



Tuesday, 13 October 1953,
 at 3 p.m.

New York

C O N T E N T S

The question of Morocco (<i>continued</i>)	45
--	----

Chairman: Mr. F. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium).

**The question of Morocco (A/2406 and Add.1,
 A/C.1/L.60) (*continued*)**
 [Item 57]*

1. Mr. BAKR (Iraq) expressed regret at the absence of the French delegation. His delegation believed that all questions which gave rise to international friction should be solved in accordance with the Charter and was convinced that an equitable solution to the present difficulties could be reached only by the combined efforts of the Member States, including those directly interested in the problem, and most particularly France.
2. The absence of the French delegation could be explained in only one way—France was not interested in reaching a peaceful and mutually acceptable solution. The representatives must conclude that the French Government had no serious intention of changing its policy, but would continue its repressive and ill-advised measures which hitherto had brought strife and unrest in North Africa.
3. If France truly believed that her presence in and administration of Morocco were beneficial to the people of Morocco, it would be the greatest folly to boycott the meetings. Mr. Bakr asked how the representatives could be blamed if they concluded that France, unable to face the searchlight of evidence and scrutiny, preferred to declare its righteous indignation and absent itself from hearing arguments it was apparently unable to refute?
4. The French boycott had been explained and justified by citing Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter. Delegations in the past had been able, he believed, to refute that contention and prove conclusively that the Moroccan dispute had such far-reaching international implications as to make it definitely undomestic in character.
5. Mr. Bakr observed that he would not discuss the legal side of the question, since that had been exhaustively done by other delegations. But he would stress the following facts: first, the relations between France and Morocco were governed by the Treaty of Fez of 1912. Morocco was a sovereign State bound to France by an international agreement. Their relations were defined by the provisions of that agreement and any dispute or difference of views arising out of the

implications and interpretations of that treaty must be considered an international dispute.

6. Secondly, the Act of Algeiras of 1906, signed by twelve States, among whom was France, was still in force. The status of Morocco was defined in that treaty which also guaranteed its independence and integrity.

7. Finally, the judgment of 27 August 1952 of the International Court of Justice clearly stated that under the treaty Morocco remained a sovereign State but it made an arrangement of a contractual character whereby France undertook to exercise certain sovereign powers on behalf of Morocco.

8. Mr. Bakr then asked how it was possible to contend, therefore, that the United Nations had no right to discuss the Moroccan question. He recalled that Mr. Robert Schuman had told the General Assembly on 10 November 1952 (392nd plenary meeting) that France was bound to Tunisia and Morocco by the treaties concluded as between sovereign States, and that the final objective of French policy was to strengthen the individuality of Morocco as a sovereign State.

9. France, in closing the door to objective deliberations on the question within the framework of the United Nations had not left other doors open for reaching a solution. Those who urged direct negotiations must surely realize, he said, that France had slammed all such doors. The leaders of Morocco had been murdered, jailed or exiled. The remaining population had been terrorized into ominous submission. The Istiqlal and other Moroccan nationalist parties had been outlawed. The Sultan, who had sought to negotiate a settlement with France in compliance with the Assembly's resolution (612 (VII)) and existing treaties, had been harassed, threatened, and browbeaten by the French resident representatives. France, in disregard of her treaty obligations to protect and honour him, had deposed him.

10. Mr. Bakr then asked where the Moroccan people should turn to receive an equitable fulfilment of their claims to liberty? The General Assembly, which had twice taken up the question of Morocco, had irrefutably demonstrated its competence and concern. But France had answered the mild Assembly resolution by taking severe measures of repression, aimed at breaking the will of the Moroccan people. It had built a wall around Morocco shutting it from the outside world and the searching eyes of the United Nations. Contrary to what history should have taught France, it seemed to believe it would continue to have a free hand in a leaderless and cowed Morocco. The representative of Iraq stated that repression and murder of nationalist leaders would only inflame the minds of the Moroccan people. More ardent and fiery nationalists would succeed the murdered moderate leaders. No

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

great nation would stay leaderless, unless it had spiritually disintegrated, which was not the case in Morocco. Would France, he asked, yield to reason or heed the collective voice of world opinion only when Morocco became embroiled in bloody civil strife?

11. Mr. Bakr observed that France by its variant conduct in North Africa and in Indo-China had given a telling and significant glimpse of its position.

