1 2 3 4 5	LAW OFFICES OF OTTO L. HASELHOFF, P.C. Otto L. Haselhoff, Esq. (SBN 190146) 201 Wilshire Boulevard, Second Floor Santa Monica, California 90401 Telephone: (800) 667-1880 Facsimile: (800) 667-0991 Email: <u>otto@olhpc.com</u> GUY LEVY LAW	ELECTRONICALLY FILED Superior Court of California, County of San Diego 08/17/2022 at 03:33:36 PM Clerk of the Superior Court By Brandon Krause,Deputy Clerk
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10 11	NICHOLAS BRADFORD SORENSEN and WILLIAM "LIAM" SORENSEN	
12	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE S	STATE OF CALIFORNIA
13	COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO	(NORTH COUNTY)
14	JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN, an individual;	Case No. 37-2022-00034611-CU-PO-CTL
15	NICHOLAS BRADFORD SORENSEN, an ) individual; WILLIAM "LIAM" SORENSEN, a ) minor by and through his father and guardian ad )	PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AND PROPERTY
16	litem NICHOLAS BRADFORD SORENSEN;	DAMAGE; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
17 18	Plaintiff(s), ) vs.	1. General Negligence/Common Carrier/Premises Liability;
18	) SYMPHONY ASSET POOL, a business entity form ) unknown; SYMPHONY ASSET POOL XIV, LLC, a)	2. Governmental Tort Liability [Gov. Code §§ 815, 815.2(a), 815.4, 815.6, 820(a), 830, 830.8,
20	limited liability company; PACIFICA ) ENTERPRISES, LLC, a limited liability company; )	835, 835.2(a), 835.2(b), 840.2, and 910, et seq.];
21	PACIFICA ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) a limited liability company; BELMONT PARK )	<ol> <li>Products Liability-Negligence;</li> <li>Products Liability-Failure to Warn;</li> </ol>
22	ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, a limited liability ) company; BELMONT PARK, a business entity form ) unknown; BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES, a )	<ol> <li>Products Liability-Strict Liability;</li> <li>Products Liability-Breach of Warranties;</li> </ol>
23	business entity form unknown; WAVEHOUSE ) BELMONT PARK LLC, a limited liability company;)	<ul> <li>7. Products Liability-Misrepresentation &amp; Concealment;</li> </ul>
24	SAN DIEGO COASTER COMPANY, a business ) entity form unknown; PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC, )	<ul> <li>8. Loss of Consortium;</li> <li>9. Negligent Infliction of Emotional</li> </ul>
25	a limited liability company; KMG, a business entity ) form unknown; KMG EUROPE BV, a business entity)	Distress (Bystander);
26	form unknown; KMG RIDES, a business entity form ) unknown; AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, a )	JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
27 28	business entity form unknown; CHANCE RIDES, is $\hat{\epsilon}$ ) business entity form unknown; CITY OF SAN ) DIEGO, a governmental entity; COUNTY OF SAN ) DIEGO, a governmental entity; THE STATE OF )	[UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE]
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1 2	CALIFORNIA including but not limited to ) CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, a ) governmental entity; and DOES 1-250 INCLUSIVE; )
3	) Defendant(s).
4	)
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6	COMES NOW, plaintiffs JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN, NICHOLAS BRADFORD
7	SORENSEN and WILLIAM "LIAM" SORENSEN, a minor by and through his father and guardian ad
8	litem NICHOLAS BRADFORD SORENSEN, who, by their attorneys, the LAW OFFICES OF OTTO
9	L. HASELHOFF, P.C., and GUY LEVY LAW, complains of defendants, and each of them, and allege,
10	as follows:
11	<u>i.</u>
12	THE PARTIES
13	1. At all times hereinafter mentioned, plaintiff JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN was, and
14	still is, a resident of the State of California, County of San Diego.
15	2. At all times hereinafter mentioned, plaintiff NICHOLAS BRADFORD SORENSEN
16	was, and still is, a resident of the State of California, County of San Diego.
17	3. At all times hereinafter mentioned, plaintiff WILLIAM "LIAM" SORENSEN, a minor,
18	was, and still is, a resident of the State of California, County of San Diego.
19	4. Plaintiffs NICHOLAS BRADFORD SORENSEN and JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN
20	are the natural parents of WILLIAM "LIAM" SORENSEN, a minor born on November 15, 2013.
21	5. Plaintiff NICHOLAS BRADFORD SORENSEN has been, or will be, appointed as
22	Guardian Ad Litem of his minor son, WILLIAM "LIAM" SORENSEN, and an application for
23	appointment of Guardian Ad Litem has been filed with this Complaint.
24	6. Defendant SYMPHONY ASSET POOL is a business entity form unknown, and a
25	business concern headquartered and/or operating in, and doing substantial business in, the State of
26	California, County of San Diego.
27	7. Defendant SYMPHONY ASSET POOL XIV, LLC is a limited liability company, and a
28	business concern headquartered and/or operating in, and doing substantial business in, the State of

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California, County of San Diego.

8. Defendant PACIFICA ENTERPRISES, LLC is a limited liability company, and a business concern headquartered and/or operating in, and doing substantial business in, the State of California, County of San Diego.

9. Defendant PACIFICA ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS, LLC is a limited liability company, and a business concern headquartered and/or operating in, and doing substantial business in, the State of California, County of San Diego.

10. Defendant BELMONT PARK ENTERTAINMENT, LLC is a limited liability company, and a business concern headquartered and/or operating in, and doing substantial business in, the State of California, County of San Diego.

11. Defendant BELMONT PARK is a business entity form unknown, and a business concern headquartered and/or operating in, and doing substantial business in, the State of California, County of San Diego.

12. Defendant BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES is a business entity form unknown, and a business concern headquartered and/or operating in, and doing substantial business in, the State of California, County of San Diego.

13. Defendant WAVEHOUSE BELMONT PARK LLC is a limited liability company, and a
 business concern headquartered and/or operating in, and doing substantial business in, the State of
 California, County of San Diego.

14. Defendant SAN DIEGO COASTER COMPANY is a business entity form unknown, and a business concern headquartered and/or operating in, and doing substantial business in, the State of California, County of San Diego.

15. Defendant PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC is a limited liability company, and a business concern headquartered and/or operating in, and doing substantial business in, the State of California, County of San Diego.

6 16. Defendant KMG is a business entity form unknown, and a business concern
7 headquartered and/or operating in, and doing substantial business in, the State of California, County of
8 San Diego.

1 17. Defendant KMG EUROPE BV is a business entity form unknown, and a business
 2 concern headquartered and/or operating in, and doing substantial business in, the State of California,
 3 County of San Diego.

4 18. Defendant KMG RIDES is a business entity form unknown, and a business concern
5 headquartered and/or operating in, and doing substantial business in, the State of California, County of
6 San Diego.

7 19. Defendant AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA is a business entity form unknown, and a
8 business concern headquartered and/or operating in, and doing substantial business in, the State of
9 California, County of San Diego.

20. Defendant CHANCE RIDES is a business entity form unknown, and a business concern
headquartered and/or operating in, and doing substantial business in, the State of California, County of
San Diego.

13 21. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon alleges that at all times hereinafter
14 mentioned, defendant CITY OF SAN DIEGO, was, and still is, a governmental entity organized and
15 existing within the State of California and encompass numerous departments, that are involved in
16 various governmental functions.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon alleges that at all times hereinafter
mentioned, defendant COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, was, and still is, a governmental entity organized
and existing within the State of California and encompass numerous departments, that are involved in
various governmental functions.

21 23. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon alleges that at all times hereinafter
22 mentioned, defendant THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA including but not limited to CALIFORNIA
23 COASTAL COMMISSION, was, and still is, a governmental entity organized and existing within the
24 State of California and encompass numerous departments, that are involved in various governmental
25 functions.

26 24. The true names and/or capacities whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise,
27 of defendants DOES 1-250 INCLUSIVE are unknown to plaintiffs who therefore sue said defendants
28 by such fictitious names. Said DOE defendants may include, but do not necessarily include,

individuals, businesses, corporations, partnerships, associations, joint ventures, trusts, L.P.s, LLCs, LLPs, defendants that are governmental in nature, as well as product manufacturers, medical providers, professionals, contractors, estates, administrators of estates, trusts and/or all other types of entities and/or individuals, as discovery in this matter may reveal. Regardless, plaintiffs allege that each of the defendants designated herein as a DOE is legally responsible in some manner for the events and happenings herein referred to, and legally caused injury and damages proximately thereby to plaintiffs as herein alleged. At least one DOE defendant is an individual defendant and resident of the State of California, and County wherein this action is filed.

9 25. At all times hereinafter mentioned, plaintiffs will show, according to proof, that 10 defendants were the agents, servants, employees, associates, partners, in a conspiracy with, co-11 conspirators of, and/or joint venturers of, each other, and were as such, acting within the scope and 12 authority of said agency, employment, association, conspiracy and/or joint venture, and with the 13 permission and consent of their co-defendants and/or that all of said acts were subsequently performed 14 with the knowledge, acquiescence, ratification, and consent of the respective principals, and the 15 benefits thereof were accepted by said principals, and that defendants also conducted themselves 16 through acts and/or omissions on their part, so as to cause all others to believe the remaining defendants to be their agents. 17

18 26. At all times hereinafter mentioned, all of the acts and conduct hereinafter described of 19 each and every corporate defendant was duly authorized, ordered and/or directed by the respective 20 defendant's corporate employees, and the officers and management-level employees of said corporate 21 defendant and that said corporate defendant participated in the acts and conduct of their said 22 employees, agents and representatives and each of them, and upon completion of the aforesaid acts and 23 conduct of said corporate employees, agents and representatives, the defendant corporation, 24 individually and collectively, ratified, accepted the benefits of, condoned, lauded, acquiesced, approved 25 and consented to each and every one of the said acts and conduct of the aforesaid corporate employees, 26 managing agents, directors, executives, and representatives.

