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7 8	SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,	Case No.: 2:22-cv-00612-CDS-EJY PLAINTIFF SECURITIES AND
9	Plaintiff,	EXCHANGE COMMISSION'S
10	V.	RESPONSE TO NON-PARTY OBERHEIDEN P.C.'S MOTION FOR
11	MATTHEW WADE BEASLEY; BEASLEY LAW GROUP PC; JEFFREY J. JUDD;	MOTION TO RETAIN EARNED FEES AND EXPENSES
12	CHRISTOPHER R. HUMPHRIES; J&J CONSULTING SERVICES, INC., an Alaska	
13	Corporation; J&J CONSULTING SERVICES, INC., a Nevada Corporation; J AND J	
14	PURCHASING LLC; SHANE M. JAGER; JASON M. JONGEWARD; DENNY	
15	SEYBERT; ROLAND TANNER; LARRY JEFFERY; JASON A. JENNE; SETH	
16	JOHNSON; CHRISTOPHER M. MADSEN; RICHARD R. MADSEN; MARK A.	
17	MURPHY; CAMERON ROHNER; AND WARREN ROSEGREEN;	
18	Defendants; and	
19	THE JUDD IRREVOCABLE TRUST; PAJ	
20	CONSULTING INC; BJ HOLDINGS LLC; STIRLING CONSULTING, L.L.C.; CJ	
21	INVESTMENTS, LLC; JL2 INVESTMENTS, LLC; ROCKING HORSE PROPERTIES,	
22	LLC; TRIPLE THREAT BASKETBALL, LLC; ACAC LLC; ANTHONY MICHAEL	
23	ALBERTO, JR.; and MONTY CREW LLC;	
24	Relief Defendants.	
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	I .	

Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") respectfully opposes non-

1 2 party Oberheiden P.C.'s ("Oberheiden's") motion to retain attorneys' fees and expenses. (Dkt. 3 No. 164, herein, "Motion" or "Mot.") Oberheiden requests that the Court release from the asset freeze \$371,622.40 in attorneys' fees and expenses Oberheiden obtained from Defendant Jeffrey 4 5 Judd ("Judd"). Oberheiden requests this relief based on unspecified "due diligence" into Judd's financials, and vague representations from Judd to Oberheiden that the amounts provided to 6 7 Oberheiden were not related to the fraudulent investment scheme at the heart of this case. This is

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I. OBERHEIDEN DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO RETAIN INVESTOR FUNDS FOR PAYMENT OF ATTORNEYS' FEES.

not sufficient evidence to support the requested release of funds.

"No lawyer, in any case, has the right to accept stolen property, or ransom money, in payment of a fee." Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989) (citation and alterations omitted). Furthermore, the Sixth Amendment does not give a defendant—even in a criminal proceeding, and even before a trial on the merits—the right to spend ill-gotten gains for his defense. *Id.*; see also U.S. v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 615 (1989) (allowing the Government to restrain a defendant from using disputed funds to pay attorneys' fees before a final judgment on the merits); SEC v. Trabulse, 526 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (quoting SEC v. Quinn, 997 F.3d 287, 289 (7th Cir. 1993)) ("Just as a bank robber cannot use the loot to wage the best defense money can buy, so a swindler in securities markets cannot use the victims' assets to hire counsel who will help him retain the gleanings of crime."). For example, in SEC v. Cherif, the Seventh Circuit reviewed a district court's refusal to modify an injunction to allow a defendant in an SEC enforcement proceeding who was also "a defendant in a pending criminal case" to withdraw more than \$20,000 in frozen funds to pay attorneys' fees. 933 F.2d 403, 416 (7th Cir. 1991). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that "[a] criminal defendant has 'no Sixth Amendment right to spend another person's money for services rendered by an attorney." *Id.* at 417, quoting *Caplin & Drysdale*, 491 U.S. at 626. In addition, the Court affirmed the district court's ability, when considering whether to modify an asset freeze, to

"draw adverse inferences" from a defendant's invocation of the Fifth Amendment and refusal to provide an accounting. *See* 933 F.2d at 417.