12. The representative of Iraq recalled that during the general debate in the Assembly, Mr. Zafrullah Khan, representative of Pakistan, had wisely cautioned against an intransigent imperialistic policy amenable only to ruthless national resistance (437th plenary meeting).

13. Mr. Bakr said that France should not mistake the moderation of the Moroccan people as a sign of weakness. It should recall the magnanimity and support of the Sultan whom it had illegally deposed, and of his people whom it had terrorized and humiliated. The state of war between France and the axis Powers had not legally involved the protectorate itself, but the Sultan had declared that Morocco must offer its unreserved assistance. Thousands of Moroccans had fought for France.

14. He said it was unfortunate that those acts of friendship had been forgotten by the French Government and by the French settlers in Morocco whose ingratitude had been clearly shown by their refusal to entertain any proposal aimed at limiting their exploitation of the country. He then referred to an article published in *The New York Times* on 11 October 1953 in which it was reported that *La Vigie marocaine* had accused the Sultan of having had German sympathies during the war. Was it because of those German sympathies, he asked, that Moroccans had fought on the side of France and her allies during the war?

15. The representative of Iraq observed that the recent French measures were also a violation of the international treaties between France and Morocco. Article III of the Treaty of Fez provided that the French Government would lend constant support to His Sherifian Majesty against all dangers which might threaten his person or throne or endanger the tranquillity of his states, and that the same support should be given to the heir to the throne and his successors. However, the French Government had continuously undermined the Sultan's authority, and had finally deposed and banished him.

16. The French maintained that they had removed the Sultan in order to save him and the country from bloodshed and unrest. However, there existed incontrovertible evidence that the French had engineered the unrest and, in doing so, had acted in accordance with a long prepared plan to get rid of the Sultan because he had not co-operated with the French authorities and had refused to compromise the interests of his country. An article published in *La Vigie marocaine* on 21 August 1953 stated that on 17 December 1952 the representatives of the colonists addressed a memorandum to the French Government proposing various measures to end the crisis in Morocco. Those measures included the deposition of the Sultan.

17. Mr. Bakr recalled that at the end of May 1953, a petition addressed to the French Government and signed by 270 pashas and caids had demanded the abdication of the Sultan, alleging that he had failed to abide by the provisions of Islamic religious ortho-

doxy. However, the pashas and caids were no more than administrative officials and had no right whatsoever to interfere in political or religious matters. The *ulemas* alone were entitled to pass judgment on questions concerning religion. Furthermore, three of the most important pashas of Morocco, and 318 *ulemas* had attacked the petition and its authors and exposed them as the tools of the French administration.

18. It was clear that the French administration had wished to entrench itself before the tide of time had fully overtaken its colonialist designs. It had sought to force the Sultan to agree to grant the French minority equal rights with the whole Moroccan population. When that attempt had failed the French administration had instigated a movement of discontent ostensibly expressed by the Berber population against the Sultan. Although its nature was never properly described, it would seem that the Sultan, by asking for genuine reforms and true independence, had deviated from the true path of the Moslem religion.

19. Mr. Bakr then quoted from a letter dated 12 August 1953 in which the Sultan had complained to the President of the French Republic that for several years there had been intrigues and manoeuvres which, thanks to the encouragement of certain French officials, had led to the constitution of a fictitious opposition, largely composed of agents of the central authority. However, the French settlers had succeeded in obtaining the consent of the French Government to their plan. The so-called civil war had been used only as a means to force the Sultan to sign the decrees of the so-called municipal reforms. When that had failed it was used as a pretext to depose him, in violation of the Treaty of Fez.

20. The events of the last few months showed that the French Government had no serious intention of implementing the General Assembly resolution 612 (VII) and was bent upon denying the Moroccan people their rightful aspirations to freedom. He stated that the Moroccan people should be helped to regain the independence which they lost forty years ago. He recalled that Morocco had existed as an independent sovereign State uninterruptedly for over a thousand years and had signed treaties with England, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Morocco had also been one of the first foreign Powers to establish diplomatic relations with the United States of America.

21. As an excuse to perpetuate their rule over the country, the French had continuously pointed to the record of their administration in Morocco. They maintained that giving Morocco its independence would halt all progress and destroy the work accomplished. Mr. Bakr then discussed actual conditions in Morocco, using only facts which, he said, had been derived from French sources, lest he be accused of distortion.

