



## OVERVIEW OF INPUTS TO THE TALANOA DIALOGUE

26/11/2018

This note presents an overview of inputs submitted by Parties and non-Party stakeholders to the Talanoa Dialogue. Its objective is to describe in general terms the trends and main contents of those inputs, categorized according to the three questions of the Talanoa Dialogue. The analysis applies to inputs received before the deadline of 29 October 2018.

### 1. Introduction

#### 1.1. Background and purpose

1. The Conference of the Parties (COP), by decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 20, decided to convene a facilitative dialogue among Parties in 2018 to take stock of the collective efforts of Parties in relation to progress towards the long-term goal referred to in Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement and to inform the preparation of Parties' nationally determined contributions (NDCs) pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement.
2. The Talanoa Dialogue was launched at COP 23<sup>1</sup> as a process comprised of a preparatory and a political phase. Parties, non-Party stakeholders and expert institutions were encouraged to prepare analytical and policy-relevant inputs to inform the dialogue and submit these to the process.
3. This note has been prepared by the secretariat in response to a request by the Presidency of COP 23 and the incoming Presidency of COP 24. It provides an overview of the inputs from Parties, non-Party stakeholders and expert institutions that were submitted by 29 October 2018 and address one or more of the three Talanoa Dialogue questions:
  - Where are we?
  - Where do we want to go?
  - How do we get there?All eligible inputs are published on the Talanoa Dialogue platform.<sup>2</sup>
4. The note provides a mapping of the inputs submitted by different stakeholders and a general overview of their content. It is intended to facilitate the Talanoa Dialogue discussions at COP 24, to be held in Katowice, Poland, on 2–14 December 2018, and to provide a general view of 'what the conversation has been about'. It does not summarize the content of inputs received.
5. The note is an update to the version of 23 April 2018, which gave an overview of the inputs received by 2 April 2018.


<sup>1</sup> The approach to the Talanoa Dialogue is described in decision 1/CP.23, annex II.

<sup>2</sup> <https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/2018-talanoa-dialogue-platform>.

## 1.2 Approach

6. Of the information provided by stakeholders at the time of submission, this report draws on:
  - Identification of the stakeholder;
  - Objectives pursued in submitting the input;
  - Summary of the input;
  - The input itself.
7. This updated note presents, in this first chapter, general statistics of the inputs and an overview of cross-cutting issues such as the objectives pursued by stakeholders in submitting an input, their expectations of the Talanoa Dialogue and key messages. The second chapter provides an overview of the substance in the inputs pertaining to each of the three questions of the Talanoa Dialogue, structured using four levels of analysis as illustrated in figure 1.

**Figure 1.** Levels for analysing inputs



8. The information is presented in accordance with the following qualifiers referring to the percentage of inputs that are relevant for a particular matter: a few (up to 10 per cent), some (11–40 per cent), about half (41–60 per cent), about two thirds (61–70 per cent) and most (71 per cent or more).
9. Information specific to different stakeholders has been classified in accordance with the categories described in table 1.

**Table 1.** Stakeholder categories used in this overview

<b>Party stakeholders</b>	
Party	A country that is a Party to the Convention
Group of Parties	Group of Parties, whether formally established under the Convention <sup>a</sup> or ad hoc associations for the sole purpose of jointly submitting an input to the Talanoa Dialogue
<b>Non-Party stakeholders</b>	
Academia and research	Stakeholders whose main activity is research or academic in nature
Civil society	Non-governmental organizations and institutions that represent the interests of citizens
International organizations	All non-United Nations intergovernmental organizations and all international associations of national government departments, agencies and institutions, as long as all members of the organization are of the same kind
Private sector	Stakeholders whose main activity is for profit
Subnational governments	Government institutions at the subnational level
United Nations	All and any United Nations funds, programmes, specialized agencies and others
UNFCCC constituted bodies	Bodies constituted under the Convention <sup>b</sup>
Mixed partnerships and coalitions	Partnerships and coalitions involving organizations and institutions from two or more of the different stakeholder categories referred to above

<sup>a</sup> <https://unfccc.int/process/parties-non-party-stakeholders/parties/party-groupings>.


<sup>b</sup> <https://unfccc.int/>.

### 1.3 Overall statistics and trends

#### *Breakdown of inputs*

10. A total of 473 inputs were uploaded to the Talanoa Dialogue platform by 29 October 2018.
11. Of the 44 inputs submitted by 156 Parties, 24 were submitted by individual Parties and 20 by groups of Parties.
12. The remaining 429 inputs were submitted by non-Party stakeholders. Civil society accounts for the largest share of non-Party stakeholder inputs (121, or 28 per cent), closely followed by academia and research organizations (94, or 22 per cent). Inputs submitted by mixed partnerships and coalitions (69) and by the private sector (62) each represent close to 15 per cent of all inputs from non-Party stakeholders. International organizations submitted 37 (9 per cent), subnational governments 32 (7 per cent), United Nations bodies 12 (3 per cent) and UNFCCC constituted bodies 2 (0.5 per cent). This breakdown is shown in figure 2.

**Figure 2.** Distribution of inputs to the Talanoa Dialogue by stakeholder category




13. Inputs vary in the extent to which they address the questions of the Talanoa Dialogue in a direct manner as well as in the extent to which they contain information that is actionable, replicable or holds potential to achieve impact on a large scale:

- Over three quarters of inputs present this clear link;
- Some inputs consist of existing material (reports, publications, slides and other material) that is relevant to climate debates but not necessarily tailored to the Talanoa Dialogue;
- A few inputs were considered to marginally address the questions of the Talanoa Dialogue.

14. Based on this context, of the 473 inputs received, 354 address the first Talanoa Dialogue question, 348 address the second and 383 address the third. Figure 3 shows this distribution.

**Figure 3.** Number of inputs addressing each Talanoa Dialogue question



15. The majority of inputs (60 per cent) addressed all three questions. These inputs typically build a narrative from the present situation (where are we?) to the future destination (where do we want to go?), and propose ways to reach objectives (how do we get there?). About 15 per cent of inputs addressed two Talanoa Dialogue questions, and the remainder (25 per cent) addressed only one, most often “how do we get there?”.

*Stakeholder objectives in submitting inputs*

16. Stakeholders appear to have interpreted the request to explain the objectives pursued in submitting an input in at least three different ways:

- The vast majority understood this request in terms of the objectives of their input (e.g. to showcase an initiative or action, to argue for the merits of particular technologies or policy options, or to make specific recommendations);
- Some understood it in terms of what they expect to get out of their involvement in the process (e.g. to influence future climate policy, to secure participation in Talanoa Dialogue events, to secure longer-term participation in the climate process);
- Yet others understood it in terms of their vision for the Talanoa Dialogue itself (e.g. how the dialogue should be conducted, who should be invited to participate, what its outcome should be).

Table 2 summarizes the main trends observed in stated objectives by stakeholder category.

**Table 2.** Objectives by stakeholder category

Stakeholder	Objectives
Parties	Set out their expectations for the preparatory and political phases of the Talanoa Dialogue, including on the expected outcome of the process; contribute their take on each of the Talanoa Dialogue questions; report on Talanoa Dialogue events that they have organized; and share experiences that may be good practices for ambitious climate policy.
Group of Parties	Submit their shared view on one or more of the Talanoa Dialogue questions; bring scientific information to the attention of the Talanoa Dialogue; call for the principles of the Convention and the Paris Agreement to be upheld; call for pre-2020 commitments to be delivered; and argue in favour of particular policy options.
Academia and research	Share expert opinions, knowledge and assessments about climate change and climate action and support, including on the basis of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change special report <i>Global Warming of 1.5°C</i> ; advocate for particular policy options, most often policies and instruments to address opportunities for and barriers to a just transition towards a low-carbon, climate-resilient world; identify opportunities for increased ambition; and influence the design of the Paris Agreement rule book.
Civil society	Influence the design and mechanisms of (international) climate policy; share opinions and information about the situation on the ground, including initiatives, actions and the state of ecosystems; get the voices of affected communities heard (including the younger generation); secure a place for themselves in the international arena and encourage a wider debate; call for bolder action, including for the goal of limiting the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels to be respected; and advocate for certain principles to be respected in the international process and climate action.
International organizations	Share expert knowledge and opinions on particular aspects of climate change, climate policies and climate action; advocate for their own role in addressing the climate challenge; and call for ambitious and urgent action.

