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12	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
13	DISTRICT OF NEVADA	A
	SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION	
14	v.	Case No. 2:22-cv-0612-JCM-EJY
15	MATTHEW WADE BEASLEY; et al.;	DEFENDANT RICHARD R.
16		MADSEN'S REPLY TO SECURITIES & EXCHANGE
17	Defendants,	COMMISSION'S RESPONSE
18	THE JUDD IRREVOCABLE TRUST; et al.;	TO MOTION TO CLARIFY ASSET FREEZE AND TO
19		ALLOW ATTORNEYS TO
20	Relief Defendants.	RETAIN EARNED FEES
21		ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED [LR 78-1]
22	Richard Madsen is accused of only two things in the Amended Complaint: selling	
23	unregistered securities and failing to register as a broker or dealer, both "strict liability" offenses.	
24		
25	(See ECF No. 118 at 23-24 & 27, First and Fifth Claims for Relief.) If the Securities & Exchange	
26	Commission had reason to believe Richard Madsen committed fraud, it could have made that	
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allegation in the Complaint. It did not. Instead, the SEC now says that it is entitled to prevent Mr. Madsen from paying his attorneys because some other defendants allegedly committed fraud, despite being unable to point to a single case supporting that novel claim. Paradoxically, the SEC now argues that the absence of such a case is what supports this newfound power. ²

Importantly, neither the Receiver nor SEC has addressed the how the unique nature of the engagement agreements Mr. Madsen executed with his attorneys establish that the funds are not subject to the asset freeze or receivership orders. Similarly, neither the SEC nor the Receiver disputes that the fees Mr. Madsen paid to his attorneys were reasonable. *See* ECF No. 332, Defendant Richard R. Madsen's Motion to Clarify Asset Freeze and to Allow Attorneys to Retain Earned Fees, at 19. Thus, even if the Court does not recognize that the fees Mr. Madsen paid to his attorneys are fully earned and thus their property as a matter of law, the Court should exercise its discretion to allow Mr. Madsen's attorneys to retain the funds. (*See* ECF No. 318, Order Denying Defendant's [Humphries & CJ Investments, LLC] Motion for Release of Funds at 5) (citations omitted).³

1. The SEC Has Not Alleged Defendant Richard Madsen Engaged In Fraudulent Conduct And Therefore Is Not Entitled To Restrict His Payment Of Attorney's Fees.

In its response to Mr. Madsen's motion, the SEC argues that so long as it alleges that *any* defendant in this case is accused of engaging in fraud, it is appropriate for *all* the defendants in the

¹ That is not to suggest that the SEC could have alleged, consistent with its obligations under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) and 11(b)(3), that Mr. Madsen engaged in fraud.

² The SEC adopts the arguments made by the Receiver in his response to Mr. Madsen's motion (ECF No. 338, Receiver Geoff Winkler's Response to Defendant Richard R. Madsen's Motion to Clarify Asset Freeze), which Mr. Madsen responded to in his Reply to Receiver's Response to Defendant Richard R. Madsen's Motion to Clarify Asset Freeze, ECF No. 347.

³ As more thoroughly explained in his motion, (ECF No. 17-18), Mr. Madsen is not seeking a release of all of his assets that did not originate from the illegal activities carried out by Defendant Beasley and the other defendants allegedly engaged in fraudulent activity. To calculate that amount with precision would undoubtedly require an unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources, not to mention the parties' resources, particularly when Mr. Madsen may lose his legal representation depending on the result of this motion.

case – regardless of whether they even knew that any alleged fraud had taken place – to have all their assets frozen. *See* ECF No. 339, Plaintiff Securities & Exchange Commission's Response to Defendant Richard R. Madsen's Motion to Clarify Asset Freeze. That is not the law and the SEC still has not cited a single case supporting this position.

In fact, the <u>only</u> case the SEC cites for the proposition that fraud allegations against the particular defendant are not necessary for an asset freeze (ECF No. 339 at 3) is *SEC v. Trabulse*, 526 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2007), an action against a hedge fund operator <u>for fraud</u>. And even in *Trabulse*, the asset freeze only limited the accused fraudster from using hedge fund assets for defense costs, not for other expenses. *Id.* at 1018. Moreover, the court in *Trabulse* did not freeze the defendant's personal assets, even though he had "commingled" fund and personal assets. *Id.* at 1011-12.

Moreover, the SEC has not only <u>never</u> previously taken its current position, the SEC's logic here obliterates the rationale for the relief it seeks. The SEC has repeatedly cited *SEC v. Quinn*, 997 F2d 287 (7th Cir. 1993), where an asset freeze was based on allegations that the particular defendant engaged in fraud. *See, e.g.*, ECF No. 180, Plaintiff Securities & Exchange Commission's Response to Defendant Jeffrey Judd's Motion for Release of Funds for Attorney's Fees, at 3; ECF No. 198, Plaintiff Securities & Exchange Commission's Response to Non-Party Oberheiden PC's Motion for (sic) Motion to Retain Earned Fees and Expenses, at 2; ECF No. 254, Plaintiff Securities & Exchange Commission's Response to Defendant Christopher Humphries and Relief Defendant CJ Investments, LLC's Motion for Release of Funds for Attorney's Fees, at 2, always quoting the same language (citing *U.S. v. Monsanto*, 491 US. 600 (1989) and *Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. U.S.*, 491 U.S. 617 (1989)). The court in *Quinn* compared the denial of a release for attorney's fees in the SEC case to the principle that "a bank robber cannot use the loot to wage the best defense money can buy." 997 F.2d at 289. But Mr. Madsen is has not been accused of any fraud, much less being

a bank robber. The SEC has not alleged that he committed any offense requiring scienter.

