IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

1: 21-cv-10878-AT-JLC

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JASON GOODMAN

Plaintiff,

-against-

CHRISTOPHER ELLIS BOUZY, BOT SENTINEL, INC., GEORGE WEBB SWEIGERT, DAVID GEORGE SWEIGERT, BENJAMIN WITTES, ADAM SHARP, NINA JANKOWICZ, MARGARET ESQUENET, THE ACADEMY OF TELEVISION ARTS & SCIENCES, SETH BERLIN, MAXWELL MISHKIN

Defendants.

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MOTION TO VACATE VOID JUDGMENT

Pro se plaintiff Jason Goodman moves this Court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rules 60(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(4), (b)(6), and 60(d)(1) and (d)(3) to vacate the Judgment entered on February 22, 2024 (Dkt. 279), and to reopen this matter for further proceedings, including leave to file an amended complaint. The judgment is void on its face due to a fatal defect that violates the separate-document requirement of Rule 58. Because no proper final judgment was entered, time limits of Rule 60(c)(1) have not been triggered, and all grounds for relief remain available.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case presents a documented record of procedural irregularities, coordinated third-party interference, and unconstitutional retaliation against a journalist's efforts to expose government misconduct. Plaintiff's complaint alleged defamation, civil conspiracy, and related claims against George Webb Sweigert (who fabricated serious accusations against Plaintiff), his brother David George Sweigert (a prolific vexatious litigant), Christopher Bouzy (who furthered the false allegations), Benjamin Wittes (Lawfare Institute Director), Nina Jankowicz (former DHS Disinformation Governance Board Director), and others linked to media and government.

The Court dismissed the case on February 22, 2024, and imposed a filing injunction on Plaintiff but ignored well-founded evidence of Defendants' coordinated interference and a broader scandal revealed by Wittes' email to then FBI Director Comey including false narratives now corroborated by ongoing congressional investigations and recently declassified documents.

The judgment must be vacated as void under Rule 60(b)(4) due to its incorrect caption. Furthermore, new evidence of ongoing extraordinary misconduct justifies reopening under Rule 60(b)(6) and relief for fraud on the court under Rule 60(d)(3). None of these are time-barred.

This motion is timely due to the void judgment and post-entry discovery of fraud, causing no prejudice to Defendants. See *Emergency Beacon Corp. v. Barr*, 666 F.2d 754, 760 (2d Cir. 1981); *Ashford v. Steuart*, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981). Vexatious post-judgment filings by David Sweigert and ongoing extraordinary misconduct underscore the need for intervention. Courts possess inherent authority to sanction process abuses, as emphasized by the Supreme Court: "Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates." *Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.*, 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting *Anderson v. Dunn*, 19 U.S. 204, 227 (1821)). Relief is essential not only to correct procedural defects but also to safeguard public confidence in the judiciary amid growing concerns of weaponized litigation.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 60(b)(4) – Void Judgments

Rule 60(b)(4) permits relief from a judgment that is void. A judgment is void when the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, lacked personal jurisdiction, or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law. *United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa*, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010); *Carter v. Fenner,* 136 F.3d 1000, 1006 (5th Cir. 1998). A judgment also is void if it

fails to satisfy the procedural requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a), which mandates that the judgment be set forth in a separate document that unambiguously identifies the case and the relief granted. See *United States v. Indrelunas*, 411 U.S. 216, 221–22 (1973) (per curiam); *Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis*, 435 U.S. 381, 384 (1978). A defective judgment of this kind is a legal nullity and must be vacated; vacatur under Rule 60(b)(4) is mandatory, not discretionary.[1]

B. Rule 60(b)(6) – Extraordinary Circumstances

Rule 60(b)(6) allows relief from a judgment for "any other reason that justifies relief" in cases of extraordinary circumstances. This provision exists to prevent manifest injustice in situations not covered by Rule 60(b)(1)–(5). Courts have granted relief under Rule 60(b)(6) where enforcement of a judgment would be inequitable due to events undermining its fairness, such as undisclosed judicial conflicts (*Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp*., 486 U.S. 847, 863–64 (1988)) or the use of improper evidence (*Buck v. Davis*, 580 U.S. 100, 115 (2017)). Relief requires a showing that the circumstances are sufficiently extraordinary to warrant overriding the interest in finality. See *Ackermann v. United States*, 340 U.S. 193, 202 (1950).

