28

1

2

3

4

5

This Motion is based on the below Points and Authorities, the pleadings and papers on file, and such other and further information as may be presented to the Court at the time of any hearing. DATED this 21st day of December, 2022.

GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP

/s/ Kara B. Hendricks By: KARA B. HENDRICKS, Bar No. 07743 JASON K. HICKS, Bar No. 13149 KYLE A. EWING, Bar No. 014051 10845 Griffith Peak Drive, Suite 600 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135

Attorneys for Receiver Geoff Winkler

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

On November 17, 2022, the Court granted the Receiver's Motion to Compel the turnover of certain Receivership Property that was in the possession of third party Kamille Dean. See ECF No. 368. In doing so, the Court awarded the Receiver fees against Ms. Dean. See id. at 19. The Court ordered the Receiver to file a "memorandum of fees and costs associated with bringing the Motion to Compel" Id. at 20. The Court provided Ms. Dean an opportunity to file a "response," if any, but specifically provided that "[n]o reply shall be permitted by the Receiver." Id. On December 1, the Receiver filed his Memorandum of Fees and Costs, ECF No. 378, and on December 15, Ms. Dean filed what she styled as an "Opposition" to the Receiver's "Motion for" Attorney's Fees and Costs" and a Declaration in Support of the same. ECF Nos. 394 & 395.

The Receiver anticipated the Court's fee award would deter Ms. Dean from continuing to make lengthy and baseless filings requiring the attention of the Receiver and his counsel and needlessly wasting Receivership fees and resources, as well as the Court's resources.¹ Unfortunately, Ms. Dean appears to have instead grown more belligerent. As explained below, Ms. Dean's Opposition and Declaration are procedurally improper on a number of levels and

In response to one motion by the Receiver, ECF No. 210, Ms. Dean has made no less than 12 filings on what is, at the end of the day, a single issue caused by Ms. Dean's own misconduct. See ECF Nos. 257, 258, 259, 260, 295, 296, 297, 380, 381, 395, 395, and 396.

contain unsupported and unwarranted speculation of a scandalous nature. Further, they appear to – again – seek reconsideration of the Court's order awarding fees, despite Ms. Dean having already made a bid at reconsideration. *See* ECF Nos. 380 and 381. As such, portions of the most recent filings should be struck and/or disregarded, as specified below. Alternatively, the Receiver requests an opportunity to file a reply to Ms. Dean's Opposition.

Also on December 15, Ms. Dean filed an "Objection to Magistrate." *See* ECF No. 396. Ms. Dean purports to object to Magistrate Judge Youchah considering *any* motions related to Ms. Dean. *See id.* at 2:1-4. The filing is confounding because, other than Ms. Dean's own motion for *the district judge* to reconsider Judge Youchah's prior order, there are no motions regarding Ms. Dean pending before the Court. *See* ECF No. 368 pp. 19-20 (disposing of all motions previously pending regarding Ms. Dean). More importantly, Ms. Dean cites no authority allowing for such an objection and does not appear to request any actual relief the Court can provide at this time. That being the case, the Objection, one of an ever-multiplying number of frivolous filings by Ms. Dean, should be denied.

I. Legal Standard

Courts "have the inherent power to strike a party's submissions other than pleadings." *Tagle v. Bean*, No. 2:15-cv-01402-JAD-VCF, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75922, at *8 (D. Nev. May 18, 2017) (collecting cases) (citations omitted). "Indeed, the alternative basis for striking improper filings is the district court's 'inherent power over the administration of its business." *Id.* (citing *Spurlock v. F.B.I.*, 69 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 1995)). "It has inherent authority to regulate the conduct of attorneys who appear before it [and] to promulgate and enforce rules for the management of litigation...." *Id.* (citing *Spurlock*) (brackets in original). "A document not allowed by Local Rule 7-2, *or otherwise permitted by order of this Court*, is a fugitive document and must be stricken from the record." *Id.* (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