22. The protecting Power, rather than attempting to reform the Makhzen, the Moroccan administration, according to the provisions of the Treaty of Fez, had set up an entirely French administration. The Makhzen had progressively declined and had now shrunk to the Grand Vizier's office and the Ministries of Islamic Justice and Religious Foundations. Direct French rule had been substituted for the normal functions of the Moroccan administration. Residential decrees had been gradually impinging on the Sultan's sovereignty.

23. Although Morocco shared with the Arab world the same culture, the French administration had built an impenetrable wall between Morocco and the main centres from which her cultural heritage had been derived.

24. Mr. Bakr illustrated the appalling disparity between the educational facilities made available to the French minority and the neglect shown the Moroccans. On the basis of school-age population eligible to use the available Moroccan facilities, 17,270 francs had been appropriated per European school-age child, whereas only 731 francs had been made available for native children.

25. He then recommended to the representatives a booklet entitled "Morocco under the Protectorate", which had been published by the Istiqlal Party and had been distributed to delegations.

26. The French administration had been organized primarily for the enrichment of the French settlers and the harnessing of Moroccan resources and activities toward that end. With the impoverishment of the peasants, unemployment had become rampant. The discrimination between European and Moroccan workers was glaring. The standard of living of the Moroccan people had been declining progressively with the mounting cost of living.

27. After forty years of French administration only fifty thousand hectares of new land had been irrigated. The irrigation networks were operated mainly by companies composed exclusively of European settlers with the financial help of the French administration. The mining industry was almost entirely owned by French companies. Moroccan exports had not been permitted to benefit the Moroccan trade balance with hard currency markets.

28. The people of Morocco had been deprived of the most elementary human rights. The right of political association or trade union activity had been denied to them and they had been forced to go underground. Freedom of the press and speech was completely absent. Neither equality before the law nor freedom of movement was guaranteed to Moroccans. After forty years, the protecting Power had only succeeded in making the Moroccans strangers in their own land. Mr. Bakr stated that France could not face those facts, which had been drawn from its own official documents, and had preferred to absent itself from the Committee.

29. He asked if the people of Morocco were not entitled to independence and, if so, should not the Members of the United Nations help those struggling people to obtain their rightful place among nations.

30. Mr. Bakr then read excerpts from authentic reports of the trials and sufferings of the thousands of Moroccan political prisoners. He said that, following the incidents of Casablanca on 7 and 8 December 1952, the French authorities in Morocco had interned more than 5,000 members of the Independence Party.

31. He then described conditions in various prisons. As an example, in the prison of Azilal some of the prisoners had to carry out hard labour from six to twenty-one hours a day under the whips of pitiless guards, who flogged them for the least possible mistake. They had to live on food which had been reduced to some pieces of bread and a little bit of sickening oil. The ill and the aged could not escape the general treatment. In the region of Ksiba, the prisoners were

compelled to work inside some cells where they risked the danger of suffocation and landslides as a result of explosions of dynamite used to break the rock. Hard bread was their only food. At Tyddes, the prisoners were put to hard labour during the day. At night they were confined in underground cells, which were unventilated grain silos. There were no contacts with the outside. They were forbidden to shave or to disinfect themselves. Mr. Bakr said that 7,000 Moroccan political prisoners were dispersed in various penitentiary centres and prisons.

32. Conditions of deported persons were not any more enviable. Health conditions were horrible in the centres of deportation, which were sometimes more than 1,000 kilometres from the home town of the deportee. An exiled person was a real prisoner in a cell, under the strict surveillance of one or more guards who were especially assigned to annoy him or to spy upon him. Some 500 persons had been deported. Upon arrival at their destination, the deportees had been scattered among different centres where they were compelled to live under the most painful surveillance. Each deportee was isolated in a cell. Mr. Bakr described several cases and said that under-feeding, humiliation, flagrant insults, moral and physical persecution and seclusion in cells were the ordinary rule in the régime described as *résidence surveillée*.

33. He said that those were but a few of the horrible stories which were being enacted in the cities, the plains and the prisons of Morocco. Those cruelties would not stifle the liberation movement. With all those repressions, there was still time for France to make of Morocco an independent friend and ally. The delegation of Iraq sincerely hoped that France would not miss that opportunity, for the time was short.

34. History would not spare the United Nations if it washed its hands of the tragic and explosive situation which was fast developing in Morocco. Deeds spoke louder than words, and the deeds of France in Morocco were black marks which were undoing all the high claims of the free world. The United Nations must face up to its task or be branded a talking-house and a paper shop with no power or influence.

35. Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia) observed that the struggle of the Moroccan people for the right of self-determination and for national independence had been going on for more than two score years. He pointed out that Mr. François Mitterrand, a former Minister of State in the present French Government, had stated in his book entitled "Aux frontières de l'Union française", that the institutions of Tunisia and Morocco were less liberal than those of Gabon, Ubangi, Kenya and Sudan.

36. The Czechoslovak Government had always given its firm support to the principles set forth in Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Charter. The Czechoslovak people had always sided with the oppressed peoples. His delegation would, therefore, accord its full support to the legitimate claims of the Moroccan people.

37. The arguments put forward by a number of delegations in the discussion on the question of Morocco have proved amply that the competence of the Assembly in the matter cannot be doubted. Developments in Morocco during the past year had only served to corroborate the duty of the Assembly to examine the question. Events in 1953 had shown that prevailing conditions in Morocco were unsound, that they

not only constituted a source of disturbance inside the country itself, but had also elicited a growing response in African and Asian countries as well as throughout the peace-loving world.

38. Mr. Nosek stated that structurally the economy of Morocco was clearly colonial. It produced substantial quantities of raw materials and agricultural products, which were exported wholesale at low prices, while imported products fetched incomparably higher prices. In that respect, constructive conclusions could be drawn from a United Nations survey of economic development in Africa (E/2377) dated 20 March 1953. This exploitation of Morocco's national resources, coupled with the exploitation of the toiling masses, was unfortunately only too often attended by the violation of the most elementary human rights. For example, any Moroccan could be arrested on a simple oral order, without a warrant of search or arrest. No public or private assemblies could be held without previous authorization.

39. Another characteristic of the colonial régime in Morocco, he said, was obdurate resistance offered by the French authorities to the efforts on the part of indigenous workers to set up trade union organizations. French authorities gave the right of organizations to urban workers only, provided they occupied no more than 50 per cent of the seats in the executive committees.

40. He pointed out that the law of 24 June 1948 prohibiting establishment of independent unions by Moroccans was still in effect, as was the law of 19 January 1949 under which the right to strike was prohibited in Morocco.

41. Since the end of 1952, Morocco had lived under a regime of repression and constant persecution. The bloody events of Casablanca had been followed by waves of arrests and deportations, by arbitrary judgments and by the prohibition of political parties.

42. The French authorities had had every opportunity to realize that the policy and methods used with regard to the people of Morocco were doomed to failure. History had often proved that force could not serve as a basis for the peaceful co-existence of peoples. That fact had been recognized by Mr. Robert Schuman, the former French Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had declared during the sixth session of the General Assembly (354th plenary meeting) that Franco-Moroccan negotiations would be held and would result in a friendly contractual solution freely arrived at. In March 1953, however, Mr. Schuman had written in the publication *La Nef* that a clarification of French policy with regard to Tunisia and Morocco could not be delayed if an unbridgeable chasm was not to open between Frenchmen and the indigenous inhabitants.

43. The question of Morocco could be resolved by peaceful and democratic means in accordance with the principles of the Charter, as the majority of the Member States had become convinced. Recent developments in Morocco had proved, indeed, that that aim could not be attained by force and by the methods of repression used to break the movement of the Moroccan people for national liberation. The United Nations, whose task it was to be a centre for harmonizing the efforts of nations so as to eliminate all factors which might lead to a breach of the peace, therefore had the duty of dealing with the Moroccan question in accord-

ance with Articles 11 and 14 of the Charter. The Czechoslovak delegation would favour any constructive proposal along those lines capable of contributing to a relaxation of international tension and of helping the Moroccan people to fulfil their legitimate claims, the elementary and inalienable rights of every people. The thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.60) constituted such a proposal and his delegation would support it.

44. Mr. LODGE (United States) declared that the aspirations towards self-government of peoples who were not then independent always evoked sympathy and support from Americans. The history of the United States spoke more loudly than words ever could of that understanding of those who sought self-government and individual freedom. That truth was basic despite the fact that, as his delegation had already made clear, it did not consider the matter as one which endangered the maintenance of international peace and security and did not consider that the General Assembly was equipped to act as a court to adjudicate the various claims made concerning events in Morocco. What could be done, however, was to express the hope that France and Morocco would move continually closer together in achieving self-government for the people of Morocco. In that connexion, his delegation noted with interest and encouragement the statement made by Mr. Maurice Schuman at the 445th plenary meeting of the General Assembly regarding the additional reforms in Morocco in which France proposed the institution of elected representative assemblies at all levels of public life, a statute of the judiciary which ensured the independence of judges, guarantees for the protection of the rights of individuals and provisions giving the workers the benefit of labour union freedom. Those words were particularly encouraging in the light of Mr. Schuman's declaration that France recognized its particular responsibilities, that it agreed with the United Nations as to the nature and scope of those responsibilities, but that, for that very reason, it could not agree to share them.