C. Rule 60(b)(1)–(3) – Mistake, Newly Discovered Evidence, Fraud

Rule 60(b)(1) permits relief for judicial mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. Rule 60(b)(2) permits relief for newly discovered evidence that could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b). Rule 60(b)(3) allows relief for fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party. To prevail under Rule 60(b)(2), the movant must show that the evidence is material, could not have been discovered earlier with reasonable diligence, and would likely change the outcome. To prevail under Rule 60(b)(3), the

[1] See also *Beller & Keller v. Tyler*, 120 F.3d 21, 23 (2d Cir. 1997) (Rule 58's separate-document requirement is "clear and mechanical" and failure to comply deprives judgment of finality), and *Pratt v. Philbrook*, 109 F.3d 18, 19 (1st Cir. 1997) (strict compliance with Rule 58 is required; defective judgments are not final for purposes of appeal or enforcement).

movant must show by clear and convincing evidence that the adverse party engaged in fraud or misconduct, and that this misconduct prevented the movant from fully and fairly presenting their case. See *Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc*., 862 F.2d 910, 923 (1st Cir. 1988).

D. Rule 60(d)(3) – Fraud on the Court

Rule 60(d)(3) preserves a court's inherent power to set aside a judgment for fraud on the court. This provision is not subject to any time limit. Fraud on the court encompasses egregious conduct that undermines the integrity of the judicial process itself, including fabrication of evidence, perjury, or intentional misconduct by officers of the court. *Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.*, 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944). It includes intentional acts that corrupt the court's ability to impartially adjudicate, such as deliberate concealment of material facts (*Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky*, 10 F.3d 338, 352 (6th Cir. 1993)) or submission of false evidence (*Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp*., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989)). Relief under Rule 60(d)(3) is reserved for the most serious forms of fraud that are directed at the judicial machinery itself.

III. ARGUMENT

A. The Judgment Is Void and Must Be Vacated (Rule 60(b)(4))

The judgment entered at Dkt. 279 bears the caption of an entirely unrelated matter, *Abraham I. Juravel v. Samuel Harold Sigal, M.D*., rather than this case. (See Dkt. 279; **Ex. A**). This is no harmless oversight. Rule 58(a) mandates that a judgment "must be set out in a separate document" identifying the case and parties. This judgment fails in that most basic requirement.

Such a substantive defect is not a clerical error. The Supreme Court is clear in that strict compliance with Rule 58 is "mechanical" and "mandatory." *United States v. Indrelunas*, 411 U.S. 216, 221–22 (1973). A judgment failing to comply is not entitled to finality. See *Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis*, 435 U.S. 381, 384 (1978); *Shalala v. Schaefer*, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).

The Second Circuit holds that improper judgment entry deprives it of jurisdiction, tolling appeal deadlines. *Covington Indus., Inc. v. Resintex A.G.*, 629 F.2d 730, 732–33 (2d Cir. 1980). The defect here created ambiguity about the judgment's application to this case, prejudicing both notice and appellate rights. As a pro se litigant unfamiliar with technical judgment-entry rules, Plaintiff was especially vulnerable to a defect that violated due process. See *Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp.*, 772 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (substantive errors affecting rights are not correctable under Rule 60(a)).

Under *United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa*, 559 U.S. 260, 270–71 (2010), such a judgment is void and may be attacked "at any time." Because the judgment never attained finality under Rule 58(a), the one-year limit in Rule 60(c)(1) for Rule 60(b)(1)–(3) never began to run. See *Sass v. MTA Bus Co.*, 6 F.4th 178, 183–84 (2d Cir. 2021) (no final judgment until separate document entered); *Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis*, 435 U.S. 381, 384 (1978) (lack of separate document delays finality).

The prejudice was compounded by Defendant Sweigert's multiple preemptive, frivolous appeals, which forced Plaintiff into "cross-appeal" status under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(3), and created insurmountable procedural confusion that impaired the pro se Plaintiff's ability to secure review of the caption defect. (See 2d Cir. Dkt. Nos. 22-40, 23-874, and 23-1021 and **Ex. B**).

Withdrawal of Plaintiff's cross-appeal was strictly the product of this manufactured confusion—not a waiver or concession on the merits. See *Matarese v. LeFevre*, 801 F.2d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 1986); *King v. First Am. Investigations, Inc.*, 287 F.3d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 2002).

B. Extraordinary Circumstances Warrant Relief (Rule 60(b)(6))

The extraordinary nature of this case lies not only in its procedural defects, but also in that a self-represented litigant was targeted by sophisticated actors tied to the U.S. government,

intelligence, and national security institutions, in circumstances now under official investigation by the current administration for conduct closely paralleling the misconduct alleged here. The misconduct is outlined in greater detail below, but in brief, includes coordination between defendants and their affiliates to disrupt adjudication of this case, the manipulation of critical evidence in a related proceeding, and the strategic intervention of politically connected counsel at a decisive moment to alter the case's trajectory.

These developments underscore that the prejudice here was not the product of ordinary litigation, but of an organized campaign by powerful actors against a pro se litigant — precisely the type of extraordinary circumstance Rule 60(b)(6) is intended to remedy.

