

From: barry@corazon.com
Date: July 26, 1996 12:21:51 PM PDT
To: schledr@ntsb.gov
Subject: **TWA crash cause explained**

I have a reasonable explanation for the cause of crash of TWA flight 800. May I speak with someone involved with aircraft accident investigations? I have extensive aircraft experience and am a retired military officer. It's worth listening to.

The theory is that inadvertent cargo door openings have caused the crashes of TWA Flight 800, Pan Am Flight 103, and United Flight 811. RE: TWA Flight 800, the visual streak reported is the cargo door spinning down reflecting in the evening dusk sun. The radar anomaly is the cargo door as it detached from the fuselage. The tapes of Flights 800, 103 and 811 will all be similar at the time of door separation.

Attached as jpg files are two illustrations: one is a photo from the NTSB accident report of United Flight 811 after landing with its cargo door torn off. The rectangle shows the area of tearing and loss. The other illustration is a drawing from the UK accident report of Pan AM Flight 103 showing the sequence of destruction. This drawing shows the similarity of disintegration. The shapes are the same, the doors were broken in half at the same breakline, and the sizes are the same.

More info: the sounds of the two flight recorders on 103 and 811 are similar at time of door coming off. The 811 door was found unlatched at the bottom of Pacific; 103 door was found and latch condition omitted in report while the other two cargo doors were reported as latched. Radar blip anomalies were detected on 103 and 800 just before disintegration. Door spinning away would give such blips and also for 800 appear as visual streak as it reflected the evening sun.

The doors of 811 and 103 came off and 125 opened, no doubt. The cause of the 811 was improper latching and design. The

stated cause of 103 was bomb in cargo hold.

All four aircraft were very early 747-100 series with over 58000 flights hours. Many early 747's, such as Pan Am 103, had their cargo doors and cargo area reworked for military use thereby tampering with original design.

False positive for explosives on TWA Flight 800 was reported today, could have happened on 103.

Yes, I am saying Pan Am 103 crash cause was an inadvertent opening cargo door and not a bomb. Yes, I am saying United 811 and Pan Am 125 were cargo doors. Yes, I am saying TWA 800 crash cause was a cargo door.

I predict the door on 800 will be found broken in half and unlatched. I predict the flight data recorders will have similar sounds at time of destruction to the 103 and 811 tapes. I predict the breakup sequence of the airframe will be similar.

Here is the analogy: A balloon not inflated when pricked does nothing, such as inadvertent door opening on runway (as 747 cargo doors have done several documented times). A balloon partially pricked does nothing, such as a door opening but not coming off (Pan Am Flight 125). A balloon pricked when fully inflated pops, such as door opening at 31000 feet (Pan Am 103). A balloon pricked when partially inflated hisses and deflates, such as door opening at 21000 feet (United Flight 811), or 13500 feet, (TWA Flight 800). And then wind force takes over and tears the fuselage apart. (How lucky were the passengers on Flight 125 and Flight 811!)

Background on me: I was an audiologist for ten years and can analyze sounds such as the flight data recorder tapes. I was a radar operator for nine years and can understand picking up large cargo doors as returns. I was an air intelligence officer/reconnaissance attack navigator for eight years and understand need for careful research, evaluation, and conclusions. I was involved in an ejection where the pilot died and I suffered back

injury. I know accident investigation is important.

1. This excerpt is from the United Flight 811 cargo door report used as background info.

1.17.1 Previous Cargo Door Incident

On March 10, 1987, a Pan American Airways B-747-122, N740PA,

operating as flight 125 from London to New York, experienced an incident involving the forward cargo door. According to Pan Am and Boeing officials who investigated this incident, the flightcrew experienced pressurization problems as the airplane was climbing through about 20,000 feet. The crew began a descent and the pressurization problem ceased about 15,000 feet. The crew began to climb again, but about 20,000 feet, the cabin altitude began to rise rapidly again. The flight returned to London.

When the airplane was examined on the ground, the forward cargo door was found open about 1 1/2 inches along the bottom with the latch cams unlatched and the master latch lock handle closed. The cockpit cargo door warning light was off.

2. Scheduled 14 CFR 121 operation of TRANSWORLD AIRWAYS (D.B.A. TWA)

Accident occurred JUL-17-96 at EAST MORICHES, NY

Aircraft: Boeing 747, registration:
N93119

Injuries: 230 Fatal.

On July 17, 1996, about 8:45pm, TWA flight 800, N93119, a Boeing 747-100, crashed into the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of

Long Island shortly after takeoff from Kennedy International Airport. The airplane was on a regularly scheduled flight to Paris, France. The initial reports are that witnesses saw an explosion and then debris descending to the ocean. There are no reports of the flightcrew reporting a problem to air traffic control. The airplane was manufactured in November 1971. It has accumulated about 93,303 flight hours and 16,869 cycles. On board the airplane were 212 passengers and 18 crewmembers. The airplane was destroyed and there were no survivors.

3. Scheduled 14 CFR 121 operation of UNITED AIRLINES (D.B.A. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.)

Accident occurred FEB-24-89 at

HONOLULU, HI

Aircraft: BOEING 747-122, registration:

N4713U

Injuries: 9 Fatal, 5 Serious, 33 Minor, 309

Uninjured.

FTL #811 WAS A SCHEDULED PASSENGER FLIGHT FROM LOS ANGELES TO SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA, WITH STOPS IN HONOLULU (HNL), HI, AND AUCKLAND, NEW ZEALAND. THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL UNTIL AFTER DEPARTURE FROM HNL. WHILE CLIMBING FROM FL220 TO FL230 THE CREW HEARD A "THUMP" FOLLOWED BY AN EXPLOSION. AN EXPLOSIVE DECOMPRESSION WAS EXPERIENCED AND THE #3 AND #4 ENGS WERE SHUTDOWN BECAUSE OF FOD. THE FLT RETURNED TO HNL AND

PASSENGERS WERE EVACUATED. INSPECTION REVEALED THE FORWARD LOWER LOBE CARGO DOOR DEPARTED INFLT CAUSING EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO THE FUSELAGE AND CABIN ADJACENT TO THE DOOR. NINE PASSENGERS WERE EJECTED AND LOST AT SEA. INVESTIGATION CENTERED AROUND DESIGN AND CERTIFICATION OF THE DOOR WHICH ALLOWED IT TO BE IMPROPERLY LATCHED, AND THE OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE TO ASSURE AIRWORTHINESS OF THE DOOR AND LATCHING MECHANISM. (SEE NTSB/AAR-90/01)

Probable Cause

THE SUDDEN OPENING OF THE IMPROPERLY LATCHED FORWARD LOBE CARGO DOOR IN FLIGHT AND THE SUBSEQUENT EXPLOSIVE DECOMPRESSION. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS A DEFICIENCY IN THE DESIGN OF THE CARGO DOOR LOCKING MECHANISMS, WHICH MADE THEM SUSCEPTIBLE TO INSERVICE DAMAGE, AND WHICH ALLOWED THE DOOR TO BE UNATCHED, YET TO SHOW A PROPERLY LATCHED AND LOCKED POSITION. ALSO CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS THE LACK OF PROPER MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION OF THE CARGO DOOR BY UNITED AIRLINES, AND A LACK OF TIMELY CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BY BOEING AND THE FAA FOLLOWING A PREVIOUS DOOR OPENING INCIDENT.

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The streak seen was the cargo doors spinning and reflecting in the evening dusk sun. The radar blip before destruction was the cargo door coming off. The culprit was seen visually and on

radar.

Real bombs have gone off on 747s before; they don't cause catastrophic destruction; they blow holes in skin or floor and planes lands safely.

#47 10.12.94 Boeing 747-283B

EI-BWF Philippine Air Lines (Philippines)

1(293) Minami Diato Isl.; nr. (Japan)

On a flight from Manila to Tokyo via Cebu, a bomb exploded in the passenger

cabin beneath seat 26K. A succesfull emergency landing at Okinawa was made at 12.45h.

The muslim group Abu Sayyaf claimed responsibility

.#34 18.01.84 Boeing 747

Air France

0(261) Karachi, 70mls (Pakistan)

An in-flight explosion after leaving Karachi blew a hole in the right rear

cargo hold and caused a loss of cabin pressure. An emergency descent to

5000ft was made and the aircraft returned to Karachi.

#31 11.08.82 Boeing 747-121

N754PA Pan American World Airways (USA)

1() Hawaii; 140mls (USA)

On a flight from Tokyo one passenger was killed when a bomb, located under

the seat cushion, exploded. The explosion also resulted in a hole in the

floor and damage to the ceiling and overhead racks. A safe landing was made

at Honolulu.

Based upon a reasonable explanation of observed events does not my theory/hypothesis merit more attention? Does any of your

staff live near the San Francisco bay area; I could go there and show them the extensive documentation such as the similarities between the three flights, 103, 800, and 811. (Similar early 747s, similar sounds on tape, similar time after takeoff, similar radar blip before destruction, and soon similar broken cargo door and breakup pattern.)

Only a hole the size of the forward cargo door opening up will quickly destroy a 747. It was the opening and tearing off of the cargo door that caused Flight 800 to disintegrate. It happened before, it happened now, and it will happen again.

The small picture is that a mechanical problem crashed an airplane; happens all the time. The big picture is that there is a pattern of crashes which are caused by the same mechanical problem which remains unfixed killing hundreds of passengers. And the cause is going unexplained because it is in the perceived best interests of the government, the manufacturer and the airline to blame act of god terrorists rather than a real life screwup in design, maintenance, and oversight. It's human nature to avoid responsibility and blame others. But when dealing with aircraft accident investigations the truth must be discovered and let the chips fall where they may because we may be the next victims when we fly.

email me or call 408 6593552 John Barry Smith

From: barry@corazon.com

Date: July 29, 1996 6:59:27 AM PDT

To: schledr@ntsb.gov

Subject: TWA crash cause ATTN Robert Francis

Mr. Francis. The reasonable cause of the TWA crash is the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door. That is the mechanical cause that must be ruled out. Compare to United Flight 811 of Feb 1989.

From: Schleede Ron <SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov>
Date: July 29, 1996 12:24:00 PM PDT
To: barry <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: **RE: TWA crash cause ATTN Robert Francis**

Be assured that we are checking that. I was the investigator in charge of the UAL flight 811 case and fully knowledgeable in its causes and factors.

Thanks for the interest.

From: barry
To: schledr
Subject: TWA crash cause ATTN Robert Francis
Date: Sunday, July 28, 1996 9:58AM

Mr. Francis. The reasonable cause of the TWA crash is the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door. That is the mechanical cause that must be ruled out. Compare to United Flight 811 of Feb 1989.

From: barry@corazon.com
Date: July 29, 1996 4:49:53 PM PDT
To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: TWA crash cause

Mr Schleede, thank you for replying to my several emails asking to rule out inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door as the cause of TWA 800 and assuring me that you are checking that. An analogy is that of the several victims, one came back (UAL flight 811) and was able to show what happened. The other victims were Pan Am 103, TWA 800, and maybe Air India and South African Airways.

Comparing 103, 800, and 811 will reveal remarkable similarities in time of destruction, place of initial damage, recorder sounds, engine flogging patterns, radar anomalies just before destruction, and sequence of fuselage destruction; all in Boeing 747-121 aircraft. Too much coincidence for homemade bombs placed randomly in cargo compartments. Perfectly understandable for reproducible mechanical problems with system that has history of inadvertent malfunctionings.

(The United 811 was an excellent accident report, far superior to UK Pan AM 103 which has serious omissions.)

I invite discussion at 408 659 3552 or barry@corazon.com.

Thank you Mr. Schleede, John Barry Smith

From: barry@corazon.com

Date: July 29, 1996 5:17:21 PM PDT

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: TWA crash cause

Be assured that we are checking that. I was the investigator in charge of the UAL flight 811 case and fully knowledgeable in its causes and factors.

Thanks for the interest.

Thank you Mr. Schleede, the attached photo of UAL 811 from accident report will show that a 747 with that gaping hole in side at 400 knots can certainly tear the nose off.

From: barry@corazon.com
Date: July 29, 1996 10:50:15 PM PDT
To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
Subject: **TWA crash cause**

<http://www.corazon.com/TWA800PA103UA811.html> is my website for cargo door crash theory.

From: barry@corazon.com
Date: July 31, 1996 8:18:06 AM PDT
To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
Subject: **Cargo Door**

"Investigators also said that a cargo door, presumably the front one, had been found significantly closer to Kennedy International Airport, where the flight originated, than almost all of the other parts located so far."

The cargo door came off first. It came off first because it was inadvertently opened. It was opened by the same causes as Flight 811, and Flight 103 and maybe others.

Compare 800 to 811 in all aspects. Have you matched the tape sounds? The thump of 811 is the thump of 800 and 103.

<http://www.corazon.com/barryhome.html> is my web site for cargo door cause.

Mr. Schleede, you should be in charge of the investigation, not the pushy paranoid FBI.

From: barry@corazon.com
Date: August 3, 1996 8:21:22 AM PDT
To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
Subject: **TWA cargo door crash cause**

Be assured that we are checking that. I was the investigator in charge of the UAL flight 811 case and fully knowledgeable in its causes and factors.

Have you informed Mr Francis of the similarities between 811 and 800? It appears the independent NTSB has rebuffed the politically driven FBI from declaring bomb and directing the investigation; for the first time I have read about aging aircraft and mechanical malfunction. They are looking into a Section 41 overhaul. Fine. Why is there no mention of the obvious possible mechanical malfunction of an opening cargo door which tears a gash in the side of plane; then air wind force blows off nose? Show them the pictures of 811 on the ground with huge hole in side by cargo door. Play tape of 811 playing thump. Door was seen as streak on 800 and was picked up on radar as anomaly blip. Check the 800 door for latch condition, open or closed. It's all there. It's all there and just needs to be put together. My web site on the cargo door causes of several 747's is at <http://www.corazon.com/barryhome.html> It is getting increased hits every day and is generating email from Europe. It was mentioned on radio show in New York. The cat is out of the bag.

From: barry@corazon.com
Date: August 6, 1996 3:56:18 AM PDT
To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
Subject: **TWA crash**

Mr. Schleede, My web site on the crashes of TWA 800, Pan Am 103, UAL 811 and others is up and operating at <http://www.corazon.com/barryhome.html> after major revision. It is quite extensive and quotes extensively from the accident report of Pan Am 103 and your UAL 811. It is quite clear that the cargo door is the culprit in all three cases. Please review the site and give opinion. I must know that the NTSB and other government authorities are on the right trail. Please refer me to any other appropriate government agency that might assist in declaring a problem with these cargo doors on early 747s. They fly as we speak. They must be fixed. Let us confirm there is a link between the government and its informed citizens. I am not assured that the NTSB is checking that (cargo door openings). Please reassure me. John Barry Smith

From: Schleede Ron <SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov>
To: barry <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: RE: TWA crash cause ATTN Robert Francis
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 1996 15:24:00 -0400
Encoding: 17 TEXT
Status:

Be assured that we are checking that. I was the investigator in charge of the UAL flight 811 case and fully knowledgeable in its causes and factors.

Thanks for the interest.

From: barry

To: schledr
Subject: TWA crash cause ATTN Robert Francis
Date: Sunday, July 28, 1996 9:58AM

Mr. Francis. The reasonable cause of the TWA crash is the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door. That is the mechanical cause that must be ruled out. Compare to United Flight 811 of Feb 1989.

From: barry@corazon.com
Date: August 6, 1996 10:35:32 PM PDT
To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
Subject: **Summary, connection, solution three crashes**

Flight Summaries of Three Flights:
TWA Flight 800, UAL Flight 811, Pan Am Flight 103

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(From news sources:)

TWA Flight 800 was a scheduled passenger flight from New York to Paris. The flight was uneventful until after departure from New York. While climbing through 13,500 feet an event occurred which tore the nose off the aircraft. The nose fell into the sea. The rest of the aircraft continued on descending until approximately 9,500 feet where it exploded into a fireball and dropped into the sea. There were two wreckage trails. Luggage from front cargo hold was found nearest event site. A streak was seen near the aircraft just before destruction. A strange radar blip was seen before destruction falling with the aircraft. There were no calls from the crew to the ground. There were no survivors.

Flight data recorders revealed a loud sound and then all recording ceased. No evidence of a bomb has been found on recovered wreckage. Front cargo door found in pieces. The aircraft was a Boeing 747-131, an early 747 with high flight time and flight cycles.

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Explanations for TWA Flight 800: Boeing 747-131 series high flight time aircraft are prone to cargo door malfunctions. Doors pop open in climb or just after. Door popping open exposes large hole in side of nose. Large hole in side of nose can tear nose off when subjected to high air pressure loads. Nose tearing off leaves rest of plane to crash resulting in two wreckage trails. Nose tearing off is sudden and total and leaves no time for calls to ground from crew or for recorder data to continue. Door opening and tearing off would be visible as streak as it reflects evening sun at 13500 feet near New York City on July 17th. Cargo door would be picked up as radar return as it spun away from aircraft. Contents from front baggage compartment would be first to leave plane after door and be found closest to event site. Door opened inadvertently because of various reasons consistent with other confirmed, documented, and witnessed cargo door openings such as design error, improper latching, electrical problems, wear and tear, or other unknown reason.

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(From UAL Flight 811 Accident Report NTSB)

UAL Flight 811 was a scheduled passenger flight from Los Angeles to Sydney, Australia, with stops in Honolulu, HI and Auckland, New Zealand. The flight was uneventful until after departure from Honolulu. While climbing from FL220 to FL230 the crew heard a "Thump" followed by an explosion. An explosive decompression was experienced and the #3 and #4 engines were shutdown because of FOD. The FLT returned to

Honolulu and passengers were evacuated. Inspection revealed the forward lower lobe cargo door departed inflight causing extensive damage to the fuselage and cabin adjacent to the door. Investigation centered around design and certification of the door which allowed it to be improperly latched, and the operation and maintenance to assure airworthiness of the door and latching mechanism.

Additional information extracted from report: Front cargo door found in two pieces. Crew erroneously reported bomb onboard to tower after hearing explosion. Radar tracked door down to ocean contact. Recorders played loud bang/sound then silence. Nine passengers were ejected and lost at sea. The aircraft was a Boeing 747-122, an early 747 with high flight time and flight cycles.

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Explanations for UAL Flight 811: Boeing 747-122 series high flight time aircraft are prone to cargo door malfunctions. Doors pop open in climb or just after. Door popping open exposes large hole in side of nose. Large hole in side of nose can tear nose off depending of variables such as angle of attack, airspeed, turbulence and strength of fuselage. Cargo door would be picked up as radar return as it spun away from aircraft. Door opened inadvertently because of various reasons consistent with other confirmed, documented, and witnessed cargo door openings such as design error, improper latching, electrical problems, wear and tear, or other unknown reason.

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(From Pan Am Flight 103 Accident Report Dept of Transport)
Pan Am Flight 103 was a scheduled passenger flight from London to New York. The flight was uneventful until seven minutes after leveling off after climb. While level at FL310 an event occurred which tore the nose off the aircraft. The nose fell

to the ground. The rest of the aircraft continued on descending and crashing into the town of Lockerbie. There were two wreckage trails. Luggage from front cargo hold was found nearest event site. A strange radar blip was seen before destruction. There were no calls from the crew to the ground. There were no survivors. Flight data recorders revealed a loud sound and then all recording ceased.

Additional information extracted from report: Front cargo door found in two pieces. Reconstruction shows cargo door area in first sequence of destruction. Eight passengers missing and not accounted for. The aircraft was a Boeing 747-121, an early 747 with high flight time and flight cycles.

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Explanations for Pan Am Flight 103: Boeing 747-121 series high flight time aircraft are prone to cargo door malfunctions. Doors pop open in climb or just after. Door popping open exposes large hole in side of nose. Large hole in side of nose can tear nose off when subjected to high air pressure loads. Nose tearing off leaves rest of plane to crash resulting in two wreckage trails. Nose tearing off is sudden and total and leaves no time for calls to ground from crew or for recorder data to continue. Cargo door would be picked up as radar return as it spun away from aircraft. Contents from front baggage compartment would be first to leave plane after door and be found closest to event site. Door opened inadvertently because of various reasons consistent with other confirmed, documented, and witnessed cargo door openings such as design error, improper latching, electrical problems, wear and tear, or other unknown reason.

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Summary of the Summaries: Three early Boeing 747-100 series high flight time, high cycles aircraft with history of front cargo door malfunctions, while climbing after takeoff or shortly

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uh, cargo door, cause of crashes TWA 800 when it opens in flight and tears gash which cuts off nose.

From: barry@corazon.com
Date: August 8, 1996 6:13:53 PM PDT
To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
Subject: **NTSB look at cargo door!**

#8 Aug another frustrating day, I don't know how long I can hold out, rational thought running thin, reasonable explanations rejected, the planes of truth fly overhead but do not see. Today it was fuel tanks in center with fuel leak. The NTSB is all around from wings, to center tanks to cockpit, it's as if they avoiding the cargo door. Is it so unreasonable to assume that a door opens once in a while when it shouldn't? Happens to all of us with car doors, or trunks. And then to think, hmmm, big hole in side of nose at 300 knots, that's not good. Maybe tear nose off. Better check out cargo door. Like checking to see if latches on found door of 800 are open position which means lock sectors locked but cams open, there's the problem. Looks locked but isn't. Doors on this model 747 have opened so often they wrote an Airworthiness Directive, a serious thing. If ADs are not complied with completely the plane is grounded. Cargo door is obvious culprit not freak occurrence. All 747-100 series aircraft must be grounded and cargo doors welded shut until further notice. If it happens again, as it did just two months after PA103, a charge of negligence can be leveled at government authorities. It's not like

they don't know. They have been emailed by me often and their own accident reports have similar events. It is very humbling to be ignored when presenting important great truth to responsible officials. Did an hour radio show with Robert Knight of WBAI last night. At least the frustration and anger are ameliorated by doing something, like talking about it to interested parties. He told me about 8 year old girl that died in crash of 800. Great. Now I see spinning girl waving arms falling two miles to ocean, maybe not screaming. I've got a call in to my former pilot from Vietnam seeking advice. Plus I'm fighting a cold. Plus my web site is incoherent and unpersuasive. If I told a mathematician two and two is four, he would say, hmmm, I don't know, let me get back to you on that. I sent an email to NTSB repeating the word cargo door fifty times, maybe insult will get their attention. Responsive government agency to an informed citizenry, hah. OK, enough self pity. Things that need to be done by NTSB: 1. check found door latch cams for open or closed position. 2. Compare recorder tape endings to Flight 103, 811, Air India two crashes and SAA crash for similar thump/sound/bang for acoustical similarities. 3. Check radar tapes for similarity for radar blips leaving 103, 811, and 800 just prior to event. 4. Check EPR tapes for telltale blip of baggage fodding number three engine. 5. Interview baggage service persons who closed door on 800 which was running late to see if they followed procedure. 6. Confirm missing persons of 800 sat over cargo door and are missing just like 811 and 103. 7. Match wreckage trails to 103. 8. Check CAS of 800 to see if it matches CAS of 300 knots for event of 103 and 811. 9. Check angle of sun at 835PM on July 17th to see if metal spinning object the size of a car would be seen on ground as streak. 10. Check latch cams on cargo door of Pan Am 103. 11. Ground all 747 100 series aircraft and weld cargo door shut until further notice.

From: barry@corazon.com
Date: August 10, 1996 12:07:40 AM PDT
To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
Subject: **Appeal for Public Help**

The paper said today that crash officials are appealing for public help. Here I am, <http://www.corazon.com/barryhome.html> giving documentation for cargo door opening as cause of TWA crash. I am retired military officer with address, phone web site, and email address. The site documents rational explanation for cause of crash. Please respond. John Barry Smith 551 Country Club Drive Carmel Valley, CA 93924 408 659 3552
barry@corazon.com

From: Schleede Ron <SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov>
Date: August 11, 1996 8:39:00 AM PDT
To: barry <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: **RE: TWA crash cause**

I have examined the cargo door from twa 800--it is locked and latched!

From: barry
To: SCHLEDR
Subject: TWA crash cause
Date: Tuesday, 30 July, 1996 01:48

<http://www.corazon.com/TWA800PA103UA811.html> is my website for cargo door

crash theory.

From: barry@corazon.com
Date: August 11, 1996 10:05:37 AM PDT
To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
Subject: The President's Life is in Danger

There is an immediate, although slight, danger to the life of the President of the United States caused by the inadvertent opening of the lower forward cargo door in the Boeing 747-200 aircraft in which he flies. The door may open in flight exposing a large hole in the nose of Air Force One leading to the sudden destruction of the aircraft and death to all aboard, including the President. My name is John Barry Smith, Major, US Army, Retired, address and SSN on request, phone number 408 659 3552, back up phone number 408 659 7564, email barry@corazon.com internet web site at <http://www.corazon.com/barryhome.html>

Forward cargo doors are coming off Boeing 747s in flight. The doors must be locked shut until further notice. This alert notice is being sent to the White House, NTSB, FBI, US Air Force, FAA, news television, the local newspaper, and interested friends. John Barry Smith

From: barry@corazon.com
Date: August 11, 1996 11:56:13 AM PDT
To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
Subject: Which cargo door and cam positions

Mr. Schleede, thank you for your prompt response.

I have examined the cargo door from twa 800--it is locked and

latched!

There are three cargo doors on TWA 800, which one are you talking about.

The front cargo door is reported to be in pieces, your sentence above implies one piece which would mean other than front cargo door checked.

The lock sectors are locked, but the cams are unlocked. You do not mention cams.

What are the positions of the cam locks of the forward cargo door? John Barry Smith

From: barry@corazon.com

Date: August 12, 1996 3:39:24 PM PDT

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: Personal appeal to Mr Francis

Important letter to Mr. Robert Francis, please forward. John Barry Smith

Dear Mr. Robert Francis, 12 August 1996

The cause of the crash you are investigating is the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight. The FAA and Boeing have acknowledged that the loss of the forward cargo door is not an acceptable event. The 88-12-04 AD which reads, "To Insure that Inadvertent Opening of the Lower Cargo Door Will Not Occur In Flight" was correct in its effort but failed in the implementation. The NTSB has known the danger of the opening of the door and has issued recommendations regarding it. The cargo door culprit is well known because of previous accidents such as Pan Am Flight 125 and UAL Flight 811. It has struck again in TWA 800. And, Pan Am 103. And, Air India 182. Strong claims, yes sir, but backed up with documentation interpreting hard physical evidence of radar blips, voice recorder, data

recorder, reconstruction patterns, engine FOD, missing passengers, and type of aircraft and flight pattern. The pattern of cargo door openings causing sudden catastrophic destruction of Boeing 747s is only apparent after observing several crashes over a period of eleven years and charting the significant similarities. Similarities which can be explained fully by a consistent serious mechanical fault occurring under similar flight circumstances to similar aircraft.

A known previously defective mechanical system, the door, is at the scene of the destruction, the main cargo hold. Please rule out that suspect, if you can. Further, please review my web site at <http://www.corazon.com/barryhome.html> for sixty pages of documentation for the claim of door openings causing crashes.

Other governments have taken the easy way out by explaining an unpopular event by saying it's a bomb by our enemies. Not true; it is a common occurrence in the real world, a door pops open when it shouldn't. Sincerely, John Barry Smith phone 408 659 3552, US Army Major, retired, Commercial pilot, instrument rated, previous Part 135 charter operator and aircraft accident survivor.

From: barry@corazon.com

Date: August 15, 1996 11:07:10 AM PDT

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: Culpability

Mr. Schleede, and Mr. Francis,

Why has not the NTSB even mentioned a prime suspect who was at the scene of the crime and could do the damage described?

The first place to investigate would be the door. It has two ADs against it, it caused a well documented accident which gave extremely similar consequences to the current mystery (811), it is at the admitted scene of damage, (in front of the wing on the

right side,) it is not unusual for the suspect to malfunction, and there is no evidence of any other suspect.

Except for wishful thinking. Yes, I'm going to come down on the side of wishful thinking instead of wilful coverup. The NTSB, FBI, Boeing, US government, and TWA all wish that the cause of the death of 230 people, more before, and probably more after, is not their fault but some crazy act of god terrorist that what the hell, it's a tough life out there and we are doing all we can but you've just got to accept life is cruel and unfair (but give us more money and agents anyway.)

They will not wish and will go to great lengths to not even think about, (as in I don't want to speculate, now is not the time to speculate, that's just speculation,") the cause of the crash to be something so in their face obvious and simple but with such severe implications and consequences that the little bit of space they allot to their right creative side brains just rebels and starts to throw up so they get a cup of coffee and talk about the Forty Niners.

I have to believe they do not know the cause and are thinking of ways to conceal the cause. That would be criminal and a betrayal of the public trust.

Really, I have to believe that the NTSB is not yet like the other government agencies of India and UK who issued official reports of a physical event ignoring physical laws and concluding politically satisfying ideas.

I understand how hard it is to be a NTSB investigator and be looking through paper work and get a glimmer of the culprit, caught visually (streak) and on radar (blip anomaly) leaving the scene of the crime and leaving documented evidence on tape of the crime (loud thump), and think, "Oh my God, a design defect in the Boeing 747 that has existed for twenty six years, crashed at least five, maybe more airplanes, killed over a thousand people grieving many more thousands, caused billions of dollars to be

incorrectly shifted around, embarrassing my profession of accident investigation, shaming governments, economically devastating a part of my country, and what for? Truth? Screw truth, we are talking real life here; money, jobs, and careers. It can't be the door! No way! These planes are strong, we are good people, we do not murder by negligence! We are the good guys and good guys don't kill accidentally. Bad guys kill on purpose and that's why we are going to look for a bomb and forget all this cargo door bullshit."

I hope a little voice says, "But, but, the threat is still there, the hazard still exists, the mystery is still unsolved, I could be next..."

Harsh, yes, Mr. Schleede, and Mr. Francis, but so is spinning to your death from thousands of feet up. Check the door!

From: barry@corazon.com

Date: August 16, 1996 10:14:39 AM PDT

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: I Apologize

Dear Mr. Schleede, I apologize for my recent rude, sarcastic remarks to you in recent emails. After I read the below email I realized I was too quick to judge and must give you the benefit of doubt and trust you are doing all you can to find the cause of the TWA crash. email follows...

Dear Barry,

I have reviewed your Schleede e-mail exchange. I see it in a better light than you do. Because of the specificity of his reply (*not* a form-letter), and the timing (and existence!) of his *second* reply, my interpretation is

you are being taken seriously. What I get from it is bureaucratic tight-ass defensiveness maybe, but not really, a diss. Suppose he did take it to heart. Not implausible he'd try to get his ducks in a row in internal NTSB channels before spilling all to you first. The ambiguity of his second message (but which door??) could serve his purpose of buying time for him and honoring your tip with a (ambiguous) morsel.

I'd advise that you just chill with him for the nonce, to resume when the bomb theory is totally threadbare. The poor guy could actually be beleaguered himself with all the FBI crap surrounding the investigation.

After all, you have science on your side. You have, as I pointed out on the show, made useful "predictions" with your theory (in classical scientific terms): Early front cargo door fall, indigestion specifically for engine #3, and the probable locus of the disappeared passengers, cards you can play at some future, more amenable moment.

Barry, I have no doubt that you are being listened to behind closed doors. Your AF1 advisory, for instance was a bold -- and responsible -- action which

officials are required to pay attention to (as evidenced, perhaps, by the timing of exchange #2). And if that were not enough, I can assure you my station is listened to because some years ago a producer got politely interrogated by Treasury officials (Secret Service) after some fool caller made irresponsible comments antagonistic to the then-President.

But as for the TW800 investigation, try assuming that the incompetents don't want to talk, while the beleaguered competent allies have to speak carefully to smart ones like you (or maybe me) because we are insightful, and because we are public entities.

We just have to help them by anticipating their circumstances.
<end>

Mr. Schleede, sorry again, John Barry Smith

From: barry@corazon.com
Date: August 16, 1996 5:37:27 PM PDT
To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
Subject: You know me, Mr. Francis

``I don't think that anybody that I know is saying that there's evidence to lean one way or another," Francis said.

Mr. Francis, I say there is evidence to lean one way and that way is the prime suspect of cargo door opening. The NTSB has already identified the door as a nine person killer in Flight 811 in similar circumstances.

How did the front cargo door in pieces become one piece? And two wreckage trails become three? And debris found in number 3 engine become no debris.

Well, at least 8 passengers will never be found because they were sucked into number three engine, just like 103, and 811. And they sat above the cargo door. Match the missing passengers to the seats they sat in, all will be above and slightly aft of the cargo door, just like 811.

From: barry@corazon.com

Date: August 17, 1996 6:12:08 PM PDT

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: **F-100 accident pattern**

Dear Mr. Schleede,

I understand you started your career with the NTSB at the Denver Field Office after flying F-100s with the USAF. Do you recall the early F-100 crashes in the fifties where a perfectly normal plane in perfectly normal weather would take off by a perfectly normal pilot and soon after takeoff turn and dive right into the ground? Each accident when seen alone could have a different cause but only after a pattern emerged could the culprit be seen. In this case it was the Coriolus Effect where the pilot would be given a frequency change from tower to center while still at low altitude after takeoff and he would turn his head and look down at the UHF comm unit frequency dial to enter the new frequency. This turning of the head and lowering at the same time induced a physiological phenomenon called the Coriolus Effect which came from a false sense of movement in the inner ear which the pilot responded to by correcting and moving the stick driving the plane into the ground. Consequently frequency changes are now given later to pilots after takeoff and the frequency counter was moved to eye level. On my RA-5C

Vigilante the counter on my now VHF comm was right in front of me.

That mysterious effect was a F-100 Super Sabre accident cause only seen by a pattern compared to other similar accidents, similar to the crash you are now investigating. Seen alone, Air India 182, Pan Am 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800 are mysterious and look to have different causes. It is only by comparing all variables that the pattern emerges and it matches closely UAL 811.

The similar variables are for Air India 182, Pan Am 103, TWA 800 and UAL 811 (up to nose not coming off):

1. Aircraft type, model, and experience: Boeing 747-100 and 200 series with two ADs against front cargo door and high flight time and cycles.
2. Flight mode: Presssure changes during or just after climb, or descent.
3. Airspeed: 300 knots.
4. Radar blip anomaly just before event: door seen on radar.
5. FOD number three engine of baggage.
6. Start of destruction: front cargo hold area.
7. One half second of loud bang on voice recorder, then silence.
8. Abrupt halt to flight data recorder: severing of main power line behind nose wheel.
9. Nose comes off.
10. Rest of aircraft falls and disintegrates landing apart from nose.
11. Cargo door and baggage closest to event indicating left first.
12. At least eight bodies never recovered: ingested into number three engine and vaporized.
13. Missing bodies sat over and just aft of cargo door.
14. Front cargo door in pieces.
15. No evidence of explosives found on any passengers nor airframe except for one aircraft with mild directional shatter

zone. (103)

Possible similar variables:

1. Engine three separates and departs to land apart from other three engines.
2. Cargo floor buckled.
3. Cargo door closed at night.
4. Door opened while crew transmitting to Center.
5. EPR blip on engine number three just before abrupt halt of data recorder.
6. Locks sectors locked on door but cam sectors unlocked.

Unknown: Why do doors open inadvertently inflight and on the ground?

The pattern which fits 800, 103, and 182 is the one you documented, UAL Flight 811. The events were similar; the cause is the same: Inadvertent opening of lower front lobe cargo door in flight.

Please compare other variables you have access to and believe could confirm or refute theory. Thank you, John Barry Smith, watching F-86, F-86D and F-100s take off from the Fresno North American plant.

From: barry@corazon.com

Date: August 21, 1996 6:00:13 PM PDT

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: Another Forest

Mr. Schleede, it turns out that four and maybe five of the cargo door airplanes were talking on the radios when the door opened. Coincidence? I don't think so. It may be power pulse from transmitter or power supply of comm radio affecting frayed electrical door harness. This is where professional accident investigation should be going...why do doors open? One plane talking no problem, but four or five, find the link. It may be

transponder related about changing codes interacting with electrical door system, far fetched yes, but worthy of investigation.

I believe the way the investigation is being reported in the press that the NTSB is now acting like a prosecutor in proving the center fuel tank exploded, a politically satisfying answer completely contrary to observed events of nose separation, fuselage descending, disintegrating, then exploding.

I'm assuming the goal of accident investigation is to find cause of crash regardless of consequences, even if own mother did it. Please don't be like Air Force that changed accident report to read only one wife was in cockpit to cause crash and not two wives to avoid looking bad. The NTSB is the last hope for a politically neutral accident cause determination based on truth determined by evidence. Being assisted by Boeing engineers is the fox guarding the henhouse.

From: barry@corazon.com

Date: August 22, 1996 11:01:42 PM PDT

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: Now you've done it

For Mr. Schleede and Francis: Well, you've gone and done it now. You stalled around and stalled around not checking prime suspect door and a FBI chemist, some poor soul, gave in to the pressure and said, yeah, I got a positive. Now the investigation is taken from the NTSB and you can go home leaving the real culprit free to stike again, as it will. Maybe that's what you wanted, relief from responsibility.

Well, when the next early model Boeing 747 takes off at night, explodes into two pieces, leaving only a short loud sound on the cvr, a fodded number 3 engine, a radar blip, and nine never recovered bodies, then we can go through this whole charade

thing again, like Air India 182, Pan Am 103, TWA 800 and the new Flight X, all struck down by random bombers using different bombs placed in different places in random airplanes. What amazing coincidences. NTSB had its window of opportunity to get the real, boring, ordinary cause, but stalled and stalled, now the FBI can do its paranoid thing. We live in a dangerous world not made safer by you. If you ever do get around to checking prime suspect door and find the cams unlatched no one will believe you when you say door opened. But you haven't checked obvious things yet, why start now? Very very disappointed. NTSB can now join India and UK transportation departments in using a tragedy to its own political ends, damn truth. This is an evil thing NTSB has permitted. John Barry Smith

From: barry@corazon.com
Date: August 25, 1996 3:55:49 PM PDT
To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
Subject: **The Key to the Crash**

Dear Mr. Ron Schleede,
Well, back again. The issue is too large for emotion to blot out. Maybe I'm an asshole, but so what? I am unimportant. Does the cause of an accident care about the discoverer? Does the messenger change the facts of the message? I would hope not. So before we get to facts that we can agree on, let me again humble myself before you as a senior accident investigator and I am the amateur sleuth with a hot lead who goes around shouting, hey everybody, look at this, look at this; over exuberant, emotional, and making mistakes left and right. Really, I'm on my virtual hands and knees begging patience, understanding, and guidance. Forgive my abrasive personality. I swallow my pride in the goal of preventing airplane crashes.

I have done everything you have told me to do. I emailed to NTSB webmaster and he forwarded the email to you. He said you were the appropriate NTSB official. I have not phoned, nor written nor anything else, just the assigned email channel of SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov. I checked, upon your recommendation, the public information about NTSB and read the biographies of the Board members. And except for a few emotional moments of perceived bitter defeat after weak FBI explosive find, I have kept to facts.

We have basic differences between us; I was Navy, you were Air Force, I was navigator, you were pilot, I loved Catch-22, you probably hated it. So, rather than go into differences, let us agree on basic facts of the case. If you don't agree it's a fact because it's open to interpretation, then it gets thrown out. And if I don't agree it's a fact because it is open to interpretation then it gets thrown out. The interpretations get thrown into the interpretation pile.

Facts, facts, facts. Actually five facts that I ask that we agree on. From those basic fundamental, essential facts, conclusions may be drawn which may be correct, or at least more likely to be correct than conclusions drawn on guesses.

The facts I got from you, Mr. Schleede, you are the one who made the key called UAL 811 which I have fit into other crashes and am saying, hey, look it fits so far, let's try it further, need some help here. I am asking you to use your key of 811 to unlock other similar early 747 crashes. If true, great, we have solved the mystery. We will both go down Fifth Avenue in a parade with confetti everywhere and pretty girls running out to the limo and kissing us. And hope we don't get stuck in the eye by a thrown rose like Major -deCoverly of Catch-22 who then wore an eye patch. He's the one who refused to sign a loyalty oath before chow by saying, "Eat. Now."

Facts:

1. On 811 a radar blip fell from the plane during some destruction.

Support: The blips were tracked down to ocean to splashdown point and door found on ocean floor. Your official 811 report states radar blips were debris from plane.

2. On 811 at least ten missing persons sitting in forward fuselage were not found.

Support: Your 811 report states 9 passengers lost in flight. An extensive air and sea search for the passengers was unsuccessful. The passengers sat in seats 8H, 9FGH, 10GH, 11GH 12H.

3. On 811 a short loud bang was heard on the cockpit voice recorder then silence.

Support: Your official report states a loud bang could be heard on the CVR. The electrical power to the CVR was lost for approximately 21.4 second following the loud bang.

Ok, now that's three facts. I'm going slow here because this is very very important. Let us disregard emotion and conjecture and speculation to look closely at each word and agree on that word and not any implications, just the word. So far, I've said the three facts are; on 811 there was a radar blip during some destruction, under ten passengers sitting in forward fuselage were never found, and a short loud bang was heard on the CVR then silence. That's all so far, no more, no less.

4. On 811 engine number three had foreign object damage.

Support: Your official report states No. 3 engine exhibited extensive foreign object damage.

5. 811 was an early model Boeing 747 with high flight time.

Support: Your official report states Flight 811 was a Boeing 747-122, serial number 19875, the 89th built, and had 58,815 flight hours.

Well, Mr. Schleede, there they are, five facts that we can agree on. Do you agree with them? Exactly as they are, no more, no less. To review: 811 had radar blips during some destruction,

under ten bodies never found, a short loud bang, then silence, engine number 3 Fodded, early model high time Boeing 747.

We know the cause of 811's moderate destruction, the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight. Support: Your report says probable cause was the sudden opening of the forward lower lobe cargo door in flight.

Ok so far, I believe. Now it gets harder.

Let's move to Pan Am 103 and stick to the facts and try to disregard seven years of daily emotional input about the evil bombers.

Facts that we can agree on are:

1. On 103 a radar blip fell from the plane during some destruction.

Support: Official report has strange blip from plane before destruction and many blips during destruction. Report has chart with radar blips showing destruction pattern. Mystery blip shown as green diamond.

2. On 103 at least ten missing persons sitting in forward fuselage were not found.

Support: Official report states the bodies of 10 passengers were not recovered and of these, 8 had been allocated seats in rows 23 to 28 positioned over the wing at the front of the economy section.

3. On 103 a short loud bang was heard on the cockpit voice recorder then silence.

Support: Official report states the tape ended with a sudden loud sound followed almost immediately by the cessation of recording.

4. On 103 engine number three had foreign object damage.

Support: Official report states No 3 engine intake area contained a number of loose items originating from within the cabin or baggage hold.

5. 103 was an early model Boeing 747 with high flight time.

Support: Official report states that 103 was a Boeing 747-121 serial number 19646, and had 72,464 flight hours.

Now, Mr. Schleede do you agree to the facts above? No conclusions yet, no conjecture, no musings, no speculation, no guessing. That's later in the interpretations section. This is the fact section. Facts unemotional, boring, slow, but let's be precise and correct. The fun part of what the hell does it all mean comes later.

Now to 800. I don't have your 811 NTSB official report nor the 103 United Kingdom Air Accidents Investigation Branch official report to support these facts so we can disregard them if you wish. I am using reputable news reports which are flimsy support at best but it's all I have and I use what I can. I need all the help I can get. If you can correct these facts, please do, sir. When the official 800 report comes out I can use it to support my facts and I can refer to it as your 800 NTSB official report because you are intimately involved again in the greatest aircraft accident mystery series ever to strike aviation. And you made the key to unlock the mystery, your 811 report.

1. On 800 a radar blip fell from the plane during some destruction.

Support: Newsday reports "law enforcement and aviation officials were particularly perplexed by an unidentified "blip," signaling the presence of some object, that appeared on air traffic control radar near the plane just before the crash, a senior law enforcement source said. Authorities were repeatedly replaying recordings of the radar transmission "but we are stymied," the source said.

2. On 800 at least ten missing persons sitting in forward fuselage were not found.

Support: News reports gives body count found on 800 and number of missing bodies is now at twenty and decreasing, but at least ten. News reports state: In all, a dozen of the 22 missing

bodies were supposed to be seated between rows 18 and 28, where investigators are rebuilding a section of the aircraft located over the center fuel tank.

3. On 800 a short loud bang was heard on the cockpit voice recorder then silence.

Support: News reports state: "So far, investigators have been frustrated in trying to decipher the only audible evidence of the blast, a sound heard for 130 milliseconds, or just over one-tenth of a second, before the recording abruptly ended."

4. On 800 engine number three had foreign object damage.

Support: News reports state: The right inboard engine was relatively intact but suffered "foreign object damage" from debris sucked in while it was apparently still running. News reports state: Investigators completed a meticulous tear-down of the right inboard engine of TWA Flight 800 yesterday and sent debris that had been sucked into the apparently still-running engine to FBI and National Transportation Safety Board labs in Washington.

5. 800 was an early model Boeing 747 with high flight time.

Support: News reports state: 800 was Boeing 747-131. The TWA airliner was 25 years old and was among a group of aircraft required to undergo more frequent inspections for metal fatigue, cracks and other age-related stresses that might pose safety concerns. The airplane is one of the older 747s in service and was the 153rd of the model to roll off Boeing's assembly line in Seattle. News reports 800 had 16869 flight cycles. Actual hours unknown.

Regarding the five facts for 800, they are flimsy, subject to change and qualification, yes. So are all the facts but today, using the broad language as stated, I submit them to be true. Here they are again in total:

1. On 800, 103, and 811 a radar blip fell from the plane during some destruction.

2. On 800, 103, and 811 at least ten missing persons sitting in forward fuselage were not found.
3. On 800, 103, and 811 a short loud bang was heard on the cockpit voice recorder then silence.
4. On 800, 103, and 811 engine number three had foreign object damage.
5. 800, 103, and 811 were early model Boeing 747s with high flight time.

The mystery event we wish to identify is seen on radar, it is heard on recorder, it is felt by engine, it has known consequences of death, and it happens to the same kind of airplane.

What does it mean? Well, there we may go in different directions, but maybe not.

What does it mean? Well, pattern. Five strong, important, facts exist in three airplane crashes. And your report states the cause of one of them.

My conclusions are:

It is most likely that the cause of the other two crashes is the same cause as yours.

It is less likely, but possible, that the three airplanes have three different causes to explain the five facts.

It is even less likely, but possible, your report is wrong and the three airplanes have a same different cause for the five facts.

And of course, it is less likely, but possible, that your report is right for one cause and the other two crashes have a same different cause for the same five facts.

Why my conclusion? It is most likely that your cause of the one crash is the right one and the same cause exists for the other two because the cause is a mechanical event that can be reproduced accurately under similar conditions to similar airplanes to give similar results.

Other less likely causes would give variables such as different model aircraft, different engine fodded, different number of

bodies missing, different sounds on voice recorder, different radar information. Different causes can give similar results but more likely similar cause gives similar results.

That is my point sir, we could all be right or wrong, but at this time, what is more likely? Where should the investigation proceed? Toward the most likely, or the less likely?

What are the basic aircraft investigator procedures? I don't know, I wish I did. Maybe I should go to school and learn and then people would not ignore me when I talk about airplane crashes and their causes.

I believe based upon the scant evidence of facts above, that the potential cause of the crash of 103 and 800 might be the same as 811, that is, the opening of the forward cargo door in flight. I recommend the cargo door be considered a prime suspect and be investigated to either rule the door in or to rule the door out.

May I jump ahead. The question now to me is, why do the doors open in flight? I have eleven reasonable answers, all requiring skill and objects beyond my capability. And yes, could be a bomb opening those doors. Yes, yes yes, could be a bomb opening the doors. Again possible, but less likely bomb to cause three events, and possible, more likely cargo door to cause three events. But could be bomb, it is one of the eleven reasonable explanations for why the doors open inadvertently.

Based upon the forward cargo hold being the danger zone of several fatal crashes, there is enough evidence to weld all the forward cargo doors shut until further notice. If it's bombs getting in to the sensitive area, then seal it shut. If it's a door opening, then seal it shut. The danger is diminished until further investigation.

If another door opens or another "bomb" goes off in forward cargo hold area, there will be questions like, Why didn't you recommend sealing off the forward cargo hold area when you knew trouble, either bombs or doors, always seems to start from

there in Pan Am 103, UAL 811, TWA 800?

Let the airlines worry about revenue loss, you and I care about lives and safe planes.

Mr. Schleede, this is not wartime, not secret stuff, not VIPs, not embarrassing revelations; this is peacetime with a civilian airplane with civilians involved in US territory. Let us be open as can be. This is not CIA, FBI, DIA, NSA, Joint Chiefs of Staff stuff; this is civilian peacetime stuff. If we get shut out of this vital above board process now, we will never know what's happening when secret, coverup, shameful, illegal stuff goes on.

The FBI is releasing info every day. They are in a PR war for control and funds and they may win. The NTSB must fight back. Give the non bomb guys a chance. Give the non missile, non terrorists, non weirdo guys a chance to present our case. There are a lot of people out there who believe in a simple common sense explanation for a crash such as cargo door or something else. They are distressed to hear bomb bomb bomb everyday and how the terrorists are out to kill us. We need a rational voice out there with technical details.

My eighty year old father, who will never believe 103 was not a bomb, says, "We hear about a catastrophic mechanical failure possibility for TWA 800, but they never tell us what kind that could be." Well, sir, state that the NTSB is examining the possibility of a catastrophic mechanical failure such as open cargo door, or exploding nose wheel, or cockpit glass imploding or something to get the bomb guys away from your evidence and out of your pockets.

Mr Francis gives the general info to the general media as he should, he is the political appointee. You are the career professional investigator with the technical facts that the intelligent, reasonable public wish to know.

We know more about the inside of the secret FBI crime lab in Wash DC than we do about the inside of the four PW engines or

unlocked or locked cargo door latches.

You are technically knowledgeable with email, and I hope reading my web site and newsgroups. Use the internet to get out technical info to the informed public. Use newsgroups, start your own web site from NTSB home page, answer requests for interviews by AVweb, send me email with permission to put on web site with source name.

Let the FBI use all this anonymous secret crap, they live on fear. Let the NTSB be open and forthright by living of facts.

What is the goal? The goal is to prevent death. We prevent death by not allowing airplanes to crash. We prevent airplanes from crashing by eliminating the causes. We eliminate the causes by finding out what they are. We find out what they are by using the benefit of hindsight, superior information collection and dissemination called the internet, remembering experiences of our own flying days, and acquiring education. Then we add common sense and gut feelings.

I have a gut feeling that 800 was not a bomb but a cargo door opening in flight that tore nose off.

I have a gut feeling that 103 was a mild cargo blast but a cargo door opening in flight that tore nose off.

I have a gut feeling that 811 was a cargo door opening in flight almost tearing nose off.

There is a reason why the first page of my 80 page site has a picture (that you may have taken, Mr. Schleede,) of the huge gaping hole of 811 where the cargo door peeled back skin and left this big, black hole in side of nose open to 300 knot slipstream. That is truth. That is what happens for real when door goes. People really die when door goes.

...And blip shows up on radar, and engine 3 foddred, and at least ten bodies never recovered, and a loud bang heard on voice recorder, and yes, that picture of 811 is of a early model Boeing 747 with high flight time.

Please, please, please, pursue cargo door angle. Whatever you do to rule causes in or out, please do it for the cargo door. Please keep public informed of your activities. Please correspond with me using email. Please find cause of 800 crash.

Sincerely, John Barry Smith

From: barry@corazon.com

Date: August 27, 1996 9:18:02 PM PDT

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: NTSB home page link to TWA 800

NTSB home page link to TWA 800, terrific! Sparse but it's a great beginning.

I've been thinking exactly what is it I'm asking of the NTSB in a respectful and documented way and it is this:

I'm asking an investigator who observed what happens when a cargo door opens in flight to the nose of an early model Boeing 747 to make the leap of intuition that the next time that door opens in flight the nose could come all the way off. Based on that possibility, the cause of the first nose hole must be ruled out as the cause of the possibility of the nose coming all the way off.

There is the justification to pursue cargo door as cause of 800: it almost made nose come off of 811 and maybe it did on 800.

I've attached as .jpg files two charts of crashes just for reference. I hope they transfer alright. The pattern is there only evident by hindsight.

John Barry Smith

From: barry@corazon.com

Date: August 28, 1996 9:54:06 AM PDT

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: New Clue: buckled floor beams

New clue: the floor under passengers and above cargo door always buckles downward. Suggest to check floor on TWA 800 for buckled down or fractured floor beams which will be similar to UAL 811, Air India 182, and Pan Am 103. Door opens to outside low pressure allowing passenger deck high pressure to push down floor beams. The low altitude of TWA 800 may make bending very subtle.

Your 811 report states: "The floor beams adjacent to and inboard of the cargo door area had been fractured and buckled downward." Sincerely, John Barry Smith

From: barry@corazon.com

Date: August 31, 1996 6:05:24 PM PDT

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: Good analysis of damage location

Good analysis of damage location, forward of the wing on the right side. And, interestingly, that is the identical spot where the big hole appears in UAL Flight 811, and underneath that big hole where the explosion was pinpointed on TWA 800 is the right side forward cargo door, prime suspect, previous killer, and so far not investigated in this case.

Again, Mr. Schleede, your UAL 811 investigation holds the key which is unlocking TWA 800.

To repeat a thought mentioned earlier. The evidence is in that mysterious trouble occurs in forward cargo holds of early model Boeing 747s. So seal the door shut. Now no bombs can get in and no door can inadvertently open.

Bottom line is that you are in the middle of a mysterious early model Boeing 747 crash and as we speak many early model

Boeing 747s are flying around, including the one that the President of the United States flies in, Air Force One, a Boeing 747-200. The problem occurs in an area you can do something about, the forward cargo hold. Seal the doors shut before another door pops off or bomb goes off and the trouble is traced to the forward cargo hold. Be prudent, this is not wartime, the fate of the nation does not hang in the balance and some risks have to be taken. Seal the doors shut until further investigation. John Barry Smith

From: barry@corazon.com

Date: September 2, 1996 10:35:25 AM PDT

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: Fiction stories

Mr. Schleede, a fiction story about plane crash investigation.

There's more on the web site under fictionbelieveme.html

#

Plane Crash Investigation

Fiction by John Barry Smith

1 Sep 1996

There was once a plane crash. It was terrible. Many children, boys, girls, men and women died terribly by being burnt, smashed, cut, and suffocated. Their families and friends cried when they found out. Everyone was sad and upset. It was a mystery why the plane crashed.

Everyone said, "Find out why the plane crashed."

So they did. Here's how they found out how the plane crashed.

The government established an agency composed of experts to investigate the circumstances and events leading to, during, and after the crash. The government agency, called the National Transportation Safety Board, or the NTSB, appointed a person to

oversee the Board. He was called the Appointee. He believed that his Administration oversaw the safest aviation transportation system in the world. And he was right.

The Appointee went to the scene of the crash. It was a mess; bodies and pieces of plane were everywhere. The NTSB took charge and organized teams to recover the pieces of the bodies and the plane. The pieces of bodies went in one direction and the pieces of plane to another where it was put back together. The bodies were not put back together, or they were, I'm not sure about that.

The NTSB had an investigator, called the Investigator, but needed more help; like most government agencies they were underfunded and understaffed. No government agency ever has enough funds or staff, that's why they are called government agencies. The Investigator believed that he investigated aircraft accidents fairly and comprehensively. And he was right.

The NTSB Appointee asked the company who made the airplane if they would send someone over to help discover why his airplane crashed and killed all these people. The airplane maker said, sure, here he is, you can call him the manufacturer's representative; we can call him the Maker. The Maker went to the crash site to help the NTSB. He believed his airplane to be the strongest, safest airplane in the world. And he was right.

Everybody had ideas why the plane crashed. The most exciting ones were the most talked about, of course. What is the most exciting one you can think of? Boom? Yes! A bomb goes boom in a boom box is an exciting idea. But, it's been done before, so this time, bomb go boom in a boom box was not accepted right away. But maybe an exciting rocket powered missile could have hit the airplane? Maybe! So the Government agency involved with missile attacks by foreigners, the Federal Bureau of Bomb Investigation, was brought into the mystery. The FBI assigned an agent, the Agent, who believed that he conducted

investigations that were complete and based on fact. And he was right.

He initially wanted to find a bomb but if he couldn't get that, he would settle for a missile; so they started examining every piece of the airplane for explosive residue. Residue is something very small, invisible trace usually, which is found on something very small, a fragment actually. Explosive residue can be found around a child's cap gun or a nuclear explosion so if the residue is found, the conclusion can be very flexible and be made to fit whoever makes the discovery. So everyone worked very hard to find explosive residue. And they found some! But there was nothing around the residue that looked like an explosion had hit it so the residue stood alone waiting.

The NTSB Appointee, his Investigator, the Maker, and the FBBI Agent were all at the hangar where the pieces of the plane were being put back together one day. They stood around. They each had a cup of coffee in a cup with their agency logo on it which matched their windbreakers. They were sharp.

"How about them 'Niners," one of them said, "think they got a chance 'gainst Dallas this year?"

"No," the Agent replied.

"How's the investigation going?" asked the Investigator.

"Wait a minute, that's my question," said the Appointee.

"Well, I can ask that question, too," said the Agent.

"Yeah, me too," said the Maker.

"OK, OK, everybody can share and ask the question, how's the investigation going?" said the Appointee.

"What investigation," said the agent, and they all laughed. They got along awfully nice together.

"Well, the plane came apart in the air. The nose separated first and fell forming a debris trail. The rest of the airplane fell and exploded later forming its own debris trail," said the Maker.

"We haven't found any conclusive evidence of a bomb or missile

or any hostile action against the plane," said the Agent.

"We reviewed the paper history of the plane and discovered it is an early model Boeing 747 and has over fifty thousand hours of flight time with several airlines flying all over the world in all types of conditions. There are also two Airworthiness Directives against the only item in front of the wing near where the destruction occurred on the right side which caused the nose to come off: the forward cargo door," said the Investigator.

An Airworthiness Directive is an order to the airline from the Federal Aviation Authority that a very dangerous condition exists and if the instructions in the Airworthiness Directive are not followed exactly, the aircraft is not permitted to fly. The forward cargo door had two Airworthiness Directives based upon previous events in which passengers were killed because of the door malfunctioning and opening in flight.

"The people are trusting us to find out what's wrong. They are continuing to fly in this type aircraft. I have consoled the victim's families. We will give daily press briefings and keep the public fully informed of all our discoveries regardless how trivial we think they may be now. I've asked for help from the public, has anyone received any help?" asked the Appointee.

"Yes, I have," said the Investigator.

"What was the help," asked the Appointee.

"An informed member of the public, who has vast experience in many aspects of aviation, suggested I visit his web site which has a hundred pages of documented evidence linking three crashes of similar type aircraft to this crash. The linking evidence is solid. He said to compare this crash to another which is similar and had a solution. The conclusion is that the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door is tearing off leaving a big hole which causes the whole nose to come off. I reviewed the pages and they are legitimate extracts from government reports. The member of the public said he was granting our request for help and suggested

we rule out the cargo door right away," the Investigator concluded.

"Well, that was very nice of the public," said the agent, "what a nice guy."

"That's very interesting," said the Maker, "let me check out that theory, where is the cargo door?"

"Over there," said the Agent who had previously checked it for explosive residue and found none even though a large explosion was suspected in the vicinity. The Maker walked over to the pieces of the door.

"What's the address of the web site," asked the Appointee, "I'd like to peruse the pages."

"<http://www.corazon.com>" said the Investigator, "and his email address is barry@corazon.com."

The Appointee went over to a nearby computer, went on the internet, booted up a web browser, put in URL address, and started reading the pages.

The Investigator asked the Agent, "Can you get us copies of the other accident reports although they belong to foreign countries."

"Can do easy, GI," said the agent and immediately picked out the small cellular phone from his coat and made a call. The logo of his agency was on the back of the phone and matched his coffee cup and windbreaker. He was sharp.

The Agent called some other agents who called some people who obtained the files and faxed them to the Agent in the hangar.

"Yeah, getting confidential files from a foreign government quickly, piece of cake," the Agent mumbled under his breath.

"Hey this is great," said the Investigator, as the faxes came across. "Look at the evidence of voice recorder, radar information, destruction sequence, engine evidence, body pathology, and aircraft reconstruction, it all matches! And the one crash that we definitely know was a cargo door has matching evidence to the mostly mysterious ones."

"Who said the one sure cause was a cargo door?" asked the Agent.

"Me," said the Investigator, "I did that crash and it was the door opening in flight, we found the door, it was unlocked, all the evidence is correct."

"Hey this is great! This is very interesting," said the Appointee while reading the one hundred pages of the crash web site. "All the evidence matches. There is a link of cargo door opening to all these crashes. We should check this out."

Just then a loud shout went up over by the cargo door reconstruction area. The Appointee, the Agent, and the Investigator all looked over at the Maker who was jumping up and down shouting, "Come over here, come over here, I've found it, I've found it!"

Now, everybody reading this story, relax, don't panic, everything is going to be all right. This is just a story and not real life. We'll take a little break here to rest our brains.

Look around, you're still safe, you understand most of what your reading, and it's easy to just read words. To review: A terrible thing happened. The government is going to find out what happened so that it does not happen again. This is how they do it. Everything is organized before the terrible thing happens so that the truth will come out quickly and you can quit worrying. The four concerned parties were the Maker, the Investigator, the Agent, and the Appointee. The people who actually flew in the airplane and died in the airplane, the Pilot and the Passenger, were not concerned, not represented, and thus were not included. They would probably get too emotional, anyway.

"Over here, over here," shouted the Maker, "I've found it!"

The Appointee, the Agent, and the Investigator rushed over to the Maker who was kneeling next to the forward cargo door pieces.

"Look at this," said the Maker, pointing to the cam locks, the cam sectors, the locking pins, the door control wire bundle and the

edges of the broken door. "Yes it's all here," said the Maker, "here is the locked lock sectors, the unlocked cam sectors, the worn metal cams and locking pins, the frayed wire bundle, and the broken pieces of door."

"What's it mean?" asked the Agent.

"It means that the door looked locked but wasn't fully latched. The metal is worn from constant use. The frayed wire bundle sent a erroneous signal to the door to open. The door opened up and outward into the slipstream and broke in half right here," said the Maker, pointing to the broken door halves.

"You know, I was right all along," continued the Maker, "my first airplane of this type did not have a door like this, only later was it added at the airlines insistence. And then later we changed the door so that it opens inward and upward so that if the door opens accidentally in flight the inside pressure will keep it closed and it will not tear off a large piece of nose skin which leads to the whole nose tearing off and crashing the airplane. See, we learn from our mistakes," finished the Maker, contentedly.

"Ah," said the Investigator, "this new crashed door matches the old crashed doors which match the known cause of door opening crash. It definitely is the door opening which caused the crash," finished the Investigator, contentedly.

"And look," said the Agent, "the floor beams are bent and fractured in the same way as a door opening event and not the opposite way as in an explosive event. It definitely was not a bomb but a door opening which caused this crash," said the Agent, contentedly.

They had found out the cause of their crash. They had done their job. They had earned their pay. They had fulfilled their years of education, striving, and experience. By teamwork, preparation and patience, they had unraveled a mystery. They all reached into their coat pockets for their cellular phones to make the calls to their bosses.

The Maker called his home office and spoke to the Chief Executive Officer. The Maker explained the door mechanical problem and how to fix it. The CEO told the Maker he would talk with the Board of Directors and get back to him. The Maker hung up satisfied with a job well done.

The Agent had called his Director and explained the discovery of the door problem. The Director had told the Agent he would talk with the Attorney General and get back to him. The Agent hung up satisfied with a job well done.

The Investigator called his family and told them of the door discovery. His family said they would talk with his buddies and would get back to him. The Investigator hung up satisfied with a job well done.

The Appointee called the Secretary and told him of the door problem discovery. The Secretary said he would talk to the President and get back to him. The Appointee hung up satisfied with a job well done.

"Well, what caused the door to open," asked the Appointee.

"Good question," said everybody.

"We'll get to that later," said the Maker, as they all waited for the phones to ring with the news from their bosses about congratulations, raises, promotions, assignments, and interviews. The phone rang. It was for the Maker. He opened the cellular flap and listened to his boss.

The phone rang. It was for the Agent. He opened the cellular flap and listened to his boss.

The phone rang. It was for the Investigator. He opened the cellular flap and listened to his boss.

The phone rang. It was for the Appointee. He opened the cellular flap and listened to his boss.

After a few minutes of listening, the Maker, the Agent, the Investigator, and the Appointee folded the cellular flaps closed and put their phones back inside their jackets. They were silent.

They went to a table and had a cup of coffee.

"How about them 'Niners, think they got a change against Dallas this year?" asked the Agent.

"No," said the Maker. "I think I may have been a bit hasty in my conclusion about the cause of the crash."

"I might have jumped the gun, too," said the Investigator.

"I may have rushed to a conclusion, also," said the Agent.

"I could have been brash," said the Appointee. "Let's reconsider."

"Yes, let's reconsider," they all agreed. And they did.

"I'll start," said the Maker, "my Chief Executive Officer reported from the Board of Directors who said that I may have been a bit hasty about the cause of the crash. Now that the cause of the crash might be determined to be a faulty forward cargo door, these events will take place as soon as it is official. Seven billion dollars of orders for this model aircraft will be cancelled, two billion dollars in liability claims will be paid by the company, new orders for our other aircraft will be slow in arriving, if ever; the repair costs for the faulty doors on all the aircraft will cost one billion dollars, our quality reputation will disappear, our stock price will disappear costing us billions in company value, and ten thousand employees will be laid off with no pension or health plan, including me. My boss asked me if I understood very clearly what he had told me, especially about the laid off with no pension part. I said I did," concluded the somber Maker. After a moment's reflection he added, "I definitely was a bit hasty about the cause of this accident. I'm reconsidering the accident cause right now."

"I'm next," said the Investigator. "My wife told me that I might have jumped the gun on the accident cause. When she called all my buddies and told them the cause of the accident was a door, they said that they were involved in the previous accidents which were said to be bombs but are now proven to be incorrect. Their reputations are shot, they have lost their credibility as accident

investigators, they will not be able to get a job, their self esteem is gone, and they have said for me never to ever again contact them in any way. My wife is very concerned about my position now that I would be the enemy of all my coworkers. She fears for her security and for our daughter who may now not be able to afford dentistry and will have all the other kids laughing at her funny mouth. She might have to go to her parent's house with our daughter. She asked did I understand what she had said, especially the part about her going to her parent's house with our daughter. I said I did," concluded the somber Investigator. After a moment's reflection he added, "I definitely jumped the gun on the accident cause. I'm reconsidering right now."

"My turn," said the Agent. "My Director informed the Attorney General who said that I may have rushed to a conclusion on the accident cause. He said that now that the cause was a mechanical problem caused by us and not a bomb from foreign enemies the new request for additional funds for new agents will not be approved. Because our current agent staffing guide is based upon previous bombing incidents on airplanes that now appear not to have happened, our current staff will be reduced. Since we made errors in announcements of explosive finds, the public has lost confidence in our judgment and all our surreptitious activities such as monitoring mail and communications through court orders will be curtailed because of lack of court approval. With the general lessening of fear from foreign terrorists our recent inroads into overseas areas with local liaison offices, we will be told to leave and return to the United States and leave the overseas investigations to the locals or the CIA. Because we bungled this bombing investigation we will not be able to expand our investigative efforts into other areas, such as bankruptcies, and will be restricted to domestic crime. Since our budget will be slashed, our mission curtailed, and our employees laid off, I am to be assigned to a place I don't want to go to, for longer than I

can stand, doing a job I hate. The Director asked me if I understood what he said, especially about the new assignment part. I said I did," concluded the somber Agent. After a moment's reflection he added, "I definitely rushed to a conclusion on the accident cause. I'm reconsidering right now."

"I guess I'm last," said the Appointee. "My Secretary called the President who said I could have been brash about the accident cause. The President said that now that the cause might be a mechanical problem which has gone on for years undetected instead of foreign terrorists, many changes will occur. When the manufacturer loses orders he lays off employees who are upset and vote against him. When the manufacturer lays off employees they don't pay their bills and go bankrupt and the entire economy of a large area of the country is adversely affected with people who will not vote for him. The billions of dollars coming into the country from overseas for airplanes will not be coming in and the national debt rises upsetting all the people who will not vote for him. The billions of dollars for airplanes will now go to a foreign country making them stronger. The cause being undetected for so long has allowed other planes to crash and kill people upsetting the victim's families and friends who will not vote for him. The reputation of the country resides in the quality of its products and the number one product of America has now shown to be defective, allowing the world to laugh at us. In addition, he will now have to apologize to a foreign leader for erroneously blaming him for bombing and destroying an aircraft resulting in sanctions against his country resulting in hardship for millions of his innocent citizens. The blame for the delay in detecting the cause, the blame for allowing the defective door to be certified as OK, the lack of oversight in enforcing the Airworthiness Directives, the revelations of sloppy paperwork and maintenance records will ensure that his administration will not be returned to power in the upcoming election. The President said that if he

goes down everyone goes down. I will be replaced as Appointee and will never be appointed to anything higher than pre-school yard monitor for the rest of my life. The Secretary asked me if I understood everything he said, especially about the schoolyard monitor part. I said I did," concluded the somber Appointee. After a moment's reflection he added, "I definitely was brash on the accident cause. I'm reconsidering right now."

So they reconsidered. They did not consider their own well being; they were above selfish self interest. They thought about their company, about their friends, about their mission, and about their country. Their personal safety, the security of their families, their aspirations about their careers, and the respect of their fellows did not enter into their considerations one bit. They cared about a higher truth. They thought about loyalty to company, mission, friends, and country. They thought about right and wrong. They were not traitors. They were not thieves. They were not bad people. They realized they had to re-evaluate the cause of the crash. They needed to look closer at the evidence. They needed to consider some new conclusions based upon the closer look at the evidence. So they did.

They looked at the radar evidence of blips just before the two aircraft disintegrated. Hey, could be an anomaly, they all agreed. They looked at the one half second loud sound then silence from the four aircraft. Hey, listening closer to this short sound makes it clear that this sound is different from all the rest of the short loud sounds. They are all different short loud sounds, they all agreed. They looked at the FODDED engine number three of the three aircraft. Hey, this foreign object junk could be anything, including the lining of the intake. The FOD could be anything, they all agreed.

They looked at the missing bodies in the same seats in the three aircraft. Hey, could be sharks or wolves that made them disappear, they all agreed.

They looked at the sudden power cut on the four aircraft. Hey, power cuts off all the time; plug comes out, power station goes out, circuit breaker pops, could be anything. The sudden power cut could be anything, they all agreed.

They looked at the tearing off of the nose on the four aircraft. Hey, could be a bomb. That's right, they all agreed, it could be bombs which tore the nose off all the four aircraft.

They looked at the same type of early model, high flight time Boeing 747 of the four aircraft. Hey, coincidence, they all agreed.

They looked at the streak seen by eyewitnesses. Hey, drunk partygoers see all sorts of stuff, they all laughed, as they agreed to disregard eyewitness evidence.

They decided to ignore cargo door latch cams, lock sectors, pull in hooks, and frayed wire bundles, as well as bent and fractured floor beams, as being too complicated, too difficult to understand and prone to misinterpretation.

The Airworthiness Directives against the door were to be mentioned with no comment. The photographs of the reconstructed fuselage showing the destruction sequence were changed to drawings by an artist who closely followed instructions on what to represent.

They reviewed the evidence. They came to the conclusion that the previous conclusion was hasty, brash, and rushed. It could have looked like an inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door was the probable cause of the crash, but then again it could look like it wasn't. It all depended on how you looked at it. It was only natural to look at it from the company's best interest, the agency's best interest, the family's best interest, and the country's best interest, if they had a choice. And they did have a choice.

They came to the sober, well thought out, conservatively reasoned explanation for the crash was unknown.

Their consciences were clear. They had closely examined the

evidence and interpreted it in the best possible light for the best interests of their company, their friends, their mission, and their country. They were patriots.

They called their bosses on the phones with the new conclusion. They listened, they beamed, they hung up.

"Well," said the Maker, "orders for new planes are pouring in. Our company is more prosperous than ever now that the cause of the crash is not the company's fault. I've just been promoted, given a raise, and given a new assignment I've been wanting for years. My Chief Executive Officer wants to personally pat me on the back," the Maker concluded happily.

"Well," said the Investigator, "my friends have all invited me over to their house for football and a party. I don't have to bring any beer either. My wife said she got a baby sitter for our daughter and she's home right now waiting for me wearing her special outfit. She wants to personally pat me," the Investigator conclude happily.

"Well," said the Agent, "my director said that since the terrorist danger is still out there, all around, our mission of catching our enemies will proceed as planned, overseas and elsewhere. Also, budgets won't be cut and staff won't be reduced. He personally wants to shake my hand and wants me as his right hand man in the home office," the Agent concluded happily.

"Well," said the Appointee, "the President said he is getting much positive feedback from polls claiming the great confidence the people have in their leader who protects them from foreign enemies and domestic problems. The unemployment rate remains low, his campaign contributions continue to pour in, the society continues to travel and do business, confidence in his administration and its supervision of the regulatory agencies is high, his opponents have no issues to attack him with, he gets to be belligerent to non-nuclear countries and appear strong, and he just wants to see me personally and give me a great big hug. He

also asked me to pick a job, any job, that my heart desires in the whole government, and it's mine, just like that," concluded the Appointee happily.

"How about them 'Niners," one of them said, "think they got a chance against Dallas this year?"

"Hell, yes," they all shouted, and went home, happy, guiltless, and content.

And that's how smart, honest, educated people can come to the wrong conclusion about an aircraft accident cause.

#Comment: Best interest rules.

#Contents

barry@corazon.com

From: barry@corazon.com

Date: September 3, 1996 8:04:48 AM PDT

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: More Fiction part 1 "You Won't Believe Me..."

Mr. Schleede, more fiction to pass the time away. I encourage the passing of this silly satire to others as a way of passing time.

John Barry Smith

You Won't Believe Me So Now You Will Die:

Curse to Follow

Fiction by John Barry Smith,

based upon true stories and personal experiences.

1 Sep 96

This is the web site for the fatal crash of the next early model Boeing 747 to fall from the sky in pieces. The date is anytime after 1 September 1996 so the actual numbers will have to be filled in by you. I'll just make some helpful guesses, OK?

The Crash:

Airline: Random, fill in actual.

Type Aircraft: Boeing 747-100 series or Boeing 747-200 series

Flight Number: Random, fill in actual.

Date: Random, fill in actual date after 1 Sep 96

Time: Night takeoff

Flight Mode: Climbing

Altitude: Random, fill in actual.

Speed: About 330 miles per hour or 300 knots calibrated
airspeed.

Fatals: All on board, maybe one survivor.

Passenger List: Place your name here as well as anyone else
likely to be travelling with you.

From: Random, fill in where you took off.

To: Random, fill in where you thought you were going to land.

Where: Over ocean

Radar Information: Radar blips just as destruction starts and
during breakup.

Data Recorder: Abrupt power cut.

Voice Recorder: Short loud sound then silence.

Engine Info: Engine number three foreign object damage.

Wreckage Trails: Two, one for the nose and the other for the rest
of the plane.

Damage starts where: In the forward cargo hold area just forward
of the wing.

Official Cause: Terrorist bomb, or fuel tank explosion, or friendly
fired missile, or... you'll have to help me out here because all I
can think for crash cause is a reasonable, common sense,
mechanical explanation that has happened before, happened now,
and will happen again. But you don't want to hear that
explanation. You will not listen. You will not understand. You
won't believe me and now you will die.

Details of crash: Well, here I'll just have to tell it to you like a
story, like I'm telling it to you personally, like it's totally about

you, OK? I think so. Here we go.

All passengers, including you, were eager to get on board and get settled into their seats so they stood at the entrance of the boarding ramp when the flight number was called. The attendant took their tickets and they moved on board and found their assigned seats. Some sat in the magic seats which are in rows eight to twenty eight. Sometimes when passengers sit there they disappear and are never seen again, even though many people spend many hours looking for them.

The airplane had over fifty thousand hours flight time amongst several airlines flying in all conditions in all parts of the world for twenty five years. It was maintained to United States Federal Aviation Regulations standards. These 747s will last forever, you thought.

You picked a seat selection in the rear because you heard that was the safest. When a plane crashes and has survivors, they usually are from the rear, that's the theory, you thought, as you stuffed your carry on bag under your seat.

You got settled in for the six hour flight from where you are now to where you are going. A one hour climb, a four hour cruise at thirty thousand plus feet of altitude, then a one hour descent to landing and cheated death again, you chuckled to yourself.

The first part of the flight was to pretend you were in a car on the freeway. OK, buckle up the seat belt, put your seat in its full upright position and look out the window at all the pretty sights. You read the crash card in the pocket in the seat back in front of you and looked at the escape hatches nearby. You wondered what happens if some crazy person walks over and unlocks that little escape door. Does it open easy or hard and then what? Oh well, forget about it, no use worrying about stuff you can't control.

The three person flight crew of the Boeing 747 had finished the preflight walk around, looking carefully at the outside of the aircraft for hydraulic leaks, oil leaks, bent metal, open hatches, or

anything else they didn't expect to find. They discovered nothing unusual.

The baggage handlers had finished their job and had loaded all the passenger's baggage, full of spare underwear and shoes, into the three cargo holds. The two aft cargo doors and the forward cargo door were all closed electrically. The complex system of lock sectors, cam latches, pull back hooks and door stops had functioned correctly. There was wear, of course, on the cam and locking pins. And the door control cable bundle was frayed, of course, from the many openings and closing of the door. If the door has to be opened at the last minute for some extra baggage, then it can be opened mechanically by back driving the sectors with a ratchet wrench. This sometimes damages the cam sectors so they appear to be locked but they are not.

On your flight, the door was not opened at the last minute and back driven mechanically. The frayed wire bundle did not rub against the metal fuselage. The wear and tear on the metal was not excessive. On your flight the door closed normally.

The early Boeing 747 fired up its number 1 engine, (all the way on the left,) then 2, then 3, then 4, (all the way on the right). The large plane lumbered out to the end of the runway.

Takeoff clearance was given and the pilot pushed the throttles all the way forward. There was not another fully loaded Boeing 747 on the runway in front of you and you did not collide with it, as happened before in the number one worst aviation crash ever.

You took off smoothly.

The plane started to climb. A loaded Boeing 747 gains altitude slowly. You reached 300 knots calibrated airspeed, stabilized, and started the long climb to cruising altitude.

Now it was time to pretend you were in a cafe chatting with friends by having some peanuts and a complimentary beverage but it would be some time before the steward got to your seats in the rear. The climb continued uneventfully.

You thought ahead to when you would pretend you were in a movie theater and watch the movie. And then you looked forward to later when you would pretend to be your bed at home in your bedroom by leaning back in your seat with a pillow behind your head and trying to go to sleep.

Already the group in back of you was pretending they were in the living room back home by talking loudly and laughing at stories. One woman's voice mentioned she is saving her receipt for purchased china at the duty free store to avoid taxes, just in case she is hassled. The receipt says something about buying saucers.

Ground radar was tracking you two ways: One was by the ground radar energy beam reflecting off your large metal airframe and returning to the radar set. Depending on how long that returned beam took, a distance was determined. The other way was by sending a radar beam to trigger a box which sent back another beam to the radar set. Again, by timing and decoding the signals a distance, an altitude, an airspeed, and heading could all be determined so that the ground personnel could direct your plane safely and keep it from colliding with others.

The flight crew was in communication with the ground controllers who were issuing orders on what heading to fly, what altitude to maintain until a certain time, and what codes to put in the box to be triggered by the ground radar.

The Captain came on the speaker and spoke with that reassuring, everything is normal, everything is gonna be all right, sit back, enjoy the flight voice, and he was so glad you could join us here with this wonderful airline in this wonderful airplane on this wonderful day. You could just see him with that touch of gray in his hair, that impeccable uniform, and those steely eyes with a glint of friendliness, if you just got to know him.

During the climb you half listened to the loud conversation in

back of you. One voice grated. This guy, obviously an idiot with an annoying voice, was complaining how he thought this flight was going to be on a different airplane but they substituted this early model Boeing 747 at the last moment because of unexpected passenger loads.

You thought, that's right, Jack, airlines have to make money too, you know, and if this plane makes more money than the other one, then this is the plane to fly in; no profit, no flying at all.

Wake up, dummy, and join the real world.

The guy in back wouldn't shut up as he went on about a series of similar crashes that were attributed to bombs, or fire, or something, but he knew, and nobody else knew, that the causes were really a forward cargo door popping open, being torn off in the wind exposing a large hole in the nose, the nose tearing off, and the plane crashing, killing everyone, on airplanes similar to this one.

Then why are you flying, you idiot, you thought, and why are you the only idiot to know about it. The guy answered as if reading your thoughts, his wife had a credit card that gave a mile for every dollar she charged and enough miles had accumulated for a free flight somewhere. He said he thought a dollar meant a mile which meant a mile, but a mile meant a tenth of a mile and he hated to be lied to right off the bat by the people into whose hands he was putting his life.

What the hell is that guy talking about, you thought. Where are earplugs when you need them. And wasn't it against the law to talk about blowing up airplanes?

The guy went on, I refused to let her or my daughter fly in these dangerous planes so I took the flight, just because I love flying and have been flying for years. It's my life.

You mean you have one, news to me, you giggled to your self.

Yeah, nobody believes me, the loud guy said to the others which you hoped were pretending to be sleepy and closing their eyes so

that maybe he would shut up. Yeah, even though I've written to the President about his airplane, Air Force One, which is an early 747, the FBI, who wants bomb information and not mechanical details, the NTSB, the FAA, the news people, and, of course, my friends who got spooked about the President and the FBI and stopped talking to me along with the government agencies who ignored me.

Get a clue, idiot, you thought, does being ignored tell you anything, like right now when nobody is replying to you. Well, life is tough out there and you just have to take your chances with an act of God once in a lifetime, wrong place at the wrong time event, said one new female voice.

Oh, no, don't encourage him, you thought.

The loud idiot said that finally he figured that since nobody agreed with him over the years, that maybe he was wrong and what the hell, the risk was small anyway, and if you can't trust your pilot, your manufacturer and your government, who can you trust.

Exactly right, you idiot, now shut up. You thought again about putting some earplugs in because the last thing you wanted to think about, as you listened to the reassuring steady whine of the huge four jet engines carrying you three hundred and thirty miles an hour through the night air, was airplane crashes. Give me a break, you thought, I've got enough to worry about without thinking about things I have no control over. Maybe I'll order a drink and pretend I'm at my favorite bar with my buddies watching football. You pushed the overhead button to get the attention of the steward but realized that the steward had two hundred people to give beverages to before he got to you so you just lay back and took a deep breath and relaxed. And the button didn't make the light come on anyway, it was broken, but no problem. It was trivial.

But it made you think, how many pieces was this plane made of?

How many didn't work? If the story were true about a structural defect in Boeing 747s, you thought, why did the manufacturer not do something about it? Why did not the government transportation agencies investigate it and find out the real cause? Why did not the TV and radio and newspapers write about it? It must be bull, some nut with a strange story just to get attention. But...but...but..you thought back to the crashes and remembered thinking, they can't all be bombs, and in your experience, the simplest, ordinary, cause of an event is usually the correct explanation, not the weird ones that make good movies. So you thought about airplane movies, they did always have a crash in them someplace, didn't they? But usually someone lived and you always expected that someone would be you, didn't you? The plane lumbered on, gaining altitude as the fuel burned off, the speed stayed the same, and the excess thrust was converted to lift.

There was no bomb aboard. There were no explosives stored in the baggage compartment. No one was on a boat aiming a missile at you. There were no fires in the lavatory about to be started by a smoker. The engines were running perfectly. The crew was not asleep or drunk. The ground control personnel had normal working equipment with good power backup as they watched you on radar and talked to you on high powered radio transmitters. There was no crazy hijacker on board. There were no mountains ahead higher than you were. You were not lost. The flight controls were responding correctly to pilot inputs. There were no corroded metal panels about to part. Everything was working normally; everything looked normal, everything sounded normal. The pilot keyed the mike to tell the ground that everything was normal.

But of course, everything was not normal. For some reason, and I don't know the reason, and if I don't know the reason, then I know you don't know the reason because I'm telling this story,

the forward lower lobe cargo door motor was powered up and started to whine. The motor moved the door locks and cams to the open position. Why? Who knows? It could have been one of lots of reasons: faulty electrical short, defective lock mechanism, door not shut properly, wear and tear, maybe an incorrect open signal sent to door control system by interacting avionics transmitters located behind nose wheel; who knows? Who cares? Well, you care because as the door cracked open in the fast moving air flow the higher pressure air inside the cargo compartment pushed the door open quickly into the low pressure outside air. The right side cargo door instantly flew up and out on its upper piano hinges, hit the fuselage in front of the wing, broke in two and the lower half flew off into space reflecting ground radar beams as it went. It also reflected the sun which was barely seen above the horizon at your altitude. The sunlight reflected off the spinning shiny metal door and appeared as a streak to viewers on the ground far away as it fell. The upper half of the forward cargo door remained attached to the hinges and tore off a large piece of fuselage skin above the door and flew off into space reflecting ground radar beams as it went into space. These pieces later landed closest to the door opening event because they left first and fell first.

The door being cracked open and being torn away happened so fast that the huge hole opened up in the nose before anybody realized it. The high pressure air in the now open cargo compartment rushed out in an explosive force to equalize with the low outside pressure air. This rushing noise was loud and was heard as a loud sound, or bang, or thump on the cockpit voice recorder. Baggage from the cargo compartment was pushed outside into the engine intake airstream which was being sucked into the huge 40000 pound thrust engine number three, the inboard engine on the starboard side. The hi-bypass jet engine sucked in the plastic, metal, and wood baggage. The foreign

objects hit the high speed revolving turbine blades and were cut up and passed through to the burner section which cremated the small items. The metal objects blunted the leading edge of the turbine blades which rubbed against the intake and started a disintegration process inside the engine which led to excessive vibration which would shortly lead the engine to detach from the pylon and airframe and land separately from the other engines. The floor beams buckled downward as the high pressure air in the now open passenger compartment pushed the beams down into the now low pressure cargo compartment.

The large hole above the cargo hold and passenger compartment allowed carry on baggage, metal carts, and humans to be pushed out into the fast moving airstream and to be sucked into the number three engine which was vibrating badly but still powerful enough to ingest foreign objects and mulch them up, burn them up, and spit them out. At least ten passengers in the magic seats in rows eight to twenty eight were pushed from their seats into the airstream to be sucked into the intakes and were ground up, mashed, and burnt to small particles which were exhausted into the thin air to drift away on the winds.

As this was going on, you were peacefully thinking about airplane movies having crashes and someone usually lives and that someone would be you. That's what you were thinking one half second ago, and that's what you were thinking as the door popped open and pressure changes started happening.

Continued in Part Two.

From: barry@corazon.com

Date: September 3, 1996 8:04:59 AM PDT

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: More Fiction Part 2, "So Now You Will Die, : Curse to Follow"

Mr. Schleede, here's Part 2 of Fiction story hoping will not predict the future. John Barry Smith
You Won't Believe Me So Now You Will Die:
Curse to Follow

Fiction by John Barry Smith,
based upon true stories and personal experiences.
1 Sep 96

Part Two

As this was going on, you were peacefully thinking about airplane movies having crashes and someone usually lives and that someone would be you. That's what you were thinking one half second ago, and that's what you were thinking as the door popped open and pressure changes started happening. The now nine foot by thirteen foot hole in the right side of the nose of the early model Boeing 747 allowed the three hundred and thirty miles per hours air pressure into the slashed open cargo compartment. The heavy volume of fast moving air pressed against the bent and fractured floor beams. The fuselage skin on the other side of the nose blew out. The beams broke. The entire nose forward of the wing came off. The power cables and information cables were severed at the nerve center behind the nose wheel. The nose fell down disintegrating as it went and formed its own debris trail very close to the event because it left before the wings and tail and the rest of fuselage. As the nose fell, the flight crew inside was pushing buttons and calling for help but all the power had been instantly cut as the nose separated from the rest of the airplane. Now you were aware something was going on because your eardrums exploded. The normal air pressure in the middle ear

cavity behind the eardrum pushed out into the now low pressure of your ear canals which were open to the now low pressure of the passenger compartment. It felt as if your brain exploded. It hadn't, that should come later. What happened to you would be called, at the pathologist's report, baro-trauma, or bilateral tympanic membrane rupture.

The now headless aircraft, which had been going three hundred and thirty miles per hour, was no longer aerodynamic and slowed to one hundred miles per hour in a few seconds. Full soda cans flew forward and impacted in the seat backs making strange holes. You were pressed into the seat in front of you in a whiplash. Many of the people around you died by breaking their necks. But you were in the rear of the plane and tightly belted so did not die, just stunned.

The aircraft carcass descended and picked up speed again. The fuselage started to disintegrate, the wings started to disintegrate, and the tail started to disintegrate. Forty thousand gallons of fuel was vaporized and surrounded the falling debris. It was about to be ignited by the hot exhaust of one of the remaining three engines still running at full power but spooling down from disrupted airflow and fuel supply.

Inside the disintegrating fuselage cabin the rush of air mixed with the screams of the remaining living passengers. One of those was you and another was the loud guy.

All you could think of was reaching under your seat and taking out your carry on bag because you knew you had a parachute there. You had never sky dived but a friend did and had asked you to buy a harness and parachute for him and bring it back. He had already paid you for the just packed and ready to go parachute. It was red and white and blue and real pretty.

You reached down, pulled out your carry on bag, pulled out the chute, unstrapped the seat belt, put on attached harness and chute, and started to get up to open the escape hatch to jump out.

The noise and pain were deafening and excruciating. The loud guy saw you and grabbed hold of your leg and wouldn't let go.

"Take me with you," he screamed.

Yeah, right, you thought, I've never jumped out of a plane before, my parachute has never been tested before, I don't know how much weight the chute can handle, I'm scared and in pain, there's a smell of gas in the air, dead bodies are everywhere, and you want me to take you with me, risking my life even more than it is now. And I don't even like you, you son of bitch, this is probably all your fault. If you hadn't talked about airplane crashes in early Boeing 747s giving similar accident evidence when the cargo door opens up in flight, this never would have happened.

So you hit the loud guy in the face with your elbow; he fell back, you looked at his face and he was mouthing words which looked like, "I give you a curse, you are cursed, I curse you."

Ha, you thought, that's all I need, like I'm not cursed now. You reached an emergency exit and just as you were about to open it, the whole side of the fuselage peeled away and everyone near you, including the loud guy, floated out into dusk lit space.

On the ground the radar operators noticed a sudden strange blip that flew away and that all of a sudden many primary, skin paint radar blips appeared where your plane was supposed to be and the secondary radar transponder replies had stopped. They called the crew but got no response. So they called air sea rescue and gave the location of last position before communications and radar contact were lost.

You and the loud guy fell together through the sky amongst all the debris and fuel vapor. You looked over and dimly saw, in the waning sunlight, two halves of a door weaving back and forth like frisbees. The door halves came toward you and just as they approached, they veered and came together in the middle of the loud guy. You could see his head on the top half of his body look

down and then look up at you. He strangely grinned and mouthed some words. They looked like: "The cam lock sectors are in the unlocked position but the locks are in the locked position. I was right, it was the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight that causes crashes of early model Boeing 747s giving similar destruction evidence. And it happened to us!"

With that the loud guy and door separated into two pieces and floated away and floated away, finally.

You pulled the ripcord and the drogue chute opened up and pulled the main chute out to inflate in the rushing air.

Just then one of the three hot jet engines ignited the fuel vapor and the entire remaining fuselage and wing and tail erupted into a huge fireball seen for miles around.

But you were mostly above the fireball. That is, the chute was above the fireball, you weren't. The burning fuel vapor expanded and just reached you as you had slowed your descent with the open parachute. The fire burnt all your clothes off, and melted the polyester material in your shirts, socks, pants, and underwear into your skin, like a permanent tattoo.

But the main chute was intact. Then minute pieces of debris blew in your eyes and partially blinded you. Other pieces of debris were spinning around like razor blades and a few pieces flew by and cut several of the lines connecting you to the parachute. Your velocity increased because of the decreased lift provided by the chute.

