

Journal of Preparedness in Canada



Volume 1 Issue 2

Preparedness is where the response fight is won

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Editor's Corner

Welcome to the second issue of the Journal. We sincerely appreciate the feedback from the inaugural issue, which was shared across the Internet. The message of preparedness in Canada is worthy of a distinct home for the discourse, debates and opinions of those who are employed as a practitioner, academic, researcher or expert; as well as the thoughts, dreams and desires of the general public.

This issue contains opinion pieces on contracted firefighting and financial incentives for preparedness. The main effort for this publication to offer space for those within emergency management an opportunity to voice their opinion, challenge norms and present innovative and disruptive ideas. The editorial staff only ensures that the content does not violate copyright or speech laws, otherwise the piece is presented in the author's original prose; we do not edit for content, grammar or tenet.

As well, this issue contains the initial report on the systemic review of public sector resident-facing preparedness communications at the national and sub national level. This research is the first project from the research division of Preparedness Labs Incorporated and will be published in three iterations over this issue and the following two in May and November, 2024.

We complete this issue with a recommendation of three podcasts within the emergency management space, that

offer different perspectives for your education and entertainment. We value the presence of preparedness information on all mediums, we offered a book review in the first issue, podcast recommendations in this version and we will consider alternate mediums in the future.



We do offer peer-reviewed publishing for those seeking to have their contribution undergo that level of scrutiny. That process has an elongated timeline, please drop us a line if interested.

Preparedness in Canada is arguably a foundational, societal area of concern. There are notable shortfalls, we see whether from a wildfire, storm or otherwise, the population is seemingly unable to navigate the chaos without external assistance. Further, there remains a significant gap between our expectations of support from the government and their capability. Amelioration will take effort and time. We first need to define individual, household and community preparedness in terms of effects, what are these social constructs expected to be able to execute in times of disruption. Only then can we assess the current level of preparedness in the community and develop a localized, evidence-based strategy to provide advice and guidance. We are trying many ideas, all without a coherent strategy, which is the principal reason why the state of preparedness is what it is.

This issue is part of a learning curve, the future steady state of the Journal will likely be different. As we navigate these first few issues, we appreciate and value your feedback. Whether that be for more innovative and disruptive material, more structured articles similar to academia, tables and charts, letters or stories from the affected population - we'll evolve. That is the brilliance and fear of a dream, bringing it to reality and watching it flounder, grow and flourish.

Enjoy the issue, provide feedback directly to me at jeff@preparednesslabs.ca. It is our honour and pleasure to serve the preparedness community.

Jeff Donaldson, PhD
Principal Researcher

Contract firefighters, Canada's Solution to Wildfire, Flood, and other Civil Emergencies

Author: Kris Liivam

In recent months there has been a lot of discussion regarding the bolstering of wildfire agencies and creating a federal emergency response force. The military has stated more than once that their responses to natural disasters are taxing their already reduced capacity. Would it shock you to learn that there has been a battalion sized force of trained, and experienced first responders who have been mostly sidelined during the most devastating fires in Canada since at least 2015, if not earlier?

Western Canada has a large sub sector of private firefighters who provide emergency services to the oilfield. This is unique to our resource basin as you do not see this size of private firefighting force in any other oil producing jurisdiction. This came about from the reckless state of the oil patch in the 1980's where the government of the day told the oil companies to start policing themselves or the government would do that for them. This resulted in a series of Industry Recommended Practices (IRP), of which one was for pumping flammable fluids. Because of this particular IRP, almost every frac site which uses diesel, methanol, or other flammable fluid for fracs required a private fire truck on site. These are not typical fire trucks, they are massive rolling fire extinguishers with hundreds of pounds of dry chemical powder and hundreds of gallons of premixed foam on board. They are staffed with firefighters who are trained in NFPA 1001/2. It is estimated that there are roughly 2000 private

firefighters, over 100 private fire trucks, amongst over a dozen companies who perform this service.

These companies do care about the communities they live in and want to participate in the response. This summer numerous contract firefighting companies, including my own, participated in almost every wildland urban interface fire in Alberta and the NWT. These companies provided a much needed capacity boost to the besieged local volunteer fire fighters to help protect their communities. There have even been a few instances where contractor leadership were asked to take on a larger role, such as being a Div Sup, or as Plans and Logistics Section Chiefs due to the lack of available resources across Western Canada.

