Anger, Injustice, and Affective Pluralism

A widespread view in moral philosophy, best defended by Amia Srinivasan and Christopher Franklin, argues that anger alone constitutes a sufficient emotional response to wrongdoing. While this is not to say that other emotions are inappropriate, if one's reaction lacks anger, it is critically deficient as an emotional response to injustice. Simply put, we should get *angry* when we are witness or victim of injustice. Srinivasan and Franklin maintain that only anger secures two essential, intrinsic values—values that are not reliant on anger's utility or downstream effects. Thus, while others have debated anger's virtues in terms of downstream utility, these philosophers focus on the intrinsic values secured by anger—and potentially, by anger alone. In contrast, I make the case that two other emotions—grief and disappointment—are in fact sufficient. In doing so, I subversively use Srinivasan and Franklin's defense of anger to explicate why both grief and disappointment mirror the way in which anger responds to wrongdoing. Thus, I argue, like anger, grief and disappointment are fully sufficient reactions to injustice. After this theoretical defense, I put my theoretical arguments to the test in three paradigmatic cases and unpack how my argument impacts the larger debate in moral psychology surrounding anger and injustice.

Then Job got up and tore his clothes in grief. He shaved his head and threw himself face downward on the ground. He said, "I was born with nothing, and I will die with nothing. The Lord gave, and now he has taken away. May his name be praised!" Despite everything that had happened, Job did not sin by blaming God.

—Job 1:20-22

In the book of Job, God tests the faith of his most righteous devotee by unjustly allowing Satan to wipe out his livestock, rain hellfire upon his servants, and crush Job's children under their own roof.[1] Job responds to this injustice, not with anger or blame, but with grief. I doubt I would have been so magnanimous; I surely would have, as Job's wife implored, angrily cursed God and died.[2] But given that Job was freely and intentionally wronged by God, how could mere grief be a sufficient emotional response? Didn't Job need to experience *anger* to fully appreciate this injustice?

[1] There are varying nuanced interpretations of the book of Job. See for example Stump (2010). Some understand the test of faith to be conducted by Satan rather than God, since the former is the one actively inflicting suffering. Regardless, it's clear that God is in charge of the situation.

[2] Some understand Job's later response to include angry defiance, but his initial reaction in the first chapter seems to be entirely devoid of anger. As is clarified in Job 27:5-6, this is not because Job accepts that he is at fault. Like the reader, Job knows he has done nothing to merit this injustice. It seems like Job's anger only later surfaces during the frustrating volleys of conversation with his three friends, who all insist that God punishes only the wicked. This anger carries over to his demand for an audience with God.

Amia Srinivasan and Christopher Franklin have argued that only anger constitutes a sufficient emotional response to wrongdoing.[3] It is not that other emotions are inappropriate, but if one's emotional reaction does not include anger, it is critically deficient as a reaction to injustice. Srinivasan and Franklin maintain that only anger secures two essential intrinsic values—values that are not reliant on anger's utility or downstream effects. So then, for Job, whether his anger would have proven useful is beside the question. Narrowly debating anger's prudence, according to Srinivasan, "tends to obscure something significant about anger" (2018, 126). Even in cases where anger might be decisively counterproductive, "we might still ask: is [anger] the fitting response to the way the world is? Is the anger, however unproductive, nonetheless apt?" (2018, 126). Thus, while others have debated anger's virtues in terms of downstream utility, Srinivasan and Franklin focus on the intrinsic values secured by anger—and potentially, by anger alone.[4]

In this paper, I will argue that Srinivasan and Franklin are wrong to anoint anger as the *only* sufficient emotional response to wrongdoing.[5] I'll make the case that two other emotions are in fact sufficient—that they fully secure the same intrinsic value anger does. Srinivasan and Franklin target disappointment and grief, respectively, stating that neither can fully appreciate injustice or value the wronged party.[6] On their view, only anger can do this work. For Srinivasan and Franklin, Job lacks something crucial when he responds with mere grief over the loss of his children. But I remain optimistic; in what follows, I will investigate if grief and disappointment can fully appreciate injustice, advocating for a more pluralistic approach.[7]