Everything was under you now. The nose had since landed and formed its own debris trail. The rest of the aircraft was falling into the water forming its own debris trail. The flight data recorders had fallen into the water and were transmitting a homing signal for the searchers and investigators to find. The engines had landed, some with foreign object damage and debris still inside the burn chambers. The radar blips were fading from the ground radar screens. The fire had gone out. Many parts of

passenger bodies were floating on the water after they had hit and exploded like a water balloon thrown from a rooftop ten thousand feet high onto a hot driveway.

It was just you coming down, injured, in pain, disfigured, in a damaged parachute too fast to survive.

But, as luck would have it, as you predicted, someone usually survives in airplane crash movies and you figured it would be you. Just under you was an island with a big volcano on it. The volcano was so high that snow would fall and remain all year long. A tall tree stood over a very deep snowbank which angled downward towards the sea.

You couldn't see much because you were blinded, but you felt your still rapidly descending body hit the branches of the tree which slowed you down, although breaking your back, and then you felt yourself land into the soft deep snow which slowed you down, although breaking your neck, and then you felt yourself sliding and sliding and sliding down the hill, slowing all the time until you came to a stop.

You looked up. You couldn't move, in severe pain, deaf and blind, but you were alive. Ha, you thought, I fooled you. You can't kill me. You did wonder though, what was the curse that the loud guy had given you.

You passed out. A local scientific team had seen you, found you, called for helicopter rescue, and sent you to a hospital where you went into surgery and coma for six weeks.

During the six weeks this is what happened.

The search was immediately started to retrieve the flight data recorders. Radar tapes were reviewed. A strange radar blip before the destruction started was reviewed over and over again and dismissed as an anomaly. The streak was dismissed as eye witness exaggeration. The radar blips recorded during the complete destruction were tracked to the sea and the search area was defined. Searchers found debris and floating bodies.

The FBI was called in to investigate because Boeing 747s just don't fall out of the sky. The FBI assigned five hundred agents to the investigation. They started investigating all passengers who had flown on the destroyed aircraft and all passengers who had flown on the plane the flight before. Many suspicious persons were discovered and issued subpoenas to appear before a judge to answer questions and present records or be held in contempt of court and go to jail. The FBI asked the Treasury Department to assign agents of the Alcohol Tobacco, and Firearms to assist them in the investigation because they didn't have enough agents. The NTSB was in charge of the investigation. The few investigators available became garbage collectors for the debris which was then analyzed by the FBI which stated that they knew a bomb blew the airplane out of the sky and they would just have to find the proof and would, sooner or later. The FBI quietly released all interesting information that supported a bomb theory every day to the press while denying they were the source leaving the impression that the NTSB was of the unofficial opinion that it was a bomb but didn't want to go on record just yet.

The flight data recorders were found. The cockpit voice recorder ended with a short loud sound, or thump, or bang, which baffled the investigators. The data recorders ended abruptly which indicated a sudden power cut to the data recorders which baffled the investigators. The investigators said that a mechanical defect which would cut the power supply that quickly was a remote possibility but that it is not ruled out. No possible defects were offered as candidates.

Some crazy guy started emailing the NTSB to investigate the possible opening of the forward cargo door in flight, just like UAL flight 811, which had a cargo door open and tear off in flight, killing nine people and leaving much evidence before returning and landing safely. Compare Flight 811 data to the

recent crash, the crazy guy said. And Pan Am 103, and Air India 182. He was reassured by the NTSB investigator that everything was all right.

Engine number three was brought up to the surface with foreign object damage inside it.

Two massive debris trails were laid out and more debris retrieved. The FBI took control of the two pieces of the forward cargo door and sent it to the FBI laboratory in Washington DC for evidence of bomb residue. The lab tech moved the latches and locks and cams around from their found position to examine all the crevices for explosive residue. None was found.

The recovered body count grew daily but never got below ten with many of the missing assigned to the magic seats from row eight to twenty eight.

The floor beams above the cargo hold were recovered and put aside.

Paper work discovered that two Airworthiness Directives were against the forward cargo door on early 747s. One was called "To Insure That Inadvertent Opening of the Lower Cargo Door Will Not Occur Flight," an event termed not acceptable by the FAA. A possible cargo door opening was not ruled in or out or ever mentioned as a potential cause of crash.

The Boeing representative who was assisting the NTSB investigation reassured investigators that the Boeing 747 is a strong airplane and would not have any mechanical defects and therefore it would be a waste of time to look for one and the time is better spent looking for a one time only type event cause such as a leaking fuel tank explosion which fault could be placed on the airline which had not managed to place a representative on the investigation team.

The investigation team was led by a very cautious, sensitive man who spent many hours consoling the grieving families of the dead passengers. He made it a priority to recover the bodies

ahead of clue filled debris. He was surrounded by engineers, investigators, and aviation employees who had a very intense personal interest in the determination of the cause of the crash. Their lives, livelihoods, families, careers, promotions, retirement, self esteem, and identity were all riding on the outcome of the investigation. They were very obliging in assisting the NTSB and worked long hours presenting the truth as they saw it.

The FBI continued its minute examination of every piece and fragment of the wreckage looking for microscopic traces of explosive. Some invisible molecules were found on very tiny pieces. A meeting was held to determine if the FBI should supersede the NTSB as leader of the investigation. The decision was made to wait a while longer. Without official authority the FBI continued to issue subpoenas, tail foreign nationals, monitor phone calls, intercept mail, and prod informers for information. The same crazy guy with a web site who says forward cargo door did it all goes on the radio and talks about it. Some newspaper reporters call but lose interest when it is discovered the guy also says the forward cargo door brought down another Boeing 747 which everybody in the world knows was a bomb, not a cargo door. He must be crazy. He even said another bomb blown up plane years ago was a cargo door. Three 747s blown up by bombs and he thinks it's a cargo door opening. "We'll be in touch, see you later," they said, ever so polite.

You remain in a coma, oblivious to it all. The world waits for your recovery to shed some light on the mystery. Your eardrums heal. Your eyes regain some vision. You start to shake in your hospital bed. Your eyelids quiver. Your fingers twitch. Every move is carried live on TV under the "developing story" caption. However, more weeks go by and not much happens. The daily press briefing is discontinued from lack of interest. The crash is old news supplanted by newer airplane crashes. The press loses interest in crash cause since the exciting bomb or missile idea

fades leaving boring mechanical problem as possibility. It looks like the US is not going to go to war to get even with someone by killing a lot of strangers. The media attention moves on.

The body count ends with ten unrecovered bodies from the shark filled water. Most of the debris is brought to the surface. It looks like the cause will be unknown until a probable cause is issued a year or so later by the government when most interest is lost.

The aircraft manufacturer breathes a sigh of relief, their airplanes will still be built and sold. The airline breathes a sigh of relief, their airplanes will not be grounded. The insurers breathe a sigh of relief, claims take years to settle, especially with an unknown cause. The engine manufacturers breathe a sigh of relief, their engines are OK. The government breathes a sigh of relief, the administration is not embarrassed by lack of oversight and employment is kept high by making the planes and flying the passengers around. The passengers scratch their heads and say, well, you got to trust someone, and if you can't trust the government, who can you trust?

The crazy guy with the web site sits typing all day long, scanning photos all day long, responding to email all day long, and uploading pages to his web site all day long. Web site hit count goes down and down as interest is lost in old news. No one calls, no one emails, friends get tired of hearing about the stupid cargo door thing, family roll their eyes and look at each, he's off again, try to change the subject, wife says, as she has said for six years, I don't want to hear about that anymore.

His four year old daughter brings accident report book to web site guy, opens it up to picture with hole in side of nose and says, hole, then she picks and points to picture of pieces on ground and says, pieces, then she points to reconstructed fuselage sequence and says, airplane, then she points to forward cargo door and says, door. Web site guys thinks if a four year old can understand concept of door opening up in flight exposing large hole in nose

which tears off which causes plane to crash into pieces, then there is hope that others will understand, the doors will be fixed, planes fly again and life goes on.

Rejuvenated with energy and hope, he shuts down web site and plays computer game with daughter thinking, this is what's real and important, not some strangers far away who will hurl out of their seats into the night to their deaths. Hell, probably some of them are escaping bank robbers and deserve to die. He and daughter play video game, forgetting all about stupid forward cargo door opening in flight thing.

You start to come out of coma. The doctors allow you to be interviewed. The FBI is chosen to interview first with others watching on closed circuit TV. You are badly burned, mostly deaf and blind and a quadriplegic. You communicate to others by moving a pencil clamped between your teeth and slowly tapping out your answers, letter by letter, on a computer keyboard which flashes your answers around the world on the internet.

First, the FBI welcomes you and assures you everything is all right and the little IRS problems, discrepancies really, that were discovered when investigating your life have been, well, will be, taken care of. And they just have a few questions about the cause of your terrible accident.

What do you remember seeing? they shout loudly so that you can hear.

You hazily recall a sharp visual image and peck out, "Flying pieces of metal, moving back and forth."

Ah, says the FBI. What did they look like?

"They moved together, like they had a life of their own," you tapped, thinking back to the two halves of the door floating and coming together in the midsection of that loud idiot.

"It was terrible," you typed, unprompted, "they hurt him, oh, they hurt him, and then they went away."

Hmmmm, said the FBI inside the hospital room.

Hmmmm, said the manufacturer representatives.

Hmmmm, said the insurers.

Hmmmm, said the many involved government agencies.

Hmmmm, said the TV reporters.

How did it happen, they asked the FBI to ask. The FBI asked.

"Everything was normal, I heard a great noise and felt a great pain, and the plane went down. It was as if something had hit the plane and cut it in two," you typed.

Hmmmm, went everybody.

Thank you, said the FBI, we'll get back to you on that, here's our card; if you think off anything else, just give us a call.

You went to sleep as the administered drug took effect.

More days passed. You rested. The web site guy had a new interest, putting in a brick walkway next to his driveway.

Everyone agreed that was a good interest, so real, so satisfying, so fulfilling, so non-weird. His wife and friends started talking to him again.

The manufacturer and airlines and insurers and government representatives were very busy, however. One day they all got together in a oiled wood paneled room and asked what can we live with regarding this plane crash, flight so and so, the exact number was fading in their memories actually. The amount of money riding on the cause of the crash was very clear to them. It was 2.1 billion dollars.

They reviewed the evidence. They had radar blips of a plane bursting in mid-air. Electrical power was cut suddenly. There was no real evidence of a bomb and that had been done before anyway, twice. The weather was fine. The pilots were cool. And they had an eyewitness account and some found notes in a passenger's purse. The eyewitness testimony indicated a mid-air collision with a thinking, controlled object. The tattered note evidence indicated flying saucers.

It was agreed that the only plausible explanation, based upon

available evidence, that would be acceptable to the innocent manufacturers of engine and airframe, to the innocent airline, and to the innocent government agencies was the cause of the crash to be a mid-air collision with an unidentified flying object or objects that departed the scene.

The fact that the UFO was not seen on radar was explained that it was a stealth UFO. The fact that no metal not common to the crashed airplane was found was explained as aliens have high technology metals which don't leave traces when they hit ordinary human made aluminum. The choice of one or more objects was added so as to appear not too certain of the event but to give an impression of mature latitude.

Everyone agreed this was fine solution. The manufacturer and airline could not be held to blame for a mid-air with an invisible flying saucer, it could happen to anyone. The insurer was elated because now the liability was limited to a small amount per passenger instead of a huge amount for negligence. The TV and other lesser media such as newspapers and magazines loved the idea knowing ratings would soar as the fake pictures and reasoned conjectures flooded into the talk shows. The government was very satisfied because now it could ask for and receive unlimited extra funding for research into alien defense mechanisms, hiring more agents, buying more machines, and being able to cloak much more activity and spending as Top Secret, Need to Know Only, and not many people needed to know, that's for sure. In fact, the fewer people that know, the better, was the motto of the heads of the government agencies as they submitted their confidential revised funding requests.

The accident report was released. It ignored all aspects of a mechanical malfunction and emphasized the sudden power loss, the strength of the airplane, the written evidence, and the conversation of the only eyewitness. It came to the conclusion that the probable cause of your crash was a mid-air collision in

the forward cargo hold area with an unidentified flying object/ objects that departed the scene. As an appendix, a recent scientific discovery of life on Mars was added, just for information's sake.

You came out of the coma again. Your head was clear. You researched your accident and several others. You remembered the conversation of the loud guy talking about similar accidents to early model Boeing 747s giving similar evidence which now matched your accident. You remembered the whine of the door motor and the decompression. You remembered the door halves coming together and the cam latches being confirmed as being open by the loud guy. Now you knew what caused the huge plane to crash and what caused all the others to crash and kill all those people. You wanted to stop the killing, to stop the crashes, to fix the doors and to tell the world what had happened and how to fix it. You knew it could happen again.

You started typing on your computer into the internet after finding the original, now abandoned, crash web site about doors. You started the site back up again and typed, "It was the opening of the forward cargo door in flight that caused my plane to crash. I felt it. The opening in flight of the forward cargo door is causing the crashes of early model Boeing 747s. It is all documented, common sense, reasonable and likely. The problem can be fixed forever."

You were ignored; you were not believed; you were scorned; you were rebuffed; you were rejected.

You called a physician known to assist troubled people out of existence. After the deadly injections, you typed to the world, "It's true, I am cursed. I know the truth. Goodbye."

You had previously written a code virus to be placed in personal computers to automatically appear on every anniversary of your crash date.

The crash anniversary arrived. The virus took effect. The

message displayed to the world: "You won't believe me so now you will die."

The End

#Comment: When the next 747 crashes...Key word here is fiction.

#Contents

barry@corazon.com

From: barry@corazon.com

Date: September 6, 1996 3:42:51 PM PDT

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: **Airplane crash cause**

Dear Mr. President, Bill Clinton

Dear Mr. Chief of Staff, Leon Panetta

Dear Mr. Secretary of Transportation, Federico Pe^a

Dear Mr. Director, Federal Aviation Authority, David Hinson

Dear Mr. Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board,
James Hall

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board,
Robert Francis

Dear Mr. Investigator, National Transportation Safety Board,
Ron Schleede

Dear Ms. Attorney General, Department of Justice, Janet Reno

Dear Mr. Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Louis Freeh

Dear Mr. Agent, New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, James Kallstrom

Mr. Bill Clinton, President of the United States of America

Dear Mr. President,

Hello, Sir. I have important news to give. Your life is in

immediate danger, although slight, hopefully slight, when you fly on Air Force One, a Boeing 747-200B. This type aircraft has a history of inadvertent forward cargo door openings in flight. Hindsight and the internet have enabled me to link several crashes of early model Boeing 747s to a common cause, the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight. Documentation, pictures, comments, and emails from all over the world regarding this discovery are on the internet web site at <http://www.corazon.com>

Your life, the lives of those who fly with you, and all the passengers on early model Boeing 747s are at risk to this door opening outward and upward, tearing off in the slipstream exposing a large gash in the nose which tears off.

The door openings at altitude mimic a bomb. It is not a bomb. The world will be a bit less dangerous once the causes are determined to be mechanical and not evil.

Have you ever had a car door, or hood, or trunk open unexpectedly? I have; it's not unusual. If you have, then please give thought to possible airplane door opening and the severe consequences.

Please be responsive to this informed citizen.

Mr. Clinton, leader from follower, I ask that you check out the forward cargo door as the cause of the crash of TWA Flight 800. Sincerely, John Barry Smith

Mr. Leon Panetta, Chief of Staff, Clinton Administration

I feel like saying, Leon, Leon, Leon, as that was the way I thought of you when I voted for you as Congressman several times in Monterey.

Mr. Panetta, we met in 1980 in your second floor office on Alvarado where I personally thanked you for inquiring on my behalf on a personnel matter while I was stationed in Korea. The last time I saw you, you were walking alone across Toro Park

during Earth Day in 1992, just before your selection as Budget Director. I remember thinking, what a job politics is shaking hands at a post hippie ecology get together. I was with a friend selling United Nations videos, not a hot seller. I live up on Country Club Drive in Carmel Valley and pass your family's hand painted sign, Villa Bella Donna, every day on the way to drop my daughter off at Tularcitos Pre-School.

I have come to alert you, sir, of danger to you, the President, and all passengers who fly in early model Boeing 747s. Yes, this is unorthodox, an email letter from a member of the public but then, I trust, as a former congressman, that you believe that occasionally a citizen may have something important to say. I do; here it is: The forward cargo doors of early model Boeing 747s are inadvertently opening in flight, tearing off door and skin, allowing the slipstream to enter the large gash which tears off the nose leading to total destruction and the deaths of all aboard. This has happened several times before and appeared to be explosions. The attached picture is of a Boeing 747 that almost had the nose come off.

Mr. Panetta, former representative of the people from former constituent, I ask that you check out the forward cargo door as the cause of the crash of TWA Flight 800 or call me at 408 659 3552 or visit my web site at <http://www.corazon.com>. Sincerely,
John Barry Smith

Mr. Federico Peña, Secretary of Transportation,

Dear Mr. Secretary, I invite you to a visit to my web site at <http://www.corazon.com>. named after my wife, Corazon Luna Smith.

Mr. Peña, traveller to traveller, I ask that you check out the forward cargo door as the cause of the crash of TWA Flight 800. Sincerely, John Barry Smith

Mr. David Hinson, Director, Federal Aviation Authority,

Dear Director, I am looking at my FAA pilot's license, number 1787797, commercial pilot, airplane single engine land, instrument airplane, of which I am very, very proud. I also received a Part 135 certificate from your agency. I was also a US Navy Lieutenant Naval Flight Officer in RVAH -1, RA-5C Vigilantes. My ejection story and US Navy accident report are on my web site at <http://www.corazon.com> along with the official accident reports on UAL Flight 811 and Pan Am 103.

All of the four Boeing 747 crashes described were caused, in my opinion, by the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight. The web site provides documentation, reasoning, and opinion supporting that hypothesis.

At minimum, there now exists a mysterious early model Boeing 747 crash. Air Force One is an early model Boeing 747. There are several hundred early model Boeing 747s now flying. The location of the start of destruction for TWA Flight 800 and others is near the forward cargo hold. I ask that you seal the door shut to prevent explosives from being placed there or to prevent the door from accidentally opening.

The forward cargo door has two Airworthiness Directives against it and has killed nine persons already in UAL Flight 811. A glance at the attached picture of a Boeing 747-121 with the large gash in the right side of its nose may persuade you a nose could easily tear off in a 300 knot slipstream.

Mr. Hinson, naval officer to naval officer, I ask that you check out the forward cargo door as the cause of the crash of TWA Flight 800. Sincerely, John Barry Smith

Mr. James Hall , Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board,

Dear Mr. Chairman, in 1992, the NTSB conducted a very complete and well explained accident report on the crash of UAL

Flight 811 in which a cargo door came open in flight and nine passengers were sucked out of their seats to their deaths. Use the key of 811 to unlock 800.

The thrust of the crash investigation should then focus on what causes the forward cargo door to open inadvertently. The NTSB stated electrical short to the door control system in UAL 811. For others, an explosive device could do it, or random electrical signals in the avionics bay might do it. There are eleven rational causes for accidental door openings listed on the web site at <http://www.corazon.com>. The cause of the door openings is unknown and must be discovered.

Mr. Hall, passenger to passenger, I ask that you check out the forward cargo door as the cause of the crash of TWA Flight 800. Sincerely, John Barry Smith

Mr. Robert Francis, Vice Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman, I've seen you on TV and believe you are a compassionate man above all. I appeal to you to prevent the future deaths of innocent passengers in early model Boeing 747s whose forward cargo door may inadvertently open outward and upward, tearing off with skin into the slipstream, exposing a large gash in the side of nose which then tears all the way off. Please compare evidence collected in the explained cargo door crash of UAL 811 to those of Air India Flight 182, Pan Am 103, and currently, TWA Flight 800.

The specific similarities will be: 1: Short loud sound on CVR. 2. Abrupt power cut. 3. Fodded number three engine. 4. Radar blips during destruction. 5. Never recovered bodies sitting in similar seats above and just aft of the cargo door. 6. Same type of aircraft, Boeing 747 series 100 or 200 with high flight time. 7. Destruction sequence starts forward of the wing. Sun angle lighting may confirm spinning loose cargo door near New York

in July at 8:30 PM at 13,500 feet would be reflected as streak. Other similarities in four crashes include: nose tears off, explosive decompression mimics bomb, crew talking on radios when event happens, night takeoff, and pressurization changes to hull at catastrophic event.

The forward cargo door has opened inadvertently many times, usually on the ground. It has opened several times in the air with only minor or moderate damage. Airworthiness Directives were issued after those events. It has opened in flight leading to total destruction three times, in my opinion, which is supported by documentation on my web site at <http://www.corazon.com>. A glance at the attached picture of a Boeing 747-121 with the large gash in the right side of its nose may persuade you a nose could easily tear off in a 300 knot slipstream.

Mr. Francis, survivor consoler from jet crash survivor, I ask that you check out the forward cargo door as the cause of the crash of TWA Flight 800. Sincerely, John Barry Smith

Mr. Ron Schleede, Investigator, National Transportation Safety Board.

Dear Mr. Investigator, you have seen the hole on UAL Flight 811. Could that hole become larger in the slipstream and tear the whole nose off? I think so.

You investigated UAL Flight 811. That model of plane was a Boeing 747-121. That Boeing 747-121 crash, off Honolulu in February 1989, left conclusive evidence that was very similar to another Boeing 747 crash years earlier which killed 329 people off the Irish coast in 1985. That plane was a Boeing 747-237B.

A Boeing 747-122 also crashed with similar evidence trails left. And yet another Boeing 747-131 also crashed with similar evidence trails left. Three destroyed and one that killed only nine and returned to land and tell its story which was inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight.

Facts, facts, facts. There are 105 pages of facts on my web site. If you were to go on the internet to the World Wide Web and go to Universal Resource Locator, URL address <http://www.corazon.com> you will find 105 pages of documentation, support, argument, and correspondence from all over the world regarding this matter, the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door of early model 747s, one of which is Air Force One.

Regarding the four Boeing 747 crashes, Air India Flight 182, Boeing 747-237B; Pan Am Flight 103, Boeing 747-121A; UAL Flight 811, Boeing 747-122; and TWA Flight 800, Boeing 747-131.:

Fact: All four crashes were early model Boeing 747s.

Fact: All four crashes had deaths.

Fact: All four crashes had a short loud sound before destruction.

Fact: All four crashes had abrupt power cut.

Fact: All four crashes had start of destruction start near forward cargo hold.

Fact: All four crashes had apparent explosions in forward cargo hold area.

Fact: All four crashes had explosive decompression.

Fact: Three crashes had nose snap off.

Fact: Three crashes had radar blips during destruction, possibly all four.

Fact: Three crashes had nine or more missing bodies never recovered, possibly all four.

Fact: Three crashes had number three engine ingesting foreign object damage, possibly all four.

Fact: Two crashes had mysterious blip before destruction door on radar, possibly all four.

Fact: Two crashes had crew talking on radio when catastrophic event occurred, possibly all four.

Fact: One crash had visual clue, possibly all four.

All of the above clues fit the puzzle that is solved by the

inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door of early model high flight time Boeing 747s in flight.

Mr. Schleede, pilot to pilot, I ask that you check out the forward cargo door as the cause of the crash of TWA Flight 800.

Sincerely, John Barry Smith

Ms. Janet Reno, Attorney General,

Dear Ms. Attorney General, your late mother would have loved this cargo door story. It has everything: mystery, money, politics, death, red herrings, explosions, prime suspects, and of course, tragedy.

Prevention is not as glamorous but more powerful than curing. Please prevent more deaths in early model Boeing 747s rather than heal the injured after the crash.

Ms. Reno, former State Attorney from a former Preventive Medicine hearing conservationist, I ask that you check out the forward cargo door as the cause of the crash of TWA Flight 800.

Sincerely, John Barry Smith

Mr. Louis Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,

Dear Mr. Director, the solution to the mystery of these plane crashes is a common mechanical fault. Although the previous investigations came to different conclusions, there is no cover up, there is no plot, there is no conspiracy; it is just honest people describing reality from their own best interest point of view, and they are wrong. We've all done it, not seeing the object we don't want to see, not hearing what we don't want to hear, and not believing what we don't want to believe.

Fidelity, Bravery, Integrity, and there is no qualifier in front of "Investigation", and this email is unencrypted and sent in the clear, and man to man, I ask that you check out the forward cargo door as the cause of the crash of TWA Flight 800. My Social Security Number is 562-58-2308. Sincerely, John Barry Smith

Mr. James Kallstrom, New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Dear Mr. Agent, there was an explosion in TWA Flight 800. It was called explosive decompression. It happened when the forward cargo door opened in flight exposing the higher pressure air in the cargo compartment to the lower outside air pressure. The decompression mimicked a bomb. The deceleration following the nose tearing off in the slipstream caused many items to smash into bulkheads, mimicking a bomb. The fuel from the disintegrating wing vaporized and exploded, mimicking a bomb.

The cargo door has a criminal profile that begs to be investigated. It has killed nine passengers already under similar circumstances and has two Airworthiness Directives against it. It is the prime suspect in TWA Flight 800. Please examine attached photo of damaged Boeing 747 for clues to determine how a nose of a 747 could tear off in a split second, as has happened several times already and may happen again.

Mr. Kallstrom, professional sleuth from amateur sleuth, I ask that you check out the forward cargo door as the cause of the crash of TWA Flight 800. Sincerely, John Barry Smith

CC: Boeing Company

US Air Force
TWA

From: barry@corazon.com

Date: September 19, 1996 2:47:36 PM PDT

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
Subject: **Mechanical cause**

Met with Bonnie Britt this AM to talk crashes and she said she knew you.

The news today said mechanical cause is on front burner, may I suggest inadvertent opening of forward cargo door.

Web site at corazon has all the info. Isn't it plausible that a nine foot by 15 foot hole in the side of an older 747 would allow air to come in and blow out other side of fuselage, allowing nose to tear off? TWA 800 did have 93000 plus hours on airframe. Well, good luck. John Barry Smith

Newsday article attached about this wacky guy smith with web site about cargo doors...don't get backed into a corner of denial...
<html><!--Beth 9/16/96--><head><title>newsday.com / Long Island / Crash of TWA Flight

<I>Al Baker and Matthew Cox contributed to this story.</I>

<H2>A Web of Intrigue</h2>

<h4><i>Flight 800 crash theories running wild on Internet</i></h4>

By Jessica Kowal

Staff Writer

On the Internet, the mystery of TWA Flight 800 has long since been solved.<p> J. Orlin Grabbe knows a missile downed the jet. On his World Wide Web site, Grabbe writes that Syrian-trained terrorists warned the FBI and then shot down the TWA jet with a surface-to-air missile from a boat in the water off Long

Island.<p> John Barry Smith is just as sure the plane was done in by a defective cargo door. According to Smith's Web site, a forward cargo door fell off both the TWA plane and off Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie in 1988, causing both planes to break apart and explode. Boeing and the U.S. government, Smith writes, aren't telling the truth because they don't want to damage the American economy.<p> Richard Ruiz of Farmingdale fervently subscribes to the "friendly fire" theory, posting his views on a computer bulletin board along with hundreds of others who believe they can pinpoint when and how the American military shot down the airplane.<p> Within minutes after the jet went down July 17 and killed all 230 people aboard, the Internet became the 24-hour worldwide talk show for theories about what caused the fireball. While the reality of this public detective story has been disappointing to armchair investigators - for almost two months, the professionals have repeated that a bomb, missile or mechanical failure could have downed the plane - virtual reality has stepped in to fill the narrative gap.<p> "However damaging it may be, we're entitled to the truth," said Ruiz, a 62-year-old chemist who has been heartened by winning converts to his view. "Let's say I'm suspicious, and until I'm proven different than my thoughts are, I have to be suspicious."<p> Using the key words "TWA Flight 800" and "missile," "bomb," or "conspiracy" yields thousands of messages posted on bulletin boards from visitors digging through hypotheses. The crash has already earned a spot alongside the Kennedy assassination and Vince Foster's death on a Web site entitled "50 Greatest Conspiracies of All Time."<p> Such speculation may be fueled by the far-fetched nature of even some officially sanctioned theories, including that a missile pierced the plane, passing through without a trace. Longtime investigators also say the lack of new developments feeds the frenzy.<p> Then there is investigators' refusal to rule out anything. Even

while generally discounting theories about "friendly fire," chief FBI investigator James Kallstrom would not dismiss them outright last week. He would only call them "highly, highly, highly unlikely." So without waiting for the agents of the FBI; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; and National Transportation Safety Board to figure it out, computer users sift through available details, drawing their own conclusions.

"When there's an absence of concrete information, the conspiracy theorists really thrive," said Vincent Cannistraro, the CIA's former counterterrorism chief of operations. "They know one fact and a fourth fact, but they don't know what's in between, so they start filling in their information." Perhaps the FBI opened the floodgates by giving out the agency's e-mail address and asking for help in solving the mystery. Now faced with a deluge of messages in reply, the FBI wades through explanations of aliens, meteorites, bombs or missiles to find tidbits of useful information coming from pilots, engineers or other experts.

"There's thousands of them. There's millions of them," Kallstrom said of the messages the bureau has received. "A lot of them are very well reasoned and thought out and we appreciate getting them . . . We read them, and any of them we think are worth a second look, we take a second look." But there is a difference between the expert and the crackpot, said Oliver (Buck) Revell, who was in charge of the FBI's investigative and intelligence operations for 12 years.

"Some of these people are fairly serious and knowledgeable about investigative processes and are using intellectual analysis," said Revell, who headed the Pan Am Flight 103 investigation. "And others are living through vicarious thrills of 'X-Files' nonsense that doesn't hold any water." On the Internet, those differences can be hard to spot. And because of speedy transmission over telephone lines, Internet theorizing moves faster than other media, said John Whalen, author of the "50

Greatest Conspiracies" Web site. Whalen warns that believing in a government cover-up is "as responsible as saying that ET shot the plane down." <p> "Anyone can get up on the Internet and propose a theory, float it out there, and then it begins to spread like an informational virus, for better or worse," Whalen said.<p> The workings of the Internet certainly allow people to directly send detailed suggestions about how the investigation should proceed.<p> Last Friday, one man sent a five-page e-mail message to the FBI to advise the bureau not to overlook the possibility that the TWA plane was hit by a meteor. Asking the bureau to find out "how long would the transit of a meteoroid traveling at 8 [kilometers per second] take to pass through a 747?" the author concluded that the lack of explosive evidence and reports of a "streak of light in the sky" before the plane exploded point to Flight 800's having been struck by "a falling object, a meteorite, comet or spacecraft debris." <p> Also in the mix are the UFO theorists, including one Web site reporting that four days before the crash, a woman living in northern New Jersey "reported" seeing a UFO flying just south of Long Island.<p> Other Web sites offer very specific information their authors say leads to one conclusion: their conclusion.<p> On his Web site, Grabbe offers essays criticizing President Bill Clinton and the FBI and explaining his own views on international financial markets.<p> In an interview, Grabbe, a Harvard-educated economist who lives in Reno, Nevada, said "high level intelligence people" who read his Web site contacted him to say the U.S. government knew within a week after Flight 800's demise that a modified surface-to-air Stinger missile hit the plane. <p> He rejects the notion he's a "conspiracy theorist." <p> "I think it was a terrorist group that took down that plane using a surface-to-air missile," Grabbe said. "I just call that the facts, but other people who don't like the facts would call that a conspiracy."<p> Spectral data from satellite photos, Grabbe

said, showed authorities that the missile's usual heat-seeking head was replaced with a white-glowing "phosphorous" tip, which could be aimed at the belly of the plane. <p> Grabbe believes the FBI has offered falsified radar data showing the airplane flying at 13,700 feet when it exploded, while "the best information I can get" was that the plane was flying at 7,600 feet when hit by a missile.<p> Moreover, Grabbe links both the TWA explosion and the July 2 energy blackout of 15 Western states to Syrian-trained terrorists. Grabbe said he believes the FBI is "deliberately falsifying evidence," with the complicity of the White House, because the United States does not want trouble with Syria but might try to use the TWA Flight 800 explosion to "justify a war in the Middle East" against Libya or Iraq. <p> "People behind the scenes are laughing, and there are bets going on about how long the FBI can maintain the charade," Grabbe said. <p> Grabbe's and others' views that the government is covering up what it knows are "crazy," Cannistraro said.<p> "Anyone who claims to have knowledge is generally lying, paranoid or [doing it] for publicity or self aggrandizement," Cannistraro said.<p> John Barry Smith of Carmel Valley, Calif., said he's putting his theory on the Internet to save lives. After viewing pictures of a United Airlines 747 severely damaged when a forward cargo door opened during a 1989 flight, killing nine people, Smith decided cargo doors, not bombs, were the cause of explosions aboard Pan Am Flight 103, the 1985 Air India Flight, and now TWA Flight 800.<p> On his Web site, Smith uses photographs and documents to compare the United Airlines plane to the Pan Am and Air India planes and to conclude that malfunctioning cargo doors opened and ripped away the skin of the fuselages and then tore the noses off the planes. In an interview, Smith said he believes a door also fell off TWA Flight 800, and that the "streak of light" some say is a missile is actually the plane's falling cargo door reflecting

light.<p> "This door is a prime suspect. This door has killed before," Smith said. "I didn't invent the cause of these crashes. The door popped open. It's not weird. It's a no-brainer. So that's when you get to the coverup."<p> The coverup, he said, is that Boeing and the federal government don't want to admit there's a major defect in the 747, potentially costing the company millions of dollars to fix and severely damaging the American economy.<p> Smith, who said he has been "sensitive" to doors since his finger was slammed in a car door when he was 5-years old, has contacted the White House, FBI, FAA, Air Force, NTSB, and airline insurance companies to alert them to his view of the problem.<p> "It's a case of human nature seeing what they want to see. They see a bomb, and they ignore what's in front of them," Smith said.<p> Several aviation officials dispute Smith's theory.<p> Boeing spokesman Doug Webb said the company knew of problems with 747 cargo doors a year before the United Airlines accident, and that the airlines have subsequently retrofitted them with steel-reinforced locks.<p>

NTSB spokeswoman Shelly Hazle said the agency examined TWA Flight 800's wreckage for a broken cargo door and discounted it as a cause of the crash.<p> If the cargo door had opened in flight, a cockpit light would have gone on and the crew would have focused all their attention on the problem, Hazle said. Yet there is no discussion of the problem on the cockpit voice-recorder tapes, so the NTSB has ruled it out, she said.<p>

And, investigators said, Pan Am 103 and the Air India planes were both downed by bombs, not cargo doors.<p> Even as some online theorists, such as Smith, use their own research, others draw conclusions using whatever information comes their way.<p> Richard Ruiz said a conversation with a French Army officer while both men were waiting to catch flights at a South American airport convinced him friendly fire was responsible for the TWA explosion. <p> Ruiz admitted he has no facts that

haven't appeared in the mainstream news media, but he still said the Frenchman's comments about other friendly-fire shoot-downs, including the U.S. Navy's downing of an Iranian Airbus in 1988, made an impact. "I began to think about it and the fact that nothing conclusive was reached about [the TWA plane]," he said. "And I began to put two and two together."<p>

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From: barry@corazon.com

Date: September 23, 1996 4:29:55 PM PDT

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: Cargo door, what else?

Mr. Schleede, well, never give up, try try again, John Barry Smith

Robert Francis, Vice Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, Wash, DC webmaster@ntsb.gov

Ron Schleede, Investigator, National Transportation Safety Board, Wash, DC webmaster@ntsb.gov

Al Dickinson, Investigator, National Transportation Safety Board, Wash, DC webmaster@ntsb.gov

Robert Knight, Producer/Host Earthwatch, WBAI, New York City, USA, rknight@escape.com

Mike Busch, Editor-in-Chief, AVweb, AVsig member, Cyberspace, editor@avweb.com

Nick Fielding, Reporter, Mail on Sunday, London, UK, msnews@mailonsunday.co.uk

Byron Acohido, Reporter, Seattle Times, AVsig member, Seattle, USA, baco-new@seattimes.com

Bob Kaputa, Managing Editor, AVsig member Cyberspace help@avweb.com

Jessica Kowal, Reporter, Newsday, Long Island, USA, plugin@newsday.com

Messrs. and Ms. Francis, Schleede, Dickinson, Knight, Busch, Fielding, Acohido, Kaputa, and Kowal,
23 Sep 96

I have established contact via email with you before so I know you are receiving my information. Mr. Kaputa and Mr. Francis have direct conversation links to Mr. Busch and Mssrs, Schleede and Dickinson so are included in this email.

Determining the cause of the crash of TWA Flight 800 is urgent. Several hundred of the same type of early model Boeing 747 are flying with passengers as I type. The US government flies four E-4B and Air Force One, all modified Boeing 747-200s. All those 747s are at risk from a cause officially unknown at this time.

I know the cause. It is the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight. This cause is documented at my website <<http://www.corazon.com>> with over 50 megabytes of data extracted from four government accident reports, news articles and based on thirty five years of flying experience.

You have sent me emails regarding this possible cause. Your replies would be adequate from a layman who has a passing interest in plane crashes but totally unsatisfactory from aviation career professionals or investigative journalists.

Let's go through them, it shan't take long.

"From Mr. Schleede on 29 July 96:

Be assured that we are checking that. I was the investigator in charge of the UAL flight 811 case and fully knowledgeable in its causes and factors.

Thanks for the interest.

From: barry

To: schledr

Subject: TWA crash cause ATTN Robert Francis

Date: Sunday, July 28, 1996 9:58AM

Mr. Francis. The reasonable cause of the TWA crash is the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door. That is the mechanical cause that must be ruled out. Compare to United Flight 811 of Feb 1989." end email.

Well, Mr. Schleede, I am not assured you are checking that, in fact, I am quite unassured you are not checking that.

Another email:

"From: Schleede Ron <SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov>

To: barry <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: RE: TWA crash cause

Date: Sun, 11 Aug 1996 11:39:00 -0400

Encoding: 13 TEXT

Status:

I have examined the cargo door from twa 800--it is locked and latched!"

end email.

Mr. Schleede, there are three cargo doors on 800, you never replied to my question of which one; did you check?

an email from Mr. Dickinson:

"Mr. Smith, thank you for your message concerning the TWA 800 crash

investigation. We have recovered many of the door/hatch/access

panel/windows from the sea floor and none of them indicate that they came

off the aircraft prior to the event which lead to the crash. In addition, both the CVR and the FDR do not have any information that

indicates any of the above things departed the aircraft prior to the

event. A depressurization event most certainly would have been noted by

the crew and recorded on the CVR. We will continue to look for any

indications leading to the source of the event and definitely pay attention to items memtioned in your letter.

Thank you for your interest in aviation safety."

end email.

Mr. Dickinson, thank you for your imterest in aviation safety.

Spelling error indicates you never proof read your email and two verb tense errors indicate you may not know better. And yes, the crew would have noticed depressurization event when their eardrums blew out. Did you check their bodies for baro-trauma?

And yes, the event was recorded on the CVR as short loud sound.

email from Mr. Busch:

"Speculation like this is fascinating, but it has no place in responsible reporting. As a journalist, I have to grit my teeth and wait until sufficient hard data is available to draw a conclusion."
end email.

Like another mystery crash and 300 more dead to add to the 838 dead and four crashes already, before sufficient hard data is available to draw a conclusion?

an AVweb ezine comment:

"This one could find its way onto "The X-files." Speculation that an errant missile launched by a U.S. warship or aircraft downed TWA 800 abounds in cyberspace; ditto theories purporting that a baggage door came open in-flight, or that ET did it -- actually, that a meteorite pierced the plane. Of course, it's all being covered up by the government, many say."
end excerpt.

Between a missile and an alien fits the cargo door; birds that fly together flock together, weirdos love company.

an excerpt from print article, Ms. Kowal,

"Smith, who said he has been "sensitive" to doors since his finger was slammed in a car door when he was 5-years old, has contacted the White House, FBI, FAA, Air Force, NTSB, and airline insurance companies to alert them to his view of the problem."
end excerpt.

end excerpt.

Well, I knew that when the questions referred to my smashed finger and ignored 800 dead persons, this was not a serious

interview, and I never said "coverup."

an email from Mr. Acohido:

"I agree your thesis is plausible."

end excerpt of email.

What? What? Plausible? And then Mr. Acohido asked reasonable, relevant, and probing questions regarding that thesis. Hope lives!

an email from Mr. Knight.

"This is one of the most cogent malfunction scenarios I have encountered so far, especially since the detail reported by REUTERS, the NY Times and others on 30 Jul 96 that a cargo door

fell into the sea well ahead of the fuselage and the decapitated cabin of TW800."

Ah! Articulate reasoning!

Yes, gentlemen and lady, hope lives that reason, logic, and clear thinking will prevail and the truth of the cargo door will emerge, one way or the other.

See, if I'm wrong, and I could be wrong about the cargo door cause, no one dies. If you are wrong, someone dies. And will, the clock is ticking.

The time between Pan Am 103 and UAL 811 was 65 days. The time between uncommanded door opening of UAL preflight and TWA 800 was almost five years. It's been 77 days since TWA 800 and counting as I type this.

I'm assuming you know about the uncommanded cargo door opening of June 13, 1991, on a UAL preflight where the cargo door started to open by itself and the ground crew could not stop it until the circuit breakers were pulled in the cockpit? Put that on the list of times the door opened when it shouldn't. The list includes that one plus Pan Am 125, UAL 811, Air India 182, Pan Am 103, and TWA 800.

Well, maybe you don't know about it. I'm assuming that

government officials assigned to investigate one of the more serious accidents to occur in the country's history are well qualified by education, experience, and demeanor. But I could be wrong. The evidence as shown by correspondence is of inarticulate, incoherent bumlbers who don't have any focus on what they are doing. At best the response to detailed and reasonable documented evidence about the accident cause presented by an informed citizen responding to a public appeal for help has been a vague brush off. I am left with the impression that the priority of government investigators is not the urgent mystery solution but figuring out how to get on the next boondoggle flight to London, or Paris, or Athens. What is the per diem in Paris, anyway, must be a bunch.

The press, ah, the press. Gives me chills to think of the First Amendment. And stomach cramps to realize what that means in reality. It means that the press is now a shill to government press releases and a copy machine for TV sound bites and photo ops. I'm assuming that press and radio reporters are interested in their subject, curious, and feel satisfaction when presenting all aspects of an issue. But I could be wrong. The evidence as shown by correspondence and several articles is of meek, narrow minded, uninformed sensationalists. (With one exception yet to be fully tested and one still on the fence.) I am left with the impression of reporters who look at computer screens and cut and paste what other reporters have cut and pasted from manufacturer and government pufferies. As soon as an original idea passes into your consciousness you cut and run. Safer on the fence, in the cave, don't commit.

You are not doing your job, gentlemen and lady. You are failing. You are betraying your professions. You are living a lie.

You have had your asses kissed so often you think your shit don't stink.

The proof is that today, this minute, the cause of the crash of

TWA 800 is officially unknown. The proof is that today, the only explanation given any depth of investigation in the papers, ezines, TV, and radio is bomb, bomb, bomb.

One focus, one failure, and that's it. 77 days and 7 million dollars and what do you have? Another day older and deeper in debt.

OK, let's sit down and have a meeting now that the pleasantries are over.

It's a round table. My name is John Barry Smith. We've all flown supersonic in combat, ejected from flaming jet aircraft, landed on pitching carrier decks at night, flown passengers for hire, written aviation articles for pay, and constructed extensive web sites on the internet, haven't we? Oh, we haven't? Am I the only one to have done all those things? Well, then I guess I will open the meeting.

I've discovered something. I didn't invent it. Through hindsight and the internet I've discovered a link to several Boeing 747 crashes over a period of eleven years. It is the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door inflight. It is a common type of mechanical malfunction. It has happened before on this type aircraft. The event is well documented on cockpit tapes and data recorders. The consequences of the event are clearly shown on wreckage. The event has been seen visually, tracked on radar, heard on audio tapes, felt by engines and passengers bodies, and thought about by many people.

It is a mystery no more. The cause of the crashes of Air India 182, Pan 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800 was the forward cargo door opening outward when it shouldn't, tearing off skin forming nine foot by 15 foot gash in the side of the nose of the early model Boeing 747 allowing a 300 knot airstream to flow into the fractured and broken floor beam compartments and snapping off the nose leaving a short loud sound of explosive decompression on the audio tape, abrupt power loss to data recorder, fodding of

number three engine, and at least nine missing bodies.

After we get over the mental hurdle of the cargo door causing the crashes, the next mystery is why do the doors open inadvertently. There are twelve possible reasons and many more to be discovered. That is the proper focus, why do doors open?

But back to the cargo door cause. What is it that makes you reluctant to consider the door as culprit? Too ordinary? Not exciting enough?

I think of a musical hook in a song...what can be the hook for the cargo door theory. It is not enough to discover a great truth, but it must be presented in a persuasive manner.

The O rings were put into a glass of ice water to show brittleness.

I can use a soda can as a pressurized hull. If the integrity of the can/hull is not cracked, it is impossible to open can/hull by pressing down with fingers/wind on round drink opening. But when cracked by tab lever/open door, the soda/baggage spews out into face/engine 3. Then the cracked drink hole/nose can be easily pushed open by finger/airstream.

You are not plumbers who know not the force of 300 knot slipstream. You are not a movie viewer who watches Arnold Schwarzenegger in movie "Erasers" holds on to the outside of a flying jet passenger airplane with his bare hands and believes it. You know that 300 knots of slipstream is twice as much force as any natural force on earth, twice as powerful as the recent hurricane Fran that tore roofs off and leveled houses. And they were sealed up.

You are not the car driver who hears baggage door and thinks car trunk. You know that a forward cargo door of a Boeing 747 is huge, eight feet by nine feet, and when that poorly designed door opens outward into the 300 knot slipstream it gets torn up and away leaving an even larger nine foot by fifteen foot hole in the nose. When the combination of the large hole and forceful air

come together, the nose gets snapped off in an instant.

The picture of UAL 811 with the huge gash in the nose after it landed may be the hook for you, but not for me. For me the connecting event which ties it all together is the .6 second loud sound on the cockpit voice recorders. This is the link inside the links.

It started with the DC-10 cargo door explosive decompression event recorded on tape. That short loud sound matched the short loud sound on the cockpit tape of Air India 182. The short loud sound on the tape of Pan Am 103 and TWA 800 are similar also. The loud sound does not have the short rise time of a bomb explosion. The sound is followed by an abrupt power loss. The sound is explained by acoustic experts as describing a structural breakup or explosive decompression.

Structural breakup or explosive decompression is what happens when the forward cargo door comes off in flight based upon the events of UAL 811.

Once the link of the short sound and abrupt power loss connects AI 182, Pan Am 103, and TWA 800, then the similarities of the consequences match UAL 811 which is a confirmed, explained forward cargo door opening in flight with fodded engines, missing bodies, wreckage patterns, radar blips, and breakup locations.

What else is there, gentlemen, before you start a vigorous investigation? Can you overcome the horror of falling down into the abyss of killing men woman and children by incorrectly giving accident cause of Air India 182, Pan Am 103 and maybe TWA 800 as bombs? Are you afraid of the dominoes falling on you as the cargo door cause ripples out to Boeing, FAA, DOT, the President, NTSB, FBI, and the airlines?

Maybe you are and maybe you shouldn't be. The government system gives you protection to defend you against that fear. The NTSB is an independent board aloof from political influence.

The press is protected by the First Amendment which allows conjecture, speculation, and hypothesizing without fear of censorship.

The two institutions you represent, the press and independent boards, are acting as if the police were standing outside your offices with handcuffs.

And that's why it is always the guy in the converted garage, me, who finds out all this interesting neat stuff first, before the guys who are supposed to find it first and tell all these rest of us about it.

Facts, facts, facts. My hypothesis, which is documented by facts, is never rebutted by facts but by attacking the messenger. Hey, easy target, this messenger is telling you unpleasant truths, not the pleasant lies you are used to. The type of messenger who tells unpleasant truths, me, is not the kind of guy you like and want to be friends with. So what? You're not gonna like me anymore? You never liked me, so what? Cargo doors don't fall in love and they don't read Airworthiness Directives.

I assume you know about AD 88-12-04 ("To Insure That Inadvertent Opening Of The Lower Cargo Door Will Not Occur In Flight,") issued on May 13, 1988? And (AD) ADT 89-05-54 which superseded AD 88-12-04?

Ah, the cargo door, protected by friends in high places, Boeing; convicted of killing nine in UAL 811, suspected as culprit in AI 182, ignored as suspect in Pan Am 103, and idly mentioned in TWA 800 although the villain was on the scene of the crime, as stated by investigators, forward of the wing on the right side, and left first.

The invisible suspect: A great big hunk of malfunctioning piece of aluminum complex mechanical system that happens to be right there at the scenes of destruction of similar model aircraft, forward cargo hold Air India 182, forward cargo hold Pan Am 103, forward cargo hold TWA 800.

Well, let's use the word coverup here as a word to consider. I reject the word. I believe from day one there is no coverup, no plot, and no conspiracy to protect the killer from identification.

The reason the obvious suspect has not been fully investigated is blind self interest by the detectives and fear of their supervisors who definitely do not want the suspect named. The President of the United States, the boss of all of us has stated, "These terrorist acts..." referring to the Olympic village bombing and the crash of TWA 800. He thinks it's not a cargo door. He thinks it's a bomb; who are we to disagree with a person who holds our lives in his hands?

Well, I do. Mr. Clinton is not a pilot, he's not a sound expert, he's never crashed in a plane, he's never stuck his hand out into a fast moving slipstream while flying, and he's not an avionics technician. Well, I am, and I disagree that it was a terrorist act. It was not a bomb or missile or alien. It was the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight. Of course the President does not want a cargo door fault, he's a politician and this cargo door cause is trouble politically. Well, too bad, that's his problem and his job to solve it. My problem is to find out why TWA 800 crashed and I solved it.

You can too. This is how. Go to the website at <http://corazon.com> and review the literature. I've just added about thirty pages from the Canadian and Indian accident report of Air India Flight 182. The documentation for the description of the short sound as explosive decompression and not bomb sound is there on page 23.

Obtain the thick official accident reports from the governments of US, Canada, India, and UK.

<http://www.open.gov.uk/aaib/aaibhome.htm> will lead you to 103.

<http://bst-tsb.gc.ca/english.html> will lead you to 182

<http://www.ntsb.gov/> will lead you to 811

I encourage the NTSB to put technical data of the 800 crash on

the TWA 800 link on the NTSB homepage; things like engine breakdown info, wreckage plot of items found, cvr and fdr tape printouts.

Compare all the many similarities in the reports to all the crashes: loud sound, type model A/C, fod, wreckage, passenger injuries, missing bodies, abrupt power loss, crew activity, destruction datum, and many many more, some trivial and some possibly significant. The crashes of UAL 811, AI 182, PA 103, and TWA 800 are inextricably linked together by many clues and one event, the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight.

Get to where I am on the mental ledge to the peak of understanding these crashes, the door openings are causing the crashes but why do the doors open when they shouldn't? Could be bomb, could be cargo shift, could be transient electronic interference to door motor, could be nine other possibilities and I want to hear more.

Review, investigate, think, write, discuss, conclude, commit. Get to it.

See, gentlemen and lady, if I am wrong, I am the bad person and I'm sorry. If you are wrong, people die, you are the bad persons and sorry doesn't help. You have to prove me wrong. You can not ignore cargo door as possibility. Rule the door out. Prove me wrong. Do not ignore. Respond. Interact. Now. Any questions?

Meeting adjourned until next time.

John Barry Smith, Amateur Sleuth

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Carmel Valley, CA 93924

From: barry@corazon.com

Date: September 29, 1996 10:09:59 PM PDT

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: Cargo door theory waiting in line

Dear Mr. Ron Schleede and Mr. Al Dickinson, John Barry Smith here waiting patiently in line for my theory to be considered as a cause for TWA 800. I've watched as bomb came and went, missile came and went, fuel center tank came and went, and now toying around with unexplained. Is it my turn yet? The cargo door theory? Well, there is no conspiracy, no coverup, no plot to conceal the truth of the cause of TWA 800, it's just a matter of time, of waiting my turn. Is it the cargo door turn yet? Please call me when it is. I know you will leave no stone unturned in your pursuit of the true cause of that crash.

How about pilot error? I personally believe not but it must be considered and ruled out because it is the number one cause of all aircraft accidents. Can a pilot crash a 747? Of course by flying straight down to the ground. Can a pilot crash a 747 and leave the clues left by TWA 800? Radar blips, short loud sound, foddred engine, abrupt power loss, nose torn off, and streak? I say no but let's look. Let's say a pilot jammed full left rudder, pulled the stick all the way aft, gave full right wing down on yoke, and then pulled power all the way back to idle. Plane yaws left, goes nose up, right wing down, stalls, spins, crashes but not in .6 second of loud sound on tape and abrupt power loss on flight data recorder with nothing unusual before that. So, I say that after consideration there is no way a pilot or flight crew member can cause a 747 to destroy itself within the evidence constraints of TWA 800. The cargo door can.

The mechanical malfunction that you have been saying for two months is the right answer. You have the right answer. Cargo door. Pictures on web site www.corazon.com from your report, NTSB on UAL 811 show it all.

Let the cargo door have its turn in the spotlight. Offer it up for consideration as a plausible mechanical explanation for TWA 800.

I have been reading about another theorist about the cause and he said he had a vicious exchange with NTSB investigators. Well, that's not right. I was wrong also. I couldn't help it. If you believed you knew the cause of airplane crashes and the cause was still there and could happen any minute, then you would be impatient too.

So, I am patient, is it cargo door turn yet?

FBI said bomb, you said maybe mechanical and you are right. You have always been right. It is mechanical and specifically, the door closing and opening mechanism on the forward cargo door.

I await the cargo door turn for investigation. Sincerely, John Barry Smith

From: barry@corazon.com

Date: October 3, 1996 5:49:18 PM PDT

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: Accident investigator Gorelick

What is going on here? The Justice Department is now making decisions about TWA 800? And she's right! How about a nine foot by 15 foot hole could cause a crash...and did...when the forward cargo door opened in flight. Is the cargo door turn yet to be investigated? Is bomb done, and missile done, and unexplained done, and center fuel tank done? Time for the obvious yet?

John Barry Smith

WASHINGTON (Reuter) - Investigators may dredge the Atlantic Ocean floor for more wreckage of TWA Flight 800 in an effort to learn what caused the plane to crash, U.S. Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick said Thursday.

"We are considering dredging," she told the weekly Justice Department news conference when asked about the investigation into the July 17 explosion of the Paris-bound jetliner shortly after takeoff from Kennedy International Airport.

"Even a small hole in the plane could cause the crash...and it is for that reason that recovery of as much of the plane -- wreckage -- as possible is necessary," Gorelick said. She added that it could be an eight-inch or 10-inch hole.

From: barry@corazon.com
Date: October 4, 1996 10:44:40 PM PDT
To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
Subject: **Figured out something**

I just figured out your reluctance to use UAL 811 as a model for TWA 800. I've been reviewing the original AAR and the revised one. Ah, the first one had the wrong probable cause of improper latching and the second, after door recovered, had the electrical malfunction cause.

So, to bring up 811 again would focus attention of NTSB error on AAR.

But, to me that shows the integrity of NTSB, to get to the bottom of the cause and correct a mistake.

The Safety Board conducts an accident investigation in a public environment. For a major accident, press briefings are held on scene in the days immediately following the accident. A public docket containing factual information about the accident is available within a few months. Usually within a year, the Board Members will review a draft of the accident report in a public meeting at Safety Board headquarters in Washington, D.C. Soon after the meeting, the Board's Public Affairs Office issues an abstract containing the Board's conclusions, probable cause statement, and safety recommendations from the accident report. The final report of a major accident is subsequently printed for public distribution.

Looking forward to public meeting and public docket. Isn't it time for the cargo door theory to have equal time with the bomb, missile and center fuel tank theories? Waiting for my turn, John Barry Smith

From: barry@corazon.com
Date: October 13, 1996 9:15:47 AM PDT
To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
Subject: AD steel rods

Please examine cargo door for steel rods to confirm AD 88-12-04 complied with on TWA 800.

Please examine cargo door for status of cam latches, unlocked or locked.

Please examine cargo door lock sectors, unlocked or locked.

Please note condition of cargo door, in how many pieces.

Please note position of cargo door when found, close to event site or far away.

John Barry Smith

From: barry@corazon.com

Date: October 16, 1996 9:38:28 AM PDT

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: balloon popping, public docket, cargo door

Mr. Schleede, a hole is cut in a balloon. A patch is put on the hole in balloon. The balloon is blown up and deflated 20000 times. The next time the balloon pops. The site of the popping is at the patch. The patch has trouble before. The patch is not examined? The patch is not examined closely? An experienced balloon investigator would go right to the patch as the cause of the popping and rule it in or out. And check out previous balloon poppings.

Please examine forward cargo door for steel rods to confirm AD 88-12-04 complied with on TWA 800.

Please examine cargo door for status of cam latches, unlocked or locked.

Please examine cargo door lock sectors, unlocked or locked.

Please note condition of cargo door, in how many pieces and if skin attached to it.

Please note position of cargo door when found, close to event site or far away.

John Barry Smith

When will the public docket be available?

The following was emailed to me.

Yesterday, Tuesday

At Boeing Commercial Aircraft, The 747 engineering team discounted any

possibility of a center or other fuel tank problems as a failure site for TWA:800..

From: barry@corazon.com
Date: October 29, 1996 7:57:05 PM PST
To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
Subject: One Consistent Theory, Cargo Door

From day one, July 18th, one crash cause theory has been consistently correct, inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight. It fits all the evidence as it becomes available during the investigation.

1. Radar anomaly just before destruction...cargo door spinning away within primary radar range.
2. Streak...cargo door spinning away at dusk at 13700 feet.
3. Short loud sound on CVR, explosive decompression sound matches PA 103, which matches AI 182 which matches DC-10 cargo door explosive decompression on CVR.
4. Abrupt power loss on FDR indicating nose separating instantly which would occur when nine foot by 15 foot gash is exposed when cargo door rips away and allows 300 knot slipstream to enter.
5. At least nine missing bodies sitting in same general area above and aft of cargo door which indicates bodies swept out and into jet engines vaporizing bodies which can't be found even after extensive, lengthy, and comprehensive searches.
6. Fodded engine number three when cargo door opens and jet sucks in contents.
7. Two wreckage trails, one of nose and the other of rest of aircraft which indicates nose came off first when decapitated by 300 knot slipstream into gash.

8. More severe flying object damage on right side of aircraft, the cargo door side.

9. Locus of destruction above and forward of the wing on the right side, exactly where the hole appears when cargo door rips away.

10. Fire in center tank after nose separates and rest of severed fuselage and disintegrating wing fall into ball of fuel vapor and spinning jet engines.

Gentleman, Dr. Bernard Loeb, Mr. Alfred W. Dickinson, Mr. Ron Schleede, let me use this use of cyberspace to address you directly. TWA 800 is a tree in a forest of four; TWA 800, AI 182, PA 103, and UAL 811. Lift your gaze up from TWA 800 to the other crashes.

How many Boeing 747s have ever crashed and left a short loud sound on the CVR? Four. AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800.

How many Boeing 747s have crashed, left a short loud sound on the CVR and then had an abrupt power loss? Four. AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800.

How many Boeing 747s have crashed, left a short loud sound on the CVR, had an abrupt power loss, and have at least nine never recovered bodies? Four. AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800.

How many Boeing 747s have crashed, left a short loud sound on the CVR, had an abrupt power loss, had at least nine never recovered bodies, had high flight time airframe, foddeng engines, and outward opening cargo doors with four Airworthiness Directives? Four. AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800.

How many Boeing 747s have totally destructed, left a short loud sound on the CVR, had an abrupt power loss, had at least nine never recovered bodies, had high flight time airframe, foddeng engines, outward opening cargo doors, and left two wreckage trails? Three. AI 182, PA 103, and TWA 800.

AI 182, PA 103, and TWA 800 are three similar trees in the forest of crashed and destroyed Boeing 747s. They have the same cause.

The cargo door must be thoroughly investigated as the cause since it is known to be defective, was at the scene of destruction, and when it malfunctions can cause the total destruction event.

When the cause is determined to be the cargo door the credit for the discovery can go to the experts in AI 182 investigation in 1985 who suggested the loud sound on the CVR matches the decompression of the DC-10 and the sound would occur in an explosive decompression such as an opening forward cargo door. The cargo door idea existed in 1985 in the official report of AI 182. The expert was right then and I am right now and you can be right tomorrow.

You have said, and I have said, since day one this TWA crash cause could be mechanical. We are right. Now that the sabotage and accidental shooting have been ruled out, the mechanical takes center stage. Yes there was a fire, but after the event of door opening which occurred after the initial event of...ah, the mystery to be solved...why the doors are opening inadvertently. UAL 811 has several possible reasons, one of which is electrical short. Many questions are raised on the issue though, why and when does the door become unlocked? There is a sticky issue and worthy of the best aircraft investigators in the world, far above my humble observations.

So, as a 35 year aviation professional, a jet crash survivor, and an informed member of the public answering a call for help made by the authorities, I, John Barry Smith, urge you gentlemen, Dr. Bernard Loeb, Director, Office of Aviation Safety, NTSB; Mr. Alfred W. Dickinson, lead investigator-TWA 800; Mr. Ron Schleede, investigator-TWA 800; check out the forward cargo door.

John Barry Smith

From: barry@corazon.com
Date: October 30, 1996 5:52:49 PM PST
To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
Subject: **Now try cargo door theory**

Flight 800 Fuel Probe Shows No
Sign of Sparks
7:55pm EST, 10/30/96

NEW YORK - Tests on two sections of fuel probes
from TWA
Flight 800 that might have provided clues to why
the plane
crashed in July revealed no signs of mechanical
failure,
investigators said Wednesday.

The two sections showed no evidence of electrical
arcing, or
sparking, which would have indicated a power
surge in the Boeing
747's center fuel tank.

Mr. Schleede, now will you try out the cargo door theory? No
bomb, no missile, no ignition source for initial fire event, now to
alternative mechanical problem, inadvertent opening of forward
cargo door in flight. John Barry Smith

From: barry@corazon.com
Date: November 1, 1996 7:34:08 AM PST
To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: clues and money

WASHINGTON, Oct. 31 (UPI) _ Investigators are searching (Thursday) for new promising clues to what destroyed TWA Flight 800 after two fuel probes showed no signs of having caused the deadly explosion that killed 230 people. The probes, which carry a tiny electrical current, had been considered a possible source of a spark that could have caused the 747's center fuel tank to blow up.

Yes, Mr. Schleede, new clues. New clues match old clues in other Boeing 747 accidents, CVR, FDR, missing bodies, inflight damage, destruction start location, fodded engines, missing bodies, and unlocked cam sectors, and are the same for the crashes. Same everything. New clues can be found in the official accident reports of Air India 182, Pan Am 103, UAL 811 which are on my web site and available for review at a click. The new clues are there.

The sudden loud sound on the CVR of a DC-10 explosive decompression is matched to Air India 182 which is matched to Pan Am 103 which is matched to TWA 800. The clues and links are there to show the cause of the crashes was the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight.

Now is the time to investigate the cargo door as initial cause.

Ê Ê Ê SMITHTOWN, N.Y. Ñ The cost of the TWA Flight 800 investigation has ballooned to \$23.9 million, four times the amount Congress set aside for the non-criminal side of the probe, according to documents and sources.

Mr. Schleede, instead of blowing up a plane, take just the cargo doors and throw them out of a C-130 at 13700 feet at the same sun angle as July 17th at same location and observe streak as door spins away in the setting orange sun. Also observe on radar

as spinning door gives strange radar anomaly return on scopes. Time to get to square one and do research. Compare official government safety agency reports of AI 182, Pan Am 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800 all side by side and note similarities of CVR, FDR, FOD, damage start location, missing bodies and seating, and inflight damage sequence on right side, the cargo door side. Time for a scholarly approach to solving mystery. My web site has charts with all similarities shown. It is remarkable, either they were all brought down by bombs, center tank fires, or cargo doors but it is one cause for all four.

A forward cargo door investigation can be justified to save money as cheaper to check out and it is reasonable to investigate a previously malfunctioning complex mechanical object close to scene of destruction.

As you reconstruct the fuselage you will see the similarities of the skin tearing to Pan Am 103 and AI 182 and UAL 811. You will solve the TWA mystery and two others at the same time. Big mysteries have big solutions. Forward cargo door. John Barry Smith

From: barry@corazon.com

Date: November 2, 1996 10:23:03 PM PST

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: Garage Door, Cargo Door in the Lineup

Amendment to suggestion to take a couple of cargo doors and toss them out of C-130 at same sun angle as July 17th near NYC...add another seven feet of metal to door to approximate the nine foot by 15 foot piece of metal of door and fuselage skin that tears off when door opens. The size of the object that created the streak is the same size as hole in side of 811, a double car garage door. In fact, take a double car garage door, bend it a little, paint it white and silver, then throw it out of a C-130 going as fast as it

can to get to close to 300 knots and watch streak appear. Then have ground radar pick up double car garage door as it goes out of C-130 and spins to ocean. Both visual and radar returns will be seen from that double car garage door as it falls from 13700 feet at sun angle of July 17th, 8:35PM off East Moriches.

Dr. Loeb, I appeal to your respect for education and research. I have an advanced degree from a university. I was an Air Intelligence Officer in the Navy. I have done a study of studies and extracted similarities, made conclusions and produced my own study, it's called the cargo door website. The studies were the official accident reports of AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and my own blazing jet crash, BUNO 149314 and all are on the website.

Although I do not have hands on experience with the actual evidence of the TWA crash, I can deduce the evidence as it was being discovered based upon the documented sequence of Air India 182, Pan Am 103, and UAL 811 described in the studies. I can deduce that the floor beams above the cargo door of TWA 800 will be bent down. I can induce that the accident will happen again to another early model high time Boeing 747 when the door pops again.

Four crashes with similarities and one is explained. Moderately damaged UAL 811 was the one almost destroyed plane that made it back to tell what happened. The other three total destruction crashes have matches on all the important parameters, CVR, FDR, FOD, missing bodies, damage start location, destruction sequence, and other clues. All four have the same reproducible mechanical cause.

To put it another way, how many Boeing 747 crashes have ever ended with a short loud sound? Four. That match puts the four airplanes in a group. How many Boeing 747 crashes have abrupt power cut? Four, and it's the same four so the group is tight. Then add the similarities of foddled engines, damage location start at forward cargo hold, more severe inflight damage on right

side, at least nine missing bodies, radar blips at time of destruction, and the four crashes of the same type aircraft are inextricably linked together like cookies from a tin pattern. The name of the pattern is inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight. The cookies are UAL 811, AI 182, PA 103, and TWA 800.

It's the cargo door theory's turn for TWA 800. The fringe thinkers had friendly missile fire theory. It was an entertaining story based on true streak observation. It was investigated and discounted from lack of evidence, I believe. The FBI had bomb theory and that was based on the true fact there was an explosion, an explosive decompression which mimics a bomb. That theory has been discounted, I believe from lack of evidence. The NTSB had center tank fire which is true, there was a fire after disintegrating fuselage and wing mixed fuel and hot jet engines. The fire as initial event is discounted, I believe from lack of evidence.

Now is the time to investigate another reasonable cause theory, with evidence, the mechanical problem theory of inadvertent opening cargo door in flight leading to large gash in nose the size of double car garage door allowing twice hurricane force winds to enter and tear off weakened nose in a second leaving evidence of visual streak, radar blips, FOD, sudden loud sound on tape, abrupt power cut to FDR, same missing bodies in general same seating, same inflight damage to right side of aircraft in leading edges of wing and horizontal stabilizer, damage start location of forward cargo hold in front of the wing on the right side, and it's happened before. It's no weird coincidence that four airplanes have same destruction evidence, they had the same cause, cargo door. The cargo door theory has corroborative evidence of real things that can be touched, listened to, and felt.

Mr. Dickinson, I appeal to your respect for hands on evidence. Pick up the pieces of the forward cargo door of TWA 800, do

they have the steel lock sectors to replace the aluminum as per AD 88-12-04? Are the cam sectors in the locked or unlocked position? Are the lock sectors and cam sectors worn or gouged? What is the condition of the manual locking handle? Is there any frayed wiring around the motor actuators? What are the computer simulations of 300 knot wind entering nine foot by 15 foot hole in side of weakened nose of 747 with 93000 hours on airframe? What would a large metal sheet look like being ejected from an aircraft at 13700 feet at dusk to observers on the ground? Would radar pick it up? Are the floor beams bent down just above the cargo door?

You are lead investigator on TWA 800, do you call the shots on the direction the investigation takes? I suggest the cargo door direction to ensure a complete investigation to leave no stone unturned, no door unopened, no avenue unexplored...

Mr. Schleede, fortunately you were the lead investigator on UAL 811 and can offer confirmation of matches of evidence to TWA 800. Does the sudden loud sound on CVR of 811 match sudden loud sound TWA 800? Does the engine breakdown of FOD in engines 3 and 4 match 811? Why the same missing bodies in same general seating of 811 and 800? Is the inflight damage sequence of 800 the same as 811 damage to leading edges, root fillet, flaps, and tail?

Gentlemen, an inflight structural breakup of a pressurized aircraft hull has occurred and the locus of destruction is near a hole cut in the hull and patched with a door. The patch failed.

The British Comets had a pressurized hull with cut holes that disintegrated at passenger windows. The patch failed. Meet the new boss, same as the old boss, hole cut in pressurized hull that failed to plug, outward opening forward cargo door on high time early Boeing 747 that opened when it shouldn't.

The real mystery right now is why the doors are opening. It's happened, in my opinion, six times in eleven years, 1985, 1987,

1988, 1989, 1991, 1996. The events just listed are all documented on my web site which is a study of those events based upon studies by government safety boards and quotations of safety board members to the reputable press.

Cargo door's time in the investigative spotlight; put cargo door in the lineup. Let's see if truth picks it. John Barry Smith

From: barry@corazon.com

Date: November 16, 1996 8:16:18 AM PST

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: TWA 800 mechanical cause analysis, door versus fire

Dear Mr. Ron Schleede, please consider the following analysis...
Friday, 15 November, 1996

Crash of TWA 800: Analysis of two possible causes.

Not a bomb.

Not a missile, friendly or enemy.

Not a meteor/space debris.

Not pilot or other crew error.

Not environment/weather factors.

Not air traffic control.

Not other aircraft/midair.

What else is there?

Mechanical/equipment failure.

What failed?

What is the evidence?

Yes, aircraft was in climb.

Yes, visual streak observed at event.

Yes, primary radar return recorded just before event.

Yes, secondary radar return disappeared abruptly.

Yes, sudden loud sound heard on cockpit voice recorder, CVR.

Yes, abrupt power cut to flight data recorder, FDR.

Yes, fifteen never recovered bodies after extensive search.

Yes, nose separated from rest of aircraft.

Yes, one or more engines exhibited foreign object damage, FOD.

Yes, fireball observed.

Yes, center fuel tank exploded.

Yes, explosive damage on wreckage.

Yes, two main wreckage trails.

Yes, nose wreckage was closer to event than rest of aircraft wreckage.

Yes, breakup started at forward part of fuselage, over or just in front of wing.

Yes, aircraft was high time/high cycles Boeing 747-131.

Yes, 230 people died.

What initial mechanical/equipment failure caused the crash and still satisfies the evidence?

There are only two; center fuel tank explosion and inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door. Which is more likely? Let us examine them side by side.

Climb: Fuel tank contents were same as takeoff, climb should have no effect on explosion. Or: Climb is pressure changing mode of flight and might assist in popping cargo door.

Streak: Fuel streaming out of wing and somehow catching fire leading to explosion. Or: Shiny metal cargo door with white fuselage skin attached spinning away at orange dusk on clear summer night at 13700 feet.

Radar blip anomaly just before event: Tank fire doesn't fit. Or: Large metal cargo door with fuselage skin attached spinning away at 13700 feet close to ground radar site.

Secondary radar return disappeared abruptly. Center fuel tank exploded and cut off power to transponder. Or: Cargo door opened and with fuselage skin tore away and allowed 300 knot wind to enter gash on right side which tore off nose severing

power to main equipment compartment housing transponder.

Sudden loud sound on CVR. Tank explodes and sound is recorded on cockpit voice recorder before power is severed. Or: Cargo door with fuselage skin tore away causing explosive decompression loud sound to be recorded on cockpit voice recorder before power is severed.

Abrupt power cut to flight data recorder. Center fuel tank exploded and cut off power to FDR. Cargo door with fuselage skin tore away and allowed 300 knot wind to enter gash on right side which tore off nose severing power to main equipment compartment housing FDR.

Fifteen never recovered bodies: Center tank explosion cremated passengers sitting in explosion area. Or: Cargo door and fuselage skin tore away exposing passengers who were ejected in decompression and sucked into number 3 jet engine and cremated.

Nose separated from rest of aircraft: Center tank explosion cuts fuselage in two just forward of the wing. Or: Cargo door with fuselage skin tore away and allowed 300 knot wind to enter gash on right side which tore off nose just forward of the wing.

One or more engines foreign object damage. Center tank explosion ejects debris into running engines. Or: Cargo door tore away exposing baggage compartment which explosive decompression ejects material into engines.

Center fuel tank exploded into fireball. Center tank explodes from unknown ignition source. Or: Cargo door with fuselage skin tore away and allowed 300 knot wind to enter gash on right side which tore off nose allowing rest of wing and fuselage to fall and disintegrate into mass of fuel vapor and spinning jet engines which exploded.

Explosive damage on wreckage. Center tank explodes. Or: Cargo door with fuselage skin tore away allowing explosive decompression to occur in passenger compartment and cargo

hold which mimics explosion.

Two main wreckage trails. Center tank explodes, severs nose which falls into tight wreckage pattern and rest of aircraft disintegrates into a larger wreckage trail. Or: Cargo door with fuselage skin tore away and allowed 300 knot wind to enter gash on right side which tore off nose which fell into tight wreckage trail and rest of aircraft fell and disintegrated into larger wreckage trail.

Nose wreckage was closer to event than rest of aircraft wreckage. Center tank explodes, severs nose which falls into tight wreckage pattern and rest of aircraft disintegrates into a larger wreckage trail. Or: Cargo door with fuselage skin tore away and allowed 300 knot wind to enter gash on right side which tore off nose which fell into tight wreckage trail and rest of aircraft fell and disintegrated into larger wreckage trail.

Breakup started at forward part of fuselage, over on just in front of wing. Center tank near forward part of wing explodes. Or: Cargo door and fuselage skin tears away just forward of the wing.

Aircraft was high time/cycles Boeing 747-131.

Two hundred thirty people died.

So, two theories exist which explain much of the evidence. Here is why the cargo door theory is more credible than the center tank explosion theory.

Mechanical/equipment failure. Both are mechanical/equipment failure, Center tank has yet to be discovered essential ignition source which isn't supposed to be ignition source while cargo door is a complicated, previously known to fail and kill, mechanical system with four airworthiness directives against it. Cargo door more likely failure.

Streak at event. Metal door with metal skin spinning away could be reflected orange dusk light and appear as streak. Time of year, altitude, clear night, sun angle, and type of object all fit streak as

spinning door. Tank fire with streaming fuel on fire is less likely. Cargo door more likely streak.

Primary radar return before event. Metal door with metal skin spinning away could be primary radar return recorded on nearby ground radar. Center tank would not give return. Cargo door more likely radar return.

Secondary radar return disappeared abruptly. Center tank explosion and nose separating when nine foot by 15 foot gash appears allowing 300 knot wind to enter and tear off nose would both cause abrupt secondary radar return to disappear. Tie.

Sudden loud sound on CVR. Center tank explosion and cargo door would both give sudden loud sound on CVR. Tie until sound matched to fuel tank explosion or explosive decompression.

Abrupt power cut to FDR. Center tank explosion and cargo door causing nose separation would both cause abrupt to FDR. Tie.

Fifteen missing bodies. Center tank explosion and cargo door would both cause missing never to be recovered bodies. Tie.

Nose separated from rest of aircraft. Center tank explosion would cause nose to separate. Cargo door with fuselage skin tore away and allowed 300 knot wind to enter gash on right side which tore off nose just forward of the wing. Tie.

One or more engines foreign object damage. Center tank explosion and cargo door opening would both cause engines to be foddled. Tie.

Fireball. Center tank explosion and cargo door opening leading to fuselage disintegration would both cause fireball. Tie.

Center fuel tank exploded. Center tank explosion and cargo door would both cause center tank to explode. Tie.

Explosive damage on wreckage. Center tank explosion and cargo door opening would both cause explosive type damage on wreckage. Tie unless no fire explosive damage found on nose section.

Two main wreckage trails. Center tank explosion and cargo door opening would both cause two main wreckage trails. Tie.

Nose wreckage was closer to event than rest of aircraft wreckage. Center tank explosion and cargo door would both cause nose wreckage to be closer to rest of aircraft wreckage. Tie.

Aircraft was high time/cycles Boeing 747-131. Center tank fire and cargo door more likely on aging aircraft. Tie.

Breakup started at forward part of fuselage, over on just in front of wing. Center tank explosion and cargo door opening would cause breakup at forward part of fuselage. Tie unless breakup is traced to above and forward of the wing on the right side, nearer to the cargo door.

Yes, 230 people died. Center tank explosion and cargo door could both cause the deaths of all passengers. Tie.

Many of the evidence explanations are ties, a few go to cargo door and none alone go to center tank fire. Cargo door theory is more likely.

Additional statements to support cargo door theory.

A structural breakup of a Boeing 747 which is disintegrating in flight can catch fire into a fireball as shown by the Saudi Arabian Airlines Boeing 747 involved in a midair over India. The initial event was not a center tank fire and yet there was fireball.

Eyewitness pilot saw the fireball of TWA 800 and stated altitude of fireball was 7500 feet, initial event for TWA 800 was at 13700 feet. Center tank fire was secondary event.

Foreign object damage can be cowling material or baggage or human material.

Explosive decompression produces loud sound and mimics a bomb for pressure damage on seats and baggage.

NTSB computer simulation traced inflight breakup of TWA 800 to above and forward of the wing on the right side, exactly where the hole is formed when the cargo door tears away with fuselage

skin.

Cargo doors opening in flight are more common than inflight fuel tank explosions.

A cargo door accident exists, UAL 811, with much evidence which matches TWA 800. Two other Boeing 747 crashes exist with much evidence which matches TWA 800 and UAL 811, none of which was caused by a center tank fire.

Tank fire accident of Iranian Boeing 747 exists which does not match TWA 800 in wreckage pattern, left wing alone, or extreme weather and lightning.

A Boeing 737 tank fire on the ground does match a Boeing 747 in flight.

Cargo door theory includes center tank explosion.

Additional statement to support center tank explosion. It happened, there was a center tank explosion.

Forward cargo door theory can be proved or disproved easily by examination, experiment and observation:

1. examine forward cargo door for steel rods to confirm AD 88-12-04 complied with on TWA 800.
2. examine cargo door for status of cam latches, unlocked or locked.
3. examine cargo door lock sectors, unlocked or locked.
4. examine cargo door lock sectors and cam sectors for wear and gouging.
5. examine cargo door manual locking bar for locking position.
6. examine all door electrical switches for proper operation.
7. check maintenance history of TWA 800 for previous cargo door problems.
8. note condition of cargo door, in how many pieces to match UAL 811.
9. note position of cargo door when found, close to event site or far away indicating time it left aircraft.
9. detect frayed wiring in door control system.

10. examine direction of buckled floor beams, up or down indicating decompression or explosion.
11. match TWA 800 evidence with other similar crashes leaving similar evidence.
12. check for presence or non presence of evidence of fire/ explosion on separated nose.
13. match sudden on loud sound on CVR to sound library of in flight aircraft explosions and decompressions.
14. match abrupt end of tape signals on FDR to two other abrupt end of tape Boeing 747 crashes.
15. confirm by computer simulation that 300 knot wind blowing into nine foot by 15 foot hole in right side of weakened nose will tear nose off in an second.
16. examine wreckage for more severe in flight debris damage on right side of aircraft to include wing fillet, leading edges of wing and horizontal stabilizer and vertical stabilizer, engine cowls and pylons.

A low cost experiment to reproduce the streak and radar anomaly is to take several two car garage doors painted silver and white and push them out the back of a C-130 going as fast as it can at 13700 feet on clear evening with same sun angle as July 17th near New York and look for streak and radar primary return. They will be there, two mysteries explained at reasonable cost.

Analogies:

1. A hole is cut in a balloon. A patch is put on the hole in balloon. The balloon is blown up and deflated 20000 times. The next inflation the balloon pops. The site of the popping is at the patch. The patch has failed before. The patch is a likely cause of the balloon popping.
2. A soda can has a semi cut hole in the top to drink out of. The can is the pressurized hull and quite strong. The semi cut hole can not be opened by pressing on it with fingers. But once the semi cut hole/door seal is broken by pressing on the hole with the

metal tab using leverage, the soda fluid/debris escapes in the explosive decompression and flies into face/engines. Now the semi cut hole can easily be pressed down further with little force from finger because the structural integrity of the soda can/hull has been cracked.

Now is the time to investigate another reasonable mechanical cause theory, with evidence, the real possibility of inadvertent opening cargo door in flight. This event leads to a large gash in nose the size of double car garage door allowing twice hurricane force winds to enter and tear off weakened nose in a second leaving evidence of visual streak, radar blips, FOD, sudden loud sound on tape, abrupt power cut to FDR, same missing bodies in general same seating, damage start location of forward cargo hold in front of the wing on the right side, wreckage trails, and it happened to TWA Flight 800, it happened before to UAL Flight 811, and it will happen again.

Disregard the demeanor of the discoverer/messenger, examine the message of cargo door, and exploit the medium of internet to email barry@corazon.com and study cargo door web site at www.corazon.com. Sincerely, John Barry Smith

From: barry@corazon.com

Date: November 30, 1996 8:06:59 AM PST

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: Safety responsibility

Mr. Schleede, an important mission may fail because a door did not do what it was supposed to do; just like cargo doors which are supposed to stay closed but don't. An inadvertent opening cargo door is not a science fiction/weirdo explanation for an explosive decompression on a 747. It happens all the time.

Every fire fighter has to respond to a 'fire' call even though that firefighter may believe it is a false alarm. He can not ignore the

'fire' call because it is his duty, regardless of his personal feelings.

I contend that the person assigned to the NTSB (S means Safety) must respond to a call of "Danger" even though he may believe it is a false alarm.

I report to you that there is 'danger' in high time Boeing 747s in which the forward cargo door may open. As evidence of the event happening in the past I refer to AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800. (Documentation on web site www.corazon.com)

Deductions from those crashes lead to the conclusion that TWA 800 had an inadvertently opened cargo door. Inductions from those crashes lead to the conclusion that it can happen again to other similar high time Boeing 747s, approximately 650 now flying.

I urge you, as I would urge a firefighter to check out a fire that I believe was caused by an event and may cause another fire until fixed, to check out the crash of TWA 800 being caused by an inadvertently opened forward cargo door that may cause other Boeing 747s to crash until fixed.

The cargo door did what it was not supposed to do, just like the Columbia space Shuttle mission now flying overhead with its malfunctioning door. High time spacecraft=malfunctioning door; high time 747=malfunctioning door.

CAPE CANAVERAL, Fla. - NASA officials are due to meet Saturday morning to discuss a jammed hatch on Columbia that

has kept astronauts leaving the shuttle for planned space walks.> The most likely explanation was that two of the six latches on

the door were misaligned, Bantle said at a news conference

Friday. The latches could be out of adjustment by as little as one-20,000th of an inch.

Forward cargo door theory can be proved or disproved easily by examination, experiment and observation:

1. examine forward cargo door for steel rods to confirm AD 88-12-04 complied with on TWA 800.
2. examine cargo door for status of cam latches, unlocked or locked.
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5. examine cargo door manual locking bar for locking position.
6. examine all door electrical switches for proper operation.
7. check maintenance history of TWA 800 for previous cargo door problems.
8. note condition of cargo door, in how many pieces to match UAL 811.
9. note position of cargo door when found, close to event site or far away indicating time it left aircraft.
9. detect frayed wiring in door control system.
10. examine direction of buckled floor beams, up or down indicating decompression or explosion.
11. match TWA 800 evidence with other similar crashes leaving similar evidence.
12. check for presence or non presence of evidence of fire/explosion on separated nose.
13. match sudden on loud sound on CVR to sound library of in flight aircraft explosions and decompressions.
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15. confirm by computer simulation that 300 knot wind blowing into nine foot by 15 foot hole in right side of weakened nose will

tear nose of in an second.

16. examine wreckage for more severe in flight debris damage on right side of aircraft to include wing fillet, leading edges of wing and horizontal stabilizer and vertical stabilizer, engine cowls and pylons.

A low cost experiment to reproduce the streak and radar anomaly is to take several two car garage doors painted silver and white and push them out the back of a C-130 going as fast as it can at 13700 feet on clear evening with same sun angle as July 17th near New York and look for streak and radar primary return. They will be there, two mysteries explained at reasonable cost. If I should not send my inquiries from the public, that's me, to you, NTSB investigator, who should I send them to?

Sincerely, John Barry Smith

From: barry@corazon.com

Date: December 18, 1996 10:44:52 AM PST

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov

Subject: Safety responsibility

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anomaly is to take several two car garage doors painted silver and white and push them out the back of a C-130 going as fast as it can at 13700 feet on clear evening with same sun angle as July 17th near New York and look for streak and radar primary return. They will be there, two mysteries explained at reasonable cost. If I should not send my inquiries from the public, that's me, to you, NTSB investigator, who should I send them to?
Sincerely, John Barry Smith

From: barry@corazon.com
Date: December 30, 1996 6:53:30 PM PST
To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
Subject: **Six months ago**

Mr. Schleede, loved you on TV, the Crash Detectives.
Six months ago you sent me this email, thank you very much.

From: Schleede Ron <SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov>
To: barry <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: RE: TWA crash cause ATTN Robert Francis
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 1996 15:24:00 -0400
Encoding: 17 TEXT
Status:

Be assured that we are checking that. I was the investigator in charge of the UAL flight 811 case and fully knowledgeable in its causes and factors.

Thanks for the interest.

From: barry

To: schledr

Subject: TWA crash cause ATTN Robert Francis

Date: Sunday, July 28, 1996 9:58AM

Mr. Francis. The reasonable cause of the TWA crash is the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door. That is the mechanical cause that must be ruled out. Compare to United Flight 811 of Feb 1989.

Mr. Schleede, it's almost New Year's and I'm reflecting on the past six months. Ah, the mystery of TWA 800. So early in the crash aftermath, 29 July, less than two weeks after crash, you had the answer. The answer is still there, waiting to be used. Forward cargo door in flight. Streak, the door, radar anomaly the door, the noise the decompression whooshing, etc etc etc and so on and so forth. All supporting documents for door explanation are on web site www.corazon.com.

But, don't commit on center tank fire too soon. There was a fire but later, the initial event was door opening just a little bit and getting torn away...

Look at the similarities to UAL 811. That report is the model for TWA 800, I hope. The UAL 811 is a well written report with valid conclusions based on the evidence at hand. A defective 811 door was thousands of feet deep. The TWA 800 door is close by. See if it matches the 811 door with the cam sectors unlocked and the lock sectors locked. A picture of the defective door in two pieces is on the web site under the UAL 811 crash link.

Please, Mr. Schleede, just to be complete and leave no stone unturned, evaluate and investigate the plausible, reasonable mechanical cause explanation of TWA 800 as inadvertent opening of forward cargo door in flight. Sincerely, John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: March 11, 1997 9:32:19 PM PST
To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
Subject: Doing prosecution, not investigation.

Reconstruct more fuselage. The initial reports had trouble from forward cargo area. Pan Am 103 reconstructed forward fuselage. You are reconstructing center tank area to prove it blew up. It did blow up. Reconstruct forward fuselage to see match in Pan Am 103 forward area reconstruction picture and to match the picture of UAL 811 after it returned with big hole in side after cargo door blew off. A prosecution of center tank explosion would only do the center tank area, an investigation would do both, the center tank area and the forward cargo area.

Cargo door explains this persistent streak observation which a center tank explosion does not explain. Door streaking away in sunset light.

Plus many others.

Main thing, do reconstruction of forward fuselage, please. To not do so would be an oversight and cause the report to be labelled, 'incomplete.'

Timeline problems with center tank explosion are also solved by cargo door tearing up and away.

Communicate with me, I'm talking facts, I'm helping, I'm not a bomb or missile guy but a mechanical cause guy, same as you. Mechanical cause. We agree.

John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: March 14, 1997 10:35:42 AM PST
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: Radar blip is door, just like radar blip for UAL 811.

Mr. Schleede, radar blip is door, not missile, not bomb, not center tank fire, but real primary radar and real blip and real metal cargo door that has been picked up on radar before for the DC 10 door, the UAL 811 door, the Pan Am 103 door as green diamond, and now the TWA 800 door.

There is now confirmed radar evidence of the cargo door departing in flight from TWA 800.

There is a match between the primary radar images of Pan Am 103 and TWA 800 just before the total catastrophic destruction of both. At the same time and distance aft and before destruction of Pan Am 103, a radar blip was picked up by two ground radars for one sweep and displayed on a drawing in the UK report as a green diamond. At the same time and distance aft and just before the destruction of TWA 800 ground radars picked up a primary return which then also disappeared. The radar plots of 103 and 800 match on time and size of reflected primary radar energy on a target just behind those airliners which shortly came apart in the air.

It is not a missile.

The blip is the forward cargo door spinning away probably with fuselage skin attached, just like UAL 811 which tracked that radar blip to the ocean where the door was retrieved. The UAL 811 radar images will match the TWA 800 and Pan Am 103 images. Air India was too far away for a primary radar image when it destructed in mid-air. The door appears almost stationary to the radar because it is decelerating and falling.

The streak is the sun's reflected energy on the metal door and skin as it peels erratically away in the sunset and observed by viewers looking east up high. The reflected flash of sunlight has been videotaped as a Boeing 747 flew by overhead with same sun angle as TWA 800 to streak observers.

The forward cargo door was seen by primary radar and human eyes as it departed TWA 800. It left first of all the pieces to go, and landed closest to the takeoff point. The door has failed before. The effect of departing caused an explosive decompression which was recorded on the cockpit voice recorder as a sudden loud sound just before an abrupt power cut. The cut occurred when the nose separated from the rest of the body by the force of the 300 knot slipstream crumpling the nose into the cargo door hole caused crease.

I say again: There is a match between the primary radar images of Pan Am 103 and TWA 800 just before the total catastrophic destruction of both. The culprit's fingerprint matched at two crimes. The cause of the crashes is the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight.

I urge you, investigate and rule in or rule out the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight as the cause of the crash of TWA 800.

I am unable to attach images to government emails. Images are on web site www.corazon.com under TWA 800. Other recipients received images attached as .jpg file. One image is the TWA 800 image showing primary radar blip picked up several times for many seconds behind the airliners circled in green. The other image is of Pan Am 103 drawing of the radar plots in a sequence. The third image is a scan of text from the Pan Am 103 UK report about that green diamond radar blip.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: March 18, 1997 8:09:49 AM PST

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: Door intrigue/streak reflection

Mr. Schleede, I received the following quoted email about a paragraph in Aviation Week and Space Technology for 10 Mar 97: Did you really say you are intrigued by the forward door? And the streak could be a reflection?

You are right sir. You are right. (Av Week quotes two NTSB officials unofficially, I shall send this email to others.)

Why forward cargo door cam latch status is unreliable indicator of door locked or unlocked: 1. The difference is subtle with the lock sectors in the locked position but the cam sectors in unlocked position. 2. Door was broken in pieces, dropped from 13700 feet, picked up by diver and placed on boat possibly changing the position of moving parts such as cam sectors. 3. The FBI laboratory explosives laboratory, under the removed for mismanagement Chief, Tom Thurman, had the door for five months looking for explosive residue and probably changed positions of every moving piece they could move to look for the invisible traces.

So, unfortunately, unless you have high quality photos of forward cargo door being retrieved, any position of the suspect cam sectors is invalid. To determine the cargo door as culprit will take other investigative techniques.