There are areas that contractors can improve upon, such as getting their crews trained to CIFFC Type 1 Wildfire standard. However, CIFFC leadership and its partners have so far barred contractors from being allowed to access that training, or recognizing equivalent training from its American counterparts. It takes roughly 10 days to complete the Type 1 Wildfire course, depending on the Province, and roughly 14 days to bring in foreign fire fighters. With that in mind, there have been times where hundreds of oilfield firefighters have been sitting due to low resource prices or low utilization due to seasonal road bans reducing oilfield activity. As well, the Type 2 Wildland firefighter does not seem to be an interprovincially utilized resource which is primarily made of First Nation contractors. Why is the connection not being made to utilize domestic talent rather than outsourcing jobs to foreign agencies? As well, if contractors are utilized more often in civil emergencies you will see them investing more

into these types of responses as well as larger capital investments allowing for more specialized equipment to be brought to the front line. This would take pressure off of governments to stock pile resources which may not get used. As well, contractors can be deployed interprovincially a lot easier than most other government agencies are able to. If you look at the American FEMA, for example, many of the resources they use are private sector based. United Rentals, one of the largest rental companies in the world have a business unit dedicated to responding to civil emergencies. Their logistics team can move thousands of pieces of equipment quickly to help support local agencies in their time of need. Rather than the Canadian Government or Provincial Governments stock piling resources which may not get used, as COVID demonstrated, critical stock piles which were created were not maintained or replenished when lots expired and were disposed of. Utilizing a company which has the skills and expertise to manage equipment and resources may be a cost effective and practicable way to ensure when resources are needed they can be deployable in a short timeframe.

There is a lot of discussion right now about increasing funding to public fire services to engage wildfires. Some serious questions need to be asked before going down this route. Can a public fire service always respond to an export request, even if they are funded to provide that response? The answer should be no! A responsible Fire Chief should be looking at the risk faced by their own community to make sure they are not giving up too much, which may in turn cause them to be the next one calling for help. As well, the Fire Chief needs to ensure they are meeting their Underwriter

Fire Survey requirements, to ensure they do not face liability concerns from insurance companies. The export dollars are tempting, but could cost them a lot more if (when) an insurance company sues them for not meeting their requirements. Additionally, the Fire Chief cannot make that decision in a silo, they need to consult their mayor, council, and CAO to make sure this is the right decision.

Unfortunately, poor decisions have been made and in the case of one small community in BC in 2017 their Fire Chief made the decision to dispatch a brush truck and team of firefighters to Williams Lake to cash in on the BC Interagency Rate Sheet for wildland urban interface dollars, while their own community was under extreme fire risk. Sure enough, a wildfire broke out and consumed over 30 homes and caused over 300 families to be evacuated for weeks. Not to say the crew on export would have saved every property, but it is likely at least 1 or 2 additional families would have had homes to go back to. Is that not why residents pay local taxes, to have these resources available when they need them? Mutual aid is very important, especially in rural Canada, but is it reasonable to ask for volunteer firefighters to be gone for weeks or even months on end while their municipality profits off it?

As well, full time fire services do not have the capacity to deploy resources for a long period of time. When Calgary and Edmonton fire services were deployed to Yellowknife they could only do 4 day deployments at a time, as that is their shift rotation. What this looked like on the ground was by the time the firefighters got familiar with their new surroundings they were being shifted out for the next crew. This also creates stress for the fire departments in their home

jurisdiction as they lose their ability to back fill for sick days, holidays, injuries, or being able to call for additional crews if a major event occurs. It also creates a massive logistics problem for them to send their spare engines away. What if their first out trucks break down, do they still have enough in reserve to keep meeting their response requirements.

As contractors, we do not deplete local community protection because we are not a dedicated resource. But why aren't contractors deployed more often? That question comes down to politics. I had a senior BC Wildfire officer tell me that they "did not want to interrupt the business relationship they have with the BC Fire Chiefs Association and the IAFF." What that translated to was they have burnt down entire communities rather than bring in contract firefighters from the oil patch. When looking at what happened with Shuswap residents staying back and defying police blockades, or West Kelowna repeating history and had an inferno destroy many homes, or countless other (mostly First Nation) communities left evacuated and unprotected maybe its time to ask if protecting union jobs and placating fire chiefs is worth the cost? I once posted on a BC Volunteer Firefighter page that there were contractor firefighter resources available to help in BC and the numerous responses back from its page members were stay out because they did not their turn at the rotation. Wildfire response should be about protecting communities, not enriching what should be a local, volunteer fire service.