## Overview of inputs to the Talanoa Dialogue

Stakeholder	Objectives
Private sector	Showcase their climate action and leadership; call for national governments to create the conditions that will enable businesses to increase their climate action; express the wish to be seen as key partners in meeting the climate challenge, and accordingly seek more integral involvement for themselves in national and international climate policymaking, including in the Talanoa Dialogue; call for governments to increase their ambition and accelerate their action; and make specific policy recommendations.
Subnational governments	Showcase their climate action and leadership; call for national governments to create the conditions necessary for subnational actors to increase climate action; express the wish to be seen as key partners in meeting the climate challenge, and accordingly seek more integral involvement for themselves in national and international climate policymaking; and call for governments to increase their ambition and accelerate their action.
United Nations	Inform the debate by sharing expert knowledge and opinions on climate issues falling under their remit and showcase their climate action.
UNFCCC constituted bodies	Inform the debate by sharing expert knowledge, opinions and key findings on climate issues falling under their remit.
Mixed partnerships and coalitions	Showcase their climate action and leadership; demonstrate the merits of different types of partnerships for climate action and for building capacity; provide information about options for more ambitious climate action in specific economic sectors; and seek to persuade governments and the international community to act in particular ways.

### *Expectations of the Talanoa Dialogue*

17. Some inputs, particularly those from Parties and Party groupings, include expectations of the Talanoa Dialogue process, including its outcomes. According to those inputs the Talanoa Dialogue is expected to:

- Be conducted in line with the principles enshrined in the Convention and the Paris Agreement (equity, common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, historical responsibility, respect for human rights and others);
- Be inclusive and safeguarded against conflict of interest;
- Take account of the best available science;
- Address the substance of the dialogue, including mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation, in a comprehensive and balanced way;
- Be facilitative, constructive and cooperative;
- Provide Parties with scientific and technical evidence to enable them to collectively assess progress towards the long-term temperature goal set out in the Paris Agreement and inform a collective and global conversation on how to enhance ambition;
- Bring concrete outcomes and deliver a strong signal to Parties to come forward with more ambitious NDCs by 2020 that are aligned with the 2/1.5 °C goal of the Paris Agreement;
- Lead to delivery on pre-2020 commitments;
- Deliver a strong message in support of the Paris Agreement and affirm the mechanism included in the Paris Agreement to raise ambition.

18. Many non-Party stakeholders explicitly welcome the opportunity to contribute to the international process, and contend that their participation makes for a more open, transparent and accountable process.

19. Several non-Party stakeholders see their input as the first step in what they hope will become more substantial and ongoing participation in the international process. A few stakeholders expect their engagement to go beyond the end of 2018.
20. A few explicitly state their availability to brief Parties on their issues of interest face to face. Others indicate that they expect their involvement to be focused on the ground (e.g. organizations active in awareness-raising).

#### *General trends*

21. The Talanoa Dialogue platform received inputs from a wide range of stakeholders from around the world representing the voices of virtually all segments of society. Several inputs included reports from events associated with the dialogue process which were organized by stakeholders ranging from grass-roots organizations to supra-national regional organizations. A few inputs also highlight that the Talanoa tradition is now being adopted in places other than the Pacific as a working method to discuss climate issues.
22. Inputs show widespread concern about how continued high levels of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are threatening to disrupt the Earth's system. For the most part, inputs are underpinned by a view of the Earth that sees it as finite and fragile, with human activity generally accepted to be the most powerful force shaping its future. At the same time, inputs also show great concern about the risks of failing to rise to the challenge posed by climate change quickly enough, particularly in terms of impacts, irreversible disruption of habitats, livelihoods and ecosystems, and the development setbacks and economic costs of delaying action.
23. Inputs show widespread support for the Paris Agreement's temperature goal, with many expressing a preference for limiting the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. That is particularly the case for inputs submitted after the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published its special report *Global Warming of 1.5°C*. However, many reach the same conclusion on the basis of the alarming increase in extreme events and natural disasters observed at current levels of warming (approximately 1 °C above pre-industrial levels) and the havoc they are wreaking.
24. Collectively, inputs show a proliferation of action on the ground on an unprecedented scale. Party inputs, for their part, show that climate change is increasingly becoming a national development issue, how national governments are engaging more deeply with a wider range of stakeholders and with each other, and how they are turning the climate challenge into opportunities (e.g. green growth, innovation). Parties also refer to challenges being faced in terms of capacity and access to finance and technology.
25. Many inputs illustrate how non-Party stakeholders are taking steps to deliver on ambitious commitments, thus complementing national ambition and/or action. This is by no means an isolated phenomenon. Rather, momentum is building as more and more stakeholders are taking this stance in many different places around the world at once. Inputs showcase a wealth of experiences, lessons learned and proposals that can be implemented, replicated and scaled up by others.
26. Inputs also showcase action undertaken by large networks of organizations spanning many countries (in some cases more than 150), representing a significant share of the world economy (e.g. in terms of asset value for networks of investors; or revenue for networks of businesses) and/or of the world population (e.g. city networks, networks of civil society organizations with membership running to many million). The private sector and subnational governments in particular are using such networks to precipitate a shift in the social norms that prevail in the environments in which they operate, for example, through leadership and peer pressure, by generating evidence that climate-friendly practices bring business benefits and by generating new perceptions of status associated with climate-friendly practices and behaviour.

27. Virtually all inputs to the Talanoa Dialogue point out that current global levels of climate action, support and ambition are insufficient to avert dangerous human interference with the climate system. Ongoing climate action is understood to be not only far from sufficient to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement, but also insufficient to deliver current NDCs.
28. Most inputs call for political will and leadership from national governments and heads of agencies and companies to step up and accelerate climate action and ambition, and to act swiftly and decisively to create the enabling environments that will empower all of society to contribute to delivering a low-emission and climate-resilient future. Some argue that this cannot be achieved through incremental change; rather, it will take rapid and revolutionary, systemic and/or structural change that only strong government action can precipitate. Some point out that support – particularly finance and capacity-building – and deeper and wider collaboration are other critical factors in delivering climate action on the scale required.
29. In the context of the Convention and the Paris Agreement, national governments are called upon to secure significantly more ambitious and robust NDCs, to deliver on pre-2020 action and support, to adopt a robust rulebook for the Paris Agreement at COP 24 and to increase their international cooperation in areas that involve the creation of a global level playing field (e.g. for investment, phasing out subsidies to fossil fuels and agriculture, phasing out fossil fuel production). This last point requires significantly more international cooperation, and wider and deeper engagement of key stakeholders.
30. A sizeable share of inputs focuses on the complex links on the ground between climate vulnerability, poverty and lack of development. While inputs contribute to sketching out ways forward to simultaneously promote climate resilience, poverty eradication and sustainable development, ideally in accord with human rights and other principles central to climate action and sustainable development, there is a general sense in the inputs that the task is enormous and action far from being commensurate with the level of need.
31. Many inputs refer to the moral and ethical dimension of climate change and climate action. They include repeated calls to ensure that transitions and development paths are just and inclusive, and consistent with human rights and equity. Due regard to the distributional effects of climate action (e.g. just transition, response measures) are other calls that occur multiple times in inputs.
32. Notably, a sizeable share of inputs to the Talanoa Dialogue were submitted by youth organizations and other organizations that speak for youth and future generations. These inputs discuss issues of intergenerational equity and set out the views of the younger generation, and elaborate at length on policies that they would like to see put in place. Most central to these inputs is that they call for the full engagement of youth as equal partners in national and international climate policymaking on the grounds that youth is the segment of society for which the climate challenge represents the highest stakes. They also call for targeted capacity-building to equip the younger generation to participate, act and make their voices heard, and become the leaders of the future.
33. The ramifications of failing fully to apply the polluter pays principle to GHG emissions released to the atmosphere also feature repeatedly in inputs. Such considerations underpin discussions relating to historical responsibility, appropriate climate finance for developing countries, in particular the least developed ones, and the merits of certain policy options such as carbon pricing and the phasing out of distortive subsidies in energy and agriculture.
34. Finally, many inputs point to the synergies between climate action and other international agendas, in particular the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 and the United Nations conventions and treaties on related issues (e.g. biodiversity, desertification, ozone layer). They also point to conflicts between climate goals and trade rules under the World Trade Organization. Inputs urge national governments and

the international community to adopt more holistic approaches with a view to exploiting synergies, addressing conflicts and diminishing inconsistencies across all these different agendas.