27 27. At all times hereinafter mentioned, defendants retained the ability to exercise, and in fact
28 exercised, substantial control, whether contractual, actual, implied or otherwise, over the means and

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manner in which the remaining defendants conducted their business and at all times hereinafter mentioned.

28. At all times hereinafter mentioned, plaintiffs will show, according to proof, that defendants were, and remain, the alter egos, successors, and/or successors in interest, of the remaining defendants.

29. As to "alter ego liability" defendants, it is alleged, upon information and belief, that as to 7 those defendants, that at all times there existed such a unity of interest and ownership among those defendants such that any separateness ceased to exist, that one was a mere shell or instrumentality through which the other carried out their business, and that each defendant exercised such complete control over the other, and so dominated it, to achieve individual goals and so ignored business formalities that any separateness was merely a fiction, and did not in fact exist, and should be deemed not to exist, and as such, if acts are alleged as against one defendant in this complaint, it is alleged that that defendant acted for itself, as well as on behalf of its alter egos. Among other things, those defendants did one or more of the following acts supporting its alter ego liability: (1) commingled corporate funds; (2) failed to observe corporate formalities including maintaining minutes and failure to contribute sufficient capital; (3) commingled funds or other assets; (4) used corporate funds for something other than corporate uses; (5) failed to maintain adequate corporate records; (6) deliberately confused the records of the separate entities; (7) had the same directors and officers of the two or more corporations; (8) used the same office or business location; (9) utilized the same employees and/or attorney; (10) failed to adequately capitalize the corporation; (11) used the corporation as a mere shell, instrumentality or conduit for a single venture; (12) failed to maintain an arm's length relationship among related entities; and/or (13) used a corporate entity to procure labor, services or merchandise for another entity. Moreover, injustice would result but for the finding of alter ego liability as to these defendants, and, as such, this Court should pierce the corporate veil. Further, since alter ego applies here, a corporation's shareholders are treated as "partners" and are held jointly and severally liable for its debts and plaintiff notes that ownership of even one share is sufficient to impose alter ego liability, and it is thus alleged, upon information and belief, that various defendants as alter egos, are also active shareholders in the remaining defendants, influenced and governed the remaining corporate defendants

and as such can, and should, be held liable as an alter ego of each and every remaining defendant.

2 30. As to those defendants liable under theories of "successor liability and/or successor in 3 interest liability," it is alleged that, as to those defendants, one or more of the following factors exists: 4 (1) there is a mere continuation on the part of defendants; (2) a common identity of directors, officer 5 and shareholders from predecessor corporations to successor corporations; (3) that assets were 6 purchased; (4) that the defendants are successors and successors in interest of both assets and liabilities 7 of the others; and (5) that, among other things, one or more of the following facts exist and/or are in 8 play, particularly given various documented mergers on record with the State of California Office of 9 the Secretary of State: (a) a continuation of the enterprise, i.e., that key people of the predecessor are 10 involved in the new entity, the same name, location, facilities or product is used, the assets were bought 11 by the new entity and the operations are the same; (b) the seller dissolved or ceased doing business after 12 the sale; (c) the purchaser assumed the liabilities and obligations ordinarily necessary to continue doing 13 business; and/or (d) the new entity holds itself out as an effective continuation of the seller. Moreover, 14 given that this case involves products liability, the "product line" theory is implicated and focuses on 15 the similarity of the finished manufactured product by the new company and the old entity and, thus, 16 plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that (1) most or all of the assets of various 17 defendants were acquired by other defendants which, upon information and belief, leaves nothing but a corporate shell of the predecessor company defendants; (2) that the new entity holds itself out to the public as a continuation of the predecessor by producing some of the product line under a similar name; and (3) the successor company is benefiting from the goodwill (i.e., reputation) of the predecessor and, as such, there is just cause to hold each defendant liable as a successor and/or as a successor in interest to remaining defendants regardless of the date of an entity's creation or subsequent corporate transfers.

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#### ALLEGATIONS ATTRIBUTABLE TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION

ii.

This case involves serious personal injuries to plaintiff JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN 31. with attendant claims for emotional distress and loss of consortium by her husband plaintiff NICHOLAS BRADFORD SORENSEN and a claim for emotional distress by her minor child plaintiff WILLIAM "LIAM" SORENSEN.

32. On or about November 14, 0221, between approximately 1:11 PM – 3:11PM at the Belmont Park - Beach Blaster ride, located at 3146 Mission Boulevard, San Diego, California 92109, plaintiff JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN was struck in the head by a mobile phone owed by DOES 1-20 and apparently dropped by DOES 1-20 while said defendants were on the Beach Blaster ride above referenced, in the presence of her husband plaintiff NICHOLAS BRADFORD SORENSEN and her minor child plaintiff WILLIAM "LIAM" SORENSEN.

33. Defendants SYMPHONY ASSET POOL, SYMPHONY ASSET POOL XIV, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS, LLC, BELMONT PARK ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, BELMONT PARK, BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES, WAVEHOUSE BELMONT PARK LLC, SAN DIEGO COASTER COMPANY, PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC, KMG, KMG EUROPE BV, KMG RIDES, AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, CHANCE RIDES, CITY OF SAN DIEGO, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA including but not limited to CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE, owned, operated, managed, designed, manufactured distributed, installed, inspected and/or maintained the "Beach Blaster" ride and the surrounding areas at Belmont Park.

34. The Beach Blaster ride as designed, owned, inspected, maintained, managed, and operated is dangerous, as set forth below. As a result of the dangers, a rider on the Beach Blaster apparently dropped a mobile phone which flew and struck plaintiff JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN in the head in the presence of her husband plaintiff NICHOLAS BRADFORD SORENSEN and minor child plaintiff WILLIAM "LIAM" SORENSEN who witnessed, and were aware of, the injuries to plaintiff JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN.

35. The Beach Blaster ride was defectively and dangerously designed, manufactured,
distributed, maintained, inspected, and/or installed by defendants SYMPHONY ASSET POOL,
SYMPHONY ASSET POOL XIV, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES, LLC, PACIFICA
ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS, LLC, BELMONT PARK ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, BELMONT
PARK, BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES, WAVEHOUSE BELMONT PARK LLC, SAN DIEGO
COASTER COMPANY, PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC, KMG, KMG EUROPE BV, KMG RIDES,
AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, CHANCE RIDES, CITY OF SAN DIEGO, COUNTY OF SAN

DIEGO, THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA including but not limited to CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE. Among other things, the ride takes participants up into the air and violently jerks them from side to side swinging above and beyond the limit of a bounded area where spectators such as plaintiff JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN may lawfully stand or sit. There was also insufficient supervision and an insufficient effort to make sure that no loose objects, including mobile phones, are taken on the ride and/or dropped by a participant during the violent maneuvers of the ride. The passenger compartment of the ride is not sealed or self-contained and is therefore open to the outside permitting loose objects to leave the passenger compartment, among other things. There are insufficient warnings. The spectator area is located too close to the ride. These are also other dangers as discovery may reveal. Among other things, there is no warning signage advising people inclined to use their mobile phones, hold their mobile phones, or film with their mobile phones, their experience on the ride. Given the dangerous jerking motions and violent directional transition to which participants on the ride will be subjected, there is a potential for objects to be dropped, striking spectators below. Compounding the danger is that fact that the bounded area is too small so that that people standing outside the bounded area are subject to and prone to injury if objects are dropped.

36. Despite requests via the California *Public Records Act*, defendant CITY OF SAN DIEGO refused to provide the accident report or the identity of the person whose mobile phone was dropped. However, the incident was caught on video. It is believed that the video depicts persons who are employed by various defendants and/or their agents, partners, joint venturers, contractors, and/or licensees, who are among the defendants sued herein, all of which defendants pay renumeration and revenue to the defendants in exchange for use of the land and potentially improvements above referenced, and share revenue and control, as well as decision making power.

37. In addition, defendants SYMPHONY ASSET POOL, SYMPHONY ASSET POOL XIV, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS, LLC, BELMONT PARK ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, BELMONT PARK, BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES, WAVEHOUSE BELMONT PARK LLC, SAN DIEGO COASTER COMPANY, PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC, KMG, KMG EUROPE BV, KMG RIDES, AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, CHANCE RIDES, CITY OF SAN DIEGO, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, THE STATE

OF CALIFORNIA including but not limited to CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE, are liable for breach of a heightened duty as a common carrier, for the creation of a dangerous premises, for products liability, for breach of implied covenant of fitness, for failure to warn, as well as other defects and dangers as discovery may reveal.

