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6 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
7 **FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

8 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE  
9 COMMISSION,

10 Plaintiff,

v.

11 MATTHEW WADE BEASLEY; BEASLEY  
12 LAW GROUP PC; JEFFREY J. JUDD;  
13 CHRISTOPHER R. HUMPHRIES; J&J  
CONSULTING SERVICES, INC., an Alaska  
14 Corporation; J&J CONSULTING SERVICES,  
INC., a Nevada Corporation; J AND J  
15 PURCHASING LLC; SHANE M. JAGER;  
16 JASON M. JONGEWARD; DENNY  
SEYBERT; ROLAND TANNER; LARRY  
17 JEFFERY; JASON A. JENNE; SETH  
JOHNSON; CHRISTOPHER M. MADSEN;  
18 RICHARD R. MADSEN; MARK A.  
MURPHY; CAMERON ROHNER; AND  
WARREN ROSEGREEN;

19 Defendants; and

20 THE JUDD IRREVOCABLE TRUST; PAJ  
CONSULTING INC; BJ HOLDINGS LLC;  
21 STIRLING CONSULTING, L.L.C.; CJ  
INVESTMENTS, LLC; JL2 INVESTMENTS,  
22 LLC; ROCKING HORSE PROPERTIES,  
LLC; TRIPLE THREAT BASKETBALL,  
23 LLC; ACAC LLC; ANTHONY MICHAEL  
ALBERTO, JR.; and MONTY CREW LLC;

24 Relief Defendants.

Case No.: 2:22-cv-00612-CDS-EJY

**PLAINTIFF SECURITIES AND  
EXCHANGE COMMISSION'S  
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM OF  
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN  
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND  
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION  
ORDER.**

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1 **INTRODUCTION**

2 Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) respectfully requests that the  
3 Court enter an amended preliminary injunction and asset freeze order that includes the eight  
4 defendants newly added to the SEC’s Amended Complaint. Like certain of the original  
5 defendants, the eight newly added defendants—Larry Jeffery, Jason Jenne, Seth Johnson,  
6 Christopher Madsen, Richard Madsen, Mark Murphy, Cameron Rohner, and Warren Rosegreen  
7 (collectively herein, the “New Defendants”)—worked as promoters for the “purchase  
8 agreement” investment scheme and obtained, collectively, at least \$40 million dollars in investor  
9 assets in violation of the federal securities laws. Extending the preliminary injunction and asset  
10 freeze to the New Defendants is necessary to ensure that the New Defendants do not continue to  
11 violate the federal securities laws, and so that any remaining investor monies they have retained  
12 are not dissipated during the pendency of this lawsuit.

13 **STATEMENT OF FACTS**

14 **I. THE NEW DEFENDANTS**

15 **Larry Jeffery** (“Jeffery”) is a resident of Laguna Beach, California. At all relevant times,  
16 Jeffery owned and controlled at least two shell companies, FD Consulting Corp. and Capital  
17 Core Financial, Inc. (*See* Ex. A, Declaration of Joni Ostler (“Ostler Decl.”) ¶¶ 6–7.) **Jason A.**  
18 **Jenne** (“Jenne”), is a resident of Las Vegas, Nevada. At all relevant times, Jenne owned and  
19 controlled J & D Consulting Firm Inc., a shell company. (*Id.* ¶ 21.) **Seth A. Johnson**  
20 (“Johnson”) is a resident of Gilbert, Arizona. At all relevant times, Johnson owned shell  
21 company Prestige Consulting LLC (d/b/a Prestige Legal Funding) with New Defendant Cameron  
22 Rohner. (*Id.* ¶¶ 31–32.) **Christopher M. Madsen** (“C. Madsen”) is a resident of Henderson,  
23 Nevada. At all relevant times, C. Madsen owned and controlled Relief Defendant ACAC, LLC.  
24 (*Id.* ¶ 40.) **Richard R. Madsen** (“R. Madsen”) is believed to currently be a resident of Kanab,  
25 Utah. At all relevant times, R. Madsen owned and controlled at least four shell companies,  
26 including Red Hills Investments, Inc., Battle Born Funding LLC, Ruger Investments Inc, and  
27 Ruger Investments RM Inc. (*Id.* ¶¶ 57–60.) **Mark A. Murphy** (“Murphy”) is a resident of

1 Henderson, Nevada. At all relevant times, Murphy owned and controlled at least two shell  
2 companies, American Colocation Services, LLC and Black Rock Business Services, LLC. (*Id.*  
3 ¶¶ 73–74.) **Cameron Rohner** (“Rohner”) is a resident of Gilbert, Arizona. At all relevant  
4 times, Rohner owned and controlled shell company CR6 LLC and co-owned and controlled  
5 Prestige Consulting LLC (d/b/a Prestige Legal Funding) with Defendant Johnson. (*Id.* ¶¶ 31–  
6 32.) **Warren Rosegreen** (“Rosegreen”) is a resident of Henderson, Nevada. At all relevant  
7 times, Rosegreen owned and controlled Relief Defendant Triple Threat Basketball, LLC. (Dkt.  
8 No. 2-5, Ostler Decl. ¶ 58 & Ex. 38; Ex. A, Ostler Decl. ¶ 78.)