As well, wildfire agencies seemed more concerned about empire building rather than doing what is needed to protect communities using the plethora of private sector resources

which are available. If an oil company can build a temporary lake on top of a mountain to do a frac 3 hours from the nearest town, with miles of water tenders lined up to fill it, why aren't the same type of resources be used to help protect a town which is endangered? Is it cost? If so, how much more does it cost to rebuild a community and to temporarily house its residents for 2 years or longer? (Lytton, BC for example) Is it a lack of familiarity with the technology and capabilities of the private sector? If so, why aren't the agencies taking the time to get familiar with what is available? Or more ominously, are the agency's leadership letting themselves purposely get overwhelmed to justify larger annual budgets?

There also is the ethical dilemma, should publicly funded agencies be competing against and pushing out an established private sector industry? Wildfire agencies used to rely very heavily on contractor firefighters up until the mid-nineties, then decisions were made to internalize the majority of the non-mechanized work force in BC and Alberta causing many of these contractors to downsize or close up shop. As well, there is an active campaign from the Canadian Fire Chiefs Association for increased funding for wildfire responses, which further strains limited deployment for contractors. This takes away jobs and opportunities for fire fighters who are looking to gain experience to join the full time fire departments in the future.

If you think of how Canadian provinces manage their highways in the winter, they know it will snow every year and plan accordingly. They do not wait until the snow is so high that the highways are unsafe or impassable before gathering

and deploying resources, plows and sanders are deployed as early as possible to make the roads usable for as long as possible. As well, they do not wait until the snow is already 12” high before hiring additional plows to come in to clear the snow out. Also, snow plow removal on provincial jurisdiction is typically done by contractors, not by municipalities, and certainly not by volunteers. However; with wildfire the same precautions and preparedness measures are not being observed even though we know wildfires are a natural and predictable part of Canada’s eco system. Aside from fixed wing and rotary wing contractors, most other contractors used for wildfire are not put on retainer, meaning they are not guaranteed to be available to response to a fire and could be snatched up by resource industry clients instead. Typically, we do not see wildland urban interface contractors being deployed until a town is already under evacuation order and in many cases contracts not being issued or issued after the contractor has been deployed. This leaves Provinces and municipalities open to liability and a host of other issues because of not planning ahead of time to use these resources. Many of my fellow contractors abide by published rates for municipal fire response, such as the Alberta WUI Guideline and the BC Interagency Rate Sheet, but there are some who do not and that can create sticker shock at the end of the event.

When looking forward into what next year holds, it may be advisable for decision makers to put contractors on retainer to ensure they have the surge capacity when they need it and direct the resources to where they need them with terms and conditions already agreed upon. Now is the time to put plans into action and get what is needed in place for the worse

case scenario (again). If the resources are in place but not utilized, then that should be considered a win, as we already saw what happens when the resources are not there and there were a lot of losses. The trained & experienced workforce is there, the equipment is available, and the desire to help runs deep. Agencies need to connect the dots to make sure these resources are used to protect Canadians instead of lying to the public that “All available resources are being utilized”.

About the Author

Kris Liivam, President of Arctic Fire Safety Services, has been involved in safety consulting since 2000. As well, Mr. Liivam taught part time at the Medicine Hat Community College, in the University of Alberta Occupational Health and Safety Certificate Program. Kris Liivam achieved the Canadian Registered Safety Professional designation in 2009 and also completed the University of Alberta OHS Certificate Program in 2010. In 2015, Kris recognized the lack of capacity Canada faces when it comes to wildland urban interface and created the firefighting division to help protect communities. Arctic Fire Safety has been deployed to numerous wildland urban interface events to provide a capacity boost for local fire fighters. Arctic Fire Safety has a crew of 30 paid on call fire fighters and a fleet of 3x Type 3 Fire Trucks, 3x Type 6 Fire Trucks, an ARFF truck, Tactical Tender, and Type 7 Fire truck.

Financial Incentives for Preparedness

Author: Jeff Donaldson, Phd

Persuasion, influence, marketing, sales and numerous other iterations of similar processes exist with the singular intent to create a demand in the human mind. Scholarship clearly points to the concept that humans make acquisition decisions based upon emotions and justify it with logic. This is the antithesis of neoclassical economics, the model that humans are rational beings, in that they make decisions based upon their own best interest, and they do so at the margins.

