

Araştırma Makalesi / Research Article

**EVALUATION OF THE SECURITY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EU
AND TÜRKİYE AFTER THE COLD WAR IN TERMS OF SECURITY
THREATS**

Sibel Elif ÖZDİLEK*

ABSTRACT

The evolving interpretation of the concept of security, influenced by emerging security threats, is examined through the lens of the Cold War and post-Cold War periods that have significantly influenced the international landscape. This study explains the role of European Union (EU) security studies in understanding and assessing security threats in the post-Cold War period. A research is conducted on the results of the EU's supranational integration efforts in the political arena, especially on security relations with EU member states and candidate country Türkiye. This research aims to address how the EU's approach to security in the post-Cold War context has affected EU-Türkiye security cooperation in the light of new security threats. The aim is to analyze the extent of security cooperation within EU-Türkiye relations as a result of the transformation brought about by these new security challenges in international security perceptions. The research methodology is based on theoretical foundational research following the Constructivist (Social Constructivist) security framework. The findings show that perceptions of security threats at the international level have changed as a result of the distinction between Cold War and post-Cold War security threats. In the context of the EU-Türkiye security relationship after the Cold War, the European Commission (EC) assesses Türkiye's alignment with the EU's security policy at an unprecedentedly low level. The failure to achieve effective EU-Türkiye security cooperation is due to the insufficient success of the EU's supranational integration efforts in the security field.

Keywords: European Union, Türkiye, Security, Security Threat, Constructivism.

* Dr. Öğr. Üyesi, Ufuk Üniversitesi, Ankara/Türkiye, İİBF, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, elif.ozdilek@ufuk.edu.tr, ORCID No: 0000-0003-0907-8771.

SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI AB İLE TÜRKİYE ARASINDAKİ GÜVENLİK İLİŞKİLERİNİN GÜVENLİK TEHDİTLERİ YÖNÜNDEN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ

ÖZ

Güvenlik kavramının, ortaya çıkan güvenlik tehditlerinden etkilenen evrimleşen yorumu, uluslararası manzarayı önemli ölçüde etkileyen Soğuk Savaş ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemlerin merceğinden incelenmektedir. Bu çalışma, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde güvenlik tehditlerinin anlaşılması ve değerlendirilmesinde Avrupa Birliği (AB) güvenlik çalışmalarının rolünü açıklamaktadır. AB'nin siyasi alanda ulus üstü entegrasyon çabalarının sonuçları, özellikle AB üye devletleri ve aday ülke Türkiye ile güvenlik ilişkileriyle ilgili olarak bir araştırma yürütülmektedir. Bu araştırma, AB'nin Soğuk Savaş sonrası bağlamdaki güvenlik yaklaşımının, yeni güvenlik tehditleri ışığında AB-Türkiye güvenlik iş birliğini nasıl etkilediğini ele almayı amaçlamaktadır. Amaç, uluslararası güvenlik algılarında bu yeni güvenlik zorluklarının getirdiği dönüşümün bir sonucu olarak AB-Türkiye ilişkileri içindeki güvenlik iş birliğinin boyutunu analiz etmektir. Araştırma metodolojisi, Konstrüktivism (Sosyal Yapılandırmacı) güvenlik çerçevesini izleyen teorik temel araştırmaya dayanmaktadır. Bulgular, Soğuk Savaş ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası güvenlik tehditleri arasındaki ayrımın sonucunda uluslararası düzeyde güvenlik tehditlerine ilişkin algıların değiştiğini göstermektedir. Soğuk Savaş'tan sonra AB-Türkiye güvenlik ilişkisi bağlamında, Avrupa Komisyonu (EC), Türkiye'nin AB'nin güvenlik politikasına uyumunu benzeri görülmemiş derecede düşük bir seviyede değerlendirmektedir. Etkili AB-Türkiye güvenlik iş birliğini gerçekleştirememesi, AB'nin güvenlik alanındaki ulus üstü entegrasyon çabalarının yetersiz başarısından kaynaklanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Türkiye, Güvenlik, Güvenlik Tehdidi, Konstrüktivism.

INTRODUCTION

This study examines the changes in the concept of security in European Union (EU)-Türkiye relations between 1945 and 1990, as well as in the post-1990 period. The primary objective of this study is to assess the future direction of EU-Türkiye security relations within the context of emerging security threats since 1990. The question of how the EU's security approach during the Cold War and after the Cold War affected the cooperation in security relations based on changing security threats in EU-Türkiye security relations. How did it affect it? Was investigated to seek an answer. The historical process subject to the research was limited to the pre-Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Did the EU's security approach, which draws the boundaries of the research, provide an opportunity for the development of cooperation with Türkiye through supranational integration activities in the 1945-1990 period and the 1990-2019 period? The subject was limited to the analysis of how the EU-Türkiye security relations will establish a new security relationship in response to emerging security threats during and after the Cold War.