9 **II. THE NEW DEFENDANTS’ ROLE IN THE FRAUDULENT “PURCHASE**  
10 **AGREEMENT” INVESTMENT SCHEME.**

11 Beginning in at least 2017 and continuing through at least March 2022, Defendant Jeffrey  
12 Judd, directly and through the Defendant J&J Entities,<sup>1</sup> along with Defendant Christopher  
13 Humphries, who worked for Judd as a promoter, offered investments in purported personal  
14 injury settlement contracts called “Purchase Agreements.” (*See* Dkt. No. 2-5, Ostler Decl. ¶¶  
15 21–22 & Ex. 11, ¶¶ 23–25, 27–30 & Exs. 13–18, ¶ 31 & Ex. 19, ¶¶ 32–33.) When promoting  
16 this investment scheme, Judd represented to investors that he had started a litigation financing  
17 business with his attorney, Defendant Matthew Beasley of Beasley Law Group PC, whereby  
18 Judd invested money in contracts with personal injury plaintiffs while Beasley procured those  
19 contracts through his relationships with other attorneys around the country. Judd also told  
20 investors he was responsible for raising funds for the business, and that Beasley was responsible  
21 for supplying the settlement contracts. (*See id.* ¶ 33, Exs. 11, 15.)

22 Judd described the investment opportunity business to investors as follows: An injured  
23 party would receive a settlement from an insurance company and would want to obtain a portion  
24 of the settlement funds before the settlement check arrived. To do so, the injured party, through a  
25 \_\_\_\_\_

26 <sup>1</sup> The J&J Entities are Defendants J&J Consulting Services, Inc. (an Alaska corporation); J&J  
27 Consulting Services Inc. (a Nevada corporation), and J and J Purchasing LLC.

1 personal injury attorney, would enter into a settlement contract called a “Purchase Agreement”  
2 with one of the J&J Entities. The contracting J&J Entity would advance funds, which the injured  
3 party purportedly repaid 90 days later plus interest and fees. (Dkt. No. 2-5, Ostler Decl. ¶¶ 23,  
4 25, 33 & Exs. 11, 12, 7, 9, 15.) Judd further represented that investors could invest in a  
5 settlement contract for \$80,000 or \$100,000 dollars, and would receive a 12.5% return (and  
6 sometimes more) in 90 days. (*Id.*) According to Judd, the investor’s principal would  
7 automatically be reinvested in a new settlement contract, such that investors would receive an  
8 annual return of at least 50%. (*Id.* ¶ 33 & Ex. 19 (Gibbs Decl.) Ex. 12.)

9 In addition to Humphries, Judd retained other promoters, including New Defendants  
10 Jeffery, Jenne, Johnson, C. Madsen, R. Madsen, Murphy, Rohner, and Rosegreen, to solicit  
11 additional investors to purchase interests in the investment scheme. (*See* Ex. A, Ostler Decl.  
12 ¶¶ 8–20 (Jeffery); *id.* ¶¶ 23–30 (Jenne); *id.* ¶¶ 33–39 (Johnson and Rohner); *id.* ¶¶ 41–56 (C.  
13 Madsen); *id.* ¶¶ 61–72 (R. Madsen); *id.* ¶¶ 75–77 (Murphy); *id.* ¶¶ 79–84 (Rosegreen).)  
14 Operating principally through word of mouth, the New Defendants collectively sold hundreds of  
15 purported tort settlement contracts to investors and received commissions (of up to at least 44  
16 percent) on each contract sold, primarily through the various shell companies they controlled.  
17 (*See generally id.*) In total, the New Defendants received over **\$40 million** in disbursements  
18 from the investment scheme, at least a portion of which were commissions from their solicitation  
19 of investors. (*See* Ex. B, Declaration of Amir Salimi (“Salimi Decl.”) ¶ 11.)