Behavioural economics is the study of the emotional decision making portion of humanity, exploring the reasons for decisions that differentiate from the classical model. Some would argue economics is on the brink of a Kuhn style paradigmatic shift, with a rapid acceptance of behavioural economics as “the” model in which to frame modern economic thought.

One cornerstone of economics that remains is the value and importance of incentives, either in the form of payments for doing something, or as penalties for not. The intent is found in the stalwart piece, *Nudge* (2011) and its many previous iterations, the concept that the government can play a role to encourage more of a certain behaviour through nudging the population in a certain direction.

Governments have two levers to influence behaviours within the population, regulations and taxation. From an economic point of view these are often seen as necessary interventions in the free market when the market fails to allocate the limited resources effectively. Regulations are the codification of

behaviour to ensure a specific outcome: civil or criminal laws, building codes, minimum wage, property law and the list is endless. When anarchy fails to get up society for success, the government intervenes and sets the rules.

Governments can see that certain behaviours are desired, however after considerable effort to persuade the population to adopt a change, the realists remain less than the intended outcome. Hence, they intervene in the market and provide an incentive to nudge, encourage or steering the citizens towards a decision their previous efforts failed to solicit. This practice is reasonably common in healthcare as argued in Vlaey et al (2019), and in the fight against obesity (Jeffery, 2012).

The link to preparedness is found in some innovative and dynamic articles suggesting that we consider providing an incentive to persuade residents to adopt a prepared life.

The complications are many, arguably the most important being that the current preparedness communications strategy is not based upon evidence, the recommended activities are not found in research as correlated to better outcomes.

One current line of research is to find the willingness to pay (WTP), the amount the population is currently willing to contribute for a cause or issue to address a known phenomenon. This is not new to the disaster preparedness space, the stalwart 2014 paper by Donahue on insights into the likely WTP to address individual, household and community preparedness.

Donahue (2014) found that in a 2007 survey the most individuals were willing to pay for increased community preparedness was \$250, with the majority being in a range between \$1 and \$75, with the modal number being \$0 (p.114). The modal number represents consistency with other investigations into WTP from government programs. When individuals were queried as to why \$0 was their response, they indicated it was either government has too much money, they are incompetent with taxation funds or there is no level of money the citizens are willing to contribute to preparedness (p.114).

An interesting element of these findings is that while the most frequent response is not to financially support community preparedness, the number is not zero. Here, there is a degree of WTP within the population to contribute financially to the growth of community resilience, however the most frequent response incorporates a distrust of government. The WTP concept was further explored in assessing household's WTP for immediate pandemic vaccination program, ironically published prior to the most recent COVID-19 pandemic (Asgard, 2012). Interestingly, the findings from Asgard (2012), whose study was conducted in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, were that the WTP from the population exceeded the costs of the program, making a pay for immediate access program cost-effective. Further examinations leveraging behavioural economics lead to very interesting probabilities for preparedness communicators (Linnemayr et al, 2016).

What if we paid them? At what level can the government set a financial incentive that will encourage preparedness behavioural adoption. As all disasters are local, an initial

thought might be to tie lower property tax to specific non-code requirements, like a reduction of X% if the household executes a certain list of tasks that are correlated to better post event outcomes. That may be those who carry additional insurance for hazards not included in basic fire insurance - flood, earthquake, tornado, etc. Those additional insurance policies, risk transfers, are costly and a financial incentive might encourage homeowners to purchase the additional coverage. This provides a mitigation against the local and national liabilities through a government non-insured recovery program - in Canada, that falls under the Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangement between levels of government.

The incentive program will need to be inclusive, in that it represents the needs of all members of society. There is a considerable body of scholarly evidence supporting the need for non per-capita investment in marginalized populations (Lillywhite & Wolbring, 2022) as well as notable classics (Levac et al, 2012; Phillips et al, 2005). We know that vulnerable populations draw a disproportionate level of public sector first response, as well as are likely to have a slower recovery.

A key element in the discussion is understanding the barriers that exist to adopting a prepared life, the reasons individuals, households and community's consistently choose alternative options. Most research grounds that is either apathy or the probability equation - it will never happen to me (Levac et al, 2012). Governments have attempted to use the identification of hazards and risk perception as a tool to breach this obstacle. However, an unintended effects is that while fear is

a great motivator - explaining all the bad things that could happen - the result of attempting to persuade the population grounded in risk perception may lead to increased avoidance (McNeill et al, 2016), as seen in some recent surveys of population perception of risk (Schovell et al, 2022). Those recent findings lead to promise that if the message is controlled and provided in a consistent, non-fear mongering methodology, the link between risk knowledge and protective behaviour is increased.

