


# Standards in Avionics System Development

(Overview on DO-178B)

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# Abstract

- DO-178B (and DO-278) are used to assure safety of avionics software. These documents provide guidance in the areas of SW development, configuration management, verification and the interface to approval authorities (e.g., FAA, EASA)

# Agenda


- Introduction to DO-178B
- System Aspects
- Software Lifecycle Management
- Certification Artifacts and Techniques
- Future: DO-178C

# Overview

- **DO-178B - Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification**
- Standard of RTCA Incorporation (in Europe it is ED-12B and standard of EUROCAE)
- Represents the avionics industry consensus to ensure software safety
- Acceptable by FAA and EASA certification authorities
- „The FAA and the civil aviation community recognize RTCA’S DO-178B as an acceptable means of compliance to the FAA regulations for SW aspects of certification.”

# History of avionics SW complexity

Ref: Subra de Salafa and Paquier



Exponential Growth

Both A380 and B 787 have 100's of millions LOC

# History

- DO-178 in 1982
  - Basic concepts of SW design assurance
  - Three levels of SW safety
- DO-178A in 1985
  - Concentrates on testing and configuration management
- DO-178B in 1992
  - Five levels of SW safety
  - From Testing focus → requirement-based
- DO-278 in 2002
  - Interprets DO-178B to ground and space based-systems
- DO-178C in 2012
  - Incorporates modern SW development and analysis techniques

# DO178B Document Structure

System Aspects Relating To  
Software Development (Sec 2.)

Overview of Aircraft and Engine  
Certification (Sec. 10.)

## SW Life Cycle Process

SW Life Cycle (Sec. 3.)

SW Planning (Sec. 4.)

SW Development (Sec. 5.)

## Integral Process

SW Verification (Sec. 6.)

SW Configuration Mgt (Sec. 7.)

SW Quality Assurance (Sec. 8.)

Ceritfication Liasison (Sec. 9.)

SW Life Cycle Data(Sec. 11.)

Additional Considrations (Sec. 12.)

ANNEX A & B (FAA checklists)

Appendices

# Software Levels in DO-178B

- Different failure conditions require different software conditions → 5 levels

Failure Condition	Software Level
Catastrophic	Level A
Hazardous/Severe - Major	Level B
Major	Level C
Minor	Level D
No Effect	Level E



# Examples DO-178B Safety Levels

## ■ Safety-Critical Levels C&D

- Anti-missile defense
- Data mining
- Health monitoring
- Mission planning and implementation
- Mission simulation and training
- Network-centric operation
- Real-time data recording and analysis
- Self-healing communication networks
- Telemetry
- Weapons targeting

## ■ Safety-Critical Levels A&B

- Fly-by-wire controls
- Auto-pilot
- Air-traffic Separation Control
- Glass Cockpit Information Display
- Radar
- Jet Engine Control
- IFF (friend or foe)
- Missile guidance
- Missile launch
- Missile self-destruct

# Objectives for Safety Levels

- Different levels of safety requires different objectives to be fulfilled
  - e.g., Level A 66, Level B 65
- Defined by 10 tables in ANNEX A
- Example: Table A-6 Objective 3.

Objective		Applicability by SW Level				Output		Control Category by SW Level			
Description	Ref	A	B	C	D	Descriptions	Ref.	A	B	C	D
Executable Object Code compiles with low-level requirements	6.4.2.1.					Software Verification Cases and Procedures					
	6.4.3.	●	●	○		Software Verification Results	11.13	1	1	2	
							11.14	2	2	2	

# Objectives for Safety Levels


- Different levels of safety require to be fulfilled
  - e.g., Level A 66, Level B 65
- Defined by 10 tables in ANNEX A
- Example: Table A-6 Objective 3.

How to store the evidence

Independence is required (full means yes)


Description	Ref	Safety Level				Output	Ref.	Control Category by SW Level			
		A	B	C	D			A	B	C	D
Executable Object Code compiles with low-level requirements	6.4.2.1. 6.4.3.	●	●	○		Software Verification Cases and Procedures Software Verification Results	11.13 11.14	1 2	1 2	2 2	

# Objectives Distribution in DO-178B



# Objectives Distribution in DO-178B

Statement Coverage is required (the only obj. difference)




Not just testing →  
assuring the correctness  
(reviews, testing and  
analysis)


# Agenda

- Introduction to DO-178B
- System Aspects
- Software Lifecycle Management
- Certification Artifacts and Techniques
- Future: DO-178C

# Typical Development road plan



# System Development Process





# System Aspects and System Safety

- System requirements „*have to be trusted*“ → start all over if changed
- Failure Condition Categories (Catastrophic, major, etc.)
- System Safety Assessment based on SAE ARP 4761
  - Fault Tree Analysis, Dependence Diagram, Markov Analysis, Failure mode and Effect analysis, Common Cause and mode Analysis, etc.
- SW requirements derived from System requirements → however, certain SW requirements can have impact on System requirements!

