

Cabinet of Russia MADMUN XV

Background Guide



Chairs

Andrew Klinke and Nathaniel Israel

Letter from the Chairs

Hey Delegates,

We are thrilled to have you as part of our Cabinet for MADMUN XV. Your participation is integral to the success of Model United Nations (MUN), and we can't wait to host everyone. MUN is always what you make of it, and we, as co-chairs, are here to support you in making it an excellent and fun time.

I (Andrew Klinke) and my co-chair (Nathaniel Israel) have been brought in to chair this advanced committee. We both graduated from Monona Grove High School in 2019 and recently graduated from college with undergraduate degrees. We possess over eight years of MUN experience and hope to bring that knowledge to create a well-run and fun environment for this advanced committee.

One of my undergraduate majors was international relations, and part of the reason I chose to pursue that degree was MUN. One of my goals for this committee is to pass on my love for international relations to all of you, and I look forward to sharing a passion for all things MUN with everyone in the Cabinet.

The Cabinet of the Russian Federation is an advanced committee designed to further improve your skills as a change maker and broaden your horizons on higher level topics. This committee will be an excellent opportunity to demonstrate and improve your skills in areas such as public speaking, negotiation, and most importantly, research. We're excited about the learning journey ahead!

As an advanced committee, we expect a few degrees more professionalism and quality in both delegates' writing and speeches. If you are on this advanced committee, you are also expected to come in well-researched. As someone who has studied this material for a while, I will know when you are making things up. I believe it is disrespectful to other delegates when they put hours of work into preparing for a committee when others do not, so please, everyone, bring your top game so we can have a good time.

Please feel free to get in contact with any question or concerns with the background guide we can only cover so much here so further clarification is understandable. We can't wait to see you all on the committee. I hope this will be a memorable experience for everyone.

Sincerely,

Andrew Klinke and Nathaniel Israel

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Topic #1 - Voter Fraud in Russia

Background

Russia has a long and complex history with its electoral process, and allegations of voter fraud have been a recurring issue, particularly since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The post-Soviet era ushered in a new political structure, but concerns over the fairness and transparency of elections have persisted.

Voter fraud in Russia typically involves a variety of methods, including ballot stuffing, falsification of results, and manipulation of voter lists. These practices are often alleged to occur at various levels of government, from local elections to national presidential contests. The international community has frequently criticized Russia's elections, citing a lack of genuine political competition and widespread electoral manipulation.

One of the most infamous instances of alleged voter fraud occurred during the 2011 parliamentary elections, which sparked mass protests across the country. Observers reported numerous irregularities, such as the use of "carousel voting," where groups of voters were bused from one polling station to another to cast multiple ballots. The outcry from these elections led to a brief period of political reform, but many argue that the fundamental issues with the electoral process remain unresolved.

Current Situation

As of the latest elections, voter fraud in Russia remains a significant concern. The 2021 State Duma elections were marred by numerous reports of irregularities, despite the government's claims of transparency and fairness. The use of electronic voting systems has added a new dimension to the issue, with critics arguing that these systems are even more susceptible to manipulation.

International observers, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), have repeatedly highlighted issues such as media bias, the exclusion of opposition candidates, and the lack of an independent judiciary to oversee election disputes. The Russian government, however, has consistently denied these allegations, asserting that its elections are conducted in accordance with the law.

The potential for voter fraud is exacerbated by the centralized nature of power in Russia, where the executive branch holds significant influence over the electoral process. This centralization has led to concerns that electoral outcomes are often predetermined, with little opportunity for meaningful opposition or public participation.

Conclusion

The issue of voter fraud in Russia raises important questions about the legitimacy of its political system and the future of democracy in the country. While the Russian government continues to assert the integrity of its elections, the persistent allegations of fraud suggest that significant reforms are needed to restore public trust in the electoral process.

The challenge for Russia lies in addressing these concerns while maintaining stability in a political environment that is often characterized by tension and uncertainty. As the international community continues to scrutinize Russia's elections, the debate over voter fraud and electoral integrity is likely to remain a key issue in Russian politics.

Questions to Consider

- **How does your country view the legitimacy of Russia's electoral process?**
- **What measures could be taken to reduce the incidence of voter fraud in Russia?**
- **How does the centralization of power in Russia affect the likelihood of voter fraud?**
- **What role should the international community play in ensuring free and fair elections in Russia?**
- **How can the Russian government balance the need for electoral reform with the desire to maintain political stability?**

This guide is designed to provide a comprehensive overview of the issue, offering insights into the background, current situation, and key questions surrounding voter fraud in Russia.

