









# **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

| TABLE OF CONTENTS       |    |
|-------------------------|----|
| DOCUMENT PROPERTIES     | 4  |
| ABOUT VBS               |    |
| SCOPE OF WORK           | 6  |
| AUDIT METHODOLOGY       | 7  |
| AUDIT CHECKLIST         | 9  |
| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY       |    |
| CENTRALIZED PRIVILEGES  |    |
| RISK CATEGORIES.        |    |
| AUDIT SCOPE             |    |
| AUTOMATED ANALYSIS      |    |
| KEY FINDINGS            |    |
| MANUAL REVIEW           |    |
| VULNERABILITY SCAN      | 28 |
| REPOSITORY              | 29 |
| INHERITANCE GRAPH       |    |
| PROJECT BASIC KNOWLEDGE |    |
| AUDIT RESULT            |    |
| REFERENCES              | 37 |





# **INTRODUCTION**

| Auditing Firm           | VITAL BLOCK SECURITY                        |
|-------------------------|---|
| Client Firm             | PREVAIL TOKEN                               |
| Methodology             | Automated Analysis, Manual Code Review.     |
| Language                | Solidity                                    |
| Contract                | 0x61Efb60A075479D96Ad3D1C54dd87D71AfFF980f  |
| Source Code Light       | Verified                                    |
| License                 | міт   |
| Centralization          | Active ownership                            |
| <b>Compiler Version</b> | v0.8.19+commit.7dd6d404                     |
| Blockchain              | BINANCE SMART CHAIN                         |
| Website                 | https://sheprotocol.com                     |
| Telegram Ann            | https://t.me/sheprotocol                    |
| Telegram Group          | https://t.me/she_protocol                   |
| Twitter                 | https://x.com/she_protocol                  |
| Doc                     | https://sheprotocol.gitbook.io/sheprotocol/ |
| Prelim Report Date      | FEBRUARY 5 <sup>th</sup> 2024               |
| Final Report Date       | FEBRUARY 8th 2024                           |

**Werify the authenticity of this report on our GitHub Repo:** <u>https://www.github.com/vital-block</u>



# **Document Properties**

| Client         | PREVAIL TOKEN                           |
|----------------|---|
| Title          | Smart Contract Audit Report             |
| Target         | Prevail Token                           |
| Audit Version  | 1.0                                     |
| Author         | Akhmetshin Marat                        |
| Auditors       | Akhmetshin Marat, James BK, Benny Matin |
| Reviewed by    | Dima Meru                               |
| Approved by    | Prince Mitchell                         |
| Classification | Public                                  |

# **Version Info**

| Version | Date                 | Author(s)          | Description       |
|---------|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| 1.0     | February 08th, 2024  | James BK           | Final Released    |
| 1.0-AP  | February 08th , 2024 | <b>Benny Matin</b> | Release Candidate |

# Contact

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In the following, we show the specific pull request and the commit hash value used in this audit.

- https://bscscan.com/token/0x61Efb60A075479D96Ad3D1C54dd87D71AfFF980f (FR78590)
- <u>https://bscscan.com/token/0x61Efb60A075479D96Ad3D1C54dd87D71AfFF980f#code</u> (6JJD78)

# **About Vital Block Security**

Vital Block Security provides professional, thorough, fast, and easy-to-understand smart contract security audit. We do indepth and penetrative static, manual, automated, and intelligent analysis of the smart contract. Some of our automated scans include tools like ConsenSys MythX, Mythril, Slither, Surya. We can audit custom smart contracts, DApps, Rust, NFTs, etc (including the service of smart contract auditing). We are reachable at Telegram (<u>https://t.me/vital\_block</u>), Twitter (<u>http://twitter.com/Vb\_Audit</u>), or Email (<u>info@vitalblock.org</u>).



# Methodology (1)

To standardize the evaluation, we define the following terminology based on the OWASP Risk Rating Methodology [4]:

- <u>Likelihood</u> represents how likely a particular vulnerability is to be uncovered and exploited in the wild;
- Impact measures the technical loss and business damage of a successful attack;
- <u>Severity</u> demonstrates the overall criticality of the risk.





# **SCOPE OF WORK**

Vital Block was consulted by PREVAIL TOKEN to conduct the smart contract audit of its Rust source code. The audit scope of work is strictly limited to mentioned .Rust file only:

O.Prevail.Sol

External contracts and/or interfaces dependencies are not checked due to being out of scope.

Verify audited contract code Repo.