The new order that emerged after World War II is known as the Cold War period. The sharp line between the Western and Eastern Blocks continued between the leaderships of the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). States chose between the two blocks or defended a policy of non-alignment by not directly defending either block. The perception of international security during the Cold War period was largely shaped by the concept of nuclear deterrence. For this reason, states predicted that the outcome of a possible war would be great destruction, and the state of tension between states was kept at a certain level as required by the policy of nuclear deterrence. The USSR, which represented the Eastern Block, was dissolved in 1990. As of 1990, the security threats of the entire international system, including bilateral alliances between states, the areas of influence and levels of states, had completely changed.

The concept of security, which is a determining factor for the positive continuity of international relations, varies depending on the social, economic, political and technological conditions of the period. This difference stems from the reflex of protection against external threats inherent in the essence of the

period, given the pace of development and change. Therefore, the concepts of security in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods differ due to changing social conditions. During the Cold War, security constituted its area with the ability to respond to predictable risk factors within certain limits such as time, space and event, whereas after the Cold War, it is seen that concepts such as time, space and event beyond borders have lost their importance. The analysis of the security threat perception that has expanded with the new order between periods and the policies pursued by the EU regarding threats, the relation of relations with Türkiye within the conventional framework within the context of security and contributing to the literature are of priority.

1. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S APPROACH TO SECURITY

1.1. The European Union's Security Approach during the Cold War

The new period that began in the European continent with the devastating consequences of the Second World War has given rise to an uncertain process. The European continent has been exposed to threats from the East and the West. The future of Europe has been shaped as a party that has had to receive assistance from the development policies of the power struggle between the victorious states of the Second World War and the Western and Eastern blocs that marked the onset of the Cold War period. During this period, the EU must make a security choice regarding the protection of its territory. At the same time, the EU has received assistance from two blocs to consolidate its power in various areas after the Second World War. In this sense, it is a matter of benefiting from the policies of the West that encourage the political, economic, and social development of the states after the Second World War. At the same time, the USSR, which was a clear threat to the eastern lands of Europe, provided military, economic, and political assistance to the EU for the protection of the Eastern European states (Karadeli, 2020).

With the end of World War II, a bipolar world system emerged, led by the United States, representing the West, and the Soviet Union, representing the East. In general, the Cold War period was characterized by a division between two separate blocs. States in the international system preferred one of the two

separate blocs or chose to remain outside the process, defending the policy of non-alignment. States advocating the policy of non-alignment took their place as a third block in the international system.

In order to rebuild the destructive process that affected all states in the international system after World War II, aid policies were established between the Western and Eastern blocs. In fact, the USA wanted to strengthen the Eastern bloc against the threat by creating aid packages such as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan for Western European countries. With the same idea, the USSR established the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, or COMECON, an economic aid package for Eastern European countries. The aid created in terms of states being able to re-establish a political, economic and military union is very effective.

In order to comprehend the security strategy of the European Union during the Cold War, it is essential to analyze the EU's security culture. This security culture reflects how a society views itself and others, rooted in its fundamental values as well as those of other societies. The concept of national identity is shaped by these perceptions of allies and adversaries, with states playing a crucial role in defining this identity. The European Union emphasizes shared values, attitudes, and security advantages, aspiring for differences to serve an integrative purpose. The security culture of the EU was sustained during the Cold War era as an integration initiative grounded in these common values. The aim of the EU security integration was to establish a security community rather than traditional military tools. Security cooperation was aimed by establishing common values with the security community (Birdiřli and Bařurgan, 2017).

One of the most important issues of the Cold War period was the provision of security. In order to ensure security, the USA established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. The USSR established the Warsaw Pact, which is the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. The defense and security of the countries in the European continent must be officially provided within the framework of a military organization. The lack of a defense organization of Europe's own and the environment of trust that being under the roof of a military organization in a period of opposition is a great necessity. Therefore, against the threat of the USSR, European states undertake to ensure

international military security under the roof of NATO and to ensure the security of other Western member states.

The European continent, which was the scene of most major wars, was the center of both world wars and showed its devastating effects heavily. Cooperation was designed as an inevitable end for the European continent, which suffered the consequences of the Second World War heavily. The consistency of cooperation will be created between the strong industrial branches of industrialized countries and states that strive for unity. One of the reasons why countries with strong industrial power aim for cooperation is because they want to leave behind the conflict, loss and poor living conditions of the wars experienced in the past. For this reason, the idea of creating a bond in the economic field with well-intentioned foundations is brought to the agenda in order to increase economic development and ensure cooperation instead of conflict.

European states that sought to establish a cooperation model based on economic foundations created the EU's common economic cooperation structure through the coal and steel industries. The profits of the coal and steel, which were almost squeezed between the Bipolar System established on the balance policy immediately after World War II, also remained in the threat area. The obvious reason for their heightened sense of risk and threat was that the EU sought to enhance its political harmonization capacity with member states in response to the USSR's efforts to develop cross-border operations beyond its border area (Açıkmeşe, 2018).