To see streak source tonight, look to the east up high at dusk and see 747 going northeast. At a certain sun angle between you, the plane, and the sun, you will get a three second or so bright flash as the metal skin reflects the sun down to you. If part of bright skin were to depart then, you would see a streak as door decelerates from 300 knots to zero horizontally and accelerates from zero knots to terminal velocity of about 250 vertically. The vertical descent was picked up on radar. The streak was seen visually at same time.

Regards, John Barry Smith

Hi,

Just in case you didn't see Aviation week for March 10, 97 there is an article describing the observations of two helicopter pilots. This article includes the following paragraph:

"NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilot saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said."

The below was in Riverside Paper, "directed to write a letter"? Let them write it themselves. They thought of it, they do it.

A better question was why the NTSB was the FBI garbage collector for five months until the FBI sort of gave up and let the NTSB do their job. Because they had guns?

Regards, John Barry Smith

NTSB's Ron Schleede

was directed to write a letter to Ron Morgan at FAA demanding a "full explanation" of the situation and inquiring why information about the missile tracks "was reported to the White House and sent to the FAA Technical Center before the Safety Board was given access to the data," the minutes said.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: March 20, 1997 6:34:15 PM PST

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: I'm taking full credit for solving TWA 800

If the evidence is all wrong and it is the center tank explosion, then the NSTB gets full credit for solving TWA 800. If the evidence is all wrong and it is a bomb, then the FBI gets full credit for solving TWA 800. If the evidence is all wrong and it is a missile, then Salinger gets full credit for solving TWA 800. If the evidence is all right and it is the cargo door then I take full credit for solving TWA 800.

When the cargo door explanation is confirmed for TWA 800 I take full credit. And for PA 103, and for AI 182. I want all the glory; I want all the adulation; I want all the respect. I've earned it. It's mine. Cargo door.

Sincerely, John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: March 20, 1997 7:11:32 PM PST

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: Trouble contacting Mr. Dickinson and Mr. Benson

Mr. Schleede, my emails to Mr. Dickinson and Mr. Benson were returned. If you and Dr. Loeb also wish me to stop emailing you with my comments on TWA 800, just say so.

Regards, John Barry Smith

From: System Administrator <postmaster@ntsb.gov>

To: <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: Undeliverable: I'm taking full credit for solving TWA 800

Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 21:31:51 -0500

Your message did not reach some or all of the intended recipients.

To: BENSONM@ntsb.gov
Subject: I'm taking full credit for solving TWA 800
Sent: 3/20/97 21:31:51 PM

The following recipient(s) could not be reached:

BENSONM@ntsb.gov on 3/20/97 21:31:51 PM
Recipient Not Found
MSEXCH:IMC:NTSB US Government:NTSB:EXCSV
From: System Administrator <postmaster@ntsb.gov>
To: <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Undeliverable: I'm taking full credit for solving TWA
800
Date: Thu, 20 Mar 1997 21:32:01 -0500

Your message did not reach some or all of the intended recipients.

To: DICKINA@ntsb.gov
Subject: I'm taking full credit for solving TWA 800
Sent: 3/20/97 21:32:01 PM

The following recipient(s) could not be reached:

DICKINA@ntsb.gov on 3/20/97 21:32:01 PM
Recipient Not Found
MSEXCH:IMC:NTSB US Government:NTSB:EXCSV

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: March 21, 1997 4:58:42 PM PST
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: **Wrong blip**

When Kallstrom changes his story about the P3 blip, will you seriously consider the cargo door? He's got the wrong blip.
John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: March 26, 1997 6:58:49 PM PST
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: **View streak source yourself/tank/cargo door**

Mr. Schleede, to see the TWA 800 streak source, the sun, for yourself, do this: at the same time after sunset as the crash, about ten minutes, look to the east at a Boeing 747 in full sunlight at 13700 feet and wait for the glint of reflection. That is the source. It is the sun reflecting off the forward fuselage, or the aft fuselage, or the vert stab, or the winglets if it is a 747-400. I've viewed the sight many times from my vantage point underneath the heaviest 747 traffic in the world, San Fran to LA.

To be perfect, wait for July 17th, at 8:31 PM, ten minutes after sunset, and look to east as 747 climbs out of Kennedy airport on a clear evening. You will see the glint/flash that last about three seconds. If a piece of fuselage were to come loose you would see a streak as the piece decelerates from 300 knots to zero horizontally and from zero to terminal vertically.

People probably will look to the east that anniversary evening of

the next July 17th and they will see the flash and wonder what it was. It is the cargo door spinning away with fuselage skin attached glinting in the full sun up high and falling to the sea being viewed as streak by humans and radar blip by radar and explosive decompression heard by CVR as loud sound just before nose comes off and abruptly cuts power to FDR. Then the heavy evidence piles up against the cargo door.

Based on news reports, I see Mr. Hall, Mr. Francis, and Dr. Loeb as being the center tank explosion proponents. It is the politically satisfying answer if no evidence for bomb, the first choice. Center tank fire can be a one in a million chance and nobody is really to blame except God and his static electricity and it may never happen again.

I see Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Benson, and Mr. Schleede as not being satisfied with the center tank as initial event based on the structure breakup time sequence, the debris pattern, and airborne eyewitnesses that showed the fireball as later and lower than initial event. Consequently, you professional accident investigators are willing to look at other alternatives such as cargo door as long as the evidence holds up and let the chips fall where they may as long as the primary crash cause of the TWA 800 is identified.

So a philosophical disagreement about the direction of the investigation: 1. go for the God caused center tank fire. 2. go for the cargo door and opening the largest can of worms in aviation history bringing in seven governments and thousands of victims and billions of dollars.

A political solution is not truth, it is an agreement that all the parties can live with. A center tank fire is a political solution, it is not truth.

Truth is inadvertent openings of forward cargo doors have caused four Boeing 747 accidents, AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800. Truth hurts; lies kill.

Please investigate the cargo door.
Sincerely,
John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: March 27, 1997 9:59:27 AM PST
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: **It's not a coincidence**

Mr. Schleede, it's not a coincidence that:

The cargo door theory explains the steak because the event happened when the plane was in the correct sun angle and time for the fuselage to reflect sun to observers on the ground. At any other 23 hours and 30 minutes of the day, it could not be said the streak was door because the sun angle would be wrong or non-existent. But, at 8:31PM on July 17th near NYC the sun angle was perfect for door to reflect sunlight as it spun away. It's no coincidence; it's cause and effect.

The cargo door theory explains the mysterious radar blip because the spinning metal cargo door with fuselage skin attached would reflect primary radar at that distance, just like it did with the DC-10 cargo door and the UAL 811 cargo door departures. The two blips on the radar plot without transponder display are a P-3 and the cargo door. It's no coincidence; it's cause and effect.

The cargo door theory explains the sudden loud sound on the CVR because when the door departs an explosive decompression occurs which causes a very loud sound, just like it did on UAL 811 according to the passengers who survived. It's no coincidence; it's cause and effect.

The cargo door theory explains the abrupt power cut because the power to the FDR and transponder was cut when the nose was severed by the 300 knot CAS force crumpling the nose into the absent cargo door hole. It's no coincidence; it's cause and effect.

The cargo door theory explains the missing bodies because the passengers are sucked out the hole caused by the departing cargo door and attached fuselage skin and into the number three engine leaving parts of human remains inside, just like UAL 811. It's no coincidence; it's cause and effect.

The cargo door theory explains why number three engine catches fire and lands separately from the other three engines because baggage from the cargo hold is ejected into number three engine which becomes Fodded, catches fire, vibrates, fuse bolts shear as designed, and engine falls away on fire before other three engines are involved. It's no coincidence; it's cause and effect.

The cargo door theory explains the fireball when baggage from the cargo hold is ejected into number three engine which becomes Fodded, catches fire, vibrates, fuse bolts shear as designed, and engine falls away on fire into disintegrating wing, fuel vapor and air, igniting fireball. It's no coincidence; it's cause and effect.

The cargo door theory explains why the aft cargo door is found intact and the forward door in pieces because the forward door opens up, out, and away, striking fuselage and breaking into pieces, just like UAL 811. It's no coincidence; it's cause and effect.

The cargo door theory explains the debris pattern which shows

forward cargo hold material ejected first, then detached nose falling in dense area, and rest of fuselage and wing and tail falling in scattered area miles later. It's no coincidence; it's cause and effect.

The cargo door theory explains it all because it is what happened; the other theories just fit a few of the important evidence clues and don't work for the others.

Is the investigation worth it? Well, it does involve Canada, France, Britain, USA, Libya, India, Ireland, and New Zealand; literally billions of dollars, thousands of lives, or I should say, 838 dead plus bereaved families, and the future of commercial aviation in America. Literally, I exaggerate not.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

408 659 3552 phone

barry@corazon.com email

www.corazon.com web site

551 Country Club Drive

Carmel Valley,

CA 93924

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: March 28, 1997 11:53:03 AM PST
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: New Clue for TWA 800

Exhaust Pressure Ratio is a commonality for three Boeing 747 crashes, including TWA 800.

800 had EPR changed before fatal crash.

103 had EPR blip on #3 FDR just before crash.

182 had EPR gripe not fixed and left was is on fatal crash.

811 could have had EPR gripe but all non cargo door gripes omitted from report.

Exhaust Pressure Ratio enters picture, too much coincidence that all three crashes had previous EPR problems. Could have been all four planes had engine #3 gauge problems too. Could be wiring for EPR gauge passes near door motor wiring. If frayed the EPR power may power the door motor.

Mr. Schleede, do you remember any gripes on the EPR on UAL 811?

Too odd that three crashed 747s all have EPR anomalies before crashing. Maybe four.

Sincerely, John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: April 3, 1997 7:34:47 AM PST
To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
Subject: Stone unturned. Turn it over.

Dear Appropriate Person,

A stone of TWA 800 crash cause is exposed and unturned. Turn it over. "Forward door of the aircraft popping open."

To turn over stone go to www.corazon.com and you will always

be able to say, "I turned over every stone, I exhausted every possibility, I checked out every chance, I tried everything."
Cheers, John Barry Smith

"NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilot saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said." Aviation Week and Space Technology, 10 Mar 97 Page 35.

Mr. Schleede, form letter to authorities. Barry

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: April 5, 1997 6:11:52 PM PST
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: Cargo door explanation copyright

Mr. Schleede,

Since I'm the first one and the only one to discover the cargo door crash cause of TWA 800 and other Boeing 747 crashes, I have intellectual property rights to the explanation as written down and copyrighted on web site www.corazon.com, as first described on July 29, 1996 for TWA 800, June 1990 for PA 103, and August 1996 for AI 182.

If the cargo door explanation is not to be investigated as a legitimate cause of the crash, then it is in the realm of fiction, a jolly good yarn, and therefore copyrightable, and is, 1996 and 1997.

Please give author credit, John Barry Smith, to cargo door

theory whenever you discuss, unofficially, or officially, the cargo door explanation for the crash of TWA 800 and others as described by me in my web site at www.corazon.com.

Sincerely, John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: April 7, 1997 9:31:52 AM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: Second Official is correct.

Please forward to the "Second Official."

The 'second official' is correct. It is the forward door popping open. It is reflection. I can lead you to the answer. Contact me with any roadblocks and I can get you around them. It is the forward door popping open. It is the reflection. You have the answer. You have said the answer. Now confirm it. I can help you. The cause is the most important thing. You have the cause. Don't let it slip away.

John Barry Smith

"NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilot saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said." Aviation Week and Space Technology, 10 Mar 97 Page 35.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: April 8, 1997 7:42:41 PM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: UAL 811 and PA 103 match and animation of destruction

Mr. Schleede,

I've taken some sequential drawings from the AAIB report and made animated .gifs. They show clearly the sequence of destruction of PA 103 with emphasis on cargo door side. Radar blip of door is also drawn in AAIB report. Below are the comments on each page.

<http://www.corazon.com/103drawrightleftani.html>

and <http://www.corazon.com/103blipsani.html>

Pan Am Flight 103 accident report drawings of sequence of destruction based upon reconstruction of fuselage. There are four drawings in each animated .gif. The important point is the damage is more severe on the cargo door side of the forward cargo hold than on the other side, the 'bomb' side. The pattern of the cargo door side of destruction matches the UAL 811 pattern, a known cargo door pattern. The door itself of 103 matches the door of 811 also, broken in two.

Pan Am 103 accident report on radar primary and secondary returns. Important to note is diamond which is primary return noted on two ground radars and described as 'anomaly.' It is the door spinning away just before destruction. The disintegrating wing and fuselage is shown as many dots while the intact nose falls and is shown as dense blob. The radar blip of door matches the radar blip of TWA 800 in time and place.

I look forward to the TWA 800 report to repeat the animation, it is very revealing.

Sincerely, John Barry Smith

Are you the 'second official'? If so, you are right.

"NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilot saw

could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft,
tongues of
flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft
popping open, a
possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official
said." Aviation Week and Space Technology, 10 Mar 97 Page 35.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: April 15, 1997 4:40:41 PM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Mr. Schleede, this is the cargo door guy. Again. This must be my
once a week email as referenced by Mr. Purdy of the New York
Times.

"One man writes at least once a week to the board, pushing his
theory that
the front cargo door of the plane blew off, setting in motion a
catastrophic
chain of events."

Mr. Purdy put me in the kook, stupid citizen, idiot member of
public, wacky internet guy with the cargo door explanation
category. Well, sir, based on the below, we are in the same boat.

"NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks
the pilot saw
could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft,
tongues of
flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft
popping open, a
possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official
said." Aviation Week and Space Technology, 10 Mar 97 Page 35.

Yes, we agree it was a mechanical cause, yes we agree there was a center tank fuel explosion. I offer as ignition source the foddled number three engine, on fire, detached, falling into fuel vapor and exploding into fireball. Please rule out or rule in. If unable to rule out, back up time from fireball at certain time and certain altitude to 13700 feet of altimeter in cockpit and transponder and certain time based on instant abrupt power cut time by time hack of FDR and time hack of CVR. Initial event is "forward door popped open," in NTSB official's words. He's right. Please rule in or out.

Could a member of the unwashed public actually come up with one good idea? Well, maybe. I offer cargo door explanation for the crash of TWA 800.....and 182....and 811...and 103....Yeah, door leads right to PA 103 and there is the mental hurdle of debunking bomb myth. Very difficult to debunk myth.

But one step at a time and let's stick to facts and here they are:

The cargo door theory explains the streak because the event happened when the plane was in the correct sun angle and time for the fuselage to reflect sun to observers on the ground. At any other 23 hours and 30 minutes of the day, it could not be said the streak was door because the sun angle would be wrong or non existent. But, at 8:31PM on July 17th near NYC the sun angle was perfect for door to reflect sunlight as it spun away. It's no coincidence; it's cause and effect.

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The cargo door theory explains it all because it is what happened; the other theories just fit a few of the important evidence clues and don't work for the others.

Mr. Schleede, you know UAL 811 inside and out, that is the model of 800 up to nose not coming off.

As an aircraft crash investigator I trust your loyalty is to finding crash cause first and foremost. Let us stick to facts and evidence. Start with streak and radar blip.

Sincerely, John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: April 18, 1997 3:44:57 PM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: Air Force War Story

Mr. Schleede, following is a war story forwarded to me and I thought you might like it too. Sincerely, John Barry Smith

Bong and McGuire were assigned to my flight in the 9th Ftr Sq, 49th Ftr Gp at Dobodura, New Guinea. Bong #2, Duckbutt Watkins, element lead and McGuire #4. But that is another story.

Back ground preface to answering your question about first combat mission. I grew up in the late 20s and 30s reading the pulps - Lone Eagle, War Aces, etc., and always wanted to become an ace. But, alas, it was not to be. During two combat tours in the Pacific, one in the ETO and one in Korea I engaged the enemy only 4 times - results - two Zeros down, once run out of the sky by a P-38 [I was still flying P-40s] when I was closing on the tail of a Zero, and a draw against a Russian instructor over the Yalu at 40,000' - he in a Mig15 and I in an F-86. But those are also other stories.

Now to your question about my first combat. As a 1st Lt. out of Panama I was assigned to the 9th Ftr Sq at Livingston Field 30 miles south of Darwin and arrived there on 18 July 1942. Our strip was a widened section of the north/south road leading south from Darwin. The oiled strip was just wide enough for single ship takeoffs. Between 7/19 and 7/27 I had four flights in my

P-40 flying as the "new boy" as #4 although I had more P-40 time than the other 3 pilots in the flight combined - 300 hrs. The flight leader was 1st Lt. Andrew J. Reynolds, a classmate of mine. #2 was John Lander, an All-American out of Texas, #3 was I.B. Jack Donalson who had been flown out of Corregidor in an amphibian after fighting as an infantryman after his a/c had been bombed on Clark Field, another story..

Our air raid warning system at Darwin was primitive and consisted of a coast watcher on a island a short distance north of Darwin. The Japs flew out of Koepang which was reconned by an RAAF Lockheed Hudson flight on a strip near ours, another story.

On 30 July, our flight was scrambled as Darwin was being bombed by the usual 27 Bettys escorted by 30+ Zeros. Unfortunately my a/c was the slowest of the four and although both RPM and Manifold Pressure were against the wall, I slowly dropped behind. We clawed our way up to over 25,000' and by that time I had lost sight of the other 3 birds of the flight they were so far ahead. I leveled at slightly over 27,000' and believed that I was going to miss out on everything as suddenly up ahead there appeared a column of black smoke

marking a downed a/c
and then another column of smoke, and another and another. I
was watching 4 a/c
going down and didn't know if they were my flight members or
Japs.

Still balls-to-the-wall and the with the head on a swivel at my 9
o'clock were a
flight of 4 Zeros in a shallow climb on a parallel course. The
outer wingman
were doing slowrolls which we had been told by intelligence that
they did to
clear the air above and below them. Can you imagine an prop a/
c doing slow
rolls in a gradual climb at 25,000'? In 1942? Anyhow, they
apparently either
missed or ignored me and, insasmuch as I had been trained to
and paid to fight,
I lost about 1,000' and dropped in behind the Zero flight -- almost
the slot
position in an acrobatic team flight. As I slowly closed on the
leader the
wingmen pulled a stunt that we had heard about from the
Marines on Guadalcanal
-- a half-assed loop to drop on the tail of the attacking a/c. I
figured that I
had time to fire on the leader and at about 500 yds, dead astern
squeezed the
trigger as he pulled up into a loop to hold me in position while
his wingmen
could get to me. I squeezed but nothing happened! Let's back
track a moment.
When we scrambled on an unknown over Darwin we would

always spread out, charge
the 6 50s [hydraulic chargers] turn on the master gun switch and
fire a test
burst and then, following pre-war safety regs, turn off the master
gun switch.
I had followed this procedure.

As the Zero leader became very big in my reflector gunsight, I
flipped on the
master gun switch and fired. By that time he was less than 100
yds from me and
I am convinced that if he had not blown up I would have flown
into him. There I
was at somewhere around 27,000' in a what I believed was a
shallow climb with 3
Zeros somewhere behind me. Please remember that we never
tried to turn with a
Zero, climb with it, or try to outrun it at altitude - it was a vastly
superior
a/c under those conditions. So, my next thought was to get the
hell out of
there so I rolled over to split-S into a vertical dive in which I
could out-dive
the Zeros. Unfortunately I was not in a shallow climb, I was
pointed straight
up so when I rolled it did nothing but kill off my remaining
airspeed. As I
stalled out the tracers began flying by so I kicked the 40 into a
spin and lost
about 10,000' in the spin. When I recovered I didn't know if the
3 Zeros were
still behind or not so I continued straight down wide-open with
both feet on one

rudder pedal trying to hold against the torque. At about 15,000', I turned my body to look back to see if they were there. Suddenly tracers were shooting out ahead of me and I thought that they were still there and I had been hit as my a/c starting to decelerate. I started to prepare for a bailout, planning to stay with it down to a lower altitude and then jump. So I started to open the canopy and when I lowered my head to clear the sliding canopy I saw the fuel warning light glowing bright red. By this time the vacuum in the cockpit created by the slightly opened canopy had sucked my old fashioned O2 mast out into the slip stream. Waking up to the fact that when I had turned my body to look behind I had inadvertently squeezed my gun trigger and that the tracers had been my own, and that my engine hadn't been hit, I had just failed to switch tanks before attacking the Zeros and I was running on empty.

I switched tanks, and the engine roared into action. My airspeed indicator and engine RPMs and Manifold Pressure were off the scale. The MP gauge went up to 50", I was pulling 65". The airspeed was off the 500 MPH scale at about 650.

When I pulled back on the throttle all needles dropped through the blank spaces into the max areas. Inspection of the a/c after landing found that

every
inspection plate had been blown off and I had taken a piece of
the Zero through
the prop which had broken out the casting at the leading edge of
the carburetor
intake and that intake looked like the muzzle end of an old
blunderbuss. After
repairs, my test flights were unsatisfactory. Wide open I could
get the bird
only up to about 12,000'. Carburetor and mag changes didn't
help so my crew
chief installed a new propellor which did the trick. The prop
went to depot in
southern Australia and the tech report that came back stated that
the prop tips
had been flattened for reasons unknown. Apparently I had been
right up against
the sound barrier in that old Kittyhawk.

I have gone into great details about this combat because of one
thing that
distinguishes survivors from victims -- the ability, God-given or
whatever, to
recover from mistakes without panicking! After that I believed
that if I could
survive after all of those mistakes I was never going to be shot
down -- that
belief stayed with me forever.

The four columns of black smoke? Andy Reynolds - 2 Zeros,
Big Stoop Landers -
1 Zero, Jack Donalson - 1 Zero. Our flight accounted for 5
Zeros! All 5 were

verified by the Aussie coast watcher - we didn't have gun cameras then.

If you are a WWII history buff, you probably know that Gen. MacArthur landed in Japan on 30 August 1945 and accepted the surrender of Japan on 2 September on the battleship Missouri. And according to William Manchester's "American Caesar - Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964" ... "Japan, the only major power whose soil had never been sullied by the boot of an enemy soldier, lost that distinction at dawn on Tuesday, August 28, when Colonel Charles Tench, a member of MacArthur's staff, stepped from a C-47 and set foot on Atsugi's bomb-pocked runway."

History is in error on two counts. MacArthur was not the first to take the surrender of Japan nor was Col Tench the first to sully the Japanese soil.

The following is a verbatim copy of a report:

HEADQUARTERS, 49TH FIGHTER GROUP
ARMY AIR FORCES
APO 337

26 August 1945

The following is a statement of Lt. Col. CLAY TICE, JR.,
0-421355,
Commanding Officer, 49th Fighter Group, in regard to the
emergency landing on
the Japanese homeland on 25 August 1945.

I was the leader of Jigger Red flight on 25 August 1945
when two planes
of that flight landed on the mainland of Japan. Our mission was
a combat sweep
around KYUSHU, across the southern tip of HONSHU, thence
around SHIKOKU and
return to base. The plotted distance of the patrol was 1370
statute miles and
flying time was estimated at six hours and forty-five minutes.

Instructions
were given to hang a 310 gallon external tank in addition to the
bomb load, and
to fill the tanks to capacity. Pilots were briefed thoroughly on the
mission by
myself and the length and duration of the mission were stressed.

Fuel
consumption was estimated at 610 gallons allowing a one hour
reserve. Total gas
carried was approximately 700 gallons.

The flight, composed of eight P-38s of the 7th Fighter
Squadron, plus
one spare, was airborne from MOTUBA Strip at 0805. Cruise on
course and during
sweep was 1800 rpm and 30"Hg in auto lean as briefed, with an
indicated air

speed of 180 mph. Prior to making landfall on KYUSHU, two aircraft aborted and returned to base due to mechanical difficulty. I made landfall at MAKURAZAKI at 0950. A course was then set for NAGASAKI with slight deviations to check shipping, arriving over NAGASAKI at 1025. I proceeded to ISAHAY to OMTA thence to YANAGAWA to KURUME to NAKATSU. Time over NAKATSU was 1100. My course was then over NAGASU to TOMIKUDURA to YA SHIMA Island to NAGAHAMA at 1122.

Approximate air mileage to this point was 600 miles. Flight Officer HALL, number two (2) in the second flight, called for a reduction in rpm because he was low on gas. His radio transmission was very poor and all messages from him were relayed through his flight commander, Captain KOPECKY.

I asked Flight Officer HALL how many gallons of gas he had left and answer was approximately 240 gallons. At that time we were 540 miles from base and I reduced power settings to 1600 rpm and 28"Hg. Low visibility forced me around the peninsula to

SHONE and down to SAEKI. I then called Flight Officer HALL again on his gas supply and understood him to say that he had about 140 gallons.

I decided that his rate of fuel consumption and gas supply would not permit his return to a friendly base and turned out to sea off FURUE to jettison bombs

at 1143.

No flak had been encountered over Japanese installations and I believed that a landing at a suitable Japanese airdrome would be preferable to the certain loss of a plane and the possible loss of a pilot in the event a forced ditching at sea was made.

I called Jukebox 36 (B-17 of the 6th Air Sea Rescue Squadron) and informed him of my intentions and requested assistance. I landed at NITTAGAHARA, 450 miles from base, at 1205. There were no Japanese in sight after landing and I checked the gas supply in flight Officer HALL's plane. He had dropped his external tank previous to informing me of his difficulty and upon inspection, I found that his wing tanks were dry and I estimated his fuel at 150 gallons in mains and reserves by visual check of fuel indicators and tanks.

At 1305 we were contacted by officers and men of the Japanese Army and although conversation was difficult, we were greeted in a friendly manner. Jukebox 36 landed at approximately 1315 and with a fuel pump and hose furnished by the Japanese, we transferred approximately 260 gallons of gas

from the B-17
to the P-38. After landing at NITTAGAHARA, I dropped my
external tank on the
runway still containing 25 to 50 gallons. I had used but 15
minutes of my
internal gas supply by that time.

Flight Officer HALL and I were airborne behind the B-17 at
1445 and set
course for base where we landed at 1645 after cruising at 1800
rpm and 28"Hf. I
had approximately 240 gallons of gas left after landing. All
cruise settings
were in auto lean. Flight Officer HALL had approximately 210
gallons remaining.

As far as it is possible to ascertain from interrogation of line
personnel concerned, Flight Officer HALL's plane was serviced
with 300 gallons
in the external tank and all internal tanks topped off. From
preliminary
investigation, it is believed that the cross feed valve was
defective thus
permitting siphoning of the fuel supply.

I carried out my landing on Japanese territory in the belief
that Flight
Officer HALL could not safely return to the nearest Allied base
and that under
the circumstances it would be the safest course of action if I
landed prior to
Flight Officer HALL because I thought that in the case of
difficulty with

Japanese, my rank and experience would be of benefit. Flight Officer HALL's lack of combat experience and the nervousness that he showed after landing and when confronted by the Japanese confirmed my belief.

Instructions in all details of the fuel system and gas consumption characteristics of the P-38 are now being given and will be followed by actual demonstrations and written examinations by all pilots of this organization. All efforts will be made to prevent any possible reoccurrence of this situation either by pilot error or mechanical failure.

/s/ Clay Tice, Jr.
CLAY TICE, JR.
Lt. Colonel, Air Corps

#: 815318 S16/Hangar Flying
13-May-95 16:51:53
Sb: #815183-WWII Introduction
Fm: Clay Tice, Jr. 76761,2765
To: Jimmy Johnson [PDK] 70470,400

Jimmy, <<. . story about landing to offer assistance to the Left-Tenant.>> except that it was flight officer.

Once again, non-history buffs tune out -- this will be a long one.
Part I.

Now that you have read the official report of that first landing in Japan on 25 August 1945, here are the details. That report was written immediately upon landing in reply to a request from Fifth AF Hqs and the politic thing to say was that the fuel problem leading to the landing was caused by material failure, i.e., cross feed siphoning. I couldn't admit to any 49th Gp pilot error -- which it was.

Now I must admit that, over the bar in our Officers Club tent, we had talked about being the first to land in Japan by lowering the gear and making a touch-and-go but the idea had been discarded because of intelligence reports that there were still some military hold-outs against the armistice at many bases in southern Japan and that on some of the closest airfields, the runways had been mined or covered with sharp objects to prevent landings. So being a hero in that respect was out.

Flight Officer Hall was a newly assigned pilot and this was his 1st mission so my pre-mission briefing was most comprehensive. We were flying fairly new

P-38L5s with leading edge 'Tokyo' tanks. The fuel system setup with these leading edge tanks required that the tops of each set of tanks be knocked off right after takeoff to prevent siphoning of fuel overboard. The sqdn was briefed in the standard procedure of taking off on mains, switching to leading edges for about 5 minutes, then to reserves for 5 minutes and then to switch both engines to the one 300 gallon drop tank on the left pylon. A 1,000# GP was hung on the right pylon and our mission was surveillance of the eastern half of Kyushu and then up as far as Hiroshima before returning to base. Our orders: To strike any movement of Japanese military forces land or sea. Our flight plan was detailed in official flight report previously rendered.

After making landfall, the first thing of interest was Nagasaki which had been the most recent recipient of a nuke. The city was divided by a ridge running east/west and the bomb had fallen on the northern half. The ridge apparently had been high enough to shield the southern portion of the city from the blast as things were fairly normal there, with cars and streetcars on the streets. The northern half was still burning in some sections with rest of that part of the city just a blackened rubble.

Later, when it became obvious that F/O Hall didn't have enough gas to return to

Okinawa, a decision as to what course of action was necessary.

Usually on

flights from Oki to Japan, we had a sub on rescue patrol midway in addition to

an RB-17 with a para-drop boat stationed about half way between the sub and

Kyushu. On this day we had no Navy support, I guess they thought as the war

seemed to be over, the hell with it, and had gone home. Anyhow, it narrowed

down to finding the RB-17 and having Hall ditch or bail out OR finding a Jap

base and land. As Hall was a brand new pilot, I had no confidence that he could

ditch the 38 safely nor bail out without hitting the horizontal stabilizer which

extended between the two booms. The only way to guarantee a reasonably safe

bailout in a 38 was to roll inverted, trim nose up and drop out.

But there was

another problem with bailing out. Given that he would be in good enough shape

to get into his rubber raft and the RB-17 dropped the boat to him, could the

boat be dropped exactly upwind of his raft and could he get to it in time?

There had been reports of boats being dropped but being blown away before the

pilot could get to it. Seems that the higher freeboard of the rescue boat acted

like a sail while the pilot in his raft sat there and paddled like
mad to catch
it to no avail.

As we were on course back to Oki, I pondered the choices. The
thought of being
first to land in Japan never entered my mind at that time as
saving Hall was
uppermost in my thoughts. Landing on a small Japanese strip
seemed the best way
to save him. Checking my maps I found that there was a little
airfield on the
east coast of Kyushu at Nittagahara and decided to land there if it
appeared
safe to do so and it was big enough for the 38. After landing I
planned on
taking Hall aboard on my lap and flying him back to Oki.

En route to Nittagahara, the gray matter started kicking in and
the idea of
having the RB-17 come in and pick up Hall seemed a good one.
Of course, the
RB-17 pilot, 2nd Lt Edwin Hawkins of Bountiful, UT, agreed in
a hurry --
anything to break the monotony of circling over a barren expanse
of ocean!
Don't give my memory any credit for remembering Hawkins'
name, I had to refer to
the Vern Haugland by-lined story of the landing that appeared in
the L.A. Times
of 27 August 1945. When we reached the Nittagahara strip I left
the sqdn under
the leadership of Capt. Kopecky and went down to circle the

field at about 3,000'. Encountering no flak or sign of opposition, I dropped down to drag the field with instructions to Kopecky to strafe if I was fired upon. There were several Tonys [inline engined fighters similar to the P-51 in configuration] scattered around the field but no sign of activity or people. After two or three more low passes, I landed on the short [2,500] asphalt strip laid out on a grass field and taxied to the west end of the runway which had a circular turn-around pad. Positioning my 38 facing the length of runway and keeping the fans turning for a rapid departure if necessary, I called Hall in and had him taxi up and park beside me and keep his fans turning also. After a few minutes there was no sign of activity so we shut down and got out of the birds.

I asked Hall about his fuel handling procedures and when had he dropped his 300 gallon tank. He told me that he dropped it just before we made landfall because the fuel pressure on both engines dropped and when the engines started to sputter he switched to mains and dropped the 'empty tank.'

When asked about the procedure he used to drop the tank he replied that he had just pulled the tank release handle while cruising in formation as tail-end charlie.

Now the 300 gallon tank was a ferry tank and not normally used on combat missions except those requiring them for very long range flight such as those made from Leyte to the Halmaheras. Great care had to be taken when dropping empty 300s. You had to slow the a/c down to just above a stall and push over when you pulled the release handle. This permitted the tank to clear both the pod and the tail boom on that side. If you were jumped by enemy fighters and didn't have time to follow this procedure, you dropped and accepted the damage. I looked over Hall's 38 very carefully to see if there was any damage to the pod or the left boom -- there wasn't a mark. From straight and level flight at cruising speed, the tank had to be full when dropped. The probability of his dropping 300 gallons of fuel made sense when the fuel remaining in his 38 was checked. Apparently he had mistakenly left both engines on one reserve tank after takeoff and when that ran dry, thinking that the 300 was empty, dropped it. This he did despite being briefed NOT to drop the tank unless jumped by enemy fighters!

Hall was very nervous as I asked him to stay with the 38s while I checked a

couple of Tonys to see if I could get one started. I thought that it would
clank up the troops back on Oki if landed there in a Jap Tony
while Hall flew my
38 back. My good idea came to naught when I found that there
was a starter lug
on a shaft protruding from the prop nose cone -- they were
started by having a
truck equipped with a motor and crank shaft backing up to the a/
c and engaging
this lug to turn the engine over. Must have had a long drive shaft
or it would
been somewhat of a thrill for the mechs on the truck!

After about an hour a Japanese on a bicycle passed by and,
seeing us, hurried
off to one of the bldgs at the far end of the field. It was almost as
though no
one had heard or seen us up until then, but they may have been in
their shelters
waiting for the bombs to fall. Shortly thereafter two Amy
officers with several
soldiers approached from across the field. As they came closer,
Hall suggested
that we take out our 45s to greet the Japanese. I vetoed that
immediately --
when you are on the enemy's ground and they outnumber you,
discretion is the
better part of valor. The Japanese walked up to about 10 feet in
front of us,
stopped and the officers saluted. Now, remember, I had been in
New Guinea when
the Japanese chopped the head off of an American pilot as Kirby

can tell you. I had been there when the crew of an A-20, which had been shot down and bellied in on the beach at Buna, had been taken into the village in front of the natives, had their hands tied behind them around a couple of palm trees and used for bayonet practice. I hated the Japanese which was completely different from my feeling towards the Germans in the ETO. Based on that, you may understand my hesitancy about returning the salute which I did -- again discretion vs valor. The two officers broke out in big smiles and advanced to shake hands -- and that was difficult -- but I shook hands as they started a flow of Japanese. In retrospect, they were probably very relieved that we were not going to treat them as they would have us if the conditions had been reversed.

I waved them off to indicate that I couldn't understand Japanese upon which, one of the officers pulled out a well-worn little pocket Japanese-English dictionary. Using the book I got across that one of the 38s was out of gas and that we had a bomber coming in to assist us -- my sign language must have been comical. I was pointing to words in the dictionary, flapping my arms to indicate wings, pointing to the south, holding up four fingers to indicate the number of engines

on the bomber -- it was a gas! When one of the officers finally nodded that he understood, he barked an order at the soldiers who raced off to return in about 15 minutes with a fuel truck and pulled up in front of Hall's 38. I went over to check it out and was overcome with an odor of something that you more elderly types may remember from the auto race days back at the county fairs -- castor oil. Their fuel was doped with castor oil for lubrication! The officers were crestfallen that their fuel wasn't good enough for the 38 and about then the RB-17 landed and taxied up in front of the 38s.

By this time we had gathered a crowd of civilians and other military who swarmed around the RB-17 pointing to the gun turrets and four engines, obviously awed by this tremendous machine. A Shinto priest rode up on a bicycle wearing his flowing black robes and his black fly-swatter hat, got off and came over to bless our a/c -- at least that is what I took his motions to be. He then got back on his bicycle and rode off. Next came the local town Mayor wearing a long-tailed morning outfit complete with striped pants, gray spats and wearing his black top hat. He bowed so many times that I couldn't keep up with him. In fact, I think that we must have been bowed to by half the

population of
Nittagahara. Meantime, the RB-17 crew broke out all of their
emergency rations
and gave the candy to all of the children who had shown up. The
Japanese
parents reciprocated with their home-made candy and it was
local fair time.

When I, through the little dictionary, asked the Japanese officer if
they had
any way to transfer fuel from the 17 to the 38 he sent his soldiers
off again to
return shortly with a hand-operated wobble pump with long
hoses and they
transferred gas from the 17 to the 38 under the supervision of the
17 crew
chief. Just as they were completing the fuel transfer we heard the
sound of
fighters and looked up to see P-51s in a long shallow dive toward
the field,
pull up, make a circle and leave the area. The 17 radio operator,
who had been
standing by on the RB's radio stuck his head out of the pilots
window and told
us that he had been monitoring the fighter frequency and heard a
35th Ftr Gp
P-51 patrol leader tell his sqdn that the Japanese had captured
some U.S. a/c
and he was going down to strafe them so that they couldn't be
used as Kamikazes!
Thank goodness for that alert radio operator who told him what
was happening on
the ground. In that case, it turned out that we had been in more

danger from
our own forces than from the Japanese.

Just before the 17 loaded up to depart, I pointed to the sword of
one of the
officers who didn't understand my meaning at first, but finally,
after a couple
of suggestive hunches of my shoulder holster, handed me his
sword. I just
wanted a souvenir. No thought of taking the surrender of Japan.
I handed the
sword to one of the 17 crew who quietly returned it after we were
back on Oki.
I never reported the sword because of the orders at that time to
turn in all
souvenirs which would be returned after the war. HA!! I still
haven't received
my German pistol that I turned in when I left the ETO in late '44.
Anyhow, the
17 departed and I sent Hall off to circle the field while I started
up.

I decided to give the Japanese a show of what a 38 flown by an
American fighter
pilot could do on takeoff. I planned to hold the bird down, suck
up the gear
before lifting the nosewheel and then do an Immelman off the
deck -- a maneuver
that I had performed before. Getting into my 38 I did so in the
approved hot
rock manner by vaulting up on the horizontal stabilizer and
running up one boom
to drop in to the cockpit. The 38 had a ladder that dropped down

from the tail
of the pod but it was hard to retract from the wing and, if left
down, made a
very noisy vibrating racket in flight. After firing up both engines
I held the
brakes until the tires started to slip and roared down the runway.
As I picked
up speed the top of the canopy flew off and I had to screech to a
stop with
smoking tires. I had failed to lock the canopy. The 38 cockpit
had two side
windows which cranked up and down like an automobile and the
top of the canopy
was framed plexi hinged at the rear and held down by two
latches at the front of
the canopy bow. I had really failed to latch the canopy! I
couldn't believe
it! Turning around at the end of asphalt I started to taxi back to
the pad at
the east end. There in front of me was a scene that I would love
to have had a
movie of. The Mayor, with tails streaming out behind him and
with one hand
holding his top hat on, was running towards me with my canopy
top in his other
hand!

I sedately taxied back, shut down and, retrieving the canopy
from the bowing
Mayor, managed to wedge it back on by bending the broken
hinges and locked it
from the outside. All of this time acting as though this was a
common occurrence

on 38s. After making certain that the canopy top would stay on in flight, my next problem was getting in the cockpit. With the canopy top locked and the side windows down there is about 12 to 14 inches of vertical opening as I recall -- might be more or less. I finally got into the cockpit by getting prone on the wing, crawling through the cockpit opening until my head and shoulders were out the other side, drawing my feet in and then worming my way back into the cockpit and harnessing up. Hardly a graceful exit for the conquering hero. I started up again, cranked up the windows and with the villagers bowing steadily, and probably wondering what was going to happen next, I quietly took off, picked up Hall and proceeded back to base on Oki.

The next day I was ordered down to 5th AF Hqs to be interviewed by the Press.

When I took the podium in the press tent before the top brass of all the correspondents gathered to cover the landing of MacArthur, I started off by saying that there was nothing to write about as it was a routine fighter mission with no highlights that made it newsworthy. I was promptly put in my place by being informed that my business was to fly airplanes and it was their business to decide what was newsworthy. The interview continued.

In more recent years, reading Japanese WWII history, I have learned that on many bases in southern Japan, there were military fanatics who, for several weeks after the Armistice, swore to kill any Americans who set foot on Japanese soil!

There again that great skill and cunning got me down on a safe strip -- no luck involved at all!

What happened to F/O Hall? He was transferred to Hqs, 5th AF as assistant mess officer and returned to the ZI shortly after arriving in Japan. He is now an ordained minister somewhere in New England..

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: May 13, 1997 8:56:18 PM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: What is 'backup theory'?

Mr. Schleede, is the backup theory door opening by metal fatigue or inadvertent unlatching? Please tell me.

Sincerely, John Barry Smith barry@corazon.com

Robert Hager

lead

crash

Discusses the

theory on the

Talks about the

the

backup theory on
disaster

Reconstructing TWA Flight 800

NBC

NEWS

Ê Ê Ê Ê Ten months after TWA Flight 800
exploded in midair and plummeted into the
Atlantic Ocean, investigators are still piecing
together the plane in hopes of finding what may
have caused the tragedy that killed all 230 on
board.

lead

crash

the

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Talks about the
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Ê Ê Ê Ê On Monday, the National Transportation

Safety Board let members of the media tour the hangar where the plane is being re-assembled as a giant jigsaw puzzle. Workers have so far logged 10,000 hours putting together 725 pieces of debris fished out of the ocean. TWA Flight 800 stands 27 feet tall with pieces as small as a thumbnail. The reconstruction so far has cost \$500,000. While FBI investigators are not ready to announce exactly how the plane blew up, they have said it was generally caused by "catastrophic mechanical failure" rather than sabotage.

Nothing indicates a bomb blast took place and nothing indicates a missile penetrated this plane," said NBC aviation correspondent Robert Hager.

Flight

Families of TWA

800

TWA Flight 800
Memorial

Ê Ê Ê Ê Although no date has been set, the FBI criminal investigation is expected to be wrapped up in a few weeks. Then the investigation moves to the lab for a more microscopic look at what happened.

Ê Ê Ê Ê With 5 percent of the plane still missing, investigators hope that won't keep them from finding the answers they are looking for.

Ê Ê Ê Ê In July, the families of the victims will be allowed to tour the reconstruction during events to mark the first anniversary of the disaster.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: May 15, 1997 11:11:25 AM PDT
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: **Don't give up**

To: DICKINAntsbgov
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Don't give up
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:

Mr. Dickinson,
Aviation Week says one of you is intrigued by forward door popping open and streak as reflected light. NBC says NTSB has backup theory.

I'm assuming the intrigued investigator is not Dr. Loeb. I'm assuming the backup theory is not advocated by Dr. Loeb. I'm assuming the backup theory is something along the lines of a rupture in pressurized hull forward of the wing, caused by something, maybe metal fatigue in square corner frame of door or unlatched door.

Whoever in the team believes the above backup theory, don't give up. You are right and lives depend upon your correct explanation of the crash. The mystery still remains of why door area ruptured. Door area must be fixed. Upgrade from backup to alternate.

Wishful thinking is: Not our fault but bad outside forces like terrorists of God with static electricity, anything but the fault is our own: design of square door, outward opening and complex latching system used over and over again.

Door was found closest to event site as reported by Rear Admiral in charge of debris retrieval. That's a fact that will not

go away. Reconstruction must include door area. Push for wider reconstruction in hangar, you have most of the pieces.

There was fireball, there was an explosion in center tank, but after door area ruptured, just like passengers drowned, but after the plane came apart. There is a timing sequence and an event sequence. There was a fireball but not initial event.

Keep on investigating. Door area is a worthy line of investigation based upon evidence in that area.

Good Luck,
John Barry Smith

"NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilot saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said." 10 Mar 97

Robert Hager

lead

the

13 May 97

Discusses the

theory on the crash

Talks about the

backup theory on

disaster

From: Schleede Ron <SCHLEDR@NTSB.gov>
Date: May 19, 1997 10:51:11 AM PDT
To: "John Barry Smith" <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: RE: What is 'backup theory'?

As I have told you before, the cargo door was locked and latched at impact. ron

From: John Barry Smith[SMTP:barry@corazon.com]
Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 1997 11:55 PM
To: Schleede Ron
Subject: What is 'backup theory'?

Mr. Schleede, is the backup theory door opening by metal fatigue or inadvertent unlatching? Please tell me.
Sincerely, John Barry Smith barry@corazon.com

Robert Hager

Discusses the lead

theory on the crash

Talks about the

backup theory on the

disaster

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NBC NEWS

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"Nothing indicates a bomb blast took place and nothing indicates a missile penetrated this plane," said NBC aviation correspondent Robert Hager.

TWA Homepage

Families of TWA Flight

800

TWA Flight 800

Memorial

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disaster.

Email: barry@corazon.com

Page: <http://www.corazon.com/>

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: May 19, 1997 11:54:48 AM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: **Thank you for door reply.**

As I have told you before, the cargo door was locked and latched at impact. ron

Yes, Mr. Schleede, I understand, forward cargo door cam sectors locked around locking pins and locking sectors in place. AD 88-12-04 complied with and steel locking sectors installed.

So that means unlatched door not possible for inadvertent opening of forward cargo door in flight leading to destruction.

There are other ways for FCD to inadvertently open.

I offer door frame failure in corner due to metal fatigue. It happened in Comet based on square windows; could happen for 747 with square door. The principle is the same. Metal needs to be examined closely at two corners of big square panel cut in pressurized hull and cycled many times.

Mid span latch, only one! may have failed and door fractured in half and opened.

The door explanation is based on evidence of other similar crashes. I don't know why door opens. I wish I knew. Also, door explanation is the only one that explains streak, blip, fireball, debris pattern and other evidence including the killer, the sudden loud sound on cvr.

My pride is gone; this is life and death we are talking about.

My current emotional political analysis is this. Who is in charge of the aircraft accident investigation? They had a cop in charge, FBI, he's gone. They have a political appointee, Mr. Hall, he's there. They had a technocrat, Mr. Francis, he's gone. They have a scientist, Dr. Loeb, he's there. Where is the aircraft accident investigator in charge? It should be the lead investigator; it's his title. It's either Mr. Dickinson, yourself, or Mr. Benson or other senior aircraft accident investigator. Aircraft investigators don't scoff at door opening or metal fatigue. They don't cringe at the thought of thousands of planes flying with a potential defect. They don't run away at the thought of added expense of fixing a potential flaw on the planes. They do try to find out what the hell happened and try to stop it happening again. The enemy is death, the only true worthy adversary. The enemy is not reduced profits from retrofits or other changes.

An aircraft accident investigator will investigate an aircraft accident with the correct priorities, other's don't. It's the way it is.

It is in the best interests of all concerned that the correct explanation be found for the crash of TWA 800 even though many involved would like the cause to be: 1; others; as in terrorists or friendly fire, 2. or God, as in static electricity, but afraid of: 3: us being the cause, as in design compromise for fast loading baggage for demanding passengers, or worn metal from decades of hard use, or other human mistake. It could be our fault for the crash of TWA 800. So what? Let's just find out what

it was and skip the wishful thinking.

The American way: think it, design it, build it, use it, break it, fix it, fly it, break it, fix it, fly it.

A worthy line of investigation is the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight leading to the rupture of the pressurized hull and severing of nose section based upon similar evidence of other similar crashes of ruptured hull high time 747s. That pesky door is always near the action.

It needs to be ruled in or out, one way or the other. Door locked and latched. Fine. What else can do it?

Please give as much attention and due investigation to the door opening as the authorities have to bomb, missile, and center tank explosion and even methane gas bubble or meteorites. Interview me as the methane gas person was. I have credentials as commercial pilot and air crash survivor. I will stick to facts and omit the political stuff. (408 659 3552)

I would offer comparisons to other sudden ruptured hull high time 747 crashes, AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and now TWA 800. CVR on all have sudden loud sound before accident, engines Fodded, missing passengers in certain seats, abrupt power cut of FDR, debris pattern and other uncanny similarities of the four lead to the forward door opening for some reason. The hull ruptures forward of the wing on the right side. The door is there. It's metal. It reflects sunlight and radar energy. It did.

Other similarities I can not explain and may be coincidence, until shown otherwise, are: all four high time 747s which had ruptured hulls took off at night, running late of schedule and had EPR gripes.

To separate the wheat from the chaff, very difficult
Thank you again for replying, I apologize again for any frustrating rude remarks I have have made months ago using quick sending email.

There is room for two mechanical lines of investigation for

TWA 800, especially since the cargo door explanation includes the center tank explosion/fire/fireball. They are compatible.

Mr. Schleede, this is a quick reply, permit me to compose a more thoughtful reply to be sent later.

Thank you again for giving consideration to my cargo door explanation.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: May 21, 1997 9:45:13 PM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: Thoughtful reply

Mr. Ron Schleede,
NTSB Aircraft Accident Investigator,
TWA 800 current investigator.

As I have told you before, the cargo door was locked and latched at impact. ron

Well, Mr. Schleede, that's all I have to go on. But it's enough. Here is my thoughtful reply.

We are dealing with life and death here so any effort is worth it to stop the death from happening again.

My goal is easier than yours. My goal is to persuade you that a worthy line of investigation for crash cause of TWA 800 is hull rupture forward of the wing on right side around cargo door.

Your difficult task, if you were persuaded to investigate rupture area, would be to prove or disprove that explanation.

The big picture: From identifying the forest, individual trees make sense. A single tree examined alone does not reveal much.

Here are the Boeing 747 trees and the forest they belong to:

TWA 800 was a solo ruptured pressurized hull event.

PA 103 was a solo ruptured pressurized hull event.

AI 182 was a solo ruptured pressurized hull event.

UAL 811 was a solo ruptured pressurized hull event.

There are other high time Boeing 747 ruptured hull crashes but they were not solo and they involved getting hit by lightning or flying into the water, the ground, or another airplane.

The only three that match TWA 800 are the above alone, sudden, and fatal hull ruptures.

You are on the scene and have seen two of the planes involved, TWA 800 and UAL 811. I contend that had UAL 811 had its weakened nose torn off the sequence of destruction would match TWA 800. Could the weakened nose of 811 have torn off from the 300 knots IAS?

My cargo door explanation is based on the central intelligence of the similarities in solo pressurized hull ruptures. They all have common consequences and leave similar evidence. I included for background reference in my research the three DC-10 cargo door events. Also included in research was PA 125, a Boeing 747 leaking pressurized hull event.

The DC-10 hull ruptures occurred in the aft fuselage as shown by the evidence after the crashes.

The four Boeing 747 hull ruptures and the one leaking hull have all been located to a small area on the large 747: Forward of the wing on the right side, exactly where a huge square hole has been cut into the pressurized hull; the outward opening cargo door.

Let's get specific:

UAL 811, NTSB report states location of rupture was forward of

the wing on right side.

AI 182, Indian report states location of rupture was forward of the wing on the right side.

PA 103, AAIB report states location of rupture was forward of the wing on left side followed immediately by right side rupture.

TWA 800, early New York Times article stated computer simulation located rupture forward of the wing on the right side.

(Documentation of sources is on web site www.corazon.com)

Now to the causes of the solo pressurized hull ruptures of the four planes above: Ah, the causes. It seems that such similar events would have a similar cause but that is not the official position.

The causes have been stated in reports as:

AI 182 as bomb in forward cargo hold or door.

PA 103 as bomb in forward cargo hold.

UAL 811 as bomb or door.

TWA 800 as bomb in forward cargo hold, missile striking forward of the wing on right side, fuel tank explosion severing nose forward of wing, or door.

If TWA 800 had been shown to be bomb then all would be right in the aircraft investigation world. Four catastrophic solo ruptures of 747s; three bombs and one door.

But TWA 800 has been shown not to be a bomb and all is not right in the aircraft investigation world. It doesn't make sense. Something's wrong. If 800 not a bomb, then maybe 103 and 183 not bombs? If not bomb, what?

Let's back up to big picture. The large forest of wide body solo hull ruptures includes three DC-10s and four Boeing 747s. The three DC-10s are definitely in the forest, but are the four Boeing 747s? What else is there to link them to include them as hull ruptures?

If the four Boeing 747 hull ruptures over eleven years can be shown to be extremely similar then they can be assumed to have

one common cause. What is it?

I contend they are so similar that they have one common cause. The common cause is a hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side. It sounds like a circle but that is an important point for us to agree on. Were there hull ruptures on the four planes and did they cause the accident? I say yes.

What caused the hull rupture at that location?

Well, every inch of that area must be examined closely. It is already a dangerous area. Section 41 retrofit was done to correct cracks near the rupture area. Several ADs were issued to correct faults in a door which may lead or did lead to a rupture in that area. The pear design at rupture location is not as strong as a circle or oval found aft, near identical door which has not failed in flight. Historically, hull ruptures have been near squarish corners of holes cut in the pressurized hull; there are squarish corners of a big hole in the rupture area.

Regarding TWA 800, I am assuming the fireball and center tank explosion occurred after hull rupture, not before, based on eyewitness accounts of streak and altitude of fireball lower than that at rupture event. Radar data also supports hull rupture first, then, later and lower, center tank explosion. There was a hull rupture forward of the wing, severing the nose, the time and cause is unknown as this time. If the cause of the hull rupture for TWA 800, the streak, and the radar blip anomaly could all be explained by center tank explosion, and if the ignition source were known, then you would not have emailed me in exasperation about the latches being latched on the 800 door. Center tank explosion does not answer all the questions nor explain all the evidence and as an investigator you would like to have all the loose ends tied up. Me too.

NTSB has been right all along to say mechanical and center tank explosion. NTSB is still right and will be right, it was mechanical and there was a center tank explosion. There is no

incompatibility.

Let's assume for purposes of this thoughtful reply, the fireball occurred later and lower than initial hull rupture.

A hull rupture would cause an explosive decompression which means a sudden loud sound.

1. There was a sudden loud sound on the four 747s CVRs.

A hull rupture would cause a large hole to open up forward of the wing on the right side.

2. There was a large hole on the right side, forward of the wing on the four 747s; the door hole and torn away associated fuselage skin.

At that rupture spot, a weakened nose could be torn off by the tremendous 300 knot slipstream and start a sequence after sudden loud decompression sound:

3. Power abruptly cut at main equipment compartment. All four had abrupt power cut.

4. Passengers sucked out of large hole and ingested into number three engine. All four had at least nine missing, never recovered bodies.

5. Nose falls in dense area on surface. Nose fell in dense area on three planes, on other plane the nose stayed on.

6. Rest of plane disintegrates as it falls leaving wider spread debris pattern. Three had wide debris pattern for noseless planes, other plane kept nose on.

7. Engine number three FODs, catches fire and falls away to land alone. Three number three engines fell away to land separately, two were on fire. Number three engine FODDED on other plane but engine stayed on wing.

8. Inflight damage by debris more severe on right side. Three planes had more severe right side damage and maybe the fourth too.

9. All four planes had ground radar information at time of rupture. Three had nearby lone primary radar blip, the other

might have had but was out of primary radar range.

Discussion: The abrupt power cut would prevent most information about the cause of the rupture from reaching alert lights, the FDR, ground control, or the crew. The streak of 800 was only because the light was such to reflect off the fuselage to ground observers. The other hull ruptures all occurred out of sight of land or at pitch dark.

(There are other similarities of the four not immediately connected to hull rupture: all were high time and took off at night, running behind schedule and with EPR gripes.)

I believe that that is enough significant similarities to state that the four high time Boeing 747 accidents were caused by hull rupture forward of the wing on right side.

If we agree on that, (and I'm sure we do for UAL 811 and AI 182, close on PA 103, and unknown on TWA 800,) then let us consider very closely what needs to be done to determine why hull ruptured.

What causes pressurized hulls to rupture? Lots of reasons. Overpressure caused by bomb or malfunctioning airconditioning, structural defects, design errors, pressure miscalculations, missile penetration, midair collision, faulty windows or doors, and metal fatigue. The evidence must match the exact explanation to be satisfactory.

Mr. Schleede, I bet you know many more than I do. In this case, I defer to a professional aircraft investigator. I consider myself an amateur accident sleuth and can only do far away research without benefit of closeup examination and without years of experience.

Submarines and planes are similar in that pressure is a huge consideration and often underestimated. Subs sink when valves are installed backwards. Planes crash when windows pop.

Ruptured hulls have been around as long as they have been pressurized. The Comet lesson was not learned by the 747. The

DC-10 lesson was not learned by the 747. Do not cut outward opening large square holes in pressurized hulls. If they are cut then the incredible pressure will eventually force it open or the continued use will weaken the structure to failure.

To say a solo hull rupture is caused by large door opening inadvertently or metal fatigue is just to refer to precedent. It's happened before. It's a normal working hypothesis.

To say hull rupture was caused by center tank explosion by unknown ignition source is to be speculative.

A 747 has never had a center tank explosion of unknown origin in good weather. A 747 has had a hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side by an inadvertently opened cargo door. There have been three other very similar accidents and none was a center tank explosion. They all could be structural failure at the rupture zone.

If a worthy line of investigation into the hull rupture of TWA 800 is a center tank explosion, or a bomb, or a missile, then it is certainly a worthy line of investigation to rule in or rule out inadvertent door opening, or metal fatigue, or structural failure at rupture location, forward of wing on right side.

To rule in or rule out rupture cause requires close examination of fuselage metal at corners of door to see if it matches the metal failure pattern of the corners of the squarish windows of the Comet. It requires close examination of the door latching mechanism to confirm the cam latches were latched around the locking pins. It requires examination of stringers, bulkheads, floor beams, skin, and panels for any preexisting failures. It requires close examination around lone mid span latch of door for failure. It requires examination of door seals for leaking and door frame for previous damage or out of rig condition.

Regarding the complex latching system of the forward cargo door: The problem is subtle. It is possible to say that the locking sectors of the door were in the locked position and yet, the door

to be unlatched. The cam sectors around pins is the key item. Was the bottom of the 800 door sill attached to the door latches? Was the door found broken in pieces but unattached to any fuselage? Did the door break at the mid span point? Did the hinge at top of door tear away at corners? Were the locking sectors steel or aluminum?

The rupture evidence of the other crashes now becomes a help. The evidence at the rupture location of 800 can be compared with the evidence of 182, 103, and 811. For instance, the tearing pattern of the rupture location on right side of fuselage for 811 and 103 match almost perfectly, it may match 800 too.

The latch status of FCD of 182 and 103 were unreported, it needs to be determined.

811 is so important and it is so fortunate you are on the 800 case too, Mr. Schleede. You do not scoff at the idea of an open door causing death.

Regarding TWA 800 specifically before fireball: All revealed evidence is consistent with hull rupture forward of wing caused by door failure:

1. Streak is shiny door departing in evening sun.
2. Radar blip is metal door reflecting primary radar energy.
3. Sudden loud sound is sudden loud decompression after door goes.
4. Engine number three would ignite disintegrating wing and fuselage into fireball.

After fireball, evidence is consistent with center tank explosion. Soon to be revealed public docket should be very interesting to contemplate:

1. Engine breakdown report. (FOD on three?)
2. Item wreckage plot. (Door found where?)
3. CVR data. (Frequency match 103?)
4. FDR data. (Any EPR problems?)
5. Radar plots. (Blip close enough to be door?)

6. Photographs of reconstructed fuselage. (Pattern match 103?)
7. Crew conversation. (The last words of the 800 pilot were to initiate a pressure changing event just before his pressurized hull ruptured, "Climb.")

To summarize: A worthy line of investigation into the crash of TWA 800 is the examination of the rupture area forward of the wing on the right side; specifically the forward cargo door area, to rule out failure of door latching mechanism, or door frame at corners, or blow out at mid span, or other structural failure in fuselage. This recommendation is based upon striking similarities to three other solo ruptured fuselage accidents, none of which was a center tank explosion.

Mr. Schleede, this was my thoughtful reply and it is. It may not be tightly organized but the point is the same: please check out the cargo door area thoroughly for mechanical failures. Use hindsight and compare all aspects of the similar earlier crashes of AI 182, PA 103, and UAL 811 to TWA 800. Use history to refer to similar Comet crashes and DC-10 crashes.

Sudden catastrophic airplane crash: New boss same as the old boss: pressurized hull rupture.

Is it possible to determine in your mind, Mr. Schleede, that TWA 800 had a hull rupture? Can you locate it? Can you offer some explanations? What needs to be done to confirm or rule out your explanations?

Let's talk by email or phone about airplane crashes, not necessarily TWA 800. That's certainly appropriate after a public appeal for information by the NTSB. There is much to discuss. I am vitally interested in this probably because of my own military RA-5C crash in which my pilot died and I survived a night fatal fiery sudden jet crash.

We both have the same goal. Success has many fathers while failure is an orphan. Let us succeed and everyone will be happy up and down the line.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
408 659 3552

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: May 24, 1997 8:23:57 AM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: Anniversary Special Suggestion

Mr. Schleede,

The first anniversary of the crash of TWA 800 is less than two months away. Many will be looking at the spot in the sky in which the 747 destructed. I suggest a recreation to test a hypothesis that a piece of the plane came off and reflected evening sunlight as it spun away appearing as a streak to ground observers and to also confirm the metal piece could be picked up on primary ATC radar.

The security guys are very good at recreating what they believe happened, bombs and missiles. Planes are being blown up and missiles fired at other planes. Let the mechanical proponents have an exercise in recreation.

Based upon the TWA 800 streak and mysterious blip at the same time, both could be related. What hypothesis could explain both?

Cargo door could. It would be cheap, safe, and easy to test that idea. In the evenings before the anniversary, observations could be made of regular 747s taking off from Kennedy and passing the event spot at 13700 feet at 300 IAS. The large, short duration, sun reflective flash can be observed off the 747's forward fuselage, moving to engines, aft fuselage, vertical stabilizer, and winglets if 747-400. I have observed this flash many time from my vantage point living under a heavily travelled airway from SF to LA.

On the anniversary evening a C-130 carrying spare old 747 cargo doors or metal object of same size and shapes could fly at 13700 feet as fast as it could go, about 220 IAS, and at 8:31 PM on 17 July, lower the C-130 inward opening aft door and the crew could push out the eight foot by nine foot pieces of shiny radar and sun reflective metal. ATC radar and ground observers could watch to see the track of the object as it slows down horizontally land speeds up vertically in a parabolic curve to the ocean surface. Radar tapes could then be analyzed to see if the object matches the blips before TWA 800 disappearance off scope. Ground observers can be queried to see if observed streak matches the TWA 800 streak. Several passes could be made in the sun reflective window between 8:20 to 8:50 PM.

A mechanical hypothesis would have been tested in a non destructive, safe, cheap, repeatable manner, inadvertent fuselage rupture forward of the wing on the right side. When the streak and radar blip are recreated at the same time and place as TWA 800, a strong case can be made that some part of the airframe flew off just before destruction and two mysteries solved.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: June 6, 1997 12:28:15 PM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: Please pass to Mr. Benson: Let the aircraft accident investigators investigate the aircraft accident

Mr. Schleede, please pass to Mr. Benson. Sincerely, John Barry Smith

Mr. Benson

NTSB aircraft accident investigator

Mr. Benson, I believe you are intrigued that the streak may be sun reflecting off the fuselage of TWA 800. In that case, please check it out, don't let the suspicion lie there.

I deduce you are the one that said the statement to the Aviation Week reporter, Mr. Fuhlgum, who wrote a second official was intrigued because after I emailed you that information my next emails to you became 'undeliverable'. That's called running away. Mr. Benson, don't run away; you are right. You have the correct explanation for the streak, it is the sun reflecting off the fuselage of TWA 800.

There will always be a stone unturned based upon that printed record of the Aviation Week article until the streak is explained. It can be explained and proved with a simple cheap experiment described below.

The first anniversary of the crash of TWA 800 is less than two months away. Many will be looking at the spot in the sky in which the 747 destructed. I suggest a recreation to test a

hypothesis that a piece of the plane came off and reflected evening sunlight as it spun away appearing as a streak to ground observers and to also confirm the metal piece could be picked up on primary ATC radar.

The security guys are very good at recreating what they believe happened, bombs and missiles. Planes are being blown up and missiles fired at other planes. Let the mechanical proponents have an exercise in recreation.

Based upon the TWA 800 streak and mysterious blip at the same time, both could be related. What hypothesis could explain both? Cargo door could. It would be cheap, safe, and easy to test that idea. In the evenings before the anniversary, observations could be made of regular 747s taking off from Kennedy and passing the event spot at 13700 feet at 300 IAS. The large, short duration, sun reflective flash can be observed off the 747's forward fuselage, moving to engines, aft fuselage, vertical stabilizer, and winglets if 747-400. I have observed this flash many time from my vantage point living under a heavily travelled airway from SF to LA.

On the anniversary evening a C-130 carrying spare old 747 cargo doors or metal object of same size and shapes could fly at 13700 feet as fast as it could go, about 220 IAS, and at 8:31 PM on 17 July, lower the C-130 inward opening aft door and the crew could push out the eight foot by nine foot pieces of shiny radar and sun reflective metal. ATC radar and ground observers could watch to see the track of the object as it slows down horizontally land speeds up vertically in a parabolic curve to the ocean surface. Radar tapes could then be analyzed to see if the object matches the blips before TWA 800 disappearance off scope. Blip can be tracked to surface and matched to actual retrieved location of door. Ground observers can be queried to see if observed streak matches the TWA 800 streak. Several passes could be made in the sun reflective window between 8:20

to 8:50 PM.

A mechanical hypothesis would have been tested in a non destructive, safe, cheap, repeatable manner, inadvertent fuselage rupture forward of the wing on the right side. When the streak and radar blip are recreated at the same time and place as TWA 800, a strong case can be made that some part of the airframe flew off just before destruction and two mysteries solved.

Mr. Benson, my goal is easier than yours. My goal is to persuade you that a worthy line of investigation for crash cause of TWA 800 is hull rupture forward of the wing on right side around cargo door. Your difficult task would be to prove or disprove that explanation.

The big picture: From identifying the forest, individual trees make sense. A single tree examined alone does not reveal much. A forest shows the pattern. Here are the trees and the forest they belong to:

TWA 800 was a solo ruptured pressurized hull event.

PA 103 was a solo ruptured pressurized hull event.

AI 182 was a solo ruptured pressurized hull event.

UAL 811 was a solo ruptured pressurized hull event.

There are other high time Boeing 747 ruptured hull crashes but they involved flying into the water, the ground, or another airplane; or getting hit by lightning.

The only three that match TWA 800 are the above.

I contend that had UAL 811 had its weakened nose torn off the sequence of destruction would match TWA 800.

My cargo door explanation is based on the central intelligence of the similarities in solo pressurized hull ruptures. They all have common consequences and leave similar evidence. I included for background reference in my investigation the three DC-10 cargo door events. Also included in research was PA 125, a Boeing 747 leaking pressurized hull event.

The DC-10 hull ruptures occurred in the aft fuselage as shown

by the evidence after the crashes.

The four Boeing 747 hull ruptures and the one leaking hull have all been located to a small area on the large 747: Forward of the wing on the right side: Exactly where a huge square hole has been cut into the pressurized hull; the cargo door.

Let's get specific:

UAL 811, rupture occurred forward of wing on right side.

AI 182, rupture occurred forward of wing on right side.

PA 103, rupture occurred forward of wing on left and right side.

TWA 800, rupture occurred forward of wing on right side.

Now we get to facts: Do you agree with the above?

We have to agree to the facts or the conclusions may be false.

UAL 811, NTSB report states location of rupture was forward of the wing on right side.

AI 182, Indian report states location of rupture was forward of the wing on the right side.

PA 103, AAIB report states location of rupture was forward of the wing on left side followed by right side.

TWA 800, early New York Times article stated computer simulation located rupture forward of the wing on the right side.

I have all the documentation if curious.

Now to the causes of the solo pressurized hull ruptures of the four planes above: Ah, the causes. It seems that such similar events would have a similar cause but that is not the official position.

The causes have been stated in reports as:

AI 182 as bomb in forward cargo hole or door.

PA 103 as bomb in forward cargo hole.

UAL 811 as bomb or door.

TWA 800 as bomb in forward cargo hole, missile striking forward of the wing on right side, fuel tank explosion severing nose forward of wing, or door.

If TWA 800 had been shown to be bomb then all would be right

in the aircraft investigation world. Four ruptures of 747s, three bombs and one door.

But TWA 800 has been shown not to be a bomb and all is not right in the aircraft investigation world. It doesn't make sense. Something's wrong. If 800 not a bomb, then maybe 103 and 183 not bombs?

Let's back up to big picture. The large forest of wide body solo hull ruptures includes three DC-10s and four Boeing 747s. The three DC-10s are definitely in the forest, are the four Boeing 747s? What else is there to link them?

If the four Boeing 747 hull ruptures over eleven years can be shown to be extremely similar then they can be assumed to have one common cause.

I contend they are so similar that they have one common cause. The common cause is a hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side. It sounds like a circle but that is an important point for us to agree on. Were there hull ruptures on the four planes and did they cause the accident? I say yes.

What caused the hull rupture at that location?

Well, every inch of that area must be examined closely. It is already a dangerous area. Section 41 retrofit was done to correct cracks near the rupture area. Several ADs were issued to correct faults which may lead or did lead to a rupture in that area. The pear design at rupture location is not as strong as a circle or oval found aft. Historically hull ruptures have been near squarish corners of holes cut in the pressurized hull; there are squarish corners in the rupture area.

Regarding TWA 800, I am assuming the fireball and center tank explosion occurred after hull rupture, not before, based on eyewitness accounts of streak and altitude of fireball lower than that at rupture event. Radar data also supports hull rupture, then later and lower, center tank explosion. There was a hull rupture forward of the wing, severing the nose, the cause is unknown as

this time. If the cause of the hull rupture for TWA 800 and the streak and the radar blip anomaly could all be explained by center tank explosion, and the ignition source were known, then you would not have emailed me in exasperation about the latches being latched on the 800 door. Center tank explosion does not answer all the questions and explain all the evidence and as an investigator you would like to have all the loose ends tied up.

NTSB has been right all along to say mechanical and center tank explosion. NTSB is still right and will be right, it was mechanical and there was a center tank explosion.

Let's assume the fireball occurred later and lower than initial hull rupture.

A hull rupture would cause an explosive decompression which means a sudden loud sound. 1. There was a sudden loud sound on the four 747s CVRs.

A hull rupture would cause a large hole to open up forward of the wing on the right side. 2. There was a large hole on the right side, forward of the wing on the four 747s.

At that rupture spot, a weakened nose could be torn off by the tremendous 300 knot slipstream and start a sequence after sudden loud decompression sound:

3. Power abruptly cut as main equipment compartment. All four had abrupt power cut.

4. Passengers sucked out of large hole and ingested into number three engine. All four had at least nine missing never recovered bodies.

5. Nose falls in dense area on surface. Nose fell in dense area on three.

6. Rest of plane disintegrates as it falls leaving wider spread debris pattern. Three had wide debris pattern for noseless plane.

7. Engine number three catches fire and falls away to land alone. Three number three engines fell away to land separately, two were on fire.

8. Inflight damage by debris more severe on right side. Three planes has more severe right side damage and maybe the fourth too.

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Discussion: The abrupt power cut would prevent most information about the cause of the rupture from reaching alert lights, the FDR, ground control, or the crew. The streak of 800 was only because the light was such to reflect off the fuselage to ground observers. The other hull ruptures all occurred out of sight of land or at pitch dark.

There are other similarities of the four not immediately connected to hull rupture: all were high time and took off at night, running behind schedule and with EPR gripes.

I believe that that is enough significant similarities to state that the four high time Boeing 747 accidents were caused by hull rupture forward of the wing on right side.

If we agree on that, (and I'm sure we do for UAL 811 and AI 182, close on PA 103, and unknown on TWA 800,) then let us consider very closely what needs to be done to determine why hull ruptured.

What causes pressurized hulls to rupture? Lots of reasons. Overpressure caused by bomb or malfunctioning airconditioning, leaking seals, structural defects, design errors, pressure miscalculations, faulty windows or doors, and metal fatigue.

I defer to a professional aircraft investigator. I consider myself an amateur accident sleuth and can only do far away research without benefit of closeup examination and without years of experience.

Submarines and planes are similar in that pressure is a huge consideration and often underestimated. Subs sink when valves are installed backwards. Planes crash when windows pop.

Ruptured hulls have been around as long as they have been pressurized. The Comet lesson was not learned by the 747. The DC-10 lesson was not learned by the 747. Do not cut outward opening large square holes in pressurized hulls. If they are cut then the incredible pressure will eventually force it open or the continued use will weaken the structure to failure.

To say a solo hull rupture is caused by large door opening inadvertently or metal fatigue is just to refer to precedent. It's happened before.

To say hull rupture was caused by center tank explosion by unknown ignition source is to be speculative.

A 747 has never had a center tank explosion of unknown origin. A 747 has had a hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side by an inadvertently opened cargo door.

If a worthy line of investigation into the hull rupture of TWA 800 is a center tank explosion, or a bomb, or a missile, then it is certainly a worthy line of investigation to rule in or rule out inadvertent door opening, or metal fatigue, or structural failure at rupture location, forward of wing on right side.

To rule in or rule out rupture cause requires close examination of fuselage metal at corners of door to see if it matches the metal failure pattern of the corners of the squarish windows of the Comet. It requires close examination of the door latching mechanism to confirm the cam latches were latched around the locking pins. It requires examination of stringers, bulkheads, floor beams, skin, and panels for any failures. It requires close examination around lone mid span latch of door for failure. It requires examination of door seals for leaking and door frame for previous damage or out of rig condition.

Regarding the complex latching system of the forward cargo door: The problem is subtle. It is possible to say that the locking sectors of the door were in the locked position and yet, the door to be unlatched. Was the bottom of the door sill attached to the

door latches? Was the door found broken in pieces but unattached to any fuselage? Did the door break at the mid span point? Did the hinge at top of door tear away at corners?

The rupture evidence of the other crashes now becomes a help. The evidence at the rupture location of 800 can be compared with the evidence of 182, 103, and 811. For instance, the tearing pattern of the rupture location for 811 and 103 match almost perfectly, it may match 800 too.

The latch status of FCD of 182 and 103 were unreported, it needs to be determined.

To summarize: A worthy line of investigation into the crash of TWA 800 is the examination of the rupture area forward of the wing on the right side; specifically the forward cargo door area, to rule out failure of door latching mechanism, or door frame at corners, or blow out at mid span, or other structural failure in fuselage. The recommendation is based upon striking similarities to three other solo ruptured fuselage accidents.

Mr. Benson, where are the accident investigators? All the public sees are the politicians, Mr. Clinton and Mr. Hall, the political appointees, Mr. Francis, (and where did he go to?) the cops, Mr. Kallstrom, and the scientist, Dr. Loeb. None is a qualified aircraft accident investigator and therefore have their own bias and priorities. They are good at what they do, too bad they don't investigate aircraft accidents.

Let me hear from the accident investigators, Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Schleede or yourself that the initial event of TWA 800 was the center tank explosion. You won't say it because it's not true. It doesn't fit the facts, only wishful thinking.

The center tank explosion is contrary to eyewitnesses putting fireball lower than 13700 feet, contrary to radar showing disintegration later, contrary to ignition source requirement, contrary to debris pattern showing dense nose first on flight path, then rest of fuselage and wing, and contrary to statistics that

show center tank explosion has not happened before in a Boeing 747.

Fuselage rupture at cargo door is consistent with eyewitnesses of streak descending in parabolic arc, consistent with radar blip anomaly, consistent with debris pattern of nose severed and rest of wing and fuselage falling and disintegrating, consistent with ignition source of engine number three fiddled on fire, burnt and mingling with wing fuel, and consistent with statistics that a fuselage has ruptured before at cargo door with UAL 811.

It is time for an accident investigator to take charge of the accident investigation. It is what you have trained for and waited for your whole life. This is the big one. You have paid your dues slogging around in the mud on Mooney's or Bonanzas that take off at high altitude fields in the summer on a hot day with full fuel and four occupants. You've taken the pictures of cables rigged in reverse. Now is the time to treat TWA 800 like an aircraft accident and not some political idea that can squeeze more money out of passengers for more security because it was a bomb or absolve someone of blame because God started the fire/explosion. It was an accident to a plane that has happened before, it left ample real evidence, and the cause is mundane, mechanical door popped open. Why did the fuselage rupture at the cargo door? I don't know and that's where the real investigators take over from me, the amateur.

I urge you to take charge. Who decided to stop the fuselage reconstruction at the aft edge of the cargo door? Not an aircraft investigator. An aircraft investigator would ask that the whole plane be reconstructed. Money is an issue? I don't think so. To not reconstruct the fuselage forward of the wing on the right side all the way to the nose is not right and shows a bias towards proving center tank explosion.

By prematurely stating cause as center tank fire there is now a schism between the FAA and the NTSB so even the politicians

are screwing up the investigation. It's time for the aircraft investigators, that's you, sir, to step up and do the job of investigating the aircraft accident. Do basic investigative techniques which are now more difficult because the evidence has been tampered with by bomb residue seeking FBI investigators. They tinkered with everything. You have a very daunting task of rebutting politicians and reconstructing altered wreckage.

As long as the streak is unexplained the US Navy will be blamed for something they did not do, accidentally shoot down TWA 800. The C-130 door streak experiment should be carried out even if only as a chance to exonerate the Navy.

It's not too late. Conduct the experiment, find the explanation that fits the facts rather than an explanation that people want to hear but requires ignoring of evidence.

The streak and the blip is the door spinning away. Mysteries explained. Center tank explosion as initial event does not explain those two facts. Facts ignored. Cargo door does explain.

A worthy line of investigation for the cause of the crash of TWA 800 is a fuselage rupture forward of the wing on the right side in the vicinity of the forward cargo door. Why did fuselage rupture? Plain and simple to ask; extremely difficult to answer.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: June 7, 1997 9:54:21 AM PDT
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: Why streak is not fuel leak.

Mr. Schleede, Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Benson, Aircraft accident investigators:

The below story just came out. Calling the streak leaking fuel is really a stretch and the sign of a desperate center tank theorist. I don't believe any of you support it. It's not true and here's why:

1. The plane was in full sunlight, not darkness. The leaking fuel as streak explanation was given by a lawyer, Lee Kriendler, months ago. A ground based person thinks if it's dark on the ground, it's dark up at the plane. Wrong. The plane was in full sunlight at 831PM at 13700 feet. A fuel leak on fire would look like a fuel leak on fire, short and horizontal if seen within a mile.
2. A fuel leak burning would be very short, not the long parabolic streak as stated by eyewitnesses.
3. A burning fuel leak stays close to the plane and does not move away from the plane as the eyewitnesses described it, a dot descending in parabolic arc.
4. A burning leak would be straight line behind plane in 300 knot slipstream, not arcing away.
5. Burning fuel leak? Never happened before in Boeing 747 nor any other airliner. Happened in Japanese Zeroes on fire in WW II, Mr. Kriendlers generation of experience.
6. No supporting evidence of burnt fuselage skin along fuel leak.
7. It doesn't make sense of explosion in center tank gives fuel leak? Why not explosion blows plane out of sky? And then later explosion blows plane out of sky after first explosion just gives fuel leak?
8. What about this new band of fuselage that tears away? If you consider that a band of metal can tear away forward of the wing severing nose, then consider door going and tearing strip of

fuselage away severing nose as happened before.

Fuel leak as streak does not explain radar blip anomaly at same time as streak.

So, a lawyer's idea is now forefront, leaking fuel from explosion in center tank ignites somehow and looks like streak to observers miles away. FBI says bomb, conspiracy fellows say missile, scientists say methane gas. I say cargo door.

When will the aircraft accident investigators stand up and give a reasonable, happened before explanation that fits the facts, fuselage rupture forward of the wing on the right side where cargo door opened up and departed, spinning away in sunlight giving streak and radar blip, nose severed after huge hole appears in nose, leading to disintegration of wing and ignited by burning number three engine?

Why does ABC, CBS, CNN, Aviation Week all get discussion with NTSB but educated experienced pilot citizen get ignored? Talk to me. I have facts, I have documentation. I have research. I have been in a night fiery fatal sudden jet crash. I know whereof I speak.

Do the streak/radar blip experiment with a C-130 by throwing metal doors out at 13700 feet at same sun angle.

I was in a RA-5C where we would dump fuel out of rear dump valve between the two J79 jet engines. Then we would ignite afterburners. A horizontal line of light would result as long as the burners were on. With ignition source off the fire stops and the fuel goes back to being fuel. The line was short, horizontal and could only be seen by observers on flight deck of carrier less than a mile away. Fuel leak from 747 which catches fire does not match eyewitness accounts of a long streak moving away from the plane descending in a parabolic arc as reported by pilot eyewitnesses in the area. Departing cargo door does.

Cop, newspaper reporters, lawyers, scientists, laymen, all have theories and all get extensive airplay and professional

consideration, when will it be cargo door's turn? An explanation that has happened before to the same type plane, that leaves similar evidence on recorders, and is mechanical and fixable.

Methane gas, missile, bomb, fuel leak, center tank explosion, all given time, thought, and money, but nothing to inadvertent opening of forward cargo door in flight, an explanation offered within days of the TWA 800 crash. Very strange. Checking a few latches does not constitute investigating forward cargo door and frame for failure.

My only explanation of the oversight is that the cargo door explanation leads to Pan Am 103, a mythic plane that must always be destroyed by terrorists bombers even though it wasn't.

Well, Mr. Dickinson, Mr. Schleede, and Mr. Benson, the evidence speaks for itself, the crashes are so similar that they must be included in same cause. Aircraft investigators use basic techniques to deduce the cause of a crash and one technique is to group all similar crashes together to look for a pattern. There is one with TWA 800 and the pattern is the same for UAL 811, AI 182, and PA 103. I didn't make those patterns up, I discovered them. They are on the web site www.corazon.com, hundreds and hundreds of pages of scanned in government accident reports from which the relevant factual similarities are drawn.

Philosophically, why does anyone make their mind up? How do people decide things? I used to think it was observation of facts meshed with personal experience. With airplane crashes I am beginning to think it is hysterical wishful thinking based on primal panic of falling.

Let the press or emotion appealing lawyers come up with explanations, and let them fall away by the light of evidence. I put my whole trust in the correct explanation for the cause of TWA 800 in the hands of professional aircraft accident investigators. I trust in the methodology taught in aircraft investigator school. I trust in the routine collection of data and

the non emotional interpretation of it, determining the sequence of the crash, the cause and let the chips fall where they may. The goal is to stop it from happening again.

The pattern of the crashes includes only high time Boeing 747s, as time goes on, they all get older and more susceptible to the cargo door area failing. Buildup of fuel vapors should happen to new ones as well as the center tank explosion is aging independent. The pattern is high time 747s, just like TWA 800 with its 93000 plus hours on airframe.

Fuselage rupture forward of wing on right side in forward cargo door area. Why door opened is still mystery; there are at least twelve reasons to check out, from unlatching to cargo shift, to metal fatigue in frame corners.

The strip tearing off in latest theory is a start, that idea sounds as if it came from a real accident investigator. It's true, fuselage skin did tear off leading to severing of nose. That strip tearing off idea means that the nose coming off when huge hole appears after door and skin tear off is plausible. I assume there is some evidence to support that skin tearing off explanation.

Those are the two mental hurdles, the nose coming off after huge hole appears when door goes tearing skin with it, and PA 103 not a bomb. One hurdle jumped, the nose severing when skin tears off, the PA 103 not a bomb as initial event hurdle can also be explained, and is on web site, www.corazon.com

Please correspond, please discuss, please evaluate cargo door explanation.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith
408 659 3552 phone

barry@corazon.com email

www.corazon.com web site

551 Country Club

Drive

Carmel Valley, CA 93924

New Theory to Explain "Missile"

in TWA Crash

NEW YORK -

Investigators looking into reports of

"missile" sightings

before the crash of TWA Flight

800 now believe the

streak of light witnesses

reported seeing may

actually have been a stream

of burning fuel.

help to clear up one puzzling

The new theory could

crash of the Paris-bound

element of the July 17

Island, New York, which killed

jumbo jet off Long

CNN reported during the

230 people, CBS and

weekend.

Investigators now

believe an explosion in the jet's
a trail of burning fuel that
reports of a mysterious
which led to early theories
down by a missile.

ring of fuselage from the
section to break off and fall
according to the new theory.

plane, still powered by four
continued to ascend at a sharp
on the damaged right wing
explosion and fireball,
reports said.

story Friday, and CNN did
their reports. Inspectors

center fuel tank spewed
could explain witness
streak of light, accounts
the plane was brought

The first blast stripped a
plane, causing the nose
13,000 feet to the sea,

The remainder of the
running engines,
angle until acute stress
fuel tank caused the final
the television news

CBS, which reported the
not name the sources for
from the National

Transportation Safety Board

that there is no evidence
a bomb or a missile.

about the light streaks is
investigators no closer to a final
cause of the crash, the news

have repeatedly stressed
the crash was caused by

Even if their new theory
true, it brings
determination of the
reports said.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: June 9, 1997 10:05:42 AM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: We agree on so many things.

"Our guys are very dogged at this," the source said. "We'll figure it out." (From Newsday on newest NTSB theory.)

Me too.

Mr. Schleede, the new NTSB theory is very interesting.

1. NTSB says door came off.
2. NTSB says strip of skin came off.
3. NSTSB says strip of skin came off and led to severing of nose.
4. NTSB has forward cargo hold penetrated.

Well, sir, cargo door explanation says the same thing!

You say small door and I say big door.

I say strip of skin attached to large door forward of the wing
when it opens and you say strip forward of wing.

I say nose severed when strip of skin went and you say so too.

I say forward cargo hold penetrated by door opening and you say

spar pierced it.

So, the similarities are so striking, Mr. Schleede, as to warrant continuing to match cargo door explanation.

Center tank explosion as initial event rules out cargo door opening.

Cargo door explanation includes center tank explosion.

My theory is compatible with yours.

Now, the access door may have caused the streak and the radar blip, yes? I say it was the big door causing streak, it could be small door. Only way to find out is to recreate the test by having C130 fly up there at 13700 feet at same sun angle and lower aft inward opening door and throw out different sizes of door, your size and my size and some inbetween or larger.

It's a cheap way to confirm access door theory and explains streak and explains blip and get Navy off the hook for missile.

Your door and my door could be the streak and blip, very important to confirm, one way or the other and it can be done soon and cheap and safely.

Also, Mr. Schleede, my email source tells me the wreckage pattern showed engine number three significantly apart from the other three. Well, that is the pattern of PA 103 and AI 182. Come on, now, too much similarity for a coincidence.

And was there an overpressure reading on the flight engineers panel before destruction?

Were the engines scrapped? My source writes:

(>Do you have a pre event TWA:800 Flight Engineer's report of an over

pressurization? I haven't seem this one it is only a rumor to me> ??

Also, from P&W engineers in W.Palm Beach.. the recovered engines were scrapped as the NTSB??)

Mr. Schleede, the above is all unsubstantiated email info but if true, very significant. The overpressure could press out large door just enough to get lip edge caught in slipstream forcing it open. The engines scrapped is terrible because they reveal what was sucked into them, from center tank explosion or baggage compartment.

Well, Mr. Schleede, the investigation proceeds, I consider the noose tightening around the serial killer cargo door as the authorities close in, closer and closer.

A rupture of the fuselage forward of the wing on the right side near the cargo door can certainly lead to a center tank explosion, especially when a strip of skin tears off and severs the nose. What happens to a 747 flying headless into 300 knot air? It comes apart and fuel meets hot jet engines foddled and spitting flame, fireball, center tank explosion.

First, in my explanation, cargo door opens/fails, why? Still don't know but could be unlatched or metal fatigue in corners of large square hole cut in pressurized hull.

Early departing access door as streak and blip must be checked out once presented as theory. It can be cheap, safe, and fast. Please include large sizes as well as small sizes to throw out just after sunset on the ground and in full sunlight at 13700 feet same distance from primary ATC radar and observers on ground. See if streak and blip can be recreated. Or at least how big metal strip has to be to be seen as streak and blip.

I am much encouraged by this new theory. It supports cargo door more than ever and is supported by NTSB facts. Mainly, strip of skin torn off of nose forward of the wing can sever nose. That is a very big mental hurdle to overcome. Why did UAL 811 stay on? Plane was not extremely high time as others whose nose did come off and the pilot said he had just come off autopilot and did not fight the plane as it gyrated after cargo door popped and left sudden loud sound on the 811 CVR and abrupt power cut to

the 811 FDR and other similar evidence of 811 which matches other fatal high time Boeing 747 crashes.

The forest of other similar crashes must be examined for similarities and clues. AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800, and Pan Am 125 are all related.

Aircraft investigators look at the forest, the politicians look at the tree. Politicians are not too concerned about passengers on airplanes far away long ago that died. Aircraft accident investigators are interested in planes that crashed far away, long ago when they match a recent plane crash nearby. Accidents reports on those far away long ago crashes are on web site www.corazon.com

Sincerely,

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NTSB Report Reveals Anatomy of Explosion

By Sylvia Adcock and Robert E. Kessler. STAFF
WRITERS

Deep inside the center fuel tank of the Boeing 747, beams more than six feet high divide the cavernous living-room-sized structure

into narrow compartments. An obscure access door with a hatchlike cover is used only rarely, when mechanics need to walk from

one cell to another.

This, investigators now know, is where the disintegration of Flight 800 began. The access door blew off its beam. Another beam

crashed forward. And a third beam was forced into the cargo hold.

That, according to a 150-page draft report, was the beginning of the end.

Like detectives in a crime novel, investigators from the National Transportation Safety Board have pieced together in astonishing

detail the last moments of TWA Flight 800. Using microscopic metallurgic images, debris field diagrams that show the order in

which the wreckage came off the plane, examinations of soot patterns and knowledge based on years of experience sifting through

wreckage at crash sites, they have produced a document

unprecedented in crash investigations.

"It's far more extensive than anything we've ever done," said NTSB spokesman Peter Goelz.

The report, which is preliminary, will not be formally released until the NTSB holds public hearings on the crash's cause, expected

sometime this fall. But investigators have been able to establish the location of the initial explosive force, between two structural

beams near the center of the tank. They have detailed the destruction of the plane, beginning with the first torn pieces of metal in

the center tank, to the cracking keel beam beneath it, to the tear in the fuselage that began running up toward the windows until the

front end of the airplane broke off.

The report, discussed last week by NTSB sources who asked not to be identified, concludes that the explosion originated in one of

two center compartments of the fuel tank and ripped its way through the beams, forcing the front wall of the tank into the cargo hold.

In one instant, that action cut the electrical power to the airplane, severed the power sources for both "black boxes" that record

mechanical data and cockpit sounds, and weakened the fuselage, initiating the plane's breakup.

The report makes it clear that the NTSB has no doubt that a fuel-air explosion brought down the plane July 17, killing

230 people.

And it has given law-enforcement investigators enough reason to say that they are now leaning toward a mechanical theory and may

pull out of the crash investigation in a matter of weeks.

A key to determining the initial breakup sequence was this fact: Only three parts of the center fuel tank were found in the

westernmost debris field, the area along the flight path closest to Kennedy Airport. That area held the parts that came off the plane

first.

In that field was the access door from deep within the tank, a piece of the beam still attached. It was notable for its unusual damage

and because it was very lightly sooted, in direct contrast to the rest of the beam, which had been in contact with more fire and was

found in a debris field to the east. In other words, the access door left the plane before it erupted into a fireball.

Parts of the two beams directly in front of the access door, along with a 13.5-foot section of the plane's keel beam, which runs

underneath the tank, were in the same lightly sooted condition and in the same debris field.

A source who was in the hangar at Calverton last August remembered that even then, the month after the crash, the door attracted

attention. "It was real distinctive, the damage that was

done to it. It was bent forward. It was pretty clear it had been subjected to an explosion," the source said.

Despite the detail with which investigators have been able to reconstruct the midair breakup, they have been frustrated by their lack

of knowledge about how the force of a fuel-air explosion moves through a fuel tank - a complex, compartmentalized structure

divided by walls with baffles that allow fuel to flow from one section to another. NTSB sources say it's likely that a flamefront from the

ignition source moved from one cell to another, but the way it moves is dependent upon many factors.