**Public Contract Link** 

https://bscscan.com/token/0x61Efb60A075479D96Ad3D1C54dd87D71AfFF980f





# **AUDIT METHODOLOGY**

Smart contract audits are conducted using a set of standards and procedures. Mutual collaboration is essential to performing an effective smart contract audit. Here's a brief overview of Vital Block Security auditing process and methodology:

### CONNECT

• The onboarding team gathers source codes, and specifications to make sure we understand the size, and scope of the smart contract audit.

### AUDIT

- Automated analysis is performed to identify common contract vulnerabilities. We may use the following third-party frameworks and dependencies to perform the automated analysis:
  - Remix IDE Developer Tool
  - Open Zeppelin Code Analyzer
  - SWC Vulnerabilities Registry
  - DEX Dependencies, e.g., Pancakeswap, Uniswap
- o Simulations are performed to identify centralized exploits causing contract and/or trade locks.
- A manual line-by-line analysis is performed to identify contract issues and centralized privileges.

We may inspect below mentioned common contract vulnerabilities, and centralized exploits:









### REPORT

- The auditing team provides a preliminary report specifying all the checks which have been performed and the findings thereof.
- $\circ$  The client's development team reviews the report and makes amendments to the codes.
- The auditing team provides the final comprehensive report with open and unresolvedissues.

#### PUBLISH

- The client may use the audit report internally or disclose it publicly.
- It is important to note that there is no pass or fail in the audit, it is recommended to view the audit as an unbiased assessment of the safety of solidity codes.





| Table 1. | <b>.0 The</b> | <b>Full Audit</b> | Checklist |
|----------|---------------|-------------------|-----------|
|----------|---------------|-------------------|-----------|

| Category                    | Checklist Items                           |  |
|-----------------------------|---|--|
|                             | Constructor Mismatch                      |  |
|                             | Ownership Takeover                        |  |
|                             | Redundant Fallback Function               |  |
|                             | Overflows & Underflows                    |  |
|                             | Reentrancy                                |  |
|                             | Money-Giving Bug                          |  |
|                             | Blackhole                                 |  |
|                             | Unauthorized Self-Destruct                |  |
|                             | Revert DoS                                |  |
| Basic Coding Bugs           | Unchecked External Call                   |  |
|                             | Gasless Send                              |  |
|                             | Send Instead Of Transfer                  |  |
|                             | Costly Loop                               |  |
|                             | (Unsafe) Use Of Untrusted Libraries       |  |
|                             | (Unsafe) Use Of Predictable Variables     |  |
|                             | Transaction Ordering Dependence           |  |
|                             | Deprecated Uses                           |  |
| Semantic Consistency Checks | Semantic Consistency Checks               |  |
|                             | Business Logics Review                    |  |
|                             | Functionality Checks                      |  |
|                             | Authentication Management                 |  |
|                             | Access Control & Authorization            |  |
|                             | Oracle Security                           |  |
| Advanced DoEi Corutiny      | Digital Asset Escrow                      |  |
| Advanced Deri Scrutiny      | Kill-Switch Mechanism                     |  |
|                             | Operation Trails & Event Generation       |  |
|                             | ERC20 Idiosyncrasies Handling             |  |
|                             | Frontend-Contract Integration             |  |
|                             | Deployment Consistency                    |  |
|                             | Holistic Risk Management                  |  |
|                             | Avoiding Use of Variadic Byte Array       |  |
|                             | Using Fixed Compiler Version              |  |
| Additional Recommendations  | Making Visibility Level Explicit          |  |
|                             | Making Type Inference Explicit            |  |
|                             | Adhering To Function Declaration Strictly |  |
|                             | Following Other Best Practices            |  |





# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Vital Block Security has performed the automated and manual analysis of the **PREVAIL TOKEN** Sol code. The code was reviewed for common contract vulnerabilities and centralized exploits. Here's a quick audit summary:

| Status  | Critical : 🔴 | Major " 🔴 | Medium # 😑 | Minor \$ 🔵 | Unknown % 🛑 |
|---|--------------|-----------|------------|------------|-------------|
| Open  | 0            | 0         | 0          | 1          | 0           |
| Acknowledged  | 0            | 0         | 1          | 3          | 2           |
| Resolved  | 0            | 0         | 1          | 0          | 0           |
| Noteworthy<br>OnlyOwnerSet Taxes and Ratios, Airdrop, Set Protection Settings, Set Reward Properties,<br>Set Reflector Settings, Set Swap Settings, Set Pair and RouterPrivileges |              |           |            |            |             |

### **PREVAIL TOKEN** Smart contract has achieved the following score: 95.0



Please note that smart contracts deployed on blockchains aren't resistant to exploits,

- vulnerabilities and/or hacks. Blockchain and cryptography assets utilize new and emerging technologies. These technologies present a high level of ongoing risks. For a detailed understanding of risk severity, source code vulnerability, and audit limitations, kindly review the audit report thoroughly.
- Please note that centralization privileges regardless of their inherited risk status constitute an elevated impact on smart contract safety and security.





