were at one hundred percent and then kicked in the afterburners. We had to takeoff soon and leave room for the next A-5 now on final for landing. We started to roll. "All temperatures normal," the pilot said as we gathered speed. Our takeoff roll was short because of our light fuel load and we were soon airborne and turning downwind to prepare to land in just a few minutes. He left the flaps at ten and the landing gear down. The afterburners were shut off and the power slightly reduced to maintain our speed of one hundred sixty knots downwind at six hundred feet. We would fly the whole six passes never getting higher than six hundred feet nor further away from the runway than a mile.

"201 abeam," I called as we passed parallel the runway. Each plane called various positions in the pattern to let everyone know where they were. The critical interval was how soon each pilot turned base which would determine how long his final approach would be. My regular pilot would often make fun of other pilots who preferred a longer approach than he did. My pilot tonight made no such derogatory statements; he just adjusted into the pattern.

"201 turning final, state 6.7," I called. We had 6700 pounds of fuel left, enough for five more passes after this one for a total of twenty five minutes of flight time.

"Landing checklist, flaps," I said to the pilot.

"Flaps full down," he replied in between heavy grunts. As usual it sounded as if the pilot was wrestling with a low, slow, clumsy,

and very dangerous monster. The vibration increased at the airflow responded to the added drag of the huge flaps hanging full down into the airstream.

"Gear," I prompted.

"Three down and locked," he answered and then added, "I've got the ball, 6.0."

"Checklist complete," I said to the pilot and then stepped on my mike button and said, "201 ball, state 6.0," I let the LSO know we had the meatball in sight which was a reflected image in a mirror which let the pilot know his angle of approach toward the simulated end of the carrier. The mirror system and the lighting pattern were identical to that of the ship giving the pilots accurate simulation of a carrier night landing. Fuel state was critical information around the ship because most of the jets were always within minutes of flaming out if they did not land successfully. At a certain point the aircraft was diverted to a land runway if it was felt the plane could not make it aboard.

"Roger ball," the LSO acknowledged that we were on final, had the field and ball in sight and we had six thousand pounds of fuel left.

Our RA-5C wiggled its wings and the engines surged up and down as we got closer and closer to the cement runway.

"Little power," the LSO advised. No reply was expected. The whine grew louder as the pilot added a little power. "Going high," the LSO's reassuring calm voice told us. I felt the power ease up. My radar altimeter and pressure altimeter wound down

lower and lower. Then came the expected thump of the landing as we hit approximately where we wanted to on the runway. During the FCLP debriefing the LSO would describe each pass to the pilot and give criticism. The LSO had the authority to wave off a plane from landing and his recommendation whether to divert a plane or not carried weight. As soon as the thump of the landing occurred the engines went to full non-afterburning power and we almost immediately were airborne again and turning downwind quickly to keep the pattern tight. I noted the time of the landing, fuel state and any comments for later debrief on my pad.

This time upwind my pilot raised the landing gear and the flaps to ten degrees. Having to lower the gear for landing made the FCLP more realistic. The first night FCLP was the hardest for each pilot and now that we had that one over, I relaxed and went into the routine. I settled into the small cockpit, checked my pad of paper clamped to the desktop with the record of landings and fuel states. I cinched up my harness, checked my clear visor down and gloves on tight. I was wearing a new silver flight suit that was undergoing testing. It had the parachute harness integrated into the suit, unlike the regular flight suit that had the harness added on as a separate item. The plane tossed and turned; it was a little like an amusement ride at a carnival. Again downwind I called, "201 abeam."

"Landing checklist, flaps," I quickly said. We both knew what the other was about to say and also knew the expected response.

"Flaps full," he replied.

"Gear," I prompted.

"Three down and locked, state 5.0," he answered just after the small thumps of the landing gear locking in place were felt.

"Checklist complete," I said to the pilot, and to the LSO I said, "201, on final, state 5.0." The plane began its usual last minute maneuverings. This particular plane, Bureau Number 149314, was on its second full day of flight operations after having been returned from a Progressive Aircraft Rework (PAR) program which updated all the systems and repainted the aircraft inside and out. It gave the feeling of flying in a brand new airplane. We also carried a million dollar camera in the reconnaissance pod. Normally the camera would not be used on the rough FCLP but this plane was up, flyable, and needed. The Navy policy of aircraft usage was when a plane was ready to fly, a crew was found to fly it. The constant pounding of the landings was hard going on camera mounts and internal parts.

"I've got the ball, 4.8" my pilot said calmly.

"201, ball 4.8," I reported to the LSO.

"Roger ball," the LSO answered.

We staggered along as usual and made a nice pass with no comments from the LSO. The plane thumped its usual thump and accelerated as the pilot applied full takeoff power. We started to climb. I started to write down the landing and the fuel state on my pad in the well-lit small cockpit when I heard a sudden soft rushing sound off to my right.

Just then my pilot said, in a slightly exasperated voice, "Oh, shit, starboard engine." I immediately asked, as I started to put my pencil into its holder still listening to the whooshing on my right,

"What's the matter?"

My pilot quickly answered me. "Standby, eject, " he said in a terse, level tone of voice. I immediately reached up with both hands and pulled the face curtain all the way down over my face and upper body.

Nothing happened.

The rushing sound continued as I looked down to see what was wrong and started to think that we were low and wouldn't have much time to do any of the manual procedures such as blowing off my canopy, unhooking myself from the seat, and jumping out. As it turned out, the delay was caused by the normal functioning of the seat firing sequence which allowed three quarters of a second for the seat to be set in the full down position. Since I was tall, I always had it in the full down position. I was still looking down when the rocket ejection seat fired. The cockpit was immediately filled with bright flame and I was ejected upwards. The original ejection seats were fired with explosive charges, but too many pilots suffered back injuries so the seat was improved by having this seat propelled by a small rocket charge that reduced the initial shock on the back. The ride up was smooth.

After the bright flash of the rocket firing I had just enough time to think that I hoped everything worked normally. I knew the complicated sequence that had to be followed precisely for me to live through this. Just then I felt a great tug and felt warm black sky all around so the knee restraints had retracted normally, the seat had bottomed out, my canopy had blown off, the seat had fired, the knee restraints had been popped off, the bladder behind me had inflated separating me from the six hundred pound

ejection seat, my drogue parachute had deployed immediately since we were below twelve thousand feet, my main parachute had opened, my face curtain was gone with the seat and I was coming down to earth under a parachute while breathing oxygen from my ten minute bailout bottle. My new silver flight suit had held and was comfortable. I did not know what had happened to my pilot. His ejection sequence is delayed one and three quarter seconds to permit my ejection sequence to complete itself before his sequence commences. Without the delay there would be a chance of his canopy blowing away into me as I was ejected upward.

As soon as I had realized that the chute had opened I saw a brilliant yellow flash down and to my left as my airplane hit the ground. I thought, "Just like in the movies." It hit and smeared a yellow flash in the night. After a maximum of three seconds in the calm air after the chute opened I abruptly hit the ground in a standing position and crumpled down into a heap.

During training I was taught to roll upon landing using the fleshy parts of my body to cushion the landing. They never mentioned what to do on a pitch dark night when the ground was invisible. As soon as I hit, I felt a sharp pain in my back but quickly got up and looked around. The burning plane was about forty yards away, upside down, and making explosive noises. I was on a hard, flat, grassy field. I kept the oxygen mask on because the gas was cool and I knew it was clean. I put my blinking flashlight on my harness, as instructed in my training classes, and started to walk away to look for my pilot. I then took off the oxygen mask and breathed in the warm Florida night air. I laughed and thought, "I did it and this is really something to talk about, I can't wait to tell the guys."

I shouted, "Mr. Butler, Mr. Butler." There was no answer, just the crackling of the burning airplane. I walked around a bit, still exhilarated but very aware of my situation. It had only been a minute since the sudden rushing noise, but it had seemed like a lifetime. A Navy fire truck drove up with some fireman hanging onto the sides. It stopped and the fireman asked me if I was all right and I said sure, why not, and laughed. They didn't laugh. The plane had crashed just next to the runway. I climbed into a yellow Navy pickup truck that soon came up and we drove to a central grouping spot. I asked about my pilot but got no answer.

I got out and walked over to a circle of men standing around a parachute I knew wasn't mine. I walked over to my pilot's parachute and it looked to me as if the flight suit attached to it had just been thrown into a heap on the grassy ground. I guessed he had unzipped his flight suit and had squirmed out of the suit, leaving it attached to the parachute which was laying all strewn out. I again asked where my pilot was, but there was no answer, only silence, as everyone just stood around and looked.

There was no activity other than silent standing around. The plane was going to burn itself out and there was no searching going on. I realized then that my pilot was still inside his flight suit and he was dead. I wasn't happy anymore and didn't look forward to telling the guys all about it anymore either. I sighed and went back to the truck and asked to be taken back to the tower.

My back was starting to hurt whenever I bent over. I rode back silently to the tower where my regular pilot and our squadron commander were already waiting. I told them we lost the starboard engine and we ejected. I told them my pilot was dead but they didn't seem to want to believe it. They said I was in

shock and to relax. The safety officer was there and suggested I tell everything I knew into a tape recorder for the accident investigation. I agreed and sat down with him and told the whole story as close as I could remember it.

I then went back to the locker room, changed my clothes and went home to bed. The next day I woke up and my back was really hurting from a compression fracture of thoracic vertebrae six from the abrupt parachute landing. I went to work, was sent to the Dispensary where I was given some muscle relaxants for my back, and took two days off. I resumed flying and completed my training.

The accident report revealed that a loose clamp, probably undone or not correctly tightened during the Progressive Rework, had become loose and was ingested into the starboard engine causing Foreign Object Damage (FOD) and a fire. The pilot's ejection sequence was normal but he was too low or the angle was not vertical enough for the parachute to inflate after it was pulled from the ejection seat by the drogue. It was guessed that he was too low because the aircraft had rolled slightly to the right while waiting for my ejection sequence to complete and thus changed the trajectory of the seat from the vertical to the horizontal. He died of massive internal injuries. It was reported that he should have used the alternate ejection handles on each armrest instead of the face curtain because that way he could have maintained the aircraft in level flight instead of taking his hands off the control stick to reach up and pull the face curtain. Up until that crash it was believed that the Vigilante could maintain altitude and even climb if an engine out situation developed when low, slow, and dirty. NATOPS was changed to have the A-5 reach five hundred feet before turning downwind. I believe that my pilot did everything right from quickly identifying the source of the

noise, to deciding the airplane was not airworthy, informing his crew with instructions, and following the correct ejection sequence. And he still died and I lived.

The family members...

June 14th, 1967 1130 PM, Sanford Florida, ejection from RA-5C during Field Carrier Landing Practice, (FCLP) killing the pilot, LCDR C.T. Butler, and injuring the Reconnaissance Attack Navigator (RAN), Ensign John Barry Smith. The dead pilot leaves a wife and five children of whom three are boys, the oldest age eight.

July 1990, Pacific Flyer prints an article written by the navigator. A picture from his cruisebook of an A-5 with an A-3 coincidentally on the backside was also submitted. August, September, October, 1990. Letters pour in to Pacific Flyer regarding mixup in photos.

November 1st 1990. A letter from Pacific Flyer arrives at the navigator's home. I open it and find another letter inside, addressed to me, John Barry Smith, Care of Pacific Flyer. The contents of the letter, handwritten in ink, follow.

Start letter: "Dear Mr Smith, My name is Richard Butler, C.T. Butler was my father. You can imagine my surprise when I came across your "Night of Terror" article in the July Pacific Flyer and realized your pilot in that accident was my father. It was even more strange because a couple of nights before I told a friend that I would like to learn more about my father's accident.

I am now a Navy pilot myself. I am attached to VF-51, flying F-14's at Miramar. We were returning from a WestPac deployment and the USS Carl Vinson was in port at Pearl Harbor, I was SDO sitting in the ready room while everyone else

enjoyed the beaches when I happened to find a copy of the Pacific Flyer. What caught my eye was that they put a picture of an A-3 instead of an A-5. When I started to read the article I got a shiver down my back when I read the date and place in the first paragraph and then saw my father's name. I can still vividly remember that next morning, when I was eight years old, and there were several strange women at my house and my mother wouldn't get out of bed. My mother has yet to remarry and did a heroic job raising five kids. We all turned out pretty well. John, the next oldest boy to me is also a Navy pilot at Miramar flying with VF-126, the adversary squadron .

We would both like a chance to meet you. Your article was a good one, answered a lot of questions I had about that accident 23 years ago. If you would like to get together with John and I sometime please give me a call or write. I look forward to hearing from you. Sincerely, Richard Butler." End letter.

I held the letter in my hand, stunned and amazed. The past had come alive. There was a string of life which had continued all these years. I immediately made plans to meet the Butler boys.

I had received the letter on a Wednesday and had already planned to fly in my Mooney to San Antonio on Tuesday for a week. I had learned not to make too firm of commitments while flying light airplanes and sent the following letter to Richard Butler.

Start letter: "Dear Richard Butler, Monday, November 5, 1990, Thank you for your letter. We must meet at a convenient time.

I was talking to a retired Navy Captain today who also knew your father. Small world.

It's amazing you and your brother are Navy pilots; it's quite an accomplishment. I met your uncle the day after the crash. I knew there were five children.

After the article appeared a reader wrote in and said he was in the pattern during the crash that night.

In 1969 I was in Sigonella filing a flight plan for an A-5 and the First Class at the tower said he watched one crash. I enquired where and when and it turned out he was the tower operator the night of the crash. He said they were all surprised anyone lived because it happened so suddenly.

Well, I lived because your Dad thought about me back there and told me to eject.

I volunteered for the hop because the previous times I had flown with him I had learned a lot. He was very helpful and patient to a 23 year old Ensign. Maybe he was that way because of his five kids.

I'm off tomorrow to San Antonio in my Mooney for a week. I will return about the 14th of November. I'll call you to set up a rendezvous. The pilot who climbed out of the plane just before your father climbed in lives in San Diego. I'll coordinate with him so we can all get together.

I just got my Commercial license with instrument rating and this is my first IFR cross country.

You might write me here at home and give me and your brother in-port schedule. Sincerely, John Barry Smith." End letter.

The trip to San Antonio to visit friends was an annual event but the first in my airplane. A year earlier in San Antonio I had first sat in a Mooney and decided I wanted one. Four days later, after arriving back in Carmel Valley, I had bought my Mooney in Hollister. Now I had it fixed up and was proudly flying it back to show off while exercising my new instrument rating.

I took off in clear weather and a fine running machine to fly direct to Bullhead City to stay in the Flamingo Hilton, courtesy of Baron Hilton who had sent me a free three night certificate, as he had done to many other pilots.

The flight was nice, the Hotel and casino were fine, and the airport was terrible. In a thirty knot wind there was no assistance to push back the plane to parking, no help tying down nor chocks available.

They would not bring a gas truck out to refuel unless I walked in and signed a gas chit. The gas truck was slow to get there and there was no ride to and from the plane to office. I was charged for two nights of tie down although I was only there 23 hours. But the room was great, which is to say it was free and I had a view of the airport with my plane on it.

I gambled a little and drank none; the next day was to be a grueling, rugged three leg, nine hour flight to San Antonio. I planned on refueling in Deming, NM, and Fort Stockton Texas.

That night I checked the weather via a phone line to Reno. A low pressure air mass had moved in during the day bringing snow, rain, and freezing rain from Phoenix to El Paso to San Antonio.

I was faced with the common problem, bad weather and what to

do. I couldn't go around it to the south because Mexico was down there. To go around to the north would require a detour as far north as Denver over some really high mountains. I had the new instrument rating and was willing to fly in clouds and rain and snow, but not freezing rain. My Mooney had no pitot heat, nor radar, nor de ice.

I did have two more free nights in the hotel, I could wait it out and push it to make the Saturday night party in San Antonio, or I could just follow the front, flying behind it in the rain but avoiding the freezing rain. When it got too bad, I could land and wait it out.

And then I thought of flying to San Diego to meet the Butlers. I gave a call to Richard's home in San Diego from the casino lobby with one of my many quarters. Richard's wife Lana responded by saying Richard was on a mission to Fallon bombing range but would be back the next night and we set up a dinner meeting.

So the attraction of meeting the sons of the man who saved my life years ago turned me away from a huge weather system and towards San Diego.

I had a tailwind and was finally able to see 200 knots on the groundspeed readout. I was in the yellow sailing along when I hit a bit of moderate to severe near Julian and lost 500 feet. I was way above maneuvering speed so I pulled the power back to slow down. Center called and asked what was going on and I replied turbulence. Another plane, a Boeing 737, heard and asked where. Center replied it was just a light plane and wasn't important. The 737 replied he didn't ask what but where.

The next day, I called my regular pilot, Burton J. Larkins, Capt

(Ret.) and explained the situation and we agreed to meet that day for lunch and dinner.

We went for a ride on his beautiful forty foot sailboat up and down the San Diego Harbor. We rode by the tied up USS Ranger, where we carrier qualified (carqualled) in RA-5Cs July 1967, three weeks after my ejection. To land on the Ranger in a Vigilante was why we were practicing FCLP that fateful night.

We rode by all the Navy ships in port with the thoughts of the impending Gulf war on our minds. The sister ships to the Iwo Jima were there. The Iwo Jima was a Marine helicopter carrier and the ship that ninety percent of my boot camp class went to after graduation. I went to an electronics school in Memphis because I told the man in the third week of boot camp I liked flying so he made me into an aviation recruit while the others became seamen recruits. We sailed by Navy boot camp and the bridge connecting Camp Nimitz which I recall marching over so often. Also visible was the USS Recruit, a landbound destroyer, where I learned to tie knots. We saw landing craft which were taking recruits to visit a ship as part of their training. Helicopters were frequently flying over us as they landed at North Island.

And we were meeting a pilot who was on a practice bombing mission in Nevada.

Captain Larkins and I were at the Cafe Machado at Montgomery Field a little early to wait for Richard and John Butler to arrive. They walked up and I immediately recognized them as Navy pilots. We made the introductions and sat down to dinner and conversation.

I offered a toast, "To C. T. Butler, a man who created your lives

and saved mine." Richard's voice was just like his dad's, sort of a soft southern drawl. Richard was of medium height, sandy hair, and bore a strong resemblance to his father. John was taller and slightly younger. Both of the young men were calm, deliberate, and thoughtful. The saying, "You can tell a fighter pilot, but you can't tell him much," was not true in this case. I had to revise my image of the elite of Naval Aviation.

John had gone to the Naval Academy, then to a short preflight, and then to flight training. He was now flying F-16s, F/A-18s, and F-5s in an adversarial role against F-14s. Richard was flying F-14s in an active Navy fighter squadron. So in professional life the two men were sibling rivals but in their personal lives I saw mutual respect and love.

I remarked that it was possible that C.T. Butler was so patient and willing to teach a 23 year old Ensign named John was because he had a son named John, age six, whom he was teaching also.

Richard had graduated from the University of Kentucky and gone to Preflight in Pensacola. He discussed the landing difficulties of FCLP at San Clemente Island, a practice carrier landing site off San Diego. There are no drop lights, there is always a right crosswind, and the landing pattern is reversed. It turns out the practice for night carrier landings is harder than the real thing.

Captain Larkins explained after he climbed out of the plane and was walking back to the ready room, he saw the flash of the explosion.

Richard mentioned there was a third brother, Paul, who had just

gotten married. He said that their mother was a dental hygienist who had gone back to work to help support the raising of five young children.

We reviewed Navy career patterns the way it is now and the way it was then. We were actually representing Naval aviation from the early fifties to the early nineties. We agreed it hasn't changed that much, actually. There are still sea tours, shore tours, school tours, ship's company tours, and exchange tours.

Captain Larkins offered to take Richard and John sailing some time which was accepted. I offered my house for a place to stay if they should come up this way. We all walked out to the ramp to look at my Mooney.

I'm quite proud of N79807, a 1965 M20C, but I knew that compared to a F-14 or F-16, it must have looked like a toy model. But, as Richard said, "It was all mine."

We had enjoyed the meal, the talk of the past, present, and future and agreed we would like to get together again, sometime.

I was flying back to the Salinas airport the next day and thinking about the meeting. Naval aviation is in good hands if there are pilots like Richard and John flying. They were polite, mature, reasoning, and intelligent. The Butler family must be one really sharp family.

I wondered what went through their mother's mind when her two sons told her they wanted to be Navy pilots, just like dad. I thought of her lying in bed the morning of the crash, unable to

get up, the nightmare come true, no husband, no father, no future. And yet, she did get up, and she succeeded.

It was a beautiful flight from San Diego to LAX to Point Magu, to San Luis Obispo, to Big Sur, to Salinas. The visibility was 200 miles. I could see the Space Shuttle lake bed landing strip at Edwards Air Force Base while over downtown LA at 10000 feet.

The trip up the coast was striking with surf, boats, caves, and windy highways to look at in the clear smooth weather.

And then, my airplane veered off to the left while on the two axis pneumatic autopilot Mooneys have. It then veered off to the right. I checked the vacuum gauge; it was zero. I had had a catastrophic vacuum pump failure and no standby system. While straight and level my attitude gyro showed me in a level, gradual climb and the directional gyro showed me in a right turn. Then they began to spin faster and faster. They ended up just going around and around. I did an ILS into Salinas in VFR under partial panel and realized it is necessary to cover up the defective instruments to avoid distraction because the scan took me right back to them every few seconds.

I taxied up to my hangar and shut down. I sat in the cockpit and reflected on what had happened. The vacuum pump had failed four flight hours out of Bullhead City. If I had gone to San Antonio, as planned, instead of San Diego to see Richard and John Butler, I would have lost my primary flight instruments while in the soup over somewhere near Deming, New Mexico, where mountains are high, radar coverage is poor, and airfields far apart.

C. T. Butler may have saved my tail again. The End.

Commissioner Major, as justification that I can contribute information to the Commission to enhance its work and thus eligible for a grant of standing, I have submitted the above narrative of what leads up to and during a sudden night fatal jet airplane crash from this survivor as well as meeting the surviving family members.

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith
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Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
safety@ntsb.org

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Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

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Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non Cooperation. (Sorry, no can do.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 9 The Crash and Meeting the Family. (It happens so fast) Filed Friday, August 18, 2006

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:52 PM PDT

To: barney.brucker@justice.gc.ca

Subject: Smith Submission 11: Reconsideration of your denial of standing:

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182

Ken Dickerson

Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 11: Reconsideration of your denial of standing: Try Try Again. (Never give up)

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Thanks and Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner
Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission
Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires
publique

Dear Commissioner Major, Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 11: Reconsideration of your denial of
standing: Try Try Again. (Never give up) Filed Saturday, August
19, 2006

1. "Disposition: Mr. Smith is denied standing. However, leave to
file materials that he believes will be useful to the Commissioner
is granted."

I believe I can be useful to you regarding the Inquiry, the
investigation, the bombing, Air India Flight 182, what's it like to
be a victim of a sudden fatal jet airplane crash, and the emotions
when meeting the family members of that fatal victim.

I believe, from his statements, Prime Minister Harper desires a
full, thorough, and compassionate public inquiry into the events
surrounding Air India Flight 182 by analyzing the evidence that
has come to light since 1985.

I believe, from your statements, that the nature of the
Commission is to be very broad in the evidence that it heard, in
order to put to rest the various theories, rumours and neglect that
have occurred since the explosion in 1985. I have a theory based
on an event in February 1989, United Airlines Flight 811. It will
not rest.

You have shown willingness to be broad minded by receiving my evidence, submissions, or information which you have considered to be helpful in fulfilling your mandate whether or not such evidence or information would be admissible in court.

I interpret the goals of the Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 to be to inquire into:

1. The investigation of the bombing.
2. The bombing.
3. Air India Flight 182.
4. The victims.
5. The family members of the victims.

As I understand the Rules and Procedures, sir, you have the authority to grant standing to a person who has a clearly ascertainable interest or perspective which would enhance the work of the Commissioner, determine any special conditions under which that person may participate, rescind the standing, and determine in which parts of the inquiry and the nature and extent of that person may participate. You are also authorized to grant to any other person who satisfies him that he or she has a substantial and direct interest in the subject matter of the Inquiry an opportunity for appropriate participation in the Inquiry.

In other words, as you know, you are granted broad powers to conduct your inquiry. You have told me that your criteria are the Terms of Reference, for example, if there were problems in the effective cooperation between government departments and agencies in the investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182. Please reconsider your previous denial of my request for

standing and grant it now with whatever special conditions, limitations, restrictions, and the extent of my contributions you determine.

I believe I have fulfilled your requirements of being useful and fulfilling a Term of Reference and thus worthy of being granted standing because:

1. I have flown in Boeing 747s and about twenty other types of military and civilian aircraft during forty five years of aviation experience accumulating thousands of hours of flight time.
2. My crew duties have included pilot in command, co-pilot, navigator, bombardier, flight crew, mechanic, and owner.
3. I am a qualified nuclear weapon loading officer/bombardier which means I know how to create, load, arm, deliver, and detonate nuclear weapons as well as conventional bombs.
4. I have dropped bombs.
5. I have investigated in depth the bombing of Air India Flight 182 and other explanations for the inflight breakup and have written a three hundred page aircraft accident report and built a thousand page website demonstrating a substantial interest. (Smith AAR for Air India Flight 182 and Exhibit S-18 in the Commission files)
6. I have been investigated by the RCMP, the Air India Task Force, and the security branch of Transport Canada during their investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182.
7. I am personally aware of a conflict between the RCMP and Transportation Safety Board of Canada which resulted in problems of effective cooperation which I believe adversely affected the investigation into the bombing of Air India Flight 182. (Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non Cooperation.)
8. I have been in a sudden fiery fatal jet airplane crash and

suffered lifelong injuries. (Smith Submission 9: The Crash and Meeting the Family.)

9. I have seen the fatal victim in that crash.

10. I have visited and discussed the crash with the surviving family members of the victim.

11. I have discovered a clear and present hazard to the security and safety of Canadian passengers flying in early model Boeing 747s such as Air India Flight 182. (The shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup hazard)

My supporting documents for the above statements are the Commission referenced documents of the report of the Honourable Mr. Justice B.N. Kirpal of the High Court of Delhi of February 26, 1986 and the Aviation Occurrence Report of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board into the crash involving Air India Flight 182 of January 22, 1986. (On file with the Commission)

In additional support, there are dozens of emails and letters between me and John Schneider and Sgt. Bart Blachford of the RCMP AITF, between me and Mr. Bill Tucker (now retired), Director General of Investigative Operations of the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, and between me and Mr. John Garstang of the Securitas branch of Transport Canada. (Filed earlier as Emails in PDF files.)

I have included the narrative of my sudden fiery fatal jet airplane crash in which I ejected at night at low level when our starboard engine ingested a titanium bolt and caught fire. My pilot told me to eject and we both did. I lived and he died. (Smith Submission 9: The Crash and Meeting the Family.)

I have included a narrative of my meeting two of his surviving sons who grew up to be US Navy pilots, like their dad.

For the reasons above, Commissioner Major, I believe I have fulfilled the formal and informal requirements for standing before your commission. Please reconsider your previous denial of my request for standing and grant it now with whatever special conditions, limitations, restrictions, and the extent of my contributions you determine.

Please allow me the opportunity to present my mechanical explanation for the airplane crash called Air India Flight 182.

To review my pleas:

1. Please grant me standing to present my mechanical non conspiracy explanation to you in depth.
2. Please ask TSB Air to provide an aircraft accident report to you on the probable cause of Air India Flight 182.
3. Please correct the highly prejudicial error on Commission website that states the CASB concluded it was a bomb; they did not. ("Yet, it was not until the following January that the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb.")
4. Please post all the non classified written material submitted to you by the public during the public inquiry (including my submissions) on the Commission website, <http://www.majorcomm.ca/en/index.asp>

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith
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Carmel Valley, California 93924
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1 831 241 0631 Cell
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safety@ntsb.org

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2006

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:52 PM PDT
To: kdickerson@majorcomm.ca
Subject: Are you still the contact point?

Michael Tansey
Commission Spokesperson
Tel.: (613) 949-8477
mtansey@majorcomm.ca

Dear Mr. Dickerson, Saturday, September 23, 2006

Are you still with the Commission? You were doing a great job as
spokesperson/public affairs.

Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
safety@ntsb.org

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:52 PM PDT
To: securitas@tsb.gc.ca, Communications@tsb.gc.ca
**Subject: Report of clear and present danger to the Canadian
flying public on early model Boeing 747s.**

SECURITAS
PO Box 1996
Station B
Hull, Quebec
J8Z 3Z2

And:

Christian Plouffe
Communications Advisor
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
Dear Gentlemen and Ladies of Securitas and TSB, Thursday,
September 28, 2006

My name is John Barry Smith of 541 Country Club Drive in Carmel Valley, California and I wish to report an unsafe condition relating to the Canadian transportation system of an equipment instability in that faulty Poly X wiring has exploited a design deficiency in early model Boeing 747 such that when the wiring shorts on the forward cargo door unlatch motor, the door subsequently ruptures open in an explosive decompression which allows the nose to be torn off by the air force leading to inflight breakup and fatalities. Specifically, this sequence has occurred in Air India Flight 182 and three others. The danger of faulty wiring is clear based upon the findings of Swiss Air 111 and TWA Flight 800 and the danger of explosive decompression caused by an inadvertently opened cargo door is evident in United Airlines Flight 811. Poly X style wiring is presently being used in Boeing 747-100 and -200 models of which about five hundred are currently in service and are flying in Canadian airspace.

I assume Securitas is interested in all flight dangers, not just terrorists or bombers or saboteurs. The clear and present danger I

am formally reporting to you is a mechanical one, not a human one. Aging wiring in aging aircraft is a documented problem which requires urgent inspections in and around the forward cargo door of early model Boeing 747s. The hazard is worthy of an emergency airworthiness directive.

What is not officially confirmed yet is that several other Boeing 747s have suffered the same probable cause as United Airlines Flight 811. Further confirming details are available at <http://www.montereypeninsulaairport.com> and <http://www.ntsbt.org>

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¥ Your profession and experience;

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US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.

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Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

¥ Your involvement in the unsafe situation being

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Independent aircraft accident investigator doing research in early model Boeing 747s that experienced a sudden loud sound on the cockpit voice recorder.

¥ Where else you have reported this unsafe situation or safety concern;

RCMP, Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Air India Flight 182, FBI, FAA, NTSB, AAIB, TSB.

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Various airlines around the world including Northwest Airlines which flies over Canada.

1. Describe (as appropriate) the unsafe act or safety concern in terms of

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United Airlines Flight 811 was the first officially recognized accident in which the electrical system was found to be at fault. My research has discovered that in fact there were several other early model Boeing 747s that had experienced many of the same characteristics and left much of the same evidence; for instance:

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examine the wiring in and around cargo doors on early model Boeing 747s for chafing to bare wire. Replace the faulty wiring and modify the cargo doors into plug type.

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Dear Aviation Safety Specialist, please do not be put off by the controversy over these airplane accidents but concentrate on the hard physical evidence I present for your consideration in my three AARs. Let the evidence of the CVR, the FDR, and the twisted metal speak for themselves. The model for comparison is United Airlines Flight 811. A pdf file of the NTSB AAR for United Airlines Flight 811 is attached. The reason these aircraft accidents are controversial is that the official reasons so far are unsatisfactory. The shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation answers all the questions.

Justice Josephson concluded about Air India Flight 182: "A bomb located in the rear cargo hold had detonated and opened a hole in the left aft fuselage of the aircraft."

That two opinions by a justice about the cause of the explosion and location are refuted by aviation safety specialists from Canada and India who actually viewed the hard evidence:

The Kirpal Report; "4.10 After going through the entire record we find that there is circumstantial as well as direct evidence which directly points to the cause of the accident as being that of an explosion of a bomb in the forward cargo hold of the aircraft."

3.2.11.42: "There was no significant fire or explosion in the flight deck, first and tourist passenger cabin including several lavatories and the rear bulk cargo hold."

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2.11.6.5 Target 47 - Aft Cargo Compartment. There was no evidence to indicate characteristics of an explosion emanating from the aft cargo compartment.

2.11.6.10 Target 362/396 - Lower Skin Panel - Forward Cargo Area The holes and other features observed in targets 362/396 and 399 must have been due to shock waves and penetration by fragments resulting from an explosion inside the forward cargo hold.

3.4.5 Explosive Device The scorching of the right wing root fillet and the damage to the upper deck cabinet suggest, if there was an explosion, it emanated from the forward cargo compartment.

Target 47, which is a portion of the aft cargo compartment roller floor, shows no indications characteristic of an explosion emanating from the aft cargo compartment.

Your predecessor, CASB, was correct in its finding for Air India Flight 182 in the 1986 AOR: "The Canadian Aviation Safety Board respectfully submits as follows:

4.1 Cause-Related Findings 5. There is considerable circumstantial and other evidence to indicate that the initial event was an explosion occurring in the forward cargo compartment. (Note there are many potential causes for an explosion in a pressurized hull, the rarest of which is a bomb. CASB did not conclude the destruction was caused by a bomb.)

CASB Aviation Occurrence Report and the Kirpal Report: "Mr. R.A. Davis, Head, Flight Recorder Section, Accidents Investigation Branch, Farnborough, U.K. 3.4.6.16 In conclusion, Mr. Davis reported as follows :- "It is considered that from the CVR and ATC recordings supplied for analysis, there is no evidence of a high explosive device having detonated on AI 182. There is strong evidence to suggest that a sudden explosive decompression occurred but the cause has not been identified. It must be concluded that without positive evidence of an explosive device from either the wreckage or pathological examinations, some other cause has to be established for the accident".

The mystery cause alluded to by the AAIB representative was revealed by United Airlines Flight 811 almost four years later, the faulty switch or shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation.

Currently there is a year long Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 being conducted in Ottawa. I have submitted material with the permission of the Commissioner in which Securitas is referenced several times.

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However, the designated SECURITAS analyst must be able to contact the reporter to follow up on details about the safety concern, if necessary.

I invite your questions or clarifications, phone me, write me, or preferably email me with specifics and I will promptly reply. This is a matter of life and death and although rare, the consequences are catastrophic. Please follow up with me.

Analysis of the reported concerns can help identify widespread safety deficiencies,

Yes, my analysis shows Poly X wiring and non plug cargo doors are hazardous and are a clear and present danger to the Canadian flying public. Poly X wiring is installed in many hundreds of airliners and non plug cargo doors are installed in many thousands of airliners.

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TWA Flight 800

NTSB AAR for United Airlines Flight 811

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:52 PM PDT

To: MINTC@tc.gc.ca

Cc: <toews.v@parl.gc.ca>

Subject: Re: Air India Flight 182

Richard Stryde
Senior Special Assistant

Dear Mr. Stryde, Friday, September 29, 2006

The Minister has asked me to reply on his behalf.

Please thank him for me for his personal attention in the matter.

This being the case, I have taken the liberty of forwarding a copy of your correspondence to the office of the Honourable Vic Toews, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, for consideration.

Thank you, sir, for that action. Although rare, the aviation safety problem I have discovered, based upon Air India Flight 182 and others, has catastrophic consequences should it reoccur.

I have sent a report to Securitas of TSB regarding the shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation, email attached below, (attachments to Securitas excluded).

Thank you again for the attention on this matter regarding the Commission of Inquiry and the safety of the Canadian flying public.

Regards,

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At 2:58 PM -0400 9/28/06, "Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities / "

"M wrote:

Mr. John Barry Smith
barry@johnbarrysmith.com

Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for your correspondence of August 20, 2006, to the Honourable Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, regarding Air India Flight 182. The Minister has asked me to reply on his behalf.

I have noted your comments with respect to this matter. Although, as you indicate, the Attorney General of Canada is the Government of Canada's representative on the Commission of Inquiry into the investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182. This being the case, I have taken the liberty of forwarding a copy of your correspondence to the office of the Honourable Vic Toews, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, for consideration.

I trust that this action will prove satisfactory. Again, thank you for writing.

Yours truly,

Richard Stryde
Senior Special Assistant
c.c. Office of the Honourable Vic Toews, P.C. M.P.

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4.1 Cause-Related Findings 5. There is considerable circumstantial and other evidence to indicate that the initial event was an explosion occurring in the forward cargo compartment. (Note there are many potential causes for an explosion in a pressurized hull, the rarest of which is a bomb. CASB did not conclude the destruction was caused by a bomb.)

CASB Aviation Occurrence Report and the Kirpal Report:
"Mr. R.A. Davis, Head, Flight Recorder Section, Accidents Investigation Branch, Farnborough, U.K. 3.4.6.16 In conclusion, Mr. Davis reported as follows :- "It is considered that from the CVR and ATC recordings supplied for analysis, there is no evidence of a high explosive device having detonated on AI 182. There is strong evidence to suggest that a sudden explosive decompression occurred but the cause has not been identified. It must be concluded that without positive evidence of an explosive device from either the wreckage or pathological examinations, some other cause has to be established for the accident".

The mystery cause alluded to by the AAIB representative was

revealed by United Airlines Flight 811 almost four years later, the faulty switch or shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation.

Currently there is a year long Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 being conducted in Ottawa. I have submitted material with the permission of the Commissioner in which Securitas is referenced several times. The Commission of Inquiry is misrepresenting the CASB report by stating on its website: "Yet, it was not until the following January that the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb." That statement is incorrect and misleading.

However, the designated SECURITAS analyst must be able to contact the reporter to follow up on details about the safety concern, if necessary.

I invite your questions or clarifications, phone me, write me, or preferably email me with specifics and I will promptly reply. This is a matter of life and death and although rare, the consequences are catastrophic. Please follow up with me.

Analysis of the reported concerns can help identify widespread safety deficiencies,

Yes, my analysis shows Poly X wiring and non plug cargo doors are hazardous and are a clear and present danger to the Canadian flying public. Poly X wiring is installed in many hundreds of airliners and non plug cargo doors are installed in many thousands of airliners.

Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
safety@ntsb.org

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:52 PM PDT
To: pm@pm.gc.ca
Cc: mtansey@majorcomm.ca
Subject: **Protest and Request**

Office of the Prime Minister
80 Wellington Street
Ottawa
K1A 0A2

Dear Prime Minister Harper,
1, 2006

Sunday, October

I am officially protesting the actions of the Commissioner in the Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 by:

1. The continuing inclusion of an error of fact regarding the cause of Air India Flight 182 as stated on the Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 website: <http://www.majorcomm.ca/en/openingstatement/> "Yet, it was not until the following January that the Canadian Aviation Safety Board

concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb." That is wrong. The uncorrected misstatement is inflammatory to emotions and misleading as to what the CASB actually concluded in their Aviation Occurrence Report: "4.1 Cause-Related Findings 5. There is considerable circumstantial and other evidence to indicate that the initial event was an explosion occurring in the forward cargo compartment." Please note, sir, there are many potential causes for an explosion in a pressurized hull, the rarest of which is a bomb and a confirmed cause of an electrical fault.

2. The denial of my promised fifteen minutes of oral submission before Commissioner Major in the Hearing for Standing as provided in the Rules and Procedures: "13. Applicants for standing will be permitted to make oral submissions not exceeding 15 minutes at a public standing hearing..." I showed up on time, was well dressed, and polite yet was only granted four minutes. (Transcript enclosed.)

3. The denial by the Commissioner of the grant of standing as a person or intervenor before the Commission although:

a. I have complied with all the administrative deadlines and required forms.

b. I meet the stringent criteria in one and probably two Terms of Reference, 2.2, and 2.7.

c. I was investigated personally by a member of the RCMP Air India Task Force and an official of the TSB.

d. Specifically:

1. I have flown in Boeing 747s and about twenty other types of military and civilian aircraft during forty five years of aviation experience accumulating thousands of hours of flight time.

2. My crew duties have included pilot in command, co-

pilot, navigator, bombardier, flight crew, mechanic, and owner.

3. I am a qualified nuclear weapon loading officer/ bombardier which means I know how to create, load, arm, deliver, and detonate nuclear weapons as well as conventional bombs.

4. I have dropped bombs.

5. I have investigated in depth the bombing of Air India Flight 182 and other explanations for the inflight breakup and have written a three hundred page aircraft accident report and built a thousand page website demonstrating a substantial interest. (Smith AAR for Air India Flight 182 is Exhibit S-18 in the Commission files and <http://www.nts.gov> and <http://www.montereypeninsulaairport.com>)

6. I have been investigated by the RCMP, the Air India Task Force, and the security branch of Transport Canada during their investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182.

7. I am personally aware of a conflict between the RCMP and Transportation Safety Board of Canada which resulted in problems of effective cooperation which I believe adversely affected the investigation into the bombing of Air India Flight 182. (Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non Cooperation.)

8. I have been in a sudden fiery fatal jet airplane crash and suffered lifelong injuries. (Smith Submission 9: The Crash and Meeting the Family.)

9. I have seen the fatal victim in that crash.

10. I have visited and discussed the crash with the surviving family members of the victim.

11. I have discovered a clear and present hazard to the security and safety of Canadian passengers flying in early model Boeing 747s such as Air India Flight 182. (The shorted wiring/ ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/ inflight breakup hazard)

Prime Minister, you are correct in excerpts below in your speech:

The one step that would have helped bring closure to the families of the victims, while providing answers to key questions that remain unsolved and could help prevent future terrorist acts against Canadian citizens. A full public inquiry is required.

He (Commissioner Harper) has agreed to serve as Commissioner for this inquiry and I have every confidence that he will conduct a thorough and compassionate investigation into the events surrounding this tragedy.

Yes, sir, a full public inquiry is required; thank you for convening one. The Commission of Inquiry can provide answers to key questions that remain unsolved if the Commission actually inquires and conducts a thorough and compassionate investigation into the events surrounding the tragedy. Sometimes an inquiry leads to areas not expected, that's what inquiries do. In the case of Air India Flight 182, the inquiry has led to a down to earth mechanical explanation with precedent instead of the conspiracy mad turbaned terrorists bungled investigations explanation.

Commissioner Major seemed to agree with your guidance for the Commission in the first day of the hearings on standing:

THE COMMISSIONER: "Yes. Well, I will confirm that. The nature of this Commission was to be very broad in the evidence that it heard, in order to put to rest the various theories, rumours and neglect that have occurred since the explosion in 1985."

Well, sir, I have a well researched scientific explanation for Air

India Flight 182; it's the shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation. Since the explanation is science and not emotional myth, the facts can be corroborated, the premises replicated, and the conclusions confirmed by official accident investigators such as those in the TSB (Air). (TSB (Air) has never given an official probable cause for Air India Flight 182)

I have asked Commissioner Major in writing and in person for four reasonable actions:

1. Please grant me standing to present my mechanical non conspiracy explanation to him in depth.
2. Please ask TSB Air to provide an aircraft accident report to him on the probable cause of Air India Flight 182.
3. Please correct the highly prejudicial error on Commission website that states the CASB concluded it was a bomb; they did not. ("Yet, it was not until the following January that the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb.")
4. Please post all the non classified written material submitted to him by the public during the public inquiry (including my submissions) on the Commission website.

The Commissioner gave me leave to submit material to the Commission and I have done so with fourteen Smith Submissions over a two month period. A pdf file of those submissions is attached for evaluation by your staff of the depth of my research, the respect of my demeanor, the logic of my reasoning, and the validity of my conclusions.
(SmithSubmissions1-14.pdf)

I protest that Commissioner Major has:

1. Not yet granted me standing,

2. Not yet asked Transportation Safety Board Air for an updated supplement to the Canadian Aviation Safety Board Aviation Occurrence Report of twenty years ago,
3. Not yet corrected the misleading error of the CASB conclusion in the Commission website,
4. Not yet made available to the public all the public input to the full public inquiry Commission of Inquiry,
5. Not yet conducted a thorough investigation as you directed,
6. Not yet been 'very broad' in the evidence the Commission of Inquiry heard in order to put to rest various theories as the Commissioner stated.

I have raised my concerns of the clear and present, although rare, danger to the flying public and reported my mechanical wiring/cargo door explanation for the accident to various Canadian agencies:

1. RCMP Air India Task Force
2. TSB (Air)
3. Attorney General representative Mr. Barney Brucker
4. Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Air India Flight 182
5. Securitas TSB
6. Minister of Transportation (reply enclosed that stated a copy of my correspondence was forwarded to the Minister of Justice)
7. Prime Minister of Canada.

Sir, if and when my substantiated mechanical explanation for Air India Flight 182 is confirmed by Crown experts in aircraft crashes (TSB Air investigators), the political consequences are very positive:

1. The caution and prudence of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board of 1986 will be revealed; their findings were correct, there was an explosion in the forward cargo compartment of Air India

Flight 182 with an electrical cause only apparent four years later with United Airlines Flight 811.

2. The RCMP and CSIS will be exonerated for their failure to catch their men because there were no men to catch. There was no bomb, there were no bombers, there was no conspiracy, there was no crime, there were no criminals; the small cause was faulty Poly-X wiring destroying a large machine, an early model Boeing 747.

3. The security of Canadian airports was intact and not penetrated because there was no bomb placed in a CP aircraft leaving Vancouver, BC, which then passed through Montreal and Toronto airports.

4. The wisdom of the Canadian judicial system will be reaffirmed as represented by Justice Josephson who found the two accused not guilty because they were.

5 The tenacity and bravery of the Prime Minister to order an Inquiry that eventually would reveal the probable cause for the two decade old tragedy whilst knowing that official Inquiries sometimes answer key questions that remain unsolved, could help prevent future aircraft accidents, but can cause turbulent changes in attitude amongst the public.

6. Reduction in the amount of fear, suspicion, and hate among Canadian citizens against themselves, a religion, an airline, and law enforcement.

Prime Minister Harper, I am officially requesting:

1. Please ask the Crown experts on the causes of aircraft accidents to provide an updated supplement to the twenty year old CASB (non-bomb conclusion) report to you on the probable cause of Air India Flight 182.

