It is sometimes said that Marxism has no moral component or that Marx's works—at least, his later works—have no moral component. As will be seen in what follows, these claims are clearly and demonstrably false. Although Marx never developed the philosophical basis for a full-fledged moral theory, he did exhibit a moral perspective, which remained relatively constant—although somewhat eclectic—throughout his writings. The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate his moral views. The approach taken is basically historical: the development of Marx's moral views, as well as the most important components of his empirical views, is traced from his earliest journalistic writings in his period of Radical Liberalism (1841-1843) through his periods of Revolutionary Humanism (1843) and Original Marxism (1844-1845) to the works of the Transitional Period (1845-1847), his works of maturation (1847-1858), and—finally—his fully mature works (1858-1883). (For my classification of Marx's works by period, see the Appendix.)

Besides laying the groundwork for refuting the claim that Marx's worldview is devoid of normative value judgments in general or of moral judgments (and principles) in particular—a refutation developed in detail in chapter 4—the present chapter, together with chapters 2 and 3, takes up the issue of the nature of Marx's implicit moral views. Although these views have been given a great many divergent interpretations, I argue for the following theses. First, although Marx's concepts of alienation and exploitation are central to his moral perspective, they can be analyzed in terms of other, more basic moral values and principles. Second, the more basic values involved are freedom (as self-determination), human community, and self-realization. Third, Marx implicitly espouses a principle requiring an egalitarian (or relatively egalitarian) distri-
distribution of these goods, especially the good of freedom. (Whether this principle is identical to the principles he proposes for the first and second stages of communism—namely, “from each according to their contribution” and “from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs”—will be discussed in later chapters.) Fourth, if these values and principles can be analyzed in terms of some even more fundamental notion, it is not the notion of utility nor the satisfaction of preferences or desires, but that of human dignity and the good of self-respect—notions with a distinctly “de-ontological” ring.

Marx's First Period: Radical Liberalism (1841-1843)

In his initial, radical liberal period—from the time he received his Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Jena in Berlin (April 1841) until he resigned as editor of the Rheinische Zeitung (March 1843)—Marx found no problem in speaking of moral or ethical requirements or making explicit moral judgments. In this period we also find his only attempts at characterizing morality from an internal point of view as a realm of human discourse or theory. In his later, social-scientific works, he would characterize morality from an external point of view as a cultural or social phenomenon.

In one of his earliest articles, “Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instructions,” which was originally written in 1842 for Arnold Ruge’s Deutsche-Französische Jahrbücher but published by Ruge in Anekdoten zur neuesten deutschen Philosophie und Publicistik (1843) in Switzerland when the Jahrbücher was shut down by the Prussian censors, Marx condemns censorship on the grounds that “it violates the most universal of all religions: the sacredness and inviolability of subjective conviction.” The censorship instruction, Marx argues, puts forward no “objective norms” but instead relies on the judgment of censors as to whether or not “the tendency” of writings is “well-intentioned” or “harmful,” and it must therefore be classified as “tendentious.” “Such laws,” he writes, “are based on a lack of character and on an unethical and materialistic view of the state. They are indirect reasons of bad conscience” (emphasis added).

In a paragraph that clearly reveals his Kantian predilections in

his conception of morality at this time, Marx attacks those who fail to separate religion from morality:

The specifically Christian legislator cannot recognize morality as an independent sphere sanctified in itself, for he derives the inner universal essence of morality from religion. Independent morality offends the basic principles of religion, and particular concepts of religion are opposed to morality. Morality recognizes only its own universal and rational religion, and religion only its own particular positive morality. Following the Instruction, censorship will have to repudiate such intellectual heroes of morality as Kant, Fichte, Spinoza for being irreligious and threatening the discipline, morals, and outward loyalty. All of these moralists proceed from a principled opposition between morality and religion, because morality they claim, is based on the autonomy, and religion on the heteronomy of the human spirit.

The notion that morality can and must be an independent, autonomous realm that is not subordinate to religion also comes out at the end of his article “On a Proposed Divorce Law,” one of Marx’s contributions to Rheinische Zeitung and perhaps the essay of this period most replete with moral language and moral claims. There he contraposes “conscious subordination to ethico-natural forces” to “unconscious obedience to a supra-ethical and supernatural authority.” Although Marx does not—here or elsewhere—explain what he means by “ethico-natural forces,” it is clear that he is primarily distinguishing the sort of morality that would be based on such considerations from one based on religious commitments or the commands of God. One might be tempted to interpret his phrase as indicating that Marx has—at this point in his development, at any rate—a naturalistic theory of the good or that his ethical views take our naturalistic inclinations as the basis for all moral judgments, but this interpretation would be wrong. The most important element in the phrase concerning obedience or duty is the part reading “conscious subordination,” which indicates that the choice of moral principles must be made on the basis of one’s own rational reflection and must not be subordinated to any outer authority. Such a belief coincides with other remarks he makes around this time—especially those employing

2 Ibid., pp. 80-81.
3 Ibid., p. 78.
the terms autonomy and heteronomy—indicating his deep concern with the Kantian notion of the individual as an autonomous chooser of ends. And to whatever extent he accepted Kant's characterization of morality—which appears to be quite considerable—he would, of course, have distanced himself from the view that we should take our naturalistic inclinations as a basis for moral judgments. For the Kantian, to do so is a failure in moral reasoning of the first order: it is to let morality (practical reason) be ruled by the heteronomy rather than the autonomy of the human will. (We will do well to keep this in mind when, in chapter 4, we consider Skil len's and Collier's "naturalistic inclination" interpretation of Marx's normative perspective.)

Further evidence can be found for the fact that Marx makes substantial moral judgments in this period and that his views of morality, as well as these substantive moral views, are firmly en sconced in the deontological and rational-will tradition of Kantian and post-Kantian German philosophy. In "On a Proposed Divorce law," for example, he asks:

If a legislator considers spiritual sacredness and not human ethics as the essence of marriage, if he replaces self determination by determination from above, inner natural dedication by a supernatural sanction, and loyal submission to the nature of the relationship by passive obedience to commandments—commandments transcending the nature of that relationship—can he be blamed for subjugating marriage to the church...?" [emphasis added].

However, even though religion cannot decree what is right and wrong, neither can the human individual or the legislator. Marx claims that "no legislature can decree what is ethical." Revealing his leaning toward the natural-law branch of the tradition of ethical rationalism at this time, he declares: "The legislator... must consider himself a naturalist. He does not make laws; he does not invent them; he only formulates them. He expresses the inner principles of spiritual relationships in conscious, positive laws."

As to the substantive moral issue at hand, Marx writes, "The Rheinische Zeitung agrees with the bill in considering the present marriage law as unethical, the numerous and frivolous reasons for divorce inappropriate, and the procedure used so far not commen-

surate with the dignity of the matter." (emphasis added). He goes on to condemn those who "take an eudaemonistic view" of marriage and divorce for not taking into consideration "the ethical substance of the relationship." Furthermore, according to Marx, it should be the case that the legislator shows reverence for marriage and recognizes its deeply ethical nature. Compliance with the wishes of individuals would become harshness against their essential nature, against their ethical rationality, which is embodied in ethical relationships [emphasis added].

A clearer declaration of kinship to the rational-will tradition of Rousseau and Kant could hardly be found. The requirements of morality stem from the autonomy of the will (i.e., reason) rather than from its heteronomy (desire or inclination). Individuals must attend (or, by law, be made to attend) to their "ethical rationality," i.e., to their real, rational wills rather than their empirical wills. As with most components of Marx's worldview in this period, however, his views on morality are mediated by those of Hegel—in particular, by Hegel's distinction between an ethical essence and its corresponding existence. In the same article on the proposed divorce law, Marx cites Hegel's distinction, claiming that "no ethical existence corresponds to its essence, or at least does not have to correspond to it." Marx differentiates himself from Hegel's authoritarian political views, however, and indicates his own commitment to democracy when, in the next paragraph, he states: "The guarantee... that the conditions will be fairly substantiated under which the existence of an ethical relationship no longer corresponds to its essence... will be present only when law is the conscious expression of the will of the people, created with and through it." Here Marx's view is closer to that of Rousseau—at least on those nontotalitarian interpretations of Rousseau in which autonomy and free consensual agreement are definitive of the general will.

Nevertheless, Marx at this time is basically a Hegelian in his view of society and history as well as in his normative political theory (with the exception noted above). He accepts Hegel's view

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3 Ibid., p. 137.
5 Ibid., p. 139.
6 Ibid., p. 140.
7 Ibid., p. 141.
that reason is progressively manifesting itself in history, as well as Hegel’s concept of the state as the actualization of rational freedom. Tracing the historical development of this view, Marx writes:

Machiavelli and Campanella earlier, and Hobbes, Spinoza, and Hugo Grotius later, down to Rousseau, Fichte, and Hegel began considering the state from the human viewpoint and developed its natural laws from reason and experience.13

While the earlier philosophers of state law derived the state from drives of ambition and gregariousness, or from reason—though not reason in society but rather in the individual—the more ideal and profound view of modern philosophy derives it from the idea of the whole. It considers the state as the great organism in which legal, ethical, and political freedom has to be actualized and in which the individual citizen simply obeys natural laws of his own reason, human reason, in the laws of the state. . . . 14

Nevertheless, since “no ethical existence corresponds to its essence, or at least does not have to correspond to it,” it is the job of philosophy to make sure that the state realizes its essence to the greatest degree possible. As Marx puts it: “Philosophy interprets the rights of humanity. Philosophy demands that the state be the state of human nature.” 15 (Here we should note that at least the very early Marx was not reticent to speak of human rights.)