## **CENTRALIZED PRIVILEGES**

Centralization risk is the most common cause of cryptography asset loss. When a smart contract has a privileged role, the risk related to centralization is elevated.

There are some well-intended reasons have privileged roles, such as:

- Privileged roles can be granted the power to pause() the contract in case of an external attack.
- Privileged roles can use functions like, include(), and exclude() to add or remove wallets from fees,
   swap checks, and transaction limits. This is useful to run a presale and to list on an exchange.

Authorizing privileged roles to externally-owned-account (EOA) is dangerous. Lately, centralizationrelated losses are increasing in frequency and magnitude.

- The client can lower centralization-related risks by implementing below mentioned practices:
- Privileged role's private key must be carefully secured to avoid any potential hack.
- Privileged role should be shared by multi-signature (multi-sig) wallets.
- Authorized privilege can be locked in a contract, user voting, or community DAO can be introduced to unlock the privilege.
- Renouncing the contract ownership, and privileged roles.
- Remove functions with elevated centralization risk.

Understand the project's initial asset distribution. Assets in the liquidity pair should be locked. Assets outside the liquidity pair should be locked with a release schedule.





### **RISK CATEGORIES**

Smart contracts are generally designed to hold, approve, and transfer tokens. This makes them very tempting attack targets. A successful external attack may allow the external attacker to directly exploit. A successful centralization-related exploit may allow the privileged role to directly exploit. All risks which are identified in the audit report are categorized here for the reader to review:

| <b>Risk Type</b> | Definition   |
|------------------|--|
| Critical : 🔴     | These risks could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.   |
| Major " 🔶        | These risks are hard to exploit but very important to fix, they carry an elevated risk of smart contract manipulation, which can lead to high-risk severity.   |
| Medium # 🔶       | These risks should be fixed, as they carry an inherent risk of future exploits, and<br>hacks which may or may not impact the smart contract execution. Low-risk re-<br>entrancy-related vulnerabilities should be fixed to deter exploits. |
| Minor \$         | These risks do not pose a considerable risk to the contract or those who interact<br>with it. They are code-style violations and deviations from standard practices. They<br>should be highlighted and fixed nonetheless.                  |
| Unknown %        | These risks pose uncertain severity to the contract or those who interact with it. They should be fixed immediately to mitigate the riskuncertainty.   |

All statuses which are identified in the audit report are categorized here for the reader to review:

| Status Type  | Definition                             |
|--------------|--|
| Open         | Risks are open.                        |
| Acknowledged | Risks are acknowledged, but not fixed. |
| Resolved     | Risks are acknowledged and fixed.      |





# **Key Findings**

Overall, these contracts are well-designed and engineered, though the implementation can be improved by resolving the identified issues (shown in Table 2.1), 2 medium-severity vulnerabilities, 3 low-severity vulnerabilities, and 2 informational recommen- dations.

| ID      | Severity      | Title   | Category        | Status |
|---------|---------------|---|-----------------|--------|
| LNY-001 | Informational | In updateForMinter, the following equation<br>is used inside an unchecked block     | Coding Practice | Fixed  |
| LNY-002 | Low           | In updateFormapping, the following<br>equation is used inside an unchecked<br>block | Business Logic  | Fixed  |
| LNY-003 | Low           | In updateForAmount, Relevant<br>Function Snippet                                    | Coding Practice | Fixed  |
| LNY-004 | Informational | In updateForOwner, Relevant Function<br>Snippet                                     | Coding Practice | Fixed  |

### Table 2.1: Key PREVAIL TOKEN Audit Findings

Beside the identified issues, we emphasize that for any user-facing applications and services, it is always important to develop necessary risk-control mechanisms and make contingency plans, which may need to be exercised before the mainnet deployment. The risk-control mechanisms should kick in at the very moment when the contracts are being deployed on mainnet. Please refer to page 10 for details.