2. Will you please use your influence to persuade Commissioner

Harper to grant me standing before his Commission of Inquiry so that I may present my scientific mechanical explanation for the cause of Air India Flight 182 during the hearings?

Very Respectfully,

John Barry Smith

541 Country Club Drive

Carmel Valley, California 93924

1 831 659 3552

1 831 241 0631 Cell

barry@johnbarrysmith.com

safety@ntsb.org

Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.

US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.

US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.

Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy

Retired US Army Major MSC

Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.

Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

Enclosures:

1. Speech of Prime Minister Harper regarding Air India Flight 182
2. Transcript of Mr. Smith at hearing for standing.
3. Email from Minister of Transportation to Mr. Smith

Speech - Prime Minister Harper announces inquiry into Air India bombing

May 1, 2006

Ottawa, Ontario

Thank you Mr. Speaker.

On June 23, 1985, Air India Flight 182, on its way from Montreal to London, England, exploded in mid-air near the coast of Ireland.

A total of 329 passengers and crew members, including more than 80 children, perished as a result of this tragic incident.

In January of the following year, the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb.

Clearly, this was an act of terrorism - one that claimed hundreds of innocent lives.

Canadians, and indeed citizens of all countries around the world demanded that those who perpetrated such an act be brought to justice.

Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, this has not yet been possible, and we must tragically admit, may never come to pass

More than 20 years have passed since this terrible tragedy took place, and while Canadians have not forgotten what took place, there has been a tendency to see this issues that surround this incident as a problem related to politics in India.

But we must never forget that the vast majority of those who perished on Flight 182 were citizens of our country. They were Canadians.

They and their families came here, just as our ancestors did, to seek a better life for themselves in a country with unlimited opportunity.

The stories and the dreams of those 329 men, women, and children, along with those of their families, were shattered on that terrible day back in 1985.

It is our duty, as Canadians, to do everything in our power to prevent a similar tragedy from ever happening again.

There have been numerous investigations into the bombing of Air India Flight 182.

But for reasons known best to themselves, previous governments failed to establish a formal public inquiry.

The one step that would have helped bring closure to the families of the victims, while providing answers to key questions that remain unsolved and could help prevent future terrorist acts against Canadian citizens.

A full public inquiry is required.

That is what we promised to the families.

And now it is going to happen.

This inquiry will be launched immediately and led by an outstanding Canadian, retired Supreme Court Justice John Major.

Justice Major has met with the families in Ottawa, Vancouver and Toronto and has developed detailed terms of reference with their full support and cooperation.

He has agreed to serve as Commissioner for this inquiry and I have every confidence that he will conduct a thorough and compassionate investigation into the events surrounding this tragedy.

Mr. Speaker, I wish to point out that this inquiry is not about retribution.

Nor is it about replaying the criminal trials that took place surrounding this case in Vancouver from 2003 to 2005.

There is nothing that would be served by such a course of action.

What this inquiry is about, however, is finding answers to several key questions that have emerged over the past 20 years about the worst mass murder in Canadian history.

It is a reflection of our compassion as a nation to those who lost mothers, fathers, siblings, relatives and friends to this terrible act of terrorism.

It is our sincere hope that this action may bring a measure of closure to those who still grieve for their loved ones.

This inquiry is about analyzing the evidence that has come to light since 1985 and applying it to the world we live in today.

Now more than ever, the Government of Canada must be prepared to take action to protect our citizens from the threat of terrorism.

Under Justice Major's guidance, we hope that a focused and efficient inquiry will provide information that will help ensure

that Canada's police agencies and procedures, its airport security systems and anti-terrorism laws are the most effective in the world.

In closing, I wish to acknowledge and honour the efforts of the families of the victims of Air India Flight 182 and their perseverance pursuing the launch of a full public inquiry.

Some of the spouses or parents of those who lost their lives in this tragedy have themselves died over the past two decades.

Their cause has, in many cases, been taken up by their children or other relatives.

Despite a long and agonizing wait, their faith and their commitment to seek the truth, no matter how painful it may be, has never wavered. They serve as an example to all of us..

Mr. Speaker, we cannot undo the past.

But we can provide some measure of closure to the families of those who lost loved ones on Flight 182.

And, by seeking answers and confronting shortcomings in our current system, we can ensure that we save lives in the future.

I would urge all honourable members to support our Government's efforts in this area.

Thank you.

PUBLIC HEARING APPLICATION FOR STANDING
AUDIENCE PUBLIQUE (Smith)

INTERNATIONAL REPORTING INC.

MR. FREIMAN: The next applicant for 1
standing is Mr. John Barry Smith. 2

--- APPLICATION FOR STANDING PRESENTED BY MR.
SMITH: 3

MR. SMITH: Thank you, Commissioner Major, 4
for allowing me to supplement my written application for 5
standing. 6

I've come a long way and I'd like to use my 7
whole 15 minutes if I may be allotted that. I was here 8
yesterday. I was sitting in my white suit back there and 9
two participants were talking after the adjournment. I was 10
reading the materials that the Commission staff provided, 11
excellent materials, and one participant said to the other, 12
"Are you going to come tomorrow", meaning will you be here
13

today. The one participant looked at the list, shook his 14
head and said, "Just crackpots". 15

Well, some things may be and I am from 16
California but not in this. This is not a movie. This is 17
real life. This is life and death. I have an alternate 18
explanation for Air India 182. It's a mechanical 19
explanation. I'll go into some detail during my 20
presentation and my detail will not be to persuade you that 21
my explanation is correct but to persuade you that my 22
research has depth and is worthy of being granted standing. 23

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I don't think, Mr. 24
Smith, that you need 15 minutes to persuade me of that. 25
Here's the difficulty. 1

The Terms of Reference direct us to take 2
into account those things that have already been 3
determined. Justice Josephson in Vancouver determined that 4
there was a bomb in a certain compartment of the airplane 5

and it was the bomb that caused the explosion that resulted 6
in the death of these people. 7

You have an alternate theory. The alternate 8
theory may over time prove to be correct. I don't know. 9
What I do know is that we cannot consider it as part of the 10
evidence in this Inquiry but what I can do is permit you to 11
file any written material that substantiates your view and 12
it will be part of the Air India record. It will be there 13
for examination by people who look at this Inquiry in 14
future years, but the Terms of Reference preclude our 15
considering whether or not there was any cause for that 16
explosion other than the bomb that is found by the Supreme 17
Court of British Columbia. 18

So I can't do anything more for you than 19
permit you to do what I have just suggested. 20

MR. SMITH: May I correct a gross error that 21
appeared in the Air India application and in the Terms of 22
Reference for this hearing? I'd like to quote from the 23
Aviation Accident Report to correct a gross error. 24

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, you still have some 25
time. So get it on the record. 1

MR. SMITH: Thank you. 2

I wish to quote from two documents 3
specifically authorized by the Commission for 4
consideration: the report of the Honourable Justice Kirpal 5
and the Aviation Occurrence Report of the Canadian Aviation 6
Safety Board. 7

THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I should -- just to 8
keep the record straight, these are not recommendations by 9
the Commission. These are directions to the Commission. 10

MR. SMITH: Right. 11

THE COMMISSIONER: This is the Order in 12
Council telling us what to do. 13

MR. SMITH: Okay. 14

THE COMMISSIONER: It's not -- those 15
directions do not come from the Commission. We're subject 16
to the directions. 17

MR. SMITH: Okay. The gross error is that 18
the Canadians have said that a bomb exploded in Air India 19
182. That is absolutely incorrect. It's not true. The 20
Indians did say that it was a bomb. I'll quote: 21
"After going through the entire record, 22
we find there is circumstantial as well 23
as direct evidence which directly 24
points to the cause of the accident as 25
being that of an explosion of a bomb in 1
the forward cargo hold of the 2
aircraft." 3

That's the Indian opinion. That's fine. 4

The Canadian opinion is absolutely correct. 5
I agree with Judge Josephson and I agree with the Canadian 6
Aviation Safety Board of 1986. The Canadian Aviation 7
Safety Board respectfully submits as follows, "Cause 8
related findings": 9

"There was no evidence to indicate the 10
structural failure of the aircraft was 11
a lead event. There is considerable 12
circumstantial and other evidence to 13
indicate that the initial event was an 14
explosion occurring in the forward 15
cargo compartment. This evidence is 16
not conclusive. However, the evidence 17
does not support any other conclusion." 18

That is absolutely correct, sir. The 19
Canadians were prudent. They were cautious and they made a
20

professional decision based upon the evidence they had. 21
They knew about a bomb. There's many reasons and 22
explanations for an explosion in the forward cargo 23
compartment. It can be a fire. It can be lightning. It 24
can be a fuel tank or it could be an explosive 25
decompression. 1

The Canadians were correct. They said an 2
explosion and declined to give an explanation. They knew 3
it could have been a bomb but they declined it and the 4
reason they declined it was because of the evidence which 5
counteracted a bomb. 6

For instance, in the same report, they 7
turned the cockpit voice recorder, which is the only direct 8
evidence, not indirect or circumstantial -- they turned 9
that over to the British Aircraft Investigation Board for 10
analyzing. 11

Mr. Davis, the U.K. accident investigator, 12
reported: 13

ÒConsidering the different acoustic 14
characteristics between a DC-10 and a 15
Boeing 747, the AIB analysis indicates 16
that there were distinct similarities 17
between the sound of the explosive 18
decompression of the DC-10 and the 19
sound recorded on the AI-182 CVR.Ó 20

He has matched the sound to a cargo door 21
caused DC-10 --- 22

THE COMMISSIONER: Mr. Smith, you're taking 23
us a bit afield. You're looking to the cause and I 24
understand your position but you have to understand ours 25
that we're saddled with certain findings and we have to 1
operate within those findings. The best I can do is to 2
repeat the offer I made and invite you to file in as much 3

as detail as you choose whatever it is that supports your 4
theory and it will be part of this record. 5

MR. SMITH: Yes, sir. 6

THE COMMISSIONER: I should say we 7
appreciate the time you've taken to come as far as you've 8
come to make this point. 9

MR. SMITH: Thank you. 10

MR. FREIMAN: Mr. Commissioner, I propose to 11
make the application and the supplementary materials 12
provided by Mr. Smith as Exhibit S-18. 13

--- EXHIBIT NO./PIÉCE No. S-18: 14

Documentary package from Mr. John Barry 15
Smith 16

THE COMMISSIONER: You're free, Mr. Smith, 17
as you probably know, to add to your filed material should 18
you choose. 19

MR. FREIMAN: The next applicant for 20
standing will be the Canadian Jewish Congress. 21

Subject: Air India Flight 182

Date: Thu, 28 Sep 2006 14:58:12 -0400

Thread-Topic: Air India Flight 182

thread-index: AcbjMAuyjPbjMIWMT4yZeXx2whhjBA==

From: "Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities / "

"Ministre des Transports, de l'infrastructure et des Co"

llectivit/s <MINTC@tc.gc.ca>

To: <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Cc: <toews.v@parl.gc.ca>

X-OriginalArrivalTime: 28 Sep 2006 18:58:13.0302 (UTC)

FILETIME=[0C6CA560:01C6E330]

X-Nospam: None

Mr. John Barry Smith
barry@johnbarrysmith.com

Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for your correspondence of August 20, 2006, to the Honourable Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, regarding Air India Flight 182. The Minister has asked me to reply on his behalf.

I have noted your comments with respect to this matter. Although, as you indicate, the Attorney General of Canada is the Government of Canada's representative on the Commission of Inquiry into the investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182. This being the case, I have taken the liberty of forwarding a copy of your correspondence to the office of the Honourable Vic Toews, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, for consideration.

I trust that this action will prove satisfactory. Again, thank you for writing.

Yours truly,

Richard Stryde
Senior Special Assistant

c.c. Office of the Honourable Vic Toews, P.C. M.P.

<<INCOMING LETTER XAE-2006-325639.TIF>>

Content-Type: image/tiff;

name="INCOMING LETTER XAE-2006-325639.TIF"

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XAE-2006-325639.TIF

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filename="INCOMING LETTER XAE-2006-325639.TIF"

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>

Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:52 PM PDT

To: securitas@tsb.gc.ca, Communications@tsb.gc.ca

Subject: Report of clear and present danger to the Canadian flying public on early model Boeing 747s.

SECURITAS

PO Box 1996

Station B

Hull, Quebec

J8Z 3Z2

And:

Christian Plouffe

Communications Advisor

Transportation Safety Board of Canada

Dear Gentlemen and Ladies of Securitas and TSB, Monday,
October 9, 2006

My name is John Barry Smith of 541 Country Club Drive in Carmel Valley, California and I wish to report an unsafe condition relating to the Canadian transportation system of an

equipment instability in that faulty Poly X wiring has exploited a design deficiency in early model Boeing 747 such that when the wiring shorts on the forward cargo door unlatch motor, the door subsequently ruptures open in an explosive decompression which allows the nose to be torn off by the air force leading to inflight breakup and fatalities. Specifically, this sequence has occurred in Air India Flight 182 and three others. The danger of faulty wiring is clear based upon the findings of Swiss Air 111 and TWA Flight 800 and the danger of explosive decompression caused by an inadvertently opened cargo door is evident in United Airlines Flight 811. Poly X style wiring is presently being used in Boeing 747-100 and -200 models of which about five hundred are currently in service and are flying in Canadian airspace.

I assume Securitas is interested in all flight dangers, not just terrorists or bombers or saboteurs. The clear and present danger I am formally reporting to you is a mechanical one, not a human one. Aging wiring in aging aircraft is a documented problem which requires urgent inspections in and around the forward cargo door of early model Boeing 747s. The hazard is worthy of an emergency airworthiness directive.

What is not officially confirmed yet is that several other Boeing 747s have suffered the same probable cause as United Airlines Flight 811. Further confirming details are available at <http://www.montereypeninsulaairport.com> and <http://www.ntsbt.org>

Include the following information in your message:

¥ Your name, address and phone number;

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
safety@ntsb.org
www.ntsbt.org

¥ Your profession and experience;

Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.

US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.

US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.

Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy

Retired US Army Major MSC

Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.

Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

¥ Your involvement in the unsafe situation being reported;

Independent aircraft accident investigator doing research in early model Boeing 747s that experienced a sudden loud sound on the cockpit voice recorder.

¥ Where else you have reported this unsafe situation or safety concern;

RCMP, Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Air India Flight 182, FBI, FAA, NTSB, AAIB, TSB.

¥ Complete identification of the aircraft,

Boeing 747-100 and Boeing 747-200.

¥ Owner/operator of the equipment.

Various airlines around the world including Northwest Airlines which flies over Canada.

1. Describe (as appropriate) the unsafe act or safety concern in terms of

¥ how the unsafe act/condition was discovered;

United Airlines Flight 811 was the first officially recognized accident in which the electrical system was found to be at fault. My research has discovered that in fact there were several other early model Boeing 747s that had experienced many of the same characteristics and left much of the same evidence; for instance:

UAL 811 and AI 182 were both:

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

had previous problems with cargo doors.

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing on right side in cargo door area

fodded number three engine

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt data loss to FDR

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door

inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as explanation during official inquiry

bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

if you are describing an event, what happened, where, when

(give the date of the event and local time) and why you think it occurred.

There were four events, Air India Flight 182 in June 1985, Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988, United Airlines Flight 811 in February 1989, and TWA Flight 800 in July 1996. I think they occurred because of the similar evidence of faulty wiring rupturing open the forward cargo door based upon the findings of United Airlines Flight 811. I have written three aircraft accident reports, one for Air India Flight 182, one for Pan Am Flight 103, and one for TWA Flight 800.

1. Give your suggestions to correct the situation.

Recommend to the FAA that an emergency AD be issued to examine the wiring in and around cargo doors on early model Boeing 747s for chafing to bare wire. Replace the faulty wiring and modify the cargo doors into plug type.

electronic messages passed to SECURITAS come directly into the SECURITAS office and are handled only by authorized SECURITAS analysts who are specialists in aviation safety.

Dear Aviation Safety Specialist, please do not be put off by the controversy over these airplane accidents but concentrate on the hard physical evidence I present for your consideration in my three AARs. Let the evidence of the CVR, the FDR, and the twisted metal speak for themselves. The model for comparison is United Airlines Flight 811. The reason these aircraft accidents are controversial is that the official reasons so far are unsatisfactory. The shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation answers all the questions.

Justice Josephson concluded about Air India Flight 182: "A bomb located in the rear cargo hold had detonated and opened a hole in the left aft fuselage of the aircraft."

That two opinions by a justice about the cause of the explosion and location are refuted by aviation safety specialists from Canada and India who actually viewed the hard evidence:

The Kirpal Report; "4.10 After going through the entire record we find that there is circumstantial as well as direct evidence which directly points to the cause of the accident as being that of an explosion of a bomb in the forward cargo hold of the aircraft."

3.2.11.42: "There was no significant fire or explosion in the flight deck, first and tourist passenger cabin including several lavatories and the rear bulk cargo hold."

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Target 47, which is a portion of the aft cargo compartment roller floor, shows no indications characteristic of an explosion emanating from the aft cargo compartment.

Your predecessor, CASB, was correct in its finding for Air India Flight 182 in the 1986 AOR: "The Canadian Aviation Safety Board respectfully submits as follows:

4.1 Cause-Related Findings 5. There is considerable circumstantial and other evidence to indicate that the initial event was an explosion occurring in the forward cargo compartment. (Note there are many potential causes for an explosion in a pressurized hull, the rarest of which is a bomb. CASB did not conclude the destruction was caused by a bomb.)

CASB Aviation Occurrence Report and the Kirpal Report: "Mr. R.A. Davis, Head, Flight Recorder Section, Accidents Investigation Branch, Farnborough, U.K. 3.4.6.16 In conclusion, Mr. Davis reported as follows :- "It is considered that from the CVR and ATC recordings supplied for analysis, there is no evidence of a high explosive device having detonated on AI 182. There is strong evidence to suggest that a sudden explosive decompression occurred but the cause has not been identified. It must be concluded that without positive evidence of an explosive

device from either the wreckage or pathological examinations, some other cause has to be established for the accident".

The mystery cause alluded to by the AAIB representative was revealed by United Airlines Flight 811 almost four years later, the faulty switch or shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation.

Currently there is a year long Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 being conducted in Ottawa. I have submitted material with the permission of the Commissioner in which Securitas is referenced several times. The Commission of Inquiry is misrepresenting the CASB report by stating on its website: "Yet, it was not until the following January that the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded that the destruction of this aircraft was caused by a bomb." That statement is incorrect and misleading.

However, the designated SECURITAS analyst must be able to contact the reporter to follow up on details about the safety concern, if necessary.

I invite your questions or clarifications, phone me, write me, or preferably email me with specifics and I will promptly reply. This is a matter of life and death and although rare, the consequences are catastrophic. Please follow up with me.

Analysis of the reported concerns can help identify widespread safety deficiencies,

Yes, my analysis shows Poly X wiring and non plug cargo doors are hazardous and are a clear and present danger to the Canadian

flying public. Poly X wiring is installed in many hundreds of airliners and non plug cargo doors are installed in many thousands of airliners.

Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
safety@ntsb.org

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:52 PM PDT
To: securitas@tsb.gc.ca, Communications@tsb.gc.ca
Subject: for Mr. John Garstang: Report of clear and present danger to the Canadian flying public on early model Boeing 747s.

SECURITAS
PO Box 1996
Station B
Hull, Quebec
J8Z 3Z2

And:

Christian Plouffe
Communications Advisor
Transportation Safety Board of Canada
Dear Mr. Garstang, Gentlemen and Ladies of Securitas and TSB,

Tuesday, October 17, 2006

My name is John Barry Smith of 541 Country Club Drive in Carmel Valley, California and I wish to report an unsafe condition relating to the Canadian transportation system of an equipment instability in that faulty Poly X wiring has exploited a design deficiency in early model Boeing 747 such that when the wiring shorts on the forward cargo door unlatch motor, the door subsequently ruptures open in an explosive decompression which allows the nose to be torn off by the air force leading to inflight breakup and fatalities. Specifically, this sequence has occurred in Air India Flight 182 and three others. The danger of faulty wiring is clear based upon the findings of Swiss Air 111 and TWA Flight 800 and the danger of explosive decompression caused by an inadvertently opened cargo door is evident in United Airlines Flight 811. Poly X style wiring is presently being used in Boeing 747-100 and -200 models of which about five hundred are currently in service and are flying in Canadian airspace.

I assume Securitas is interested in all flight dangers, not just terrorists or bombers or saboteurs. The clear and present danger I am formally reporting to you is a mechanical one, not a human one. Aging wiring in aging aircraft is a documented problem which requires urgent inspections in and around the forward cargo door of early model Boeing 747s. The hazard is worthy of an emergency airworthiness directive.

What is not officially confirmed yet is that several other Boeing 747s have suffered the same probable cause as United Airlines Flight 811. Further confirming details are available at <http://www.montereypeninsulaairport.com> and <http://www.nts.gov>

Include the following information in your message:

¥ Your name, address and phone number;

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
safety@ntsb.org
www.ntsbt.org

¥ Your profession and experience;

Commercial pilot, instrument rated, former FAA Part 135 certificate holder.

US Navy reconnaissance navigator, RA-5C 650 hours.

US Navy patrol crewman, P2V-5FS 2000 hours.

Air Intelligence Officer, US Navy

Retired US Army Major MSC

Owner Mooney M-20C, 1000 hours.

Survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash in RA-5C

¥ Your involvement in the unsafe situation being reported;

Independent aircraft accident investigator doing research in early model Boeing 747s that experienced a sudden loud sound on the cockpit voice recorder.

¥ Where else you have reported this unsafe situation or safety concern;

RCMP, Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Air India Flight 182, FBI, FAA, NTSB, AAIB, TSB.

¥ Complete identification of the aircraft,

Boeing 747-100 and Boeing 747-200.

¥ Owner/operator of the equipment.

Various airlines around the world including Northwest Airlines which flies over Canada.

1. Describe (as appropriate) the unsafe act or safety concern in terms of

¥ how the unsafe act/condition was discovered;

United Airlines Flight 811 was the first officially recognized accident in which the electrical system was found to be at fault. My research has discovered that in fact there were several other early model Boeing 747s that had experienced many of the same characteristics and left much of the same evidence; for instance:

UAL 811 and AI 182 were both:

early model

poly x wired

Boeing 747

had previous problems with cargo doors.

experienced hull rupture forward of the wing on right side in cargo door area

fodded number three engine

sudden sound on CVR

loud sound on the CVR

short duration sound on the CVR

abrupt data loss to FDR

outward peeled skin in cargo door area

more severe inflight damage on starboard side

at least nine never recovered bodies

vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of cargo door

inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight offered as explanation during official inquiry
bomb in forward cargo hold initially suspected

if you are describing an event, what happened, where, when (give the date of the event and local time) and why you think it occurred.

There were four events, Air India Flight 182 in June 1985, Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988, United Airlines Flight 811 in February 1989, and TWA Flight 800 in July 1996. I think they occurred because of the similar evidence of faulty wiring rupturing open the forward cargo door based upon the findings of United Airlines Flight 811. I have written three aircraft accident reports, one for Air India Flight 182, one for Pan Am Flight 103, and one for TWA Flight 800.

1. Give your suggestions to correct the situation.

Recommend to the FAA that an emergency AD be issued to examine the wiring in and around cargo doors on early model Boeing 747s for chafing to bare wire. Replace the faulty wiring and modify the cargo doors into plug type.

electronic messages passed to SECURITAS come directly into the SECURITAS office and are handled only by authorized SECURITAS analysts who are specialists in aviation safety.

Dear Aviation Safety Specialist, please do not be put off by the controversy over these airplane accidents but concentrate on the hard physical evidence I present for your consideration in my three AARs. Let the evidence of the CVR, the FDR, and the twisted metal speak for themselves. The model for comparison is United Airlines Flight 811. The reason these aircraft accidents

are controversial is that the official reasons so far are unsatisfactory. The shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation answers all the questions.

Justice Josephson concluded about Air India Flight 182: "A bomb located in the rear cargo hold had detonated and opened a hole in the left aft fuselage of the aircraft."

That two opinions by a justice about the cause of the explosion and location are refuted by aviation safety specialists from Canada and India who actually viewed the hard evidence:

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Regards,

John Barry Smith
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1 831 659 3552
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barry@johnbarrysmith.com
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From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:52 PM PDT
To: pm@pm.gc.ca, barney.brucker@justice.gc.ca,
MINTC@tc.gc.ca, communications@tsb.gc.ca,
Paulette.Delorme@tsb.gc.ca, Terry.Burtch@tsb.gc.ca,
securitas@tsb.gc.ca, mtansey@majorcomm.ca
Subject: Air India Flight 182 wiring/cargo door explanation1

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Salpie Stepanian

Assistant to the Prime Minister
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Honourable
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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air
India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner

Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson, Public Affairs Officer / Agent des affaires publiques

Michael Tansey, Commission Spokesperson

mtansey@majorcomm.ca

Sgt. B. Blachford

Air India Task Force

5255 Heather St.

Vancouver, B. C.

V5Z 1K6

Dear Honourable Ministers, Commissioner, and Respected
Staff, Sunday, October 22, 2006

All roads lead to Barney. But first...our subject:

Introduction:

An action transferred is an action completed and an action completed is

better than no action at all, so let me thank the below staff for their referrals:

1. Salpie Stepanian, Assistant to the Prime Minister for the reply to my email to the Prime Minister; "Please be assured that your comments have been carefully reviewed and are appreciated. I have taken the liberty of forwarding your correspondence directly to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, the Honourable Vic Toews, within whose responsibilities this matter falls."

2. Richard Stryde, Senior Special Assistant, to Honourable Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities for his reply to my email. "The Minister has asked me to reply on his behalf. I have noted your comments with respect to this matter. Although, as you indicate, the Attorney General of Canada is the Government of Canada's representative on the Commission of Inquiry into the investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182. This being the case, I have taken the liberty of forwarding a copy of your correspondence to the office of the Honourable Vic Toews, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, for consideration.

Thank you both, Ms. Stepanian and Mr. Stryde, and I appreciate the attention at highest political levels that my alert has received of the clear and present danger to the Canadian flying public by the shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for early model Boeing 747s, of which Air India Flight 182 was but one. It occurred to me that since my wiring/cargo door explanation received the attention of such high officials, then it must also be considered by others, such as the AG, TSB, and the Commission of Inquiry.

I present myself to you as someone who is not seeking compensation, who is not pursuing a lawsuit, who is not angry and ranting, who does not seek a special tax break, nor one who is pleading for mercy for a criminal conviction. I am someone who is trying to prevent mass deaths

in another airplane crash similar to Air India Flight 182. I am qualified to do so through experience and education but not by rank or title. I have proven my good intentions by flying to Ottawa from California and staying in a hotel at my own expense and time. I consider myself one of the good guys and would like to think that everyone involved here is also good. We are to protect and serve the people, you from your official public positions and me from my private and unofficial one. We are on the same side. We have the same goals although different routes. I understand your way. I'm asking that you understand my path; it's down to earth, makes sense, and is clear cut.

There was some surprise that my research and conclusions about an airplane crash were referred to the Attorney General but I still appreciate the referrals, thank you again, Ms. Stepanian and Mr. Stryde. Sooner or later the Transportation Safety Board (Air) will be the ones to evaluate the causes of an airplane crash based on the physical laws of science and not the emotional, irrational motives of human nature. The other official responses to my alert from the Minister of Justice, the Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182, the TSB (Air), and Securitas (TSB) have been...silence. The Attorney chooses to remain silent, the Spokesperson will not speak, the Inquirer will not inquire, and the security officers will not...do whatever they do. I shall hopefully assume the silences reflect deep contemplation, solemn pondering, if you will.

I must make do with what I have and what I have are two referrals from high authority to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada...which is actually his representative, Mr. Barney Brucker. My presentation must be appropriate to the audience and will therefore be made using legal terms in a courtroom model with attorney relationships. Mr. Brucker and I are most certainly good sons, wonderful husbands, terrific fathers, loyal to our friends, and competent professionals. However, in the courtroom model we shall be professional adversaries as the British system uses the plaintiff and

defendant style to determine findings: I shall be polite and respectful while arguing a common goal to understand what happened and why; in this case, why Air India Flight 182 exploded in midair so many years ago. If everyone knew 'why' for sure, there would not be the many conflicting official opinions about what and where in the aircraft the explosion occurred nor the current Commission of Inquiry or an upcoming perjury trial. The issue is still contentious and will remain so until a conclusive ending is attained.

In the old days, say before June, 1985, the government was the stolid, conservative arbiter of verdicts and justice while the wild eyed conspiracy guys with their erratic connecting the coincidental dots into plots of mass murder by foreign looking gents were the barely tolerated and scorned rabble. Now the government is the conspiracy bomber terrorist believing guy and a scientific fellow like me is on the outside, trying to reason with the unreasonable. Please be reasonable; respond to reason not emotional hate and a lust for revenge based on horror and grief. There are real terrorists out there wanting to blow up airliners but they were not involved with the destruction of Air India Flight 182.

Let us assume that the Crown believes and has prosecuted several men on the premise that two or three bombs were placed on two Boeing 747s which departed Vancouver BC and later blew up, one on a baggage cart and one in an aircraft, murdering many. Furthermore, those bombs were placed by several revenge seeking turbaned terrorists who conspired with each other over a period of months. Subsequent attempts at prosecution revealed administrative lapses among various agencies which are alleged to have thwarted justice. A witness lied. Victims' families remain irate. Law enforcement is frustrated. Thus an Inquiry and further prosecution of a presumed conspirator continue.

Assume that I claim that there was no bomb on Air India Flight 182 and therefore no bombers, no conspiracy, no crime, and no criminals. The cause was the mechanical one of the shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/

ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation which is amply supported by facts, data, evidence, recorders, schematics, and a matching precedent of United Airlines Flight 811.

Presentation Outline:

Introduction

Opening Statement

Presenting Case:

Part I: Witnesses

Part II: Analogy

Part III: Matchups

Part IV: Best Evidence

Part V: Human Nature Conjecture

Part VI: Photograph evidence

Part VII: Layperson Explanation

Part VIII: Template

Part IX: The Unifying Official Version

Part X: Sequence of Destruction

Part XI: Political Implications

Part XII: Standing

Summation

Permit me now to make my opening statement to Mr. Barney Brucker, (the judge, jury, and prosecutor of one), then present my case in detail, and sum up to conclusion and await the verdict from Mr. Brucker.

Opening statement:

Mr. Brucker, I am the plaintiff, I have come to you for redress of a grievance, that grief being the loss of a huge airliner and the deaths of 329 men, women, and children and flight crew. I believe the probable cause of that airplane crash to be the same probable cause of about half of all the thousands of airplane crashes, a mechanical fault with the

machine. I do not believe the cause of that inflight breakup to have been caused by the rarest of causes for an explosion in a highly pressurized hull; sabotage and specifically a bomb explosion. My explanation is called the shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation or wiring/cargo door for short. That electrical cause occurred for Air India Flight 182 and for several other early model Boeing 747s, in particular United Airlines Flight 811. That wiring problem can occur again and another 329 persons can needlessly die. The problems are mechanical and can be fixed thus preventing another inflight explosion when that cargo door ruptures outward in flight, causing an explosion which mimics a bomb explosion. The hard evidence refutes a bomb explosion because the necessary scientific evidence which would confirm a bomb explosion is missing and the scientific evidence which confirms an explosive decompression due to a ruptured open cargo door is present. A bomb explosion on Air India Flight 182 is scientifically ruled out and an open cargo door is ruled in.

The defence (government) contends it was a bomb explosion in the aft bulk cargo compartment on the left side that caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182. They have offered as proof a complicated conspiracy theory involving a Mr. X, an adulterous affair, jealous lovers, misappropriated funds, shootouts, angry and revengeful savages, army assaults, religious conflicts and a potential breakaway civil war. Fine, that's all very exciting and a movie with those elements would be very entertaining, I'm sure. Air India Flight 182 was first and foremost an airplane crash. It was not a domestic disturbance that escalated into violence or a bank robbery. An airplane has to obey immutable laws of physics to fly and the same laws to breakup in flight and crash. Humans who commit crimes react to their own internal changing moral rules and can not be predicted. Machine behaviour can be predicted. The conspiracy guys will claim that the reason there were no convictions is because one of the conspirators perjured himself during trial and if he had just told the truth, convictions would have followed.

To understand and explain why Air India Flight 182 crashed I will stick to the facts and leave the intrigue to the newspapers and TV. Please bear with me as I present charts, photographs, text, expert opinions, similar airplane accidents with similar evidence, and closely reasoned conclusions. Swiss Air Flight 111 and TWA Flight 800 have taught the Canadian, UK, and USA government investigators much about the consequences of faulty wiring in widebody airliners.

Both sides, the conspiracy and the mechanical, have a common goal with different routes to get there. We want to protect the trusting flying public and prevent needless deaths. Here are my paths starting from the end and working backwards:

1. The known faulty and aging Poly X type wiring needs to be replaced in early model Boeing 747s.
2. The design flaw of non-plug cargo doors needs to be corrected by making the doors like the plug type passenger doors.
3. The design flaw of absent locking sectors on the two midspan latches of the two cargo doors needs to be corrected by inserting the missing locking sectors.
4. The USA Federal Aviation Administration will issue an Airworthiness Directive (AD) for emergency inspection of the cargo door wiring for chafing and charring based upon the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) updated findings.
5. The TSB (Air) will investigate and issue an updated CASB Aircraft Accident Report (AAR) for Air India Flight 182 based upon hindsight using the knowledge gained from several subsequent similar accidents, specifically United Airlines Flight 811, Swiss Air 111, and TWA Flight 800. I will assist the TSB in their investigation. The new AAR will be based upon the suggestion of the Commissioner of the Inquiry into Air India Flight 182.
6. The Commissioner will request TSB (Air) for their official opinion as to the cause of Air India Flight 182 since the last official accident report of twenty years ago by the predecessor CASB did not conclude the

cause was a bomb and evidence at that time refuted the bomb explosion explanation and suggested a explosive decompression caused by structural failure.

7. I persuade Commissioner Major that it would be prudent to order an updated AAR to fulfill his mandate of a full and thorough inquiry and to satisfy his personal goal that the inquiry was to be very broad in the evidence that it heard, in order to put to rest the various theories, rumours and neglect that have occurred since the explosion in 1985.

8. The Attorney General of Canada will suggest to the Commissioner that I be granted standing as witness since I qualify under a Term of Reference and have submitted the paperwork in a timely manner.

9. I persuade the AG representative to act on my behalf because the evidence I present today warrants the checking out of the reasonable, mechanical, alternative explanation. I persuade the AG representative to solicit Crown expert opinions about Air India Flight 182 from the quasi-judicial and technical fields of the Commission of Inquiry and the TSB (Air) aircraft accident investigators.

Or: Mr. Brucker or Commissioner Major directly asks TSB (Air) to provide to them an opinion as to the probable cause of Air India Flight 182. TSB has never been asked and might very well welcome the chance to express their professional opinion; after all, this crash is the most famous airplane crash in Canadian history and their purpose for existence is to explain airplane crashes to the political leadership and public.

Or: Mr. Brucker suggests to TSB (Air) staff that they meet with me in Vancouver to allow me to present my wiring/cargo door explanation in person to the investigators.

The path of the Crown prosecutors and RCMP Air India Task Force appears to be to try to put several people in prison which will 'send a message' and salve some grief. The Crown has many who agree it was a bomb explosion which include the RCMP, the CSIS, the prosecutors, the

accused, the defence counsels, newspapers, books, TV, radio, the manufacturer, the airline, the victim's families, justices, and the man in the street.

The start of my path is here today and I will now present my case for the mechanical explanation, the non bomb explanation, for Air India Flight 182. The only people who agree with me of not concluding it was a bomb explosion in the aft bulk cargo compartment are those who actually know why airplanes fly and why they don't; who know why airplanes mostly land safely and why they occasionally come apart in the air; that is, professional government aircraft accident investigators from four countries, the USA, the UK, India, and Canada. It should be an interesting argument, a pleasing myth believed by millions versus unpleasant science concluded by dozens.

Presenting the wiring/cargo door case. It's detailed, it's complex, it's science, it's logical, it's factual, and it makes sense.

Part I: I call several witnesses by means of quoting their official words in documents.

Speech excerpts - Prime Minister Harper announces inquiry into Air India bombing

"A full public inquiry is required. This inquiry will be launched immediately and led by an outstanding Canadian, retired Supreme Court Justice John Major. He has agreed to serve as Commissioner for this inquiry and I have every confidence that he will conduct a thorough and compassionate investigation into the events surrounding this tragedy. This inquiry is about analyzing the evidence that has come to light since 1985 and applying it to the world we live in today."

From transcript of 18 July 2006, Hearing on Standing, Commissioner Major:

The Commissioner: "Yes. Well, I will confirm that. The nature of this

Commission was to be very broad in the evidence that it heard, in order to put to rest the various theories, rumours and neglect that have occurred since the explosion in 1985."

From transcript again: Mr. Barney Brucker:

Mr. Brucker: I just wanted to indicate to you, Commissioner, that I have provided this morning to Mrs. Cook and to Commission counsel a brief submission that we had prepared just on the general test for standing and issues that we submit you will be taking into account.

The Commissioner: You can't do much better than get standing, though, can you?

Mr. Brucker: No, we can't, but we are concerned about the focus of the Inquiry. When I attended here and listened to your Opening Statement I was struck by one comment that you made and I will paraphrase that, perhaps not accurately, but what I took from your comments was that you intended to conduct a thorough but efficient inquiry and that an efficient inquiry does not mean that it has to take a great deal of time. We have, in my submission to you, a very compressed time schedule in which we have to get things done and my submissions simply highlight that in that environment, a matter which is of interest to all Canadians, that there should be some judicious consideration of who will get standing and who won't or who may be an intervenor and who won't, and that to ensure that the process is thorough and efficient I have offered some general principles that I submit might be of assistance to you.

The Commissioner: Thank you. That's been filed and will be looked at."

End quotes.

I can not cross examine but I can comment on those statements. The Prime Minister desires a full, thorough, and compassionate public

inquiry into the events surrounding Air India Flight 182 by analyzing the evidence that has come to light since 1985. The direction for the Commission is pointed by the two leading authorities, the Prime Minister and the Commissioner to be full, thorough, and broad.

Mr. Brucker recommends an efficient inquiry. Well, kangaroo courts are efficient and lynch mobs are cheap and fast. "Thorough and broad" requires time for the presentation of various theories since the explosion of 1985, one of which is the wiring/cargo door explanation. That alternative explanation should have its time in front of the Commission of Inquiry and that can be done by granting me witness or intervenor standing. It's been twenty one years since the event and several more hours of listening to a 'various theory' is certainly justified in the name of thoroughness. As far as efficiency goes, when the wiring/cargo door explanation is confirmed by Crown aircraft investigators, the Commission of Inquiry can reduce 90% of its workload since the reason for the acquittals by Justice Josephson is obvious, the accused were innocent and the prosecutors, RCMP and CSIS can be exonerated for failing to obtain convictions.

Does the wiring/cargo door explanation have validity? Is it as wild as a mid air with a flying saucer explanation and thus not worthy of consideration? Or is the wiring/cargo door explanation down to earth and real?

Let me present expert witnesses through their quotes:

CASB Aviation Occurrence Report on Air India Flight 182, 1986: "The Canadian Aviation Safety Board respectfully submits as follows:

04.1 Cause-Related Findings

5. There is considerable circumstantial and other evidence to indicate that the initial event was an explosion occurring in the forward cargo compartment.

From Kirpal Report for Air India Flight 182, 1986: "Mr. R.A. Davis,

Head, Flight Recorder Section, Accidents Investigation Branch, Farnborough, U.K. 3.4.6.16 In conclusion, Mr. Davis reported as follows :- "It is considered that from the CVR and ATC recordings supplied for analysis, there is no evidence of a high explosive device having detonated on AI 182. There is strong evidence to suggest that a sudden explosive decompression occurred but the cause has not been identified. It must be concluded that without positive evidence of an explosive device from either the wreckage or pathological examinations, some other cause has to be established for the accident".

End quotes:

That 'other cause' was established by me in 1996 based on an event in 1989, United Airlines Flight 811, plus other accidents. (And there is good reason why it is called an "explosive" decompression. It is an explosion that mimics a bomb.)

That non bomb concluding finding from CASB is absolutely correct. It does not conclude the destruction of the aircraft was caused by a bomb. It is specific on the location of the mystery explosion as the forward cargo compartment and rules out the rear cargo compartments. There are several alternative explanations for that confirmed explosion, from fire in the cargo hold or hull rupture at a door, or bomb in baggage explodes. I agree there was an explosion in the forward cargo compartment as did all the experts agree on that point in 1986 for solid reasons.

The Canadian and United Kingdom government experts in aircraft accident investigation for Air India Flight 182 did not state the cause was a bomb and in fact, the UK expert stated in 1986 it was not a bomb and gave strong evidence for his conclusion. To claim the Canadian Aviation Safety Board concluded the cause was a bomb is incorrect, prejudicial, and inflammatory.

The Canadian crash experts (CASB) called Air India Flight 182 a 'crash'.

It was. The word "bomb" was never used in relation with Air India Flight 182 in their entire CASB report. "Bomb" was used only once in reference to a different aircraft and event for comparison purposes and there was no match.

Aircraft accidents are sometimes complicated events and analogies may possibly explain the misunderstandings. Air India Flight 182 is but one tree in a forest of four early model Boeing 747s that experienced an inflight breakup leaving similar evidence.

Part II: An analogy to include the four trees in the forest but I'll call them brothers instead:

Early model Boeing 747s are machines. We say they die when they crash but they were never really alive, now were they? We anthropomorphize. Let me continue with the analogy.

It's as if a person falls down dead. The police, the media, the man's family, the courts, the prosecution, and the defence all agree, yes, it was a shot to the head that killed him but we'll argue about who and where and when he was shot. Several men are arrested, and at the trial the defence states that yes, the victim was shot in the head but their clients did not do it. All the while some physicians who examined the dead person are saying, no, it was not a gunshot to the head but a heart attack, while other physicians say we don't know how he died but we may find out later.

And then another man falls down dead at same spot and it's the brother of the previous dead man. Same thing happens, most non physicians say gunshot to head but the autopsy cause of death determined by government physicians claim natural causes. Several more men are accused and tried. The defence agreed with the prosecution as to cause of death as gunshot but their clients did not pull the trigger.

And then another brother falls down dead under similar circumstances...first guesses were gunshot to head but later proven wrong.

And then another brother falls down dead under similar circumstances...first guesses were gunshot to head but later proven wrong.

All four brothers share the same exact DNA and the evidence discovered at their deaths is generally the same. Two brothers are conclusively proven to have died of heart attacks and the deaths of the other two remain controversial.

And all the while, the people who know why people fall down dead are saying, not a gunshot to the head but heart attack, probably caused by poor diet.

How does a four time serial killer called faulty wiring get away with it?

1. The deaths happen over a period of years, 1985 through 1996. Memories are short. Personnel change. Documents are thrown away, misplaced, or lost. Witnesses forget.
2. The deaths happen many thousands of miles apart from each other, such as Ireland, New York, Lockerbie, and Hawaii.
3. The deaths involve many agencies; RCMP, Scotland Yard, FBI, CIA, CSIS, TSB, NTSB, CASB, AAIB, Indian Civil Aviation Agency, and all the way to the top political leaders. The agencies do not cooperate or communicate fully, they defend their area of investigation, they are secretive, and they have many administrative senior officials directing them. Each agency looks closely at its lone tree/brother/aircraft in the forest/family of four while ignoring the other three.
- 4 The deaths involve objects that look different at first glance such as different colors in their livery, different names in their titles, and different nicknames.

5. The deaths involve victims who are not wealthy, important, connected to authority, or famous.

6. The deaths involve different complex legal jurisdictions in faraway places such as India, Canada, UK, and USA.

7. The deaths involve billions of dollars which means people get funny when they get around money.

A. The killer is well loved, well connected, wealthy, powerful, and not a suspect and anybody raising suspicion is scorned.

B. The killer has killed before but is still above suspicion having said to have reformed.

C. The killer's freedom is necessary for the financial well being of thousands of workers.

1. The accused are relatively poor, different color skin and language than the accusers, and have in the past expressed violent thoughts.

2. The accused reinforce the prejudices of the accusers.

3. The accused get the suspicion off the real killer.

Part III: Matchups to determine a pattern.

There are no conspiracies among the agencies, courts, media, or public to hide or protect the real killer or to convict the innocent. All involved really believe the real killer is not guilty and the accused are guilty based upon the public's own self interest. The well meaning accusers all believe in a vast international conspiracy by the accused to commit mass murder and like all conspiracy zealots, refuse to consider down to earth explanations for such mass grief causing events. The hysteria feeds on itself with the stories gaining myth status with constant repeating, embellishment and modifications.

The real killer is faulty wiring, a small failure which brings down huge machines, early model Boeing 747s, by exploiting the design flaws of non plug cargo doors and no locking sectors on the midspan latches. The

dead brothers/machines are Air India Flight 182, Pan Am Flight 103, United Airlines Flight 811, and TWA Flight 800.

The deaths are respectively 329, 270, 9, and 230 for a total of eight hundred thirty eight fatalities. That's a mass killing in four events over eleven years and thousands of miles apart involving the governments of four countries.

The four mechanical victims are virtually identical. They are early model Boeing 747s. There are tens of thousand of airliners out there in hundreds of model and submodels but there are currently about five hundred Boeing 747-100 and 747-200 aircraft still in service of which only four planes have the below similar evidence after inflight breakups.

The similarities in the circumstances and of the wreckage of those events are many: larger version at <http://www.montereypeninsulaairport.com> Other details at <http://www.nts.gov>

The defence counsel for the four accused of bombing two of those aircraft essentially stipulated to the cause of the crashes as bombs and quibbled over a few feet of where it was in the aircraft and challenged the Crown to prove who planted the bombs.