In April, experts from some of the world's leading research laboratories and universities flew to Long Island, meeting in a hotel to

study the evidence. The group disbanded without drawing any conclusions, and knew they would have to start from scratch learning

about fuel-tank explosions.

The agency plans a battery of tests to help explain what happened, including computer models, tests of small-scale fuel tank models

and a fuel-air explosion test on a full-size Boeing 747 center fuel tank.

"We've got the best in the world working for us. I sat in a room with forty of these people . . . in which it was clear how little we do

know," said an NTSB source.

What is known is that the volatile fuel-air mixture in the nearly empty center tank exploded from deep within the tank with a force

that appeared to move forward. "We know that the forward part of the fuel tank failed. We know that the airplane opened up just in

front of it, that it opened up just enough so that the nose could no longer be supported," the NTSB source said.

Examination of soot on the wreckage - how much of it and where it was - provided valuable clues. For instance, an airplane part that

was lightly sooted was blown off the airplane early, before the rest of the plane erupted in a fireball when the wing tanks broke open.

If the fractured edge of a broken piece of metal is clean and the rest of the part is burned, then the part broke apart after it was

burned.

Investigators say they aren't sure if the access door was the first part of the plane subjected to the explosive force. It may have been

ripped off by pressure from an explosion coming from the rear, or by the failure of the keel beam underneath it a split-second later.

"The manufacturing access door . . . and a small portion of the web above the door were recovered from the red area indicating early

departure from the airplane," the preliminary sequence

report said. "Final separation of the door . . . indicated that the pressure on

the aft surface of the door was significantly greater on the forward surface for the door at the time."

The first true structural failure was in the next beam forward, called the spanwise beam No. 3, which crashed into the front wall of the

tank, remaining attached to the floor of the tank but tipping forward. Then the front wall of the tank, called the front spar, was forced

into the cargo hold.

The combination of the failure of the front spar and the blast itself caused the skin of the lower part of the fuselage to begin peeling,

continuing up until the front end of the plane forward of the wings broke free. The rest of the plane erupted into a fireball when the

right wing tank broke open.

Nowhere, investigators say, is there any evidence of a bomb or missile - only the distinctive residue of a fuel-air explosion. But

investigators have not entirely eliminated the possibility that a projectile from outside the plane could have entered the tank and

ignited it.

James Kallstrom, who is running the FBI's investigation into the crash, sent a letter to victims' families last week saying the FBI is in

the "last phase" of its criminal probe. Kallstrom said

experts would continue to examine the holes and punctures in the three-dimensional mockup of the plane for the next 60 to 120 days. "We hope that we can then say with certainty that this tragedy was or wasn't the result of a criminal or terrorist act," Kallstrom wrote.

An NTSB source said its investigators are optimistic that they can determine what ignited the center fuel tank vapors, even if it means a process of eliminating potential ignition sources - until they are left with one or two possibilities - in laboratory tests.

Potential ignition sources include an electric spark from wires near or in the tank, the fuel probes, the pumps in the rear of the tank or a static electric buildup.

"Our guys are very dogged at this," the source said. "We'll figure it out."

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06/08

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: June 14, 1997 8:21:55 AM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: Letter/email to Senator McCain

Mr. Schleede,

Below is email/letter sent to Senator John McCain regarding TWA 800 and other items. I again welcome the opportunity to discuss with you the nuts and bolts of the already released information about TWA 800 and of course the twisted nuts and bolts of previous 747 crashes, 182, 103, and 811.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

To: JulieSwinglemccainsenategov

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: Explanation for not waiting/cargo door/Secret Service referral

Cc:

Bcc:

X-Attachments:

John McCain, Arizona,
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
United States Senate

Dear Senator John McCain,

13 Jun 97

Thank you again for the valuable time spent in your extensive reply to me. You said in your D-Day letter, "However, I believe it is appropriate at this time to await the report of the crash investigation. I hope you will do the same." I responded by saying I can't and explanation to follow. This is my explanation.

There is no time, sir. We are out of time. We are living on borrowed time as it is.

I will put the entire persuasive argument to you from me on one piece of evidence: the streak. If the recent explanation of your official advisers makes more sense than the explanation of this wacky guy in California on the net in a converted garage, then waiting is the proper thing to do. If my way, the way of a white haired retired military officer jet plane crash survivor, who presents documented support for a explanation which is common sense and has happened before, is chosen, then there are certain immediate steps to be taken which are described later in this letter.

Steak: A bomb, missile, or center tank explosion does not satisfactorily explain the streak; cargo door does. That is the bottom line. If you believe, fellow pilot, that the NTSB explanation of streak as leaking fuel after center tank explosion which somehow catches fire and is seen by ground observers ten miles away looking at a plane in bright sunlight, then the thing to do is "...await the report of the crash investigation."

If you can't believe that leaking jet fuel in a 300 knot slipstream would ignite, stay lit, not be straight and horizontal but change shape and direction, and then be visible for miles and miles as it descends to the ocean, then please consider another explanation, one which was offered as soon as the eyewitness reports of streak appeared and has held steady ever since, a shiny metal object spinning away in the evening sun being seen miles away by ground observers as a streak as it decelerated from 300 knots to

zero horizontally and accelerated from zero knots to 220 knots vertically as it descended from 13700 feet to the surface of the ocean in a parabolic arc. The shiny metal door was also picked up by primary ATC radar at the same time as streak and shown as mystery blips. Center tank explanation omits mystery radar blip explanation, cargo door includes it.

So, Senator, two explanations: Streak as ignited leaking fuel, or spinning away metal object. I put my entire argument on the line right there.

I waited before and 230 people died and I know why. If I had been more persistent I might have prevented the crash. I have been following the 747 cargo door as serial killer since 1990 when I published an article in an aviation newsletter; then 1992 in a letter to Flying magazine; then extended correspondence in 1995 with an insurance executive imploring him to investigate cargo door as cause of crash of one of his insured airplanes. He put me off with reassurances about experts. I waited. TWA 800 crashed in 1996. I should not have waited.

I am not waiting now. Here's how a reluctant authority rebuffs. It says, "Wait until the data is assembled and interpreted and presented by experts." The person waits and reads the report and finds problems and reports the problems. The government replies, "Where were you when the investigation was going on? Why did not you make your concerns known then? If it's so important why did you wait so long? The report is done, it's too late. Go somewhere else and appeal. Good day. Thank you for interest in aviation safety."

Here is what else happens to amateur sleuths. The government gathers the routine data but keeps the evidence to itself. A little bit leaks out but not much. The person goes to the government agencies and reports on his research which relies on news reports and the government response is, "Where's your evidence, you've got no evidence, you can't believe the newspapers, come back

when you have some facts. In the meantime the experts will tell you what's going on at the appropriate time. Good day. Thank you for your interest in aviation safety." Experienced amateurs' opinions regarding their specialty are ignored by a government that is aloof and isolated. I know what I'm talking about when it comes to sudden fiery night fatal jet crashes, and so do you, Senator.

I'm trusting your Navy training, sir, same as mine. What makes sense? What is real and what is wishful thinking? Work through terror. Fight panic. Defer to reality.

My strength comes from NTSB reports. I respect the NTSB. My research base is the NTSB reports of the UAL 811 accident. That is the model for other 747 crashes and is the plane that came back to reveal what happened to it; cargo door opened in flight, nine dead. UAL 811 is the same as TWA 800 up until the nose coming off. UAL 811's nose stayed on; TWA 800 didn't.

The NTSB is moving towards the correct answer but too slow and a little bit off in direction. My web site, www.corazon.com, has scanned in NTSB reports for documentation support. (By the way, your Senate web servers are still unable to receive pictures, a deplorable situation.)

Our goal is the same, prevent death by preventing airplane crashes by explaining crash and fixing it. Our passenger citizens are now at risk. Our aviation industry is now at risk. Our country's manufacturing reputation is at risk. And all because recently a high time Boeing 747 took off at night running late and disintegrated in the air leaving a sudden loud sound on the CVR, an abrupt power cut to the FDR, foddred engines, and missing bodies; and it's happened in 1985, 1988, 1989 and now in 1996 with the identical evidence named above. Four exact sequences: four different official explanations. One official explanation is correct, the NTSB explanation for UAL 811 as forward cargo door opening in flight.

But only one had a streak; all the others were high up in pitch darkness; only one was in direct sunlight at 8:31 PM on July 17th at 13700 feet ten miles off Long Island.

The streak can be recreated. The radar blip can be recreated. Should you believe that the spinning away shiny metal object explanation for streak is worthy of investigation, then conduct an experiment to assist the NTSB in their leaking fuel story or confirm cargo door as streak. The NTSB explanation has an access door blowing away after the center tank explodes which leads to leaking fuel. Have a C-141/C-130 fly at 13700 feet at 300 knots at same sun angle as TWA 800 and toss out various sized shiny metal objects from the aft inward opening C-130/C141 door. The access door, small as it is, may be seen as streak and on radar. Cargo door, big as it is, will be seen as streak and radar blip. Either way the experiment will assist in the NTSB investigation. And our Navy gets cleared of preposterous friendly fire suspicion.

I know, unfortunately distracting, will be the media circus with live CNN tracking the C-141 as it approaches the destruct point off Long Island. All eyes will be on that fateful spot to see what happens at the exact moment. The suspense will equal General Billy Mitchell dropping bombs on battleships to show the superiority of air power.

Well, I mentioned dropping bombs again. Uh, oh.

Hmm....All my bombs I've dropped have been 'shacks.' They were smokes dropped at Lake George at 450 knots at 500 feet. I was vomiting from turbulence downwind, and radar tracking inbound to IAP, then release point..."Shack." Each time.

Air Force One...Boeing 747...E4B...Boeing 747, TWA 800...Boeing 747..hmmm...

Well, I assume we will both see "Air Force One," with Harrison Ford as President aboard a hijacked Air Force One. There may be a character in the movie based upon you, Senator McCain. I

would hope that a good action political thriller has the judicial, legislative, and of course the executive branches represented.

Back to reality: The senior Secret Service agent, Ms. Janice K. Griffen, told me during her interrogation of me that she had never seen the forward cargo door of Air Force One open. I know they have something called a self contained baggage loading system, so in fact Air Force One may not be in danger from the outward opening forward cargo door opening in flight. However, the President may be required to fly in times of emergency in the National Command Center aircraft, an E-4B, a modified Boeing 747, which certainly does have an outward opening forward cargo door.

So, the danger is real to the President and not just in some movie.

You state, "Please accept my personal assurance...that neither I nor my staff made any request for an investigation or interrogation of you or your family by the Secret Service or any government agency or other entity."

I accept. I believe you believe that, sir. Now, how can I reconcile the senior Secret Service agent saying clearly, "This referral came from McCain's office?" Somebody is wrong. I've listened to the tape over and over again. It is quite clear.

Maybe the Secret Service monitors your email and intercepted my email unknown to you. Twenty four hours after I sent the email to you which has the word, "President" and the word, 'bomb' in the same paragraph, the agents were at my front door saying they came on your office referral. She also said they have computers to pick out certain words.

The mystery of TWA 800 is mechanical and no conspiracy, no coverup and no plot by anybody. This Secret Service investigation is getting interesting though.

I believe you personally did not refer the Secret Service to investigate me. Who did? The timing of my email to "McCain's

office" talking about the President dying and bombing somebody and twenty four hours later the senior agent directly stating reason for her investigation for referral was from "McCain's office" indicates "McCain's Office" is somehow involved.

Possible explanations:

1. Your email is monitored and the Secret Service acted unilaterally to investigate suspicious email based on certain keywords. Unlikely but possible and very wrong if done. (Talk about needing encryption.)
2. A member of your staff called the Secret Service and is now reluctant to admit it. Unlikely but possible based on human nature.
3. You're fibbing to me. Impossible.
4. Secret Service agent deliberately misstated referral source as "McCain's office" for unknown reasons. Unlikely but possible but lacks motive and very wrong if done.

Ask her yourself, Senator, she's at 408 535 5288, San Jose office of the Secret Service, Ms. Janice K. Griffen. Ask her why she said your name as the referral source. Richard Metzger was the junior agent, he heard her too. Ask him.

Call me, 408 659 3552, I can play the videotape on the telephone and you can hear your name from her lips. Send an aide to me at my home and I can play the tape. Do you want me to send you a copy?

Let's say it's a computer from "McCain's office" that initiated the call to the Secret Service; how to resolve blunder of something or somebody initiating Secret Service investigation on citizen based solely on polite email offering contrary opinion but using volatile words?

(Assume a former Navy officer decorated for valor in combat is not going to let an abusive assault against the Constitution pass by without resolution.)

1. Deny blunder. It'll blow over. Forget about it. Might work

except the phrase "This referral is from McCain's office." is said by senior agent Griffen on tape.

2. Patch the blunder by saying it was not your fault .

(Well, quoting worked before in that many emails went by without comment and I quoted from Shakespeare and got immediate response. It may be coincidence but here comes another Shakespeare quote just in case it's not. And you got me started quoting when I heard you, Senator, quoting Chairman Mao on C-SPAN. I heard you say that and I thought, "Ah, here is a man not afraid of words, content is king, not style.")

"And oftentimes the excusing of a fault

Doth make the fault the worse by th' excuse,

As patches set upon a little breach

Discredit more in hiding of the fault

Than did the fault before it was so patched."

King John Act 4, Scene 2.

In this case, to say it happened but it wasn't your fault also goes contrary to Navy training of Commanding Officer accepts responsibility. To use the patch would draw attention to process of blunder.

3. Face the blunder and reconcile differences.

Here is my recommendation based upon the fact that it was not you that was in imagined danger but someone else.

1. Refer to the offending paragraph:

"Please avoid the option to do nothing. In some cases that is wise, in this one it is not. The door hazard exists and can happen again with varying catastrophic consequences. May I be melodramatic, Senator? Why not. After the Tonkin Gulf incident in 1964, we attacked and bombed North Vietnam. After Pan Am 103 in 1988, we attacked and bombed Libya. After TWA 800 in 1996, we attacked and bombed Iraq; all for thought-to-be good reasons. Well, if Air Force One or any of the four E-4Bs (Airborne Command Posts) (all modified Boeing 747s with

outward opening cargo doors) have that forward door open in flight tearing off fuselage skin allowing the 300 knot CAS slipstream to enter nose and tear it off leading to the death and destruction of all aboard including the President and other high officials, then we will attack and bomb somebody. And it would be wrong. Just fix the door again and prevent the crash is the answer. (The door has failed before.)"

2. State that based upon the receipt of the above email your computer or a monitoring agency scanned the words "President" and "bomb somebody" and erred on the side of caution in their zeal to protect the life of the President of the United States by immediately calling the Secret Service. In retrospect it now is clear the concern was unwarranted and you regret any inconvenience to the poor sap who wrote it. As compensation please accept the enclosed two tickets to see "Air Force One".
The End.

As the poor sap, I would appreciate something I can show my friends, my parents, and any prospective employers that I am a good citizen and not some crazy dangerous nut when they find out I was interrogated by armed Secret Service agents in my home after they arrived unannounced and uninvited to discuss a referral from a United States Senator's office.

I am now in the quandary of being investigated for unknown reasons by unknown people who give confusing responses. I am reassured that it was not you personally, Senator McCain, who ordered the investigation. It is a bad feeling to be distrusted.

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Back to life and death:

If I were a subcommittee chairman, a fellow senator, or fellow

congressman, or constituent, and wanted cargo door investigated, and you as Committee Chairman, said to me, "However, I believe it is appropriate at this time to await the report of the crash investigation. I hope you will do the same." I would.

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I full well understand the consequences of refusing to grant the 'hope' of a powerful man. They are usually not good. When a leader says 'do' something, it gets done. When he says, I 'want,' I 'dream,' I 'think,' I 'pray,' I 'wish,' I 'hope' something gets done, it gets done. To say 'No,' is risky and I said 'No can do,' to you, Senator. I had to say no. I will not 'await,' I can not 'await.'

And you must not either, Senator. The streak. What do you think it is? Missile? No way. Leaking fuel? Don't make me laugh. Shiny metal object spinning away from plane? Maybe, let's check it out. Replicate the experiment with a C-141/C-130. It's cheap, fast, safe, and conclusive and it needs to be done now. Before the next door pops. Before the report of the crash investigation team is released. Before the cement sets.

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We have the same goal. Preventing death. We have the direction. Investigate, gather data, establish facts, interpret, support, confirm, conclusion.

We have the same target in sight. Mechanical cause, rupture of forward fuselage when strip of skin tears off and nose is severed. Fuel tank and cargo door explanations both agree on that.

Tank and door disagree by fifty feet and twelve seconds. I say shift final crosshairs slightly to the right to focus on forward of the wing on right side at cargo door, NTSB says steady on center fuel tank above the wing. Center fuel tank is not close enough. It did blow up, but after another event, cargo door opening and departing and taking skin with it leading to severing of nose. A fault can't be fixed until exactly identified.

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I put it all on line: streak. Fellow night cat shot shooter, fellow night trapper, fellow ejection survivor, streak is shiny metal object spinning away in sunlight up high, seen by humans as streak and machines as blip. (Tomorrow night is the 30th anniversary of my crash, June 14th, 1967. Seeing my dead pilot, LCDR C.T. Butler, who had just saved my life, on the ground, crumpled up in his flight suit, spurs me on. Your 30th is coming

up. We were both literally seconds from death when saved. We are both living on borrowed time. Let's use it.)

Chairman of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Honorable United States Senator, Presidential Candidate To Be, Esteemed Republican from Arizona, Mister John McCain, the streak is not leaking fuel from just exploded center fuel tank which is ignited somehow and moves from the plane to appear to eyewitness ten and more miles away as a streak near Boeing 747 in full sunlight, as your Board suggests in preliminary report. They are to be commended for their solid investigative efforts so far.

At first it was thought bomb and the FBI had it, but no bomb. Then it was thought missile and Defense had it, but no missile. Now it is NTSB and thought center fuel tank explosion. Yes, center fuel tank explosion. But not initial event. Initial event is not center tank explosion but fuselage rupture fifty feet away and twelve seconds sooner. Before center fuel tank explosion was severed nose which subjected the broken wing and fuselage to 300 knots winds which disintegrated them. Fuel vapor mixing with now detached fodded engine #3 ignited the fireball twelve seconds after initial event. The nose was severed because a big hole appeared on the right side of the fuselage forward of the wing. The hole was at least nine feet by fifteen feet big, the same size as the hole on UAL 811. The nose crumpled into the huge hole when pushed by the 300 knots winds. The hole appeared because the forward cargo door opened when it shouldn't. The area around the cargo door or the door itself failed. Why the door opened is a mystery. It could be improper latching or fatigue around the large square hole cut in the pressurized hull of a Boeing 747.

Based upon your personal experience, Senator, if you think a shiny metal object spinning away could be the streak:

1. Investigation is immediately warranted into the cargo door

area of TWA 800.

2. All ten latches, cam sectors, and locking sectors of the door plus the hinges must be checked for proper positioning.
3. Frame area needs to be checked at mid span latch area, main latching area, hinge, and sharp corners for metal fatigue failure.
4. Reconstruction of the frame of TWA 800 must be extended to the nose.
5. Conduct the flight experiment to rule in or rule out cargo door as streak and radar blip. It must be ready by July 17 for proper sun angle and completed soon thereafter.

Senator McCain, I understand your desire to stick with the chain of order of NTSB to FAA to airlines. I want our government to look good, too. Finding out the cause of the crash is success and makes everyone look good. It's OK to have a solution to a mystery come from a citizen. It's just a step and the large mystery remains of why the door opened in flight requiring more professional investigation by the NTSB.

And now I beg. An officer never begs. Now I am a citizen and citizens can beg. I beg the attention of a senior government official, experienced jet pilot, father, husband,did it work? Do I have your attention? Begging works?

I would hope not. The fate of the messenger is independent of the truth of his message. The messenger, in this case, wacky guy on the net using email, can be ugly, rude, weird, and impatient. So what? What is his message? Is it true?

Streak is shiny metal object spinning away in bright sunlight.

Streak is not leaking fuel from just exploded center fuel tank.

Shiny object is forward cargo door.

Is there doubt about the message above? Resolve doubt, sir.

Take action. There is a time to get hands-on involved with an issue that affects several countries and billions of dollars past and future, and that time is now: When the person knows what he's talking about. You and I know what we are talking about when

we talk about fiery sudden jet crashes. Our opinions carry weight.

The implications of cargo door explanation are immense and require the highest level of government participation. Pan 103 was not a bomb but a cargo door, just like AI 182, and UAL 811, and now TWA 800. Yes, it's hard to believe, so?

Thank goodness we have a pilot in charge of the Transportation Committee. Please use your experience to become involved and make decisions. Talk facts, and evidence, and experience and not solely rely on political appointees Mr. Hall or Mr. Francis, or policeman Mr. Kallstrom, or scientist Dr. Loeb, or reporter Mr. Salinger, for explanations, but rely on NTSB aircraft accident investigators Mr. Dickinson or Mr. Schleede and yourself.

There has never been an aircraft accident investigator in charge of the TWA 800 aircraft accident investigation. First it was the police who touched, twisted and moved pieces looking for explosive residue and thus inadvertently tampered with the only real evidence that counts, the knobs, latches, metal hinges, and wiring. Soon it will be the lawyers twisting everything making their case. Then the media gets into it. Let us hear from Mr. Al Dickinson, the lead investigator on TWA 800. Or Mr. Ron Schleede, who is on the TWA 800 team and also was the lead investigator on UAL 811. Those gentleman don't scoff at open cargo door causing death, they have seen it.

Nowhere in your three page letter is anything of substance about the crash of TWA 800; it is all polite rebuffs and efforts to keep the current system working which has no avenue for citizen input. The TWA 800 Committee hearing you mentioned had the NTSB and the FBI present. There was no public input even though you said my cargo door explanation had been "forwarded to the Committee for review". The upcoming NTSB hearing has no public input and is put off again to winter, a year a half to deliver a 'preliminary' report. The NTSB has no public docket, as

required by the same rules Mr. Hall quotes to me to prevent a passenger representative on the investigation team. The FAA refers me to the NTSB. Information about a US civilian airliner crash in US territory in peacetime with no VIPS or hazardous cargo aboard comes from foreign news magazines. This is not the way a democratic society is supposed to work. An isolated and arrogant government is not what we went to war to sustain. A receptive and inquisitive government showing respect for citizen's assistance is.

Despots investigate the messenger; a free society investigates the message. I have been checked out but my message has not. And you ask me to wait. No can do, sir.

The hard evidence supports door explanation, which is our fault. The soft evidence supports wishful thinking of: It's not our fault, it's the terrorists with a bomb, or accident with a missile, or God with static electricity.

Streak: A real thing.

Here's my play, Senator, I'm committing.

Streak:

Bomb?

Missile?

Leaking fuel?

Shiny metal object?

If it's leaking fuel, I'm turning my wings in.

If you believe streak could be a shiny metal object spinning away in bright sunlight and being observed by humans as streak and radar as blip, please order a close examination of the forward cargo door area.

Very

Respectfully,

John Barry

Smith
MAJ USA (Ret)
408 659 3552

barry@corazon.com
www.corazon.com

551 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, CA 93924

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: June 15, 1997 9:58:38 AM PDT
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
**Subject: Corrected copy of "Explanation for not waiting/
cargo door/Secret Service referral"**

Dear Mr. Schleede, I reviewed "Explanation for not waiting/
cargo door/Secret Service referral" 13 June 97 and found and
corrected two typographical errors and added a most important
addendum for this best letter below. Please consider this the best
reply sent from me to the Senator. Surely as a former Air Force
pilot you looked for and found flying aircraft/bogeys by the
sunflash reflective glint they produced by the shiny fuselages
reflecting the sun at the right angle. That glint is the source of the
TWA 800 streak.

Sincerely, John Barry Smith

John McCain, Arizona,
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and

Transportation
United States Senate

Dear Senator John McCain,

13 Jun 97

Thank you again for the valuable time spent in your extensive reply to me. You said in your D-Day letter, "However, I believe it is appropriate at this time to await the report of the crash investigation. I hope you will do the same." I responded by saying I can't and explanation to follow. This is my explanation.

There is no time, sir. We are out of time. We are living on borrowed time as it is.

I will put the entire persuasive argument to you from me on one piece of evidence: the streak. If the recent explanation of your official advisers makes more sense than the explanation of this wacky guy in California on the net in a converted garage, then waiting is the proper thing to do. If my way, the way of a white haired retired military officer jet plane crash survivor, who presents documented support for a explanation which is common sense and has happened before, is chosen, then there are certain immediate steps to be taken which are described later in this letter.

Steak: A bomb, missile, or center tank explosion does not satisfactorily explain the streak; cargo door does. That is the bottom line. If you believe, fellow pilot, that the NTSB explanation of streak as leaking fuel after center tank explosion which somehow catches fire and is seen by ground observers ten miles away looking at a plane in bright sunlight, then the thing to do is "...await the report of the crash investigation."

If you can't believe that leaking jet fuel in a 300 knot slipstream would ignite, stay lit, not be straight and horizontal but change shape and direction, and then be visible for miles and miles as it

descends to the ocean, then please consider another explanation, one which was offered as soon as the eyewitness reports of streak appeared and has held steady ever since, a shiny metal object spinning away in the evening sun being seen miles a way by ground observers as a streak as it decelerated from 300 knots to zero horizontally and accelerated from zero knots to 220 knots vertically as it descended from 13700 feet to the surface of the ocean in a parabolic arc. The shiny metal door was also picked up by primary ATC radar at the same time as streak and shown as mystery blips. Center tank explanation omits mystery radar blip explanation, cargo door includes it.

So, Senator, two explanations: Streak as ignited leaking fuel, or spinning away metal object. I put my entire argument on the line right there.

I waited before and 230 people died and I know why. If I had been more persistent I might have prevented the crash. I have been following the 747 cargo door as serial killer since 1990 when I published an article in an aviation newsletter; then 1992 in a letter to Flying magazine; then extended correspondence in 1995 with an insurance executive imploring him to investigate cargo door as cause of crash of one of his insured airplanes. He put me off with reassurances about experts. I waited. TWA 800 crashed in 1996. I should not have waited.

I am not waiting now. Here's how a reluctant authority rebuffs. It says, "Wait until the data is assembled and interpreted and presented by experts." The person waits and reads the report and finds problems and reports the problems. The government replies, "Where were you when the investigation was going on? Why did not you make your concerns known then? If it's so important why did you wait so long? The report is done, it's too late. Go somewhere else and appeal. Good day. Thank you for interest in aviation safety."

Here is what else happens to amateur sleuths. The government

gathers the routine data but keeps the evidence to itself. A little bit leaks out but not much. The person goes to the government agencies and reports on his research which relies on news reports and the government response is, "Where's your evidence, you've got no evidence, you can't believe the newspapers, come back when you have some facts. In the meantime the experts will tell you what's going on at the appropriate time. Good day. Thank you for your interest in aviation safety." Experienced amateurs' opinions regarding their specialty are ignored by a government that is aloof and isolated. I know what I'm talking about when it comes to sudden fiery night fatal jet crashes, and so do you, Senator.

I'm trusting your Navy training, sir, same as mine. What makes sense? What is real and what is wishful thinking? Work through terror. Fight panic. Defer to reality.

My strength comes from NTSB reports. I respect the NTSB. My research base is the NTSB reports of the UAL 811 accident. That is the model for other 747 crashes and is the plane that came back to reveal what happened to it; cargo door opened in flight, nine dead. UAL 811 is the same as TWA 800 up until the nose coming off. UAL 811's nose stayed on; TWA 800 didn't.

The NTSB is moving towards the correct answer but too slow and a little bit off in direction. My web site, www.corazon.com, has scanned in NTSB reports for documentation support. (By the way, your Senate web servers are still unable to receive pictures, a deplorable situation.)

Our goal is the same, prevent death by preventing airplane crashes by explaining crash and fixing it. Our passenger citizens are now at risk. Our aviation industry is now at risk. Our country's manufacturing reputation is at risk. And all because recently a high time Boeing 747 took off at night running late and disintegrated in the air leaving a sudden loud sound on the CVR, an abrupt power cut to the FDR, foddred engines, and

missing bodies; and it's happened in 1985, 1988, 1989 and now in 1996 with the identical evidence named above. Four exact sequences: four different official explanations. One official explanation is correct, the NTSB explanation for UAL 811 as forward cargo door opening in flight.

But only one had a streak; all the others were high up in pitch darkness; only one was in direct sunlight at 8:31 PM on July 17th at 13700 feet ten miles off Long Island.

The streak can be recreated. The radar blip can be recreated. Should you believe that the spinning away shiny metal object explanation for streak is worthy of investigation, then conduct an experiment to assist the NTSB in their leaking fuel story or confirm cargo door as streak. The NTSB explanation has an access door blowing away after the center tank explodes which leads to leaking fuel. Have a C-141/C-130 fly at 13700 feet at 300 knots at same sun angle as TWA 800 and toss out various sized shiny metal objects from the aft inward opening C-130/C141 door. The access door, small as it is, may be seen as streak and on radar. Cargo door, big as it is, will be seen as streak and radar blip. Either way the experiment will assist in the NTSB investigation. And our Navy gets cleared of preposterous friendly fire suspicion.

I know, unfortunately distracting, will be the media circus with live CNN tracking the C-141 as it approaches the destruct point off Long Island. All eyes will be on that fateful spot to see what happens at the exact moment. The suspense will equal General Billy Mitchell dropping bombs on battleships to show the superiority of air power.

Well, I mentioned dropping bombs again. Uh, oh.

Hmm....All my bombs I've dropped have been 'shacks.' They were smokes dropped at Lake George at 450 knots at 500 feet. I was vomiting from turbulence downwind, and radar tracking inbound to IAP, then release point..."Shack." Each time.

Air Force One...Boeing 747...E4B...Boeing 747, TWA
800...Boeing 747..hmmm...

Well, I assume we will both see "Air Force One," with Harrison Ford as President aboard a hijacked Air Force One. There may be a character in the movie based upon you, Senator McCain. I would hope that a good action political thriller has the judicial, legislative, and of course the executive branches represented.

Back to reality: The senior Secret Service agent, Ms. Janice K. Griffen, told me during her interrogation of me that she had never seen the forward cargo door of Air Force One open. I know they have something called a self contained baggage loading system, so in fact Air Force One may not be in danger from the outward opening forward cargo door opening in flight. However, the President may be required to fly in times of emergency in the National Command Center aircraft, an E-4B, a modified Boeing 747, which certainly does have an outward opening forward cargo door.

So, the danger is real to the President and not just in some movie.

You state, "Please accept my personal assurance...that neither I nor my staff made any request for an investigation or interrogation of you or your family by the Secret Service or any government agency or other entity."

I accept. I believe you believe that, sir. Now, how can I reconcile the senior Secret Service agent saying clearly, "This referral came from McCain's office?" Somebody is wrong. I've listened to the tape over and over again. It is quite clear.

Maybe the Secret Service monitors your email and intercepted my email unknown to you. Twenty four hours after I sent the email to you which has the word, "President" and the word, 'bomb' in the same paragraph, the agents were at my front door saying they came on your office referral. She also said they have computers to pick out certain words.

The mystery of TWA 800 is mechanical and no conspiracy, no coverup and no plot by anybody. This Secret Service investigation is getting interesting though.

I believe you personally did not refer the Secret Service to investigate me. Who did? The timing of my email to "McCain's office" talking about the President dying and bombing somebody and twenty four hours later the senior agent directly stating reason for her investigation for referral was from "McCain's office" indicates "McCain's Office" is somehow involved.

Possible explanations:

1. Your email is monitored and the Secret Service acted unilaterally to investigate suspicious email based on certain keywords. Unlikely but possible and very wrong if done. (Talk about needing encryption.)
2. A member of your staff called the Secret Service and is now reluctant to admit it. Unlikely but possible based on human nature.
3. You're fibbing to me. Impossible.
4. Secret Service agent deliberately misstated referral source as "McCain's office" for unknown reasons. Unlikely but possible but lacks motive and very wrong if done.

Ask her yourself, Senator, she's at 408 535 5288, San Jose office of the Secret Service, Ms. Janice K. Griffen. Ask her why she said your name as the referral source. Richard Metzger was the junior agent, he heard her too. Ask him.

Call me, 408 659 3552, I can play the videotape on the telephone and you can hear your name from her lips. Send an aide to me at my home and I can play the tape. Do you want me to send you a copy?

Let's say it's a computer from "McCain's office" that initiated the call to the Secret Service; how to resolve blunder of something or somebody initiating Secret Service investigation on citizen based solely on polite email offering contrary opinion but using volatile

words?

(Assume a former Navy officer decorated for valor in combat is not going to let an abusive assault against the Constitution pass by without resolution.)

1. Deny blunder. It'll blow over. Forget about it. Might work except the phrase "This referral is from McCain's office." is said by senior agent Griffen on tape.

2. Patch the blunder by saying it was not your fault .

(Well, quoting worked before in that many emails went by without comment and I quoted from Shakespeare and got immediate response. It may be coincidence but here comes another Shakespeare quote just in case it's not. And you got me started quoting when I heard you, Senator, quoting Chairman Mao on C-SPAN. I heard you say that and I thought, "Ah, here is a man not afraid of words, content is king, not style.")

"And oftentimes the excusing of a fault

Doth make the fault the worse by th' excuse,

As patches set upon a little breach

Discredit more in hiding of the fault

Than did the fault before it was so patched."

King John Act 4, Scene 2.

In this case, to say it happened but it wasn't your fault also goes contrary to Navy training of Commanding Officer accepts responsibility. To use the patch would draw attention to process of blunder.

3. Face the blunder and reconcile differences.

Here is my recommendation based upon the fact that it was not you that was in imagined danger but someone else.

1. Refer to the offending paragraph:

"Please avoid the option to do nothing. In some cases that is wise, in this one it is not. The door hazard exists and can happen again with varying catastrophic consequences. May I be melodramatic, Senator? Why not. After the Tonkin Gulf incident

in 1964, we attacked and bombed North Vietnam. After Pan Am 103 in 1988, we attacked and bombed Libya. After TWA 800 in 1996, we attacked and bombed Iraq; all for thought-to-be good reasons. Well, if Air Force One or any of the four E-4Bs (Airborne Command Posts) (all modified Boeing 747s with outward opening cargo doors) have that forward door open in flight tearing off fuselage skin allowing the 300 knot CAS slipstream to enter nose and tear it off leading to the death and destruction of all aboard including the President and other high officials, then we will attack and bomb somebody. And it would be wrong. Just fix the door again and prevent the crash is the answer. (The door has failed before.)"

2. State that based upon the receipt of the above email your computer or a monitoring agency scanned the words "President" and "bomb somebody" and erred on the side of caution in their zeal to protect the life of the President of the United States by immediately calling the Secret Service. In retrospect it now is clear the concern was unwarranted and you regret any inconvenience to the poor sap who wrote it. As compensation please accept the enclosed two tickets to see "Air Force One".
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around the large square hole cut in the pressurized hull of a Boeing 747.

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Senator McCain, I understand your desire to stick with the chain of order of NTSB to FAA to airlines. I want our government to look good, too. Finding out the cause of the crash is success and makes everyone look good. It's OK to have a solution to a mystery come from a citizen. It's just a step and the large mystery remains of why the door opened in flight requiring more professional investigation by the NTSB.

And now I beg. An officer never begs. Now I am a citizen and citizens can beg. I beg the attention of a senior government official, experienced jet pilot, father, husband,did it work? Do I have your attention? Begging works?

I would hope not. The fate of the messenger is independent of the truth of his message. The messenger, in this case, wacky guy on the net using email, can be ugly, rude, weird, and impatient. So what? What is his message? Is it true?

Streak is shiny metal object spinning away in bright sunlight.

Streak is not leaking fuel from just exploded center fuel tank.

Shiny object is forward cargo door.

Is there doubt about the message above? Resolve doubt, sir. Take action. There is a time to get hands-on involved with an issue that affects several countries and billions of dollars past and future, and that time is now: When the person knows what he's talking about. You and I know what we are talking about when we talk about fiery sudden jet crashes. Our opinions carry weight.

The implications of cargo door explanation are immense and require the highest level of government participation. Pan 103 was not a bomb but a cargo door, just like AI 182, and UAL 811, and now TWA 800. Yes, it's hard to believe, so?

Thank goodness we have a pilot in charge of the Transportation Committee. Please use your experience to become involved and make decisions. Talk facts, and evidence, and experience and not solely rely on political appointees Mr. Hall or Mr. Francis, or policeman Mr. Kallstrom, or scientist Dr. Loeb, or reporter Mr. Salinger, for explanations, but rely on NTSB aircraft accident investigators Mr. Dickinson or Mr. Schleede and yourself.

There has never been an aircraft accident investigator in charge of the TWA 800 aircraft accident investigation. First it was the police who touched, twisted and moved pieces looking for explosive residue and thus inadvertently tampered with the only real evidence that counts, the knobs, latches, metal hinges, and wiring. Soon it will be the lawyers twisting everything making their case. Then the media gets into it. Let us hear from Mr. Al Dickinson, the lead investigator on TWA 800. Or Mr. Ron Schleede, who is on the TWA 800 team and also was the lead investigator on UAL 811. Those gentleman don't scoff at open cargo door causing death, they have seen it.

Nowhere in your three page letter is anything of substance about the crash of TWA 800; it is all polite rebuffs and efforts to keep the current system working which has no avenue for citizen input. The TWA 800 Committee hearing you mentioned had the

NTSB and the FBI present. There was no public input even though you said my cargo door explanation had been "forwarded to the Committee for review". The upcoming NTSB hearing has no public input and is put off again to winter, a year a half to deliver a 'preliminary' report. The NTSB has no public docket, as required by the same rules Mr. Hall quotes to me to prevent a passenger representative on the investigation team. The FAA refers me to the NTSB. Information about a US civilian airliner crash in US territory in peacetime with no VIPS or hazardous cargo aboard comes from foreign news magazines. This is not the way a democratic society is supposed to work. An isolated and arrogant government is not what we went to war to sustain. A receptive and inquisitive government showing respect for citizen's assistance is.

Despots investigate the messenger; a free society investigates the message. I have been checked out but my message has not.

And you ask me to wait. No can do, sir.

The hard evidence supports door explanation, which is our fault.

The soft evidence supports wishful thinking of: It's not our fault, it's the terrorists with a bomb, or accident with a missile, or God with static electricity.

Streak: A real thing.

Here's my play, Senator, I'm committing.

Streak:

Bomb?

Missile?

Leaking fuel?

Shiny metal object?

If it's leaking fuel, I'm turning my wings in.

If you believe streak could be a shiny metal object spinning away in bright sunlight and being observed by humans as streak and radar as blip, please order a close examination of the forward cargo door area.

Respectfully,

Smith

(Ret)

3552

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Valley, CA 93924

Addendum: 14 June 1997

Dear Senator McCain, I sent off the above last night by email and snail mail. But I keep on thinking and must add several vital points not included. Please also consider:

1. Source of flash can be seen by looking at any 747 or other plane at sunset and wait for sun reflective flash of two to three second duration. You may do this experiment, sir. At your convenience, in the evening, look for a flying plane up high, conning if possible, and look for sun angle and wait. You will see the source of the streak, a shiny piece of 747 fuselage reflecting

Very

John Barry

MAJ USA

408 659

551 Country Club Drive

Carmel

sun now to you as steady bright light but suddenly piece departs and spins away and slows down to zero one way and speeds up the other way and descends to sea in a shallow parabolic arc. The reflective flash travels front one end to the other such as nose forward fuselage first, then engines, then winglets if 747-400, then aft fuselage, then vertical stabilizer, then dull skin again. Please conduct this personal experiment . Possibly you already believe it will happen as A4 pilot looking for Migs, looking for sun flash off Mig 21. Well, there you have it sir, Flash, then piece comes off, streak to surface, gone. Picked up on radar as it falls. Two mysteries explained, one senior service exonerated.

2. I can't get this Secret Service thing out of my mind. It must be satisfactorily explained to me. Somehow. I ran off a tape of the interrogation for you sir, should you wish, you are mentioned several times. The male agent walked in and immediately properly identified a picture of a RA-5C I had on my wall. I was so impressed. What is going on? Why were they in my home?

3. A better metaphor:

Streak: A real thing.

Here's my play, Senator, I'm committing. Number three wire coming up. OK 3.

Streak:

Bomb?

Missile?

Shiny metal object?

Leaking fuel?

4. Borrowed time also refers to the amount of time between door openings on other accidents which now exceeds the minimum, by my calculations.

5. Tonight is the anniversary of my crash. 11:30PM or as I wrote at the time, 2330, 14 June 1967, Sanford Florida. My narrative of the events of that night are on my web site as FCLP with a picture of the actual Vigilante. But I could include the story

here...and will with your indulgence.

Respectfully Again,

Smith

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Very

John Barry

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Carmel

Field Carrier Landing Practice FCLP

I popped up my canopy by toggling the switch on the left console. The aluminum clamshell with two small side windows

whooshed up and locked. The warm night air of central Florida rushed into the cockpit displacing the cool forced conditioned air on my forehead while I still breathed the cold oxygen from my mask.

The dull roar of the two idling jet engines hit me through my helmet; the intakes were just two feet away on my left and right, I was in the middle. I was strapped into the back seat of an RA-5C Vigilante at 2300 hours on a concrete ramp at Sanford Naval Air Station on 14 June 1967. We were conducting Night Field Carrier Landing Practice (FCLP) on Runway 27 with five other aircraft in the pattern. Wind was calm and temperature about 85 degrees. The sky was clear with only the flashing lights of the other aircraft as they went around and around the pattern to be seen.

My regular training pilot climbed out of his front cockpit and wiggled down the ladder attached to the fuselage and the new pilot climbed up and in. The fifty thousand pound airplane with its two fifteen thousand pound thrust idling engines sat in its chocks and vibrated as it was being refueled by a yellow truck off to the side. Flashing lights were everywhere but it was all orderly and the pilot switch and hot refueling was going off without a hitch. I took off my mask and instantly the smell of exhausted jet fuel came into the cockpit. I relaxed and enjoyed it. It was all very exciting.

The new pilot came up on hot mike and said, "OK, Smitty, how do you read?" He knew that his regularly assigned Reconnaissance Attack Navigator (RAN) had been replaced by me for this evening FCLP only.

"Loud and clear, sir," I replied, putting my mask back on and talking into the microphone embedded in it. I toggled down my canopy and it closed with a reassuring thump and clunked locked. The air cooled down and the noise eased for a bit.

My regular pilot walked away without a look back. He had just practiced twelve landings and would do so again tomorrow night. He was an unmarried thirty eight year old Navy Commander who had been flying single seat jet reconnaissance fighters (F-8) off carriers for years and had had one combat tour in the new war in Vietnam. He was now preparing to carrier qualify in this type aircraft before he went back to war in Vietnam. It was his first time flying in a two seat carrier jet.

I was a single, twenty three year old Ensign navigator who had had little jet experience, little navigator experience and had never been in combat or even on a carrier. I was in awe of him. We had been assigned as a crew and we flew all our missions together. We were due to qualify in the RA-5C in one month on the USS Ranger, one of the large supercarriers of the time, and then on to combat in six months over North Vietnam flying from Yankee Station in the Gulf of Tonkin.

But first we had to practice crew coordination and the techniques and procedures to land the largest and heaviest carrier aircraft on a flight deck. This was the pilot's time.

For the past several months I had been navigating low level, medium speed photo missions throughout Florida, Georgia, Alabama, and Tennessee, learning how to take pictures of small bridges, roads, power plants, and prisons, while maneuvering up and down and all around at four hundred and eighty knots.

The hardest part was not throwing up while thinking ahead of the airplane and putting in very small number new target coordinates into the computer. Now it was FCLP and all pilot technique and skill to get this airplane at a certain spot on the earth, in a certain attitude, at a certain speed, at a certain weight, and at a certain time. It had to be done right. We were doing OK.

"Any gripes?" my new pilot asked, referring to any problems the airplane might have developed during the previous two FCLP periods.

"No problems," I answered. My new pilot was a Lieutenant Commander, also thirty eight, and had had much experience in combat and RA-5C carrier flying. He was married and had five children. I addressed him as Mr.

Butler. I was more respectful to him than in awe, but also felt much more friendly towards him. He had recently returned from a Western Pacific (WestPac) cruise and a harrowing combat tour. He was now undergoing refresher training before going out for another combat cruise with a different squadron than mine. I had volunteered to fly these two hops with him because I knew him to be safe and instructive.

"Call for taxi," he directed. I made all the radio calls but the incoming instructions were for the pilot who was listening and had his hands full trying to precisely place this ungainly airplane onto a spot of runway about twenty yards wide by twenty yards long. The A-5, like most supersonic aircraft, was a clumsy, underpowered buffalo when it was slow and dirty with flaps, droops, and landing gear down, but cleaned up it was a beautiful, graceful, speeding demon.

"Ground control, 201, taxi," I said into the oxygen mask as I pressed down on a button on right right footrest after first confirming I had the correct frequency set in the small window at eye level. We were flying one of twelve aircraft assigned to the only Navy tactical reconnaissance training squadron, RVAH-3. Our call sign was Commanche Trail 201 which I had shortened to 201. I would have shortened it to 01 but there was another 01 in the pattern and I did not want to be confused with him.

"201, Ground, cleared to taxi runway 27, wind calm, altimeter two niner niner two," the tower replied. "Ground," was short for "ground control" which was the title of the person in the tower who monitored aircraft movements on the ramp just prior to takeoff. The same person might be called, "Tower," after we were airborne.

The engines revved up and we started to slowly taxi toward the duty runway. We were only partially loaded with fuel because we would be landing shorty after takeoff and the landing gear would not support the weight of a fully loaded landing aircraft. The A-5 usually held thirty thousand pounds of jet fuel, about five thousand gallons, but for our touch and go's we usually took off with about seven thousand pounds of JP-4, or about a thousand gallons.

That amount of fuel was sufficient for about twenty five minutes of six crash and dashes before we would stop and hot refuel again. Each pilot would then have had two exhausting periods of twelve field carrier landing practices on the night runway which had landing lights which simulated a carrier's angled flight deck. They usually emerged from the cockpit soaked in sweat.

There was a Landing Signal Officer (LSO) standing by the end of the runway to talk to the pilots as they made their approach. The LSO, "Paddles," as he was called, was an experienced RA-5C pilot who made recommendations to the squadron commander as to whether a particular pilot was qualified to fly out to the ship for landing qualifications which would enable that pilot to go on the cruise. A thumbs down by Paddles was a serious thing for a pilot and his career.

"Take off checklist," my pilot intoned.

"Compass," I quickly promptly as I was expecting the request. I had only flown with Mr. Butler one other time, a day low-level hop through mountains in southern Tennessee. It was the only time I had ever tried the Terrain Following Radar (TFR) which allowed the plane to be guided below mountain tops by the navigator interpreting special radar signals. No one trusted the radar enough to use it for real. On that day the radar worked fine and I respected the pilot for at least showing his trust for me and the system. For that reason I had volunteered to stay and fly the extra two periods instead of getting out and leaving with my regular pilot who had completed his two periods.

"Set," the pilot answered the expected reply.

"Hook," I said.

"Up," he answered.

"IFF," I said, and then answered my own query, "set to standby." Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) was not required since we never left the air station control area, but we always went through every checklist item anyway.

"Canopy," I said.

"Down and locked, lights out," he answered.

"Harness," I said.

"Locked," he replied.

"OK, flaps and take off power to go," I said as we neared the end of the runway. The takeoff ritual was proceeding exactly as usual. We never engaged in idle chitchat.

There was so much information coming into us from different sources that it required all our concentration to monitor and interpret it so we didn't have any time for non-life threatening conversation. We were closely watching dials telling us engine temperatures, flap position, radio frequency, fuel flow, hydraulic status lights and also listening to the tower, the LSO, and five other aircraft in the pattern.

Our senses were alive with processing information, figuring out which calls were for us and which required responses. We had engine noise and radio noise also interfering with hearing clearly. Internal communication was kept to a minimum.

We waited for a minute as another aircraft came in for his approach. It was no use calling for take off yet and the common frequency was busy enough with six airplanes all communicating where they were, their intentions, their fuel states, and listening to the LSO give final landing instructions.

I checked the inside of my small cockpit. My left elbow could touch the

aluminum skin of the left side and my right elbow could touch the right. My arm partially bent forward could touch the front console. I had a little one foot by one foot window high up on the left and right side of my canopy. In front of me there was a fold-down desk and a full instrument panel including radar, viewfinder, altimeters and many other electronic controls. It was cramped but comfortable once I knew where everything was. The seat was a hard beige plastic which was the bottom of the ejection seat which also went up my back and over the top of my head. The seat had to be hard to exert the correct forces without hurting the back. No cushions were allowed. I could not see nor touch my pilot in his equally small cockpit in front of me.

I figured that in an hour and a half I would be having a cold can of beer and a Florida lobster and baked potato dinner at my favorite Sanford restaurant.

I watched out my little right side window as the landing A-5 wobbled lower and lower. The A-5 came down in its flared position, wings rocking back and forth, and slammed down in front of us and then with a roar took back off again, then slowly turned right to prepare for its next touch and go. It was said that a carrier landing was nothing more than a controlled crash. One reason Air Force type aircraft were unsuitable for carrier landings is that the landing gear were never strong enough.

"OK, call for take off," my pilot said. We were on hot mike which allowed everything we said to be heard by each other. His breathing increased.

"Tower, 201 for takeoff," I quickly radioed.

"201, tower, cleared for takeoff, wind calm," the tower crisply responded. All the players were correctly anticipating each other.

"201, roger," I acknowledged.

As we quickly taxied into position at the end of the runway, I called off the last checklist item, "Flaps." A crew had once attempted to take off with flaps at zero. The plane never got airborne. It was such a small thing with such serious consequences.

"Flaps ten," he said, "OK, power coming up."

The engines now started their whining up to full roar. He released the brakes as soon as the engines were at one hundred percent and then kicked in the

afterburners. We had to takeoff soon and leave room for the next A-5 now on final for landing. We started to roll.

"All temperatures normal," the pilot said as we gathered speed. Our takeoff roll was short because of our light fuel load and we were soon airborne and turning downwind to prepare to land in just a few minutes. He left the flaps at ten and the landing gear down. The afterburners were shut off and the power slightly reduced to maintain our speed of one hundred sixty knots downwind at six hundred feet. We would fly the whole six passes never getting higher than six hundred feet nor further away from the runway than a mile.

"201 abeam," I called as we passed parallel the runway. Each plane called various positions in the pattern to let everyone know where they were. The critical interval was how soon each pilot turned base which would determine how long his final approach would be. My regular pilot would often make fun of other pilots who preferred a longer approach than he did. My pilot tonight made no such derogatory statements; he just adjusted into the pattern.

"201 turning final, state 6.7," I called. We had 6700 pounds of fuel left, enough for five more passes after this one for a total of twenty five minutes of flight time.

"Landing checklist, flaps," I said to the pilot.

"Flaps full down," he replied in between heavy grunts. As usual it sounded as if the pilot was wrestling with a low, slow, clumsy, and very dangerous monster. The vibration increased at the airflow responded to the added drag of the huge flaps hanging full down into the airstream.

"Gear," I prompted.

"Three down and locked," he answered and then added, "I've got the ball, 6.0."

"Checklist complete," I said to the pilot and then stepped on my mike button and said, "201 ball, state 6.0," I let the LSO know we had the meatball in sight which was a reflected image in a mirror which let the pilot know his angle of approach toward the simulated end of the carrier. The mirror system and the lighting pattern were identical to that of the ship giving the pilots accurate simulation of a carrier night landing. Fuel state

was critical information around the ship because most of the jets were always within minutes of flaming out if they did not land successfully. At a certain point the aircraft was diverted to a land runway if it was felt the plane could not make it aboard.

"Roger ball," the LSO acknowledged that we were on final, had the field and ball in sight and we had six thousand pounds of fuel left.

Our RA-5C wiggled its wings and the engines surged up and down as we got closer and closer to the cement runway.

"Little power," the LSO advised. No reply was expected. The whine grew louder as the pilot added a little power.

"Going high," the LSO's reassuring calm voice told us. I felt the power ease up.

My radar altimeter and pressure altimeter wound down lower and lower. Then came the expected thump of the landing as we hit approximately where we wanted to on the runway. During the FCLP debriefing the LSO would describe each pass to the pilot and give criticism. The LSO had the authority to wave off a plane from landing and his recommendation whether to

divert a plane or not carried weight.

As soon as the thump of the landing occurred the engines went to full non-afterburning power and we almost immediately were airborne again and turning downwind quickly to keep the pattern tight. I noted the time of the landing, fuel state and any comments for later debrief on my pad.

This time upwind my pilot raised the landing gear and the flaps to ten degrees. Having to lower the gear for landing made the FCLP more realistic.

The first night FCLP was the hardest for each pilot and now that we had that one over, I relaxed and went into the routine. I settled into the small cockpit, checked my pad of paper clamped to the desktop with the record of landings and fuel states. I cinched up my harness, checked my clear visor down and gloves on tight. I was wearing a new silver flight suit that was undergoing testing. It had the parachute harness integrated into the suit, unlike the regular flight suit that had the harness added on as a separate item.

The plane tossed and turned; it was a little like an amusement ride at a carnival. Again downwind I called, "201 abeam."

"Landing checklist, flaps," I quickly said. We both knew what the other was about to say and also knew the expected response.

"Flaps full," he replied.

"Gear," I prompted.

"Three down and locked, state 5.0," he answered just after the small thumps of the landing gear locking in place were felt.

"Checklist complete," I said to the pilot, and to the LSO I said, "201, on final, state 5.0."

The plane began its usual last minute maneuverings. This particular plane, Bureau Number 149314, was on its second full day of flight operations after having been returned from a Progressive Aircraft Rework (PAR) program which updated all the systems and repainted the aircraft inside and out. It gave the feeling of flying in a brand new airplane. We also carried a million dollar camera in the reconnaissance pod. Normally the camera would not be used on the rough FCLP but this plane was up, flyable, and needed. The Navy policy of aircraft usage was when a plane was ready to fly, a crew was found to fly it.

The constant pounding of the landings was hard going on camera

mounts and internal parts.

"I've got the ball, 4.8" my pilot said calmly.

"201, ball 4.8," I reported to the LSO.

"Roger ball," the LSO answered.

We staggered along as usual and made a nice pass with no comments from the LSO. The plane thumped its usual thump and accelerated as the pilot applied full takeoff power. We started to climb. I started to write down the landing and the fuel state on my pad in the well-lit small cockpit when I heard a sudden soft rushing sound off to my right.

Just then my pilot said, in a slightly exasperated voice, "Oh, shit, starboard engine."

I immediately asked, as I started to put my pencil into its holder still listening to the whooshing on my right, "What's the matter?"

My pilot quickly answered me. "Standby, eject," he said in a terse, level tone of voice.

I immediately reached up with both hands and pulled the face curtain all the way down over my face and upper body.

Nothing happened.

The rushing sound continued as I looked down to see what was wrong and started to think that we were low and wouldn't have much time to do any of the manual procedures such as blowing off my canopy, unhooking myself from the seat, and jumping out.

As it turned out, the delay was caused by the normal functioning of the seat firing sequence which allowed three quarters of a second for the seat to be set in the full down position. Since I was tall, I always had it in the full down position.

I was still looking down when the rocket ejection seat fired. The cockpit was immediately filled with bright flame and I was ejected upwards. The original ejection seats were fired with explosive charges, but too many pilots suffered back injuries so the seat was improved by having this seat propelled by a small rocket charge that reduced the initial shock on the back.

The ride up was smooth.

After the bright flash of the rocket firing I had just enough time to think that I hoped everything worked normally. I knew the complicated sequence that had to be followed precisely for me to live through this.

Just then I felt a great tug and felt warm black sky all around so the knee restraints had retracted normally, the seat had bottomed out, my canopy had blown off, the seat had fired, the knee restraints had been popped off, the bladder behind me had inflated separating me from the six hundred pound ejection seat, my drogue parachute had deployed immediately since we were below twelve thousand feet, my main parachute had opened, my face curtain was gone with the seat and I was coming down to earth under a parachute while breathing oxygen from my ten minute bailout bottle. My new silver flight suit had held and was comfortable.

I did not know what had happened to my pilot. His ejection sequence is delayed one and three quarter seconds to permit my ejection sequence to complete itself before his sequence commences. Without the delay there would be a chance of his canopy blowing away into me as I was ejected upward.

As soon as I had realized that the chute had opened I saw a brilliant yellow flash down and to my left as my airplane hit the ground. I thought, "Just like in the movies." It hit and smeared a yellow flash in the night.

After a maximum of three seconds in the calm air after the chute opened I abruptly hit the ground in a standing position and

crumpled down into a heap.

During training I was taught to roll upon landing using the fleshy parts of my body to cushion the landing. They never mentioned what to do on a pitch

dark night when the ground was invisible. As soon as I hit, I felt a sharp pain in my back but quickly got up and looked around.

The burning plane was about

forty yards away, upside down, and making explosive noises. I was on a hard, flat, grassy field. I kept the oxygen mask on

because the gas was cool and I

knew it was clean. I put my blinking flashlight on my harness, as instructed in my training classes, and started to walk away to look for my pilot. I then

took off the oxygen mask and breathed in the warm Florida night air. I laughed and thought, "I did it and this is really something to talk about, I can't wait

to tell the guys." I shouted, "Mr. Butler, Mr. Butler."

There was no answer, just the crackling of the burning airplane.

I walked around a bit, still exhilarated but very aware of my situation. It had only been a minute since the sudden rushing noise, but it had seemed like a

lifetime. A Navy fire truck drove up with some fireman hanging onto the sides. It stopped and the fireman asked me if I was all right and I said sure, why

not, and laughed. They didn't laugh.

The plane had crashed just next to the runway. I climbed into a yellow Navy pickup truck that soon came up and we drove to a central grouping spot. I asked about my pilot but got no answer. I got out and walked over to a circle of men standing around a parachute I

knew wasn't mine. I walked over to my pilot's parachute and it looked to me as if the flight suit attached to it had just been thrown into a heap on the grassy ground. I guessed he had unzipped his flight suit and had squirmed out of the suit, leaving it attached to the parachute which was laying all strewn out.

I again asked where my pilot was, but there was no answer, only silence, as everyone just stood around and looked. There was no activity other than silent standing around.

The plane was going to burn itself out and there was no searching going on.

I realized then that my pilot was still inside his flight suit and he was dead. I wasn't happy anymore and didn't look forward to telling the guys all about it anymore either. I sighed and went back to the truck and asked to be taken back to the tower. My back was starting to hurt whenever I bent over. I rode back silently to the tower where my regular pilot and our squadron commander were already waiting. I told them we lost the starboard engine and we ejected. I told them my pilot was dead but they didn't seem to want to believe it. They said I was in shock and to relax. The safety officer was there and suggested I tell everything I knew into a tape recorder for the accident investigation. I agreed and sat down with him and told the whole story as close as I could remember it. I then went back to the locker room, changed my clothes and went home to bed.

The next day I woke up and my back was really hurting from a compression fracture of thoracic vertebrae six from the abrupt parachute landing. I went to work, was sent to the Dispensary where I was given some muscle relaxants for my back, and took two days off. I resumed flying and completed my training.

The accident report revealed that a loose clamp, probably undone or not correctly tightened during the Progressive Rework, had become loose and was ingested into the starboard engine causing Foreign Object Damage (FOD) and a fire.

The pilot's ejection sequence was normal but he was too low or the angle was not vertical enough for the parachute to inflate after it was pulled from the ejection seat by the drogue. It was guessed that he was too low because the aircraft had rolled slightly to the right while waiting for my ejection sequence to complete and thus changed the trajectory of the seat from the vertical to the horizontal.

He died of massive internal injuries. It was reported that he should have used the alternate ejection handles on each armrest instead of the face curtain because that way he could have maintained the aircraft in level flight instead of taking his hands off the control stick to reach up and pull the face curtain.

Up until that crash it was believed that the Vigilante could maintain altitude and even climb if an engine out situation developed when low, slow, and dirty. NATOPS was changed to have the A-5 reach five hundred feet before turning downwind.

I believe that my pilot did everything right from quickly identifying the source of the noise, to deciding the airplane was not airworthy, informing his crew with instructions, and following the correct ejection sequence. And he still died and I lived.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: June 30, 1997 8:23:54 AM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: Explanation for left yaw after initial event of TWA 800

Mr. Schleede, a possible explanation for the left yaw after initial event for TWA 800 is the recoil effect of the explosive decompression as the starboard cargo door popped. The door went to the right with great force and the nose went to the left. The left yaw would explain the aircraft going left of track after initial event. The recoil effect would explain the left yaw. (The crumple effect would explain how the nose tore off when 300 knot wind crumpled nose into large hole made when cargo door goes.) The sharp angular deflection about the lateral axis after initial event also happened to Air India 182.

Left yaw and left track deviation after initial event reduces credibility of center tank fire/explosion as initial event. Center tank fire/explosion would be centerline and have little effect of

aircraft track.

Is the 8 Dec 97 hearing in Baltimore going to have an opportunity for the public, me, to present explanation? Or is it going to be government, NTSB, presenting explanation and public listens? Is there any opportunity anywhere for me to present the cargo door explanation to aviation aircraft accident investigating professionals?

There is still time to conduct the C-141 experiment to confirm door as streak and mystery radar blip. The original C-130 and helo crew would be glad to participate in a reconstruction of the event/crime, a standard mystery solving technique. It is normal to reconstruct the mystery event; it is not normal to blow planes up with bombs, set fuel tanks on fire, and fire missiles at planes. By pushing shiny objects out of C-141 or C-130 at 13700 feet at same time as TWA 800 initial event the center tank fire/access door explanation or the cargo door explanation may be confirmed and the investigation proceeds with valuable evidence.

To not take advantage of the sun angle which occurs only once a year at TWA 800 event location is a missed opportunity and one thought of early enough to take advantage.

This evening I watched Discovery Channel as a B-17 pilot was describing his P-51 escorts in WWII. He said he watched the Mustangs as the sky suddenly 'glittered' when they dropped their wing drop tanks upon sighting the enemy. The glitter was the sun reflecting off the spinning away shiny objects, in this case drop tanks at 180 knots giving glitter. In the case of TWA 800, it was the forward cargo door spinning away in the evening sunlight at 300 knots giving streak. The image I have is a high altitude bombing raid over Germany in the last year of WW II with hundreds of B-17s and P-51s droning along with contrails streaming. Then the Focke-Wulf 190s attack. The escort fighters release their long range shiny metal fuel tanks and prepare for battle, now lean and mean. The crews of the bombers watch as

the hundreds of metal tanks drop away and decelerate from the slow cruise of 180 knots to terminal velocity down. This is seen and reported by the crews as 'glitter'. Glitter falling from the sky as the sun reflects off the shiny metal objects. So pretty just before death approaches in machine guns firing and bombs dropping. Beauty before ugliness.

I also noted explanation for late docket in news reports. The FBI was blamed.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: July 13, 1997 10:26:26 AM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: Is the investigation over?

Investigators are united in blaming the explosion
of fuel fumes and air in
the plane's center fuel tank
for the destruction of
the jet but what touched it off
is in doubt.

Mr. Schleede,

Is the above true? Do you believe center tank was initiating event? Are all the investigators united?

Six months before the preliminary report is released, three months before the NTSB takes official control, and a year and a half before the final report is estimated to be

released...'investigators are united'?

So, is the investigation over? Just clearing up the paperwork?

Then tell me so I can go away. Tell me, Mr. Dickinson. Tell me you believe the center tank explosion was the initial event that led to the destruction of TWA 800. Ignition source unknown.

If you believe that, tell me so I can stop offering you conflicting evidence.

When you write the report the initial event of center tank will be tough because it conflicts with the evidence while cargo door is consistent.

1. TWA 800 yawed left after event, recoil from cargo door popping to the right could have caused it. Center tank should be neutral.
2. Ear and eyewitnesses reported streak 50 seconds at least after initial event consistent with airfoil shaped cargo door launched at 300 knots at 13700 feet. Witness reports conflict with center tank explanation of streak as leaking fuel before noisy explosion.
3. Mystery radar blip at same time as event and streak could be metal door spinning away. Center tank fire gives no radar blip.
4. Engine number three shows burn evidence and could be ignition source using cargo door explanation. Center tank explosion should give equal burning to all engines.

The main discrepancy is cargo door is on starboard side and center tank is...well...center. Damage, wreckage, and flight track are consistent with event starting on starboard side of plane, not centerline.

The recreation of the event by a leased Evergreen 747 is good. After the results of the test flight are inconclusive, try the C-141 tossing out shiny metal objects to recreate the streak and mystery radar blip.

If the investigation is complete and center tank is culprit then tell me and keep on acting like prosecutors proving center tank and dismissing conflicting evidence.

If the investigation is active, then continue to conduct experiments and look for explanations that fit the evidence and facts. And tell me so I can continue to contribute as a member of the public reacting to a public appeal for help from the government agencies investigating.

Is there any room for cargo door explanation among bomb, missile, center tank, meteorite, methane gas explanations?

There was a center tank explosion. I am not contradicting NTSB on that. It is just 12 seconds earlier the cargo door popped.

The NTSB has looked closely at the tree of TWA 800 while ignoring the other fallen similar trees of AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811. That forest of four high time Boeing 747s shows the consistent evidence pattern pointing to the correct NTSB explanation of one of them, UAL 811. The NTSB has the correct model, UAL 811.

The NTSB gets the credit for solving this mystery of TWA 800 because it solved the mystery of UAL 811, eight years earlier.

Take sworn testimony from me for the public hearing in December 8, Baltimore. Who chooses who and what the board will hear? Is there any provision made for input from the public?

I give you my personal assurance, as a former Naval Flight Officer and Vietnam combat veteran, the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight has caused the crash of TWA 800 and other high time Boeing 747s. The next time you look up and a 747 and see the sun reflect off the fuselage giving a bright glint you are seeing the streak source, the sun.

But if the deal is done, center tank takes the fall, then tell me so I can stop all this futile writing and wait for the next one.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: July 18, 1997 8:23:18 PM PDT
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: Ascending/descending streak explained.

Dear Mr. Schleede,

The point on ascending/descending for the streak is it depends on the observer's position. Is the object coming toward the observer or going away. It changes everything. It can go either way for the same event.

Many people saw it go up, many saw it go down. They are all right.

A helicopter crew on the scene and quoted in Aviation Week saw it and described it as a 'Shallow, descending, parabolic arc.'

Others say it went up. Both right.

How can that be?

You can see for yourself in slow motion with an aircraft coming towards you high up. It appears to climb. Once overhead it departs and appears to dive. It could be level, or climbing or descending, but to the observer on the ground it appears to ascend coming closer and descend going away. To an observer above the aircraft the observations would be reversed. And that is what happened in this case, different observers reporting different directions for the same event. All correct.

Corroboration is needed and that is supplied by the timing of the radar blips and streak and door location on ocean floor. The blips are almost stationary or very slow moving. The door was found right of track exactly where the mystery blips are located. Cargo

doors that have departed in the past have been identified on radar, specifically UAL 811 and the Paris DC-10 cargo door accidents.

The really important thing about the streak is that it existed, not the size or color or direction or duration, those are too arbitrary and subject to interpretation for an unexpected event. Even if observers were told to expect the streak, and it happened, accounts would vary, all except that it occurred.

And as far as leaking fuel causing a streak, that's funny. 300 knots will blow out most fires, and any fire would be horizontal right behind the plane, and it would be short, not thin, and it would stay close to the plane, and in no way would it ever be described as a 'streak.'

The mystery streak and mystery primary radar return can be explained as a shiny metal airfoil shaped object spinning away in the evening reflective sunlight at 13700 feet decelerating from 300 knots to zero in the horizontal plane and accelerating from zero to terminal velocity in the vertical plane and seen by observers miles away as a blur/streak or light and by radar as a blip. The flight trajectory would be a parabolic arc.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: July 25, 1997 10:35:29 AM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: Cargo door causes and effects.

Mr. Schleede, I respect your bravery for putting the lives of passengers and the reputation of your Board on the line on the belief the below for TWA 800 is all wrong:

1. Streak: Shiny metal forward cargo door spinning away in evening sunlight.
2. Same time mystery radar blip: Metal forward cargo door spinning away within primary radar range.
3. Same time sudden loud sound of CVR: Start of explosive decompression noise when door pops.
4. Same time abrupt power cut to FDR: Main Equipment Compartment cables disrupted when adjacent cargo hold compromised when cargo door departs.
5. Same time left yaw: Recoil affect of forward cargo door popping to the right, nose recoils left.
6. Four missing bodies: Ingested into number three engine through large hole where cargo door and attached skin used to be.
7. Engine number three burnt: Ignition source for fireball.
8. Start of destruction: Forward cargo hold.
9. Airframe: Flooring buckled and pressure relief doors in position consistent with cargo door suddenly detaching.
10. Engine number 3 Fodded: Baggage and other material from forward cargo hold ingested.
11. Forward cargo door broken; aft door intact: Forward door detaches, hits fuselage, breaks; aft door secure.
12. Nose severed: Forward door detaches taking skin with it allowing nose to be torn/crumpled/twisted off by 300 knot wind, the ultimate destructive force, not the explosive decompression.
13. Fireball: Seconds later as fuselage falls and disintegrates by 300 knot wind into fuel vapor hit by spinning hot jet engine.
14. Debris pattern: Forward Cargo door found very close to first items because it left first and it's airfoil shape allowed it to gradually descend, not drop like other items.
15. Autopsies of passengers: Passengers in nose consistent with cargo door detached severing nose before fire. Sudden

deceleration of aft passengers when blunt end of severed fuselage faces 300 knots.

16. Crew order to climb just before event: Pressure changing event related to high internal outward pressure on cargo door.

17. History: Forward cargo door has commonly failed as initial event on many other planes causing destruction, and on other high time Boeing 747 causing death; center tank explosion rare as initial event.

For you to put the welfare of passengers, your reputation and the integrity of the NTSB on the line based upon the above being wrong is the act of a brave man. It is a brave team that rejects the above as true since it appears to be so reasonable according to physical laws, NTSB documents, and aviation history. It is a brave investigative team that refuses to go down the thought trail of the cause of the crash of TWA 800 being the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight because the risk is so high.

If the above is right, then..well, then...the consequences of the above being right but not confirmed are..well, severe to all.

If the above is wrong, then your reward is to continue with the questions and scrutiny and agency bickering and general dissatisfaction of the reasoning of the investigation, but, a report gets published and center tank gets the blame or crash cause left unexplained and fault not fixed.

Are those seventeen items above wrong? Could they be right? To be on the safe side, to be on the comprehensive side, to be on the complete investigation side, to be on the searching for the answers anywhere side, a reasonable man might conclude the cargo door explanation is a worthy line of investigation, worth assigning investigators to review the cargo door area for subtle confirming evidence or to conclusively rule the cargo door area out as initial cause. Either way, it would be a complete

investigation, worthy of the United States National Transportation Safety Board.

When the NTSB officially gets the TWA 800 investigation, soon we hope, why not start with a fresh sheet of paper and include open forward cargo door as a possibility? There is ample corroborative evidence in other similar crashes to justify the expense and time and it's not too late. NTSB has shown its willingness to get it right even though it meant issuing a revised AAR, 92/02, UAL 811, superceding AAR-90-01. So there is still time to explore another mechanical explanation for the crash while the current explanation is correct also, fireball.

Everyone is doing the best they can, including me, there is no hiding or fudging, we are all trying to figure this out. Cargo door makes sense to me; can you check it out?

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: July 30, 1997 5:36:53 PM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: Things to do to rule out or in for cargo door

Mr. Schleede, the below are things to do to rule in or rule out cargo door should you decide it is a worthy line of investigation. They come from me and Mr. Dan Savage.

Also attached is analysis of UAL 811 door opening sequence based upon your NTSB report and related explanation for events split seconds after door departs that explains movement of aircraft and why nose tears off others but stays on UAL 811, also

by Mr. Dan Savage.
Sincerely,
John Barry Smith

- 1) Position of the latch sectors?
- 2) Condition of the latch pins?
- 3) Position and condition of the lock sectors?
- 4) Condition of fuselage-to-door cable bundle?
- 5) Condition of all cargo door switches, especially S2 master latch lock handle switch?
- 6) Was AD 88-06-04 applied, including the "terminating action?"
- 7) Was AD 89-05-54 applied, including the torque-limiting devices?
- 8) Condition of the torque-limiting devices?
- 9) Condition of floor beams immediately inboard from fcd?
- 10) Condition of the oxygen lines passing immediately adjacent to floor beams?
- 11) Condition of the cargo door hinges?
- 12) Detailed paint mark analysis of any "foreign" paint marks on fcd?

1. examine forward cargo door for steel rods to confirm AD 88-12-04 complied with on TWA 800.
2. examine cargo door for status of cam latches, unlocked or locked.
3. examine cargo door lock sectors, unlocked or locked.
4. examine cargo door lock sectors and cam sectors for wear and gouging.
5. examine cargo door manual locking bar for locking position.
6. examine all door electrical switches for proper operation.
7. check maintenance history of TWA 800 for previous cargo

door problems.

8. note condition of cargo door, in how many pieces to match UAL 811.

9. note position of cargo door when found, close to event site or far away indicating time it left aircraft.

9. detect frayed wiring in door control system.

10. examine direction of buckled floor beams, up or down indicating decompression or explosion.

11. match TWA 800 evidence with other similar crashes leaving similar evidence.

12. check for presence or non presence of evidence of fire/explosion on separated nose.

13. match sudden on loud sound on CVR to sound library of in flight aircraft explosions and decompressions.

14. match abrupt end of tape signals on FDR to two other abrupt end of tape Boeing 747 crashes, PA 103, and AI 182.

15. confirm by computer simulation that 300 knot wind blowing into nine foot by 15 foot hole in right side of weakened nose will tear nose off in an second.

16. examine wreckage for more severe in flight debris damage on right side of aircraft to include wing fillet, leading edges of wing and horizontal stabilizer and vertical stabilizer, engine cowls and pylons.

A low cost experiment to reproduce the streak and radar anomaly is to take several two car garage doors painted silver and white and push them out the back of a C-130 going as fast as it can at 13700 feet on clear evening with same sun angle as July 17th near New York and look for streak and radar primary return. They will be there, two mysteries explained at reasonable cost.

What answers would I look for?

1) If the latch sectors aren't within 18-22 degrees of fully-closed

position, it could mean that door wasn't fully latched, or door tried to unlatch itself after closing and locking.

2) If the latch pins have a "smooth" part from 6:30 position to 8:30 position, this could be indication of "out-of-rig" door. If there is a discolored (blued) roughened (gouged) section from 6:30 to 7:30 position, it would mean that latch sectors were violently pulled past latch pins, indicating a blown/torn-out fcd.

3) if the lock sectors aren't completely "over-center" and show deformation on the surface closest to latch sectors, it could show that door has had "uncommanded door opening." If these are in direct contact with latch sectors, we can reasonably conclude that fcd tried to open itself.

4) Mostly this will show whether these cables are chaffed. The critical wire here is 101-20, which NTSB has shown that it can short with many other sources to cause "uncommanded door opening," especially if detail number 5 is true.

5) If these switches show concave deformation, it could be an

indication
of door that has been
"out-of-rig" for some time. If S2 master latch lock handle switch
has
broken bracket inside, the
operation should be tested to verify whether "door-open" circuit
was
being jumped "closed"
allowing current to pass even though master latch lock handle is
stowed
and locked.

6) Airworthiness Directive 88-12-04 terminating action required
that the
soft aluminum lock
sectors be replaced with steel units or with steel re-enforced
units.

7) This AD requires installation of torque-limiting devices
(clutches)
on all latch sector drive
motors, preventing the latch sectors from being back-driven into
and
deforming or breaking the
lock sectors. Once this happens, latching mechanism is
effectively
disabled. If this AD and the
previous one has not been applied to a 747, the cargo door
latching

mechanism can't be trusted
to be safe.

8) Were the torque-limiting devices installed and in proper working order?

9) If the floor beams are buckled downward, it is an indication that explosive decompression has taken place.

10) If the floor beams have been buckled downward, there is a very good chance that all flight deck and cabin oxygen lines will have been "pinched-off" preventing anyone from getting oxygen from on-board oxygen generators. At higher altitudes, this would adversely affect flight and cabin crew effectiveness when dealing with an emergency of this magnitude, even if the nose section hasn't been torn off.

11) If the cargo door hinges are bent backwards, it is an indication that cargo door opened past it's full "open" position, and probably struck fuselage immediately above it.

12) This detail should be performed with detail 11 to show if door violently opened in flight. Any "foreign" paint marks found should be checked with portion of

fuselage
immediately above fcd
through detailed paint mark analysis.

Only when these 12 details have been verified, can the fcd
problem be
ruled out as a possible
probable cause. If a discrepancy is found for one, they all need to
be
closely examined before a
positive conclusion can be made. If any of the previous steps
indicate
an "out-of-rig" door, we can
reasonably conclude that the fuselage has been flexing, probably
causing
cargo door latch
failure.

From Mr. Dan Savage:

Because the original conclusion in the NTSB UA811 report was
that UA811
cargo door incident
was caused by human-error through improper latching and
locking of door,
the PMI's (FAA
representative assigned to monitor airline's aircraft maintenance
and
operation) assigned to
United Airlines after UA811 incident was instructed to heighten
surveillance of cargo door
operations. As was reported in NTSB UA811, these individuals

reportedly
observed many
problems with cargo door ops. It wasn't procedural problems
they found,
but problems with the
747 itself.

The most serious one, in my opinion, was the reporting of a
possible
design deficiency of the
fuselage. In my opinion, this is the root cause of all 747 cargo
door
problems. This deficiency
allows the 747 fuselage to flex when cargo door was open and
the
airplane was fully loaded.

The report detailed one incident where the ground personnel
couldn't
close the forward cargo
door with a fully-loaded 747. They unloaded airplane, towed it to
overnight maintenance facility,
and the door worked perfectly. They detailed chaffing problems in
the
fuselage-to-door cable
bundle, problems where the pull-in latches don't pull the door in
far
enough, and the latch sectors
finished the job, and caused the door jamb to be flexed
downward with a
resultant "loud thump"
as door slammed into position. The NTSB theorized that the
reason fcd's

go "out of rig" is
because of this fuselage flex.

Once UA811's cargo door was pulled from the bottom of the ocean, a detailed analysis of the entire latching mechanism was performed. This pointed out many symptoms of an "out of rig" (sprung) door. These included a "smoothed" section on all eight (8) latch pins, indicative of long-term "out of rig" condition. They found that all of the switches on the door had a "concave" deformation, and the S2 master latch lock handle switch had what I term "carbon-scoring" on the "door-close" circuit of the switch, which is indicative of higher than normal current passing through switch and subsequent arcing when door slams closed and causing internal contacts to open and close. They also found that an internal bracket inside the switch was broken, causing the switch to fail when the master latch lock handle was stowed and locked. This would also be consistent with a door slamming closed for an extended period of

time.

Boeing inspected and tested all of the cargo door switches and could find no reason for any of this to have happened. They concluded that this didn't happen when door came off, when door impacted ocean or from the pressures developed from door resting on ocean floor depth of ~14,000' for about a year.

Briefly, here is a synopsis of cargo door operation.

Its operation is actually pretty simple. It uses a series of "sequencing switches" and drive motors. When door is open and "close" button is pressed, it starts the sequence in motion.

1) Door drive motors (lift actuators) drive door downwards until the contact the pull-in hook motor switch. This turns off door close/open motors, and turns on pull-in hook motors.

2) When pull-in hook motors contact latch sector motors switch, it disengages the pull-in hook motors and engages the latch sector motors.

3) When the latch sectors reach the end of their rotation, they contact latching sector motor "shut-off" switch. This stops latch sector motors.

4) Ground personnel close master locking handle engaging locking sectors and closing safety switch S2. (Opening circuit to prevent current from passing through)

The door-open sequence simply reverses the aforementioned sequence.

My theory: When master locking handle is open (unlocked) the safety switch S2 is in "door-close" (down) position. The "door-open" side of switch S2 was "broken" allowing current to pass even when master locking handle was closed. When the master locking handle was closed, the switch position changed to "door-open" position. Chaffed wires shorted, allowing current to pass through this switch, and in doing so, started door open sequence. Because master locking handle has now been closed and locked, the locking sectors are now in place to prevent complete door-open sequence. Ground power bus is disconnected shortly thereafter, withdrawing power from circuit.

But the die has already been cast. The latching sectors are now in the 7:30 position. Because the door jamb is "used" to being flexed when fcd moves down and around the latching pins due to long-term "out-of-rig" condition, the fcd blows out once sufficient altitude (pressure) is reached.

But why is the fuselage flexing? Let's examine the design of the 747. It was the first of the new "wide-body" airliners to fly. It was designed at a time when the idea of "wide-body" aircraft was very new and not widely accepted. The wide-body fuselage was pioneered by Jack Conroy of Aerospacelines, Inc., when he designed and built the first "Pregnant Guppy." Before the Guppy flew, most aeronautical engineers believed that a wide-body aircraft wouldn't be strong enough to fly. The Guppy proved that it would be strong enough.

The 747's forward cargo door is located on the fuselage's widest and tallest point. The fcd is also located near the bottom of the fuselage where the stress on the fuselage is the highest, both on

the ground and in the air. When the cargo doors on these aircraft are closed, they become structural members of the fuselage, carrying "hoop" stresses, meaning that they tie the front of the cargo door jamb to the back, and the top to the bottom.

It's a given assumption that dynamic loads are usually much greater than static loads, therefore the stress on an airplane flying in the air is higher than one sitting on the ground. Given that, we can assume that if the forward cargo door is missing, the flexing of the 747 fuselage in flight will be much greater than the one on the ground, as was detailed in the NTSB UA811 report. Which brings us to the fcd theory.

We have four (4) fatal incidents that have been put forward as being fcd-related:

Air India Flight 182	1985
Pan Am Flight 103	1988
United Airlines Flight 811	1989
TWA Flight 800	1996

There are two (2) other incidents where there was a failure of the cargo door latching mechanism

but resulted in no fatalities. These are:

Pan Am Flight 125 1987
United Airlines N152UA 1991 (During Pre-flight)

AI182 and PA103 both had evidence that some sort of "explosion" took place in the forward cargo hold. AI182 had upward buckled floor beams and sooting, and PA103 had a 10"x50" hole in the left side of the fuselage, blast pattern/sooting. What isn't clear in the reports is *when* the explosions took place. The evidence gathered from AI182 was very similar to TW800, but the recovery of the aircraft wasn't nearly as comprehensive. They did recover the fcd, but it was lost overboard before it could be examined and was never located again, so it is inconclusive. PA103 crashed on land, but the blast pattern and sooting received most of the report's attention, so no mention was made of the condition of the fcd latching mechanism.

In these two cases, we can assume one of two scenarios:

- 1) Cargo door was problem and was "covered-up"
- 2) Blast pattern/sooting led investigators away from fcd latching mechanism.

I prefer to believe the second.

PA125, UA811 and UA N152UA were positively determined to be a problem with the cargo door latching mechanism, although UA N152UA was an anomaly, because it had a rear cargo door "uncommanded opening" during a pre-flight inspection. This is significant because this airplane probably arrived from its previous flight in this condition. If the S2 master latch lock switch had failed, it too may have had an "uncommanded door opening" in flight.

If we examine what the FDR's recorded in AI182, PA103 and UA811, we find that just prior to their power being cut, there was a sharp departure in the yaw and pitch axis of the airplane about the same time as the "short loud sound" heard on the CAM channel of the CVR in these aircraft. Separate detailed analysis was performed by the investigative bodies' during their investigations and we find in all three (3) reports, that they determined there was sharp yaw to the left, and a rise upward in pitch (attitude).

When the "short loud sound" occurred, the airplanes "turned" to the left, and rose up to a higher angle of attack. Now the airplane is missing a structural component (fcd) and a portion of another structural component (fuselage side) and the stresses on this part of the fuselage are much higher than normal due to dynamic loading. Here is what I think happens:

When the fcd departs aircraft, cabin air pressure blows down and to the right causing yaw and pitch departure recorded on FDR's due to Newton's first law of motion (action/reaction). Due to inertia and the weakened structure, the nose of the airplane continues to "fly" straight ahead while rest of aircraft yaws left and pitches up, further buckling floor beams that were damaged during fcd departure and subsequent explosive decompression. The yaw dampers and 747's large vertical fin "force" the aircraft back on track, but now the nose section is "canted" to the right and down. 300 knot slipstream pushes nose section into hole caused by missing fcd and

associated fuselage structure, tearing it off, down and to the right. Aircraft break-up follows shortly thereafter.

Why didn't the nose section depart the aircraft in UA811? This aircraft was a newer airplane with fewer logged flight-time. Also, anecdotal evidence received, indicates that the Captain of UA811 says he didn't have the auto-pilot engaged when incident occurred, and he gently brought the airplane back on course.

Three of the four fcd incident airplanes were "high-time" aircraft, meaning they were old. They were some of the first off the Boeing assembly line, and I believe this is also a factor.

In conclusion, the Forward Cargo Door Theory has the potential to be an ugly problem. I personally would like to see the following details verified to rule out fcd for TW800 and all future 747 incidents which exhibit the same characteristics as the three (3) mentioned here: AI182, PA103 and UA811.

- 1) Position of the latch sectors?

- 2) Condition of the latch pins?
- 3) Position and condition of the lock sectors?
- 4) Condition of fuselage-to-door cable bundle?
- 5) Condition of all cargo door switches, especially S2 master latch lock handle switch?
- 6) Was AD 88-06-04 applied, including the "terminating action?"
- 7) Was AD 89-05-54 applied, including the torque-limiting devices?
- 8) Condition of the torque-limiting devices?
- 9) Condition of floor beams immediately inboard from fcd?
- 10) Condition of the oxygen lines passing immediately adjacent to floor beams?
- 11) Condition of the cargo door hinges?
- 12) Detailed paint mark analysis of any "foreign" paint marks on fcd?

What answers would I look for?

- 1) If the latch sectors aren't within 18-22 degrees of fully-closed position, it could mean that door wasn't fully latched, or door tried to unlatch itself after closing and locking.
- 2) If the latch pins have a "smooth" part from 6:30 position to 8:30 position, this could be indication of "out-of-rig" door. If there is a discolored (blued) roughened (gouged) section from 6:30 to 7:30 position, it would mean that latch sectors were

violently
pulled past latch pins,
indicating a blown/torn-out fcd.

3) if the lock sectors aren't completely "over-center" and show deformation on the surface closest to latch sectors, it could show that door has had "uncommanded door opening." If these are in direct contact with latch sectors, we can reasonably conclude that fcd tried to open itself.

4) Mostly this will show whether these cables are chaffed. The critical wire here is 101-20, which NTSB has shown that it can short with many other sources to cause "uncommanded door opening," especially if detail number 5 is true.

5) If these switches show concave deformation, it could be an indication of door that has been "out-of-rig" for some time. If S2 master latch lock handle switch has broken bracket inside, the operation should be tested to verify whether "door-open" circuit was being jumped "closed" allowing current to pass even though master latch lock handle is stowed and locked.

6) Airworthiness Directive 88-12-04 terminating action required that the soft aluminum lock sectors be replaced with steel units or with steel re-enforced units.

7) This AD requires installation of torque-limiting devices (clutches) on all latch sector drive motors, preventing the latch sectors from being back-driven into and deforming or breaking the lock sectors. Once this happens, latching mechanism is effectively disabled. If this AD and the previous one has not been applied to a 747, the cargo door latching

mechanism can't be trusted to be safe.

8) Were the torque-limiting devices installed and in proper working order?

9) If the floor beams are buckled downward, it is an indication that explosive decompression has taken place.

10) If the floor beams have been buckled downward, there is a

very good
chance that all flight
deck and cabin oxygen lines will have been "pinched-off"
preventing
anyone from getting oxygen
from on-board oxygen generators. At higher altitudes, this would
adversely affect flight and
cabin crew effectiveness when dealing with an emergency of this
magnitude, even if the nose
section hasn't been torn off.

11) If the cargo door hinges are bent backwards, it is an
indication
that cargo door opened past
it's full "open" position, and probably struck fuselage
immediately
above it.

12) This detail should be performed with detail 11 to show if
door
violently opened in flight. Any
"foreign" paint marks found should be checked with portion of
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Only when these 12 details have been verified, can the fcd
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indicate
an "out-of-rig" door, we can
reasonably conclude that the fuselage has been flexing, probably
causing
cargo door latch
failure.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: August 9, 1997 10:35:55 AM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

**Subject: The NTB is the greatest aircraft accident
investigative organization on the planet ever because:**

Dear Mr. Schleede, Dr. Loeb, and Mr. Dickinson,

The National Transportation Safety Board is the greatest aircraft
accident investigative organization on the planet ever because:

1. It has determined there was a center fuel tank fire on TWA
800.
2. It admits its rare incomplete conclusions and issues a revision
to its original report, AAR 92/02 for AAR 90/01, based upon
retrieval of new evidence.
3. It listens to the suggestions of citizens and retrieves relevant
evidence; forward cargo door to UAL 811 from ocean after
original AAR released.
4. It holds public hearings and considers input from non
government persons. "A 3-day public hearing was held in
Seattle... Parties represented at the hearing were...Air Line Pilots
Association, and the International Association of Machinists."
Page 100 of AAR 92/02
5. It analyzes multiple theories for a catastrophic event: "Three

possible theories to explain why the latch cams could have been in a partially latched condition during flight are examined:..."

Page 74 of AAR 92/02.

6. It does extensive research into similar accidents for historical comparison. AAR 92/02 reports on other aircraft in the same airline, UAL; and many other aircraft of the same type, Boeing 747s; and on aircraft of different type, DC-10.

7. It writes clear, comprehensive, logical, and balanced accident reports, AAR 92/02.

8. It does in depth review of an entire system from design to certification to operation to maintenance to breaking to fixing: Boeing design of door, certification, difficulty reports, and Airworthiness Directives on cargo door system of Boeing 747. AAR 92/02

9. It is an open agency with names of Board members named. It makes available the results of its investigation to the public via a phone number and a credit card. It responds to requests for interviews. Its investigation team appears on camera for news reports and documentaries. Evidence, such as wreckage and 'black boxes', is displayed as it is retrieved. It makes available on the internet Service Difficulty Reports, Incident Reports, Accident Reports, testimony before Congress, and press releases. It shows by doing it is a responsive public agency conducting a deliberate, complex investigation under trying and emotional circumstances.

Mr. Schleede, Dr. Loeb, and Mr. Dickinson, I believe the above, it's all true. I ask that the true statements above be continued to be applied to the current investigation into TWA 800.

1. There was a center tank fire.
2. It is probably an incomplete conclusion because it probably was not the initial event.
3. This citizen asks that the same in depth investigation into

bomb, missile, and center tank theories be given to the conclusion in AAR 92/02, inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight.

4. During the public hearing in Baltimore, 8 December, this non government person be permitted a few minutes to present the AAR 92/02 explanation for the TWA 800 explanation. I would quote NTSB AAR 92/02.

5. Analyze multiple theories for TWA 800 including the NTSB conclusion reached in AAR 92/02.

6. Conduct research into similar accidents for historical comparison such as Air India Flight 182, PA 103, UAL 811, PA 125 and the three DC-10 cargo door accidents. All had a sudden loud sound on Cockpit Voice Recorder at destruction not matched to a bomb but matched to explosive decompression as stated in official reports; Indian Court and Canadian Aviation Safety Board report, page 23 and 24, UK AAIB report, and NTSB AAR 92/02

7. Write a clear, comprehensive, logical, and balanced accident report for TWA 800 equal to the outstanding example of an aircraft accident investigative report, AAR 92/02.

8. Conduct an depth review of an entire cargo door system and confirm all ADs fully complied with for TWA 800, noting recent Service Difficulty Reports of B747 aft cargo door opening in flight, "NWA 27 Nov 1994, Discrepancy/Corrective Action: on rotation, aft cargo door opened."

9. Continue to contact this night sudden fiery fatal jet airplane crash survivor for open discussion via email at barry@corazon.com.

Mr. Schleede, Dr. Loeb, and Mr. Dickinson, the NTSB got the answer right in NTSB AAR 90/01. They made it more right in NTSB AAR 92/02. The NTSB got the answer right with center tank fire for TWA 800. I suggest the more right answer for TWA 800 is the same more right answer in NTSB 92/02.