In section **I**, I draw on recent work by Srinivasan and Franklin, agreeing that anger is clearly a sufficient response to injustice or wrongdoing.[8] I then explain why Srinivasan and Franklin contend that anger is the only sufficient emotional response to injustice—why other emotions like grief and disappointment supposedly fall short. This will set up section **II**, where I push back against these

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[3] While Franklin speaks of 'blame,' he clarifies that blame necessarily involves anger, going beyond Sher's (2006) affectless account of blame: a belief/desire pair (Franklin 2013, 210-211). In footnote 15, Franklin specifies that, for his article, blame can be understood in the reactive attitude sense: as necessarily involving anger and its closely related blame-cousins: resentment, indignation, contempt, rage, hatred, and bitterness (2013, 214). I will thus include Franklin among those who defend anger as the uniquely sufficient response to wrongdoing.

[4] Pettigrove (2012), Nussbaum (2015 & 2016), and Huebner (2017) highlight anger's negative effects. Others have defended anger on instrumental grounds; see McBride (2017), Leboeuf (2017), and Cherry (2021, especially Ch 1-2).

[5] I focus on Srinivasan and Franklin because their arguments are interesting and compelling, but they are not alone either in their general defense of anger or specifically in their claim that anger is an intrinsically fitting response to injustice: see Kauppinen (2018), Hirji (2022), and Reis-Denis' (2021) defense of resentment (which can easily be translated to anger).

[6] Franklin uses the word 'sadness,' but I suspect that this may unfairly trivialize its potential depth. I will proceed using 'grief.'

[7] I understand anger, grief, and disappointment in broadly phenomenal or experiential terms—that these emotions are constitutively feelings and intertwined normative evaluations rather than a functionalist set of behaviors or effects (elevated blood pressure, etc.). It seems quite clear, for instance, that one could 'angrily' yell without actually experiencing anger. The raw mental or physical sensations of an emotion seem also to be directly connected with some value-laden appraisal that grounds the emotion in question. My resentment includes an inchoate evaluation that (1) I have been treated unfairly and (2) I should not have been. My feeling of resentment or anger reveals my (immediate) evaluation of the situation. I am concerned with this constitutive normative evaluation expressed by experiencing any given emotion, but specifically in this case with the normative evaluations expressed by anger, grief, and disappointment (see Srinivasan 2018, 128 and Nussbaum 2016, 18 & Appendix A).

[8] I use these terms interchangeably.

exclusionary claims. I argue that both grief and disappointment mirror the way in which anger responds to wrongdoing. Thus, like anger, grief and disappointment are fully sufficient reactions. In section **III**, I consider two objections to these claims. In section **IV**, I put my theoretical arguments to the test in three paradigmatic cases. I conclude in section **V** by unpacking how my argument impacts the larger debate surrounding anger and injustice.

I. Anger's Aptness

Srinivasan and Franklin build their defense of anger on a few plausible premises. I'll first explain these foundational claims and how they support the conclusion that anger is a fitting, sufficient reaction to wrongdoing. Importantly, I want to be clear that I accept these premises—what I'll go on to challenge is anger's monopoly on responding to injustice.

First, it's important to recognize a distinction between *appreciating* and *valuing* vs merely *judging* appreciable or valuable. Fully appreciating an injustice necessarily involves being affectively connected to the subject of injustice, whereas merely evaluating them as appreciable need not include this connection (Srinivasan 2018, 132-133). The same distinction holds between *valuing* and *judging valuable*. Following Elizabeth Anderson, Franklin suggests that valuing requires being "emotionally invested" in how that thing is treated, while merely judging valuable remains affectively cold (2013, 214).[9]