20 New Defendants Jeffery and Rosegreen generally instructed investors to wire their  
21 investment funds to the Beasley Law Group’s IOLTA at Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Ex. A, Ostler  
22 Decl. ¶¶ 13, 17, 83.) New Defendants Jenne, C. Madsen, R. Madsen, Johnson, Rohner, and  
23 Murphy instructed investors to send their investment money directly to accounts held by shell  
24 companies these New Defendants controlled, and these New Defendants would then send the  
25 investor funds to the Beasley Law Group IOLTA themselves. (*Id.* ¶¶ 30, 36, 50, 54–56, 67, 72,  
26 77.) Bank records for the Beasley Law Group’s IOLTA and the J&J Entities indicate that  
27 Beasley, Judd, and/or promoter Shane Jager (in the case of Rohner and Johnson) would then

1 send funds back to the shell companies controlled by the New Defendants for payment of  
2 investor “returns” and commission payments. (*See id.*)

3       Until about December 2021, the New Defendants generally gave prospective investors  
4 copies of the alleged tort settlement contracts and an “investment agreement” to sign, which  
5 included a clause prohibiting the investor from contacting the fictitious plaintiff or his or her  
6 lawyer (generally a real plaintiff’s tort lawyer that Beasley would find using internet searches)  
7 without Judd’s written consent. In or around December 2021, Judd required the New Defendants  
8 to distribute more formal offering documents, including a private placement memorandum, to  
9 both new and existing investors. (*See Ex. A, Ostler Decl. ¶¶ 16 & Ex. 6, id. ¶¶ 37, 43, 47, 52,*  
10 *69.*) With the exception of New Defendants Jenne, Rohner, and Johnson, the New Defendants  
11 asked investors to sign and return a subscription agreement, an investor questionnaire, and new  
12 nondisclosure and non-compete agreements (which, as before, prohibited the investors from  
13 contacting the fictitious plaintiffs or their lawyers), to which Defendant J and J Purchasing was  
14 the counterparty.<sup>2</sup> (*Id.*)

15       In some instances, certain of the New Defendants had investors enter into investment  
16 agreements directly with one of the entities they controlled. For example, Jeffery had investors  
17 he solicited enter into investment agreements with the entities he controlled, Capital Core  
18 Financial and FD Consulting. (*Ex. A, Ostler Decl. ¶¶ 11–12 & Exs. 3, 4.*) These agreements  
19 stated that Jeffery and his entity were acting as representatives of J&J Consulting and Judd. (*Id.*)  
20 Both Jeffery and Judd signed these Letter Agreements (Jeffery on behalf of his entity, and Judd  
21 on behalf of J&J Consulting). (*Id.*) Likewise, Rohner and Johnson had investors they solicited

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22  
23 <sup>2</sup> Johnson executed the new offering documents on behalf of Prestige Consulting and continued  
24 to sell interests to investors through Prestige Consulting without asking investors to review or  
25 sign the new J and J Purchasing documents. (*Ex. A, Ostler Decl. ¶ 37.*) Jenne executed the  
26 offering documents on behalf of his entity J&D Consulting Firm, Inc., and did not forward the  
27 documents to his investors. (*Id. ¶ 16 & Ex. 23.*)

1 enter into investment agreements with Prestige Consulting LLC. (*Id.* ¶¶ 33–34 & Ex. 32.) These  
2 agreements stated that Prestige Consulting was the seller of the interest in the purported  
3 settlement agreements, and made no mention of J&J Consulting or Judd as the ultimate source of  
4 the settlement agreements. (*See id.*) Prestige Consulting would separately buy the purported  
5 settlement agreements from J&J Consulting. (Ex. A, Ostler Decl. ¶ 35.) Prestige Consulting  
6 would pass a portion of the returns through to their investors, and Rohner and Johnson would  
7 keep a portion of the returns. (*Id.* ¶¶ 35–36.)

8 Each of the New Defendants received significant commission payments for their  
9 solicitation of investors into the scheme. (*See* Ex. A, Ostler Decl. ¶¶ 14–15, 18 (Jeffery); *id.*  
10 ¶¶ 27–28 (Jenne); *id.* ¶ 35 (Johnson and Rohner); *id.* ¶ 53 (C. Madsen); *id.* ¶ 68 (R. Madsen); *id.*  
11 ¶ 77 (Murphy); *id.* ¶ 83 (Rosegreen).) Typically, these payments would be a percentage of the  
12 “returns” paid out to investors through Beasley or Judd’s accounts: in addition, some of the New  
13 Defendants misrepresented or underrepresented the purported returns from the investments, and  
14 kept a portion of the returns made by the investors they solicited for themselves. For example,  
15 Jenne represented to the investors he solicited that the return on their investment was 10 percent  
16 quarterly (rather than the 12.5 percent represented by Judd and Humphries) and then pocketed  
17 the difference. (Ex. A, Ostler Decl. ¶ 27 & Exs. 24, 25, 26, 27.) Jenne justified this by claiming  
18 that if investors knew what Judd was offering, they would “want more” and be “greedy.” (*Id.* ¶  
19 27 & Ex. 25.) Likewise, Johnson and Rohner, who operated in part through their shell company  
20 Prestige Consulting LLC, generally paid investors “returns” of only 8 percent quarterly. (*Id.*  
21 ¶ 34.) And New Defendant R. Madsen told at least one investor that the investor would receive  
22 returns of 7 percent quarterly, and then—once the investor learned, in December 2021, that other  
23 investors were being paid up to 12.5 percent quarterly returns—represented to the investor that  
24 going forward R. Madsen and his brother C. Madsen would be making less commissions and that  
25 investors would be making even more money. (*Id.* ¶¶ 49, 53.)

