

Fission of the Global South? China and India's Divergence in Methane Emission Policy

BACKGROUND

Methane is the second most important greenhouse gas after carbon dioxide (CO₂). It has a 100-year global warming potential (GWP100) of 27.9, meaning that, over a century, each kilogram of methane exerts a radiative forcing effect 27.9 times stronger than an equivalent amount of CO₂ (Smith et al. 2021). Compared to CO₂, reducing methane emissions can quickly lower greenhouse gas concentrations in the short term. The mitigation of methane emissions is, therefore, a good choice for achieving a relatively quick climate response (Forster et al. 2021).

During the 26th Climate Summit in Glasgow in 2021, the European Union and the United States spearheaded the initiation of the "Global Methane Pledge." (GMP) This pledge aims to decrease worldwide methane emissions by 30% by 2030, using 2020 levels as a baseline. About 150 countries participated in this pledge, excluding China and India, which are the world's largest and third largest methane emitters respectively. Nonetheless, this does not mean that China and India are in the same position in dealing with methane emissions.

This article aims to answer the question of why China and India have adopted different methane emissions reduction policies even though neither has joined GMP and their total methane emissions rank among the highest in the world. It examines how political institutions and industrial pressures contribute to the stance that developing countries take on specific international environmental concerns, focusing on a division between China and India. Due to their distinct self-positioning and varying economic and political institutions, their disagreement will probably persist, as evident in global climate negotiations.

The remainder of this article is structured as follows. I will initially compare the differences in methane policies between China and India, mainly focusing on the policy measures both countries have adopted after refusing to sign the GMP. Then, I will discuss why China and India adopted different methane policies from three aspects: industrial structure, government form, and policy orientation. Finally, the impact of the division among the Global South on methane mitigation is discussed before some concluding remarks are offered.

CHINA'S AND INDIA'S POSITIONS TOWARDS METHANE REDUCTION

The reason for choosing China and India as comparative cases lies not only in the fact that they are the two largest carbon and methane emitters among developing countries but also that both countries are essential members of the BRICS and the BASIC group, holding annual meetings such as the BRICS Environment Ministers' Meeting and the BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change to coordinate policy positions. The differences between the two emerging powers on methane policy can explain the potential divergence of countries within the Global South on climate change to some extent.


According to data from the International Energy Agency (2024), China's methane emissions accounted for 15.12% of the global total in 2023. The three primary sources of emissions were energy activities (42.24%), agricultural activities (35.12%), and waste management (19.88%). Since September 2020, Chinese President Xi Jinping has stated on multiple significant international occasions that China will strengthen the control of non-CO₂ greenhouse gases, including methane. After the dual carbon goals of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality were proposed, the frequency of "methane reduction" in a series of essential policies in China has increased, and the implementation of methane reduction work is actively advancing.

In November 2023, the Methane Emission Control Action Plan (MECAP) was unveiled by the Ministry of Ecology and Environment of China (MEE) and 10 additional Chinese ministries. This plan outlines China's strategy for managing methane emissions in a methodical, logical, and systematic way. It sets forth 20 "essential tasks" that include the enhancement of emissions monitoring, the advancement of technological innovation, the establishment of policy frameworks, and the expansion of international cooperation, among others. Furthermore, the document states that by 2030, oil and gas producers will "strive" to "gradually" eliminate flaring, and the annual utilization of coal mine methane is expected to hit 6 billion/m³ (Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2023). While this plan stops short of setting specific timelines for methane reductions, it establishes a foundational strategy for China's methane management approach. Earlier, in October 2021, the State Council had already set the stage by issuing the "Working Guidance for Carbon Dioxide Peaking and Carbon Neutrality," which emphasized the importance of curbing non-CO₂ greenhouse gases, including methane. This directive was further reinforced in the same month by

an update to China's Nationally Determined Contribution, which articulated a commitment to "effectively controlling methane emissions from coal, oil, and gas extraction." This commitment is part of the broader "1+N" policy framework aimed at achieving carbon peak and neutrality, complemented by significant policy documents such as the "Implementation Plan for Emission Reduction and Carbon Sequestration in Agriculture and Rural Areas" and national plans for climate change spanning the 12th to the 13th Five-Year Plans, all mandating the regulation of methane emissions.