45. The United States delegation therefore looked for the day when those hopes and aspirations would become actual realities. It hoped that nothing done in the General Assembly would promote disorder or confusion in Morocco and that the Assembly's action would bring about an atmosphere in which France and Morocco would move continually closer to effectuating self-government for the people of Morocco.

46. Mr. LUDIN (Afghanistan) noted that the competence of the General Assembly had once again been challenged on the ground of domestic jurisdiction. He would examine the context, nature and relevant provisions of the Treaty of Fez to see under what circumstances it had come into being, to what extent France had fulfilled its obligations under it and whether, in that light, it was binding on the people of Morocco; because it was on the basis of that Treaty that the claim of domestic jurisdiction had been made. In so doing, he fully realized that the General Assembly was a political body concerned primarily with matters relating to the preservation of peace and the promotion of friendly relations among nations, and was not a court of law.

47. The Treaty of Fez had been preceded by other treaties to which Morocco had been a party and which had determined its character and content. A number

of bilateral treaties concluded in the nineteenth century had given consular jurisdiction and extra-territorial rights in Morocco to several European States. That game of protection and interference in the internal affairs of Morocco had proved so attractive that the German Kaiser, during a visit to Tangier, had proclaimed himself in March 1905 the sole protector of the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan. The conference called by the interested States as a result of the ensuing crisis had led to the General Act of Algeciras of 7 April 1906, in which the signatory Powers agreed on the sovereignty and independence of the Sultan. The Act had temporarily saved the sovereignty and independence of Morocco subject to the privileges enjoyed by the signatory Powers.

48. The Republic of France, however, had been making persistent efforts to negotiate bilateral treaties with other Powers concerning their interests in Morocco. It had been assuming the responsibility of discharging certain of the international obligations of Morocco without the latter's knowledge or consent. Finally, the Franco-German Convention concluded at Berlin of 4 November 1911 had proved to be the foundation of the protectorate régime. The French Republic became the sole agent of the interested Powers in Morocco. It then made itself the sole Power representing Morocco in the international field by imposing its protection on Morocco. The Treaty of Fez, signed on 30 March 1912, had been concluded between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of His Sherifian Majesty. Ratification of the treaty by the people of Morocco had not been stipulated and in fact they had not approved of the treaty, but had maintained their unequal but continued struggle to resist aggression and to recover their freedom. As General Guillaume, the former French Resident-General of Morocco, had attested, not one of the native tribes had submitted to the French without having been subdued by force.

49. The Sultan of Morocco had not fared any better than his people under French protection. Article III of the Treaty of Fez, under which France had pledged constant support to the Sultan against all dangers which might threaten his person or throne, or endanger the tranquility of his State, had proved of no avail when His Majesty Mulai Hafid had been forced to abdicate. Nor had the protecting Power discharged its obligation to His Majesty Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef some forty years later.

50. Under article I of the Treaty of Fez the contracting parties had agreed to establish in Morocco a new régime comprising various reforms which the French Government might see fit to introduce within the Moroccan territory. Those measures were, among other things, to have ensured the economic development of the country. Neither the spirit nor the letter of the treaty gave the protecting Power the right to replace the Government of the Sultan by a French administration exercising direct rule over the Moroccan people.

51. Under article IV of the treaty which established the sovereignty of the Sultan, any measure that the new régime might require could not become law until it was established by a decree of the Sultan or the authorities to which he might have delegated his power. The sovereignty of Morocco, according to the treaty, thus resided in the person of the Sultan.

52. Mr. Ludin pointed out that the French authorities had recently proposed to the Sultan of Morocco

adoption of certain measures in the name of "reforms", according to which the Sultan would have to share his sovereign rights with the directorates and assemblies which would be controlled by the French settlers in Morocco. The Sultan had considered those measures detrimental to the sovereignty of the Moroccan people of which he was the trustee and the symbol, and had refused to affix his signature to them. The elements friendly to the French authorities had then carried out their threat and deposed him.