Undoubtedly, the dominant states in the international environment before the Cold War could not maintain their place in the balance of power after the Cold War. Because during the Cold War, there was a war of opposing ideological views and a battle for superiority between the USA and the USSR. The European continent was trying to recover from the heavy defeat of the war. Europeans continued their reformist efforts by entering into reactions of reconstruction in the political, economic and social environments after the defeat of the war.

1.2. The European Union's Security Approach in the Post-Cold War Era

The important threat potential for ensuring European security during the Cold War period is undoubtedly the Soviet threat. The aim of the security policy during this period is provided through membership in NATO to protect against

the threat of communism. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the threat of communism during the Cold War period caused the EU's security strategy, which was created due to the threat of communism during the period, to lose its importance. The EU's efforts in structuring security in the domestic and foreign political environment lead to calls for political and military cooperation and attempts to establish their formations. EU member states have taken joint steps for political and military cooperation, but full success is not achieved due to various reasons. While the collapse of the USSR ended the threat of communism for the EU, new problems begin to emerge with the size of the changing threat perception.

For instance, the risks associated with regional conflicts and the instability of local administrations highlight existing security vulnerabilities. To address these vulnerabilities, international organizations are prioritizing cooperative initiatives. Consequently, the European Union is concentrating on the development of its own common security and defense policy, emphasizing the risks and threats prevalent during this period. This initiative led to the establishment of the "European Security and Defense Policy," which was introduced through the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Recognized as a significant component of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Security and Defense Policy represents a pragmatic advancement in the realm of security. Furthermore, the Amsterdam Treaty and the Petersburg Declaration, which can be regarded as enhanced and slightly revised iterations of the Maastricht Treaty, facilitate the acceleration of efforts to fortify the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Following the Cold War, a security culture centered on bureaucracy has been established by the EU. In response to emerging security threats, it has developed a conciliatory language of security. This security dynamic prioritizes diplomacy over military action. The EU has taken proactive measures to safeguard the discourse of peace regarding regional conflicts prior to their escalation to the borders of the EU. For instance, a neighborhood policy for the Balkans has been formulated. Through diplomatic efforts, the EU has successfully constructed a language of security that avoids reliance on military intervention.

It is seen that the EU's security threats were redefined and its security policy was restructured after the Cold War. Another of the first issues to be addressed after the Cold War was that the EU accepted the spread of weapons

of mass destruction as a risk and threat element and emphasized that measures should be taken against the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the AGS. During the bipolar period, the two blocs were able to keep nuclear armament at the level of mutual deterrence. With the collapse of the USSR, which balanced deterrence, what would happen to the control dominance of nuclear weapons is a cause for concern. The danger created by an uncontrolled environment, such as the possibility of the weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of groups that carry out terrorist acts, must be prevented.

Another problem is that the EU has taken on the task of restructuring laws supporting the fight against organized crime. Therefore, it wants to frame the functioning, organization and awareness of the breadth of the information network of organized crime with the institutions it has created. The reason why the tendency of organized crime is considered a security threat for European lands is considered to be the inadequate policies in ending the activities of groups prone to organized crime, which stems from the lack of a solid administrative structure in the governments of the states that left the USSR (Yıldız, 2020).

This organization is establishing a community called Trevi in order to stop the investment of resources in terrorism activities and cooperation supporting terrorism formations among EU member states in Europe. It is also known that the Trevi Community is the first security step that forms the basis of Europol in the following years (Zenginoğlu, 2016). The purpose of establishing structures such as Trevi and Europol is to build a protection mechanism against security gaps created by new security threats. Therefore, the cooperation between Trevi and Europol has been accelerated to solve and coordinate organized crimes and various crimes. Organized crimes are among the common security concerns of the EU and Türkiye.

Due to the increasing new security threats, the EU has strengthened its security activities since the 1980s. The EU has included threat elements in the securitization field by emphasizing the diversification of threats in the security field. As a matter of fact, EU member states focus on perpetuating security-related structures within the framework of agreements and policies. The EU's attempts to establish a security and defense organization throughout history have been based on the idea of establishing an EU army. When the EU, which is under the

protection of the West within the new order, analyzed the increasing security risks, a dual debate was created between those who advocated the idea of establishing its own military army within the EU and member states who did not even accept the possibility of shaking their commitment to the Atlanticist alliance (Narin, 2022). In general terms, this period aims to establish a consensus on joint intervention against problems beyond their borders with the logic of common problems and common solutions with EU member states. In addition, the Lisbon Treaty was signed in order for member states to coordinate more closely in the field of security and defense. Although the signed agreements have strengthened relations between members' states, the need for real military defense remains.

From the past to the present, there have been some efforts to ensure cooperation in the field of defense and security in the European geography. The Western European Union, which was established during the Cold War, resumed its activities after a while after the end of the Cold War. The EU is unable to make an effort to create an alternative against NATO, the only alliance in the field of defense and security with the Western European Union. Some EU member states interpret the possibility of weakening relations with NATO not as the strengthening of the union in the field of defense and security, but as the course of negative situations contrary to national interests. For this reason, it is seen that as of 1993, support was not provided to meet the requirements such as infrastructure and resource input that would support the full operation of the Western European Union. The Western European Union's ability to progress slowed down, but with the Marseille Declaration, it was decided to strengthen the EU's security policies and to institutionalize the relationship between the EU and the Western European Union within the common structure.