However, India has not shown its ambition to reduce methane emissions like China. Data from IEA (2024) shows that India's methane emissions accounted for 8.6% of the global total in 2023. The three main sectors of emissions were agriculture (61.05%), energy (18.38%) and waste (18.59%). Conversely, the Indian government has failed to release comprehensive legislation or policies to manage methane emissions. According to data from the Indian Parliament, from October 2021 to March 2024, members from the Rajya Sabha (Council of States) and Lok Sabha (House of the People) have asked the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) 7 times about whether India will join the GMP and issues regarding its domestic methane emissions. The MoEFCC considers that joining the GMP, given methane's role in food security as essential for survival "emission" rather than luxury "emission," may affect India's rice production as well as its economic and trade prospects (Ramesh 2022). Meanwhile, the MoEFCC also mentioned in its response that India is developing several technologies with mitigation potential for methane from rice, promoting green fodder production, and supporting biodegradable waste recovery in fields such as agriculture and livestock.

As Figure 1 shows, China has shown a more active response: China has now coordinated, built consensus and developed the relevant climate strategy on methane emissions. (Dubash et al. 2021); but India has not yet agreed on methane reduction internally. Although the country has made some progress in methane reduction technology, it has not yet developed comprehensive guidance documents covering the relevant vital industries, which also shows the country's lag in action on this issue.

Figure 1 Progress between China and India on methane emissions

Note: The data for China are from the websites of the Chinese Central Government and the Ministry of Ecology and Environment. The data for India are from the website of the Parliament of India.

EXPLAINING DIVERGENCE

As both are essential emerging countries, why are there such significant differences in the methane policies of China and India? There is an acknowledgment of the diverse nature of the Global South and these countries' potential for distinct governance strategies (Allan and Dauvergne 2013; Pauwelyn 2013). Yet, why developing countries show solidarity on specific issues but discord on others remains largely unexplored. In examining the environmental diplomacy policies of individual nations, the existing scholarship provides explanations from structural, institutional, ideological, and personal angles (Recchia 2002; Steinberg and VanDeveer 2012). Nevertheless, the focus on industrialized nations considerably overshadows that on developing countries, leaving a gap in comparative research.

To navigate the increasingly intricate actions of developing nations, recent inquiries have delved into the internal dynamics of the Global South and the specific environmental diplomacy policies of its members. While a vast body of work has compared rising powers' environmental and climate policies (Aamodt and Stensdal 2017; Wu 2018), the investigation into their environmental and climate diplomacy tactics is somewhat scant. In comparative environmental diplomacy between China and India, Stokes, Giang, and Selin (2016) dissect the discord between China and India at the Minamata Convention on Mercury, attributing it to domestic resources, developmental limitations,

and technological capacities. Yang (2023) argues that the divergence between China and India at the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol stems from differences in political systems and development strategies. However, these considerations do not explain why China has advanced more rapidly and extensively than India regarding methane emissions. This article posits that, through the lens of the methane emission policies of both nations, the divergence between China and India is significantly influenced by aspects of industrial structure, governance form, and policy orientation not previously captured by existing analyses.

Industrial Structure

The data of IEA shows that the energy sector is the largest source of China's methane emissions, accounting for around 42% of total emissions. Among them, China's coal industry produces a large amount of methane emissions, accounting for 80% of the energy sector, and the oil and natural gas industry accounts for about 12%. In other words, the coal industry is China's largest source of methane emissions (Chen et al. 2022).

In China, the coal and petroleum industries are monopolistic and dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which are fewer in number and under strict government supervision than private companies. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA) play vital roles in regulating these SOEs by establishing strategic policies and guidelines that support national energy objectives. These include formulating comprehensive energy strategies and standards that affect enterprise operations. Additionally, the NEA has the authority to approve and oversee significant energy projects and adjust energy pricing policies to control market dynamics and influence the economic performance of SOEs in sectors such as electricity.