The NTSB has provided the correct answer for one accident, UAL 811. I ask that that same correct answer by the NTSB, the greatest aircraft investigative organization in the world, be applied to the current NTSB investigation into TWA 800. I suggest that complete, amplified, and clarified answers to TWA 800 are in NTSB AAR 92/02, a comprehensive, logical, and balanced accident report. Please believe your previous work. It is correct.

Sincerely,
John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: August 13, 1997 1:39:19 PM PDT
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: **Trust NTSB previous explanation, yours**

Dear Mr. Schleede, Dr. Loeb, and Mr. Dickinson,

Possible explanations for the cause of TWA 800 crash:

1. Leaking fuel leading to center tank explosion and sudden loud sound on CVR and abrupt power cut to FDR: A lawyer's idea whose blame alone falls on is richest person around, manufacturer.
2. Bomb leading to sudden loud sound on CVR and abrupt power cut to FDR. A policeman's idea whose blame falls on criminals.
3. Friendly or enemy missile hits aircraft leading to sudden loud sound on CVR and abrupt power cut to FDR: Internet theorists whose blame falls on unknown and unseen enemies.
4. Inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight leading to sudden loud sound on CVR and abrupt power cut to FDR: John Barry Smith and NSTB whose blame fell on the manufacturer and the airline and FAA. AAR 92/02

The NTSB has already found the cause of a fatal accident of a high time Boeing 747 that took off and during climb experienced a disintegration forward of the wing on the right side, recorded a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut on the FDR, experienced buckled floor beams, foddled number three engine which had a fire, several missing bodies, and had pieces of the aircraft retrieved from the ocean. It's all been researched, reviewed, analyzed, and explained correctly in NTSB AAR 92/02.

It is reasonable and prudent to consider the same correct cause the NTSB diligently determined in NTSB AAR 92/02 for another fatal accident of a high time Boeing 747 that took off and during climb experienced a disintegration forward of the wing on the right side, recorded a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut on the FDR, experienced buckled floor beams, foddled number three engine which had a fire, several missing bodies, and had pieces of the aircraft retrieved from the ocean, TWA 800.

NTSB should put its investigative effort into a NTSB provided solution, not lawyers, policeman, and theorists.

The prime investigative path into the crash of TWA 800 should be the NTSB proven path of a similar crash, UAL 811.

NTSB investigators, put your faith in the NTSB.

The above statements are based on quotes from NTSB AAR 92/02. The NTSB can quote from AAR 92/02 also to justify the added expense and time to pursue an NTSB suggested solution to TWA 800, inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight.

The investigation into the door is a difficult one. The cause is subtle. The door appears latched but isn't. The door has been manhandled for months by another agency not concerned with latch position but with explosive residue. Metal is twisted. To

rule in or rule out the door is tough, but fortunately, AAR 92/02 is there to guide the investigators. All the hard work done on AAR 92/02 now pays off. Match AAR 92/02 to TWA 800. There are many similarities of the two accidents to compare and match.

All the effort, money, and time put into AAR 92/02 by the NTSB is now invaluable to correctly identify the cause of the crash of another high time Boeing 747 that took off and during climb experienced a disintegration forward of the wing on the right side, recorded a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut on the FDR, experienced buckled floor beams, foddred number three engine which had a fire, several missing bodies, and had pieces of the aircraft retrieved from the ocean, TWA 800.

I use as my basic document to support all my conclusions the NTSB AAR 92/02. It is well written, clear, and makes sense. Everything comes back to AAR 92/02.

NTSB investigators, I urge you to have faith in yourself and in your previous work, AAR 92/02.

Sincerely,
John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: August 17, 1997 2:47:41 PM PDT
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: I'm using your report as the 'bible'

Dear Mr. Schleede I'm using the report you were the lead investigator on, UAL 811 as my reference that I always go back to when queried.

Here's some info below:

Sincerely,
John Barry Smith

John McCain, Arizona,
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
United States Senate

Dear Senator John McCain,

To break through the noise: Senator McCain, as your assurance to me from a former naval officer and combat veteran meant truth, I assure you, as a former naval officer and combat veteran, that a worthy line of investigation into the crash of TWA 800 is the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight.

It is as if accidental explosions continue to occur under you, sir. Sitting in your Scooter on the Forrestal, diving in against enemy fire in your A4, and now Chairman of the Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee with TWA 800.

Please be as resourceful as Chairman as you were in your Skyhawk. On the CVA-59 flight deck, all the support personnel risked their lives and lost trying to rescue you. No one held back. They could not help you. You helped yourself by taking unorthodox resourceful action, you unstrapped and climbed down the refueling boom to safety, literally saving your life.

As Chairman, everyone is trying to help you but has not succeeded. The NTSB, FAA, FBI are all doing the best they can to find out what happened to TWA 800. I suggest it is time for you to take unorthodox resourceful action. Check out the cargo door explanation. Contact me. Have one of your assistants contact me. Ask NTSB to contact me. Give cargo door explanation the attention it deserves.

It deserves attention because it is the NTSB explanation for another high time Boeing 747 that took off at night and during climb experienced an event near the leading edge of the wing that caused a sudden loud sound on the CVR, an abrupt power cut to the FDR, missing bodies, foddred number 3 engine that caught fire, and the initial thought was that a bomb had gone off.

I refer of course to UAL 811 and the facts come from NTSB AAR 92/02.

TWA 800 is also a:

- 1 A high time
 - 2 Boeing 747.
 - 3 during climb
 - 4 experienced an event near the leading edge of the wing
 - 5 that caused a sudden loud sound on the CVR,
 - 6 an abrupt power cut to the FDR,
 - 7 missing bodies,
 - 8 foddred number 3 engine that caught fire,
- and the initial thought was that a bomb had gone off.

I ask that the diligent investigative analysis and conclusion of the NTSB as shown in NTSB AAR 92/02, inadvertent opening of the cargo door inflight, be applied to a similar event, TWA 800.

Cargo door is a worthy line of investigation. The lawyer said leaking fuel and center tank explosion as initial event, the policeman said bomb, the other guys say missile, the NTSB has said cargo door for a similar fatal night sudden fiery accident on a high time Boeing 747, UAL 811.

LetÕs use the official NTSB document AAR 92/02 which lays it all out as a basis for TWA 800.

The final reason is that it is an opportunity to clear the Navy of the untrue allegation of friendly fire. If the NTSB final conclusion is center tank fire or unexplained, the US Navy will forever be tainted with the unproven accusation of accidentally killing its citizens and then covering it up. It is a sick thought and

must be countered conclusively. I can do that. Your father and grandfather would agree with me that every effort to expunge a black mark on our Navy must be pursued, yes?

Very

Respectfully.

John Barry

Smith
MAJ USA (Ret)
408 659 3552

barry@corazon.com
www.corazon.com

551 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, CA 93924

Mr. Schleede, the below is a list of things that might be done to rule in or rule out that pesky cargo door.

Sincerely,
John Barry Smith

What was the condition of the cargo door hinges?

Bent upward/equally/unequally etc.

Was AD 88-06-04 applied, including the "terminating action?"

Was AD 89-05-54 applied, including the torque-limiting devices?

What was the condition of the torque-limiting devices?

Very Important to 1,100 other B-747s...

show that door has had "uncommanded door opening."

If these are in direct contact with latch sectors, we can reasonably conclude that fcd tried to open itself.

What was the condition of the fcd frame and the locking pin holes?

Do these holes show the locking pin being pulled across the frame in different directions?

Was the bottom of the cargo door frame worn away prior to crash?

What was the condition of the floor beams immediately inboard from fcd?

What was the condition of the bulkhead immediately aft of the fcd?

Do the floor and bulk head beam's metallographic cross sections indicate that slow (seconds) high energy torsional twisting or fast (<sec) fracture fatigue damage?

Were repairs/actions from the Nov-Dec 1992 rebuild involved?

Detailed paint mark analysis of any "foreign" paint marks on fcd?

Detailed analysis of the "grease" on fcd parts for wear indicator materials?

What was the condition (failure mechanism) of the RH Inboard powerplant pylon bolts?

Were all recovered engine pylon bolts of the correct type?

What was the condition of the front stages of the RH inboard engine?

Was baggage related debris found in this engine?

Were any of the silicone/organic materials in the RH wing burned?

Is there evidence of complete or incomplete combustion of these materials?

What was the failure type of all of the different powerplant main bearings?

Do all post failure analysis of these bearings indicate a normal "spindown"?

What was the spectrometric metal content of the powerplane oil in the filters and in the main bearings?

Does any of the Baggage from the FCH have indications of high temperature (<1,500F) burning?

This would indicate a self oxygenating fire or (plastic) Explosive.

Does any of the Baggage from the FCH have indications of lower temperature (<750F) burning?

This would indicate fuel related burning.

If not burned then baggage was lost prior to major fuel explosion(s).

Were there any cell phones in use on the plane?

Were any conversations recovered from AT&T or MCI switching

computers?

Remember Cell Phones are part of the internet..

Has the position of any transmission(s) been calculated?

Has any cell phone background noise been analyzed?

Remember that the NTSB did this in the ValuJet crash.

1. Outside observers on the ground / in the air.
2. Radar tracking..
3. Satellite Tracking..
(No body reporting on this!)
4. Commercial & private video tape / pictures.
5. Coroner's forensic reports and victim damage computer model.
(not released to the public yet)
6. Physical Condition of items ejected from aircraft prior to explosion.
7. Physical Conditions of Engines and recovery locations.
8. Physical Condition of other aircraft material / sections and recovery locations.
9. Explosive and trace elemental analysis of recovered materials.
10. Fast/slow strain analysis model of aircraft skin fasteners.
11. Oxidation sampling modeling of aircraft metallic components for explosion temperature zone modeling. Shows high temperature combustion areas..
12. Oxidation Sampling modeling of aircraft organic components for explosion temperature zone modeling. Shows lower temperature combustion areas.
and items 13 - 200+ etc.

1) Position of the latch sectors?

2) Condition of the latch pins?

- 3) Position and condition of the lock sectors?
- 4) Condition of fuselage-to-door cable bundle?
- 5) Condition of all cargo door switches, especially S2 master latch lock handle switch?
- 6) Was AD 88-06-04 applied, including the "terminating action?"
- 7) Was AD 89-05-54 applied, including the torque-limiting devices?
- 8) Condition of the torque-limiting devices?
- 9) Condition of floor beams immediately inboard from fcd?
- 10) Condition of the oxygen lines passing immediately adjacent to floor beams?
- 11) Condition of the cargo door hinges?
- 12) Detailed paint mark analysis of any "foreign" paint marks on fcd?

1. examine forward cargo door for steel rods to confirm AD 88-12-04 complied with on TWA 800.
2. examine cargo door for status of cam latches, unlocked or locked.
3. examine cargo door lock sectors, unlocked or locked.
4. examine cargo door lock sectors and cam sectors for wear and gouging.
5. examine cargo door manual locking bar for locking position.
6. examine all door electrical switches for proper operation.
7. check maintenance history of TWA 800 for previous cargo door problems.
8. note condition of cargo door, in how many pieces to match UAL 811.
9. note position of cargo door when found, close to event site or far away indicating time it left aircraft.
9. detect frayed wiring in door control system.

10. examine direction of buckled floor beams, up or down indicating decompression or explosion.
11. match TWA 800 evidence with other similar crashes leaving similar evidence.
12. check for presence or non presence of evidence of fire/ explosion on separated nose.
13. match sudden on loud sound on CVR to sound library of in flight aircraft explosions and decompressions.
14. match abrupt end of tape signals on FDR to two other abrupt end of tape Boeing 747 crashes, PA 103, and AI 182.
15. confirm by computer simulation that 300 knot wind blowing into nine foot by 15 foot hole in right side of weakened nose will tear nose off in a second.
16. examine wreckage for more severe in flight debris damage on right side of aircraft to include wing fillet, leading edges of wing and horizontal stabilizer and vertical stabilizer, engine cowls and pylons.

1) If the latch sectors aren't within 18-22 degrees of fully-closed position, it could mean that door wasn't fully latched, or door tried to unlatch itself after closing and locking.

2) If the latch pins have a "smooth" part from 6:30 position to 8:30 position, this could be indication of "out-of-rig" door. If there is a discolored (blued) roughened (gouged) section from 6:30 to 7:30 position, it would mean that latch sectors were violently pulled past latch pins, indicating a blown/torn-out fcd.

3) if the lock sectors aren't completely "over-center" and show deformation on the surface closest to latch sectors, it could show that door has had "uncommanded door opening." If these are in direct contact with latch sectors, we can reasonably conclude that fcd tried to open itself.

4) Mostly this will show whether these cables are chaffed. The critical wire here is 101-20, which NTSB has shown that it can short with many other sources to cause "uncommanded door opening," especially if detail number 5 is true.

5) If these switches show concave deformation, it could be an indication of door that has been "out-of-rig" for some time. If S2 master latch lock handle switch has broken bracket inside, the operation should be tested to verify whether "door-open" circuit was being jumped "closed" allowing current to pass even though master latch lock handle is stowed and locked.

6) Airworthiness Directive 88-12-04 terminating action required that the

soft aluminum lock sectors be replaced with steel units or with steel re-enforced units.

7) This AD requires installation of torque-limiting devices (clutches) on all latch sector drive motors, preventing the latch sectors from being back-driven into and deforming or breaking the lock sectors. Once this happens, latching mechanism is effectively disabled. If this AD and the previous one has not been applied to a 747, the cargo door latching

mechanism can't be trusted to be safe.

8) Were the torque-limiting devices installed and in proper working order?

9) If the floor beams are buckled downward, it is an indication that explosive decompression has taken place.

10) If the floor beams have been buckled downward, there is a very good chance that all flight deck and cabin oxygen lines will have been "pinched-off"

preventing anyone from getting oxygen from on-board oxygen generators. At higher altitudes, this would adversely affect flight and cabin crew effectiveness when dealing with an emergency of this magnitude, even if the nose section hasn't been torn off.

11) If the cargo door hinges are bent backwards, it is an indication that cargo door opened past it's full "open" position, and probably struck fuselage immediately above it.

12) This detail should be performed with detail 11 to show if door violently opened in flight. Any "foreign" paint marks found should be checked with portion of fuselage immediately above fcd through detailed paint mark analysis.

Only when these 12 details have been verified, can the fcd problem be ruled out as a possible probable cause. If a discrepancy is found for one, they all need to be closely examined before a positive conclusion can be made. If any of the previous steps indicate an "out-of-rig" door, we can reasonably conclude that the fuselage has been flexing, probably

causing
cargo door latch
failure.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 8, 1997 11:19:20 AM PDT
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: **Nose gear doors.**

Dear Mr. Schleede,

The CNN story on nose gear doors was not picked up by any other news organization. Very sad. Anyway, I believe that there are real crash investigators on TWA 800 team using basic tried and true techniques to find solution and they are now checking out nose for structural problems. It's boring and hard work, it's not exciting like missile or bomb or fuel explosion, but it is true and it's happened before often, door opened when it shouldn't. Regarding the imploded nose doors...impact with ocean? Inflight damage when falling? Sucked in when decompression? May I recommend reconstructing the entire nose now? It's extra money and time but worth it and justified with unusual nose gear doors. Puzzles are easier to see clearly when pieces are fitted together. That whole area of nose, including bottom of cargo door, nose gear doors, and reconstruction needs to be done. There is justification now.

Where is cargo door? The reconstruction photo shows on 5% of seal hinges and some skin. Important 95% part of door frame, bottom half, and latches are missing.

Yes, center tank fire but later, after initial event that allowed decapitation from 300 knot tornado entering hole in now weakened nose. Ignition source; detached, fiddled, flaming engine number 3. Fiddling with fuel mixtures and ignition sources and outside air temps will not support spontaneous explosion explanation.

Good luck with your investigation of the forward nose of TWA 800. I think that is the right area.

The ballpark of mechanical-structural-nose is the right ballpark. That nose, the pear turning into apple under many pressurizations, has a history of trouble, from Section 41 and section 42 and cargo door area.

I've included below an idea list of things to check out in the structural nose to possibly assist in the investigation.

Regarding the imploding nose gear doors...another mystery. If they were to open, either in or out, the tornado winds of 300 knots certainly could enter and do catastrophic damage. My only explanation, and a poor one so far, is my scenario of FCD opens, torn off, large hole, 300 knots tears nose off and in the nose falling and twisting something strikes the doors inward. There is no suction from FCD opening as the nose wheel well is unpressurized, I assume. That area at main equipment compartment is so critical as that's where abrupt power cut happens and it is near FCD and nose gear doors. That whole area forward of the wing on the right side is in small pieces, unlike the large slabs on opposite side. Something happened in that area, including nose wheel well area.

Exploding tire could do damage but not that much and CVR would carry more data than sudden loud sound. Nose wheel well problems should give equal damage on both sides of fuselage but TWA 800 has more severe damage on starboard, according to reconstruction photos I have seen.

Nose gear doors flying off could give streak of reflecting sunlight to observers on the ground. Large hole created by missing doors and wind entering wheel well could tear nose off too. Long time for nose wheel well door to hit surface of ocean would explain observers hearing boom of fireball at 7500 feet and looking up and seeing door in last moments of free fall still reflecting sun.

Thank you for going down the investigative path of structural problem in nose possibly related to door doing strange things. Based upon my research, I believe the path leads to inadvertent opening of the FCD in flight. The mystery of why door opened is a difficult one. NTSB UAL 811 has chafing wires to motor short to latches unlatching overriding safety feature, and door pops when pressure differential is enough to override friction. I add for other crashes the sequence continues to nose coming off. Why door opens may be fuselage twisting and flexing for so long that a door, or doors get edges stuck into slipstream just a bit and it gets torn out and away and then ultimate destructive force, the tornado 300 knots take over and tears nose off. Then of course the rest of plane falls disintegrating into debris, fuel, and flaming foddred number three engine as ignition source and fireball.

The evidence is there for examination, thank goodness. Good luck, sir. I'm standing by with any research assistance regarding other related crashes, if needed.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

Nose gear doors baffle
TWA crash
investigators

September 5, 1997
Web posted at: 10:53 p.m. EDT (0253

GMT)

NEW YORK (CNN) --
Federal officials
investigating the crash of
TWA Flight 800 are baffled
by the recent discovery of impact

damage on the
gear.

doors that close over the front landing

in the

According to several people involved
investigation, for the last two weeks

National

Transportation Safety Board

investigators have

been trying to figure out what could

have caused

the nose gear doors to blow inward --

and

whether whatever caused that damage
happened before the plane's center fuel

tank

exploded.

Atlantic shortly

The Boeing 747 crashed into the

Airport

after takeoff from New York's Kennedy

all 230

en route to Paris, July 17, 1996, killing

people aboard.

crash

Examiners who have been looking at

now said to

wreckage for the past 13 months are

the

be mystified about the significance of

below

damage on the doors, which are located

plane's

the flight deck and well forward of the

equally

center fuel tank. The investigators are

doors

troubled by the fact that these nose gear

plane to have

were among the first things on the

come off in flight.

Friday that

One crash investigator told CNN on

of

the discovery keeps open the question

primary
breakup of
NTSB
significance,
have to see
into their

whether the fuel tank explosion was the
or secondary event in the in-flight
TWA flight 800. But Shelly Hazle, an
spokeswoman, downplayed the
emphasizing that investigators will
how this newly discovered evidence fits
theory of how the plane blew up.

Ê

Suggestions below culled from cargo door guys' consultations:

What was the condition of the cargo door hinges?

Bent upward/equally/unequally etc.

Was AD 88-06-04 applied, including the "terminating
action?"

Was AD 89-05-54 applied, including the torque-limiting
devices?

What was the condition of the torque-limiting devices?

What was the condition of the fcd frame and the locking pin
holes?

Do these holes show the locking pin being pulled accross the
frame in
different directions?

Was the bottom of the cargo door frame worn away prior to

crash?

What was the condition of the floor beams immediately inboard from fcd?

What was the condition of the bulkhead immediately aft of the fcd?

Do the floor and bulk head beam's metallographic cross sections indicate that slow (seconds) high energy torsional twisting or fast (<sec) fracture fatigue damage?

Were repairs/actions from the Nov-Dec 1992 rebuild involved?

Detailed paint mark analysis of any "foreign" paint marks on fcd?

Detailed analysis of the "grease" on fcd parts for wear indicator materials?

What was the condition (failure mechanism) of the RH Inboard powerplant pylon bolts?

Were all recovered engine pylon bolts of the correct type? What was the condition of the front stages of the RH inboard engine?

Was baggage related debris found in this engine?

Were any of the silicone/organic materials in the RH wing burned?

Is there evidence of complete or incomplete combustion of these materials?

What was the failure type of all of the different powerplant main

bearings?

Do all post failure analysis of these bearings indicate a normal "spindown"?

What was the spectrometric metal content of the powerplane oil in the filters and in the main bearings?

6. Physical Condition of items ejected from aircraft prior to explosion.
7. Physical Conditions of Engines and recovery locations.
8. Physical Condition of other aircraft material / sections and recovery locations.
9. Explosive and trace elemental analysis of recovered materials.
10. Fast/slow strain analysis model of aircraft skin fasteners.
11. Oxidation sampling modeling of aircraft metallic components for explosion temperature zone modeling. Shows high temperature combustion areas..

- 1) Position of the latch sectors?
- 2) Condition of the latch pins?
- 3) Position and condition of the lock sectors?
- 4) Condition of fuselage-to-door cable bundle?
- 5) Condition of all cargo door switches, especially S2 master latch lock handle switch?
- 6) Was AD 88-06-04 applied, including the "terminating action"?
- 7) Was AD 89-05-54 applied, including the torque-limiting devices?
- 8) Condition of the torque-limiting devices?

- 9) Condition of floor beams immediately inboard from fcd?
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3. examine cargo door lock sectors, unlocked or locked.
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5. examine cargo door manual locking bar for locking position.
6. examine all door electrical switches for proper operation.
7. check maintenance history of TWA 800 for previous cargo door problems.
8. note condition of cargo door, in how many pieces to match UAL 811.
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11. match TWA 800 evidence with other similar crashes leaving similar evidence.
12. check for presence or non presence of evidence of fire/ explosion on separated nose.
13. match sudden on loud sound on CVR to sound library of in flight aircraft explosions and decompressions.
14. match abrupt end of tape signals on FDR to two other abrupt

end of tape Boeing 747 crashes, PA 103, and AI 182.

15. confirm by computer simulation that 300 knot wind blowing into nine foot by 15 foot hole in right side of weakened nose will tear nose off in an second.

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2) If the latch pins have a "smooth" part from 6:30 position to 8:30 position, this could be indication of "out-of-rig" door. If there is a discolored (blued) roughened (gouged) section from 6:30 to 7:30 position, it would mean that latch sectors were violently pulled past latch pins, indicating a blown/torn-out fcd.

3) if the lock sectors aren't completely "over-center" and show deformation on the surface closest to latch sectors, it could show that door has had "uncommanded door opening." If these are in direct contact with latch sectors, we can reasonably conclude that fcd tried to open itself.

4) Mostly this will show whether these cables are chaffed. The critical wire here is 101-20, which NTSB has shown that it can short with many other sources to cause "uncommanded door opening," especially if detail number 5 is true.

5) If these switches show concave deformation, it could be an indication of door that has been "out-of-rig" for some time. If S2 master latch lock handle switch has broken bracket inside, the operation should be tested to verify whether "door-open" circuit was being jumped "closed" allowing current to pass even though master latch lock handle is stowed and locked.

6) Airworthiness Directive 88-12-04 terminating action required that the soft aluminum lock sectors be replaced with steel units or with steel re-enforced units.

7) This AD requires installation of torque-limiting devices (clutches) on all latch sector drive motors, preventing the latch sectors from being back-driven into and

deforming or breaking the lock sectors. Once this happens, latching mechanism is effectively disabled.

8) Were the torque-limiting devices installed and in proper working order?

9) If the floor beams are buckled downward, it is an indication that explosive decompression has taken place.

10) If the floor beams have been buckled downward, there is a very good chance that all flight deck and cabin oxygen lines will have been "pinched-off" preventing anyone from getting oxygen from on-board oxygen generators. At higher altitudes, this would adversely affect flight and cabin crew effectiveness when dealing with an emergency of this magnitude, even if the nose section hasn't been torn off.

11) If the cargo door hinges are bent backwards, it is an indication that cargo door opened past it's full "open" position, and probably struck fuselage immediately above it.

12) This detail should be performed with detail 11 to show if

door
violently opened in flight. Any
"foreign" paint marks found should be checked with portion of
fuselage
immediately above fcd
through detailed paint mark analysis.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: September 9, 1997 3:40:30 PM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: Nose gear doors/access door/cargo door/streak

Dear Mr. Schleede,

More thinking: I can see nose gear doors implode and air rushes in and causes cargo door to pop and nose tears off and rest of plane falls and center tank fire/explosion by ignition of number 3. I can't see cargo door popping causing nose gear doors to implode. So you may have an event which precedes cargo door which precedes nose off which precedes center tank explosion. So now it comes to what allowed nose gear doors to move inward? Not much is needed at 300 knots.

Did UAL 811 have any nose gear door anomaly? I have not seen any mention of nose gear doors in my reports of AI 182 and 103 and 811 but will look again. Nothing may have been reported because that was not an area of interest so there may be something wrong in that area anyway.

Cargo door is made to go out and possibly did; nose gears doors are not made to move inward and did, very strange and difficult to do.

Nose reconstruction is mandatory based on strange nose gear door evidence, don't you think? It's cheaper than blowing up more airplanes.

The whole starboard and center section of the nose/head forward of the wing must be minutely examined, something is going on there on high time Boeing 747s, AI 182 same spot, PA 103 same spot, UAL 811 same spot, TWA 800 same spot. And all had same sudden loud sound on CVR, and same abrupt power cut, and same missing bodies, and other similarities. That nose is full of historical problems; it's not a virgin area for trouble.

This avenue of investigation of structural problem in nose of TWA 800 concerning strange action of doors will be a fruitful one, I believe. It explains so much, TWA 800 was a hull rupture in flight after all.

Regarding streak; please let us put the missile explanation to rest and clear the Navy. To do that explain the streak. Without the streak the missile guys have nothing. The streak can be nose gear doors, which are said to leave early in crash sequence, reflecting evening sunlight to ground observers on shore looking up at plane. To put streak as door in play, charter C141 or use National Guard C141 or C130, they would be glad to help, and at 13700 feet at same sun angle and same spot, or do experiment in desert with same sun angle and altitude, and throw metal airfoil shaped objects out of safe aft cargo door and watch what happens. See if ground and air observers see streak as doors decelerate from 300 to zero one way and accelerate from zero to terminal velocity downward.

I say yes. One nose gear door is equal to one half of cargo door, which always breaks in two in the previous crashes, including

UAL 811. Nose gear door is big, I would guess a single garage door size. People out here do not understand the size of doors on 747, the internal pressure at altitude, nor the incredible destructive force of 300 knots, more than the fastest tornado on earth.

Mojave Airport would work as they have Evergreen 747 sitting there on ramp as parts plane with available sized objects to replicate doors, I drove by it the other day.

If streak can be recreated by door sized object flying out of testbed C141 then could have been doors flying off TWA 800 and the US Navy and military will owe you and the NTSB a debt of gratitude for exonerating them from this terrible false accusation of shutdown. I'm former Navy aviation and it is very upsetting to me to hear Navy accused of coverup. And it's all because of this streak, this streak that I believe came from cargo door but could be nose gear doors spinning away when launched up high at 300 knots and reflecting evening sun. It was just before sunset, weather clear, the doors are metal, it was up high and fast, and doors are curved to give erratic flightpath, all facts, all real, all there, all fit.

How expensive can it be? How long to set up and do? It's something real, it's relevant, it's doable, and it has tremendous implications if successful. Streak explained. Big step forward.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

I see Mr. Benson went to Miami and promptly found unlatched latches in cargo compartment for DC8 crash. Hmm...those pesky latches.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: September 15, 1997 4:21:52 PM PDT
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: Streak source

Mr. Schleede,

My contention that departed cargo door piece could be streak source of TWA 800 received boost yesterday when F 117A crashed. The departed piece of wing fluttered down from sky. The video at below CNN web site shows in one frame a distinct flash of reflected sunlight as black piece fluttered down. If a shinier piece of cargo door were to be launched two miles up at 300 knots, the reflections from evening sunlight would appear as streak to observers on Long Island.

Paint smears between windows of 800 reconstruction tell tale of something red touching and transferring paint, possibly cargo door underneath opening up violently, like UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 92/02.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

[http://www.cnn.com/US/9709/14/f117.crash.update/
am.crash.lake.24sec.mov](http://www.cnn.com/US/9709/14/f117.crash.update/am.crash.lake.24sec.mov)

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: September 15, 1997 9:54:52 PM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: New wild thought, cowling

Mr. Schleede,

New wild thought, cowling of number 3 engine departs, shown as radar blip, streak source, seen a EPR or EGT spike on FDR, bleed air disrupted/alterd to forward cargo hold and blows out at weakest area, door.

Is there any confirmation of wild conjecture of cowling lost by: where was cowling of number 3 found? Any EGT or EPR irregularities?

All suspect planes, 182, 103, 811, and 800 had P&W JT-9D-7xx engines, very unusual.

EPR surge can blow out cowling. PA 103 had strange EPR blip on number 3 just before event. TWA 800 pilot called for climb just before event. All planes had EPR anomalies before or during fatal flight.

This would explain big blowout damage on starboard side near cargo door yet latches still latched.

Below is report on lost cowlings on JT9D.

Yes, sir, conjecture, but identified as such.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

AAIB Bulletin No: 12/96 Ref: EW/C96/8/3 Category: 1.1

Aircraft Type and Registration:

Boeing 747-283B,

G-VOYG

No & Type of Engines:

4 Pratt & Whitney

JT9D-7J turbofan

engines

Year of Manufacture:

1971

Date & Time (UTC):

6 August 1996 at

approximately 1146

hrs

Location:

On departure from

London Gatwick

Airport

Type of Flight:

Public Transport

Persons on Board:

442

Injuries:

Nil

Nature of Damage:

Damage to No 3

engine and cowling

Commander's Licence:

Pilot's Licence	Airline Transport
Commander's Age:	36 years
Commander's Flying Experience:	6,500 hours (of which 1,800 were on type)
hours	Last 90 days - 130
hours	Last 28 days - 50
Information Source:	AAIB Field Investigation

The aircraft departed London Gatwick from Runway 26L on a Lambourne 3M Standard Instrument Departure (SID) bound for Orlando, Florida. The weather at the time, broadcast on the 1145 hrs ATIS, was: surface wind 220;14 kt (maximum 26 kt; minimum 5 kt); visibility 30 km with nil weather; cloud broken at 2,300 feet; temperature 19;C; dew point 11;C and QNH 1007 mbs.

Shortly after take off the crew heard a muffled thud which was followed by the failure of No 3 engine EGT gauge. There were no indications on the flight deck of any other malfunctions. Discovering, after consultation with their operations, that there were no replacement gauges at

Orlando and that an EGT gauge is an MEL (minimum equipment list) item, the crew were advised to return to Gatwick for replacement of the faulty instrument. The aircraft landed without incident at 1304 hrs.

After shutdown it was discovered that a significant section of the No 3 engine cowling was missing. Several large sections of cowling were found on farmland within a mile of the western end of Runway 26L.

The JT9D engine hinged side cowlings provide access to the engine compressor case, combustion chamber and turbine areas, various engine accessories and power plant equipment. The 15th stage bleed ports are incorporated on the right side cowling panel for discharging bleed air overboard.

The cowlings are located and supported on their top edge by six hinge hooks containing recesses which engage a series of rollers carried by the support structure on the top of the engine nacelle. The lower edges of the left and right hinged cowlings are joined together by six adjustable latches which engage in 'U' bolts on the bottom of the right hand cowling.

Examination of the cowlings revealed that the left cowling had detached first, and had then caused the rear of the right hand cowling to detach.

All of the left hand cowling was recovered in one piece except for one hook hinge which was not found. Of the other five hook

hinges, three had recesses in which the original paint had not been marked by the rollers. This indicated that the rollers had not engaged the recesses, either on G-VOYG, or on any other aircraft to which the cowling had been fitted with those hinge hooks.

The front of the right hand cowling, containing four hook latches and four 'U' bolts had remained attached to the engine, whilst the rear section had fragmented and detached. Although none of the 'U' bolts or latches had been significantly damaged, there was severe distortion around one of the latches and its associated locating spigot on the rear section of the right hand cowling.

The possibility was considered that the cowling had been distorted because of the lack of proper roller engagement. If this had been the case an engine surge may have caused an overpressure within the cowling, leading to its release. Although the FDR did not show evidence of a surge it was decided to carry out a test bed run to determine the susceptibility of the engine to a surge. The engine had sustained some external damage during the incident and therefore minor repairs were necessary to permit a diagnostic test bed run in the 'as received' condition. The engine was handled in such a way as to provoke a surge on the test bed but did not show any tendency to surge.

On 26th September 1996 Boeing issued a telex to all 747 customers which reviewed the causes of side cowling losses. In

summary, excluding
this incident, 39 side panel losses had been reported since 1969,
of these:

14 were attributed to improperly latched, or unlatched, forward
latches,

18 (+ 1 suspected) losses were attributed to specific engine
incidents, not applicable in this incident,

6 had no cause attributed.

The operator's procedures require that the opening and closing of
the side cowlings should be documented, there were no such
entries
relating to the previous flight. As a result of this incident the
operator initiated a programme to check all the hinge hooks on
his aircraft for
engagement.

The failure of the No 3 EGT gauge was caused by secondary
damage to the No 3 engine as a result of the cowling separation.

[CLICK HERE TO RETURN TO DECEMBER INDEX](#)

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: October 1, 1997 9:09:37 AM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

**Subject: Streak not fuel, but shiny metal object spinning
away, cargo door**

Dear Mr. Schleede, 1 Oct 97

I notice that it is the FBI and CIA and Dr. Loeb calling the streak as leaking fuel on fire. Ha. I notice real accident investigators are mum. Streak is not missile, streak is not leaking fuel, streak is not meteor, streak is shiny metal object spinning away in evening sun reflecting light to observers on the ground. That makes sense and can be confirmed. If you want to have confirmable conclusions and not a weak prosecution of a center tank explosion as initial event. I have to say center tank as initial event is as wacky as the missile guys, it's a good story and a lot of people like it, but it does not fit the evidence. But it happened so it's safe, and what's a few seconds or so? Except the fault is still there and will happen again.

Cargo door explanation has been proposed since day one after the accident of TWA 800, long before streak was revealed and event time was sunset, long before reconstruction that showed big blowout on starboard side forward of the wing, cargo door area, and long before red paint between windows which is red painted door transferring paint to white window area as it slammed upward, just like UAL 811, NTSB AAR 92/02. Long before hole in reconstruction where bottom half of door with its important latches are located. Where is that pesky bottom half of forward cargo door? It's pretty important to have a pressure releasing device, the door, near a pressurized hull rupture point, located and examined. Center tank give equal damage to both sides of fuselage, contrary to the reconstruction which is starboard side, the cargo door side.

All the money is spent on CVR, FDR, and reconstruction, and then when the evidence of those items supports cargo door it is ignored. Sudden loud sound on CVR is explosive decompression starting, abrupt power cut to FDR is total disruption of cabin

floor at main equipment compartment, reconstruction shows unilateral damage on fuselage, red paint transfer, bottom door missing, and top attached to hinges and piece of fuselage skin. All that expensive accident information data is on TWA 800 and matches UAL 811 and is ignored because the hard evidence conflicts with center tank as initial event.

The red paint between the windows of TWA 800 as shown in the reconstruction photo point to open cargo door as explanation as to how the white paint became red. The upward opening and tearing off top red painted cargo door slammed up and onto the white painted window frames transferring red paint to white. This sequence happened in UAL 811, NTSB AAR 92/02. The red paint transfer only occurred above and slightly aft of the cargo door.

I have followed the cargo door explanation for high time Boeing 747 accidents for eight years. I have not said the Indian Mid air of a 747 or the Guam 747 crash are cargo door caused. From day one I have said TWA 800 was cargo door. I did not know the reconstruction photo would match UAL 811 as to paint and hinges, and tearing of lower half but it does. And the sudden loud sound and abrupt matched too. As the evidence as been released about TWA 800 the cargo door explanation holds true.

When bomb in forward cargo hold was possible the cargo door area was prime area as initial event because of evidence. When bomb idea went away the evidence didn't, cargo hold still prime area.

Looking at reconstruction photo the truth is there to see of hull rupture when bottom of door, still missing, blows out and top of

door with hinge and fuselage skin attached slamming upwards, then nose comes off and everything tears apart. It matches other cargo door caused accidents. Without the door in reconstruction photo with status of latches reported the investigation can not be called complete. Where is the bottom of door? In the FBI lab? On the hangar floor? On the ocean floor? This vital piece of metal must be examined closely for the investigation to be called exhaustive.

Streak as leaking fuel is making the evidence fit the theory and that's backwards. The evidence of reconstruction and eyewitnesses does fit open cargo door explanation.

September 8, 1997 Aviation Week & Space Technology
NTSB teams will reconvene in New York this week to examine debris from Trans World Airlines Flight 800 that some investigators claim has unusual or as-yet-unexplained damage. ... Officials from the safety board and parties to the probe, such as Boeing, TWA and the Air Line Pilots Assn., will be examining portions of the wreckage that some investigators say could raise new questions about why and how the aircraft broke up

"We're going back to Calverton to attempt to understand more fully the damage to certain pieces of wreckage", said Bernard S. Loeb "these items do not question in any significant way the Board's analysis of the sequence of Flight 800's breakupSome investigators, primarily those outside the

NTSB, are intrigued by specific debris whose damage has not yet been explained fully. These investigators said that pieces of debris, like the doors for Flight 800's nose-gear wheel well, could raise questions not about the sequence of the breakup, but its cause.

What made door open?

Regarding that, an interesting discovery has been made. TWA 800 has had previous problems with exploding pressurized vessel inside the cargo hold.

The potable water tank exploded after being overpressurized. The top came off and penetrated the floor and hit the ceiling. Floor penetration of TWA 800 may have come from this. If tank top was deflected by baggage it would go through fuselage and may cause rupture.

There are many possible reasons door area ruptured in flight, but first rupture in forward cargo door area needs to be confirmed. The red paint transfer does that.

Center tank explosion as initial event just doesn't conform to the evidence but does as sequence to door open/hull rupture/nose off/disintegration.

Please direct attention to hull rupture in cargo door area as initial

event. The evidence is there, much more than wire bundles doing this and that maybe.

When are the accident investigators going to make their move and investigate the accident and push away the lawyer theories and the cop theories and the scientist theories? So far 800 has been a center tank prosecution, like terrorist bomb or missile for FBI; a cargo door opening is an accident investigator type of explanation, mechanical, happened before, subtle clues, and no conspiracy, coverup, or plot, just solid mechanical objects obeying the laws of nature and physics.

Sincerely,
John Barry Smith

24 May 1994:

JFK - DURING MODIFICATIONS TO THE CABIN WHILE IN HANGAR, THE LT POTABLE WATER TANK UPPER

POLAR CAP ERUPTED UPWARD, PENETRATING THE CABIN FLOOR AND PSU AREA ON CEILING AT STA 980 TO

984. REPAIRS TO DAMAGED AREA WERE MADE AND THE AIRCRAFT WAS RETURNED TO SERVICE.

INVESTIGATION INDICATES THE MOST PROBABLE CAUSE WAS THE TANK BECAME OVERPRESSURIZED DUE

TO A MALFUNCTION IN THE AIR COMPRESSOR SWITCH, MFG PN 1G216, AND THE RELIEF VALVE, MFG PN

524-6D-45, SETTING WAS ABOVE THE 50 PSIG MAXIMUM BECAUSE OF A LOOSE ADJUSTMENT LOCKING NUT. A

FLEET CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN INITIATED FOR
RELIEF VALVE PRESSURE CHECKS AND
REPLACEMENTS WILL BE
OF A NEW VALVE DESIGN, MFG PN RV05-361.
TOTAL CYCLES 15,653.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: October 24, 1997 9:23:54 AM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

**Subject: Photos sent to Mr. Dickinson support rupture on
starboard side**

Dear Mr. Schleede,

Below is an email sent to Mr. Dickinson regarding photos in the mail. As time goes on UAL 811 is more and more closely matched to TWA 800. Now it is the paint smears from door to upper fuselage. UAL 811 had dark paint from fuselage go to door while TWA 800 has dark red paint from door go to fuselage between windows, as clearly shown on NTSB reconstruction photo on starboard side above cargo door. The photos should have arrived by now and are interesting with the links they show to other high time 747 crashes.

TWA 800 is just one accident that the center tank explanation has to fit the evidence and does poorly; cargo door explanation has to fit four accidents, and does overwhelmingly.

It's not too late to investigate the same cause of 811 as the initial event for 800. Especially since the lower half of that forward door is missing with the latches and AD 88-12-04 implementation lock sectors. Why did you say the latches were latched when the latches are missing? The aft door has same

latches and was latched so that may have been the door latches you were referring to. But to rule out door without the door is not right. And looking at the badly damaged cargo door area it is unlikely that door was closed and latched at impact.

So the cargo door area is very suspicious and is worthy of investigation. It looks like a blowout. It is a fuselage rupture at the cargo door area.

Center tank fire/explosion was later.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

From: Schleede Ron <SCHLEDR@NTSB.gov>
To: "John Barry Smith" <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: RE: What is 'backup theory'?
Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 13:51:11 -0400
Encoding: 135 TEXT

As I have told you before, the cargo door was locked and latched at impact. ron

From: John Barry Smith[SMTP:barry@corazon.com]
Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 1997 11:55 PM
To: Schleede Ron
Subject: What is 'backup theory'?

Mr. Schleede, is the backup theory door opening by metal fatigue or

inadvertent unlatching? Please tell me.
Sincerely, John Barry Smith barry@corazon.com

Dear Mr. Dickinson, 23 Oct 97

I'm sending a package with some color photos and analysis to you via mail because the government email does not accept photographs. The pack should arrive in a few days.

The photos are essentially visual evidence of a hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side at the cargo door on four aircraft, AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800.

TWA 800 is particularly interesting because it shows rupture on right side only which discounts center tank exploding as initial event. It also shows paint smears between windows from transfer of paint from cargo door below and hinges attached and working, both similar to UAL 811. The photo also shows sudden singed area from white to gray which also discounts center tank as initial event. The photo also shows the rupture/blowout of TWA 800 at cargo door area with bent and curved metal showing hole. Also significant is what is missing, the bottom half of the forward cargo door with the latches and locking sectors which were supposed to be modified by AD 88-12-04.

To rule out cargo door, even cursorily, without having bottom half of door to check latch status and AD implementation of

locking sectors, is not right.

To rule in center tank as initial event with such contrary evidence is not right either.

The other photos are ones which link PA 103 and AI 182 to UAL 811 with text and pictures.

Again, NTSB 92/02 for UAL 811 is the linchpin with the sudden loud sound, abrupt power cut, and description of what happens when door pops in flight.

The NTSB reconstruction photo of TWA 800 is very valuable and shows the worth of the reconstruction.

So, NTSB data and photos are used to support the claim that the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight has caused the fatal accidents of four high time Boeing 747s and may again.

It's not too late to consider cargo door as culprit. To be locked into untenable center tank explosion as initial event is to have pride before a fall. I know Mr. Hall and Dr. Loeb have staked their reputations, their careers, and the lives of passengers on center tank as initial event. Well, they are wrong. It shall come out; too much is at stake.

Center tank explosion/fire did happen so NTSB can not be faulted for going down that investigative path. But to call it the initial event is wrong and will allow the cargo door to pop again later. Why it pops is unknown but most likely what NTSB 92/02 said for UAL 811, chafed wires to short to motor on overriding safety sectors and unlatching. Door pops from internal pressure

and tornado slipstream takes off nose on three and almost for the fourth.

To rule out cargo door without having the bottom half to examine the latches and sectors is not right. Where is that bottom half?

The NTSB photo of reconstruction of TWA 800 shows a blowout at cargo door area. The sequence of evidence and shown on photo is consistent with UAL 811 sequence when door blew out as described in NTSB 92/02; hinges working and attached to skin which rips in vertical pattern, paint transfer from color to white of door to above fuselage, door breaking in half longitudinally, and frayed appearance. TWA 800 cargo door area and UAL 811, PA 103, and AI 182 match in photo and text. They are in the forest of cargo door caused accidents and TWA 800 is a tree in that forest.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: October 29, 1997 10:02:47 AM PST

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: Here it is in pictures TWA 800 blowout hole

Mr. Schleede, 29 Oct 97

Here it is, plain to see and read, fuselage rupture at cargo door area for four high time 747s.

Below links show in NTSB pictures and text show TWA 800

fuselage blowout at cargo door area. Other aircraft accidents are matched also. Your experience will enable you to identify the cargo door area. Note round rupture circle.

<http://www.corazon.com/crashcontentspagelinks.html>

Click on 'Newest page'. <http://www.corazon.com/presskit.html>

<http://www.corazon.com/800foreafthorreconweb.html>

<http://www.corazon.com/doorpixweb.html>

<http://www.corazon.com/reasoning.html>

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: November 3, 1997 3:44:04 PM PST

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: UAL 811 matches again! Aft midspan latch

Dear Mr. Schleede, 3 Nov 97

If you go to <http://www.corazon.com/811page35analydoor.html>

<http://www.corazon.com/811doorhalves.html>

<http://www.corazon.com/811doorhalvesphoto.html>

you will see the forward cargo door of UAL 811. The URLs will give text and photographs from NTSB AAR 92/02 of UAL 811 about the door after it was recovered from the ocean floor.

The UAL 811 door has a rupture at aft mid span latch. The aft midspan latch was damaged while the forward one was not. What is seen is a small rupture at aft midspan latch of door that led to door departing in two pieces and then slamming upwards and transferring paint to skin above.

What is seen in 800 reconstruction photo is large rupture of fuselage at forward cargo door at aft midspan latch. The large rupture allowed the bottom latches to stay latched while the top part of the door slammed upwards and transferred red paint from the door to the fuselage above.

At the 800 reconstruction, please locate and identify if possible, the aft mid span latch looking for gouging and wear patterns. Use NTSB AAR 92/02 for UAL 811 as your guide as to what to expect. The descriptions and damage of door, latches, and cam sectors will match 800.

If unable to positively identify all the latches, in particular the aft midspan latch, then the door rupture at aft midspan latch can not be ruled out and must be investigated further.

Aft midspan latch of forward cargo door is two inch square and is shown to be damaged on one door, UAL 811, and will be on another, TWA 800.

Now, why did aft mid span latch of forward cargo door rupture/fail/open? It could be unsequenced unlatching. 811 may have been very synchronized and all opened so door flew off in only two pieces with small rupture. 800 and others were slightly slower and large rupture occurred before all other latches could unlatch so big hole appeared and expelled baggage into engine

number 3.

Aft midspan latch is culprit, it just may be the weakest area against the large internal air pressure force. Fuselage flexing on old airplane and that was the weak spot. Anyway, why it failed is open to conjecture, but that is now my datum of damage. And UAL 811 and PA 125 and UAL preflight inadvertent open doors were electrical problem from chafed wires to door motor and that is probably the same on 800 and others.

The aft mid span latch large rupture explains why the lower latches were latched, the rupture hole released the air pressure and blew the outer top of door up against the upper fuselage and left red paint smears.

In pictures and text, UAL 811 matches TWA 800 in sudden loud sound, abrupt power cut to FDR, at least nine never recovered bodies, and now fuselage rupture start point at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door.

I'm available for further discussion or clarification.

Sincerely,
John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: November 5, 1997 12:07:24 PM PST
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: Rupture amplified/FAA letter/midspan latch

Dear Mr. Schleede, 5 Nov97

NTSB AAR 92/02 has worked again! The picture of the 811 door

with the small rupture led to the rupture explanation and the discovery of why two doors ruptured and two came off of the four 747 accidents, 182, 103, 811, and 800. The midspan latches have no locking sectors so the door AD 88 12 04 is ineffective on two so door opens completely. When AD in place or locking sectors hold it works on lower latches only so rupture occurs at midspan. 182 and 800 had ruptures, 103 and 811 had complete door open.

It explains why you were right to say bottom latches were latched on 800 to me months ago in email and yet I say door still ruptured/opened.

Complete explanation with NTSB AAR 92/02 references are in letter below in response to letter from Mr. Brenerman of FAA Northwest Region to me.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

Bob Brenerman,
FAA Structural Aerospace Engineer,
Federal Aviation Administration
Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100
1601 Lind Ave. S.W.
Renton, WA 98055-4056
(206) 227-2100
Ron Wojnar, Manager
Darrell Pederson, Assistant Manager
Tom McSweeney, Director ACS

Dear Mr. Brenerman,

5 Nov 97

Thank you for your 29 Oct 97 letter reference 97-120S-699. It was signed by Mr. Pederson for Mr. Wojnar but I'm assuming you wrote it and you are the "FAA structural engineer who assisted the NTSB at the hangar in Calverton, New York..."

I would prefer to discuss with you, an airplane person with the hands on experience of TWA 800, the details of your letter.

First, the politics...why is the Northwest Region of the FAA given the task by Mr. McSweeney through my congressman to 'investigate Mr. Smith's concerns'? Would not the Office of Accident Investigation of the FAA be more appropriate?

Especially since the Northwest Region of the FAA is the only FAA authority to go on record as supporting the center tank as initial event with its own ignition theory?

"Worn Wiring May Have Had
Role In TWA Disaster

Chafing in

Fuel Tank Conduits Found

in Study of Early 747s

By Don

Phillips

Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, July 2, 1997; Page

A16

The Washington Post

Northwest

A theory, developed by the FAA's
Region in Seattle, involves an

unlikely chain of
problem causes a
tank to the
designed
tank. At the
reverses
another vent

events in which an electrical
fire to burn outward from the wing
wing tip through a vent tube that is
to allow vapors to escape from the
wing tip, the flame front then
direction and travels back down
tube into the center tank.

800
theory as only

The NTSB, conducting the TWA
investigation, played down the
one of many."

So, you see, Mr. Brenerman, my cargo door explanation was sent for evaluation to a group who already have their own contrary explanation for TWA 800, not exactly an open mind to an impartial forum for investigation. It's like asking someone to prove they're wrong. Few will attempt to overcome that set bias. I hope you can.

By the way, we are as one on chafed wiring as a problem. NTSB AAR 92/02 for UAL 811 had chafed wiring which shorted to turn on door motor which unlatched door. This explanation of why door ruptured/opened may well explain why fuselage

ruptured at cargo door area for AI 182, PA 103, and TWA 800 also.

One last thing on politics: We are the good guys, we seek to prevent airplane crashes, we are open, we discuss the possibilities relying of real evidence that we can see, touch, and hear. If my style 'chafes' when I rebut or attempt to refute your line of thinking, please don't take it personally. We are not indifferent; we care. We are on the same side with the same goal, as you state in your letter to me, "...the first priority of the ... (FAA) is ensuring the continued operational safety of aircraft."

In that regard let me dissect your letter of 29 Oct 97 very carefully and reply to each observation and conclusion you have made about TWA 800 and others.

Assumptions:

1. You are a FAA structural engineer and understand the Boeing 747 airframe.
2. I am a FAA licensed commercial pilot, instrument rated and previous FAA Part 135 certificate holder.
3. NTSB published documents such as AAR 92/02 shall be assumed to be correct unless otherwise noted.
4. UK AAIB and Canadian/Indian published government aircraft accident reports shall be assumed to be correct unless otherwise noted.
5. You have had hands on experience with TWA 800 and can confirm or refute deductions based upon personal experience lacking a published NTSB AAR for referral.
6. The color photograph of the reconstruction of TWA 800 is complete and accurate. (Photo included in letter and at www.corazon.com/800foreafthorreconweb.html.)
7. You may soon have internet access and can examine my web

site at www.corazon.com which has scanned text of accident reports for referral. Email is available to you and you can correspond to me at barry@corazon.com

8. Hindsight is great and everybody makes mistakes once in a while.

29 Oct 97 letter to me from you:

Paragraph four, sentence two:

"However, when the wreckage of the nose section was recovered it became evident that the forward cargo door had not opened in flight or separated from the nose section prior to impact with water."

Well, sir, let's be picky. A door means a door and not pieces or segments or sections. The forward cargo door of TWA 800 is in tatters, it's shattered, it's in pieces; it's everything but a 'door'. It is so shattered that only 20% is recovered and reconstructed. What is the weight of a normal door? What is the weight of the recovered pieces? For the purposes of discussion I use 20%. If wrong, provide a more accurate number please. To base the conclusion, "...forward cargo door had not opened in flight or separated from the nose section..." based upon only 20% of the evidence is not valid.

Especially since I have pinpointed the location of door failure/rupture to the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door and that latch is not connected to the frame, as seen in reconstruction photo. The identification of the aft midspan latch as the point of failure is deduced by a. observing the large round hole in reconstruction photo of TWA 800, b. reading descriptive text about the AI 182 door rupture, and c. viewing the recovered door of UAL 811. The UAL 811 door shows a small door rupture at aft midspan latch area. The forward midspan latch pin was not

damaged while the aft latch pin was. The UAL 811 door had a rupture hole straight through the door. That was an opening in the door. The door opened inside the door itself as well as at the latches.

(<http://www.corazon.com/811page35analydoor.html>
<http://www.corazon.com/811doorhalves.html> and
<http://www.corazon.com/811doorhalvesphoto.html> give URLs of pictures and text of UAL 811 and <http://www.corazon.com/182pixtext1web.html> gives text about forward cargo door area of AI 182.)

UAL 811 is the model for the three other accidents, AI 182, PA 103, and TWA 800. It always comes back to NTSB AAR 92/02. (Not the first UAL 811 NTSB AAR which was NTSB/AAR-90/01 and then superseded by NTSB AAR 92/02, written after door was recovered and conclusions changed. Everybody makes mistakes once in a while.)

The TWA 800 reconstruction photo shows other similarities to UAL 811 which will be discussed as we go along.

Paragraph five, sentence one:

"The FAA structural engineer who assisted the NTSB at the hangar in Calverton, New York, verified that the forward cargo door was recovered at the same location as the rest of the nose section."

Well sir, again, not door recovered but pieces were. Let us assume the bottom 5% of the door pieces with the bottom eight latches was found with the nose section and attached to the sill and fuselage of TWA 800 as seen in NTSB photo. (That matches the description of AI 182 from video film 6700 feet underwater

also, corazon.com/182pixtext1web.html.) Because 5% of the door of TWA 800 was found with the nose does not rule out door rupture at aft mid span latch. It does not rule out fuselage rupture caused by door failure. What it does do is say that bottom piece of door stayed with nose until water impact. Rupture at midspan latch still possible.

Paragraph five, sentence two:

"A further examination of the recovered wreckage showed that the upper hinge was still attached to the both the fuselage and the door."

Exactly! That is what the model shows too! UAL 811 had the door tear away with the top piece taking upper flange of the door and all the hinge and attachment bolts with it. The hinges of UAL 811 were in the same condition and attached to the door as TWA 800. (corazon.com/811page35analydoor.html) NTSB AAR 92/02 page 35 and 41: "The hinge pins and all hinge sections from N4713U's forward cargo door were intact; all hinge sections rotated relatively easily. All attach bolts from the hinge sections of the door remained attached..." The TWA 800 reconstruction photo shows a piece of fuselage skin attached to hinge. The fuselage skin that left with the door of UAL 811 was not recovered from ocean floor for examination.

Paragraph five, sentence four and five:

"In addition, the door latches at the bottom of the door were still attached to the fuselage lower sill structure. This indicates that the door was in the 'latched and locked' position at the time of impact with the water."

Well, sir, there are two latches unaccounted for out of ten, the mid span latches. The door may have been in the almost all

latched and locked position when it hit the water but not totally. And it is in that area, specifically, the aft midspan latch area, where the evidence points to rupture.

It was an understandable conclusion to make that door did not rupture/open in flight when bottom latches were found latched and attached. It is an understandable conclusion to make that the door did not rupture/detach when the hinge stayed attached to the door. However, both conclusions can be adjusted by viewing more of the door and relying on past precedent.

The answer to refute aft midspan latch rupture is to locate and identify the aft mid span latch and confirm it is latched around its pin, an impossibility when looking at the TWA 800 reconstruction photo with sharp, clean line at door frame where aft mid span latch is supposed to be latched and isn't.

Paragraph six, sentence one:

"The nose section of the airplane impacted the water on the right side, causing severe hydraulic damage with the result that the door structure did not remain completely intact."

Well, sir, is this an explanation of why the starboard side cargo door area is so shattered and the port side of fuselage is so smooth? You mentioned in our phone call that the skin appeared to be pushed inwards also. On page 41 of AAR 92/02 for UAL 811 it reads, "Examination of the outer skin contour of the upper door piece revealed that it had been crushed inward." So the cargo door of UAL 811 does give an appearance of inward crush on the door when top piece struck fuselage on its way up after explosive decompression. You may have noticed the same effect on the TWA 800 top piece of door. Regarding the rest of the nose having inward crushing, the TWA 800 reconstruction shows

otherwise with large pieces of skin clearly showing an outward force with the skin peeled outwards. Regarding the many pieces of the cargo door area, that is to be expected when the fuselage ruptured in flight and the weakened nose tore off subjecting that now exposed and jagged area to 300 knots of slipstream.

Paragraph six, sentence two:

"However, wreckage for the entire door was recovered at the same location as the nose section and had the same impact damage as the surrounding fuselage structure on the right side."

Well, sir, I have to contest the use of the adjective, "entire." My online dictionary states; *entire* \in-"tr\ adj : complete, whole synonym: sound, perfect, intact, undamaged ~ *entirely* adv

No way was that entire door recovered period, anywhere, according to that TWA 800 reconstruction photo. I estimate 20% recovered and let us assume that was in the nose section debris field. That leaves most of door missing and in particular the accused aft midspan latch section of the door. In addition, the 20% recovered pieces shown in the reconstruction have all types of damage revealed; inward, outward, crushed, twisted, crumpled, torn, and frayed, which is dissimilar to damage only ten feet above cargo door area of the nose. (I am unable to comment on the forward part of the cargo door or the area forward as the only released photograph by NTSB is cropped short of the entire reconstruction.)

The many pieces of the door would explain the discrepancy in the newspapers, a computer simulation, and a Coast Guard Rear Admiral stating on the record that the forward cargo door was found closest to the event site, yet contradicted by your above statement. All may be correct, it depends upon which piece is

talked about. The categorical statement by the officer in charge of recovery that the door was found closest to Kennedy Airport is probably true and implies that the critical midspan latches may in the piece of the door he is referring to. The statement by you that the door was found with nose section is true because you are referring to the pieces that stayed with the nose.

Please reconsider your appraisal of 'entire' and 'same impact damage' based upon close analysis of TWA 800 reconstruction photo.

Paragraph six, sentence three:

"This is additional verification that the forward cargo door had not opened in flight or separated from the airplane."

Well, sir, my explanation of TWA 800 is rupture in forward cargo door at aft mid span latch. A door can open at places other than the latches, some parts can separate and some can stay attached and yet door can still be said to have 'opened.' But 'open' implies turning doorknob and door opens. That's why I changed 'inadvertently opened' to 'ruptured'.

Now to paint smears. The red paint smears are real, there are a lot of them, and solid conclusions can be reached by that very real evidence. Their location is important, only above and slightly aft of the forward cargo door. Using NTSB AAR 92/02 as a model again, page, 41, "There were also many areas on the outer skin where blue and red paint transfer marks could be seen." The paint transfers for UAL 811 were from fuselage to door using blue and red paint of United Airlines. TWA 800 was the red of TWA from the door to the fuselage above. This indicates an outward expansion of the area below forcing the red colored door to slam upwards against the fuselage transferring

red paint onto the white painted areas between the passenger windows. NTSB AAR 92/02 again, page, 41, "The forward cargo door can rotate open 143 degrees before the hinge would deform, permitting the door to contact the fuselage above."

The splotchy red painted skin above the door matches the splotchy red painted smears between windows, indicating the top of the door slammed up, transferred paint and tore away. The red paint smears above cargo door indicated outward force not inward. The peeled open skin indicates outward movement. The outward means the unilateral starboard damage is not water impact. Not water impact means that center tank explosion is not viable as initial event since that would give bilateral damage and didn't. Outward unilateral damage strengthens rupture at cargo door area explanation as that is what would happen and did.

Paragraph seven, sentence two and three:

"There is even more compelling evidence resulting from the TWA flight 800 accident investigation that indicates that the forward cargo door did not cause the accident. However, it is up to the NTSB to share this information with you."

Well, sir, that hurts. NTSB sharing information with me? I think not. Secret information that cargo door didn't burst? I think not also.

Paragraph eight, sentence two and three:

"However, the accidents to which your refer, in particular the Pan Am flight 103 and the Air India flight 182 accidents, each had strong evidence of an internal explosion caused by high explosive materials (terrorist bomb). In each case there has been no evidence that the forward cargo door opened in flight causing the accident."

Well, sir, let me polite in disagreement. Not 'strong' evidence of bomb. Very weak is what the evidence shows and I have reviewed the evidence as described in UK, Canadian, and India accident reports over and over again. AI 182 and PA 103 as cargo door rupture is quite clear once the premise is made of fuselage rupture in flight in cargo door area. AI 182 said the fuselage ruptured in flight at cargo door area and for want of a better explanation, said bomb did it. PA 103 also had fuselage rupture on left side of forward cargo hold while wreckage evidence shows much more damage and sooner on starboard side, at cargo door area. The evidence is in the reports and they are on web site www.corazon.com under the flight numbers.

Briefly, AI 182 summation leading to cargo door rupture is on web page <http://www.corazon.com/AI182essentials.html>. I will quote from only two of twenty statements about AI 182 here:

"As described earlier, the sudden nature of the occurrence indicates the possibility of a massive airframe structural failure or the detonation of an explosive device." Page 49. And then:

"The AIB report concluded that the analysis of the CVR and ATC recordings showed no evidence of a high-explosive device having been detonated on AI 182. It further states there is strong evidence to suggest a sudden explosive decompression of undetermined origin occurred." Page 24.

So, Mr. Brenerman, the official report actually gives 'strong evidence' to cargo door rupture and 'no evidence' to bomb.

PA 103 is similar; rupture at cargo door area is supported by factual evidence including the reconstruction of PA 103 on starboard side which matches the photograph of UAL 811 after landing. The essentials for cargo door for PA 103 are on page <http://www.corazon.com/PA103essentials.html>. The premise of

bomb is based upon evidence which shows that a '...rather large shotgun had been fired at the inner surface of the fuselage at close range.' Pages 19 and 20 of AAIB report. The resulting hole was about 15 inches in diameter, not a bomb hole and not big enough to bring down a 747. There was a blast in PA 103 but after the rupture at cargo door, just as center tank explosion was after cargo door rupture for TWA 800. One last thing on PA 103, the AAIB report never said bomb, only 'improvised explosive device.' The British are precise with language and they are right to be so. A door rupturing in flight becomes a device which wasn't meant to be but became an explosive causing agent, an explosive decompression. And residue that could be high explosive is now shown to be possibly benign with TWA 800 and the dog sniffing test. Bomb explanation for PA 103 is tenuous at best and will not stand up to scrutiny. I would love to go over every point of AI 182 and PA 103 with you but first become very familiar with the government accident reports as I have, they give the evidence. I encourage you to do so.

The bomb conclusions were political. As an engineer and pilot let us leave shadowy Sikh terrorists and secret Libyan agents putting bombs aboard planes to the politicians and let us examine evidence such as CVR, FDR, FOD, bodies, metal, and statistics. I full well know the immense claim of PA 103 not being a bomb. It is a myth airplane like the ship Titanic, the airship Hindenberg, and the ship Maine, all three of which had original accident causes modified over time, brittle steel, flammable skin, and coal dust.

Four high time Boeing 747s took off at night running late and suffered a fuselage rupture at forward cargo hold which left similar evidence of sudden loud sound on CVR, similar abrupt power cut to the FDR, similar Fodded engines, similar paint smears, similar wreckage pattern, similar in flight damage, similar destruction sequence, similar missing never recovered

bodies, similar reconstruction patterns, and similar red herring of bomb.

All four, Mr. Brenerman, all four; and only those four of all 747 accidents. Only one came back to reveal the cause, inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight, rupture at aft midspan latch area, UAL 811 as described in text and pictures in NTSB AAR 92/02.

Paragraph nine, sentence two:

"A repetition of the events that caused the UAL flight 811 forward cargo door to open in flight is not likely to occur again because of modifications required by Airworthiness Directive (AD) T89-04-54."

Well sir, the cargo door was not supposed to open:

1. after certification.
2. After the first AD when lower sill damage was noticed.
3. After the second AD after door opened on PA 125.
4. After the third AD after UAL 811 cargo door opened.
5. After the fourth AD after the UAL preflight uncommanded opening.
6. After the fifth AD you mention.

And they are still opening, leaking and malfunctioning. Here's just one of ten non fatal openings, leakings and loss of pressurizations over the past three years. SDR: 27 November 1994 Discrepancy/Corrective Action: On rotation, aft cargo door opened. Replaced spring on lock pin and adj per MM52-34-12.

The cargo door is known to be dangerous, has failed in the past, is still failing, and I'm saying it's failed/ruptured on three previously undetected events, AI 182, PA 103, and TWA 800.

The modification you refer to is to replace the aluminium locking sectors with steel to prevent the lower eight latching cams from being back driven past the soft metal and unlatch the door. It's like making the barn door stronger against a horse when it may be a bull inside trying to get out.

And more important, the midspan latches have no locking sectors at all so the modification does not apply to them at all. Is it not strange that the risk of latch cams becoming unlatched, and they have several times, is so great as to warrant locking sectors yet the two side midspan latches have none? And each of them holds in more door sill than the lower latches. That is an astonishing discovery: no locking sectors on all Boeing 747 forward cargo door latches which have rupture evidence at that midspan latch as shown on UAL 811 recovered door.

The absence of locking sectors for the midspan latches and the AD to strengthen the eight locking sectors for the lower eight latch cams explains much.

It probably solves how the forward cargo door of AI 182 and TWA 800 ruptured at aft midspan latch while the bottom latches remained latched in place: that is the locking sectors did their job on those two doors and prevented the eight lower latch cams from being driven into the unlatched position when chafed wires shorted and turned door motor on. Unfortunately the midspan latches had no such protection and were driven into the unlatched position enough for the internal pressure to rupture at that now weakened area leaving similar shattered door pieces and bottom latches still attached to lower sill for AI 182 and TWA 800.

For UAL 811 and Pan Am 103, the soft, pre-AD, locking sectors were overridden by door motor and all ten latches were driven

into the unlatched position allowing the door to open completely and slam upward, breaking in two and tearing away, leaving the identical pattern of torn away fuselage skin and door broken in half longitudinally at midspan latches for each door.

Four aircraft, four door motors to unlocked position, two locking sectors held and two didn't; two partial openings/ruptures and two total openings as reflected in the reconstructions and photographs of wreckage. AI 182 and TWA 800 had locking sectors hold so ruptures. PA 103 and UAL 811 had locking sectors overridden so entire door opened and came off.

Paragraph ten, sentence one:

"I hope that this information assures you that the tragedy of TWA flight 800 was not caused by the in-flight opening of the forward cargo door and that the FAA has taken measures to ensure that another occurrence similar to that of UAL flight 811 will not be repeated."

Well, sir, I am not assured that the tragedy of TWA 800 was not caused by the inflight opening of the forward cargo door and I am not assured that the actions of the FAA ensures another UAL 811 will not be repeated. On the contrary, I strongly believe that the tragedy of TWA 800 was caused by the inflight rupture of the fuselage at the forward cargo door at the aft midspan latch area and the actions of the FAA will not prevent such a reoccurrence.

Now, what to do about it. Eventually Boeing will have to fix the door again.

But first, FAA and NTSB are doing what they can prior to TWA 800 based upon the best evidence at the time. If the real cause of a failure is unknown, then the fault can't be fixed. If foreign

governments insist on saying a bomb caused a crash, then it is a security matter, not a structural engineers' or accident investigators'.

Second, if the cause of a national aviation tragedy is unclear and ambiguous, then it is understandable for politicians to turn the cause to advantage, even if later proved wrong.

Third, accident investigating teams only had precedent to rely on up to their crash. Hindsight and the subsequent similar crashes were not available to them for their analysis. They are for mine and now they are for yours. We are all doing the best we can with what we have.

Fourth, the internet with its research and communication abilities have sped up the citizen analysis of national accidents.

Fifth, I am the one to have discovered the cargo door cause because of circumstances:

1. Aircraft modeler.
2. Aircraft owner doing routine maintenance. Mooney M20C
3. Commercial pilot, instrument rated.
4. FAA Part 135 certificate holder, single pilot, single aircraft.
5. Enlisted aircrewman in SP-2E with 2000 hours in patrol aircraft maintaining and operating all electronic anti-submarine equipment with specialty of radar.
6. Officer as reconnaissance attack navigator in RA-5C going supersonic in combat during wartime flying off carriers.
7. Retired military officer with time, money, and motivation to devote to research into cargo door of Boeing 747s.
8. Survivor of sudden, night, fatal, fiery, jet airplane crash. June 14th, 1967.

I am qualified to give worthy explanation into other sudden, night, fatal, fiery jet airplane crashes, AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800: inadvertent opening/rupture of forward cargo door in flight at aft midspan latch area on high time Boeing 747s.

What I'm personally doing to prevent a reoccurrence of those accidents is mailing my analysis to you, talking on the telephone, emailing government officials and media, and being open and sharing all information I find that is relevant as soon as I can. Only through fast, open, and accurate communications can we stop these fuselages of high time Boeing 747s rupturing in flight at forward cargo door.

What you can do, Mr. Brenerman, is up to you, as you see fit based upon the evidence that you have seen with your own eyes at Calverton, my analysis, NTSB and other government accident reports, and your own conscience. You have contacts with Boeing, NTSB, and FAA aircraft accident related groups. I encourage you to pass along my concerns and analysis for discussion and possible rebuttal. Please give me scientific rebuttal to this letter today, I'm sure there must be some inaccuracies, everybody makes mistakes once in a while.

And everybody gets it right once in a while, too.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
408 659 3552
barry@corazon.com

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From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: November 7, 1997 3:25:37 PM PST

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: Hinge overtravel impressions/811 like 800

Dear Mr. Schleede, 6 Nov 97

Here is another important specific factual evidence checking thing that can be done to rule in door open/rupture or not:

There is one specific piece of evidence that can tie 811 to 800 not yet mentioned. The hinge of 800 exists because it can be seen in reconstruction photo. The hinge closeup of door is also in a photo for UAL 811 in NTSB 92/02, page 40. Let's match up those two hinges. Let me make a prediction. There will be overextension damage on 800 hinge that matches 811. When the door slams upward and transfers paint above, the hinge gets bent too far and causes visible damage on the opposite hinge pieces. The closeup of the damage is in the photo of UAL 811 door, page 40, AAR 92/02 and on my web site www.corazon. The caption for 811 hinge reads, "Figure 14.--Close-up view of cargo door hinge section. Arrows show impressions caused by contact with opposite hinge section." The explaining text on page 35 reads, "Several areas on the hinge sections, such as the fuselage hinge sections, showed evidence of contact from the door during overtravel, (see Figure 14)."

So, an opportunity to match UAL 811 with TWA 800, and with the absence of accused aft midspan latch area of door to examine and the previously mentioned red paint smears, a prediction is made that the actual hinge of 800 will show impressions caused by contact with opposite hinge sections during overtravel when door slammed upward after door ruptured/opened.

A center tank explosion as initial event would not cause door to fly open.

Overtravel on hinges rules in door rupture/open. Overtravel on hinges rules against midspan latch latched and locked at impact with water while still allowing bottom latches to be latched.

Overtravel on 800 hinges would UAL 811, a cargo door rupture/open event. Overtravel on hinges rules against center tank explosion as initial event.

The goal is to determine if the top piece of the forward cargo door of 800 went upward so much as to make contact with the opposite hinge, making an impression, gouge, or other marks. Normally, the top piece of the door never touches the opposite hinge in its usual extension of opening up; only were it to slam all the way up enough to smear paint onto the upper fuselage would the top of door make contact with opposite hinge leaving impressions.

So, there you have it, Mr. Schleede. Good science, good investigative techniques, good examination of real evidence, and closely reasoned conclusions based on results. Can you closely examine that forward door hinge now hanging on the 800 reconstruction for overtravel impressions? It will require an eyeball about five inches away with a magnifying glass, like Sherlock Holmes, to match the picture in NTSB AAR 92/02 page 40 to the actual red painted 800 hinge.

The results one way or the other are very important.

Sincerely

John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: November 20, 1997 8:58:15 PM PST

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: **Red paint, red flags.**

Dear Mr. Schleede, 20 November 1997

You've got the red flags hanging off the top part of the cargo door which means it was found closest to JFK and first off plane.

You've got the red paint smears which clearly show the top red door smashing outward and upward into white painted areas above and transferring paint.

You've got a round rupture hole at left side of door.

You've got absent aft midspan latch and missing middle part of door.

You've got smooth left frame of door with no door attached.

You've got hinge to examine for overtravel impressions to confirm door rupture in flight.

You've got sudden loud sound on CVR and abrupt power cut which matches UAL 811, a cargo door open in flight.

You've got smooth port side forward of the wing and shattered

starboard side in cargo door area.

You know that doors can rupture with most and even all latches latched.

You've got the past evidence and you have the present evidence and they match, fuselage rupture in cargo door.

You've got OK from Chairman Hall to examine problems in 'aging' aircraft for the upcoming hearing. Cargo door problem only happens on high time Boeing 747s.

NEW YORK (CNN) Although the NTSB has indicated that no probable cause will be declared until late 1998, the hearings -- scheduled to be held in Baltimore -- will address "in great detail" the question of what caused the fuel tank to explode, said James Hall, chairman of the NTSB. They also will probe the whole issue of aging aircraft, he said.

Sequence of Destruction for TWA Flight 800 Aft Midspan Latch Rupture in Forward Cargo Door

Wire bundle gets chafed by continuous door openings and closings on it. Sheath around bundle gets worn through to

insulation. Insulation gets worn through to bare wire. Bare wire shorts against metal powering on door motor which turns cam sectors to unlocked position. On TWA 800, at 13700 feet MSL and 300 KCAS, the eight lower cam sectors were prevented from unlocking because of the strengthened locking sectors which now have steel doublers as per AD 88-12-04. However, the two midspan latches have no locking sectors at all. The slack in bellcranks, torque tubes, and high time worn cam latches allowed the aft midspan latch to rotate just past center allowing the 3.5 PSI internal pressure to rupture the forward cargo door at the aft midspan latch.

The nine foot by eight foot squarish door burst open at midspan latch sending the latch and door material spinning away in the setting sun which reflected upon the shiny metal and appeared as streak to ground observers. The aft door frame was clean of attachment to door and bulged outward. The door fractured at midline and shattered. The bottom eight latches held tight to the bottom eight latch pins on sill while bottom external skin of door blew away. The top piece of red door slammed out and up smashing into the white fuselage skin above leaving the red paint on the door on the white paint between passenger windows above. The top piece of the door took the hinge with it and fuselage skin as it is tore away. The hinge appears to be working normally while having overtravel impression marks on the opposite hinge when door overextended to slam on fuselage above.

The now uncompressed air molecules rushed out of the nine foot by thirty foot hole equalizing high pressure inside to low pressure outside. The sudden rushing air was recorded on the Cockpit Voice Recorder as a sudden loud sound. The explosive decompression of the forward cargo hold disrupted the nearby

main equipment compartment and abruptly shut off power to the Flight Data Recorder.

The door hole was now at least nine feet by thirty feet large. At least nine passengers were blown out of the hole into the nearby number three engine which mulched them up into tiny bone fragments. The number three engine also ingested metal in baggage and started on fire from inefficient burning of fuel. Then the number three engine with pylon started to vibrate and soon detached from wing as designed.

The floor beams were bent, fractured and broken. The main structural members of door and frame were gone and compromised. The flight attitude of the aircraft was askew to the left from reaction of explosive decompression to the right. Air rushed into the hole and weakened other skin and frame peeling skin outward. The 300 knots of air pressed upon the weakened nose and crumpled it into the large hole. The nose tore off and fell and landed in a dense heap before the rest of the plane.

Pieces of baggage and fuselage skin flew backward and left more severe damage on starboard side, such as right wing fillet, of TWA 800 fuselage than port side.

The port side forward of the wing was smooth and unshattered while the starboard side forward of the wing is shattered, torn, and frayed at ruptured cargo door area.

The rest of the plane without the nose suddenly decelerated from 300 knots and caused whiplash injuries to passengers. Passengers inside fuselage had baro-trauma to eardrums which ruptured trying to equalize middle ear pressure. The plane maneuvered with huge gaping wound in front increasing drag. The wind force

disintegrated the fuselage and wings. Fuel poured out of ruptured tanks. The broken fuselage, the ruptured wings, the fuel cloud, the center tank, and the spinning, on fire engine number three met at 7500 feet and exploded into a bright loud fireball putting singe marks on the fuselage skin while leaving the nose burn free. Center tank exploded/caught fire as well as other nearby fuel tanks. The debris falls and spreads out from 7500 feet to sea level.

Ground observers hear the fireball explosion of the center tank and other fuel and look up. Noise of fireball to observers is about 50 seconds for the ten mile distance. They see the still falling shiny pieces of the forward cargo door as it is still falling from 13700 feet to the sea in about 60 seconds.

The detached burnt engine number three and pylon fall apart from the other three engines which fall together.

Explosive decompression at the forward cargo hold led to suspicion of bomb in cargo compartment but bomb later ruled out.

Streak of shiny metal object spinning away reflecting evening sun to ground observers led to suspicion of missile but later ruled out.

Fire/explosion of center tank into fireball leads to suspicion of center tank explosion as initial event but difficulty arises in determining ignition source, fuel volatility, unheard of explosion sound, unilateral damage, and weakness of tank needed for such an initial explosion.

Fuselage rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door

inflight is initially rejected because most of latches are found latched around locking pins.

Further investigation reveals door rupture at aft midspan latch in forward cargo door possible with bottom latches latched and midspan latches missing.

Questions about center tank explosion as initial event which evidence raises.

1. Sudden loud sound on Cockpit Voice Recorder is described as start of aircraft breakup but not sound of explosion. How can an explosion in the center tank be powerful enough to start the aircraft breakup and blow off nose of Boeing 747 and not be heard on CVR?

2. Center tank explosion would be spherical, not directed, and would either give no damage forward of the wing or about equal damage on both sides of the fuselage of TWA 800. The wreckage reconstruction shows smooth skin with little damage forward of the wing on the port/left side yet severe, shattered, torn, and frayed damage on the starboard/right side of the fuselage in the cargo door area. How can a center tank explosion cause unilateral damage only on starboard side?

3. TWA 800 wreckage reconstruction shows outward peeled skin, outward rupture hole, and paint transfers. Water impact damage would be inward, not outward. How could water impact damage produce outward peeled skin, outward rupture hole, and paint transfers?

4. TWA 800 wreckage reconstruction shows red paints smears only above the forward cargo door area and nowhere else on both

side of the Boeing 747 fuselage. This indicates that the red painted door below ruptured/opened outward, slammed upward, and smashed into the white painted area above and transferred red paint from door onto white paint between windows. How did red paint smears get where they are?

5. A center tank explosion would be far enough away from power cables to allow the Flight Data Recorder to record longer than the abrupt power cut it suffered. How can a center tank explosion which is not loud enough to be heard on the CVR and some distance away be strong enough to abruptly cease power to the FDR?

6. How could forward cargo door rupture/open when bottom eight latches are latched and locked in TWA reconstruction?

7. How could forward cargo door rupture cause center tank explosion?

Answers of forward cargo door rupture to questions which evidence raises:

1. Sudden loud sound is sound of explosive decompression which gives a sudden loud sound when forward cargo door ruptures/opens in flight. The TWA 800 sudden loud sound was linked to PA 103 sudden loud sound on CVR which was linked to AI 182 sudden loud sound on CVR which was linked to DC-10 cargo door explosive decompression on CVR. UAL 811 had a cargo door rupture/open in flight and recorded a sudden loud sound on the CVR. The sound is the sudden rushing of air molecules which were compressed now moving fast outward to equalize with the lower pressure outside air.

2. Explosive decompression and rupture of forward cargo door area when aft midspan latch ruptures would give shattered, torn and frayed, damage to cargo door area while leaving port/left/ opposite side smooth and light damage. Cargo door rupture would give the unilateral damage on starboard side as shown by TWA 800 wreckage. UAL 811 also had unilateral cargo door area damage when its door opened in flight.

3. Explosive decompression in nose of TWA 800 would give outward peeled skin in nose, outward rupture hole, and paint transfers as internal high pressure rushes outward to equalize with the low outside pressure.

4. After the rupture at aft midspan latch the door fractured and upper piece of the red painted door was pushed outward, rotated on its hinge, slammed upward and smashed into the white painted fuselage skin above, transferring red paint to the white painted area between the passengers windows, as shown by the TWA 800 reconstruction. UAL 811 also had paint transfer from door to fuselage when its door opened in flight.

5. The explosive decompression in the cargo compartment would severely disrupt the cargo hold floor and the adjacent main equipment compartment in which the FDR and power cables are located. The severe disruption would abruptly cease power to the FDR. UAL 811 also had abrupt power cut when its cargo door opened in flight.

6. The forward cargo door of Boeing 747s is over nine feet by nine feet square. It has a hinge on the top and eight cam latches on the bottom. On each nine foot side is one midspan latch. The bottom eight cam latches go around eight latching pins. Over each cam latch is a locking sector. The two midspan latches have

no locking sectors. The forward cargo door could rupture at the midspan latch and the hinge and bottom eight latches could still be attached to fuselage skin. The top of the door with hinge attached would tear off with the fuselage skin and spin away. The bottom eight latches could stay attached to bottom sill and continue down to the sea with the nose. The middle of the large door can still be ruptured/opened while the lower part stays attached to airframe. Doors can open/rupture with most or all latches latched. TWA 800 reconstruction shows aft mid span latch missing which implies it became unlatched. The aft door frame sill is smooth and not attached to door which implies door opened in that area.

7. When cargo door ruptures in flight a huge hole is created in nose which the 300 knot slipstream tears off. The falling, noseless, structurally compromised aircraft disintegrated into wings of rupturing fuel tanks, fuselage pieces including center tank, and spinning hot on fire jet engine. When falling debris reached about 7500 feet, the fodded on fire engine number three ignited the fuel cloud and center fuel tank into a fireball. Center tank fire/explosion occurred but later and lower than forward cargo door rupture initial event.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: November 28, 1997 10:28:37 PM PST

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: Cargo door rupture/NTSB TWA 800 Hearing

Ron Schleede
NTSB TWA 800 Investigator

Dear Mr. Schleede,

26 November 1997

Hello again, still trying...

We are allies, we are on the same side, we have the same goal. Let us use the upcoming public hearing in Baltimore to share our information. I will be there and look forward to meeting you.

I wish to prevent death by preventing airplane accidents by preventing fuselage disintegration in flight by preventing forward cargo door rupture at aft midspan latch on aging Boeing 747s. It's happened before and confirmed: UAL 811; and probably happened before on Pan Am 103, and before that Air India 182. It's probably happened again with TWA 800. The probable cause for all is the same, door rupture in flight.

The Chairman of NTSB has said the whole issue of aging aircraft will be examined. TWA 800 was certainly that.

Let's assume a few things about TWA 800, AI 182, PA 103, and UAL 811:

1. TWA 800 (93,000 hours), AI 182 (23,624 hours), PA 103 (72,464 hours), and UAL 811 (58,815 hours) were high time, aging early model Boeing 747-100, -200 aircraft.
2. Explosive decompression makes a sudden loud sound. If explosive decompression does not make a sudden loud sound then the cargo door explanation is not valid.
3. TWA 800, Air India 182, PA 103, and UAL 811 all had sudden

loud sounds on the CVR at event time. If not, then cargo door explanation for that aircraft is not valid.

4. If the forward cargo door were to rupture in flight and do the same damage as UAL 811, the nose could tear off, although it did not for UAL 811. If the nose of an aging 747 always stays on after forward door ruptures/opens, then the cargo door explanation is not valid.

4. Explosive decompression is an explosion.

5. Destructive force of 300 knots onto weakened structure is immense.

To explain TWA 800 from the top down is to match up four aging Boeing 747s which had fatal accidents with destruction starting in fuselage near leading edge of the wing, sudden loud sound on CVR, abrupt power cut to FDR, foddred engines, never recovered bodies, severe starboard side damage, similar wreckage plots, and all were thought to be a bomb for some time. Only four 747 accidents fit that pattern, UAL 811, AI 182, PA 103, and TWA 800. They belong to a group from which deductions can be made. The many other evidence matches of these four to each other are reported in the respective governments' AARs: UK AAIB 2/90, CASB and Indian Aviation Occurrence, and NTSB AAR 92/02; all available on web site www.corazon.com

To explain TWA 800 from the bottom up, the evidence pertaining to TWA 800 must be examined closely and deductions made. The following observations and explanations refer to TWA 800.

1. CVR sudden loud sound: Explosive decompression starts as air molecules rush against each other quickly. NTSB reported sudden loud sound.

2. FDR abrupt power cut: Severe disruption to cargo hold floor and adjacent main equipment compartment. NTSB reported

abrupt power cut.

3. Streak: Top part of door with fuselage skin attached spinning away reflecting evening sunlight to ground observers appearing as streak as it decelerates. Door is shiny metal object and light source was orange setting sun.

4. TWA 800 wreckage reconstruction can be seen at URL <http://www.corazon.com/presskit.html> and reveals the following: Red flags on top of door indicate it was found closest to airport. Top piece of door and fuselage skin were found closest to airport and far apart from its usual frame and nose: Door ruptured/opened in flight and pieces spun away first, landed first, and found closest.

5. Red paint smears between passenger windows only found above forward cargo door: Red paint from door below transferred when door opened out, up, and slammed into fuselage above. Paint transfer between door and white fuselage principle matches UAL 811.

6. Missing red paint on trim above cargo door: Red paint from trim scraped off by friction of metal bending and rubbing together.

7 Inward bending of top of cargo door: Inward bend occurs when top of door hits fuselage. Inward bending of top door matches UAL 811 top door piece inward bend.

8. Most of middle of cargo door, aft midspan latch, door frame, and outer skin missing: Missing material not available for examination. Door can rupture even when bottom eight latches hold because only two midspan latches hold sixteen feet of door closed and have no locking sectors to prevent inadvertent unlatching.

9. Door hinges are attached to door and appear near normal: Hinges match UAL 811 hinge description in appearance and function.

10. Outward petal bulge rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door: Outward bulge rupture suggests rupture at aft latch.

Petal pattern indicated outward, not inward force of rupture.

11. Outward peeled upper fuselage skin: Outward indicates internal force pushed outward, not external force, such as water, pushing inward.

12. Vertical tear line at station 741 between windows: Vertical tear line is nose cut off point and matches other two Boeing 747 nose cut off points, AI 182, and PA 103.

13. Starboard only shattered, torn, and frayed fuselage around forward cargo door: Unilateral rupture suggests explosive decompression caused by inadvertent rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door in flight and discounts center tank fire/explosion as initial event.

From top to bottom, TWA 800 crash cause is clear to see, hear, and touch; fuselage rupture forward of the wing on right side on a very old and worn aircraft. The cargo door explanation is plausible, it's mechanical, it's happened before, and it fits the evidence. It also incorporates the center tank fire/explosion explanation as happening as described by NTSB but a few seconds later and a few thousand feet lower than the initial event at 13700 feet/8:31 PM.

I first discovered the cargo door rupture problem on aging 747s after PA 103 in 1988 and confirmed for me by UAL 811 only three months later. My concerns were published first in an aviation newsletter in April, 1990 and in Flying magazine in July, 1992. I've had correspondence with a Pan Am 103 aviation insurance company representative in 1995 regarding the risk of another cargo door inadvertent opening. As soon as I heard that TWA 800 had disappeared from radar and disintegrated in flight shortly after takeoff I suspected cargo door and it was confirmed for me when the sudden loud sound and abrupt power cut to the FDR were reported by NTSB. All of the subsequent evidence

confirms even stronger that the cause of TWA 800 was the aft midspan latch rupture in flight. This letter only describes a few of the linking clues, evidence, and closely reasoned deductions based on the observations of the evidence.

To sum up specific, irrefutable evidence that leads to conclusion of cargo door rupture for TWA 800:

1. Sudden loud sound on CVR.
2. Abrupt power cut to FDR.
3. Red flags on top of door in wreckage reconstruction.
4. Red paint smears on white paint between passenger windows.
5. Most of middle door, aft latch, outer skin, and door frame missing.
6. Shattered, torn, and frayed starboard fuselage structure surrounds the blown apart cargo door yet the opposite port side is smooth and relatively undamaged.
7. Visible bulging outward opening rupture hole at missing aft midspan latch of forward cargo door.

A confirming exercise would be to closely examine the door hinge of TWA 800 to see if it has overtravel impressions on the opposite hinge which would match the overtravel impressions on the UAL 811 door hinge as reported in NTSB AAR 92/02 and seen at <http://www.corazon.com/811page40doorhinge.html>

Cargo door explanation for TWA 800 is worthy of intense investigation. My intentions at the public hearing are to support such an investigation. I have formally offered to speak before the fact finding panel as a qualified technical person with special knowledge. I will be offering literature to attendees including pictures and text from NTSB AAR 92/02 showing big hole in nose of UAL 811.

What can be done to stop fuselage ruptures in high time Boeing 747s?

1. Boeing must modify/fix the cargo doors again.
2. FAA can direct Boeing to fix the doors with a sixth Airworthiness Directive.
3. NTSB can confirm door explanation and make recommendations to FAA.
4. NTSB public fact finding hearing can determine cargo door explanation worthy of investigation and confirm probable cause if valid.
5. Families of victims and their representatives may be persuaded to investigate the door and make recommendations to authorities.
6. Elected officials may be persuaded to conduct a parallel door investigation.
7. Media can draw attention to cargo door explanation and bring it to the attention of all concerned.

In all my discussions with persons involved with TWA 800, one person asked the key question: "Why do the doors open?" That was asked of me by my Congressman, Sam Farr, in his office as I presented the cargo door explanation to him. It is a good question.

I will reply now, as I did then, "I don't know for three of them, but for UAL 811 it was chafed wires shorting to turn on door motor which overrode safety features and unlatched the door which opened outward, up, and away, taking fuselage paint with it, killing nine passengers whose bodies were never recovered, leaving a sudden loud sound on the CVR, an abrupt power cut to the FDR, severe starboard side damage, and the cause was thought to be a bomb. The other three are probably the same reason but there are lots of other possibilities that need to be investigated."

(Regarding the AD 'fix' installed after UAL 811, it affected locking sectors yet the two midspan latches have no locking sectors to be 'fixed.' TWA 800 shattered door shows a midspan rupture with bottom latches in place. There were two pairs of door failure: UAL 811 and PA 103 had door rupture midspan and entire door open; AI 182 and TWA 800 had bottom latches hold and door ruptured/opened just at midspan latch.)

I hope to work with you, the authorities and all those concerned to confirm the probable cause of TWA 800. Please contact me with questions or rebuttal. My email is barry@corazon.com. I hope to see you at the NTSB public fact finding hearing about TWA 800 and aging aircraft.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

Persons contacted and responded:

Mr. Sam Farr
17th District, California
House of Representatives
Congress of the United States
Washington, DC
samfarr@mail.house.gov
Contacted: 29 Oct 1996 09:10:09 EST
Responded: 29 Oct 1996 09:10:09 EST

John McCain, Arizona,
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation

United States Senate
Julie_Swingle@mccain.senate.gov
Contacted: Mon, 09 Sep 96 17:49:37 EST
Responded: Mon, 09 Sep 96 17:49:37 EST

Lyle Streeter
FAA Office of Accident Investigation
Lyle.Streeter@faa.dot.gov
Contacted: 3 Nov 97
Responded: 4 Nov 97

Al Dickinson
NTSB TWA 800 Lead Investigator
DICKINA@ntsb.gov
Contacted: 12 Sep 96
Responded: 19 Sep 96

Ron Schleede
NTSB TWA 800 Investigator
SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
Contacted: 26 Jul 96
Responded: 29 Jul 96

Allan Pollock
Media representative
POLLOCA@ntsb.gov
Contacted: 11 Nov 96
Responded: 11 Nov 96

John Garstaing
CASB investigator
Contacted: 18 Apr 97
Responded: 3 May 97

Jacques.Babin@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca

CASB Official

Contacted: 10 Apr 97

Responded: 10 Apr 97

Ron Wojnar, Manager

Darrell Pederson, Assistant Manager

Federal Aviation Administration

Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100

Contacted: 30 Oct 97

Responded: 30 Oct 97

Bob Brenerman,

FAA Structural Aerospace Engineer,

Contacted: 30 Oct 97

Responded: 30 Oct 97

John Schneider

RCMP

Air India Flight 182 Task Force in Canada.