# **AUTOMATED ANALYSIS**

| Symbol   | Definition              |
|----------|-------------------------|
|          | Function modifies state |
| <b>*</b> | Function is payable     |
| ŝ        | Function is internal    |
| 2        | Function is private     |
| l        | Function is important   |

### | \*\***PREVAIL**\*\* | Interface | ||| | <sup>L</sup> | totalSupply | External | | | | NO| | | L | decimals | External 🛛 | 👘 🕴 |NO 🖉 | | <sup>L</sup> | symbol | External **]** | 🕴 |NO**]** | | <sup>L</sup> | name | External | | | | | NO | | | L | getOwner | External | | | NO | <sup>L</sup> | balanceOf | External | | INO I | L | transfer | External | | " | <sup>L</sup> | allowance | External | | INO I | <sup>L</sup> | approve | External | | " INO. | L | transferFrom | External | | " |NO | 111111 | **\*\*IFactoryV2**\*\* | Interface | ||| | L | getPair | External 🛛 | INO I | L | createPair | External 📕 | " INO I 111111 | **\*\*IV2Pair\*\*** | Interface | ||| | <sup>L</sup> | factory | External | | | | | NO | <sup>L</sup> | getReserves | External <mark>|</mark> | | |NO<mark>.</mark> | | L | sync | External | | " |NO |





| **IRouter01 <sup>**</sup>   Interface  |
|--|
| <sup>L</sup>   factory   External <mark> </mark>   NO <mark> </mark>                     |
| <sup>L</sup>   BSC   External      NO  |
| L   addLiquidityBNB   External ]   #  NO]  |
| L   addLiquidity   External     "  NO  |
| L   swapExacBNBForTokens   External     #  NO  |
| L   getAmountsOut   External     NO  |
| L   getAmountsIn   External     NO   |
|  |
| ** <mark>IRouter02</mark> **   Interface   IRouter01                                     |
| <sup>L</sup>   swapExactTokensForBNBSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens   External ]   "  NO]  |
| <sup>L</sup>   swapExactBNBForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens   External ]   #  NO]  |
| L   swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens   External 🛛   " 🦳 🤎  NO🏾      |
| <sup>L</sup>   swapExactTokensForTokens   External <mark>]</mark>   "  NO <mark>]</mark> |
|  |
| ** <b>Protections</b> **   Interface   |
| L   checkUser   External 🎚   " ! 🥯  NO🌡  |
| L   setLaunch   External 🕽   " 🛛 🥚  NO 🖁   |
| L   setLpPair   External 🛛   " 🛛 🥚  NO🌡  |
| L   VAIL   External     "  NO!   |
| <sup>L</sup>   removeSniper   External     "  NO   |
|  |
| **Cashier**   Interface  |
| <sup>L</sup>   setRewardsProperties   External ]   "  NO ]                               |
| <sup>L</sup>   tally   External     "  NO  |
| <sup>L</sup>   load   External ]   #  NO]  |
| <sup>L</sup>   cashout   External <mark>]</mark>   "  NO ]                               |
| <sup>L</sup>   giveMeWelfarePlease   External ]   "  NO]                                 |
| <sup>L</sup>   getTotalDistributed   External             NO                             |
| L   getUserInfo   External   NO!   |
| <sup>L</sup>   getUserRealizedRewards   External       NO                                |





| <sup>L</sup>   getPendingRewards   External <mark> </mark>     NO <mark> </mark>              |
|---|
| <sup>L</sup>   initialize   External <mark>]</mark>   "  NO ]                                 |
| <sup>L</sup>   getCurrentReward   External <mark>]</mark>       NO <mark>]</mark>             |
|   |
| <b>**SOL</b> **   Implementation   <b>SafeMath</b>  |
| <sup>L</sup>   <constructor>   Public <mark>]</mark>   #  NO <mark>]</mark>  </constructor>   |
| <sup>L</sup>   transferOwner   External <mark>]</mark>   "   onlyOwner                        |
| <sup>L</sup>   renounceOwnership   External <mark>]</mark>   "   NO <b>!</b>                  |
| <sup>L</sup>   setOperator   Public <mark>]</mark>   "  NO <mark>]</mark>                     |
| <sup>L</sup>   renounceOriginalDeployer   External     "  NO                                  |
| <sup>L</sup>   <receive ether="">   External <mark>]</mark>   #  NO<mark>]</mark>  </receive> |
| <sup>L</sup>   totalSupply   External <mark>]</mark>   NO <mark>]</mark>                      |
| <sup>L</sup>   decimals   External <mark> </mark>   NO <mark>,</mark>                         |
| <sup>L</sup>   symbol   External <mark> </mark>   NO <mark> </mark>                           |
| <sup>L</sup>   name   External <mark>]</mark>   NO <b>]</b>                                   |
| L   getOwner   External 🛛   🕴 INO 🖁   |
| <sup>L</sup>   balanceOf   Public <mark> </mark>   <b>!</b>  NO                               |
| <sup>L</sup>   allowance   External   |
| L   approve   External 🕽   " ! 🧼 🛛 NO 🕽   |
| <sup>L</sup>   _approve   Internal \$   "   |
| L   approveContractContingency   Public 🛛   " 🦳 🗧   onlyOwner                                 |
| <sup>L</sup>   transfer   External <mark>]</mark>   "  NO <mark>]</mark>                      |
| <sup>L</sup>   transferFrom   External <mark>]</mark>   "  NO <mark>]</mark>                  |
| <sup>L</sup>   setNewRouter   External <mark>]</mark>   "   onlyOwner                         |
| <sup>L</sup>   setLpPair   External <mark>]</mark>   "   onlyOwner                            |
| <sup>L</sup>   setInitializers   External <mark>]</mark>   "   onlyOwner                      |
| <sup>L</sup>   isExcludedFromFees   External       NO   |
| <sup>L</sup>   isExcludedFromDividends   External           NO                                |
| <sup>L</sup>   isExcludedFromProtection   External         NO                                 |
| L   setDividendExcluded   Public     "   onlyOwner  |
| L   setExcludedFromFees   Public     "   onlyOwner  |