Srinivasan and Franklin use this distinction to argue that well-functioning moral agents must *appreciate* and *value* objects of categorical worth—plausibly including nature, aesthetic works, and people (Franklin 2013, 215).[10] Srinivasan asks us to consider "a person who does everything, as it were, by the ethical book—forming all the correct moral beliefs and acting in accordance with all her moral duties—but who is left entirely cold by injustice, feeling nothing in response to those moral wrongs of which she is perfectly aware" (2018, 132). There is clearly something missing in a person left cold in the face of wrongdoing. However, this deficiency cannot be located in the person's beliefs or actions; it must be found in her failure to *appreciate* the injustice. She fails to be emotionally affected by the wrong. Thus, there is "a value to *appreciating* the injustice of the world…a value that is distinct from that of simply *knowing* that the world is unjust" (Srinivasan 2018, 132). And because the person who is left affectively cold has failed to properly appreciate the injustice and value the wronged, she is therefore critically deficient as a moral agent.[11]

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[9] Anderson (1993, 2-3).

[10] In a sensible caveat, Franklin clarifies that one must at least be *disposed* towards reactive emotions rather than actually *feel* them to allow for cases in which one might reasonably be distracted or preoccupied. If my father has just died, and I fail to feel outraged when someone throws their Snickers wrapper on the ground in Zion National Park, I have not obviously failed to value the park. If no overriding preoccupations exist, though, failing to emotionally respond to the litterer would mean that I did not *value* the park, only that I may judge it valuable (2013, 214-215 & 222-223).

[11] While slightly beyond the scope of this argument, I will admit that I find even this claim somewhat strange. Consider a public defendant who does not experience reactive emotions in response to the outcome of her client's convictions; it seems strange to say that a person like this is critically deficient in some manner. In fact, her lack of emotional investment may be the only thing which allows her to continue her practice. However, for this article, I will grant that there may be a large subset of cases wherein Srinivasan's claim holds. In what follows, I will focus solely on that set of

But appreciating injustice and valuing the wronged requires more than simply feeling any emotion—one must feel the right kind of emotion: fitting, apt, or appropriate emotion.[12] So far, we've seen that one must value objects of categorical worth (such as people) and that doing so requires one to be emotionally invested in how those objects are treated. And it's not difficult to see why anger is a sufficient emotional response to wrongdoing. Clearly, anger fully appreciates injustice and values the wronged. When I become angry or indignant after seeing you treat someone unfairly, my anger is how I appreciate the injustice and reveals the extent to which I value the wronged.

But Srinivasan and Franklin's subsequent exclusion of other emotions is disconcerting. After introducing her 'left cold' case, Srinivasan suggests that while the person left cold by injustice has not acted wrongly, "it would be better, ceteris paribus, if she were capable of feeling anger towards the injustice she knows to exist" (2018, 132). I agree; the person left cold in the face of injustice is missing something valuable. But the leap from left cold to *anger* is troubling—it's not yet clear how Srinivasan and Franklin make the case for anger specifically.

Franklin explicitly spells out the basis for this exclusion: "First, the standards of value require that we defend and protect moral values. Second, only [angry blame] plays these expressive and functional roles. Therefore, [angry] blame is a required mode of valuation" (2013, 219-220). Franklin's second premise is our focus. Why does anger alone protect moral values? Srinivasan and Franklin both foresee this question and offer preventative arguments, explaining why two alternative emotions, grief and disappointment, are insufficient. Franklin pushes back against grief while Srinivasan targets disappointment, but both philosophers find these emotions lacking for similar reasons.

Franklin argues that "two features of [grief]—what it responds to and what it expresses—prevent it from playing the same role as [angry] blame" (2013, 221). He claims that grief does not respond to free disvaluations—the intentional mistreating of an object or person (2013, 218-219). Grief responds only to the raw fact that something we value was harmed (2013, 212-213, 221). In other words, grief is blind to *how* harm was produced. Grief only responds, according to Franklin, to the magnitude of the harm. Grief is too shallow—it cannot recognize and reflect the subtleties of the wrongdoer's quality of will. To feel only grief in response to injustice "does not indicate that anyone has violated the standards of value. It indicates only that an object of value has been harmed" (Franklin 2013, 221).