Topic #2 - The Russo-Ukrainian War

Background

The Current phase of the Russo-Ukrainian war began on February 24, 2022, when the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine. The quote “Special Military operation” ordered by current Russian president Vladimir Putin has lasted for the last two years with no clear end in sight. However, the origins of this war stem further back and require a deeper explanation. It is also important to get an explanation of how the war has evolved since. These topics and more will be explained below in this section.

While the current phase of the war started in 2022, the origins and beginning of this conflict can be traced back to the pivotal year of 2014. It was then that the Ukrainian president at the time, Viktor Yanukovich, made an unexpected decision. He elected to not sign the European-Ukraine Association Agreement, a move that led to the Maidan Uprising, also known as Euromaidan. This uprising led to a change in government in Ukraine, as the Pro-Russian Yanukovich was removed from office and replaced with a Pro-EU interim government until formal elections could be held.

Due to this ousting of the pro-Russian government of Ukraine, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, Elected to launch a snap operation to seize the significant Crimean Peninsula. Using pre-existing Russian military units within Crimea, the army quickly captured the most strategic infrastructure with minimal loss of life. After the capture of Crimea, an election was held within

the region to establish it as a part of the Russian Federation. The election has not been widely recognized outside of Russia.

UKRAINE-RUSSIA CRISIS

Conflict at a glance

After months of tensions, on **February 24, Russian forces launched a full-scale military invasion** of Ukraine. **Kyiv has declared martial law**, saying Ukraine will defend itself.



Within a few days of the annexation of Crimea, Unmarked Russian Forces would appear alongside pro-Russian separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine. This would start a low-intensity conflict between the two states for the next eight years. The purpose of this stage of the conflict was to make it difficult for Ukraine to Join NATO or the EU as a country

cannot join its organization if they have an ongoing territorial dispute, leaving them in a state of limbo.

The Conflict in Ukraine would be seriously escalated on February 24th, 2022, when Russian forces crossed the border into Ukraine along with a large-scale air bombardment by Aircraft and Cruise Missiles. That same day, President of Russia Vladimir Putin announced a “Special Military Operation” and stated the purpose of his campaign was to prevent NATO expansion and to purge Ukraine of “Russian Forces.”

While Putin in his speech would initially promise for the conflict to be over in three days, a narrative that many western observers at that time also echoed. However within a couple of weeks of the invasion beginning it would become clear that the initial three day objective was not going to be achieved. Since then a variety of factors can be attributed to this failure by Russia forces but three are most attributable to their failure.

One

Russian Forces underestimated the will to fight the Ukrainian people. Before the war, Russian intelligence believed they would find support or at least apathy for the Russian Army among the Ukrainian public and their armed forces once they entered the country. However, this would quite quickly be proven not to be the case, as many Ukrainian civilians would take up armed resistance against Russia while the Ukrainian army had much higher morale than expected. The nation's morale was further bolstered by a speech given by Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy on February 25th, stating that he would remain in Ukraine to help in the fight against

the advancing Russian forces towards Kyiv. Due to Russian overconfidence in attacking Ukraine in part two and their false belief of low morale among Ukrainian forces, Russian forces quickly became severely overextended in Ukraine.


Two

Russian overextension allowed Ukrainian Forces to take advantage of a variety of Western weapons that severely limited the Russian advance. Some of the most prevalent and effective weapons in the early stages of the war were Western-supplied light anti-tank weapons such as the Swedish NLAW or American Javelin Missile delivery systems. These anti-tank weapons had a predictably adverse effect on the overextended Russian tank columns. These systems and others, such as the Turkish TB2 Bayraktar, were a pre-existing stock of weapons purchased before the war; therefore, they were the only Western and NATO standard weapons available at the start of the war. Once Ukraine proved it could hold back the Russian advances, western nations began sending them a stream of modern weapons systems. Modern weapons such as the PATRIOT Surface-to-Air Missiles and HIMARS have proved to be invaluable within Ukraine, allowing their force to match or even, in some cases, exceed the Russian system from a technology standpoint. However, the continued flow of these weapons systems is absolutely vital if Ukraine wants to maintain or break the current stalemate, and it is also critical for Russia to cut off if they want to break it.