Contacted: 10 Apr 97

Responded: 13 Apr 97

Securitas@bst-tsb.x400.gc.ca

Canadian aviation security

Contacted: 27 Feb 97

Responded: 27 Feb 97

Secret Service, San Jose Office

Contacted: 24 Feb 97

Responded: 24 Feb 97

LCDR Donald Lawson
Aircraft accident investigator
NPG School, Monterey
Navy Accident School
Contacted: 13 Jan 97
Responded: 13 Jan 97

John Hamilton
Boeing Safety Office
Contacted: 5 Dec 96
Responded: 5 Dec 96

John Brennan
Chairman
Executive Committee
US Aviation Underwriters
Contacted: 16 Aug 95
Responded: 16 Aug 95

Michael D. Busch
Editor-in-Chief
AVweb, the Web Site for Aviators
mbusch@avweb.com
Contacted: 26 Jul 96
Responded: 30 Jul 96

Robert Knight
News Director
WBAI
rknight@escape.com
Contacted: 2 Aug 96
Responded: 2 Aug 96

Nick Fielding
Reporter Mail on Sunday
msnews@mailonsunday.co.uk
Contacted: 9 Aug 96
Responded: 9 Aug 96

Byron Acohido
Reporter Seattle Times
baco-new@seatimes.com
Contacted: 18 Sep 96
Responded: 18 Sep 96

Matthew L. Wald
The New York Times
mattwald@mailgate.nytimes.com
Contacted: 14 Mar 97
Responded: 14 Mar 97

David Evans,
Editor of the Aviation Group at Phillips
Business Information, Inc.
Air Safety Week.
devans@phillips.com
Contacted: 27 Nov 96
Responded: 27 Nov 96

Jessica Kowal
Reporter Newsday
cbhays@amherst.edu
Contacted: 11 Sep 96
Responded: 11 Sep 96

Lou Miliano

Reporter WCBS
RLM6KIDS@aol.com
Contacted: 16 Dec 96
Responded: 16 Dec 96

Royal Barnard, Publisher
The Mountain Times
Killington, VT
E-Mail RBarn64850@AOL.com
Contacted: 13 Nov 96
Responded: 13 Nov 96

Antonio Leonardi
Gianfranco Bangone
Journalists
Telematic diary Galileo
<http://galileo.webzone.it>
Contacted: 20 Mar 97
Responded: 20 Mar 97

Carmel Valley Sun
Editor
Elizabeth Cowles
Contacted: 9 Jun 97
Responded: 9 Jun 97

Speiser, Krause,
Madole, Nolan, Granito
Attorneys for victims
Contacted: 11 Oct 96
Responded: 11 Oct 96

Arthur Wolk

Attorney

Contacted: 23 Oct 96

Responded: 8 Nov 96

Jerry Sterns,

Sterns, Walker & Lods

sterns@pop.lanminds.com

sterns@trial-law.com

Attorney

Contacted: 20 Sep 96

Responded: 20 Sep 96

Jos/Cremades

Victims of Flight 800

cremades@calva.net

Contacted: 18 July 97

Responded: 22 July 97

The following have not responded but have been contacted by letter and email.

The Honorable John J. Duncan, Jr.

U.S. House of Representatives

jjduncan@hr.house.gov

Contacted 9 Aug 97

Slade Gorton, Washington, Chairman

Subcommittee on Aviation

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

senator_gorton@gorton.senate.gov

Contacted 19 Feb 97

Bernard Loeb

NTSB Director, Office of Aviation Safety
LOEBBER@ntsb.gov
Contacted: 12 Aug 96

John Warner
United States Senator
From: Senator@warner.senate.gov
Contacted: 07 Sep 96 11:56:32 EST

President, Bill Clinton
Chief of Staff, Leon Panetta
Secretary of Transportation, Federico Pe^a
Director, Federal Aviation Authority, David Hinson
Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, James Hall
Vice Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board, Robert
Francis
Attorney General, Department of Justice, Janet Reno
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Louis Freeh
Agent, New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
James Kallstrom
Contacted: All on 18 Dec 96

Wendell H. Ford
United States Senator
Contacted: 3 Mar 97

Ron Wyden
United States Senator
Senator@wyden.senate.gov
Contacted 10 Mar 97

Kay Bailey Hutchison,
United States Senator

senator@hutchison.senate.gov
Contacted: 24 Aug 96

James Oberstar,
Congressman
oberstar@hr.house.gov
Contacted: 7 Sep 96

Dianne Feinstein
United States Senator CA
senator@feinstein.senate.gov
Contacted: 7 Sep 96

Jim Kallstrom
Assistant Director
FBI Office New York
newyork@fbi.gov
Contacted: 19 July 96

WebmasterFAA@mail.hq.faa.go
Contacted: 27 Sep 96

BENSONM@ntsb.gov
NTSB investigator
Contacted: 11 Nov 96

US Air Force
hewitts@emh.aon.af.mil
Contacted: 26 Sep 96

Department of Transportation
webmaster@www.dot.gov
Contacted: 6 Sep 96

US Air Force
jberger@dtic.mil
nefft@afsync.hq.af.mil
hewitts@emh.aon.af.mil
Contacted: 9 Sep 96

Jim Hall
Chairman NTSB
National Transportation Safety Board
Office of the Chairman
Contacted: 10 Feb 97

Tom McSweeney
Director
FAA Aircraft Certification Service.
Contacted: 21 Oct 97

Perkins Coie
Seattle, Washington, 98101-3099
Davis, Scott, Weber & Edwards, PC
New York, New York 10017
Attorneys for Boeing
Contacted: 6 Nov 97

Mr. Harold Clark
Chief Executive Officer
US Aviation Insurance Group
New York, New York
Contacted. 30 Aug 95

CNN.FEEDBACK@turner.com
Contacted: 13 Aug 96

plugin@newsday.com
Cargo door mentioned
Contacted 3 Sep 96

George Magazine
Cargo door mentioned
Contacted: 17 Nov 96

David Fuhlgrum
Reporter, Aviation Week
Cargo door mentioned
mangann@mcgraw-hill.com
Contacted: 29 Oct 97

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: December 16, 1997 9:35:24 AM PST
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: **You've been a bad boy.**

Mr. Schleede, this is John Barry Smith, cargo door guy. You've been a bad boy. You jumped to a wrong conclusion early on and haven't changed it when presented with contrary evidence.

You guessed the entire forward cargo door was intact, latched and locked at water impact based upon a cursory examination of 20% of the door material and 80% of the latches. The wreckage reconstruction now shows door not intact but shattered from outward force; not all latched and locked but two missing and unlatched, the midspan latches. The viewing ports, overpressure relief doors, manual locking handle, and torque tubes are missing too. A thorough professional accurate examination of the forward cargo door was not done. It's not too late.

By you telling your superiors the door was fully locked and fully examined and conclusively proven to be intact and latched at water impact you have perpetuated a serious hastily made error.

Al Dickinson reported the below to Mr. James Wildey based upon your incomplete examination. Mr. Wildey reported it to Mr. Hall who reported it to the world. The world reads the below and thinks the door was fully latched and intact at water impact. Your error has serious repercussions.

"Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit Number 15C, Report Number 97-82, Section 41/42 Joint, Forward Cargo Door. "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill.""

The problem is that there are ten latches, not eight. 80% is good enough for some things but not for the most intensive aircraft accident the nation has ever known. 99% is not good enough, only 100% and that means ten latches. And that means impossible because the reconstruction photograph shows the missing, unlatched from door frame, aft midspan latch in the middle of a round outward torn rupture hole.

Outward peeled skin on wreckage means outward shattering force, not inward water impact force. Red paint smears above red door mean outward. Petal rupture hole means outward.

You made the fully latched conclusion on 11 August 1996 to me and again officially on April 22, 1997, before the wreckage reconstruction was completed in May 1997 which showed the door rupture hole, missing two midspan latches and missing 80%

door material. You did not change your conclusion to mostly latched from all latched. You did not change the 'intact at water impact then shattered by inward force' to 'shattered by outward force before water impact.'

It's not too late.

By the way,

Other documents from NTSB Baltimore public hearing supported cargo door explanation:

1. The first item to leave TWA 800 came from the cargo bay, A489, fwd lower cargo bay struct, FS 900, page 45 of Exhibit Number 22B, Trajectory Study. It left before the last radar response from TWA 800.
2. Chart 12 of Sound Spectrum Study Exhibit Number 12B shows the four aircraft I say are cargo door caused, UAL 811, TWA 800, PA 103, and AI 182 have the same matching sudden loud sound on the cockpit voice recorder on one NTSB prepared chart.

And you can check the outward force of open cargo door by examining the 800 hinge for overtravel impression damage, just like UAL 811.

Bad things happen from hasty conclusions. Good things happen from carefully considered conclusions.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

From: Schleede Ron <SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov>

To: barry <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: RE: TWA crash cause
Date: Sun, 11 Aug 1996 11:39:00 -0400
Encoding: 13 TEXT
Status:

I have examined the cargo door from twa 800--it is locked and latched!

From: Schleede Ron <SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov>
To: barry <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: RE: TWA crash cause ATTN Robert Francis
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 1996 15:24:00 -0400
Encoding: 17 TEXT
Status:

Be assured that we are checking that. I was the investigator in charge of the UAL flight 811 case and fully knowledgeable in its causes and factors.

Thanks for the interest.

Mr. Dickinson, this is John Barry Smith, cargo door guy. You've been a bad boy, too. You wrote the below to Mr. Wildey who was misled into thinking the entire door was latched and locked at water impact.

Wrong. The door was mostly latched, not all latched, the shattering force was outward, not inward. The wreckage reconstruction shows it. The outward peeled skin, the petal tear outward skin around rupture hole, and the red paint smears above cargo door all indicate outward, not inward. The missing two midspan latches and the round rupture hole around the aft midspan latch indicate door rupture/opened in flight. The 80% missing door material such as two overpressure relief doors, the viewing ports, the torque tubes, and manual locking handle indicate your report to Mr. Wildey was incomplete and non professional.

You made your hasty conclusion of all latched and intact and wrote your report on April 22 1997, a month before the wreckage reconstruction refuted that conclusion. You did not change it.

The error was believed by Mr. Wildey, Dr. Loeb, and Mr. Hall. And they have told others who believe them. It's a problem which is now becoming resolved by the report of eight latches latched but proven to be ten, therefore two not examined.

It's not too late.

Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit Number 15C, Report Number 97-82, Section 41/42 Joint, Forward Cargo Door. "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill."

This the poorest examination of a complex device the NTSB has ever done. The forward cargo door, a known killer located near the scene of the crime, is cleared of involvement based upon a cursory 20% of material and 80% of the latches by one misleading sentence among 2475 pages of data.

You've been a bad boy, Mr. Dickinson.

19 Sep 96 and 22 Apr 97 is a long time ago, before the reconstruction was completed, before the red paint smears became apparent, before the trajectory study was complete, and before the sudden loud sounds were compared by NTSB on Chart 12.

Other documents from NTSB Baltimore public hearing supported cargo door explanation:

1. The first item to leave TWA 800 came from the cargo bay, A489, fwd lower cargo bay struct, FS 900, page 45 of Exhibit Number 22B, Trajectory Study. It left before the last radar response from TWA 800.
2. Chart 12 of Sound Spectrum Study Exhibit Number 12B shows the four aircraft I say are cargo door caused, UAL 811, TWA 800, PA 103, and AI 182 have the same matching sudden loud sound on the cockpit voice recorder on one NTSB prepared chart.

New evidence means new interpretation. It's not too late.

We will continue to look for any indications leading to the source of the event and definitely pay attention to items mentioned in your letter.

That's what you told me you would do, Mr. Dickinson. I ask you to do it.

Sincerely,
John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: December 31, 1997 10:54:34 AM PST
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: Cargo door letter for Mr. Schleede, Mr. Dickinson, and Dr. Loeb.

Ron Schleede,
Investigator, TWA 800
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Dear Mr. Schleede,

31 Dec 97

I've just mailed off several 95 page documents to the persons below. I didn't have enough for each person so could you please read Dr. Loeb's copy. It's mailed to Dr. Loeb and your name is on it also. The original mailed document, in tan clasp envelope, has color pictures embedded in the text which I am unable to transmit via email because government servers do not accept pictures. The text of the main letter is attached below. I've also included copies of my sources referred to in the text.

It's essentially laying out cargo door as precipitating event for TWA 800 and offers interpretation of evidence.

Cheers,

John Barry Smith

Sam Farr
Member of Congress
17th District, California
House of Representatives
Congress of the United States
Washington, DC

John McCain
Member of Congress
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
United States Senate
Washington, DC

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Dear Gentlemen,

29 December 1997

I address you as an American citizen to United States government officials. I have come to the conclusion that you are listening to me. You may not agree or always respond, but still my information is getting through. So I continue.

Chairman Jim Hall of NTSB has made an important yet unsubstantiated reply to Congressional inquiry regarding TWA 800 cargo door status: "Early in the investigation we determined conclusively that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water, and there was no evidence of any failure of any of the latching mechanisms on the doors."

That statement is not yet correct. A complete examination of the forward cargo door and two other cargo doors remains to be done. Only eight of ten latches have been examined in the forward door and none of the other doors. Chairman Hall has

reported to me and senior officials that all doors have been conclusively determined to be all latched at water impact. That statement is not yet exactly true. It can be.

One person made an early conclusion under time pressure and poor working conditions about one shattered door and that erroneous first guess has been compounded into three doors over time and not corrected. It leads to this imaginary yet factual conversation between Chairman Jim Hall and Mr. Bob Breneman, the person who first examined and deduced forward cargo door all latched and intact at water impact:

Chairman Hall: I have reported in writing to high officials that all the cargo doors are all latched, is that correct, Mr. Breneman?

Mr. Bob Breneman: Maybe, sir!

Chairman Hall: What is the position of the forward cargo door manual locking handle, is it locked or unlocked?

Mr. Bob Breneman: Don't know, sir, didn't examine it.

Chairman Hall: Do any of the forward door latches show damage?

Mr. Bob Breneman: Don't know, sir, didn't examine them all, only eight of ten.

Chairman Hall: Are the latches on the two vertical sides of the forward door latched?

Mr. Bob Breneman: Don't know, sir, didn't examine the sides, only the top and bottom.

Chairman Hall: Do you have the two midspan latches?

Mr. Bob Breneman: Don't know sir, maybe, or maybe missing, or maybe destroyed.

Chairman Hall: Does the hinge show overtravel damage?

Mr. Bob Breneman: Don't know, sir, didn't examine it for that.

Chairman Hall: What is the status of the two overpressure relief doors in the forward door?

Mr. Bob Breneman: Don't know, sir, didn't examine them.

Chairman Hall: What are the positions of the aft and the bulk cargo door manual locking handles?

Mr. Bob Breneman: Don't know, sir, didn't examine them.

Chairman Hall: What is the status of any the latches and hinges of the aft and bulk cargo doors?

Mr. Bob Breneman: Don't know, sir, didn't examine any of them.

Chairman Hall: What is the status of the door frames, the overpressure relief doors, the viewing ports, and the hinges of the aft and bulk cargo doors?

Mr. Bob Breneman: Don't know, sir, didn't examine any of them.

Chairman Hall: Very well, Mr. Breneman, and you want me to

say all cargo doors are all latched, locked and no latch failures at water impact for TWA 800?

Mr. Bob Breneman: You can say anything you want, Mr. Chairman, you're the Chairman!

Gentleman, I ask you, how did such a crazy thing come about? Here's how. The chain of erroneous conclusion regarding forward cargo door of TWA 800 is thus:

1. July 1996. Mr. Bob Breneman examined bottom eight latches. He stated to me in a phone call on 30 October 1997 that "early on as the pieces of door were being brought into Calverton hangar," he determined cargo door latched and not implicated in crash of TWA 800 because bottom latches latched. He said he felt relief that bottom latches were latched as the initial thought was the forward cargo door might be a problem. He could not recall status of two midspan latches.

2. 11 August, 1996. Mr. Ron Schleede emails me on 11 August 1996 to tell me, "I have examined the cargo door from twa 800--it is locked and latched!"

3. 19 September, 1996. Mr. Al Dickinson emails me and states, "We have recovered many of the door/hatch/access panel/windows from the sea floor and none of them indicate that they came off the aircraft prior to the event which lead to the crash."

4. 1 November, 1996, Congressman Sam Farr, D-CA, writes to me and states, "In an effort to be of assistance to you, I have forwarded a copy of your communication to the Federal Aviation Administration and asked them to respond directly to you. Their officials have the resources and expertise to thoroughly

investigate your claims about the inadvertent inflight opening of the forward lower lobe cargo door."

5. 18 November, 1996. Thomas E. McSweeney writes, (Douglas G. Kirkpatrick signs,) to Congressman Sam Farr, D-CA, reporting, "The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has no evidence that would lead us to suspect that the forward cargo door is implicated in this accident."

6. 26 November, 1996, Congressman Farr writes to me and states, "According to Mr. McSweeney, the FAA has looked into the possibility that door failures played a role in the accident, but have found no evidence to that effect."

7. 19 December 1996, Senator John McCain R-AR, Chairman, Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, writes to me and states, "Thank you again for contacting me with your concerns regarding the potential hazards involving Boeing 747s. As you know, I have passed the information you sent to Chris Paul and he has informed me of your findings. I have since forwarded the material you sent to the Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee for their review."

8. 5 February 1997, LCDR Don Lawson of US Navy Aviation Accident School emails me and states, "From the head of the NTSB team working TWA 800:

1. He personally, even again this morning, looked at all the doors from the airplane. All latches were either destroyed or in closed positions. The destroyed latches were adjacent to ones in closed positions.

2. Nobody associated with the investigation is considering further a cargo/passenger door malfunction to be part of the probable cause of this accident. Door problems have been

categorically ruled out because there is simply no evidence pointing to the doors (and latches)."

9. 10 Mar 97, Aviation Week and Space Technology, Page 35. "NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilot saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said."

10. 22 April, 1997. Mr. James Wildey II signs report No. 97-82 of Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit 15C, Section 41/42, Forward Cargo Door, dated 22 April 1997, with Mr. Al Dickinson, AS-10, listed as investigator. Report states, "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill."

11. May, 1997, TWA 800 reconstruction of fuselage wreckage is completed. Outward bulge of door frame, red paint smears above cargo door on white fuselage, missing/not hung aft midspan latch, outward peeled upper skin, rupture hole at aft midspan latch, and larger explosive decompression shape become apparent in photograph of reconstruction.

12. 19 May 1997, Mr. Ron Schleede emails me and states, "As I have told you before, the cargo door was locked and latched at impact."

13. 6 June, 1997. Senator McCain writes to me and states, "My staff reviewed the detailed information you provided concerning a faulty cargo door which could have caused the crash. They promptly contacted the appropriate agencies and were advised

they had received similar correspondence from you and were aware of and looking into your theory. Inasmuch as the investigation is not yet complete, I expect that the information you provided is being handled appropriately by the crash investigation team."

14. 11 June 1997. Congressman Sam Farr writes to me, "I have every confidence in the ability of the professional investigators who are looking into the cause of the accident. If one of the plane's doors was at fault, as you suspect might be the case, it is certain that evidence of this will be found. Further, since you have conveyed your ideas to the NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board), I have no doubt that NTSB staff will be in contact with you if the Board feels that this information would be useful to its investigation."

15. 24 October 1997. Chairman NTSB Jim Hall writes Congressman Farr and states, "'Please be assured that our team has examined all of the structure recovered from TWA flight 800, approximately 95%--including all of the cargo door mechanisms and structures. Early in the investigation we determined conclusively that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water, and there was no evidence of any failure of any of the latching mechanisms on the doors. This information has been forwarded to Mr. Smith by our investigators on previous occasions."

16. 29 October, 1997. Ronald T. Wojnar writes, (Darrell M. Pederson signs), "When the first bits of information became available that the nose section of TWA flight 800 had separated from the rest of the airplane, we were concerned that a possible in-flight opening of the forward cargo door may have caused the accident. However, when the wreckage of the nose section was

recovered if became evident that the forward cargo door had not opened in flight or separated from the nose section prior to impact with the water."

"The FAA structural engineer who assisted the NTSB at the hangar at Calverton, New York, verified that the forward cargo door was recovered at the same location as the rest of the nose section. A further examination of the recovered wreckage showed that the upper door hinge was still attached to both the fuselage and the door. In addition, the door latches at the bottom of the door were still attached to the fuselage lower sill structure. This indicates that the door was in the "latched and locked" position at the time of impact with the water."

"The nose section of the airplane impacted the water on the right side, causing severe hydraulic damage with the result that the door structure did not remain completely intact. However, wreckage for the entire door was recovered at the same location as the nose section and had the same impact damage as the surrounding fuselage structure on the right side. This is additional verification that the forward cargo door had not opened in flight or separated from the airplane."

17. 20 November 1997. Mr. Peter Goelz of NTSB writes to Sandy Hentges of Congressman Farr's office and states, "As Congressman Farr was advised by letter dated October 24, 1997, early in the investigation we determined conclusively that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water, and there was no evidence of any failure of any of the latching mechanisms on the doors."

18. 10 December 1997. Congressman Sam Farr writes me and states, "You will also note that the NTSB continues to stand by their findings that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water."

19. 19 December 1997. Chairman Jim Hall of NTSB writes me and states, "However, to repeat, the investigation of the accident involving TWA flight 800 has revealed no evidence to suggest that a failure of a cargo door precipitated the event."

Gentlemen of government, I assume you respect facts, evidence, data...eight is not ten. Most is not 'all.' That forward door has ten latches. Eight have been examined. A close reading of the correspondence to me reveals that when latches are mentioned, only the bottom eight latch status of one door is reported. The other two latches, the midspan latches, are unexamined and unreported. To say door is all latched is wrong; it is misstatement, it is exaggeration, it is an error. You may consider it not a serious error, but it is an error nonetheless. It can be corrected. Closely examine the other two latches on that forward door.

To drive point home; to say that all the latches are latched based on examination of only eight of the ten is to make the wrong conclusion entire door was latched at water impact. If you lose two toes to frostbite you can not say truthfully say to your wife you have all your toes, you have most of your toes. If you have ten marbles and a bully comes by and takes two, you can not fib to your buddies you have all your marbles, you have most of your marbles. If your test has ten questions and you get eight right you can not truthfully report to your parents you got them all right, you got most of them right. If a door with ten latches has eight latched, you can not truthfully issue a report stating the door is all latched, it is mostly latched.

The forward cargo door and aft cargo door are identical in size and number of latching cams, locking sectors and latching pins.

For each door there are ten latching cams and eight locking sectors. The midspan latches have no locking sectors. An Airworthiness Directive to strengthen locking sectors would have no direct effect on the midspan latches because there are no locking sectors to strengthen. A latching system consists of a cam sector turned around a latching pin. The pins are in the door frame. All ten latches of the door have a cam sector and pin. Only the bottom eight latches of each door have an additional locking sector for each latch system for safety to prevent inadvertent unlatching.

The total for the two identical starboard cargo doors and frames of TWA 800 is twenty latching cams, twenty latching pins, and sixteen locking sectors. There exist twenty latching systems for two cargo doors and only eight have been examined, the bottom eight latch system on the forward cargo door. Eight latching systems examined of twenty in two identical doors which have both opened in flight in the past is not a high percentage. In fact, it changes from most latched to some latched.

Facts, evidence, data...The bulk cargo door as reported in Exhibit 7A, page 15, is an approximate square of eleven feet wide and ten feet high and is aft of wing on port side. Assuming TWA 800 had one port side bulk cargo door, as stated in exhibit 7A, and although larger, has the same amount of latches as the two starboard side cargo doors, the total number of cargo doors for TWA 800 is three.

The total number of latch pins for the three cargo doors and frames is thirty, total number of latch cams is thirty, total number of locking sectors is twenty four, total number of door sides is twelve, total number of feet of cargo door frame edge cut out of fuselage is one hundred eleven, and total manual locking handles

is three.

Total number of cargo doors examined by FAA and NTSB of three available is three, 100%. Complete. None to go.

Total number of latch pins examined of thirty available is eight, 26.6%. Incomplete. Twenty two latches to go.

Total number of latch cams examined of thirty available is eight, 26.6%. Incomplete. Twenty two cams to go.

Total number of locking sectors examined of twenty four available is eight, 33%. Incomplete. Sixteen locking sectors to go.

Total number of sides of cargo door examined of twelve available is two, 16.6%. Incomplete. Ten sides to go.

Total number of feet of cargo door frame examined of one hundred eleven available is eighteen, 16.2%. Incomplete. Ninety three feet to go.

Total number of manual locking handles examined of three available is zero, 0%. Incomplete. Three manual locking handles to go.

To say all cargo doors conclusively determined as latched and locked, as Chairman Hall stated to Congressmen, is not true and needs to be true, and can be true. Just fully examine all three doors.

Or at least fully examine one previous faulty killer door, the forward cargo door, located just forward of the wing, where the first objects left TWA 800 as shown in Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 22B, Trajectory Study Supporting Material, page 30 in dark numbers. The first item to depart TWA 800 is "A489, fwd lower cargo bay struct, FS 900."

Every aft and forward cargo door is 110 inches wide and 99

inches high, or about nine by eight feet square and each has four sides, one hinge, ten latch cams, eight locking sectors, thirty four feet of door frame cut out of fuselage, two over pressure relief doors, eight viewing ports, torque tubes, and one manual locking handle. Every cargo door frame in the fuselage has ten latching pins; eight on the bottom and two on the sides.

Total number of forward cargo doors examined of one available is one, 100%. Complete. None to go.

Total number of latch pins examined of ten available is eight, 80%. Incomplete. Two latch pins to go.

Total number of latch cams examined of ten available is eight, 80%. Incomplete. Two latch cams to go

Total number of locking sectors examined of eight available is eight, 100%. Complete. None to go.

Total number of sides of forward cargo door examined of four available is two, 50%. Incomplete. Two sides to go.

Total number of feet of forward cargo door frame examined of thirty two feet available is eighteen, 52.9%. Incomplete. Sixteen feet of frame to go.

Total number of manual locking handles examined of one available is zero. 0%. Incomplete. One manual locking handle to go.

To say that forward cargo door was conclusively determined to be latched and locked, as said by Mr. Breneman, Mr. Schleede, Mr. Dickinson, and Chairman Hall is not true, and needs to be, and can be. Just examine fully the forward cargo door. For example, the TWA 800 cargo door hinge can be examined for overtravel impression damage similar to that observed on UAL 811 in AAR 92/02 on page 35. That will confirm door opened in flight or rule against it.

I suspect it is wrong to tell people they are wrong. I can't help it. To say eight equals ten is wrong. To say conclusively when only 50% is examined is wrong. Wrong, wrong, wrong. The top and bottom of the forward cargo door were examined but the sides were overlooked. It's an oversight. It was a hasty, time driven, wishful thinking error. It's not right. It can be corrected.

As a citizen I trust I am permitted to be impertinent once in a while.

Facts, evidence, data ...

A fact is a forward cargo door has burst open in flight before on a high time Boeing 747 during climb leaving a sudden loud sound on the CVR as the air molecules rushed outside to equalize the internal high pressure with the external low pressure followed by an abrupt power cut to FDR. The evidence is the mangled CVR and FDR of TWA 800. The data is the sudden loud sound on CVR tape and abrupt power cut to the FDR of TWA 800.

It is apparent that the conclusion of fully latched forward cargo door was made early on in the investigation based upon only examining eight of ten latch systems. That erroneous conclusion has held firm although new data has arrived with the TWA 800 wreckage reconstruction completed in May.

The reconstruction shows new evidence, that's one reason why it was built. The new evidence is the red paint smears above the door on the usually white paint between windows; outward bulged door frame at aft midspan latch; outward peeled skin at many places on nose, door hinge, the missing manual locking handle, the missing two overpressure relief doors, missing red trim paint, and the missing/not hung midspan latches of the

forward cargo door which are supposed to be there if latched and are not.

You can see it with your own eyes. The red paint smears are found only between seven passenger windows, all above the cargo door area. This indicates red paint transfer from a red object, most likely the red painted top of door below. An outward force would cause red door to open outward and rotate on hinge and slam into upper white fuselage. It happened that way on UAL 811, in principle and documented on page 41 of AAR 92/02. Parts of the TWA 800 red paint trim on top of the white base coat above cargo door is missing and may be source of the red paint smears. Outside force from water impact would not give red paint smears.

You can see the missing aft midspan latch location with your own eyes. The door frame in which the aft midspan latch pin is embedded is smooth with no latch cam attached. The frame is smooth and indicates unlatched latch.

The door frame at the aft midspan latch is bulged outward from within. You can see it with your own eyes. Other bulged outward skin in the area shows a round rupture hole at aft midspan latch.

The skin is peeled outward above the windows above the cargo door. You can feel it with your own fingers. Mr. Streeter and Mr. Wildey contributed the knowledge there were hoop stresses in the area, stresses the closed forward cargo door is supposed to prevent.

The cockpit voice recorder data plays a sudden loud sound at event time. You can hear it with your own ears. It is sudden, loud, an audible sound, and it lasts a short time. NTSB has

grouped AI 182, TWA 800, PA 103, and UAL 811 sounds together in Chart 12 of Exhibit 12-B. They match except in duration and that variable was determined by abrupt power cut, not the source of the sound which is probably rapidly rushing air molecules seeking to equalize high pressure inside to low pressure outside.

The Exhibits in the Public Docket reveal evidence. You can read it with your own eyes. For instance, Exhibit 7A, page 34, has red paint smears and an engine stator blade in the right horizontal stabilizer. Red painted top of door with red hinge and red trim on fuselage skin departed and blew back into object directly behind it, the right horizontal stabilizer. The engine, probably number three, came partially apart when it ingested foreign objects and spit stator blade out into slipstream into object directly behind it, the right horizontal stabilizer.

The cargo door, aft or forward, is a known killer of wide body airliners such as DC-10. The forward cargo door has caused a fatal accident in a high time Boeing 747, UAL 811. To rule out previously inadvertently opened in flight aft and forward Boeing 747 cargo door involvement in TWA 800 based on examination of only eight of twenty latching systems of the two cargo doors is not right. To rule out forward cargo door, a known killer of nine in a 747, who was at scene of recent crime and left early, based upon alibi of all latched when only eight examined is not right. The forward cargo door was not all latched; it was mostly latched. A mostly latched large door can rupture. The cargo door alibi has holes in it, a big hole, a four foot round hole at the aft midspan latch, as seen in NTSB reconstruction photograph.

Mr. Breneman and Mr. Schleede, under great time pressure, working in poor conditions, surrounded by hundreds of pieces of

twisted metal, under supervision of police forces not familiar with aircraft accidents, trying to please seniors and media with simple answers to complex problems, quickly examined eight bottom latches of the forward door and deduced the entire door was latched and reported it as such. The door all latched conclusion was later raised to all cargo doors latched without examination of other doors to support conclusion. The early conclusion was not reviewed in light of completion of the reconstruction and old report was not modified. Officials in senior positions have maintained that early stance of all doors all latched through good discipline and loyalty but it is not supported by facts, evidence or data. It is supported by wishful thinking.

Chairman Hall has written a yet to be substantiated statement to Congressman Farr. Mr. Hall states, "Early in the investigation we determined conclusively that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water, and there was no evidence of any failure of any of the latching mechanisms on the doors." Mr. Hall wisely refers to all cargo doors, not only forward cargo door but the aft and port side bulk cargo door as well. He wants a comprehensive report.

There is evidence of failure of one of the latching mechanisms, the aft midspan latch which is not latched to its pin and should be, as seen on NTSB reconstruction photograph. The forward midspan latch is not hung also and should be. There are no reports stating the status of the aft or bulk cargo door latches. It is not conclusively determined all doors were all latched. Only eight latches of one door of thirty latching mechanisms of three doors were examined. Mr. Hall's statement is not yet true, but can be.

A good idea is to do what the Chairman Hall obviously wants done, conclusively determine all cargo doors latched and locked at water impact and find no evidence of any failure of any latching mechanism.

Conclusion means the logical consequence of a reasoning process. A proper reasoning process requires as much data as available. There is much more data now available since the reconstruction was completed upon which to reach a logical conclusion. That reconstruction data has not yet been considered; the reasoning process is flawed, the current conclusion is in error.

For one door, ten is total, ten is conclusive; eight is not total, eight is not conclusive. For all doors, as Chairman Hall refers to, thirty latches is total; eight is some. Eight is not conclusive.

To say no evidence found of any failure of a latch mechanism requires the mechanisms be examined. If they are missing or not examined, as twenty two latch mechanisms are, then the statement is not valid. It can be valid. Examine all the latching mechanisms Chairman Hall states have not failed.

Mr. Dickinson refers to "door/hatch/access panel/windows" but does not mention latching mechanisms at all.

Mr. Wildey repeats the eight bottom latched observation from Mr. Schleede and Mr. Breneman in final report used for Exhibit 15C, the latest official statement.

LCDR Lawson quotes the lead investigator as saying, "All latches were either destroyed or in closed positions. The destroyed latches were adjacent to ones in closed positions." No numbers are given. Destroyed latches may be missing latches

and are latches not examined. The bottom eight were reported as latched, that indicates the two midspan latches are destroyed; either way they were not examined and the word 'all' is not correct. Are the midspan latches destroyed, or missing, or recovered but not hung? Just what exactly is the status of the missing/destroyed/recovered midspan latches?

The only basis for the conclusion that the forward cargo door was all latched and intact at water impact as stated by Congressman Farr, Senator McCain, high FAA officials and NTSB Chairman Hall, is one report made 'early on' by an FAA structural engineer at Calverton, under stress, without benefit of wreckage reconstruction and who examined a few door pieces of many, and only eight of ten latches. That one person's best conclusion at the time has not been modified all these months even though new evidence has been observed in completed wreckage reconstruction such as red paint smears, bulging rupture hole, explosive decompression damage visible, absent aft midspan latch, smooth door frame and unattached aft midspan latch.

NTSB AAR 90/01, the original AAR about UAL 811, had the incorrect cause for the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight as improper latching. Upon later new evidence, the retrieval of the door from the ocean floor, the cause was changed to properly latched but electrical short and new AAR was issued, NTSB AAR 92/02. This shows that the NTSB responds to reason and logic supported by facts, evidence and data. It shows NTSB will modify itself when appropriate. It shows that the highest priority of NTSB is to find out conclusively what happened, regardless.

Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit 15C, Section 41/42, Forward Cargo

Door, dated 22 April 1997, with Mr. Al Dickinson, AS-10, listed as investigator and Mr. Wildey as author, states, "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill." That's it. One door gets one sentence. This is an incomplete report based upon the new evidence of the completed reconstruction, and an addendum should be added based upon total, not most of, examination of the forward cargo door latches. A comprehensive report would include all three cargo doors, all twelve sides, and all thirty latch systems, as suggested by Chairman Hall.

The aft cargo door, identical in shape, function, and design, is reported in Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit 7A, Structures Group Report, page 15, 2.3, Aft Fuselage, (Section 46), "The upper fuselage structure broke into relatively large sections and the lower fuselage structure, including the aft main and bulk cargo doors, fragmented into smaller pieces." That's it, that's the total examination of the aft cargo door and bulk cargo door. There is no report of any latch status. Two doors get one sentence.

Three cargo doors get two sentences. These are known killers, gentleman. A main side cargo door opened and caused the crash of a DC-9. An aft cargo door opened and caused the crash of a DC-10. The forward cargo door opened and caused the fatal accident of a Boeing 747.

Each cargo door is a very complex mechanism. Each door includes a hinge, bottom eight latch cams, bottom eight locking sectors, two midspan latches, manual locking handle, two overpressure relief doors, two pull in hooks, eight viewing ports, and various torque tubes. Every item is affected when door rupture/opens in flight. Every item needs thorough examination

to determine conclusively if doors were all latched at water impact with no evidence of latching failures.

Chairman Hall's recent letter repeats position of no evidence found for cargo door as causing initial event but omits statement that all cargo doors examined totally and all latches latched. And there is lots and lots of NTSB provided evidence that the cargo door was the initiating event. What is missing is the NTSB interpretation of the evidence they recovered. For instance, Exhibit 7A, Structures Group Report, page 34, examination of right horizontal stabilizer revealed: "A section of the structure outboard of H7 exhibited evidence of red paint transfer marks on the upper skin (H8); ..."

Picture above is Boeing photograph of -400 series of basic 747-100 design. The livery of Boeing demo is different than TWA 800. It's still the most beautiful airplane in the world.

The red paint has to come from somewhere. And somewhere some red paint has to be missing. There is a rare location on the wreckage reconstruction that fits that description. It's the spotted red trim area above the cargo door. The cargo door explanation/interpretation has door rupturing/opening in flight, blowing out, up, and away, smashing into white painted fuselage skin above, transferring red paint to white, and removing red paint from trim at impact, then red trim pieces and top of door which is red blows directly aft in the 300 knot slipstream and impacts the object directly behind, the right horizontal stabilizer, leaving "...evidence of red paint transfer marks on the upper skin (H8)..."

There is no red paint skin down low under the wing where the center tank resides. There is a lot of red paint on the forward cargo door and trim above and some of it is missing.

Photo above shows principle of colored object at cargo door location flying aft at 300 knots would strike right horizontal stabilizer. TWA had different paint scheme than above.

The evidence is there, gentlemen; the interpretation is missing. And the one that exists officially is not exactly correct. Eight is not ten and red is not white. There is a more exact interpretation of the evidence. Forty two seconds earlier than center tank explosion and five thousand feet higher. Nose comes off. Still no fireball explosion. Before nose comes off a large hole had appeared on starboard side, forward of the wing. The large hole started from a small hole, located at the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door. The aft midspan latch ruptured at the aft midspan latch because...because...I don't know the confirmed answer to that and need help. I have a good dozen possibilities why the fuselage rupture point of TWA 800 is located at aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door. Why, why, why?

TWA 800 is UAL 811 with bottom latches holding and the nose coming off. The evidence is there on the CVR, the FDR, the wreckage reconstruction, the Exhibits of Sound Spectrum Study, Structures Report, Trajectory Study and many more. The expensive evidence collecting devices such as CVR and FDR, the expensive accident recreation device of the reconstruction, and the expensive analysis of experts into Exhibits are very, very important. They were done for very good reasons. They have provided the facts, evidence, and data. They did their job. What is missing and now needed is interpretation. Cargo door explanation is an interpretation that fits as initial event, then center tank explodes seconds later and lower. Interpretation of center tank explodes first; then forward cargo door area shatters on water impact later does not fit the facts, evidence and data.

Come on now, gentleman, to confirm if a door was open or closed, you at least need to check the door locking handle, and you have not done that. The prime suspect, before bomb or missile or center tank or meteor, in a fuselage rupture accident forward of the wing on a high time Boeing 747 during climb after take off is the forward cargo door. They all could have done it, but which actually did it? Only one has done it before so I say the prime suspect is the one worthy of intense investigation.

There is one interpretation by NTSB of the evidence which supports the cargo door explanation:
Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Study,
Author: Mr. James F. Wildey II, page 20, "The initial opening of the fuselage lower lobe (e.g. LF6A) would have the expected result of rapid depressurization accompanied by collapse of the main deck floor for some distance forward of STA 1000. The red area recovery of interior components as far forward as STA 600 would not be inconsistent with this floor collapse and associated structural breakup." That is to say, initial fuselage opening gives explanation for observed evidence. Forward cargo door is within the STA 1000 to STA 600 zone.

Each step up the line the early, hasty conclusion of all doors all latched has been affirmed:

Mr. Breneman sees eight bottom latches of one door latched.

That leads to assumption all ten latched.

Mr. Wojnar and Mr. Pederson confirm bottom latches latched so all latched and locked.

That leads to assumption all three doors latched, locked and intact at water impact.

Mr. Schleede says all latched and locked.

Mr. Dickinson avoids direct statement about latches but refers to

hatches.

LCDR Lawson quotes Mr. Dickinson saying all latches latched or destroyed.

Mr. Wildey repeats eight bottom latches latched so door all latched and intact at water impact based upon Mr. Dickinson's report.

Mr. McSweeney says no evidence of latching failure.

Mr. Goelz reports all latches on all cargo doors latched and locked to Congressman.

Chairman Hall says all cargo doors all latched and locked and no evidence of any latching failure to Congressman Farr and Senator McCain.

Mr. Farr and Senator McCain write to me all three cargo door latches latched and locked at water impact.

Chairman Hall writes to me and repeats no evidence for initial event as cargo door failure.

Here are the errors of deduction early on and not corrected, "A further examination of the recovered wreckage showed that the upper door hinge was still attached to both the fuselage and the door. In addition, the door latches at the bottom of the door were still attached to the fuselage lower sill structure. This indicates that the door was in the "latched and locked" position at the time of impact with the water."

"The nose section of the airplane impacted the water on the right side, causing severe hydraulic damage with the result that the door structure did not remain completely intact. However, wreckage for the entire door was recovered at the same location as the nose section and had the same impact damage as the surrounding fuselage structure on the right side. This is additional verification that the forward cargo door had not opened in flight or separated from the airplane."

Absolutely not true. Absolutely not good science. Absolutely not American.

As Americans, we build them, we fly them, we break them, we fix them, and then we fly them again. To fix a broken airplane requires precision.

Here is rebuttal to erroneous conclusion of all latched and shattered skin caused by water impact only:

1. Because upper door hinge was attached to door and fuselage skin is no proof door was attached to nose. In fact, the wayward UAL 811 door stayed attached to hinge also. The entire top piece of door of TWA 800 and the attached hinge, and the attached fuselage skin tore away, as the reconstruction photo shows.
2. The eight door latches on bottom sill were latched. Fine. There at ten latches holding that door closed. Eight is not ten. Ten is conclusive; eight is maybe. Eight of ten latched does not indicate, "that the door was in the "latched and locked" position at the time of impact with the water."
3. The nose may have landed on the right side; however, the outward peeled skin in many places, not inward, and the red paint smears, indicate force from within, not outside, caused peeling evidence. The outward force is sharply outlined on reconstruction photo; a water impact landing and damage would give gradual damage from severe to less severe to mild, not an abrupt cut as shown by photo. Nearby passenger door is intact; cargo door is shattered. Water impact damage did not cause the shattered skin found only in the cargo door area, explosive decompression did.
4. Wreckage for the entire door was not recovered so could not be examined and said to be recovered at same location. The door

was shattered into many large, small and tiny pieces as shown by the reconstruction. To say entire door was examined is wrong; it's in hundreds of pieces, there is no door, only pieces. Only 20% of door material is visible. The larger door pieces were reported to be recovered on several different days of dredging and reported by recovery officials to be found closest to Kennedy airport, a finding later corroborated by trajectory study Exhibits 22 A and B showing pieces of the cargo hold, which the door belongs to, as the first to leave TWA 800 at initial event time.

5. Door wreckage does not exhibit the same impact damage as the surrounding fuselage on the right side, as shown by the picture. The surrounding fuselage around the shattered cargo door area is smooth and intact.

The entire rupture/blowout/explosive decompression damage can be seen on NTSB photo of starboard side forward of the wing. The small initial rupture hole can be seen at unlatched missing midspan latch position on the curved outward door frame and petal shaped outward skin. The door then opened outward and upward tearing off with hinge and piece of fuselage skin attached, striking the white painted fuselage above and transferring red paint from trim and door to paint between the passenger windows.

The total explosive decompression damage can be seen as approximate square with sharp delineation at vertical sides further out from cargo door sides to top as horizontal line just below top row of passenger windows. The flat bottom of blowout is the bottom sill of cargo door. The picture shows a small rupture round hole within a large blowout square. Reinforced stringers and bulkheads defined the square shape.

The explosive decompression zone of damage is clear to see and

resulted in severe, shattered, twisted skin and destroyed stringers, and downward movement of floor beams. It is a blowout frozen in metal. It is not water impact damage. Most of door is missing, including the crucial midspan latches where the blowout occurred.

The explosive decompression consequence is a huge hole on the right side of the nose of TWA 800, much larger than the huge hole on the side of the nose of UAL 811. It is easy to see the 300 knots of slipstream tearing that weakened and damaged nose off in three to five seconds.

Gentleman, we agree on so much about TWA 800.

1. Suspicion of forward cargo door opening in flight.
2. The cargo door area is shattered.
3. Bottom latches latched.
4. Two midspan latch status not reported.
5. Hinge attached to top of door.
6. Outward peeled skin.
7. Vertical cuts in fuselage skin.
8. Red paint smears between passenger windows and on right horizontal stabilizer.
9. Floor beams in area bent downward.
10. First pieces to leave were just forward of the wing.
11. Port side forward of wing relatively smooth.
12. Center tank had fire/explosion.

Do we agree eight is not ten? Do we agree red paint is not white paint? If we do, then a comprehensive examination of all three cargo doors is warranted. If a suspicion exists, and it does, that forward cargo door failed in flight, then only an exhaustive evaluation of that possibility will satisfy.

We all agree that center tank exploded and cargo door area is shattered. Current official position is center tank exploded from unknown source, nose came off and fell into water shattering cargo door. My explanation is cargo door shattered from rupture leading to explosive decompression, nose comes off leading to disintegrating fuselage and wing tanks and engine number three ignites vapor into fireball seconds later and thousands of feet lower.

We agree on evidence, just disagree on timing and that is only seconds. Tank then door; or door then tank?

You were right at the beginning to suspect the door. You were right. Don't give up so easily. Check out that door thoroughly.

Why? Eight is not 'all.' It has to get past nine before it can get to ten and be called 'all.' The official last word to date, released 8 December 1997, is Exhibit 15C, Forward Cargo Door which states, "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill."

The number eight is written above, not ten. Ten is 'all.' Eight is most. The forward door was mostly latched. Mostly latched large doors can rupture when subjected to high internal pressures and have in the past.

The forward door was mostly latched, and as it turns out, that's not good enough. That aft midspan latch area appears to have ruptured in flight for TWA 800 and the evidence is there for you to see in the reconstruction and it is there to see in NTSB AAR 92/02, UAL 811 report. AAR 92/02 has a good examination of

the forward cargo door and its adjacent fuselage after the door ruptured/opened in flight, killing nine. The rupture hole at the aft midspan latch on the door of UAL 811 can be seen in the photograph on page 36 of AAR 92/02. That UAL 811 rupture hole is smaller than TWA 800 rupture hole because the eight bottom latches held while they all unlatched completely on UAL 811. UAL 811 had all latches unlatch in flight. That's 'all,' as in ten.

Another Boeing 747 forward cargo door rupture description can be read about, Air India 182, that also broke apart in flight. The Indian and Canadian Occurrence report states the forward cargo door being frayed from an outward force and broken horizontally one quarter of the way up and bottom of door attached to fuselage. That is similar to TWA 800. Air India 182 and UAL 811 can be discussed together as relevant because NTSB grouped them together, along with PA 103, in Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 12-B, Sound Spectrum Study, page 21, Chart 12. All four accidents are similar in all having a sudden loud sound on CVR at event time, a sound that was matched from TWA 800 to AI 182 in NTSB Chart 12. The Canadian report on page 23 links that AI 182 sudden loud sound to the DC-10 cargo door decompression sudden loud sound. The reports link TWA 800 to PA 103 sound which is linked to AI 182 sound which is linked to DC-10 cargo door event sound. Chart 12 links all sounds to UAL 811.

Air India 182 is the matching Boeing 747 door rupture event to TWA 800. UAL 811 is the matching door open event to PA 103. Both pairs have similar forward cargo door area wreckage descriptions, drawings and photograph matches. Why doors opened is not yet officially determined for two of them.

Center tank explanation is being tested for one Boeing 747 accident. Irregularities can be excused as random. Cargo door explanation has four high time Boeing 747 accidents to explain. Every evidence item or sequence for a ruptured forward cargo door has to satisfy four accidents, and does.

The recently adjourned but not concluded TWA fact finding public hearing and release of public docket was good and can get better by the further release into the docket of three already completed exhibits: eyewitness, wreckage plot, and powerplant breakdown.

There is interesting observation, already briefly referred to, in an exhibit: Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge."

Engine number three is on the right side inboard and would be the engine to throw off a stator blade to penetrate the right horizontal stabilizer. Engine number four is too far outboard of stabilizer. The left side stabilizer had no such engine part penetration.

A stator blade was embedded in the right horizontal stabilizer right behind engine number three. This indicates engine number three was fodded early on and threw off pieces which is consistent with cargo door explanation and inconsistent with center tank explosion as initial event in which engines windmill and fall intact to water.

The four engines hold vital accident clues. To ignore and omit that information is wrong. They are four vacuum cleaners at the scene of the crime. The door rupture or center tank explosion would send debris into the engines. How much debris, what kind it is, what did the engines do, and what happened to them is vitally important. Blade tip rubs and inlet cowling damage reports are extremely relevant. Pratt and Whitney was not even a party to the investigation and no exhibit item was released of the engine breakdown.

NTSB AAR 92/02, page 2, has engine number three foddred by baggage debris and throwing off fod into engine number four which caught fire. Both engines had to be shut down. Early news reports had TWA 800 engine number three foddred with inlet cowl material and the only engine to show burn damage. UAL 811 also had dents in right horizontal stabilizer and torn, punctured, and dented inlet cowl material according to AAR 92/02, page 7.

The engine breakdown report is vital and is connected to the TWA 800 investigation by the stator blade in right horizontal stabilizer. The engines are involved; they are not innocent bystanders. Engine number three may be the center tank mysterious ignition source. P&W should be invited to the party.

Gentlemen, another clue to an accident cause is the sequence of breakup and that is determined from wreckage plot. What departs the aircraft first may well be near the initial event. The NTSB has provided a study: Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 22B, Trajectory Study Supporting Material, page 45 in faded numbers and page 30 in dark numbers. Among all the charts of pieces of the plane coming off and when, there is one chart that shows the

first to go, that is page 30 chart, Forward Cargo Structure trajectories. The first item is "A489, fwd lower cargo bay struct, FS 900." That item left even before the last ASR radar beacon to Islip radar. The next item to go before anything else in the entire plane is "A470, R fwd lower cargo bay struct, FS 820." There are five other forward cargo bay structures which are plotted and leave soon thereafter.

The overall debris appraisal was made by Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 22A, Trajectory Study, page 3: "The wreckage distribution shows that parts were initially shed from the area just forward of the wing."

Please carefully agree, gentleman, cargo door is just forward of the wing and the center tank is not.

The wreckage plot exhibit is needed to corroborate this most important conclusion of first parts shed forward of wing.

Eyewitnesses saw orange-red streak near TWA and later Aviation Week reports an NTSB official as saying it could be forward door departing aircraft. "NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilot saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, ... or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said." It may well be the shiny metal piece of door spinning away from sunlit TWA 800 and reflecting red-orange evening sunlight to ground observers who perceive the erratic, falling blur as a streak. NTSB has considered streak as door piece spinning away. They are probably correct. That NTSB hypothesis can be checked out by experiment of throwing out metal door sized objects at 13700 feet at 300 knots in evening sunlight and recording ground

observers statements.

The eyewitness group exhibit should be released to corroborate or rebut cargo door explanation of streak as shiny metal piece of door spinning away reflecting evening sunlight and appearing as orange-red streak to ground observers.

The wreckage plot exhibit should be released to corroborate or rebut cargo door area material as first to leave TWA 800 at initial event time.

The powerplant group exhibit should be released to corroborate or rebut cargo hold debris being ingested by engine number three causing it to catch on fire, provide ignition source for center tank explosion, and then disintegrate and throw stator blade into right horizontal stabilizer of TWA 800.

Please conduct an examination of the two identical starboard cargo doors of TWA 800 and the bulk cargo door in at least the same depth as was given to the two cargo doors of other high time Boeing 747s grouped by NTSB as being similar, AI 182, PA 103, and UAL 811, as shown in their government reports, Canadian and Indian Aviation Occurrence, UK AAIB 2/90, and NTSB AAR 92/02. (All scanned in and available for viewing at www.corazon.com) And at least as much examination as the landing gear doors of TWA 800 in Exhibit 7A which had twenty two paragraphs more than the one sentence about forward cargo door in Exhibit 15C.

Exhibit 7A, Structure Report, discusses twenty one landing gear doors and the aft and bulk cargo doors but nothing about the forward cargo door. The forward cargo door, a known previously faulty complex device in a fuselage rupture killer accident, is detected departing early and near the scene of another fuselage rupture accident, and is given one sentence among literally

thousands of pages of wreckage examination exhibits.

Not right. Not complete. Not precise. Not American.

According to NTSB and FAA AARs and SDRs, the aft and forward cargo doors of Boeing 747s have opened inadvertently four times, 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1994. That's four in nine years by official numbers or one cargo door opening in just over two years. Cargo door explanation for TWA 800 adds three more, 1985, 1988, and 1996. That's seven in eleven years by my numbers or a cargo door opening every year and a half. It is now a year and a half after TWA 800. That gives me a sense of urgency. I have researched the forward cargo door on high time Boeing 747s for eight years. TWA 800 was no surprise to me.

The message is that inadvertent rupture/opening at the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door in flight has caused the accident of TWA 800 and other high time Boeing 747s. The message is supported by official government released text, reports, documents, exhibits and photographs.

The medium is internet email and web, hard copy snail mail, face to face, telephone, the English language, high resolution color photographs, printed words, and stories.

The messenger is me. Why listen to me? Others have explanations. The only difference is I'm a survivor of a sudden night fiery jet airplane crash talking about a sudden night fiery jet airplane crash. My crash is documented on web site www.corazon.com, US Navy carrier jet crashed, one dead, one alive. I'm the live one. C.T. Butler was the dead one. Mr. Butler saved my life. Literally, as in exact. It was a sudden night fiery fatal jet airplane crash. We were practicing landings and heard a

strange noise on starboard side. Within three seconds he told me to eject and I did. He did too. I pulled my face curtain and waited, my canopy jettisoned, my ejection seat fired and then separated from me and my parachute deployed and opened automatically and two seconds later, I hit the nighttime flat dirt of Sanford Florida at 1130 at night on June 14th, 1967. My pilot, LCDR Charles T. Butler, pulled his face curtain, had his canopy separate after my canopy had gone, his ejection seat fired, separate from him and his parachute automatically deployed. But did not open in time as his body hit the ground and killed him from multiple traumatic injuries. In the two seconds coming down in my parachute, the RA-5C Vigilante with twin GE J-79-8 engines, Navy carrier reconnaissance two seater jet, exploded beneath us.

The suddenness of it is stunning. From perfectly normal to ejection seat firing within three seconds. From normal to death within ten seconds. That suddenness is what the passengers of TWA 800 knew and what the CVR and FDR recorded.

So, the messenger has the experience in the matter under discussion, a sudden, night, fiery fatal jet airplane crash. Few have that specific.

The messenger has the aviation knowledge of modeler, then Navy aircrewman technician for 2000 hours, then Navy bombardier reconnaissance navigator in carrier jet for 650 hours, then private aircraft Mooney owner for 1000 hours, and commercial licensed pilot, instrument rated with FAA Part 135 certificate holder for 100 hours. Few have that breadth.

I also have the brilliant insight of intelligence to figure this problem out. In a flash I saw that eight is not ten. Red is not

white. Most have that genius.

Chairman Hall has said in his closing statement of the recent TWA 800 public inquiry, "We have presented all of the factual information available at this time." Well that's not exactly true as the exhibits on eyewitnesses, powerplants, and wreckage plot were available but not released or presented. The Chairman's statement can be made true by release of all the factual information available.

He also said, "We have sought to take a careful, objective look at all conceivable ideas and theories, and have called on a wide array of experts to assist us in this endeavor." Well, that's not exactly true either. A careful look has not been taken at the rupture at cargo door theory and only one engineer looked at a few pieces. The Chairman's statement can be made true by having a wide array of experts carefully look at cargo door explanation.

Chairman Hall continued by stating, "We are by no means finished. Our work will continue and we will spare no effort to determine the cause of the crash of TWA 800." Chairman Hall says the right words, let them be made true.

We are judged by our actions, not our words. Please examine all twenty latching pins, all twenty latching cams, and all sixteen locking sectors of the two identical cargo doors for comparison and damage consistent with inflight unlatching as described in NTSB AAR 92/02. In addition, for completeness, the other cargo doors on TWA 800 should receive the same thorough examination. Only then can Chairman Hall's statement to high elected government officials about conclusive determination that all three cargo doors are latched and locked and no evidence

found of any latching failure be correct or corrected. Only then can the statements of Mr. Goelz, Mr. Schleede, Mr. Dickinson, LCDR Lawson, Mr. Wildey, Mr. Breneman, Mr. Wojnar, Mr. Pederson, Mr. Kirkpatrick, Mr. Sweeney, Senator McCain, and Congressman Farr be correct or corrected.

Only then will the numbers add up.

What if I'm wrong?

If I am wrong, I want to know about it. I ask questions to determine if cargo door explanation holds up.

Why are the red paint smears there?

What is status of midspan latches of forward door?

What is status of all latches.?

Why is forward skin shattered and then close by smooth and intact?

What is hinge status?

Are locking handles locked or unlocked?

What is position of the overpressure relief doors?

Why is large rupture square shape apparent?

Why is forward door frame aft so smooth with no midspan latch attached?

Why is red paint missing on red trim?

Why is red paint on right horizontal stabilizer?

Why is engine stator blade in right horizontal stabilizer?

Why is fuselage skin peeled outward?

Why most of door material missing?

Why port side smooth and starboard side shattered?

Why did cargo door structure leave plane first?

What caused the sudden loud sound?

What ignited the center tank?

Why so few forward passengers burned? (I know the answer to

that one, they were not there to be burned.)

Why are statements made by high officials that are not exactly true, but could be with a little extra work?

I would hope someone here would ask the question, "What if he is right?"

In Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Report, page 30, Mr. Wildey of NTSB writes: "It is therefore possible that new scenarios (sequences) may emerge as new information is acquired whether it be from newly identified parts, or simply a new interpretation of current information."

That is an open minded approach both reasonable and logical. It is possible and it has happened. New evidence, new interpretation, new scenario/sequence has emerged: aft midspan latch rupture in forward cargo door.

If cargo door explanation is wrong the downside is work done on examining three cargo doors which was not necessary to determine accident cause. But, if cargo door explanation is right, then...

There are no evil people involved with TWA 800; everyone is giving their best effort. It appears there is a blind spot regarding cargo doors on Boeing 747s. It may be legacy from UAL 811 where everybody looked bad. NTSB excoriated Boeing for not modifying door after DC-10 cargo door accident. It lambasted the airline for not complying with AD in time. It chided FAA for giving such a long compliance time for AD. And then NTSB got cause of opening door wrong and had to correct itself with new AAR, 92/02. But, the cause was eventually determined:

Electrical short to door motor which overrode safety feature of

locking sectors coupled with a bad switch S2, caused unlatching of door which burst open, in a tremendous explosion smashing outward and up into the fuselage above, leaving paint smears and a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut to the FDR. As a result of NTSB recommendations and FAA ADs, the bottom latches were fixed so that they would not open again with the same problem, and they didn't. TWA 800 bottom latches held, the strengthened locking sectors worked.

But, the midspan latches have no locking sectors and a rupture hole is evident at that aft midspan latch point and the aft midspan latch is missing. The cause was conclusively determined for UAL 811 but not conclusively fixed. Now is that time.

In the short term cargo door confirmation looks bad but in long term it is best for Boeing and the US.

Everybody, even me as a passenger demanding cheap fares and lots of luggage loaded fast, has to share blame for these accidents. We all have blood on our teeth. Boeing for designing large, squarish, outward opening, non-plug, doors cut into a highly pressurized hull. The airlines for wanting to operate the planes when out of warranty and wanting large cargo loading capability. Government for trying to please all parties and ending up pleasing none. And the lawyers for putting blame assessment first before the accident cause was conclusively found thereby bringing in the police, nondisclosure and secrecy in an area where information and idea exchanges are essential, aircraft accident investigation.

The police have been intimately involved in all four cargo door caused accidents and have adversely affected the professional aircraft investigators. AI 182, RCMP still have an active

investigation going. PA 103, United Nations still has inquiry going. UAL 811, the Coast Guard and Hickam Air Force Police had an active investigation going until further investigation revealed door was gone but not by bomb. TWA 800, FBI had sixteen months of primary active investigation and even when suspended the FBI controls release of relevant documents into the Public Docket and access to the evidence, the wreckage reconstruction.

Now is the time for openness for TWA 800; let a citizen have a chance to explain what happened. Everyone else has had a whack at it, from lawyers to cops to scientists to politicians to wackos. It's time for a survivor of a sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash to be listened to.

Please engage my intellect. Check my numbers, confirm my sources, evaluate my reasoning. My goal is to prevent death, the only worthy adversary, by preventing plane crashes by preventing pressurized fuselage ruptures by preventing aft midspan latch area of forward cargo door of high time Boeing 747s from opening in flight. I am attempting to persuade the National Transportation Safety Board that a worthy line of investigation is the possible inadvertent rupture/opening of the forward cargo door in flight. If confirmed, NTSB will make recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration. The FAA will then direct the manufacturer to fix the doors again. Boeing shall then makes changes to conclusively stop those doors from opening in flight.

Let Senator John McCain hold all the latches in his hand for examination. He is a jet pilot who has also ejected and understands mental and metal stresses as well as dangers of high speed structural failure and the suddenness of aviation accidents.

Let Congressman Sam Farr examine all the latches. He asked the key question, "What causes the doors to open?"

Let Chairman Jim Hall examine all the latches. He effectively made the definitive statement, 'all doors, all latched, no problems.'

Let everyone who has officially reported status of latches on cargo doors hold all of them in their hands and examine them closely.

There are mechanical problems associated with confirmation of cargo door opening on TWA 800. They can be fixed with workers, that's why the manufacturer makes the big bucks, that's his job, to fix things.

There are political problems associated with confirmation of cargo door opening on PA 103. They can be fixed with negotiation, that's why the politicians get the high respect, that's their job, to smooth things over.

There are administrative problems with confirmation of cargo door opening on high time Boeing 747s. They can be fixed in time, that's why government bureaucrats get steady tenure, that's their job, to handle the paperwork.

There are investigative questions raised in the confirmation of cargo door openings in airliner pressurized hulls. They can be answered. That's why aircraft investigators get their hands dirty, it's hard work to figure out what happened.

Chairman Hall stated, "I now declare this hearing to be in recess

indefinitely."

I request that the recess soon end and the hearing reconvene. The sequel should release all the information available, take a careful, objective look at all conceivable ideas and theories, call on a wide array of experts to assist, and take every effort to determine the cause of the crash of TWA 800.

Very Respectfully,

John Barry Smith
barry@corazon.com
408 659 3552
551 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
Taken from my deck.

Email attachments:

From: Schleede Ron <SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov>
To: barry <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: RE: TWA crash cause
Date: Sun, 11 Aug 1996 11:39:00 -0400
Encoding: 13 TEXT
Status:

I have examined the cargo door from twa 800--it is locked and latched!

From: Dickinson Al <DICKINA@ntsb.gov>

To: barry <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: RE: mechanical crash cause

Date: Thu, 19 Sep 1996 19:04:00 -0400

Encoding: 129 TEXT

Status:

Mr. Smith, thank you for your message concerning the TWA 800 crash

investigation. We have recovered many of the door/hatch/access

panel/windows from the sea floor and none of them indicate that they came

off the aircraft prior to the event which lead to the crash. In

addition, both the CVR and the FDR do not have any

information that

indicates any of the above things departed the aircraft prior to the

event. A depressurization event most certainly would have been noted by

the crew and recorded on the CVR. We will continue to look for any

indications leading to the source of the event and definitely pay attention to items mentioned in your letter.

Thank you for your interest in aviation safety.

Date: Wed, 05 Feb 1997 12:34:04 -0800

From: Donald Lawson <DLawson@mntny.nps.navy.mil>

To: barry@corazon.com

Subject: 747 cargo door final report

From the head of the NTSB team working TWA 800:

1. He personally, even again this morning, looked at all the doors from the airplane. All latches were either destroyed or in closed positions.

The destroyed latches were adjacent to ones in closed positions.

2. Nobody associated with the investigation is considering further a cargo/passenger door malfunction to be part of the probable cause of this accident. Door problems have been categorically ruled out because there is simply no evidence pointing to the doors (and latches).

- So, there it is. They had already looked at the doors (so I still have faith in the system) and they looked at it further and replied back basing their answer on the actual evidence in hand. It may not be the answer you were looking for, but I believe that you were looking for the attention to the possible problem and not a particular answer o that problem. And you accomplished that.

LCDR Don Lawson

Mime-Version: 1.0

Date: Thu, 19 Dec 1996 09:53:05 -0500

From: Julie Swingle <Julie_Swingle@mccain.senate.gov>
Subject: Boeing 747 Information
To: barry@corazon.com

Dear Mr. Smith,

Thank you again for contacting me with your concerns regarding the potential hazards involving Boeing 747s.

As you know, I have passed the information you sent to Chris Paul and he has informed me of your findings. I have since forwarded the material you sent to the Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee for their review.

Again, thank you for contacting me. I am always glad to have the opportunity to be of assistance.

Sincerely,

John McCain
U.S. Senator

JM/jes

ATA Code : 5230
Aircraft Manufacturer : BOEING
Aircraft Model : 747245F

Aircraft Serial No. : 20826
Difficulty Date : 27 November 1994
Operator Desig. : FDEA
Operator Type : Air Carrier
A/C N Number : 640FE
Precautionary Procedure : Unsched. Landing
Nature : Warning Indication
Stage of Flight : Take Off
Station : ORD
Flight # : 77

Discrepancy/Corrective Action:

ON ROTATION, AFT CARGO DOOR OPENED. REPLACED
SPRING ON LOCK PIN AND ADJ PER MM 52-34-12.

Part Name : SPRING
Manufacture Part Number : MS245851290
Part Condition : FAILED
Part/Defect Loc. : AFT CARGO DOOR
Name : FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP
Submitter Code : Carrier
District Office : Southern US office #04

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: March 13, 1998 4:07:34 PM PST
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: **Dear Mr. Schleede,**

Sam Farr
Member of Congress
17th District, California
House of Representatives
Congress of the United States
Washington, DC

John McCain III
Member of Congress
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
United States Senate
Washington, DC

James Hall
Chairman,
National Transportation Safety Board

Bernard Loeb,
Director of Aviation Safety
National Transportation Safety Board

Al Dickinson,
Lead Investigator, TWA 800
National Transportation Safety Board

Ron Schleede,

Investigator, TWA 800
National Transportation Safety Board

Thomas McSweeny
Director, Aircraft Certification Service
FAA National Headquarters

James F. Wildey II
National Resource Specialist
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Lyle Streeter
FAA AAI
Aircraft Accident Investigator
FAA National Headquarters
800 Independence Avenue, S.W
Building FOB 10A, Room 838,
Washington D.C 20591

Neil Schalekamp
Manager, Propulsion & Mechanical Systems and Cabin Safety
Branch
Transport Standards Staff
Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100
1601 Lind Ave. S.W.
Renton, WA 98055-4056

Bob Breneman,
Aerospace Engineer,
Federal Aviation Administration
Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100

1601 Lind Ave. S.W.
Renton, WA 98055-4056

Dear US Government Officials involved with TWA 800, 13
March 1998

The TWA 800 wreckage database offers more proof that forward cargo door opened in flight and allowed starboard engines to become damaged. What the wreckage plot so far shows is that the door was not intact at water impact. It shows that the nose cut off point is somewhere in the explosive decompression rectangle shown by shattered skin on reconstruction photo. The cargo door is in that fuselage station zone of twenty feet wide of explosive decompression on right side. The door is nine feet wide by eight feet high. The missing portion in the reconstruction photo is about 80%. So it appears that what cargo door was found on the ocean bottom was hung on the wreckage model, all 20% of it.

Here's the mysteries:

1. Why so much wreckage with the identical lat/long positions to same accuracy to tenth of degree?
2. Where is the rest of the door including master latch lock handle, (a big mother about two feet long,) the rest of the latches, the viewing ports, the skin, torque tubes, pull in hooks, and the over pressure relief doors?
3. Only door material reported in Exhibit 15, trajectory study and now database is: eight latches locked to bottom sill and stayed with nose, and forward portion of door stayed with nose.
4. The hinge of cargo door was recovered, we can see it in photo, but where was it found?
5. It's as if the door is invisible. PA 103 never mentioned the forward door at all. And for 800: The trajectory study has no mention of door; the exhibit devoted to door area has one

sentence covering only 80% of the latches; and the total wreckage database has only four references to it and those only refer to a forward 'portion', stringers, and a lift. The lift is about 2% of door, the portion is about 15%, and the stringer 34R and aft stringer 28R-43R are another 3%, so about 80% of the door is missing in reconstruction photo and not reported in database. The missing items are centered around the aft midspan latch area, which I contend is the locus of rupture point which is the pinprick which pops the balloon and shatters skin all around it in huge 20 foot by forty foot explosive decompression.

I'm starting to think the aft latches and aft portion of door are still out there, the very, very first to go and landed far afield where you have not looked. Where can they be?

So, conclusion is that door was in several pieces at least at water impact. Most of door is missing in database and reconstruction. Missing material is on aft part of door. Much cargo bay structure very close to door landed in red zone.

The engines are interesting too. Number 4 was in parts which again confirms the engines were not normal until water impact. Engine number four in parts would fit UAL 811 which had fodded and on fire number 4. Number 4 in parts means it may have been on fire on the way down and could have ignited the center tank and all the tanks that blew up. Engine number three falling apart and alone matches two other patterns and indicates the fodded engine vibrated and fuse pins failed before water impact and engine departed slightly earlier than other three that landed in line.

But, engines conclusively not normal which requires PW be made a party to the investigation and release of powerplant

report. Cargo door not intact at water impact but shredded in flight with most of it nowhere to be found.

So, another important public docket exhibit, wreckage database, is leaked and shows important support for cargo door/wiring explanation and much debunking of center tank as initial event.

What is going on? To put a harsh light on the actions of public officials in the conduct of this investigation the following interpretations can be made.

1. Coercion of FAA official to change his conclusion from outward outward explosion to inward from water impact.

coerce \ko-"ers\ vb coerced; coercing 1 : restrain, repress 2 : compel 3 : enforce ~ coercion \-"er-zhen, -shen\ n ~ coercive \-"er-siv\ adj

Mr. Schalekamp used facts to support a conclusion, i.e, 'structural deformation and paint markings' indicate outward explosion. He later uses opinion from NTSB but no facts to recant from outward to inward. He had discussions to 'persuade' him it was in his best interest to forget the facts and rely on opinion of seniors. Witness coerced.

2. Tampering with labels of location of wreckage pieces from red to yellow zone.

tamper \-"tam-per\ vb 1 : to carry on underhand negotiations (as by bribery) <~ with a witness> 2 : to interfere so as to weaken or change for the worse <~ with a document> 3 : to try foolish or dangerous experiments

Pieces of important metal were found in place 'r' and labeled as such. Later it was determined that the pieces in place 'r' rebutted center tank as initial event and supported cargo door opening in flight. So, the labels were altered from place 'r' for red to 'y' for yellow. Labels tampered with.

3. Obstruction of investigation into reasonable alternative mechanical explanation.

obstruct \əb-ˈstrɪkt\ vb 1 : to block by an obstacle 2 : to impede the passage, action, or operation of 3 : to cut off from sight ~ obstructive \-ˈstrɪk-tɪv\ adj ~ obstructor \-tər\ n

A huge wreckage reconstruction exists which is off limits to citizens to photograph in order to analyze and draw own conclusions. The citizen's access to public items is obstructed.

4. Suppressing public docket exhibits completed and ready for release.

suppress \sə-ˈpres\ vb 1 : to put down by authority or force : subdue <~ a revolt> 2 : to keep from being known; also : to stop the publication or circulation of 3 : to hold back : repress <~ anger> <~ a cough> ~ suppressible \-ˈpre-se-bel\ adj ~ suppression \-ˈpre-shən\ n

Eyewitness exhibit 4A, wreckage database, and powerplant report Exhibit 8 are three vitally important exhibits which are present in all major accident investigations. TWA 800 had those three suppressed. None of the reasons for suppression made sense. TWA 800 was not criminal so to withhold eyewitness report waiting for trial testimony is nonsense. Wreckage database is nuts and bolts numbers with no reason to suppress. A stator

blade in right horizontal stabilizer is reason alone to include the engine manufacturer as a party to the investigation and release the current information in the powerplant report. The suppression of the engine breakdown report makes no sense either.

Except that the three reports all contain real data that rebuts center tank as initial event and offers hard support for open cargo door in flight. The eyewitnesses confirm there was something strange in the sky around TWA 800 that could have been pieces spinning away reflecting sunlight and not leaking fuel. The wreckage database confirms door in pieces and pieces found all over the place so it opened in flight. It also shows first pieces to leave did not come from center tank but lower cargo bay. The engine report may show fiddled starboard engines which support door opening and allowing baggage foreign object in the vicinity of the jet intakes. The engine report may show fire damage for one or more engines which could be ignition source for center tank explosion which rebuts center tank as initial event.

Vital public docket exhibits are suppressed which rebut official explanation and support alternate.

5. Distort report to reporter about position of door pieces and status of door at water impact.

distort \di-"stort\ vb 1 : to twist out of the true meaning 2 : to twist out of a natural, normal, or original shape or condition 3 : to cause to be perceived unnaturally ~ distortion \-"stor-shen\ n

When queried by a Pulitzer Prize winning aviation reporter for a large metropolitan newspaper about possible cargo door opening in flight, the official said the door was all latched and all locked and all intact at water impact. That statement was based on

known error of concluding eight latches latched out of ten possible meant all latched. It was known door pieces not all found in one site near the nose so door was not all intact at water impact. The true meaning of eight latches latched is eight latches latched, not distorted into all latches latched.

Determination of cargo door status was distorted.

6. Mislead in CWT as initial event

mislead \mis-"led\ vb -led \-"led\; -leading : to lead in a wrong direction or into a mistaken action or belief ~ misleadingly
adv

The center tank explanation was made early on and much effort was made to confirm that explanation even though it was quickly shown to be a wrong direction based upon no ignition source found.

Public was misled into thinking the only mechanical possibility was center tank explosion as initial event.

7. Sham public fact finding board of inquiry

sham \ˈsham\ n 1 : an ornamental covering for a pillow 2 : counterfeit, imitation 3 : a person who shams

The Baltimore public hearing found few facts, rarely asked questions it did not know the answers already, gave scant inquiry to other reasonable lines, ignored its own researched reports, and pretended all the while to do otherwise. It was a sham; it was a show trial against the center tank.

The center tank explanation would carry more weight if had been proposed by an accident investigator first instead of an aviation trial attorney with understandable bias toward his clients, Lee Kreindler representing families of TWA 800. After meeting with Lee Kreindler, Bernard Loeb also agrees streak was leaking fuel and center tank spontaneously blew up.

So, a harsh look reveals:

1. Coercion of FAA official to change his conclusion from outward to inward.
2. Tampering with labels of location of wreckage pieces from red to yellow zone.
3. Obstruction of investigation into reasonable alternative mechanical explanation by refusing admittance to wreckage to public.
4. Suppressing public docket exhibits completed and ready for release, eyewitness, wreckage plot, and powerplant report.
5. Distort statement with reporter about position of door pieces and status of door at water impact, said it was all latched and all locked at water impact when known evidence contradicted statement.
6. Mislead public to believe there was only one mechanical possibility by only offering one when others available.
7. Sham public inquiry held; few questions, no public input, suppressed testimony and staged presentation of predetermined conclusion.

Not only must the TWA 800 investigation by Government be thorough, it must give the appearance of thoroughness also. At this stage the appearance is sloppy, shallow, and slanted towards center tank.

Most of the above harsh criticisms can be explained as an excess of zeal to promote one cause to the exclusion of others.

So, dear Government Officials, you are honor bound to investigate any reasonable line of inquiry into the cause of the crash of TWA 800. To know of a reasonable line of inquiry and not inquire is a crime of betrayal of public trust.

Is there a reasonable line of inquiry not yet investigated?

Bomb was reasonable and done by FBI.

Missile was reasonable and done by FBI.

Center tank explosion was reasonable and done by you.

Meteor was reasonable and done by you.

Are there any others?

Is it reasonable to say that UAL 811 was an aged, high flight time, early model Boeing 747 which took off in low light running late and during climb experienced a sudden initial event of hull rupture near the leading edge of wing which left a short, sudden, loud sound on the cockpit voice recorder, an abrupt power cut to the flight data recorder, unusual damage to starboard engine #3, more severe inflight damage on starboard side, at least nine never recovered bodies, port fuselage side forward of the wing relatively undamaged, torn and frayed skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side, unusual paint

smears above forward cargo door area, rupture at aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door, outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage, vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward cargo, had hinge stay attached to detached top piece of forward cargo door, and destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb but later conclusively ruled out? The confirmed cause was wiring/cargo door fault.

Is it reasonable to say that TWA 800 was an aged, high flight time, early model Boeing 747 which took off in low light running late and during climb experienced a sudden initial event of hull rupture near the leading edge of wing which left a short, sudden, loud sound on the cockpit voice recorder, an abrupt power cut to the flight data recorder, unusual damage to starboard engine #3, more severe inflight damage on starboard side, at least nine never recovered bodies, port fuselage side forward of the wing relatively undamaged, torn and frayed skin in forward cargo door area on starboard side, unusual paint smears above forward cargo door area, rupture at aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door, outward peeled skin on upper forward fuselage, vertical fuselage tear lines forward of the wing and aft of forward cargo, had hinge stay attached to detached top piece of forward cargo door, and destruction initially thought to be have been caused by a bomb but later conclusively ruled out? The cause is officially undetermined.

Is it reasonable to say that an NTSB documented event with one high time Boeing 747 could have happened again to another high time Boeing 747 since there are so many similarities?

Is it reasonable to say the NTSB documented cause of one accident could be the actual cause of the other?

If so, then it is a reasonable line of inquiry.

To not investigate that reasonable line of inquiry with the same comprehensiveness as was done for the bomb, the missile, the meteor, or the center tank explanations is unprofessional and a betrayal of public trust. That betrayal has serious consequences.

The public trusts you to investigate all reasonable lines regardless of your title. To investigate that reasonable line of inquiry is to fulfill your professional responsibility and your special honor of being a member of the United States Government.

John McCain, you are a jet pilot who survived a jet crash caused by a missile. What is your opinion whether wiring/cargo door is a reasonable line of inquiry for TWA 800? Are you relying on Bernard Loeb for your opinion?

James Hall, you are the Chairman of a Safety Board, what is your opinion whether wiring/cargo door is a reasonable line of inquiry for TWA 800? Are you relying on Bernard Loeb for your opinion?

Bernard Loeb, you are the NTSB Chief Theoretician for TWA 800, what is your opinion whether wiring/cargo door is a reasonable line of inquiry for TWA 800? Are you relying on Lee Kreindler for your opinion?

James Wildey, you are the metal expert who wrote the definitive report on cargo door for TWA 800, what is your opinion whether wiring/cargo door is a reasonable line of inquiry for TWA 800? Are you relying on Bernard Loeb for your opinion?

Al Dickinson and Ron Schleede, you are the TWA 800 aircraft accident investigators, what are your opinions whether wiring/cargo door is a reasonable line of inquiry for TWA 800? Are you relying on Bernard Loeb for your opinion?

Lyle Streeter, you are the FAA official who interacts with NTSB for major accidents, what is your opinion whether wiring/cargo door is a reasonable line of inquiry for TWA 800? What are you relying on?

Neil Schalekamp and Bob Breneman, you are the FAA structural experts used by NTSB for TWA 800, what are your opinions whether wiring/cargo door is a reasonable line of inquiry for TWA 800? Are you relying on Bernard Loeb for your opinion?

Well, there you have it. What to do?

To not act is wrong; to act may be wrong. What to do?

I face the same dilemma.

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith
551 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
408 659 3552
barry@corazon.com

Attached list is of evidence to establish that evidence of TWA 800 shows that wiring/cargo door cause for TWA 800 is a

reasonable line of inquiry.

Below evidence is consistent with forward cargo door rupture to open to explosive decompression on right side forward of the wing leading to nose off and fireball at 7500 feet when center and other fuel tanks explode.

1. horizontal stab has red paint smear
2. stator blade in right horizontal stab behind engine number 3
3. inward movement top of cargo door matches UAL 811
4. top of door attached to hinge matches UAL 811
5. petal shape of rupture area around aft midspan latch
6. missing pieces of locking handle, latching pins, overpressure relief doors, midspan latches
7. rectangle of explosive decompression zone of outward peeled skin on right side forward of the wing on right side
8. downward movement of floor beams near cargo door
9. hoop stresses found
10. cvr sudden loud sound matches NTSB Chart 12 UAL 811
11. fdr abrupt power cut matches UAL 811
12. TWA 800 matches UAL811 in twenty five similarities
13. TWA 800 matches PA 103 in many similarities
14. TWA 800 matches AI 182 in many similarities
15. red paint smears above cargo door on white paint
16. fire on 4 in UAL 811 for ignition source for fireball/center tank explosion on TWA 800
17. starboard side more damaged than port side.
18. inflight objects hit same things such as right wing fillet in other other accidents
19. poly x is known to be susceptible to chafing and TWA 800 had poly x.
20. section 41 is known to be weak and TWA 800 did not have the retrofit

21. history of cargo door openings in past in various airliners including model and type of TWA 800.
22. EPR problems on aircraft before or during fatal flight.
23. fires in forward cargo hold in the past on Boeing 747s.
24. vertical tears in fuselage skin forward of the wing on the right side match UAL 811
25. singe marks on right side of fuselage show burnt skin, then abruptly at tear line there are no singe marks.
26. red paint rubbed off revealing white paint underneath above cargo door area
27. first pieces off came from forward cargo hold just forward of the wing
28. at least nine missing never recovered bodies, just fragments.
29. initially thought to be a bomb, just like AI 182, PA 103, and UAL 811
30. wreckage debris shows cargo door in pieces at water impact.
31. aft portion of door which includes aft midspan latch and locking handle missing from recovery effort

Evidence to check to rule in or rule out cargo door involvement.

1. hinge overtravel impression damage to match AAR 92/02
2. aft midspan latch pin for heat damage to match AAR 92/02
3. aft midspan latch for damage
4. put door back together from shattered pieces to show petal rupture
5. stator blade from which engine
6. red paint matching from cargo door area to right horizon stab
7. chafed wire bundles to bare wire in forward cargo hold to match AAR 92/02

Lee Kreindler's Theory-Center Tank as Initial Event.

The National Law Journal (p. A01)
Monday, June 30, 1997

WITH EVERY DAY that passes, it seems, Lee Kreindler looks smarter and smarter. Nearly one year after TWA Flight 800 exploded and crashed into the ocean off Long Island last July 17, killing all 230 aboard, investigators are increasingly leaning

toward mechanical failure as the cause--not a bomb or missile. It is the explanation that Mr. Kreindler, a New York aircraft

disaster litigator, has been pushing from the start.

It is also the theory that provides Mr. Kreindler and a small group of fellow plaintiffs' lawyers the clearest path to pursue TWA and

The Boeing Co. for billions of dollars in damages claimed by the victims' families.

Mr. Kreindler, of Kreindler & Kreindler, represents more than 50 of the victims' families in current and planned lawsuits against

the companies. He also chairs the plaintiffs' committee, consisting of lawyers from six firms that represent victim families in

approximately 54 wrongful-death cases. He was also the lead plaintiffs' lawyer in litigation surrounding the crash of Pan Am Flight

103, which was caused by a terrorist bomb.

Since January, nearly all of the TWA 800 lawsuits have been consolidated in a multidistrict litigation pending in federal

court in

the Southern District of New York, before Judge Robert W. Sweet.

The National Transportation Safety Board and Federal Bureau of Investigation still have not conclusively determined what exactly

brought down the 25-year-old Boeing 747, although they have spent more than \$26 million trying, says NTSB spokeswoman Shelly

Hazle. But in the past few months, both agencies have sent signals that indicate they are moving toward eliminating a criminal act

as the cause of the tragedy.

Immediately after the crash, Navy divers began recovering bodies and wreckage from the crash site. By the time recovery efforts

were concluded in May, investigators had collected about 95 percent of the plane, consisting of hundreds of thousands of pieces of

wreckage in an aircraft hangar in Calverton, Long Island. After meticulously cataloging each piece, investigators reconstructed

much of the shattered airplane, including a critical 90-foot section of the fuselage.

From the start, investigators focused their attention on the plane's center fuel tank. They believe that a volatile mix of air and fuel

vapor built up inside the tank creating conditions that led to an explosion. Still undetermined, however, is what ignited the explosion.

In May, FBI Director Louis Freeh said that investigators had found no evidence of a bomb or missile and that mechanical failure

was the most likely explanation. And on June 4, FBI assistant director James K. Kallstrom, the agent in charge of the bureau's

investigation, sent a letter to victims' families saying "we are in what could be the last phase of our criminal investigation."

Within two weeks after the crash, Mr. Kreindler's firm began piecing together its own theory of the case, based largely on news

reports and on the work of Peter Jorgenson, a former Boeing engineer the firm retained as an expert. And within a month, Mr.

Kreindler appeared on the NBC program "Dateline" to present his theory that a malfunctioning fuel pump may have ignited fuel

vapors in the airliner's center fuel tank. In October, Mr. Kreindler presented the NTSB with a 28-page report detailing his theory.

A supplemental report, sent to the NTSB in March, identified the scavenge pump, one of three pumps located in the fuel tank, as

the most likely ignition source. While the NTSB found no evidence that either of the other pumps had malfunctioned, the scavenge pump was never found.

Mr. Kreindler's early theorizing was sharply criticized at the time by plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers as premature and as a

transparent attempt to attract clients. Nor has the NTSB been particularly grateful for Mr. Kreindler's and Mr. Jorgenson's help.

"We have given Mr. Jorgenson more than fair consideration and have come away unimpressed," wrote NTSB General Counsel

Daniel D. Campbell in an April 29 letter to Mr. Kreindler.

Helpful or not, Mr. Kreindler's theory has the virtue of agreeing with the apparent consensus on the most important point for

purposes of the litigation: that the crash was caused by a mechanical failure.

A mechanical failure theory allows the plaintiffs to pursue a relatively straightforward products liability case against Boeing, in

which they will try to show that the aircraft was designed or manufactured improperly.

The case against TWA, however, is a little more complicated. The Warsaw Convention, an international aviation treaty, limits air

crash victims to \$75,000 in damages against an airline unless they can prove the airline acted with willful misconduct.

The major U.S. airlines, including TWA, are complying voluntarily with a proposed agreement that would abolish the \$75,000 limit

and the heightened liability requirement. The Warsaw Convention was in effect at the time of the TWA 800 crash, however, and

applies to the litigation.

Hoping they can prove willful misconduct, the plaintiffs charge the airline kept the plane in service beyond its intended lifespan

and failed to inspect and maintain it properly.

Although the plaintiffs' theory in the Pan Am 103 case relied on allegations that inadequate security was to blame for allowing the

bomb on board, a bomb or missile theory would be much easier for TWA and Boeing to defend against. Thus, company representatives are in no hurry to eliminate them as possibilities.

"Despite what some...reports have suggested, we have no indication that the investigation is over," said Randal Craft, of Haight,

Gardner, Poor & Havens in New York, counsel for TWA. "Certainly no initiating cause has been identified."

Until the FBI and NTSB investigations are concluded, plaintiffs are limited in what they can do to prepare their cases. The NTSB

says Congress gave it exclusive control over wreckage when investigating cases like TWA 800. As a result, none of the plaintiffs'

lawyers so far has been allowed inside the Calverton hangar. But in a motion before Judge Sweet, the plaintiffs' committee argued

that they should be allowed to see the wreckage because employees of TWA and Boeing have had access to the evidence from

the start, working shoulder-to-shoulder with government

investigators. And the NTSB has permitted victims' families and news

photographers to view the wreckage, they argued.

Judge Sweet declined to rule on the motion June 9, but expressing concern that evidence could be lost or destroyed before trial, he

encouraged the NTSB to consider granting the plaintiffs' lawyers and their experts some limited access to the wreckage.

Lawyers

representing the board agreed to get back to the plaintiffs' committee by the end of the month.

There may indeed be some cause for concern. Sen. Charles E. Grassley, R-Iowa, said his staff is investigating allegations that FBI

lab officials, already criticized in a government report for mishandling evidence in other cases, improperly handled evidence

recovered from the crash site.

In the meantime, plaintiffs have served more than 200 document requests. Once they have had a chance to review the companies'

documents, they will start taking depositions, says Mr. Kreindler.

Mr. Kreindler believes damages in the TWA 800 cases could be comparable to those in the Pan Am 103 case. Individual settlements ranged from \$575,000 to \$13 million, for a total of more than \$500 million, he says. But the plaintiffs will have to overcome some obstacles first.

In addition to heightened Warsaw Convention threshold in favor of TWA, both TWA and Boeing lawyers are expected to argue

that, because the plane crashed into the Atlantic Ocean, the Death on the High Seas Act applies. If Judge Sweet agrees with the

defendants' expected motion to apply the act, scheduled to be briefed and decided by the fall, plaintiffs' recoveries will be limited

to economic damages.€

Lee Kreindler meets NTSB officials

" NTSB spokeswoman Shelly Hazle said representatives from Kreindler's firm met with NTSB officials in Washington yesterday. "There was nothing really new," she said."

\$100M Crash Suit

First filed in TWA 800, it cites mechanical failure 23 Oct 96

By Sylvia Adcock

Staff Writer

In the first lawsuit filed in the crash of TWA Flight 800, a Manhattan attorney claimed yesterday that mechanical failure blew the plane from the sky

-- something federal investigators said they can't prove.

The \$100-million suit was filed on behalf of the two grown children of Leonard Johnson of Springfield, Va., who was one of the 230 people killed when

the Boeing 747 exploded July 17 off the South Shore.

"There's no evidence of a bomb or missile," attorney Lee Kreindler said. The theory behind the suit "is something based in logic and understanding of the systems and examination of the path of identical airplanes and expert knowledge."

The suit, filed in Brooklyn, asks for \$50 million from Boeing and \$50 million from TWA. TWA failed to maintain and service the 25-year-old plane properly, the suit said, and Boeing was at fault for approving TWA's decision to fly the plane beyond its service life, among other things.

"This is just the first," said Kreindler, who represents families of 25 other people. Kreindler represented the families of Pan Am Flight 103, who recovered multi-million judgments after the 1988 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland.

In the case of Flight 800, the cause of the crash has not yet been determined. Investigators from the National Transportation Safety Board and the FBI have been able to conclude only that the nearly empty center fuel tank exploded, but they aren't sure what ignited it. Investigators have recovered more than 90 percent of the aircraft from the ocean, with no metallurgical evidence of a bomb or missile, so the mechanical theory has taken center stage.

In a statement, Kreindler said two paid experts concluded that the tank explosion would be enough to break apart the fuselage and said the tank's

scavenge pump, which has not been recovered, was "probably" the ignition source.

In an attempt to explain eyewitness accounts of a streak of light that led to the missile theory, the statement said that the explosion spread through

the fuel vent line on the right wing, creating a trail of burning vapors shooting out the wing tip.

The suit points out that TWA sold the Boeing 747 to Iran in the mid-1970s, buying it back a year later. The explosion and crash, the suit said, were

caused by TWA's "willful misconduct" in "failing to restore the subject Boeing 747 to airworthy condition after its sale to and purchase from Iran."

The suit said that the jetliner was originally designed for 60,000 hours of flying, but that as of July 17, it had flown 101,000 hours, which is allowed under federal regulations.