The same failure holds, according to Srinivasan, for disappointment; "anger presents its object as involving a *moral violation*: not just a violation of how one *wishes* things were, but a violation of how things *ought* to be" (2018, 128).[13] This ability to respond to transgressions is what renders "anger intelligible as anger, and distinct from mere disappointment" (2018, 128). Like grief, disappointment

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cases wherein we believe a lack of emotional connection to the wronged party would be deficient. For these cases where an emotional response is required, I'll explore whether grief and disappointment are lacking anything.

[12] There are many affective responses that are clearly insufficient because they fail to appreciate and value. For instance, upon witnessing a serious injustice, it would be deeply inapt to find the wrongdoing funny, solely feel relieved that the wrong did not befall you, or experience irritation over your own obligation to now aid the wronged party.

[13] In a footnote, Srinivasan rightly clarifies that anger clearly responds to more than just *moral* violations—it can coherently respond to violations of all dimensions of normativity (moral, epistemic, prudential, etc.) (2018, 128).

is blind to critical features of wrongful action—namely, the fact that the action was *wrong*, not just unwanted or unpleasant. A malefactor's intentions or quality of will is what differentiates a wrongful act from a merely painful one. When one acts freely and intentionally, one reveals what they value or, more importantly for our case, disvalue.

Thus, if Srinivasan and Franklin are right that neither grief nor disappointment can respond to *how* harm was produced, they cannot be sufficient responses to injustice.[14] On this view, Job's grief-stricken reaction is deficient because it cannot appreciate God's mistreatment or value Job's children and innocent servants. In the next section, I'll examine if grief and disappointment really are as limited as Srinivasan and Franklin suggest.

II. Two Faces of Grief and Disappointment

Srinivasan and Franklin emphasize an emotion's ability to respond to the nature of how a malefactor acted—to respond to their intentions or quality of will. Essentially, Srinivasan and Franklin have denied that grief and disappointment can be what P.F. Strawson called *reactive attitudes*—feelings which play a central role in how we respond to the actions of others (1962, 22-23).[15] When others act intentionally, they reveal their good or ill intentions towards us. In turn, when we experience (and often express) our own reactive emotions, we directly respond to how others have treated us. And as Srinivasan and Franklin point out, anger is clearly a reactive emotion.[16] Anger naturally lends itself to being directed *at* or *towards* someone in response to how that person acted. When we feel angry in the face of injustice, we feel angry *towards* the wrongdoer. Our anger is co-reactive; it responds to another's intentions and calls for an emotional exchange with that person (McGeer 2012).

Excuses highlight an emotion's responsiveness to intentions. If you step on my hand, I will naturally experience both anger and pain. However, if I see that you only hurt me by accident while trying to help me, I will no longer be angry with you, even while the pain in my hand remains (Strawson 1962, 22). Thus, unlike pain, anger is reactive; it is responsive to intentions while pain is not. Similarly, fear is a naturally *non*reactive emotion. We do not feel fear *at* or *with* someone—rather, we are afraid *of* someone in the same way we are afraid *of* a non-agential hurricane or disease. Of course, it makes sense to express to someone that they invoke fear in you, but the emotion itself seems to be a fear *of* the other, rather than *at*, *towards*, or *with* them.

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[14] Franklin explicitly states that only angry blame fully values a wronged person. Srinivasan is less clear, but seems amenable to this bolder claim by arguing against another emotional response (disappointment) and by asking "for any instance of counterproductive anger we might still ask: is it *the* fitting response to the way the world is?" (2018, 126, emphasis added). The use of 'the' rather than 'a' implies that anger is the solely apt reaction to wrongdoing.

[15] Another way to frame the question at hand is whether grief and disappointment can constitute blaming emotions. Framed this way, my position can be seen as arguing for pluralism about the faces of blame. We can experience apt angry blame as well as 'griefy blame' or 'disappointed blame.'

[16] Anger often goes by 'resentment' or 'indignation' in the literature on moral responsibility and reactive attitudes.