But whereas Hegel interprets the freedom to be actualized by the state as merely the rationality of the bureaucracy which, in his view, is to run it, Marx interprets it as including not only such civil liberties as freedom of thought and of the press but the active and equal participation of the entire citizenry as well. While Hegel is a conservative who advocates monarchy, a limited franchise, and government by middle-class, professional bureaucracies, Marx is a democrat and, in many ways, a liberal. As a radical journalist writing for opposition newspapers in Germany, he defended freedom of the press and freedom of thought and, as we have seen, demanded that the state be subject to the will of the people rather than the reverse. “In an ethical state,” Marx claims, “the view of the state is subordinated to its members, even if they oppose an organ of the state or the government.” 16

14 Ibid., p. 130.
15 Ibid., p. 127.

Marx’s Second Period: Revolutionary Humanism (1843)

As I have divided Marx’s work, this period takes up only the second half of 1843 and consists of Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, on which he worked during the summer of 1843, and his contributions to the first and only issue of Deutsche-Französische Jahrbücher (namely, “On the Jewish Question,” “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction,” and “Letters to Arnold Ruge”). This issue was published by Ruge and Marx in January 1844. These works are most notable for (1) the change in his normative political position—Marx moves from being a supporter of the bourgeois democratic state to an advocate of some sort of more communal society along the lines of Rousseau’s model of the good society—and (2) his modified views on the means of social change. From viewing philosophical and journalistic criticism as sufficient for social change, he comes to argue that political activity and even material force may be necessary. For the most part, these revised positions were the result of changes in his empirical rather than his moral views. From the beginning, Marx accepted the values of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution—enjoyment, liberty, equality, and fraternity—in addition to the Kantian value of moral autonomy and the value of self-realization as stressed by the German philosophical tradition. These values lie behind his demand for the “realization of philosophy.”

The tremendous influence of French Enlightenment thought on both his descriptive-explanatory and evaluative views comes out most clearly perhaps in a somewhat later work: The Holy Family (1845). In a section entitled “Battle Against French Materialism,” in which Marx defends the French Enlightenment philosophers from the attacks of the left-Hegelian Bruno Bauer and his school of Critical Criticism, he writes:

No great acumen is required to see the necessary connection of materialism with communism and socialism from the doctrines of materialism concerning the original goodness and equal intellectual endowment of man, the omnipotence of experience, habit and education, the influence of external circumstances on man, the extreme importance of industry, the justification of enjoyment, etc. If man forms all his knowledge, perception, etc., from the world of sense and experience in the world of sense, then it follows that the empirical world
must be so arranged that he experiences and gets used to what is truly human in it, that he experiences himself as man. If enlightened interest is the principle of all morality, it follows that men’s private interests should coincide with human interests. . . . If man is formed by circumstances, then his circumstances must be made human. If man is by nature social, then he develops his true nature only in society and the power of his nature must be measured not by the power of the single individual but by the power of society. 17

Marx also indicates the impact of Enlightenment thought on his moral views when he goes on in this section to present a number of excerpts from the ethical writings of Holbach, Helvétius, and Jeremy Bentham.

Given his acceptance of these Enlightenment values, it was an easy step to his new positions. He only had to reach the conclusion that bourgeois society does not allow for the “realization of philosophy,” i.e., for the realization of these values, and that philosophical criticism is not an effective means to create social arrangements that realize these values. This is not to say that Marx’s moral views were absolutely static or that the way in which they were expressed did not change at all. The third noticeable change in this period, in fact, is that Marx—under the impact of Feuerbach’s writings—came to express his moral views increasingly in terms of the dignity or, conversely, the degradation or dehumanization of human beings. This, however, seems mostly a change in the manner in which his basic moral sentiments are expressed and cannot account for the changes in his normative political positions.

In Marx’s first expressly theoretical manuscript, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, he both reaffirms his commitment to democracy and begins to doubt that bourgeois society, with its divisions between the state and civil society and between “man as citizen” and “man as egoistic individual,” has the potential to become a genuinely democratic and “human” society. Consequently, he defends universal suffrage and participation of all in political processes against Hegel’s view of limited suffrage and government by a middle-class bureaucracy: “The drive of civil society to become political or to make political society actual is evident as a drive toward participation in legislative power as universal as possible.” 18 According to Marx, “Voting is the paramount polit-

cical interest of civil society. Only in unlimited voting, active as well as passive, does civil society actually rise to an abstraction of itself, to political existence as its true universal and essential existence.” 19

In the same manuscript, however, Marx indicates that universal suffrage, i.e., “the idea that all as individuals should participate in deliberating and deciding on political matters of general concern,” 20 is not in and of itself sufficient. In a passage that is, again, reminiscent of Rousseau, he claims:

In a really rational state one could answer, “It is not the case that all as individuals should participate in deliberating and deciding on political matters of general concern,” for the “individuals” participate in deliberating and deciding on political matters of general concern as “all,” that is, within society and as parts of society. Not all as individuals, but individuals as all. 21

As with Rousseau’s conception of the general will, this can be interpreted as a prescription that everyone accept the moral point of view, that is, that everyone vote on the basis of the common good rather than their individual good or, more precisely, that they come to think of the common good as their individual good. As we shall see, the prescription that all members of society ought to act on the basis of the common good as well as the associated empirical thesis that people could and, in general, would act on this basis in a rationally constructed society, occurs in one form or another, in all the rest of Marx’s works. In “On the Jewish Question,” Marx refers to this thesis as the incorporation of the abstract, moral citizen into the egoistic individual of civil society. In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, the thesis comes out in what he variously calls “universal,” “social,” “communal,” or “species” consciousness. Persons who embody this sort of consciousness are called “species-beings.” And although he does not often explicitly refer to this type of consciousness in his fully mature works, it is nevertheless presupposed by his vision of communism as a stateless, conflict-free society in which everyone lives in perfect harmony.

Furthermore, in “On the Jewish Question” Marx condemns the “acquisitive spirit” of “Judaism” or—as he makes clear—the system of private property and egoistic bourgeois civil society. He

17 Writings of the Young Marx (Easton and Coddal, eds.), pp. 394–395.
18 Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, p. 199.
20 Ibid., p. 197.
21 Ibid.
again distinguishes the state and the role of the citizen from civil society and the role of the egistic individual and, consequently, political emancipation from human emancipation. Political emancipation releases members of society from the political repression of the state; it is the guaranteed recognition of their political rights. Mere political emancipation does not, however, free the member of civil society from the separated, isolated, individualistic, and egoistic condition of civil society itself. Realization of the various proposed "rights of man" is thus not sufficient for the attainment of a genuinely human or good society. Marx thus prescribes human emancipation, that is, "the emancipation of civil society." But a necessary condition for human emancipation is the incorporation of the abstract, moral citizen into the individual as a member of civil society.22

In terms of his empirical theory, Marx first links his normative political positions to the plight of the proletariat in " Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction." Here Marx claims that human emancipation is tied up with the emancipation of a "universal" class, that is, a class whose "sufferings are universal"—in the case of modern industrial society, this is the proletariat. Furthermore, "the proletariat demands the negation of private property. . . ." and "just as philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds its intellectual weapons in philosophy. . . . Philosophy can be realized only by the abolition of the proletariat, and the proletariat can be abolished only by the realization of philosophy."23

As to the evolution of his views on the means of social change, in a September 1843 letter to Arnold Ruge, Marx sees philosophical criticism as the way to social change. However, this criticism must be a "relentless criticism of all existing conditions, relentless in the sense that criticism is not afraid of its findings and just a little afraid of the conflict with the powers that be."24 By the end of this very short period, however, Marx claims: "Criticism is no longer an end in itself, but simply a means; indigation is its essential mode of feeling, and denunciation its principal task."25 And, more importantly, "it is clear that the arm of criticism cannot re-


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place the criticism of arms. Material force can be overthrown only by material force. . . ."26

Marx's third change of this period—his acceptance of Feuerbach's humanistic moral terminology—is evident as early as a May 1843 letter to Ruge. Speaking about the manner in which society can be revitalized and improved, Marx states that "freedom, the feeling of man's dignity will have to be awakened. . . . Only this feeling . . . can again transform society into a community of men to achieve their highest purpose, a democratic state."27 He claims that "despotism's only idea is contempt for man, dehumanized man. . . . A Despot only sees man as degraded"28 and that "the principle of monarchy in general is man despised, despicable, dehumanized."29 Furthermore, Marx speaks of entering "the human world of democracy" and of "an order of free mankind."30

To see that Marx's criticism of politics at this time is very similar to Feuerbach's criticism of religion, one need only substitute the word "religion" for the terms "despotism," "despot," and "monarchy" in the sentences above. When these substitutions are made we have Feuerbach's criticism of religion framed precisely in his terms. Feuerbach believed that religion—or, at any rate, the Judeo-Christian tradition in religion which hypostatizes a personal God—is a sign of the psychic or "spiritual" alienation of the human species. Religion of this sort arises from the human species' externalization and projection of its needs and values into an otherworldly, transcendent realm, in particular, into the person of God. Through this process of projection and reification, Feuerbach argues, human beings come to compare themselves to the perfect and all-powerful creature they have built up in their imaginations and thus come to look upon themselves as debased, despised, and despicable creatures. Religion "dehumanizes" man, and the Feuerbachian project is to make people conscious of this connection so that they will lose interest in religious illusions and become free of them. Only then, according to Feuerbach, will people become "rehumanized." Only then will they take "man" as the most important being for "man" and rejoice in the glory of the human species rather than in that of an illusory God. As Marx remarks in the September 1843 letter to Ruge quoted above: "Our entire pur-
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Pose consists in nothing else (as is also the case in Feuerbach's criticism of religion) but bringing the religious and political problems into self-conscious human form.\textsuperscript{31}