26 | ///

///

27 || ///

28 | ///

1

10 11

12

9

13 14

15

16 17

18 19

20

21

22

23 24

25

26

27

28

II. The Court Should Strike or Disregard Portions of Ms. Dean's "Opposition" and Declaration Regarding the Receiver's Memorandum of Fees and Costs

As noted, the Court's order granting the Receiver fees directed the Receiver to file a memorandum of fees and costs "detailing the activities, hours spent (in tenths of hours), and the rate charged by each attorney and non-attorney who worked on the Motion and related filings." ECF No. 368 at 20. The Court did not ask the Receiver to address any issues other than these specific items directed at the reasonableness of the fees requested, and the Receiver did not do so. See generally ECF No. 378 (detailing the Receiver's fees and addressing reasonableness of the same). Accordingly, Ms. Dean's response, if she chose to file any, should have been constrained to the matters addressed in the memorandum and ordered briefed by the Court – i.e., the fees and costs the Receiver claims and their reasonableness.

Instead, Ms. Dean filed nearly twenty pages of briefing that, by her own admission, addresses at least three topics: (1) whether the Receiver's "Motion" for fees and costs is "moot"; (2) the fees the Receiver seeks; and (3) unsupported allegations of "concealment" by the Receiver. Only topic two falls within the purview of the briefing permitted by the Court's November 17 Order. Accordingly, briefing on topics (1) and (3) should be struck, including because they improperly seek reconsideration of prior orders and make unfounded allegations against the Receiver and his counsel based on Ms. Dean's own speculation and in direct contravention to previous orders of this Court.

As an initial matter, the Receiver's memorandum of fees and costs is not a "motion," as Ms. Dean repeatedly describes it.² The Court already awarded the fees the Receiver seeks in the November 17th Order with a mere calculation of the amount and determination of the reasonableness remaining to be decided, and there is no additional relief requested in the Receiver's Memorandum. See ECF No. 378. Accordingly, any arguments directed at whether the Receiver is entitled to the fees in the first place would be properly made in a motion for reconsideration. Ms. Dean has in fact already made such a motion (or "appeal") of the Magistrate

² See, e.g., ECF No. 294 at 7:2-4 & 9:1-3.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22 23 24

26 27

28

25

repetition of her arguments in support of reconsideration should be struck as both outside the scope of the response authorized by the Court's November 17 Order and an improper attempt to seek reconsideration under the guise of opposing a memorandum of fees and costs. Compare, e.g., Dean's Appeal of Mag. J. Order, ECF No. 380 at 1-2, 11, and 20-23 (arguing Dean "purged" her contempt and 28 U.S.C. § 754, respectively) with Opp. to Recvr.'s Memo. of Fees/Costs, ECF No. 394 at 7-10 and 23-24 (making the same arguments).

Judge's ruling, which is pending at ECF No. 380. See ECF No. 380 at 8-9. Ms. Dean's latest

Further, Ms. Dean's filings inappropriately and baselessly accuse the Receiver of "concealment," "gross negligence," "subterfuge," and other scandalous things with no support for these claims except, at best, her own speculation. See, e.g., ECF No. 394 at 22-24. Each of these accusations is without merit, but to provide a detailed response would require significant time and, of course, a reply brief, which the Court specifically instructed the Receiver not to file. See ECF No. 368 at 20. Moreover, because they were not addressed in the Memorandum of Fees and Costs, their inclusion in an opposition to the Memorandum is inappropriate as it was not authorized by the November 17 Order. See id. Accordingly, the Receiver requests these portions of the brief be struck or the Court enter an order specifically indicating that the arguments will not be considered.

Finally, Ms. Dean claims, without any explanation, that the fees claimed on behalf of one of the Receiver's law firms, Allen Matkins, was not included in its Second Quarterly Application for Payment of Fees and Expenses. See ECF No. 394 at 24-25. The fees were included, however. See generally ECF No. 360 (seeking authority for Receiver to pay Allen Matkins these fees (among others)) and ECF No. 361 (declaration in support of the same).³ This argument, which again attempts to paint the Receiver and his professionals in an unsavory light with no cognizable basis for doing so, should be struck.