Srinivasan and Franklin maintain that grief and disappointment are inexorably nonreactive; they cannot be coherently directed *at* or *towards* someone in response to their intentional, normative transgressions.

First, consider disappointment. Srinivasan claimed that anger responds to how things normatively *ought* to be, while disappointment merely responds to how I *wish* things were (Srinivasan 2018, 128). This characterization seems needlessly narrow and fails to mesh with common experiences of disappointment.[17] Instead, I suggest that disappointment has two faces: a *reactive* face which responds to the intentional nature of wrongdoings and a *nonreactive* face which responds to mere violations of preference.[18] We typically think of disappointment's reactive face in terms of being disappointed *in* or *with* someone, whereas being merely disappointed *that* an event occurred highlights disappointment's nonreactive mode. In claiming that disappointment only responds to preference violation, Srinivasan has ignored or forgotten disappointment's reactive face.

To see these different faces in action, imagine a father who played football at LSU. When it comes time for his son to choose where he will play quarterback, the father may understandably feel a twinge of disappointment *that* his son reached for an Alabama hat, but he likely would not feel disappointed *in* his son. The father had a (private) preference *that* his son choose LSU, but in understanding that his son did not violate any normative requirements, he fails to be disappointed *with* or *in* his son.

However, merely nonreactive disappointment would not be sufficient had his son chosen to violate his high school's academic honesty policies, losing his college scholarship offers. Reactive disappointment *in* his son would be wholly appropriate in this case; the father would be responding to his son, not with typical angry blame, but with 'disappointed blame.' Because disappointment has these two faces—reactive disappointment *in* or *with* someone vs nonreactive disappointment *that*—it is an emotion which is readily available as a response to genuine normative violations. Disappointment is perfectly capable of responding to *wrongdoing*, not only to mere preference.

Disappointment's reactive face is also responsive to excuses in the same way that anger is. If someone appears to freely wrong you by shoving you into a wall, but you learn that he himself was pushed into you by a careless passerby, then both anger *and* disappointment directed towards him would be unfitting because he did not in fact *freely* violate any norms. He did not intend to push you. It was an accident, and so there is nothing for anger or reactive disappointment to respond to.

Next, consider grief. Franklin claimed that grief does not respond to *free disvaluations*, only to the fact that something we value was harmed (2013, 221). Anger is essentially "relational in a way that

[17] Thanks to Glen Pettigrove for emphasizing this point in our conversation regarding his (2012) article: (https://platoscave.fireside.fm/61).

[18] The inspiration for coining the 'two faces' of disappointment comes from Watson's "Two Faces of Responsibility." The idea that a single emotion may have more than one face or mode is not original to this article; Mason (2014) has argued that contempt's reactive face, when responded to insufficiently, can give rise to nonreactive contempt in the form of an emotionally toned objective stance. See also Mason (2003).

[grief] is not" (2013, 212-213). In other words, grief is essentially nonreactive because it is blind to how the harm was produced.

I suggest that Franklin has failed to notice that grief, like disappointment, has two faces: a reactive face and a nonreactive one. It seems clear that grief need not be blind to *how* harm is produced. In addition to feeling grief in response to the raw harm, one might also feel grief in direct response to the intentional nature of the wrong itself. Free disvaluations *themselves* can illuminate features of another's quality of will and directly induce fitting grief. For instance, imagine that a friend betrays your trust and steals money from the small business you both co-founded. In addition to feeling grief over the raw loss of your businesses' reserves, it would be fully fitting to experience additional grief over the realization that this person was not the friend you thought he was, that he could willingly do this to you, and that you apparently mean so little to him. Thus, grief can respond not only to the severity of the harm, but to the *intentional nature* of how the harm came about. One can feel grief over the harm done (nonreactive) *and* over the intentional nature of the harm itself (reactive). A fire that consumes one's treasured belongings is an apt reason for grief. Learning that the fire was intentionally started by one's neighbor is a reason for additional, reactive grief.