The danger is that governments will be encouraged to incentivize behaviour not correlated to preparedness and better outcomes. One of the key stalwarts in preparedness is the emergency kit or 72 hr kit. There is no research to demonstrate any relationship between residents who possessed one and better post event outcomes. If we incentivize that behaviour, we will encourage the adoption of behaviours we're familiar with, but are in the end, unhelpful.

The way forward is to first understand that which leads to better post event outcomes, which is well underway throughout the academic and researcher community, with notable publications on social capital (Aldrich, 2015) and recent literature reviews (Ryan et al, 2020). With that knowledge, we can then begin the studies for incentives, tying behaviours and understanding the level of financial support necessary to encourage residents to adopt a prepared life.

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Preparedness and Social Media in Canada

Author: Research Division, Preparedness Labs Incorporated

In days of lore, information was available through social networks, trusted sources with whom you sought knowledge and updates. Communities were close, news travelled at remarkable speed throughout the town and countryside. Important events were highlighted by the presence of gifted orators, those whose command of voice inspired crowds in the town square, the gathering place in every town or village, where great speakers would congregate and climb upon a wooden soap box to pronounce.

Throughout the last centuries, that soapbox has been replaced with newsprint, a daily feed of the latest events, happenings and town drivel sold for a pence on the corner. Further evolutions have taken that newsprint and transformed it into the Internet, creating the conditions for the most connected of human generations. With the exhausting pace of disruption and innovation, platforms emerged where individuals, without charge, have voice, share what they like and at a species level, attempt to persuade and influence outcomes.

The government has a responsibility to inform, to provide accurate and timely information to citizens. Some will refer to that as a fiduciary duty, others contest it includes the requirement to separate truth from chaff and finally, others believe the task to be the creation of a single safe and trusted information source.


Over the last thirty years, the evolution of preparedness communications emanating from the public sector has not kept pace with innovation. An evaluation of the sub-national governments in Canada demonstrate a varied engagement across the to most frequented social media platforms, X and Facebook.

This article is the first in a series on the state of preparedness communications in Canada. Over 600,000 individual data points were collected from both the national and sub-national governments in Canada. Specifically, their social media feeds on Facebook and X (formerly Twitter), as well as a sampling of other traditional mediums. The period representing the most robust body of data upon which to assess and comment was from March of 2022 to August 2023, encompassing some of the most challenging recent periods of time in national emergency management.

The provinces and territories were grouped into regions, to both protect individual feeds and to reflect that hazards cross geo-political boundaries. Risks within Canada are often faced by multiple provinces, with some events spanning hundreds, if not thousands of kilometres. Hence, all three territories are grouped into “North”; with “Atlantic” representing Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland and Labrador; “Central” includes Ontario and Quebec; with “West” encompassing Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia.

This first report is to provide an introduction to the frequency and language chosen within the space, to understand what is being said and the extent to which Canadians care. Follow on

articles will present a more in detail analysis, including time characteristics, message engagement rates and recommendations on the timing, frequency and word choice for future campaigns.



This figure represents the average number of social media posts that were advisory in nature across Canada. Of note there were significant spikes in early 2023 for various major storms and in the July 2023 period for the record setting wildfire season.


The extent to which the 2023 fire season dominated the information space in emergency management did not correlate with a growth in social media following.

In 2021, Statistics Canada reported on Canadian's assessment of social media in their lives, drawing data from the 2018 Canadian Internet Use Survey. It showed that just

over 60% of those who use social media leverage that access to follow current events, more than the percentage of time dedicated to publicly sharing content with friends (35-55%). Further, an average of 93% of Canadians under the age of 35 use social media daily, with the percentage dropping after age 35, about 68% thereafter.

There is a notable difference between those who indicate regular social media use, and those who subscribe to official public sector emergency management general warning accounts. With the median age in Canada (Statistics Canada, 2020 census) being 41, demonstrating an average of 83.7% social media use, it is concerning that there are only a range of 8-21% of the population subscribed to official government social media accounts. Extrapolating the data, there are approximately 21.9 million Canadians who are regularly on social media, with only between 3.1 and 8.1 million following government accounts.

That range represent the possibility that not every follower is a distinct individual, in that a follower of a government account might also be accounted for in other statistics - someone may follow both the Ontario and Nova Scotia official emergency management accounts. Hence, the range represents that variable.