"This aircraft was in good shape, current in all its maintenance and airworthiness directives," said TWA spokesman Mark Abels. "The cause of this

crash has been the subject of tens of thousands of hours of intensive investigation by the NTSB and the FBI, who have not been able to support a

mechanical malfunction theory or for that matter any theory. I don't know what Mr. Kreindler knows that they don't know. If he does have valuable

information, perhaps he should contribute it."

NTSB spokeswoman Shelly Hazle said representatives

from Kreindler's firm met with NTSB officials in Washington yesterday. "There was nothing really new," she said.

Boeing spokesman Doug Webb declined to comment.

Neil Schalekamp> "The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT"

Byron Acohido>"I, in fact, did grill several sources very hard about the forward cargo door evidence, including Bernie Loeb. Unless everyone involved is lying, (an assumption you'll no doubt make) there is nothing on the cargo door that indicates it came loose and was the initiating event.

All locks and latches were found in proper positions. According to Bernie Loeb, early information that the door was found in the red zone was incorrect. It was found in the yellow zone, along with all major parts of the forward fuselage section."

Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit 15C, Section 41/42, Forward Cargo Door, dated 22 April 1997, with Mr. Al Dickinson, AS-10, listed as investigator and Mr. Wildey as author, states, "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill."

Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in

the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge.

James Wildey> "...there were some fuselage pieces that were recovered that had a red tag on it and were supposedly recovered from the red << the red << earliest debris field...."

" ...

we also examined the fuselage pieces right around there that had red tags on them, and we looked at all the features we could find, and for the fuselage pieces around there we said we find no physical evidence to suggest that those particular pieces actually departed the airplane early on in the sequence.

I think, if I remember our report, we said we believed that those particular pieces should be treated as yellow zone parts because we don't find any way that they could possibly have come off the airplane early in the sequence and actually have been found in the red debris field."

"The examinations of the TWA airplane, however, conclusively show that this door was latched and locked along its bottom edge through the entire break-up sequence.

The door was in this position and was part of the nose section when it impacted the water.

Basically, for these two items you can see they are both part of the nose section and that there are no

separations or failures prior to water impact in this 25 area."

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: March 17, 1998 11:06:04 AM PST

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: NTSB/cargo door meeting

Dear Mr. Schleede, should the meeting between NTSB and me take place, as Senator McCain suggests, can you attend? You could contribute much.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

Jim Hall
Chairman NTSB
National Transportation Safety Board
Office of the Chairman
490 L'Enfant Plaza, S.W.
Washington, DC 20594-2000

Dear Chairman Hall,

17 Mar 98

I've just received a 4 Mar 98 letter to me from Senator John McCain stating, "I have received your letter regarding the

forward cargo door of TWA Flight 800, and your interest in meeting with someone at the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) relating your concerns.

I have contacted the NTSB on your behalf, about your concerns. I have asked for a prompt response to be sent directly to you."

Chairman Hall, I interpret that to mean that Senator McCain wishes that the NTSB and I get together in a meeting to relate my concerns about the forward cargo door of TWA 800. That seems reasonable enough. To accurately and efficiently relate my concerns to NTSB, may I present the following suggestions:

I offer to travel to Seattle, Washington, from California to meet with NTSB officials in their offices. That's the closest office to me and previous government officials who have written to me regarding forward cargo door and TWA 800.

(From NTSB web site: NTSB Northwest Regional Office 8 a.m.-4:30 p.m.
19518 Pacific Highway South
Room 201
Seattle, Washington 98188)

The sooner the better; may I suggest Wednesday, April 1, 1998 in Room 201 of NTSB NW Regional Office at 8 a.m.?

A meeting goal would be to discuss with me my concerns regarding the forward cargo door of TWA 800. My goal is to persuade NTSB that a reasonable line of inquiry, worthy of the same effort as that done for bomb, missile, and center tank, is the wiring/cargo door rupture explanation. The wiring/cargo door rupture concerns are:

1. water in forward cargo bay.
2. chafed bare wire touched by water.
3. electrical short occurs.
4. forward door motor turns on to unlatch position.
5. aft midspan latch of forward cargo door partially unlatches.
6. pressurized hull ruptures at aft midspan latch.
7. cargo door tears into pieces, some pieces stay with nose, some don't.
8. explosive decompression occurs shattering cargo door area forward of the wing on right side exposing twenty foot by forty foot hole in nose producing sudden loud sound on CVR.
9. 300 knots slipstream tears weakened nose off.
10. ejected debris is ingested by starboard engines which catch fire.
11. wing and wing fuel tanks; engines, tail, and fuselage fall and disintegrate on way down.
12. fiery starboard engine ignites fuel vapor clouds from disintegrating tanks, including center tank.
13. fireball observed on the ground.
14. water impact of wreckage, cargo bay material among first to land.

Every concern will be documented with US government and other official reports, exhibits, testimony, and charts. I will bring my laptop computer with internet access to reach NTSB TWA 800 website and other government sites for reference. All that will be required is an outside phone line, some chairs, a table, and some good lighting.

The main concern, as is the main concern of all aviation safety persons, is that can happen again unless wiring/cargo door rupture explanation is ruled in or out by a reasonable line of inquiry by NTSB which is my goal of the meeting which Senator

McCain has suggested take place.

Senator McCain mentions, 'someone' at NTSB to meet with me. May I suggest several persons to be invited to the meeting?

1. NTSB Chief of Northwest Region and staff that are available.
2. Mr. Breneman of FAA who has hands on experience with the forward cargo door of TWA 800 assisting NTSB at Calverton.
3. Mr. Neil Schalekamp of FAA who offered conclusion of evidence of TWA 800 being outward explosion at cargo door area but later changed mind.

It's far away but I certainly invite you, Mr. Chairman, and would be honored should you attend, as well as Dr. Loeb, Mr. Wildey, Mr. Drake, Mr. Dickinson, and Mr. Schleede, all of whom are very familiar with wiring/cargo door explanation and would contribute much to resolving my concerns about the forward cargo door of TWA 800. Also most helpful would be Mr. Lyle Streeter, the FAA link to NTSB. Mr. Streeter is a professional aircraft accident investigator whose opinions about aircraft accidents carry weight. If not able to attend in person, then email, phone and letters are available of course to us.

This meeting of minds is a very welcome opportunity to clear the air and resolve some differences of opinion about TWA 800 and it's cause. Harsh letters between NTSB and me have crossed paths in the last few weeks. It's distracting from the mechanical explanation of TWA 800 which relies on facts, data and evidence which is what I shall address in the proposed meeting in Seattle.

I truly believe this meeting will be very fruitful, Mr. Chairman. Goals are to establish that the cargo door of TWA 800 opened in

flight or did not, it's happened before to other 747s or has not, present new evidence which has shown up in wreckage reconstruction or has not; and therefore, a reasonable line of inquiry is the wiring/cargo door rupture explanation or it is not.

I will report back to Senator McCain with the evaluation of wiring/cargo door rupture explanation by NTSB in words a former US Navy carrier jet pilot will understand, which is to say, technical and makes sense.

Chairman Hall, NTSB and FAA went right to that suspicious forward cargo door of TWA 800 from day one. It's time to go back. There's a lot more there than meets the eye at first glance. The whole story is there. It answers your question of, "Why so few bodies burned?" The answer is basically, "They were not there to be burned. They were blown away by the first initial non-fiery explosive decompression and they were in the severed unburnt nose section. When the center tank finally did catch fire/ explode, there were no passengers in front of the fiery explosion to be burnt."

To ask your question, sir, as you did about the unburnt passengers, is to understand the center tank as initial event does not ring all the way true. There is doubt about the actual initial event in your mind.

I can resolve it.

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith

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Carmel Valley, CA 93924
408 659 3552
barry@corazon.com
www.corazon.com

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: April 1, 1998 2:41:21 PM PST
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
**Subject: FAA/NTSB link to wiring/cargo door cause for TWA
800**

Sam Farr
Member of Congress
17th District, California
House of Representatives
Congress of the United States
Washington, DC

John McCain III
Member of Congress
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and

Transportation
United States Senate
Washington, DC

James Hall
Chairman,
National Transportation Safety Board

Bernard Loeb,
Director of Aviation Safety
National Transportation Safety Board

Al Dickinson,
Lead Investigator, TWA 800
National Transportation Safety Board

Ron Schleede,
Investigator, TWA 800
National Transportation Safety Board

James F. Wildey II
National Resource Specialist
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza East, SW.
Washington, DC 20594

Thomas McSweeny
Director, Aircraft Certification Service
FAA National Headquarters

Lyle Streeter
FAA AAI
Aircraft Accident Investigator

FAA National Headquarters
800 Independence Avenue, S.W
Building FOB 10A, Room 838,
Washington D.C 20591

Neil Schalekamp
Manager, Propulsion & Mechanical Systems and Cabin Safety
Branch
Transport Standards Staff
Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100
1601 Lind Ave. S.W.
Renton, WA 98055-4056

Bob Breneman,
Aerospace Engineer,
Federal Aviation Administration
Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100
1601 Lind Ave. S.W.
Renton, WA 98055-4056

Dear Mr. Schleede,

1 April

1998

Senator McCain, you were absolutely right when you recently said about a GAO report, "I am very concerned that once again the FAA has fallen short by not fully utilizing its capabilities to help determine potential aviation safety and security problems." Well, honest agencies such as FAA and NTSB make honest mistakes, and honest agencies make honest corrections.

A motive has been discovered to explain why FAA Certification Service is so adamant that the cargo door of TWA 800 did not

open in flight. It's because they earlier said it couldn't happen. There is another motive for not examining the entire door before declaring it all latched and all locked and all intact at water impact which is the Certification Service saying that the eight locking sectors for the ten latches in the door were sufficient to keep door closed in flight when it originally certified the Boeing 747. And NTSB relied on FAA examination of TWA 800 door for belief it was all latched, all locked, and all intact until water impact.

Rprt_Nbr: A-91-84 states: "Since the issuance of this NPRM, the FAA has further reviewed the circumstances surrounding this door opening incident and has confirmed that an inadvertent in-flight opening of the cargo door cannot be caused solely by wire chafing. The FAA has determined that in addition to chafing at least four independent failures must also occur in order to drive the door latches to the open position. In light of these findings, the FAA determined that the requirements proposed by the NPRM were unnecessary."

FAA Aircraft Certification Service has thus said door was safe when designed but when it opened in flight anyway said it couldn't happen again after it was supposed to have been fixed. It was not safe when designed and it did happen again because the problems of water in hold and midspan latches not having locking sectors were not recognized at the time.

The attachment below details the sequence of NTSB asking that the wire conduits to the cargo doors of early Boeing 747s be inspected. It gives the FAA response that it couldn't happen, so the check was not necessary. It is NTSB saying cargo door could come inadvertently open electrically and FAA saying it couldn't. NTSB was well aware of the wiring problems involved with

cargo doors of Boeing 747s and asked that the wiring be checked again. FAA demurred.

This NPRM attachment explains so much.

It explains why Bob Brennerman knew and went to forward cargo door as soon as wreckage was brought to Calverton within days. FAA knew there was a problem with doors and knew they could have caused problem as shown by circumstances of TWA 800: NTSB had previously said door may open in flight, FAA knew it had before, and TWA 800 looked like hull rupture at forward cargo door.

It explains why FAA was so quick to say door was not the problem when only bottom eight latches checked out of ten available and the rest of complex door parts ignored: FAA had said door opening could not happen and did not want to be wrong.

It explains why Mr. Wildey so readily agreed with FAA cursory examination and hasty conclusion door was all latched, all locked, and all intact at water impact: NTSB had said door might open in flight and was reassured by FAA saying it couldn't and NTSB accepted it. He does not want to be wrong.

It explains why Mr. Schalekamp so quickly retracted his statement of outward explosion of hull forward of the wing on the right side in the cargo hold area: FAA had said it couldn't happen and his evaluation of paint markings and structural deformation directly contradicted that appraisal. He does not want to say FAA is wrong.

It explains why Mr. McSweeney continues to state TWA 800 had

no door problem while providing no evidence to support conclusion and ignores contrary evidence it did: He said it couldn't happen and does not want to be wrong.

It explains why FAA Northwest Region is the only FAA branch to go public agreeing with center tank as initial event: FAA Northwest Region desperately wants TWA 800 to not be a door opening in flight: They said it couldn't happen and do not want to be wrong.

It explains why Mr. McSweeney will not reply directly to knowledge that the midspan latches have no locking sectors and rupture appears at aft midspan latch: FAA certification service said midspan locking sectors were not necessary when certifying cargo door as acceptable as designed. He does not want to be wrong.

It explains why FAA and NTSB and Boeing all ignore possible cargo door involvement with TWA 800 and insist on preposterous position of forward cargo door all latched, all locked, and all intact until water impact, contrary to visual proof of wreckage reconstruction of outward peeled skin, red paint smears, petal bulge at aft latch, and rectangular shatter zone in cargo door area: All said the door was safe when designed with only eight locking sectors; when it finally broke it was supposed to have been fixed; a door opening was not supposed to ever happen again; and recommended safety actions concerning wiring and the door were rebuffed. Cargo door opening in flight for TWA 800 may make them all wrong, unless center tank explosion blew it open. FAA, NTSB and Boeing do not want to be wrong. Nobody does.

All aviation safety persons in Boeing and government are now

living a nightmare. Something, the cargo door, they said was safe when designed is now shown not to be so and resulted in a failure and fatalities, Pan Am 125 and UAL 811. Something that broke was supposed to have been fixed but wasn't and resulted in another failure, UAL preflight. Something that could have been checked, wasn't, and may now have resulted in more fatalities, TWA 800. That was horror preamble, this is the current nightmare: The wiring chafed short problem causing cargo doors to open in flight is still there on all early Boeing 747s still flying.

I am saying cargo door opening in flight could happen again and did with TWA 800. The new reasons, not known by FAA at the time, are that water in the cargo hold can bypass the four safety feature switches upon which FAA relied on to prevent the inflight opening and the midspan latches do require locking sectors.

The certification should not have been granted for the door with only eight locking sectors installed instead of ten possible. There is bias against believing door opened in flight at rupture at aft midspan latch because FAA said the midspan latches were safe and did not require locking sectors. The latches required locking sectors then and still do now.

FAA said that door could not open by chafing alone relying on safety features all bypassed by water around the chafed wiring. Water and fluid are known to get into forward cargo hold by my personal viewing, by recent Bournemouth Boeing 737 AAIB incident report, the cargo hold has a bilge to hold the expected water, water condenses in the warm humid hold when subjected to cold conditioned air, two large potable water tanks are in hold, the seals are notorious for leaking, and a rain shower engulfed TWA 800 an hour before takeoff on the fatal flight.

The forward cargo door opened in flight for TWA 800, that is plain to see in the reconstruction photo of structural deformation and paint markings. What caused it to open is conjecture based on precedent and scant evidence. I agree with NTSB in A-91-83 and A-91-84 that the wiring in cargo door conduits is involved. To maintain door did not open in flight and the rectangular shatter zone forward of the wing on the right side of TWA 800 was all caused by water impact is untenable based on visual hard evidence of paint markings and structural deformation. Additional evidence for forward cargo door opening in flight is the petal bulge at aft midspan latch, the missing midspan latches, missing 80% of door material, the outward peeled skin, red paint smears, and the shape of shatter zone matches that of another cargo door opening in flight, UAL 811.

Mr. Tom McSweeney, I ask that you overcome those two biases of saying door was safe with only eight locking sectors and it could not open in flight again and conduct a thorough investigation of possible forward cargo door opening in flight for TWA 800. Institutional memory is a strong factor in investigations and it's very difficult to admit error but in areas of life and death, pride must be overcome and objectivity sought. That door opening in flight has not yet been checked out as it should be.

Mr. Neil Schalekamp, you believed at one time the forward cargo door area did open outward in flight based on structural deformation and paint markings. Will you please inform Mr. McSweeney of your findings and conclusions.

Mr. Bob Brenerman, you examined the forward cargo door of TWA 800 and saw the bottom eight latches latched. Will you please tell Mr. McSweeney that you reported on only the eight latches and not the ten available, nor did you examine the manual

locking handle, the overpressure relief doors, the viewing ports or the torque tubes.

Chairman Jim Hall, please note the NTSB was right on target by zeroing in on the wire conduits as stated in A-91-83 and A-91-84: "Evaluate the design, installation, and operation of the forward cargo door flexible conduits on Boeing 747 airplanes so equipped and issue, if warranted, an Airworthiness Directive for inspection and repair of the flexible conduit and underlying wiring bundle, similar to the provisions recommended in A-91-83." That is exactly what I would recommend after all these years of research into door openings of early 747s which tracked down the culprit to chafed wiring, a problem well known to the NTSB and FAA all this while. You were right to hold hearing on aging airliners and old wiring problems. Please follow your own recommendation and thoroughly investigate the wiring/cargo door rupture explanation for TWA 800.

Mr. Al Dickinson and Mr. Ron Schleede, would you follow NTSB recommendation in A-91-83 and examine the flexible conduit protecting the wiring bundle between the fuselage and aft cargo door; specifically:

- (1) the wiring bundle in the area normally covered by the conduit for the presence of damaged insulation (using either an electrical test method or visual examination);
- (2) the conduit support bracket and attached standoff pin on the upper arm of the forward lift actuator mechanism;
- (3) the flexible conduit for the presence of cracking in the convoluted innercore.

Mr. Jim Wildey, your exhibit report of 15C remains the final official word on the forward cargo door status of TWA 800. Knowing that you based your conclusion of door all latched and

all locked and all intact at water impact on information from the service which has a very strong bias that the door not open in flight, would you reevaluate your findings and conclusions to reflect the new evidence shown in TWA 800 wreckage reconstruction such as paint markings and structural deformation? Note that the midspan latches have no locking sectors to strengthen and water does get into the forward cargo hold in flight.

Mr. Lyle Streeter, can you set up a meeting with me and government aircraft safety investigators to discuss this issue of whether forward cargo door opened in flight or not for TWA 800? Phone, or letter, or email, or in person is fine, but the details in the evidence need to be talked about in a give and take session, not just letters back and forth with general conclusions. Although NTSB may have primary responsibility for investigating aircraft accidents, FAA Safety Office is now expected to be fully utilizing its capabilities to help determine potential aviation safety and security problems.

Gentleman, every single thing I say about the accident cause of TWA 800 and other Boeing 747s suffering hull rupture in flight forward of the wing on the right side which leaves a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut to the FDR has happened before, is documented in government accident reports, and the danger known about by FAA and NTSB.

Wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 is reasonable and worthy of a thorough investigation. It is not weird such as missile, bomb, or meteor, explanations which have been granted much consideration. Center tank explosion occurred but it was an effect of the wiring short, just as cargo door opening and engines being foddred, not the initial event but secondary.

Safety People, the unlikely happened, again. That damned cargo door opened in flight, as it did in 1987, 1989, and 1991 by your official count and again in 1985, 1988, and 1996 by my additional count.

It's a big problem and needs a big fix. Wiring is becoming chafed, meeting water and shorting, giving a petite mal of trivial electrical devices turning on or off and a grand mal seizure when the door motor turns on when it shouldn't.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith
408 659 3552
barry@corazon.com
551 Country Club Drive
Carmel Valley, CA 93924

Attachment below:

NTSB Safety Recommendation Brief

Data_Source: U.S. NTSB Safety Recommendations

Rprt_Nbr: A-91-83

Last Updated: 03-13-95

[O] On June 13, 1991, United Airlines (UAL) maintenance personnel were unable to electrically open the aft cargo door on a Boeing 747-222B, N152UA, at John F. Kennedy Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York. The airplane was one of two used exclusively on nonstop flights between Narita, Japan, and JFK. This particular airplane had accumulated 19,053 hours and 1,547

cycles at the time of the occurrence.

Recommendations:

A-91-83. Issue an Airworthiness Directive applicable to all Boeing 747 airplanes with a flexible conduit protecting the wiring bundle between the fuselage and aft cargo door to require an expedited inspection of:

(1) the wiring bundle in the area normally covered by the conduit for the presence of damaged insulation (using either an electrical test method or visual examination);

(2) the conduit support bracket and attached standoff pin on the upper arm of the forward lift actuator mechanism;

(3) the flexible conduit for the presence of cracking in the convoluted innercore.

Wires with damaged insulation should be repaired before further service. Damage to the flexible conduit, conduit support bracket and standoff pin should result in an immediate replacement of the conduit as well as the damaged parts. The inspection should be repeated at an appropriate cyclic interval.

Responses:

FAA LTR DTD: 11/1/91

The FAA agrees with the intent of these safety recommendations and is considering the issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking to address these issues. I will provide the Board with a copy of any document that may be issued.

NTSB LTR DTD: 11/27/91

These recommendations were issued as a result of the Board's investigation of an incident in which the rear cargo door on a Boeing 747-222B initially would not open electrically and then opened electrically without activation of the door open switches. Your letter indicates that the Federal Aviation Administration agrees with the intent of these recommendations and is considering the issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking to address these issues. The Board urges the FAA to move expeditiously on the recommendations. Pending receipt of additional information concerning the action to be taken by the Federal Aviation Administration, the Safety Board is classifying Safety Recommendations A-91-83 and -84 as "Open--Acceptable Action."

FAA LTR DTD: 4/5/93

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) agrees with the intent of these recommendations. On February 18, 1992, the FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes. This NPRM proposed to require inspection of the flexible conduit, wiring, and support brackets between the fuselage and the forward and aft cargo doors. Since the issuance of this NPRM, the FAA has further reviewed the circumstances surrounding this door opening incident and has confirmed that an inadvertent in-flight opening of the cargo door cannot be caused solely by wire chafing. The FAA has determined that in addition to chafing at least four independent failures must also occur in order to drive the door latches to the open position. In light of these findings, the FAA determined that the requirements proposed by the NPRM were unnecessary. On December 21, 1992, the FAA withdrew the NPRM. I have enclosed a copy of the notice of withdrawal for the Board's information.

Airworthiness Directive (AD) 90-09-06 (Docket No. 89-NM-148-AD) mandates the installation of a door warning switch located on the lock sector, as well as a reinforcement of the lock sector to ensure that the latches remain locked against backdriving of the latches by the latch power drive unit. Failure of lock sectors that are reinforced in accordance with AD 90-09-06 has been shown to be unlikely and, even in the event of such a failure, an indication by means of the door warning switch will warn the flightcrew of the problem. The modifications, tests, and inspections required in AD 90-09-06 provide an acceptable level of safety to preclude inadvertent actuation of the cargo door power drive unit and possible injury to maintenance or cargo handling personnel. I have enclosed a copy of the AD for the Board's information. The FAA believes that the current requirements of AD 90-09-06 address the full intent of these safety recommendations to preclude an uncommanded opening of the forward and aft cargo doors.

I consider the FAA's action to be completed, and I plan no further action on Safety Recommendations A-91-83 and -84.

NTSB LTR DTD: 11/8/93

The National Transportation Safety Board has reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) response of April 5, 1993, to Safety Recommendations A-91-83 and -84. These recommendations asked that the FAA issue an airworthiness directive applicable to all Boeing 747 airplanes with a flexible conduit protecting the wiring bundle between-the-fuselage and aft cargo door to require an expedited inspection of:

- (1) the wiring bundle in the area normally covered by the conduit for the presence of damaged insulation (using either an electrical

test method or visual examination); (2) the conduit support bracket and attached standoff pin-on the upper arm of the forward lift actuator mechanism; (3) the flexible conduit for the presence of cracking in the convoluted innercore.

The Board further recommended that wires with damaged insulation be repaired before further service. Damage to the flexible conduit, conduit support bracket, and standoff pin should result in an immediate replacement of the conduit as well as the damaged parts. The inspection should be repeated at an appropriate cyclic interval.

The Safety Board then asked, in Safety Recommendation A-91-84, that the FAA evaluate the design, installation, and operation of the forward cargo door flexible conduits on Boeing 747 airplanes so equipped and issue, if warranted, an airworthiness directive for inspection and repair of the flexible conduit and underlying wiring bundle, similar to the provisions recommended in Safety Recommendation A-91-83.

The FAA's April 5, 1993, response listed a number of findings of an FAA review of the circumstances surrounding the subject door opening. Among the findings, the FAA confirmed that an inadvertent inflight opening of the cargo door cannot be caused solely by wire chafing. Further, the FAA determined that at least four independent failures must occur to drive the door latches to the open position. The FAA also stated that failure of lock sectors that are reinforced in accordance with AD 90-09-06 has been shown to be unlikely and, even in the event of such a failure, the door warning switch would warn the flightcrew, of the problem.

Based on these findings, the FAA has decided that the requirements of AD 90-09-06 address the full intent of these

recommendations-to preclude an uncommanded opening of the forward and aft cargo doors.

FAA staff has also expressed concern that the recommended inspections could result in damage to the wire bundle insulation during the intrusive inspection. Therefore, based on the level of redundancy that now exists to prevent inadvertent door opening in flight, the Safety Board has classified Safety Recommendations A-91-83 and -84 as "Closed-Reconsidered. The Board will closely monitor incidents related to the uncommanded opening of cargo doors on 747 airplanes to further document this position.

NTSB Safety Recommendation Brief

Data_Source: U.S. NTSB Safety Recommendations

Rprt_Nbr: A-91-84

Last Updated: 03-13-95

[O] On June 13, 1991, United Airlines (UAL) maintenance personnel were unable to electrically open the aft cargo door on a Boeing 747-222B, N152UA, at John F. Kennedy Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York. The airplane was one of two used exclusively on nonstop flights between Narita, Japan, and JFK. This particular airplane had accumulated 19,053 hours and 1,547 cycles at the time of the occurrence.

Recommendations:

A-91-84. Evaluate the design, installation, and operation of the forward cargo door flexible conduits on Boeing 747 airplanes so equipped and issue, if warranted, an Airworthiness Directive for inspection and repair of the flexible conduit and underlying wiring bundle, similar to the provisions recommended in A-91-83.

Responses:

FAA LTR DTD: 11/01/91

The FAA agrees with the intent of these safety recommendations and is considering the issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking to address these issues. I will provide the Board with a copy of any document that may be issued.

NTSB LTR DTD: 11/27/91

These recommendations were issued as a result of the Board's investigation of an incident in which the rear cargo door on a Boeing 747-222B initially would not open electrically and then opened electrically without activation of the door open switches. Your letter indicates that the Federal Aviation Administration agrees with the intent of these recommendations and is considering the issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking to address these issues. The Board urges the FAA to move expeditiously on the recommendations. Pending receipt of additional information concerning the action to be taken by the Federal Aviation Administration, the Safety Board is classifying Safety Recommendations A-91-83 and -84 as "Open-Acceptable Action."

FAA LTR DTD: 4/5/93

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) agrees with the intent of these recommendations. On February 18, 1992, the FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes. This NPRM proposed to require inspection of the flexible conduit, wiring, and support brackets between the fuselage and the forward and aft cargo doors. Since the issuance of this NPRM, the FAA has further reviewed the circumstances surrounding this door opening

incident and has confirmed that an inadvertent in-flight opening of the cargo door cannot be caused solely by wire chafing. The FAA has determined that in addition to chafing at least four independent failures must also occur in order to drive the door latches to the open position. In light of these findings, the FAA determined that the requirements proposed by the NPRM were unnecessary. On December 21, 1992, the FAA withdrew the NPRM. I have enclosed a copy of the notice of withdrawal for the Board's information.

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I consider the FAA's action to be completed, and I plan no further action on Safety Recommendations A-91-83 and -84.

NTSB LTR DTD: 11/8/93

The National Transportation Safety Board has reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) response of April 5, 1993, to Safety

Recommendations A-91-83 and -84. These recommendations asked that the FAA issue an airworthiness directive applicable to all Boeing 747 airplanes with a flexible conduit protecting the wiring bundle between-the-fuselage and aft cargo door to require an expedited inspection of:

(1) the wiring bundle in the area normally covered by the conduit for the presence of damaged insulation (using either an electrical test method or visual examination); (2) the conduit support bracket and attached standoff pin-on the upper arm of the forward lift actuator mechanism; (3) the flexible conduit for the presence of cracking in the convoluted innercore.

The Board further recommended that wires with damaged insulation be repaired before further service. Damage to the flexible conduit, conduit support bracket, and standoff pin should result in an immediate replacement of the conduit as well as the damaged parts. The inspection should be repeated at an appropriate cyclic interval.

The Safety Board then asked, in Safety Recommendation A-91-84, that the FAA evaluate the design, installation, and operation of the forward cargo door flexible conduits on Boeing 747 airplanes so equipped and issue, if warranted, an airworthiness directive for inspection and repair of the flexible conduit and underlying wiring bundle, similar to the provisions recommended in Safety Recommendation A-91-83.

The FAA's April 5, 1993, response listed a number of findings of an FAA review of the circumstances surrounding the subject door opening. Among the findings, the FAA confirmed that an

inadvertent inflight opening of the cargo door cannot be caused solely by wire chafing. Further, the FAA determined that at least four independent failures must occur to drive the door latches to the open position. The FAA also stated that failure of lock sectors that are reinforced in accordance with AD 90-09-06 has been shown to be unlikely and, even in the event of such a failure, the door warning switch would warn the flightcrew, of the problem.

Based on these findings, the FAA has decided that the requirements of AD 90-09-06 address the full intent of these recommendations-to preclude an uncommanded opening of the forward and aft cargo doors.

FAA staff has also expressed concern that the recommended inspections could result in damage to the wire bundle insulation during the intrusive inspection. Therefore, based on the level of redundancy that now exists to prevent inadvertent door opening in flight, the Safety Board has classified Safety Recommendations A-91-83 and -84 as "Closed-Reconsidered. The Board will closely monitor incidents related to the uncommanded opening of cargo doors on 747 airplanes to further document this position.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: April 9, 1998 9:49:50 AM PDT
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: **Wrong door**

Dear Mr. Schleede, big big problem. 9 Apr 98

8/11/96, I said which door are you talking about.

It turns out, almost two years later, you were talking about the wrong door.

Bob Breneman, the FAA structural engineer who made the examination and concluded forward door all latched and locked, could not have examined the forward door latches and locks because they were not recovered. They are not in the database and they are not in the wreckage reconstruction in the hangar. The forward door is only 20% recovered and sill and latches are missing.

But in the terminal field (that includes the wings and rest of headless 747 fuselage and aft door) was found on page 14 of 71 of wreckage database, "C122, RF45A 40 39 47.00 latitude, 72 37 27. 90 longitude, aft cargo door- lower sill latches & locks."

Exhibit 15 C "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill."

So in the hangar jumbled with wreckage days after crash, as wreckage was brought in, Bob Breneman of FAA looked at bottom latches of a cargo door and saw them locked and hastily said forward door all latched and locked. He got the two identical doors mixed up. He never corrected his error.

The forward door reconstruction shows all the pieces of those items found in database. Most of the forward door is missing in wreckage reconstruction and most of forward door is missing in database. The sill and latches and locks are missing in database and reconstruction. 80% of forward door is still out there someplace.

What to do about it? Please pass along to Mr. Dickinson, his name is on Exhibit 15C which talks about the wrong door. Dr. Loeb would be interested to know about the wrong door, too. And for sure, Chairman Hall. I've already told Mr. Jim Wildey, author of 15C.

I suggest starting all over again about the forward cargo door starting with the wreckage reconstruction and petal bulge at aft midspan latch, red paint smears, and outward peeled skin, all like UAL 811, NTSB AAR 92/02, which we know by heart, especially the bare chafed wiring shorting on door motor to unlatch position. Bad wiring on UAL 811 and now NTSB says bad wiring on TWA 800, we think alike.

Cheers,
John Barry Smith

From: Schleede Ron <SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov>
To: barry <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: RE: TWA crash cause
Date: Sun, 11 Aug 1996 11:39:00 -0400
Encoding: 13 TEXT
Status:

I have examined the cargo door from twa 800--it is locked and latched!

From: barry
To: SCHLEDR

Subject: TWA crash cause
Date: Tuesday, 30 July, 1996 01:48

<http://www.corazon.com/TWA800PA103UA811.html> is my website for cargo door crash theory.

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
From: barry@corazon.com
Subject: Which cargo door and cam positions
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:

Mr. Schleede, thank you for your prompt response.
I have examined the cargo door from twa 800--it is locked and latched!

There are three cargo doors on TWA 800, which one are you talking about.

The front cargo door is reported to be in pieces, your sentence above implies one piece which would mean other than front cargo door checked.

The lock sectors are locked, but the cams are unlocked. You do not mention cams.

What are the positions of the cam locks of the forward cargo door? John Barry Smith

From: Schleede Ron <SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov>
To: barry <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: RE: TWA crash cause ATTN Robert Francis
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 1996 15:24:00 -0400
Encoding: 17 TEXT

Status:

Be assured that we are checking that. I was the investigator in charge of the UAL flight 811 case and fully knowledgeable in its causes and factors.

Thanks for the interest.

From: barry

To: schledr

Subject: TWA crash cause ATTN Robert Francis

Date: Sunday, July 28, 1996 9:58AM

Mr. Francis. The reasonable cause of the TWA crash is the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door. That is the mechanical cause that must be ruled out. Compare to United Flight 811 of Feb 1989.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: April 13, 1998 10:50:18 AM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: TWA 800 cargo door mixup

Sam Farr

Member of Congress

17th District, California

House of Representatives

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC

John McCain III
Member of Congress
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
United States Senate
Washington, DC

James Hall
Chairman,
National Transportation Safety Board

Robert Francis II
Vice Chairman
National Transportation Safety Board

Bernard Loeb,
Director of Aviation Safety
National Transportation Safety Board

Thomas E. Haueter
Chief, Major Investigations Division
National Transportation Safety Board

John B. Drake
Division Chief
Aviation Engineering Division
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington DC 20594

Al Dickinson,

Lead Investigator, TWA 800
National Transportation Safety Board

Ron Schleede,
Investigator, TWA 800
National Transportation Safety Board

James F. Wildey II
National Resource Specialist
National Transportation Safety Board
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Peter Goelz
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Shelly Hazle,
Office of Government, Public, and Family Affairs
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Doug Kirkpatrick
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Ron Wojnar,
Manager
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James Devany
Acting Manager
Federal Aviation Administration
Transport Airplane Directorate

Darrell Pederson,
Assistant Manager
Federal Aviation Administration
Transport Airplane Directorate,

Neil Schalekamp
Manager, Propulsion & Mechanical Systems and Cabin Safety
Branch
Transport Standards Staff
Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100
1601 Lind Ave. S.W.
Renton, WA 98055-4056

Bob Breneman,
Aerospace Engineer,
Federal Aviation Administration
Transport Airplane Directorate, ANM-100
1601 Lind Ave. S.W.
Renton, WA 98055-4056

Dear Mr. Schleede,

13 Apr 98

This letter is to confirm and explain the significance of the cargo door sill mixup for TWA 800.

The aft cargo door sill, latches and locks have been recovered. The forward door sill, latches and locks have not. The aft door sill, latches and locks are in the wreckage database as found on page 14 of 71, "C122, RF45A 40 39 47.00 latitude, 72 37 27. 90 longitude, aft cargo door- lower sill latches & locks."

The aft sill was found with companion aft cargo door skin in the terminal debris field as expected which is where the wings and rest of fuselage were found, far away from the nose debris field where the forward cargo door hinge and a few pieces of top forward door skin were found as expected, but no forward door latches and locks or sill found.

To repeat: The aft sill was found where it was expected, with other aft door skin in the expected location, wing and aft fuselage debris field. The forward sill was not found where it was expected, with other forward door skin in the expected location, the nose field; it was not found at all.

When confronted with a cargo door sill, latches and locks in a crowded, noisy hangar deck floor with pieces of wreckage all around and time pressure for a conclusion, Mr. Breneman deduced the recovered door sill, latches and locks were from the

forward door, not the aft. He was wrong. He did not check later to see what debris field it was found in. That would have confirmed it was the aft door sill as it was recovered from the same area of other aft cargo door skin and hinge. He would have continued looking for the forward cargo door sill and latches and would have confirmed they were missing. They were missing then and they are still missing twenty months later.

The aft door sill was confused as the forward door sill. It's an understandable mistake. They have the same size, shape and function. The wrong suspect, the aft door, was examined and found to be mostly innocent and released while the real suspect, the forward door, lies dormant and unexamined.

Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 15C, Report Number 97-82, Section 1/42 Joint, Forward Cargo Door, "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill," is now shown to be conclusively wrong because the forward door sill, latches and locks have not been recovered to be examined.

The forward door sill and latches and locks have not been recovered because they are not in the wreckage database of all the items recovered. They are also not in the reconstruction at Calverton. They are still out there on the ocean floor because TWA 800 certainly had the forward cargo door sill, latches and locks on board and functioning normally when it took off the night of 17 July 1996.

To summarize: Aft cargo door lower sill, latches and locks found and recovered and examined.
Forward cargo door lower sill, latches and locks not found, not

recovered, and not examined.

The mixup has serious consequences.

The search for the forward cargo door of TWA 800 must be resumed, exactly as was done for UAL 811 in September/October of 1990, a year and a half after the initial event of inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door in flight over the ocean.

The investigation into TWA 800 must start from square one. As soon as the wreckage was brought into Calverton hangar, the forward door was sought out and examined by Mr. Breneman because it was suspected as having opened in flight. He was right to suspect that forward door, it has killed nine passengers already in a high time early model 747 that left a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut to the FDR, exactly like TWA 800. Now that the wreckage reconstruction and database shows that 80% of the forward door is still missing, further investigation must be made to determine the status of latches and locks.

What would NTSB have done if the report from Mr. Breneman had come back correctly as forward cargo door sill and latches unrecovered and therefore latch status undetermined which means forward cargo door could have opened in flight? Continue to look for the forward door, of course, and then look at the surrounding structure of the forward cargo door. NTSB would then see what can be seen now in the wreckage reconstruction: a large rectangular outward explosive decompression zone proven by structural deformation and paint markings, as Mr. Schalekamp described it; or red paint smears, outward peeled skin, and petal bulge at aft midspan latch of forward door, as I describe it; all

indicative of forward door opening in flight, as it did for UAL 811 leaving similar evidence of structural deformation and paint markings as described in NTSB AAR 92/02.

While waiting for the forward door sill and latches to be found and retrieved, the assumption must be made that something unusual happened to the forward door for it not to have been found where expected, in the nose recovery field with the rest of the 20% recovered forward door parts such as top part of door and hinge. Eighty percent of forward door missing and not recovered after an extensive search indicates something seriously strange about that door. It was not all latched, locked and intact at water impact. If forward door had been intact, most of the pieces, including the sill, latches and locks, would have been found and recovered at the nose impact point and debris field, but they weren't. Door area shattered in flight from explosive decompression when door opened in flight. The nose tore off because of the 300 knots of slipstream pressed onto weakened nose with huge thirty by forty foot hole in it.

Once determined by reconstruction evidence that the forward door opened in flight, the cause of the opening will of course be investigated.

I offer the explanation of UAL 811: Chafed bare wire, poly X, known to be susceptible to chafing, shorted door motor on to unlatch position. For TWA 800, the midspan latches had no midspan locking sectors to be strengthened so they went to partial unlatch position and allowed the 38115 pounds of internal pressure to rupture forward door at aft midspan latch. Evidence shows petal shaped rupture hole at that location on wreckage reconstruction and missing midspan latch.

Water in the cargo hold bypassed all the four power cutoff safety switches which FAA had assumed would prevent another cargo door opening from chafed wire only. Water got into the forward cargo hold of TWA 800 because a rain storm swept over it an hour before takeoff and the door may have been open then or the seals leaked when unpressurized on the ground. I have seen water pour out of a Boeing airliner forward cargo hold myself. There is a bilge in the cargo hold so water is expected, possibly from condensed water from humid air in hold suddenly subjected to cold air from conditioning or cold skin from outside air at altitude.

Other explanations for TWA 800 forward cargo door opening in flight will be offered of center tank blew it open, as Mr. Schalekamp of FAA opined, bomb as Mr. Kallstrom of FBI offered for so many months, or missile as the wackos still do, meteor by another, electromagnetic interference by another, or some other unknown reason. All should be considered.

Bare chafed wiring has shorted on a forward cargo door motor to unlatch position fatally before and it has happened again for TWA 800. That is my claim. NTSB has urged door wiring be checked in NTSB Safety Recommendation Brief Report Number A-91-83. That recommendation by NTSB should now be followed.

What to do? I offer my time and services again to government to assist in confirming the cause of TWA 800, as I have for the past twenty months. To reject my further offer of help is just as wrong as the past of ridicule, disparagement, and disregard that officials have given me.

Chairman Hall, Mr. Schleede, Ms. Hazle, Mr. Goelz, Mr.

Breneman, Mr. Schalekamp and Mr. Drake have all delivered personal insults about me to elected leaders, media, and to me indicating I don't know what I'm talking about, I bother the officials with so many letters, I don't have my facts straight, and they have been very patient with me explaining why I am wrong about the forward cargo door in great detail, but still I persist and should be ignored.

None of my factual evidence has ever been rebutted, but only a generality of that forward door was checked, all cargo doors were latched and locked and door was intact at water impact was offered to inquiries by Senator McCain, Congressman Farr, and various media persons. A meeting requested by me and seconded by Senator McCain to relate my concerns about the forward cargo door with NTSB officials was rejected. The refusal to consider forward door opening in flight was based on a false premise, door sill, latches and locks recovered belonged to the front door. Wrong, they belonged to the back door.

A recent example shows the tone; the below from NTSB spokesperson Hazle to NTSB accredited newspaper reporter on April 8, 1998, five days ago, before door mixup detected and reported:

"Your proposed article is incorrect. First of all, Senator McCain did not request that the NTSB meet with Mr. Smith. The Senator asked that the Board respond to Mr. Smith's concerns, which we have done numerous times and in great detail... Secondly, Mr. Smith is simply wrong. There is absolutely no physical evidence to support his personal theory that the forward cargo door came unlatched. Although Mr. Smith does display some knowledge of the Boeing 747, he has a basic misunderstanding of the facts.

For example, Mr. Smith claims that there are 10 latches on the cargo door and that the Board only discusses eight in the above

mentioned report. While a superficial description of the door might imply that there are 10 latches, Mr. Smith is, in fact, incorrect in implying that they all hold the door onto the fuselage. The eight at the bottom of the door, which were discussed in the report actually hold the door closed - the other two, one on each side of the door are merely "alignment latches" and do not hold the door closed."

Ha!

FAA and NTSB have made this cause of TWA 800 personal by attacking me, the messenger, instead of the message, door opened in flight. It's a mistake. It's as wrong as calling the back door the front door. And then continuing to repeat the erroneous conclusion when inundated with facts from a person who says check the door, check the door, over and over again, but never checking the actual door, is even more wrong.

Fortunately, no other early 747 has had another forward door pop open in flight in the twenty months since TWA 800, so only feelings are hurt so far.

I ask that the politicians reconcile the strained relationship between this citizen and government aviation officials. Mend the fences, start the healing process, bury the hatchet, let bygones be bygones. I'm willing; I can't do it alone; it takes two.

I continue to offer my help. I have nine years of research into this forward cargo door problem with early 747s. I am a crash survivor of a sudden night fatal jet plane accident. I'm a commercial pilot, instrument rated. I'm a retired military officer. Permit me to assist the official investigators in a volunteer capacity or make it official, just as long as my data, facts, and

conclusions can be considered for a contribution to the probable cause of TWA 800. I am an ally. Call me an outside independent consultant. Whatever, but my input is essential.

Discovery of the forward door problem for TWA 800 is very important. This cargo door mixup leads to door open in flight for TWA 800. That leads to UAL 811. That leads to PA 103 and that leads to AI 182, all early model 747s that had hull rupture in flight forward of the wing leaving a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut to the FDR. The implications of PA 103 and AI 182 not being bombs but wiring caused door openings are profound and affect the entire worldwide aviation industry. The consequences of that will require very high level government actions.

That's out of my league; my league is early 747 hull ruptures in flight. My ball park is four accidents. My inning is TWA 800. My time at bat is forward cargo door. My hit was it opened in flight. My home run is the cause was water on bare chafed wire to short door motor on to unlatch to rupture at aft midspan latch. The pitch was a curve ball of explosive decompression which mimics a bomb or fuel tank explosion.

The door mixup shows that it is time for NTSB to do it right the second time, just like UAL 811. This time without FBI interference. This time with time to think it over. Find the door and in the meantime go on the assumption that a previous event happened again, even though it was not supposed to, TWA 800 forward door opened in flight from chafed wire short to door motor to aft midspan rupture.

The door mixup error is understandable; it was an unintentional human error of judgment between two identical looking items

and understandable under the circumstances of urgent wreckage assembly and inspection at Calverton hangar shortly after the accident.

Forward cargo door opening is very good news for NTSB. It opens up the pathway, the first choice pathway, of forward cargo door opening in flight that was considered closed these many months, but now with the crucial piece of evidence, the lower sill, latches and locks which was blocking the pathway, being removed by explanation of aft, not forward sill, NTSB can now go down that first choice pathway.

And sure enough, the evidence retrieved in the meantime confirms that first pathway choice: there is no yet conclusively confirmed cause of the crash, although bomb, missile, meteor, and spontaneous center fuel tank explosion were seriously considered; streak is explained as shiny object spinning away reflecting red-orange evening sunlight; the shattered outward fuselage skin around the forward door looks exactly as expected if the door were to open in flight, paint markings are as expected if door were to slam upwards into fuselage above, the CVR and FDR data match another cargo door opening flight, and on and on; all facts, data, evidence compiled by NTSB investigators.

NTSB has produced the reports, data, and interpretations from which the forward cargo door opening in flight for TWA 800 is explained. NTSB AAR 92/02 for UAL 811 is the bedrock document for cargo door explanation for TWA 800.

NTSB will show that solving airplane crashes is the most important goal and let the chips fall where they may. NTSB had the first official deduction for TWA 800, forward door opened in flight, and it was the right one. Confirmation was delayed while

other agencies had a hack at it, but eventually, with a citizen's help, the first choice pathway was cleared of confusing debris.

NTSB recommended that the door wiring bundles be checked on early 747s. NTSB has determined Poly X wiring in early model 747s is suspect and subject to vibration caused chafing. NTSB compiled the exhibits for the public docket which assisted the citizen investigation so much. NTSB has the web site that publishes all the previous accident reports from which so much valuable research was derived.

The official credit for cargo door opening in flight explanation for TWA 800 will go to NTSB. It's their data, facts, and evidence. Success has many fathers; failure is an orphan.

The new investigation requires reexamination of those NTSB facts, data, and evidence, some of which are listed below:

1. horizontal stab has red paint smear
2. stator blade in right horizontal stab behind engine number 3
3. inward movement top of cargo door matches UAL 811
4. top of door attached to hinge matches UAL 811
5. petal shape of rupture area around aft midspan latch
6. missing pieces of locking handle, latching pins, overpressure relief doors, midspan latches
7. rectangle of explosive decompression zone of outward peeled skin on right side forward of the wing on right side
8. downward movement of floor beams near cargo door
9. hoop stresses found
10. cvr sudden loud sound matches NTSB Chart 12 UAL 811
11. fdr abrupt power cut matches UAL 811
12. TWA 800 matches UAL811 in twenty five similarities
13. TWA 800 matches PA 103 in many similarities
14. TWA 800 matches AI 182 in many similarities

15. red paint smears above cargo door on white paint
16. fire and fod in engine #3 for ignition source for fireball/center tank explosion on TWA 800, also missing blades.
17. starboard side more damaged than port side.
18. inflight objects hit same things such as right wing fillet in other other accidents
19. poly x is known to be susceptible to chafing and TWA 800 had poly x.
20. section 41 is known to be weak and TWA 800 did not have the retrofit to strengthen.
21. history of cargo door openings in past in various airliners including model and type of TWA 800.
22. EPR problems on aircraft before or during fatal flight.
23. fires in forward cargo hold in the past on Boeing 747s.
24. vertical tears in fuselage skin forward of the wing on the right side match UAL 811
25. singe marks on right side of fuselage show burnt skin, then abruptly at tear line there are no singe marks.
26. red paint rubbed off revealing white paint underneath above cargo door area
27. first pieces off came from forward cargo hold just forward of the wing
28. at least nine missing never recovered bodies, just fragments.
29. initially thought to be a bomb, just like AI 182, PA 103, and UAL 811
30. wreckage debris shows cargo door in pieces at water impact.
31. aft portion of forward door which includes aft midspan latch and locking handle missing from recovery effort as well as bottom sill latches and locking sectors.
32. front spar of center tank found early in debris field is unsooted.

Actions to rule in or rule out forward cargo door involvement.

1. Check hinge overtravel impression damage to match AAR 92/02.
2. Check aft midspan latch pin for heat damage to match AAR 92/02.
3. Check aft midspan latch for damage when located.
4. Put door back together from smaller shattered pieces to clarify petal rupture at aft midspan latch.
5. Determine lone 'stator blade' from which engine
6. Check red paint matching from cargo door area to right horizontal stabilizer.
7. Find chafed wire bundles to bare wire in forward cargo hold to match AAR 92/02.
8. Search, find, and retrieve forward cargo door bottom sill, latches, and locks and examine for latch lock status.

The similarities between UAL 811 and TWA 800 are uncanny, even to both having to retrieve the door from bottom of ocean after tentative probable cause given. But this time the explanation of the forward door opening in flight will not require a new AAR, it will all be done in the first aircraft accident report.

Please use my experience, knowledge, and aviation skills. My research has much to offer in this complicated matter. I know all the explanations very well and can rebut each while pointing to documentation, facts, data, and evidence to support each facet of the wiring/forward cargo door explanation.

I volunteer. Bring me on board.

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith
408 659 3552
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
barry@corazon.com
www.corazon.com

NTSB Safety Recommendation Brief

Data_Source: U.S. NTSB Safety Recommendations

Rprt_Nbr: A-91-83

Last Updated: 03-13-95

[O] On June 13, 1991, United Airlines (UAL) maintenance personnel were unable to electrically open the aft cargo door on a Boeing 747-222B, N152UA, at John F. Kennedy Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York. The airplane was one of two used exclusively on nonstop flights between Narita, Japan, and JFK. This particular airplane had accumulated 19,053 hours and 1,547 cycles at the time of the occurrence.

Recommendations:

A-91-83. Issue an Airworthiness Directive applicable to all Boeing 747 airplanes with a flexible conduit protecting the wiring bundle between the fuselage and aft cargo door to require an expedited inspection of:

(1) the wiring bundle in the area normally covered by the conduit for the presence of damaged insulation (using either an electrical test method or visual examination);

(2) the conduit support bracket and attached standoff pin on the upper arm of the forward lift actuator mechanism;

(3) the flexible conduit for the presence of cracking in the convoluted innercore.

Wires with damaged insulation should be repaired before further service. Damage to the flexible conduit, conduit support bracket and standoff pin should result in an immediate replacement of the conduit as well as the damaged parts. The inspection should be repeated at an appropriate cyclic interval.

On 08/04/98, at 21:25, Hazle Shelly <hazles@NTSB.gov> wrote:

Dear Dr. Wills,

Your proposed article is incorrect. First of all, Senator McCain did not request that the NTSB meet with Mr. Smith. The Senator asked that the Board respond to Mr. Smith's concerns, which we have done numerous times and in great detail.

Secondly, Mr. Smith is simply wrong. There is absolutely no physical evidence to support his personal theory that the forward cargo door came unlatched. In fact, there is considerable evidence to the contrary. As stated in the Metallurgist's Factual Report, Exhibit 15C (which, of course, is a public document and available at our web site

www.nts.gov):

Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill.

Overall examination of the forward portion of the airplane showed that sections 41 and 42 contained uniform crushing damage that extended from S-39L across the bottom of the fuselage and up above the right side main cabin window belt to S-14R. This crushing damage is consistent with the intact forward portion of the airplane (including section 41 and 42) impacting the water with a right wing low attitude. The lower lobe forward cargo door was in the crush area.

Although Mr. Smith does display some knowledge of the Boeing 747, he has a basic misunderstanding of the facts. For example, Mr. Smith claims that there are 10 latches on the cargo door and that the Board only discusses eight in the above mentioned report. While a superficial description of the door might imply that there are 10 latches, Mr. Smith is, in fact, incorrect in implying that they all hold the door onto

the fuselage. The eight at the bottom of the door, which were discussed in the report actually hold the door closed - the other two, one on each side of the door are merely "alignment latches" and do not hold the door closed.

We receive numerous inquiries from the public, many with their own extensively developed theories, and we try to be responsive to all. You are free to request copies of the correspondence between Mr. Smith and the Safety Board, a prudent step, I believe, before publishing such an article.

If you have further questions or concerns, please feel free to contact us.

Sincerely,

Shelly Hazle

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: April 20, 1998 9:58:15 AM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: Retrieve forward cargo door sill of TWA 800

Sam Farr
Member of Congress
17th District, California
House of Representatives
Congress of the United States
Washington, DC

John McCain III
Member of Congress
Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
United States Senate
Washington, DC

James Hall
Chairman,
National Transportation Safety Board

Robert Francis II
Vice Chairman
National Transportation Safety Board

Bernard Loeb,
Director of Aviation Safety
National Transportation Safety Board

Thomas E. Haueter
Chief, Major Investigations Division
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Bob Breneman,
Aerospace Engineer,

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Renton, WA 98055-4056

Dear Mr. Schleede,

20 April 1998

Please do what good investigators do, go back to the crime scene and look for more evidence that should be there. You have NTSB documents that reveal you don't have all of the TWA 800 wreckage and you have NTSB documents that reveal the missing cargo door sill is very important. So, I suggest, ask, insist, demand that you go back to the scene, look for it, find it, and get it. Call out the dredgers. Everyone will understand, it's what happens in thorough investigations, and TWA 800 is certainly going to be that.

To make a human error of hasty confusion over two identical shaped and sized objects such as the aft and forward cargo door sills of Boeing 747s is understandable and forgiven when corrected.

To not correct error when detected is inhuman and not forgiven.

The error of cargo door mixup was reported to you on April 8th and subsequent days. It is now April 20, twelve days later, almost two weeks, a hundred eternities to pilots, and still no effort is apparent to retrieve door.

What is going on? Time's a wastin'!

Wiring to be checked for bare wire chafing in TWA 800 and location to search for forward cargo door follow:

Plug P3 and Plug P4 at a distance between three to four inches from plug pin tips. The P4 damage location may correspond to wire bundle clamp positions. These areas are where the chafed bare wires shorted on the door latch actuator motor to the unlatch position for UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 92/02. Water also entered the door switches because water poured out of the switches when retrieved from the ocean.

Location on ocean floor to search, find, retrieve, examine, and determine ten latch status and eight locking sector status of forward cargo door of TWA 800: Forward door sill is probably within this one minute geographical coordinates of a box: 40:37:50 latitude north up to 40:38:50 degrees, minutes, seconds north by 72:39:20 west longitude over to 72:40:20 degrees, minutes, seconds of west longitude. This one mile square datum box estimate is based on NTSB wreckage database items plotted out and NTSB trajectory study items studied.

All radar track anomalies in NTSB Exhibit 13A of objects leaving TWA 800 should be plotted to ocean surface and searched at that spot.

There is much radar data on TWA 800 and the forward door can be tracked to 300 foot depth ocean probable location, just as was done with UAL 811 in which NTSB AAR 92/02, page 26, describes the procedure to track, search, locate, and retrieve the forward cargo door from the ocean floor. Radar returns, wind data, and ocean currents were used to retrieve the door from

14,200 feet on the first pass. Seven dives later they had the pieces of the forward cargo door from which the true cause of the inadvertent opening in flight as chafed bare wiring shorting on door motor to unlatch position was revealed.

The below information is from the NTSB investigator who helped locate the forward cargo door of UAL 811 in 1990:

Date: Sat, 17 Aug 1996 12:52:15 -0700

From: wmor@ix.netcom.com (William M. O'Rourke)

Subject: UAL811

To: barry@corazon.com

Status:

JBS:

I'll try to answer your questions here re. UAL811 but the answers may not be the ones you're looking for.

1. Ron Schleede was the Chief of the Accident Investigation Division at the time of the accident and oversaw much of the on-scene investigation. He is highly experienced and a reliable investigator. He started his career with the NTSB at the Denver Field Office after flying F-100's with the USAF.
2. I never saw the actual door but was informed that it was in two pieces versus the single (entire) door we based our calculations on. I learned that the USN utilized our estimate of impact point & time and applied their detailed knowledge of under water current data. The result was that they drew a 5 NM box around a point they calculated would

have been the resting place of the door. Thier ship then entered at the NW corner of the box steaming on a track towards the SE corner. At about the half-way point, on the first run, they located the debris field on the ocean floor in approximately 14,000 feet of water.

3. I DID NOT SEE ANY BLIPS! What I did see was a computer

printout of FAA and USN FACSFAC ground based radars which

listed all primary & secondary (transponder) returns covering the area we specified in our data reduction request.

Since the Navy's FACSFAC processor (computer) was more state-of-the-art than the FAA system, plus it had more feeds, we utilized the USN data for the most accurate data presentation.

From the data in the printout, we could not tell which target was the door or which was debris. Further, we had no way of telling which was which. What the printout did tell us was whether it was a long-run length or short-run length target. Generally, you could say that a long-run target is a strong target while the short-run length was a weak target. However, the difference twixt the two is actually more of radar cross section of a target. As an example, picture a billboard of 15 feet high, 30 feet wide and 6 inches thick. If you look at the billboard staright on, you see its full 15x30 foot area or an object with a surface area of 450 sq. feet. However, when you view the same billboard from end-on, you see an object with a total area of 7.5 square feet. Hence, an excellent example of the primary difference between a long & short run length target.

With respect to the UAL811 incident, we were very lucky in that

while the flight was climbing out of HNL, a WX balloon was also

on its way up. This gave us very accurate winds which enabled

us to validate winds aloft info recorded on the DFDR. The largest

problem I had was to correlate the various timing involved from

all of the data sets. Since the most accurate timing source was the FAA's ARTCC tapes, we had to adjust FAA & USN radar data, CVR,

DFDR, NWS, and FAA tower tapes to one single time base.

The above are the same techniques we used in reconstruction of flight tracks of accident incident aircraft as well as the Shuttle Challenger accident.

Although my primary job was as an ATC investigator at the NTSB, I got stuck with doing radar data since I had a radar background going back to 1957 as a GCI controller, a brief stint on RC-121D's, TDY to a DDR and DER as well as TDY to VP-26 while at NQX (ASP-20).

If you give me your snail-mail address, I send you a copy of the Factual Report - Radar Reconstruction, that I completed on this case. I think I still have a copy of it around here somewhere.

I retired from NTSB in May 1991 after 34-years and do not even have a copy of the amended UAL811 report. I do know that they had to amend the report based on the information they recovered

door revealed.

Mike O'Rourke
wmor@ix.netcom.com

Below letter discusses the efforts to get door examined.

From: Chris Hinch <chris@dcc.govt.nz>
To: "'barry@corazon.com'" <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Cargo Doors & UAL 811
Date: Thu, 22 Aug 96 22:29:00 NZT
Encoding: 90 TEXT
Status:

Barry

Hang in there.

I was on a computer graphics team that developed computer animation sequences for a documentary about UAL811. The animation sequences showed how the door latching mechanisms work for the cargo door in question.

At that time, the official story was that a ground handler had damaged the latching mechanism and/or not closed the door properly. The father of a New Zealand teenager killed on the flight argued against this, and as a result, the TVNZ documentary was commissioned, presenting his theory that an electrical failure initiated the door opening sequence with the 'L' shape of the locking latches making them susceptible to deformation.

In order to create the animation sequences, we had to study and

understand the issues involved. We then predicted that if the door was found, what the relative positions of the cams and interlocks would be, and that the L locking bars would be deformed by the backdriven cams.

The documentary was rebuffed by United, who said that that they were aware, prior to the accident, that the L locks could be deformed by initiating the door open sequence while locked, and that a modification had been issued to strengthen them. As that modification had *apparently* been fitted to 811, we were "therefore" wrong. In addition, local airlines said that a special 'strengthening' modification had been fitted to their fleet of B747's, "therefore" it was okay to keep flying.

But when the door was retrieved, the locks were deformed as predicted, and the cams were in the positions we predicted. Obviously, if fitted, the modification was not strong enough. This meant that it could happen again, and I was approached by TVNZ to say so on camera. I did so but did not realise the personal and professional cost that would occur as a result.

I was not aware that the NTSB had changed their position, and I cannot tell you the personal feeling of relief, vindication and resolution that I felt reading their revised executive summary at your web site. Thank you very, very much.

But now, the horrifying feeling that our words will continue to go unheeded, and that more people will die - especially when we hear airlines continuing to say that they are "okay" because they have fitted the "special" strengthening mod.

Can you confirm if 811 had the rivetted L plates modification added? Did 800? 103? Can you confirm or determine if any one

has actually initiated the opening sequence on the ground, with the door fully closed, with the L plates modification fitted? Can Boeing/NTSB categorically demonstrate that the mod fitted will prevent deformation when the cams are backdriven?

I wish you the very very best of luck. Remain focused, persistent and rational in your arguments, and they cannot argue.

By the way - check 811's pilot statement (on record I believe) that the only reason the aircraft didn't come apart underneath him was that he had just taken it off AP and let go of the controls at the point of event - he felt that fighting the aircraft (or trying to keep it straight, as the AP would have done) would have resulted in catastrophic failure.

In the other accidents, were they on AP?

Cheers

Chris Hinch

chris@dcc.govt.nz

Dear gentleman, the ball is in your court. You have the facts presented to you. It is time for your action. To not act and not correct error when given startling information indicating serious error in investigative thinking is wrong.

To review:

1. Why forward cargo door pieces including sill are important to recover. It is shown in NTSB AAR 92/02 that the forward door can unlatch in flight and kill passengers in an early Boeing 747.
2. Why cargo door sill of TWA 800 is aft door sill: Because it was found in the aft fuselage debris field in which other aft cargo door pieces were found.

3. Why forward cargo door sill is missing: It was not found in the forward cargo bay debris field in which other forward cargo door pieces were found, it is not listed in the entire wreckage database, and it is not hung on wreckage reconstruction.

4. Where is it: Forward door sill is probably within this one minute geographical coordinates of a box: 40:37:50 latitude north up to 40:38:50 degrees, minutes, seconds north by 72:39:20 west longitude over to 72:40:20 degrees, minutes, seconds of west longitude.

5. Where is wire chafed: Plug P3 and Plug P4 at a distance between three to four inches from plug pin tips. The P4 damage location may correspond to wire bundle clamp positions.

To repeat: Correct error of cargo door mixup. Retrieve forward door. Bring me into the investigation; I know a lot about the problem, I can help in this life and death matter. Question me. To use assets that are available is smart. To reject proven assets who volunteer to assist is wrong. I have been right since day one of the TWA 800 accident, I'm still right, and I will be right as new questions come up. Time is not on your side; I am.

Respectfully,

John Barry Smith
408 659 3552
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From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: April 22, 1998 8:45:32 PM PDT
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: Retrieve Door!

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Dear Mr. Schleede and US government officials involved with
the TWA 800 investigation,

22 April 1998

A. You know the forward cargo door of TWA 800 is very
important:

1. You checked it first as the wreckage was brought into
Calverton hangar for the very thing I say happened then and say
now, unlatching in flight of the latching cams, specifically, the aft
midspan latch.
2. The forward cargo door has unlatched several times before,
one with fatal consequences, UAL 811, which has many
significant matches of evidence including a sudden loud sound
on the cockpit voice recorder and an abrupt power cut the Flight
Data Recorder.

B. You know you don't have the forward cargo door main pieces to include the lower sill, latches, and locks, manual locking handle, overpressure relief doors, and the two midspan latches.

1. They are not listed in the wreckage database of items recovered.
2. They are not hung on the wreckage reconstruction in Calverton hangar.
3. They are never referred to correctly in any TWA 800 exhibits.

C. You know you made a misidentification mixup of aft cargo door sill latches and locks for the forward cargo door sill latches and locks.

1. They are both identical shaped and sized.
2. The aft door sill was found in the aft fuselage and aft cargo door pieces debris field.
3. The forward cargo door sill was not found in the nose and forward door parts debris field.
4. The misidentification was made in haste, under pressure, and is an understandable human error.

D. You know you need to have the forward cargo door sill, all latches and locks as well as manual locking handle.

1. It is necessary for a thorough examination of the hull rupture of TWA 800 that came apart first as shown by trajectory study and wreckage database, forward of the wing on the right side in the forward cargo bay.
2. The results of the examination of the forward cargo sill, latches and locks, and manual locking handle can change the entire probable cause of the TWA 800 accident, as was shown by the corrected AAR of UAL 811 after door was retrieved.

E. You know where it is:

1. There is extensive radar data that shows hundreds of small items that were ejected from TWA 800 and tracked to ocean surface.
2. The currents are known.
3. The winds are known.
4. The wreckage database shows latitude and longitude of various cargo door pieces and other items to leave first.
5. Forward door sill is probably within these one minute geographical coordinates of a box: 40:37:50 latitude north up to 40:38:50 degrees, minutes, seconds north by 72:39:20 west longitude over to 72:40:20 degrees, minutes, seconds of west longitude. This one mile square datum box estimate is based on NTSB wreckage database items plotted out and NTSB trajectory study items studied.

F. You know how to get it.

1. Thousands of items have already been recovered using known retrieval procedures.
2. US Navy dredges and recovery ships as well as personnel are available to continue their previous work.

G. You know what to do with it when you get it.

1. Examine the ten latches for unlatching around the latch cams.
2. Examine the latch pins for heat damage.
3. Examine the paint for transfer marks from fuselage.
4. Examine for outward peeled skin.
5. Examine for outward petal shaped rupture/bulge at aft midspan latch.
6. Examine for soot.
7. Examine for bare chafed wires.
8. Correlate found latitude/longitude location and incorporate in breakup sequence.
9. Match door latches, skin, cams, locking sectors, overpressure

relief doors, viewing ports, torque tubes, and paint to similar evidence of same items in NTSB AAR 92/02.

H. You know when to get it.

1. As soon as you knew you did not have it.
2. As soon as you knew you need it.
3. As soon as you knew how to get it.
4. As soon as you knew where to get it.

That time was two weeks ago. Every day that goes by with no forward door sill latches and locks recovered and examined is compounding the understandable error of judgment into nonunderstandable error of negligence.

When an outfielder misjudges his position and a ball whizzes by him next to the line, a run scores and he may get an error.

When safety officials and other officials responsible for the lives of the citizens misjudge their position and an accident occurs, someone dies and they may get an error.

When the outfielder consistently misjudges his position and refuses to act to correct his misjudgment even when told by coaches, fans, and the media, and a ball whizzes by him and a run scores, he is released from active duty or retired.

When safety officials and other officials responsible for the lives of the citizens they are sworn to protect continue to misjudge their position and refuse to act to correct the misjudgment even when pointed out by elected officials, newspapers, and an informed and experienced citizen, and an accident occurs, they are prosecuted for criminal negligence.

Why the difference? One is a game and the other is real life.

I have been in a sudden, night, fiery, fatal, jet airplane crash. It is no game. It is real life.

If the carrot of satisfaction of a job well done by thoroughness of an investigation into TWA 800 does not sway you into action, then the stick of punishment may.

As a former Naval Flight Officer who has flown low level navigation missions through Italy in training, I strongly disagree with the US prosecution for negligent homicide of the flight crew who misjudged their position and cut the cable. Apparently top level US government officials are sending a message to others in service that they are held accountable for screwups even while under orders and on duty. The crew and senior officers tried to cover it up but were quickly found out.

Quick action needs to be taken now. Search, locate, retrieve, and examine the complete forward cargo door of TWA 800 to include the sill, all ten latches, all eight locks, manual locking handle, viewing ports, overpressure relief doors, torque tubes, and missing skin.

While waiting for the recovery effort to produce the forward door sill, latches and locks:

A. Examine the extensive wreckage evidence you do have to consider as an explanation wiring short from bare wire to door unlatch motor to door rupture at aft midspan latch resulting in explosive decompression of thirty foot by forty foot hole in the nose of TWA 800 on the right side forward of the wing. The weakened nose would then be torn off by the 300 knot slipstream.

B. Check the wiring as described in Safety Recommendations
Rprt_Nbr: A-91-83 and -84

- (1) the wiring bundle in the area normally covered by the conduit for the presence of damaged insulation (using either an electrical test method or visual examination);
- (2) the conduit support bracket and attached standoff pin on the upper arm of the forward lift actuator mechanism;
- (3) the flexible conduit for the presence of cracking in the convoluted innercore.

C. And check the wiring as described in NTSB AAR 92/02:
Plug P3 and Plug P4 at a distance between three to four inches from plug pin tips. The P4 damage location may correspond to wire bundle clamp positions. These areas are where the chafed bare wires shorted on the door latch actuator motor to the unlatch position for UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 92/02.

Retrieve Door! Time's a wastin'!

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith
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barry@corazon.com

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: April 27, 1998 1:35:15 PM PDT
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: Sill confusion

Dear Mr. Schleede, 27 April 1998

NTSB is now saying, from the hangar tag person, David Mayer, that the forward lower sill latches and locks were recovered but in three pieces and the latches were latched and locked. He gave reference numbers of RF 3A, 3G, and 3H for the sill pieces.

Problems:

1. Nowhere in wreckage item database is any mention of forward sill or latches and locks on any of the thirteen forward cargo door pieces listed
2. The given reference numbers are contradicted by the database:
 - a. 3A is under the belly away from door.
 - b. 3G is described as cargo door hinge, nine feet away from bottom sill.
 - c. 3H is described as stringer with cargo door attached.
3. 80% of door still missing, including midspan latches and manual locking handle.
4. Bottom sill latches and locks not visible in photo reconstruction of TWA 800.
5. Aft cargo door sill latches and locks are specifically named in database as one piece.
6. Exhibit 15C refers to forward 'lower door sill' as one piece and not pieces.
7. If door intact at water impact then most of door should be recovered in same area, not most missing.

Confusion reigns!

Regardless, door opened in flight as shown by red paint smears, outward peeled skin, petal bulge at aft midspan latches, missing midspan latches, and most of door missing from expected location.

Although Mr. Smith does display some knowledge of the Boeing 747, he has a basic misunderstanding of the facts. For example, Mr. Smith claims that there are 10 latches on the cargo door and that the Board only discusses eight in the above mentioned report. While a superficial description of the door might imply that there are 10 latches, Mr. Smith is, in fact, incorrect in implying that they all hold the door onto the fuselage. The eight at the bottom of the door, which were discussed in the report actually hold the door closed - the other two, one on each side of the door are merely "alignment latches" and do not hold the door closed.

This is nonsense. Proof is UAL 811 that has forward midspan 'latch' 'alignment' pin showing no damage and the aft midspan 'latch' 'alignment' pin showing extensive heat damage. In fact, it may have been the 'latching' action of that aft midspan latch that held that door closed for the 1.5 seconds described in NTSB AAR 92/02 before door opened fully that allowed sufficient decompression that only a ten foot by twenty foot piece of fuselage skin was ripped off, instead of the thirty for forty foot hole the other planes had, thus allowing UAL 811 nose to stay on and the others to come off.

Is there not enough missing parts, enough confusion about what

is what, enough history to do a thorough investigation of that forward door?

What more is needed to prod safety investigators into asking questions, checking out the contradictions, and resolving the discrepancies once and for all? This is a known killer of nine people. It is worth the effort.

Four cargo doors ruptured/fractured in flight at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door as shown by official text, drawings, and photographs, AI 182, PA 103, UAL 811, and TWA 800.

Will someone please check out the total door and not just the 20% recovered?

There is urgency.

I invite checking my numbers. From tomorrow as zero, April 28th.

June 23, 1985, AI 182, nose off at forward cargo bay, 329 dead. No forward sill recovered.

March 10, 1987, PA 125, forward cargo door open in flight, 0 dead. Latches unlatched on forward sill.

December 21, 1988, PA 103, nose off at forward cargo bay, 270 dead. No forward sill status reported.

February 24, 1989, UAL 811, forward cargo door open in flight, 9 dead. Latches unlatched on forward sill.

June 13, 1991, UAL preflight, uncommanded aft cargo door open on ground. 0 dead. Latches unlatched on aft sill.

July 17, 1996, TWA 800, nose off at forward cargo bay, 270 dead. No forward sill recovered, possibly pieces.

AI 182 to TWA 800 is approx 3993 days.
Approx 666 days between events.
Approx 649 days since TWA 800.
Approx 17 days to go. From April 29 to May 15.
65 days minimum, four years and eleven months for maximum
between events.
0 deaths to 329 deaths as consequence.

So, law of averages says an uncommanded starboard side cargo door will open on an early model Boeing 747 with varying consequences from trivial to severe within three months of July 17th, 1996 to June 23, 2001 with the mean occurring on May 15th, 1998. The airline with the most 747s, 41, and the oldest average at 19.9 years, is Northwest Airlines.

So, a NWA 747 has uncommanded cargo door opening in May 1998 if the law of averages is enforced. I'm working on stopping that from happening.

Regards,
Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: April 30, 1998 11:08:47 AM PDT
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: Locate and examine forward cargo door sill of TWA 800

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Dear Mr. Schleede, 29 April 1998

Will you please ask again for NTSB officials to meet with me so I can relate my concerns about the forward cargo door of TWA Flight 800, as you did in your 4 March 1998 letter to Chairman Hall? It's very important.

Serious confusion exists as to the location of the suspect ten latches, ten latching cams, and eight locking sectors of the forward cargo door of TWA 800. Conclusions about location and status of door parts in official exhibits and letters are totally contradicted by other official NTSB documents.

One NTSB official in charge of wreckage identification, David Mayer, recently said the forward cargo door sill is in three pieces and gave reference numbers, RF3A for the aft two latches, locks and sill; RF3G for the mid latches, locks and sill; and RF3H for the forward latches, locks and sill.

However:

RF3A in database has no reference to sill, latches and locks.

RF3G in database describes the piece as cargo door hinge and has no reference to sill, latches and locks.

RF3H in database is described as forward portion of lower right cargo door and has no reference to sill, latches, and locks.

There is no reference in the database to any forward cargo door sill, latches or locks.

The pieces of the forward cargo door in the database match the actual pieces hung on the wreckage reconstruction.

The photograph of the reconstruction shows the keel beam, pieces of the door, the door hinge, but the sill, latches and locks are apparently absent.

Exhibit 15C states forward cargo door sill is in one piece, not three.

Personal correspondence from an FAA official, Bob Breneman, who examined a cargo door sill, declared it to be the forward door sill and all latched and locked, said it was in one piece, not three.

Why are there no references to forward cargo door sill, latches and locks in the wreckage database and yet the conclusion made that it was all latched and locked at water impact?

An explanation is possible: Mixup with the aft cargo door sill and latches:

The aft cargo door sill was found in one piece, registered in the database and had the latches and locks attached. The aft and forward cargo door sills are the same shape and size and function the same.

How does one distinguish between two identical pieces of shattered, twisted and dirty pieces of metal? A mistake is plausible.

Most of the very important pieces of the forward door are still missing and include the manual locking handle, two overpressure relief doors, two midspan latches and viewing ports.

Regardless of status of lower door sill latches and locks, the damage start location is the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door. This is shown by the outward petal shaped bulge in the metal door frame. It is shown as outward explosion by the outward peeled skin above cargo door. It is shown by the red paint smears between the passenger windows above cargo door. It is shown by the absence of most of the cargo door skin and most of the complex mechanisms in the door. The aft midspan latch area has the petal shaped outward bulge indicating an explosive decompression rupture. None of the midspan latches has been recovered, not the two from the forward door nor the two from the aft door. All of the forward cargo door material around the aft midspan latch is missing from database and from wreckage reconstruction.

There is enough doubt about the status of locks and latches in the forward cargo door to initiate a thorough examination and evaluation of a forward cargo door opening in flight for TWA 800. It was the prime suspect early on and it is still the prime suspect.

The evidence of paint smears, twisted outward metal, and shape of explosive shattered outward zone proves cargo door area opened in flight. The cause of that opening may then be determined.

Regarding the recent response of Shelly Hazle of NTSB with the below excerpt:

"For example, Mr. Smith claims that there are 10 latches on the cargo door and that the Board only discusses eight in the above mentioned report. While a superficial description of the door might imply that there are 10 latches, Mr. Smith is, in fact,

incorrect in implying that they all hold the door onto the fuselage. The eight at the bottom of the door, which were discussed in the report actually hold the door closed - the other two, one on each side of the door are merely "alignment latches" and do not hold the door closed."

There are 'alignment' devices in the door already, they are called, 'pull-in hooks', one hook on each side. The midspan latches do exactly that, latch. And they had to latch an eight foot slice in a pressurized hull against 38115 pounds of internal pressure for TWA 800. Proof that midspan latches latch is UAL 811 that has forward midspan latch pin showing no damage yet the aft midspan latch pin showing extensive heat damage during the forward cargo door opening event. In fact, it may have been the 'latching' action of that aft midspan latch that held that door closed for the 1.5 seconds described in NTSB AAR 92/02 before door opened fully that allowed sufficient decompression so that only a ten foot by twenty foot piece of fuselage skin was ripped off, instead of the thirty by forty foot hole the other three planes had, thus allowing UAL 811 nose to stay on and the others to come off.

NTSB implies in the quote from Ms. Hazle that the two midspan latches have not been recovered but, not to worry, they are not important, but they are not in the database and NTSB tacitly admits they have not been recovered by saying they are not important anyway.

Latches latch. All ten latches in each cargo door are essential to hold door closed.

To the claim by NTSB and FAA officials that they have responded to my concerns in great detail numerous times, the

attached excerpts reveal the few times I been responded to, and always at the behest of Senator John McCain or Congressman Sam Farr. The one detail is the reiteration of the NTSB explanation of center tank as initial event with no discussion of cargo door except to conclude that eight latches latched means all latched. The few NTSB opinions about the cargo doors are untrue and easily refuted with NTSB documents, exhibits, and photographs.

Two officials, Neil Schalekamp and David Mayer were forthcoming at first. Then, within days, both refused to talk further with an inquiring member of the public. Mr. Mayer, after being told to by Dr. Bernard Loeb, refused to even repeat public docket information he had said several days earlier.

Many high resolution pictures were taken in May 1997 of the forward cargo door in the wreckage reconstruction by Mr. Jan Staller for the New York Times but all photographs were kept by NTSB, the New York Times magazine has none. There are none of those high resolution photographs of the cargo door area in the NTSB CD-ROM which has many pictures of the TWA 800 reconstruction.

This is a civilian airliner accident during peacetime in US territorial waters with an incomplete public docket. To silence Neil Schalekamp of FAA and David Mayer of NTSB about data in the public docket is wrong and suspicious. To refuse to meet with me to discuss a safety matter supported by NTSB documents at the request of Senator McCain is strange. For Mr. Schalekamp of FAA and Mr. Drake of NTSB to point blank tell me they will not respond to me, a citizen speaking about aviation safety to safety officials, is very irregular, even negligent of their safety responsibility.

Total forward cargo door references in the wreckage database:

B250 RF3A Stringer with attached cargo door.

B008 RF3B Stringer with floor beam.

B250 RF3C Stringers with rear top portion of forward cargo door.

B189 RF3D Stringers with top right corner of forward cargo door.

B221 RF3E Small section upper forward cargo door.

B001 RF3F Stringer.

B007 RF3G Cargo door hinge, 2 rollers.

B2017 RF3H Forward portion lower right forward cargo door.

Missing items of forward door: Lower cargo door sill, eight bottom latches, eight bottom pins, eight locking sectors, two midspan latches, two midspan pins, eight viewing ports, two overpressure relieve doors, manual locking handle, torque tubes, and approximately seventy percent of door skin.

Total aft cargo door references in the wreckage database:

C122 RF45A Aft cargo door lower sill latches and locks.

C1080 RF45E Aft cargo door surround.

C644 RF45F Piece of cargo door.

C2133 RF45G Aft cargo door fragment.

C111..... Aft cargo door cutout

.....RF54E Forward lower corner of aft cargo door cutout.

C2155 RF98 Outer frame aft cargo door panel (aft upper main cargo door sill)

C2162.....Aft cargo door doorstep.

C2252 RF30A Stringer aft cargo door hinge.

TG1.....Cargo door 7'x3'x1'.

Missing items of aft door: midspan latches, manual locking handle, torque tubes, viewing ports, two overpressure relieve doors, approximately twenty percent of door skin.

References to forward cargo door sill from FAA:

29 Oct 97 letter from Mr. Wojnar/Pederson/Breneman to JBS:

"In addition, the door latches at the bottom of the door were still attached to the fuselage lower sill structure. This indicates the door was in the 'latched and locked' position at the time of impact with the water." "However, wreckage for the entire door was recovered at the same location as the nose section and had the same impact damage as the surrounding fuselage structure on the right side. This is additional verification that the forward cargo door had not opened in flight or separated from the airplane."

18 Nov 96 letter from Mr. McSweeney/Kirkpatrick, FAA, to Congressman Farr:

"The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has no evidence that door failures played a role in the TWA flight 800 accident."

30 Jan 1998 letter from Neil Schalekamp, FAA, to JBS:

"While no scenario has been categorically proven to be the cause, it is believed, based upon available data, that the center wing tank (CWT) explosion preceded any separation of the forward cargo door. The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT. Furthermore, you mentioned that the forward cargo door was recovered a considerable distance from the rest of the structure. This could be due to its aerodynamic characteristics and prevailing winds at the time of the accident, rather than attributing this as the primary cause of the accident."

"You may not agree with the reasoning of the official accident investigators, but I want you to understand the evidence to date indicates that the CWT explosion preceded any fuselage breakup, including damage to the forward cargo door."

19 Feb 1998 letter from Mr. Neil Schalekamp to JBS:

"The theory of an explosive decompression, due to a sudden opening of the forward cargo door was one theory that was examined. However, it has been determined that this did not occur. Based upon the existing evidence, the National Transportation Safety Board, (NTSB), the agency in charge of the accident investigation, believes that the probable cause of the accident was a center wing fuel tank (CWT) explosion, due to an internal fuel tank ignition source. The FAA agrees with the NTSB on this matter.

You apparently believe that the forward cargo door precipitated the accident scenario by initially separating from the airplane. The evidence from the reconstructed 747 airplane reveals that the forward cargo door was attached to the forward section of the airplane and was latched in the closed position when this section of the plane impacted the ocean."

References about forward cargo door from NTSB:

24 Oct 1997 letter from Chairman Hall, NTSB to Congressman Farr:

"Please be assured that our team has examined all of the structure recovered from TWA flight 800, approximately 95%--including all of the cargo door mechanisms and structures. Early on in the investigation we determined conclusively that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water, and there was no evidence of any failure of any of the latching mechanisms on

the doors."

20 November 1997 Letter from Peter Goelz of Sandy Hentges of Congressman's Farr's office:

"As Congressman Farr was advised by letter dated October 24, 1997, early in the investigation we determined conclusively that the cargo doors were latched and locked at impact with the water, and there was no evidence of any failure of any of the latching mechanisms on the doors."

19 December 1997 letter from Chairman Hall, NTSB to JBS:

"However, to repeat, the investigation of the accident involving TWA flight 800 has revealed no evidence to suggest that a failure of a cargo door precipitated the event."

12 January 1998 letter from Jim Wildey, NTSB, to JBS:

"The Safety Board has received your letter to the Chairman, dated December 30, 1997, concerning the possibility that the TWA 800 accident was related to an in-flight opening of a cargo door. As conveyed to you in previous letters we have sent you, the Safety Board believes that sufficient facts have been gathered to rule out this possibility."

10 March 1998 letter from John B. Drake, NTSB, to JBS:

"As we have stated in numerous previous responses, the investigation team has gathered sufficient facts to rule out this possibility."

17 March 1998 letter from Chairman Hall, NTSB, to JBS:

"As stated in our most recent letter dated March 10, 1998, the TWA flight 800 investigative team has gathered sufficient facts to rule out this possibility of an in-flight opening of a cargo door. We do not believe a meeting is necessary to further discuss this

issue."

Responses to JBS regarding further communications:

10 March 1998 letter of John B. Drake of NTSB to JBS :

"We consider our correspondence on this subject to be complete. Should you continue to reiterate your position on this issue in future correspondence, you should expect no further response from the Safety Board."

30 Jan 1998 letter of Neil Schalekamp of FAA to JBS :

"Please note that this office will no longer be responding to your further inquiries about these same concerns, including your February 6 and February 9 letters that I just received."

17 March 1998 letter of Jim Hall of NTSB to JBS :

"We do not believe a meeting is necessary to further discuss this issue."

The above rejections directly contradict NTSB's recent statements on their website:

Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements

"...a program to increase the public's awareness of, and support for, action to adopt safety steps that can help prevent accidents and save lives."

I'm a member to the public, I'm aware and support action to adopt safety steps that can help prevent accidents and save lives.

There is urgency according to my numbers:

June 23, 1985, AI 182, nose off at forward cargo bay, 329 dead.

No forward sill recovered.

March 10, 1987, PA 125, forward cargo door open in flight, 0

dead. Latches unlatched on forward sill.

December 21, 1988, PA 103, nose off at forward cargo bay, 270 dead. No forward sill status reported.

February 24, 1989, UAL 811, forward cargo door open in flight, 9 dead. Latches unlatched on forward sill.

June 13, 1991, UAL preflight, uncommanded aft cargo door open on ground. 0 dead. Latches unlatched on aft sill.

July 17, 1996, TWA 800, nose off at forward cargo bay, 270 dead. No forward sill listed as recovered.

AI 182 to TWA 800 is approximately 3993 days.

Approximately 666 days between events.

Approximately 649 days since TWA 800.

Approximately 17 days to go, from April 29 to May 15.

65 days minimum; four years and eleven months for maximum between events.

0 deaths to 329 deaths as consequence.

The law of averages indicates an uncommanded opening of a starboard side cargo door will occur on an early model Boeing 747 with varying consequences from three months after July 17th, 1996 to June 23, 2001 with the mean occurring on May 15th, 1998. The airline with the most Boeing 747s, 41, and the oldest average at 19.9 years, is Northwest Airlines.

It would not be unusual for a NWA early model 747 to have an uncommanded cargo door opening with varying consequences in the next few months.

Quick action needs to be taken now. Search, locate, retrieve, and examine the complete forward cargo door of TWA 800 to include the sill, all ten latches, all eight locks, manual locking handle, viewing ports, overpressure relief doors, torque tubes, and

missing skin.

While waiting for the recovery effort to produce the forward door sill, latches and locks:

A. Examine the extensive wreckage evidence to consider as an explanation: Wiring short from bare wire to door unlatch motor to door rupture at aft midspan latch resulting in explosive decompression of thirty foot by forty foot hole in the nose of TWA 800 on the right side forward of the wing. The weakened nose would then be torn off by the 300 knot slipstream.

B. Check the wiring as described in NTSB Safety Recommendations Rprt_Nbr: A-91-83 and -84

(1) the wiring bundle in the area normally covered by the conduit for the presence of damaged insulation (using either an electrical test method or visual examination);

(2) the conduit support bracket and attached standoff pin on the upper arm of the forward lift actuator mechanism;

(3) the flexible conduit for the presence of cracking in the convoluted innercore.

C. Check the wiring as described in NTSB AAR 92/02 UAL 811 cargo door accident:

Plug P3 and Plug P4 at a distance between three to four inches from plug pin tips. The P4 damage location may correspond to wire bundle clamp positions. These areas are where the chafed bare wires shorted on the door latch actuator motor to the unlatch position.

For NTSB officials to refuse to talk with the missile or meteor proponents for TWA 800 is understandable based on the evidence and lack of precedent. To refuse to talk with the wiring/cargo door proponent is not understandable based on the wreckage

evidence and the precedent of faulty wiring and previously opened inflight forward cargo doors in early model Boeing 747s.

To discuss in a meeting the wiring/cargo door explanation is reasonable and understandable. Please be reasonable and understanding.

Very Respectfully,

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From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: May 12, 1998 12:38:47 PM PDT
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: **Cracked wiring found in TWA 800 cargo door zone.**

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Dear Mr. Schleede, NTSB and FAA Officials involved with TWA

800 investigation,

12 May 1998

Good work finding cracks in frayed wire in Boeing airliners and taking such quick action to investigate and confirm. As the mechanic reported frayed wires detected, I report frayed wires detected. Please take the same decisive action to investigate and confirm. I ask that you expand your investigation into frayed wiring to Boeing 747s based upon the following discovery of frayed to the core wiring in TWA 800.

"Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found." NTSB Public Docket Exhibit 9A page 116:

Please note that BMS13-42A is known faulty Poly-X wiring. Cargo door location is FS 560-670 and cracked wires are within that zone. Frayed wires in that area have shorted before and caused the forward cargo door to open in flight, NTSB AAR 92/02 UAL 811.

Other wiring events in 747 forward cargo holds:

A. 1996, burning smell in forward cargo compartment, found damaged wiring

shorted to ground, charring found.

B. Oct 12, 1996, Wire bundle arcing and resultant fire at aft bulkhead of

forward lower lobe cargo hold on 747-200 freighter.

Source: NTSB Exhibit 9C, Attachments to the Systems Group Factual Report page 44, 45, 46:

Please expand chafed Poly X wiring checks to Boeing 747s in the cargo door areas.

To review:

A. Examine the extensive wreckage evidence to consider as an explanation: Wiring short from bare wire to door unlatch motor to door rupture at aft midspan latch resulting in explosive decompression of thirty foot by forty foot hole in the nose of TWA 800 on the right side forward of the wing. The weakened nose would then be torn off by the 300 knot slipstream.

B. Check the cargo door wiring as described in NTSB Safety Recommendations Rprt_Nbr: A-91-83 and -84

(1) the wiring bundle in the area normally covered by the conduit for the presence of damaged insulation (using either an electrical test method or visual examination);

(2) the conduit support bracket and attached standoff pin on the upper arm of the forward lift actuator mechanism;

(3) the flexible conduit for the presence of cracking in the convoluted innercore.

C. Check the cargo door wiring as described in NTSB AAR

92/02 UAL 811 cargo door accident:

Plug P3 and Plug P4 at a distance between three to four inches from plug pin tips. The P4 damage location may correspond to wire bundle clamp positions. These areas are where the chafed bare wires shorted on the door latch actuator motor to the unlatch position.

D. Examine for wiring cracks five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 as described in TWA 800 Public

Docket Exhibit 9A, page 116.

E. Check for damaged wiring in forward cargo compartment as described in NTSB Exhibit 9C.

Regarding the recent response of Shelly Hazle of NTSB with the below excerpt:

"For example, Mr. Smith claims that there are 10 latches on the cargo door and that the Board only discusses eight in the above mentioned report. While a superficial description of the door might imply that there are 10 latches, Mr. Smith is, in fact, incorrect in implying that they all hold the door onto the fuselage. The eight at the bottom of the door, which were discussed in the report actually hold the door closed - the other two, one on each side of the door are merely "alignment latches" and do not hold the door closed."

If you believe that four eight foot slices into a large sausage shaped pressurized hull do not need 'latches' then you are beyond reason. Please be reasonable. There are four eight foot slices in a 747 hull, two each for each cargo door. All four slices have one midspan latch to latch the door closed by its latching action of latching cam around the latching pin. One latch for eight feet of slice. And it has no locking sector to stop the latching cam from becoming unlatched around its latching pin when the door unlatch motor turns on when cracked Poly X wiring shorts, as it has done exactly before. That one midspan latch cam around the latching pin may be sufficient provided there is no effort to unlatch it. If there is, it unlatches slightly and internal 3.5 pressure differential ruptures door at aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door, as it has done before. As the photograph of TWA 800 shows with outward peeled skin, red paint smears, and

outward petal shaped bulge at aft midspan latch, that aft midspan latched and ruptured cargo door in flight, as it has done before.

Latches latch. All ten latches in each cargo door are essential to hold door closed. All midspan latches have not been recovered to be examined. The master locking handle has not been recovered to determine manual locking status.

Cracked wiring causes bad things to happen. You are checking the fuel tank explosion consequence, please check the cargo door opening in flight consequence. You now know that cracked to the bare core wiring was found in TWA 800 cargo door zone. You know that cracked wiring caused cargo door to open in flight before causing fatalities. You know that cracked wiring has caused fires in the forward cargo bay before, very close to center fuel tank. Please check out the cracked wiring caused forward cargo door to open in flight explanation for TWA 800.

I ask again for NTSB officials to meet with me so I can relate my concerns about the forward cargo door of TWA Flight 800.