38. Upon information and belief, there were prior accidents placing defendants SYMPHONY ASSET POOL, SYMPHONY ASSET POOL XIV, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS, LLC, BELMONT PARK ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, BELMONT PARK, BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES, WAVEHOUSE BELMONT PARK LLC, SAN DIEGO COASTER COMPANY, PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC, KMG, KMG EUROPE BV, KMG RIDES, AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, CHANCE RIDES, CITY OF SAN DIEGO, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA including but not limited to CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE, on notice of the dangers of the ride, the need for signs and the need for an increased size bounded area. Despite this, in an effort to maximize the number of rides and the profitability of Belmont Park and the Beach Blaster ride in particular decided to place profits before safety and did not expand the bounded area, inviting the publics entry and reliance on the presumed good conduct of the defendants which was in fact misplaced based upon the aforementioned acts and omission of the defendants. Defendants thereby caused, created, allowed, and permitted a dangerous condition of property and were guilty of a failure to warn.

39. Upon information and belief defendants SYMPHONY ASSET POOL, SYMPHONY ASSET POOL XIV, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS, LLC, BELMONT PARK ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, BELMONT PARK, BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES, WAVEHOUSE BELMONT PARK LLC, SAN DIEGO COASTER COMPANY, PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC, KMG, KMG EUROPE BV, KMG RIDES, AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, CHANCE RIDES, CITY OF SAN DIEGO, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA including but not limited to CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE, were on notice of the problem for a very long time prior to the accident due to the fact that there were prior accidents that defendants' employees regularly observed and discovered.

40. In contrast, at said time and place, plaintiff JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN was acting with due caution, attention and care and did not in any way contribute to or cause the accident and/or injuries as described hereinafter.

41. Plaintiffs bring personal injury claims, emotional distress claims, loss of consortium claims, property damage, medical bills, loss of personal effects, loss of earning, and pain and suffering. Damages claimed are both compensatory and punitive in nature and include both economic and non-economic damages and more.

#### A. Premises Liability/Common Carrier Liability/General Negligence

42. Defendants SYMPHONY ASSET POOL, SYMPHONY ASSET POOL XIV, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS, LLC, BELMONT PARK ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, BELMONT PARK, BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES, WAVEHOUSE BELMONT PARK LLC, SAN DIEGO COASTER COMPANY, PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC, KMG, KMG EUROPE BV, KMG RIDES, AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, CHANCE RIDES, and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE, were acting as "common carriers" for hire, and as such, there was a heightened duty of care to the public.

43. Among other things, (a) these defendants maintain a regular place of business for the purpose of transporting passengers; (b) these defendants advertise their services to the general public; and (c) these defendants charge standard fees for their services. These defendants have a regular schedule of departures, a fixed route, and transportation licenses. These defendants, therefore, are common carriers, and must carry passengers and property safely. As common carriers, these defendants must use the highest care and vigilance of a very cautious person. These defendants must do all that human care, vigilance, and foresight can reasonably do under the circumstances to avoid harm to passengers and/or property. These defendants must use reasonable skill to provide everything necessary to provide safe transportation in view of the transportation modalities used and the practical operation of the business.

44. The aforementioned ride and surrounding property involved in the accident was also owned, leased, operated, repaired, inspected, driven, registered, controlled, maintained, and/or managed by defendants SYMPHONY ASSET POOL, SYMPHONY ASSET POOL XIV, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS, LLC, BELMONT PARK ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, BELMONT PARK, BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES, WAVEHOUSE BELMONT PARK LLC, SAN DIEGO COASTER COMPANY, PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC, KMG, KMG EUROPE BV, KMG RIDES, AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, CHANCE RIDES, and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE, who each negligently, carelessly and recklessly owned, operated, and permitted the use of the ride and property owned by them and/or under their control to the respective operators of the ride, and that the operators of the ride violated various rules and were otherwise careless negligent and reckless in the instance so as to proximately cause, in some manner, and become a substantial factor in the aforementioned accident and/or a cause of some injury and damage to the plaintiff.

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11 45. In addition, it is alleged that each and every such defendant which will be found to have 12 been an owner, registrant, lessor, lessee, of the aforementioned ride also negligently entrusted said ride 13 to the respective operator(s) thereof, and that said defendants was/were otherwise careless and 14 negligent in the instance, and that the defendants sued in this cause of action expressly and/or impliedly 15 permitted the operator defendant(s) to use/operate their ride at all times alleged herein, most 16 particularly at the time of the accident alleged in this complaint. These defendants SYMPHONY ASSET POOL, SYMPHONY ASSET POOL XIV, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES, LLC, 17 18 PACIFICA ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS, LLC, BELMONT PARK ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, 19 BELMONT PARK, BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES, WAVEHOUSE BELMONT PARK LLC, SAN DIEGO COASTER COMPANY, PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC, KMG, KMG EUROPE BV, 20 KMG RIDES, AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, CHANCE RIDES, and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE, 21 22 were also government contractors operating the ride and park pursuant to government contract and 23 sharing revenue, profits, losses, and more with the governmental entities that these defendants were in a 24 contract, partnership and joint venture with each other and the governmental entity defendants, infra.

46. Upon information and belief defendants SYMPHONY ASSET POOL, SYMPHONY
ASSET POOL XIV, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES
INVESTMENTS, LLC, BELMONT PARK ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, BELMONT PARK,
BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES, WAVEHOUSE BELMONT PARK LLC, SAN DIEGO

COASTER COMPANY, PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC, KMG, KMG EUROPE BV, KMG RIDES, 1 AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, CHANCE RIDES, and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE, were in 2 3 violation of one or more of the following code sections: Civil Code §§ 2100 and 2101; CA Labor Code §§ 7903, 7905, 7906, 7908, 7909, 7911, 7912, 7914, 7916, 7919, 7921, 7923, 7924, 7925, 7926, 7927, 4 7928, 7930 and 7931; Division 1 - Department of Industrial Relations, Chapter 3.2 Cal/OSHA, 5 6 Subchapter 2 OSHA requirement of Department of OSHA §§344.5, 344.6, 344.7, 344.8, 344.9, 344.11, 7 344.12, 344.13, 344.14, 344.15 and 344.16; Division 1 - Department of Industrial Relations, Chapter 4, Division of Industrial Safety, Subchapter 6.2, Permanent Amusement Ride Safety Orders; 3195.1, 3195.2, 3195.3, 3195.4, 3195.5, 3195.6, 3195.7, 3195.8 and 3195.9; Consumer Product Safety Act; and the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, among others.

47. In addition, defendants DOES 1-20 INCLUSIVE negligently took a mobile phone on the ride and dropped the mobile phone and was otherwise careless, reckless and negligent in the instance.

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#### **B**. Government Tort Liability

48. The incident occurred at Belmont Park in the County of San Diego, State of California. That area was in a dangerous condition due to a variety of factors. That area is owned, operated, inspected, designed, maintained, and/or controlled, by defendants CITY OF SAN DIEGO, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, and THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA including but not limited to CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE. The entities involved in the ownership, management, design, operation, and inspection of the park and ride, include defendants CITY OF SAN DIEGO, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, and THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA including but not limited to CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE.

49. Defendants CITY OF SAN DIEGO, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, and THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA including but not limited to CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE, caused, created, permitted, allowed and contributed to a dangerous condition. These conditions were thus a dangerous condition of public property and created a nuisance and safety issue for members of the public using the ride with due care. The conditions were also factors in causing the accident. The governmental entity defendants had both actual and constructive notice of the dangerous conditions aforementioned a sufficient period of time prior to the incident such that these defendants in the exercise of ordinary care could have, and should have, and abated the nuisance but that these defendants failed to do so.

50. Defendants CITY OF SAN DIEGO, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, and THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA including but not limited to CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE, are liable under the *Government Code* for numerous reasons, including for causing and allowing <u>dangerous condition of public property</u> to exist, and thereby creating governmental liability under *Gov. Code* §§ 835, 835.2(a), 835.2(b), and 830.

51. These defendants are also liable for <u>negligent governmental employees</u> who, among other things, dangerously maintained, design and created dangerous conditions set forth above, study the problem, or implement required and reasonable remedial measures under *Gov. Code* § 815.2.

52. These defendants are also liable for the <u>negligence of government contractors</u> including all the person and entities involved in construction activities who, among other things, created and allowed a dangerous physical condition to exist, by failing to properly maintain and build the roadway as required by the law and/or the plan thereby creating governmental liability under *Gov. Code* § 815.4.

53. These defendants are also liable for breach of mandatory duties under Gov. Code § 815.6 including, but not limited to, a violation of the following code section: Civil Code §§ 3479 and 3480, CA Vehicle Code Sections 21350, 21351, 21400, 21401, and 21467. They are also liable under Government Code §§ 815, 815.2, 815.4, 815.6, 820(a), 830, 830, 835, 835.2(a), 835.2(b) and 840.2. The governmental entity defendants violated one or more of the following code sections: Civil Code §§ 2100 and 2101; CA Labor Code §§ 7903, 7905, 7906, 7908, 7909, 7911, 7912, 7914, 7916, 7919, 7921, 7923, 7924, 7925, 7926, 7927, 7928, 7930 and 7931; Division 1 - Department of Industrial Relations, Chapter 3.2 Cal/OSHA, Subchapter 2 OSHA requirement of Department of OSHA §§344.5, 344.6, 344.7, 344.8, 344.9, 344.11, 344.12, 344.13, 344.14, 344.15 and 344.16; Division 1 - Department of Industrial Relations, Chapter 4, Division of Industrial Safety, Subchapter 6.2, Permanent Amusement Ride Safety Orders; 3195.1, 3195.2, 3195.3, 3195.4, 3195.5, 3195.6, 3195.7, 3195.8 and 3195.9; Consumer Product Safety Act; and the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, among others.