2. ANALYSIS OF EU-TÜRKİYE RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW SECURITY THREATS

2.1. Fundamental Dynamics of European Union-Türkiye Security Relations

The history of EU-Türkiye relations begins with the 1963 Ankara Agreement. The common dynamics of the EU-Türkiye security culture are nourished by multiculturalism. EU membership aims to create an identity of tolerance by adopting supranational (law, democracy, peace) values as a common denominator

for countries with different historical, political, and social experiences. Integrative universal values serve as the key to achieving supranational integration. There is an expectation that EU-Türkiye security relations will also improve social areas such as economic development, industrialization, and urbanization. For this reason, EU-Türkiye relations became official with Türkiye's application to the EC in 1987. Türkiye's EU candidacy process includes a harmonization process that needs to be carried out within the framework of the Copenhagen Criteria.

The dynamic change in EU-Türkiye security relations after the Cold War is evident. The change in security relations between the EU and Türkiye can be achieved by reading the security culture. Türkiye's security culture during the Cold War is interpreted through a military strategy based on a realistic security approach.

The international landscape of the 1990s witnessed a profound transformation in security dynamics. Following the conclusion of the Cold War, Europe reassessed its security priorities in light of the civil wars that erupted in the Balkans. This reassessment highlighted the emergence of failed states as a novel threat. Furthermore, the civil conflicts contributed to the rise of irregular migration, which has become a pressing security issue for Europeans. As these challenges intensified, new risks emerged, fostering the growth of organized crime groups. Consequently, from the 1990s into the 2000s, a notable shift in the understanding of security has taken place, leading to the development of a new security paradigm.

Since the 2000s, the change in international security threats has also led to changes in the examination of EU-Türkiye relations and security approaches. Between 2000 and 2010, Türkiye prioritized its EU membership. Accordingly, Türkiye's security approach has shifted towards a constructivist line when examining EU-Türkiye relations. This period represents Türkiye's Europeanization process. The constructivist approach, which forms the basis of the EU, is explanatory in terms of understanding EU-Türkiye relations. As of the 2010s, it is observed that the reading of EU-Türkiye security cooperation has created a wave of reforms reflected in Türkiye's security policies within the neoclassical realist framework. In the realistic security approach, the role of the military in security policies is balanced with the transition to neoclassical realism and its

presence as an actor. The presence of the military as an actor is created by increasing the role of the civil bureaucracy in security, creating a balancing process. In order for Türkiye to implement civil-military relations in the EU, the structure of the National Security Council (MGK) has been strengthened through the civil bureaucracy. Thus, reforms have been made to ensure a military-civilian balance in security policies. In regions where failed states can create regional conflict areas, EU-Türkiye security relations have begun to be interpreted as a complement to good relations, especially in the Balkans and the Middle East.

The first goal of state administrators in the risk environment is to protect the state security and preserve the freedoms of citizens. Accordingly, when overly restrictive policies are implemented, individual rights of citizens can be compromised. The threat to individual rights is explained by the situation of preventing a civil organization against the conflicting actions in question. As a dimension of the international security concept, individual security brings up the subject of discussion in terms of violations implemented by states at the individual level due to the concern about terrorism, which is an example of an international danger.

2.2. European Union-Türkiye Security Relations in the Context of Regional Conflicts

Türkiye's regional dynamics, rich opportunities and history constitute an inseparable whole of the EU's security policy. Türkiye's strong coordination skills with the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Eastern Mediterranean, Western Asia, Caucasus and the Balkans constitute a junction and transition point between the regions. Türkiye's dominance over all these regions also includes the role of undertaking a task such as ensuring peace between regions. The EU has an awareness drive towards ensuring military cooperation due to its historical understanding of security. The EU demonstrates its activities to create spheres of influence against threats in its near or distant geography with its influence in common military alliances. The reconstruction of the regions that were dispersed after the end of the Cold War and possible crisis-ending activities bring the EU together with Türkiye within the framework of security interests. Türkiye's regional conciliatory and unifying status is seen as an important country in the EU's crisis-ending activities with regional countries in terms of its military

capabilities and possibilities. The strategic harmony of geographical opportunities is a unifying factor and a necessity for the establishment of military cooperation. The alignment index against the EU's security policies is evaluated based on this policy in terms of the security alignment of the candidate country Türkiye and, therefore, the area of security cooperation. Therefore, Türkiye, which is not a member of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, appears as a limiting and challenging element in terms of its ability to develop EU security cooperation.