53. Each one of those acts of commission and omission on the part of the protecting Power constituted a flagrant violation of the Treaty of Fez, and their collective effect gave rise to serious doubts regarding the validity and binding nature of that treaty. Pointing out that Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Charter set forth the purpose of the Organization to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace, he submitted that the French attitude towards the Moroccan question was not in keeping with France's obligations under the Charter. There was no use denying the fact that a dispute existed between France and the patriots, nationalists and people of Morocco concerning the latter's legitimate rights and aspirations under the Charter. As a result, a state of siege and martial law existed in Morocco. In those circumstances, non-intervention by the General Assembly would be tantamount to approval of France's deeds in Morocco. The Assembly was well within its competence in discussing the matter and was amply justified in lending its influence, prestige and support to a just and equitable solution of the question in keeping with the principles and purposes of the Organization.

54. Mr. TARCICI (Yemen), recalling the history of the question of Morocco before the United Nations, said that during the previous year his delegation had hoped that there would at least be an improvement in French policy in response to the moderate and wise wishes voiced by the General Assembly in resolution 612 (VII). The French Government, unfortunately, had not so used the time given to it, and the situation had deteriorated even further. That was what had induced fifteen delegations, representing almost the whole of two large continents, to submit the question to the Security Council (S/3085). Despite the favourable attitude of almost half its members and despite the military action undertaken against the people of Morocco and the moves against its real spokesman, the Sultan, the Security Council had not included the question in its agenda. As was known, the action of the French authorities had led to the illegal removal of the Sultan from his country despite the terms of the General Assembly resolution.

55. Instead of furthering the fundamental liberties of the people of Morocco, France had imposed a régime of strict martial law, and any Moroccan interested in public affairs found himself in prison, exiled, or even liquidated. The negotiations called for by the resolution had not taken place despite the Sultan's appeals to Paris. In a manner directly contrary to the wishes expressed by the General Assembly the French Government had drawn up "reforms" which would have conferred upon the representatives of the colonists, a small minority, a representation equal to that of 8 or 9 million Moroccans. It was evident that the other half of the representation would be nothing but collab-

orators virtually nominated by the authorities of Casablanca.

56. In the face of the situation that obtained, Mr. Maurice Schuman, the head of the French delegation, had stated in the General Assembly (445th plenary meeting) that his Government preferred to devote its efforts to leading the peoples united to it by the links of treaties, history and confidence, to that liberty where they would be able democratically to manage their own affairs. Mr. Tarcici asked when Morocco would be given the self-government which it had always had prior to the efforts undertaken by France. Was there to be further retrogression which would be called progress towards Moroccan self-government?

57. Turning to article III of the Treaty of Fez, under which the Government of France had pledged constant support to the Sultan or to his successors, he pointed out that the present Sultan found himself in exile on the pretext of protection, as if a popular monarch could not be protected within his country in which France claimed to be ensconced only for the purpose of maintaining law and order. The Treaty of Fez did not say that the Sultan must forgo his authority, his people and his aspirations in order to purchase, at that price, the support of the French Government. In addition to flinging a challenge in the face of the United Nations, France had been guilty of violation of the Treaty of Fez, illegal deposition of the Sultan in violation of the official law and traditions of Morocco recognized by France itself, and the illegal appointment of a new Sultan in violation of the same laws.

58. What should be done in the face of those overt acts? Should the International Court of Justice be asked for a new judgment condemning France's acts in Morocco? Or should there be recourse to the United Nations? An attempt had been made to introduce the question in Paris during the sixth session (342nd plenary meeting), but the General Assembly had listened to the appeal made by the French Foreign Minister. The question had been submitted to the seventh session while innocent persons were being machine-gunned in Casablanca and elsewhere. The resolution adopted by the General Assembly (612 (VII)) had been totally disregarded. The Sultan had watched the encroachments of France and the French colonists, and had addressed himself to the Organization in an attempt to limit the excesses of colonialism. In the face of that action the French imperialists had shown their true hostility towards the Sultan. When the Organization had decided to consider the Moroccan and Tunisian questions, France had withdrawn from the debates, the massacres in the two countries had continued, and the cases of deportation, imprisonment and even assassination had multiplied.