The classic formulation of Marx's revolutionary humanist morality, however, is contained in "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction":

The criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that man is the supreme being for man. It ends, therefore, with the categorical imperative to overthrow all those conditions in which man is an abased, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible being—conditions which can hardly be better described than in the exclamation of a Frenchman on the occasion of a proposed tax upon dogs: "Wretched dogs! They want to treat you like men!"\textsuperscript{32}

Although Marx is not a moral philosopher and thus makes no attempt to construct a systematic moral theory, it is clear from these remarks—at least in the early stages of the development of his thought—that he has moral views, and these are most fundamentally based on the concept of intrinsic human dignity or worth rather than on the satisfaction of human desires. In this respect, at least, they must be classified as "deontological" as opposed to utilitarian. These moral views, as I shall argue presently, appear throughout the rest of Marx's works, even though the terminology in which they are expressed changes somewhat and they become increasingly less explicit. They constitute for Marx what he refers to in another context as the "ideas won by our intelligence, embodied in our outlook, and forged in our conscience... chains from which we cannot tear ourselves away without breaking our hearts... demons we can overcome only by submitting to them."\textsuperscript{33}

Marx's Third Period: Original Marxism (1844)

Even though Marx was beginning to have an impact somewhat earlier, it was not until 1844—after moving to Paris to escape the Prussian censors—that he came into his own as an original theorist. It was in this year, as a result of his critical study of classical political economy and his adaptation of Hegel's problematic of objectification, alienation, and the transcendence of alienation to the historical development of human nature through human productive activity, that he first formulated the doctrines constituting Original Marxism. These doctrines include Marx's critique of classical political economy as an explanatory theory, his critique of capitalism as a social system, a more detailed presentation of his humanist morality, and the beginnings of his materialist theory of history. Furthermore, it is in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (hereafter referred to as the Paris Manuscripts or, more simply, the Manuscripts) that he first explicitly espouses communism in his normative political theory and offers the beginnings of an empirical explanation of its possibility and, indeed—in Marx's view—indefatigability. It is here also that his concept of alienation blossoms into the central category of his implicit humanist morality.

In this period Marx generally does not use the terms "moral" or "ethical" to qualify his own evaluative judgments as he had previously. His moral judgments are now almost entirely implicit and, for the most part, are packed into such quasi-descriptive terms as "alienation" and—as he uses the term—"human," as well as into such other value-laden terms as "impoverishment," "misery," "well-being," "debasement," "degradation," "domination," "freedom," "enjoyment," "satisfaction," "servitude," "depravity," "inhuman," "cruel," "crude," and "malignant."

Not only has Marx stopped qualifying his evaluative judgments by the terms "ethical" and "moral" but he has also stopped speaking of morality as an autonomous realm and, in effect, has stopped trying to characterize what today we refer to as the "moral point of view." When he speaks of morality in this period—and from then on—it is from a descriptive, sociological point of view. He speaks of the morality of particular classes, groups, and individual theorists. That Marx now conceives of morality from an external, sociological point of view rather than from an internal, evaluative point of view is further borne out by his comment that "the bearing of political economy upon morals is either arbitrary and accidental and thus lacking any scientific basis or character, is a mere sham, or else it is essential and can then only be a relation between economic laws and morals."\textsuperscript{34} His project concerning morality from this point on is to ascertain the relation of a mode of production

\textsuperscript{31} Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction," p. 52.
\textsuperscript{32} Marx, "Communism and the Augsburg 'Allgemeine Zeitung,'" p. 135.
\textsuperscript{33} Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 173.
and its economic laws and—by extension—the interests of its dominant socioeconomic class to the system or systems of mores (accepted moral values) it contains. In this sense Marx is one of the seminal figures in the sociology of morals.

Although Marx’s worldview, in this period, is becoming more and more empirical and, in a broad sense of the term, scientific, it is still in some respects abstractly philosophical. These philosophical aspects involve the concepts of alienation and its transcendence, on the one hand, and the concepts of essence and existence, on the other. While these concepts are beginning to receive a descriptive, social-scientific content, Marx still assumes that whatever is alienated seeks to overcome (transcend or supersede) its alienation and that existences tend toward their essences. Nevertheless, it is clear that he is in the process of abandoning the Hegelian idealism that his earlier views approximated. In the section entitled “Critique of Hegel’s Dialectic and General Philosophy” in the Manuscripts, Marx—who always had too much of a naturalistic inclination to be fully a Hegelian—attacks the idealistic aspect of Hegel’s philosophy:

When Hegel conceives wealth, the power of the state, etc. as entities alienated from the human being, he conceives them only in their thought form. They are entities of thought and thus simply an alienation of the pure (i.e., abstract) philosophical thought. The whole movement therefore ends in absolute knowledge. It is precisely abstract thought from which these objects are alienated, and which they confront with their presumptuous reality. . . . It is not the fact that the human being objectifies himself inhumanly, in opposition to abstract thought, but that he objectifies himself by distinction from and in opposition to abstract thought, which constitutes alienation as it exists and as it has to be transcended. 39

For Hegel, human life, man, is equivalent to self-consciousness. All alienation of human life is, therefore, nothing but alienation of self-consciousness. This alienation of self-consciousness is not regarded as the expression, reflected in knowledge and thought, of the real alienation of human life. 36

Nevertheless, Marx for the first time in this period adopts the Hegelian problematic of objectification, alienation, and the transcendence of alienation. Ironically, he did not utilize this problematic in his initial periods of development when he was actually much closer philosophically and politically to Hegel. The acceptance of the problematic of alienation, however, goes hand in hand with his growing attachment to the new science of political economy and is perhaps to be attributed as much to his reading of Adam Smith and the other classical political economists as to his rereading of Hegel’s works at this time. His first study of Hegel—“Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of the State” or, alternatively, “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right”—which he worked on in 1842 and 1843, contains no hint of the importance he would a year later attach to the concept of alienation. Furthermore, “Hegel’s standpoint,” according to Marx, “is that of modern political economy. He conceives of labour as the essence, the self-confirming essence of man.” 37

The outstanding achievement of Hegel’s *Phenomenology* is, first, that Hegel grasps the self-creation of man as a process, objectification as a transcendence of this alienation, and that he, therefore, grasps the nature of labour, and conceives objective man (true, because real man) as a result of his own labour. 38

In short, Hegel conceives labour as man’s act of self-creation (though in abstract terms). 39

On Marx’s adaptation of the Hegelian problematic, human beings objectify their natural powers and faculties by creating an objective world of material and cultural objects, and in this historical development of material and intellectual production, beings create themselves, create their own historical human natures. While there is a certain basic or essential human nature or, rather, set of natural powers and faculties common to all (normal) persons throughout history, human personality and identity are created by and through the production of systems of physical and cultural objects in each specific historical period and culture. 40

This creation of historical human nature, of human identity and personality, is, however, dependent upon the creation of cultural objects as much as upon the creation of physical objects. Marx speaks of the “objects of natural science and art” as “man’s spiri-
tual inorganic nature, his intellectual means of life, which he must first prepare for enjoyment and perpetuation," and claims:

It is only through the objectively deployed wealth of the human being that the wealth of subjective human sensibility . . . is cultivated and created. For it is not only the five senses, but also the so-called spiritual senses, the practical senses (desiring, loving, etc.), in brief, human sensibility and the human character of the senses, which can only come into being through the existence of its object, through humanized nature. The cultivation of the five senses is the work of all previous history.42

However, in all societies that have existed thus far these material and cultural objects have been in some sense separated from the vast majority of human beings, taken out of the orbit of their utilization and control. Consequently, they have been perceived by the vast majority of persons as "alien" and "hostile." The vast majority, therefore, have not only been alienated from the objects or products of material and intellectual production but, according to Marx, from the process of production, other persons, nature, and their own selves, i.e., "human life," or their own "species-being." These forms of alienation will be transcended, in Marx's view, only when the vast majority regain control of these objects and their own lives. This is possible only when they become truly social beings, which, in turn, is possible only with the creation of communist society.

Although the philosophical language of objectification, alienation, and the transcendence of alienation is somewhat vague and confusing, Marx's use of these terms, unlike Hegel's, does not require any profound metaphysical assumptions. Of the three German terms—"vergegenständlichung," "entäußerung," and "entfremdung"—generally lumped together under the English terms "alienation" and "estrangement," the first is almost entirely descriptive in nature, the second primarily descriptive and secondarily evaluative, and the third primarily evaluative and only secondarily descriptive. All three concepts enter into Marx's philosophical anthropology and are connected by him to the categories of political economy.