Three

Related to the second reason, the reason why Russia failed in its initial advance was its failure to gain air supremacy over Ukraine. In modern warfare, air supremacy is one of the most important advantages to gain over an opponent. Air superiority has been a key factor for success in

NATO-led interventions such as the Gulf War. However, at the beginning of the 2022 invasion, Russia seemingly failed to gain that advantage either due to bad intelligence, overconfidence, or an incorrect assumption made on target priority. Many of Ukraine's air defenses remained online. Both Ukraine's Air Force and Surface to Air missile systems remained largely intact, allowing the following days to reorganize and harden these defenses, Squandering away their best opportunity. Since then, Russia has been unable to gain air superiority over Ukrainian air space, a job that will become more difficult as Ukraine will soon be receiving F-16s from NATO.



Current Situation

The Modern situation in Ukraine as of 2024 has seen much slower movement, more akin to a stalemate along the frontlines; however, Russian forces have been making steady yet extremely slow and costly gains across the frontlines. Three main aspects of the Modern war in Ukraine

should be considered: the widening of the technology gap in Russian equipment, exit strategies for Russia, and the Ukrainian Kursk offensive. These three main aspects of the current war in Ukraine that delegates should note when formulating their policy

Widening Technology Gap in Russian Equipment

Out of all the Branches of the Russian military, none have suffered greater casualties and equipment losses than the Russian Ground Forces. Being a land war in Russia near abroad, higher attrition for the ground forces makes sense. However, it has led to a difficult quandary for the Russian Ground Forces in how to replace these losses. Russia has two methods to replace these equipment losses.

The first, more convenient way to do this is by drawing from its large stockpile of old Cold War stockpiles of weapons left over from the Soviet Union. While it is cheaper and easier to pull from these stockpiles as the weapons are prebuilt and only require refurbishment, many of these weapons systems are considered outdated, if not entirely obsolete. The problem that these weapons systems are considered obsolete is only made worse as Ukraine has obtained a large number of Western systems specifically built to counter the Soviet-built ones now operated by Russia. Units of the Russian Ground Forces operating these old stockpiled weapons suffer from reduced combat capabilities and more significant maintenance costs, making them less effective. While it may seem that Russia has some stockpiles that are infinite, this is not the case, and they are predicted to start running low soon on old equipment. While reactivating old equipment is convenient, it is not a long-term solution.

Russia's second method for equipment replacement involves the production of brand new equipment through its large military industrial complex. This approach offers a significant advantage-it allows for the deployment of more modern equipment to the frontlines, which is generally superior to the equipment it replaces. However, this advantage is counterbalanced by the fact that it takes considerably longer to manufacture this equipment, and the Russian industrial complex is significantly smaller than its former Soviet counterpart.


Exit Strategies for Russia

Since the start of the modern phase of the War in Ukraine, there has been ongoing speculation about a Russian exit strategy and the strategic objectives it might achieve. The complexity of devising such a strategy lies in the need for acceptance from Ukraine/West, the Russian people, and the Kremlin, each with distinct desires for the war's outcome. Russia has tabled numerous offers to end the conflict, but many have been rejected due to their perceived unacceptable terms, such as territorial concessions and a commitment to not join NATO.

However, the Russians can just pull out their troops; however, the Russian people will want something out of the war that their soldiers have died in. Pulling out will also make the Russian government look weak in the eyes of the oligarchy. Therefore, the only solution may be to keep pressing on for victory; however, this comes at the cost of further economic stagnation and more Russian families losing their Sons in Ukraine, making them more hostile to the Kremlin. Russia can't stay in this war forever, but Ukraine can't either, so the question must be asked: who will break first?

Ukrainian Kursk offensive

In August of 2024, Ukraine shocked many international observers and Russia by launching a surprise offensive into the Russian Federation itself, taking territory once thought safe from Ukraine. Since then, Ukraine has seized a number of significant towns from Russia near the border in the Kursk Oblast. The purpose of this offensive was to secure Ukraine's northern border with Russia, preventing them from doing the same to Ukraine as they did in 2022 during the initial invasion. The other purpose of those incursions is to force Russia to move units out of regions in Donetsk and Luhansk, easing the pressure on Ukrainian forces in those regions. This gives Russia an interesting choice in which it should either divert force to protect its homeland or secure victory in eastern Ukraine.