#### C. Products Liability

54. Upon information and belief, in the collision sequence, the ride, as well as its components and sub-component parts, was manufactured, designed, marketed, distributed, assembled, and/or retailed/sold by defendants SYMPHONY ASSET POOL, SYMPHONY ASSET POOL XIV, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS, LLC, BELMONT PARK ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, BELMONT PARK, BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES, WAVEHOUSE BELMONT PARK LLC, SAN DIEGO COASTER COMPANY, PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC, KMG, KMG EUROPE BV, KMG RIDES, AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, CHANCE RIDES, CITY OF SAN DIEGO, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA including but not limited to CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE, contained a number of defects.

55. These defects, and the defendants believed responsible, include, but are not limited to, the following: the Beach Blaster ride was defectively and dangerously designed, manufactured, distributed, maintained, inspected, and/or installed by defendants SYMPHONY ASSET POOL, SYMPHONY ASSET POOL XIV, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS, LLC, BELMONT PARK ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, BELMONT PARK, BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES, WAVEHOUSE BELMONT PARK LLC, SAN DIEGO COASTER COMPANY, PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC, KMG, KMG EUROPE BV, KMG RIDES, AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, CHANCE RIDES, CITY OF SAN DIEGO, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA including but not limited to CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE.

56. Among other things, the ride takes participants up into the air and violently jerks them from side to side swinging above and beyond the limit of a bounded area where spectators such as plaintiff JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN may lawfully stand or sit. There is insufficient supervision and an insufficient effort to make sure that no loose objects, including mobile phones, are taken on the ride and/or dropped by a participant during the violent maneuvers of the ride. The passenger compartment of the ride is not sealed or self-contained and is therefore open to the outside permitting loose objects to leave the passenger compartment, among other things. There are insufficient warnings.

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The spectator area is located too close to the ride. These are also other dangers as discovery may reveal. Among other things, there is no warning signage advising people inclined to use their mobile phones, hold their mobile phones, or film with their mobile phones, their experience on the ride. Given the dangerous jerking motions and violent directional transition to which participants on the ride will be subjected, there is a potential for objects to be dropped, striking spectators below. Compounding the danger is that fact that the bounded area is too small so that that people standing outside the bounded area are subject to and prone to injury if objects are dropped.

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57. In addition, defendants SYMPHONY ASSET POOL, SYMPHONY ASSET POOL XIV, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS, LLC, BELMONT PARK ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, BELMONT PARK, BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES, WAVEHOUSE BELMONT PARK LLC, SAN DIEGO COASTER COMPANY, PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC, KMG, KMG EUROPE BV, KMG RIDES, AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, CHANCE RIDES, CITY OF SAN DIEGO, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA including but not limited to CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE, are liable for breach of a heightened duty as a common carrier, for the creation of a dangerous premises, for products liability, for breach of implied covenant of fitness, for failure to warn, as well as other defects and dangers as discovery may reveal.

58. Upon information and belief, there were prior accidents placing defendants SYMPHONY ASSET POOL, SYMPHONY ASSET POOL XIV, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS, LLC, BELMONT PARK ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, BELMONT PARK, BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES, WAVEHOUSE BELMONT PARK LLC, SAN DIEGO COASTER COMPANY, PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC, KMG, KMG EUROPE BV, KMG RIDES, AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, CHANCE RIDES, CITY OF SAN DIEGO, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA including but not limited to CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE, on notice of the dangers of the ride, the need for signs and the need for an increase bounded area. Despite this, in an effort to maximize the number of rides and the profitability of Belmont Park and the Beach Blaster ride in particular decided to place profits before safety and did not expand the bounded area, inviting

the publics entree and reliance on the presumed good conduct of the defendants which was in fact misplaced based upon the aforementioned acts and omission of the defendants. Defendants thereby caused, created, allowed, and permitted a dangerous condition and were guilty of a failure to warn.

59. Upon information and belief defendants SYMPHONY ASSET POOL, SYMPHONY ASSET POOL XIV, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS, LLC, BELMONT PARK ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, BELMONT PARK, BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES, WAVEHOUSE BELMONT PARK LLC, SAN DIEGO COASTER COMPANY, PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC, KMG, KMG EUROPE BV, KMG RIDES, AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, CHANCE RIDES, CITY OF SAN DIEGO, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA including but not limited to CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE, were on notice of the problem for a very long time prior to the accident due to the fact that there were prior accidents that defendants' employees regularly observed and discovered.

#### D. Damages

60. As a proximate result of all these negligent and wrongful acts and omissions by defendants, and under these conditions and circumstances, major injuries and damages occurred to plaintiffs' great detriment and damage. Plaintiffs were affected as follows:

Plaintiff JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN sustained a traumatic brain injury (TBI), concussion with probable loss of consciousness, subacute concussion, 1.5 mm focus of microhemorrhage within the right frontal corona radiata white matter, post-traumatic intractable headaches with migrainous and tension-type features versus traumatic occipital neuralgia, episodic dizziness, vertigo, imbalance, and visual disturbances due to vestibular dysfunction associated with head and neck injury, memory dysfunction and concentration difficulties, insomnia and sleep disturbances, anxiety, mood changes, fatigue, depression, cervicalgia muscle sprain/strain and whiplash injury, radiculopathy, numbness and tenderness in the left scalp due to direct head trauma, with resultant loss of earnings and medical bills, both past and future, as well as pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life.

1	$\circ$ Plaintiff NICHOLAS BRADFORD SORENSEN, the lawful spouse of plaintiff	
2	JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN, sustained bystander negligent infliction of emotional	
3	distress and loss of consortium.	
4	• Plaintiff WILLIAM "LIAM" SORENSEN, a minor, and child of plaintiff JENELLE	
5	PUGAL SORENSEN, sustained bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress	
6	damages.	
7	<u>iii.</u>	
8	VENUE & JURISDICTION	
9	61. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the subject matter of this complaint. This Court also	
10	has jurisdiction over each defendant, as the occurrences alleged herein happened in California. Venue is	
11	proper in this Court because at least one defendant is domiciled in the County in which this action is	
12	filed and/or because some, or all, of the violations of law which form the basis for this action occurred	
13	in the County in which this action is filed.	
14	FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION	
15	BY PLAINTIFF JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN	
16	<u>AS AGAINST</u>	
17	<u>DEFENDANTS</u>	
18	SYMPHONY ASSET POOL, SYMPHONY ASSET POOL XIV, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES,	
19	LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS, LLC, BELMONT PARK ENTERTAINMENT,	
20	LLC, BELMONT PARK, BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES, WAVEHOUSE BELMONT PARK	
21	LLC, SAN DIEGO COASTER COMPANY, PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC, KMG, KMG EUROPE	
22	<b>BV, KMG RIDES, AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, CHANCE RIDES,</b>	
23	and DOES 1-250 INCLUSIVE	
24	FOR GENERAL NEGLIGENCE, INCLUDING COMMON CARRIER AND PREMISES LIABILITY	
25	62. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and re-alleges each and every fact and/or allegation set forth	
26	in the prior paragraphs of this complaint with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at	
27	length herein.	
28	63. Defendants, and each of them, owed plaintiff a duty of care which they breached, in	
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PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

some manner, proximately causing injuries and damages to plaintiff as hereinafter alleged.

64. Without limiting the generality or specificity of the foregoing, defendants sued in this cause of action were careless and negligent and/or fell below an applicable standard of care in some manner, so as to proximately cause, as a substantial factor, injury and/or damage to plaintiff, the nature and extent of which acts and/or omissions awaits discovery and investigation.

65. In contrast, at said time and place, plaintiff was acting with due caution, attention and care and did not in any way contribute to or cause the accident and/or injuries as described hereinafter. Plaintiff's injuries and damages were a proximate result of the wrongdoing of the defendants and each of them and was not in any way or manner the result of wrongdoing on said plaintiff's part, nor any comparative fault on said plaintiff's part, nor any assumption of risk on said plaintiff's part.

66. That as a proximate result of various acts and omissions on the part of the defendants and each of them, plaintiff was damaged, and seriously injured, sustaining, among other things, physical, emotional and psychological injuries, which are permanent and continuing in nature and duration, medical bills (past and future), loss of earnings (past and future), and loss of enjoyment of life, and upon information and belief, and will continue to do so in to the future, as well as other injuries and damages according to proof, and is thus entitled to compensatory damages from defendants and each of them according to proof.

67. By reason of the foregoing, plaintiff has been damaged in sums which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, which amounts will be shown according to proof at time of trial.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: BY PLAINTIFF JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN AS AGAINST DEFENDANTS CITY OF SAN DIEGO, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA including but not limited to CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE FOR GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY 68. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and re-alleges each and every fact and/or alleg

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68. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and re-alleges each and every fact and/or allegation set forth in the prior paragraphs of this complaint with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length herein.

69. On or about April 29, 2022, via certified mail, and by hand, with all service by every means occurring within six (6) months of the date of the incident that gives rise to this lawsuit, plaintiffs and each of them timely and properly served a Governmental Tort Claim upon the governmental entity defendants, presenting all facts and claims then known and/or reasonably known to plaintiffs concerning the event referenced herein. By operation of law or otherwise, said defendants denied the claims in their entirety, and this action is timely commenced within six (6) months of such denials, be they explicit or by operation of law.