Türkiye's regional location, due to its proximity to the countries in question, adopts the role of a country that balances external security problems with its own borders. At the same time, Türkiye, which has rich natural resources in its own region and is also close to other regions with abundant resources, is at the very center of potential conflicts. As a disadvantage of Türkiye's proximity to the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia regions, it is seen that it is close to risk areas and has a high probability of receiving threats in case of a possible conflict in the international environment. As a responsibility of Türkiye's geographical location, it maintains its regional power status with the right strategic policies. Although Türkiye has balanced its multidimensional security relations with the will of regional power in a way that the conflict environment remains outside its borders, it maintains a cautious attitude in its security relations with Türkiye due to the factor of proximity to a potential conflict zone from the EU's perspective. It seems possible for Türkiye to expand its network of relations based on cooperation with Türkiye as a security channel in the control of regions by seeing its geographical proximity as an advantage within the scope of EU security interests (Altun, 2019).

The increasing insecurity due to new security threats that emerged after the Cold War needs to be brought under control in terms of international security. The EU must achieve certain strategic goals to establish a foreign policy stance that ensures global security. In line with these strategic goals, it should diversify its security relations with Türkiye, which is on its way to becoming a geo-strategic power.

The most important factor restricting the area of cooperation in EU-Türkiye security relations is that the EU restricts its relations with Türkiye in the field of security by not directly considering Türkiye as a member of the European Security

and Defense Policy. It imposes a consultative role on Türkiye, with the Rapid Intervention Force offered as an alternative. It is seen that it is trying to reflect an attempt to create an alternative cooperation model in the security relations between the EU and Türkiye. From Türkiye's perspective, the effort to create an alternative security cooperation model with the EU is not a positive approach since it is a development outside of Türkiye's main goal. While the EU is trying to establish an alternative relationship model, it is making Türkiye's position in the European Security and Defense Policy without an alternative.

2.3. European Union-Türkiye Security Relations in the Context of Irregular Migration

The new security threats that emerged after 1990 are addressed within the new security understanding, allowing security threats to be more understandable. Indeed, while migration before 1990 was called a security concern, migration after 1990 is considered a new security threat, including irregular and illegal migration. The changing world conditions after the Cold War call for a direct perception of security threats stemming from the negative effects of migration on societies. The worrisome element of migration management is the mission of failure in migration management. In conditions where planned and correct migration management cannot be carried out, the economic, political and demographic integrity of states reveals a ground that is vulnerable to being shaken. Here, along with migration management concerns, a wide range of threat headings are derived among the new security threats that follow the failed state process. The EU, on the other hand, organizes supranational security cooperation beyond national planning as required by its security understanding. The consensus of EU member states on migration security is based on the externalization of the migration system. Thanks to this system, the way is opened for the establishment of a cooperation channel with states other than EU member states. It is desired to keep the new security threats under control by externalizing the migration mission security, which has turned into an uncontrolled line since 2000. In the policy of externalizing migration with third countries, the third country obtains some privileges and opportunities from the EU. Thus, various security cooperation balances are established between third countries and the EU (Erdoğan, 2022).

The European Commission limits the irregular migration factor under six headings to establish the framework of the security cooperation area to be organized with third countries. The listed field headings are as follows; Visa policy, information exchange, infrastructure for cooperation and coordination, border management, police cooperation, aliens law and criminal law, return and readmission policy. In general, the determined subheadings draw the boundaries of the privilege areas highlighted by the externalized security system in cooperation to be carried out with third countries outside the EU member states. The main purpose of these headings is to reach a decision that the state, which is defined as a transit country at the point where irregular migration tends, will consent to the privilege conditions to be given in the said field headings in order to control the process. It is also seen on the legal ground that the EU acts to suppress the problem and protect its own security requirements through the transit country (www.eur-lex.europa.eu, “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Common Policy on Illegal Immigration” 07.12.2023).

It is necessary to focus on what is meant by the concept of externalization of migration. It is the control of migration through countries that will create the potential for migration flow in order to curb the threat potential of irregular migration, which has become an international problem that transcends national borders. The EU is at the forefront of the unions that use this strategic action functionally. The EU is making an agreement with Türkiye to control migration management and ensure border securitization. This situation creates cooperation channels between the EU and Türkiye over threats that need to be taken due to new security threats. In order to prevent the evolution of national values into a large-scale negative change due to the cross-border threat dimension of new security threats, an irregular migration security cooperation path has been opened between the EU and Türkiye. Some titles have been worked on in order to make concessions in various areas to the EU-Türkiye, which is turning to externalization policy by controlling migration. The EU focuses on creating financial funds, providing project support and supporting steps for the capacity development of third countries. The main objective of the EU is to pursue a common policy to end the threat without bringing it closer to its borders, thus solving the problem by externalizing it (Muftuler-Bac, 2021).