26 As detailed in the SEC’s earlier motion for a temporary restraining order and asset freeze,  
27 and contrary to representations made by Defendants to investors both orally and in distributed

1 written materials, there was no network of personal injury attorneys and no settlement  
2 agreements supporting the investment scheme. For example, an investor solicited by Defendant  
3 Humphries was given a “Purchase Agreement” with the name of a local attorney and that  
4 attorney’s purported “slip and fall” client. However, as attested to by the attorney named in the  
5 “Purchase Agreement,” the attorney never had a client of that name, and never entered into any  
6 such agreement with J&J Consulting Services. (Dkt. No. 2-5, Ostler Decl. ¶¶ 18–19 and Ex. 6.)  
7 Likewise, when a confidential source who was solicited by Humphries and given copies of  
8 Purchase Agreements showing the attorneys as parties to the agreements, telephoned those  
9 attorneys, those attorneys and their law firm staff were unable to locate any records of either the  
10 Purchase Agreements or the clients listed on the Agreements. In essence, the attorneys indicated  
11 that the Purchase Agreements were fake. (*Id.* ¶ 23.)

12 In addition, accounting analysis of the Beasley IOLTA Account—the account that  
13 appears to have been the central hub for the investment funds entering the scheme—indicates  
14 that there were no transactions consistent with investment activities, including investments in  
15 litigation settlements. (*See* Dkt. No. 2-8, Salimi Decl. ¶¶ 12–13.) Instead, the Beasley Account  
16 shows a pattern of repeated deposits in increments of \$40,000, \$50,000, \$80,000 or \$100,000  
17 (the typical investment amounts for investors in the “purchase agreement” scheme) followed by  
18 immediate transfers to those Defendants involved in promoting the scheme. (*Id.* ¶ 12.) Between  
19 January 2017 and March 15, 2022, approximately \$487 million was disbursed from the Beasley  
20 Account—and there is no indication that any of those account transactions are consistent with  
21 making disbursements to litigation plaintiffs or their lawyers (as purportedly was being done as  
22 part of the investment scheme). (*Id.* ¶ 13.) Instead, most of the money (approximately \$411  
23 million, or 84 percent of the total funds disbursed from the Beasley Account) was disbursed to  
24 Defendants (including the New Defendants) and Relief Defendants. (*Id.* ¶ 14.) For example,  
25 New Defendant Jeffery received disbursements of \$2.4 million; Johnson received personal  
26 disbursements of at least \$1.8 million, along with \$1.5 million to the Prestige Consulting account  
27 he and Rohner controlled; Rohner received personal disbursements of at least \$1.1 million; Jenne

1 received disbursements of at least \$3.1 million; C. Madsen received disbursements of at least  
2 \$12.3 million; R. Madsen received disbursements of at least \$5.8 million; Murphy received  
3 disbursements of at least \$4.8 million; and Rosegreen received disbursements of at least \$12.4  
4 million. (Ex. B, Salimi Decl. ¶ 11.)

5 On March 3, 2022, FBI agents attempted to execute a search warrant at Beasley's home.  
6 (Dkt. No. 2-5, Ostler Decl. ¶ 6.) During the ensuing standoff, Beasley spoke with an FBI agent  
7 negotiator in a series of telephone calls. (*Id.*) Recordings of those calls were provided to SEC  
8 staff by the FBI. In the calls, Beasley confessed that since 2016 or 2017 he ran a "Ponzi  
9 scheme" related to personal injury settlements, which he started because he had gambling debts.  
10 (*Id.* at Ex. 1, Beasley Tr. at 6:14-15; 19:23-22:9, 33:10.) Beasley said that investors were  
11 promised that their money would be given to someone who had settled a personal injury case but  
12 had not received their settlement money yet. (*Id.* at Ex. 2, Beasley Tr. at 33:9-23.) Beasley  
13 admitted that he "got names of attorneys" for the scheme but "never actually talked to them."  
14 (*Id.* at Ex. 2, Beasley Tr. at 32:19-20.) Beasley said that as Judd found more investors, "I made  
15 up more attorney's deals and just kept growing it." (*Id.* at Ex. 2, Beasley Tr. at 14:21-23.)  
16 Beasley admitted that investors "would give their money to me, and I would supposedly send it  
17 to a bunch of attorneys" but actually "I kept it and used it to pay, basically pay them back to pay  
18 off gambling debts," including to his bookie, Relief Defendant Anthony Alberto, Jr. (*Id.* at Ex.  
19 2, Beasley Tr. at 15:5-16:13.)