20 70. To the extent applicable, other governmental and/or quasi-governmental entities not 21 identified by name herein may have been served with claims, and these entities also rejected claims 22 presented to them and such entities additionally advised that they had absolutely no involvement in the 23 area where the accident occurred. As such, plaintiffs do not name explicitly such other governmental 24 entities (as plaintiffs are genuinely ignorant of facts showing liability towards such other governmental 25 defendants) but plaintiffs reserve the right to insert the name of such entities as DOE defendants if it is later shown through discovery that said entities were in fact involved and culpable. At such time, the 26 filing of the present lawsuit shall protect the statute of limitations and will cause any subsequent DOE 27 amendments to "relate back" to the original filing date for the subject lawsuit. 28

71. Defendants sued in this cause of action caused, created, allowed, and permitted a dangerous condition and a failure to warn consisting of, among other things, a dangerous park and ride, specifically the beach blaster and surrounding areas.

72. Defendants are liable under the *Government Code* for numerous reasons, including for causing and allowing <u>dangerous condition of public property</u> to exist, and thereby creating governmental liability under *Gov. Code* §§ 835, 835.2(a), 835.2(b), and 830.

73. Defendants are also liable for <u>negligent governmental employees</u> who, among other things, dangerously maintained, design and created dangerous conditions set forth above, study the problem, or implement required and reasonable remedial measures under *Gov. Code* § 815.2.

74. Defendants are also liable for the <u>negligence of government contractors</u> including all the person and entities involved in construction activities who, among other things, created and allowed a dangerous physical condition to exist, by failing to properly maintain and build the roadway as required by the law and/or the plan thereby creating governmental liability under *Gov*. *Code* § 815.4.

75. Defendants are also liable for <u>breach of mandatory duties</u> under *Gov. Code* § 815.6 including, but not limited to, a violation of the following applicable code sections: *Civil Code* §§ 2100 and 2101; *CA Labor Code* §§ 7903, 7905, 7906, 7908, 7909, 7911, 7912, 7914, 7916, 7919, 7921, 7923, 7924, 7925, 7926, 7927, 7928, 7930 and 7931; Division 1 - Department of Industrial Relations, Chapter 3.2 Cal/OSHA, Subchapter 2 OSHA requirement of Department of OSHA §§344.5, 344.6, 344.7, 344.8, 344.9, 344.11, 344.12, 344.13, 344.14, 344.15 and 344.16; Division 1 - Department of Industrial Relations, Chapter 4, Division of Industrial Safety, Subchapter 6.2, Permanent Amusement Ride Safety Orders; 3195.1, 3195.2, 3195.3, 3195.4, 3195.5, 3195.6, 3195.7, 3195.8 and 3195.9; Consumer Product Safety Act; and the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, among other code sections.

76. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that at all times relevant to this action, and that the defendants sued in this cause of action were, and still are, governmental entities that jointly and severally operated police departments involved in the case, and/or owned, managed, maintained, inspected, repaired, and constructed, the real property where the incident took place,

including but not limited to Belmont Park and the Beach Blaster ride as well as surrounding areas. Defendants and their agents, servants, employees and contractors, potentially negligently owned, managed, maintained, inspected, repaired, maintained, and constructed, the accident scene, casting 4 defendants in liability pursuant to, inter alia, Government Code §§ 815.2, and 815.4, et seq.

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77. The aforementioned accident scene was potentially in a dangerous condition that created a substantial risk of serious personal injury or death, which damages were in fact sustained by plaintiffs, when the property was used in a manner that was reasonably foreseeable, casting defendants in liability pursuant to Government Code § 835. Defendants, through its agents, servants, employees and/or contractors, violated various statutes, laws, regulations and ordinances and otherwise failed to discharge mandatory duties pertaining to the construction, supervision, owning, maintenance, inspection, and repairing of the accident scene, casting the defendants in liability, pursuant to Government Code § 815.6.

Among other things, plaintiffs allege that defendants were jointly and severally charged 78. with the ownership, operation, management, inspection, construction, maintenance and repair of the accident scene, and was also charged with the inspection of the accident scene, but that said defendants breached their applicable duty of care, as aforestated, and in such other respects as will be revealed in discovery.

79. Upon information and belief, sufficient time passed from the moment the dangerous 19 condition was created such that defendants knew or should have known a dangerous condition was created and such that it had sufficient time to have remedied or warned against the dangerous condition. Potentially, notice was actually provided to defendants through prior accidents under similar circumstances such that defendants had sufficient time to take action to remedy the dangerous 22 condition and activities. 23

80. Defendants and/or their management, administration, designers, planners, engineers, 24 25 maintenance personnel, inspectors and/or other employees, staff, agents or contractors, acting within the course and scope of their duties and/or employment negligently, unreasonably and improperly 26 27 owned, operated, designed, planned, engineered, maintained, inspected, repaired, failed to repair, and 28 controlled the roadway, thereby creating dangerous conditions and exposing drivers to dangerous

conditions.

81. Defendants undertook to control the subject area, invited reliance on the subject area and are liable as it created a dangerous condition in doing so. The dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injuries/damages which were incurred, and (a) were created by a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of defendants and/or (b) defendants had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous conditions for a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous conditions. Bus accident at the accident scene for the same issue previously occurred.

82. These dangerous conditions and these acts and omissions of the defendants (and their management, administration, designers, planners, engineers, maintenance personnel, inspectors and/or other employees, staff, agents or contractors, acting within the course and scope of their duties) proximately caused the plaintiffs' injuries/damages.

83. Further, these dangerous conditions were directly attributable wholly or in substantial part to a negligent or wrongful act of these employees of the defendants and these employees had the authority and the funds and other means immediately available to take alternative action which would not have created the dangerous condition; and/or these employees had the authority and it was his/her/their responsibility to take adequate measures to protect against the dangerous condition at the expense of the public entity and the funds and other means for doing so were immediately available to him/her/them, and he/she/they had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.

84. Further, signs, warnings or other devices were necessary to warn of these dangerous conditions which would not be reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, a person exercising due care. Further, defendants and their employees acting within the scope of their employment undertook, gratuitously or for consideration, to avoid, remedy and/or abate these dangerous conditions. These undertakings and promises were the kind that they recognized as necessary for the protection of third persons.

85. These entities and their employees acting within the scope of their employment failed to exercise reasonable care in the performance of these undertakings and promises, the failure to

exercise reasonable care resulted in physical harm to the third persons, and either (a) their carelessness increased the risk of such harm, or (b) the undertaking or promises were to perform a duty that the other owed to the third persons, or (c) the harm was suffered because either the other or the third persons relied on the undertaking.

86. Plaintiffs are further informed and believe and thereon allege that the defendants had actual and constructive notice of the aforementioned dangerous conditions within a sufficient period of time prior to the incident to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition, but that said defendants failed to do so. Plaintiffs are further informed and believes and thereon alleges that defendants failed to reasonably perform remedial work, to the extent necessary and failed to warn of the dangerous conditions set forth above. The aforementioned negligence of public employees, dangerous condition of public property, failure to discharge mandatory duties, and failure to warn were, jointly and severally, substantial factors in causing plaintiffs' harm.

87. Plaintiffs are further informed and believe and thereon allege that any arguable immunities do not apply factually or legally, or, alternatively, that if any do apply that they have been lost by the applicable governmental entities.

88. Plaintiffs also may have, and thus present, causes of action for spoliation of evidence in violation of law and contract notwithstanding the Superior Court ruling in *Cedars Sinai v. Sup. Ct.* Plaintiffs also have causes of action involving the negligent and/or intentional cover-up of the accident by investigating personnel who are employees or agents of the defendants. It is believed these individuals ignored the testimony of eyewitnesses and/or improperly discounted them to protect defendants, and/or changed the scene post-accident. Plaintiffs also may have causes of action based upon the failure to comply, or the failure to fully comply with requests for Public Records Act requests, the full extent of which is unknown at this time.

89. Due to these acts and failures to act, and dangerous conditions, the defendants and their employees are liable for plaintiffs' injuries under the *Government Code*, including but not limited to, *Government Code* §§ 815, 815.2(a), 815.4, 815.6, 820(a), 830, 830.8, 835, 835.2(a), 835.2(b) and 840.2. In contrast, at said time and place, plaintiffs were acting with due caution, attention and care and did not in any way contribute to or cause the collision and/or injuries as described hereinafter.

90. The accident occurred, in part, due to the neglect and intentional wrongdoing of the defendants and each of them by and through their agents, servants, employees, contractors, joint venturers and co-conspirators, and each of them and that the plaintiffs herein sustained damages thereby. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege that at all times relevant to this action, and that the defendants and each of them set forth in the caption were, and still are, governmental entities that jointly and severally operated police departments involved in the case, and/or owned, managed, maintained, inspected, repaired, and constructed, the real property where the incident took place as alleged herein, including Belmont Park, the Beach Blaster ride and surrounding areas. These defendants and their agents, servants, employees and contractors, potentially negligently owned, managed, maintained, inspected, repaired, maintained, and constructed, the accident scene, casting defendants in liability pursuant to, inter alia, *Government Code* §§ 815.2, and 815.4, et seq.

91. The aforementioned accident scene was in a dangerous condition that created a substantial risk of serious personal injury or death, which damages were in fact sustained by plaintiffs, when the property was used in a manner that was reasonably foreseeable, casting defendants in liability pursuant to *Government Code* § 835. Defendants, through their agents, servants, employees and/or contractors, violated various statutes, laws, regulations and ordinances and otherwise failed to discharge mandatory duties pertaining to the construction, supervision, owning, maintenance, inspection, and repairing of the accident scene, casting the defendants in liability, pursuant to *Government Code* § 815.6. Among other things, plaintiffs allege that defendants, and each of them, were jointly and severally charged with the ownership, operation, management, inspection, construction, maintenance and repair of the accident scene, and were also charged with the inspection of the accident scene, but that said defendants breached their applicable duty of care, as aforestated, and in such other respects as will be revealed in discovery.