# SW Safety

- SW Safety level based on potential failure conditions
  - Level A → „failure in the SW would result in **catastrophic** failure condition the aircraft”
- DO-178B defines the interface with the systems
- DO-178B software classes
  - User-modifiable software
    - Entertainment software
  - Option-selectable software
    - Cartography software
  - Commercial Off-The-Shelf software
    - RTOS
  - Field-Loadable software
    - Maintenance software

# Agenda

- Introduction to DO-178B
- System Aspects
- Software Lifecycle Management
  - Planning
  - Development
- Certification Artifacts and Techniques
- Future: DO-178C

# Software Life Cycle

- **Planning should proceed all development activity**
- Four building blocks :
  - Define Requirements (R)
  - Design the program (D)
  - Code the program (C)
  - Integrate the program (I)
- Allows various development sequences

## Example processes:

R-D-C-I → Waterfall

R-C-I-C-I-C-I-R-D-C-I → Rapid prototyping

R-I → Previous designed SW

# The plans

- Five different plans
  - SW Development Plan
  - SW Verification Plan
  - SW Quality Assurance Plan
  - SW Configuration Plan
  - SW Aspects of Certification
- Verification, management, quality assurance and certification are overlaid on the defined development process

# Software Planning

## ■ Transition criteria

- „the minimum conditions, as defined by the software planning process, to be satisfied to enter a process”
- Tells when you are done and can proceed
- Good characteristics: quantifiable, documented 😊

## ■ Additional considerations

- COTS
- Previously developed components

## ■ Environments


- Methods and notations
- Language with any constraints
- Development and verification tools

# Software Planning

- SW development standards
  - SW requirements standard
    - Language to be used (e.g., plain 500 English)
  - SW design standards
    - Complexity limits, exclusion of recursion, dynamic memory allocation
  - SW Code standards
    - Syntax, semantics and constraints

# SW Development

- **High-Level** requirements
  - Based on system analysis and safety assessment
  - Black-box view of the software component
  - System level considerations
  - Functional requirements by mode of operation
  - Performance criteria
  - Timing requirements
  - Memory size constraints
  - HW and SW interfaces






# SW Development

## ■ Low-Level requirements and Software Architecture

- SW requirements
- Derived from High-Level requirements
- Design constraints
  - Task allocation
  - Algorithms
  - Data Structures
- Input/output definitions
- Data and Control flows
- Resource management and scheduling (e.g., partition scheduling in ARINC 653)
- Design Methods




# SW Development

## ■ Source Code

- Usually collection of „high-level” language and assembly
- Includes linker files, compile commands etc.

## ■ Executable

- Completely target computer specific
  - „machine readable”
- Final output is the integrated system on the target platform



# Agenda

- Introduction to DO-178B
- System Aspects
- Software Lifecycle Management
- Certification Artifacts and Techniques
  - Verification
  - Configuration Management
  - Quality Assurance
  - Certification/Approval Liaison
- Future: DO-178C

# Integral Process - Verification

- Two purposes
  - Demonstrate intended function
  - Demonstrate (to the extent possible) the absence of unintended function
- Consists of
  - Reviews
  - Analysis
  - Testing
- Important: The FAA or EASA representative needs to accept all part of the verification process. (e.g., test cases)

# Integral Process - Verification

## ■ Reviews

- Qualitative assessment of the process or product
- Typical implementation: checklist
- Applied on all SW Development process step (HLR, LLR, SA, SC, Test cases, etc.)

## ■ Analysis

- Provide repeatable evidence of correctness
- Typical implementation: timing, stack analysis, data flow and call-tree

# Traceability DO-178B

- Through the complete product life-cycle (30+ years)
- From requirements to byte code (Level A)
- Essential for maintainability
- Back-annotation of errors
- Typical implementation:
  - Excel ☹️
  - Rational RequisitePro
  - *Rational Doors*
- Code generators usually gives extensive support
- Hard in case of multiple development tools

Traceability

REQ\_HLR\_SAFE\_4\_3\_2\_12:


The take-off angle cannot be more than 55°

REQ\_LLRL\_TOM\_3\_67: in the eps\_line method the calculated s1 variable represents the angle of attack

```
int eps_line(double sx, double sy, double vx, double vy, int s1, int s2)
{
    int s1 = sign(sx*vx + sy*vy, -0x1.90641p-4);
}
```

```
IDX[3]  VAR POS [ADDR: 0x12Fde0]
IDX[2]  CALL [Arg:2][ADDR: 0x42e40a]
IDX[2]  CALL [Arg:1][ADDR: 0x42e1e9]
```