Moreover, obtaining operating income is not the primary development goal of SOEs. SOEs also need to assume the crucial responsibilities of serving national strategies, ensuring national security, and operating the national economy. SOEs have also initiated actions to cut down on methane emissions. In March 2021, Sinopec announced its goal of achieving net-zero emissions and proposed to reduce methane emission intensity by 50% by 2025 (Sinopec 2021). The China Oil and Gas Enterprises Methane Emission Control Alliance, which includes major oil and gas corporations such as the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Sinopec, and the China National

Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), has proposed that alliance members strive to reduce the average methane emission intensity to below 0.25% during the natural gas production process by 2025 (International Trade Administration 2022). The movements of Chinese energy enterprises indicate that, under the central government's directive to reduce carbon emissions, SOEs have followed suit in setting their own carbon neutrality goals and establishing corresponding methane mitigation plans.

In 2016, as outlined in India's third Biennial Update Report, methane emissions "were 409 million tonnes CO_{2e} of which, 73.96% was from Agriculture sector, 14.46% from Waste sector, 10.62% from Energy sector and 0.96% was from Industrial Processes and Product Use sector." (Press Information Bureau 2023) Research indicates that livestock accounts for 63% of India's agricultural methane emissions, while rice farming accounts for only 11% (Sharma 2020). The primary sources of methane emissions stem from enteric fermentation and rice farming, with these emissions originating from agricultural practices carried out by small, marginal, and medium-scale farmers across the country. Agricultural methane emissions are characterized by scattered distribution, vast scale, and chaotic appearance, making it difficult to centralize supervision. Hence, agriculture serves as the primary contributor to methane emissions in India. However, it remains one of the most challenging sectors to mitigate.

More importantly, between 2020 and 2024, the number of farm workers in India has increased by around 60 million. This growth can be attributed, at least in part, to a food welfare program that provides meals to hundreds of millions of individuals. Agriculture remains the mainstay of employment in this country, which has a population of 1.4 billion. In 2019, 54% of households are involved in agriculture. Some regions have far higher percentages than that, such as Rajasthan in the northwest (Ministry of Statistics 2021). In 2020, India's agricultural sector had an increase of 13 million laborers (Ethiraj 2021; Li and Agarwal 2024). Furthermore, a considerable segment of India's population depends on the livestock sector for their livelihood, given that the country has the highest cattle population in the world. If the Indian government takes decisive measures to reduce methane emissions in agriculture, it will affect rice profits. Due to the inherently low profitability of agriculture, if mandatory targets are introduced that further increase the cost of methane reductions, this could have an impact on the food supply. In contrast, farmers' capacity to bear these costs is limited, potentially leading to significant unemployment. On the other hand, it will also

make it impossible for people who rely on cattle for their livelihood to continue to survive. Under such circumstances, it is difficult for the Indian government to carry out substantial methane reductions because this will seriously harm the agricultural foundation and the livelihood of the enormous agrarian employment population.

Government Form

Since Xi Jinping's leadership began in 2012, China has adapted to a new economic reality: the previous high-speed growth has transitioned to a more moderate "new normal." As economic growth alone can no longer guarantee government success, Xi's administration has emphasized environmental stewardship as a critical governance strategy. Addressing public concerns about pollution, the government has integrated sustainability into national policy, championing it as a core value to reduce governance costs and obstacles. As part of its efforts to maintain political legitimacy, China has radically shifted away from a purely development policy orientation towards a more pro-environmental approach and shifted its authoritarian tradition towards environmental authoritarianism (Beeson 2010; Gilley 2012; Teng and Wang 2021) from a developmental state to an eco-developmental state (Esarey et al. 2020; Lin and Wang 2023). Authoritarianism gives China greater scope to address the complex threats that environmental degradation and climate risks pose to economic growth and well-being (Beeson 2010). The Chinese government, which previously based its legitimacy on material prosperity, must now balance economic development and environmental sustainability in the face of growing public concern about environmental degradation.

China operates under this kind of authoritarian regime characterized by a restricted separation of powers. Under a monolithic regime, the central government operates without the uncertainty of elections, the scrutiny of judicial review, and the limitations of budget limits, resulting in enhanced policy consistency and autonomy. Take China's methane policy as an example. The country's methane policy is mainly drafted by the MEE and approved by the State Council. MEE will also lead the establishment of a coordination and cooperation working mechanism based on the MECAP. China's authoritarian system involves public stakeholders in addition to the industry. Once contribute their knowledge, these stakeholders have limited control over methane regulation details.