### 20 **III. THE NEW DEFENDANTS' ATTEMPTS TO LIQUIDATE ASSETS.**

21 Following the March 3, 2022 standoff between Beasley and the FBI, and the SEC's  
22 subsequent filing of this action against the original defendants and relief defendants, the New  
23 Defendants have taken steps to liquidate or otherwise transfer assets. On March 25, 2022, less  
24 than three weeks from the date of Beasley's arrest, R. Madsen sold his home in Nevada for \$2  
25 million and moved to Utah. (Ex. A, Ostler Decl. ¶ 89.) R. Madsen also proceeded to drain funds  
26 from his shell companies' accounts: between the date of Beasley's arrest and April 30, 2022 (the  
27 last date on which the Commission has information), R. Madson has withdrawn or transferred

1 over \$35,800 from Ruger Investments and over \$14,000 from Red Hills Investments, and has  
2 posted his 2021 Ram 3500 Limited truck for sale for \$98,000. (*Id.* ¶¶ 90–93.) Likewise, from  
3 March 3, 2022, the date of Beasley’s arrest, to March 31, 2022, C. Madsen withdrew \$190,000  
4 from the account for his shell company ACAC, LLC, made payments totaling over \$32,000 to  
5 credit cards, and transferred over \$77,000 to entities controlled by his brother R. Madsen. (*Id.*  
6 ¶ 88.) The Commission has also learned that C. Madsen recently sold his warehouse of classic  
7 cars for at least \$1 million.

8 Since Beasley’s arrest, Rohner has transferred or withdrawn \$71,000 from the account in  
9 the name of his shell company CR6 LLC. There is also an electronic withdrawal of \$114,000,  
10 the date and recipient of which Rohner redacted. (*Id.* ¶ 93.) Jeffery, meanwhile, currently has a  
11 home listed for sale for \$4.65 million—and reduced the asking price by \$175,000 on June 14,  
12 2022. (*Id.* ¶ 85.) Between the date of Beasley’s arrest on March 3 and April 30, 2022, Jeffery  
13 has also transferred or spent at least \$62,100 from the account of his shell company FD  
14 Consulting. (*Id.* ¶ 86.) Jenne, meanwhile, has withdrawn or transferred \$387,821 from the  
15 account of his shell company J&D Consulting since Beasley’s arrest. (*Id.* ¶ 87.) And bank  
16 records for Murphy’s shell company American Colocation show that, since Beasley’s arrest,  
17 Murphy has refunded \$600,000 to certain investors, moved \$13,000 into a Fidelity Investments  
18 account, and allowed investors to continue to cash checks for fictitious investment returns, and  
19 cashed his own fictitious investment return checks totaling over \$47,000. (*Id.* ¶ 94.)

## 20 ARGUMENT

### 21 **I. THE COURT’S PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD BE EXTENDED** 22 **TO THE NEW DEFENDANTS.**

23 Section 20(b) of the Securities Act of 1933) and Section 21(d) of the Securities Exchange  
24 Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) authorize the SEC to obtain a preliminary injunction or other  
25 temporary relief without a bond. *See* 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b) & 78u(d). In general, a plaintiff  
26 seeking a preliminary injunction must “demonstrate ‘that he is likely to succeed on the merits,  
27 that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of

1 equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” *SEC v. Banc de Binary*  
2 *Ltd.*, 964 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1232 (D. Nev. 2013), quoting *Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky*, 586 F. 3d  
3 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009); see *Winter v. NRDC*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). In SEC actions, the  
4 SEC need only make a two-prong showing: (1) a *prima facie* case that defendants have violated  
5 the federal securities laws, and (2) a reasonable likelihood that the defendants will repeat their  
6 violations. See, e.g., *SEC v. Blockvest, LLC*, No. 18CV2287-GPB(BLM), 2019 WL 625163, at  
7 \*4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2019). That is because the SEC appears “not as an ordinary litigant, but as  
8 a statutory guardian charged with safeguarding the public interest in enforcing the securities  
9 laws.” *SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc.*, 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975). This enforcement  
10 action is brought in the public interest, and thus, the Court’s “equitable powers assume an even  
11 broader and more flexible character than when only a private controversy is at stake.” *FSLIC v.*  
12 *Sahni*, 868 F.2d 1096, 1097 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting *FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc.*, 668 F.2d 1107,  
13 1112 (9th Cir. 1982)).

14 **A. The SEC Has Made A *Prima Facie* Showing That The New Defendants**  
15 **Have Violated The Federal Securities Laws.**

16 The SEC has made a *prima facie* showing that the New Defendants have violated both  
17 the registration provisions of Sections 5(a) and (c) of the Securities Act, and the broker  
18 registration provisions of Section 15(a)(1) of the Exchange Act.