Marx claims that human beings, through their physical and intelectual labor, objectify (in the sense of "vergegenständlichung") their powers and faculties in material and cultural objects. In the modern system of the division of labor and private property, the greater part of humanity is—in the sense of "entäußerung"—divested of or alienated from the material and cultural objects they create. These objects, in other words, are alienated from the common, laboring human being in precisely the sense that one's property is alienated when one sells it to another: one loses control of it. Finally, this social system—like all social systems based on the opposition of dominant and subordinate classes, as the later Marx observes—alienates (in the sense of "entfremdung") one from the process and product of production as well as from other persons and one's self (i.e., one's own human nature) because one feels separated and isolated from these objects and perceives them as hostile forces against which one feels powerless.

It is clear that part of the meaning of "alienation"—at least in the sense of "entfremdung"—is its negative evaluative connotation. Marx makes this clear, for example, when he speaks of "the sense of alienation" as "error, a defect, that which ought not to be" (emphasis added). The moral content of the various forms of alienation Marx describes in the Manuscripts, the moral grounds upon which he condemns these forms of alienation, can, I think, be successfully reduced to three primary moral principles to which he implicitly subscribes in the Manuscripts and throughout the rest of his writings. These principles are freedom (as self-determination), human community, and self-realization. On this interpretation, alienation from the products of production primarily concerns the domination of the producer by alien powers and thus a lack of freedom. Similarly, alienation from the process of production has to do with the domination of the producer by alien powers and the resultant loss of meaningfulness in his work, which indicates not only a lack of freedom but a lack of genuine community as well. Alienation from other men (and women) is normally objectionable because it indicates the lack of genuine community and thus the opportunity to realize certain human potentialities having genuine human community as their precondition. Alienation from the species-being or from one's own "truly human" nature suggests that certain "human" potentialities cannot be realized under prevalent socioeconomic conditions, thus indicating that the values of self-realization and human community are being impugned.

41 Ibid., p. 126.
42 Ibid., p. 161.
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Alienation is, in fact, the evaluative concept Marx employs most in his critique of "the system of private property," or what he later simply refers to as capitalism. Human beings are alienated in this social system because of (1) the detrimental conditions in which they must live and work (detrimental, that is, to their physical and mental health, their ability to realize their human potentialities, and—in general—their ability to flourish), and (2) the lack of control they are accorded concerning their lives and work situations. This much, on Marx's analysis, is confirmed by the principles of political economy:

(The alienation of the worker in his object is expressed as follows in the laws of political economy: the more the worker produces the less he has to consume; the more value he creates the more worthless he becomes; the more refined his product the more crude and misshapen the worker; the more civilized the product the more barbarous the worker; the more powerful the work the more feeble the worker; the more the work manifests intelligence the more the worker declines in intelligence and becomes a slave of nature.)

Political economy conceals the alienation in the nature of labour in so far as it does not examine the direct relationship between the worker (work) and production. Labour certainly produces marvels for the rich but it produces privation for the worker. It produces palaces, but hovels for the worker. It produces beauty, but deformity for the worker. It replaces labour by machinery, but it casts some of the workers back into a barbarous kind of work and turns others into machines. It produces intelligence, but also stupidity and cretinism for the workers.44

Marx now describes these nonoptimal, detrimental effects of a society based on private property, profit, and the division of labor in terms of various forms of alienation. By way of contrast, in his later works he is satisfied to illustrate these effects without subsuming them under this concept. Though the manner of description thus changes, the postulation of the empirical effects themselves, together with Marx's moral evaluation of them, is constant throughout his writings.

The concepts of "human" (or "truly human") and of "species-being" also figure into Marx's evaluative framework at this time and are thus linked to his concept of alienation. Although the term "human" may seem to be of a purely descriptive nature, Marx's use of it on some occasions is at least partially evaluative. In such phrases as "how far man's natural behavior has become human" and "the human nature of needs," it is clear that "human" means something like "that which is worthy of human beings." In turn, that which is worthy of human beings is that which allows for or promotes the realization of their essential or "truly human" capacities, namely, sociability and the capacity for free, conscious creative activity. Furthermore, it is these two capacities or powers that are definitive of transhistorical human nature or of what he calls man's "species-being," distinguishing human beings from the lower animals.

Productive life is... species-life... in the type of life activity resides the whole character of a species, its species-character; and free, conscious activity is the species character of human beings. ... The animal is one with its life activity. It does not distinguish the activity from itself. It is its activity. But man makes his life activity itself an object of his will and consciousness.... Conscious life activity distinguishes man from the life activity of animals. Only for this reason is he a species-being. Or rather, he is only a self-conscious being, i.e., his own life is an object for him because he is a species-being. Only for this reason is his activity free activity. Alienated labour reverses the relationship, in that man because he is a self-conscious being makes his life activity, his being, only a means for his existence.45

Thus, on Marx's view, one is alienated when one's essential human capacities are blocked or thwarted, when those potentialities that must be fulfilled for human wholeness, health, and happiness go unfulfilled. The system of private property and profit alienates human beings because it thwarts the fulfillment of these two essential human capacities. Underlying this view are a descriptive-explanatory thesis and an evaluative one. According to the former thesis, human beings are naturally communal and creative beings, with the result that—unless corrupted by social arrangements or other contingencies—they will spontaneously cooperate among themselves and enter into creative activities. The evaluative or, more specifically, moral thesis proposes that it is good for human

44 Ibid., pp. 123-124.

individuals to be whole and to flourish and, consequently, it is
good for human beings to be allowed to develop what Marx alternately
calls "social," "communal," "universal," or "species" con-
sciousness and to indulge in free, creative activity. It is good, in
other words, that people be allowed to realize their essential hu-
man nature or conform to their "species-being."46

Although it may be tempting to claim that Marx's theory of
alienation and the associated values of freedom (as self-deter-
nation), human community, and self-realization make up his en-
tire moral theory, this raises two problems. First, it would not be
able to account for Marx's concern for how these goods—es-
pecially the good of freedom—are distributed (more on this in chap-
ter 3). The second problem—from a Marxist point of view—is that
without some sort of principle of distribution of the good, we
could be saddling Marx with an untenable theory. In short, while
his theory of alienation and associated values may go a long way
in portraying his theory of the good and his vision of the good
life, it does not provide an adequate moral theory.

Nevertheless, communism (which is now the explicit goal in
Marx's normative political theory) is to be preferred to capitalism
precisely because it allows for the realization of these two essential
human capacities, whereas capitalism (the system of private prop-
erty) does not. In one of his more Hegelian passages in the Man-
uscripts, Marx claims:

"Communism is the positive abolition of private property, of human
self-alienation, and thus the real appropriation of human nature
through and for man. It is, therefore, the return of man him-
self as a social, i.e., really human being, a complete and con-

46 For other reconstructions and/or analyses of Marx's concept and theory of
alienation, see A. Wood, Karl Marx, pp. 1-59; Elster, An Introduction to Karl Marx,
pp. 41-59 and Making Sense of Marx, pp. 74-78, 100-107; Buchanan, Marx and Justice,
pp. 36-49; Ohmman, Alienation; Richard Schacht, Alienation. Doubleday, Garden
City, N.Y., 1970; istvan Meszaros, Marx's Theory of Alienation, Harper & Row, N.Y.,
1970; David Mccullin, "Alienation in Hegel and Marx," Dictionary of the History of
Human Relevance of Marx's Concept of Alienation," and "The Philosophical and
Sociological Relevance of Marx's Theory of Alienation." See also Irving Louis Horowitz, "On
Alienation and the Social Order," Dialogues on the Philosophy of Marxism (John Somervelle and
Howard Parsons, eds.); Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," American Sociological
Review, vol. 24, no. 6 (Dec. 1959); Nicholas C. Tatsis and George V. Ziou, "Marx, Durkheim, and Alien-
ation: Toward a Heuristic Typology," Social Theory and Practice, vol. 3, no. 2 (Fall
1974); Bowles and Gintis "Capitalism and Alienation"; Kenneth A. Megill, "The
30, no. 3 (March 1970); and C. Taylor, "Alienation and Community."
gnawing criticism of the mice . . . since we had achieved our main purpose—self-clarification.” The final work of this period—The Poverty of Philosophy (1847)—is Marx’s polemic against Proudhon’s views as expressed in The Philosophy of Poverty and is, in Marx’s view, his first genuinely scientific work: “The salient points of our conception were first outlined in a scientific, although polemical, form in my Misère de la Philosophie . . . which was aimed at Proudhon [and] published in 1847.”

It is in this period that Marx first develops at least the fundamentals of all his empirical, social-scientific theories, the theories—whether ultimately correct or incorrect—that entitle his thought to be designated scientific. These can be divided into: (1) his general approach to accounting for sociohistorical phenomena; (2) his theories of sociohistorical transformations (historical materialism proper); (3) the somewhat less general and abstract set of theories surrounding his class analysis of society, which serves as the basis for (4) his analysis of capitalism and projections concerning post-capitalist society. (It is, by the way, only the truth of a subset of the last two sets of theories—which Popper refers to as “Marx’s institutional theories”—that I take to be crucial to the justification of the Marxist’s basic normative political positions.)

Even in The Holy Family—the first and most philosophical work of this period and his first collaboration with Engels—Marx’s developing social-scientific theories are in evidence even though he and Engels are still enmeshed in Hegelian and Young Hegelian terminology, as they polemize against Bruno Bauer (one of Marx’s former associates in Germany) and his school of Critical Criticism. Consider the following passage in which Marx both condemns the social situation of the proletariat and gives the outlines of an empirical, social-scientific explanation of how and why the proletariat will abolish these oppressive social conditions and establish a better society.