**Box 1: Collaboration**

Collaboration and partnership is a recurrent theme under all three Talanoa Dialogue questions.

Collaboration is pursued for a variety of purposes, including: pooling knowledge and other resources for more robust solutions; coordinating efforts for a more efficient use of limited resources; increasing buy-in of policies; creating a level playing field at the international level; and bringing together a critical mass of actors to exert increased influence and leadership.

Collaboration happens in a variety of situations such as humanitarian (e.g. to secure more comprehensive preparedness and better coordinated responses to natural disasters), sectoral (e.g. to prepare sector-wide road maps and strategies), around specific climate targets (e.g. business and/or city networks for knowledge-sharing that capitalize on peer pressure for increased ambition) and national governments consulting with subnational actors to enhance policy buy-in (e.g. to secure ownership and commitment to delivering NDCs).

Inputs feature collaboration at very different stages of development, ranging from collaboration that is already delivering tangible results which can be replicated and scaled up to incipient collaboration in the form of relatively recent efforts towards establishing communication channels.

Actors tend to see collaboration as an integral part of their vision for the future and are often quite clear as to with whom they wish to collaborate further, the barriers that they face and how they could be overcome. The actors that most seek out and advocate for more collaboration are the private sector, subnational governments and civil society. The actors most solicited to collaborate are national governments, the private sector and subnational governments.

Calls for increased collaboration are made at all jurisdictional levels:

- At the **international level**, inputs call for closer integration of the United Nations agendas for climate, disaster risk reduction, sustainable development and other treaties and conventions (biodiversity, desertification, ozone layer), and greater coherence within the United Nations. Parties are also called to cooperate to create a global level playing field on matters such as carbon pricing, fossil fuels subsidy reform, innovation and investment;
- At the **subnational level**, inputs come from well-established collaborative efforts which call for better vertically integrated governance as a key factor to deliver more climate action. This involves the integral participation of subnational actors in climate policymaking and implementation, including in the preparation and implementation of nationally determined contributions;
- Inputs also call for comprehensively involving stakeholders in the design and delivery of plans to achieve low emissions and climate resilience at the **sectoral level**, including through public–private partnerships, closer cooperation among actors on the ground and closer links between donor and partner countries;
- Finally, inputs that touch primarily on **cross-cutting issues** also make calls for deeper engagement and capacity-building of certain population groups and of grass-roots organizations in climate policymaking. This includes the youth, indigenous and faith organizations.

## 2. Overview per Talanoa Dialogue question

### 2.1. Where are we?

35. A total of 354 inputs addressed this question.

36. The distribution of inputs to the first Talanoa Dialogue question (where are we?) by stakeholder category is broadly the same as the distribution for all submissions (see figure 2).


37. Of the 37 inputs to this question submitted by 145 Parties, 19 were submitted by Parties individually and 18 by groups of Parties.

38. The inputs to this Talanoa Dialogue question typically do one or more of the following:

- a. Present **findings on GHGs** at the global, national or sectoral scale;
- b. Set out **climate impacts and vulnerability** observed around the globe;
- c. Assess progress in initiatives, actions and the situation on the ground;
- d. Identify **challenges and opportunities** for policy action;
- e. Analyse existing institutional arrangements and policies.

39. Figure 4 shows the number of inputs to the first Talanoa Dialogue question that tackle each of the above-mentioned topics.

**Figure 4.** Number of inputs to the Talanoa Dialogue question “where are we?” that address a given topic



40. The specific interest of different stakeholders as regards this question is as follows:

- Academia and research organizations predominantly share analyses of the situation on the ground (e.g. climate impacts, adequacy of existing policy or other frameworks) and discuss how to tackle challenges and opportunities;
- Civil society organizations predominantly showcase their initiatives and actions, identify challenges and opportunities and demands for policy action and report on the situation on the ground, with a sizeable share highlighting climate impacts and vulnerability;
- International organizations centre primarily on the progress to date in initiatives and actions and the policy context, and several report findings on GHGs;
- Mixed partnerships and coalitions showcase their initiatives and actions, identify challenges and opportunities and make demands for policy action; some of them report on climate impacts and vulnerability;

- Parties' inputs primarily showcase their climate action (strategies, plans and policies), point to challenges and opportunities, and make demands for policy action at the international level;
- Both the private sector and subnational governments primarily showcase their own initiatives and actions, identify challenges and opportunities and make demands for policy action. Subnational governments also devote substantial attention to climate impacts and vulnerability;
- United Nations agencies and programmes mostly address findings on GHG emissions, and challenges and opportunities, including demands for policy action;
- UNFCCC constituted bodies for the most part report on progress to date and discuss current institutional arrangements and policies under the Convention.

### *Findings on greenhouse gases*

41. Over a third of inputs to the first Talanoa Dialogue question address this topic. Collectively, these inputs cover emissions sources, levels and trends; emission projections; mitigation potential, typically at the sectoral level;<sup>3</sup> the global carbon budget; the effort gap as compared with mitigation pathways compatible with reaching the 2/1.5 °C target at least cost; expected warming; and other global changes that result from increased GHGs in the atmosphere.

42. Inputs tend to outline GHG emission trends at the global, national, subnational and sectoral level and even at the level of individual organizations. They typically set out past emission profiles and sketch future projections. For past emissions, inputs identify main emissions sources and showcase online tools and platforms that stakeholders use to keep track of their commitments and progress. Some inputs are more future oriented, and set out trajectories towards future targets. Examples of inputs fitting this description include some inputs submitted by Parties, subnational governments, trade associations, networks of cities and businesses, and individual companies and other organizations.

43. Several inputs raise concerns that the current emission levels are too high, and draw attention to the substantial gap between current emission levels and trends from what is required to stay on track to meet the 2/1.5 °C target. The general appreciation is that, at this stage, it seems implausible that global emissions will peak by 2020 and be consistent with pathways to stay on track to meet the 2/1.5 °C target. Some raise similar concerns in terms of the limited carbon budget or point out that staying on the current emission pathway would lead to overshooting and would require net negative emissions to return to global warming to 2/1.5 °C.

44. Some inputs concern themselves with future projections only. They often discuss emission levels derived from NDCs, their associated uncertainties and their adequacy to meet the Paris Agreement's temperature goal. They emphasize that the achievement of existing NDCs will lead to an increase in global average temperature of approximately 3 °C and that failing to deliver on them may result in increases of 4.7 °C or more.

45. Inputs that set out emission trends and mitigation potential at the sectoral level most often centre on transport (with aviation, shipping, freight and urban transport emissions featuring repeatedly); agriculture and the global food system (with animal foods, food waste and agricultural practices featuring repeatedly); energy (with estimates of energy intensity and the role of renewable energy and energy efficiency featuring prominently); and, to a lesser extent, the heating and cooling sector.

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<sup>3</sup> This note uses a sectoral breakdown in line with the Global Climate Action Agenda's thematic areas: energy, water, land use, oceans and coastal zones, human settlements and industry. In addition, it considers cross-cutting issues (e.g. health, education, finance and gender).

## Overview of inputs to the Talanoa Dialogue

46. A few inputs refer to the need for addressing non-carbon dioxide emissions including methane, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and black carbon.
47. A few inputs discuss the mitigation potential in negative emission technologies and natural sinks for the purposes of closing the emissions gap.
48. Finally, a few inputs set out the links between emissions in the atmosphere and other changes in the Earth's system, such as ocean acidification, biodiversity losses and tipping points.