19 **1. The New Defendants Violated the Registration Provisions of Sections**  
20 **5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act.**

21 **First**, each of the New Defendants violated the registration provisions of Sections 5(a)  
22 and 5(c) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77e(a), (c)] by offering and selling securities (the  
23 litigation finance “Purchase Agreements”) without a registration statement as to those securities  
24 and without a valid exception to such registration. To establish such a violation, the SEC must  
25 demonstrate that the New Defendants, directly or indirectly, offered or sold securities without a  
26 registration statement having been filed or in effect. See *SEC v. International Chem. Dev. Co.*,  
27 469 F.2d 20, 27 (10th Cir. 1972). “The elements of [an] action for violation of Section 5 are (1)

1 lack of a registration statement as to the subject securities; (2) the offer or sale of the securities;  
2 and (3) the use of interstate transportation or communication and the mails in connection with  
3 the offer or sale.” *Europe & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London*, 147  
4 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting *In re Command Credit Corp.*, No. 3-8674, 1995 SEC  
5 LEXIS 989, at \*2 (S.E.C. Apr. 19, 1995)). Section 5 is a strict liability offense, and thus  
6 Defendants’ state of mind does not provide any exception to Section 5’s registration  
7 requirements. *Aaron v. SEC*, 446 U.S. 680, 714 n.5 (1980); *SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd.*  
8 *Liab. Co.*, 991 F. Supp. 6 at 9 (“whether [defendant] was an unwitting participant in this complex  
9 scheme [is] of no moment”). As discussed at length in the SEC’s memorandum in support of  
10 temporary emergency relief as to the original defendants, the “purchase agreements” offered and  
11 sold by the New Defendants are securities. (See Dkt. No. 2-1, Mem. at 12–13.) The New  
12 Defendants never filed a valid registration statement as to those securities, and no exemption to  
13 the registration provisions applies. (See *id.*, Mem. at 16–19.) As described above and detailed in  
14 the accompanying Declaration of Joni Ostler, each of the New Defendants (in roles as promotor  
15 and solicitor) offered and sold securities to investors. That is sufficient to state a *prima facie*  
16 case for violations of Section 5 as to each of the Defendants.

17 **2. The New Defendants Also Violated The Broker Registration**  
18 **Provisions of Section 15(a)(1) of the Exchange Act.**

19 The SEC has also made a *prima facie* case that the New Defendants violated the broker  
20 registration provisions of Section 15(a)(1) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1)] by each  
21 soliciting at least dozens of investors to invest in the “purchase agreements” and by being paid  
22 for that solicitation in the form of transaction-based compensation, all without being registered as  
23 a broker or being associated with a registered broker.

24 Section 15(a)(1), makes it unlawful for a broker “to make use of the mails or any means  
25 or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transactions in, or to induce or attempt to  
26 induce the purchase or sale of, any security” unless registered with the SEC. See 15 U.S.C.  
27 § 78o(a)(1). Section 15(a), like Securities Act Section 5, is strict liability statute; and proof of

1 the New Defendants state of mind is not required. *SEC v. Interlink Data Network*, No. 93 3073  
2 R, 1993 WL 603274, \*10 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 1993).

3 Exchange Act § 3(a)(4)(A) defines “broker” as “any person engaged in the business of  
4 effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A); *see also*  
5 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (defining “person” to include a company). This definition “should be  
6 construed broadly” and exemptions should be ‘narrowly drawn in order to promote both investor  
7 protection and the integrity of the brokerage community.’” *In the Matter of Frederick W. Wall*,  
8 Exchange Act Release No. 52467, 2005 SEC LEXIS 2380, \*8 n.9 (Sept. 19, 2005) (Comm. Op.)  
9 (quoting Exchange Act Release, No. 22172, 33 SEC Docket 685, 686 (June 27, 1985)).

10 The Ninth Circuit, in determining “whether a person has engaged in the business of being  
11 a broker,” “applies conduct-based factors and a ‘totality of the circumstances approach.’” *SEC v.*  
12 *RMR Asset Mgmt. Co.*, 479 F. Supp. 3d 923, 926 (S.D. Cal. 2020), quoting *SEC v. Feng*, 935  
13 F.3d 721, 731 (9th Cir. 2019). These factors, called the “*Hansen* factors,” consider whether the  
14 person, for example, received transaction-based income (such as commissions) as opposed to a  
15 salary, and regularly participated in securities transactions.<sup>3</sup> *See Feng*, 935 F.3d at 732; *see also*  
16 *SEC v. Small Bus Capital Corp.*, No. 5:12-CV-3237 EJD, 2013 WL 4455850, at \*14 (N.D. Cal.  
17 Aug. 16, 2013). No one factor is dispositive and a person may have acted as a broker even  
18 where only one or two of the factors are met. *See, e.g., SEC v. Collyard*, 154 F. Supp. 3d 781,  
19 789 (D. Minn. 2015) (*reversed on other grounds* 935 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2019)).