Conclusion

The Russo-Ukrainian War has evolved into a complex and protracted conflict with deep historical roots and significant global implications. This initial stage set the stage for a low-intensity conflict in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which ultimately escalated into a full-scale invasion in 2022.

As the war drags on into 2024, it has settled into a grinding stalemate with sporadic gains and losses on both sides. Russia faces significant challenges, including a widening technological gap in its military equipment and the difficulty of replacing losses with either outdated Soviet-era stockpiles or slow-to-produce modern weapons. At the same time, Russia grapples with the dilemma of finding a viable exit strategy that satisfies its domestic and geopolitical goals, without appearing weak to its citizens or the international community.

Ukraine's recent offensive in the Kursk region highlights the ongoing volatility of the conflict and the strategic complexities both nations face. As the war continues, the question remains: which side will falter first under the immense pressure of sustained military and economic strain? The decisions delegates make on the outcome of this war will have profound implications not only for Ukraine and Russia but for the broader international order.

Questions to Consider

- **How does your person view the war from their position in the Russian government? **
- **What measures could be taken to gain Russian Strategic or Tactical supremacy in Ukraine? **
- **What should be done about the Russian Equipment problem? **
- **What can be achieved to move towards a possible exit from Ukraine? **

- **Should an exit from Ukraine be pursued?**
- **How Should the Kursk Offensive be handled?**

This guide is designed to provide a comprehensive overview of the issue, offering insights into the background, current situation, and key questions surrounding the Russo-Ukraine war.

Cabinet Members Overview

Preface

The following is a list of positions that will be in the Russian Cabinet for MADMUN XV. This part of the background guide is more intended to give cabinet members an idea of what other positions will be in the room where it happens. The overview is not intended to be basics for your research however can give an idea of how us as chairs view your role.

You may notice that some positions listed here are not part of the official Russian cabinet. We have included these positions from other sources, such as the Russian Security Council, to provide a more comprehensive and diverse range of opportunities for participation.

Unofficial Cabinet of the Russian Federation

Prime Minister of Russia Mikhail Mishustin - A more administrative role the prime minister serves as the chair of the Russian Cabinet when the president is not present. The name prime minister is an informal designation, the actual name being Chairman of the government of the Russian Federation. Serves as an organizer for the activities of the other minister and serves and informs the president of the internal affairs of the Russian government.

Secretary of the Security Council Sergei Shoigu - Acts as the head of the Russian Security Council, which aids the Russian President in making decisions relating to national security. The head of the Russian Security Council is in charge of organizing the information that is communicated and highlighted as important for the Russian President. It is important to note that

Sergei Shoigu previously was the minister of defense until May 2024. The move to Secretary of the Security Council was seen as a change of strategy for Russian operations in Ukraine.

Minister of Defence Andrey Belousov - Appointed in May 2024 to replace Sergei Shoigu in the role, Andrey Belousov is notable as he is the first non-uniformed head of the Russian military and has never served in the military. The minister of defense is in charge of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, including the Ground Forces, Navy, Aerospace Forces, Strategic Missile Forces, Airborne Forces (yes, there is a difference), and Special Operations Command.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov - Sergey Lavrov is an experienced diplomat and one of the longest-serving foreign affairs ministers in Russian history. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs oversees Russia's foreign policy, diplomatic missions abroad, and presence in the United Nations.

Minister of Internal Affairs Vladimir Kolokoltsev - Vladimir Kolokoltsev, Former Head of the Moscow City Police, has served in his current role since 2012. Also known as the MVD, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is in charge of internal domestic security within the state. Some of its responsibilities include leading the State Police of Russia, counterterrorism, and migration controls.

Director of the Federal Security Service Alexander Bortnikov - An extremely close associate of President of Russia Vladimir Putin, Alexander Bortnikov, was known to be a major advocate for the war in Ukraine before it started and is still also a General within the Russian Ground

forces. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) handles border security, internal surveillance, and counterintelligence. The FSB also has direct control over the Russian border patrol force, a more heavily militarized force than its US equivalent.

Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service Sergei Naryshki Former Former Chairman of the State Duma (similar to a speaker of the house) Sergei Naryshkin was promoted to the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service in 2016. The Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) is tasked with espionage activities outside the country. The SVR are considered a spiritual successor of the infamous KGB and conduct activities abroad such as intelligence gathering, assassination plots, and spreading misinformation.