The ratio of followers to population is a challenge to present, as the data is not sufficiently robust to argue that a follower of a provincial feed is a resident. This chart shows that Facebook followers in Atlantic Canada represent a number equal to 42% of the total population. In Central, it's just above 1%.


They are likely someone who has an interest, a sense of place associated with that region. Regional disparities exist, as the northern and Atlantic regions of Canada engage with governments on social media at significantly higher rates than those within the western and central regions. The data was inconclusive as to why, though some theories include the presence of alternate sources of information from the government, to cultural differences in access to social media as well as ongoing pressures on institutional confidence in Canada.

The next iteration of data will look at the influence of message reception based upon time and day of posting, the population's engagement rate with public sector posts and a survey on the attitudes towards preparedness communications from across Canada.

The content of the communications often transmits an important message itself, word selection matters. Theory argues there are three elements to successful communication programs. First, an audience willing to listen, which requires trust and confidence in the issuer. Second, is a chosen medium that has the potential to reach the target population, essentially meeting them where they're at. Finally, a succinct, confident and useful message, a selection of words that will engage the reader and influence their decisions. This last element of the first report in a collection of the content of 18 months of social media feeds from the public sector. Word clouds are powerful tools, they represent both the intent of the issuer and the advice provided. These word clouds represent the federal government and the individual regions.

Northern Canada

The Northern region contains a wonderful collection of language from across the three Territories and contain similar key phrases:



Conclusion

Canadians are using social media as their modern public square, it is where they go for information in a crisis. This represents a unique opportunity for the public sector to engage the population where they are, in the places they frequent to provide relevant information that residents may find useful in navigating exogenous shock.

A challenge is that between 11- 37% of Canadians are following the public sector social media feeds. If residents saw government social media feeds as the trusted institutional source of important timely and accurate information, the following rates would be higher, substantially so in central and western Canada.

The discussion is why? What are the obstacles to Canadians viewing government social media accounts as trusted sources of information?

The next edition of this article series on social media will present additional data points to support an argument that when the message is issued matters, the engagement rates with the population and survey results from Canadians on their rationale for deciding whether to consider government social media feeds as important sources of trusted information in all stages of emergencies.

Podcast Recommendations

Podcasting is experiencing exponential growth, with well over one million shows on Apple Music, with Spotify and Google Podcasts not far behind. Similar to audiobooks, it is a source of information and entertainment that can be consumed as a primary activity - intentionally listening, to a background experience while executing another task - cleaning, driving or commuting.

To be upfront, Preparedness Labs Incorporated owns the rights to *Inside My Canoehead*, a Canadian podcast dedicated to emergency preparedness and individual empowerment.

This recommendation section is a new addition to the Journal, as the production and consumption of preparedness communications is not limited to peer-reviewed articles, opinion pieces or social media. Podcasts remain a powerful opportunity for all four sectors of society - public (government), private (business), non-profit and civil society to spread the preparedness message, to engage residents and businesses alike.

As hundreds of millions listen to podcasts on a monthly basis, it opens another important avenue for those responsible for preparedness communications. If you work in the field, especially within the public sector, why doesn't your town have a podcast on preparedness?

In this first iteration, we'll highlight three podcasts, which can be found on major platforms:

Louisiana State University, National Center for Biomedical Research and Training Preparedness Podcast

This weekly podcast presents various topics from preparedness through a protection lens. The research and training program is based within the Academy on Counter-Terrorism, leveraging years of experience in managing threats to society, this is an evidence-based series of episodes on becoming and remaining preparedness for exogenous shocks.

Hometown Ready Emergency Management

This monthly locally orientated podcast is produced by and for the Springfield-Green County Office of Emergency Management designed to provide public insight into the field of emergency management and the operations of your local emergency management office. A brilliant, home town focus for those who seek a local flavour and hospitality.

Act ASAP

This periodic veteran powered podcast speaks to the communication, leadership and resiliency necessary to navigate today's world and to guide you through the maze of disaster planning. In 2024, the podcast is orientating towards financial preparedness and the steps to becoming resilient in these economically challenging times.

Final Thoughts

This is an effort to inform, to challenge ideas and to contribute to better outcomes across Canada. We thrive in an environment where you contribute, argue and see yourself within a solution. So be bold, be aggressive and be passionate. This incredible country is worth every blood, sweat and tear.

Pro Patria