92. Upon information and belief, sufficient time passed from the moment the dangerous condition was created such that defendants knew or should have known a dangerous condition was created and such that it had sufficient time to have remedied or warned against the dangerous condition. Potentially, notice was actually provided to defendants through prior accidents under similar circumstances such that defendants had sufficient time to take action to remedy the dangerous

condition and activities. Defendants and/or its management, administration, designers, planners, engineers, maintenance personnel, inspectors and/or other employees, staff, agents or contractors, acting within the course and scope of their duties and/or employment negligently, unreasonably and improperly owned, operated, designed, planned, engineered, maintained, inspected, repaired, failed to repair, and controlled the roadway, thereby creating dangerous conditions and exposing drivers to dangerous conditions. Defendants undertook to control the subject area, invited reliance on the subject area and are liable as it created a dangerous condition in doing so. The dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injuries/damages which were incurred, and (a) were created by a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of defendants and/or (b) defendants had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous conditions for a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous conditions. These dangerous conditions and these acts and omissions of the defendants (and its management, administration, designers, planners, engineers, maintenance personnel, inspectors and/or other employees, staff, agents or contractors, acting within the course and scope of their duties) proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries/damages. Further, these dangerous conditions were directly attributable wholly or in substantial part to a negligent or wrongful act of these employees of the defendants and these employees had the authority and the funds and other means immediately available to take alternative action which would not have created the dangerous condition; and/or these employees had the authority and it was his/her/their responsibility to take adequate measures to protect against the dangerous condition at the expense of the public entity and the funds and other means for doing so were immediately available to him/her/them, and he/she/they had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. Further, signs, warnings or other devices were necessary to warn of these dangerous conditions which would not be reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, a person exercising due care. Further, defendants and its employees acting within the scope of their employment undertook, gratuitously or for consideration, to avoid, remedy and/or abate these dangerous conditions. These undertakings and promises were the kind that they recognized as necessary for the protection of third persons. These entities and their employees acting within the

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scope of their employment failed to exercise reasonable care in the performance of these undertakings and promises, the failure to exercise reasonable care resulted in physical harm to the third persons, and either (a) their carelessness increased the risk of such harm, or (b) the undertaking or promises were to perform a duty that the other owed to the third persons, or (c) the harm was suffered because either the other or the third persons relied on the undertaking. Plaintiffs are further informed and believe and thereon allege that the defendants had actual and constructive notice of the aforementioned dangerous conditions within a sufficient period of time prior to the incident to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition, but that said defendants failed to do so. Plaintiffs are further informed and believe and thereon allege that defendants failed to reasonably perform remedial work, to the extent necessary and failed to warn of the dangerous conditions set forth above. The aforementioned negligence of public employees, dangerous condition of public property, failure to discharge mandatory duties, and failure to warn were, jointly and severally, substantial factors in causing plaintiff's harm. Plaintiffs are further informed and believe and thereon allege that any arguable immunities do not apply factually or legally, or, alternatively, that if any do apply that they have been lost by the applicable governmental entities.

93. Plaintiffs also may have, and thus presents, causes of action for spoliation of evidence in violation of law and contract notwithstanding the Superior Court ruling in *Cedars Sinai v. Sup. Ct.* Plaintiffs also have causes of action involving the negligent and/or intentional cover-up of the accident by investigating personnel who are employees or agents of the defendants and each of them. It is believed these individuals ignored the testimony of eyewitnesses and/or improperly discounted them to protect defendants, and/or changed the scene post-accident. Plaintiffs also may have causes of action based upon the failure to comply, or the failure to fully comply with requests for public records act requests, the full extent of which is unknown at this time.

94. Due to these acts and failures to act, and dangerous conditions, the defendants and their employees are liable for plaintiffs' injuries under the *Government Code*, including, but not limited to, *Government Code* §§ 815, 815.2(a), 815.4, 815.6, 820(a), 830, 830.8, 835, 835.2(a), 835.2(b), 840.2 and 910, et seq.

95. In contrast, at said time and place, plaintiff was acting with due caution, attention and

care and did not in any way contribute to or cause the accident and/or injuries as described hereinafter. Plaintiff's injuries and damages were a proximate result of the wrongdoing of the defendants and each of them and was not in any way or manner the result of wrongdoing on said plaintiff's part, nor any comparative fault on said plaintiff's part, nor any assumption of risk on said plaintiff's part.

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96. That as a proximate result of various acts and omissions on the part of the defendants and each of them, plaintiff was damaged, and seriously injured, sustaining, among other things, physical, emotional and psychological injuries, which are permanent and continuing in nature and duration, medical bills (past and future), loss of earnings (past and future), and loss of enjoyment of life, and upon information and belief, and will continue to do so in to the future, as well as other injuries and damages according to proof, and is thus entitled to compensatory damages from defendants and each of them according to proof.

97. By reason of the foregoing, plaintiff has been damaged in sums which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, which amounts will be shown according to proof at time of trial.

16	THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
17	BY PLAINTIFF JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN
18	<u>AS AGAINST</u>
19	<u>DEFENDANTS</u>
20	SYMPHONY ASSET POOL, SYMPHONY ASSET POOL XIV, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES,
21	LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS, LLC, BELMONT PARK ENTERTAINMENT,
22	LLC, BELMONT PARK, BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES, WAVEHOUSE BELMONT PARK
23	LLC, SAN DIEGO COASTER COMPANY, PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC, KMG, KMG EUROPE
24	<b>BV, KMG RIDES, AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, CHANCE RIDES,</b>
25	and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE
26	FOR PRODUCTS LIABILITY - NEGLIGENCE
27	98. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and re-alleges each and every fact and/or allegation set forth
28	in the prior paragraphs of this complaint with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at

PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

length herein.

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99. Upon information and belief, at all times hereinafter mentioned, in the regular and ordinary course of business, defendants, and each of them, manufactured, sold, designed, assembled, inspected, marketed, supplied, repaired, and distributed the aforementioned ride, and/or their component parts and other products involved in the accident (hereinafter collectively "the products") and entered the same into the stream of commerce, in the ordinary course of business, with the expectation that it would be sold to and/or used by consumers in the United States, and California in particular, without any change in manufacture and/or design. Upon information and belief, the products and their component parts contained a number of defects including, but not limited to, one or more of the defects as set forth above and as discovery may reveal.

11 100. Upon information and belief, it is further alleged (1) that each defendant manufactured, 12 designed, supplied, installed, inspected, rented, distributed, and/or sold products and their respective 13 component parts; (2) that each defendant was negligent in the manufacture, design, supplying, 14 installation, inspection, renting, distribution, and/or selling of the products and their respective 15 component parts; (3) that plaintiffs were harmed; and (4) that each defendant's negligence was a 16 substantial factor in causing plaintiffs' harm. Among other things, upon information and belief, 17 defendants, and each of them, failed to use the amount of care in designing, manufacturing, inspecting, 18 installing, and/or retailing the products and their respective component parts, that a reasonably careful 19 designer, manufacturer, supplier, installer, distributor, and/or retailer would use in similar 20 circumstances to avoid exposing others to a foreseeable risk of harm. If any defendants balanced in any 21 manner the likelihood and severity of harm from the product, based upon what a defendant knew or 22 should have known against any cost or burden of taking safety measures to reduce or avoid the harm, 23 the defendants failed to use reasonable care in such a process and wantonly, maliciously, and 24 intentionally chose profits over safety.

101. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, defendants, and each of them,
manufactured, constructed, assembled, marketed, designed, delivered, distributed, built, packaged,
and/or inspected, various products, including subcomponent parts thereof, as well as systems therein
and as such, said defendants and each of them were charged with, among other things, a duty to

exercise due and reasonable care in, among other things, the manufacture, construction, assembly, design, delivery, marketing, distribution, building, packaging, and/or inspection of the products. Nevertheless, defendants caused and allowed the products to contain various defects and, as such, the defendants and each of them breached their respective duties of reasonable care, and were careless, reckless, and/or negligent in causing and allowing the products to enter the stream of commerce and be sold and were further careless, reckless, and/or negligent in causing and allowing the products to persons, which contained various dangers and defects, including, but not limited to, the defects set forth above, of which defendants, and each of them, were well aware and all of which defendants, and each of them, failed to remedy and which exposed plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm and injury.

102. Defendants, and each of them, had both actual and/or constructive notice of the dangers with their products and their respective component parts, a sufficient period of time prior to the happening of the incident mentioned hereinbefore, such that defendants should have remedied the same in a proper timely fashion, but that defendants did not do so, and that defendants, and each of them, acted wrongfully by, among other things, one or more of the following: failing to properly design, construct, assemble, manufacture, market, and/or inspect products; by failing to properly install, maintain, and/or retail products; negligently selecting, retaining, and/or supervising component part manufacturers; and that defendants were otherwise careless and negligent and/or failed to warn of dangerous defects in the products.

103. In contrast, at said time and place, plaintiff was with due caution, attention and care and did not in any way contribute to or cause the accident and/or injuries as described hereinafter. Plaintiff's injuries and damages were a proximate result of the wrongdoing of the defendants and each of them and was not in any way or manner the result of wrongdoing on said plaintiff's part, nor any comparative fault on said plaintiff's part, nor any assumption of risk on said plaintiff's part.

