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76  
been recorded in channel 50 data. (U)

The only non-detectable fault from the G&C section which could have caused a No-Go would have been loss of confirm codes. This type of fault would not have produced a VRSA channel 9 and 12, but only a channel 9. This information eliminated the No-Go theory as the cause of the incident. <sup>77</sup> (U)

As stated earlier, all 10 launch facilities shutdown with a VRSA channel 9 and 12 (G&C No-Go and Logic Coupler No-Go) recordings. Because of this consistency considerable investigation was expended in the Logic Coupler area. In the channel 50 analysis it was shown that the guidance section did not experience a No-Go and therefore, it was felt that the VRSA channel 9 report was not valid. It is possible, however, for the Logic Coupler to generate both of these No-Go indications. <sup>78</sup> ~~(S)~~ (U)

The logic of the coupler was studied by the investigating team in an effort to identify a method by which both VRSA 9 and 12 could be activated. The opinion of the team was that external generated signals caused the generation of these two channels and shutdown of the launch facilities. The possibility of this is very remote due to the fact that all 10 couplers would have to fail in the flight within a few seconds of each other. <sup>79</sup> ~~(S)~~ (U)

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76. Rpt, (S) "Report of Engineering Investigation of Echo Flight Incident, Malmstrom AFB, Mont. - 16 Mar 67, by Engineering Investigation Team, 23 Mar 67, p 8.

77. Ibid., p 30.

78. Ibid., p 30.

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79. Ibid., p 30.