20 Courts particularly emphasize two of the *Hansen* factors as most important: (1) regularity  
21 of participation in securities transactions and (2) receipt of transaction-based compensation. *See,*  
22 *e.g., SEC v. Bravata*, No. 09–12950. 2009 WL 2245649 at \*2 (E.D. Mich. July 27, 2009)

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24 <sup>3</sup> In sum, the *Hansen* factors are whether an individual: “(1) is an employee of the issuer; (2)  
25 received commissions as opposed to a salary; (3) is selling, previously sold, the securities of  
26 other issuers; (4) is involved in negotiations between the issuer and the investor; (5) makes  
27 valuations as to the merits of investment or gives advice; and (6) is an active rather than passive  
finder of investors.” *RMR Asset Mgmt.*, 479 F. Supp. 3d at 926, citing *Hansen*, 1984 WL 2413,  
at \*10.

1 (“regularity of participation [in securities transactions] is the primary indicia of being ‘engaged  
2 in the business.’”) (internal quotations omitted).

3 Here, the New Defendants each acted as a broker in repeatedly soliciting investors to  
4 purchase the “Purchase Agreement” securities. The New Defendants received transaction-based  
5 payments for the contracts they sold, solicited numerous investors into the scheme, and sold  
6 numerous contracts to numerous investors. (*See* Ex. A, Ostler Decl. ¶¶ 8–20 (Jeffery); *id.* ¶¶ 23–  
7 30 (Jenne); *id.* ¶¶ 33–39 (Johnson and Rohner); *id.* ¶¶ 41–56 (C. Madsen); *id.* ¶¶ 61–72 (R.  
8 Madsen); *id.* ¶¶ 75–77 (Murphy); *id.* ¶¶ 79–84 (Rosegreen).) None was registered with the SEC  
9 as a broker. (*Id.* ¶ 95.) The New Defendants thus violated § 15(a)(1). *See Interlink Data*  
10 *Network*, 1993 WL 603274, at \*10.

11 **B. The SEC Has Shown The Violations Are Likely To Be Repeated.**

12 The SEC has also demonstrated a likelihood that the New Defendants’ violations will be  
13 repeated. Whether a likelihood of future violations exists depends upon the totality of the  
14 circumstances. *See SEC v. Murphy*, 626 F.2d 633, 655 (9th Cir. 1980); *Fehn*, 97 F.3d at 1295–  
15 96. The existence of past violations may give rise to an inference there will be future violations.  
16 *See Murphy*, 626 F.2d at 655; *SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc.*, 474 F.2d 354, 358–59 (9th  
17 Cir. 1973). Courts also consider factors such as the degree of scienter involved, the isolated or  
18 recurrent nature of the violative conduct, the defendant’s recognition of the wrongful nature of  
19 the conduct, and the likelihood that, because of the defendant’s occupation, future violations may  
20 occur. *See Murphy*, 626 F.2d at 655.

21 Here, the New Defendants’ involvement in the fraudulent investment scheme has been  
22 ongoing since at least 2017, with funds being raised right up until Beasley’s March 2022 standoff  
23 with the FBI. Since then, the New Defendants continue to attempt to misappropriate investor  
24 funds by liquidating assets, and at least one of the New Defendants has continued to allow  
25 certain investors to cash checks for their fictitious returns even after Beasley’s arrest. (*See* Ex.  
26 A, Ostler Decl. ¶ 94.) A preliminary injunction preventing the New Defendants from continued  
27

1 violation of the federal securities laws and solicitation of investors is necessary to ensure that  
2 these promoters do not continue to inappropriately promote this or any other similar scheme.

3 **II. THE COURT SHOULD EXTEND THE ASSET FREEZE TO THE NEW**  
4 **DEFENDANTS' ASSETS.**

5 In addition to preliminary injunctive relief, the SEC requests that the Court extend its  
6 asset freeze to cover the New Defendants' assets. Federal courts have "inherent equitable power  
7 to issue provisional remedies ancillary to its authority to provide final equitable relief." *Reebok*  
8 *Int'l, Ltd v. Marnatech Enterprises, Inc.*, 970 F.2d 552, 559 (9th Cir. 1992); *SEC v. Wencke*, 622  
9 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1980). The Court's equitable powers include the authority to freeze  
10 assets of both parties and nonparties. *See SEC v. Hickey*, 322 F.3d 1123, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003);  
11 *SEC v. Int'l Swiss Invest. Corp.*, 895 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1990). The purpose of a freeze  
12 order is to prevent the dissipation of assets so they may be available for the benefit of victims.  
13 *See, e.g., Hickey*, 322 F.3d at 1132. "[T]he public interest in preserving the illicit proceeds [of a  
14 defendant's fraud] for restitution to the victims is great." *FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC*, 179  
15 F.3d 1228, 1236 (9th Cir. 1999). "A party seeking an asset freeze must show a likelihood of  
16 dissipation of the claimed assets, or other inability to recover monetary damages if relief is not  
17 granted." *Johnson v. Couturier*, 572 F.3d 1067, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009).