Thus, the preliminary question in any inquiry concerning the use of frozen funds to pay for legal expenses are whether the funds are, in fact, the defendant's property, or instead the property of third parties. *See*, *e.g.*, *SEC v. Lauer*, 445 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1369–70 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (funds derived from the fraud, and thus "tainted," should not be released from freeze to pay legal fees); *SEC v. Current Fin. Servs.*, 62 F. Supp. 2d 66, 68 (D.D.C. 1999) (same). In this Circuit, the *Trabulse* court relied on a two-prong analysis that was previously adopted in *Quinn*, *see* 997 F.2d at 289, such that once the SEC makes a preliminary showing that a defendant's assets could be traced to fraud, the defendant is required to show that the assets were ultimately untainted by fraud (a showing that the defendant in *Quinn* ultimately failed to establish). *See Trabulse*, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 1018.

Here, as Judge Mahan found in granting the SEC's request for a preliminary injunction, "the Commission has made a proper *prima facie* showing that . . . Jeffrey J. Judd [and the J&J Entities] directly and indirectly engaged in the violations alleged in the Complaint" (including violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws) and that Defendants, "unless restrained and enjoined by the Court," may "dissipate, conceal or transfer from the jurisdiction of this Court assets that could be subject to an order of disgorgement or an order to pay a civil monetary penalty in this action," and that "entry of a preliminary injunction, asset freeze, and order for other equitable relief as set forth below is necessary and appropriate." (*See* Dkt. No. 56, Order at 2.)¹ These findings—along with the bank records analysis presented by the SEC

¹ At the hearing on July 25, 2022, Judd's counsel insisted that the SEC has produced "no evidence" that Judd was aware that the business he ran for over five years was a Ponzi scheme. In fact, the SEC has submitted evidence that Judd was aware the Purchase Agreements purportedly supporting the scheme were fake, and that he took steps to conceal that fact from

showing that Judd (and entities he controlled) obtained at least \$315.3 million in investor funds (see Dkt. No. 2-8, Salimi Decl. ¶¶ 12–13)—are sufficient to meet *Quinn*'s preliminary showing that Judd's extant assets can be traced to fraud. As a result, it is Oberheiden's burden to show that the funds Oberheiden received from Judd for payment of attorneys' fees are ultimately untainted. Oberheiden's Motion provides no cognizable evidence to that effect.

II. OBERHEIDEN DOES NOT PROVIDE A SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS TO SHOW THAT THE FUNDS AT ISSUE ARE UNTAINTED.

Oberheiden relies on two arguments to support its claim that the funds are untainted or otherwise unconnected to the Ponzi scheme at the heart of this case. Neither is sufficient to support a release of over \$370,000 in likely investor funds, because neither is supported by anything more than the attorneys', and Judd's, say so. *Compare SEC v. King*, No. SACV 20-02398, 2021 WL 3598732, *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2021) (denying motion to unfreeze assets for attorneys' fees where defendant failed to provide sufficient evidence that funds were untainted or that defendant had sufficient untainted funds to pay the requested attorneys' fees).

First, Oberheiden states that it performed unspecified "due diligence" of Judd's "financials, bank records, emails, text exchanges, and other information," along with an "analysis [by] several retired federal agents," to "ensure the funds it initially received from Mr. Judd were lawfully obtained." (Dkt. No. 164, Mot. at ¶ 4.) But Oberheiden does not reveal the specific information it or its representatives reviewed, nor does it disclose the result of whatever due diligence was performed (other than to imply that the firm's review established that some, unspecified amount of the funds are untainted). That is, there is no representation from Oberheiden in the Motion, or more properly in any declaration under oath in support of the Motion, that whatever due diligence Oberheiden performed established the untainted nature of all the funds at issue. Moreover, Oberheiden does not provide any documentation or support,

investors. (See Dkt. No. 181, SEC Reply in Support of Motion to Amend Preliminary Injunction Order, at 11–12.)