C. Relief Under Rule 60(b)(1)–(3) Is Timely and Independently Justified

Relief under these grounds is timely due to the facially defective judgment entered at Dkt. 279, continuous, ongoing misconduct by Sweigert including frivolous filings in this instant matter, calculated to harass the Plaintiff as recently as August 4, 2025 (see Dkt. 296), and relief is further warranted for the following reasons:

a. Rule 60(b)(1) – Mistake, Inadvertence, or Excusable Neglect

Rule 60(b)(1) mandates vacatur where a judgment is entered through clear judicial error or neglect. See *Kemp v. United States*, 596 U.S. 528, 533–34 (2022) (judicial legal errors may constitute "mistake" under Rule 60(b)(1)). As shown above, the miscaptioned judgment violated Rule 58(a) and deprived it of finality. Failure to correct this sua sponte is itself grounds for vacatur.

But the Court's error did not end there. In dismissing Plaintiff's reference to Defendant Wittes' email to then–FBI Director James Comey as "conspiracy theory," the Court disregarded evidence that has since gained corroboration through newly declassified documents released by

the Director of National Intelligence showing that senior FBI and intelligence officials' Russia-related schemes were unfounded. This email further implicates the defendants because Bouzy's unlikely attorney Maxwell Mishkin was directly involved in a case where Michael Sussmann was charged with 18 U.S.C. § 1001 based on similar communications with one of the email's FBI recipients, Jim Baker. This context was ignored and gives heightened significance to the Wittes–Comey communication, directly bearing on the credibility and motives of the defendants.

The Court likewise overlooked the apparent coordination in David Sweigert's decision to alert Benjamin Wittes and Nina Jankowicz—just as Defendant Bouzy approached default. That interference fundamentally altered the case's trajectory by triggering the otherwise improbable appearance of Attorney Defendant Mishkin on Bouzy's behalf. Failing to address this calculated intervention, and its impact on the fairness of the proceedings, constitutes mistake and neglect within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1) and independently supports vacatur.

b. Rule 60(b)(2) – Newly Discovered Evidence

Relief is also warranted under Rule 60(b)(2) because material evidence came to light only after judgment that could not reasonably have been discovered sooner. This includes continuous and ongoing misconduct by David Sweigert in the form of irrelevant, vexatious post-judgment filings (Dkts. 286–296) and alleged covert collaboration with Defendant Jankowicz. In a retaliatory Virginia circuit court proceeding, Jankowicz introduced evidence, allegedly provided by Sweigert, that was presented in a false light. This suggests a covert campaign to manipulate parallel litigation and influence this Court through undisclosed, malicious coordination. When considered alongside Sweigert's prior communications with Wittes and Jankowicz and the improbable timing of Ballard Spahr's entry, the record reveals a pattern of improper interference

that continues to materially affect this case well beyond February 2024, up to and including today. This conduct meets the standard for reopening under Rule 60(b)(2).

c. Rule 60(b)(3) – Fraud, Misrepresentation, or Misconduct

Vacatur is warranted under Rule 60(b)(3), which applies when a judgment is obtained or preserved through fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct that prevents a party from fully and fairly presenting their case. See *Rozier v. Ford Motor Co*., 573 F.2d 1332, 1339 (5th Cir. 1978) (misconduct under Rule 60(b)(3) includes withholding or misrepresenting material evidence).

Defendant Bouzy's malicious republication of a false rape allegation initially gave rise to this dispute. Bouzy worked to destroy Plaintiff's social media platforms and silence reporting about Defendant Wittes' coordination with the FBI. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Sweigert acted in concert with Bouzy, Wittes, and others in a broader, ongoing scheme to damage Plaintiff's reputation, sue him into submission, and destroy his ability to speak or conduct business online.

The totality of the evidence, false allegations, clandestine coordination, continuous harassment, and the use of tainted proceedings in other courts, demonstrates a hidden, ongoing campaign conducted by Sweigert and executed through cooperative actions of all defendants. This is not isolated misconduct, but a unified strategy to weaponize judicial process, distort the factual record, and manipulate outcomes in multiple venues. Such systemic abuse is exactly the type of fraud, misrepresentation, and misconduct that Rule 60(b)(3) is intended to remedy.

D. Fraud on the Court (Rule 60(d)(3))

a. Coordinated "Tag-Team" Defamation

The misconduct alleged was not ordinary advocacy; it was a coordinated fraud upon the Court. George Webb Sweigert fabricated a claim that Plaintiff raped a woman he has never met

and who has never accused him of rape. David Sweigert relayed that falsehood to Defendant Bouzy, who maliciously published that Plaintiff had been "accused of rape."