104. That as a proximate result of various acts and omissions on the part of the defendants and each of them, plaintiff was damaged, and seriously injured, sustaining, among other things, physical, emotional and psychological injuries, which are permanent and continuing in nature and duration, medical bills (past and future), loss of earnings (past and future), and loss of enjoyment of life, and upon information and belief, and will continue to do so in to the future, as well as other injuries and damages according to proof, and is thus entitled to compensatory damages from defendants and each of them according to proof.

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105. By reason of the foregoing, plaintiff has been damaged in sums which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, which amounts will be shown according to proof at time of trial.

# FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

# BY PLAINTIFF JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN

# AS AGAINST

#### **DEFENDANTS**

SYMPHONY ASSET POOL, SYMPHONY ASSET POOL XIV, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS, LLC, BELMONT PARK ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, BELMONT PARK, BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES, WAVEHOUSE BELMONT PARK LLC, SAN DIEGO COASTER COMPANY, PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC, KMG, KMG EUROPE BV, KMG RIDES, AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, CHANCE RIDES, and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE

# FOR PRODUCTS LIABILITY - FAILURE TO WARN

106. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and re-alleges each and every fact and/or allegation set forth in the prior paragraphs of this complaint with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length herein.

20 107. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges: (1) that each defendant 21 manufactured, designed, distributed, and/or sold products, and their respective component parts; (2) 22 that the products had potential risks, side effects, and/or reactions to stimuli that were known or 23 knowable to defendants by the use of scientific knowledge available at the time of the product's 24 manufacture, design, distribution, and/or sale; (3) that the potential risk, side effects, and/or reactions 25 presented a substantial danger to users of the products including, but not limited to, the products and 26 their respective component parts; (4) that ordinary consumers would not have recognized the potential 27 risks, side effects, and/or reactions; (5) that defendants failed to adequately warn or instruct of the 28 potential risks, side effects, and/or reactions; (6) that the products were used in a way that was reasonably foreseeable to defendants; (7) that plaintiff were harmed; and (8) that lack of sufficient instructions and/or warnings were substantial factors in causing plaintiff's harm.

108. In contrast, at said time and place, plaintiff was acting with due caution, attention and care and did not in any way contribute to or cause the accident and/or injuries as described hereinafter. Plaintiff's injuries and damages were a proximate result of the wrongdoing of the defendants and each of them and was not in any way or manner the result of wrongdoing on said plaintiff's part, nor any comparative fault on said plaintiff's part, nor any assumption of risk on said plaintiff's part.

109. That as a proximate result of various acts and omissions on the part of the defendants and each of them, plaintiff was damaged, and seriously injured, sustaining, among other things, physical, emotional and psychological injuries, which are permanent and continuing in nature and duration, medical bills (past and future), loss of earnings (past and future), and loss of enjoyment of life, and upon information and belief, and will continue to do so in to the future, as well as other injuries and damages according to proof, and is thus entitled to compensatory damages from defendants and each of them according to proof.

110. By reason of the foregoing, plaintiff has been damaged in sums which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, which amounts will be shown according to proof at time of trial.

1 FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 2 BY PLAINTIFF JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN 3 AS AGAINST 4 DEFENDANTS 5 SYMPHONY ASSET POOL, SYMPHONY ASSET POOL XIV, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES, 6 LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS, LLC, BELMONT PARK ENTERTAINMENT, 7 LLC, BELMONT PARK, BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES, WAVEHOUSE BELMONT PARK LLC, SAN DIEGO COASTER COMPANY, PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC, KMG, KMG EUROPE 8 9 BV, KMG RIDES, AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, CHANCE RIDES, 10 and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE 11 FOR PRODUCTS LIABILITY - STRICT LIABILITY 12 Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and re-alleges each and every fact and/or allegation set forth 111. in the prior paragraphs of this complaint with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at 13 14 length herein. 15 112. Plaintiff is informed and believe and thereon allege: (1) that defendants, and each of 16 them, manufactured, distributed, designed, and/or sold products and their respective component parts; 17 (2) that the products and their respective component parts contained a manufacturing and/or design 18 defect, or both, when it left defendants' possession; (3) that plaintiff was harmed; and (4) that the products' defective design, manufacture, or both, was/were (a) substantial factor(s) in causing 19 plaintiff's harm. 20 21 Among other things, plaintiff alleges that the design of the products including, but not 113. limited to, the products and their respective component parts were defective because the products and 22 23 their respective component parts did not perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would have

24 expected them to perform.

114. Plaintiff is further informed and believes and thereon alleges that the risks of the design
of the products, and their respective component parts, as designed, far outweighed any benefits of the
products' design, given, among other things, (a) the gravity of the potential harm resulting from the use
of the product; (b) the likelihood that this harm would occur; (c) the feasibility of an alternative safer

design at the time of manufacture; (d) the cost of an alternative design; (e) the disadvantages of an alternative design; and (f) other relevant factor(s) and considerations.

115. In contrast, at said time and place, plaintiff was acting with due caution, attention and care and did not in any way contribute to or cause the accident and/or injuries as described hereinafter. Plaintiff's injuries and damages were a proximate result of the wrongdoing of the defendants and each of them and was not in any way or manner the result of wrongdoing on said plaintiff's part, nor any comparative fault on said plaintiff's part, nor any assumption of risk on said plaintiff's part.

116. That as a proximate result of various acts and omissions on the part of the defendants and each of them, plaintiff was damaged, and seriously injured, sustaining, among other things, physical, emotional and psychological injuries, which are permanent and continuing in nature and duration, medical bills (past and future), loss of earnings (past and future), and loss of enjoyment of life, and upon information and belief, and will continue to do so in to the future, as well as other injuries and damages according to proof, and is thus entitled to compensatory damages from defendants and each of them according to proof.

117. By reason of the foregoing, plaintiff has been damaged in sums which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, which amounts will be shown according to proof at time of trial.

1 SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 2 **BY PLAINTIFF JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN** 3 AS AGAINST 4 DEFENDANTS 5 SYMPHONY ASSET POOL, SYMPHONY ASSET POOL XIV, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES, 6 LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS, LLC, BELMONT PARK ENTERTAINMENT, 7 LLC, BELMONT PARK, BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES, WAVEHOUSE BELMONT PARK 8 LLC, SAN DIEGO COASTER COMPANY, PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC, KMG, KMG EUROPE 9 **BV, KMG RIDES, AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, CHANCE RIDES,** 10 and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE 11 FOR PRODUCTS LIABILITY - BREACH OF WARRANTIES 12 Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and re-alleges each and every fact and/or allegation set forth 118. 13 in the prior paragraphs of this complaint with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at 14 length herein. 15 119. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that defendants: (1) made a 16 statement of fact, and/or a promise to, which was received by plaintiff that the products were safe and 17 fit for use; (2) that the products include its/their component parts; (3) that the defendants 18 gave/sold/supplied to plaintiff a sample or model of the product and its component parts; (4) that the 19 products and its component parts did not perform as stated/promised and/or did not meet the quality of 20 the description/sample/model provided to plaintiff; (5) that, by this lawsuit, plaintiff has taken 21 reasonable steps to notify defendants within a reasonable time that the products including, but not 22 limited to, the product and its component parts were not as represented, whether or not defendants 23 received such notice; (6) that plaintiff was harmed; and (7) that the failure of the products including, but not limited to, the product and its component parts to be as represented was a substantial factor in 24 25 causing plaintiff's harm and/or that (1) that plaintiff bought the products including, but not limited to, 26 the product and its component parts from defendants; (2) that, at the time of purchase, defendants were 27 in the business of selling these products including, but not limited to, the product and its component 28 parts as defendants' occupation and/or held himself, herself and/or itself out as having special

knowledge or skill regarding these products including, but not limited to, the product and its component 1 2 parts; (3) that the products including, but not limited to, the product and its component parts had one or 3 more of the following characteristics: (a) was not of the same quality as those generally acceptable in 4 the trade; (b) was not fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; (c) did not conform 5 to the quality established by the parties' prior dealings or by usage of trade; and/or (d) was in violation 6 of one or more other standards and other grounds as set forth in *Commercial Code* section 2314(2) which states that in order to be merchantable goods must (i) pass without objection in the trade under 8 the contract description; (ii) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the 9 description; (iii) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; (iv) run, within the 10 variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; (v) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; 12 and (vi) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any; (4) that plaintiff took reasonable steps (i.e. via this lawsuit) to notify defendants within a reasonable time that the product including, but not limited to, the product and its component parts did not have the expected 14 quality; (5) that plaintiff was harmed; and (6) that the failure of the products including, but not limited to, the product and its component parts to have the expected quality was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's harm.

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120. In contrast, at said time and place, plaintiff was acting with due caution, attention and care and did not in any way contribute to or cause the collision and/or injuries as described hereinafter. Plaintiff's injuries and damages were a proximate result of the wrongdoing of the defendants and each of them and was not in any way or manner the result of wrongdoing on said plaintiff's part, nor any comparative fault on said plaintiff's part, nor any assumption of risk on said plaintiff's part.