Specifically, compare ECF No. 378-3 at p. 7 (Ex. A to Ex. 2 to Rec.'s Memo. of Fees & Costs, setting forth billing entries for Allen Matkins attorney D. Zaro on 7/5, 7/6, 7/7, 7/19, 7/29, and 8/1, for which the Receiver seeks payment by Ms. Dean) with ECF No. 361 at pp. 28, 29, 31, 32-33, and 33 (respectively setting forth the same billing entries in Ex. A to Del Castillo Decl. in Support of Allen Matkins Application for Payment of Second Quarter Fees).

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In short, it appears Ms. Dean's 19-page brief only addresses the reasonableness of specific fees and costs claimed by the Receiver for approximately 12 pages. See ECF No. 394 at 10:18-22:25.4 Ms. Dean also filed a purported declaration in support of her Opposition. ECF No. 395. Astoundingly, very little of Ms. Dean's declaration contains facts of which she has personal knowledge. See id. Instead, Dean again attacks the Court's the award of fees itself, claims she "purged" any contempt, cites case law, and draws legal conclusion after legal conclusion – many of which the Court already rejected. See id. Even when she does argue for a reduction of the fees the Receiver actually claims at paragraphs 10 through 18, she does not attack the reasonableness of the fees, instead making a strained argument for reduction that relies entirely on a legal argument the Court already rejected in granting the Receiver's previous motion to compel –that the Receiver failed to satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 754. See ECF No. 395 ¶¶ 10-18.

Accordingly, the Receiver requests that the entirety of Ms. Dean's Declaration (ECF No. 395) be struck and/or disregarded and that portions of her Opposition to the Receiver's Memorandum (ECF No. 394) be struck and/or disregarded. With regard to the Opposition, the Receiver asks that the Court strike and/or disregard the following pages and lines: 7:4-8; 7:10-10:17; and 22:26-25:20.⁵

III. Alternatively, the Court should Allow the Receiver to File a Reply

If the Court is inclined to consider the additional arguments forwarded by Ms. Dean, the Receiver requests an opportunity to file a reply. The Receiver has not drafted or attached a proposed reply at this time because he believes drafting it would be a poor use of Receivership

The Receiver and his counsel submitted only fees and costs they believed were reasonable for this Court's consideration. That being the case, the Receiver of course disagrees with Ms. Dean's arguments regarding the reasonableness of the fees wholeheartedly. Ms. Dean relies primarily on misapplication of case law, conjecture, and frivolous allegations of vagueness. However, because the Court did not permit a reply, the Receiver will not say more than this without an order from the Court permitting further briefing. See ECF No. 368 at 20.

⁵ For the avoidance of confusion, the page numbers used here and throughout this brief refer to the ECF page number in the Court's time stamp at the top of the page and not to the page numbering provided by Ms. Dean in the bottom margin, as they differ. The line numbers of course refer to Ms. Dean's line numbers.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

funds given the Court's current order precluding a reply. See ECF No. 368 at 20. Further, continuing to respond to Ms. Dean's sensational and baseless arguments has become a drain on the Receivership's resources. As noted above, Ms. Dean has made no less than 12 filings on what is, at the end of the day, a single issue caused by Ms. Dean's own conduct (her failure to turn over Receivership Property). See ECF Nos. 257, 258, 259, 260, 295, 296, 297, 380, 381, 395, 395, and 396. Without the Court's intervention, the Receiver fears he and his counsel will continue to waste an inordinate amount of time and Receivership funds responding to the barrage of needless and, at times, frivolous filings.⁶ Accordingly, striking her filings in part to avoid the Receiver again briefing frivolous and/or recycled arguments is appropriate.