# OPTIMIZATIONS PREVAIL TOKEN

| ID  | Title                             | Category         | Status         |
|-----|-----------------------------------|------------------|----------------|
| DTV | Logarithm Refinement Optimization | Gas Optimization | Acknowledged 🔵 |
| DOP | Checks Can Be Performed Earlier   | Gas Optimization | Acknowledged   |
| DDP | Unnecessary Use Of SafeMath       | Gas Optimization | Acknowledged   |
| DWY | Struct Optimization               | Gas Optimization | Acknowledged   |
| DGT | Unused State Variable             | Gas Optimization | Acknowledged 🔵 |



# **General Detectors**



### e

### **DoS with Failed Call**

This contract uses external calls that may fail, resulting in loss of functionality.

A

### **Misuse of Boolean Constant**

No compiler version inconsistencies found

The usage of specific true/false values in this contract may lead to errors.



 $\checkmark$ 

 $\checkmark$ 

### **Numeric Notation Best Practices**

The numeric notation used in this contract is unconventional, possibly worsening the reading/debugging experience



Attention Required

Attention Required

No tautologies or contradictions found

| No unchecked call responses found            |          | No faulty true/false values found                          |
|--|----------|--|
| No vulnerable self-destruct functions found  |          | No innacurate divisions found                              |
| No assertion vulnerabilities found           |          | No redundant constructor calls found                       |
| No old solidity code found                   | <b></b>  | No vulnerable transfers found                              |
| No external delegated calls found            | <b>~</b> | No vulnerable return values found                          |
| No external call dependency found            | <b></b>  | No uninitialized local variables found                     |
| No vulnerable authentication calls found     |          | No default function responses found                        |
| No invalid character typos found             |          | No missing arithmetic events found                         |
| No RTL characters found                      | <b>⊘</b> | No missing access control events found                     |
| No dead code found                           |          | No redundant true/false comparisons found                  |
| No risky data allocation found               |          | No state variables vulnerable through function calls found |
| No uninitialized state variables found       |          | No buggy low-level calls found                             |
| No uninitialized storage variables found     |          | No expensive loops found                                   |
| No vulnerable initialization functions found | <b>⊘</b> | No bad numeric notation practices found                    |
| No risky data handling found                 | <b>⊘</b> | No missing constant declarations found                     |
| No number accuracy bug found                 |          | No missing external function declarations found            |
| No out-of-range number vulnerability found   | <b></b>  | No vulnerable payable functions found                      |
| No map data deletion vulnerabilities found   | <b>⊘</b> | No vulnerable message values found                         |
|  |          |  |





10000000

PancakeV2

Buy 0.00 %/ Sell 0.00 %

# **Vulnerability Run check**

### Prevail / VAIL

07/02/2024 06:31 AM UTC+8

### **Contract information**

total amount transaction tax Exchange 1

#### **Risk detection**

#### Contract source code has been verified

This token contract is open source, please view the contract code for details. Token contracts that do not provide source code are likely to have malicious functions and defraud users of their assets.

#### No additional issuance function

The issuance function is transparent or non-existent. Hidden minting may increase the number of tokens in circulation and affect the price of the token.

#### Owner cannot change balance

The contract owner does not have the right to modify the token balance of other addresses.

### Pixiu Risks

#### This doesn't seem to be Pixiu

We found no code blocking the token sale.

#### 😨 no anti-whale

There is no limit on the number of token transactions. The number of fraudulent token transactions may be limited (Pixiu risk).