18 Here, bank account records confirm that approximately \$490 million in funds flowed  
19 through the Beasley Account, a large percentage of which appear to be investor funds (which  
20 were deposited in round increments of \$40,000, \$50,000, \$80,000 or \$100,000, relating to the  
21 price of the securities investments Defendants offered and promoted). The bank records confirm  
22 that the New Defendants received, collectively, at least \$40 million in funds from the scheme  
23 that cannot be reasonably tied to any funds other than investor deposits, and that those funds  
24 were used to purchase, among other things, multi-million dollar real estate, and luxury vehicles  
25 (which the New Defendants have been attempting to liquidate). An asset freeze is necessary to  
26 preserve the remaining assets of the New Defendants for investors, and to prevent any further  
27 dissipation of funds.

**CONCLUSION**

For the foregoing reason, the SEC respectfully requests that the Court enter the proposed Amended Preliminary Injunction, attached hereto as Exhibit C, extending the preliminary injunctive and asset freeze relief already ordered as to the original defendants to the New Defendants. (*See* Ex. C, Proposed Order.)

DATED this 29th day of June, 2022.

/s/ Casey R. Fronk  
Tracy S. Combs  
Casey R. Fronk  
Attorney for Plaintiff  
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

1 I hereby certify that on the 29th day of June, 2022, I caused the **PLAINTIFF**  
2  
3 **SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION’S MOTION AND MEMORANDUM**  
4 **OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND**  
5 **PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORDER TO INCLUDE NEWLY ADDED**  
6 **DEFENDANTS** to be served to all parties entitled to service through the Court’s ECF system  
7 and to the following individuals by the means indicated below:  
8

9 *Sent to process server for personal service:*

10 Larry Jeffery  
11 [REDACTED]  
Laguna Beach, CA [REDACTED]

12 Jason A. Jenne  
13 [REDACTED]  
Las Vegas, NV [REDACTED]

14 Seth Johnson  
15 [REDACTED]  
16 Gilbert, AZ [REDACTED]

17 Christopher M. Madsen  
18 [REDACTED]  
Henderson, NV [REDACTED]

19 -OR-  
20 [REDACTED]  
Henderson, NV [REDACTED]

21 Richard R. Madsen  
22 [REDACTED]  
Las Vegas, NV [REDACTED]  
23 -OR-  
24 [REDACTED]  
Duck Creek Village, UT [REDACTED]  
(Kane County, UT, possibly Kanab)

25 Mark A. Murphy  
26 [REDACTED]  
Henderson, NV [REDACTED]

1 Cameron Rohner

2 [REDACTED]  
Gilbert, AZ [REDACTED]

3 Warren Rosegreen

4 [REDACTED]  
Henderson, NV [REDACTED]

5 *By U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, to:*

6 BJ Holdings LLC  
7 c/o Beasley Law Group PC, c/o Matthew Wade Beasley  
8 Nevada Southern Detention Center  
9 2190 East Mesquite Avenue  
Pahrump, NV 89060

10 The Judd Irrevocable Trust  
11 c/o Trustee Matthew Wade Beasley  
12 Nevada Southern Detention Center  
2190 East Mesquite Avenue  
Pahrump, NV 89060

13 Jason M. Jongeward and JL2 Investments, LLC  
14 [REDACTED]  
15 Washington, UT [REDACTED]

16 PAJ Consulting, Inc  
17 21371 Estepa Cir.  
Huntington Beach CA 92648

18 Triple Threat Basketball, LLC  
19 c/o Warren Rosegreen  
[REDACTED]  
20 Henderson, NV [REDACTED]

21 The Judd Irrevocable Trust  
22 c/o Jeffrey Judd  
[REDACTED]  
23 Henderson, NV [REDACTED]

24 *By email to the following:*

25 Anthony Michael Alberto, Jr. and Monty Crew, LLC  
26 [REDACTED]

1 Dyke Huish  
2 Huish Law Firm  
3 huishlaw@mac.com  
4 *Counsel for Roland Tanner*

5 Daniel Hill  
6 Snow, Christensen & Martineau, P.C.  
7 DDH@scmlaw.com  
8 *Counsel for ACAC LLC*

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*/s/ Casey R. Fronk*  
Casey R. Fronk