In the fully-formed proletariat the abstraction of all humanity, even of the semblance of humanity, is practically complete; since the conditions of life of the proletariat sum up all the conditions of life of society today in their most inhuman form; since man has lost himself in the proletariat, yet at the same time has not only gained theoretical consciousness of that loss, but through urgent, no longer removable, no longer dis-

guisable, absolutely imperative need—the practical expression of necessity—is driven directly to revolt against this inhumanity, it follows that the proletariat can and must emancipate itself. But it cannot emancipate itself without abolishing the conditions of its own life. It cannot abolish the conditions of its own life without abolishing all the inhuman conditions of life of society today which are summed up in its own situation. . . . It is not a question of what this or that proletarian or even the whole proletariat, at the moment regards as its aim. It is a question of what the proletariat is, and what, in accordance with this being, it will historically be compelled to do. Its aim and historical action is visibly and irrevocably foreshadowed in its own life situation as well as in the whole organization of bourgeois society today.51

The last part of the paragraph foreshadows his materialist approach to history and his theory of historical materialism, but it is the first part that helps illuminate Marx’s implicit moral views. Bourgeois society is “inhuman” or a form of “inhumanity” because it does not allow for the majority of its members to be treated as human beings should be treated. It does not allow people to realize the positive aspects of their human nature: sociability and free, conscious creative activity. Marx argues in The Holy Family that humanity is “abstracted” from the proletariat and that “man has lost himself in the proletariat” precisely because the proletariat’s “species-being” is not allowed to flourish. The resulting poverty, misery, and abasement of the proletariat arouse man’s indignation.”

The German Ideology, which comes next, is the major work of this period and—along with the Paris Manuscripts, the Grundrisse, and Capital—certainly one of the most important of Marx’s larger works. It is a polemic against Bruno Bauer, Max Stirner, Ludwig Feuerbach, and the Young Hegelians in general as well as against Karl Grun and True German Socialism. It contains much more systematic accounts of Marx’s materialist view of history, his theory of sociohistorical transformations, and his institutional social-scientific theories, as well as more explicit statements of the humanist moral principles underlying his moral judgments. His normative political positions have stabilized by this point into his advocacy of communism and communist revolution. His vision of commu-

50 Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, p. 22.
51 Ibid.
52 See Ibid., pp. 44–45.
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nism is, however, still somewhat idyllic—as evidenced by his famous passage stating that communism would allow one "to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have in mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic."55

Although Marx claims in *The German Ideology* that morality is a form of ideology, there is perhaps no other work in which his definitive moral views are expressed so clearly. He uses the term "alienation" less than he did in earlier works and even ridicules the notion of "estrangement" (a synonym for "alienation") as "a term that will be comprehensible [only] to philosophers,"56 i.e., comprehensible to the Young Hegelians and other contemporary German philosophers. But he still uses the term "alienation" upon occasion. Marx states, for example, that "with the abolition of the basis of private property, with the communistic regulation of production (and, implicit in this, the destruction of the alien relation between men and what they themselves produce), the power of the relation of supply and demand is dissolved into nothing, and men get exchange, production, the mode of their mutual relation, under their own control again."57

The values underlying both the concepts of alienation and—as I shall argue presently—exploitation in Marx's works are themselves brought into the open in *The German Ideology*. In addition, Marx utilizes the hybrid concept of "self-activity"—hybrid because it combines the notion of free (i.e., self-determined) activity with that of creative (i.e., self-realizing) activity. An important empirical notion that Marx introduces and emphasizes at this point is that of the division of labor:

Only the proletarians of the present day, who are completely shut off from all self-activity, are in a position to achieve a complete and no longer restricted self-activity, which consists in the appropriation of a totality of productive forces and in the thus postulated development of a totality of capacities. All earlier revolutionary appropriations were restricted; individuals, whose self-activity was restricted by a crude instrument of production and a limited intercourse, appropriated this crude instrument of production, and hence merely achieved a new
development of moral perspective

state of limitation. Their instrument of production became their property, but they themselves remained subordinate to the division of labour and their own instrument of production. In all expropriations up to now, a mass of individuals remained subservient to a single instrument of production; in the appropriation by the proletarians, a mass of instruments of production must be made subject to each individual, and property to all. Modern universal intercourse can be controlled by individuals, therefore, only when controlled by all.58

Only at this stage does self-activity coincide with material life, which corresponds to the development of individuals into complete individuals and the casting-off of all natural limitations. The transformation of labour into self-activity corresponds to the transformation of the earlier limited intercourse into the intercourse of individuals as such. With the appropriation of the total productive forces through united individuals, private property comes to an end. Whilst previously in history a particular condition always appeared as accidental, now the isolation of individuals and the particular private gain of each man have themselves become accidental.

The individuals . . . are no longer subject to the division of labour.59

These passages are a veritable gold mine of Marx's moral views. The goal of humanity-in-society is (or should be) self-activity, i.e., activity not controlled by outside ("alien") forces but directed by one's own self. Realizing self-activity means that individuals are no longer "subservient to a single instrument of production" nor "subject to the division of labour" nor in the thrall of any of many possible "natural limitations," i.e., limitations that are not consciously planned and willed by individuals but that can be eliminated once they succumb to conscious planning and willing. These phrases manifest Marx's commitment to a standard or principle of freedom as self-determination. His commitment to the value of human community is manifested in his claim that the formerly divided and isolated individuals will, under communism, be "united individuals" who freely and cooperatively control social production, whose instruments are "made subject to each individual, and

56 Ibid., p. 125.
57 Ibid., p. 126.
58 Ibid., p. 155.
59 Ibid., p. 156.
property to all." Finally, his commitment to the value of self-realization comes out in the phrases concerning the "development of a totality of capacities" and "the development of individuals into complete individuals."

The most explicit statement invoking these three cardinal values (freedom as self-determination, human community, and self-realization), and showing their interrelation for Marx, occurs several pages later. He writes:

The transformation, through the division of labour, of personal powers (relationships) into material powers cannot be dispelled by dismissing the general idea of it from one's mind, but can only be abolished by the individuals again subjecting these material powers themselves and abolishing the division of labour. This is not possible without the community. Only in community (with others) has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; only in the community, therefore, is personal freedom possible. In the previous substitutes for community, in the State, etc., personal freedom has existed only for the individuals who developed within the relationships of the ruling class, and only insofar as they were individuals of this class. The illusory community, in which individuals have up till now combined, always took on an independent existence in relation to them, and was at the same time, since it was the combination of one class over against another, not only a completely illusory community, but a new fetter as well. In the real community the individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association.  

With the community of revolutionary proletarians . . . who take their conditions of existence and those of all members of society under their control . . . it is as individuals that the individuals participate in it. It is just this combination of individuals (assuming the advanced stage of modern productive forces, of course) which puts the conditions of the free development and movement of individuals under their control—conditions which were previously abandoned to chance and had won an independent existence over against the separate individuals just because of their separation as individuals, and because of the necessity of their combination which had been

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Determinations of labour, and through their separation had become a bond alien to them.  

Genuine personal freedom permits the individual to have available the (social) means of cultivating his or her gifts to their full potential. But the social means of self-development are not available to individuals except in a genuine community because (though Marx does not make these points plain here): (1) outside of the establishment of a real community in advanced industrial societies (i.e., outside communism), the vast majority of people will not have access to the leisure time and the material and cultural resources requisite for genuine self-development; and (2) outside of a genuine community it is impossible for individuals to realize one of their most fundamental human potentialities—a potentiality sought by all persons unless they are warped by pernicious social conditions—namely, full community, i.e., full universal, communal, social, or "species" consciousness. "In the real community the individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association."  

This view, of course, has nothing in common with the totalitarian view of the relation between the individual and society so often falsely imputed to Marx by his vulgar critics. That individuals should be controlled in any way by outside forces rather than their own self-determining consciousness or that they should become bland and unthinking conformists are both views that could not be further from Marx's thought. The whole problem for him was how to make possible the "free development and movement of individuals" or, as he puts it elsewhere, the "full and free development of every individual." This to end every humanly alterable circumstance must be made to conform. The only form of society capable of insuring this, according to Marx, is communism. The only class with the motive and ability to create communism is the working class. Once communism has come about, however, coercion or the threat of coercion will no longer be necessary to insure the possibility of the "free development and movement of individuals" because the individuals themselves, having achieved communal consciousness, will ensure it.  

Now whether or not Marx is correct in this last assumption is a matter of considerable dispute, both between Marxists and non-Marxists and within the Marxist tradition itself. Those who assert that this scenario is unrealistic often claim that the struggle be-

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96 Ibid., pp. 162–163.

97 Ibid., pp. 161–162.
between individuals (and groups of individuals) over the distribution of scarce resources is not the only source of interpersonal conflict and thus argue that the state, as a public organ having a monopoly on legitimate coercive power, will always be necessary. Marx's critics may well be right on this point, but fortunately Marx's normative political positions do not stand or fall with the truth or falsity of this particular empirical thesis nor with the connected thesis that full-fledged communism is a genuine historical possibility. In his later works Marx distinguishes between what he calls the "first" and "higher" stages of communism. He asserts that the first stage is a transitional period in which productive property has been socialized and the economy brought under a common plan but still embodies the conditions of moderate scarcity and moderate egoism (i.e., the incomplete socialization or "humanization" of the individual). At this stage the state—with its functions of coordination and arbitration—is still a necessary institution.