### 🞗 Does not contain a whitelist mechanism

There is no whitelisting mechanism included in the contract. If there is a whitelist, some addresses may not be able to trade normally (Pixiu risk).

#### 🥑 no agent

There is no agency in the contract. A proxy contract means that the owner of the contract can modify the functionality of the token and potentially affect the price.

#### Contract rights cannot be regained (false abandonment)

If this function exists, it is possible for the project owner to regain ownership even if he abandons it.



#### No transaction cooldown

The token contract does not have a transaction cooling function. If there is a transaction cooling function, users will not be able to sell tokens within a certain period of time or generate blocks after purchasing.

#### ☆ Find the blacklist function

Contains a blacklist function, some addresses may not be able to trade normally (Pixiu risk).





# **POY-01 Key Findings**

| Category                       | Severity • | Location                        | Status        |
|--------------------------------|------------|---------------------------------|---------------|
| Status Mathematical Operations | Low        | Prevail.sol Contracts – 218-227 | Informational |

# Description

In updateForMinter , the following equation is used inside an unchecked block

| <pre>function _mint(address account, uint256 amount) internal override {     supermint(account, amount);</pre>                         |
|--|
| <pre>dividendTracker.setBalance(account, balanceOf(account)); }</pre>  |
| <pre>function excludeFromFees(address account, bool isExcluded) public onlyOwner {     isExcludedFromFees[account] = isExcluded;</pre> |
| <pre>emit ExcludeFromFees(account, isExcluded);</pre>  |

Minter can not issue more **PREVAIL TOKEN** Token indefinitely. Note that as of the date of publishing, the above review reflects the current understanding of known security patterns as they relate to the **VAIL** contract.

Thus, this enables the approval of a token account for confidential transfers, even if it is associated with a different mint. Ideally, token accounts should only be allowed to hold tokens from the specific mint they are associated with. By not checking the mint consistency, the function effectively approves arbitrary token accounts for confidential transfers. Such unauthorized token mixing may have security and financial implications, as it could result in loss of value or assets for users who rely on the token system's integrity.

### Recommendation

Incorporate the following verification within process approve account to confirm that the token account's associated mint aligns with the mint for which the confidential transfer approval is sought.





# **PNY-02 Key Findings**

| Category       | Severity • | Target               | Status |
|----------------|------------|----------------------|--------|
| Business Logic | Medium     | Contract/Prevail.sol | Fixed  |

# Description

In **updateFormapping**, the following equation is used inside an unchecked block

```
mapping (address => bool) public isExcludedFromFees;
uint16[3] public totalFees;
bool private _swapping;
IUniswapV2Router02 public routerV2;
address public pairV2;
mapping (address => bool) public AMMPairs;
```

### **Description**

The function mapping () does not have the override specifier. It should be noted that since ( a function that overrides only a single interface function does not require the override specifier (see doc). However, all other instances of this in the code base contain the override specifier.

### Recommendation

We recommend either checking for overflow in this case, or ensuring that the **PairsIn** is close enough it will never cause an overflow





# **PNY-03 Key Findings**

| Category                                     | Severity •                             | Target                           | Status      |
|--|--|----------------------------------|-------------|
| Inconsistency                                | Informational                          | Multiple Contracts               | Acknowledge |
|  |  |                                  |             |
| Description                                  |  |                                  |             |
| In updateForAmount, Releva                   | ant Function Snippet                   |                                  |             |
| function _burn(ad<br>superburn(a             | dress account, uin<br>ccount, amount); | t256 amount) internal override { |             |
| dividendTrack<br>}                           | er.setBalance(acco                     | unt, balanceOf(account));        |             |
| <pre>function _mint(ad     supermint(a</pre> | dress account, uin<br>ccount, amount); | t256 amount) internal override { |             |
| dividendTrack<br>}                           | er.setBalance(acco                     | unt, balanceOf(account));        |             |

### **Description**

The function amount0 () does not have the override specifier. It should be noted that since amount0 > a function That overrides only a single interface function does not require the override specifier. However, all other instances of this in the codebase contain the override specifier

### Recommendation

We recommend adding the override specifier to amount() or removing the override specifier from all other functions this applies to for consistency.