# Integral Process – Verification Software Testing



# Integral Process – Verification Software Testing

- Categories of Tests
  - Normal range
  - Robustness (abnormal range)
- Typical approaches
  - Equivalence Classes and Boundary Values
  - Multiple Iteration testing for time related functions
  - Testing State Transitions
  - Initialization with abnormal conditions
  - Failure modes of input data
  - Boundary values in loops, protection mechanisms




# Integral Process – Verification Software Testing

- Structural Coverage
  - Determine what software structure were not exercised
- Levels:
  - Decision Coverage
  - Statement Coverage
  - Modified Decision Condition Coverage (MCDC)
    - Each decision tries every possible outcome
    - Each condition in a decision takes on every possible outcome
    - Each entry and exit point is invoked
    - Each condition in a decision is shown **to independently affect** the outcome of the decision
- Gaps
  - Compiler induced code (e.g., array bound checks)
  - Deactivated code
  - Dead code
- Performed on source code,
  - except Level A
    - Correspondence must be shown
    - Compiler optimization can introduce new code
- In addition, coverage of data and control coupling is required

# Integral Process – Verification Software Testing

```
IF(C AND( A OR B))
THEN Foo();
```



statement

## Statement Coverage (SC) Level C


- Each statement is executed at least once

#	A	B	C	Foo Executed
1	0	0	0	NO
2	0	0	1	NO
3	0	1	0	NO
4	0	1	1	YES
5	1	0	0	NO
6	1	0	1	YES
7	1	1	0	NO
8	1	1	1	YES

Coverage Type	Minimum # of Test Cases	Possible Combinations
Statement	1	4 or 6 or 8

# Integral Process – Verification Software Testing

```
IF(C AND( A OR B))
THEN Foo();
```



## Decision Condition Coverage (DC) Level B


- Each decision tries every possible outcome
- Each entry and exit point is invoke

#	A	B	C	Foo Executed
1	0	0	0	NO
2	0	0	1	NO
3	0	1	0	NO
4	0	1	1	YES
5	1	0	0	NO
6	1	0	1	YES
7	1	1	0	NO
8	1	1	1	YES

Coverage Type	Minimum # of Test Cases	Possible Combinations
Statement	1	4 or 6 or 8
Decision	2	4 or 6 or 8 + Any NO

# Integral Process – Verification Software Testing

```
IF(C AND( A OR B))
THEN Foo();
```



## Modified Decision Condition Coverage (MCDC) Level A

- Each decision tries every possible outcome
- Each condition in a decision takes on every possible outcome
- Each entry and exit point is invoked
- Each condition in a decision is shown to independently affect the outcome of the decision

#	A	B	C	Foo Executed
1	0	0	0	NO
2	0	0	1	NO
3	0	1	0	NO
4	0	1	1	YES
5	1	0	0	NO
6	1	0	1	YES
7	1	1	0	NO
8	1	1	1	YES

Coverage Type	Minimum # of Test Cases	Possible Combinations
Statement	1	4 or 6 or 8
Decision	2	4 or 6 or 8 + Any NO
MCDC	4	2,3,4, and 6 OR 2,4,5 and 6


# Integral Process – Certification/Approval Liaison

- Communication between application developer and certification authority
- Proposes compliance and obtain agreement on the plan
- Software Accomplishment Summary
  - Covers all areas
  - Legal issues also (if something goes wrong the developer is responsible!)

# SW Development Tools(DO-178B)

## ■ Software Development Tools


- **Can introduce errors** into the final system
- Same objectives as the development process → verified on the same level as the developed application!
- E.g., Scade Suite, Matlab Stateflow, Wind River Diab compiler



# V&V tools (DO-178B)

## ■ Software Verification Tools

- **Can only fail to detect errors**
- Tool operation req. Must be satisfied under normal operating conditions
- e.g., static source code analyzer ASTRÉE, CAVEAT



# Agenda

- Introduction to DO-178B
- System Aspects
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- Certification Artifacts and Techniques
- Future: DO-178C



# DO-178C

- **DO-178C - Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification**
- Awaited in 2011
- New certification for avionics software development
- Incorporates "novel" development and verification techniques
- Core is almost the same as DO-178B but
- Dedicated subgroups
  - SG3: Tool Qualification
  - SG4: Model Based Design and Verification
  - SG5: Object-Oriented Technology
  - SG6: Formal Methods

- **Object Oriented Technology**
  - C++ and Ada
  - Safety Critical Java
  - Restricted use (deterministic behavior)
- **Tool Qualification**
  - Special rules for tools
  - More than two categories
- **Model Based Design and Verification**
  - Use of models for source code synthesis and verification
  - Early model based validation
  - Matlab Simulink (already used), AADL
  - Largest and most cumbersome subgroup 😊

## ■ Formal methods

- Already used in many projects
- Mature technologies available
- Defines how certification credits can be earned by its use
- Can be part of the Development process
  
- Typical tools
  - Model checker
  - Static code analyzers
  - Theorem provers (only in limited scenarios)