It is worth noting that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ranks second among issuing ministries in the MECAP, after MEE. This shows that Sino-U.S. climate diplomacy plays a prominent role in

introducing China's methane policy. Methane regulation has become a priority in Biden's climate diplomacy. China's form of authoritarian environmentalism allows for a unitary national stance, avoiding the polarization and political struggles over climate change that can arise from domestic electoral pressures, thereby forming strategic climate institutions (Dubash 2021). At the same time, China is also willing to reach a consensus with the U.S. Biden administration on methane reduction to strengthen the narrative of an "ecological civilization" (Kalantzakos 2022) and enhance its governance legitimacy.

India operates under a system of parliamentary democracy. The Indian National Congress (INC) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), two competing political parties, have alternated in governing. According to 2022 data, more than 60% of Indian voters are farmers, forming one of India's most influential voting blocs. A significant portion of India's workforce is engaged in agriculture, yet numerous farm laborers continue to grapple with poverty. Should the government modify agricultural practices to diminish methane emissions, it might provoke opposition from the farming electorate, potentially impacting election outcomes. Consequently, the farm sector in India has largely been overlooked in policy-making and research aimed at reducing the sector's inherent emissions.

India is known as "the world's largest democracy," with a population of over 1.4 billion, nearly 700 million of whom are eligible voters, and about 500 million participate in voting. BJP is a Hindu-nationalist political party, primarily supported in the northern and western regions, commonly referred to as the "Hindi Belt."¹ India's methane tracking data shows that from January to September 2022, among the top ten states in India by domestic methane emissions, the agriculture and livestock sector accounts for the largest proportion, accounting for almost more than 50% of each state's methane emissions. As Figure 2 illustrates, seven of these states are ruled by the BJP and its allies, and four are in the "Hindi Belt." States with higher methane emissions are predominantly governed directly by the BJP and its allies. Given that the farmers' interest groups in these states are mighty - In 2021, facing large-scale protests organized by the farmers, Prime Minister Modi, despite his high popularity in India, had to yield to the interests of farmers by withdrawing the proposed agricultural

¹ The Hindi Belt, also referred to as the Hindi Heartland, is a linguistic region that includes parts of the Indian states of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Uttarakhand, as well as the union territory of Chandigarh and the National Capital Territory of Delhi. It encompasses various Northern, Central, Eastern, and Western Indo-Aryan languages spoken in these regions.

laws to address their deep concerns. These interest groups also negatively stance agrarian innovations such as methane reduction, directly threatening their interests. Hence, it is challenging for the current Indian government to enact comprehensive decrees to promote methane reduction.

This is akin to shooting itself in the foot, severely undermining its governance legitimacy.

Table 1 Top 10 local methane emissions in India (January to September 2022)

No	State*	Amount of methane emission in the agriculture waste (ton)	Amount of methane emission in the livestock (ton)	Total amount of methane emission (ton)	Proportion of agriculture and livestock sectors (%)	Governed by the BJP or its allies?
1	<u>Uttar Pradesh</u>	3,938	227,154	364,424	63.41%	Yes
2	<u>Madhya Pradesh</u>	1,065	155,907	241,454	65.01%	Yes
3	<u>Rajasthan</u>	87	151,302	203,585	74.36%	Yes
4	Maharashtra	611	120,743	235,999	51.42%	Yes
5	West Bengal	2,247	86,054	170,524	51.78%	No
6	Odisha	1,713	65,610	165,226	40.75%	Yes
7	<u>Bihar</u>	1,739	70,161	141,690	50.74%	Yes
8	Tamil Nadu	537	67,515	125,031	54.43%	No
9	Karnataka	355	77,370	122,784	63.30%	No
10	Gujarat	232	60,452	108,947	55.70%	Yes

* Underlined states indicate they are in the Hindu Belt.