Since Marx and Marxists clearly believe this sort of society to be vastly superior to any form of capitalism, they are seemingly committed to the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of socialism whether or not communism is a real historical possibility. Thus, even if we accept as true the claim that the state will always be necessary and, therefore, by definition, full-fledged communism is not historically possible, this does not relieve us of the responsibility of judging between capitalism and socialism (as well as between socialism and state-socialism or—if one is cynical enough to think that state-socialism is the only historically possible alternative to capitalism—between state-socialism and capitalism). That is, the truth of this thesis does not relieve us of the responsibility to decide for or against what I have described as the Marxist's basic normative political positions (more on these choices in chapter 10).

Thus far I have shown only that Marx made moral judgments and implicitly utilized moral principles in his early and transitional works. The thesis I am defending, however, is that Marx's moral views inform both his early and his later work and remain substantially the same. In the next section I shall take pains to show that he makes moral judgments in his later as well as his early writings. But even if the later works are not devoid of moral content, as many would claim, there are a number of different ways of interpreting the moral judgments, and not everyone familiar with the matter agrees that these judgments evidence a fundamental continuity of moral principles or moral theory from the early to the later Marx.

It might be maintained, for example, that even though freedom (as self-determination), human community, and self-realization are the primary values to be found in Marx's early and transitional writings, they are not primary throughout his works, having been replaced in the later period by a more utilitarian evaluative framework and the concept of exploitation, neither of which is reducible to these three values. This position was perhaps not unreasonable in the days before the publication of Grundrisse in 1939, but since this work makes clear the continuity of Marx's moral perspective from his early to his later writings, this position no longer seems tenable. But even those Marxists and students of Marx who proclaimed before the publication of the Grundrisse that his later works are value free or that his moral values or principles are radically different in his later works cannot be fully excused because—for the attentive reader—these claims are falsified by Capital as well as Marx's other later works.

Morality in Marx's Later Works (1848–1883)

Marx's later works can be divided into two subperiods: that of his works of maturation (1847–1858) and that of his fully mature works (1858–1883). I shall consider the period as a whole because, in general, the reader will be more familiar with Marx's thought in this time period and because the changes that take place in his thought are, on the whole, less extensive than was the case earlier. After settling accounts with the Young Hegelians and their own "philosophical consciences" in the polemical works of their transitional period (1844–1847), Marx and Engels spent the years from 1847 to 1850 involved in revolutionary political activities and participated directly in the great European upheavals that took place from 1848 to 1850. (Marx edited over 300 issues of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung in Cologne during the German Revolution of 1848–1849.) As a result, they concentrated on writing programmatic documents that had immediate value in terms of building the revolutionary movement and, in particular, the Communist League. These short works—Engels' first draft of the Manifesto for the Communist League entitled The Principles of Communism (1847); the Communist Manifesto (1848), coauthored by Marx and Engels; and Marx's Wage Labor and Capital (1849), which was given as a series of lectures by Marx to communist workers in Brussels—represent
the first formulations of their mature (though not fully mature) political and theoretical positions.

After the European revolutions of 1848–1850 were put down, Marx and Engels spent the next period of their theoretical activity reflecting upon and analyzing these events from their theoretical and political perspective. This resulted in the first detailed application of their mature theories and views to recent historical events and gave rise to Marx’s A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1857–1858), which was published in 1867. (Marx worked on the second and third volumes from 1867 to 1880. These volumes were edited by Engels from Marx’s unfinished manuscripts and published by Engels in 1885 and 1893–1894, respectively. Also, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy actually consisted of notebooks 6 through 15 out of a total of twenty-one notebooks written by Marx from 1861–1863.)

Marx’s final period—that of his fully mature works—begins, according to my analysis, in 1858, when he finished the Grundrisse and began work on A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. The preface to the latter text is well known due to its review of the development of his theories and theoretical works up to that point and its definitive statement of a standard version of his theory of historical materialism. The line between Marx’s works of maturation and his fully mature works is most perspicuously drawn here for two reasons. First, after the Grundrisse, he no longer extensively employs the philosophical language of alienation to make points about the pernicious effects of capitalism and how these effects are to be overcome (i.e., how alienation is to be transcended) in communist society. Second, starting with A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, he makes the important theoretical distinction between labor and labor-power. (Although this terminology appears in current editions of Marx’s earlier economic writings—e.g., in Wage Labor and Capital written in 1849—it is present because Engels made this change in later editions of Marx’s works.)

On Marx’s mature view, the worker sells his labor-power to the capitalist at whatever this commodity is going for on the labor market, and it is the differential between what the capitalist pays for this commodity (i.e., labor-power) and the actual value that the worker’s labor adds to the product in the process of production that generates surplus value and profits for the capitalist. This is a significant modification of his economic theory and, indeed, of classical political economy generally. According to Engels’ speech at Marx’s graveside, it constitutes one of Marx’s two great scientific discoveries, the other being the materialist approach to history.60

Marx’s fully mature works are generally less concerned with philosophical issues, make less use of the language of alienation and its transcendence, and make less explicit moral proclamations than his writings up to 1858. This does not mean, however, that his fully mature or later works in general are devoid of moral content, as is sometimes claimed by the orthodox proponents of the school known as Scientific Socialism and certain other scholastic Marxists and students of Marx. Although all of his later works—including Capital—contain at least implicit moral judgments, his moral views, as well as the continuity between his early and later works, can be seen most clearly in the Grundrisse.

The Grundrisse, the massive predecessor of Capital, was written from 1857 to 1858 but not published until 1939 (and not in English until 1953). It is primarily concerned with laying the foundations for a critique of political economy; but rather than being as narrowly economic as Capital, its discussions of economics are, as David McLellan notes, “inextricably linked with digressions of a much wider nature on such subjects as the individual and society; problems of increasing leisure and the abolition of the division of labour; the nature of alienation in the higher stages of capitalist society; the revolutionary nature of capitalism and its inherent universality, and so on.”61 And, as McLellan further remarks, “It is these digressions that give the Grundrisse its primary importance.”62

60 The claim that labor is a unique commodity in this respect has recently been challenged from within the Marxist tradition by John Roemer. See his A General Theory of Exploitation and Class, pp. 183–186, 284–287.
62 Ibid.
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Its importance lies in the fact that it shows the fundamental continuity of much of Marx's thought from the Original Marxism of 1844 to the Mature Marxism of Capital. Although his views on humanity-in-society and, in particular, humanity-in-capitalist-society were in the process of becoming less speculative and philosophical and more empirical and scientific during this entire period of maturation, his concerns as well as the values underlying them remained substantially the same.53

While the concept of alienation is rarely seen in most of his later works, it is utilized extensively in the Grundrisse. As in the Paris Manuscripts, Marx's theory of alienation of humanity-in-capitalist-society can be divided here into the categories of alienation of the product of production, alienation of the activity of production, alienation of the individual from other individuals, and alienation of the individual from his or her own self and/or his or her own (human) nature.

Both the product and activity of production are alienated from and alien to the individual producer. (Here the first expression can be taken to represent the objective, sociological dimension of alienation, and the second to represent its subjective, psychological dimension.) But we can deduce from Marx's writings that the concept of alienation—though it usually implies psychological estrangement—is primarily a matter of subordination or domination by something outside the individual's control. He writes, for example: "The individuals are subordinated to social production, which exists externally to them, as a sort of fate; but social production is not subordinate to individuals who manipulate it as their communal capacity."64 Thus the conditions of alienation violate the principle of freedom (as self-determination).

Similarly, "The universal nature of production creates an alienation of the individual from himself and others,"65 and thus contravenes the value of human community. The condition of alienation in capitalism also works against the self-realization of individuals. Capitalism prevents people from developing and realizing their individual talents and capacities spontaneously and cooperatively and becoming all-around, well-developed persons because

63 For an excellent defense of this general position, see T. B. Bottomore's introductory essay to Karl Marx: Early Writings.
64 Marx, The Grundrisse, p. 68.
65 Ibid., p. 71.

DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL PERSPECTIVE

Universal prostitution appears as a necessary phase of the development of the social character of personal talents, abilities, capacities, and activities. This could be more delicately expressed as the general condition of serviceability and usefulness. It is the bringing to a common level of different things, which is the significance that already Shakespeare gave to money.66

The concept of alienation, in other words, has all of the evaluative implications in the Grundrisse that it has in his earlier works. Perhaps the biggest difference between Marx's account of alienation in the Manuscripts and in the Grundrisse is that in the latter he more consciously attempts to integrate his emerging economic theory (or sociology of economics) into the framework of his theory of alienation. The entire world of products is "objectified labor," i.e., the result of labor as it has been objectified in material products. This world of material goods is, however, "alienated" from the producers in capitalist society because they have no control over the products of production. Wage-labor is alien labor because the worker has no control over it. Furthermore, capital is "alien objectified labor" because it is value (or surplus-value) that has been alienated from the direct producers (in a legalistic sense) by the capitalist class. Nevertheless—and this is of the utmost importance for understanding Marx—objectified labor is not, under any and all social conditions, necessarily alienated labor. The identification of objectified and alienated labor, i.e., the fact that objectified labor is alienated, is "in no way an absolute necessity of production; it is, rather, ephemeral."68

Social relations in capitalism tend to distort and hide their real nature (in ways Marx was later to develop in his theory of the fetishism of capital, money, and commodities in the first and third volumes of Capital), so that everyone in that society tends to misperceive them. But according to Marx it is especially the "bourgeois economists" who "are so bogged down in their traditional ideas of historical development of society in a single stage that the necessity of the objectification of the social forces of labour seems to them inseparable from the necessity of its alienation in relation to living labour."69 But this equivalence, Marx claims, holds only in

66 Ibid.
67 See ibid., pp. 81, 97, 99.
68 Ibid., p. 151.
69 Ibid.
class-divided, commodity-producing societies such as capitalism. He notes that as the productive forces develop, objectified labor (i.e., fixed capital) grows in proportion to living labor (i.e., variable capital) in the process of production and, thus,

social wealth becomes, in ever greater and greater proportions, an alien and dominating force opposing the worker. Stress is placed not on the state of objectification but on the state of alienation, estrangement, and abandonment, on the fact that the enormous objectified power which social labour has opposed to itself as one of its elements belongs not to the worker but to the conditions of production that are personified in capital. So long as the creation of this material form of activity, objectified in contrast to immediate labour power, occurs on the basis of capital and wage-labour, and so long as this process of objectification in fact seems to be a process of alienation as far as the worker is concerned, or to be the appropriation of alien labour from the capitalist’s point of view, so long will this distortion and this inversion really exist and not merely occur in the imagination of both workers and capitalists.\(^\text{70}\) [emphasis added].