And the defence followed that strategy all the while knowing (assuming they did their homework) that the actual government experts in aviation crash investigations were saying they did not know the cause, or the cause was an explosive decompression and that one UK crash expert even refuted the bomb cause. The defence knew that similar type aircraft had similar type fatal accidents in 1989 and 1996 and the cause was electrical, not a bomb explosion. The defence uncritically believed the police story and that of the Crown prosecutors, the media, the public,

and the anguished victim's families, while ignoring the one group who knew what they were talking about, the Canadian Aviation Safety Board investigators, the UK Air Accidents Investigation Board investigators, the National Transportation Safety Board investigators, and the Indian accident investigators.

For Air India Flight 182 the location of the explosion was in the forward cargo compartment for fifteen years. That conclusion is amply supported by hard wreckage evidence and yet on the day of the trial the location switched to the aft bulk cargo compartment, a location conclusively ruled out by earlier investigators. The defence never disputed the move of the explosion from forward to aft compartments.

For Pan Am Flight 103 the AAIB investigator of the wreckage observed that the cause of the soot in the container alleged to have held a powerful, spherical and loud bomb was actually: "Where these panels formed the boundary of the shatter zone, the metal in the immediate locality was ragged, heavily distorted, and the inner surfaces were pitted and sooted - rather as if a very large shotgun had been fired at the inner surface of the fuselage at close range." The defence never objected to the premise of a bomb explosion which was shown by evidence to be mild, directed, and silent, three physical impossibilities for a bomb but natural for a 'very large shotgun' in the luggage which was safe unless a huge explosive decompression were to occur nearby were a cargo door to rupture open in flight.

Emotion trumped science. Wishful revenge thinking ruled the day. Pleasant explanations based on grief salving emotions were believed while unpleasant explanations supported by hard evidence that could be touched, seen, and listened to was rejected without consideration.

Part IV: Best Evidence:

Speaking legally as an amateur, I understand there are several types of

evidence; circumstantial, indirect, hearsay, and direct. All can be very persuasive. The best evidence is direct evidence. For Air India Flight 182, Pan Am Flight 103, and TWA Flight 800 there is much circumstantial evidence such as airspeed, altitude and time of day. There is indirect evidence such as wreckage debris pattern and twisted metal. Hearsay is for the conspiracy guys believing quarreling lovers and taped political ramblings.

The one source for the best evidence which is direct and irrefutable is the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder. They were there at event time. Those recorders were put there to do precisely what they did, record for later evaluation events which took place in the cockpit and in the aircraft at large. They tell us directly what went on in the final minutes.

And what does the best and indisputable direct evidence show as to what the cause of Air India Flight 182 and Pan Am Flight 103 and two others?

Chart 12 above from NTSB public docket for TWA Flight 800 showing the sudden loud sound from the CVRs in graphical format. Air India is Air India Flight 182, PanAm is Pan Am Flight 103, and United is United Airlines Flight 811. (Philippine Air was a Boeing 737 that had a fuel tank explode on the ground and not a Boeing 747 exploding in the air as the others.)

The graph shows a sudden loud sound followed by an abrupt power cut to the flight data recorders, a rare event separately, and extremely rare to have both together.

The sudden loud sound was analyzed very carefully by the government analysts for frequency, duration, limiting, and rise and fall time.

The conclusion reached by all the analysts in the UK, USA, Canada and India is that the sudden loud sound is not a bomb explosion sound, nor a missile exploding sound, but that of an explosive decompression sound. The bomb sound was ruled out because necessary low frequencies were not present and the rise time was too slow. There was no bomb sound in the cockpit at the initial event time for Air India Flight 182, Pan Am Flight 103, United Airlines Flight 811, and TWA Flight 800.

If not a bomb sound, then what was the cause of the sudden loud sound?

Air India Flight 182

"Mr. R.A. Davis, Head, Flight Recorder Section, Accidents Investigation Branch, Farnborough, U.K. 3.4.6.16 In conclusion, Mr. Davis reported as follows :- "It is considered that from the CVR and ATC recordings supplied for analysis, there is no evidence of a high explosive device having detonated on AI 182. There is strong evidence to suggest that a sudden explosive decompression occurred but the cause has not been identified. It must be concluded that without positive evidence of an explosive device from either the wreckage or pathological examinations, some other cause has to be established for the accident".

2.10.2 Analysis by Accidents Investigation Branch (AIB), United Kingdom

The AIB analysis was restricted to the CVR and the Shannon ATC tape. An analysis of the CVR audio found no significant very low frequency content which would be expected from the sound created by the detonation of a high explosive device. A comparison with CVRs recording an explosive decompression* on a DC-10, a bomb in the cargo hold of a B737, and a gun shot on the flight deck of a B737 was made. Considering the different acoustic characteristics between a DC-10 and a B747, the AIB analysis indicates that there were distinct similarities between the sound of the explosive decompression on the DC-10 and the sound recorded on the AI 182 CVR. *Explosive decompression is an aviation term used to mean a sudden and rapid loss

of cabin pressurization.

(Please note the DC-10 explosive decompression above referenced in the Air India Flight 182 CVR analysis was probably the Turkish Airlines DC-10 fatal event when the aft cargo door blew open causing an explosive decompression which destroyed the flight controls leading to the crash.)

Pan Am Flight 103

"It is not clear if the sound at the end of the recording is the result of the explosion or is from the break-up of the aircraft structure. The short period between the beginning of the event and the loss of electrical power suggests that the latter is more likely to be the case."

United Airlines Flight 811

"The Safety Board believes that the approximate 1.5 to 2.0 seconds between the first sound (a thump) and the second very loud noise recorded on the CVR at the time of the door separation was probably the time difference between the initial failure of the latches at the bottom of the door, and the subsequent separation of the door, explosive decompression, and destruction of the cabin floor and fuselage structure. The door did not fail and separate instantaneously; rather, it first opened at the bottom and then flew open violently. As the door separated, it tore away the hinge and surrounding structure as the pressure in the cabin forced the floor beams downward in the area of the door to equalize with the loss of pressure in the cargo compartment."

TWA Flight 800

"The TWA flight 800 CVR recorded noise characteristics that were most similar to those recorded by the CVRs on board the United flight 811 and Philippine Airlines airplanes."

The Pan Am Flight 103 sudden loud sound is 'more likely' to be the case for the break-up of the aircraft structure, not a bomb sound.

The United Airlines Flight 811 sudden loud sound is indisputably and irrefutably the explosive decompression sound when the forward cargo door burst open because that aircraft barely landed safely at Honolulu.

The TWA Flight 800 sudden loud sound is most similar to United Airlines Flight 811 as both were early model Boeing 747s.

United Airlines Flight 811 is the model that fits the other three, it is the victim of the killer wiring that was able to make it back to Honolulu to eventually identify the culprit, the electrical system of wiring or a switch. Just as it was only after United Airlines Flight 811 that the cause of the sound on Air India Flight 182 was identified, it was only after Swiss Air Flight 111 and TWA Flight 800 that the true extent of the pervasive and dangerous Poly X wiring in all early model Boeing 747s was made known.

(United Airlines Flight 811 is the case law analogy; it was a similar case that was tried and proven beyond doubt to be a certain cause and that cause may be applied to other similar cases.)

The best evidence for these similar events in similar aircraft is the direct evidence which is the cockpit voice recorder which recorded the sudden loud sound which when analyzed indicated an explosive decompression from a ruptured open forward cargo door and not a bomb explosion sound. That's science, that's real, that's confirmable, and it's corroborated by government sound analysts.

Part V: Human Nature Conjecture:

Why has the shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182, Pan Am Flight 103, and TWA Flight 800 not been advanced before in the public's mind?

I would hope I would not, but I might very well have reacted as others have if my job, my reputation, my income, and my freedom depended upon the bomb explosion explanation being the accepted one and the wiring/cargo door explanation rejected. There is no conspiracy, just people acting in their own perceived best interests. Who and what are they?

1. The manufacturer wants the blame for the loss of the aircraft and life to be placed upon factors out of its control and not on its design errors of non plug cargo doors and absent locking sectors in the midspan latches. The manufacturer does not want to have to spend millions to correct the manufacturing faults in the wiring nor modify the cargo doors.

2. The airline wants the blame placed on others such as airport screening personnel and not on itself for not finding the frayed wires to the cargo door unlatch motor. The aircrews want to believe the event was a rare occurrence and do not want to believe that every minute they fly in early model Boeing 747s the aircraft can come apart in flight in seconds when the cargo door blows open as it did in United Airlines Flight 811.

3. The police, the RCMP, the FBI, Scotland Yard and prosecutors all welcome the inclusion of the high profile catastrophes into their jurisdiction so they can solve the crime and increase their budgets and staff to counter the threats. They would reject the mechanical cause as their general involvement would end.

4. The court system welcomes the chance to establish justice by punishing the criminals asserted by the law enforcement agencies. Vast amounts of bailiffs, new court facilities, numerous attorneys, and much tax money goes into trials while a mechanical cause is relegated to settlement meetings between insurance attorneys.

5. The victims' families have turned their grief to anger to hate and want someone to vent their emotion of revenge against. They would prefer to believe their loved ones died in some vast international conspiracy which is part of a worldwide larger force instead of a trivial event such as bare wire shorting to metal and turning on a motor which is supposed

to remain off while in flight.

6. The media such as TV, radio, and newspapers much prefer an emotional human tragedy interesting story to tell rather than a scientific story which requires education into basic laws of nature such as gravity, lift, thrust, drag, and pressure differential. Emotional stories require feelings which everyone has while science stories require education which is absent in many viewers, listeners, and readers. The media tells people what they want to hear and that is exciting, illogical, conspiracy stories, not boring mechanical proofs.

7. The government oversight agencies want to shift the blame of the crashes to foreign terrorists slipping through lax airport security and not their own failures as regulators and monitors of safety issues. The wiring/cargo door explanation reveals their failure to order the airlines and manufacturer to fix the documented problem of faulty wiring causing cargo doors to open in early model Boeing 747s such as Pan Am Flight 125 in 1987, United airlines preflight in 1991, and United Airlines Flight 811 in 1989.

8. The public demands revenge for a great loss of human life which was preventable. Dying in a bombed airplane crash offends two basic instincts of all humans at birth, a startle reflex shown by arms stretched wide and the falling reflex shown by grasping hands. The public pays money to hear what it wants and rejects that which is unpleasant. The bombing explanation reinforces their prejudices of xenophobia and racism; it implies the event was a one off affair and not likely to reappear if only security were tighter. The bombing story gives an opportunity for revenge; it gives an exciting tale of intrigue, spying, shootouts, and chase scenes. The wiring/cargo door explanation is dry, has lots of charts and statistics, and implies the faulty wiring and dangerous non plug cargo doors are industry wide, not fixed, and the problems could reappear the next time they fly as a passenger.

I say again, there are no conspiracies among the principals, only people acting in their own perceived best interests which is essentially, "It's not my fault, nor my company's fault, nor my government's, nor the police,

nor the airline, nor the media, nor the courts' fault; it's the fault of those revenge seeking turbaned terrorists over there."

To support that blame shifting exculpatory bomb explosion explanation, vast illogical and science defying fantasies had to be devised and repeated until the myth of the Lockerbie bombing and the bombing of Air India Flight 182 was implanted into the public psyche. Debunking will be very difficult as myths are generated and believed by a people needing them. Debunking is important because the genuine cause of faulty wiring remains at large, waiting for the right circumstances to strike again.

However.....conspiracy zealots defeat their cause eventually. The continued controversies with Air India Flight 182 and Pan Am Flight 103 are evidence that something is not right and thus the trials, the appeals, and the inquiries continue.

Part VI: Photograph evidence:

More logical conclusions supported by photographic evidence:

1. When a bomb is detonated on the port side of pressurized early model Boeing 747s, that port side will be shattered and the starboard opposite side remains smooth, like the Bruntingthorpe staged bombing of a real Boeing 747. (Port side is left side facing forward and starboard side is right side.)
2. When the faulty wiring causes the forward cargo door to blow out on the starboard side, that starboard side is shattered into characteristic pattern of rectangle and longitudinally split cargo door, as is Air India Flight 182, Pan Am Flight 103, Pan Am Flight 103, and United Airlines Flight 811, while the port side remains relatively smooth.

Which of the above choices fits the Air India Flight 182 and Pan Am

Flight 103 actual evidence? Let's look at the photographs and wreckage reconstruction sketches by the authorities.

A Boeing 747 had a real bomb go off in the aft cargo compartment in a real Boeing 747 during a staged event. (Bruntingthrope photos below)

Results:

1. Port side blown to bits
2. Starboard side opposite the blast has the aft cargo door and bulk cargo door latched, intact, and smooth skin all around.

Now to Pan Am Flight 103, (thought by many to be bomb explosion of same type and size as Bruntingthorpe.)

Below is wreckage reconstruction sketch from UK AAIB AAR:

Port side, a small blue rectangle (from alleged bomb explosion) with relatively smooth non exploded skin around. Other bent skin is from aero dynamics not explosion.

Starboard side at same initial time is shattered and large area with door split longitudinally, stringers exposed and large rectangle destruction area.

Port side above for Pan Am Flight 103, nose to left.

Starboard side forward cargo door for Pan Am Flight 103, nose to right.

United Airlines Flight 811

Port side is very smooth and undamaged.

Starboard side is shattered with large rectangle destruction area, split longitudinal door, and stringers exposed.

1.3 Damage to the Airplane

The primary damage to the airplane consisted of a hole on the right side in the area of the forward lower lobe cargo door, approximately 10 by 15 feet large.

TWA Flight 800

Port smooth side below opposite cargo door and forward of center fuel tank, nose to left.

Starboard side below, with cargo door shattered area to right. Center fuel tank explosion as initial event would be bilateral, not unilateral.

TWA Flight 800 starboard side, nose to right.

TWA Flight 800 forward cargo door area to right.

Air India Flight 182 below:

Air India Flight 182 wreckage reconstruction from CASB and Kirpal Report. Of the small amount of wreckage recovered, only the pieces of wreckage that showed damage was reported. There is no reports of inflight or other damage to the port side opposite either cargo door so the assumption can be that there was none and thus smooth. The forward cargo door was damaged and split in two longitudinally which matches Pan Am Flight 103 and United Airlines Flight 811.

CASB report: "All cargo doors were found intact and attached to the fuselage structure except for the forward cargo door which had some fuselage and cargo floor attached. This door, located on the forward right side of the aircraft, was broken horizontally about one-quarter of the distance above the lower frame. The damage to the door and the fuselage skin near the door appeared to have been caused by an outward force. The fractured surface of the cargo door appeared to have been badly frayed. Because the damage appeared to be different than that seen on other wreckage pieces, an attempt to recover the door was made by CCGS John Cabot. Shortly after the wreckage broke clear of the water, the area of the door to which the lift cable was attached broke free from the cargo door, and the wreckage settled back onto the sea bed. An attempt to relocate the door was unsuccessful." "This damage was different from that seen on other wreckage pieces. A failure of this door in flight would explain the impact damage to the right wing areas. The door failing as an initial event would cause an explosive decompression leading to a downward force on the cabin floor as a result of the

difference in pressure between the upper and lower portions of the aircraft." 2.11.6.5 Target 47 - Aft Cargo Compartment This portion of the aft cargo compartment roller floor was located between BS 1600 and BS 1760. Based on the direction of cleat rotation on the skin panel (target 7) and the crossbeam displacement on this structure, target 47 moved aft in relation to the lower skin panel when it was detached from the lower skin. No other significant observation was noted. There was no evidence to indicate characteristics of an explosion emanating from the aft cargo compartment. Target 47, which is a portion of the aft cargo compartment roller floor, shows no indications characteristic of an explosion emanating from the aft cargo compartment."

The above quotes from the accident investigators indicate the explosion was not on the port side but on the starboard side and in the forward cargo compartment. The implications are that the inflight damage was on the starboard side and the port side was undamaged. The rear cargo compartment had no explosion from a bomb or otherwise.

Below is a layout of the staged bombs for the Bruntingthorpe experiment with standard container with bomb inside exploding on port side, shattering it but leaving the starboard side smooth and door intact and latched.

Deductions:

When the port side is smooth and starboard side opposite and near the cargo door is shattered, that means cargo door opened in flight and no bomb. That description fits Air India Flight 182, Pan Am Flight 103, United Airlines Flight 811, and TWA Flight 800. That evidence rules in ruptured open cargo door as initial event.

When port side is shattered and starboard side opposite and near cargo

door is smooth, that means bomb and no open cargo door. That description fits none. That evidence rules out bomb explosion.

The conclusions to be made from the above photographs is that for Air India Flight 182, Pan Am Flight 103, Pan Am Flight 103, and United Airlines Flight 811, the damage occurred on the starboard side near the forward cargo door leaving the port side smooth. That actually did happen and rules in the wiring/cargo door explanation. A bomb explosion on the port side, as in the Bruntingthorpe experiment and alleged for Air India Flight 182 and Pan Am Flight 103 would have shattered the port side and left the starboard side smooth. That did not happen, but the reverse did, thus ruling out the bomb explosion explanation and confirming the wiring/cargo door explanation.

Part VII: Layperson Explanation

One excuse I am given by those unwilling to evaluate the hard evidence that supports the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182 is that it is 'too technical'.

Well, it's not too technical; below is the explanation for laypersons who have a basic education in science. If a person knows why lightning strikes, why balloons pop, the power of wind, and why gravity pulls, then that person can understand what happened to Air India Flight 182.

Lightning Strikes

Balloon Pops

Wind Power

Gravity Pulls

Lightning strikes because of an imbalance between the negative electrically charged particles and the further away positively charged particles. When sufficient negative and positive charges gather, and

when the electric field becomes sufficiently strong, an electrical discharge (the bolt of lightning) occurs within clouds or between clouds and the ground. Lightning occurs because the bottom of a thundercloud becomes negatively charged. The ground becomes positively charged. Simple physics says that opposite charges attract, so boom, the lightning takes a one way trip to the closest positively charged item- usually a tree, phone pole, or other high object.

In a Boeing 747 the opening and closing of the cargo doors is done by an electric current through a latching or unlatching motor controlled by a switch. When the switch is open/off, there is no current to turn the motor which would turn the latching cams around the latching pins. When the switch is closed/on the circuit between the negatively charged particles and the positively charged is closed and current flows through the resistive motor which turns torque tubes which turn cams to surround pins which closes and holds the door tight against the fuselage.

When the aircraft is airborne a switch is opened/off which prevents any current from inadvertently turning on the cargo door unlatch motor. There is no way to turn on the unlatch motor to open the cargo door from inside the cockpit.

However, when faulty wiring such as Poly X type, which was used in Air India Flight 182, chafes and cracks to bare wire to short on the metal fuselage, the voltage has a path to complete the circuit and the lightning strikes; that is, the safety feature of a switch is bypassed and the now flowing current turns on the cargo door unlatch motor. The imbalance between the charged electrons which was held steady by the safety switch is now allowed to discharge/equalize through the shorted wire through the resistive motor which turns on as it is supposed to do when receiving current. The latching cams now turn around the latching pins

into the unlock/unlatch direction thus releasing their hold on the closed cargo door. The faulty wire which allowed the motor to turn on when it was supposed to stay off was installed during manufacture of the aircraft. The defective wiring is a manufacturing error.

The bare wire shorted on the cargo door unlatch motor which turned the cams to the unlatch position. Lightning struck and the unlatch motor turned on and started to allow the cargo door to open in flight.

Balloon pops:

Air tends to move in a straight line from a high-pressure area to a low pressure area. As balloons reach maximum expansion they get to a point where the latex runs out of stretch and gets stiff and resists further stretching. This is obvious in a fresh, over inflated balloon. It will become stiffer and get very rigid as all the latex molecules all become oriented in the tensile stress directions. This increase in stiffness will cause balloons, unlike soap bubbles, to increase in internal air pressure just before bursting.

Even small balloons like nine inch rounds can produce a very big bang if they are strong high quality balloons and are blown up to the limit. They can develop fantastically high tensions. Of course a larger balloon blown up to a similar extreme tension all over would make an even bigger bang.

The hull of a Boeing 747 such as Air India Flight 182 can be considered a huge balloon when pressurized. As the aircraft climbs the air molecules outside are further apart and have less pressure than those that were inside the aircraft at takeoff. If the aircraft is not pressurized, the air molecules inside and outside the aircraft are the same and there is no differential. The hull is not inflated and there would be no inside high pressure trying to equalize with the outside lower pressure.

But the hull of the Boeing 747 in flight with crew and passengers aboard can not remain unpressurized as the air would be too thin to sustain life so oxygenated air is pumped into the hull and the balloon/hull inflates. There now exists a distance difference between the air molecules inside the aircraft to those outside of the airplane. There is an imbalance. There is now pressure to equalize the air molecules but the sealed metal fuselage skin prevents the equalization. The hull stays inflated.

As the plane climbs higher, the pressure inside is kept constant at a comfortable level for the passengers while the pressure outside continues to decline the higher the aircraft goes. When the aircraft is about 20000 feet, the pressure on the inside of the fuselage is about 3.5 PSI or pounds per square inch. At cruise altitude of about 31000 feet, the pressure on each square inch on the inside of the inflated balloon called the hull is 8.9 PSI.

The Boeing 747 has two cargo doors 110 by 99 inches in size. The pressure on the cargo doors of Air India Flight 182 when cruising at 31000, when the initial event occurred, was 96921 pounds pressing on each of the nine foot by eight foot doors held in place only by a long hinge, eight rotating lower latching cams around latching pins and two midspan rotating latching cams around latching pins.

An analogy: Imagine a large under inflated balloon with no holes in it. Then cut six small holes in the balloon and two large square holes. Then, if you could, put patches over the six small holes from the inside of the balloon so that when the balloon is inflated, the inside high pressure would press the patch tighter into the balloon and seal the hole tighter. That is called a 'plug type' patch. But....then put patches over the two large square cut holes on the outside of the balloon so that when the balloon is inflated, the high air pressure inside the balloon presses

against the outside patch to push it outward. That is called a 'non plug type' patch.

Another analogy for the patch is a band aid wound dressing on an arm. The arm has the cut hole/wound and the patch is the band aid to stop the bleeding wound. A band aid on the inside of the arm would be more effective but impractical so band aids are put on the outside of the arm and often are pulled off inadvertently.

Air India Flight 182 has those several small holes cut into the pressurized hull and then patched from the inside. They are called plug type passenger doors. When airborne and at altitude, those passenger entry and exit doors can not be opened in flight because the inside air pressure presses them tight against the metal fuselage. Only if the pilot depressurizes the inside of the hull can those doors be opened, such as on the ground. The wounds are small and the band aid is sufficient to stop the bleeding since the patch is in the inside and the blood pressure actually prevents bleeding.

However, the two huge cargo doors which were cut from the metal fuselage and then patched back are non-plug type. It's as if they are patched from the outside so that as the inside pressure grows higher and the outside pressure goes lower, the pressure differential increases and about 97000 pounds of air presses on the eight by nine foot door to burst it open. The door does not press on the inside of the fuselage tighter because it is not a plug type. The only things holding the door closed are the hinge and the ten latches around the ten latch pins. The latch cams are not told to unlatch in flight because there is no current to the unlatch motor. The non plug cargo doors are a design error; they should be plug type. The wounds are large and the band aid is not sticky enough to stop the bleeding as the blood pressure pushes outward.

A hull rupture in flight can be a catastrophic event so safety efforts are made to prevent its occurrence. As the cams are turned around the pins,

a locking sector is then manually placed against the latch pin to prevent the inadvertent unlatching should electrical current turn the unlatch motor on. The locking sector would stop the cam from turning to the open position and the unlatch motor would burn itself out trying.

However, while the lower eight latches have eight locking sectors as a safety measure, the two midspan latches have no locking sectors at all. That is another design error; the midspan latches need locking sectors similar to the eight lower ones. The band aid over the wound was too small.

(As it turns out, years after Air India Flight 182 crashed, it was shown that the eight locking sectors themselves were too weak to stop the cams from unlatching when the unlatch motor did in fact inadvertently receive power and the door unlatched in flight; United Airlines Flight 811. The eight locking sectors were then strengthened but the midspan latches had no locking sectors to strengthen.)

For Air India Flight 182, the faulty bare wire shorted on the power for the cargo door unlatch motor which turned the cams to the unlatch position after bypassing the safety switch. The eight lower latching cams overrode the weak lower eight locking sectors. Just past dead center of the pins the 97000 pounds of internal pressure finally popped the balloon of a pressurized hull at the forward cargo door. The result was an explosive decompression which occurred in an instant. Explosive decompression is an aviation term used to mean a sudden and rapid loss of cabin pressurization.

The sudden and powerful rushing out of the higher pressure air inside the pressurized hull of Air India Flight 182 mimicked a bomb in sound and fury. The sound of the explosion was so loud it was picked up on the cockpit voice recorder. The forward cargo door split into two parts and burst apart as it tore out and up taking further fuselage skin with it. The contents of the forward cargo hold were blown out and into the nearby

starboard engines number three and four causing foreign object damage to the nacelles and turbine blades inside the engines. The ensuing hole in the starboard side of the fuselage forward of the wing centered around the forward cargo door of Air India Flight 182 in the wreckage reconstruction below was now about thirty feet tall and twenty feet wide, target 204 and cross hatch skin above it.

The manufacturing flaw of installing defective wiring had exploited the design flaw of a non plug door coupled with the design flaw of no locking sectors on the mid span latches allowing the door to inadvertently open in flight causing a massive explosive decompression which created a huge hole in the nose of Air India Flight 182.

Lightning struck and the unlatch motor turned on. The balloon popped when the forward cargo door unlatched and ruptured open.

Wind Power:

From the CVR and DFDR, AI 182 was proceeding normally en route from Montreal to London at an altitude of 31,000 feet and an indicated airspeed of 296 knots when the cockpit area microphone detected a sudden loud sound: 296 knots is 341 miles per hour or 549 km/h.

If the newly created huge hole in the nose of Air India Flight 182 had occurred while the aircraft were motionless in the calm air, the nose would have stayed on and the aircraft would not have broken up in flight. However, the wind force on the now compromised formerly streamlined hull was higher than any natural wind on earth.

Category V Hurricane, Catastrophic >155 mph

Shrubs and trees blown down and uprooted; considerable damage to roofs of all buildings; all signs down. Very severe and extensive damage

to windows and doors. Complete failure of roofs on several residences and industrial buildings. Extensive shattering of glass from pressure variation and blown debris. Some complete building failures. Smaller buildings are overturned or destroyed. Complete destruction of mobile homes.

F3 Tornado, Fujita Scale 3 158-206 mph, strongly built schools, homes, and businesses have outside walls blown away; weaker homes completely swept away,

F4 Tornado, Fujita Scale 4 207-260 mph, strongly built homes have all interior and exterior walls blown apart; cars thrown 300 yards or more in the air

F5 Tornado, Fujita Scale 5 261-318 mph, strongly built homes are completely blown away

An intact egg is strong when pressed on its small end but after the shell is cracked, the strength is gone and it crumbles. So it was with Air India Flight 182.

The wind force of 341 miles per hour tore the gashed nose off which fell first in the debris pattern on the ocean floor. The wind force tore into the rest of the tubular, now unpressurized hull, and ruptured open the rest of the fuselage and other compartments. The debris was blown aft and hit the starboard wing and stabilizer causing inflight damage. The engines and wings came off and mixed with the rest of the disintegrating aircraft.

Lightning struck and the unlatch motor turned on. The balloon popped when the forward cargo door unlatched and ruptured open. The enormous wind power tore the nose off and disintegrated the rest of the aircraft.

Gravity grabs.

Gravity is one of four known fundamental forces of nature. Gravity is by

far the weakest of the four, yet it dominates on the scale of large space objects. Gravity cannot be shielded in any way. Intervening objects, whatever their make-up, have no effect whatsoever on the attraction between two separated objects.

If Air India Flight 182 were in far outer space the thousands of broken parts would just float around but those debris pieces were affected by the gravity of Earth and caused the aircraft parts to flutter down to the sea and further down to the ocean floor 6500 feet under the water surface.

Lightning struck and the unlatch motor turned on. The balloon popped when the forward cargo door unlatched and ruptured open. The enormous wind tore the nose off and disintegrated the rest. Gravity pulled the pieces downward to the bottom of the ocean.

Lightning Struck
Balloon Popped
Wind Powered
Gravity Pulled

Part VIII: Template:

If the DNA can be used as an analogy for specific evidence discovered for one event and that specific evidence is matched in another event, it can be said the DNA matches.

United Airlines Flight 811 below:

"Executive Summary from USA NTSB AAR 92/02 of March 1992:
On February 24, 1989, United Airlines flight 811, a Boeing 747-122,

experienced an explosive decompression as it was climbing between 22,000 and 23,000 feet after taking off from Honolulu, Hawaii, en route to Sydney, Australia with 3 flightcrew, 15 flight attendants, and 337 passengers aboard.

The airplane made a successful emergency landing at Honolulu and the occupants evacuated the airplane. Examination of the airplane revealed that the forward lower lobe cargo door had separated in flight and had caused extensive damage to the fuselage and cabin structure adjacent to the door. Nine of the passengers had been ejected from the airplane and lost at sea.

A year after the accident, the Safety Board was uncertain that the cargo door would be located and recovered from the Pacific Ocean. The Safety Board decided to proceed with a final report based on the available evidence without the benefit of an actual examination of the door mechanism. The original report was adopted by the Safety Board on April 16, 1990, as NTSB/AAR-90/01.

Subsequently, on July 22, 1990, a search and recovery operation was begun by the U.S. Navy with the cost shared by the Safety Board, the Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing Aircraft Company, and United Airlines. The search and recovery effort was supported by Navy radar data on the separated cargo door, underwater sonar equipment, and a manned submersible vehicle. The effort was successful, and the cargo door was recovered in two pieces from the ocean floor at a depth of 14,200 feet on September 26 and October 1, 1990.

Before the recovery of the cargo door, the Safety Board believed that the door locking mechanisms had sustained damage in service prior to the accident flight to the extent that the door could have been closed and appeared to have been locked, when in fact the door was not fully latched. This belief was expressed in the report and was supported by the evidence available at the time. However, upon examination of the

door, the damage to the locking mechanism did not support this hypothesis. Rather, the evidence indicated that the latch cams had been backdriven from the closed position into a nearly open position after the door had been closed and locked. The latch cams had been driven into the lock sectors that deformed so that they failed to prevent the back-driving.

Thus, as a result of the recovery and examination of the cargo door, the Safety Board's original analysis and probable cause have been modified. This report incorporates these changes and supersedes NTSB/AAR-90/01.

The issues in this investigation centered around the design and certification of the B-747 cargo doors, the operation and maintenance to assure the continuing airworthiness of the doors, cabin safety, and emergency response.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the sudden opening of the forward lower lobe cargo door in flight and the subsequent explosive decompression. The door opening was attributed to a faulty switch or wiring in the door control system which permitted electrical actuation of the door latches toward the unlatched position after initial door closure and before takeoff. Contributing to the cause of the accident was a deficiency in the design of the cargo door locking mechanisms, which made them susceptible to deformation, allowing the door to become unlatched after being properly latched and locked. Also contributing to the accident was a lack of timely corrective actions by Boeing and the FAA following a 1987 cargo door opening incident on a Pan Am B-747. As a result of this investigation, the Safety Board issued safety recommendations concerning cargo doors and other nonplug doors on pressurized transport category airplanes, cabin safety, and emergency response." The first probable cause was incorrect so the NTSB issued another AAR based upon new evidence. The same can be done by TSB Air for Air India Flight 182 based upon the subsequent new evidence. I have had

the benefit of hindsight to research all Boeing 747 hull losses for matches to the evidence retrieved regarding Air India Flight 182. There have been five matches, including Air India Flight 182. All are controversial while United Airlines Flight 811 is the only aircraft that was able to land after the shorted switch or wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup occurred. The DNA evidence and probable cause for United Airlines Flight 811 is irrefutable.

In none of the five official investigations for Air India Flight 182 was United Airlines Flight 811 considered. For four of those investigations, United Airlines Flight 811 had not occurred yet; for the fifth, the attorneys and law enforcement agencies chose not to refer to it.

What happened to Air India Flight 182 happened to United Airlines Flight 811 and others. The cause of United Airlines Flight 811 is the same cause for Air India Flight 182. The sequence is the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation.

The linchpin DNA match to all five Boeing 747 accidents is the sudden loud sound on the Cockpit Voice Recorder followed by the abrupt power cut to the Flight Data Recorder. The CVR and FDR data is the only direct evidence available and it is the best.

NTSB AAR, United Airlines Flight 811:

"The CVR revealed normal communication before the decompression. At 0209:09:2 HST, a loud bang could be heard on the CVR. The loud bang was about 1.5 seconds after a "thump" was heard on the CVR for which one of the flightcrew made a comment. The electrical power to the CVR was lost for approximately 21.4 seconds following the loud bang. NTSB Accident Report 92-02 Page 25

CASB AOR, Air India Flight 182:

"From the CVR and DFDR, AI 182 was proceeding normally en route from Montreal to London at an altitude of 31,000 feet and an indicated airspeed of 296 knots when the cockpit area microphone detected a sudden loud sound. The sound continued for about 0.6 seconds, and then almost immediately, the line from the cockpit area microphone to the cockpit voice recorder at the rear of the pressure cabin was most probably broken. This was followed by a loss of electrical power to the recorder." Canadian Aviation Safety Board Air India 23 June 1985, page 21

Kirpal Report: "Mr. R.A. Davis, Head, Flight Recorder Section, Accidents Investigation Branch, Farnborough, U.K. 3.4.6.16 In conclusion, Mr. Davis reported as follows :- "It is considered that from the CVR and ATC recordings supplied for analysis, there is no evidence of a high explosive device having detonated on AI 182. There is strong evidence to suggest that a sudden explosive decompression occurred but the cause has not been identified. It must be concluded that without positive evidence of an explosive device from either the wreckage or pathological examinations, some other cause has to be established for the accident"

Premise Explanation for Air India Flight 182: Explosion in the forward cargo compartment caused by explosive decompression caused by structural failure of ruptured open forward cargo door at one or both of the midspan latches caused by faulty electrical wiring:

Analysis: There is close agreement with the opinions of the two aviation authorities (CASB and AAIB), the judicial finding of Judge Kirpal, and this independent aircraft accident investigator in the specific location in the aircraft and consequences of the explosion with the only difference being the cause of the explosion on the starboard side of the forward cargo compartment of Air India Flight 182:

A. CASB: There was an explosion, which could have been

a bomb explosion, on the starboard side of the forward cargo compartment near the forward cargo door which caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182.

B. AAIB: There was an explosion, cause not identified but not a bomb explosion, which caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182.

C. Justice Kirpal: There was an explosion, a bomb explosion, on the starboard side of the forward cargo compartment near the forward cargo door which caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182.

D. Justice Josephson: There was an explosion, a bomb explosion, on the port side of the aft cargo compartment opposite the aft cargo door which caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182.

E. John Barry Smith: There was an explosion, an explosive decompression when faulty wiring shorted on the forward cargo door unlatch motor which allowed one or both of the midspan latches to rupture open in the forward cargo door on the starboard side of the forward cargo compartment, which caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182.

F. Transportation Safety Board of Canada (Air): Yet to be asked for opinion.

To determine the pattern in early model Boeing 747 accidents that suffered breakups in flight, it was necessary to evaluate carefully all the official accident reports concerning them. A pattern was detected of similar significant evidence among only five of the over forty hull damages or losses, two of which are Air India Flight 182 and United Airlines Flight 811.

Summary of specific matching evidence between Air India Flight 182 and United Airlines Flight 811: (The DNA evidence listed below applies to both aircraft)

A. Boeing 747

- B. Early model
- C. Polyimide wiring (Poly X type)
- D. Sudden airframe breakup in flight
- E. Breakup occurs forward of the wing
- F. Section 41 retrofit not done
- G. At least medium flight time
- H. At least medium aged airframe
- I. Previous maintenance problems with forward cargo door
- J. Initial event at about 300 knots while proceeding normally in all parameters
- K. Initial event involves hull rupture in or near forward cargo door area
- L. Initial event starts with sudden sound
- M. Initial event sound is loud
- N. Initial event sound is audible to humans
- O. Initial event followed immediately by abrupt power cut to data recorders
- P. Initial event sound not matched to explosion of bomb sound
- Q. Initial event sound is matched to explosive decompression sound in wide body airliner
- R. Torn off skin on fuselage above forward cargo door area
- S. Evidence of explosion in forward cargo compartment
- T. Foreign object damage to engine or cowling of engine number three
- U. Foreign object damage to engine or cowling of engine number four
- V. Right wing leading edge damaged in flight
- W. Vertical stabilizer damaged in flight
- X. Right horizontal stabilizer damaged in flight
- Y. More severe inflight damage on starboard side than port side
- Z. Port side relatively undamaged by inflight debris
- AA. Vertical fuselage tear lines just aft and forward of the forward cargo door
- AB. Fracture/tear/rupture at a midspan latch of forward cargo door
- AC. Midspan latching status of forward cargo door not reported as latched
- AD. Airworthiness Directive 88-12-04 not implemented (stronger

lock sectors)

- AE. Outwardly peeled skin on upper forward fuselage
- AF. Rectangular shape of shattered area around forward cargo door
- AG. Forward cargo door fractured in two longitudinally
- AH. Status of aft cargo door as latched
- AI. Passengers suffered decompression type injuries
- AJ. At least nine missing and never recovered passenger bodies
- AK. Initial official determination of probable cause as bomb explosion.
- AL. Initial official determination modified from bomb explosion
- AM. Structural failure considered for probable cause
- AN. Inadvertently opened forward cargo door considered for probable cause
- AO. Takeoff after sunset on fatal flight
- AP. Takeoff after scheduled takeoff time on fatal flight

A few of the above matches may be common, trivial, or irrelevant but most are rare and critical.

The important DNA matches that determine the certainty that both aircraft:

1. Were similar model and type of early model Boeing 747s..
2. Had the same appearance for each longitudinally fractured forward cargo doors
3. Had sudden loud sounds which were an explosive decompression sound and not a bomb explosion sound.
4. Had an abrupt power cut to the flight data recorders after the sudden loud sound.
5. Had the same damaged areas around the forward cargo door.
6. Had relatively smooth fuselage skin on port side opposite the shattered starboard cargo door side.
7. Had similar inflight damage to the starboard engines and flight surfaces.

8. Had at least nine never recovered bodies.
9. Had explosions in the forward cargo compartment which were initially thought to have been bombs but the opinions were later somewhat modified.

There are many reasonable possible explanations for an explosion or explosive decompression near the forward cargo door of an early model Boeing 747, only one of which is a rare bomb explosion:

- A. Bomb explosion. (Considered for both, ruled out in one, should be ruled out for both.)
- B. Crew or passenger error. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- C. Electrical fault in switch or wiring. (Ruled in for one.)
- D. Pneumatic overpressure. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- E. Cargo shift. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- F. Compressed air tank explosion. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- G. Fire. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- H. Missile strike. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- I. Midair collision. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- J. Fuel tank explosion. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- K. Stowaway. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- L. Electromagnetic interference. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- M. Comet or meteor. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- N. Space debris. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- O. Turbulence. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- P. Out of rig door. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- Q. Lightning. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- R. Metal fatigue. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- S. Improperly latched. (Initially accepted for one flight, then ruled out for both flights.)
- T. Design error. (Accepted for one flight)
- U. Repair error. (Ruled out for both flights.)
- V. Maintenance error. (Ruled out for both flights.)

General Conclusion: Based upon the indisputable probable cause of electrical fault for United Airlines Flight 811 and the many matches of evidence to Air India Flight 182, the discovered common cause for United Airlines Flight 811 and Air India Flight 182 is the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation which is a mechanical explanation for an explosion on the starboard side in the forward cargo compartment of explosive decompression when the forward cargo door ruptured open in flight, probably at one or both of the midspan latches and probably caused by faulty wiring inadvertently turning on the door unlatch motor.

Specific Conclusions for Air India Flight 182:

These conclusions are based on evidence available after 1985.

A. While proceeding normally, an inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182 occurred suddenly and catastrophically at 0714Z at 31000 feet at 300 knots TAS about 110 miles west of Cork, Ireland on 23 June, 1985. There were no survivors.

B. The breakup was caused by an explosion in the forward cargo compartment.

C. The explosion was a severe and sudden explosive decompression.

D. The explosive decompression was caused by the suddenly ruptured open forward cargo door probably at one or both of the midspan latches.

E. The ruptured open forward cargo door was probably caused by faulty wiring which turned on the door unlatch motor which unlatched the latching cams from around the latching pins in flight.

F. The wiring fault was probably the Poly X wiring with inferior insulation which easily cracked to bare wire especially in the presence of moisture.

G. There was no bomb explosion in any cargo compartment, crew cabin, passenger cabin, or anywhere else on the aircraft.

H. There was no explosion from any source in the aft cargo

compartment.

I. The sudden loud sound on the cockpit voice recorder was the sound of the air rushing out during the explosive decompression in the forward cargo compartment.

J. The abrupt power cut to the recorders was caused by the explosive effects of the decompression affecting the power cables in the adjacent main equipment compartment to the forward cargo compartment.

Contributing causes:

A. Water or moisture in the forward cargo compartment.

B. Weak locking sectors on the bottom eight latches of the cargo doors.

C. Poor design of one midspan latch per each eight foot side of the cargo doors.

D. Poor design of no locking sector for each midspan latch of the cargo doors.

E. Poor design of outward opening, nonplug type, large, square cargo doors in a highly pressurized hull.

There were no bombs on Air India Flight 182. There were no crimes and no criminals and no conspiracies. There was and is a mechanical problem which exists to this day, aging and failing Poly X wiring which exploits design errors of non plug cargo doors and omitted midspan locking sectors allowing an explosive decompression when the forward cargo door ruptures open in flight.

To know the cause of Air India Flight 182 and Pan Am Flight 103, one must know the details of United Airlines Flight 811, the model and irrefutably explained event. All of those official AARs are available at <http://ntsb.org>.

Part IX: The Unifying Official Version

There is one scenario that unites the five official versions: Bombs in

baggage explode.

1. The first official determination is the Narita Event is from the Japanese police point of view.

"At 0541 GMT, 23 June 1985, CP Air Flight 003 arrived at Narita Airport, Tokyo, Japan, from Vancouver. At 0619 GMT a bag from this flight exploded on a baggage cart in the transit area of the airport within an hour of the Air India occurrence. Two persons were killed and four were injured... Baggage cart explodes in transit area... The explosion of a bag from CP 003 at Narita Airport, Tokyo, took place 55 minutes before the AI 182 accident...the site where the blast had taken place was inspected which gave some, though very vague, idea of the detonating power of the blast."

To sum up: "A bag from a Vancouver flight exploded on a baggage cart in a transit area from a vague power of a blast."

The Narita Event is officially determined by the police to be a bomb which caused the blast of vague power in a bag as part of the baggage on a baggage cart in a transit area of a major airport hub. The first official bomb in the baggage explodes.

2. The next official determination of the Air India Flight 182 Event is from an Indian judge's point of view.

Kirpal Report: "4.10 After going through the entire record we find that there is circumstantial as well as direct evidence which directly points to the cause of the accident as being that of an explosion of a bomb in the forward cargo hold of the aircraft."

"All cargo doors were found intact and attached to the fuselage structure, except for the forward cargo door which had some fuselage and cargo floor attached. This door, located on the forward right side of the aircraft, was broken horizontally about one-quarter of the distance above the lower frame. The damage to the door and the fuselage skin

near the door appeared to have been caused by an outward force. The fractured surface of the cargo door appeared to have been badly frayed. Because the damage appeared to be different from that seen on other wreckage pieces,..."

The Air India Flight 182 Event is officially determined by an Indian judge to be caused by a bomb in the baggage in the forward cargo hold possibly on the right side. (No physical connection between the forward and aft cargo holds which are several hundred feet apart.) That is the second official bomb in the baggage to explode.

3. The next official determination of the Air India Flight 182 Event is from a Canadian judge's point of view.

Below from "Reasons for Judgment" by Justice Josephson regarding Malik and Bagri.

I. Overview [1] In the early morning hours of June 23, 1985, Air India Flight 182, carrying 329 people[1], was destroyed mid-flight by a bomb located in its rear cargo hold.

H. Conclusion [190] It is agreed amongst the experts that the Kanishka was destroyed by the detonation of an explosive device within its left aft fuselage.

The Air India Flight 182 Event is officially determined by a Canadian judge to be a bomb in the baggage in the rear cargo hold on the left side. That is the third official bomb in the baggage to explode.

4. The next official determination of the Air India Flight 182 Event is from the Canadian aviation accident investigators point of view:

The Canadian Aviation Safety Board respectfully submits as follows:

4.1 Cause-Related Findings

5. There is considerable circumstantial and other evidence to indicate that the initial event was an explosion occurring in the forward cargo compartment.

"The forward cargo door which had some fuselage and cargo floor attached was located on the sea bed. The door was broken horizontally about one-quarter of the distance above the lower frame. The damage to the door and the fuselage skin near the door appeared to have been caused by an outward force and the fracture surfaces of the door appeared to be badly frayed. This damage was different from that seen on other wreckage pieces. A failure of this door in flight would explain the impact damage to the right wing areas. The door failing as an initial event would cause an explosive decompression leading to a downward force on the cabin floor as a result of the difference in pressure between the upper and lower portions of the aircraft."

The Air India Flight 182 Event is officially determined by Canadian aviation accident investigators to be an explosion of unknown cause in the forward cargo compartment probably on the right side. An explosion in the forward cargo compartment occurs from undetermined cause.