### *Climate impacts and vulnerability*

49. Over a third of inputs on the first Talanoa Dialogue question discuss the topic of climate impacts and vulnerability. Of these, about two thirds discuss the challenges faced by vulnerable communities and ecosystems in different parts of the world, and the other third discuss the links between climate vulnerability on the one hand, and poverty and poor economic opportunity on the other.
50. A fair share of those discussing impacts tackle the effects of individual extreme events at the current level of warming – 1 °C above pre-industrial levels – and/or consider a range of extreme events and discuss their occurrence and consequences (costs, disruption, development setbacks). Recurring themes include floods and droughts, storm surges, typhoons, wildfires, heatwaves and others. Several inputs highlight that many populations and ecosystems are already suffering grave consequences as a result of climate change and that the humanitarian implications will gain in severity as global warming increases.
51. Against this background, many stakeholders express concern about the inadequacy of current levels of mitigation and share their views on different levels of acceptable warming. Some, particularly submissions made after the publication of the IPCC special report on *Global Warming of 1.5°C*, discuss the advantages of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C and express support for this goal in view of the expected level of devastation for the most vulnerable communities.
52. A few inputs under this topic also examine matters of principle, such as ethics, justice, equity and human rights considerations and implications of climate change in relation to impacts and vulnerability (see section 2.2 below). Some describe the situation faced by certain communities and ecosystems around the world. Island communities in the Caribbean and Pacific regions, communities in extreme climatic zones and youth in Africa are some of communities and habitats that are discussed in multiple inputs.
53. Inputs that centre on resilience and resilience-building often explore the synergies with disaster risk reduction, sustainable development and poverty eradication, particularly with regard to unlocking climate resilient-development. Some identify challenges, such as certain ramifications of climate action that may run counter to other (sustainable development) goals (e.g. the increased energy needs generated by increased cooling to cope with a warming climate). Such inputs sometimes raise fundamental questions about the vision of development, particularly with regard to the justice and sustainability of development paths.
54. Several inputs addressing climate resilience also contain references to finance. This includes current financing models, flows and effort gap as compared with what is needed for the pre-2020 and the post-2020 periods. A few inputs address the issue from the vantage point of investors.
55. Finally, in the context of resilience building, inputs call for collaboration models which more substantially involve and empower affected local and indigenous communities, and which effectively incorporate their knowledge.

*Progress in initiatives, actions and the situation on the ground*

56. About two thirds of inputs that address the first Talanoa Dialogue question do so by discussing the progress achieved in particular initiatives and actions, and/or discussing the situation on the ground (e.g. evolution of the environment in which the stakeholder operates). These inputs show that action to build a low-emission and climate-resilient society is expanding as an increasing number of actors across the world, including governments, private sector companies, citizens and others, join global efforts and cooperate to reduce emissions and increase resilience.

57. The majority of these inputs come from non-Party stakeholders, but this topic is also addressed by Party inputs that outline country strategies, plans, policies and targets to combat climate change. Inputs reporting on Talanoa Dialogue events organized across the world during 2018 by actors ranging from national governments to grass-roots organizations are also captured under this topic.

58. Inputs under this topic assess the state of play in terms of pledged action and results achieved to date (e.g. national and sectoral targets on, for example, GHG emissions, renewable energy use and others; participation in initiatives for transparency, research and development; and advocacy for action); tools to measure progress (e.g. technical online tools); and evolution of the environment in which the stakeholder operates (e.g. concerning preparedness to deal with natural hazards, policies to foster resilience through better economic opportunities, assessments of progress towards pre-2020 commitments). In this respect, most Parties elaborate on their mitigation and adaptation action, including national plans and strategies to achieve the climate goals, concrete examples of domestic-driven climate finance mechanisms and tangible and successful mitigation and adaptation initiatives to contribute towards international goals.

59. Several other inputs refer to actions that cut across mitigation and adaptation. Examples include action from coalitions of businesses, industry, investors and subnational governments (e.g. cities and regions) and nature-based solutions that serve both mitigation and adaptation objectives (e.g. in rural communities).

60. Inputs by non-Party stakeholders addressing this topic often adopt a sectoral perspective. Figure 5 shows their distribution according to whether they address a single sector, multiple sectors or cross-cutting issues. The share “Other” captures aspects that do not fit into a sectoral breakdown such as conceptual discussions on matters of principle (e.g. climate justice), scientific assessments, expert opinions on the role of innovation, GHG emissions accounting methodologies, integrated assessment models and matters relating to geoengineering.

61. Economic sectors most frequently referred to in inputs include transport (e.g. aviation, shipping, electric mobility, urban transport and rail), energy (e.g. energy efficiency, renewable energy and clean energy technologies), buildings (e.g. building materials, heating and cooling) and land use (e.g. food production and consumption patterns, forests, wetlands and mangroves). Inputs that set out initiatives, actions or assess the situation on the ground pertaining to multiple sectors are captured as “Multisector” and include such matters as technologies, carbon pricing and methodologies to track adaptation.

62. Cross-cutting issues are dominated by references to finance, education and awareness-raising. Inputs on finance often discuss estimates of financial needs, shortfalls (e.g. in terms of flows of climate finance and investment, including from one group of countries to another), projections, and quantitative assessments of resources that could be freed up and used more effectively for climate action (e.g. from subsidy reform, alternative uses for funds divested from fossil fuels).

63. Many of the inputs that touch on education and awareness discuss capacity-building for youth (e.g. equipping youth to act, participate and lead) and the centrality of education and awareness for mobilizing citizens at the individual level for more resilient and sustainable communities.

**Figure 5.** Sectoral distribution of inputs addressing progress in initiatives, actions and the situation on the ground



*Challenges, opportunities and demands for policy action*

64. Over two thirds of inputs to the first Talanoa Dialogue question identify challenges and opportunities for further climate action. Most inputs show or imply potential for further and faster climate action provided that barriers are addressed and efforts to create an enabling environment increased. The opportunity to mobilize untapped climate action seems substantial as inputs suggest myriad enabling factors, game changers and policy action to empower a rapidly growing number of actors (e.g. businesses, subnational governments, civil society) to deliver climate objectives.

65. About a third of inputs addressing this topic identify challenges including barriers, gaps and unmet needs. Recurrent themes include poor political will, shortcomings in the policy framework (e.g. poor policies, poor policy coherence) and in governance (e.g. corruption, poor law enforcement, poor stakeholder involvement in the development of national targets and policies, including NDCs), psychological factors (e.g. short-termism and self-interest) and finance (e.g. insufficient finance for mitigation and, particularly, for adaptation, including up to 2020; insufficient finance to deliver on pre-2020 action; poor accessibility and predictability of finance; little or no finance to address the negative distributional effects of climate action).

66. In contrast, about half of the inputs under this topic discuss opportunities for increased climate action. Recurrent themes are enabling factors and game changers and include: demands for an adequate Paris Agreement work programme to be adopted at COP 24; keeping the political momentum going at the international level; calls for a paradigm shift in the value system, economic model and/or vision for development; new technologies, techniques and tools (e.g. building materials and techniques, cooling technologies, ecosystem-based solutions, including for adaptation, tools and platforms to set commitments and monitor individual and collective progress towards targets and commitments); deeper and wider collaboration between Party and non-Party stakeholders, including vertically coordinated multilevel governance; increased participation of underrepresented groups in national and international policymaking (e.g. women, youth, indigenous peoples); capacity-building (e.g. youth's demands for education and awareness-raising to foster

more climate-friendly behaviour, retraining for workers to enhance buy-in from communities negatively impacted by climate policies); and better communication of climate change, climate action and climate justice issues.

67. Recurrent themes in terms of specific demands for policy action to improve enabling environments include carbon pricing policies and mechanisms to fully enforce the polluter pays principle for GHG emissions; pursuing policies to protect societies from unacceptable impacts and vulnerability to climate change while simultaneously alleviating poverty; means of implementation to adequately meet mitigation and adaptation needs; and all matters relating to the transition towards clean energy (e.g. fossil fuel phase-out, fossil fuel subsidy reform, divestment from fossil fuels), towards climate-smart agriculture (e.g. a shift in agricultural production and consumption patterns, agricultural subsidy reform, food waste reduction, dietary shifts) and towards smart urban mobility.

#### *Institutional arrangements and policies*

68. About a quarter of all inputs to the first Talanoa Dialogue question assess current institutional arrangements. They discuss pre-2020 action, the current design of NDCs and other aspects of the Paris Agreement rule book (e.g. global stocktake, transparency framework). Some also address features and shortcomings in the international climate change process, such as the limited participation of non-Party stakeholders, the role of interest groups and others. Issues at the national/international interface also appear multiple times, for example, the extent to which national policies and targets are aligned with international commitments.

69. As far as NDC design is concerned, inputs primarily point out weaknesses which require the attention of the international community. Some of these include limitations in scope and content (e.g. adaptation not systematically included, sectoral perspectives and plans lacking, plans for financing implementation lacking), transparency and rushed preparation at the national level without proper involvement of subnational governments and other key stakeholders. A few inputs also touch on how the high degree of freedom accorded to Parties in their NDCs hampers comparability and effective monitoring and review.