The establishment of a security cooperation area between the EU and Türkiye began with Türkiye gaining the status of a candidate country for the EU. In the same period, the irregularization of migration and the ongoing illegal migration activities emerged as an international problem. The Readmission Agreement was signed between the EU and Türkiye in 2014. With this agreement, an official cooperation document on migration was established between the EU and Türkiye. After the migration factor, irregular migration to the EU, and diversified threats such as human trafficking were resolved beyond national territory, Türkiye took the threat under control through Türkiye. Thus, cooperation was reached between the EU and Türkiye due to the migration threat with the 2014 Readmission Agreement in order to limit and end the threat. With the responsibility it has assumed, Türkiye becomes the first preventer of a security problem that the EU should directly deal with (www.eeas.europa.eu, “EU and Türkiye Manage Migration Together” 08.12.2023).

Following the migrant crisis that emerged in 2015, the 18 March Agreement between Türkiye and the European Union (EU) has been the focus of many political, legal, and even moral debates. While certain circles praised the agreement because it was an effort to prevent a humanitarian tragedy, criticisms were that the parties turned a blind eye to the violation of human rights and refugee rights for the benefit of the countries involved. Amnesty International accused the EU of allegedly ignoring the tragic situation of the refugees and described the Agreement as “Europe’s Year of Shame.”

The circles criticizing the agreement have claimed that the EU will unlawfully send migrants back to Türkiye with the “1 to 1” formula foreseen in the agreement and that the agreement is contrary to EU and international law. However, the aim of the EU and Türkiye was to prevent migrant deaths in the Aegean and to break the human trafficking chain. Indeed, the agreement showed its effect immediately in its first year, and according to EU Commission data, irregular crossings decreased by 97%. The “1 to 1” application, which has been the subject of the most criticism, included limited returns and resettlement in EU countries, but the March 18 Agreement significantly prevented irregular migration and, therefore, loss of life via the Aegean Sea with its deterrent effect.

The joint action plan presented by the EU Commission mentions some responsibilities within the framework of the agreement to which the EU and Türkiye are parties. If we touch upon the EU's responsibilities, it is to ensure that the necessary material, systematic, and technical arrangements are made to ensure fundamental rights, human rights, and legal rights against migrants hosted by Türkiye. If we touch upon Türkiye's responsibilities, it is to keep track of and record migrants migrating to Türkiye and to ensure the continuity of cooperation with countries in related geographical locations to prevent illegal migration. With the joint action plan prepared, the EU and Türkiye aim to reach a consensus within the framework of a common stance and a common plan against security vulnerabilities that may diversify due to the migration factor, which is one of the new security threats (Tavacı, 2023). The EU's material and technical support to Türkiye against the threat of irregular migration is created to prevent threats directed at the EU. The EU's strategic security approach primarily provides its own security interests through cooperation with Türkiye.

2.4. European Union-Türkiye Security Relations in the Context of Terrorism

From the past to the present, Türkiye's strong army in the field of security and defense, thanks to its strategic thinking and implementation capacity, has maintained its characteristic of being a successful country in terms of developing consensus and cooperation in the regional, global, and international systems. Türkiye's uncompromising attitude against terrorism is documented by the operations it has carried out. Indeed, Türkiye has solidified its authority globally through diplomatic and academic contributions. By taking part in the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism in the pre-2000 period, it has accepted that it will stand against all kinds of situations that may lead to terrorism and has undertaken to act together for its precautions. It is understood that it has made it its duty to cooperate in order to ensure the spirit of solidarity at the table and in the field (Bay, 2021).

How is the area of security cooperation established between the EU and Türkiye over the threat of terrorism during the Cold War and after the Cold War? How was the EU-Türkiye stance and cooperation against the threat of terrorism carried out during the Cold War? How was the EU-Türkiye stance and cooperation

against the threat of terrorism carried out after the Cold War? What areas of preventive cooperation are being developed between the EU and Türkiye against the threat of terrorism? In which cases is a more limited dialogue carried out over the threat of terrorism in EU-Türkiye security relations? The answers to all these questions are analyzed in this section of the study.

It would be useful to examine the reflections of the Cold War terrorism threat on the EU's internal security. The last thirty years of the Cold War period indicate a period in which the changing dynamics of perceived threat factors began to be recognized. In this period, when the scope and definition of security threats began to change, terrorism became apparent as a security problem spreading beyond borders in the international system. A joint effort in establishing the EU's internal security is carried out with the Maastricht Treaty. The Maastricht Treaty constitutes a legal and official basis for a common security mechanism for EU members. The third pillar of the Maastricht Treaty provides guidance on the method of combating the threat of terrorism among member states and the establishment and maintenance of cooperation.

Following the 2001 terrorist incidents after the Cold War, Türkiye's tough stance against terrorist incidents that have been ongoing for years and its military successes led some EU members to support the use of Türkiye's knowledge and equipment within the European army, which efforts were made to establish, while others opposed this view. The foundation of the EU's ultimate security construction is based on the continuation of the harmony among the members within the framework of respect for common values. The security relationship between the EU and Türkiye is based on efforts to establish military integrity by focusing on common values. For this reason, it is seen that two different perspectives prevail among the member states regarding Türkiye's role and place in the European army, before the 2001 terrorist incidents and after the 2001 terrorist incidents. The divergence in perspectives is developing in terms of the role and role Türkiye should play in the process in order to make more cautious and stabilizing decisions against the shocking effects of the terrorist incident. Türkiye's role is emphasized within the framework of two views. First; The EU's perception of potential threats against Middle Eastern countries is being controlled through Türkiye due to the values it defends and its military know-how. The second is divided into two by the views of member states who do not

want the EU to face threats in Türkiye's close geography in return for Türkiye's balance, stability and peace role against Middle Eastern countries.