23 121. That as a proximate result of various acts and omissions on the part of the defendants 24 and each of them, plaintiff was damaged, and seriously injured, sustaining, among other things, 25 physical, emotional and psychological injuries, which are permanent and continuing in nature and duration, medical bills (past and future), loss of earnings (past and future), and loss of enjoyment of 26 27 life, and upon information and belief, and will continue to do so in to the future, as well as other 28 injuries and damages according to proof, and is thus entitled to compensatory damages from defendants and each of them according to proof.

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122. By reason of the foregoing, plaintiff has been damaged in sums which exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, which amounts will be shown according to proof at time of trial.

# SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION BY PLAINTIFF JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN AS AGAINST DEFENDANTS SYMPHONY ASSET POOL, SYMPHONY ASSET POOL XIV, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS, LLC, BELMONT PARK ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, BELMONT PARK, BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES, WAVEHOUSE BELMONT PARK LLC, SAN DIEGO COASTER COMPANY, PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC, KMG, KMG EUROPE BV, KMG RIDES, AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, CHANCE RIDES, and DOES 21-250 INCLUSIVE

## FOR PRODUCTS LIABILITY - MISREPRESENTATION/CONCEALMENT

123. Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and re-alleges each and every fact and/or allegation set forth in the prior paragraphs of this complaint with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length herein.

19 124. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that: (1) defendants represented 20 expressly and/or impliedly to plaintiff that an important fact was true; (2) that defendants' representation was false; (3) that defendants knew that the representation was false when defendants 21 22 made it or that defendants made the representation recklessly and without regard for its truth and had no 23 reasonable grounds for believing the representation to be true when made; (4) that defendants intended 24 that plaintiff rely on the representation; (5) that plaintiff reasonably relied on defendants' 25 representation; (6) that plaintiff was harmed; and (7) that plaintiff's reliance on defendants' 26 representations was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's harm.

27 125. Moreover, plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that: (1) the relationship
28 between plaintiff and defendants was such that a duty to disclose material facts and information existed

1 pursuant to which defendants were obligated to disclose material facts to plaintiff; (2) that defendants 2 intentionally failed to disclose an important fact to plaintiff; (3) that defendants intentionally failed to disclose an important fact that was known only to defendants and not plaintiff and which plaintiff could 3 4 not have discovered and/or that defendants actively concealed an important fact from plaintiff and/or 5 prevented plaintiff from discovering that fact; (4) that plaintiff did not know of the concealed fact; (5) that defendants intended to deceive plaintiff by concealing the fact; (6) that plaintiff reasonably relied 6 7 on defendants' deception; (7) that plaintiff was harmed; and (8) that defendants' concealment was a 8 substantial factor in causing plaintiff's harm.

9 126. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing paragraphs, plaintiff is informed and 10 believes that the defects contained within the products and their component parts were known to defendants and each of them, including the potential for catastrophic injury, that these facts were 11 12 material, that defendants had a duty to disclose the same, but instead that defendants actively concealed 13 the same, and otherwise marketed their product as safe for its intended use, and that plaintiff reasonably 14 and actually relied thereon in purchasing and using the product and its component parts to plaintiff's 15 detriment, suffering severe injuries and damages. In so doing, the defendants acted intentionally, with 16 malice, and with conscious disregard for the rights, safety and wellbeing of others, most particularly the 17 plaintiff.

18 127. In contrast, at said time and place, plaintiff was acting with due caution, attention and
19 care and did not in any way contribute to or cause the accident and/or injuries as described hereinafter.
20 Plaintiff's injuries and damages were a proximate result of the wrongdoing of the defendants and each
21 of them and was not in any way or manner the result of wrongdoing on said plaintiff's part, nor any
22 comparative fault on said plaintiff's part, nor any assumption of risk on said plaintiff's part.

128. That as a proximate result of various acts and omissions on the part of the defendants and each of them, plaintiff was damaged, and seriously injured, sustaining, among other things, physical, emotional and psychological injuries, which are permanent and continuing in nature and duration, medical bills (past and future), loss of earnings (past and future), and loss of enjoyment of life, and upon information and belief, and will continue to do so in to the future, as well as other injuries and damages according to proof, and is thus entitled to compensatory damages from defendants 1 and each of them according to proof.

2	129. By reason of the foregoing, plaintiff has been damaged in sums which exceed the	
3	jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, which amounts will be	
4	shown according to proof at time of trial.	
5	EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION	
6	<u>BY PLAINTIFF</u>	
7	NICHOLAS BRADFORD SORENSEN	
8	<u>AS AGAINST</u>	
9	<u>DEFENDANTS</u>	
10	SYMPHONY ASSET POOL, SYMPHONY ASSET POOL XIV, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES,	
11	LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS, LLC, BELMONT PARK ENTERTAINMENT,	
12	LLC, BELMONT PARK, BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES, WAVEHOUSE BELMONT PARK	
13	LLC, SAN DIEGO COASTER COMPANY, PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC, KMG, KMG EUROPE	
14	BV, KMG RIDES, AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, CHANCE RIDES, CITY OF SAN DIEGO,	
15	COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA including but not limited to	
16	CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION	
17	and DOES 1-250 INCLUSIVE	
18	FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM	
19	130. Plaintiff NICHOLAS BRADFORD SORENSEN incorporates each and every allegation	
20	set forth in the prior paragraphs with the same force and effect as though more fully set forth at length	
21	herein.	
22	131. Plaintiff NICHOLAS BRADFORD SORENSEN is, and at all times relevant herein was,	
23	the lawful spouse of plaintiff JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN.	
24	132. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and/or omissions of defendants which give	
25	rise to JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN's claims as alleged herein, plaintiff NICHOLAS BRADFORD	
26	SORENSEN was caused and continues to be caused to suffer one or more of the following: loss of	
27	support, services, love, companionship, affection, society, sexual relations, and/or solace, from his	
28	lawful spouse, and further that plaintiff JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN must either perform, or pay to	
	20	
	39 PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURIES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL	
	I PARTITIFTS COM PARTIFON I PROVINE INJUNIES AND FROFEN I DAMAGE; DEMAND FOR JUNY INIAL	

have performed, nursing and other chores for his lawful spouse, to said plaintiff's detriment, and that said plaintiff has incurred medical bills for his lawful spouse, to said plaintiff's detriment, and will incur the foregoing in the future, to said plaintiff's detriment.

By reason of the foregoing, plaintiff NICHOLAS BRADFORD SORENSEN has been 133. damaged in a sum which exceeds the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, which will be shown according to proof at time of trial.

7	NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION
8	BY PLAINTIFFS
9	NICHOLAS BRADFORD SORENSEN
10	and WILLIAM "LIAM" SORENSEN
11	<u>AS AGAINST</u>
12	SYMPHONY ASSET POOL, SYMPHONY ASSET POOL XIV, LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES,
13	LLC, PACIFICA ENTERPRISES INVESTMENTS, LLC, BELMONT PARK ENTERTAINMENT,
14	LLC, BELMONT PARK, BELMONT PARK ASSOCIATES, WAVEHOUSE BELMONT PARK
15	LLC, SAN DIEGO COASTER COMPANY, PEI FUND I SPONSOR, LLC, KMG, KMG EUROPE
16	BV, KMG RIDES, AMUSEMENTS OF AMERICA, CHANCE RIDES, CITY OF SAN DIEGO,
17	COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA including but not limited to
18	CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION
19	and DOES 1-250 INCLUSIVE
20	FOR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS (BYSTANDER)
21	134. Plaintiffs NICHOLAS BRADFORD SORENSEN and WILLIAM "LIAM" SORENSEN
22	incorporate each and every allegation set forth in the prior paragraphs with the same force and effect as
23	though more fully set forth at length herein.
24	135. The defendants and each of them negligently caused injury to plaintiffs NICHOLAS
25	BRADFORD SORENSEN and WILLIAM "LIAM" SORENSEN; that plaintiffs NICHOLAS
26	BRADFORD SORENSEN and WILLIAM "LIAM" SORENSEN were present during the injury
27	causing events and were then and there aware of the incident causing the injuries, and thereby suffered
28	severe emotional distress, including suffering, anguish, fright, horror, nervousness, grief, anxiety,

worry, shock, humiliation, and/or shame.

136. Plaintiffs NICHOLAS BRADFORD SORENSEN and WILLIAM "LIAM" SORENSEN's injuries and damages were due to the wrongdoing of the defendants and each of them and were not in any way or manner the result of wrongdoing on plaintiffs' part, nor any comparative fault on plaintiffs' part, nor any assumption of risk on plaintiffs' part.

137. By reason of the foregoing, plaintiffs NICHOLAS BRADFORD SORENSEN and WILLIAM "LIAM" SORENSEN has been damaged in a sum which exceeds the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction, which will be shown according to proof at time of trial.

# <u>iv.</u>

#### PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for judgment as against each and every defendant, jointly and severally, on each and every cause of action, according to proof, as follows:

- General "non-economic" damages, including pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life, according to proof;
- 2. Special "economic" damages, including medical bills, past and future, loss of earnings, past and future, loss of earnings capacity, property damage, rental, towing, storage and loss of use, according to proof;
- 3. Costs of suit, interest, and attorney's fees if applicable, according to proof;
  - 4. A determination of rights, responsibilities, or lack thereof; and

Such other and further relief as the court deems proper.

22 Dated: **1** 

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LAW OFFICES OF OTTO L. HASELHOFF, P.C.

OTTO L. HASELHOFF Attorney(s) for Plaintiff(s) JENELLE PUGAL SORENSEN, NICHOLAS BRADFORD SORENSEN, and WILLIAM "LIAM" SORENSEN