# **PNY-04 Key Findings**

| Category   | Severity •   | Target   | Status        |
|--|--|--|---------------|
| Coding Practices   | low  | contracts/Prevail.sol  | Informational |
| Description<br>In updateForOwner, Relevan<br>function updateSwapT<br>require(_swap<br>"SwapThreshold: Cannor<br>threshold");<br>swapThreshold<br>emit SwapThresh | tFunctionSnippet<br>hreshold(uint16 _sw<br>ThresholdRatio > 0<br>t exceed limits fro<br>Ratio = _swapThresh<br>sholdUpdated(_swapT | apThresholdRatio) public onlyOwner<br>&& _swapThresholdRatio <= 500,<br>m 0.01% to 5% for new swap<br>oldRatio;<br>hresholdRatio); | {             |

### **Description**

For Ownership efficiency, the Prevail Token is engineered with the reserve cache mechanism, which necessi-tates the common steps to be followed when operating with the reserve Ownership data in different scenarios, including the tax generation, update, and eventual persistence.

# Recommendation

Revise the above functions to following a consistent approach to use the reserve cache mechanism.





# **Vulnerability Scan**

### REENTRANCY

No reentrancy risk found

Severity

Major

**Confidence Parameter** 

Certain

# Vulnerability Description

Solution Wintable: More amount of the PREVAIL TOKEN token can NOT be minted by a private wallet or contract. (This is Essentially normal for most contracts )

# Scanning Line:

function \_mint(address account, uint256 amount) internal override {
 super.\_mint(account, amount);

```
dividendTracker.setBalance(account, balanceOf(account));
}
```

```
function excludeFromFees(address account, bool isExcluded) public
onlyOwner {
    isExcludedFromFees[account] = isExcluded;
```

emit ExcludeFromFees(account, isExcluded);





| <b>Repository:</b><br>https://bscscan.com/address/0x61Efb60A075479D96Ad3D1C54dd87D71AfFF980f  |
|---|
| <u>Prevail.sol</u>  |
|   |
|   |
| 0x306C912d99066ea6E795C59ba5eC527361779dd2  |
| 0x61Efb60A075479D96Ad3D1C54dd87D71AfFF980f  |
| https://bscscan.com/tx/0x85831fc06c1a5cfc13637016cdd0c<br>53ddc12fa92857c6ee8e231f6ab982222b1 |
|   |





# **INHERITANCE GRAPH**



| Identifier    | Definition                                 | Severity |
|---------------|--|----------|
| <b>CEN-12</b> | Centralization privileges of PREVAIL TOKEN | Medium # |
|               |  |          |

# Vulnerability 0 : No important security issue detected. **Threat level:** Low







# **ISSUES CHECKING STATUS**

|     | Issue Description   | Checking Status |
|-----|---|-----------------|
| 1.  | Compiler errors.  | PASSED          |
| 2.  | Race Conditions and reentrancy. Cross-Function Race Conditions. | PASSED          |
| 3.  | Possible Delay In Data Delivery.                                | PASSED          |
| 4.  | Oracle calls.   | PASSED          |
| 5.  | Front Running.  | PASSED          |
| 6.  | Sol Dependency.   | PASSED          |
| 7.  | Integer Overflow And Underflow.                                 | PASSED          |
| 8.  | DoS with Revert.  | PASSED          |
| 9.  | Dos With Block Gas Limit.                                       | PASSED          |
| 10. | Methods execution permissions.                                  | PASSED          |
| 11. | Economy Model of the contract.                                  | PASSED          |
| 12. | The Impact Of Exchange Rate On the solidity Logic.              | PASSED          |
| 13. | Private use data leaks.   | PASSED          |
| 14. | Malicious Event log.  | PASSED          |
| 15. | Scoping and Declarations.                                       | PASSED          |
| 16. | Uninitialized storage pointers.                                 | PASSED          |
| 17. | Arithmetic accuracy.  | PASSED          |
| 18. | Design Logic.   | PASSED          |
| 19. | Cross-Function race Conditions                                  | PASSED          |
| 20. | Save Upon solidity contract Implementation and Usage.           | PASSED          |
| 21. | Fallback Function Security                                      | PASSED          |





# **MANUAL REVIEW**

Prevail Token is a token on The Binance Smart Chain rewarding our holders with BNB!

TOKEN NAME: PREVAIL TOKEN Ticker: VAIL DECIMALS: 18 Total Supply: 10,000,000



### The PREVAIL TOKEN Platform Is Launching On The BSC Network



#### Prevail Token

Name: Prevail Token

icker: VAII

Blockchain: Binanace Smart Chain

Total Supply: 10,000,000

No Transfer Fees

10% Buy and Sale Tax

Distribution of Taxes: 5% to holder in form of BNB, 3% to Prevail LP, 2% to marketing and development CONTENT CREATION UTILITY!!!



Our Utility is a one of a kind content creation utility which uses content creation to generate revenue to strengthen Prevail Token LP, Increase daily buy/sell volume, and create marketing and development funds for continued growth.



Our Team

Our team at Prevail Token is made up of dedicated individuals who share a common goal of running an honest, trustworthy project in the defi space.