59. It was against that background that the General Assembly was told that it should not deal with the question since bloodshed in Morocco might result. To argue that the machine guns directed against freedom of speech and the threat to unarmed and innocent persons in North Africa were sufficient reasons for not dealing with the question was similar to the counsel of those who advised the parents of a kidnapped child, on the pretext of saving the child's life, not to address themselves to the judicial authorities.

60. Some representatives had based their objections on certain provisions of the Charter in disregard of the existence of the Treaties of Algeciras and Fez, in order to prevent the General Assembly from even dis-

cussing the problem, an attitude different from that displayed by the same representatives towards other and by no means dissimilar cases. The Sultan had had faith in the Organization and in the Charter. Mr. Tarcici expressed his confidence that the United Nations would not drive the Sultan and liberation movements throughout the world to despair, but would encourage them to address themselves to the Organization.

61. The sovereignty of Morocco had been made to vanish at the very moment when the General Assembly had been attempting to ensure that the people of Morocco would be enabled to govern themselves. In that connexion, he referred to an article in *L'Observateur* on 24 September 1953 in which, after an analysis of the existing situation in Morocco, it was said that the parity which had been opposed by the Sultan and the Istiqlal stripped the protectorate of its content by causing the Sherifian sovereignty to vanish. Rather than continue to adopt resolutions that were disregarded, the Organization should keep in constant touch with the factual situation in order to strengthen the foundation of the United Nations and in order to confer a permanent value upon those resolutions. The situation in Morocco was more dangerous than it had ever been in the past and could not be eased by imprisonments and deportations, as France well knew from painful experience. He referred to the attitude of liberal elements in France and to the resignation from the French Government of Mr. Mitterrand, who had subsequently written that while the Sultan was the enemy of France, it was incumbent upon the French Government to abide by its international undertakings. There were others in France who were outraged at the conduct of the French Government and who had come out to plead the cause of true friendship between France and the people of North Africa.

62. If the will of the Organization was to strive to restore the situation, while leaving the door open for France to readjust its attitude, the thirteen-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.60) provided the appropriate way.

63. Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma) was disturbed at the highly legalistic approach which some Member States took towards the Charter. Those delegations tended to seize on one particular provision of the Charter, to consider it in isolation and to give it an interpretation, which, if accepted, would prevent consideration of a question regarded as embarrassing or inconvenient. Indeed, some appeared to hold that it was sufficient for a Member State to make a unilateral claim that any given question fell essentially within its domestic jurisdiction to prevent even the discussion of the question. That was a dangerous doctrine, which, if accepted, would make the Charter almost meaningless. The Charter was not merely a legal document. It was a living document, whose provisions were so interlinked that it was impossible to isolate any one of them, a document which reflected the hopes and aspirations of mankind. All Members of the Organization had subscribed to it, including France, which, to his regret, was not represented in the Committee. All the Members of the Organization had thereby assumed certain obligations of a general character. When a State was accused of failing to live up to its obligations, it was its duty either to refute the accusation or to take steps to remedy the situation from which the accusation had resulted. Either course necessarily involved

some discussion in the United Nations. However, if the State concerned did not follow either of those alternatives and refused even to discuss the question on the basis of its own interpretation of one provision of the Charter considered in isolation, it would be difficult to escape the conclusion that that State did not take its obligations under the Charter too seriously. In his delegation's opinion, France had placed itself precisely in that position.

64. It seemed obvious that there must be some discussion of a question before a decision could be taken as to whether it fell within the scope of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter. Such a discussion has already been held, and in the light of it he wondered how many members of the Committee really believed that the question was essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of France. The French position, in response to a charge of violation of the Charter, was that the Committee had no business considering the matter. Noting that the preamble of the Charter reaffirmed the equal rights of men and women, he pointed out as a glaring element of the case against France, that more than forty years after France had assumed the protectorate of Morocco, the French Government was introducing reforms in that country based not on the equality of men and women but on the proposition that one French colonist was the equal of twenty-four Moroccans, since 425,000 French colonists were to be given a voice equal to the 9.5 million Moroccans. France preferred to give no explanation for what appeared to be severe discrimination in favour of the French residents of Morocco. Instead, France said in effect that it was entitled to do what it pleased in Morocco and Tunisia under the terms of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter.