70. A few inputs discuss the assessment of NDCs against specific benchmarks. Attention is called to historical responsibility and equity, and to the need to define “ambitious” and “fair” in relation to NDCs. Several inputs see the Talanoa Dialogue as paving the way for a robust global stocktake under the Paris Agreement.

71. References to shortcomings in the international climate change process highlight insufficient participation from non-Party stakeholders and the public, especially of certain population groups (youth, women, indigenous peoples), business and others, and argue that without these the governance and transparency of the Paris Agreement is in jeopardy. Insufficient attention to conflict of interest in climate policy negotiations is another issue mentioned multiple times.

## **2.2. Where do we want to go?**

72. A total of 348 inputs addressed this question.

73. The breakdown of inputs to the second Talanoa Dialogue question by stakeholder category broadly mirrors the overall statistics (see figure 2).

74. Of the 38 inputs to this question submitted by 156 Parties, 20 were submitted by Parties individually and 18 by groups of Parties.

75. The inputs to this Talanoa Dialogue question typically do one or more of the following:


- a. Identify aspirations in terms of global goals and principles for climate action;

## Overview of inputs to the Talanoa Dialogue

- b. Describe a **vision towards a zero (net) emissions world**, which sometimes includes emissions scenarios and trajectories;
- c. Describe a vision towards climate resilience;
- d. Explain the vision and ambition that the stakeholder has for itself;
- e. Outline expectations about future institutional arrangements and policies.

76. Figure 6 illustrates how many inputs addressing this Talanoa Dialogue question significantly touch on each of the topics described above.

**Figure 6.** Number of inputs to the Talanoa Dialogue question “where do we want to go?” that address a given topic



77. The primary interest of different stakeholders as regards this question is as follows:

- Party and Party groupings primarily elaborate on global goals and principles for climate action, and their vision towards a zero (net) emissions and climate-resilient world. Some also outline their own vision and plans for themselves;
- Academia and research organizations predominantly articulate their vision towards zero (net) emissions and climate resilience, including in terms of emissions trajectories, and touch on institutional arrangements and policies;
- Civil society organizations emphasize their future vision towards zero (net) emissions and climate resilience, and what institutional arrangements and policies they would like to see in place;
- International organizations centre primarily on global goals and principles, and often outline their vision towards zero (net) emissions;
- Mixed partnerships and coalitions most often outline a global vision towards zero (net) emissions, and often a vision and ambition for themselves in fairly concrete terms;
- Private sector inputs most often set out the vision and ambition that they have for themselves, often in fairly concrete terms and set against the background of a wider vision towards zero (net) emissions for their sector or the world. They also touch on global goals and principles;
- Subnational governments primarily outline their vision and ambition for themselves, against the background of a global vision towards a zero (net) emissions world;
- United Nations bodies focus on institutional arrangements and goals and principles for global climate action;
- UNFCCC constituted bodies primarily outline their vision towards zero (net) emissions and a climate-resilient future.

*Global goals and principles for climate action*

78. About half of the inputs to Talanoa Dialogue question 2 address global goals and principles.

79. Most affirm the temperature goal in the Paris Agreement, with many stressing the need to limit global warming to 1.5 °C, notably those submitted after the publication of the IPCC special report *Global Warming of 1.5°C*. Warming beyond this level is seen as entailing unacceptable risks. For some, further efforts beyond 1.5 °C would be required, quoting an acceptable level of warming between 0.5 and 1.5 °C.

80. Many inputs note that meeting the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal would require reaching carbon neutrality by the second half of the century. In this respect, inputs urge Parties to come forward with low GHG development strategies, preferably with a time horizon of 2050 or sooner.

81. Some inputs devote their attention in part or in full to the principles enshrined in the Convention and the Paris Agreement, and call for them to continue to be upheld. Some inputs call for other principles of a moral or ethical nature to be given more consideration in the international process and in all climate action more generally.

82. Inputs concerning themselves with principles often address the balance between climate action on the one hand, and economic development and poverty eradication on the other; historical responsibility; equity in such matters as the intergenerational dimension of climate change, the adequacy of support provided by developed countries, common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and others; justice, particularly as concerns social issues (e.g. just transition, employment issues), loss and damage, and response measures; human rights; gender equality; and transparency, accountability and inclusiveness of the national and international processes.

83. Several inputs address trust as a sine qua non condition for the success of the Paris Agreement, and highlight that trust in the medium term is contingent on developed countries delivering on pre-2020 action and support, particularly as regards adequate, predictable and sustainable means of implementation.

84. Finally, several inputs tackle this Talanoa Dialogue question from a philosophical perspective. This group of inputs explores options and argues in favour of redefining the relationship between humankind and nature into one that gives more value to the common good and is consistent with planetary boundaries. A few of these inputs point out that successfully addressing climate change can be achieved only by fundamentally changing today’s prevailing (economic) value system.

85. Certain inputs note the synergies between the Paris Agreement goals and those under other international regimes/processes (e.g. Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Sendai Framework). These inputs tend to call for more holistic approaches when tackling any one of these issues.

*Vision towards a zero (net) emissions world*

86. Most inputs to the second Talanoa Dialogue question articulate a vision towards deep GHG emission reductions and GHG emission neutrality.

87. Most inputs that set out a vision towards GHG emission neutrality whether at the global, national, subnational, sectoral or company level include some discussion of emissions scenarios, trajectories and projections. A few of them stress that global emissions trajectories compatible with the Paris Agreement require peaking no later than 2020, and a rapid decline towards zero (net) GHG emissions by mid-century at the latest and note, often with alarm, that this requires efforts well above those currently planned.

88. Inputs that refer to emission reductions tend to discuss primarily the gap between current emission trends and emission pathways compatible with least cost trajectories to limit warming to 2/1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. Closing the current emissions gap is seen to rest on all Parties properly monitoring and delivering on existing commitments (pre-2020, first round of NDCs), increased ambition in the next round of NDCs and suitable short- and long-term strategies towards zero (net) emissions. Inputs that centre on one high-emitting sector typically include estimates of emission reduction potential in the sector in question and the targets that the sector could aim for within particular time frames. This is presented as the sector's contribution towards closing the global emissions gap.

89. Most inputs also articulate a vision in terms of what a low or zero (net) emissions world would look like, including the changes and transitions needed at a systemic level for the necessary emission reductions to materialize. Some explicitly acknowledge that the change needs to be revolutionary – incremental change will not suffice – and call for major paradigm shifts.

90. Inputs frequently articulate the legal, policy, regulatory, governance, investment or fiscal frameworks they aspire to and which would be conducive to realizing untapped potential. Some inputs also discuss other aspirations such as striving for less resource-intensive economies and simpler and more climate-friendly lifestyles; more climate-aware citizens; full application of the polluter pays principle; investment frameworks that mobilize low-carbon and sustainable finance; improved availability and accessibility of finance (private and public); collaborations that involve and mobilize a wider range of sectoral stakeholders; efficient climate policies that simultaneously address multiple policy objectives; and better exploitation of science, research and development, innovation and technology to achieve carbon neutrality.

91. Key sectors frequently addressed in inputs include transport (urban transport, low-emission transport plans, comprehensive transport plans); energy (curbing demand, energy efficiency, renewable energy, phasing out fossil fuels); agriculture and food (overhaul of food production and consumption through subsidy reform, lifestyle changes, food waste reduction and low-emission agriculture); land (forests, forest degradation, deforestation, mangroves, peatlands, wetlands); buildings (building codes, building materials, urban planning); and cities and subnational regions.

### *Vision towards a climate-resilient world*

92. About a third of inputs to this Talanoa Dialogue question include material that relates to a vision for a climate-resilient future.

93. Many of these inputs take as their starting point the plight of particularly vulnerable communities, habitats or ecosystems (e.g. low-lying islands, arid or semi-arid lands), or the link between, on the one hand, vulnerability to climate impacts and, on the other, poverty and development.

94. For many, the way towards a climate-resilient world involves a holistic approach that exploits synergies between climate resilience, disaster preparedness and sustainable development, in line with the respective United Nations agendas for climate, disaster risk reduction and sustainable development (Paris Agreement, Sendai Framework, 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development). Poverty alleviation and opportunities for development are often highlighted as an effective way of reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience.

95. Some inputs explicitly call for effective reductions in GHG emissions as key to addressing the cause of climate risk, and ensuring a climate-resilient future. Some would like to see a world where funds divested from fossil fuels get invested in resilience and adaptation.