Source: Chasing Methane, <https://methane.indiaspend.org/>

Policy Orientation

Around 2010, China was severely affected by air pollution. However, since 2013, the Chinese government has successively issued a series of laws and policy documents to control air pollution and launched a battle to prevent and control air pollution. At present, the quality of China's atmospheric environment has initially improved: From 2013 to 2022, the national average PM_{2.5} concentration decreased by 57%, falling from 72 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ to 29 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$, and the number of heavily polluted days decreased by 93%, making it the country with the quickest air quality improvement globally (Zou 2023). Meanwhile, as the dual carbon goals approach, MEE has begun to emphasize

the in-depth fight against air pollution while also focusing on reducing pollution and carbon emissions and released the implementation plan for synergistic efficiency of pollution reduction and carbon reduction (Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2022).

Methane is a short-lived climate pollutant that contributes to the formation of tropospheric ozone (O₃), the latter being a potent air pollutant and greenhouse gas. These pollutants not only affect the climate but also directly impact public health. Controlling methane can, on the one hand, slow down the rise in global temperatures and, on the other hand, reduce air pollution. Therefore, it meets the actual needs of China's current environmental governance. China incorporates stringent environmental and climate targets into its Five-Year Plans, reflecting international commitments and enforcing them with strict rules that tie the success of their implementation to the career progression of local government and SOE leaders (UNEP 2019). It has been calculated that from 2013 to 2022, domestic emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides in China have decreased by 85% and 60%, respectively, while carbon emission intensity has concurrently reduced by 34.4%, demonstrating a sound effect of coordinated pollution control and carbon reduction (Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2024). Based on these practices, it is a natural progression for China to include methane in the next phase of strictly regulated pollutants.

India struggles to develop a systematic methane reduction strategy due to a lack of public engagement with sustainability issues. An Ipsos survey categorized Indians into three sustainability groups: 41% as Busy Bystanders, who are distracted from climate issues by daily life; 24% as Disengaged Denialists, who are skeptical of environmental concerns; and only 23% as Activists, who push for urgent action against ecological crises. This distribution highlights the challenge of mobilizing national commitment to environmental strategies (Ipsos IndiaBus 2024). Another survey also shows that less than 12% of respondents believed that addressing air and water pollution was a top concern, and the category came in at No.17 out of 31 governance-related objectives (Association for Democratic Reforms 2019). India is recognized as the most air-polluted country globally, with over 99% of its population exposed to polluted air. Despite the severe air quality issues, these environmental concerns rarely surface in public discourse or political promises, as noted by former Indian member of Parliament Kalikesh Singh Deo. He highlighted that air pollution, though harmful to everyone, is often seen as nobody's fault and seldom motivates voters (Bhattacharji 2019). Consequently, there has been minimal political pressure for the Indian government to implement

costly solutions. The great majority of Indians felt there was little they could do about the issue of air pollution, were ignorant of it, or silently accepted it as part of conducting business (Urpelainen 2023). It is evident that, against the backdrop where environmental issues are not mainstreamed, methane emissions are destined not to become a priority on the national policy agenda for the time being. Therefore, India also lacks sufficient motivation at the policy level to promote an overall strategy to reduce methane emissions.

Overall, the dichotomy between China's more centralized approach and India's democratic process is reflected in their environmental policies and outcomes. China's authoritative system enables rapid policy changes and implementation, leading to significant environmental improvements. India's democratic system, while allowing for more inclusive policy-making, often results in slower progress due to the need to balance diverse economic and social interests.

IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL SOUTH

China and India's differences highlight the shared and divergent goals of developing nations. The Global South countries exhibit varying degrees of unity regarding many environmental challenges. When various countries bear differing levels of responsibility and susceptibility, internal divisions become more pronounced because the biggest emitters of greenhouse gases must make huge trade-offs between their interests and those of vulnerable developing nations. The importance of this problem will grow when non-CO₂ greenhouse gas emissions are examined more closely. Therefore, the different strategies presented by China and India in methane reduction will further shape, and even deepen, the divisions within the Global South in at least the following three aspects.

Firstly, methane mitigation is redefining the narrative on climate change and altering the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR). The warming effect of methane is realized within 12 years, attributing the current situation to emissions over the past 12 years. Thus, traditional industrialized countries do not carry as heavy a burden for global warming as they do for their historical CO₂ emissions, while emerging economies like China and India need to bear more historical responsibility for methane emissions. Such a change challenges the long-standing "Southern Consensus" that has united the Global South, where developed nations were primarily blamed for global warming. However, the focus on methane undermines this consensus, questioning

the validity and influence of CBDR and deepening divisions within the Global South.