In fact, grief can be an appropriate response to free disvaluations that lack *any* produced harm. If your friend and co-founder had attempted to loot your business's safe, but failed because of an automated security system, no direct harm was produced—no money was in fact stolen. However, upon discovering that your partner and friend had freely disvalued you in this way, a grief-stricken response tracking only the intended disvaluation would not be at all inapt. Greif in response to the loss of your ability to trust this person moving forward cannot be tracking the raw harm produced by his actions, since no harm was caused. It can only be responding to the free disvaluation itself.

Thus, I argue that grief and disappointment can be not only fitting or appropriate, but sufficient responses to injustice. Both disappointment and grief have reactive faces which can naturally respond to intentional disvaluations. Disappointment *in* or *with* someone can respond to genuine normative violations, not merely the frustration of one's preferences. And like anger, grief can directly respond to the free, intentional nature of wrongdoing. I argue that Srinivasan and Franklin have misunderstood grief and disappointment. These emotions need not express different values than anger; rather, they are simply different ways to express the same value and appreciation.

III. Objections

One might object that grief and disappointment do not naturally involve addressing the wrongdoer while anger often inclines one towards addressing injustice.[19] This may be true; anger may engender verbal response or even spur one towards action much more reliably than grief or disappointment. And in some cases, anger could be instrumentally more useful on both an experiential level—anger could motivate action while grief and disappointment may not—and on an expressive

[19] Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for raising this concern.

level—perhaps anger might engender change in others or better command respect. However, whether one addresses one's wrongdoer—with grief, disappointment, or anger—is beyond the scope of this discussion. Remember that our question is concerned with the *intrinsic* sufficiency of anger, grief, and disappointment as responses to injustice. What matters is an emotion's ability to appreciate and value, not to incite verbal or physical action. Whether one does address (or is inclined to address) injustice when experiencing any given emotion strays into instrumental concerns. These prudential concerns are of great importance but are not connected with grief and disappointment's intrinsic sufficiency.[20]

Perhaps, following another line of objection, I have artificially contorted grief and disappointment, forcing them into reactive emotions when they are naturally disposed to be nonreactive.[21] This worry could take two different forms: one, that grief and disappointment do not have a reactive face at all. I previously argued in section II that this claim simply does not fit with common experiences of both emotions. The second form of this objection might worry that while grief and disappointment have both reactive and nonreactive faces, anger *always* shows itself through a reactive face, thus rendering anger fitting as a response to injustice by its very nature. However, this objection seems likewise untenable; anger, like grief and disappointment, clearly has a reactive and nonreactive face. Nonreactive anger is often triggered by things that are not agential in any way: the universe or the unfairness of life in general. I have witnessed (and perhaps undertaken) the instinctive bashing of a table upon which one's toe was stubbed. It seems clear, then, that grief, disappointment, and anger can all express themselves through both reactive and nonreactive faces.

IV. Paradigmatic Cases

Now it's time to put these theoretical suggestions to work. In this section, I will examine three cases wherein anger would be undoubtedly fitting, but I'll consider whether grief and disappointment can also sufficiently appreciate the wrongdoing and value the wronged.

1. *Truth and Reconciliation Commission*: The TRC was an attempt to provide amnesty for the perpetrators of the South African apartheid, reintegrate them into the community, and provide victims an opportunity to reconcile with their oppressors. Gobodo-Madikizela, a psychologist aiding in the reconciliation effort, detailed a meeting between Eugene de Kock, one of the most heinous mass murderers during the apartheid, and Pearl Faku, whose husband was brutally murdered by de Kock. After de Kock admitted to committing the murder and bared his soul to Faku, she stated:

> I couldn't control my tears. I could hear him, but I was overwhelmed by emotion, and I was just nodding, as a way of saying yes, I forgive you. I hope that when he sees our tears, he knows that they are not only tears for our husbands, but tears for him as well…I would like

[20] In this way, I am following Srinivasan's intriguing sidestepping of the counterproductivity debate. But while Srinivasan uses this maneuver to defend anger at the exclusion of other emotions, I use it to illuminate a more pluralistic approach.
[21] Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for raising this second objection.