5. The next official determination for Air India Flight 182 is from the United Kingdom aircraft accident investigator point of view.

"Mr. R.A. Davis, Head, Flight Recorder Section, Accidents Investigation Branch, Farnborough, U.K. 3.4.6.16 In conclusion, Mr. Davis reported as follows :- "It is considered that from the CVR and ATC recordings supplied for analysis, there is no evidence of a high explosive device having detonated on AI 182. There is strong evidence to suggest that a sudden explosive decompression occurred but the cause has not been identified. It must be concluded that without positive evidence of an explosive device from either the wreckage or pathological examinations, some other cause has to be established for the accident".

The Air India Flight 182 Event is officially determined by a British aviation accident investigator to be something, not a bomb, somewhere, causes an explosive decompression. That is the fifth explanation for an explosion.

Those are the five official determinations of explosions related to Air

India Flight 182 by five official investigations in three countries over two decades.

1. A vaguely powerful explosion of a bag on a baggage cart with bags in a major transit area hub airport determined by the Japanese police in 1985.
2. A very powerful explosion of a bomb in a bag in the baggage in the forward cargo hold, possibly on the right side, of Air India Flight 182 determined by the Indian Justice Kirpal in 1986.
3. A very powerful explosion of a bomb in a bag in the baggage in the rear cargo hold on the left side of Air India Flight 182 determined by the Canadian Justice Josephson, in 2005.
4. An explosion of unknown cause in the forward cargo compartment, probably on the right side, of Air India Flight 182 determined by the Canadian aircraft accident investigators of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board, CASB in 1986.
5. A very powerful explosive decompression, not a bomb, someplace in Air India Flight 182, determined by the British aircraft accident investigator R. A. Davis of U.K. Accidents Investigations Branch in 1986.

There is no consensus on any significant issue by any officials other than explosive events occurred on a baggage cart and on an airplane thousands of miles apart and within the hour.

There is official disagreement in the determinations of whether it was a bomb or something else, how many bombs were involved, where the bombs were loaded, how powerful the bombs were, what container the bomb was in, which major section of the aircraft the bomb was placed, on what side of the aircraft the bomb was located, or what caused an explosive decompression that was not a bomb. (Not counted are the disagreements of who put the bombs there and why.)

There was no official hard evidence determined for bombs such as three fuses, three bomb casings, three bomb residues, shrapnel wounds, or

three timers in any of the three locations stated as having bombs detonated which are the Narita airport, the rear cargo, and the forward cargo compartments of Air India Flight 182. (The rear and forward cargo compartments are hundreds of feet apart with no physical connection.)

There is one official cause to unite them all: Three bombs by assuming that an explosion means only one thing and that is bomb explosion and assuming that official determinations after official investigations are correct.

The one scenario that unites the five official determinations is that bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom.

Two of the bombs were surreptitiously placed on two Boeing 747s at Vancouver airport on 22 June 1985, the day before they blew up. The third bomb was placed into one of the Boeing 747s at the Montreal airport later that same day.

The official versions united:

Bomb 1: One bomb was loaded on CP 003 which flew to Tokyo with no detonation of the bomb during the long flight across the Pacific. This bomb was then unloaded in a busy airport, put on a baggage cart which was wheeled through a 'transit' area with many other bags from many other flights, and only then did the vaguely powerful bomb detonate at 0619Z, not from an altimeter fuze but from a timing fuze which went off when it was not supposed to for an aircraft terrorist bombing. No fuze or parts of any bomb or the suitcase were reported to have been discovered. No match of any debris parts of this bomb were made to other bombs by same terrorist group. No claims of responsibility or confessions were obtained. (The Japanese police determined bomb.)

Bomb 2: At the same time the Narita bomb was loaded at Vancouver

onto CP 003 on the afternoon of 22 June 1985, another bomb was loaded onto CP 060, also in Vancouver, and successfully slipped past the extensive security of men, dogs, and machines. CP 060 then flew to Toronto without the bomb going off by timer or altimeter fuse. At Toronto, the bomb was then off loaded from CP 060 and sent, along with some passengers, to a different aircraft, a Boeing 747 which was Flight 181 which, after another flight to Montreal, would change to Flight 182. At Toronto, all the baggage from Vancouver on CP 060, including the bomb, was placed in the aft cargo hold of the Boeing 747. This aircraft, called Flight 181, took off and flew to Montreal with the bomb still not detonating by altimeter or timing fuze. The timer was set to go off at 0714Z. (The Judge Josephson determined bomb.)

Bomb 3: After the Boeing 747 called Flight 181 landed in Montreal with the bomb from Vancouver still in the aft cargo hold, the flight number of the same Boeing 747 changed to Air India Flight 182, and more passengers and baggage were put on board. All their baggage was placed into the forward cargo hold. A new aircraft bomb was thus loaded into the forward cargo compartment with the timer set to go off at 0714Z. (The Judge Kirpal determined bomb.)

There were many delays involved with loading parts of a large engine into the aft cargo compartment which did not set off the bomb in that compartment. Finally, the aft and forward cargo compartment bomb laden Boeing 747 now called Air India Flight 182 took off from Montreal for its third flight in many hours, flew for five hours across the Atlantic and then a fuze for the Montreal loaded bomb activated and exploded in the forward cargo compartment, not by an altimeter fuze because the aircraft was level at 31000 feet and had been so for hours, but by a timer fuze. The Vancouver bomb, first loaded in Vancouver and transferred to the aft cargo compartment of the doomed aircraft in Toronto, detonated at exactly the same time, 0714Z. The two bombs blew holes in the pressurized hull causing an explosive decompression.

Thus explains and unites the Japanese police bomb, the Justice Kirpal bomb, the Justice Josephson bomb, the CASB explosion, and the UK AIB explosive decompression events.

The official determinations assume inefficient ticketing agents, dull-witted security forces, and malfunctioning X ray machines in four large metropolitan airports in two industrialized nations. It assumes incompetent terrorists who can't set a bomb to go off on time. It assumes quiet bombs in an aircraft that leave no sound when they go off. It assumes three stealthy bombs that managed to slip through sniffing dogs, portable metal detectors, X-Ray machines, private security teams, and yet leave no trace of their fuzes, timers, explosive material, or containers.

Officially the terrorists were of two groups; one group in Vancouver to check the bomb in the baggage which was placed in the aft cargo compartment of Air India Flight 182 to explode according to the Canadian judge. Another terrorist group in Montreal checked their bomb in baggage which was placed in the forward cargo compartment of Air India Flight 182 to explode there according to the Indian judge. The Vancouver terrorist group also checked in another bomb in the baggage of another aircraft to explode later on a baggage cart at Narita airport, according to the Indian judge.

The terrorists were stupid because:

1. The bombs did not go off when a real aircraft bomb usually goes off, shortly after takeoff climb on the initially loaded flight.
2. The fuzes were three timers set to go off at odd times such as 0619, 0714, and 0714 many hours later after being set.
3. They did not claim responsibility to advertise their cause.

The terrorists were smart because:

1. They were able to construct bombs which left no fuse, no casings, no timer evidence and were silent.
2. They were able to smuggle three bombs through tight security at four

large airports in two countries.

3. They coordinated two bomb explosions on the same aircraft loaded in different locations at two airports to ensure destruction.

The terrorists were lucky because;

1. The four takeoffs and landings and turbulence did not detonate the amateur improvised bombs.

2. The changing of two planes and movement of baggage from plane to transit area did not detonate the bombs.

3. Their bomb laden baggage was not misplaced or misdirected by the airline.

4. The many unexpected schedule delays and aircraft changes still allowed the bombs to go off to kill innocent people instead of in an unoccupied hangar or baggage storage area.

This is the official unified motive to explain the Narita airport transit area and Air India Flight 182 bombings: Revenge seeking terrorist groups managed to place three stealthy bombs in three aircraft and on one baggage cart through four airports in one day.

Part X: Sequence of Destruction

Below is the scientific explanation for Air India Flight 182 in narrative form based on direct, circumstantial, tangible, deduced, historical, and inferred evidence obtained through government aircraft accident reports and testimony under oath, 1953-2006. All statements of fact can be corroborated as having occurred in Air India Flight 182 or other similar Boeing 747s under similar circumstances.

Pressurized hulls of jet airliners have been blowing up since 1953 with the Comet.

03/03/1953

location: Karachi, Pakistan

carrier: Canadian Pacific flight:

aircraft: comet registry:
aboard: fatal: 11 ground:
details: First fatal crash of a commercial jet aircraft

05/02/1953

location: near Jagalogori West Bengal, India
carrier: British Overseas Airlines flight: 783/057
aircraft: De Havilland comet 1 registry: g-alyv
aboard: 43 fatal: 43 ground:
details: broke up in flight during a violent thunderstorm. Metal fatigue due to design flaw.

01/10/1954

location: Elba, Italy
carrier: British Overseas Airlines flight:
aircraft: De Havilland comet 1 registry:
aboard: fatal: 35 ground:
details: broke up in flight. Metal fatigue due to design flaw.

04/08/1954

location: stromboli, italy
carrier: South African Airways flight:
aircraft: De Havilland comet 1 registry:
aboard: fatal: 21 ground:
details: broke up in flight. Metal fatigue due to design flaw.

The Wiring/Cargo Door Explanation

Hull ruptures in flight leading to sudden explosive decompressions have occurred in over fifty airliners over the years. The causes can be bombs, metal fatigue, cargo shifts, inadvertent door openings from improperly latched to electrical faults, cockpit windows being broken by bird strikes, fuel tank explosion, missile hits, corrosion, faulty repair of damaged bulkhead, midair collisions, thunderstorms, and improperly

fitted pressure relief valves.

Air India Flight 182 fits into one of those categories, the shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup one.

There are literally hundreds of pressurization problems that occur in airliners that are not sudden explosions but slow failures. These events rarely lead to fatalities while the sudden loud events usually do.

In an historical and statistical sense Air India Flight 182 was a normal aircraft accident: The cause was mechanical and not unusual. There have been several subsequent explosive decompressions in Boeing 747s similar to Air India Flight 182 that left similar evidence.

The forward cargo door of Air India Flight 182 opened inadvertently in flight for certain, the cause of that opening was probably faulty wiring.

Background:

On 18 July, 1984 a high lift vehicle damaged the fuselage skin near the forward cargo door of a Boeing 747-237B, Air India Flight 182, construction number 330, operated by Air India airlines. The fuselage skin had wiring routed on the inside which became bent from the impact and subsequently cracked to bare wire, a characteristic of the polyimide type insulated Poly X wiring installed in the aircraft. The forward cargo door had non-steel locking sectors to keep the bottom eight latching cams from being back driven which would allow the door to open in flight causing explosive decompression which would be a catastrophic event well known to aircraft designers.

In June of 1986 several passengers changed their flight plans and their baggage routing for various flights through Canada to overseas destinations probably from Vancouver.

On 22 June, 1986, two aircraft had baggage loaded aboard them at the Vancouver B. C. airport; one flight was called CP 003 and the other CP 060. Flight 003 took off and flew uneventfully to the extremely busy Narita airport near Tokyo, Japan. After the baggage was unloaded from the flight, it was put on a baggage cart which was wheeled through a transit area of many other baggage carts containing many other bags from many other flights. An explosion of unspecified cause, unknown fuzing, unknown container, and unknown material occurred on the baggage cart which killed two people and injured others. The airport had high security because of previous terrorist attacks on it resulting in fatalities over the years.

The other flight, CP 060, flew uneventfully to Toronto Airport. The baggage was unloaded from CP 060 and those bags continuing on to London on Air India Flight 181/182 were loaded into the aft cargo compartment of the Boeing 747-237B, construction number 330. The flight, now called Air India Flight 181, then flew uneventfully to Mirabel Airport in Montreal. After landing, some baggage of the departing passengers was unloaded from the aft compartment. Parts of a broken engine were placed in the aft cargo compartment for ferry back to India. New passengers and new baggage from Montreal for the next flight of the same aircraft, construction number 330 and now called Air India Flight 182, were loaded with all the new baggage going into the forward baggage compartment. The baggage from Vancouver on CP 060 and reloaded at Toronto remained in the aft cargo compartment of the Boeing 747-237B now called Air India Flight 182.

The forward cargo compartment was filled with summer night air, warm and moist. When flying at altitude the air would be cooled by the air conditioning and the very cold outside air would cool the fuselage skin thus condensing out moisture along the inside of the compartment which would run through the wiring bundles and down into the cargo door bilge.

Air India Flight 182 took off from Montreal for London at 0218 Z

on 23 June 1985 and flew uneventfully for about five hours and while at 31000 feet at 296 knots and about 115 miles west of Ireland a tragic sequence of events began at 0714 Z. The pressure differential between outside and inside air was at its maximum design limit, 8.9 pounds per square inch.

Water may have met the cracked insulated wire which may have been previously damaged by the high lift accident to the cargo door area. The now exposed and bare wire shorted against the metal fuselage. The electricity then flowed around safety cutout switches and powered on the cargo door actuator unlatch electric motor which attempted to rotate all ten cam sectors to unlocked positions around their ten latching pins. The eight lower cam sectors may have been prevented from unlatching around the latching pins because of the bottom eight locking sectors. However, the two midspan latches had no locking sectors to prevent the inadvertent rotation of the midspan latching cams around the midspan latching pins.

The lower eight cams probably overcame the weaker locking sectors to just turn past center and allow the door to unlatch in flight, a defect known years later in two other Boeing 747 flights, Pan Am Flight 125 and United Airlines Flight 811. The midspan cams turned just past center with no locking sectors to prevent the backdriving of the cams, an operation only supposed to be allowed on the ground. Possibly other factors such as an out of rig cargo door, a poor repair job on the door area, the slack in bellcranks, torque tubes, and worn latch pins may have contributed to have allowed the two midspan latches to rotate just past center permitting the almost 100,000 pounds of internal pressure on the 99 inch by 110 inch door to rupture outward in flight relieving the maximum pressure differential on the internal fuselage.

The nine foot by eight foot squarish forward cargo door would have instantly burst open at the midspan and bottom latches sending the latches, door material, and large pieces of fuselage skin spinning away.

The forward cargo compartment would have spewed its contents outward onto the starboard side of the fuselage. It was as if a huge mylar balloon had popped. The severe explosion of explosive decompression caused the forward cargo door to be fractured and shattered into a few large pieces and many small pieces which gave a frayed appearance from an outward force. Many small bits of metal from the explosion were embedded into the cargo door area metal fuselage structure.

The top part of the door swung outward and upward on its hinge and then separated taking large vertical pieces of fuselage skin with it, exposing stringers and bulkheads. The very lower part of the door sill with its eight bottom latches may have stuck to fuselage skin. The resulting damage zone appeared as a huge rectangle of shattered door, skin, and stringers. Some pieces of the door and fuselage skin flew directly aft and impacted the leading edge of the right wing, the vertical stabilizer and the right horizontal stabilizer inflight.

This explosion of explosive decompression blew out a large hole about thirty feet wide and forty feet high on the starboard side of the nose forward of the wing. It looked as if a bomb had gone off inside the forward cargo hold. Fuselage skin was peeled outward at various places on the starboard side of the nose.

The forward cargo door had some fuselage and cargo floor attached. This door, located on the forward starboard side of the aircraft, was broken horizontally about one-quarter of the distance above the lower frame. The damage to the door and the fuselage skin near the door appeared to have been caused by an outward force. The fractured surface of the cargo door appeared to have been badly frayed. The cargo door pieces and the adjacent skin had holes, flaps, fractures, inward concavity, tears, deformities, outward bent petals, curls, missing pieces, cracks, separations, curved fragments, spikes, and folds. The fast and powerful explosion of the explosive decompression would have caused a metallurgical effect called "twinning" on a few fragments of pieces

of wreckage.

The now uncompressed air molecules rushed out of the huge hole equalizing the high pressure inside the fuselage to the low pressure outside the aircraft while making a sudden very loud audible sound. This sudden rushing outward air was recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder as a sudden loud sound. The sound did not accurately match any bomb explosion sounds on other aircraft but did match the explosive decompression sound on another wide body airliner, a DC-10 cargo door open event.

The tremendous explosive force in the forward cargo hold severely disrupted the adjacent main equipment compartment which housed power cables and abruptly shut off power to the Flight Data Recorders. The resulting data tapes showed a sudden loud audible sound followed by an abrupt power cut to the flight data recorder, the cockpit voice recorder and transponder.

The number three engine and cowling, closest to the forward cargo compartment, were damaged by inflight debris from material ejected from the now exposed compartment and cabin above, debris which also damaged the number four engine cowling by a displaced turbine blade from number three engine. The resulting vibration from the internal damage to engine number three caused the nacelle and engine to fall away from the wing, as designed, and land apart from the other three engines.

The floor beams above the forward cargo hold were sucked downward, and were fractured and broken from the sudden decompression. The floor panels were stationary but gave the appearance of separating upward by the suddenly moving downward floor beams.

The flight attitude of the aircraft was askew to the left from reaction of explosive decompression from the right. Air rushed into the large hole

and weakened other skin and frames thus peeling skin further outward and rupturing the aft part of the aircraft to include the aft cargo compartment and the aft pressure bulkhead. There was no evidence of an explosion of any source in the aft cargo compartment.

The 296 knots of wind force pressed upon the weakened airframe and broke it in half amidships. This wind force was larger than any wind force the surface of the earth had ever experienced. The nose portion and wings tore off and landed in a dense debris heap apart from the debris field of the aft part.

The rest of the plane without the forward section suddenly decelerated from 296 knots and caused whiplash injuries to passengers. After the breakup, the passengers who were not wearing their seatbelts were scattered to far distances. They suffered explosion type injuries such as pieces of metal embedded in them from flying debris in the cabin. They were not burned because there was no fire nor explosion from a bomb explosion. The passengers had no other bomb explosion evidence. The passengers and crew were ejected from the disintegrating aircraft to tumble to the water and suffer upward impact physical damage to their bodies. Some remained in their seats and were trapped in the fuselage underwater. Some had decompression type injuries of hypoxia from the high altitude aircraft breakup.

The passengers fell to the sea and some floated and some sank. The baggage from Vancouver passengers and loaded into the aft cargo compartment fell to the sea and some floated and some sank. The baggage from Montreal passengers and loaded into the forward cargo compartment fell to the sea and some floated and some sank. The aircraft fell in pieces and some pieces floated and some sank.

The pilots may have been conscious for a few seconds and adjusted the trim controls out of habit. The communications radio may have been activated by the disturbances in the cockpit and transmitted for a few

seconds to air traffic control.

The port side forward of the wing was relatively smooth and undamaged from inflight debris while the starboard side forward of the wing was shattered, torn, and frayed at the ruptured cargo door area.

A few local fires appeared on the surface of the ocean from the jet kerosene fuel and singed some seat cushions and floating passengers.

All was quiet as the ground controllers tried to contact Air India Flight 182 as the flight crew did not respond to radio calls. Rescue teams were sent. Authorities became aware of the tragedy of 329 men, women, and children dying in a sudden plane crash.

Aftermath:

Explanations were sought as to what happened. Immediately the suggestion was made by authorities that a bomb explosion had caused the accident because of the sudden and catastrophic nature of the immediate evidence.

The Canadian aviation accident investigation authorities became involved since the aircraft had taken off from Canada and had many Canadian citizens aboard. Indian authorities became involved since the airline, Air India, has government ties. The Indian authorities quickly dismissed their aviation experts and assigned a Judge of the Court to oversee the investigation.

After a period of investigation, much of which was conducted to confirm the bomb explosion explanation and identify the culprits, the Indian judge made a finding in 1986 that a bomb in the forward cargo compartment had caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182 and ruled out any type of explosion in the aft cargo compartment.

After a period of investigation, during which the opinion of the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch representative of an explosive

decompression not caused by a bomb but a cause as yet to be determined was given, the Canadian Aviation Safety Board made a conclusion in 1986 that an explosion of unstated cause in the forward cargo compartment had caused the inflight breakup of Air India Flight 182 while also ruling out any explosion of any type in the aft cargo compartment.

The immediate finding by the Indians of a bomb explosion in the forward cargo compartment was accepted and remained the probable cause for Air India Flight 182 twenty one years later although subsequent accidents of a similar type aircraft in similar circumstances leaving similar evidence now resolutely contradicted that finding although confirming the Indian finding of an explosion on the starboard side of the forward cargo compartment and no explosion in the aft.

The Canadian probable cause of an explosion in the forward cargo compartment of an undetermined cause has been proven to be correct by subsequent accidents of a similar type aircraft in similar circumstances leaving similar evidence which do reveal the cause of the explosion: faulty wiring causing the forward cargo door to rupture open inflight at the latches leading to a tremendous explosion of explosive decompression causing Air India Flight 182 to totally breakup in flight.

In 2001 three men were arrested for involvement in the unproved bombing. One pled guilty on a bomb making charge and went to prison while denying any involvement with Air India Flight 182.

In 2005 two of the accused were found not guilty by a Canadian judge in British Columbia. The other man remains in prison and charged with perjury in that trial. The Canadian judge determined that an explosion occurred in the rear cargo compartment on the left side and the cause was a bomb. No explanations were offered to rebut the original findings of explosion in the forward cargo compartment on the right side and no explosion of any source in the aft cargo compartment.

In 2006 a Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 was appointed. The shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation was presented to the Commissioner at an open hearing on 19 July, 2006. Excerpts below:

Application for Standing presented by Mr. Smith: Mr. Smith: Thank you, Commissioner Major, for allowing me to supplement my written application for standing...I have an alternate explanation for Air India 182. It's a mechanical explanation. I'll go into some detail during my presentation and my detail will not be to persuade you that my explanation is correct but to persuade you that my research has depth and is worthy of being granted standing.

The Commissioner: Well, I don't think, Mr. Smith, that you need 15 minutes to persuade me of that. Here's the difficulty...You have an alternate theory. The alternate theory may over time prove to be correct. I don't know...but the Terms of Reference preclude our considering whether or not there was any cause for that explosion other than the bomb that is found by the Supreme Court of British Columbia.

Hindsight:

In 1985, when Air India Flight 182 suffered an inflight breakup from an explosion, it was believed that an explosive decompression in an early model Boeing 747 could not cause an abrupt power cut to the data flight recorders. That belief was cited by the Indian Kirpal Report as a reason to reject the explosive decompression explanation because, in fact, Air India Flight 182 had suffered an abrupt power cut to the data recorders. The Indian Kirpal Reports states: "It was not possible that any rapid decompression caused by a structural failure could have disrupted the entire electrical power supply from the MEC compartment." The later event of United Airlines Flight 811 showed that it was possible, and indeed, did happen, that an explosive decompression caused by a

structural failure could and did cause an abrupt electrical cutoff to the recorders.

The reason for the Indians in 1986 to rule out explosive decompression by structural failure was negated by the reality of United Airlines Flight 811 in 1989. If the Indians had the foreknowledge of United Airlines Flight 811 and the explosive decompression which cut off abruptly the power to the recorders, it is most probable they would have sustained the findings of the Canadians and the British who said that a explosion in the forward cargo compartment occurred and all would have then known the solution to the mystery posed by the AAIB investigator: "...but the cause has not been identified." The cause was identified in 1989 and demonstrated by United Airlines Flight 811 in NTSB AAR 92/02: The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the sudden opening of the forward lower lobe cargo door in flight and the subsequent explosive decompression.'

The evidence that was unavailable to the Air India Flight 182 CASB, AAIB, and Indian accident investigators in 1985 that became available in the ensuing 16 years that would have been invaluable in assisting them in determining the probable cause was:

- A. Evidence that an explosive decompression could cause an abrupt power cut to the data recorders.
- B. Evidence that floor panels can appear to separate upwards when in fact the floor beneath were pulled down.
- C. Testimony that twinning can occur in explosions other than bombs, such as an aviation fuel explosion, or explosive decompression.
- D. Evidence that the type of wiring installed, Poly-X, was defective in that it cracked to bare wire easily, especially in the presence of moisture.
- E. Visible ruptures in flight in forward cargo doors of other early model Boeing 747s that suffered the same events in flight.
- F. Several Airworthiness Directives for defects in and around the

forward cargo doors of Boeing 747s that if uncorrected could lead to inadvertent opening of the cargo door in flight leading to catastrophic explosive decompression.

The evidence that was available to the Air India Flight 182 CASB, AAIB, and Indian accident investigators in 1985 was such to lead them to conclude that an explosion had taken place on the starboard side in the forward cargo compartment which was picked up by the cockpit voice recorder and cut off the electrical power in the adjacent main electrical equipment compartment. The cause of the explosion was given as either unknown, structural failure of explosive decompression, or a bomb explosion. Since the event in 1989 with United Airlines Flight 811 had not happened yet, the understandable decision of the Indians, based on three assumptions later proven unreliable, was to state the cause of the explosion in the forward cargo compartment a bomb whilst the cautious Canadian CASB and the British AAIB left the cause unstated or unidentified.

Part XI: Political Implications

Mr. Brucker, if and when the substantiated mechanical explanation for Air India Flight 182 is confirmed by Crown experts in aircraft crashes (TSB Air investigators), the political consequences are very positive: (Assuming I'm a political amateur optimist)

1. The caution and prudence of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board of 1986 will be revealed; their findings were correct, there was an explosion in the forward cargo compartment of Air India Flight 182 with an electrical cause only apparent four years later with United Airlines Flight 811.
2. The RCMP and CSIS will be exonerated for their failure to catch their men because there were no men to catch. There was no bomb, there were no bombers, there was no conspiracy, there was no crime, there were no criminals; the small cause was faulty Poly-X wiring destroying a large machine, an early model Boeing 747.
3. The security of Canadian airports was intact and not penetrated

because there was no bomb placed in a CP aircraft leaving Vancouver, BC, which then passed through Montreal and Toronto airports.

4. The wisdom of the Canadian judicial system will be reaffirmed as represented by Justice Josephson who found the two accused not guilty because they were.

5 The tenacity and bravery of the Prime Minister to order an Inquiry that eventually would reveal the probable cause for the two decade old tragedy whilst knowing that official Inquiries sometimes answer key questions that remain unsolved, can help prevent future aircraft accidents, but can cause turbulent changes in attitude amongst the public.

6. A grand reduction in the amount of fear, suspicion, and hate among Canadian citizens against themselves, a religion, an airline, and law enforcement.

7. Closure for the families.

A pessimist might opine that acceptance of a mechanical explanation and rejection of the bomb conspiracy story would create disturbance in the minds of the citizens and cause unrest among the families and my reply would be, "That's why politicians and high officials get the respect, because they explain clearly and smooth upsets over to maintain the peace and prosperity of the state."

Part XII: Standing as witness before the Commission of Inquiry

I have fulfilled a Term of Reference and thus worthy of being granted standing because:

1. I have flown in Boeing 747s and about twenty other types of military and civilian aircraft during forty five years of aviation experience accumulating thousands of hours of flight time.

2. My crew duties have included pilot in command, co-pilot, navigator, bombardier, flight crew, mechanic, and owner.

3. I am a qualified nuclear weapon loading officer/bombardier which

means I know how to create, load, arm, deliver, and detonate nuclear weapons as well as conventional bombs.

4. I have dropped bombs.

5. I have investigated in depth the bombing of Air India Flight 182 and other explanations for the inflight breakup and have written a three hundred page aircraft accident report and built a thousand page website demonstrating a substantial interest. (Smith AAR for Air India Flight 182 and Exhibit S-18 in the Commission files)

6. I have been investigated by the RCMP, the Air India Task Force, and the security branch of Transport Canada during their investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182.

7. I am personally aware of a conflict between the RCMP and Transportation Safety Board of Canada which resulted in problems of effective cooperation which I believe adversely affected the investigation into the bombing of Air India Flight 182.

8. I have been in a sudden fiery fatal jet airplane crash and suffered lifelong injuries.

9. I have seen the fatal victim in that crash.

10. I have visited and discussed the crash with the surviving family members of the victim.

11. I have discovered a clear and present hazard to the security and safety of Canadian passengers flying in early model Boeing 747s such as Air India Flight 182. (The shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup hazard)

Summation

There were no bombs on Air India Flight 182. There were no crimes and no criminals and no conspiracies. There was and is a mechanical problem which exists to this day, aging and failing Poly X wiring which exploits design errors of non plug cargo doors and omitted midspan locking sectors allowing an explosive decompression when the forward cargo door ruptures open in flight.

Mr. Brucker, please check out this alternate explanation for the current bomb explosion one for Air India Flight 182. The alternative mechanical explanation with precedent warrants requests to Crown experts in technical matters (TSB (Air) investigators), and the Crown expert in inquiry (Commissioner Major of the Commission of Inquiry), for their opinions to assist you on a course of action to follow after their inquiries are complete. I can also help those agencies by being available to present the wiring/cargo door explanation to them in detail. Can you ask TSB (Air) for their professional opinions?

Can you set up a meeting with TSB (Air) investigators and me in Vancouver? I will go there to meet them.

Can you suggest to Commissioner Major that I be granted standing as a witness before him? It is in the best interest of the Commission of Inquiry to inquire into the wiring/cargo door explanation to fulfill the guidance given by the Prime Minister to conduct a full and thorough inquiry and also fulfill the Commissioner's stated goal of being very broad in the evidence that it heard, in order to put to rest the various theories, rumours and neglect that have occurred since the explosion in 1985.

On a personal note, I have read the law somewhat in my forty five years of adulthood. In my opinion, my readings of military law, federal law, local law, and aviation law have revealed one thing that is always apparent: Fairness. The law as written always allows the other side the same advantages or concessions as the other. If one side has time, the other does too. If one side makes a statement, the other side has an opportunity to rebut, and the original side can rebut the rebuttal and then the other side gets to rebut that rebuttal. The bombing explanation has had twenty one years to present its case, please allow the wiring/cargo door a few hours in front of TSB (Air) or the Commission of Inquiry. Please turn those fair words of the written law and the idealistic words of the Prime Minister and the Commissioner into reality.

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith
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1 831 241 0631 Cell
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<http://www.montereypeninsulaairport.com>
<http://www.ntsب.org>

Mr. John Barry Smith
barry@johnbarrysmith.com

Dear Mr. Smith:

On behalf of the Prime Minister, I would like to thank you for your e-mail of October 2 regarding the Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Air India Flight 182. Please be assured that your comments have been carefully reviewed and are appreciated.

I have taken the liberty of forwarding your correspondence directly to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, the Honourable Vic Toews, within whose responsibilities this matter falls.

Once again, thank you for taking the time to write.
Sincerely,

Salpie Stepanian
Assistant to the Prime Minister

cc: Hon. Vic Toews, P.C., M.P., Minister of Justice and Attorney General
of

Canada

Mr. John Barry Smith
barry@johnbarrysmith.com

Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for your correspondence of August 20, 2006, to the Honourable Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, regarding Air India Flight 182. The Minister has asked me to reply on his behalf.

I have noted your comments with respect to this matter. Although, as you indicate, the Attorney General of Canada is the Government of Canada's representative on the Commission of Inquiry into the investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182. This being the case, I have taken the liberty of forwarding a copy of your correspondence to the office of the Honourable Vic Toews, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, for consideration.

I trust that this action will prove satisfactory. Again, thank you for writing.

Yours truly,
Richard Stryde
Senior Special Assistant

c.c. Office of the Honourable Vic Toews, P.C. M.P.

Dear John Barry Smith,

Thank you for your interest in Transportation Safety Board.

Your comments are important to us and we will address them as quickly as possible.

We have lots of information already available on-line which may be exactly what you need. Our e-mail service is now available. The subscription page lets you choose the documents for which you would like to receive a notification. When a type of document you have requested is posted on our Web site, an e-mail that includes a short summary and a link to the document on our Web site will be sent to you. Please use the following link to subscribe to our e-mail service (<http://listserv.tsb.gc.ca/en/subscribe/>).

We invite you to start by reading:

About the TSB (<http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/common/about.asp>);

FAQ (<http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/common/faq.asp>) where many of your questions may already have been addressed;

The Site Map (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/common/site_map.asp); and

Search (<http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/search/query.asp>) pages are valuable tools to find specific information.

If you wish to contact a TSB employee, please use the GEDS Employee Directory at <http://direct.srv.gc.ca/cgi-bin/direct500/BE>.

Please note that personal information collected by TSB is protected.

Thank you for taking the time to provide us with your comments.

Communications Group

Transportation Safety Board
E-mail: communications@tsb.gc.ca
<http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/common/offices.asp>

Good afternoon,

The Transportation Safety Board (TSB) has implemented SECURITAS, a confidential program through which you can report potentially unsafe acts or conditions relating to the Canadian transportation system that would not normally be reported through other channels.

For more information, please follow this link:
<http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/securitas/index.asp>

Thank you for your interest in the Transportation Safety Board of Canada.

Best regards,

Christian Plouffe
Communications Advisor
Transportation Safety Board of Canada

Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for your recent inquiry regarding the last correspondence you had with Mr. Bill Tucker on the Air India file. Mr. Tucker's replacement is Mr. Terry Burtch, who joined us last October. I have forwarded your request to Mr. Burtch, who is pursuing it at present. You may also be interested to know that just before we received your request, both the Director of Investigations - Air and the Director, Engineering, retired from the Transportation Safety Board. Mr. Burtch is presently following up with other staff in those respective organizations, and will

communicate directly with you at the earliest opportunity. We regret the delay in responding, but trust that this approach will be satisfactory.

Paulette G. Delorme
Executive Assistant / Adjointe ex/cutive
Transportation Safety Board of Canada/
Bureau de la s/curit/ des transports du Canada
Tel.: (819) 994-8002
FAX: (819) 994-9759

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:52 PM PDT
To: MINTC@tc.gc.ca
Cc: <pm@pm.gc.ca>, <toews.v@parl.gc.ca>
Subject: **Re: Air India Flight 182**

Honourable Lawrence Cannon,
Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities
Richard Stryde
Senior Special Assistant

Dear Mr. Stryde, Monday, November 20, 2006

Thank you for your letter of Monday, November 20, 2006 in which you state that "...Transport Canada will not be taking any action with respect to your statements."

My statements you refer to are those that purport my position is that Air India Flight 182 was brought down by science, not myth, in that I did not conclude the crash was caused by a rare bomb by conspiracy minded terrorists but by the most common of probable causes for airplane crashes, mechanical failure of parts.

The reason you give for not taking any action (not even a question) is that my statements:

...have been investigated by competent investigative bodies, and the department is not aware of any findings that support your position.

Well, for the record, your conclusion implies you are not aware that the Canadian Aviation Safety Board and the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch (the two most competent Crown aircraft investigative bodies in regard to Air India Flight 182) also 'support my position,' actually, I support their position since they came first, years before my research.

The CASB did not conclude the crash was caused by a bomb.

The Canadian Aviation Safety Board respectfully submits as follows:

Ò4.1 Cause-Related Findings

5. There is considerable circumstantial and other evidence to indicate that the initial event was an explosion occurring in the forward cargo compartment.Ó

(Mr. Stryde, there are many alternative explanations for that explosion in the forward cargo compartment, such as a ruptured open cargo door.)

The UK AAIB in fact ruled a bomb out.

"Mr. R.A. Davis, Head, Flight Recorder Section, Accidents Investigation Branch, Farnborough, U.K. 3.4.6.16 In conclusion, Mr. Davis reported as follows :- "It is considered that from the CVR and ATC recordings supplied for analysis, there is no

evidence of a high explosive device having detonated on AI 182. There is strong evidence to suggest that a sudden explosive decompression occurred but the cause has not been identified. It must be concluded that without positive evidence of an explosive device from either the wreckage or pathological examinations, some other cause has to be established for the accident".

There you have it, Mr. Stryde; no conclusion it was a bomb and evidence presented it was not a bomb by....competent investigative bodies.

To sum up, Mr. Stryde, the Minister states he is not aware of the findings of the two most competent investigative bodies regarding airplane crashes that support my position that Air India Flight 182 was not brought down by a bomb. And please, Mr. Stryde, I'm not being sarcastic when I have to say that Air India Flight 182 was an airplane, not a bank robbery, where you might consider the RCMP a relevant competent investigative agency.

I am now in the absurd position of having to plead with the Crown to believe the Crown experts and take some action....like asking questions of me.

Questions are a good thing in investigations and Commissions of Inquiry, would you not agree? Well, in serious investigations and inquiries, that is.

Here is my question: Why are you not asking me questions when I present scientific evidence to you that supports the conclusions of the two most competent investigative bodies of the Canadian and UK Crowns which directly affects the safety of the Canadian flying public?

Regards,

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At 3:51 PM -0500 11/20/06, "Minister of Transport,
Infrastructure and Communities / "

"M wrote:

Mr. John Barry Smith
barry@johnbarrysmith.com

Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for your correspondence of October 22, 2006, to the Honourable Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, which was further to your previous correspondence with Transport Canada regarding Air India Flight 182. The Minister has asked me to reply on his behalf.

Minister Cannon appreciates being made aware of your concerns on this matter; however, the accidents cited in your e-mail have been investigated by competent investigative bodies, and the department is not aware of any findings that support your position. As such, Transport Canada will not be taking any action with respect to your statements.

Again, thank you for sharing your views with the federal government.

Yours truly,

Richard Stryde
Senior Special Assistant

c.c. Office of the Right Honourable Stephen Harper, P.C., M.P.
Office of the Honourable Vic Toews, P.C. M.P.

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From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:52 PM PDT
To: MINTC@tc.gc.ca
Subject: Mr. Stryde Re: Accident Investigation Flight 182

Richard Stryde

Senior Special Assistant

Dear Mr. Stryde, Thursday, January 25, 2007

Thank you for your email this morning. Let me evaluate it carefully, word for word, sentence by sentence, as written communications are our specialty and all we have to gain understanding.

Thank you for your e-mail of November 20, 2006, which was further to our previous exchange of correspondence regarding Air India Flight 182.

You're welcome, sir.

As indicated in my November 20 e-mail to you, Transport Canada is not responsible for investigating accidents.

Yes, I believe TSB (Air) is responsible; however, they will not respond with a brushoff letter or inquiries. Neither will the Minister of Justice, the department I am most often referred to. You have responded, thank you. I assume Transport Canada has safety concerns in land, sea, and air transport and that's why my presentation of scientific research into the present dangers of early model Boeing 747s in that faulty wiring is causing a cargo door to open inflight is relevant.

Therefore, the department is not in a position to undertake an evaluation of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board and U.K.

Aircraft Accident Investigation Board reports on the Air India accident.

If not you, then who? TSB (Air)? Do you know anybody over there you could refer me to or refer them to me? Are the two agencies, Canada Transport and Transportation Safety Board on speaking terms? They both have the root word 'Transport' in them. Are you saying that the fact that the latest official Crown opinion by aircraft accident investigators that did not conclude Air India Flight 182 was a bomb (CASB occurrence report) while all the judges, media, police, and politicians say it was a bomb explosion is none of your business? A bombing would indicate a one off event while faulty wiring and door problems indicate a continuing problem which may put the present flying public in danger.

In light of your safety concerns with the forward cargo door of the Boeing 747, Transport Canada has reviewed the aircraft's service history, accident reports, occurrence reports and the Service Difficulty Report database.

Well, thank you, Mr. Stryde, for actual action. You have done what I have done many times. That's research and shows respect for history and science. You will have noted the several inadvertent cargo door openings, dozens of depressurizations, and thousands of electrical incidents in Boeing 747s over the years attributed to many things such as faulty wiring, out of rig door, improper latching, malfunctioning relief valves, and faulty alert switches.

When you write above that Transport Canada 'has reviewed the

aircraft's service history" I have to assume you mean the aircraft is Air India Flight 182 which service history reveals the problems it had with cargo doors long before and just before the accident. Or you may mean the Boeing 747 service history which is long and honorable although it does reveal the many thousands of electrical incidents and dozens of depressurization events.

When you write above that Transport Canada has reviewed 'accident reports' I have to assume you reviewed all early model Boeing 747 inflight breakups which produced a sudden loud sound on the cockpit voice recorder followed by an abrupt power cut to the flight recorders, more severe inflight damage to the starboard side of the aircraft, a longitudinally split forward cargo door...and many other evidence matches to Air India Flight 182. (There are three other solid matches, Pan Am Flight 103, United Airlines Flight 811, and TWA Flight 800. Those government aviation accident reports (AARs) are available for download in PDF as well as my Smith AARs on my website at ntsb.org.)

When you write above that Transport Canada has reviewed "occurrence reports" I have to assume you mean the Canadian Aviation Bureau Canadien Safety Board de la securite aerienne AVIATION OCCURRENCE AIR INDIA BOEING 747-237B VT-EFO CORK, IRELAND 110 MILES WEST 23 JUNE 1985 since that is the only "Occurrence Report" relevant because after CASB disbanded the name of the report was changed:

"Aviation Investigation Report
In-Flight Fire Leading to Collision with Water
Swissair Transport Limited
McDonnell Douglas MD-11 HB-IWF
Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia 5 nm SW
2 September 1998

Report Number A98H0003"

The main unresolved fault for early model Boeing 747s is the design flaw of non plug outward opening cargo doors with no midspan latch locking sectors. The faulty wiring can be replaced.

Shall I list the many SDRs? Well, you have them already.

At least we agree that there are difficulties with those cargo doors on early model Boeing 747s such as Air India Flight 182. I am saying that the 182 accident is cargo door related, not terrorist bomb revenge related. My assertion is grounded in facts, history, and science, not entertaining myths. In that regard, I have included below my latest submission to the Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182, Submission 17, Myth versus Reality, submitted just a few days ago.

Transport Canada has concluded that corrective actions taken over the years by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, the Authority responsible for type design, have been effective in mitigating any safety issues related to the Boeing 747's forward cargo door.

Ah, beauty is in the eye of the beholder. "Corrective actions"...such as the many Airworthiness Directives (ADs) of which there are more every day trying to put band aids on that 747 type design.

There are many cargo door specific ADs to correct the frayed wiring, the bent doorframe, the corrosion, the weak locking sectors, the twisted cargo door floor, the placards, the viewing ports the distorted section 41 airframe, and on and on.

A few of the major cargo door ADs are AD 88-12-04, AD 79-17-02, AD 90-09-06, and one I've included below AD 2000-02-37 dealing with potential backwards installed latch pins in cargo doors.

Safety is in the mind of passengers and they trust and rely on the opinions of government officials such as yourself, Mr. Stryde. The current mentality of fear of being hijacked and flown into a skyscraper is shallow and statistically unworthy of the amount of attention it is receiving but...fear rules. Mature authority concerns itself with knowledge gained in subsequent accidents such as United Airlines Flight 811 to attain safety for the most common of aircraft accidents, mechanical failure, not the rarest which is sabotage with subsets of hijacking or bombing.

This being the case, Transport Canada does not have any safety concerns with respect to this door.

"Any"? You are saying the agencies that determine if a cargo door is safe were asked if the cargo door is safe and they said the cargo door was safe. Of course they say that, that is their job, just like the manufacturer says his planes are safe and the airlines says its planes are safe. I am saying they are not safe and yet you do not ask me any questions. Why are you not asking followup questions of me to justify my assertions that faulty wiring causing a forward cargo door to open in flight caused the destruction of Air India Flight 182, an opinion which supports the conclusion of Canadian and UK aircraft accident investigators?

Do you not respect the opinions of private citizens? Are my

science based findings supported by history and corroborated by government accident reports too zany? Is the assertion that Air India Flight 182 exploded in flight by the common cause of mechanically caused explosive decompression too weird? Are these common sense opinions about a sudden fatal jet airplane crash offered to you by this survivor of a sudden fatal jet airplane crash considered so unworthy of consideration as to not even warrant one question? Am I to be dismissed by a polite letter by you which essentially says Air India Flight 182 is none of our business and we think the Boeing 747 is safe?

I trust that the foregoing has clarified the department's position with respect to this matter.

Clarified....let me review:

1. You've replied to me before. (Thank you.)
2. Transport Canada is not responsible for investigating accidents.
3. Transport Canada will not evaluate Canadian Aviation Safety Board and U.K. Aircraft Accident Investigation Board reports on the Air India accident.
4. Transport Canada has reviewed the aircraft's service history, accident reports, occurrence reports and the Service Difficulty Report database. (Thank you.)
5. Transport Canada does not have any safety concerns with respect to this door.

That's your story and you're sticking to it?

The brick wall of officialdom. Always talking but never listening. Always rejecting but never accepting.

You could have asked questions, sir, you could have referred someone who knows about airplane accidents to me, you could have referred me to an agency that deals with aircraft accidents, you could have set up a meeting, you could have recommended that I be given my promised fifteen minutes before the Inquiry into Air India Flight 182, you could have suggested someone in Transport Canada that knows why airplanes crash to telephone/ email me for discussion about wiring and cargo doors in Boeing 747s, some of which fly over Canadian airspace. I of course will give my best efforts to such a discussion. It would be a data and evidence based evaluation not an emotional police based horror story.

I note you call Air India Flight 182 an 'accident'. So do I, Mr. Stryde. It was. We agree. A bombing is not an accident, it is a carefully thought out sequence of events. An inadvertently opening forward cargo door in flight caused by faulty wiring is an accident. Air India Flight 182 was an accident. The accident happened again four years later with United Airlines Flight 811. I can explain through science, not evil human nature, how both accidents occurred and how to prevent them from happening again.

Accidents can be investigated to prevent their reoccurrences. Fewer accidents mean more efficient transportation and better economic success for the country. I believe we share our concerns for safety in all aspects of transportation such as car crashes, train derailments, ship sinkings, and plane explosions. There are several rational explanations for the midair explosion for Air India Flight 182, the least of which is the rare turbanned terrorist event compared to the more common mechanical explosive decompression. The early Comets suffered the same

fate; meet the new boss, same as the old boss.

Again, thank you for writing.

Well, thank you, Mr. Stryde, for replying to my somewhat extensive and controversial opinions about a controversial subject in Canadian transportation, Air India Flight 182. And thank you for reviewing the aircraft's service history, accident reports, occurrence reports and the Service Difficulty Report database. I've added a few below to include a mechanical problem and electrical problems in Boeing 747s.