Secondly, the differences between China and India also reflect the divergences in the green transition paths of emerging economies. China and India have competed for over a century, described as "the Competition of Dragon and Elephant." In recent years, with major shifts in international geopolitics, comparisons of development models ("Beijing Consensus" vs. "Mumbai Consensus") to maneuvers within international organizations (such as within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS and G20) have often brought the two countries into discussion together. As the climate crisis intensifies, China's state-led environmental strategies contrast with India's democratic approach. According to the Global Methane Hub (2024), the Chinese government is seen as the most influential institution to reduce methane, while in India, responsibility is perceived to lie with corporations and citizens. This divergence in approach affects their participation in international climate negotiations, making the coordination of their development models and climate policies within groups like BRICS and G20 a critical issue for future discussions.

Thirdly, the policy differences between China and India on methane mitigation highlight the complexity of forming a unified stance among the diverse nations of the Global South. Although the "G77+China" summit annually adopts a joint declaration to solidify a common position on climate issues, achieving a unified voice among these countries remains challenging. Notably, there is no "single" climate strategy that applies to the "Global South"; climate action will be highly diverse among different countries (Fuhr 2021; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2018). More likely, other configurations of developing countries will cluster around various issues, depending on their environmental and national interests (Tran 2023). The strength of the Global South lies in its ability to act as a third party—a global audience—that can intervene to help shape the international narrative about what is appropriate and acceptable behavior in world politics (Ikenberry 2024). With climate change at the forefront, developing countries face crucial decisions in their green development trajectory. They could either follow the traditional Western model by adopting established low-carbon technologies or forge ahead as innovators, crafting unique green development paths that capitalize on their distinct advantages. China and India exemplify the latter approach, suggesting a future of more varied green governance and differing stances in international climate negotiations. This diversity may become the "new normal" in future climate dialogues.

CONCLUSION

China and India have adopted markedly different strategies in dealing with methane mitigation. This divergence stems from three main factors: industrial structure, government form, and policy orientation, which influence their respective industrial preferences and the intensity of policy efforts toward reducing methane emissions. China aims to enhance the legitimacy of its authoritarian regime by leading in environmental and climate initiatives and seeks to lessen geopolitical tensions through climate cooperation with the U.S., aligning with its dual carbon goals and green transformation in the energy sector. Consequently, China will likely take a more flexible and proactive approach to methane reduction. In contrast, India's methane emissions predominantly originate from agriculture, involving the livelihoods of numerous farmers. Despite India's democratic framework enabling various stakeholders to influence government positions, the dominant "economy first" mindset and strong farmers' interest groups complicate and slow the progress on methane reduction.

This article also indicates that the divergence between the two Asian giants will likely persist. Their differences in methane reduction are not accidental but determined by deeply rooted domestic political and economic structural factors (Rofel and Rojas 2023). This divergence indeed corroborates recent discussions about the division within the Global South, especially between China and India, on climate issues (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012; Prys-Hansen 2022; Stokes, Giang, and Selin 2016; Yang 2023).

As global attention to climate change deepens, controlling methane emissions has become a shared concern of the international community. Methane, as a gas with a stronger greenhouse effect than CO₂ in the short term, has increasingly occupied an important position in global climate governance. The acceleration of the GMP signifies the consensus achieved by the international community on methane reduction and suggests that methane may become one of the greenhouse gases that need to be prioritized in future global environmental agreements. Some non-governmental organizations have suggested that "countries should strive to rapidly adopt a global methane agreement, which provides an overarching framework to gauge progress in necessary reductions by 2030 and beyond." (Changing Markets Foundation, Environmental Investigation Agency, and

Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives 2022)

This process highlights the challenges for countries in the Global South, where the need to balance economic growth with climate action is particularly pressing. For these developing nations, prioritizing economic development often conflicts with the demands of methane reduction, which can restrict their economic progress. Particularly in countries heavily dependent on agriculture or energy, methane reduction is not only a technical challenge but also a significant economic and social burden. Thus, while the international consensus on methane reduction marks positive progress, it could also deepen internal divisions within the Global South, potentially leading to further fragmentation.

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