In communist society this identification of objectified labor and alienated labor is destroyed. “But as labor loses its immediate, individual character, whether subjective or entirely external, as individual activity becomes directly general or social, the objective elements of production lose this form of alienation. They are then produced as property, as the organic social body in which individuals are reproduced as individuals, but as social individuals.”\(^\text{71}\)

But what does Marx mean here by “directly general or social labour”? Labor, for Marx, is directly social or general or, and only if, the direct producers have control of the activity and products of labor (rather than being subservient to them). He assumes that if this were to occur, then workers would come to see themselves as being voluntarily part of what in reality already is an inherently social process of the production of the total product of society rather than an involuntary individual producer of exchange values. In a rational society,

the social character of production would make the product from the start a collective and general product. The exchange

originally found in production—which is an exchange not of exchange values but of activities determined by communal needs and communal aims—would from the start imply the participation of individuals in the collective world of products.\(^\text{72}\)

In this sort of society,

the labour of the individual is established from the start as collective labour. But whatever the particular form of the product which he creates or helps to create, what he has bought with his labour is not this or that product, but a definite participation in collective production. Therefore he has no special product to exchange. His product is not an exchange value. The product does not have to change into any special form in order to have a general character for the individual. Instead of a division of labour necessarily engendered by the exchange of values, there is an organisation of labour, which has as its consequence the participation of the individual in collective consumption.\(^\text{73}\)

Just like Marx’s earlier account of alienation, his present characterization of nonalienated labor is rather obviously connected with his three primary values. Alienated labor is not free in the sense of being self-determined (i.e., determined by the worker) since “labor serves an alien will and an alien intelligence.”\(^\text{74}\) Moreover, it is not conducive to the establishment of either genuine human community or to self-realization. Nonalienated labor is labor that is free (i.e., self-determined or, in other words, both freely chosen and noncoerced) and therefore partially constitutive of both human community and self-realization. This comes out most clearly, perhaps, in Marx’s comments on Adam Smith’s view of labor, which is worth quoting at length.

“Thou shalt labour by the sweat of thy brow!” was Jehovah’s curse that he bestowed upon Adam. A. Smith conceives of labour as such a curse. “Rest” appears to him to be the fitting state of things, and identical with “liberty” and “happiness.” It seems to be far from A. Smith’s thoughts that the individual, “in his normal state of health, strength, activity, skill and efficiency,” might also require a normal portion of work, and

\(^\text{70}\) Ibid., pp. 150-151.

\(^\text{71}\) Ibid., p. 151.

\(^\text{72}\) Ibid., p. 74.

\(^\text{73}\) Ibid., p. 75.

\(^\text{74}\) Ibid., p. 117.
of cessation from rest. It is true that the quantity of labour to be provided seems to be conditioned by external circumstances, by the purpose to be achieved, and the obstacles to its achievement that have to be overcome by labour. But neither does it occur to A. Smith that the overcoming of such obstacles may itself constitute an exercise in liberty, and that these external purposes lose their character of mere natural necessities and are established as purposes which the individual himself fixes. The result is the self-realisation and objectification of the subject, therefore real freedom, whose activity is precisely labour. Of course he is correct in saying that labour has always seemed to be repulsive, and forced upon the worker from outside, in its historical forms of slave-labour, bond-labour and wage-labour, and that in this sense non-labour could be opposed to it as "liberty and happiness." This is doubly true of this contradictory labour which has not yet created the subjective and objective conditions (which it lost when it abandoned pastoral conditions) which make it into attractive labour and individual self-realisation. This does not mean that labour can be made merely a joke, or amusement, as Fourier naively expressed it in shop-girl terms. Really free labour, the composing of music for example, is at the same time damned serious and demands the greatest effort. The labour concerned with material production can only have this character if (1) it is of a social nature, and (2) it has a scientific character and at the same time is general work, i.e. if it ceases to be human effort as a definite, trained natural force, gives up its purely natural, primitive aspects and becomes the activity of a subject controlling all the forces of nature in the production process.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 123-124.}

Thus, according to Marx, labor in the process of material production should be and—in communist society—will be free (directed toward "purposes which the individual himself fixes") and at least partially constitutive of both human community ("it is of a social nature") and self-realization ("the result is the self-realization . . . of the subject").

But even though genuine self-realization can be found in the realm of material production, according to Marx, full self-realization requires a variety of activities, and material production is not even necessarily the main one. Marx seems willing to concede at this point that the individual's higher capacities will, in the main, be realized outside of material production (which he later calls the "realm of necessity") in the free time available for leisure and the pursuit of higher activities (i.e., in what he later calls the "realm of freedom"). He claims, for example:

The less time society requires in order to produce wheat, cattle, etc., the more time it gains for other forms of production, material or intellectual. As with a single individual, the universality of its development, its enjoyment and its activity depends on saving time.\footnote{Ibid., p. 75.}

The theft of others' labour time upon which wealth depends today seems to be a miserable basis compared with this newly developed foundation that has been created by heavy industry itself . . . . The surplus labour of the masses has ceased to be a condition for the development of wealth in general; in the same way that the non-labour of the few has ceased to be a condition for the development of the general powers of the human mind. Production based on exchange value therefore falls apart, and the immediate process of material production finds itself stripped of its impoverished antagonistic form. Individuals are then in a position to develop freely. It is no longer a question of reducing the necessary labour time in order to create surplus labour, but of reducing the necessary labour of society to a minimum. The counterpart of this reduction is that all members of society can develop their education in the arts, sciences, etc., thanks to the free time and means available to all.\footnote{Ibid., p. 142.}

On Marx's view, a rational society would seek to reduce labor time as much as possible and still provide for the needs and wants of the "socialized" individuals of which it is composed. This can actually be put into the form of a stronger argument in favor of socialism, for as such contemporary Marxists as G. A. Cohen have pointed out, this is one thing that capitalist societies cannot do: the way the profit motive operates in the economy, the way it directs the flow of capital and social resources, it is simply not possible for capitalist society to choose to work less (i.e., allow the producers more free time) rather than to produce more. Every time this choice is faced in capitalist society, it is automatically made in fa-
MARX’S MORAL PERSPECTIVE

In his projections concerning communist societies, he does indicate what seems to be necessary for the long-term solution to our economic problems. One necessary condition, if the Marxist economic analysis of capitalism is even close to being correct, is the replacement of capitalism with a planned socialist economy. (As noted previously, this leaves open the possibility that it could be a planned modified-market economy, such as exists in Yugoslavia, if it were ultimately to prove the most efficient type of economic organization open to a society based on the social ownership and control of productive property and production.) Another condition quite possibly necessary is that the individuals composing such societies develop a social consciousness to such an extent that they will insist on everyone’s basic needs being met and, for themselves, having only what they really need to live a quality life. This would probably spell the end of conspicuous consumption as we know it in advanced capitalist countries. Furthermore, this is a place where the ecological (or environmental) movement seems to dovetail with the ideal of a socialist society: both see the cost to the natural environment (not to mention the human psyche) of production for the mere sake of greater production (and profits) as prohibitive.

Development of Moral Perspective

Although Marx seems to have generally been overly optimistic in his projections concerning communist societies, he does indicate what seems to be necessary for the long-term solution to our economic problems. One necessary condition, if the Marxist economic analysis of capitalism is even close to being correct, is the replacement of capitalism with a planned socialist economy. Another condition quite possibly necessary is that the individuals composing such societies develop a social consciousness to such an extent that they will insist on everyone’s basic needs being met and, for themselves, having only what they really need to live a quality life. This would probably spell the end of conspicuous consumption as we know it in advanced capitalist countries. Furthermore, this is a place where the ecological (or environmental) movement seems to dovetail with the ideal of a socialist society: both see the cost to the natural environment (not to mention the human psyche) of production for the mere sake of greater production (and profits) as prohibitive.