65. The reforms in question, however, were those that the then Foreign Minister of France, Mr. Robert Schuman, had referred to at the opening of the seventh session of the General Assembly (392nd plenary meeting). Mr. Barrington quoted from that statement to the effect that the policy which France had set itself was clear and could not be suspected by anyone. Mr. Schuman had also alluded to Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, which had gained independence within the French Union. In view of the system of representation sought in the new reforms, it could be agreed that the policy of France was indeed perfectly clear. Mr. Barrington doubted, however, whether many would agree that that policy could not be suspected by anyone. In that connexion, he noted that Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam had been in the news since the statement made by Mr. Schuman, despite the latter's assurance that those three countries were already independent within the system of the French Union.

66. The slow pace of political advancement of the people of Morocco was serious enough, but what was really disturbing and depressing was the spectacle of once liberal France, the cradle of democracy, embarking on a fundamentally undemocratic policy in regard to its protectorates in North Africa, and glorifying it, in Mr. Schuman's words, as a task which France would pursue with faith and pride. It gave no pleasure to have to say such things, and he would rather be praising France for its magnanimity. The people of Morocco had been very patient but there had been illustrations elsewhere of what could happen when the patience of a subject people ran out. The Moroccan people were still anxious to co-operate with France

although many might be becoming disillusioned. His delegation still hoped that France would soon act speedily to remedy the fast deteriorating situation in Morocco. What was required was not merely an acceleration of tempo in the introduction of reforms, but, in so far as some elements were concerned, an actual reversal of policy, to the end that Morocco might once again emerge as a free and independent State, ever grateful to France for the role which it could yet play in bringing about that evolution.

67. Mr. BULAJIC (Yugoslavia), referring to the issue of competence, reiterated his delegation's opinion, borne out by events during the past year, that the Moroccan problem had an international character and that the United Nations had the right to consider it. The international character of the question was also attested by the concern of a large number of Asian and African and other countries. The Moroccan problem must be considered within the framework of the general movement of Asian and African peoples toward attainment of their independence and equality. If that fact was not understood and taken into account, it was difficult to work efficiently toward the strengthening of peace and the development of democratic relations among nations. It should be borne in mind that contemporary problems could not be solved through obsolete methods of political pressure and of administrative measures. To attempt to maintain influence over a country through such means was a very dangerous course which could only further complicate matters.

68. The Yugoslav delegation adhered firmly to the principle of the right of each people to self-determination which was embodied in the Charter. His country, which had been defending for many years and at great sacrifice its right to freedom and independence would not be true to itself if it denied that right to other peoples or failed to support them in their efforts to achieve it. No people wished to live under conditions of dependence and inequality. Unless that was understood and the appropriate steps were taken, an ever-increasing number of problems even more difficult and grave would arise, regardless of arguments as to their domestic or international character.

69. His delegation considered the Moroccan question and similar questions to be closely connected with the struggle for world peace and the development of democratic relations among nations. It could not share the view that the problem was not a matter of concern to the United Nations because no other State was threatened by France or Morocco. The existing world was so interdependent that a dispute between two countries, and especially one assuming the proportions of the Franco-Moroccan conflict, must necessarily endanger international peace and security. Moreover, the struggle for peace could not be separated from the struggle for national independence. Only a system of collective security consisting of independent and equal nations could be a genuine and effective one.

70. As for the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at the seventh session (612 (VII)), Mr. Bulajic observed that it was perhaps to be expected that France would not have accepted the resolution as such, but his delegation had believed nevertheless that the measures taken in Morocco would be in general harmony with the recommendations of the Assembly and would therefore contribute to the settlement of the problem. However, events had taken a different, indeed a contrary and dangerous turn.

71. While his delegation did not wish to deny the importance of all that France had done in Morocco, or its contribution to the general progress of that country, the question was whether the reforms carried out by France, and especially those carried out recently, were in keeping with the strivings of the Moroccan people toward full independence. It seemed obvious that they did not correspond to the aims of the Moroccan people, and he regarded that as a basic cause of the existing tension. Stressing the ties of friendship between Yugoslavia and France, he said that his delegation was convinced that France was fully capable of approaching the solution of the problem realistically and constructively, and believed that such a solution would

give France new strength, increase its prestige and serve its best interests. Such a solution would at the same time constitute a new contribution to world peace and security.

72. In conclusion, Mr. Bulajic found it very encouraging that the Moroccan and other peoples were appealing to the United Nations for solution of disputes of that nature. That was a proof of the great prestige and authority that the Organization enjoyed. The decisions of the United Nations should be such as to justify and strengthen that confidence rather than forfeit it.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.