Our primary goal first and foremost is to watch out for the best interest of our holders and the Prevail Token Community. We are committed to making a positive impact in the Defi Space.





IdentifierDefinitionSeverityCEN-02Initial asset distributionMinor (a)

All of the initially minted assets are sent to the contract deployer when deploying the contract. This is Normal for most

deployer and/or contract owner.

```
function marketingFeesSetup(uint16 _buyFee, uint16 _sellFee, uint16 _transferFee) public
onlyOwner {
    totalFees[0] = totalFees[0] - marketingFees[0] + _buyFee;
    totalFees[1] = totalFees[1] - marketingFees[1] + _sellFee;
    totalFees[2] = totalFees[2] - marketingFees[2] + _transferFee;
    require(totalFees[0] <= 2500 && totalFees[1] <= 2500 && totalFees[2] <= 2500,
"TaxesDefaultRouter: Cannot exceed max total fee of 25%");
    marketingFees = [_buyFee, _sellFee, _transferFee];</pre>
```

```
emit marketingFeesUpdated(_buyFee, _sellFee, _transferFee);
```

### RECOMMENDATION

Project stakeholders should be consulted during the initial asset distribution process.



### RECOMMENDATION

Deployer and/or contract owner private keys are secured carefully.

Please refer to PAGE-7 CENTRALIZED PRIVILEGES for a detailed understanding.

### ALLEVIATION

The PREVAIL TOKEN project team understands the centralization risk. Some functions are provided privileged access to ensure a good runtime behavior in the project





# References

- 1 MITRE. CWE-1041: Use of Redundant Code. <u>https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1041.</u> html.
- MITRE. CWE-1099: Inconsistent Naming Conventions for Identifiers. <u>https://cwe.mitre.org/</u> <u>data/definitions/1099.html</u>.
- 3 MITRE. CWE-561: Dead Code. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/561.html.
- 4 MITRE. CWE-563: Assignment to Variable without Use. <u>https://cwe.mitre.org/data/</u> <u>definitions/563.html</u>.
- 5 MITRE. CWE-663: Use of a Non-reentrant Function in a Concurrent Context. <u>https://cwe.</u> mitre.org/data/definitions/663.html.
- 6 MITRE. CWE-837: Improper Enforcement of a Single, Unique Action. <u>https://cwe.mitre.org/</u> <u>data/definitions/837.html</u>.
- 7 MITRE. CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow. <u>https://cwe.mitre.org/</u> <u>data/definitions/841.html</u>.
- 8 MITRE. CWE CATEGORY: Bad Coding Practices. <u>https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/</u> <u>1006.html</u>.
- MITRE. CWE CATEGORY: Business Logic Errors. <u>https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/</u> <u>840.html</u>.
- 10 MITRE. CWE CATEGORY: Concurrency. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/557.html.
- 11 MITRE. CWE VIEW: Development Concepts. <u>https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/699.</u> <u>html</u>.
- 12 OWASP. Risk Rating Methodology. <u>https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\_Risk\_Rating\_Methodology</u>.





| Identifier | Definition               | Severity |
|------------|--------------------------|----------|
| COD-10     | Third Party Dependencies | Minor 🌍  |

Smart contract is interacting with third party protocols e.g., Pancakeswap router, cashier contract, protections contract. The scope of the audit treats third party entities as black boxes and assumes their functional correctness. However, in the real world, third parties can be compromised, and exploited. Moreover, upgrades in third parties can create severe impacts, e.g., increased transactional fees, deprecation of previous routers, etc.

### RECOMMENDATION

Inspect and validate third party dependencies regularly, and mitigate severe impacts whenever

necessary.





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The smart contract for this particular audit was analyzed for common contract vulnerabilities, and centralization exploits. This audit report makes no statements or warranties on the security of the code. This audit report does not provide any warranty or guarantee regarding the absolute bug-free nature of the smart contract analyzed, nor do they provide any indication of the client's business, business model or legal compliance. This audit report does not extend to the compiler layer, any other areas beyond the programming language, or other programming aspects that could present security risks. Cryptographic tokens are emergent technologies, they carry high levels of technical risks and uncertainty. You agree that your access and/or use, including but not limited to any services, reports, and materials, will be at your sole risk on an as-is, where-is, and as-available basis. This audit report could include false positives, false negatives, and other unpredictable results.

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Vital Block is Dedicated to Making Defi & Web3 A Safer Place. We are Powered by Security engineers, developers, Ul experts, and blockchain enthusiasts. Our team currently consists of 5 core members, and 4+ casual contributors.

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