If the Court does not strike or disregard the procedurally improper portions of Ms. Dean's pleadings, the Receiver must be allowed an opportunity to reply. Ms. Dean's intervening actions in submitting an Opposition that goes beyond the scope of the Receiver's Memorandum of Fees and Costs and the Court's November 17 Order authorizing the same warrants reconsideration of this ruling. So, if the Court is inclined to consider Ms. Dean's pleadings, the Receiver requests the Court reconsider its position and enter an order allowing him to file a reply in light of Ms. Dean's Opposition drastically expanding the scope of the Receiver's Memorandum of Fees and Costs.

The Court Should Deny Ms. Dean's "Objection to Magistrate" IV.

Ms. Dean also filed an "Objection to Magistrate." See ECF No. 396. Ms. Dean purports to object to Magistrate Judge Youchah considering any motions related to Ms. Dean. See id. at 2:1-4. Ms. Dean cites no authority allowing for such an objection. Accordingly, to the extent the Objection seeks relief from the Court, the Objection violates both F.R.C.P. 7(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 7-2(d). For these reasons, the Objection should be denied.

///

25 26

27

28

⁶ Even if the Court continues to exercise its discretion to award the Receiver fees each time Ms. Dean makes unnecessary and unsupported filings, the Court cannot replace the time, energy, and attention of the Receiver, his employees, and his professionals. As the Court is aware, the Receiver and his team have much important work to do in this case, and each time his resources are diverted to Ms. Dean, those resources cannot be dedicated to other important tasks.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

V. Conclusion

Because Ms. Dean's filings are procedurally improper, fail to meet the requirements of the relief she requests, and include baseless and scandalous claims regarding the Receiver and his counsel, the Court should:

- Strike pages 7:4-8; 7:10-10:17; and 22:26-25:20⁷ of Kamille Dean's Opposition to 1. the Receiver's Memorandum of Fees and Costs (ECF No. 394);
- 2. Strike Kamille Dean's Declaration in Support of her Opposition to the Receivers' Memorandum of Fees and Costs (ECF No. 395) in its entirety; and
 - Deny Ms. Dean's "Objection to Magistrate" (ECF No. 396). 3.

If the Court does not strike Ms. Dean's inappropriate arguments, the Court should instead enter an order amending its November 17, 2022, Order (ECF No. 368) to allow the Receiver to file a reply to Ms. Dean's Opposition to the Receiver's Memorandum of Fees and Costs. The Receiver is prepared to submit such a response within five (5) court days of entry of any such order.

DATED this 21st day of December 2022.

GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP

By: /s/ Kara B. Hendricks

KARA B. HENDRICKS, Bar No. 07743 JASON K. HICKS, Bar No. 13149 KYLE A. EWING, Bar No. 014051 10845 Griffith Peak Drive, Suite 600 Las Vegas, Nevada 89135

Attorneys for Receiver Geoff Winkler

24

25

26

27

28

For the avoidance of confusion, the page numbers used here and throughout this brief refer to the ECF page number in the Court's time stamp at the top of the page and not to the page numbering provided by Ms. Dean, as they are inconsistent. The line numbers of course refer to Ms. Dean's line numbers.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on the 21st day of December 2022, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF KAMILLE DEAN'S "OPPOSITION" TO THE RECEIVER'S MEMORANDUM OF FEES AND COSTS [ECF No. 394] AND DECLARATION IN SUPPORT OF THE SAME [ECF No. 395] OR, ALTERNATIVELY, FOR LEAVE TO FILE A REPLY – AND – RESPONSE TO KAMILLE DEAN'S OBJECTION TO MAGISTRATE was filed electronically via the Court's CM/ECF system. Notice of filing will be served on all parties by operation of the Court's CM/ECF system, and parties may access this filing through the Court's CM./ECF system.

/s/ Evelyn Escobar-Gaddi

An employee of Greenberg Traurig, LLP