Very Respectfully,

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From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: May 20, 1998 5:55:59 PM PDT
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: **Orange zone/door wiring**

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Dear Mr. Schleede,

21 May 1998

The missing eighty percent of the forward cargo door of TWA 800 may be in the Orange debris field. The retrieved items have tag numbers 9000 to 9999:

Public Docket SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Chairman's Factual Report of Investigation, page 5, "In addition, an area 2.7. nautical miles in radius, centered at 40 degrees 38 minutes 54 seconds North, 072 degrees 40 minutes 23 seconds West, was defined. The portions of this area that did not already lie in either the Red, Yellow or Green zone were designated the Orange Zone. The center of this zone corresponds to the last secondary radar return from the aircraft."

"The database created to track recovered parts is known as the TAGS database. A series of metal tags were issued to be attached to the recovered parts as durable identification tags. The metal tags were colored one of six possible colors."

"Orange Recovered from areas other than Areas 1, 2 or 3 during the trawling operation."

"9000-9999 Issued by the trawlers working the western half of the Orange zone."

Gentlemen, please note there are no Orange Zone pieces in the TAGS database. There is no mention anywhere of the pieces which were found in the Orange zone by trawlers and issued 9000 series metal identification tags. Eighty percent of the forward cargo door is missing. The NTSB Trajectory Study Exhibit, page 50, shows pieces from the forward cargo bay were the first to leave TWA 800 and left at the same time as the last secondary radar beacon was returned. It is very likely that the missing pieces of the forward cargo door are in the Orange zone and may have already been retrieved and tagged with 9000 series tags.

Where are the Orange zone pieces recovered from TWA 800? What pieces were they? Where did they come from on the aircraft? Where are the missing eighty per cent of the forward cargo door?

I direct the questions for answers to Mr. David Mayer, the person in charge of the wreckage database.

The larger point is this, chafed wiring to the core is reported on TWA 800 in NTSB Public Docket Exhibit 9A page 116:

"Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only

within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found."

Please note that BMS13-42A is known faulty Poly-X wiring. Cargo door location is FS 560-670 and cracked wires are within that zone. Frayed wires in that area have shorted before and caused the forward cargo door to open in flight, NTSB AAR 92/02 UAL 811.

Fuel tank wiring is shown to be chafed to bare wire. The TWA 800 NTSB document shows cargo door area wiring is chafed to bare wire also. FAA and NTSB officials are taking efforts to inspect fuel tank wiring. Cargo door wiring should also be inspected, especially since cargo door wiring is a known killer of nine in UAL 811 accident.

There's more reason to inspect cargo door wiring in 747s as stated in NTSB Exhibits:

"A. 1996, burning smell in forward cargo compartment, found damaged wiring shorted to ground, charring found.

B. Oct 12, 1996, Wire bundle arcing and resultant fire at aft bulkhead of forward lower lobe cargo hold on 747-200 freighter. Source: NTSB Exhibit 9C, Attachments to the Systems Group Factual Report page 44, 45, 46."

These are real reports of real events showing real danger. They are reported to you, Mr. McSweeney.

To be blind to the red paint smears above the cargo door of TWA 800 is not right; your rods and cones respond to color the same as mine. Those red paint smears indicate door opened in flight, just like paint smears indicated door opened in flight for UAL 811.

Are they not there? Are there not many? Are they not red?

I see them and Mr. Schalekamp of FAA saw them, so I know they exist as well as being in pictures on the NTSB CD-ROM of TWA 800. They are not going to fade away with time.

The forward cargo door opened in flight for TWA 800. To disregard paint smears, outward peeled skin on the side and bottom of fuselage, and the petal shaped outward bulge at the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door is very strange, it's not right. It's not worthy of NTSB.

It's one thing to be forceful in prosecuting the center tank as the initial villain, but it's another thing to ignore a previous killer of nine that left very similar evidence to this crime as in another crime.

To check the cargo door wiring as well as the fuel tank wiring is wise and prudent. To not do so is reckless in the face of compelling evidence. I direct that opinion to Dr. Loeb.

A citizen has done much research into high time Boeing 747 accidents involving hull ruptures in flight. I ask that I be allowed a meeting during which I may present evidence for consideration and discussion to government aviation safety officials.

I pose that request to Congressman Farr and Senator McCain. It is apparent the aviation officials themselves will not comply without orders from above. I need help.

To me, the following is reasonable and prudent:

1. Check known faulty Poly X wiring in cargo door areas of early

747s for chafed to bare wires.

2. Offer explanation of red paint smears, outward peeled skin, and petal bulge at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door of TWA 800.
3. Locate missing eighty percent of forward cargo door by either finding it in Orange Zone, Calverton hangar, or locating it on the bottom of the ocean.
4. Meet with citizen, as the suggestion of a Senator, to discuss and consider real evidence as discovered in research of NTSB and FAA documents regarding wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800.

Will you please be reasonable and prudent?

I ask that question of all.

Respectfully,
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From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: May 29, 1998 12:12:34 PM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: Wiring/cargo door evidence from US government documents

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Dear elected, appointed, and employed US government officials
involved with TWA 800 investigation, 29 May 1998

Gentleman, I respectfully address all as if this were a cyberspace meeting and it is my turn to speak. Most of us have exchanged letters, emails, conversations in person or telephone calls in the past. The case for wiring/cargo door opening in flight as an explanation for the TWA accident grows stronger every day with evidence such as this:

Quote from TWA 800 Public Docket 516A, Exhibit 9A Systems Group Chairman's Factual report of Investigation, Page 47, "A Boeing telefax of June 25, 1997, stated that: The Poly-X wire was used as general purpose wire on the RA164 (TWA 800) aircraft. Wire insulation known as Poly-X had three in-service problems:

- Abrasion of the insulation in bundles installed in high vibration areas.

(This problem was corrected by Boeing Service Bulletin No. 747-71-7105, Dated July 19, 1974)

- Random flaking of the topcoat.

- Insulation radial cracks in tight bend radii.

Radial cracking phenomenon of the Poly-X wire was mainly associated with mechanical stress. Bend radius is the largest contributor to mechanical stress in installed wire or cable.

Presence of moisture in conjunction with mechanical stress is also a contributor."

The Systems Exhibit 9A continues on same page 47, "Evidence of arcing or short circuiting was found in the fuselage of N93119, (TWA 800) in addition to what was found in the wiring from the raceway below the left cabin floor and near the forward wing spar.

The Systems Exhibit 9A continues, page 116:

"Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found."

(Please note that BMS13-42A is Poly-X wiring. Cargo door location is FS 560-670 and cracked wires discovered are within that zone. Frayed wires in that area have shorted before and caused the forward cargo door to open in flight, NTSB AAR 92/02 UAL 811. Water has been seen pouring out of a forward cargo bay of a Boeing airliner. Water and leaking electricity make a powerful conductor. Both are known to exist in Boeing airliners.)

NTSB Exhibit 9C, Attachments to the Systems Group Factual Report, page 44:

"Response: There was one reported wire insulation abrasion on the 747 in 1996. There operator reported that a burning smell was noted during cargo loading in the forward cargo compartment. Cargo loading system wiring was found damaged and shorted to ground below the cargo floor at station 650, below

the aft right corner of a large ball mat. A wiring loom "p" clip was found broken enabling the wire to chafe against structure. A hole was found burned through the bottom angle of the cargo floor cross member, where the wiring clip attached, and charring was evident in the surrounding insulation blanket. Repairs were made."

Page 44: "Response: There were seven reported wiring fires on the 747 in 1996."

Page 45: "f. 747-200 reported on October 12, 1996
Wire bundle arcing and resultant fire at aft bulkhead of forward lower lobe cargo hold on a 747-200 freighter. This occurred with the airplane on the ground, during post C-check functional test. Note: Portions of the damaged wire bundles were forwarded to Boeing for evaluation in determining the cause of the damage. The results of the analysis indicated the primary conductor(s) sustained mechanical or thermal damage prior to the application of electrical power."

Page 46, "g. 747-400 reported on November 1, 1997, (see response to question 1)
There was one reported wire insulation abrasion on the 747 in 1996. The operator reported that a burning smell was noted during cargo loading in the forward cargo compartment. Cargo loading system wiring was found damaged and shorted to ground below the cargo floor at station 650, below the aft right corner of a large ball mat. A wiring loom "p" clip was found broken enabling the wire to chafe against structure. A hole was found burned through the bottom angle of the cargo floor cross member, where the wiring clip attached, and charring was evident in the surrounding insulation blanket. Repairs were made."

Page 57, Letter from Commander Naval Air Systems Command to National Electrical Manufacturers Association, 1 Oct 82, "As you know, the problems with poly-x wire are well known to headquarters and its use had been curtailed."

FAA Aircraft Certification Service Mission Statement:

<http://www.faa.gov/avr/air/hq/mission.htm>

"Aviation Safety Begins With Safe Aircraft

The Aircraft Certification Service is responsible for the safety of civil aircraft. The inherent safety of an aircraft is a function of its design integrity and its manufacturing quality. It is the mission of the Aircraft Certification Service to promote safety by:

Prescribing safety standards governing the design, production quality, and airworthiness of civil aeronautical products;

Administering design, production quality, and finished product certification programs in compliance with the prescribed safety standards;

Monitoring safety performance, and acting to provide continued operational safety of aircraft;

Working in partnership with aviation safety authorities of other countries to continuously improve the safety of the international air transportation system and achieve international harmonization of aircraft certification standards and practices.

Our program priorities are:

ÊÊÊÊÊFIRST: Continued operational safety including surveillance.

ÊÊÊÊÊSECOND: Safety standards, policies, and procedures.

ÊÊÊÊÊTHIRD: Type, production, and airworthiness certification."

Text of 1 May 98 letter from Congressman Farr:

"Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for contacting me recently regarding your ongoing interest in the forward cargo door of TWA flight 800. I appreciated hearing from you.

I am, of course, glad to help, and am therefore in touch with the appropriate government agency on your behalf. I will write to you again as soon as a response is available, but please let me know if there is anything further that I can do for you in the interim.

Sincerely,

Sam Farr
Member of Congress

Text of 12/19/86 email Senator McCain:

Dear Mr. Smith,

Thank you again for contacting me with your concerns regarding the potential hazards involving Boeing 747s.

As you know, I have passed the information you sent to Chris Paul and he has informed me of your findings. I have since forwarded the material you sent to the Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee for their review.

Again, thank you for contacting me. I am always glad to have the opportunity to be of assistance.

Sincerely,
John McCain
U.S. Senator
JM/jes

Excerpt of 4 Mar 98 letter from Senator John McCain to me: "I have received your letter regarding the forward cargo door of TWA Flight 800, and your interest in meeting with someone at the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) relating your concerns.

I have contacted the NTSB on your behalf, about your concerns. I have asked for a prompt response to be sent directly to you."

FAA and NTSB and manufacturers are taking efforts to inspect fuel tank wiring on all airliners. Cargo door wiring on Boeing 747s should also be inspected. A wiring caused inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door of TWA 800 in flight should also be investigated.

It's prudent.

1. Check known faulty Poly X wiring in cargo door areas of early 747s for chafed to bare wires.
2. Figure out explanation of red paint smears, outward peeled skin, and petal bulge at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door of TWA 800.
3. Attempt to locate missing eighty percent of forward cargo door by either finding it in Orange Zone, Calverton hangar, or from the bottom of the ocean.
4. Meet face to face with a citizen, as the suggestion of Senator McCain, to discuss and consider real evidence as discovered in research of NTSB and FAA documents regarding wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800.

Following the example of Congressman Farr of open discussion of TWA 800 and the inclusion of relevant correspondence in letters, I have put all your correspondence to me on my web site www.corazon.com. All emails and scanned letters are seen at [<http://www.corazon.com/correspondence.html>](http://www.corazon.com/correspondence.html)

Democracy and the internet in action.

Regards,

John Barry Smith
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
408 659 3552
barry@corazon.com

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: June 5, 1998 9:43:50 AM PDT
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: **Inspect cargo door wiring too.**

Sam Farr
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Congress of the United States
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Dear Mr. Schleede and Official Persons who feel responsibility
in explaining TWA 800, 5 June 1998

There are cracked wires to the bare conductors in the cargo door area of TWA 800 as described by NTSB Systems Exhibit 9A, page 116:

"Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found." Page 47 also states, "Evidence of arcing or short circuiting was found in the fuselage of N93119, (TWA 800) in addition to what was found in the wiring from the raceway below the left cabin floor and near the forward wing spar.

That's a fact and NTSB told me so. To be prudent, determine if the forward cargo door unlatch motor power on wire is among those cracked to the bare wires located by NTSB in TWA 800. NTSB did it before with UAL 811 in AAR 92/02 where a bare chafed wire turned on the forward cargo door unlatch motor. There is a precedent of bare wires in that area causing a fatal accident in a high time Boeing 747. It would be prudent to rule out that event happening again by checking the bare wires discovered by NTSB in TWA 800 wreckage in cargo door area to see if it is the door unlatch motor wire.

True power always wants to know if it may be wrong and immediately take steps to confirm or rebut. True power knows error is weakness and will immediately correct the error to become strong again. Fake power ignores any evidence of error. It is weak and will fail. NTSB discovers the cause and makes recommendations to FAA. FAA orders the manufacturer to fix the problem. The problem is old cracked wiring. I come to

elected officials, NTSB, and FAA officials because only you have to power to persuade the manufacturer to replace defective, old, and chafed wiring if necessary and it is necessary.

Very many, very red, and very large red paint smears exist on TWA 800 above the forward cargo door area on top of normal white paint in between the passenger windows. That's a fact and NTSB showed it to me by presenting the TWA 800 reconstruction photograph in which the many, large, red paint smears are clearly evident. <<http://www.corazon.com/TWA800hullrupture.html>> A precedent has been set of paint transfer marks in that area by UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 90/01 and AAR 92/02. <<http://www.corazon.com/811page42paintondoor.html>>

It would be prudent to confirm or rule out the red paint smears indicating an open cargo door in flight or not. One way would be to examine the cargo door hinge for overtravel impression damage, another precedent set by UAL 811 in NTSB in AAR 92/02. <<http://www.corazon.com/811reportcontentpage.html>>

There is outward peeled skin high up on the right side of TWA 800, also more outward shattered skin on the belly, and most of all, there is outward peeled skin forward of the wing on the right side, centered around the outward petal shaped bulge at the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door. That's a fact and I know that because NTSB presented the photograph of TWA 800 wreckage reconstruction and described the outward peeled skin in NTSB exhibits.

Main deck floor beams above the forward cargo hold were broken downward in UAL 811 during the explosive decompression. That also happened in TWA 800. An explanation

was offered by Mr. James Wildey of NTSB: Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Study, page 20, "The initial opening of the fuselage lower lobe (e.g. LF6A) would have the expected result of rapid depressurization accompanied by collapse of the main deck floor for some distance forward of STA 1000. The red area recovery of interior components as far forward as STA 600 would not be inconsistent with this floor collapse and associated structural breakup."

The red paint smears and the outward peeled skin strongly indicate the forward cargo door opened in flight, an opinion shortly held by Mr. Fred Schalekamp of FAA:

30 Jan 1998 letter from Neil Schalekamp, FAA, to JBS: "The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT."

That's a fact and NTSB and FAA told me so in a letter and shown in sooting diagrams in exhibits. To not see the very red, very many, and very large unusual paint smears, and to not see the outward, not inward, peeled skin is to defy reality. The red smears, downward floor beams, and the outward skin are there and strongly indicate cargo door opened in flight based on physics and precedent.

The forward cargo door did open in flight, but not by the overpressure of a center tank explosion because the cargo door pieces were unsooted, just like the forward pieces of the center fuel tank.

What else could cause the forward cargo door to open inflight? There is a precedent, UAL 811, as described in NTSB AAR

90/01 and AAR 92/02 in which a high time Boeing 747 suffered a hull rupture in flight forward of the wing which left a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut to the FDR, paint transfer marks in cargo door area, and outward peeled skin, all caused by chafed to bare wire conductor in the cargo door area. <<http://www.corazon.com/811reportcontentpage.html>>

TWA 800 had a hull rupture forward of the wing which left a sudden loud sound on the CVR and an abrupt power cut to the FDR, paint transfer marks in cargo door area, outward peeled skin, and chafed to bare wire conductor discovered in cargo door area.

That is enough of a match to justify inspection of cargo door wiring in early Boeing 747s irrespective of other corroborative evidence of faulty Poly-X wiring discovered in Boeing airliners under NTSB and FAA orders.

Bare shorted wires have also caused fires in forward cargo holds of Boeing 747s before.

NTSB Exhibit 9C, Attachments to the Systems Group Factual Report page 44, 45, 46. "1996, burning smell in forward cargo compartment, found damaged wiring shorted to ground, charring found.

B. Oct 12, 1996, Wire bundle arcing and resultant fire at aft bulkhead of forward lower lobe cargo hold on 747-200 freighter."

It would be prudent to inspect cargo door wiring in the forward cargo hold of early 747s since that wiring has been shown to be faulty in general, early Boeing airliner wiring has been shown to be faulty in particular, UAL 811, and faulty cargo door area

wiring has shown up in the same area on a new fatal accident, TWA 800.

A solution to the mystery of the ignition source of the fireball and center tank fire may well be a foddred and on fire engine number 3 igniting disintegrating wing fuel tanks thousands of feet lower and seconds later than the initial event.

TWA 800 engine number three shows foreign object damage, fire, and uncontainment in the NTSB powerplant report and the structures report.

Exhibit 8A, page 11, paragraph 3, discussing results of engine 3 disassembly, "Of the 46 fan blades in the fan rotor, 21 blades with complete or partial airfoils and 6 root sections were recovered. All of the fan blades had sooting on the convex airfoil surfaces. Most of the full length airfoils were bent rearward and the tips outboard of the outer midspan shroud were bent forward slightly. About half of the fan blades had impact damage to the leading and trailing edges. Almost all of the impact damage to the airfoils could be matched to contact with the midspan shroud on an adjacent blade. One full length blade had four soft body impacts along the leading edge and a partial airfoil had a soft body impact, which had some streaking extending rearward."

Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard trailing edge.

A prudent action would be to rule in or rule out the precedent of

UAL 811 applied to TWA 800. A risky action is to ignore many large red paint smears, downward broken floor beams, and much outward peeled skin and their clear implication of cargo door open in flight. The red paint smears will not fade away; they will always be many, large, and red in the photographs on the NTSB CD-ROM. The floorbeams will always be broken in Exhibit 18A. The outward peeled skin will always be shattered outward on the belly, the upper fuselage, and around the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door in the photographs of TWA 800 on the NTSB CD-ROM. Engine number three will always be sooted, blades missing, and have soft body impacts as shown by NTSB Exhibit 8A.

A more prudent action is to ground all Boeing 747s with Poly-X wiring for total inspections and replacement of that wiring. A total wiring inspection casts the net wider to catch faulty wiring. By inspecting all the wiring to include the fuel tank wiring, the yaw damper wiring, and the known previously faulty cargo door power wiring, all wiring can all be cleared as intact and pose no danger of shorting on, as has happened before fatally.

I understand the difficulty and turmoil the grounding would cause. Boeing would have much work to rewire the planes if necessary. If not feasible, new airliners would have to be built and the grounded ones used for parts, similar to what the Navy has done with their Poly-X F-14 Tomcats.

Am I a traitor? Does my belief of a wiring cargo door fault for TWA 800 and other early 747s hurt my country? Specifically, the Northwest quadrant which has an economy derived from the design, manufacture, and selling of 747s.

Here's my answer to myself on that one. No, I am not a traitor, I

am a patriot. Here's why.

Seattle is successful and must remain so. Seattle is successful because nearby is built successful airplanes. Successful airplanes are the best selling ones. The best selling ones are the most made ones. The most made ones are the ones that make the most money. The ones that make the most money are the ones that fly the most. The ones that fly the most are the safest ones. The safest airplane is the most successful airplane. Period.

So, to present an explanation for an unsafe event, the crash of TWA 800, an early Boeing 747, is a good thing to do, even if proven wrong later. The goal is to make safe airplanes which will fly the most and be sold the most and be made the most, thereby keeping our country's economy thriving.

My personal goal is to prevent death by preventing airplane crashes by preventing hull ruptures in flight on early 747s by preventing cracked bare wires shorting on the door unlatch motor thereby allowing the aft midspan latch to rupture and allow the middle of the forward cargo door to burst open causing a large explosive decompression which allows the 300 knot slipstream to tear nose off. This inner goal was determined by the selfless action of my pilot who saved my life in a sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash years ago and which I have never forgotten.

It is the duty of aviation professionals to strive to explain TWA 800. And yet, this loyal citizen is rebuffed when presenting to NTSB NTSB derived evidence of a supplemental explanation to TWA 800. Why is that?

If I can't have a real conversation with NTSB or FAA officials regarding TWA 800, here is an imaginary one that sums up the

past two years.

JBS: "Hello, NTSB, I'm answering your plea for public assistance regarding the cause of TWA 800."

NTSB: "What do you want?"

"I believe the initial event is moisture meeting chafed to bare wire and shorting on cargo door motor to unlatch position causing rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door in flight leading to thirty by forty foot hole of explosive decompression which allows 300 knot slipstream to tear nose off which leads to disintegrating aft fuselage, wings, and tail which ignite into fireball when fiery foddred engine number three meets vaporizing fuel thousands of feet lower and seconds later."

"No."

"There are many similarities to an event that happened before, UAL 811, and TWA 800."

"You're crazy. Who are you?"

"Commercial licensed pilot, instrument rated, 1000 PIC hours, Navy jet navigator, aircraft owner, FAA Part 135 certificate holder, avionics technician, and survivor of sudden night fiery fatal jet airplane crash talking about a sudden night fiery fatal jet airplane crash."

"Go away."

"The evidence of red paint smears, outward peeled skin, and petal bulge at aft midspan latch support conclusion forward cargo

door opened in flight, just like UAL 811."

"I'm ignoring you and will not respond to further comments."

"You are safety aviation officials who say you turn over every stone, who check out every explanation, who really want to know what happened to TWA 800, regardless of cause. Listen to me; talk to me."

"You are a wacky guy on the internet, you are bothering the real investigators and getting in the way, you have been told over and over again in great detail that you are wrong and we are right, you don't have your basic facts straight about the door, you should check with us before you say your nonsense to others, and you are a flake and we don't like you."

"Maybe, but so what? The messenger's style is independent of the truth of his content. Moisture and shorted wiring caused the crash of TWA 800. Why do you not ask questions to me, as real investigators do, as I ask you?"

"We don't ask questions of citizens that we don't already know the answers to, we just make statements such as this: No, you're wrong, you're crazy, go away, we will not respond, goodbye, and thank you your for your interest in aviation safety."

Below is real:

10 March 1998 letter of John B. Drake of NTSB to JBS :

"We consider our correspondence on this subject to be complete. Should you continue to reiterate your position on this issue in future correspondence, you should expect no further response from the Safety Board."

30 Jan 1998 letter of Neil Schalekamp of FAA to JBS :

"Please note that this office will no longer be responding to your further inquiries about these same concerns, including your February 6 and February 9 letters that I just received."

17 March 1998 letter of Jim Hall of NTSB to JBS :

"We do not believe a meeting is necessary to further discuss this issue."

Summarized conversation between me and ordinary citizens who visit my web site:

Visitor: "What does NTSB and FAA say when you tell them about wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800?"

JBS: "They write that all cargo doors were all latched, all locked, and all intact at water impact, they have told me that over and over again and they will not respond to any further inquiries from me."

"What do they say about the red paint smears?"

"They pretend they don't exist except one FAA official who did but changed his mind and now pretends they don't exist."

"What do they say about the outward peeled skin?"

"They say it was caused by inward water impact."

"What do they say about the petal outward bulge at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door?"

"They pretend it does not exist except one FAA official who did

but changed his mind and now pretends it doesn't exist."

"What do they say about the missing manual locking handle, the two overpressure relief doors, the viewing ports, the torque tubes, the two pull-in hooks, the midspan latches, and the other eighty percent of forward cargo door skin?"

"They say they are unimportant."

"What do they say about the Orange Zone pieces, the possible mixup in cargo door sills, the unsooted pieces of center fuel tank, the thirty by forty foot shattered skin zone forward of the wing on the right side, the chafed to bare wire discovery in cargo door area, and the many significant matches to UAL 811?"

"Nothing. They say nothing. Well, actually they told me to go away, and stay away."

"Have you gone to your congressman?"

"Yes, Sam Farr, and he has asked many time to NTSB and FAA for information."

"What happened?"

"They wrote to him that the door was all latched, all locked, all intact at water impact, they have told me that many times, and thanked him for his interest in aviation safety."

"Did you contact any other elected politician?"

"Yes, Senator John McCain, jet plane crash survivor and Chairman of the Committee that oversees NTSB."

"What happened?"

"He reviewed my data and submitted it to his committee for review. He asked me to wait until the hearings. He asked the NTSB to meet with me to related my concerns about the forward cargo door of TWA 800."

"What happened?"

"The Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation still has the matter under review, I waited until the hearings, I went to the hearings. The suggested meeting by Senator McCain between NTSB officials and me was refused by Chairman Hall of NTSB saying there was sufficient evidence to rule out the cargo door opening in flight, he has told me that many times in great detail and a meeting was not necessary."

"Have you tried the press?"

"Yes, I've had several radio and TV interviews. Some get airplay and some don't."

"Have you tried Boeing?"

"Yes, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas both contacted before the merger. The two safety officers were polite and referred me to NTSB. Boeing engineers referred me to the Public Relations office of Boeing. The Boeing Public Relations office referred me to the NTSB. NTSB told me to go away."

"Have you tried the internet?"

Yes, I have a 1200 page, 100 meg website which has been online since July, 1996 and visited about 70000 times, according to page counters."

"What are you doing now?"

"I'm continuing to write to appropriate officials presenting the evidence and trusting it will speak for itself. It's not going to go away."

"Have you tried calling them?"

"No, my wife and daughter were approached in my home by two armed federal agents within twenty four hours of me posting an email to Senator McCain about Air Force One crashing. Calling on the telephone out of the blue would be much too aggressive. Prior to the Secret Service interrogation, phone calls usually ended up with the official shouting and hanging up. So now I continue to write non-threatening, polite, full of facts letters and emails."

"Are you saying government public safety aviation officials in writing refuse to adequately respond to your request for a meeting to discuss facts, evidence, documents, photos, which clearly indicate a forward cargo door opening in flight on TWA 800?"

"Yes."

"They will not call you, write to you, or respond to polite letters with sources listed?"

"Nope."

"Are these the same guys that say safety is priority number one, they will turn over every stone, never give up to get a full explanation, and respond to every public inquiry?"

"Yup."

"Who are you? A wacky guy on the 'net?"

"Maybe, although I use government AARs for sources, and I'm also a survivor of a sudden night fiery fatal jet airplane crash, a commercial licensed pilot, instrument rated, FAA Part 135 certificate holder, light aircraft owner, jet carrier navigator, avionics technician including radar operator, and a retired military officer in a converted garage with a computer and a phone line."

"And you've tried for almost two years to meet face to face with the public officials involved with TWA 800?"

"Yes."

What happened?

"Nothing yet. But I'm still trying. It's only been two years for TWA 800. The investigation is open and active. The evidence is not changing or going away."

And I am still trying:

Real facts presented by NTSB about TWA 800 in exhibits, photographs, text, drawings, and testimony:

1. right horizontal stab has red paint smear
2. stator blade in right horizontal stab behind engine number 3
3. inward crush top of cargo door
4. top of cargo door attached to hinge
5. petal shape of rupture area around aft midspan latch
6. missing pieces of forward cargo door include locking handle, latching pins, overpressure relief doors, midspan latches
7. rectangle visible of explosive decompression zone of outward peeled skin on right side forward of the wing on right side
8. downward movement of floor beams near cargo door
9. hoop stresses found
10. CVR sudden loud sound
11. FDR abrupt power cut
12. missing turbine blades in engine number 3.
13. soft body impacts on blades in engine number 3.
14. outward peeled skin near top of nose, under belly, and in cargo door area.
15. red paint smears above cargo door on white paint
16. soot on most blades of engine 3.
17. starboard side more damaged than port side
18. intact R2 door near shattered cargo door.
19. poly x is known to be susceptible to chafing and present
20. section 41 is known to be weak
21. history of cargo door openings in past in various airliners
22. EPR problems on aircraft before or during fatal flight.
23. fires in forward cargo hold in the past on Boeing 747s.
24. vertical tears in fuselage skin forward of the wing on the right side
25. single marks on right side of fuselage show burnt skin, then abruptly at tear line there are no single marks
26. red paint rubbed off revealing white paint underneath on skin above cargo door area
27. first pieces off plane came from forward cargo hold just

forward of the wing

28. at least nine missing never recovered bodies, just fragments

29. initially thought to be a bomb

30. wreckage debris shows cargo door shattered in many pieces

31. aft portion of forward door which includes aft midspan latch and locking handle missing from recovery effort

32. no soot on maintenance hatch

33. no soot on front spar of center wing tank

34. no burned bodies forward of the wing and very few burned at all

35. aft cargo door sill, latches, and locks recovered

36. forward cargo door sill, latches, and locks not recorded in data base

37. no orange zone pieces recorded in database

38. no orange zone discussion in public record other than identification

39. chafed to bare wires found in cargo door area

40. wiring defects found on Boeing airliners

41. water observed pouring out of forward cargo hold of a Boeing airliner, cargo holds have bilges.

42. no soot on keel beam forward of the wing

43. compression fractures right side forward of the wing

44. tension fractures left side forward of the wing

45. seats in the rows in the explosive shatter zone above cargo door are in red zone and not sooted

46. aft cargo door sill is sooted

47. many witnesses said they saw downward streak that was red-orange

48. NTSB official said possibility of forward door popping open was intriguing.

49. FAA official said, then recanted, that paint smears and structural deformation indicated outward explosion.

50. initial event time was 20:31:12 at 13700 on 17 July 1996

eight miles off coast of Long Island.

Reasonable conclusions derived from facts above:

1. water in forward cargo bay.
2. chafed bare wire touched by water.
3. electrical short occurs.
4. forward door motor turns on to unlatch position.
5. aft midspan latch of forward cargo door partially unlatches.
6. pressurized hull ruptures at aft midspan latch.
7. cargo door tears into pieces, some pieces stay with nose, some don't.
8. shiny metal pieces spin away reflecting evening sunlight and perceived as red-orange streak to observers far away.
9. explosive decompression occurs shattering cargo door area forward of the wing on right side exposing twenty foot by forty foot hole in nose producing sudden loud sound on CVR.
10. 300 knots slipstream tears weakened nose off.
11. ejected debris is ingested by starboard engines which catch fire.
12. wing and wing fuel tanks; engines, tail, and fuselage fall and disintegrate on way down.
13. fiery starboard engine ignites fuel vapor clouds from disintegrating tanks, including center tank.
14. fireball observed on the ground.
15. water impact of wreckage, cargo bay material first to hit water.

I may not be alone: "NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilots saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said." AW&ST 3/10/97

Regarding the Aviation Week and Space Technology article quoted above, the following is supplied: <<http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html>>

Monica Warnock
Washington Bureau
Aviation Week & Space Technology

Dear Ms. Monica Warnock,

21 May 1998

You wrote to me:> You must remove these articles and any other Aviation Week copyrighted material from your website immediately, or we will consider legal action.

I replied>Consider it done. And not because you threatened me, but because you may be right."

Ms. Warnock, I now believe you to be wrong.

I'm putting the 10 March 97 Aviation Week and Space Technology article in dispute back up on my web site at www.corazon.com at one minute after midnight on 1 June 1998.

Here's why: The content is everything and the content of the article is very, very important. I agree with the content. AvWeek agrees with content. The public officials quoted in your article agree with the content. The content quotes a public NTSB official who says that the cause of TWA 800 may have been forward door popping open. It also said the streak seen before TWA 800 crash may have been reflection off the skin of aircraft. I agree with that. It is very important. Let us call it the door pop

streak article.

Ms. Warnock, you have done your job well by searching the web for Avweek articles. You found one. You then followed orders and directed it be removed. It was removed. The problem is now above your level of authority. So I direct my comments to your boss: Mary Francis Koerner, the Manager of Bureaus.

Will you please see that this letter goes to her?

Dear Ms. Koerner, I am told several things:

1. Get the door pop streak article off my web site.
2. I should ask permission to put AvWeek articles on web site.
3. Permission will be denied.

I asked permission. It was denied. You were right.

You have done all you can do. The problem is now above your level of authority. I assume you would refer me to 'The Lawyers.' I direct my statements to the lawyers.

Will you please see that this letter goes to them?

Dear AvWeek lawyers:

Ah, copyright, don't you love it?

My name is John Barry Smith. I have a 1200 page, 100 meg website at www.corazon.com mainly devoted to high time Boeing 747 accidents in which the hull ruptures in flight forward of the wing. It contains mostly government scanned in aviation accident reports, AARs, and occasionally copyrighted material

from media, such as yours.

Please note, let us stipulate:

1. My site is non profit. I have not made a penny on anything related to that website. In fact, much of my money has gone out, nothing has come in, a problem as my wife will attest.
2. It is research oriented with airplane crash related comments, investigations, reports, pictures, and text.
3. I give full and clear credit to the sources I quote. AvWeek was clearly stated as the author of the door pop streak 10 Mar 97 article in question. In fact, that is very important, that's why I quote clearly and give credit to Aviation Week by scanning in the entire article instead of paraphrasing, which would be quicker to download but not have the authority of the best aviation magazine on the planet, Aviation Week and Space Technology. And I omitted the advertising on the pages, too.

Now for argument:

1. I stole nothing from you.
2. It's fair use.
3. I can publish that article without your permission if certain conditions are met, and are: Non profit, small parts used, and credit given.

"Fair use and implied licenses.

Fair use is a legal license to use others' work, whether they approve or not. It constitutes one of the most important, and least clear cut, limits to copyright. The basic problem is that words like "fair" or "reasonable" cannot be defined with the precision non-lawyers (or many law students) would like. Until 20 years

ago, fair use did not appear in U.S. legislation, but it now occupies about half of the copyright statute. In the U.S., partial or limited reproduction of another's work may be permitted under this doctrine.

On the one hand, fair use offers an especially liberal defense to uses that advance public interests such as education or scholarship. On the other hand, it is unlikely to be available if one fails to credit the original artist or author. It is not apt to be available to those who profit or interfere with original artists' or authors' ability to derive income from their works."

" 1998 Franklin Pierce Law Center. All rights reserved." (I hope I have fair use to quote the above.)

I believe I advance the public interest in aviation safety, I credit the original speaker, the reporter, and the magazine, and I do not profit from it. I have fair use.

Conclusion: It will take a Judge to order me to remove the 10 March 97 AvWeek article from my website after it is put back up on 1 June 1998 or to permit me to continue to post it.

So, Lawyers, the problem is above your level of authority. I turn my attention to the Managing Editor:

Will you please see that this letter goes to him?

Dear Managing Editor,

What's the beef? You and your reporter, David Fulghum, have done a fine piece of work. You have pinpointed the cause of a mystery crash now under current investigation, TWA 800. It was the door popping open in flight. The NTSB official you quoted was correct. The streak was the skin spinning away reflecting

evening red orange sunlight to observers below. The official was correct and he was quoted correctly by your aviation reporter. The implications of the truth you printed are profound. The cause now leads to chafed wiring shorting on cargo door unlatch motor and allowing rupture at aft midspan latch of forward cargo door which opened in flight. Exactly as has happened before with UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 92/02. The 300 knot slipstream tore the nose off TWA 800 because the explosive decompression shatter zone was much bigger on TWA 800 than on UAL 811, as shown by NTSB reconstruction photo of TWA 800 wreckage.

I encourage you to do a follow up story on the wiring/cargo door explanation as described on the website in question, www.corazon.com. Mr. Fulghum and Mr. McKenna are familiar with the details of TWA 800 and wiring cargo door explanation.

Attached:

1. Correspondence between AvWeek Ms. Warnock and me.
2. Three .jpgs of the images published on website of 10 March door pop streak article.
3. Recent email to Government officials regarding this matter. Please note accurate numbers and sources given.

So, I must publish your copyrighted material, the 10 March 97 article on my website at URL <http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html> on June 1, 1998.

I'm at email barry@corazon.com or 408 659 3552 or 551 Country Club Drive, Carmel Valley, CA 93924.

I encourage discussion regarding this matter. It's a hot story even though almost two years old. Wiring is the main culprit, not the door, not the center tank. NSTB is in the right church but the wrong pew. Wiring is the problem and it's in places other than the fuel tank tubes. It's in the cargo door unlatching motor circuits.

Cheers,
John Barry Smith

From: monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
Date: Thu, 14 May 98 10:24:37 -0500
To: <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Aviation Week
Mime-Version: 1.0

To: barry@corazon.com

Dear Sir,

Your website "<http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html>" contains several scanned-in pictures of the Aviation Week & Space Technology article "ANG Pilot: TWA Hit By Object," March 10, 1997. Our records do not show that you requested permission to use these articles on your website.

Aviation Week & Space Technology is covered by copyright law which states that permission must be granted before our material is

used.

Your website is in violation of this law. You must remove these

articles and any other Aviation Week copyrighted material from your website immediately, or we will consider legal action.

Sincerely,
Monica Warnock
Washington Bureau
Aviation Week & Space Technology
monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
(202)383-2314

To: monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Request permission to present article on website.
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:

To: barry@corazon.com

Dear Sir,

Your website "<http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html>" contains several scanned-in pictures of the Aviation Week & Space Technology article "ANG Pilot: TWA Hit By Object," March 10, 1997. Our records do not show that you requested permission to use these articles on

your website.

Dear Madam, 14 May 1998

A thousand pardons. I immediately request permission to reprint Aviation Week & Space Technology article "ANG Pilot: TWA Hit By Object," March 10, 1997 on my website, www.corazon.com. (Corazon is my wife's name.)

The reason I scanned in exact image instead of paraphrasing text was to be precise and show source, very important for a research paper.

Should my request be denied, I shall of course, immediately comply with your request and remove the article from my web site.

AWST is a fine magazine and one which I have read diligently for over thirty years. I have watched AWST's web site mature as time goes on. <http://awgnet.com/awgnews.htm> is on my bookmarks list and I check it first thing every morning. I'm in your database of subscribers. Keep up the good work!

Regarding this life and death matter of a sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash about which I have published a 1200 page website presenting my shorted wiring opening forward cargo door in flight explanation to the general public in a non profit effort:

1. You surely understand I can not alter my website just on an unsolicited email out of the blue from:

Monica Warnock
Washington Bureau

Aviation Week & Space Technology
monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
(202)383-2314

The absence of title indicates your request may be personal in nature and not official. Please confirm your official title which corresponds to your request that I delete an article from AWST from my site. You may be spoofing me and my asking for credentials is prudent and an established protocol.

2. Your response indicates an interest in the subject of TWA 800. Could you refer a reporter to me so I can present my wiring/cargo door explanation to him/her? I would appreciate the opinion of an aviation professional regarding my nine years of amateur research into hull ruptures of hour high time Boeing 747s. Your reporter, David Fuhlgum, in the referenced article, was able to elicit important material from NTSB officials regarding TWA 800; the forward door may have popped open in flight, and the streak may have been pieces of the aircraft reflecting evening sun. I am able to amplify those observations by an anonymous NTSB 'second official' using NTSB documents and photographs. It's a good story and one worthy of AWST's interest. FAA, NSTB, and Boeing are all saying wiring in older Boeing airliners is fraying and shorting causing problems, and so am I, long before the officials came to the realization.

3. >or we will consider legal action.

Why, O why did you threaten me? Your first contact, out of the blue, and it contains a threat of 'legal action'. What does that mean? I don't think it means a good thing. It just sets a wrong tone. Is politeness gone from even presentations about a plane

crash?

4. >Your website is in violation of this law.

Whoa! You are calling me a criminal? Just like that? I'm breaking the law? I'm a lawbreaker? This is very disturbing. Maybe that's the way AWST works with the big boys who only respond to threats, not to polite requests with explanation attached. I'm not a big boy. I'm a retired military officer working out of a converted garage in California. I don't like anybody telling me I'm breaking the law unless it's a policeman, judge, or jury. And I still don't like it, but I obey. I really can't tell my friends that I changed my cherished web site because of a strange unauthenticated email from some babe named Monica at McGraw-Hill, now can I? I mean, am I a man or a mouse?

See, a threat always turns a pleasant conversation into stressful one. Squeek, squeek.

To review:

1. I respectfully request permission to display scanned in images of Aviation Week & Space Technology article "ANG Pilot: TWA Hit By Object," March 10, 1997 on my personal website, www.corazon.com.

2. Please to show credentials, madam.

4. Refer reporter to me regarding a subject that you feel strongly enough to want to affect with correspondence, TWA 800.

5. Keep up the good work covering aviation subjects around the world.

Cheers,

John Barry Smith
551 Country Club Drive,
Carmel Valley, CA 93924
408 659 3552
barry@corazon.com
www.corazon.com

From: monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com
Date: Thu, 14 May 98 13:48:41 -0500
To: <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Re: Request permission to present article on website.
Mime-Version: 1.0

Dear Mr. Barry,

I am an editorial assistant in the Washington Bureau of
Aviation Week
& Space Technology. I work for Mary Francis Koerner. She
is the
Manager of Bureaus and she is the official contact for Reprints
&
Permission. We will periodically search the web for Aviation
Week on
outside websites and that is what brought me to your site.

Unfortunately, at present, Aviation Week & Space Technology
does not
allow its material to be reprinted on any websites other than
our own.

We appreciate your interest in Aviation Week & Space

Technology;

however, we must ask that you remove the article from your website, as

you have indicated you are willing to do.

My interest in this regard is not related to TWA800 but protecting the

magazine in general. Many people are not aware of the rules regarding

copyright on the internet. You may reference the section "Photocopy

and Rights & Permission" on the Contact Us page of Aviation Week if

you have any future requests for permission.

James McKenna would be the best editor to send your correspondence to

regarding TWA 800. He is located in the Washington bureau:
1200 G

Street, NW Suite 922, Washington, DC 20005. (202)
383-2332.

I will mail you a hard copy of this letter on Aviation Week & Space

Technology letterhead to satisfy any concerns you might have about my

identity. Thank you for your understanding.

Monica Warnock

Editorial Assistant, Washington Bureau

Aviation Week & Space Technology

To: monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Subject: Re: Request permission to present article on website.
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:

Dear Mr. Barry,

I am an editorial assistant in the Washington Bureau of
Aviation Week
& Space Technology. I work for Mary Francis Koerner. She is
the
Manager of Bureaus and she is the official contact for Reprints
&
Permission. We will periodically search the web for Aviation
Week on
outside websites and that is what brought me to your site.

Dear Ms. Monica,

Thank you for your prompt reply. I am saddened by the denial to
present the AWST article on my web site. I shall search through
it and delete it. Do I need permission to post your email in its
place to explain why the article was deleted? I should explain
why the article was removed to squelch any conspiracy coverup
nonsense that pervades this TWA 800 investigation.

Unfortunately, at present, Aviation Week & Space Technology
does not
allow its material to be reprinted on any websites other than
our own.

So sad.

We appreciate your interest in Aviation Week & Space Technology;

however, we must ask that you remove the article from your website, as you have indicated you are willing to do.

As soon as I am finished with this upcoming TV interview about wiring/cargo door explanation, I will. The TV station is KOMO-TV, Channel 4, ABC, in Seattle Washington and the arrive within the hour. I'm preparing for it so am unable now to find page, delete, change links, upload it to server right now. But how long to I have? Is 48 hours OK?

My interest in this regard is not related to TWA800 but protecting the magazine in general. Many people are not aware of the rules regarding copyright on the internet. You may reference the section "Photocopy and Rights & Permission" on the Contact Us page of Aviation Week if you have any future requests for permission.

Protecting the magazine? Well, OK, if you say so. I feel that quoting AWST in a non profit website about aviation safety helps AWST, but what do I know.

James McKenna would be the best editor to send your correspondence to regarding TWA 800. He is located in the Washington bureau: 1200 G Street, NW Suite 922, Washington, DC 20005. (202)

383-2332.

Thank you very much, ma'm, and I shall. I shall say you referred me, is that OK?

I will mail you a hard copy of this letter on Aviation Week & Space

Technology letterhead to satisfy any concerns you might have about my

identity. Thank you for your understanding.

Fine, can I put that on my website?

Let me get back to you on this. I will delete offending article and then send you URL of the new page so you can confirm I have cleansed the dirty deed.

Cheers,
John Barry Smith

Monica Warnock
Editorial Assistant, Washington Bureau
Aviation Week & Space Technology

From: monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com

Date: Thu, 14 May 98 14:47:54 -0500

To: <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: Re[2]: Request permission to present article on website.

Mime-Version: 1.0

Mr. Smith,

I will mail your letter today. When it arrives, you are welcome

to

place it on your website. We understand that you are busy right now-

as long you are able to delete the pages by next Friday, that's fine

with us. The complete URL is

<<http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html>>

If you do contact Mr. McKenna, you may tell him I referred you. Again,

thank you for your interest in Aviation Week.

Monica Warnock

Editorial Assistant, Washington Bureau

Aviation Week & Space Technology

To: monica_warnock@mcgraw-hill.com

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: Done

Cc:

Bcc:

X-Attachments:

Dear Ms. Warnock,

You must remove these

articles and any other Aviation Week copyrighted material from your

website immediately, or we will consider legal action.

Consider it done. And not because you threatened me, but because you may be right.

<http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html>

is the URL which now has deleted article. Completed 6:57PM 14 May 97, nine hours after your request. The TV interview went swimmingly. In fact, the interviewer from KOMO TV ABC Seattle, asked that I send him an email of the article in question. He was interested to hear about your request.

I just want you to know that you have made an old man very very sad. I shall have to research the web, as is my wont, to find out for sure if the copyright laws exist to keep non profit websites from fairly using one article of a magazine to support an aviation safety hypothesis. I make no money from this site, on the contrary, it costs me money to keep it up. The site is 1200 pages deep with on one page assigned to article. The goal of the website is aviation safety, a common goal with Aviation Week. The officials quoted on the article are public officials whose comments are public.

It seems to me that permission should not be necessary for me to put your article on my website as long as I give credit to the author and make no money from it.

It seems to me that when permission was requested to put the article on my website, permission should have been granted.

You said 'protect your magazine,' as motive for requesting I delete the article. Protection from whom? Me? Aviation Week needs protection from me? I am a retired guy working out of a converted garage with a computer and a modem. You have nothing to fear from me, we are on the same side, aviation safety.

Regardless, the excellent article by David Fulghum in the March 10, 1997 issue has been deleted at your request. Should it

become apparent that I do have the fair right to use your article under conditions which I fulfill, then, pop! up it goes again. I shall let you know in advance so you may attempt to dissuade me if you wish. It just seems that a guy ought to be able to pull out old magazine articles to quote from when he's trying to persuade visitors of an aviation safety point. In case I'm wrong, and I'm never wrong, I have erred on the side of safety and complied with your request.

Cheers,
John Barry Smith

Mr. Smith,

I will mail your letter today. When it arrives, you are welcome to place it on your website. We understand that you are busy right now-

as long as you are able to delete the pages by next Friday, that's fine

with us. The complete URL is

<<http://www.corazon.com/800avweekintrigue.html>>

If you do contact Mr. McKenna, you may tell him I referred you. Again,

thank you for your interest in Aviation Week.

Monica Warnock
Editorial Assistant, Washington Bureau
Aviation Week & Space Technology

DAVID A. FULGHUM/WASHINGTON

Two New York Air National Guard pilots, with the best view of

the crash of
TWA Flight 800 last July, are disagreeing about what they saw
immediately
before destruction of the Boeing 747-131 jetliner.

One believes the airliner was struck by a fast-moving object
coming from the
east, while the other saw only a fiery trail from the west.

However, both believe a violent explosion ripped the aircraft
apart,
propelling some of its passengers high enough that they did not
hit the
water's surface until 3-4 min. after the initial explosion.

Maj. Frederick C. Meyer, pilot of an HH-60 helicopter from the
ANG's 106th
Rescue Wing, has just been freed from an FBI gag order
preventing him from
giving interviews about the 1996 disaster off Long Island, N.Y.
The copilot,
Capt. Christian Baur, remains under FBI restrictions not to speak
about the
accident. But two officials familiar with his testimony told
Aviation Week &
Space Technology in detail what he told investigators.

In the days immediately after the accident, before being ordered
not to
speak, Meyer discussed his initial impressions with news media
(AW&ST July
29, 1996, p. 32). Last week, he chose Aviation Week as the first
news

organization to hear a detailed account of his recollections and his testimony to federal investigators.

Meyer and Baur were in one of the wing's two aircraft operating north of the crash site. The helicopter was operating over Long Island about 12 mi. north of the TWA crash site. Baur, the copilot, was at the controls practicing instrument approaches. The crew was awaiting darkness so they could begin training with night vision goggles.

The key point on which the two pilots disagree is whether a streak of light appeared from the opposite direction of the flight of TWA 800 (which was flying from west to east after takeoff from Kennedy Airport), a possible indication of an intercepting missile or some other object.

Meyer's attention was first called to the area of the sky where the accident occurred "by a streak of light moving from my right (west) to my left (east)," the same direction as the TWA flight, he said.

Baur's account differs on this point. According to the two officials who have heard both pilots' accounts, Baur, on the left side of the cockpit, saw a streak moving from left to right toward the approaching TWA

aircraft before
the initial explosion.

"Almost due south [of the helicopter], there was a hard white light, like burning pyrotechnics, in level flight," Baur told investigators from the National Transportation Safety Board, FBI and a Federal anti-terrorist task force. "I was trying to figure out what it was. It was the wrong color for flares. It struck an object coming from the right and made it explode."

Baur's first impression was that there had been a midair collision, possibly between two light aircraft that tow banners along the beach.

"They had witnessed these aircraft come very close to each other at that time of day, and that's what they assumed," the second official said.

NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilots saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the second official said.

Meyer could not actually see the aircraft, but only the streak, and he admits

that Baur, a younger man, has better eyesight. Moreover, Meyer adds,

"Whatever Chris saw on the left side I didn't see because he blocked my view." Baur disputes this, saying that the explosions and crash were virtually dead ahead of the aircraft.

The helicopter was executing a missed approach and was about halfway down

Runway 24 at the Francis S. Gabreski International Airport at Westhampton

Beach, N.Y. It had started a climbing left turn to the south when the

accident occurred. The Sun had not yet set and the sky was still bright.

According to Meyer, the streak was about 15-20 deg. above his line of sight

and perhaps 15 deg. left of the aircraft's centerline.

"I don't know if it was a missile that struck the airliner," Meyer said.

"Nothing at that moment said 'missile' to me. I spent a number of years in

Vietnam and had seen missiles fired, some of them at me. But, that was

25-year-old missile technology, which left smoke trails. I understand today

that they are made with smokeless rocket fuel and don't leave trails. What I

saw was a streak of light, not a smoke trail."

The streak of light that Meyer saw made a very shallow, gradually descending arc. He points out that he never saw the actual airframe of the TWA 747 within the streak or subsequent explosions or smoke trails. It was virtually identical to the trajectory of a meteor, with only a slight curve. But unlike a meteor, the streak was red-orange in color, he said.

Meyer observed the descending streak for 3-5 sec. Then there was what Meyer describes as a hard, very sudden, yellowish-white explosion that looked identical to the detonation of an antiaircraft shell. He did not suggest an antiaircraft weapon was fired at TWA Flight 800, however.

"It left a cloud of smoke just like a flak explosion does," Meyer said. "One to two seconds later, there was a second, hard explosion almost pure white in color. The position of that explosion appeared to be slightly below and behind where one would have anticipated the streak of light to have gone. The trajectory at that point appeared to be slightly bent down and slowed."

A new detail in Meyer's story was that almost immediately there was a third explosion and fireball. Meyer doesn't remember if there was an explosion and

fireball or if the third explosion turned into the fireball.

"That was a soft explosion unlike the first two," Meyer said. "It began as a tiny point and it grew very rapidly into a huge fireball four times the diameter of the Sun. I was dumbstruck."

Baur also saw three explosions. But he contends that they started from left (east) and went to right (west). He said the explosions created a "huge waterfall of flame that cascaded down," the first official said. "The column of flame was being whipped around violently. First it was tumbling, and then it refined itself into a spiral. The explosions were all before the cascade of flame began."

In the helicopter, Baur spoke first, asking if it was pyrotechnics. ANG operations that night were to have included flares dropped by a HC-130 transport aircraft. The crew then called the Gabreski tower.

"We said we'd observed a fireball south of the field and we would like clearance to the beach to investigate," Meyer said. Baur actually made the call and reported a possible midair collision, the second official involved in the investigation said.

The crash time has been variously reported as being from 8:31 to 8:45 p.m., Meyer said. He believes the earlier time is more likely to be correct although he can't be sure.

Baur continued to fly the helicopter during the search while Meyer functioned as copilot and primary communicator. As they approached the crash site, after about 4 min. of flight, debris was still falling so they slowed to avoid being hit.

"As they got closer, within two or three miles, Baur could see the aircraft body, not tumbling, but in a vortex almost like inside a tornado," the second official said.

Meyer made another revelation that was the result of long reflection after the accident.

"I was looking ahead . . . as we approached the crash site," Meyer said. "I saw some debris at 1,200-1,300 ft. falling at terminal velocity and fuselage fragments tumbling at 40-50 mi. per hour. The things falling at high speed were bodies still strapped in their seats. That is logically inconsistent

if they came from the same explosion at the same time. On reflection, I have concluded that the bodies must have been blown upward before they came down. That indicates a violent explosion."

On this point, the two pilots' accounts agree, the officials said.

"Debris was falling like snow," according to Baur's testimony. "Among the particulate there was metal and paper, some of it glowing. Through all of that, things would come racing through -- two or three high-speed objects like sacks of potatoes. I believed them to be bodies that had been blown upward."

The pilots' opinion differ from the conclusion of inspectors that all the passengers were in the fuselage when it ripped apart from aerodynamic forces.

In an attempt to debunk the most egregious coverup and conspiracy theories, Meyer and other ANG officials remain adamant that their unit was not part of any larger, undisclosed, multiservice operation. Operations the night of the crash were standard training flights to maintain currency with night vision goggles, rescue operations and in-air refueling.

The HH-60 flight was to be of about two hours' duration and

would not extend
more than 2 mi. off the Long Island southern coast. The HC-130
would drop
flares, rafts and a para-rescueman and later refuel the helicopter
in a
communications-out, lights-out operation.

"No other people of other services were on the base at the time,"
Meyer said.

Nor were there indications of the operations of drone aircraft,
another
theory that has surfaced as the possible cause of the crash. "No,
there would
have been some kind of notice."

AW&ST 3/10/97

Until the streak is adequately explained, the missile explanation
will always be possible. I say missile explanation will always be
could be, but wasn't. The evidence refutes every missile
explanation suggested event. Likewise for meteor and bomb
explanations, they will always be could have been, but weren't.

The center tank did catch fire and there was a fireball, so center
tank explanation will always be could have been and was, the
only issue is when.

The wiring/ cargo door explanation explains the streak, refutes
the bomb and meteor, and supplements the center tank
explanation.

The wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 is the more
correct, more complete explanation.

I urge that Boeing 747s with Poly-X wiring be grounded until wiring is checked in cargo door areas known to have been faulty in the past.

I again request to meet with NTSB officials to present my wiring/cargo door explanation.

Sincerely,

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www.corazon.com
Citizen: USA
Major: US Army Retired
Pilot: Commercial, instrument rated, FAA Part 135 certificate.
Navigator: RA5C Vigilante
Owner: Mooney M20C
Survivor: Sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: June 12, 1998 2:38:54 PM PDT
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: Red Paint Transfer Marks TWA 800 Cargo Door Area

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Dear Mr. Schleede and Official Persons who feel responsibility
in explaining TWA 800,

Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report,
page 34, A section of the structure outboard of H7 exhibited
evidence of red paint transfer marks on the upper skin (H8); only
the remnants of the shattered logo light window remain in the
window frame.

The above details a red paint transfer mark on the right
horizontal tail surface of TWA 800 directly aft of the red painted
trim in cargo door area. This area shows missing red paint clearly
in NTSB photo displayed at URL <[http://www.corazon.com/
redpaintsmearssoloprint.html](http://www.corazon.com/redpaintsmearssoloprint.html)>

The NTSB photographs are clear in color and detail. The TWA
800 reconstruction photograph shows abnormal green, white and
red paint on the right side forward of the wing.

Normal TWA red trim paint scheme is seen at <[http://
www.corazon.com/twapaintpixweb.html](http://www.corazon.com/twapaintpixweb.html)> Only above the
forward cargo door of the reconstructed fuselage of TWA 800 is
seen the abnormal red paint smears.

The sequence is thus: bare aluminum skin is cleaned, primed,
base coat of white applied, then red trim on top of white, then
decals. This sequence is basic painting for Boeing 747s and

confirmed by aviation professionals.

It is not red paint trim on primer with overspray, mask off, then paint white base coat around the trim.

The red trim is always on top of white base coat and means that the many, red, and large red paint smears between the passenger windows are red paint transfer marks. The red paint marks are not red paint exposed when white above is worn away, it is always red on top of white, not underneath.

This is further proven by skin which has red paint missing and thus exposing white undercoat. This is seen at URL <<http://www.corazon.com/TWA800hullrupture.html>> The white is always underneath the red. The green is always underneath the white.

Additionally, the added red paint between the windows is next to the missing red paint in the trim above the cargo door. Red paint went from one area to another.

The many red and large red paint transfer marks above the forward cargo door of TWA 800 indicate the cargo door opened in flight. The precedent of cargo door paint transfer marks was set by UAL 811 as described in NTSB AAR 92/02, page 41.

The red paint transfer marks indicate the red door below ruptured/opened in flight and slammed into the white paint above, removing the red trim paint and transferring it on top of the white paint. This is clearly seen between the passenger windows.

The red paint evidence coupled with the outward peeled skin on

the side, and in the door area, and in the belly proves an explosive event occurred inflight in the cargo door area.

The downward crushed main floor beams confirm the explosive event. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Study, page 20, "Downward separation directions were noted at STA 900, 880, 840, 820, 800, and 780..." and ""The initial opening of the fuselage lower lobe (e.g. LF6A) would have the expected result of rapid depressurization accompanied by collapse of the main deck floor for some distance forward of STA 1000. The red area recovery of interior components as far forward as STA 600 would not be inconsistent with this floor collapse and associated structural breakup."

The petal shaped outward bulge at the aft midspan latch of the forward cargo door pinpoints the location of the initial rupture of the hull of TWA 800 as seen at URL <<http://www.corazon.com/petalbulge.html>> The aft latch is missing, the door frame is curved outward, and surrounding skin is shaped circular.

The analysis of red paint markings and structural deformation indicating an outward explosion was briefly held by FAA Branch Manager Neil Schalekamp of Northwest Region in a letter to me on 30 Jan 1998. "The paint markings and structural deformation that you cite, do indicate an outward explosion, generally accepted to be caused by the explosion of the CWT."

The cause of the outward cargo door explosion being the center tank is refuted by the lack of soot on the few recovered forward cargo door pieces and other right side fuselage pieces. Exhibit 20A page 129. Fire and Explosion Group Factual Report. "RF2 C-004 No sooting No sooting
RF3A-H These pieces are part of the

forward main cargo door.

Some have grimy corrosion
inhibiting compound (CIC), but
there is no apparent sooting.

These pieces are part of the
forward main cargo door.

Some have grimy corrosion
inhibiting compound (CIC), but
there is no apparent sooting.

RF4 B-103 No sooting No sooting

RF5 A-071 No sooting No sooting

RF6A B-2004 No sooting No sooting

RF6B B-240 No sooting No sooting

RF6C B-318 No sooting No sooting

RF7 A-033 No sooting No sooting

RF8A No sooting No sooting

RF8B B-256 No sooting No sooting

RF8C B-263 No sooting No sooting

RF8D B-068 No sooting No sooting

RF8E B-268 No sooting No sooting

RF8F B-248 No sooting No sooting

RF9A C-117 No sooting No sooting

RF9B C-117 No sooting No sooting

RF9C C-259 No sooting No sooting"

NTSB investigators also are intrigued by the aircraft forward door popping open in flight, an explanation supported by red paint smears, outward peeled skin, downward floor beams, and petal shaped bulge at aft midspan latch. "NTSB investigators have suggested unofficially that the streaks the pilots saw could have been light reflections from the skin of the aircraft, tongues of flame from the airliner or the forward door of the aircraft popping open, a possibility that still intrigues investigators, the

second official said." AW&ST 3/10/97

Basic NTSB generated evidence for TWA 800 in photos, text, sooting diagrams, tables, and drawings, a NTSB produced report AAR 92/02, and your visual interpretations of NTSB photograph at

<<http://www.corazon.com/redpaintsmearssoloprint.html>> and on NTSB CD-ROM proves that the forward cargo door of TWA 800 opened in flight.

The evidence above proves the the cargo door was not all latched, all locked, and all intact at water impact, as previously believed based upon examination of only eight of the ten cargo door latches. Docket Number SA-516, Exhibit No. 15C, Report Number 97-82, Section 41/42 Joint, Forward Cargo Door, "Examination of the lower lobe forward cargo door showed that all eight of the door latching cams remain attached (along with pieces of the door itself) to the pins along the lower door sill."

The cause of the door opening in flight is probably the same as UAL 811, as described in AAR 92/02; chafed wiring shorting on door unlatch motor based upon NTSB evidence for TWA 800 in Docket Exhibit 9A page 116: "Some wires found in the section of W480 from forward of station 570 and identified as BMS13-42A had numerous cracks in the insulation. Most of the cracks in this bundle were found to expose the core conductor when examined by microscope. Only within five feet of the aft end of the W480 bundle from station 570-900 were insulation cracks found."

NTSB agrees that a new explanation for the destruction sequence is possible based on new interpretations of the evidence such as

shown by the red paint smears. Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 18A, Sequencing Report, page 30: "It is therefore possible that new scenarios (sequences) may emerge as new information is acquired whether it be from newly identified parts, or simply a new interpretation of current information."

The wiring/cargo door explanation for TWA 800 must be thoroughly investigated to rule in or rule out the reasonable conclusions reached by the careful analysis of red paint smears, outward peeled skin, downward floor beams, petal shaped bulge at aft midspan latch, and cracked to bare conductor wires discovered in TWA 800 by NTSB.

The wreckage of TWA 800 is the victim at autopsy. It is the victim saying look at me, I exploded in flight, right there at the aft midspan latch. Just like I did before in 1989 with UAL 811 and left paint smears, outward peeled skin, aft midspan latch rupture, sudden loud sound on the CVR and power cut to the FDR. Don't ignore me; don't deny me; do something about me.

Sincerely,

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Pilot: Commercial, instrument rated, FAA Part 135 certificate.
Navigator: RA5C Vigilante

Owner: Mooney M20C

Survivor: Sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash.

Facts presented by NTSB about TWA 800 in exhibits, photographs, text, drawings, and testimony:

1. right horizontal stab has red paint smear
2. stator blade in right horizontal stab behind engine number 3
3. inward crush top of cargo door
4. top of cargo door attached to hinge
5. petal shape of rupture area around aft midspan latch
6. missing pieces of forward cargo door include locking handle, latching pins, overpressure relief doors, midspan latches
7. rectangle visible of explosive decompression zone of outward peeled skin on right side forward of the wing on right side
8. downward movement of floor beams near cargo door
9. hoop stresses found
10. CVR sudden loud sound
11. FDR abrupt power cut
12. missing turbine blades in engine number 3.
13. soft body impacts on blades in engine number 3.
14. outward peeled skin near top of nose, under belly, and in cargo door area.
15. red paint smears above cargo door on white paint
16. soot on most blades of engine 3.
17. starboard side more damaged than port side
18. intact R2 door near shattered cargo door.
19. poly x is known to be susceptible to chafing and present
20. section 41 is known to be weak
21. history of cargo door openings in past in various airliners
22. EPR problems on aircraft before or during fatal flight.
23. fires in forward cargo hold in the past on Boeing 747s.

24. vertical tears in fuselage skin forward of the wing on the right side
25. single marks on right side of fuselage show burnt skin, then abruptly at tear line there are no single marks
26. red paint rubbed off revealing white paint underneath on skin above cargo door area
27. first pieces off plane came from forward cargo hold just forward of the wing
28. at least nine missing never recovered bodies, just fragments
29. initially thought to be a bomb
30. wreckage debris shows cargo door shattered in many pieces
31. aft portion of forward door which includes aft midspan latch and locking handle missing from recovery effort
32. no soot on maintenance hatch
33. no soot on front spar of center wing tank
34. no burned bodies forward of the wing and very few burned at all
35. aft cargo door sill, latches, and locks recovered
36. forward cargo door sill, latches, and locks not recorded in data base
37. no orange zone pieces recorded in database
38. no orange zone discussion in public record other than identification
39. chafed to bare wires found in cargo door area
40. wiring defects found on Boeing airliners
41. water observed pouring out of forward cargo hold of a Boeing airliner, cargo holds have bilges.
42. no soot on keel beam forward of the wing
43. compression fractures right side forward of the wing
44. tension fractures left side forward of the wing
45. seats in the rows in the explosive shatter zone above cargo door are in red zone and not sooted
46. aft cargo door sill is sooted

47. many witnesses said they saw downward streak that was red-orange
48. NTSB official said possibility of forward door popping open was intriguing.
49. FAA official said, then recanted, that paint smears and structural deformation indicated outward explosion.
50. initial event time was 20:31:12 at 13700 on 17 July 1996 eight miles off coast of Long Island.

Reasonable conclusions derived from facts above:

1. water in forward cargo bay.
2. chafed bare wire touched by water.
3. electrical short occurs.
4. forward door motor turns on to unlatch position.
5. aft midspan latch of forward cargo door partially unlatches.
6. pressurized hull ruptures at aft midspan latch.
7. cargo door tears into pieces, some pieces stay with nose, some don't.
8. shiny metal pieces spin away reflecting evening sunlight and perceived as red-orange streak to observers far away.
9. explosive decompression occurs shattering cargo door area forward of the wing on right side exposing twenty foot by forty foot hole in nose producing sudden loud sound on CVR.
10. 300 knots slipstream tears weakened nose off.
11. ejected debris is ingested by starboard engines which catch fire.
12. wing and wing fuel tanks; engines, tail, and fuselage fall and disintegrate on way down.
13. fiery starboard engine ignites fuel vapor clouds from disintegrating tanks, including center tank.
14. fireball observed on the ground.
15. water impact of wreckage, cargo bay material first to hit water.

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: June 23, 1998 4:45:01 PM PDT
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: My errors corrected

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Dear Mr. Schleede, June 23, 1998

NTSB just sent me a two page letter. It was indirectly from Dr. Bernard Loeb. The first page was a form letter from NTSB reporting that I had used the wrong zip code on my hand addressed letter to Dr. Bernard Loeb. The second page was a copy of the misaddressed letter which was my 13 March 1998 letter to everyone addressed above.

This recent letter from NTSB tells me much. It tells me Dr. Bernard Loeb received the letter all right because the correction came from NTSB which means NTSB received it all right and everyone in NTSB knows Dr. Bernard Loeb as the Director of Aviation Safety and point man for TWA 800. I assume that Director Loeb gives close scrutiny to my letters to catch a one digit zip code error from incorrect 20591 to correct 20594. I assume this is a way for Director Loeb to point out errors in my

correspondence.

And he's right. It was an error. It may be trivial in this case but potentially catastrophic when flying. As a navigator I recognize a serious error and the lack of attention to detail in a wrong number. It is a mistake I shall remember always. Dr. Bernard Loeb has shown me the need to check my numbers. Accuracy is everything in aviation and one digit being wrong is enough to kill. It happened with a Korean flightcrewmember avoiding the digit '4' and putting in a different number into his inertial navigation computer which then led him, his plane and his passengers over enemy territory which led to a shootdown, KAL 007. It happened to me when hand addressing envelopes of hard copy letters to back up the electronic emails. I checked out the error and traced it to a mixup of zip codes between NTSB and FAA. NTSB is 20594 and FAA is 20591 and I mixed them up.

There is an additional error on my address to Dr. Bernard Loeb. I put "490 L'Enfant Plaza East SW" instead of the correct "490 L'Enfant Plaza SW."

The principle is the same: Errors kill and accuracy counts.

I shall follow the example of NTSB and recognize the error and correct it.

I may have made another error recently in regard to TWA 800: I said that the many large red paint marks between the passenger windows above the forward cargo door of TWA 800 wreckage were 'transfer marks'. I stated they were red marks from the red fuselage skin below coming up and smashing into the white and leaving the red paint on top, similar to UAL 811.

There is now serious dissent that states the many large red paint marks are red paint from overspray of the trim below. The red marks are revealed white paint between the passenger windows is peeled back, revealing the red underneath. Several painters of airliners give conflicting opinion. The conclusive evidence is on the wreckage of TWA 800.

I ask NTSB and Director Loeb, can you confirm the paint sequence for the many large red paint marks between the passenger windows as seen in URL <http://www.corazon.com/redpaintsmearssoloprint.html> and <http://www.corazon.com/TWA800hullrupture.html>? Are they red on top of white paint, or are they red underneath white paint? Is the red underneath or on top?

It's vitally important. If red is underneath white, then I have made another error and wish to correct it. If red on top of white then it appears that the red could have come from skin below opening up and slamming together causing paint transfer marks, thus confirming cargo door opened in flight.

There is no expense involved, only a short time for a metallurgist to climb up on a stepladder with a magnifying glass and look at the TWA 800 red paint marks.

As NTSB pointed out to me, numbers are to be accurate. I believe NTSB also respects numbers.

That's why eight is not ten. And never will be. That's why all ten of the forward cargo door latches must be recovered and examined and determined to have been operating normally before the cargo door is ruled out as culprit. That conclusive examination of all ten has not been done and that's why the

forward cargo door can not be ruled out.

As NTSB told me to use the right numbers in my zip code, I ask NTSB to use the right numbers on the forward cargo door. There are ten identical latching pins and cams on that door and examining only eight is not good, not trivial, and wrong for NTSB.

For me to write NTSB zip code accurately is right for me. To check all ten latches is right for NTSB.

The two missing midspan latches that NTSB have not examined have been shown to carry loads as reported in AAR 92/02 where the aft midspan latch pin showed heat damage from hard contact. All ten latches are vital for proper operation of that door.

Only checking eight of ten is as bad as putting 20591 instead of 20594.

So, I acknowledge an error pointed out to me by NTSB and I remark on another error nearby, and corrected both.

I ask that NTSB do the same for themselves.

There is additional NTSB evidence which is perplexing if the center tank explosion as initial event is to be confirmed:

Docket No. SA-516, Exhibit No. 7A, Structures Group Report, page 33: "5.1 Horizontal Stabilizer, "Some of the items found in the horizontal stabilizer are sections of seat track, a stator blade from turbine section, and glitter." On 5.1.1 Right Horizontal Stabilizer, page 34, "An engine stator blade from turbine section penetrated the upper honeycomb surface near the outboard

trailing edge." And same page: "A section of the structure outboard of H7 exhibited evidence of red paint transfer marks on the upper skin (H8); only the remnants of the shattered logo light window remain in the window frame."

Seat track, glitter, stator blade and red paint all had to come from up front because that's where they were. All of these items must have become embedded in the horizontal stabilizer in flight, because it's the only way they could have gotten there based upon the separation of nose and tail long before water impact. The only way for the stuff in front to get to the back in flight is for it to come out of the forward baggage hold. One very good way, a reasonable way, a way that's happened before, is for the forward cargo door to come open inflight and allow glitter contents of cargo bins, a seat track, and red painted door top to be blown aft. It also allows a fodded engine three to cause stator blade to be thrown out and back into right horizontal stabilizer.

A way to rule a repeat door opening event out is to examine the door and determine if it was functioning normally. That can not be done yet because only eight of ten latches have been recovered as well as on 20% of the door structure. Until door totally recovered it can not be totally ruled out. Until cargo door totally ruled out, TWA 800 investigation is not totally complete.

Examining many large red paint markings can assist in that determination. Are the red paint marks on top of the white paint or underneath the white paint between the passenger windows above the forward cargo door?

Sincerely,

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Citizen: USA
Major: US Army Retired
Pilot: Commercial, instrument rated, FAA Part 135 certificate.
Navigator: RA5C Vigilante
Owner: Mooney M20C
Survivor: Sudden night fiery fatal jet plane crash

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>
Date: July 2, 1998 9:33:15 PM PDT
To: SCHLEDRntsbgov
Subject: Response to Chairman Hall's letter to Congressman Farr.

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Dear Mr. Schleede,

July 2, 1998

Congressman Sam Farr sent me a letter on June 16th enclosing a

letter to him from Chairman Jim Hall on June 8th discussing TWA 800 and cargo door cause. The letter from Chairman Hall to Congressman Hall contains various inaccuracies which require clarification:

Chairman Hall, "...Mr. Smith expressed his belief that the failure of cargo door led to the accident."

Chairman Hall has misstated my 'belief.' My belief is a wiring short led to the accident. As NTSB states a wiring short led to center tank explosion led to the accident, I say a wiring short led to cargo door rupturing in flight leading to the accident. Cargo door did not 'fail'; it did what it was told to do, unlatch.

Chairman Hall, "...numerous letters..."

Yes, that's correct. Three hundred and thirty eight to NTSB officials since July 20, 1996, three days after TWA 800, all with same consistent explanation; hull rupture forward of the wing on the right side at cargo door area. After researching hull ruptures on high time 747s for seven years, it was readily apparent that TWA 800 matched the previous accidents, one of which was confirmed as wiring/cargo door caused, UAL 811.

Chairman Hall, "Examination of the wreckage has not revealed any evidence..."

This is the Chairman of NTSB's opinion about a probable cause and is same as the Chairman of NTSB's opinion in 1990 about the forward cargo door for UAL 811 in AAR 90/01 which was in error and corrected with AAR 92/02. The forward cargo door has opened and fooled before.

Chairman Hall, "The cargo doors were found with their respective fuselage sections..."

Not accurate. Only 60% in pieces of the aft cargo door and only 20% in pieces of the forward cargo door were found, recovered and examined. Twenty percent of a door is not 'a door.'

Chairman Hall, "...the examination of the cargo door latches found that they were closed at the time of impact."

Not true. There are ten latches on each door and only eight of the forward door were examined because only eight were recovered. Above quote also implies some latches opened but not in flight. What is the status of the forward midspan latches? Found? Open or closed? Damaged? They are not in the wreckage database, they are not hung on wreckage reconstruction, and they are not discussed in the forward cargo door Exhibit 15C.

Chairman Hall, "Safety Board metallurgists and structures engineers have carefully examined the cargo door..."

Not true because it's impossible. Only 60% in pieces of the aft cargo door and only 20% in pieces of the forward cargo door were found so it was impossible to carefully examine the cargo doors. Missing from the forward cargo door recovery are two midspan latches, manual locking handle, eight viewing ports, two overpressure relief doors, and 80% of the door skin. Most of the forward cargo door is not in wreckage recovery database nor hung on wreckage reconstruction. Who is the 'metallurgist'? Mr. Wildey? Who is the 'structures engineer'? Mr. Breneman?
Asking someone who said something once to say it again is not an impartial confirmation of a questioned evaluation.

Chairman Hall, "...carefully examined...the latching mechanisms..."

Not true. Only eight of the ten latching mechanisms were recovered to be examined. Two latches have not been examined at all.

Chairman Hall, "...carefully examined...the surrounding structure..."

Not accurate. Most of the surrounding structure is missing. Many nearby large red unusual paint markings were not evaluated.

Chairman Hall, "...found no evidence of pre-impact failure..."

Not supported opinion. There is much clear visual evidence of pre-impact failure with petal shaped rupture at aft midspan latch, outward peeled skin on side and belly, unilateral shattered fuselage in cargo door area, downward floor beams, and several large red paint markings between passenger windows only above cargo door.

Chairman Hall, "...no evidence...that the door had opened in flight."

Not true. A FAA structures engineer at one time agreed that paint markings and structural deformation indicated an outward explosion in cargo door area. There is much hard, real, and documented evidence below that forward cargo door ruptured/ opened in flight.

1. right horizontal stab has red paint smear
2. stator blade in right horizontal stab behind engine number 3

3. inward crush top of cargo door
4. top of cargo door attached to hinge
5. petal shape of rupture area around aft midspan latch
6. missing pieces of forward cargo door include locking handle, latching pins, overpressure relief doors, midspan latches
7. rectangle visible of explosive decompression zone of outward peeled skin on right side forward of the wing on right side
8. downward movement of floor beams near cargo door
9. hoop stresses found
10. CVR sudden loud sound
11. FDR abrupt power cut
12. missing turbine blades in engine number 3.
13. soft body impacts on blades in engine number 3.
14. outward peeled skin near top of nose, under belly, and in cargo door area.
15. red paint smears above cargo door on white paint
16. soot on most blades of engine 3.
17. starboard side more damaged than port side
18. intact R2 door near shattered cargo door.
19. poly x is known to be susceptible to chafing and present 20. section 41 is known to be weak
21. history of cargo door openings in past in various airliners
22. EPR problems on aircraft before or during fatal flight.
23. fires in forward cargo hold in the past on Boeing 747s.
24. vertical tears in fuselage skin forward of the wing on the right side
25. singe marks on right side of fuselage show burnt skin, then abruptly at tear line there are no singe marks
26. red paint rubbed off revealing white paint underneath on skin above cargo door area
27. first pieces off plane came from forward cargo hold just forward of the wing
28. at least nine missing never recovered bodies, just fragments

29. initially thought to be a bomb
30. wreckage debris shows cargo door shattered in many pieces
31. TWA 800 matched to AI 182, PA 103, and UAL 811.
32. no soot on maintenance hatch
33. no soot on front spar of center wing tank
34. no burned bodies forward of the wing and very few burned at all
35. aft cargo door sill, latches, and locks recovered
36. forward cargo door sill, latches, and locks not recorded in data base
37. no orange zone pieces recorded in database
38. no orange zone discussion in public record other than identification
39. chafed to bare wires found in cargo door area
40. wiring defects found on Boeing airliners
41. water observed pouring out of forward cargo hold of a Boeing airliner, cargo holds have bilges.
42. no soot on keel beam forward of the wing
43. compression fractures right side forward of the wing
44. tension fractures left side forward of the wing
45. seats in the rows in the explosive shatter zone above cargo door are in red zone and not sooted
46. aft cargo door sill sooted
47. many witnesses said they saw downward streak that was red-orange
48. NTSB official said possibility of forward door popping open was intriguing.
49. FAA official said, then recanted, that paint smears and structural deformation indicated outward explosion.

I again ask for a meeting with an NTSB representative to present my nine years of research for an impartial evaluation of the evidence derived from official governmental aviation agencies.

Sincerely,

John Barry Smith

From: John Barry Smith <barry@corazon.com>

Date: July 28, 1998 9:27:58 AM PDT

To: SCHLEDRntsbgov

Subject: History repeats

Dear Mr. Schleede, 28 July 1998

The below are email sent to you and one by you in July 1996.
Wiring/cargo door explanation was there then, and it is here now.

One sentence in Exhibit 15C and eight of ten latches recovered is not enough to rule out the inadvertent opening of that door in flight.

Cheers,

John Barry Smith

7.26.96

To: schledr@ntsb.gov

From: barry@corazon.com

Subject: TWA crash cause explained

Cc:

Bcc:

X-Attachments: :Master:

31652:crash103drawdoorpictcrop.JPG: :Master:

31652:crash811doorpictcrop.JPG:

I have a reasonable explanation for the cause of crash of TWA flight 800. May I speak with someone involved with aircraft accident investigations? I have extensive aircraft experience and am a retired military officer. It's worth listening to.

The theory is that inadvertent cargo door openings have caused the crashes of TWA Flight 800, Pan Am Flight 103, and United Flight 811. RE: TWA Flight 800, the visual streak reported is the cargo door spinning down reflecting in the evening dusk sun. The radar anomaly is the cargo door as it detached from the fuselage. The tapes of Flights 800, 103 and 811 will all be similar at the time of door separation.

Attached as jpg files are two illustrations: one is a photo from the NTSB accident report of United Flight 811 after landing with its cargo door torn off. The rectangle shows the area of tearing and loss. The other illustration is a drawing from the UK accident report of Pan AM Flight 103 showing the sequence of destruction. This drawing shows the similarity of disintegration. The shapes are the same, the doors were broken in half at the same breakline, and the sizes are the same.

More info: the sounds of the two flight recorders on 103 and 811 are similar at time of door coming off. The 811 door was found unlatched at the bottom of Pacific; 103 door was found and latch condition omitted in report while the other two cargo doors were reported as latched. Radar blip anomalies were detected on 103 and 800 just before disintegration. Door spinning away would give such blips and also for 800 appear as visual streak as it reflected the evening sun.

The doors of 811 and 103 came off and 125 opened, no doubt. The cause of the 811 was improper latching and design. The stated cause of 103 was bomb in cargo hold.

All four aircraft were very early 747-100 series with over 58000 flight hours. Many early 747's, such as Pan Am 103, had their

cargo doors and cargo area reworked for military use thereby tampering with original design.

False positive for explosives on TWA Flight 800 was reported today, could have happened on 103.

Yes, I am saying Pan Am 103 crash cause was an inadvertent opening cargo door and not a bomb. Yes, I am saying United 811 and Pan Am 125 were cargo doors. Yes, I am saying TWA 800 crash cause was a cargo door.

I predict the door on 800 will be found broken in half and unlatched. I predict the flight data recorders will have similar sounds at time of destruction to the 103 and 811 tapes. I predict the breakup sequence of the airframe will be similar.

Here is the analogy: A balloon not inflated when pricked does nothing, such as inadvertent door opening on runway (as 747 cargo doors have done several documented times). A balloon partially pricked does nothing, such as a door opening but not coming off (Pan Am Flight 125). A balloon pricked when fully inflated pops, such as door opening at 31000 feet (Pan Am 103). A balloon pricked when partially inflated hisses and deflates, such as door opening at 21000 feet (United Flight 811), or 13500 feet, (TWA Flight 800). And then wind force takes over and tears the fuselage apart. (How lucky were the passengers on Flight 125 and Flight 811!)

Background on me: I was an audiologist for ten years and can analyze sounds such as the flight data recorder tapes. I was a radar operator for nine years and can understand picking up large cargo doors as returns. I was an air intelligence officer/reconnaissance attack navigator for eight years and understand need for careful research, evaluation, and conclusions. I was involved in an ejection where the pilot died and I suffered back injury. I know accident investigation is important.

1. This excerpt is from the United Flight 811 cargo door report used as background info.

1.17.1 Previous Cargo Door Incident

On March 10, 1987, a Pan American Airways B-747-122, N740PA,

operating as flight 125 from London to New York, experienced an incident involving the forward cargo door. According to Pan Am and Boeing officials who investigated this incident, the flightcrew experienced pressurization problems as the airplane was climbing through about 20,000 feet. The crew began a descent and the pressurization problem ceased about 15,000 feet. The crew began to climb again, but about 20,000 feet, the cabin altitude began to rise rapidly again. The flight returned to London.

When the airplane was examined on the ground, the forward cargo door was found open about 1 1/2 inches along the bottom with the latch cams unlatched and the master latch lock handle closed. The cockpit cargo door warning light was off.

2. Scheduled 14 CFR 121 operation of TRANSWORLD AIRWAYS (D.B.A. TWA)

Accident occurred JUL-17-96 at EAST MORICHES, NY

Aircraft: Boeing 747, registration:
N93119

Injuries: 230 Fatal.

On July 17, 1996, about 8:45pm, TWA flight 800, N93119, a Boeing 747-100, crashed into the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Long Island shortly after takeoff from Kennedy International Airport. The airplane was on a regularly scheduled flight to Paris, France. The initial reports

are that witnesses saw an explosion and then debris descending to the ocean. There are no reports of the flightcrew reporting a problem to air traffic control. The airplane was manufactured in November 1971. It has accumulated about 93,303 flight hours and 16,869 cycles. On board the airplane were 212 passengers and 18 crewmembers. The airplane was destroyed and there were no survivors.

3. Scheduled 14 CFR 121 operation of UNITED AIRLINES (D.B.A. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.)

Accident occurred FEB-24-89 at

HONOLULU, HI

Aircraft: BOEING 747-122, registration:

N4713U

Injuries: 9 Fatal, 5 Serious, 33 Minor, 309

Uninjured.

FTL #811 WAS A SCHEDULED PASSENGER FLIGHT FROM LOS ANGELES TO SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA, WITH STOPS IN HONOLULU (HNL), HI, AND AUCKLAND, NEW ZEALAND. THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL UNTIL AFTER DEPARTURE FROM HNL. WHILE CLIMBING FROM FL220 TO FL230 THE CREW HEARD A "THUMP" FOLLOWED BY AN EXPLOSION. AN EXPLOSIVE DECOMPRESSION WAS EXPERIENCED AND THE #3 AND #4 ENGS WERE SHUTDOWN BECAUSE OF FOD. THE FLT RETURNED TO HNL AND PASSENGERS WERE EVACUATED. INSPECTION REVEALED THE FORWARD LOWER LOBE CARGO DOOR DEPARTED INFLT CAUSING EXTENSIVE DAMAGE

TO THE FUSELAGE AND CABIN ADJACENT TO THE DOOR. NINE PASSENGERS WERE EJECTED AND LOST AT SEA. INVESTIGATION CENTERED AROUND DESIGN AND CERTIFICATION OF THE DOOR WHICH ALLOWED IT TO BE IMPROPERLY LATCHED, AND THE OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE TO ASSURE AIRWORTHINESS OF THE DOOR AND LATCHING MECHANISM. (SEE NTSB/AAR-90/01)

Probable Cause

THE SUDDEN OPENING OF THE IMPROPERLY LATCHED FORWARD LOBE CARGO DOOR IN FLIGHT AND THE SUBSEQUENT EXPLOSIVE DECOMPRESSION. CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS A DEFICIENCY IN THE DESIGN OF THE CARGO DOOR LOCKING MECHANISMS, WHICH MADE THEM SUSCEPTIBLE TO INSERVICE DAMAGE, AND WHICH ALLOWED THE DOOR TO BE UNLATCHED, YET TO SHOW A PROPERLY LATCHED AND LOCKED POSITION. ALSO CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT WAS THE LACK OF PROPER MAINTENANCE AND INSPECTION OF THE CARGO DOOR BY UNITED AIRLINES, AND A LACK OF TIMELY CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BY BOEING AND THE FAA FOLLOWING A PREVIOUS DOOR OPENING INCIDENT.

Index for Feb 1989 | Index of Months

The streak seen was the cargo doors spinning and reflecting in the evening dusk sun. The radar blip before destruction was the cargo door coming off. The culprit was seen visually and on radar.

Real bombs have gone off on 747s before; they don't cause catastrophic destruction; they blow holes in skin or floor and

planes lands safely.

#47 10.12.94 Boeing 747-283B

EI-BWF Philippine Air Lines (Philippines)

1(293) Minami Diato Isl.; nr. (Japan)

On a flight from Manila to Tokyo via Cebu, a bomb exploded in the passenger

cabin beneath seat 26K. A succesfull emergency landing at

Okinawa was made at

12.45h.

The muslim group Abu Sayyaf claimed responsibility

.#34 18.01.84 Boeing 747

Air France

0(261) Karachi, 70mls (Pakistan)

An in-flight explosion after leaving Karachi blew a hole in the right rear

cargo hold and caused a loss of cabin pressure. An emergency descent to

5000ft was made and the aircraft returned to Karachi.

#31 11.08.82 Boeing 747-121

N754PA Pan American World Airways (USA)

1() Hawaii; 140mls (USA)

On a flight from Tokyo one passenger was killed when a bomb, located under

the seat cushion, exploded. The explosion also resulted in a hole in the

floor and damage to the ceiling and overhead racks. A safe landing was made

at Honolulu.

Based upon a reasonable explanation of observed events does not my theory/hypothesis merit more attention? Does any of your staff live near the San Francisco bay area; I could go there and show them the extensive documentation such as the similarities between the three flights, 103, 800, and 811. (Similar early 747s,

similar sounds on tape, similar time after takeoff, similar radar blip before destruction, and soon similar broken cargo door and breakup pattern.)

Only a hole the size of the forward cargo door opening up will quickly destroy a 747. It was the opening and tearing off of the cargo door that caused Flight 800 to disintegrate. It happened before, it happened now, and it will happen again.

The small picture is that a mechanical problem crashed an airplane; happens all the time. The big picture is that there is a pattern of crashes which are caused by the same mechanical problem which remains unfixed killing hundreds of passengers. And the cause is going unexplained because it is in the perceived best interests of the government, the manufacturer and the airline to blame act of god terrorists rather than a real life screwup in design, maintenance, and oversight. It's human nature to avoid responsibility and blame others. But when dealing with aircraft accident investigations the truth must be discovered and let the chips fall where they may because we may be the next victims when we fly.

email me or call 408 6593552 John Barry Smith

To: schledr@ntsb.gov

From: barry@corazon.com

Subject: TWA crash cause ATTN Robert Francis

Cc:

Bcc:

X-Attachments:

Mr. Francis. The reasonable cause of the TWA crash is the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door. That is the mechanical cause that must be ruled out. Compare to United Flight 811 of Feb 1989.

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
From: barry@corazon.com
Subject: TWA crash cause
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:

Mr Schleede, thank you for replying to my several emails asking to rule out inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door as the cause of TWA 800 and assuring me that you are checking that. An analogy is that of the several victims, one came back (UAL flight 811) and was able to show what happened. The other victims were Pan Am 103, TWA 800, and maybe Air India and South African Airways.

Comparing 103, 800, and 811 will reveal remarkable similarities in time of destruction, place of initial damage, recorder sounds, engine flogging patterns, radar anomalies just before destruction, and sequence of fuselage destruction; all in Boeing 747-121 aircraft. Too much coincidence for homemade bombs placed randomly in cargo compartments. Perfectly understandable for reproducible mechanical problems with system that has history of inadvertent malfunctionings.

(The United 811 was an excellent accident report, far superior to UK Pan AM 103 which has serious omissions.)

I invite discussion at 408 659 3552 or barry@corazon.com.
Thank you Mr. Schleede, John Barry Smith

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
From: barry@corazon.com
Subject: TWA crash cause
Cc:

Bcc:

X-Attachments: :Master:31652:crash811doorpictcrop.JPG:

Be assured that we are checking that. I was the investigator in charge of the UAL flight 811 case and fully knowledgeable in its causes and factors.

Thanks for the interest.

Thank you Mr. Schleede, the attached photo of UAL 811 from accident report will show that a 747 with that gaping hole in side at 400 knots can certainly tear the nose off.

From: Schleede Ron <SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov>

To: barry <barry@corazon.com>

Subject: RE: TWA crash cause ATTN Robert Francis

Date: Mon, 29 Jul 1996 15:24:00 -0400

Encoding: 17 TEXT

Status:

Be assured that we are checking that. I was the investigator in charge of the UAL flight 811 case and fully knowledgeable in its causes and factors.

Thanks for the interest.

From: barry

To: schledr

Subject: TWA crash cause ATTN Robert Francis

Date: Sunday, July 28, 1996 9:58AM

Mr. Francis. The reasonable cause of the TWA crash is the inadvertent opening of the forward cargo door. That is the mechanical cause that must be ruled out. Compare to United Flight 811 of Feb 1989.

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
From: barry@corazon.com
Subject: TWA crash cause
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:

<http://www.corazon.com/TWA800PA103UA811.html> is my website for cargo door crash theory.

To: SCHLEDR@ntsb.gov
From: barry@corazon.com
Subject: Cargo Door
Cc:
Bcc:
X-Attachments:

"Investigators also said that a cargo door, presumably the front one, had been found significantly closer to Kennedy International Airport, where the flight originated, than almost all of the other parts located so far."

The cargo door came off first. It came off first because it was inadvertently opened. It was opened by the same causes as Flight 811, and Flight 103 and maybe others.

Compare 800 to 811 in all aspects. Have you matched the tape sounds? The thump of 811 is the thump of 800 and 103.

<http://www.corazon.com/barryhome.html> is my web site for cargo door cause.

Mr. Schleede, you should be in charge of the investigation, not the pushy paranoid FBI.