96. A number of inputs articulate a vision for a climate-resilient future in terms of the transformations needed. Chief among these transformations are: greater political will to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience (especially that of vulnerable groups); greater political will to

draw on the private sector for resilience and adaptation; increased availability, accessibility and predictability of finance; greater amounts of support available (finance, technology and capacity-building); a more balanced allocation of resources between mitigation and adaptation/resilience; greater knowledge and capacity in all areas relating to resilience and adaptation; and policy reform and alignment across the international, national and local level. National adaptation plans and national adaptation programmes of action feature as useful tools on this last point.

97. Other critical aspects include empowered local communities and indigenous peoples that fully participate in decision-making that affects them; more inclusive partnerships of actors on the ground; increased collaboration across humanitarian and development action; and the deployment of adequate adaptation strategies, including those with mitigation co-benefits.

#### *Vision and ambition for self*

98. Over a third of the inputs to the second Talanoa Dialogue question include stakeholders' visions and ambition for themselves. Parties, the private sector, mixed partnerships and coalitions, and subnational governments account for the majority of these inputs.

99. Inputs falling into this topic refer to targets and corresponding plans and strategies set forth by a wide variety of stakeholders, with some also referring to indicators, metrics and methodologies to measure progress. Many of these inputs were submitted by a variety of non-Party stakeholders, not least individual organizations and businesses, business networks, sectoral associations, subnational jurisdictions and associations of subnational actors at the national or international level.

100. Some inputs falling into this category also elaborate on how stakeholders see themselves influencing their immediate environment to step up climate action. Stakeholders report that they exert leadership and influence on their peers and value/supply chains, use peer pressure to change established social norms, collaborate more widely with other stakeholders, work with their customers/constituents to develop more climate-friendly products/solutions and work with government to create effective framework conditions (legal, policy, governance, fiscal, investment). Examples include large businesses coming together in different networks and alliances to use their purchasing power to foster the switch to renewable energy or electric vehicles and investors coming together to set new (global) standards for climate risk reporting.

101. For certain stakeholders, their vision for themselves turns on securing a more prominent role in the national and international processes. Youth organizations are particularly vocal in this respect, making the case that given the nature of the climate issue, they ought to be upgraded from a constituency to full partners in the national and international processes. Other groups arguing for more inclusion and a bigger role for themselves include indigenous peoples, faith organizations and grass-roots leaders. Faith and grass-roots leaders in particular see themselves as catalysts and multipliers of climate action at the level of the individual, and therefore as key enablers of behavioural and lifestyle change.

102. Finally, certain stakeholders present their vision for themselves in the future in terms of the products, technologies and solutions that they plan to develop. Examples are wide-ranging and may target the technical specifications of their products (e.g. more energy-efficient air-conditioning devices), the nature of the solutions they produce (e.g. more climate-friendly urban transport strategies) or the ways they work (e.g. closer collaboration between subnational and national authorities to empower bottom-up action at the subnational level).

#### *Institutional arrangements and policies*

103. About half of inputs to the second Talanoa Dialogue question discuss future institutional arrangements. These include institutional arrangements in general, those under the Paris Agreement and national frameworks.

104. Inputs dealing with institutional arrangements and policies in general put forward demands such as increased political will; pre-2020 commitments being fully delivered; synergies between the climate agenda and other related international agendas being capitalized on (e.g. 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Sendai Framework, Kigali Amendment, Convention on Biological Diversity, United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification); certain issues being more prominently or directly addressed in the international process under the Convention (e.g. aviation emissions, carbon sinks, the hydrological cycle, education and awareness-raising); and improved coordination (multilevel governance across the international, national and local level, and across sectors).

105. Many non-Party stakeholder inputs to the second Talanoa Dialogue question would like to see an international process that is more inclusive and participatory, on the basis that this would empower more bottom-up climate action, mobilize more expertise, resources and capacity. Parties that express a view on this point, however, tend to raise concerns about extending participation in the international process, and argue that it should remain Party-owned.

106. Inputs addressing institutional arrangements under the Paris Agreement and its implementing decisions target such requirements and processes as: NDCs, the global stocktake, the transparency framework and the market mechanisms to be developed under Article 6.

107. Finally, a few stakeholders submitted inputs that discuss institutional arrangements at the national level. These inputs tend to include specific recommendations and advice, often at the level of preferred policy options and measures.

### 2.3. How do we get there?

108. A total of 383 inputs addressed this question.

109. The distribution of inputs to this Talanoa Dialogue question by stakeholder category is broadly the same as for all submissions (see figure 2).

110. Of the 38 inputs to this question submitted by 156 Parties, 20 were submitted by Parties individually and 18 by groups of Parties. All Parties that submitted an input to the Talanoa Dialogue addressed the third Talanoa Dialogue question.

111. Parties and non-Party stakeholders address this question from a variety of angles and perspectives. Some propose ideas and experiences that have been tried and tested, while others set out proposals that are yet to be put into practice. Many inputs identify actions for a variety of actors, notably the UNFCCC bodies, governments, the private sector and the international community within set time frames.

112. Therefore, collectively inputs addressing this Talanoa Dialogue question identify a series of valuable aspects for establishing a road map towards the destination identified under the second Talanoa Dialogue question.


113. Most inputs address this question by doing one or more of the following:

- a. Make a case for **proposed and planned ways forward** that are delivering or may in future deliver results through replication and/or scale-up;
- b. Share knowledge, analyses and opinions on **high-potential solutions and technologies** that may help to broaden the scope of, and accelerate, climate action;
- c. Identify **actions for national governments** to take to ensure progress towards realizing the global vision and ambition outlined in Talanoa Dialogue question 2;
- d. Identify **actions for the UNFCCC bodies** on issues to be addressed in the international climate negotiations;
- e. Identify actions for **the private sector**;

f. Identify actions for **the international community**.

114. Figure 7 illustrates how frequently these topics occur within the inputs to the third Talanoa Dialogue question.

**Figure 7.** Number of inputs to the Talanoa Dialogue question “how do we get there?” that address a given topic



115. The specific interest of different stakeholders as regards this question is as follows:


- Academia and research organizations predominantly propose ways forward (often at the level of the national or international economy), identify actions for national governments and describe the potential in promising solutions and technologies;
- Civil society primarily proposes existing or planned ways forward (most often on cross-cutting issues) and identifies actions for national governments and the bodies of the Convention;
- International organizations mostly identify proposed and planned ways forward and identify actions for national governments;
- Mixed partnerships and coalitions primarily showcase proposed and planned ways forward and identify actions for national governments;
- Inputs from Parties (both Parties and Party groupings) predominantly identify actions for other national governments and set out their climate action as exemplary ways forward;
- Private sector inputs mostly address this Talanoa Dialogue question by demanding action from national governments and imply that their action on the ground is the way to achieve climate goals;
- Subnational governments primarily showcase their action on the ground as exemplary ways forward and identify actions for national governments;
- The United Nations agencies and programmes for the most part set out proposed ways forward and call on national governments to take specific actions;
- Finally, UNFCCC constituted bodies primarily identify actions for national governments and for the international community.

*Proposed and planned ways forward*

116. Over 75 per cent of inputs to the third Talanoa Dialogue question showcase plans, actions and initiatives that stakeholders present as the way forward towards achieving global climate goals. They range from ideas yet to be developed to tried and tested plans, actions and initiatives that have produced tangible results on the ground, embodying positive experiences that can be considered good practices ready for others to emulate.

117. The sectoral distribution of the proposed and planned ways forward in inputs is shown in figure 8.

**Figure 8.** Sectoral distribution of proposed and planned ways forward



118. About a fifth of all inputs that touch on this topic present ways forward that transcend individual economic sectors. They address either multiple sectors or the economy as a whole. Most Party inputs and many inputs submitted by non-Party stakeholders touching on this topic fit this description.

119. Many Party inputs with a multisector approach elaborate on Parties' existing or planned climate strategies, plans and policies. They present these as good practices showing the way forward, and articulate how and why their choices are well suited to meeting climate goals. Some of the areas covered by these Party inputs are proper application of the polluter pays principle; increased international cooperation in climate finance, capacity-building, aid and research and development in technology; transformation sought across the economy; ensuring a just transition for the workforce; and specific policy options.