> to hold him by the hand, and show him that there is a future, and that he can still change (Gobodo-Madikizela 2004, 14-15).[22]

Faku's response to de Kock is incredible; while she does not excuse or justify his actions, she reacts to the injustice, not with anger, but seemingly with overwhelming grief and deep disappointment. Our task, then, is to explore whether Faku's response is intrinsically deficient. I argue it is not. She clearly grieved the loss of her husband (the raw harm), but also for the tragedy of de Kock himself. Faku's tears for de Kock, fully knowing that he murdered her husband, suggest a type of reactive grief—grief *in* or *with* de Kock himself. She may well have thought or spoken aloud something akin to the questions '*How could you do this? How could you have become so morally deformed?*' These questions, while congruent with Faku's lack of anger, would still hold de Kock accountable for his actions. Contrary to Srinivasan and Franklin, grief and disappointment in no way let de Kock off the hook for what he did. Faku's non-angry response clearly and fully appreciated de Kock's injustice and valued his victims, as reflected both in the depth of her grief and disappointment and that they were directed *towards* de Kock.

2. *Assault*: Angela and Rebecca are close friends. While at a college party, Rebecca is assaulted by a stranger. A few days later, Rebecca shares her assault with Angela, expressing her anger, confusion, grief, and hatred towards her attacker. Clearly, if in response to Rebecca's experience, Angela felt only seething anger, this reaction would be appropriate.

But imagine that Angela lacks any anger and is instead overcome with grief and disappointment. She mourns the loss of Rebecca's joy and carefree love for life. She loves her friend and feels partially broken herself by Rebecca's pain. She is deeply disappointed *in* her assaulter, *in* the widespread acceptance of rape-culture on college campuses, and *in* the members of the assaulter's moral community who failed to reform his callous impulses. While fierce anger would be clearly apt, deep grief and disappointment would not lack an appreciation of the injustice or fail to value the wronged party. In fact, grief seems to especially value the wronged party; as Nussbaum has suggested, a purely angry response would seem to focus disproportionately on the criminal's acts and not the victim's needs (2016, 21-22). At the very least, it should be clear that grief and disappointment are not intrinsically lacking; both grief and disappointment are a fully appreciative response to the free disvaluation of Rebecca, and the depth of Angela's grief reflects how profoundly she values her friend.

3. *Job*: Finally, let us return to the case of Job. As the story goes, Satan challenges God to a test of Job's faith, suggesting that Job only serves God because he is good to him. So, with God's permission, Satan begins taking away Job's riches—and, crucially, does so *unjustly*; both the reader and Job himself know that he has done nothing to deserve such treatment. Torment and suffering ensue; Job loses his oxen, camels, donkeys, and their attending servants by way of Sabean and Chaldean raids. His sheep and remaining servants are wiped out by a shower of hellfire. Finally, Job learns that a

[22] Faku's testimony appears in Allais (2008, 40-41), who uses the case to explore the philosophical nature of forgiveness. Incidentally, Allais agrees that Faku's non-angry response is not a case of her "making a moral mistake" (2008, 41).

mighty wind tore down the house in which his children were feasting, killing them all. In all of this, Job did not angrily curse God, but rather grieved the loss of his livestock, servants, and children.[23]

Having one's livelihood and family unjustly taken away might naturally garner a wellspring of anger—anger that would undoubtedly appreciate the injustice and value his children.[24] But Job's initial reaction appears to wholly lack anger; he tears his clothes in grief, shaves his head, and scrapes his skin with broken pottery as he is engulfed with grief. Contrary to Srinivasan and Franklin, I argue this non-angry response intrinsically lacks nothing. Clearly, Job grieved the loss of his children (the raw harm itself), but he could have grieved the intentional nature of the loss as well: God's free disvaluation of objects of moral worth. We might imagine Job additionally grieving the loss of who he believed to be a just and fair God, being deeply disappointed *in* and *with* God for his cruelty. Job could have sought to hold God accountable, not through anger, but through his grief and disappointment.