Be that as it may, Marx believed the reduction of necessary labor time to be, evaluatively speaking, an absolute necessity. He claims that real wealth is the developed productive force of all individuals. It is no longer the labor time but the disposable time that is the measure of wealth. And from a work published in 1821, entitled The Source and the Remedy of the National Difficulties, Marx ap-

77 Ibid., pp. 144-145.
provingly quotes the passage: "A nation is truly rich when, instead of working 12 hours, it works only 6. Wealth is not command over surplus labour time, but disposable time, beyond that used in immediate production, for each individual and for the whole of society."\(^{91}\)

And this holds, for Marx, whether the individuals choose leisure and recreation or higher cultural activities or the alternative he certainly approved: a balanced life of both. Although he has great regard for higher cultural activities and thinks that involvement in them is perhaps the highest form of human self-realization, he does not think that they are the "be all and end all" of human existence. As he writes in the Grundrisse:

Economising, therefore, does not mean the giving up of pleasure, but the development of power and productive capacity, and thus both the capacity for and the means of enjoyment. ... To economise on labour time means to increase the amount of free time, i.e., time for the complete development of the individual. ... Work cannot become a game, as Fourier would like it to be; his great merit was that he declared that the ultimate object must be to raise to a higher level not distribution but the mode of production. Free time—which includes leisure time as well as time for higher activities—naturally transforms anyone who enjoys it into a different person, and it is this different person who then enters the direct process of production.\(^{82}\)

This passage and the others previously quoted raise a number of interesting questions concerning the nature of Marx's implicit moral theory or views. Does he hold a hedonistic theory of good? Should he be classified as a hedonistic utilitarian? An ideal utilitarian? A perfectionist? A consequentialist of some other sort? A consideration of these questions will be postponed, however, until chapters 2 and 3. But before we move on, we need to analyze one more quote lest one be misled into thinking that Marx utilizes the values or principles of freedom (as self-determination), human community, and self-realization to justify his vision of communism vis-à-vis capitalism only in the Grundrisse and previous works but not in works after the Grundrisse, i.e., not in his fully mature works. The quote to which I refer, of course, is Marx's famous par-

\(^{91}\) Marx, The Grundrisse, p. 143.

\(^{82}\) Ibid., p. 148.

The realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production. Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, so must civilized man, and he must do so in all social formations and under all possible modes of production. With his development this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of his wants, but, at the same time, the forces of production which satisfy these wants also increase. Freedom in this field can only consist in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with the realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working day is its basic prerequisite.\(^{83}\)

This passage is important for two reasons. First, it shows that Marx had grown more realistic and less idyllic concerning the nature of work, even work in communist society. Formerly he seemed to think that if only work were perceived as meaningful by the socialized individual, put under the workers' collective control, and made as tolerable as possible, it would be the major means of the individual's self-realization. Now he submits that though work can be an integral component of the individual's self-realization (under these conditions), it is only in one's free time, when one can pursue creative and leisure activities of one's own choosing, that human potentialities can be fully realized.

Second, to return to Marx's substantive moral views, this is perhaps the most morally pregnant passage in his later works. Here again we find Marx's values of freedom (as self-determination), human community, and self-realization. The value of human community is obviously satisfied because communist society consists

\(^{83}\) Marx, Capital, vol. 3, p. 820.
of "socialized man" or the "associated producers"—terms we have previously shown to refer to human individuals who have so greatly come to identify their good with the common good that, for all practical purposes, the distinction has collapsed. Whether or not this is a practical possibility is, of course, a different question and one that, on empirical grounds, seems rather dubious—at least to the extent that we have in mind modern mass societies (Gesellschaften) as opposed to small communities (Gemeinschaften).

The value of freedom (as self-determination) is realized because the associated producers are "rationally regulating their interchange with nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature." Although Marx does not here go into the manner of this collective control, what he has in mind seems to be the elimination of the forces of the market—particularly the periodic crises of overproduction that lead to recessions and depressions—together with the democratic (perhaps consensual) social control over the investment of capital and general regulation of the economy. On Marx's view, the (socialized) individuals are self-determining and thus, in this sense, free. Moreover, due to their "socialization" workers spontaneously do the work required to run the economy. Since no coercion or force is involved, the workers—i.e., everyone capable of working—are free in this sense as well. Needless to say, people are not coerced to do anything by the state because there is no state. He seems to assume, as well, that there will be no important social or interpersonal conflicts of a sort that would require coercion or force to settle. (That this scenario is utopian with respect to modern mass societies I take to be self-evident.)

The value of self-realization is realized because, first, individuals have become "socialized" and thus the attainment of the common good as their own good in whatever socially productive work they perform. Second, their wants—those of truly human beings, and which thus lead to self-realization when satisfied—have expanded. Finally, the "realm of necessity" (i.e., the "sphere of actual material production"), and thus the "working day," has been reduced, allowing individuals more time for "that development of human energy which is an end in itself."

Although he rarely utilized the terminology of alienation in his later works, the values (as has been previously argued) underlying the concept of alienation—namely, freedom (as self-determination), human community, and self-realization—remain Marx's basic moral problematic. He now uses the concept of exploitation in many evaluative contexts, but this concept—so I shall argue—can also be reduced to one or more of the three primary values and an egalitarian principle of distribution.

Furthermore, although Marx does not directly refer to it here, also present in his later, as well as his earlier, works is what might be called his most general evaluative concept because it contains his three primary values. This is his ideal of the fully developed human being, i.e., "the fully developed individual, fit for a variety of labours, ready to face any change of production, and to whom the different social functions he performs are but so many modes of giving free scope to his own natural and acquired powers." Correspondingly, his most basic political demand is for a society in which "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all."

It remains to be seen whether these concepts and principles provide an adequate ground for Marx's criticisms of capitalism and for the Marxists' basic normative judgments that communism (in either its lower or higher state) is morally preferable to capitalism (as well as to state-socialism), and that social and/or political revolution, if necessary and sufficient to bring such a society into being, is morally justified.

It should be noted, however, that Marx and the Classical Marxists all conceived of the first stage of communism (i.e., socialism) as an extremely democratic form of society. Although they certainly believed that the state in a newly formed socialist society would have the legitimate authority and indeed the duty to prevent counter-revolution, none of them thought that this would require either severe or long-term repressive measures. They believed that the majority of the population would be highly supportive of the new organization of social life since, as Marx puts it, the socialist revolution would be the first revolution in history that is made by a "movement of the immense majority in the interests of the immense majority." Any attempt by the former classes or ruling elites to resume power and initiate a counter-revolution in property relations would, therefore, be spontaneously squelched by the armed majority; the state as a source of legitimate coercive power would hardly be needed. As Marx makes clear in The Civil War in France, he also believed that the population, through institutions of direct and representative democracy and

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various measures to counter tendencies toward bureaucracy (such as officials receiving no more pay than an average worker), would be firmly in control of the state rather than vice versa.

Although Marx was also certainly in favor of what is sometimes called "negative freedom" (i.e., freedom from interference by other individuals with one's actions), it is not at all clear that he gives an adequate account of how freedom in this sense is to be preserved. He may also have overestimated the extent to which the elimination of market forces will be beneficial and the extent to which this form of self-determination depends upon the (problematic) transcendence of the distinction between the individual and common good. In addition, even though Marx puts forward different principles of distribution for each stage of communism—the first based on the notion of contribution and the second on ability and needs—it is not at all clear that either of them or both taken together add up to an adequate theory of social or even distributive justice. I shall take up these difficulties in later chapters.

In fairness to Marx and the Classical Marxists, however, it should be stressed that they thought that socialist revolution was bound to occur first in the most advanced capitalist countries, whose populations generally had a substantial democratic tradition. Marx only hazily conceived of the possibility of socialist revolution occurring first in underdeveloped (i.e., relatively nonindustrialized) societies or on an isolated basis. Furthermore, none of the Classical Marxists thought that a genuine socialist society could exist on anything but a worldwide basis—or at least on the basis of the socialization of the economies of all the advanced industrialized societies.

In a passage in *The German Ideology*—the only passage, to my knowledge, in which Marx speaks of the possibility of communism taking root (or rather failing to do so) in an underdeveloped and isolated area—he writes that the development of productive forces (which itself implies the actual empirical existence of men in their world-historical, instead of local, being) is an absolutely necessary practical premise because without it want is merely made general, and with destitution the struggle for necessities and all the old filthy business would necessarily be reproduced; and furthermore, because only with this universal development of productive forces is a universal intercourse between men established, which produces in all nations simultaneously the phenome-

non of the "propertyless" mass (universal competition), makes each nation dependent on the revolutions of the others, and finally has put world-historical, empirically universal individuals in place of local ones. Without this, (1) communism could only exist as a local event; (2) the forces of intercourse themselves could not have developed as universal, hence intolerable powers: they would have remained home-bred conditions surrounded by superstition; and (3) each extension of intercourse would abolish local communism. Empirically, communism is only possible as the act of the dominant peoples "all at once" and simultaneously, which presupposes the universal development of productive forces and the world intercourse bound up with communism.  

This passage forebodes the development of the socialist revolutions of this century which have so far occurred only on an isolated and "local" basis. Although Marx arguably would have supported all the socialist revolutions of the twentieth century, just as he supported all the popular revolutions of the nineteenth century, and would today probably support the post-capitalist societies to which they gave rise—at least as steps toward world socialism—it is clear that they do not (yet) meet the democratic standards upheld by Marx and the Classical Marxists. It is not clear, however, that Marx's theory has been refuted by these historical events since the conditions he laid down for the development of socialism (namely, the success of the world revolution and consequent abolition of all major capitalist powers) have not yet been fulfilled. Thus the Marxist's contention that democratic, non-totalitarian forms of post-capitalist society can—and will—evolve has not been definitively refuted. Whether or not and under what conditions such societies can exist is, of course, the political question of our time, and one on which I shall have more to say as this work progresses.