120. A sizeable share of inputs tackling multiple sectors simultaneously are those that address plans, actions and initiatives for dealing with climate vulnerability and resilience. They often advocate reducing vulnerability by means of sustainable livelihoods, collaboration across economic sectors, private sector engagement and comprehensive plans for resilience and adaptation, particularly in countries that depend on donor support.

121. A few inputs also address issues to do with technology, research and innovation in relation to multiple sectors or the economy as a whole. They sometimes come forward with proposals for research and development policies, policies on standards and other issues such as the scope and advantages of early deployment of new technologies.

122. About a third of inputs addressing this topic do so by considering a single sector. Energy is the sector that attracts the highest share of inputs on this topic (nearly 12 per cent), followed closely

by land use (8 per cent) and transport (5 per cent), while human settlements, industry, water or oceans each are the primary target of about 1–4 per cent of inputs on this topic.

123. Inputs tackling the energy sector feature the following recurrent themes: phasing out fossil fuel production; fossil fuel subsidy reform; adequate carbon pricing; moderating energy demand; digitalizing the power sector; promoting smart regulation; incentivizing the right investment (e.g. away from fossil fuels and towards clean technologies); transitioning to a low-emission energy system through renewable energy sources and energy efficiency; energy plans at the subnational level (i.e. cities and regions); and plans to ensure a just and sustainable transition away from fossil fuels.

124. Recurrent themes in the land use sector include increasing mitigation in the land use sector through better farming practices, subsidy reform, sustainable intensification and better management of forests; more sustainable food consumption (e.g. reduced food waste, promoting the dietary shift towards plant-based products); and increased food security through more resilient agricultural supply chains and more resilient agricultural practices that are community-based and rooted in nature-based solutions. On forests, many inputs discuss ways to exploit the carbon sink in forests (and some in mangroves) and several inputs make proposals for improved forest management through more capacity-building and better governance.

125. In the transport sector, recurrent themes turn on urban mobility (e.g. promotion of sustainable public transport), electric vehicles, regulating emissions standards, improving (road) freight management, influencing passenger behaviour and tackling GHG emissions from aviation and shipping.

126. On human settlements, recurrent themes include plans of cities and regions to address mitigation and adaptation, best practices on coordination at the city level, city leadership in climate action and capacity-building. In addition, some inputs illustrate how vulnerable human settlements can be made more resilient (e.g. by early warning systems and/or enhancing communities' resilience through better economic opportunities). A few inputs also elaborate on building standards as a way of improving mitigation in buildings.

127. Inputs from industry show how businesses are coming together to use their influence to facilitate wider climate action, for instance by using their collective purchasing power to help new low-emission technologies to overcome barriers to market entry (e.g. associations of corporations switching to 100 per cent renewable electricity or to electric cars) or demanding climate neutrality in their supply chains. Other recurrent themes include investors' efforts to generate framework conditions more conducive to climate-friendly investment (e.g. mandatory climate risk disclosure, policies to divest from fossil fuels).

128. For oceans and coastal zones, the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action is generally understood to have provided a helpful framework for action, with some actors showing how the ways in which they are addressing the links between climate and sustainable development in oceans and coastal zones can be harnessed by others.

129. Finally, inputs on the water sector show a variety of collaboration models that allow for more effective water management (e.g. integrated water management at the basin level that cuts across jurisdictional boundaries).

130. About a quarter of inputs proposing ways forward concern themselves with cross-cutting issues such as finance, capacity-building, governance and how different constituencies (youth, indigenous peoples, women) can play a more substantial role in climate action. On finance, many inputs tackle how financial resources for climate action, technology and capacity-building can be increased (see also box 2). Other recurrent themes include actions to foster education, awareness-raising and other capacity-building to improve communication on climate change and action, improve the integration of indigenous knowledge, elicit more commitment and climate action by all

and better equip youth to be full partners in climate debates and action; some plans, actions and initiatives described in the inputs are about human rights and a just transition of the workforce.


131. The remaining inputs focus on other issues that do not really lend themselves to a sectoral classification (e.g. academic discussions of incremental versus transformational change, GHG accounting methodologies for national inventories, academic ideas on how to handle the human rights implications of loss and damage).

#### *High-potential solutions and technologies*

132. About 40 per cent of inputs to the Talanoa Dialogue question “how do we get there?” elaborate on high-potential solutions, including technologies and collaboration models. These inputs discuss the merits of different solutions for more rapid and wide-ranging climate action.

133. The inputs under this topic fall under different economic sectors as set out in figure 9.

**Figure 9.** Sectoral distribution of high-potential solutions and technologies



134. Inputs addressing high-potential solutions and technologies most often target the energy sector (20 per cent) and cross cutting issues (17 per cent), closely followed by those that are applicable to multiple sectors including the entire economy (15 per cent), land use and transport (each 11 per cent), other (10 per cent) and human settlements (7 per cent). Oceans and coastal zones, industry and the water sector are touched upon by fewer than 5 per cent of inputs on promising solutions and technologies.

135. High-potential solutions in the energy sector include grid solutions (e.g. community-based peer to peer grids, including in remote places), widespread electrification, low-emission energy solutions for poor/vulnerable homes, carbon dioxide capture and storage and solutions to contain methane leaks. They also include solutions for increased energy efficiency and the scaling-up of energy technologies generally.

136. Many of the inputs that address cross-cutting issues centre on finance, specifically, for adaptation, for increased energy productivity and for job creation, this last in the context of the just

transition of the workforce. Some present other solutions such as ways for the voices of future generations to be heard in climate debates and policymaking, and ways of more effectively communicating about the climate change challenge and its solutions. A few inputs also highlight the Talanoa Dialogue method and spirit as a working method that is now being adopted in places other than the Pacific to discuss climate issues. A few inputs present specific collaboration models for a variety of purposes (e.g. to advance technology programmes or aid decision-making at the community level).

137. Inputs presenting high-potential solutions in multiple sectors, including across the entire economy, primarily address technology, carbon pricing and carbon markets, business practices that would multiply climate action such as making climate-neutral business practices standard, information technology systems to set science-based targets and to monitor progress, clean and climate-resilient infrastructure solutions and ways of aligning incentives that result in climate-friendly decisions.

138. Inputs discuss numerous solutions in the land use sector. This includes nature-based solutions for carbon sequestration (e.g. in soils, forests, mangroves); mitigation actions that have co-benefits for the Sustainable Development Goals, adaptation and food-security; ways to climate proof agriculture; extending REDD to non-forest areas; improving emissions reporting for the land use sector; low-carbon agricultural practices and technologies; and digital solutions to reduce food waste.

139. High-potential solutions and technologies in transport include solutions to reduce urban emissions (e.g. traffic reduction), zero emissions vehicles (hydrogen technologies, alternative fuels), ways to address emissions from international aviation and maritime transport (e.g. technological solutions and practices and ways to incorporate these emissions into emissions trading systems) and tools to help individuals to make climate-friendly travel decisions (e.g. online tools to calculate the carbon footprint of different travel options).

140. Solutions and technologies for human settlements are primarily about low-emission building materials, more effective building techniques and community-based approaches to resilience building. Networks of subnational actors, especially cities and regions, also showcase data tools and solutions to set science-based targets and to monitor progress.

141. Finally, a handful of inputs elaborate on solutions and technologies in oceans and coastal areas (e.g. technologies to restore coral reefs and other ecosystems, experiences in successful outreach, capacity-building and knowledge creation and management), water (e.g. integrated management and better water resource planning in the face of scarcity) and industry (e.g. solutions deployed by businesses to capitalize on their leadership and purchasing power to precipitate change).

142. Other solutions and technologies discussed in inputs cover a variety of matters that do not lend themselves to a sectoral classification, such as geoengineering technologies, abating pollution from HFCs and short-lived climate pollutants, and specific methodologies to allocate the mitigation burden according to historical responsibility.

## **Box 2: Finance**

Finance appears recurrently in inputs across all three Talanoa Dialogue questions. Inputs that address finance estimate current finance levels, future needs, shortfalls and projections to meet climate goals. Other inputs consider more qualitative aspects of climate finance (e.g. availability, accessibility and predictability).

Most inputs on finance find current levels to be largely insufficient. The shortfalls are often attributed to insufficient finance from developed countries, particularly in relation to pre-2020 pledges, which in turn results in lost opportunities for leveraging finance from other sources and time frames. Some inputs quantify what it would take to close different finance gaps (e.g. for mitigation in general, in specific sectors, for particular technologies, for adaptation).