Imagine that later, when given the opportunity to speak with God, rather than fall silent as he did in the Biblical version, Job instead allowed his grief and disappointment to be directed *towards* God for engaging in a petty feud with Satan. Job might have felt disappointment in God for stooping to Satan's level, for being calloused enough to take away Job's children without cause, and for failing to provide a coherent explanation for why he had done all of this. Would Job's grief and disappointment be *intrinsically* lacking? I cannot see how this would be the case; Job's grief and disappointment both show that he was emotionally connected to how objects of value were treated and to the free, intentional manner of their disvaluation.

V. Conclusion

In this paper, I have aimed to support a kind of affective pluralism—to defend grief and disappointment as intrinsically sufficient responses to injustice. To do so, I argued that grief and disappointment have reactive faces which can respond to normative violations and, more importantly, the nature of how those violations were produced. If grief and disappointment can respond to a wrongdoer's quality of will, then they are capable of appreciating injustice and valuing the wronged. And if they can appreciate and value, then grief and disappointment are sufficient emotional responses to injustice. My conclusion is that anger does not maintain its monopoly on responding to wrong.

However, there are many conclusions which my arguments do *not* decisively support. I have not argued that anger is an inapt response to wrongdoing, nor that grief and disappointment are more appropriate than anger. I have not argued that anger should be wholly eliminated from our lives or

[23] Some understand Job's later response to include angry defiance, but his initial reaction in the first chapter seems to be entirely devoid of anger. As is clarified in 27:5-6, this is not because Job accepts that he is at fault. Like the reader, Job knows he has done nothing to merit this injustice. It seems like Job's anger only later surfaces during the frustrating volleys of conversation with his three friends, who all insist that God punishes only the wicked. This anger carries over to his demand for an audience with God.

[24] I am assuming that Job would be right to feel anger, grief, and disappointment because God was in the wrong. Job was in a position to know this because, as stated explicitly in the opening of the Book of Job, he had done nothing to deserve this treatment which God actively allowed Satan to inflict on him.

that the experience and expression of anger cannot be instrumentally beneficial. I have maintained that both grief and disappointment can fully appreciate an injustice and value the wronged. It seems, then, that Job's lack of anger need not indicate any deficiency; there was no intrinsic need to angrily curse God and die.

This raises a final upshot of my argument which maps on to wider debate about the role anger plays in our emotional lives. As I alluded to in the beginning of this paper, Srinivasan and Franklin locate their arguments within a larger discussion about the value of apt anger. There are both intrinsic and instrumental reasons for and against cultivating (and expressing) certain emotions. One intrinsic reason to feel angry in the face of injustice is simply because it's fitting or apt; it's a correct response to become angry when wrong is committed. But there are clearly cases wherein experiencing or expressing anger can be counterproductive. Some critics have argued that we should strive to eliminate anger because of these downstream consequences. But by arguing that anger is the solely sufficient response to wrongdoing, Srinivasan and Franklin thus shift the debate; if they are right, even in cases where decisively counterproductive, anger has a new foothold: it *alone* values and appreciates. And if anger alone secures this intrinsic value, critics face the burden of explaining why "reasons of prudence trump reasons of aptness"—a challenging task (Srinivasan 2018, 127).

My argument affects this debate in a new way. By defending grief and disappointment as sufficient responses to wrongdoing, I have undercut anger's sole claim to securing this intrinsic value. This eliminates a critical premise for anger's defenders: if anger, grief and disappointment are all intrinsically sufficient, then certain non-angry responses lack nothing. Thus, in cases where anger is indeed decisively counterproductive, I have generated more space to consider whether it's wise to become angry, to stay angry, or to cultivate an angry disposition. Again, I am not advocating for the elimination of anger; I am advocating for a more open, pluralistic conclusion. Since anger, grief, and disappointment are on an even playing field when it comes to securing this intrinsic value, in situations where anger is decisively counterproductive, we are no longer bound by the claim that only anger appreciates and values. I have made room to contemplate what, *all* things considered, is a wise character to cultivate.

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