Regards,

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Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of
Air India Flight 182
Ken Dickerson
Public Affairs Officer/Agent des affaires publique

Dear Mr. Dickerson,

Sunday, January 21, 2007

"You're free, Mr. Smith, as you probably know, to add to your filed material should you choose."

As given permission by the Commissioner to submit material:
Enclosed below is Smith Submission 17: Myth vs. Reality

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why, and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)

Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb, bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom. (Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts of type of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006

Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation. (Please consider a plausible, reasonable, electrical cause with precedent) Filed Tuesday, August 8, 2006.

Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The Layperson version. (It's not rocket science) Filed Friday, August 11, 2006

Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday, August 15, 2006

Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years: Predicting the Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non Cooperation. (Sorry, no can do.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 9: The Crash and Meeting the Family. (It happens so fast) Filed Friday, August 18, 2006

Smith Submission 10: The Elephant and Emperor Kanishka. (Easy to see, hard to talk about) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 11: Reconsideration of your denial of standing: Try Try Again. (Never give up) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 12. Last Gasp: Grasping at a Straw. (Throw me a bone here, I'm dying) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 13: What is the fear? (Boo!) Filed Monday, August 28, 2006

Smith Submission 14: Putative Facts and Unsubstantiated Opinions. (Who Says?) Filed Friday, September 29, 2006

Smith Submission 15: Letter to PM, AG, Commissioner, Minister of Transport, TSB, Securitas, RCMP AITF. Filed Wednesday, October 25, 2006.

Smith Submission 16: Research This. Filed Saturday, December 16, 2006

Smith Submission 17: Myth vs. Reality. Filed Sunday, January 21, 2007

Thanks, Happy 2007, and Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924

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Doonesbury Sunday, January 14, 2007

It's just too controversial...And so is the Air India Flight 182 controversy, the Pan Am Flight 103 controversy, the TWA Flight

800 controversy....

Air India Flight 182 currently has a Commission of Inquiry twenty two years after the event.

Pan Am Flight 103 has a case before the Scottish Criminal Courts Review Commission eighteen years after the event.

TWA Flight 800 continues to have stories of a missile shootdown by the US Navy or terrorists eleven years after the event.

The controversy for those Boeing 747 crashes, as I see it, is the conflict between pleasant conspiracy myths and unpleasant mechanical reality.

Hello, Commissioner Major and Researchers of the Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Air India Flight 182, my name is John Barry Smith and I offer a reality based scientific alternative to the imaginative conspiracy explanation for Air India Flight 182.

But you know that already. I've appeared personally before the Commission, I've written letters, I've submitted hard copies of researched material as well as my sixteen supplemental submissions of which this formal seventeenth is just be the latest.

Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182

Honourable John C. Major, Q.C. Commissioner

Sheila-Marie Cook, Executive Director and Commission Secretary

Mark J. Freiman, Commission's Lead Counsel

Michel Dorval, Commission's Co-Counsel

Ken Dickerson, Public Affairs Officer/Agent des affaires publiques

Michael Tansey, Commission Spokesperson
Research Staff of Academics in the Research Program from
Across Canada and Elsewhere

Dear Commissioner Major and specifically Commission
Research Staff, Sunday, January 21, 2007

Smith Submission 17: Myth vs. Reality. Sunday, January 21,
2007

From Commission Website: Our Research Program: "Concurrent with the hearings, the Commission's research staff will study all of the documents, reports and evidence from the hearings to deal with all issues within our mandate. The research program will involve academics and other specialists from across Canada and elsewhere. They will provide studies that can be valuable when the Commission assesses the evidence and makes findings to be included in the final report."

I would hope that Commission Exhibit S-18, the Smith AAR for Air India Flight 182, will be invaluable to researchers in the Research Program as you assess the evidence 'within their mandate'. The mandate is broad according to Commissioner Major: The Commissioner: "Yes. Well, I will confirm that. The nature of this Commission was to be very broad in the evidence that it heard, in order to put to rest the various theories, rumours and neglect that have occurred since the explosion in 1985."

So, here we go on my latest submission, Myth vs. Reality.

I can just imagine the excitement when Mr. Dickerson immediately calls up Commissioner Major and announces, "Sir, we've got another one! Number 17!" Commissioner Major tells

the Minister he was talking to that their meeting will have to be adjourned as he has just received a very important email from a respected investigator regarding the subject of the Commission Inquiry, Air India Flight 182, and needs immediate time to study the contents.

Mr. Dickerson then located all the researchers spread out across Canada and elsewhere and gives them the news, "Another one from Smith! I'm forwarding you the details at this time, acknowledge receipt and prepare for discussion."

The staff attorneys are then informed in milder tones since attorneys hate any conflicting news of their point of view so carefully prepared for presentation to satisfied clients. The attorneys were nowhere to be found and their cell/mobile phones were off so voicemail messages were left on their answering machines and pagers.

Meetings were set up the next morning to evaluate the shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup explanation for Air India Flight 182. The hard evidence was examined, the assumptions about wiring/cargo door were confirmed, the findings were corroborated, the conclusions were judged to be sound and decisions were reached: Smith was asked to present his wiring/cargo door explanation to the full Commission and researchers and counsel; in addition, a request to the Transportation Safety Board of Canada was made for an updated supplement to the twenty year old Aircraft Occurrence Report by the Canadian Aviation Safety Board in which they did not conclude the probable cause was a bomb explosion and in fact quoted an United Kingdom investigator who ruled it out.

The TSB (Air) report then confirmed the cause as a mechanical fault, not a bomb explosion, and provided the scientific evidence to support the findings.

Upon hearing the news that the Commission of Inquiry into the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 was actually going to inquire into the bombing of Air India Flight 182, Smith swooned.

Subsequently the science explanation was accepted, the faulty wiring was replaced and no more Boeing 747s came apart in flight. Smith was so dumbfounded at the events he had so long hoped for that he appeared humble when knighted by the Queen of Canada in a moving ceremony attended by many. (It could happen!)

Reality: Email submission 17 is filtered to Trash.

Wishful thinking versus reality. What is reality, or as I like to say, "The map is not the territory, the territory is the territory." To put a fine point on it, "A map is a piece of paper."

Research means to re search, to search again. To inquire means to investigate and both acts require questions. Questions are good things. Inquisitiveness is a virtue. Air India Flight 182 is still controversial, still being researched and still the subject of inquiry. It is time to forego the pleasant wishful thinking and defer to ugly reality.

For Air India Flight 182, a wishful thinking map has been drawn for the cause of the tragedy in which 239 men women and children died a terrible death. The pretty map shows that Canadian government, Indian government, Boeing manufacturer, Air India airline, the flight crew, and the passengers to be

guiltless of any responsibility for the many deaths as the cause was the lax efforts of sloppy security screeners at several airports and the dastardly deeds of turbaned terrorists seeking revenge.

If only that pleasant guilt absolving version were so. Many hundreds of media representatives, manufacturer reps, government agencies, police, defence counsel, prosecutors, and attorneys have tried for over twenty years to make it so. But alas, reality keeps on intruding into the fantasy and thus the Commission of Inquiry exists with its staff of academics and researchers from across Canada and elsewhere. (I'm from Elsewhere, California.)

The reality that intrudes is composed of sound recordings of the actual event taking place which rule out bomb explosion, twisted metal in the aircraft skin which indicates the explosion occurred in the forward compartment not the aft, wreckage debris patterns of engines and tail parts, and of course, the split longitudinally forward cargo door which matches other Boeing 747s that suffered inflight breakup especially United Airlines Flight 811. The reality is that Air India Flight 182 was an accident caused by the sequence that causes most aircraft accidents, mechanical failure of a part which leads to failures of other parts which leads to destruction. There were no bombs, no bombers, no conspiracies, no crimes, and no criminals. It was an accident. That reality is unpleasant to accept for many, especially those who will appear to be somewhat responsible.

The reality of the wiring/cargo caused accident of Air India Flight 182 shows that Judge Josephson was correct in finding the accused not guilty, explains why the RCMP could not find the bombers, proves religious groups are not killing each others, and that the early Crown aircraft investigators were correct. Why do

those consequences not bring joy to Canadian citizens to have their judicial system regain stature, decrease hate amongst themselves, restore confidence in the police agencies, and trust again Canadian aircraft investigators?

I'm guessing it's because the wishful thinking guilt absolving map is still more pleasant and entertaining to believe than the routine banal mechanical explanation. (I could be wrong on determining the motives of human nature, that's not my area. Why people do what they do is a continuing mystery to me.)

The wishful thinking bombers map and the reality of the scientific evidence territory conflict; they do not match. One is wrong. The evidence in the territory of aircraft wreckage remains the same; the map can change.

Innocent day dreams are fine things. The problems occur when they are believed as truth and actions are taken based on false assumptions. Farmers may dream of rain but the reality of the drops is needed, the plants can't be fooled. Politicians spout dreams as truth all the time such as balanced budgets are just around the corner. Politicians have to tell the citizens what they want to hear or they will be politicians no longer. Researchers have the luxury of telling the truth based on solid science, not changing emotions.

A pleasant day dream to deflect grief is one composed of anger, hate, and revenge. That has occurred for Air India Flight 182 and other Boeing 747 tragedies. It was the terrorists and they are everywhere is the day dream turned nightmare which eases the pain of grief.

An unpleasant reality is that early model Boeing 747s including

Air India Flight 182 have known defective Poly X wiring installed that is prone to cracking to bare wire which turns on the cargo door unlatch motor leading to explosive decompression and inflight breakup. That manufacturing defect is present in about five hundred currently in service Boeing 747-100 and 747-200 series, some of which fly in Canadian airspace.

An unpleasant reality is the all Boeing 747s have design flaws of outward opening non plug cargo doors which do not have locking sectors on the midspan latches.

Researchers are supposed to be neutral in reacting to the findings during their research. That's hard to do when the facts conflict with preconceived assumptions but then, that's why researchers make the big bucks, they are paid to be impartial, just like judges. If it were easy to ignore built in prejudices and make fair findings based on evidence, everyone would do it instead of the relatively few judges and researchers in the world.

I consider myself a researcher. I have often during my sixteen years of research into the wiring/cargo door explanation for early model Boeing 747s that disintegrate in flight have had to resist the temptation to exaggerate, ignore, or flat out lie about any conflicting data I might uncover. All the data must be corroborated, analyzed, and reported whether it fits the hypothesis or not.

As it turns out, once the correct explanation is figured out, the facts will confirm it. I call those many moments, "Cargo Door Moments". It's when I say to myself, "Well, if the starboard side forward cargo door opened in flight, then certain things have to happen, such as the starboard horizontal elevator or wing would receive inflight damage." I then research all the information

about inflight damage and sure enough, the accident reports confirm that more inflight damage occurred on the starboard side of these Boeing 747s than the port side.

Science seems so simple to me. Two and two is four which might be good or it might be bad depending on circumstances. I don't change the answer to five to avoid the unpleasant answer of four. However, for those officials who believe there are no unpleasant consequences but many good ones for stating the answer is five, the wrong answer is easy to state. As a survivor of a sudden night fiery fatal jet airplane crash, I know of the unpleasant consequences of a mechanical failure. Two and two is four regardless of how much I wanted the answer to be five. I deferred to reality, my plane was on fire and going down. I acted on the reality and saved my life.

It turns out that for the majority nowadays, the answer is often five. Trying to get the media and government agencies to consider a scientific answer which conflicts with the imaginative faith based conclusion of terrorists is so far impossible. The reaction by government officials, (well, to be specific, Commissioner John Major,) is the same as trying to enter into discussion about evolution with a Christian fundamentalist. The zealot knows the answer, period, and rejects all efforts by others to offer evidence of science which refutes the pleasing mythic belief.

I was promised fifteen minutes in a face to face hearing to present my science based explanation for Air India Flight 182 to the Commission of Inquiry (sic) and was rejected after five, three of which were spent listening to Commissioner Major tell me I might be right but he didn't want to hear about it and to go away.

Those that wish to believe that a Boeing 747 was destroyed by a bomb placed by foreign looking men with odd headgear will continue to believe that imaginative idea regardless of the lack of supporting evidence and reject any alternative explanation well supported with hard facts and data. Emotion overrules reason, sad to say. Anger, hate, and revenge are stronger emotions than the pleasure of enlightenment through knowledge obtained by research. It was ever thus, savages temporarily dominate. Reason is gentle but persevering while violent anger burns out over time.

What harm would occur if I had been allowed my promised fifteen minutes? What harm would occur if the science based explanation for Air India Flight 182 had been given standing to allow a full explanation to be presented to the Commission? The religious based agencies who applied were given standing and will present their persecution based explanations for the tragedy. The Commission is not a scientific inquiry but turning into an emotion based faith healing show.

Science was not trusted and lost; the controversy was stifled. Can science based researchers make a difference? Are the Commission researchers and academics from across Canada and elsewhere the type that research Noah's Ark, the Shroud of Turin, teeth from Buddha, the Bermuda Triangle, Bigfoot, and crop circles? If so, then all is lost and myth composed of entertaining stories becomes common folk wisdom.

Emotion sells, reason rots on the stinking shelf. It seems today that most TV news (sic) is really packaged emotions with few facts presented but lots of sincere inflections in the beautiful readers' voices. It's as if being lectured by condescending third grade teachers who are so reluctant of telling their young students of the harsh realities of the real world. The media and

government are in the business of transmitting emotions: anger at the chosen enemy, hate at chosen villains, revenge toward chosen terrorists, sympathy towards chosen victims, and all ending with a little heart warming cuddly story to reassure the citizen/children that although things may be bad around the world, authority/daddy/mommy is protecting us at home. There's a word for those presentations: Propaganda.

propaganda [n.]

PRON: /"prɒp&'gɒnd&/

1. Information that is spread for the purpose of promoting some cause.

ETYM: Abbrev. from Latin *de propaganda fide*: cf. French *propagande*. Related to *Propagate*.

For instance, several hundred passengers and crew die a terrible death which includes sudden loud sounds, pain, and the horror of falling to death. That event is politically treated as a one off event that probably could have been avoided had but a few security screeners done a better job. New security practices are in place to prevent another two bombs being placed in baggage on two Boeing 747s on the same day and exploding much later within the hour. The message 'cause' is the tragedy won't happen again and all as is well. Continue to buy tickets. Flying is safer than driving. There is not an industry wide problem with non plug outward opening cargo doors or hundreds of passenger airliners flying with faulty wiring putting many thousands at daily risk.

Three criminal court justices have concluded a bomb explosion brought down Air India Flight 182; Justice Kirpal of India, Justice Josephson and Justice Major of Canada. Justice Kirpal authored the Indian accident investigation report which stated a

bomb explosion in the forward cargo compartment, Justice Josephson presided over the two accused bombers' trial and stated there was a bomb explosion in the aft cargo compartment, and Justice Major has stated in interviews with the press that he believed a bomb caused the destruction of unstated location. The Justices can not even agree as to where the supposed bomb was located nor who did it but they do know it was a rare bomb explosion and not the more common mechanical fault that causes inflight decompressions.

Three criminal court justices who know the evil in men's hearts saw evil in the destruction of a Boeing 747 and concluded a bomb exploded somewhere in it and it was placed by foreign looking men who were callously killing children out of revenge for another act of evil years earlier. This entertaining myth has betrayal, violence, explosions, grief, intrigue, sexual adventures, large sums of money exchanging hands, police from several countries earnestly working, and of course continuing headlines and TV interviews. What's not to like about the bombers explanation for Air India Flight 182? Emotion sells and this story has mythic qualities.

The people who actually know why Boeing 747s come apart in the air did not conclude it was a bomb. The Canadian aircraft accident investigators concluded that the cause was an explosion of unknown cause to be determined later. The UK investigator said the cause was an explosion but not a bomb. Both investigators used science to support their conclusions such as frequency response in recordings, direction of twisted metal, and debris patterns. This private independent investigator from California used the luxury of hindsight to look back on subsequent similar accidents which occurred after the CASB and UK investigators' reports to conclude the Crown investigators

were correct in 1986 and can offer much more corroborating evidence. United Airlines Flight 811 is the model wiring/cargo door Boeing 747 event which occurred four years after Air India Flight 182 and matches in many critical evidence areas.

The scientific wiring/cargo door explanation is boring to laymen. Understanding it requires basic education in electricity, gravity, and physics of air pressure. Science implied that the danger was more widespread and still exists. This explanation did not dispel grief through anger, hate, and revenge. Science was rejected without discussion or investigation.

Government refuses to accept an unpopular scientific inconvenient truth which is supported by scientists in several countries. Global warming is a similar controversial explanation for observed events which also affects Canada. Global warming is called an inconvenient truth, I call the wiring/cargo door explanation an unpleasant reality; both are science based and rejected by politicians and the public while accepted by researchers and experts in their fields.

The criminal justices used police reports of overheard conversations, sexual affairs, and paid for betrayals. Interest sustained.

The aircraft accident investigators used recordings, wreckage reconstructions, flight logs, baggage manifests, and debris patterns. Interest wanes.

Criminal court justices giving opinions about the cause of a plane crash or the actual scientific research based conclusions by aircraft investigators...who you gonna trust?

The answer is neither until the crash cause is re-searched and inquiries are made by the researcher staff employed by the Commission of Inquiry to search again as well as request the TSB (Air) for their first official opinions.

Please do so. I implore the Commission researchers to ask me questions based on science as you inquire about Air India Flight 182. I invite you to ask me to submit my additional research materials for confirmation or rebuttal. The mythic bomb explanation has had twenty two years to persuade; it has failed. Give the science explanation of shorted wiring/unlatch motor on/ruptured open forward cargo door/explosive decompression/inflight breakup a few days of your time before hearings resume on February 19th. It's all there in Commission Exhibit S-18, in my other sixteen Commission Submissions, and on <http://www.montereypeninsulaairport.com> or <http://www.ntsbt.org>

Trust science again.

Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
<http://www.montereypeninsulaairport.com>
<http://www.ntsbt.org>

Smith Submission 1, Grievous Error of Fact Detected, Filed 28 July, 2006. (Please correct Commission website.)

Smith Submission 2: Inquiry into the Inquiry: Who, what, why,

and will you, Filed 3 August, 2006 (Please grant me standing.)
Smith Submission 3: The Official Versions: Bomb, bomb,
bomb, in the baggage, baggage, baggage go boom, boom, boom.
(Please ask TSB Air for their opinion to resolve official conflicts
of type of explosion and where it occurred.) Filed Tuesday,
August 8, 2006

Smith Submission 4: The Unofficial Version: The shorted
wiring/ruptured open/forward cargo door/explosive
decompression/inflight breakup explanation. (Please consider a
plausible, reasonable, electrical cause with precedent) Filed
Tuesday, August 8, 2006.

Smith Submission 5: Substantiating the Unofficial Version: The
Layperson version. (It's not rocket science) Filed Friday, August
11, 2006

Smith Submission 6: Substantiating the Unofficial Version:
The DNA Match. (A match made in heaven) Filed Tuesday,
August 15, 2006

Smith Submission 7. Dear People in Future Years: Predicting
the Past. (The Major Doctrine.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 8: Specific Term of Reference: Non
Cooperation. (Sorry, no can do.) Filed Thursday, August 17, 2006

Smith Submission 9: The Crash and Meeting the Family. (It
happens so fast) Filed Friday, August 18, 2006

Smith Submission 10: The Elephant and Emperor Kanishka.
(Easy to see, hard to talk about) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 11: Reconsideration of your denial of
standing: Try Try Again. (Never give up) Filed Saturday, August
19, 2006

Smith Submission 12. Last Gasp: Grasping at a Straw. (Throw
me a bone here, I'm dying) Filed Saturday, August 19, 2006

Smith Submission 13: What is the fear? (Boo!) Filed Monday,
August 28, 2006

Smith Submission 14: Putative Facts and Unsubstantiated

Opinions. (Who Says?) Filed Friday, September 29, 2006
Smith Submission 15: Letter to PM, AG, Commissioner,
Minister of Transport, TSB, Securitas, RCMP AITF. Filed
Wednesday, October 25, 2006.

Smith Submission 16: Research This. Filed Saturday,
December 16, 2006

Smith Submission 17: Myth vs. Reality. Filed Sunday, January
21, 2007

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA
delegate whose signature appears below issues the following
Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39.1 (1) of
CAR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the
requirement section (being action that the delegate considers
necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to
the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability
section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement
section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the
requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the
compliance section.

Boeing 747 Series Aeroplanes

AD/B747/221

Lower Lobe and Main Deck Side Cargo Doors Latch Pins

4/2000

Applicability: Model 747 series aircraft, line numbers 1 through 1078.

Requirement: Action in accordance with the technical requirements of FAA AD 2000-02-37 Amdt 39-11555.

Note: Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-52A2258 refers.

Compliance: As specified in the Requirement document for the one-time inspection and modification action, with a revised effective date of 20 April 2000.

This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 20 April 2000.

Background: The FAA received reports that latch pins have been found installed backward on the cargo doors on several aircraft. The actions specified by this Directive are intended to prevent improper latching of latch pins and the mating latch cam on the cargo door, which could result in damage to the structure of the cargo door and doorway cutout and consequent opening of the cargo door during flight.

(Original signed by)

Bernard Malcolm Hole
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
8 March 2000

The above AD is notified in the Commonwealth of Australia Gazette on 22 March 2000.

[4910-13-U]

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39 [65 FR 5746 2/7/2000]

[Docket No. 99-NM-41-AD; Amendment 39-11555; AD
2000-02-37]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 747 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes, that requires a one-time inspection to determine whether latch pins on the lower lobe and main deck side cargo doors are installed backward, and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment also requires eventual modification of the latch pin fittings on certain cargo doors. This amendment is prompted by reports that latch pins have been found installed backward on the cargo doors of several airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent improper latching of latch pins and the mating latch cam on the cargo door, which could result in damage to the structure of the cargo door and doorway cutout and consequent opening of the cargo door during flight.

DATES: Effective March 13, 2000.

The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of March 13, 2000.

ADDRESSES: The service information referenced in this AD may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. This information may be examined at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane Directorate, Rules Docket, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal

Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Julie Alger, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM-120S, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (425) 227-2779; fax (425) 227-1181.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: A proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes was published in the Federal Register on May 5, 1999 (64 FR 24092). That action proposed to require a one-time inspection to determine whether latch pins on the lower lobe and main deck side cargo doors are installed backward, and corrective actions, if necessary. For certain airplanes, that action also proposed to require eventual modification of the latch pin fittings on certain cargo doors.

Explanation of Change Made to the Final Rule

The FAA has revised the applicability statement of the final rule to reference "line numbers" instead of "line positions." The airplane manufacturer has informed the FAA that "line numbers" is the proper reference, although some Boeing service bulletins still refer to "line positions."

Comments

Interested persons have been afforded an opportunity to participate in the making of this amendment. Due consideration has been given to the comments received.

Support for the Proposal

One commenter supports the proposed rule, and two commenters state no objection to the proposed rule. An additional commenter supports the proposed modification.

Requests to Revise Applicability

One commenter requests that the applicability of the AD be revised to remove the airplane having line number 1079. The commenter points out that that airplane was modified in production and was removed from the effectivity of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-52A2258, dated June 1, 1995, by Notice of Status Change 747-52A2258 NSC 03, dated December 14, 1995. The FAA concurs and has revised the applicability of the final rule accordingly.

In addition, one commenter requests that the one-time inspection of the latch pins of the main deck side cargo door be made applicable only to airplanes having line numbers 1 through 307 inclusive. The commenter states that the latch pins on airplanes having line numbers 308 and subsequent were modified in production with a bracket that prevents the latch pins from being installed backward.

The FAA concurs with the commenter's request and has revised paragraph (a) of the final rule accordingly. [Also, as a result of the revision of paragraph (a) of this final rule, a new paragraph (b) has been added to incorporate the corrective actions specified in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of the proposal, and all other paragraphs have been renumbered accordingly.]

Request for Credit for Previously Accomplished Actions

One commenter requests that a statement be added to the proposed rule to clarify that no further action is required for airplanes inspected in accordance with the proposed rule prior to the effective date of this AD. The FAA agrees that no further inspection is required for these airplanes. Operators are always given credit for previously accomplished actions by means of the phrase in the compliance section of the AD that states, "Required unless accomplished previously." Therefore, no change to the final rule is necessary in this regard.

Request for Extension of the Compliance Time

One commenter requests that the compliance time for the

modification required by paragraph (b) of the proposed rule [paragraph (c) of the final rule] be extended from two years after the effective date of this AD to six years or at the next removal of the latch pins. The commenter states that the immediate safety concern is addressed once the one-time inspection specified in paragraph (a) of the proposed rule is accomplished, and that the modification does not need to be accomplished until the next time the latch pins are removed.

The FAA does not concur with the commenter's request to extend the compliance time for the modification. In developing an appropriate compliance time for this action, the FAA considered the safety implications, parts availability, and normal maintenance schedules for timely accomplishment of the modification. In consideration of these items, as well as the possibility that a latch pin may be misinstalled during maintenance until the modification is accomplished, the FAA has determined that two years represents an appropriate interval of time allowable wherein an acceptable level of safety can be maintained. No change to the final rule is necessary in this regard.

Request to Revise Structural Inspection Requirements

One commenter requests that the proposed rule be revised to allow a Boeing Company Designated Engineering Representative to approve procedures for the structural inspection specified in paragraph (a)(2) of the proposed rule [paragraph (b)(2) of the final rule]. The commenter states that, in the event that a latch pin is installed backward, an airplane would be grounded until inspection methods are approved and accomplished, because no structural inspection methods are currently approved by the Manager of the FAA's Seattle Aircraft Certification Office [as specified in paragraph (a)(2) of the proposed rule].

The FAA does not concur with the commenter's request. To

date, the airplane manufacturer has not provided the FAA with structural inspection criteria. The extent of the area that must be inspected for damage is not defined because the extent of the inspection depends on the number and location of latch pins found to be installed backward. Procedures for the structural inspections are also not defined, and there are no published standards that can be used as a basis for a compliance finding. The FAA is not authorized to delegate a function for which there is no established standards [i.e., in accordance with Part 25 ("Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Airplanes") of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 25)]. No change to the final rule is necessary in this regard.

Request to Revise Service Information

One commenter requests that Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-52A2258 be revised to include the structural inspection methods specified in paragraph (a)(2) of the proposed rule [paragraph (b)(2) of the final rule]. The commenter states that this would reduce the number of requests for approvals of alternative methods of compliance that the FAA would have to review.

The FAA does not concur. As stated previously, the airplane manufacturer has not provided structural inspection procedures for inclusion in the final rule. The FAA has determined that further delay in issuance of this AD while the airplane manufacturer revises Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-52A2258 would not provide an acceptable level of safety. However, the airplane manufacturer may request approval of an alternative method of compliance for structural inspection procedures on behalf of all affected operators, thereby limiting the number of requests for approval of alternative methods of compliance from individual operators. No change to the final rule is necessary in this regard.

Request to Add One-Time Inspection of Interchanged Latch Pins

One commenter, the airplane manufacturer, recommends that the proposed rule be revised to require accomplishment of Boeing Service Bulletin 747-52-2142, dated May 6, 1977. That service bulletin recommends a one-time inspection to detect interchanged latch pins between the lower lobe cargo doors and the main deck side cargo door, and installation of a pin stop bracket. The commenter provides no technical justification for its request.

The FAA does not concur with the commenter's request. To require this modification would necessitate issuance of a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking and reopening of the comment period. The FAA finds that to further delay the issuance of this rule in this way would be inappropriate. Furthermore, though two interchanged latch pins were found during production, the FAA has not received any reports that operators have found such interchanged latch pins. Therefore, the FAA finds that mandatory action is not necessary. No change to the final rule is necessary in this regard.

Explanation of Change Made to Proposal

The FAA has clarified the inspection requirement contained in the proposed AD. Whereas the proposal specified a visual inspection, the FAA has revised this final rule to clarify that its intent is to require a general visual inspection. Additionally, a note has been added to the final rule to define that inspection.

Conclusion

After careful review of the available data, including the comments noted above, the FAA has determined that air safety and the public interest require the adoption of the rule with the changes previously described. The FAA has determined that these changes will neither increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of the AD.

Cost Impact

There are approximately 990 airplanes of the affected design in

the worldwide fleet. The FAA estimates that 235 airplanes of U.S. registry will be affected by this AD.

It will take approximately 2 work hours per airplane to accomplish the required inspection, at the average labor rate of \$60 per work hour. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be \$28,200, or \$120 per airplane.

It will take approximately 3 work hours per airplane to accomplish the required modification, at the average labor rate of \$60 per work hour. Required parts will cost approximately \$2,045 per airplane. Based on these figures, the cost impact of the AD on U.S. operators is estimated to be \$522,875, or \$2,225 per airplane.

The cost impact figures discussed above are based on assumptions that no operator has yet accomplished any of the requirements of this AD action, and that no operator would accomplish those actions in the future if this AD were not adopted.

Regulatory Impact

The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this action (1) is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a "significant rule" under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the

criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. A final evaluation has been prepared for this action and it is contained in the Rules Docket. A copy of it may be obtained from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption "ADDRESSES."

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39 - AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

□ 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

REGULATORY SUPPORT DIVISION

P.O. BOX 26460

OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA 73125-0460

U.S. Department

of Transportation

Federal Aviation

Administration

The following Airworthiness Directive issued by the Federal Aviation Administration in accordance with the provisions of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39, applies to an aircraft model of which our records indicate you may be the registered owner. Airworthiness Directives affect aviation safety and are regulations which require immediate attention. You are cautioned that no person may operate an

aircraft to which an Airworthiness Directive applies, except in accordance with the requirements of the Airworthiness Directive (reference 14 CFR part 39, subpart 39.3).

2000-02-37 BOEING: Amendment 39-11555. Docket 99-NM-41-AD.

Applicability: Model 747 series airplanes, line numbers 1 through 1078 inclusive, certificated in any category.

NOTE 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (d) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.

To prevent improper latching of latch pins and the mating latch cam on the cargo door, which could result in damage to the structure of the cargo door and doorway cutout and consequent opening of the cargo door during flight, accomplish the following:

One-Time Inspection

(a) Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the requirements of paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this AD, as applicable, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-52A2258, dated June 1, 1995; as revised by Notices of Status Change 747-52A2258 NSC 1, dated July 20, 1995; 747-52A2258 NSC 2, dated August 31, 1995; and

747-52A2258 NSC 03, dated December 14, 1995.

(1) For airplanes having line numbers 1 through 307 inclusive: Perform a one time general visual inspection to determine whether latch pins on the forward and aft lower lobe cargo doors and the main deck side cargo door are installed backward.

(2) For airplanes having line numbers 308 through 1078 inclusive: Perform a one time general visual inspection to determine whether latch pins on the forward and aft lower lobe cargo doors are installed backward.

NOTE 2: For the purposes of this AD, a general visual inspection is defined as: "A visual examination of an interior or exterior area, installation, or assembly to detect obvious damage, failure, or irregularity. This level of inspection is made under normally available lighting conditions such as daylight, hangar lighting, flashlight, or drop-light, and may require removal or opening of access panels or doors. Stands, ladders, or platforms may be required to gain proximity to the area being checked."

Corrective Actions

(b) If any latch pin is found installed incorrectly during any inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, prior to further flight, accomplish the requirements of paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) of this AD.

(1) Reinstall the affected latch pin correctly, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-52A2258, dated June 1, 1995; as revised by Notices of Status Change 747-52A2258 NSC 1, dated July 20, 1995; 747-52A2258 NSC 2, dated August 31, 1995; and 747-52A2258 NSC 03, dated December 14, 1995.

(2) Perform structural inspections to detect damage of the affected cargo door and doorway cutout, in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate.

Modification

(c) Within 2 years after the effective date of this AD, modify the latch pin fittings of the forward and aft lower lobe cargo doors, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-52-2260, Revision 1, dated March 21, 1996.

NOTE 3: Modification of the latch pin fittings accomplished prior to the effective date of this AD in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-52-2260, dated December 14, 1995, is considered acceptable for compliance with paragraph (c) of this AD.

Alternative Methods of Compliance

(d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle ACO. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.

NOTE 4: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO.

Special Flight Permits

(e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.

Incorporation by Reference

(f) Except as provided by paragraph (b)(2) of this AD, the actions shall be done in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-52A2258, dated June 1, 1995; as revised by Notices of Status Change 747-52A2258 NSC 1, dated July 20, 1995; 747-52A2258 NSC 2, dated August 31, 1995; and 747-52A2258 NSC 03, dated December 14, 1995; and Boeing Service Bulletin 747-52-2260, Revision 1, dated March 21, 1996.

This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

(g) This amendment becomes effective on March 13, 2000.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Julie Alger, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe Branch, ANM-120S, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (425) 227-2779; fax (425) 227-1181.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on January 28, 2000.

Donald L. Riggin, Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.

IASA STUDY FOR ELECTRICALLY RELATED 747
EVENTS

FAA Original Records selected: 3,202 AND
FURTHER SORTED FOR ELECTRICAL EVENTS BY J
KING 9/20//00 IASA jking1@mediaone.net

SEE IMPORTANT NOTICE Page
27

Records Selected (27 pages) from FAA's original lot

Editor's reference notes

in upper left corner and in bold.

FAA Run Date: 06-Sep-2000

FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION Service Difficulty Report Data

747

RECORDS

FOR THE PERIOD OF: 1995 TO RUN DATE

SORTED BY: GROUP AND ATA

PREPARED FOR: JOHN KING This Report Derives
from Unverified Information Submitted By the CONTROL
NUMBER: FT2000-08-1736

Aviation Community without FAA review for Accuracy

NNUM	ACFT MAKE	ENG MAKE	COMP MAKE
PART NAME	PART CONDITION	STAGE OPS	T
TIME NATURE	CONDITION	PRECAUTION	PROC
OPCD	ACFT MODEL	ENG MODEL	COMP
MODEL	PART NUMBER	PART LOCATION	DIFF-
DATE	TSO		
ATA	ACFT SERIAL	ENGINE SERIAL	COMP
SERIAL	RECDO	PSL	OPER CONTROL NO FAA
REPORT NO.	REGION		

SUBMITTER	REMARKS		
Item 1 (ref pg 1)	ALSO SEE ITEM 42		
625US			
BOEING			
PACK	MALFUNCTIONED		
CLIMB	0	SMOKE	UNSCHE
LANDING			
NWAA 747251B			NR
1 01/17/1996	0		DUMP
FUEL			
2150 21707		GL	
9601056625	1996011900520	NM	

A AFTER TAKEOFF AND SUBSEQUENTLY TURNING OFF PACKS, SMOKE FILLED THE ENTIRE AIRCRAFT. WITH ALL PACKS SHOWING NORMAL OPERATING

TEMPERATURE, THE SMOKE DISSIPATED WITHIN A MINUTE. CREW FOLLOWED COCKPIT OPERATING PROCEDURE, DUMPED 177,000 POUNDS OF FUEL, AND RETURNED TO LAX. FOUND NR 1 PACK FILTER WITH OIL SMELL. NR 2 AND NR 3 PACKS CHECKED OK. DEFERRED NR 1PACK PER MEL 21-1A.

Item 2 (ref pg 12) REPEATER, ALSO SEE ITEM 17
604FF BOEING

			COFFEE MAKER
FAILED	CRUISE	0	
SMOKE	DEACTIVATE		
TWRA 747121			812020401
GALLEY 01/10/1996	0		
2530 19659		EA	15
TWRA9602	1996020900086	NM	

A JFK/LAX - DURING FLIGHT, MID-GALLEY COFFEE MAKER TRIPPED CIRCUIT BREAKER. WHEN CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS RESET, A STRONG ODOR OF ELECTRICAL SMOKE WAS NOTICED FOLLOWED BY VISUAL SMOKE. THE GALLEY WAS ISOLATED BY SHUTTING OFF GALLEY POWER. THE GALLEY WAS PLACARDED, 'DO NOT

USE' AND CIRCUIT BREAKER COLLARED. ELECTRICAL WIRING WAS CHECKED, NO FAULT WAS FOUND. ALL CANNON PLUGS WERE CHECKED FOR SECURITY, ALL OK. COFFEE MAKER WAS SENT TO VENDOR FOR REPAIR. (X)

Item 3 (ref pg 23)

859FT BOEING	CIRCUIT BREAKER
FAILED TAXI/GRND HDL	0
OTHER	RETURN TO BLOCK
P5CA 747123	10608061025
COCKPIT	03/03/1996 0

2450 20326 WP
P5CA9600154 1996030800635 NM

A AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO BLOCKS DUE TO FAILURE OF ALL RADIO/AIR DATA INSTRUMENTS ON CAPTAIN'S SIDE. FOUND ESSENTIAL RADIO BUS C/B OPEN, DUE TO HISTORY OF C/B OPENING REPLACED C/B. CHECKED SYSTEM PER MM 34-13-00 AND 24-50-02.

Item 4 (ref pg 24)

858FT BOEING

WIRING

SHORTING TAXI/GRND HDL 0 WARNING
INDICATION RETURN TO BLOCK
P5CA 747123 NR 2 LED
SWITCH 03/08/1996 0
2781 20109 WP 23
P5CA9600156 1996031500155 NM

A WHEN LEADING EDGE DEVICES WERE
EXTENDED, THE NR 2 INDICATED AMBER. AIRCRAFT
RETURNED TO BLOCKS. FOUND WIRING AT THE NR 2
POSITION SWITCH

WAS SHORTING TO GROUND. REPAIRED IAW
STANDARD WIRING PRACTICES 20-10-13.

Item 5 (ref pg 25) REPEATER, ALSO SEE ITEM 25
672UP BOEING

DECK HEATER

MALFUNCTIONED DESCENT 0
SMOKE OTHER
IPXA 747123
COCKPIT 03/08/1996 0

2140 20324 SO
UPS96405650 1996031500292 NM

A CREW REPORTED STRONG ELECTRICAL SMELL
BEGAN DURING DESCENT. ISOLATED TO RT UPPER
DECK HEATER. NO ABNORMAL INDICATIONS, BUT
BURNING
SMELL RECURRED WITH RT UPPER DECK HEATER ON.
DEFERRED RT UPPER DECK HEATER, M 10789 ASSIGNED
PER MEL SEQ NR 21-18-2.

Item 6 (ref pg 46) HISTORY ??? NO FURTHER SDRS NOTED

852FT
BOEING

SOLENOID FAILED
CRUISE 0 SMOKE
OTHER
P5CA 747122 A42006289400
COCKPIT 05/15/1996 0

3230 19757 WP
P5CA9600228 1996051600605 NM

A DURING CRUISE, EXPERIENCED SMOKE IN COCKPIT FOR 4 TO 5 MINUTES. SMOKE DISPERSED ON ITS OWN. UPON LANDING FOUND LANDING GEAR LEVER LOCK
CIRCUIT BREAKER POPPED, SOLENOID FAILED.
DEFERRED PER MEL 32-16 CATEGORY A, TO BE REPAIRED WITHIN 7 FLIGHT DAYS.

Item 7 (ref pg 46)

616FF BOEING

RELAY R352
FAILED CRUISE 0 WARNING
INDICATION UNSCHED LANDING
TWRA 747212B
BACR13CF2A CABIN 04/11/1996 0
MANUAL O2 MASK
2130 21939 EA 15
TWRA9620 1996051600838 NM

A DURING CRUISE AT FL 350, AIRCRAFT EXPERIENCED AN UNCONTROLLABLE CABIN CLIMB.

RAPID DECOMPRESSION AND EMERGENCY DESCENT CHECKLIST WAS ACCOMPLISHED. INITIATED DESCENT TO 10,000 FEET RIGHT OUTFLOW VALVE CIRCUIT BREAKER POPPED, RESCENT AND POPPED AGAIN. AIRCRAFT DIVERTED TO

MUSCAT (MCT) UPON LANDING AT MCT. THE ITEM WAS DEFERRED TO THE ODI 04593 AND THE RIGHT OUTFLOW VALVE LOCKED IN THE CLOSE POSITION. OXYGEN

MASK STOWED AND ITEM DEFERRED. DURING TROUBLESHOOTING, MAINTENANCE FOUND BURNT PIN ON RELAY R352 AND BURNT CONNECTOR AT CONTROLLER.

ALL ITEMS WERE REPLACED AS REQUIRED. PRESSURIZATION CHECK COMPLETED. AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO SERVICE. (M)

Item 8 (ref pg 48)

638FE BOEING

ELECT TEST BOX

FAILED APPROACH 0 NO
WARNING ABORTED APPROACH
FDEA 747245F LANDING
GEAR 05/20/1996 0
3260 21841 SO 25
96FDEA01003 1996052300393 NM

A UAM - IND LIGHTS PILOT AND FLIGHT ENGINEER C/B POPPED DURING FLT. INITIAL UNSAFE GEAR IND NO LIGHTS FOR GEAR DOWN, DOOR OPEN, OR GEAR. RESET C/B AND REPLACED 15 LIGHT BULBS. C/B POPPED AND RESET AGAIN AND AGAIN. REPLACED 4 BULBS, GEAR

DOWN IND 9 GREEN LIGHTS, GEAR RECYCLED 3 TIMES WITH 2 TOWER FLY-BYS TO CONFIRM POS GEAR DOWN IND. ENTER UAM, DURING T/SFOUND MASTER DIM TEST ELECTRONIC BOX WITH 5 DAMAGED CIRCUIT

CARDS, REPLACED MASTER DIM TEST ELECTRONIC BOX AND IND LIGHTS, PILOT AND FE C/B, GROUND TEST GOOD PER MM 33-11-01, ALSO SIMULATED LANDING

MODE, EXT FLAPS/SLATS ALL SYS NORMAL, C/NDUP REQUIRES FURTHER EVALUATION BY FLT CREW.
Item 9 (ref pg 50)

704CK BOEING

SMOKING	CRUISE	OVEN	69430
SMOKE	OTHER		
CKSA 747146		244E10001	AFT
GALLEY 03/27/1996	0		

2530 20528	GL
CKSA96030 1996053000379	NM

A VIDP - LEFT NR 2 OVEN (FACING FORWARD) AND LEFT NR 2 OVEN FACING AFT IN AFT GALLEY, BOTH EMITTED A LOUD RATTLING NOISE, GOT EXTREMELY HOT AND

EMITTED SMOKE WITH NOTHING HAVING BEEN PUT IN OVEN. LUBED NR 2 OVEN FACING FORWARD AND LUBED NR 2 OVEN FACING AFT IN AFT GALLEY.

OPS

CHECKED GOOD. (M)

Item 10 (ref pg 52)

602FF BOEING

			OVEN	
FAILED		CRUISE		0
	SMOKE		NONE	
TWRA	747124			2510003209
UPPER DECK	05/09/1996	0		
2530	19734		EA	
TWRA9627	1996060600643	NM		

A DURING CRUISE, CABIN ATTENDANT REPORTED ELECTRICAL SMOKE COMING FROM UPPER DECK OVEN 704 CONTROLLER. PULLED CIRCUIT BREAKER AND REMOVED OVEN. ITEM WAS DEFERRED TO PAD 3822002, MEL 25-21. OVEN REPLACED. (M)
 Item 11 (ref pg 55) ALSO SEE ITEM 55
 850FT BOEING

			WIRE	
SHORTED		CLIMB		0 WARNING
INDICATION		UNSCHEDED LANDING		
P5CA	747122			TE
FLAPS	06/12/1996	0		
DEACTIVATE				
2750	19755		WP	23
P5CA9600244	1996062000188	NM		

A EXPERIENCED FLAP FAILURE/ASYMMETRY LOCKOUT ON CLIMBOUT. RETRACTED T/E FLAPS USING ALTERNATE SYSTEM, DIVERTED TO BIRMINGHAM DUE TO ATLANTA WEATHER. TROUBLESHOT SYSTEM, FOUND LOCKOUT PROBLEMS STOPPED WHEN MODE 'S' RELAY CB PULLED. REPAIRED SHORTED WIRE FOUND NEAR

P54 PANEL, RELAY 4R914, OPS CHECK NORMAL PER MM 27-58-00.

Item 12 (ref pg 58)

624US BOEING TERMINAL BLOCK
FAILED CLIMB 0 FALSE
WARNING OTHER
NWAA 747251B NLG
INDICATION 06/15/1996 0

3260 21706 GL
9613376624 1996062700006 NM

A DURING CLIMB, THE RED NOSE LANDING GEAR LIGHT ILLUMINATED AFTER LANDING GEAR RETRACTION. RECYCLED LANDING GEAR AND LIGHT EXTINGUISHED.

AIRCRAFT CONTINUED TO MSP AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. REPAIRED WIRE AT TERMINAL STUD AND REPLACED TERMINAL BLOCK.

OPERATIONAL

CHECK GOOD.

Item 13 (ref pg 60)

601US BOEING OVERHEAT WIRE
FAILED CLIMB 0
FALSE WARNING UNSCHED LANDING
NWAA 747151 NR 3
HYD BAY 06/23/1996 0

2613 19778 GL
9613716601 1996062700179 NM

A DURING CLIMB, THE NR 3 HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

OVERHEAT LIGHT ILLUMINATED. FOLLOWED
COCKPIT OPERATING MANUAL PROCEDURES AND
LIGHT REMAINED
ILLUMINATED. AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO NRT AND
LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. REPAIRED WIRE FOR
OVERHEAT INDICATION IN THE NR 3 HYDRAULIC BAY,
OPERATIONAL CHECK GOOD.