The SEC is seeking to have it both ways in this case. The SEC clearly thought allegations of fraud were important when opposing other defendants' requests for asset releases in this case. For example, in the SEC's response to Defendant Humphries's argument that the SEC had not sufficiently proven that he possessed the requisite scienter to be liable for fraud, the SEC spent nearly its entire brief describing the evidence of Humphries's fraud, not once suggesting that the mere fact that Mr. Humphries was a defendant in a case *involving* an alleged fraudulent Ponzi scheme, or that other defendants engaged in fraud or had knowledge of the fraud was sufficient to deny him a release from the asset freeze for attorney's fees. (*See* ECF No. 254, SEC's Response to Humphries, at 2-8). Instead, the SEC took the position that "the Humphries Defendants provide no evidentiary basis to reconsider Judge Mahan's ruling that the SEC has made a *prima facie* case that Humphries – like Beasley and Judd – had violated the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws." (*Id.* at 6.) That is not true for Mr. Madsen. The SEC has made no allegation, let alone a *prima facie* showing that Mr. Madsen committed fraud.

2. Mr. Madsen Is Not Analogous To A Relief Defendant.

The SEC and Receiver improperly rely on relief defendant cases to support freezing Mr. Madsen's assets and not permitting the release of funds for attorney's fees. As explained in Mr. Madsen's motion, cases involving relief defendants do not support the unlimited scope of relief the SEC seeks against Mr. Madsen. The SEC mischaracterizes Mr. Madsen's argument, saying he claims to be entitled to relief from the asset freeze because he provided "consideration." *See* ECF 339 at 3.4 Not true. Mr. Madsen's argument is that he is entitled to relief from the asset freeze because (1) he is *not accused of fraud*, and separately, (2) he cannot be treated like a relief defendant

⁴ The SEC does not, and could not, claim that Mr. Madsen would be a proper relief defendant. *See* ECF No. 181, Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission's Reply in Support of Motion to Amend Preliminary Injunction Order, at 8.)

because Mr. Madsen provided consideration for the commissions he received. *See* ECF No. 332 at 10, fn 1. *See also* ECF No. 181, Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission's Reply in Support of Motion to Amend Preliminary Injunction Order, at 8.

This is an important distinction for a court exercising its equitable jurisdiction. Individuals like Mr. Madsen, who are only alleged to have engaged in registration offenses subject to strict liability, are entitled to different treatment than defendants who allegedly committed fraud and relief defendants who took money without providing any consideration. Relief defendants are a special case because they knew they had no claim on the funds in the first place, having failed to provide consideration. The same cannot be said for an individual like Mr. Madsen—or his attorneys.

Moreover, the possibility that Mr. Madsen may be ordered to disgorge some portion of his assets in the future does not support limiting his ability to pay his attorneys prior to the judgment. If the SEC eventually chooses to litigate this case, perhaps it will be able to demonstrate it is entitled to an order of disgorgement from Mr. Madsen for the strict liability offenses it alleges he committed. But the SEC has not steps to do so. It appears to have no interest in giving reciprocal discovery to the defendants in this action – at least while any of those defendants still have attorneys. It is nearly six months past the deadline for the SEC to initiate a scheduling conference of the parties pursuant to LR 26-1. The SEC has gotten everything it wants already: the alleged Ponzi scheme was shut down before the SEC filed this action; the preliminary injunction and receivership orders require the defendants to produce the bulk of any discoverable documents they have without the bother of a discovery order; and the orders have frozen all the assets of not just

⁵ Even giving the SEC the benefit of the doubt by using the first appearance of a defendant after the Amended Complaint was filed as the triggering date for LR 26-1, it is nearly three months past the deadline for the SEC to initiate such a conference.

1 the principals but even individuals like Mr. Madsen, who invested their own money in the supposed 2 scheme. 3 3. Conclusion 4 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Richard R. Madsen respectfully requests a declaration 5 that Bragança Law and Howard & Howard may retain the amounts he has paid to them pursuant to 6 Mr. Madsen's engagement agreements with both firms, as they were not and are not subject to the 7 8 asset freeze and receivership orders previously entered by this Court. 9 Date: November 7, 2022 /s/David A. O'Toole Celiza P. Bragança (IL Bar No. 6226636) 10 David A. O'Toole (IL Bar No. 6227010) Bragança Law LLC 11 5250 Old Orchard Rd., Suite 300 Skokie, IL 60077 12 Tel: (847) 906-3460 13 Email: lisa@secdefenseattorney.com david@secdefenseattorney.com 14 Cami M. Perkins (NBN 9149 15 John J. Savage, Esq (NBN 11455 16 Howard & Howard Wells Fargo Tower 17 3800 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 1000 Las Vegas, NV 89169-5980 18 Tel: (702) 667-4855 Email: cperkins@howardandhoward.com 19 20 Attorneys for Defendant Richard R. Madsen 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28