Minister of Justice Konstantin Chuychenko - A major member of the Russian oligarchy, Konstantin Chuychenko served on the board of Gazprom Media until 2005 and has now been the minister of justice since 2020. The Ministry of Justice is the chief authority for prosecuting crimes in Russia and runs organizations such as the Russian Federal Prison system.

Minister of Finance Anton Siluanov - A career economist, Anton Siluanov, has been part of the Russian finance ministry since the Soviet era in late 1987, being appointed to the top spot in 2011. The Ministry of Finance handles duties such as balancing the government budget, tax collection, and customs services.

Minister of Industry and Trade Anton Alikhanov - Formally the governor of the Kaliningrad Oblast, notably an exclave seized from the Germans at the end of WW2, he assumed the office of

Minister of Industry and Trade in May 2024. A more recently formed ministry, only formed in 2008, the Ministry of Industry and Trade is responsible for Russian strategic sectors and regulates prices in such areas.

Minister of Emergency Situations Aleksandr Kurenkov - A prominent Putin loyalist, Alexandr Kurenkov was formally the deputy of the National Guard Forces Command before being promoted to his current position in 2022. The Ministry of Emergency Situations handles major domestic crises, such as natural disasters or clean-up after large-scale attacks. The Ministry of Emergency Situations commands a wide variety of departments, such as national fire services, civil defense services, and disaster response services.

Minister of Transport Roman Starovoyt - Former Governor of the Kursk Oblast Roman Starovoyt was appointed Minister of Transport in May of 2024. The Ministry of Transport in Russia focuses on the maintenance and construction of roads, Rails, Airports, and Canals within the state. Unlike its Western counterparts, a large portion of the ministry's focus is on rail-based infrastructure rather than roads.

Head of the National Guard Troops of Russia Viktor Zolotov - A member of the Russian Security Council, Viktor Zolotov has served in various security roles over the years and assumed his current position in 2016 when various internal security forces were merged. National Guard Troops of Russia, better known as Rosgvardiya, is a notably separate organization from the regular armed forces of Russia; however, they remain closely aligned in duties. The organization handles armed defense for strictly Russian soil and is doctrinally defensive in nature.

Minister of Science and Higher Education Valery Falkov - Formally, a faculty member at the University of Tyumen, made head of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education in 2020. The Ministry of Science and Higher Education was split from the Ministry of Education to focus solely on Russia's university-level educational system.

Minister of Culture Olga Lyubimova - Deputy Minister of Culture Olga Lyubimova's background is in television, and she was appointed to her current role in 2020. The Ministry of Culture carries out and creates regulations for culture, art, cinematography, and copyright law. The Ministry has also played a major role in developing pro-Russian propaganda for the war in Ukraine.

Chief of Staff of the Russian Military Valery Gerasimov - Serving in both the Soviet and Russian Militaries as a field commander until the early 2000s, Valery Gerasimov made the transition to senior military leadership, where he served as the commander for a variety of military districts as chief of staff of the Russian Military in 2012, he was involved on a far more tactical level in the conflict in Ukraine than his peers.

Minister of Energy Sergey Tsivilyov - Originally a businessman, Sergey Tsivilyov would become a governor of Kemerovo Oblast in 2018. In 2024, he will be appointed as the Minister of Energy of Russia, responsible for energy policy inside Russia.

Head of the Republic of Crimea Sergey Aksyonov - A vocal leader for the annexation of Crimea even before 2014 during the occupation, Sergey Aksyonov was put in charge of Crimea

in 2014 during the occupation. Since then, he has led the federal subject of Crimea under the Russian government, winning reelection in 2019. The primary role of the Head of the Republic of Crimea is to be the link between the government in Moscow and the people of Crimea.

Mayor of Moscow Sergey Sobyenin - Very soon after the fall of the Soviet Union, Sergey Sobyenin got his start in politics, moving up through regional levels and being part of Putin's United Russia party until 2004, when he became a member of the leadership council for the party. In 2010, he would then, with Putin's blessing, become mayor of Moscow, where he has been active in both local and federal politics ever since. He has been a vocal supporter of the war in Ukraine and has launched programs to entice young Russian men from Moscow to join the military.

Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov - Originally serving in the diplomatic core of the Russian Federation abroad, Dmitry Peskov returned to the Kremlin in 2008, remaining at Putin's side ever since. Being the Kremlin's mouthpiece for the war in Ukraine, he generally maintained the party line when it came to statements on the war.

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