Türkiye is on a path toward EU membership, demonstrating its commitment to meeting the EU's market economy expectations, collaborating with EU member states, and establishing political and economic equilibrium. As a NATO member, Türkiye is also making significant sacrifices to satisfy the requisite conditions for EU accession. Even prior to its potential membership, Türkiye contributes to EU security through its NATO affiliation. This coordination in security plays an active role in managing the risk landscape by participating in NATO military security efforts and mitigating environmental and regional threats. The strategic significance of Türkiye's geographical position is regarded as a valuable asset in the realm of geopolitics. Concurrently, Türkiye is compelled to foster closer ties with emerging risks and threats while implementing measures to preserve its geopolitical stability. Its pivotal location renders Türkiye a crucial partner for the EU in fostering relations with the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans.

When the EU-Türkiye terrorism security threat is evaluated, it is seen that the cooperation opportunities stemming from terrorism are carried out limitedly. There is no joint action plan for preventing conflicts in common crisis regions regarding EU-Türkiye security cooperation. A limited cooperation link at the diplomatic level does not offer a real solution for the threat of terrorism, which is one of the most important common threat areas. The diversified organized crime threats within the terrorism threat reveal the increasing need for joint action. A joint action plan adapted to the threat of terrorism should be created for the joint action plan followed for the threat of irregular migration, which is one of the common problems of EU-Türkiye. Condemning terrorism at the level of discourse does not mean stopping the threat from becoming limitless. The security of the EU is not considered independent of the security of Türkiye. Türkiye is combating operationally all structures that support terrorist activities and all kinds of formations representing terrorist groups, depending on the name change. Similarly, the EU should condemn terrorist groups without discrimination in order to maintain peace at national, regional and international levels and should be open to forming a common struggle with Türkiye to respond to their potential for action (www.ab.gov.tr, "Frequently Asked Questions and Answers to EU Minister and Chief Negotiator Ömer Çelik" 01.12.2023).

The EU and Türkiye have common security interests in the threat of terrorism, but they approach it from different perspectives. Different perspectives and interests make it difficult to cooperate from time to time. The EU and Türkiye do not act concretely together in a joint cooperation effort against the threat of terrorism. Türkiye's military experience in the fight against terrorism also plays an important role in EU security. Indeed, the role Türkiye has taken in the crisis regions of Syria, Iraq and Libya following active regional peacekeeping is important for EU security. Türkiye is the only NATO member state that has directly entered into conflict with terrorist organizations in crisis regions. It is seen that Türkiye has created a unilateral struggle area rather than a bilateral struggle area in the incidents titled terrorism in EU security. Some of Türkiye's security priority struggles pose a threat to Türkiye's national security due to the EU's differentiation based on the names of terrorist groups (PKK, PYD, DAESH, etc.). Based on this, the EU's attitude of not criticizing the differentiation of all terrorist groups by name rather than seeing them in the same group stagnates the EU-Türkiye terrorism security cooperation. The problem of the scope of security threats, which prioritize interests according to events and situations, directly affects EU-Türkiye cooperation (www.kriterdergi.com, "EU-Türkiye Security Cooperation Possibilities and Constraints" 17.12.2023).

The refugee crisis has highlighted the crucial role of Türkiye within the European Union, while simultaneously illustrating the EU's significance to Türkiye. Millions of individuals have traversed through Türkiye to reach Europe, and following the signing of the "Türkiye - EU Statement" on 18 March 2016, there was a marked reduction in both the influx of migrants and the humanitarian emergencies at the borders of the EU. Although the Statement ignited considerable discussion within Türkiye and resulted in significant advantages for the EU from the ensuing agreements, it arose out of the essential need for a strong partnership between Türkiye and the EU. Throughout the Cold War, Türkiye served as a critical buffer for Western Europe against the Soviet threat for a span of four decades. In the second decade of the 21st century, These groups included not only refugees but also extremists and foreign terrorist fighters. Addressing terrorism and countering extremism have been two uncommon areas where Türkiye and the EU have made progress in their relations.

CONCLUSION

The cooperation between the EU and Türkiye in the field of security within the framework of security culture yields positive results when they intersect on a common ground. However, since they do not share a common security culture on a common ground, the results of the cooperation that is carried out within the framework of new security threats are negative. The EU-Türkiye cooperation analysis gains meaning depending on the win-win policy between the parties. Solution-oriented cooperation studies are carried out around the common security threats of the EU and Türkiye and the common benefits. However, since the common benefit output is greater for the EU than the security threats analyzed in the article, there are facts that do not provide full benefit for Türkiye.