Some inputs point out significant imbalances in the distribution of finance across mitigation, adaptation, technology and capacity-building. A few among them suggest ways to redress these imbalances and ensure that sufficient funds are made available for adaptation, technology for adaptation and capacity-building (e.g. creating separate funds for adaptation). Several inputs point to the difficulties that certain actors face in accessing financial resources. These include national administrations with poor capacity, subnational governments and civil society organizations.

Some inputs highlight progress achieved to date in generating additional finance through, for example, initiatives that seek to create a level playing field for investment (e.g. Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures) and policies that seek to create incentives for climate-friendly investment through, for example, price signals. Price signals and policy certainty feature repeatedly as key investment enablers.

Areas where more or better finance is called for include:

- Adaptation: in particular finance for climate-resilient infrastructure, finance to generate knowledge, systems and economic opportunity to increase resilience and finance to fund capacity for adaptation;
- Technology and innovation: in particular finance to fund innovation clusters, finance for developing countries to acquire technology for mitigation and adaptation and finance for developing countries to adapt technology to local conditions;
- Subnational actors: financial sources for all sorts of climate action;
- Public finance to leverage private finance.

Specific solutions for financing that are showcased in inputs include innovative financing for cities and urban contexts and financial services adapted to local communities in vulnerable parts of the world (e.g. insurance protection against climate risks).

The finance generating capacity of certain policy options features repeatedly too. That is the case in several inputs arguing for subsidy reform (e.g. fossil fuels and agricultural subsidies), for carbon pricing mechanisms (e.g. emissions trading systems) and policies that create incentives to divest from fossil fuels and use the funds to invest to meet climate goals (e.g. in adaptation, low-emission technologies).

*Actions for the UNFCCC bodies*

143. A little over a third of inputs to the third Talanoa Dialogue question identify actions for the UNFCCC bodies, including the COP and the other bodies of the Convention.

144. A first group of inputs elaborates on the general goals of the Convention. These inputs call for accelerating the systemic transformations needed towards a low-carbon and climate-resilient world to avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate change and point to the time frames required (pre- and post-2020 action), and for increased international cooperation.

145. Many inputs refer to the work of the bodies of the Convention in relation to the Paris Agreement. They typically call for a robust and fit for purpose rule book that preserves integrity. Specific recurrent recommendations concern:

- The design of NDCs: in addition to mitigation, NDCs should cover adaptation and all means of implementation and comprehensively cover all/different economic sectors, and reflect the expected contribution of subnational actors; NDCs should be comparable, and fit for monitoring and review; a definition of “fair” and “ambitious” in relation to NDCs should be operationalized;
- The design of the global stocktake should ensure an effective cycle of increasing ambition;
- Transparency, especially as regards support; and a robust transparency framework;
- Carbon sequestration, including through natural solutions at scale;
- Operational mechanisms under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.

146. Many of the inputs call for immediate national, long-term, deep decarbonization strategies, and some also call for more attention to be given to near-term pathways. Most of these inputs point out that these strategies should be developed as a matter of urgency.

147. The attention of the UNFCCC bodies is also solicited on specific policy issues that require international coordinated policy action. Recurrent themes include carbon pricing (including the provisions under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement); policies on non-carbon dioxide GHGs (e.g. HFCs, short-lived climate pollutants); phasing out fossil fuel production; phasing out of damaging subsidies to fossil fuels and agriculture; institutional reforms to spur investment and to improve the availability, adequacy, predictability, accessibility and sustainability of means of implementation; giving more attention to behavioural change; tackling aviation and shipping emissions; tackling barriers to technological development and deployment; and finding ways to enable assessments of adaptation needs and mitigation options for developing countries.

148. In addition, the UNFCCC bodies are also called upon to ensure that all climate action, including negotiations, uphold the fundamental principles embodied in the Convention and the Paris Agreement.

149. Some of the actions identified in inputs for the UNFCCC bodies target the international climate change process. They variously call for a more open and transparent process, more integral involvement of certain non-Party stakeholders, particularly youth and indigenous peoples. More participation of a wider range of non-Party stakeholders is advocated to counter the disproportionate voice of big industrial emitters in the international climate change process. Some inputs also demand that the UNFCCC bodies undertake efforts to communicate in ways that are more accessible to citizens.

150. Many non-Party stakeholder inputs express appreciation of Global Climate Action and point to a robust rule book for the Paris Agreement as key to integrity and to secure more private sector involvement. Others state that they would like to see the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action develop further and become more influential in negotiations and in implementation.

## Overview of inputs to the Talanoa Dialogue

151. Some inputs call for closer multilateral coordination. These inputs variously invoke United Nations coherence; links between climate and related United Nations conventions and treaties such as those on the ozone layer, biodiversity and desertification; synergies between the climate and other United Nations agendas such as disaster risk reduction and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; and call for efforts to resolve inconsistencies between trade rules under the World Trade Organization and climate objectives.

152. Finally, some inputs call on the UNFCCC bodies to ensure that the Talanoa Dialogue is conducted in particular ways and ensure that it produces a new round of more ambitious NDCs.

### *Actions for national governments*

153. Almost 75 per cent of inputs to the Talanoa Dialogue question “how do we get there?” identify actions and recommendations for national governments, mostly on creating the legal, policy, regulatory, fiscal and governance frameworks to unleash more and more rapid climate action within their territories.

154. In relation to the implementation of the Paris Agreement and NDCs, many of these inputs call for more political will to take decisive action in key sectors (energy, transport and agriculture), including unpopular decisions that can deliver the systemic transformations needed to meet the Paris Agreement’s goals, for increased national ambition backed by clear plans and for all Parties to follow the example set by those already working to better align their national targets and policies with international commitments.

155. Several inputs point out general considerations in relation to the national policy framework, not least: the scope for more comprehensive national-level consultation on NDC preparation and implementation; the consideration of co-benefits of climate policy for other policy areas and vice versa; ways to enhance the subnational governance framework to enable subnational actors to deliver more substantially towards national climate objectives; and the need for better integration of climate change in national visions for sustainable development and other concurrent international agendas such as the Sendai Framework, and United Nations treaties and conventions on the ozone layer, desertification, biodiversity and others. A few focus on the principles that they would like to see national governments uphold and address more convincingly, for example, justice (especially in relation to the just transition for the workforce), equity and human rights.

156. Inputs calling for specific policies at the national and/or sectoral level often advocate a more comprehensive coverage of sectors and GHGs (HFCs, short-lived climate pollutants) in mitigation policies. They also advocate more focus on demand-side policies (e.g. incentives); removal of harmful subsidies to fossil fuels and agriculture; promotion of climate-friendly dietary choices; mainstreaming of climate action into (all) sectoral policies; giving more consideration to behavioural and non-incremental change; building resilience in conjunction with sustainable development, disaster risk preparedness and poverty alleviation, ensuring sufficient financial resources for all four objectives; protecting populations from unacceptable impacts; increasing education and awareness-raising so as to mobilize the broadest possible citizen base; and more financial support for carbon removal research and technologies (including natural sinks).

157. Inputs on technology often call for governments to foster the conditions, including investment, for faster deployment and dissemination of low-emission technologies (i.e. research, development and innovation more generally).

158. Certain inputs focus on aspects of finance, for example, increasing climate finance, ensuring more balance between adaptation and mitigation finance, and mainstreaming climate considerations into investments (see also box 2).

159. Finally, governments are urged to cooperate more and in a more effective way with their peers at the international level to achieve climate goals across the board (see section “Actions for the UNFCCC bodies” above).

*Actions for the private sector*

160. A few inputs to the third Talanoa Dialogue question identify actions and recommendations for the private sector. The private sector is requested to step up low-carbon and climate-resilient practices; adopt science-based targets; and increase financial disclosure, address risk and otherwise contribute to creating an investment environment conducive to large-scale, climate-friendly investment.

161. Businesses are further requested to continue to harness their purchasing power to generate market signals and are urged to exploit their leadership and influence to help to propagate climate ambition among their peers and across their supply chains.

*Actions for the international community*

162. Finally, a few inputs set out actions and recommendations for intergovernmental organizations whose activities have synergies with climate action. This concerns better links and collaboration among United Nations agencies and programmes (United Nations Development System, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Maritime Organization), synergies among relevant international agreements (Kigali Amendment, Convention on Biological Diversity, United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification) and closer integration with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

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