Item 14 (ref pg 61) REPEATER, SEE ITEM 15

611FF BOEING PWA

ENGINE

MALFUNCTIONED APPROACH 0

SMOKE NONE

TWRA 747282B JT9D7A

LEFT 05/30/1996 0

7200 20502 663020 EA 15

TWRA9632 1996062700584 NE

A ON APPROACH AND DURING TAXI IN TO PARKING
SPOT, A SMELL OF SMOKE WAS DETECTED COCKPIT
GALLEY POWER WAS OFF SMELL MOSTLY CAME
FROM
CAPTAINS SIDE (EYEBALL VENTS). NR 2 ENGINE WAS
REPLACED AND R/U CHECK OK, ALL 3 PACKS WERE
RUN. OPS CHECK OK. NO SMOKE IN COCKPIT OR
CABIN.

(M)

Item 15 (ref pg 61) REPEATER, SEE ITEM 14

611FF BOEING

SWITCH

SHORTED APPROACH 0

SMOKE NONE

TWRA 747282B

8906K15597100

COCKPIT 05/31/1996 0

3340 20502 EA
TWRA9633 1996062700585 NM

A ON APPROACH, ELECTRICAL BURNING SMELL WAS NOTICED IN COCKPIT AFTER LEFT OUTBOARD LANDING LIGHT WAS TURNED ON DURING TAXI, LIGHT COULD NOT BE TURNED OFF WITH SWITCH. INSPECTED AREA AND FOUND SWITCH SHORTED AND FIRST INCH OF WIRE TO SWITCH BURNED. CIRCUIT BREAKER ON P6 PULLED AND COLLARED MEL 33-8-C. ON 6/2/96 THE SWITCH WAS REPLACED AND WIRE REPAIRED. OPS CHECK OF LANDING LIGHTS OK. AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO SERVICE. (M)

Item 16 (ref pg 67)
683UP BOEING

		SMOKE	
DEFECTIVE	CRUISE	0	
FALSE WARNING	OTHER		
IPXA 747121		2156646	CARGO
COMPT 06/28/1996	0		

2611 20353 SO 01
UPS96420569 1996070300586 NM

A INSPECTION TYPE PIRE, NR 5 MAIN DECK CARGO SMOKE DETECTOR ILLUMINATED. REPLACED NR 5 SMOKE DETECTOR (P/N 2156-646) (S/N 140) OFF. REPEATER, SEE ITEM 2
Item 17 (ref pg 71)
604FF BOEING

LOOSE	CRUISE	CONNECTOR
FALSE WARNING	NONE	0
TWRA 747121		SMOKE
ALARM 06/13/1996	0	

2611 19659	EA
TWRA9641 1996071000655	NM

A CREW REPORTED UPPER DECK SMOKE ALARM SOUNDS INTERMITTENTLY WITH NO INDICATION OF SMOKE PRESENT. DURING TROUBLESHOOTING, MAINTENANCE FOUND LOOSE CANNON PLUG CONNECTOR AT DETECTOR. SECURED CONNECTOR, OK. (M)

Item 18 (ref pg 71) ALSO SEE ITEM 58
619FF BOEING

CHAFED	CRUISE	SEAT ELEC CABLE
	SMOKE	0
TWRA 747212B		NONE
SEAT 3B 05/15/1996	0	60B4005212
AFFECTED		FLT CONT
2520 21316		EA
TWRA9629 1996071100004	NM	

A UPON DESCENT, FLIGHT ATTENDANT NOTICED A SPARK UNDER SEAT 3B. FLIGHT ATTENDANT NOTIFIED THE FLIGHT ENGINEER AND TECHNICAL REP, ONE FIRE BOTTLE WAS USED TO EXTINGUISH THE SPARK.

CANNON PLUG WAS DISCONNECTED TO SEAT ELECTRONICS BOX. REPAIR TO WIRE ACCOMPLISHED. NO FURTHER

PROBLEMS FOR REMAINDER OF FLIGHT. UPON LANDING, SEAT ELECTRONICS BOX CABLE WAS REPAIRED. OPS CHECK OK. MM 23-32-00. (X)

Item 19 (ref pg 75) REPEATER, ALSO SEE ITEMS 31, 52, 65, 66, 67

673UP BOEING		SMOKE	
INOPERATIVE	CLIMB		0
	FALSE WARNING	ACTIVATE FIRE	

EXT.

IPXA 747123		215680	
CARGO COMPT	07/16/1996	0	

2611 20325		SO	01
UPS96420611	1996071800540	NM	

A INSPECTION TYPE-N/A, LOWER AFT CARGO FIRE WARNING DURING CLIMB, BOTH FIRE BOTTLES DISCHARGED AS PER AOM. AIR TURN BACK TO SEL. REMOVED

AND REPLACED NR 4 SMOKE DETECTOR IN AFT LWR CARGO COMP, OPS CHK NORMAL PER B747 M/M. REMOVED AND REPLACED BOTH FIRE BOTTLES IAW MM

26-23-01, OPS SQUIB AND PRESS SYSTEM CHECK GOOD.

Item 20 (ref pg 75)

745SJ BOEING		SMOKE DET	
MALFUNCTIONED	CRUISE		0
FALSE WARNING	OTHER		

SRAA 747212B
DECK 06/17/1996 0

CARGO

2611 20888 GL
SRAA69606 1996071800929 NM

A DURING CRUISE NR 2 MAIN DECK SMOKE
DETECTOR LIGHT CAME ON, PHYSICALLY INSPECTED
MAIN CARGO DECK FOUND NO SIGN OF FIRE OR
SMOKE, ABNORMAL
PROCEDURE COMPLIED WITH, LIGHT WENT OUT
APPROXIMATELY 10 MINUTES LATER. MAINTENANCE
PERFORMED OPS CHECKED ON SMOKE DETECTION
SYSTEM

PER BMM CH 26-14-00, COULD NOT DUPLICATE
PROBLEM, OPS CHECKED GOOD. (M)

Item 21 (ref pg 83)

178UA BOEING PWA
HUMIDIFIER

FAILED CRUISE 0
SMOKE OTHER

UALA 747422 PW4056
COCKPIT 07/24/1996 0

2170 24385 WP
96UAL900570 1996080200549 NM

A SHORTLY AFTER LEVEL OFF AT CRUISE ALTITUDE,
SMOKE APPEARED IN COCKPIT. SMOKE CEASED
AFTER LOWER RECIRCULATION FAN SWITCHED OFF.
CAUSE
UNKNOWN. COULD NOT DUPLICATE CONDITION ON
GROUND. HUMIDIFIER WAS REPLACED AS A

PRECAUTION.

Item 23 (ref pg 108)
602FF BOEING

SMOKE

MALFUNCTION CRUISE 0
FALSE WARNING ACTIVATE FIRE EXT.
TWRA 747124 30231A7
CARGO COMPT 07/17/1996 0

2611 19734 837 EA
TWRA96178 1996081500605 NM

A IN CRUISE AT FL 390, LOWER FWD CARGO FIRE WARNING (BELL/LIGHTS) CAME ON. WHEN FIRE BOTTLE NR 1 WAS DISCHARGED, FIRE WARNING LIGHTS WENT OUT IMMEDIATELY. FM VOL, 1 PAGE 2.12.2 PROCEDURE WAS ACCOMPLISHED SUSPECTED FAULTY WARNING SYSTEM. F/E MADE PHYSICAL INSPECTION OF CARGO COMPARTMENT IN FLIGHT AND FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF HEAT, FIRE OR SMOKE. MAINTENANCE INSPECTED THE AREA, FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF HEAT, FIRE OR SMOKE. FOUND TO BE AN INDICATION PROBLEM. REMOVED AND REPLACED DETECTOR, SMOKE DETECTOR AMPLIFIER. OPS CHECK NORMAL PER MM 26-16-11.

AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO SERVICE. (M)

Item 24 (ref pg 130) ALSO SEE ITEMS 34, 39, 104
851FT BOEING

WIRE

CHAFED TAXI/GRND HDL 0 WARNING
INDICATION RETURN TO BLOCK
P5CA 747122 E/E

COMPT 08/31/1996 0

3260 19756 WP
P5CA9600670 1996090500421 NM

A PRIMARY DISPLAY AND CONTROL CIRCUIT
BREAKER TRIPPED. REPAIRED CHAFED WIRE AT
CONNECTOR IN LANDING GEAR CARD FILE
DISCONNECT PANEL,
OPERATIONAL CHECKED OK PER M/M 32-61-00.

Item 25 (ref pg 151) REPEATER, SEE ITEM 5
672UP BOEING

SMOKE
FAILED INSP/MAINT 0
FALSE WARNING NONE
IPXA 747123 AFT
CARGO COMPT 09/20/1996 0

2611 20324 SO
UPS96421143 1996092600307 NM

A LOWER CARGO LT BLINKED ON BRIEFLY
ACCOMPANIED BY A BELL. ALL OTHER INDICATIONS
WERE NORMAL. REMOVED AND REPLACED 6 AFT
SMOKE
DETECTORS, OPS CHECK GOOD.

Item 26 (ref pg 152)
152
305TW BOEING

SWITCH
0
FAILED CRUISE
SMOKE OTHER
TWAA 747284B 24454
COCKPIT 08/30/1996 0

3310 20742 CE 05
96ZZZX4898 1996092600662 NM

A JFK - FLT 885 - DURING CRUISE, LIGHT SWITCH
MFG PN 2445-4, ARCED AND EMITTED SMOKE AT THE
R4 PANEL. TURNED OFF LIGHT SWITCH. REPLACED
LIGHT
SWITCH AND LIGHTS; OPERATION CHECKED NORMAL.
CHECK C-3 - 2-15-96 - MCI.

Item 27 (ref 152)

53116 BOEING

WIRE
0
CHARRED CRUISE
SMOKE DEACTIVATE
TWAA 747131
GALLEY 09/03/1996 0

2530 20321 CE
96ZZZX4904 1996092600668 NM

A JFK - FLT 925 - DURING CRUISE, ELECTRICAL
ARCING AND SMOKE WAS EMITTED FROM WORK
LIGHT WIRING AT B-GALLEY COFFEEMAKER. SHUT OFF
GALLEY
ELECTRICAL POWER. FOUND CHARRED ELECTRICAL
WIRING INSULATION. REPAIRED WORK LIGHT AND
GALLEY POWER OPERATION CHECKED NORMAL.

CHECK

C-1 - 10-2-95 - JFK.

Item 28 (ref pg 167)

676UP BOEING

CIRCUIT BREAKER MELTED UNKNOWN

0 FLAME NONE

IPXA 747123

C338 P-14

CTR MAIN 10/16/1996 0

2460 20101

SO

UPS96421338 1996102400197 NM

INSPECTION TYPE N/A FOUND ACCESS

LEFT UPPER DECK C/B BURNED. REPLACED C338

BREAKER, UPPER DECK LIGHTS TEST GOOD.

DEFERRED P-14 C/B PANEL

NEEDS HOLE REPAIRED, DEFERRED NR

D117075.

Item 29 (ref pg 168) ALSO SEE ITEM 30

129TW

BOEING

CABLE

SHORTED

LANDING 0

SMOKE

ACTIVATE FIRE EXT.

TWAA 747128

C0294660

CABIN SEAT 08/30/1996 0

2520 21141

CE 05

96ZZZX5314 1996102400370 NM

A LGW - FLT 720 - DURING LANDING, SPARKS
EMITTED FROM UNDER SEAT 31-7. USED HALON
EXTINGUISHER. FOUND SEAT ELECTRONIC UNIT CABLE
SHORTED UNDER

CHAIR LEG, MFG P/N C02946-60. REPLACED SEAT

ELECTRONIC UNIT CABLE AND ALL SEAT CONTROLS
OPERATION CHECKED NORMAL. CHECK C-2 - 6-22-96 -
MZJ.

(X)

Item 30 ref pg 169) ALSO SEE ITEM 29
129TW BOEING

OVEN
SMOKING CRUISE 0
SMOKE DEACTIVATE
TWAA 747128
GALLEY 08/27/1996 0

2530 21141 CE 05
96ZZZX5315 1996102400371 NM

A JFK - FLT 903 - DURING CRUISE FIRST CLASS
GALLEY OVEN 1-6 EMITTED SMOKE. TURNED OFF
OVEN. FOUND FOOD SPILLAGE IN OVEN. CLEANED
OVEN, OVEN
OPERATION THEN CHECKED NORMAL. CHECK C-2 -
6-22-96 - MZJ.

Item 31 (ref pg 192) REPEATER, SEE ITEMS 19, 52, 65, 66,
67

673UP BOEING SMOKE
INOPERATIVE CRUISE 0 WARNING
INDICATION UNSCHED LANDING
IPXA 747123 CARGO
COMPT 11/30/1996 0 FALSE WARNING
ACTIVATE FIRE EXT.
2611 20325 SO 01
UPS96421689 1996120500261 NM

A AFT CARGO FIRE WARN LIGHT WITH BELL.

ACCOMPLISHED AFT CARGO FIRE CHK LIST PRIOR TO LANDING. REMOVED AND REPLACED LWR CARGO COMPT NR 6 SMOKE DETECTOR PER B 747 MM. OPS CK NORMAL, THIS CLEARS M119730.

Item 32 (ref pg 207) REPEATER, SEE ITEM 40
481EV BOEING

INOP CLIMB SMOKE 85210 FALSE
WARNING UNSCHED LANDING
EIAA 747132 30231R7B
CARGO 11/22/1996 0

2611 19896 NM 09
EIAA9687 1996122600231 NM

A LAX - ON CLIMB-OUT LWR AFT CARGO FIRE WARNING LIGHT CAME ON TWICE. NR 1 FIRE BOTTLE DID NOT DISCHARGE. NR 2 FIRE BOTTLE DISCHARGED NORMALLY. SMELL OF ELECT BURNING IN THE COCKPIT. RETURNED TO LAX. FOUND BOTH NR 1 AND NR 2 FIRE BOTTLES DISCHARGED. NR 1 BOTTLE AFT DISCHARGE PRESS SW INSTALLED IN NR 1 FWD POSITION. REPOSITIONED TO THE CORRECT POSITIONS. NO EVIDENCE OF FIRE SMOKE OR CHARRED WIRING FOUND.

4 HOUR OPS CHECK WAS OK. FOUND NR 3 AFT SMOKE DETECT LIGHT CAME ON AND STAYED ON DURING OPS CHECK. REPLACED NR 3 AFT SMOKE

DETECTOR.

(M)

Item 33 (ref pg 209)

4724U BOEING PWA
ALLIED SIGNA DRIVE UNIT FAILED
CLIMB 0 FLT CONT AFFECTED
UNSCHED LANDING
UALA 747122 JT9D7A 126344151U1
NR 2 LE FLAP 12/17/1996 0 WARNING
INDICATION
2750 19875 WP 29
96UAL900944 1996122600505 NM

A LEFT NR 2 LEADING EDGE FLAP WOULD NOT
RETRACT. RETURNED TO FIELD. *S/D* NR 2 LEFT
HAND LEADING EDGE FLAP DRIVE UNIT WAS
REPLACED. REMOVED
UNIT WAS DISASSEMBLED IN THE SHOP WITH NO
DEFECTS NOTED.

Item 34 (ref pg 209) REPEATER, SEE ITEMS 24, 39, 104

851FT BOEING

AIRSPPEED IND
INOPERATIVE TAKEOFF 0
OTHER ABORTED TAKEOFF
P5CA 747122 A4321710103 RT
COCKPIT 12/20/1996 0 RETURN
TO BLOCK
3414 19756 WP 23
P5CA9601251 1996122600523

A FIRST OFFICER'S AIRSPEED INDICATOR READ
ZERO WHILE CAPTAIN'S ASI INDICATED 100 KNOTS.
PERFORMED HIGH ENERGY STOP INSPECTION PER BAC

MM

05-51-10 AND REPLACED FIRST OFFICER'S AIR
SPEED INDICATOR PER BAC MM 34-13-05.

Item 35 (ref pg 210)

854FT BOEING

			RADAR SCOPE	
INOPERATIVE		DESCENT	0	
SMOKE		NONE		
P5CA	747122		MI585285	NR
1	12/19/1996	0		
3442	19754		WP	23
P5CA9601252	1996122600524			

A CAPTAIN'S WEATHER RADAR INDICATOR WENT
BLANK WITH SMELL OF SMOKE IN COCKPIT - PULLED
CIRCUIT BREAKER. REPLACED RADAR INDICATOR
PER BAC

MM 34-43-05 AND TESTED PER MM 34-43-00.

Item 36 (ref pg 210)

BOEING

OECO		TRANSFORMER	BURNT	
	TAXI/GRND HDL	0	OVER	
TEMP		NONE		
	747475	10615	10615	AOA
SENSOR	07/10/1996	0		
3418		3598	CA	
CA960711007	1996122600580			

W (CAN) LH ANGLE OF ATTACK SENSOR FAILED. ON
INSTALL ANGLE OF ATTACK SENSOR TRANSFORMER
OVERHEATED AND CAUSED BURNING SMELL IN
COCKPIT.

TRANSFORMER SELF DESTROYED. REPLACED.

Item 37 (ref pg 211)

303TW BOEING

FAILED	CRUISE	TEST BOX
		0
	SMOKE	OTHER
TWAA 747257B		65B4752230
COCKPIT	11/19/1996	0

3310 20116 CE 05
TWAA9614201 1997010200323 NM

A JFK - FLT 885 - DURING CRUISE, HAD SMOKE AND ELECTRICAL ODOR FROM ENGINEER PANEL. TURNED OFF WINDOW HEAT. FOUND OVERHEAT INDICATION IN

MASTER DIM AND TEST BOX, MFG P/N 65B47522-30. REPLACED MASTER DIM AND TEST BOX, CHECKED WINDOW HEAT WIRING. MASTER DIM AND TEST BOX AND

WINDOW HEAT OPERATION CHECKED NORMAL. CHECK C - 4-16-96 - MCI. (X)

Item 38 (ref pg 213)

627US BOEING PWA

	TR UNIT		
MALFUNCTIONED	LANDING	0	PARTIAL
RPM/PWR LOSS	OTHER		
NWAA 747251B	JT9D7Q		NR 1
ENGINE	12/30/1996	0	ENGINE
FLAMEOUT			
7830 21709	702055	GL	01
9627326627	1997010900167		NM

A DURING LANDING, ENGINE NR 1 REVERSER
 WOULD NOT STOW. DURING SECOND STOW ATTEMPT
 ENGINE NR 1 EXPERIENCED A COMPRESSOR STALL
 AND AUTO
 SHUTDOWN. MAINTENANCE INSPECTED ENGINE NR 1,
 OPS CHECK OF ENGINE AND REVERSER WAS
 PERFORMED. NO DISCREPANCIES NOTED.

Item 39 (ref pg 217) REPEATER, SEE ITEMS 24, 34, ref
 500

851FT BOEING

		AIR SPEED IND
READS HIGH	TAKEOFF	0
OTHER	ABORTED TAKEOFF	
P5CA 747122		A4321710002 RT
COCKPIT 01/09/1997	0	RETURN
TO BLOCK		
3414 19756		WP 23
P5CA9700019	1997011600339	

A AFTER APPLICATION ON TAKEOFF, THRUST FIRST
 OFFICERS AIRSPEED INDICATOR INDICATED 20 KNOTS
 FASTER THAN CAPTAINS, INCREASED TO 85 KNOTS
 THEN
 STUCK AT THAT INDICATION. ABORTED TAKEOFF.
 REPLACED FIRST OFFICERS AIRSPEED INDICATOR PER
 BOEING MAINTENANCE MANUAL 34-13-04.

Item 40 (ref pg 218) REPEATER, SEE ITEM 32.

481EV BOEING

		SMOKE	BAD
BULBS	INSP/MAINT	0	

INADEQUATE Q C NONE
EIAA 747132 30231R7
CARGO COMPT 11/26/1996 0

2611 19896 NM
EIAA9688 1997011600639 NM

A SYD - DURING DESCENT, MASTER FIRE WARNING LIGHTS CAME ON FOR TWO SECONDS, TWO DIFFERENT TIMES. NO OTHER INDICATIONS. DUE TO RECENT HISTORY, LOWER CARGO HOLDS WERE CHECKED. SHAKE CHECKS OF EXPOSED WIRING IN FORWARD AND AFT HOLDS CARRIED OUT. UNABLE TO FAULT DETECTOR LAMPS, CHECKED NR 3 AND BULK 'A', HAD INCORRECT LAMPS. RELAMPED SMOKE DETECTOR WITH BUILT IN SPARE LAMPS. CARD A8 INTERCHANGED

WITH APU LOOP 2. SYSTEM TEST CARRIED OUT FROM P4 SATISFACTORY. (M)

Item 41 (ref pg 226)

857FT BOEING

ACM
CONTAMINATED DESCENT 0
SMOKE DEACTIVATE
P5CA 747132 7192385 NR
1 PACK 01/19/1997 0

2150 20246 WP 23
P5CA9700039 1997013000204 NM

A SMOKE FILLED THE COCKPIT AT TOP OF DESCENT. TURNED AIR CONDITIONING PACKS OFF

AND CLOSED ENGINE BLEED AIR VALVES WITH NO EFFECT. SMOKE CLEARED BEFORE LANDING. PERFORMED MAINTENANCE CHECK OF AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM AND FOUND NR 1 WATER SEPARATOR CONTAMINATED.

DEACTIVATED NR 1 A/C PACK AND REACTIVATED NR 2 PACK.

Item 42 (ref pg 226) ALSO SEE ITEM 1
625US BOEING

AURAL WARN

MALFUNCTIONED TAKEOFF 0 FALSE
WARNING ABORTED TAKEOFF

NWAA 747251B

COCKPIT 01/18/1997 0

RETURN TO BLOCK

3150 21707 GL 01

9701406625 1997013000269 NM

A DURING TAKEOFF, THE AURAL WARNING HORN SOUNDED. AIRCRAFT ABORTED TAKEOFF AND RETURNED TO THE GATE. MAINTENANCE COULD NOT DUPLICATE

FAULT, OPERATIONAL CHECK OF AURAL WARNING SYSTEM AND FLAP SYSTEM CHECKED GOOD.

Item 43 (ref pg 258) ALSO SEE ITEM 61
859FT BOEING

WIRE HARNESS

CHAFED INSP/MAINT 0
OTHER NONE

P5CA 747123 LT

WING 03/14/1997 0

2460 20326 WP
P5CA9700469 1997040300806 NM

A NR 1 RESERVE TANK HAS BARE WIRE AND HAS SIGN OF ARCING RIB NR 1196. REPAIRED PER WPM 20-10-13.

Item 44 (ref pg 260)

173UA BOEING PWA
AMP CABLE SPLICE
DAMAGED INSP/MAINT 30722
OTHER NONE
UALA 747422 PW4056 2771611 BS
1500 03/08/1997 0

2420 24380 WP
97UAL900237 1997041700153 NM

A 3/8/97 MECHANIC DISCOVERED HEAT DAMAGED NR 1 APU GENERATOR FEEDER CABLE SPLICES. SPLICES INSTALLED AT FACTORY. DURING C-CHECK, SPLICES COMMON TO APU GENERATOR NR 2 WERE FOUND TO HAVE SIMILAR DAMAGE. DAMAGE WAS IDENTIFIED BY SPLIT INSULATION AND MELTED SPACERS. ALL SPLICES (6 TOTAL) WERE REPLACED AND REPLACED INSULATION AT OAK. OPERATION CHECKS NORMAL.

Item 45 (ref pg 263)

603FF
BOEING
SWITCH FAILED
APPROACH 0 SMOKE
OTHER

TWRA 747130 8906R1559
COCKPIT 03/21/1997 0

3340 19746 EA 15
TWRA9735 1997041700536 NM

A DURING FINAL APPROACH, A LOUD POP WAS HEARD AND ELECTRICAL SMOKE WAS NOTED. SMELL WAS NOTED FOR A SHORT TIME. LOWERED PILOT'S

OVERHEAD PANEL AT P7 AND P12 CHECKED FOR BURNED WIRES OR SWITCHES. FOUND RT INBOARD LANDING LIGHT SWITCH BURNED, REPLACED SWITCH. (X)

Item 46 (ref pg 266)

675UP

BOEING

SMOKE DEFECTIVE
CRUISE 0 FALSE WARNING
NONE

IPXA 747123 215680 CARGO
COMPT 04/14/1997 0

2611 20390 SO 01
UPS97422605 1997042400102 NM

A INSPECTION TYPE-N/A, DURING CRUISE THE AFT CARGO FIRE LOWER LIGHT CAME ON INTERMITTENTLY FOR ABOUT A 5 MIN PERIOD OF TIME

IT DID NOT COME ON
AGAIN UNTIL OUR DESCENT INTO KIX AND WAS
INTERMITTENT AGAIN. *S/D* REPLACED 4 SMOKE
DETECTORS, OPS GOOD M128482 CLEARED PLACARD.

REMOVED (P/N 2156-80) (S/N OFF 108) (S/N ON 112) (S/
N OFF 114) (S/N ON 154) (S/N OFF 115) (S/N ON 117).

Item 47 (ref pg 269)

177UA BOEING PWA SMOKE
MALFUNCTIONED CRUISE 0
SMOKE ACTIVATE FIRE EXT.
UALA 747422 PW4056 5L
LAVATORY 04/14/1997 0 NO WARNING

2611 24384 WP
97UAL900286 1997050100077 NM

A SMOKE ALARM - DETECTOR DID NOT ACTIVATE
WITH FIRE AND SMOKE IN GARBAGE BIN AT 5L
LAVATORY. SUPPLEMENTAL DATA UPDATE SMOKE
DETECTOR

MAY OR MAY NOT ACTIVATE DEPENDENT ON THE
SEVERITY OF THE SMOKE. FIRE EXTINGUISHER DID
NOT ACTIVATE WHICH INDICATES HEAT FACTOR WAS
NOT

HIGH ENOUGH TO DISCHARGE HALON AGENT (174
DEGREES F.) AN EG CALLOUT ISSUED TO RECHECK
ALL AFFECTED SYSTEMS.

Item 48 (ref pg 274)

607PE BOEING
FAN
FAILED TAXI/GRND HDL 0
SMOKE NONE
TWRA 747238B 6054572

CABIN 04/15/1997 0

2121 20011 EA
TWRA9761 1997050100816 NM

A SMOKE IN COCKPIT WHILE ON GROUND AT MED. SUBMITTER STATES, SUSPECT RECIRC FAN NR 1. DEFERRED AS MEL 21-21-D WHICH IS FOR A GASPER FAN.

GASPER FAN REPLACED 4-13-97. (M)

Item 49 (ref pg 281) ALSO SEE ITEM 50

482EV BOEING CIRCUIT
BREAKER CHARRED CRUISE 0
SMOKE OTHER
EIAA 747212B BACC18W7
NR 2 HF 03/23/1997 0

2310 20713 NM 09
EIAA970081 1997052200356

A KLAX - LOG PAGE: F27562 - DURING CRUISE FLIGHT, A STRONG ELECTRICAL ODOR WAS NOTICED BY THE CREW EMANATING FROM THE COCKPIT. THE ODOR CAME

ON INTERMITTENTLY. UNABLE TO DETERMINE THE SOURCE OR ORIGIN BY ISOLATING OR TURNING OFF CERTAIN COMPONENTS. INSPECTED BEHIND ALL CIRCUIT

BREAKER PANELS. FOUND HF NR 2 AC C/B DISCOLORED AND CHARRED. REPLACED C/B. OPERATIONAL CHECKS GOOD, ALL OTHER AREAS CHECKED OK. (X)

Item 50 (ref pg 293) ALSO SEE ITEM 49

482EV BOEING PDU
FAILED CLIMB 0 WARNING INDICATION
NONE
EIAA 747212B 12634415 RT LE
FLAP 02/06/1997 1810

2780 20713 NM 09
EIAA970015 1997060500836 NM

A LCK - LOG PAGE: E04038 - ON DEPARTURE, GROUP NR 1 LEADING EDGE DEVICE LT WING HAD INTRANSIT LIGHT ILLUMINATE ABOUT 4 MINUTES AFTER

RETRACTION. FLAP WAS RETRACTED BY THE ALTERNATE METHOD. ALTERNATE METHOD WAS USED FOR LEADING EDGE FLAPS FOR REMAINDER OF FLIGHT

SUCCESSFULLY. AFTER LANDING WHEN ATTEMPTING TO RETRACT LEADING EDGE FLAPS BY ALTERNATE METHOD, GROUP NR 3 LT WING INTRANSIT LIGHT

REMAINED ON AND GROUP NR 3 RT WING EXTENDED LIGHT REMAINED ON. GROUP 3 ALT L/E CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIPPED. REPLACED NR 3 R/T L/E PDU. OPS CHECK NORMAL, RII ACCOMPLISHED. (X)

Item 51 (ref pg 317)

617FF BOEING

A-14 CARD
BURNED CRUISE 0
SMOKE NONE
TWRA 747121 65B475291
COCKPIT 06/12/1997 0

3310 19650 EA
TWRA97147 1997070300501 NM

A DURING CRUISE FLT LVL390, SMOKE AND EXTREME ELECTRICAL BURNING SMELL SEEMED TO BE COMING FROM BEHIND FLIGHT ENGINEERS PANEL. SMOKE SOON STOPPED. NO EVIDENCE COULD BE FOUND. UPON INSPECTION, FOUND A-14 CARD BURNED. REPLACED CARD AS PER 33-11-03. ALL OPERATIONAL CHECKED NORMAL. A/C RETURN TO SERVICE. (M)

Item 52 (ref pg 325) ALSO SEE ITEMS 19, 31, 65, 66, 67

673UP BOEING

		FIRE LIGHT	
DEFECTIVE	UNKNOWN	0	FALSE
WARNING	NONE		
IPXA 747123			CARGO
COMP 06/29/1997	0		

2612 20325 SO 01
UPS97423604 1997071000130 NM

A INSPECTION TYPE:N/A, DET CARGO FIRE LIGHT AND BELL ON INTERMITTENTLY. CLEANED CONTACTS ON A-8 LWR SMOKE DETECTOR CARD, RELAMPED NR 5 SMOKE DETECTOR SYS, OPS OK PER MM 26-00-00.

Item 53 (ref pg 325) REPEATER, SEE ITEM 54
3203Y BOEING

		CADC	
FAILED	CRUISE	0	
OTHER	NONE		
P5CA 747128		19039253	RT
COCKPIT 06/30/1997	0		

3417 19751 WP 23
P5CA9701217 1997071000141

A FIRST OFFICER'S ALTIMETER READS 300 FT HIGH AT 31,000 FEET, MACH METER READS .03 HIGH, AND IAS READS NORMAL. REPLACED CADC IAW MAINTENANCE MANUAL 34-12-01 PG 401, OPERATIONAL CHECK PER 34-12-00 PG 508-5.

Item 54 (ref pg 325) REPEATER, SEE ITEM 53
3203Y BOEING

		CADC	
MALFUNCTIONED	CRUISE	0	
OTHER	NONE		
P5CA 747128		19039254	
NR 1 07/02/1997	0		

3417 19751 WP 23
P5CA9701270 1997071000194

A CAPTAINS ALTIMETER 900 FT LOW AT FL 370, STANDBY MODE NO HELP, MACH NR'S .4 LOW, TRUE AIRSPEED LOW 30 KNOTS, ALTERNATE STATIC SOURCE NO HELP.

REMOVED AND REPLACED NR 1 CADC PER

MAINTENANCE MANUAL 34-12-01 PAGE 401.
OPERATIONAL CHECKED PER MAINTENANCE MANUAL
34-12-00 PAGE 501.

LEAK CHECKED PER MAINTENANCE MANUAL
34-11-00 PAGE 501.

Item 55 (ref pg 332) ALSO SEE ITEM 11

850FT BOEING ALTIMETER
STICKING DESCENT 0 OTHER
NONE
P5CA 747122 98020702 RT
COCKPIT 07/17/1997 0

3416 19755 WP 23
P5CA9701301 1997072400886

A ON DESCENT, FIRST OFFICER'S ALTIMETER
STICKING FOR APPROXIMATELY 500 FT. REMOVED
AND REPLACED ALTIMETER PER BOEING M/M34-13-04
AND

OPERATIONAL CHECKED PER M/M 34-17-04.

Item 56 (ref pg 341) REPEATER, SEE ITEMS 98, 101

6186 BOEING AIR ODOR
CRUISE 0 SMOKE
OTHER
TWRA 747212B
CABIN 07/25/1997 0

2120 21439 EA
TWRA97169 1997081400096 NM

A CABIN STAFF REPORTED A STRONG SMELL OF
SOMETHING OVERHEATED OR BURNT IN THE CABIN,
AFT END OF A-ZONE. ALSO, A PASSENGER

REPORTED

SMELLING SOMETHING HOT OR OVERHEATING RIGHT SIDE E-ZONE. TURNED OFF GALLEY POWER. RE-CIRC FANS AND TURNED ON GALLEY/LAV EXHAUST FAN.

SMELLS THEN DISSIPATED. INSPECTED A-ZONE RIGHT SIDE WALLS, LIGHTS AND BALLAST, OPEN OVERHEADPANELS, INSPECTED LOWER 41, CHECK RECIRC FANS,

GASPER FANS. CHECKED UPSTAIRS LAV AND CHECKED ALL ZONES. FOUND ALL NORMAL. ACFT RETURNED TO SERVICE. (X)

Item 57 (ref pg 343) REPEATER, SEE ITEMS 88, 111

852FT BOEING OVERHEAT WIRE
SHORTED TAXI/GRND HDL 0 OVER
TEMP NONE

P5CA 747122 LT
WING 08/09/1997 0 FALSE WARNING

2613 19757 WP

P5CA9701401 1997081400977 NM

A INTERMITTENT LEFT WING OVERHEAT LIGHT ON. ISOLATION VALVE AND ENGINES 1 AND 2 BLEED VALVES CLOSED. FOUND WIRE W640-1W728-18R SHORTED,
REPAIRED WIRING PER BAC WDM AND OPS CHECK PERFORMED IN CONJUNCTION WITH HIGH POWER ENGINE RUN OPS NOW NORMAL. CLEARED DEFERAL NOTED

IN REPORT P5CA9701389.

Item 58 (ref pg 344) ALSO SEE ITEM 18

303TW BOEING

ELECTRONIC UNIT

FAILED CRUISE 0
SMOKE OTHER
TWAA 747257B 1103460121
CABIN 07/28/1997 0

2520 20116 CE 05
TWAA9785001 1997082100422 NM

A JFK - FLT 883 - DURING CRUISE, SEAT
ELECTRONIC UNIT AND CABLE EMITTED SPARKS AT
SEAT 23-2. REMOVED AND REPLACED SEAT
ELECTRONIC UNIT, MFG PN
1103460-121, MANUFACTURED BY HUGHES AIRCRAFT,
AND POWER CABLE, MFG PN C02946-54. OPERATIONAL
CHECK NORMAL. CHECK C - 3-20-97 - JFK. (X)

Item 59 (ref pg 350)

629US BOEING PWA IND SWITCH
MALFUNCTIONED CLIMB 0 WARNING
INDICATION UNSCHED LANDING
NWAA 747251F JT9D7J NR
1 ENGINE 08/31/1997 0 ENGINE
SHUTDOWN
8012 22388 662707 GL
9716636729 1997091100030 NM

A AT FL250, THE NR 1 ENGINE START VALVE OPEN
LIGHT ILLUMINATED. CREW SHUT DOWN THE ENGINE
AND RETURNED TO ANC WITHOUT INCIDENT.

MAINTENANCE REPLACED THE NR 1 ENGINE START
VALVE INDICATING SWITCH. EXACT PART CAUSING

PROBLEM TO BE DETERMINED.

Item 60 (ref pg 353) HISTORY ?? NO EARLIER SDR
NOTED HERE

674UP BOEING

			AIR DISTR	
ODOR		CLIMB	0	
OTHER		NONE		
IPXA	747123F			FLIGHT
DECK	09/09/1997	0		
2120	20100		SO	01
UPS97424402	1997091800290	NM		

A STRONG FUEL ODOR ON FLIGHT DECK STARTING
AT ROTATION AND INITIAL CLIMB ODOR DISSIPATED
AFTER PACKS TURNED ON REPEAT WRITE UP SEE
PAGE

992546. INSPECTED BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER
FUELING E/E COMPARTMENT WING TO BODY FAIRINGS
AIR CONDITIONING PACK BAYS NO FUEL SEAPS OR
LEAKAGE NOTED. SUBMITTER STATES, SUSPECT
ODOR FROM PREVIOUS MAINT.

Item 61 (ref pg 359) ALSO SEE ITEM 43

859FT BOEING

			WIRE	
CHAFED		CLIMB	0	
	FALSE WARNING		UNSCHE	
LANDING				
P5CA	747123			RT
WING	09/21/1997	0		
2613	20326		WP	23
P5CA9701591	1997092500774	NM		

A CHAFED WIRE CAUSED RIGHT WING OVERHEAT WARNING LIGHT TO ILLUMINATE AFTER TAKEOFF. FOLLOWED PROCEDURES PER CHECKLIST AND LIGHT

REMAINED ON. RETURNED TO DEPARTURE STATION. WIRE CHAFED DUE TO RUBBING ON CLAMP, REPAIRED PER BAC WDM 26-18-11 AND TESTED OK PER BAC MM 26-18-00.

Item 62 (ref pg 359) ALSO SEE ITEMS 18, 58, 63
668US BOEING

			ELECT BOX
FAILED	CRUISE	0	
SMOKE	ACTIVATE FIRE EXT.		
NWAA 747451			SEAT
10D 09/23/1997	0		DEACTIVATE
2330 24223		GL	01
9717936308	1997100200111		

A DURING CRUISE, SMOKE ACCUMULATED FROM SEAT 10D. FLIGHT CREW UTILIZED PORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHER AND DEACTIVATED PERSONAL VIDEO SYSTEM.

AIRCRAFT CONTINUED TO DESTINATION AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. MAINTENANCE REPLACED SEAT ELECTRONICS BOX AND INSPECTED AREA FOR ANY DEFECTS. NO FURTHER DEFECTS WERE FOUND, OPERATIONAL CHECK GOOD.

Item 63 (ref pg 367) ALSO SEE ITEMS 18, 58, 62
638US BOEING

			ELECT BOX
WATER CONTAM	CRUISE	0	
SMOKE	UNSCHED LANDING		
NWAA 747251B			

CABIN 10/10/1997 0 DUMP
FUEL
2330 23549 GL 01
9718996638 1997101600599

A DURING CRUISE, SMOKE ACCUMULATED FROM SEAT 87AB. CREW WAS UNABLE TO LOCATE SOURCE OF SMOKE. AIRCRAFT DIVERTED TO MSP AND DUMPED FUEL DOWN TO 155K. AIRCRAFT LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. FOUND LIQUID SPILL ON SEAT ELECTRONICS BOX. REPLACED SEB. MAINTENANCE REPLACED THE

VIDEO MONITORS AND VEB AS A PRECAUTION, OPERATIONAL CHECK GOOD.

Item 64 (ref pg 368)

672UP BOEING

FIRE WARNING
ACTIVATED CRUISE 0 FALSE
WARNING OTHER
IPXA 747123
COCKPIT 10/13/1997 0

2612 20324 SO 01
UPS97424683 1997101600785 NM

A INSPECTION TYPE-N/A, DURING CRUISE MOMENTARY MASTER FIRE WARNING LIGHT ILLUMINATED AND BELL SOUNDED. UNABLE TO DETERMINE THE SOURCE, ALL FIRE SYSTEMS TESTED NORMAL. DID NOT OCCUR AGAIN. INSPECTED FIRE WARNING LOGIC CARDS, NO DEFECTS NOTED.

Item 65 (ref pg 372) REPEATER, SEE ITEMS 19, 31, 52, 66, 67

673UP BOEING

			SMOKE DET
MALFUNCTIONED	CLIMB	0	FALSE
WARNING	OTHER		
IPXA	747123		CARGO
COMPT	10/22/1997	0	

2611 20325 SO 01
UPS97424757 1997103000084 NM

A INSPECTION TYPE-N/A, ON CLIMBOUT THE NR 4 MAIN DECK CARGO SMOKE DET LIGHT ILLUMINATED MOMENTARILY. THE LIGHT WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE MASTER FIRE LIGHTS BELLS AND HORN ACTIVATING MOMENTARILY. SYSTEM WAS TESTED, OPS NORMAL. COMMENT NOTED BY MAINT ALL MAIN DECK SMOKE DETECTORS TEST GOOD WITH NO FALSE DETECTIONS.

Item 66 (ref pg 374) REPEATER, SEE ITEMS 19, 31, 52, 65, 67

673UP BOEING

			SMOKE
MALFUNCTIONED	CLIMB	0	
FALSE WARNING	OTHER		
IPXA	747123F		
COCKPIT	10/23/1997	0	

2611 20325 SO

UPS97424767 1997103000261 NM

A ON TAKEOFF JUST PAST LIFTOFF, GOT
MOMENTARY MASTER CAUTION AND FIRE BELL,
SUSPECT CAUSED BY MAIN DECK SMOKE DET AS PER
LOGPAGE 993132

WRITE UP. ALL SMOKE DETECTORS TEST OPS CK OK.
NO FAULTS NOTED REF MM 26-14-00.

Item 67 (ref pg 379) REPEATER, SEE ITEMS 19, 31, 52,
65, 66

673UP BOEING FIRE WARNING
ACTIVATED TAKEOFF 0 FALSE
WARNING OTHER
IPXA 747123
COCKPIT 10/27/1997 0

2612 20325 SO

UPS97425016 1997111300690 NM

A INSPECTION TYPE-N/A, FIRE BELL AND LIGHT ON
TAKEOFF ROLL SOURCE UNKNOWN REPEAT (NOT
ENGINES). REMOVED, CLEANED AND RESEATED FIRE
DETECTION

CHORD A8, OPS CHECKED GOOD PER MM 26-14-00.

Item 68 (ref pg 386) ALSO SEE ITEMS 106, 161, 171

471EV BOEING

AIR
SMOKE CRUISE 0
SMOKE OTHER
EIAA 747273C
LAVATORY 11/03/1997 0

2120 20651 NM 09

EIAA970204 1997120400856 NM

A YSSY - ONE HOUR OUT OF SYDNEY, THAT CAP AND FE SAW SLIGHT SMOKE COMING FROM THE LAV AREA, NOTHING COULD BE FOUND WRONG. VISUAL

INSPECTION OF FLIGHT DECK AND LAV AREAS FOUND NO BURNED WIRES OR ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT. ALL SYSTEMS OPERATIONALLY PUT ON LINE AND FURTHER INSPECTION FOUND NORMAL. (M)

Item 69 (ref pg 387) ALSO SEE ITEM 73
632US BOEING

		CIRCUIT	
TRIPPED	CLIMB		0
WARNING INDICATION	UNSCHE	LANDING	
NWAA	747251B		
COCKPIT	12/02/1997		0

2822 23112 GL
9722486632 1997120400995 NM

A DURING CLIMB, PILOTS NOTICED SEVERAL BOOST PUMP LOW PRESSURE LIGHTS ILLUMINATED. AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO MNL AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. CLOSED CIRCUIT BREAKERS, OPERAITONAL CHECK OK.

Item 70 (ref pg 390)
BOEING

		LIGHT	
SMOKING	NOT REPORTED		0
SMOKE	NONE		
747338		65B115210	PASS

COMPART 03/07/1997 0

3320 AU S
AU970362 1997121800244 NM

W (AUS) CABIN SIDEWALL LIGHTING SYSTEM
LIGHT TUBE TOMBSTONE LOCATED ATSEAT POSITION
30ABC SMOULDERING

Item 71 (ref pg 391)

BOEING PWA
SMOKE

INTERMITTENT CRUISE 0 FALSE
WARNING UNSCHED LANDING
747233B JT9D7 FWD

CARGO 08/22/1997 0

ACTIVATE FIRE EXT.

2611 P689576 CA

CA970905007 1997121800407 NM

W (CAN) FORWARD CARGO FIRE LIGHT CAME ON IN
FLIGHT. BOTH FIRE AGENTS DISCHARGED. FLIGHT
DIVERTED, INSPECTED ON RUNWAY, NOFIRE.

CHANGED MAIN

AND ALTERNATE CARGO FIRE BOTTLES AND SQUIBS.
FORWARD CARGO SMOKE DETECTORS AND NR1 AND
NR2 SMOKE DETECTOR AMPLIFIER.

Item 72 (ref pg 400)

BOEING

WIRE FAILED

INSP/MAINT 0

OTHER NONE

747312 6098976 11892221 FUEL

BOOST PUMP 04/24/1997 0

2822 11892221 AU S
AU970760 1998011500139 NM

W (AUS) NO2 FUEL BOOST PUMP ELECTRICAL
WIRING INSULATION FAILED DUE TO CONDUCTIVE
CORROSION AT THE WIRE TERMINAL ASSEMBLY

Item 73 (ref pg 401) ALSO SEE ITEM 69

632US BOEING

CONNECTOR

SHORTED CRUISE 0

SMOKE ACTIVATE FIRE EXT.

NWAA 747251B

CABIN 01/10/1998 0

3320 23112 GL 01

9800546632 1998011500871 NM

A DURING CRUISE, SMOKE OCCURRED ABOVE SEAT
4JK. FLIGHT CREW UTILIZED PORTABLE
EXTINGUISHER TO ELIMINATE SMOKE. FLIGHT CREW
NOTICED CIRCUIT

BREAKER HAD POPPED AND DID NOT RESET.

AIRCRAFT CONTINUED TO DESTINATION AND LANDED
WITHOUT INCIDENT. MAINTENANCE REPAIRED AND
RESTOWED WIRING AND CAPPED AT THE COLUMN
TIMER DECODER, OPERATIONAL CHECK GOOD.