The EU sees security policy as an advanced level of integration with a common representative identity of constructivist values in the context of new security threats after the Cold War. It foresees an advanced level of integration with the abandonment of national identity limitations, the construction of a supranational identity, and the attribution of authority to supranational institutions. In order to become an EU member, Türkiye has also found some domestic political reforms to complete the Copenhagen Criteria. It is seen that the common values accepted as integrative by the states that have completed the Copenhagen Criteria have transferred the national authority area to the supranational authority area. It has been seen that the national identity has not fully reinforced the supranational identity reference in Türkiye. Since the EU-Türkiye security cooperation is not a complete example of integration in terms of supranational political values, cooperative attitudes, and actions do not offer a full two-way benefit output.

The contribution of this study to researchers and knowledge interested in the subject is provided by the research question. The EU's Constructivism approach after the Cold War is analyzed with an original question in terms of how and in what way it affects EU-Türkiye cooperation in the context of new security threats.

REFERENCES

- Açıkmeşe, A.S. (2018). *Büyük güçlerin güvenlik politikaları: “ABD, Rusya, Avrupa Birliği, Çin”*, (M. Aydın ve A. H. Atalay Ed.). *Strateji ve Güvenlik* (116-142) Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi Yayınları.
- Altun, T. (2019). *Güvenlik faktörünün Türkiye AB ilişkilerine etkisi*. Yüksek lisans tezi, Hacettepe Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara.
- Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye Delegasyonu. (2023). *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye göçü beraber idare ediyor*. Erişim adresi: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/t%C3%BCrkiye/ab-ve-t%C3%BCrkiye-g%C3%B6%C3%A7-beraber-i%C3%87dare- ediyor_tr. (Erişim tarihi: 06/03/2025).
- Bakan, S., ve Şahin, S. (2018). Uluslararası güvenlik yaklaşımlarının tarihsel dönüşümü ve yeni tehditler: *The Journal of International Lingual, Social and Educational Sciences*, 4(2), 136-149.
- Bay, D. (2021). 11 Eylül saldırılarının AB’nin terörizmle mücadelesine etkileri, *Euro Politika*, (11), 59.
- Birdişli, F. (2016). Güvenlik kültürü üzerine bir inceleme: Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam Üniversitesi öğrencilerinin güvenlik algısı, *Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 9(43), 644-654.
- Birdişli, F., ve Başurgan, A. (2017). Güvenlik politikalarının konstrüktivist bir unsuru olarak güvenlik kültürü ve Türkiye örneği, *Adnan Menderes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 4(4), 62-66.
- Erdoğan, S. (2022). Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği göç iş birliği: bir göç dışsallaştırma örneği olarak Türkiye’deki mülteciler için mali yardım aracı. *İçtimaiyat Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 359-361.
- European Commission. *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a common policy on illegal immigration*. Erişim adresi: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52001DC0672> (Erişim tarihi: 06/03/2025).



Karaca, S. O. (2021). Avrupa Birliği'nin Türkiye ile ortak güvenlik politikaları, *Ankara Uluslararası Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 4(8), 124.

Karadeli, C. (2020). Soğuk savaş'ın ilk aşamasında Doğu Avrupa: sosyalizm ve başkaldırı, *Uluslararası Kriz ve Siyaset Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 4(1), 44-46.

Köse, T. (2022). *Avrupa Birliği-Türkiye güvenlik iş birliği imkan ve kısıtları*. Erişim adresi: [https://kriterdergi.com/dosya-savunma-ve-guvenlik/AB-Türkiye-guvenlik-is-birligi-imkan-ve-kisitlari](https://kriterdergi.com/dosya-savunma-ve-guvenlik/AB-Turkiye-guvenlik-is-birligi-imkan-ve-kisitlari). (Erişim tarihi: 06/03/2025).

Muftuler-Bac, M. (2021). Externalization of migration governance, Türkiye's migration regime, and the protection of the European union's external borders. *Turkish Studies*, Sabancı University 4-5.

Narin, S. (2022). AB'nin ortak güvenlik ve savunma politikasında bütünleşmesine yönelik farklı yaklaşımlar ve pesco kapsamında Türkiye-AB ilişkileri, *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 24(özel sayı), 4-31.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı. (2022). *Türkiye ve Avrupa Güvenlik ve İş Birliği Teşkilatı*. Erişim adresi: [https://www.mfa.gov.tr/Türkiye-ve-avrupa-guvenli-ve-isbirligi-teskilati_agit_.tr.mfa](https://www.mfa.gov.tr/Turkiye-ve-avrupa-guvenli-ve-isbirligi-teskilati_agit_.tr.mfa) (Erişim tarihi: 06/03/2025).

Yıldız, F. (2020). Sınır aşan/organize suçlar bağlamında Avrupa Birliği, *Yönetim ve Ekonomi Dergisi*, 27(2), 279.