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either with its filing or *in camera*, to establish such conclusion. Thus, there is no way for the SEC or the Court to verify that the funds at issue are untainted, or that whatever due diligence was performed came to the correct conclusion as to the source of the funds.

Second, Oberheiden relies on various "written assurances" and representations from Judd to Oberheiden that the funds at issue were "from lawful sources" and not otherwise connected to the fraud. (See Dkt. No. 164, Mot. at ¶¶ 5–7.) The only such representations the Motion specifically identifies, however, were not made under oath but as part of standard retention agreements Judd signed when he hired Oberheiden in or around *October 2021*. (See id. at ¶ 2 (noting "the firm's October 2021 in-writing engagement contract with Mr. Judd").)² Remarkably, Judd currently asserts, through his attorneys, that he only learned of Matthew Beasley's fraud in or about *March 2022*, upon Beasley's arrest and five months after Judd signed his retention agreement with Oberheiden. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 163, Judd's Resp. at 14.) Thus, assuming, counterfactually, the truth of Judd's argument—i.e., that he was unaware before March 2022 of the Ponzi scheme—any representation he made to Oberheiden in or around October 2021 about the untainted nature of the funds is meaningless. But if, as the facts show, Judd knew long before October 2021 that the Purchase Agreements were fake, it is impossible to credit his self-serving representations to Oberheiden that the funds at issue are not connected to the fraud. Moreover, Judd has now invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused to provide the required accounting or expedited discovery responses that would give clarity to the representations he made to Oberheiden regarding the source of the funds paid to the firm—from which the Court may draw an adverse inference regarding the funds' ultimate source. Compare Cherif, 933 F.2d at 417.

² The Motion vaguely references additional "written assurances" possibly outside of the Oberheiden engagement contract, but does not indicate when Judd made these additional assurances, or in what context. (*See* Dkt. No. 164, Mot. at ¶ 5.)

In sum, Oberheiden requests that the Court release over \$370,000 in attorneys' fees and costs for unidentified criminal defense work on behalf of Judd, despite that there is currently no pending criminal case against Judd and despite providing no cognizable evidence that the funds sought to be released are untainted. This is not sufficient, and there is no present basis on which the Court could release the requested funds.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the SEC respectfully requests that the Court deny Oberheiden's request for a modification of the asset freeze and/or receivership orders to release funds for attorneys' fees and expenses.

DATED this 27th day of July, 2022.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 I hereby certify that on the 27th day of July, 2022, I caused the PLAINTIFF 2 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION'S RESPONSE TO NON-PARTY 3 OBERHEIDEN P.C.'S MOTION FOR MOTION TO RETAIN EARNED FEES AND 4 5 **EXPENSES** to be served to all parties entitled to service through the Court's ECF system and to 6 the following individuals by the means indicated below: 7 By U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, to: 8 BJ Holdings LLC 9 c/o Beasley Law Group PC, c/o Matthew Wade Beasley Nevada Southern Detention Center 10 2190 East Mesquite Avenue Pahrump, NV 89060 11 The Judd Irrevocable Trust 12 c/o Trustee Matthew Wade Beasley 13 Nevada Southern Detention Center 2190 East Mesquite Avenue 14 Pahrump, NV 89060 15 Jason M. Jongeward and JL2 Investments, LLC 16 Washington, UT 17 PAJ Consulting, Inc 18 Huntington Beach CA 19 20 Triple Threat Basketball, LLC c/o Warren Rosegreen 21 Henderson, NV 22 The Judd Irrevocable Trust 23 c/o Jeffrey Judd 24 Henderson, NV 25 Jason A. Jenne 26 Las Vegas, NV 27

Mark A. Murphy Henderson, NV Warren Rosegreen Henderson, NV By email to the following: Anthony Michael Alberto, Jr. and Monty Crew, LLC Dyke Huish Huish Law Firm huishlaw@mac.com Counsel for Roland Tanner /s/ Casey R. Fronk Casey R. Fronk