Item 74 (ref pg 408) ALSO SEE ITEMS 114, 115

921FT BOEING

WARNING LIGHT

ILLUMINATED CLIMB 0 FALSE

WARNING UNSCHED LANDING

P5CA 747238B LT/RT

MLG 01/26/1998 0
3260 21575 WP 23
P5CA9800050 1998012900825 NM

A LEFT WING AND RIGHT WING PRIMARY AND ALTERNATE TILT LIGHTS ON. ALSO, LEFT AND RIGHT WING LANDING GEAR DOOR PRIMARY AND ALTERNATE LIGHTS ON WHEN THE GEAR HANDLE PLACED TO THE OFF POSITION. LEFT AND RIGHT WING TILT AND DOOR SENSORS CHECKED OK, GEAR RETRACTION AND EXTENSION CHECKED NORMAL PER BOEING MAINTENANCE MANUAL 32-32-00, 32-33-00 AND 32-34-00 UNABLE TO DUPLICATE FAULT.

Item 75 (ref pg 409)

193UA BOEING PWA
WARNING SYST
ACTIVATED TAKEOFF 0 FALSE
WARNING ABORTED TAKEOFF
UALA 747422 PW4056 TE
FLAPS 08/02/1997 0 RETURN
TO BLOCK
3150 26890 WP
97UAL900589 1998020500681 NM

A FLAPS WARNING CAME ON WITH FULL POWER ON TAKEOFF. ABORTED TAKEOFF AT 100 KTS. *S/D* COULD NOT DUPLICATE. RECYCLED FMC CIRCUIT BREAKERS, PREFORMED GROUND TEST OF FMC'S, FCC L, R, C GROUND TEST AND TAKEOFF WARNING CONFIDENCE TEST. ALL SYSTEMS TESTED OK.

Item 76 (ref pg 427) ALSO SEE ITEMS 18, 58, 62, 63
159UA BOEING PWA WIRING
FAILED NOT REPORTED 0
SMOKE ACTIVATE FIRE EXT.
UALA 747238B JT9D7J
CABIN 06/11/1997 0

2520 21140 WP
97UAL900449 1998021100983 NM

A OBSERVED SMOKE AND SPARKS AT SEAT 2EF.
FLIGHT ATTENDANT USED FIRE EXTINGUISHER ON
FLOOR. NO SIGN OF FIRE. POWER TO SEAT SHUT OFF.

S/D

REPAIRED WIRING AT SEAT 2EF, OPS CHECK OK.

Item 77 (ref pg 429) REPEATER, ALSO SEE ITEMS 79,
84, 99, 122

608FF BOEING COMPUTER
FAILED CRUISE 0
SMOKE NONE
TWRA 747131 9650184002
COCKPIT 02/01/1998 0

3416 19672 EA 15
TWRA9805 1998030500927

A TWO HOURS AFTER TAKEOFF AT 35.0 FT, ALT
ALERT AND ALT ALERT PUSH TO RESET LIGHTS CAME
ON, WARNING TONE SOUNDED. APPROX 1 MINUTE
LATER
ACRID SMELL OF HOT ELEC INSULATION WAS
NOTICED BY F/E. CAPT FOUND ALT ALERT COMP C/B
POPPED ON PT7. RESET AND 20 SECONDS LATER

LIGHTS

REILLUMINATED, TONE SOUNDED AND C/B POPPED AGAIN APPROX 30 SECONDS LATER SAME SMELL. SMELL DISSIPATED AFTER 1 MINUTE. CHECKED AC/DC POWER AND GRD TO ALT ALER COMP. WIRES CHECKED OK PER W/D 34-12-41 PAGE 2. REMOVED AND REPLACED ALT ALERT COMPT PER MM 34-16-00 PAGE 501. OPS

CHECK OK. (M)

Item 78 (ref pg 431)

606FF BOEING

			AIR
ODOR		CRUISE	0
	SMOKE		OTHER
TWRA	747136		
CABIN	02/28/1998	0	

2120	20273		EA	15
TWRA9810	1998031900396	NM		

A PASSENGERS AND FLIGHT ATTENDANTS REPORTED A SMELL OF ELECTRICAL BURNING AROUND L2 AND R2. TURNED OFF ALL RECIRCULATING FANS AND GASPER FAN, SMELL STOPPED. INSPECTED ALL RECIR AND GASPER FANS FOR DEFECTS AND OPS, ALL NORMAL. PERFORMED PACK BURN OUT, ALL PACKS AND ENGINES,

NO ODOR NOTED AFTER BURN OUT. (X)

Item 79 (ref pg 431) REPEATER, ALSO SEE ITEMS 77, 84, 99, 122

608FF BOEING

EATON PSS SWITCH SHORTED

CRUISE 0 SMOKE
NONE
TWRA 747131 24451 24451 R3
AUDIO CTRL P 02/21/1998 0

2350 19672 EA
TWRA9809 1998031900397

A DURING CRUISE, R-3 AUDIO CONTROL PANEL (PSS
PWR) SWITCH SHORTED OUT CAUSING SMOKE.
REMOVED THE UNIT. STORED UNIT IN COCKPIT.
FOUND PSS
SWITCH CONTACT BURNED. REMOVED AND
REPLACED PSS SWITCH. CHECKED WIRING PER WDW
23-30-12. WIRING OK AND OPS CHECK PSS OK PER MM
23-34-00.

ALL FUNCTIONS NORMAL. (X)
Item 80 (ref pg 432)
853FT BOEING

CONNECTOR
CONTAMINATED TAKEOFF 0 FALSE
WARNING RETURN TO BLOCK
P5CA 747122
BACC63AF243058 NR 4 ENGINE 03/13/1998 0

8012 19753 WP 23
P5CA9800505 1998032600261 NM

A NR 4 ENG START VALVE OPEN LIGHT ON.
RETURNED TO RAMP. FAULT T/S CARRIED OUT.
SHAKE CHECK OF WIRING ON ENG STRUT PLUGS AND
ENG DISCONNECT
PLUGS UNABLE TO REPRODUCE DEFECT. ENG

DISCONNECT PLUG D0014P DISCONNECTED AND
FOUND STRUT CONNECTOR D0044J BADLY
CONTAMINATED AND

INSULATION ROTTEN. CHANGED CONNECTOR PER
WDM 20-11-11 AND SYSTEM CHECKED OK ON ENG RUN.
Item 81 (ref pg 439) HISTORY ?? NO EARLIER SDRs
NOTED

BOEING

GENERATOR

WIRING TAXI/GRND HDL 0 WARNING
INDICATION RETURN TO BLOCK

7474F6 NR 4
03/23/1998 0
2430 CA
CA980325010 1998041000363 NM

W (CAN) HISTORY OF NR 4 GEN AND BUS NR 4
FAULT PROBLEMS. MANY UNITS CHANGED, NO FIX,
HIGH RESISTANCE BETWEEN NR 4 GCU AND CURRENT
LIMITER,
ON GOING.

Item 82 (pg pg 440)
522MC BOEING

AIR

ODOR CLIMB 0
SMOKE NONE

UIEA 7472D7B
COCKPIT 01/28/1998 0

2120 21783 EA
UIEA9801 1998041000772 NM

A FRA/SHJ - FLT TG891 - AFTER TOP OF DESCENT, A

STRONG ELECTRICAL SMELL WAS NOTED. FLIGHT DECK FAN WAS ON AT THE TIME FOR APPROX 10 MINUTES.

FAN SWITCHED OFF. P6 CIRCUIT BREAKER PANEL (FRONT, BACK, AND UNDER F/E TABLE) WERE CHECKED FOR SMOKE AND ODORS. THE SMELL SEEMED

PREDOMINANTLY TO COME FROM F/O SIDE, MORE FROM TOP OF HIS GLARESHIELD THAN UNDER. SMELL DISSIPATED APPROX 5 MINUTES AFTER TURNING FLT DECK FAN OFF. FAN RAN ON GROUND FOR APPROX 10 MINUTES WITH NO RECURRENCE. (X)

Item 83 (ref pg 443)

154UA	BOEING		PWA
SUNDSTRAND	CSD		FAILED
CRUISE	0		OVER
TEMP	ENGINE SHUTDOWN		
UALA	747123	JT9D7A	705117E
NR 4 ENGINE	03/06/1998	0	WARNING
INDICATION			
2410	20103	1422	WP 29
98UAL900108	1998041701129	NM	

A APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR PRIOR TO ARRIVAL AT HNL NR 4 ENGINE CSD OVER TEMPERATURE. PROCEDURES 733 AND 734 INEFFECTIVE INDISCONNECTING THE CSD. SHUT DOWN NR 4 ENGINE. LANDED UNDER AMBER ALERT. *S/D* ROOT CAUSE CANNOT BE DETERMINED DUE TO EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO CSD. THE UNIT

WILL BE SCRAPPED. THE SOLDER FOR THE DISCONNECT SOLENOID WIRES WAS MELTED AND IT

CANNOT BE DETERMINED WHEN IT OCCURRED. THE
CSD WAS
REPLACED.

Item 84 (ref pg 447) REPEATER, ALSO SEE ITEMS 77,
79, 99, 122

608FF BOEING

		OVEN	
ODOR	CLIMB		0
SMOKE	NONE		
TWRA	747131		
GALLEY	02/04/1998		0

2530	19672	EA	15
TWRA9807	1998042400604	NM	

A DURING CLIMB ACRID SMELL PERMEATED
COCKPIT, NO SMOKE OBSERVED AND NO SOURCE
COULD BE FOUND. DURING THAT TIME NOTED OVEN
IN NR 2 GALLEY
POPPED CIRCUIT BREAKER. RESTORED ELECTRICAL
POWER, OPERATED NORMALLY UNTIL
APPROXIMATELY 45 MINUTES BEFORE LANDING
WHEN SMELL

RETURNED. FOUND C/B'S NR 2 GALLEY OVENS SET,
RAN OVENS FOR 2 HOURS PER MM 25-31-00. OPS
CHECK OK. (M)

Item 85 (ref pg 448)

480EV BOEING

		LIGHT	
FAILED	CLIMB		0
SMOKE	OTHER		
EIAA	747121		900202
COCKPIT	04/16/1997		0

3310 20348

NM 09

97ZZZM671 1998042800115 NM

A JFK - AFTER TAKEOFF FROM LAX, SMELL FROM FLT OFFICERS SIDE, UNDER GLARE SHIELD, BY LIGHTS. ODOR SMELLS LIKE OVERHEATING BALLAST RESISTOR.

INSPECTED COCKPIT AREA, DID NOT LOCATE ANY DAMAGE. SUBMITTER STATES, SUSPECT OVER HEATING BALLAST RESISTOR. DEACTIVATED FLIGHT OFFICERS

SIDE FLOOD LIGHT ASSEMBLY, UNABLE TO DUPLICATE SMELL WHEN POWER WAS APPLIED. DEFERRED PER MEL 33-1. REPLACED BALLAST AND FLOOD LIGHT

ASSEMBLY. OPERATIONAL CHECKS WERE GOOD. REFERENCE EIAA970088.

Item 86 (ref pg 461) ALSO SEE ITEM 110

14024 BOEING

CADC

FAILED CLIMB 23608 WARNING

INDICATION UNSCHED LANDING

CALA 747238B

1903925

NUMBER 1 05/01/1998 0

3417 20534

SW 09

CALA9800725 1998050800812

A AFTER DEPARTURE, NUMBER ONE CADC FAILED CAPTAINS FD AND MACH INDICATOR HAD WARNING FLAGS AND NO WIND READ OUT ON INS 1 AND 3.
AIR

RETURNED. REMOVED AND REPLACED NUMBER 1
CADC PER MM 34-12-01 AND PERFORMED STATIC LEAK
TEST.

Item 87 (ref pg 467)

855FT

BOEING

FIRE DET PANEL	SPARKING	TAXI/
GRND HDL 0	SMOKE	RETURN TO
BLOCK		

P5CA 747124

65B4750944

COCKPIT 05/22/1998 0

2612 19733

WP

P5CA9800777 1998052900381 NM

A AFTER ENGINE START WHEN POWER WAS
TRANSFERRED TO AIRCRAFT POWER AN ACRID SMELL
WAS NOTICED IN COCKPIT. SPARKS WERE SEEN
COMING FROM
FIRE DETECTION PANEL BEHIND P6 PANEL. REPLACED
CARD INDEX PANEL PER M/M 26-11-05 AND
OPERATIONAL CHECKED PER M/M 26-11-00.

Item 88 (ref pg 468) REPEATER, SEE ITEMS 57, 111

852FT BOEING

CONTROL CARD

OVERHEATED CRUISE

0

SMOKE OTHER

P5CA 747122

69B476006

COCKPIT 05/23/1998 0

3010 19757

WP 23

P5CA9800778 1998060500077 NM

A APPROXIMATELY 6 HOURS INTO FLIGHT HAD STRONG ODOR OF ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS OVER HEATING/BURNING. ALSO, HAD VISIBLE SMOKE HAZE. RAN SMOKE SOURCE AND ELECTRICAL FIRE CHECKLIST. CREW USED OXYGEN ODOR DISSIPATED AFTER 20 TO 30 MINUTES. FOUND WING ANTI-ICE CONTROL CARD AND RELAY WITH EVIDENCE OF OVERHEAT/BURNING. REPLACED RELAY AND CONTROL CARD OPERATIONAL CHECK NORMAL PER M/M 36-11-00 AND 24-00-00.

ALSO, REPLACED A1, A8, A10, A13, AND A17 MASTER DIMMER CONTROL CARDS DUE TO SIGNS OF OVERHEATING PER M/M 33-12-00.

Item 89 (ref pg 470)

620FF

BOEING

AMPLIFIER		MALFUNCTIONED		
CRUISE	0	FALSE WARNING		
UNSCHED LANDING				
TWRA	747212B		21561	E/E
COMPT	04/18/1998	0		ACTIVATE
FIRE EXT.				
2612	21162	1396	EA	15
TWRA9821	1998060500567	NM		

A FLT 24 - SFO-JFK - DIVERTED TO COS DUE FWD CARGO COMPT FIRE DETECTION LIGHT ILLUMINATED IN FLIGHT. BOTH FIRE BOTTLES DISCHARGED PER LOWER FWD COMPT FIRE CHECK LIST. POST FLIGHT INSPECTION FOUND NO INDICATION OF FIRE. SYSTEM GIVES FALSE FIRE WARNINGS INTERMITTENTLY. REPLACED BOTH FWD CARGO COMPT FIRE BOTTLES PER MM 26-23-01.

REPLACED NR 1 AND NR 2 FIRE DETECTORS AND FWD
AMPLIFIER PER MM 26-13-00. OPS CHECK OK. (M)

Item 90 (ref pg 471)

157UA BOEING PWA
CIRCUIT BREAKER
FAILED NOT REPORTED 0
FLAME ACTIVATE FIRE EXT.
UALA 747123 JT9D7A
2TC610MOD P7 PANEL 05/15/1998 0
UNSCHEDED LANDING
2450 20106 WP
98UAL900198 1998061200432 NM

A FIRE FROM NR 2 C/B INS. *S/D* C/B C787 FAILED
INTERNALLY. REPLACED BREAKER.

Item 91 (ref pg 471) ALSO SEE ITEM 108

619FF
BOEING
FIRE CARD INTERMITTENT
CRUISE 0 FALSE WARNING
ACTIVATE FIRE EXT.
TWRA 747212B 335D5
APU 04/18/1998 0

2612 21316 5834 EA 15
TWRA9824 1998061200600 NM

A IN FLT APU INTERMITTENT FIRE INDICATION,
DISCHARGED FIRE BOTTLE, 'A' LOOP STILL
INTERMITTENT. INSPECTION APU COMPT, NO
EVIDENCE OF FIRE.
INSPECTION ACCOMPLISHED, REPLACED APU FIRE
BOTTLE AND SQUIB PER MM 26-22-00. REPLACED FIRE

DET CARD AS PER MM 26-10-00. APU OPS CHECK
NORMAL.

FIRE

Item 92 (ref pg 484)

4728U BOEING

PWA

SMOKE

MALFUNCTIONED NOT REPORTED 0

FALSE WARNING ACTIVATE FIRE EXT.

UALA 747122

JT9D7A

21562B

CARGO 05/25/1998 0

2612 19925

WP 29

98UAL900208 1998062600628 NM

A FORWARD LOWER CARGO FIRE INDICATED IN
FLIGHT. EXTINGUISHING AGENT FIRED INTO
COMPARTMENT. *S/D* FOUND NO EVIDENCE OF FIRE
IN FWD CARGO

COMPT. BOTH SMOKE DETECTORS REPLACED FOR
PRECAUTIONARY REASONS. SUBSEQUENT SHOP
FINDINGS INDICATE ONE OF THE TWO DETECTORS
HAD A

LAMP BURNED OUT CAUSING A FIRE CONDITION.
ENGINEERING VIEWS THIS AS AN ISOLATED
INCIDENT.FUTURE MAINTENANCE PROGRAM UNDER
DISCUSSION TO

REPLACE SMOKE DETECTOR BULBS ON A ROUTINE
SCHEDULE TO PREVENT SUCH OCCURRENCES.
PRESENTLY, THE EXISTING MAINTENANCE MANUAL
HAS

INSTRUCTIONS TO REMOVE AND INSTALL THE
BULBS IN EACH SMOKE DETECTOR.

Item 93 (ref pg 485) ALSO SEE ITEM 107

602FF BOEING

SWITCH
FAILED APPROACH 0
SMOKE OTHER
TWRA 747124 8906K1559
COCKPIT 04/20/1998 0

3340 19734 EA 15
TWRA9823 1998062600681 NM

A DURING APPROACH TURNED ON LANDING LIGHTS AND STARTED SMOKING BEHIND SWITCHES. TURNED OFF LIGHTS, SMOKE WENT AWAY. FOUND LEFT OUTBOARD LANDING LIGHT AT FAULT, PULLED AND COLLARED CIRCUIT BREAKER ON P15 PANEL. PLACARDED INOP. REMOVED AND REPLACED SWITCH.

REACTIVATED SYSTEM. PERFORMED OPS CHECK OK, NO SMOKE IN COCKPIT PER MM 33-11-00. (M)

Item 94 (ref pg 486) REPEATER, SEE ITEM 95

614US BOEING PWA
ENGINE FLAMED
OUT CLIMB 0 ENGINE
FLAMEOUT OTHER
NWAA 747251B JT9D7J NR
2 06/26/1998 0
7200 20359 689474 GL 01

9809686614 1998071400020 NE

A WHILE CLIMBING THROUGH FL340, THE NR 3 ENGINE FLAMED OUT. THE ENGINES WERE RESTARTED APPROXIMATELY ONE MINUTE LATER WITH NORMAL INDICATIONS. THE FLIGHT CONTINUED TO SEL WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. MAINTENANCE INSPECTED THE ENGINES AND PERFORMED ENGINE RUNS WITH NO DEFECTS

NOTED. EXACT PART CAUSING PROBLEM TO BE DETERMINED.

Item 95 (ref pg 486) REPEATER, SEE ITEM 94

614US BOEING PWA

		ENGINE	FLAMED
OUT	CLIMB	0	ENGINE
FLAMEOUT	OTHER		
NWAA	747251B	JT9D7F	NR

2 06/26/1998 0

7200 20359 689456 GL

9809696614 1998071400021 NE

A WHILE CLIMBING THROUGH FL340, THE NR 2 ENGINE FLAMED OUT. THE ENGINES WERE RESTARTED APPROXIMATELY ONE MINUTE LATER WITH NORMAL INDICATIONS. THE FLIGHT CONTINUED TO SEL WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. MAINTENANCE INSPECTED THE ENGINES AND PERFORMED ENGINE RUNS WITH NO DEFECTS

NOTED. EXACT PART CAUSING PROBLEM TO BE DETERMINED.

Item 96 (ref pg 486) ALSO SEE ITEMS 94, 95, 97

642NW BOEING PWA
ENGINE
FAILED CLIMB 0
WARNING INDICATION UNSCHED LANDING
NWAA 747212B JT9D7Q NR
4 06/26/1998 0
ENGINE SHUTDOWN
7200 21942 702134 GL
9809706642 1998071400022 NE
DUMP FUEL

A WHILE CLIMBING PAST FL320 (AMS), THE NR 4 ENGINE EPR AND FUEL FLOW INDICATIONS BEGAN TO FLUCTUATE WITH EGT RISING INTO THE CAUTION RANGE.

THE ENGINE WAS SHUT DOWN, FUEL WAS DUMPED, AND THE AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO AMS AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE AIRCRAFT WAS THEN CONFIGURED FOR A THREE ENGINE FERRY FLIGHT TO MSP. EXACT PART CAUSING PROBLEM TO BE DETERMINED.

Item 97 (ref pg 487) ALSO SEE ITEMS 94, 95, 96

624US BOEING PWA
COMPRESSOR
STALLED CLIMB 0 ENGINE
STOPPAGE UNSCHED LANDING
NWAA 747251B JT9D7Q NR 4
ENGINE 06/27/1998 0 ENGINE
SHUTDOWN
7230 21706 702176 GL
9809726624 1998071400082 NE
DUMP FUEL

A WHILE CLIMBING THROUGH 1400 FEET AGL, THE

NR 4 ENGINE AUDIBLY COMPRESSOR STALLED AND
FLAMED OUT. THE CREW SECURED THE ENGINE,
DUMPED
FUEL, RETURNED TO MSP, AND LANDED WITHOUT
INCIDENT. THE NR 4 ENGINE WAS CHANGED. EXACT
PART CAUSING PROBLEM TO BE DETERMINED.

Item 98 (ref pg 487) ALSO SEE ITEMS 56, 101
6186 BOEING COFFEE MAKER
FAILED CRUISE 0 SMOKE
NONE
TWRA 747212B 50000011
CABIN 06/05/1998 0

2530 21439 EA 15
TWRA9831 1998071400359 NM

A IN FLIGHT, SMOKE SEEPING FROM AFT SLOT OF
CEILING PANEL IN AFT GALLEY JUST FORWARD OF
COFFEE MAKERS, TURNED OFF GALLEY POWER AND
PULLED
OVEN CONTROL C/B'S, SMOKE STOPPED. INSPECTED
AREA, FOUND COFFEE MAKER AT POSITION 516 WITH
BURNED WIRES TO HOT JUG. REMOVED AND
REPLACED

COFFEE MAKER. OPS CHECK GOOD. NO OTHER
DEFECTS NOTED. REACTIVATED GALLEY. (M)
Item 99 (ref pg 487) REPEATER, SEE ITEMS 77, 79, 84,
122

608FF BOEING
OVEN
SHORTED CRUISE 0
SMOKE DEACTIVATE
TWRA 747131

GALLEY 05/08/1998 0

2530 19672 EA
TWRA9829 1998071400360 NM

A SMOKE COMING FROM L-2 MID-GALLEY. FOUND
CIRCUIT BREAKER NR 3 OVEN OPEN. SHUT DOWN AND
SECURED NR 3 OVEN. MADE INSPECTION OF OVEN
AREA
AND FOUND ALL OK. TRANSFER TO ODI PER MEL.
NR 3 CIRCUIT BREAKER FOR OVEN COLLARED.
REMOVED OVEN. (X)

Item 100 (ref pg 490)
603US BOEING

BOOST PUMP
FAILED CLIMB 0
WARNING INDICATION UNSCHED LANDING
NWAA 747151 NR
4 07/13/1998 0
2822 19780 GL 01
9809816603 1998071700498 NM

A DURING CLIMB, THE NR 4 FORWARD AND AFT
BOOST PUMPS FAILED. AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO NRT
AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. REPLACED THE NR
4
FORWARD AND AFT BOOST PUMPS, OPERATIONAL
CHECK GOOD.

Item 101 (ref pg 490) ALSO SEE ITEMS 56, 98
6186 BOEING

SHORTED CRUISE LIGHT 0
SMOKE NONE
TWRA 747212B
COCKPIT 06/14/1998 0

3310 21439 EA 15
TWRA9833 1998071700574 NM

A DURING CRUISE, HAD SMOKE IN COCKPIT.
REPAIRED NR 4 FWD BOOST PUMP AMBER LIGHT
MODULE. OPS CHECK OK. (X)

Item 102 (ref pg 492)

156UA BOEING

PWA

INDICATOR DAMAGED INSP/
MAINT 0 OTHER
NONE

UALA 747123 JT9D7A NR 1-
NR 4 FUEL 06/12/1998 0

2841 20105 WP 29
98UAL900313 1998072400130 NM

A NR 1 AND 4 RESERVE FUEL QUANTITY
INDICATORS DAMAGED, BURNT INDICATORS.

Item 103 (ref pg 496) ALSO SEE ITEM 105

470EV BOEING

INDICATOR
FAILED NOT REPORTED 0
WARNING INDICATION ENGINE SHUTDOWN

EIAA 747273C 8DJ163LYT4
COCKPIT 06/29/1998 7815 ENGINE
STOPPAGE
7722 20653 NM
EIAA980216 1998073100250 NM

A ANC - LOG PAGE: F08754 - IN-FLIGHT, NR 2 EGT
GAUGE FAILED, AN IN-FLIGHT SHUT DOWN WAS
PERFORMED AS A PRECAUTION, OIL PRESSURE
STAYED ABOVE 5 PSI
AT ALL TIMES. REPLACED EGT INDICATOR PER MM
77-21-03. CARRIED OUT WINDMILL INSPECTION PER
MM 72-00-00. OPS CHECKED EGT INDICATION PER MM
77-21-03 SATISFACTORY. (X)

Item 104 (ref pg 500) ALSO SEE ITEMS 24, 34, 39, 105
851FT BOEING

WIRING
CHAFED TAKEOFF 0
FALSE WARNING RETURN TO BLOCK
P5CA 747122 FE
PANEL 07/22/1998 0

2612 19756 WP
P5CA9801208 1998080700341 NM

A REJECTED TAKEOFF FROM RTA DUE TO AFT
CARGO FIRE INDICATION AND FIRE BELL DURING T/O
ROLL. PARKED AND INSPECTED FOR FIRE. NO SMOKE
OR FIRE
NOTED. TRANSFERED TO DMI NR 20623 AND 20624.
REMOVED AND REPLACED SMOKE DETECTOR PANEL
P-4 FOR T/S PER MM 26-16-00 DMI OK TO CONTINUE.
LOWER CARGO FIRE DETECT LIGHT INTERMIT

DURING TURBULENCE AND LANDING AT JFK. FOUND
CHAFFED WIRE BEHIND F/E PANEL. REPAIRED WIRING
PER MM

20-10-13 CHECK OK PER 26-16-00 DMI CLEARED.

Item 105 (ref pg 504) ALSO SEE ITEM 103

470EV

BOEING

LIGHT		SMOKING		NOT
REPORTED	0	OTHER		
NONE				

EIAA 747273C

COCKPIT 07/16/1998 0

3310 20653 NM 09

EIAA980230 1998082100219 NM

A KWRA - LOG PAGE: F67062 - CAPTAIN'S
FLUORESCENT LIGHT ON GLARE SHIELD SMOKING
WITH POWER ON. TRANSPORTED TO DMI 260 PER MEL
33-1 CAT C DUE

7-25-98. CAPTAIN'S FLUORESCENT LIGHT CIRCUIT
BREAKER PULLED. (X)

Item 106 (ref pg 471) ALSO SEE ITEMS 68, 106, 161, 171

471EV BOEING SMOKE FAILED

CLIMB	0	FALSE WARNING	UNSCHE
LANDING			

EIAA 747273C 21562B

CARGO BAY 06/19/1998 0

2611 20651 NM 09

EIAA0211 1998082100626 NM

A FJR - LOG PAGE: F80971 - ON CLIMB-OUT,

FORWARD LOWER CARGO COMPARTMENT FIRE LIGHT ILLUMINATED. NO CARGO LOADED. NO SMOKE OR FIRE OBSERVED. RETURNED TO FJR. REPLACED FORWARD LOWER CARGO AFT SMOKE DETECTOR, AND OPS CHECKED SYSTEM PER MM26-14-02. (X)

Item 107 (ref pg 509) ALSO SEE ITEM 93
602FF BOEING

		SWITCH
MALFUNCTIONED	DESCENT	0
	NO TEST	OTHER
TWRA 747124		65B821062
LOAD LIMITER	08/29/1998	0

2830	19734	700018	EA	15
TWRA9850	1998091801357	NM		

A DURING FUEL DUMP, NR 3 MAIN JETTISON PUMP PRESSURE LIGHT REMAINED ON WITH BOTH PUMPS ON. DUMP RATE FROM NR 3 WAS ONE-HALF (50 PERCENT)

BELOW NR 2 MAIN. REQUIRED TO CLOSE NR 2 JETTISON PUMP TO MAINTAIN BALANCE. REF: ATB AILERON PROBLEM. CHECKED WIRING OF NR 3 MAIN INBOARD

AND OUTBOARD FUEL JETTISON PUMPS CIRCUITS PER WDM 28 42 12 AND 26 31 21. RE-SECURED LOOSE PRESSURE SWITCH CONNECTION ON NR 3 INBD PUMP. OPS

CHECK NORMAL. MM REF 38 31 00. (X)

Item 108 (ref pg 510) ALSO SEE ITEM 91
619FF BOEING

DETECTOR
FAILED CRUISE 0
FALSE WARNING UNSCHED LANDING
TWRA 747212B 21562B
CARGO BAY 09/01/1998 0
ACTIVATE FIRE EXT.
2612 21316 EA
TWRA9849 1998091801366 NM

A DURING CRUISE FL 330, AFT CARGO FIRE
WARNING LIGHT AND BELL ACTIVATED. BOTH FIRE
BOTTLES WERE DISCHARGED. ACCOMPLISHED
EMERGENCY CHECK
LIST AND AIRCRAFT DIVERTED TO DENVER. AFTER
LANDING, FIRE DEPARTMENT CONFIRMED NO FIRE.
INSPECTED AFT CARGO AND BULK COMPT, FOUND NO
SMOKE OR FIRE. FOUND NR 5 FIRE DETECTOR
FAULTY. DISCONNECTED NR 5 DETECTOR,
CONTINUED IN O D I. NO CARGO IN LOWER
COMPARTMENTS.

Item 109 (ref pg 511)

610FF BOEING OVEN
DIRTY CRUISE 0 SMOKE
DEACTIVATE
TWRA 747282B
GALLEY 07/25/1998 0

2530 20501 EA 15
TWRA9840 1998092500278 NM

A IN FLIGHT, FLIGHT ATTENDANT REPORTED

SMELL OF ELECTRICAL NATURE IN THE MID GALLEY.
ALL POWER TURNED OFF AND ITEM TRANSFERRED TO
ODI 25587.

FROM LOG PAGE 25587 OPERATED ALL OVENS, LIGHTS,
AND COFFEE MAKERS. ALL OPERATED NORMAL. NO
SMOKE, NO SMELL, NO SPARKS, JUST A DIRTY OVEN.

CLEANED OVEN, NO FURTHER DEFECTS NOTED. (M)
Item 110 (ref pg 513) ALSO SEE ITEM 86

14024 BOEING

WIRE

FAILED CLIMB 0
SMOKE UNSCHED LANDING
CALA 747238B R-1
WINDOW 09/20/1998 0

3040 20534 SW 09
CALA9801807 1998092500624 NM

A ELECTRICAL ARCING IN R-1 WINDOW CAUSED A
SMALL AMOUNT OF SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT DURING
CLIMBOUT OF GUM. THE AIRCRAFT WAS RETURNED
TO

GUM WHERE IT LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT.
MAINTENANCE FOUND POWER WIRE TO R-1 WINDOW
BROKEN AND BURNT. THE WIRE WAS REMOVED AND
WIRING

WAS RESPLICED. AN OPERATIONAL CHECK OF R-1
WINDOW WAS GOOD.

Item 111 (ref pg 515) ALSO SEE ITEMS 57, 88

852FT BOEING

LOGIC BOX

MALFUNCTION TAKEOFF 0 FALSE
WARNING UNSCHED LANDING

P5CA 747122
LANDING GEAR 09/04/1998 0

65B4750650

3260 19757
P5CA9801528 1998100900446 NM

WP 23

A FOLLOWING T/O, RED GEAR LIGHT ON P2 WITH HORN. AIR TURN BACK. REPLACED LANDING GEAR LOGIC MODULE IAW MM 31-26-03, OPSCHECK OK.

Item 112 (ref pg 516) REPEATER, SEE ITEM 117

178UA BOEING

PWA

WIRE FAILED INSP/

MAINT 0 OTHER

NONE

UALA 747422 PW4056

CABIN 08/14/1998 0

3320 24385 WP 29

98UAL900479 1998100900902 NM

A UPPER DECK WINDOW LIGHTS AT SEATS 12AB AND 14GH PREVIOUSLY DEFERRED INOP. ON TAXI TO INBOUND GATE CIRCUIT BREAKERS TRIPPED ON P180 AND P414

PANELS. FOUND SEVERAL BURNT AND OVERHEATED WIRES COMMON TO WIRE BUNDLE W7510. *S/D* FOUND EVIDENCE OF ARCING ON AIR DISTRIBUTION DUCT

AND SIDE WALL PANEL END CAP LIGHT ASSY UPPER EDGE (P/N 417U7572-1 ASSY 417U7514-1DETAIL). REPAIRED FIBERGLASS WIRE/WOUND AIR

DISTRIBUTION DUCT
AND INSULATION. REMOVED DAMAGED WIRE
SECTIONS AND SPLICED IN NEW WIRE SECTIONS AND
SECURED CLEARANCE BETWEEN SIDE WALL PANEL
END CAP
UPPER EDGE. TESTED ALL EFFECTED SYSTEMS.

Item 113 (ref pg 518) ALSO SEE ITEM 149
691UP BOEING

			SMOKE	
MALFUNCTIONED	CRUISE	0		FALSE
WARNING	UNSCHED LANDING			
IPXA	747121			CARGO
COMPT	10/10/1998	0		EMER.
DESCENT				
2611	19641		SO	01
UPS98427898	1998102900008	NM		

A LT MAIN DECK CARGO SMOKE DETECT WARNING
ON. VISUAL INSPECTED MAIN CARGO DECK AND
NOTICED PRESENCE OF FUMES NEAR 14R PALLET
POSITION.

DECLARED EMERGENCY AND DIVERTED TO COLD BAY
(CDB) EMERGENCY CHECK LIST PERFORMED IAW
AOM. INSPECTED AREA AROUND SUSPECTED FUMES
FOR

DAMAGE OR REMAINING FUMES. NO DEFECTS
NOTED. SUSPECT SMOKE DETECTOR 4B ERRONEOUS.
DEFERRED 4B SMOKE DETECTOR PER MEL.

Item 114 (ref pg 521) ALSO SEE ITEMS 74, 115

921FT BOEING

		FIRE WARNING	
ACTIVATED	TAKEOFF	0	FALSE
WARNING	ABORTED TAKEOFF		
P5CA 747283B			CARGO
COMPT 11/10/1998	0		

2612 21575 WP 23
P5CA9801594 1998111301345 NM

A ON TAKEOFF ROLL, MAIN DECK CARGO FIRE WARNING 1 ILLUMINATED WITH BELL. ABORTED TAKEOFF AND EMERGENCY CHECKLIST CARRIED OUT IAW AOM

VOL 1. ON TAXI IN, THE SAME WARNING CONTINUALLY CAME ON WITH NO SMOKE. NOTE: ACFT LOADED WITH LIVE CATTLE. FOUND 1A DETECTOR CAUSING

SPURIOUS WARNING. DEACTIVATED AND TRANSFERRED TO DMI PER MEL 26-11.

Item 115 (ref pg 523) ALSO SEE ITEMS 74, 114

921FT BOEING

		PACK	
MALFUNCTIONED	CRUISE	0	
	OTHER	UNSCHEDED LANDING	
P5CA 747283B			NR
2 11/22/1998	0		

2150 21575 WP
P5CA9801598 1998112600753 NM

A NR 2 PACK UNCONTROLLABLE IN AUTO AND

MANUAL MODE. DUE TO INOP NR 3 PACK ON DMI, HAD TO RETURN TO HKG. INTERCHANGE NR 2 AND NR 3 PACK

CONTROLLERS BYPASS VALVE AND TEMP SENSOR AND NR 3 PACK OPS NORMAL.

Item 116 (ref pg 530)

BOEING PWA
CRUISE 0 SWITCH FAILED
ENGINE SHUTDOWN WARNING INDICATION
747133 JT9D7 NR 2
ENGINE 10/02/1998 0

7931 P662912 CA
CA981019018 1998121800446 NM

W (CAN) NR 2 ENGINE OIL PRESSURE LIGHT ILLUMINATED WITH AN ACCOMPANYING LOW OIL PRESSURE GAUGE IN-FLIGHT. THE ENGINE WAS SHUTDOWN.

POS-FLIGHT INSPECTION OF THE ENGINE CHIP DETECTORS AND OIL FILTERS FOUND NO FAULT. THE NR 2 ENGINE OIL PRESSURE SWITCH WAS REPLACED AND THE

ENGINE WAS GROUND RUN SERVICEABLE.

Item 117 (ref pg 532)

BOEING LOOM
MISINSTALLED NOT REPORTED 0
WARNING INDICATION OTHER
747438 AIR DIST
11/28/1998 0
2120 AU S

AU981636 1999011500351 NM

W (AUS) DURING CLIMB CAUTION MESSAGE,
'EQUIPMENT COOLING' ANNOUNCED. GROUND
INSPECTION FOUND DAMAGED AND BURNED
EQUIPMENT COOLING
WIRING IN FORWARD CARGO AREA. THE ADJACENT
INSULATION BLANKET WAS FOUND TO HAVE BEEN
BURNED BY THE SHORTING WIRING. FURTHER
INVESTIGATION REVEALED THE AFFECTED WIRING
HAD BEEN ROUTED UNDER INSTEAD OF OVER THE
INSULATION BLANKET. THE DAMAGE HAD BEEN
CAUSED BY

STEPPING ON THE BLANKET CRUSHING THE
WIRING AGAINST THE METAL STRUCTURE.

Item 118 (ref pg 540) REPEATER, SEE ITEM 112

178UA	BOEING	PWA	
LUCAS	HUMIDIFIER		DIRTY
CRUISE	0		
SMOKE	DEACTIVATE		
UALA	747422	PW4056	M01AB0101
	COCKPIT	01/24/1999	0

2170 24385 518 WP 29
99UAL900059 1999022600428 NM

A SMOKE IN COCKPIT SUDDENLY OCCURRED
DURING CRUISE FLIGHT. SELECTED HUMIDIFIER OFF
AND SMOKE DISSIPATED. *S/D* HEAVY CALCIUM
DEPOSITS IN
UNIT. SUSPECT SMOKE WAS ACTUALLY CALCIUM IN
DUCTS. SHOP CLEANED AND CHECKED UNIT

SERVICEABLE.

Item 119 (ref pg 542)

622US BOEING

TR UNIT

BURNED

TAXI/GRND HDL 0

FLAME

ACTIVATE FIRE EXT.

NWAA 747251B

60B001775 NR

2 02/24/1999 0

2433 21704

GL 01

9900696622 1999030500507 NM

A DURING TAXI, THE NR 2 TRANSFORMER
RECTIFIER CAUGHT ON FIRE. EXTINGUISHED FIRE
WITH FIRE EXTINGUISHER AND TAXIED TO GATE
WITHOUT FURTHER
INCIDENT. REPLACED THE NR 2 TRANSFORMER
RECTIFIER, OPERATIONAL CHECK GOOD.

Item 120 (ref pg 543) ALSO SEE ITEMS 18, 58, 62, 63,
76. NO FURTHER SDR FINDINGS NOTED

117UA BOEING

SEXTANT INFL

VIDEO BOX

ODOR

NOT REPORTED 0

OTHER

NONE

UALA 747422

176420F747 ROW

2A 02/20/1999 0

2330 28810

WP 29

99UAL900122 1999031800009

A SEAT 2A FOOTREST MOTOR HAD BAD
ELECTRICAL BURNING SMELL COMING FROM IT. *S/D*

THE CAUSE OF THE ODOR WAS FOUND TO BE EMANATING FROM THE VIDEO DISTRIBUTION BOX, LOCATED UNDER THE SEAT. THE VDB, PART OF THE B/E2000M IN-SEAT VIDEO SYSTEM, WAS REPLACED. THE MANUFACTURER, SEXTANT IN-FLIGHT SYSTEMS, HAS BEEN ALERTED AND WILL PROVIDE ANY FINDINGS WHEN THE UNIT REACHES THEIR REPAIR FACILITY.

Item 121 (ref pg 545)

629US BOEING

WARNING LIGHT

ILLUMINATED APPROACH 0

FALSE WARNING OTHER

NWAA 747251F

LANDING GEAR 03/09/1999 0

3260 22388 GL 01

9900876729 1999031900646 NM

A DURING APPROACH, THE RED LANDING GEAR WARNING LIGHT ILLUMINATED. RECYCLED LANDING GEAR AND ALL INDICAITONS WERE NORMAL.

AIRCRAFT

LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. INSPECTED LANDING GEAR SYSTEM VISUAL AND OPERATIONAL CHECKS WERE GOOD. EXACT PARTCAUSING DISCREPANCY TO BE

DETERMINED.

Item 122 (ref pg 546) REPEATER, SEE ITEMS 77, 79, 84, 99

608FF BOEING BENDIX RMI
FAILED CRUISE 0
SMOKE NONE

TWRA 747131 38091393 RT
COCKPIT 03/09/1999 0

3454 19672 7005572 EA 15
TWRA9908 1999040900493

A DURING CRUISE, SMOKE WAS OBSERVED AS
COMING FROM VICINITY OF CO-PILOT'S RMI. CIRCUIT
BREAKER WAS PULLED AND SMOKE DISSIPATED.
REPLACED NR 2
RMI INDICATOR. CHECKED CONNECTIONS AND AREA
FROM SMOKE AND OR OTHER DAMAGE. NO
ADDITIONAL DAMAGE WAS FOUND. NEW INDICATOR
OPS

CHECK OK AS PER MM 34-30-00 PAGE 501. (M)
Item 123 (ref pg 551) REPEATER, SEE ITEM 124
680UP BOEING WARNING SYST
MALFUNCTIONED CRUISE 0 FALSE
WARNING OTHER
IPXA 747SR46
COCKPIT 05/19/1999 0

3150 20923 SO 01
UPS99429662 1999052800215 NM

A ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS INFLIGHT MASTER
WARNING BRIEFLY FLASHED AND FIRE BELL BRIEFLY
SOUNDED. ALL OTHER INDICATIONS NORMAL.
FUNCTION TEST
APU FIRE TEST OPS TEST NORMAL PER MM26-22-00.
Item 124 (ref pg 551) REPEATER, SEE ITEM 123
680UP BOEING

FIRE CARD

NOT SEATED CRUISE 0
FALSE WARNING NONE
IPXA 747SR46
APU 05/12/1999 0

2612 20923 SO
UPS99429663 1999052800216 NM

A 1.5 HRS INTO FLT THE APU FIRE WARNING LIGHT ILLUMINATED VERY DIMLY AND THE FIRE BELL SOUNDED, BUT SILENTLY FOR 10 SECONDS. THIS SITUATION DID NOT HAPPEN THE REST OF FLT. RESEATED THE A-5 AND A-8 CONTROL CARDS. APU FIRE TEST GOOD PER M/M26-10-00.

Item 125 (ref pg 555)

536MC BOEING FIRE WARNING
ACTIVATED TAXI/GRND HDL 0 FALSE
WARNING NONE
UIEA 747228F
COCKPIT 04/14/1999 0

2612 21576 EA 15
UIEA9921 1999061100468 NM

A FLT GT020 - FIRE WARNING BELL AND LIGHT SOUNDED ON FORWARD COCKPIT LIGHT FOR CARGO AREA, BUT WENT OUT TOO FAST TO CHECK/F/E PANEL. CHECK

CARGO AREA FIRE TEST AND INDICATION AND NO ABNORMALITIES NOTED. (M)

Item 126 (ref pg 555) REPEATER, SEE ITEMS 128, 130
508MC BOEING

			SMOKE	
MALFUNCTIONED	CRUISE		0	
FALSE WARNING	OTHER			
UIEA 747230B				NR 4
04/30/1999	0			
2611	21644		EA	
UIEA9922	1999061100469	NM		

A FLT CI328 - MAIN DECK SMOKE DETECTOR (NR 1) RED WARNING LIGHT ILLUMINATED AND BELL SOUNDED AND NR 4 SMOKE DETECTOR (A) LIGHT

INTERMITTENTLY FLASHED A FEW TIMES DURING THE FIRST THREE HOURS OF FLIGHT. THEY CAN ON AT THE SAME TIME AND WERE ONLY ON FOR A SHORT

PERIOD OF TIME. OPERATIONAL CHECK OF SYSTEM REVEALED NO ABNORMALITIES. (M)

Item 127 (ref pg 555)
526MC BOEING

			MAP LIGHT	
SMOKING	CRUISE		0	
	SMOKE		NONE	
UIEA 7472D7B				LT
COCKPIT	06/06/1999	0		
3310	22337		EA	
UIEA9920	1999061100470	NM		

A FLT EK9880 - AMS/DXB - APPROXIMATELY 5 HOURS IN CRUISE, CAPTAIN NOTICED SMOKE COMING FROM AREA OF CAPTAINS MAP LIGHT ASSEMBLY. THIS WAS A MOMENTARY CONDITION. THE FLIGHT CONTINUED

FOR ANOTHER 4 HOURS UNEVENTFULLY. DXB
MAINTENANCE INSPECTED ALL WIRING BEHIND
CAPTAINS

MAP LIGHT ASSY AND NO BURNING FOUND. MAP
LIGHT ASSY OPERATIONS NORMALLY. (M)

Item 128 (ref pg 555) REPEATER, SEE ITEMS 126, 130
508MC BOEING

			SMOKE
DEFECTIVE	CRUISE		0
FALSE WARNING	NONE		
UIEA 747230B			2156646
CARGO COMPT	04/07/1999	0	

2611	21644		EA
UIEA9919	1999061100471	NM	

A FLT CI326 - MAIN DECK SMOKE DETECTOR
SECTION 1 GAVE TOW MOMENTARY FIRE WARNINGS.
INSPECTED MAIN DECK AND DETERMINED WARNING
TO BE
FALSE. MAIN SMOKE DETECTOR REPLACED.
OPERATIONAL CHECK NORMAL. (M)

Item 129 (ref pg 556)

163UA	BOEING		PWA
		ENGINE	
MALFUNCTIONED	DESCENT		0
	SMOKE		NONE
UALA 747238B	JT9D7J		NR
2	04/17/1999	0	
7200	21353	685696	WP 29
99UAL900215	1999061200004	NE	

A ELECTRICAL OVERHEAT SMELL IN COCKPIT
DESCENDING THRU 24,000 FT, NO SMOKE. SMELL
DISSIPATED, THEN RETURNED ON ADDING POWER
LATER IN DESCENT.

S/D FOUND OIL RESIDUE ON NR 1 ACM. REPLACED
ACM, NO OIL LEAKS FOUND. INVESTIGATION
REVEALED ACM INGESTED FOD, NO DAMAGE FOUND,
THE OIL

SEALS WERE INTACT. A 2ND ACM WAS REMOVED ON
5/3. THE ACM WAS DISASSEMBLED AND TESTED, NO
LEAKS FOUND. ACM'S WERE NOT THE CAUSE OF THE

SMELL. THE NR 2 MAIN ENG WAS REPLACED.
AFTER REPLACEMENT OF 2 ACMS, 2 PACK BURNOUTS,
SMELL STILL EXISTED, AFTER NR 2 ENGINE
REPLACEMENT THE

OIL SMELL DISAPPEARED. THE NR 2 ENGINE WAS
LIKELY THE CAUSE OF THE OIL SMELL.

Item 130 (ref pg 557) REPEATER, SEE ITEMS 126, 128
508MC BOEING

			WIRING	
CHAFED		INSP/MAINT	0	
SMOKE		NONE		
	UIEA 747230B			MLG
WW	05/10/1999	0		

2612 21644 EA 15
UIEA9918 1999061800610 NM

A FLT CI 346 - DURING COCKPIT PREFLIGHT
CHECKS, WHEN MASTER DIM AND TEST SWITCH
PLACED TO 'TEST' POSITION, CIRCUIT BREAKER NR 152
POPPED AND
SMOKED. TROUBLESHOT SYSTEM AND FOUND

WIRING CHAFING IN OVERHEAD P5 PANEL GOING TO
'WHEEL WELL FIRE DETECTION MODULE'. REPAIRED
WIRING

AND MASTER DIM AND TEST SYSTEM OPERATION
NORMAL. (M)

Item 131 (ref pg 557)

507MC BOEING

BATTERY

FAILED TAXI/GRND HDL 0

SMOKE RETURN TO BLOCK

UIEA 747230B 279202

APU 05/08/1999 0

2432 21380 EA

UIEA9917 1999061800611 NM

A FLT 9603 - BTB - DURING TAXI APU BATTERY
CHARGER SPARKED TWICE, THEN STARTED, FILLING
THE MAIN CABIN WITH SMOKE UNTIL C/B POPPED.

AIRCRAFT

RETURNED TO GATE. FOUND APU BATTERY CHARGER
DEFETIVE. REPLACED APU BATTERY CHARGER,
OPERATIONAL CHECK NORMAL. (M)

Item 132 (ref pg 558)

192UA BOEING PWA

AIR DIST

ODOR UNKNOWN 0

SMOKE NONE

UALA 747422 PW4056

CABIN 06/04/1999 0

2120 26881 WP 29

99UAL900310 1999062500036 NM

A INBOUND CREW REPORTED BAD SMELL THROUGH THE WHOLE AIRPLANE.

Item 133 (ref pg 559)
BOEING

		WIRE	
SHORTED		INSP/MAINT	0
OTHER		NONE	
747438			W474230224B TE
FLAP	05/18/1999	0	

2751 AU S
AU990560 1999070900113 NM

H (AUS) TE FLAP POSITION WIRING LOCATED IN THE FORWARD CARGO HOLD CEILING ADJACENT TO STA 690 HAD SHORTED TO GROUND.

Item 134 (ref pg 559)

BOEING			
WIRE		FAULTY	INSP/
MAINT	0	OTHER	
NONE			
747312		60B890049	07881590
BOOST PUMP	04/09/1999	0	

2822 07881590 AU
AU990561 1999070900114 NM

H (AUS) NR 2 MAIN AFT BOOST PUMP WIRING INSULATION FAULTY.

Item 135 (ref pg 561) REPEATER, SEE ITEM 139.

HISTORY ??? NO FURTHER SDRs NOTED
494MC BOEING

FIRE WARNING
ACTIVATED TAKEOFF 0 FALSE
WARNING ABORTED TAKEOFF
UIEA 74747UF MAIN
DECK 06/24/1999 0 RETURN
TO BLOCK
2612 29255 EA
UIEA9944 1999073000024 NM

A RTO/ANC - FLT FX076 - AT APPROX V1, MAIN DECK FIRE WARNING TRIGGERED BOTH AURAL AND VISUAL WARNINGS. REJECTED TAKEOFF, MAINT AT ANC

INSPECTED ACFT FOR DAMAGE PER CHAPTER 5 HIGH ENERGY STOP. NO DAMAGE FOUND. NO FAULT MESSAGES ON CMC. REQUESTED BOEING TO SEND AOG

TEAM TO ANC TO ASSIST IN FAULT ISOLATION AND CORRECTION OF THIS DISCREPANCY. AIRCRAFT CURRENTLY UNDER MAINTENANCE AT ANC WITH ASSISTANCE FROM BOEING TEAM AND ATLAS AIR QUALITY CONTROL INSPECTION. WILL ADVISE FINDING WHEN THEY BECOME AVAILABLE. WITH BOEING

TECHNICAL EXPERTISE, THE MAIN DECK SMOKE DETECTOR SYS WAS THOROUGHLY CLEANED. ALL AFOLTS (8) CARDS AND 3 DIODE CARDS WERE REPLACED.

ACFT TEST FLOWN AND SYS OPERATION NORMAL.
(X)

Item 136 (ref pg 562)

683UP BOEING HEAT DUCT
DIRTY CLIMB 0 WARNING INDICATION
UNSCHED LANDING
IPXA 747121 CARGO
COMPT 07/24/1999 0

2120 20353 SO
UPS99430163 1999073000203 NM

A INSPECTION TYPE:N/A, AFT LWR CARGO
COMPARTMENT FIRE WARNING ACCOMPLISHED LWR
CARGO COMP SMOKE DET TEST, CKD OK.
THOROUGHLY INSPECTED

LOWER AFT CARGO COMP, NO EVIDENCE OF FIRE
FOUND. WHEN INSPECTING CGO COMPT HEAT DUCT,
FOUND PLASTIC TRASH STICKING TO THE DUCT.

TRASH

WAS PARTLY BURNED AND MOLTEN CAUSING FIRE
ALARM GOING OFF. DEFERRED AFT LWR CARGO HEAT
PER MEL.

Item 137 (ref pg 563)

674UP BOEING

HEAT SYSTEM
INOP NOT REPORTED 0
OTHER NONE
IPXA 747123F CARGO
COMMPT 07/29/1999 0

2160 20100 SO
UPS99430243 1999081200310 NM

A COMPUTER SHOWS FIRE WARNING, AFT CARGO
HEAT SYSTEM WILL NOT TEST DI M1 76126. AFT

CARGO HEAT SYSTEM WILL NOT TEST. CHECKED
WIRING TO
VALVES AND CHECK EXTENSION OVRD VALVES
ACTUATOR AND OPS CHECKED GOOD MM 21-44-00.

Item 138 (ref pg 567)

641NW BOEING

		FAN	
FAILED		CRUISE	0
	SMOKE	UNSCHE	LANDING
NWAA	747212B		6054577
CABIN	08/22/1999	0	

2121 21941 GL 01

9903376641 1999090300006 NM

A DURING CRUISE, ELECTRICAL FUMES
CIRCULATED IN THE COCKPIT AND CABIN. AIRCRAFT
DIVERTED TO ANC AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT.
REPLACED

GASPER FAN, OPERATIONAL CHECK GOOD.

Item 139 (ref pg 571) REPEATER, SEE ITEM 135

494MC

BOEING

	FIRE WARNING	ACTIVATED
TAKEOFF	0	FALSE WARNING
ABORTED TAKEOFF		

UIEA 74747UF

COCKPIT 06/04/1999 0

RETURN TO BLOCK

2612 29255 EA

UIEA9928 1999091700541 NM

A FLT FX076 - TAKEOFF ABORTED AT 138 KNOTS

DUE FIRE WARNING ALARM (AURAL AND VISUAL).
AFTER REJECTED TAKEOFF (THROTTLES IDLE, FULL
REVERSE,
MAX BRAKING) NO FURTHER INDICATION. WAS
UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHICH ENGINE CAUSED
WARNING. INSPECTED ALL ENGINES AND NO DAMAGE
FOUND.

PERFORMED CHAPTER 5 HIGH ENERGY STOP
INSPECTION AND CMC GROUND TEST, NO
ABNORMALTIES NOTED. PERFORMED ENGINE RUN-UP
AND WAS UNABLE TO

DUPLICATE DISCREPANCY. NO CMC MESSAGES
RECORDED IN PLF (PRESENT LEG FAULTS) OR EF
(EXISTING FAULTS). (X)

Item 140 (ref pg 573) REPEATER, SEE ITEMS 147, 166

673UP	BOEING		DRIVER CARD
DEFECTIVE	CLIMB	0	FALSE
WARNING	OTHER		
IPXA	747123		69B475193 FIRE
WARN SYS	09/19/1999	0	

2612	20325		SO
UPS99430637	1999092400517	NM	

A INSPECTION TYPE:N/A, ON DEPARTURE
CLIMBOUT INTERMITTENT FIRE WARNINGS BEGAN.
ALL FIRE WARNING SYSTEMS FOR CARGO
COMPTSTESTED GOOD. LWR
AFT CARGO FIRE WARNING CONTINUED EMERGENCY
RETURN WAS INITIATED AND TOUCHDOWN WAS MADE

OVERWEIGHT AND VERY SMOOTH AT APPROX 165 KTS AND 685,000 LBS. RESCUE CREWS REPORTED NO EVIDENCE OF FIRE. REMOVED AND REPLACED A-7 DRIVER CARD LWR CARGO (P/N 69B47519-3), (S/N AA27) ON,

(S/N 208) OFF. REMOVED AND REPLACED A-8 DRIVER CARD NR 4 ENG AS PRECAUTION, (P/N 69B47519-3), (S/N FT2-7) ON, (S/N 267) OFF.

OPERATIONAL CK OF FIRE

WARNING SYSTEM ON LWR CARGO AND NR 4 ENG CKS GOOD PER MM 26-10-01.

Item 141 (ref pg 574) REPEATER SEE ITEM 142, 143

630US	BOEING		PWA	
		ENGINE		FLAMED
OUT	APPROACH	0		ENGINE
FLAMEOUT		OTHER		
NWAA	7472J9F	JT9D7J		NR
4	09/21/1999	0		
7200	21668	689632	GL	01
9903976730	1999100100059	NE		

A DURING APPROACH, THE NR 4 ENGINE FLAMED OUT AT APPROXIMATELY 3,500 FEET. FLIGHT CREW CONTINUED APPROACH AND PERFORMED AN UNEVENTFUL LANDING. NO EMERGENCY WAS DECLARED. MAINTENANCE INSPECTED INLET, EXHAUST, AND BLEED PORTS. NO DAMAGE OR DEBRIS WAS FOUND. FUEL

PRESSURE AT FP-12 PORT CHECKED AND FOUND WITHIN LIMITS. REPLACED THE FUEL FILTER. ENGINE GROUND RUN AND ALL PARAMETERS NORMAL.

Item 142 (ref pg 574) REPEATER SEE ITEM 141, 143

630US BOEING PWA
 FUEL CONTROL
 MALFUNCTIONED APPROACH 0
 ENGINE FLAMEOUT OTHER
 NWAA 7472J9F JT9D7J NR 4
 ENGINE 09/26/1999 0

7321 21668 689632 GL 01
 9904046730 1999100100643 NE

A AT 4,000 FEET ON FINAL APPROACH (KIX), THE NR 4 ENGINE FLAMED OUT. A SINGLE RESTART WAS ATTEMPTED AND ABORTED DUE TO HIGH EGT. THE LANDING WAS COMPLETED WITHOUT INCIDENT. MAINTENANCE INSPECTED THE ENGINE EXHAUST AND INTAKE WITH NO DEFECTS NOTED. THE FUEL CONTROL AND TT2 SENSOR WERE REPLACED. SUBSEQUENT ENGINE OPERATIONAL RUN WAS NORMAL.

Item 143 (ref pg 575) REPEATER SEE ITEMS 142, 141

630US BOEING PWA
 ENGINE FLAMED
 OUT APPROACH 0 ENGINE
 FLAMEOUT OTHER
 NWAA 7472J9F JT9D7J NR
 4 09/25/1999 0
 7200 21668 689632 GL 01
 9904056730 1999100100644 NE

A AT 4,500 FEET ON APPROACH, THE NR 4 ENGINE FLAMED OUT WHILE AT IDLE POWER. THE ENGINE WAS RESTARTED AND OPERATED NORMALLY FOR THE

REMAINDER OF THE FLIGHT INCLUDING REVERSE AND TAXI OPERATION. MAINTENANCE INSPECTED THE ENGINE INCLUDING CHIP DETECTORS AND FUEL FILTER

WITH NO DISCREPANCIES NOTED. THE FUEL TANKS WERE SUMPED AND THE FUEL FILTER WAS REPLACED. AN ENGINE OPERATIONAL TEST WAS PERFORMED

WITH ALL INDICATIONS NORMAL.

Item 144 (ref pg 575)

	BOEING		PWA	
		OVEN		
MALFUNCTIONED		CRUISE		0
	SMOKE		UNSCHED LANDING	
	747433	PW4056		
GALLEY	08/19/1999	0		EMER.
DESCENT				
2530	P724696		CA	
CA990927082	1999101500552	NM		

W (CAN) EN ROUTE ELECTRICAL SMELL IN FORWARD GALLEY, GALLEY POWER TURNED OFF BURN SMELL PERSISTED, EMERGENCY DECLARED AND AIRCRAFT LANDED. OVEN REMOVED AND ROUTED FOR REPAIR. NEW OVEN INSTALLED AND RUN FOR ONE HOUR AND NO SMELL.

Item 145 (ref pg 577)

470EV	BOEING		SWITCH	
FAILED	CLIMB	74840	WARNING	
INDICATION	OTHER			
EIAA	747273C			NR 4
ENGINE	11/30/1998	0		

8012 20653 NM
EIA980352 1999102900653 NM

A LAX - WHILE CLIMBING THROUGH FL330, THE NR
4 ENGINE START VALVE OPEN LIGHT ILLUMINATED.
ENGINE SHUT DOWN PER ABNORMAL PROCEDURES.

WINDMILLED WITH 24 PSI OIL PRESSURE. PERFORMED
INSPECTION OF WING FROM PRESSURE SWITCH TO
WING BODY CONNECTION AND PERFORMED
RESISTANCE

CHECK, NO DEFECTS NOTED. REPLACED
PRESSURE SWITCH PER MM 80-11-05 CHECKED GOOD
UNABLE TO DUPLICATE. PERFORMED WINDMILL
INSPECTION MM
72-00-0. FILTER AND CHIP DETECTOR SERVICING. (M)

Item 146 (ref pg 578)

409EV BOEING

EICAS

FAILED NOT REPORTED 4539

SMOKE UNSCHED LANDING

74745E

6228588105

COCKPIT 10/13/1999 0

3140 28097 4027 WP 03
99ZZZX4134 1999110500069

H PILOT REPORTED SMOKE IN COCKPIT AND UPPER

EICAS DISPLAY UNIT BLANKED OUT DURING ROUTE FROM TPE/DXB ON 10-13-99. CREW TRIPPED UPPER EICAS DUAL CIRCUIT BREAKER AND AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO TPE. MAINTENANCE CHECKED, FOUND UPPER EICAS DISPLAY UNIT INTERNAL BURNT OR ARCING. WIRE AND CONNECTORS CHECKED NORMAL. REPLACED A NEW EICAS DISPLAY UNIT PER MM 31-61-02. AIRCRAFT RETURNED TO SERVICE.

Item 147 (ref pg 579) REPEATER, SEE ITEMS 140, 166
673UP BOEING

		SMOKE	
MALFUNCTIONED	CRUISE	0	
FALSE WARNING	UNSCHED LANDING		
IPXA 747123			CARGO
COMPT 10/27/1999	0		

2611 20325 SO 01
UPS99430999 1999110500165 NM

A AFT LOWER CARGO FIRE WARINING ILLUMINATED DURING FLIGHT. DETERMINED TO BE FALSE WARNING. MEL'D AFT LWR CARGO FIRE WARNING PER MEL 26-10-1-1, AND PLACARDED M 180936.

Item 148 (ref pg 579) HISTORY ?? NO EARLIER SDR NOTED

691UP BOEING

		CONNECTOR	
CONTAMINATED	CRUISE	0	
WARNING INDICATION	UNSCHED LANDING		
IPXA 747121			NR 4

ENGINE 10/28/1999 0 ENGINE
SHUTDOWN
8010 19641 SO
UPS99431001 1999110500166 NM

A APPROX 2 HRS INTO FLIGHT, NR 4 START VALVE
LIGHT CAME ON THE WENT OUT CAME ON AGAIN,
THEN SHUT DOWN NR 4 ENGINE PER AOM. LIGHT
WENT OUT.

MX FOUND CONNECTORS AT START VALVE OIL
SOAKED AND SHORTED. CLEANED CONNECTORS.
SYSTEM OPS CHECK NORMAL. THIS CLEARS M180958.

Item 149 (ref pg 580) ALSO SEE ITEM 113

691UP

BOEING

SMOKE INOP

CLIMB 0 FALSE WARNING

UNSCHED LANDING

IPXA 747121

CARGO COMPT 11/09/1999 0

2611 19641 SO 01

UPS99431068 1999111900023 NM

A INTERMITTENT ZONE 5 MAIN CARGO DECK FIRE
LIGHT ILLUMINATED DURING CLIMB-OUT OF PHL.

DEFERRED PER MEL 26-11. REMOVED AND REPLACED
B SMOKE

DETECTOR AND A8 SMOKE DETECTOR CARD. OP'S
CHECK GOOD PER MM 26-10-00. POSITIONS 14 TO 15A
VOID. REFERENCE LOG PAGE 148290 ITEM 3 FOR
OVERWEIGHT LANDING WHICH OCCURED DURING
LANDING.

Item 150 (ref pg 583)

674US BOEING BALLAST
FAILED CRUISE 0
SMOKE DEACTIVATE
NWAA 747451 ROW
12 11/22/1999 0
3320 30269 GL 01
9904946314 1999120400231 NM

A DURING CRUISE, AN ELECTRICAL ODOR AND SMOKE WAS NOTICED COMING FROM THE OVERHEAD LIGHTS IN CABIN ZONE 'B'. TURNED CABIN LIGHTS OFF AND THE ODOR AND SMOKE DISSIPATED. AIRCRAFT CONTINUED TO DTW AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. REPLACED BALLAST AT ROW 12JK. OPERATIONAL CHECK GOOD.

Item 151 (ref pg 584)

520UP BOEING FAN INOP
INSP/MAINT 0 SMOKE
NONE
IPXA 747212B
COCKPIT 12/04/1999 0

2150 1 SO
UPS99431169 1999121100698 NM

A CREW PREFLIGHT, ELECTRIC ODOR UPPER DECK EQUIP COOLING FAN INOP. SWAPPED LEFT MAIN EQUIP COOL FAN WITH UPPER DECK AND DEFERRED.

Item 152 (ref pg 586)

494MC BOEING

SMOKE

INOPERATIVE TAKEOFF 0

FALSE WARNING ABORTED TAKEOFF

UIEA 74747UF

CABIN 10/08/1999 0

DEACTIVATE

2611 29255

EA

UIEA9988 1999121101079 NM

A FLT GT3573 - REJECTED TAKEOFF, AT APPROX 80 KNOTS, A MAIN DECK FIRE WARNING ALERT WAS ANNUNCIATED. THE CENTRAL MAINTENANCE COMPUTER (CMC) SHOWED NR 1 ZONE MAIN DECK SMOKE DETECTORS 'A' AND 'B' AT FAULT. BOM, MAINTENANCE DEACTIVATED NR 1 ZONE MAIN DECK SMOKE DETECTORS

'A' AND 'B' BY REMOVING THE ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS PER FLT CREW AND ATLAS AIR MAINTENANCE CONTROL, JFK REQUEST. DISCREPANCY WAS DEFERRED

PER MEL ITEM NR 26-14-1 AND AIRCRAFT RELEASE. REPLACED BOTH 'A' AND 'B' NR 1 ZONE SMOKE DETECTORS AND OPERATIONAL CHECK NORMAL. (M)

Item 153 (ref pg 588) REPEATER, SEE ITEM 154

665US BOEING

RELAY

FAILED

TAKEOFF

0 FALSE

WARNING ABORTED TAKEOFF

NWAA 747451

WHEEL WELL 12/26/1999 0

2612 23820

GL

9905436303 2000010800089 NM

A DURING TAKEOFF, THE WHEEL WELL FIRE
WARNING ACTIVATED. AIRCRAFT ABORTED TAKEOFF
AND RETURNED TO GATE WITHOUT INCIDENT.

REPLACED R8048

RELAY. OPERATIONAL CHECK OK.

Item 154 (ref pg 589) REPEATER, SEE ITEM 153

.665US

BOEING

RELAY FAILED
TAKEOFF 0 FALSE WARNING

ABORTED TAKEOFF

NWAA 747451

MLG

WW 12/26/1999 0

2612 23820

GL

9905436305 2000010800444 NM

A DURING TAKEOFF, THE WHEEL WELL FIRE
WARNING ACTIVATED. AIRCRAFT ABORTED TAKEOFF
AND RETURNED TO THE GATE WITHOUT INCIDENT.

REPLACED

R8048 RELAY. OPERATIONAL CHECK GOOD.

Item 155 (ref pg 598) REPEATER, SEE ITEM 156

BOEING

CONNECTOR

FAILED

INSP/MAINT 0

OTHER NONE
747438 ENGINE
09/13/1999 0
7160 AU AU991006

2000011500301 NM
W (AUS) NR 1 STRUT BULKHEAD CONNECTORS
ARCING. FURTHER INVESTIGATION FOUND THE
WIRING LOOM CONDUIT D8451P DRAIN HOLE
INCORRECTLY
POSITIONED ALLOWING A BUILD UP OF HYDRAULIC
FLUID AT THE REAR OF THE CONNECTOR WHICH
CAUSED DETERIORATION OF THE RUBBER INSERT
WHICH

ALLOWED THE PINS TO SHORT CIRCUIT.
Item 156 (ref pg 598) REPEATER, SEE ITEM 155
BOEING

CONNECTOR
FAILED INSP/MAINT 0
SMOKE NONE
747338 D9981P D9981J
COCKPIT 10/20/1999 0

2510 AU AU991034
2000011500322 NM
W (AUS) CREW REST INTERFACE MODULE
CONNECTOR PINS SHORT CIRCUITED. SUBMITTER
SUSPECTED CONNECTORS CONTAMINATED BY WATER.
Item 157 (ref pg 594)

BOEING WIRE
CONTAMINATED CRUISE 0 ELECT. POWER
LOSS-50 PC UNSCHED LANDING
747238B GALLEY
09/08/1999 0 SMOKE

2530 AU S
AU991017 2000022300014 NM WARNING
INDICATION

W (AUS) REAR GALLEY HOTPLATE WIRING AND
TERMINAL BLOCK DETERIORATED. WATER
CONTAMINATION OF WIRING.

Item 158 (ref pg 594)

624FF

BOEING

CABLE FAILED INSP/
MAINT 0 NO TEST

NONE

TWRA 747212B W2741X1012

GENERATOR 02/04/2000 0

2421 21439 EA 15

TWRA0013 2000022600048 NM

A DURING C-CHECK, FOUND GENERATOR FEEDER
CABLE BURNT STA'S 970, 980, AND 985. REPLACED
FEEDER CABLES. (X)

Item 159 (ref pg 594) ALSO SEE ITEM 162

408MC

BOEING

GE EICAS MALFUNCTIONED
TAKEOFF 0 FALSE WARNING

ABORTED TAKEOFF

UIEA 74747UF CF650E2

COCKPIT 12/16/1999 0

3150 29261 EA 15

UIEA9998 2000022600800 NM

A FLT AZ9162 - MXP-ORD - ON TAKEOFF ROLL AT 20 KNOTS, THE FLT CREW SAW A MOMENTARY RED FLASH ON THE EICAS. BELIEVED TO BE A FIRE WARNING MESSAGE, BUT IT WAS TOO QUICK TO READ. TAKEOFF WAS ABORTED WITHOUT EXCEEDING TAXI SPEED AND A/C RETURNED TO BLOCKS. WHEN A/C ARRIVED AT THE BLOCKS, THERE WAS NOT EICAS MESSAGE. ALSO, THERE WERE NO PRESENT LEG FAULT(PFL) MESSAGES. PERFORMED FIRE WARNING/OVERHEAT TEST

AND FOUND TO BE NORMAL. AIRCRAFT VISUALLY CHECKED FOR ABNORMALITIES AND NONE FOUND. NO HISTORY MESSAGES IN THE CMC. UNABLE TO DUPLICATE THE REPORTED DISCREPANCY. (M)

Item 160 (ref pg 598) REPEATER, SEE ITEMS 163, 164
640US BOEING

ACTIVATED	CRUISE	WARNING	FALSE
WARNING	OTHER		
NWAA 747251F			
COCKPIT	03/11/2000		

2611 23888 GL 01
0000916740 2000040500108 NM

A DURING CRUISE, THE NR 1 MAIN DECK CARGO SMOKE DETECTOR LIGHT ILLUMINATED AND FIRE BELL ACTIVATED. FOLLOWED COCKPIT OPERATING MANUAL PROCEDURES AND VERIFIED NO CARGO SMOKE OR FIRE. AIRCRAFT CONTINUED TO DESTINATION AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. TIGHTENED COVER FOR MAIN DECK CARGO SMOKE DETECTOR AMPLIFIER AND CLEANED A8 SMOKE DETECTOR CARD. OPERATIONAL CHECK GOOD.

Item 161 (ref pg 599) ALSO SEE ITEMS 68, 106, 171
471EV BOEING

SMOKE

MALFUNCTIONED APPROACH
FALSE WARNING ACTIVATE FIRE EXT.

EIAA 747273C
CARGO BAY 01/30/2000

2611 20651 NM
EIA000009 2000040800316 NM

A KDEN - LOWER AFT CARGO COMPARTMENT SMOKE DETECTOR LIGHT CAME ON. NR 1 BOTTLE DISCHARGED. LIGHT WENT OUT AFTER APPROX 2 MINUTES. NR 2 BOTTLE DISCHARGED ON APPROACH. PERFORMED LOWER CARGO COMPARTMENT SMOKE DETECTION TEST IAW B747MM 26-16-00. NO DEFECTS NOTED. (M)

Item 162 (ref pg 600) ALSO SEE ITEM 159
408MC BOEING

HARNESS

DAMAGED INSP/MAINT 4464
OTHER NONE

UIEA 74747UF
OVEN 03/09/2000
2530 29261 EA 15
UIEA0009 2000041500447 NM

A ON REMOVAL OF OVEN B/E AEROSPACE TYPE
DF400PTC, FOUND CONNECTING POWER SUPPLY FLEX
CABLE TEFLON SPIRAL WRAP MELTED DUE
CONTACTING
HOUSING OF HOT AIR CIRCULATING FAN. WIRE
BUNDLE WAS PREVIOUSLY REPAIRED AS INDICATED
BY WIRE SPLICES. BUNDLE IS APPROX 3 FT IN LENGTH
WHICH

IS REQUIRED SO OVEN CAN BE CONNECTED/
DISCONNECTED AFTER SLIDING OUT OF OVEN COMPT
C-4.ON SLIDING OVEN INTO COMPARTMENT, CABLE
FREE STATE

COMPRESSES AND ALLOWS CONTACT TO THE HOT
AIR CIRCULATING FAN CASING CAUSING MELTING OF
OUTER PROTECTIVE COVERINGS. THIS IS A BLIND
AREA

AND CANNOT BE CHECKED AFTER INSTALLATION.
WIRES AND CASING REPAIRED AND NEW SPIRAL WRAP
INSTALLED. (M)

Item 163 (ref pg 601) REPEATER, SEE ITEM 164
674US BOEING

		SMOKE	FALSE
INDICATION	CRUISE		FALSE
WARNING	OTHER		
NWAA	747251F		215610C
CARGO BAY	03/12/2000		

2611 23888 GL

0000946740 2000042200089 NM

A DURING CRUISE, THE NR 1 SMOKE DETECTOR LIGHT ILLUMINATED AND FIRE BELL ACTIVATED. FOLLOWED COM PROCEDURES AND VERIFIED NO CARGO SMOKE OR FIRE. AIRCRAFT CONTINUED TO DESTINATION AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. CLEANED BOTH SMOKE DETECTORS, OPERATIONAL CHECK GOOD.

Item 164 (ref pg 601) REPEATER, SEE ITEM 163
640US BOEING

		SMOKE	FALSE
INDICATION	CRUISE	FALSE	
WARNING	OTHER		
	NWAA 747251F		215610C
CARGO BAY	03/12/2000		

2611 23888 GL

0000956740 2000042200090 NM

A DURING CRUISE, THE NR 1 SMOKE DETECTOR LIGHT ILLUMINATED AND FIRE BELL ACTIVATED. VISUALLY CONFIRMED NO CARGO SMOKE OR FIRE. AIRCRAFT CONTINUED TO DESTINATION AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. REPLACED A8 SMOKE DETECTOR CARD AND "A" AND "B" SMOKE DETECTORS. OPERATIONAL CHECK GOOD.

Item 165 (ref pg 603) ALSO SEE ITEM 170
603FF

BOEING

CABLE	BURNED	INSP/
MAINT	OTHER	

NONE

TWRA 747130

W2785X102

FUSELAGE 01/10/2000

2400 19746

EA

TWRA0007 2000042800255 NM

A DURING C-CHECK, FOUND APU GENERATOR FEEDER CABLE AT BS 1450 BELOW CABIN FLOOR BURNED. REPLACED GENERATOR FEEDER CABLE. (M)
Item 166 (ref pg 605) REPEATER, SEE ITEMS 140, 147
673UP

BOEING

SMOKE

INOPERATIVE

CLIMB

SMOKE

ACTIVATE FIRE EXT.

IPXA 747123F

CARGO

BAY 04/08/2000

FALSE WARNING

UNSCHED LANDING

2611 20325

SO

UPS00432237 2000052000395 NM

A 15 MIN AFTER TAKEOFF, LOWER AFT CARGO FIRE LIGHT ILLUMINATED. LOWER AFT CARGO FIRE CHECKLIST ACCOMPLISHED, BOTH BOTTLES DISCHARGED.

REMOVED AND REPLACED NR 3 AND NR 6 AFT LOWER CARGO SMOKE DETECTORS PER 2 6-16-02 SYSTEM OPS CKS GOOD. ALSO REMOVED AND REPLACED BOTH CARGO COMPARTMENT FIRE EXTINGUISHER BOTTLES IAW MM 26-23-01.

Item 167 (ref pg 606)
636US BOEING

		FAN	
FAILED	CRUISE		63440
	SMOKE	OTHER	
NWAA	747251B		60545711
COCKPIT	04/22/2000	25373	

2121 23547 GL
0001506636 2000060300523 NM

A DURING CRUISE, A BURNING SMELL WAS NOTICED IN THE FLIGHT DECK ALONG WITH A LOW FREQUENCY VIBRATION. SECURED ZONE 1 RECIRCULATION FAN AND ODOR AND VIBRATION STOPPED. AIRCRAFT CONTINUED TO DESTINATION AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. REPLACED THE RECIRCULATION FAN, OPERATIONAL CHECK GOOD.

Item 168 (ref pg 606)
612US BOEING

		ODOR	
DETECTED	DESCENT		
SMOKE	OTHER		
NWAA	747251B		
CABIN	05/09/2000		
2120	20357	GL	
0001826612	2000060300546	NM	

A DURING DESCENT, AN ELECTRICAL SMELL WAS NOTICED IN THE FLIGHT DECK AND CABIN. DEACTIVATED GALLEYS AND READING LIGHTS AND SMELL SLOWLY

DISSIPATED. AIRCRAFT CONTINUED TO DESTINATION AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. INSPECTED CABIN ELECTRICAL SYSTEM WITH NO FAULTS FOUND.

REPLACED THE GASPER FAN AND NR 3 RECIRCULATION FAN AS A PRECAUTION. OPERATIONAL CHECK GOOD.

Item 169 (ref pg 608)

618FF BOEING

SWITCH

SHORTED DESCENT
SMOKE OTHER

TWRA 747212B A350
COCKPIT 03/23/2000

3310 21937 EA 15

TWRA0021 2000061700629 NM

A FOUND STRONG SMELL OF BURNING ELECTRICAL WIRES IN COCKPIT. DURING DESCENT, THE LANDING LIGHT SWITCHES ACTIVATED. FOUND RIGHT OUTBOARD

LANDING LIGHT SWITCH SHORTED. REPLACED SWITCH, OPERATIONAL CHECK NORMAL. (M)

Item 170 (ref pg 609) ALSO SEE ITEM 165

603FF BOEING

SMOKE

DETECTED NOT REPORTED
SMOKE OTHER

TWRA 747130
COCKPIT 03/30/2000

3310 19746 EA 15

TWRA0022 2000061700630 NM

A FOUND ELECTRICAL SMOKE IN COCKPIT FROM CONTROL PEDESTAL THROUGH NR 1 THROTTLE OPENING SLOT. DISAPPEARED WHEN CONTROL STAND PANEL LIGHTS WERE TURNED OFF. INSPECTED AREA, CHECKED WIRING FOR ANY DISCREPANCIES, NONE NOTED. UNABLE TO DUPLICATE ITEM. (M)
Item 171 (ref pg 614) REPEATER, SEE ITEMS 68, 106, 161
471EV BOEING

FIRE DETECTOR

MALFUNCTIONED CRUISE FALSE
WARNING ACTIVATE FIRE EXT.
GK4Y 747273C
CARGO BAY 06/12/2000

2612 20651 WP 03
20000707SH004 2000080200085 NM

B TELEX RECEIVED FROM EIA OPERATION THAT AIRCRAFT REPORTED FIRE IN AFT HOLD. AIRCRAFT EN ROUTE HNL/NAN/SYD, WAS ONE HOUR 45 MINUTES FROM NAN WHEN REPORT RECEIVED. BOTH FIRE BOTTLES WERE DISCHARGED ON ARRIVAL NAN, AFT CARGO OPENED AND INSPECTED FOR EVIDENCE OF FIRE. EVERYTHING FOUND NORMAL. AIRCRAFT WAS RELEASED TO SERVICE BY CREW UNDER DDPG DUE NO FIRE BOTTLE ON STATION AND NO COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS IN CARGO HOLDS. (X)

Item 172 (ref pg 615)
521UP BOEING

HARNESS

ARCED INSP/MAINT
OTHER NONE
IPXA 747212B
FUSELAGE 06/10/2000

2400 21944 SO
UPS00433359 2000082200021 NM

A INSPECTION TYPE:C, FWD CARGO HOLD - CABLE
LOOM PASSING THROUGH FRAME AT BS 520, RBL 24
SHOWS EVIDENCE OF ARCING. ACCOMPLISHED PER
QUERY

NOTE 35/2000 WHICH ASKS FOR WIRES TO BE
REMOVED AS SYSTEM IS INACTIVE. WIRES REMOVED
FROM CB C914 IN P14 PANEL TO RELAY R175 IN PANEL
P86, AT

FWD CARGO DOOR PER WDM 24-51-72.

NUMBER OF (ORIGINAL) RECORDS: 3, 202. Prepared by
the Aviation Data Systems Branch / AFS - 620 Format:
SDR_G AFS620MK. Selection Criteria:[C140]='747'AND
([C40]>'1000'AND[C40]<'5100'OR[C40]>'6730'AND[C40]
<'8551')AND[C25Y]>'1995' Sort Criteria: [C5],[C40]

From: John Barry Smith <barry@johnbarrysmith.com>
Date: September 5, 2009 11:46:53 PM PDT
To: atipb@rcmp-grc.ca
**Subject: Please reconsider denial of access to information
about Air India Flight 182**

Dear Sgt Sheridan, Tuesday, September 11, 2007

Please reconsider denial of access to information about Air India Flight 182 based upon my non Canadian citizenship. Air India Flight 182 is an internationally infamous event which is of considerable interest to citizens of various countries worldwide, one of which is the USA, the manufacturer of the aircraft.

I am writing within my 30 day response deadline and ask the information be sent to me.

Regards,

John Barry Smith
541 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, California 93924
1 831 659 3552
1 831 241 0631 Cell
barry@johnbarrysmith.com
<http://www.montereypeninsulaairport.com>
<http://www.ntsbt.org>

Please provide me copies of about 50 video tapes and nearly 3000 still photographs

(positives and transparencies) which provided the visual information on the targets

on Air India Flight 182. The tapes and films were taken and stored for future evaluation.

Two sheets attached from a Crown Aviation Accident Report detail the types of film, video tapes, and targets.

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access to federal government records that are not of a personal nature.

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Transportation Safety Board of Canada

Tonette Allen

Access to Information and Privacy Coordinator

Place du Centre

200 Promenade du Portage, 4th Floor

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tonette.allen@tsb.gc.ca

Transport Canada

Linda Savoie

Access to Information and Privacy Coordinator

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Canadian Aviation Bureau canadien Safety Board de la sécurité
aérienne
AVIATION OCCURRENCE AIR INDIA BOEING 747-237B VT-
EFO
CORK, IRELAND 110 MILES WEST 23 JUNE 1985
REPORT OF THE COURT INVESTIGATING
ACCIDENT TO AIR INDIA BOEING 747 AIRCRAFT VT-EFO,
"KANISHKA" ON 23RD JUNE 1985
2.11.2 Wreckage Mapping and Surveying
The Canadian Coast Guard Ship (CCGS) John Cabot was given
the task of
mapping the wreckage on the ocean floor. On 19 July 1985, the
Cabot with a
SCARAB deep submersible on board departed Cork. On arrival at
the site, and
based on surface wreckage distribution and bottom side scan
sonar plots, four

transmitters were placed on the sea bed. These transmitters provided signals for the ALLNAV navigation system used to accurately plot the sea bed wreckage.

Based on all the data available, the SCARAB was launched on 24 July 1985 to

begin the bottom search in position 51°01.9'N 12°41.0'W. During the mapping,

stage areas were designated for search and each progressive area was determined

based on the information gained during the search. The search was conducted

using sonar and video. Wreckage found was recorded on video tape and on 35mm

positive film.

The first object plotted on the sea bed was a torn suitcase located at lat

51°02.63'N, long 12°53.15'W and was the most westerly object located. This

suitcase has not been recovered, nor has it been positively identified as having

come from the accident aircraft.

As the search progressed eastward, the first positive identification of aircraft

wreckage was made at lat 51°02.9'N, long 12°49.93'W. Slowly, over a period of

about 90 days, a detailed bottom wreckage plot was developed.

While mapping was in progress, some of the wreckage was revisited to obtain

additional data. During the transit through areas already searched, wreckage not

previously plotted was found, and, in some areas, the density of wreckage

physically precluded 100 per cent coverage. Components and major structural

items were identified from all sections of the aircraft and when the

mapping of
the sea bed ended, most of the aircraft had been found and
photographed.
Although positive identification of each piece of wreckage could
not be made, it
was decided in late October 1985 that the search phase was
essentially completed
and wreckage recovery could begin. A bottom wreckage
distribution plot is
contained separately in an envelope as Appendix F.

2.11.4 Photographic and Video Interpretation of Wreckage

2.11.4.1 Photographic Interpretation

All wreckage sighted was recorded on video tape and all major
items were
recorded on 35mm positive film. During the course of the
investigation, several
members of the investigation team had the opportunity to view
the tapes and
photographs. Subsequently, when some items were recovered, it
became apparent
that the optical image presented on video and still film had some
limitation with
respect to identification of damage or damage patterns. For
example, the sine
wave bending of target 7* appeared in the video and photographs
as a sine wave
fracture, and some of the buckling on target 35 was not evident in
either the video
or photographs. The interpretation of damage through
photographic/video
evidence without the physical evidence might be misleading, and
any
interpretation should take this into account.

1.5.13 Another important decision which was taken at the Pre-
hearing

Confence was that a Structural Group was formed consisting of

(1) Mr. H.S.

Khola or his nominee (2) Representative of the Canadian Government (3)

Representative of NTSB, USA (4) Representative of Boeing Airplane Co., USA

(5) Representative of Air India. This group was entrusted with the task of

examining and analysing, initially in Seattle, USA, the video films and the still

photographs of the wreckage. This group was also to indicate and decide the items

of priorities of wreckage which had to be recovered. The report of this group was

required to be submitted by 18th October, 1985. The report of the work done at

Seattle was in fact submitted only on 25th October, 1985. This group was also

given the liberty to associate any other experts or persons from Boeing or any

other Authority. The group was also to inspect the floating wreckage which had

already been salvaged and any further wreckage which would be salvaged.

2.4.3.6 A question arose whether removal of the door stop fittings could

have caused some difficulty in flight. From the video films of the wreckage it was

found that the complete aft cargo door was intact

and in its position except that it had come adrift slightly.

2.11.5 Wreckage Recovery and Initial Examination

During the wreckage mapping, some small items were recovered, and an

unsuccessful attempt was made to recover a portion of the forward cargo door. On

completion of the sea bed survey, an offshore supply ship, Kreuztrum, chartered

by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), joined John Cabot for a wreckage recovery operation. Prior to the commencement of the wreckage recovery, the structures group met at the Boeing facility in Seattle, USA and reviewed the video tapes and photographs of the wreckage.

3.2.5.1 The Scarab provided video tapes and still photographs. In the initial

stages (upto 9.8.1985) the John Cabot was operating in peripheral areas and

therefore few targets were found. Hence the output of videotapes was small. In

fact upto 9.8.85, only about 10 targets were found and only 3 video tapes were

used up. But later, when John Cabot came close to and into the crucial areas,

video tapes were recorded at a fast rate. Further, still photography facility on the

Scarab was activated at about this time. Therefore, arrangements were made

periodically to obtain the video tapes and films from John Cabot. Video tapes and

still photographs (these required to be processed) were transported from John

Cabot to Cork Control Centre.

3.2.5.2 About 50 video tapes and nearly 3000 still photographs (positives and

transparencies) provided the visual information on the targets.

Arrangements had to be made at Cork for such viewing and study of the video

tapes and still photographs. Video equipment (TV monitor plus VCR) suitable for

viewing the video tapes had to be arranged.

3.2.5.3 The still photography used special professional quality colour film

(35 mm), each roll having 800 frames. The film was diapositive. These had to be developed and transparencies obtained from them. Thereafter negatives and prints had to be made. Special equipment for viewing the transparencies had to be provided for continuous work. The video tapes, transparencies and prints provided the principal means of monitoring of the results of the operation.

3.2.9 Extent of Damage

Photographic and Video Interpretation of Wreckage

Photographic Interpretation

3.2.9.1 All wreckage sighted was recorded on video tapes and all major items

were recorded on 35 mm positive film. During the course of the investigation, several members of the investigation team had the opportunity to view the tapes and photographs. Subsequently, when some items were recovered, it became apparent that the optical image presented on video and still film had some limitation with respect to identification of damage or damage pattern. For example, the sine wave bending of target 7 appeared in the video and photographs as a sine wave fracture, and some of the buckling on target 35 was not evident in either the video or photographs. The interpretation of damage through photographic/video evidence without the physical evidence might be misleading, and any interpretation should take this into account.

3.2.10.1 During recovery operation the video tapes as well as photographs of the wreckage to be recovered, were supplied to the personnel on

board the ship
for facilitating identification and recovery of correct targets.

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3.2.5.2 About 50 video tapes and nearly 3000 still photographs (positives and

transparencies) provided the visual information on the targets.

Arrangements had to be made at Cork for such viewing and study of the video

tapes and still photographs. Video equipment (TV monitor plus VCR) suitable for

viewing the video tapes had to be arranged.

3.2.5.3 The still photography used special professional quality colour film

(35 mm), each roll having 800 frames. The film was diapositive.

These had to be

developed and transparencies obtained from them. Thereafter

negatives and prints

had to be made. Special equipment for viewing the

transparencies had to be

provided for continuous work. The video tapes, transparencies and prints provided

the principal means of monitoring of the results of the operation.

3.2.9 Extent of Damage

Photographic and Video Interpretation of Wreckage

Photographic Interpretation

3.2.9.1 All wreckage sighted was recorded on video tapes and all major items

were recorded on 35 mm positive film. During the course of the investigation,

several members of the investigation team had the opportunity to view the tapes

and photographs. Subsequently, when some items were recovered, it became

apparent that the optical image presented on video and still film had some

limitation with respect to identification of damage or damage pattern. For

example, the sine wave bending of target 7 appeared in the video

and photographs
as a sine wave fracture, and some of the buckling on target 35
was not evident in
either the video or photographs. The interpretation of damage
through
photographic/video evidence without the physical evidence might
be misleading,
and any interpretation should take this into account.

3.2.10.1 During recovery operation the video tapes as well as
photographs of
the wreckage to be recovered, were supplied to the personnel on
board the ship
for facilitating identification and recovery of correct targets.