This was a calculated "tag-team" operation: one actor manufactured the lie, another selectively republished a "sanitized" fragment to preserve the defamatory sting while concealing its falsity. Such conduct falls within established principles of concerted tort liability and holds a person jointly liable if they act in concert with another to commit a tort or give substantial assistance to its commission. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876; *Cianci v. New Times Publ'g Co.*, 639 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing liability for coordinated republication of defamatory matter); *Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc.*, 619 F. Supp. 684, 707 (D.N.J. 1985).

Courts reject the notion that literal truth shields a statement that conveys a defamatory or false implication, holding that a technically accurate statement may be actionable if it implies the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts. *Davis v. Boeheim*, 24 N.Y.3d 262, 268 (2014); *White v. Fraternal Order of Police*, 909 F.2d 512, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Bouzy's phrasing was engineered to convey the same reputational harm as the original lie while obscuring its falsity—precisely the kind of coordinated deception that undermines the integrity of judicial proceedings.

b. Manipulated Evidence in Arlington Circuit Court Tainted This Case

Separately, in a parallel proceeding in Arlington, Virginia (*Jankowicz v. Goodman*), Jankowicz' attorneys introduced misrepresented evidence that appears to have originated with David Sweigert. It was obtained through deceptive means, its source was deliberately concealed, and it was presented under false pretenses to secure a protective order against Plaintiff.

That order, obtained through deception, was then imported into these proceedings to prejudice the Court's perception of Plaintiff and justify a filing injunction. This cross-jurisdictional laundering of tainted judicial outcomes is a textbook example of fraud on the court:

the use of one tribunal's manipulated result to improperly influence another's. Taken together, these actions constitute intentional, coordinated conduct that corrupted the judicial process itself.

c. Strategic Intervention by Political Operatives

As Bouzy approached default judgment, David Sweigert alerted Defendants Wittes and Jankowicz. Within a day, Ballard Spahr LLP appeared on Bouzy's behalf—an improbable development given Bouzy's publicly known litigation history and financial status.

The Court's prior dismissal of Plaintiff's citation of Wittes' email to then–FBI Director James Comey as "conspiracy theory" was a critical misjudgment. Newly declassified documents released by the Director of National Intelligence confirm that FBI and intelligence officials' Russia-related claims were themselves "conspiracy theories" that lacked factual foundation, underscoring the relevance and probative value of the Wittes–Comey communication.

This new evidence materially alters the factual landscape and directly undermines the credibility and exposes the improper motives of key actors—precisely the type of changed circumstance requiring vacatur recognized in *Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp.*, 486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988) (holding that where newly discovered facts reveal grounds for disqualification affecting the integrity of the proceedings, vacatur is required to preserve public confidence in the judiciary), and *Standard Oil Co. v. United States*, 429 U.S. 17, 18–19 (1976) (confirming that post-judgment facts may compel modification or setting aside of a final decree).

Under Rule 60(b)(6), such post-judgment developments that strike at the integrity of the proceedings and reveal previously undisclosed grounds for disqualification or credibility defects fall within the "extraordinary circumstances" requiring relief, as in *Liljeberg* and *Standard Oil.*

In light of this corroboration, Sweigert's alert to Wittes and Jankowicz can no longer plausibly be dismissed as incidental. It aligns with patterns of litigation misconduct recognized in

Hazel–Atlas and *Aoude*, where coordinated deception and concealment of material facts subverted the judicial process. The Court's failure to recognize this calculated intervention, and to treat the appearance of Mishkin immediately thereafter as deliberate misconduct, allowed the scheme to succeed in altering the case's trajectory, undermining the integrity of the proceedings.

d. Repeated Patterns of Institutional Manipulation

Ballard Spahr's intervention is part of a broader, documented pattern. The firm, through Attorney Defendant Mishkin, previously represented New York Times journalist Eric Lichtblau in *United States v. Sussmann,* Case No. 1:21-cr-00582 (D.D.C.), a prosecution alleging political operatives funneled false information to the FBI through law firms and the press to trigger baseless investigations into Donald Trump. Sussmann was charged with making false statements to FBI General Counsel Jim Baker, who was among the recipients of the Wittes–Comey email that was dismissed by this Court. The same pattern, using legal process as a conduit to disseminate and legitimize false information and target political adversaries, is present in this case and Mishkin's direct involvement as counsel to Wittes' affiliate Bouzy cannot be ignored.

In light of the new corroborating evidence, judicial notice of the Sussmann docket and Ballard Spahr's involvement sheds new light on the scope of deceptive coordination in this case.

e. Systematic Abuse Demanding Vacatur

This was not isolated misconduct but a sustained, politically driven campaign to corrupt the adversarial process, chill Plaintiff's journalism, and destroy his means of earning a living. Relief under Rule 60(d)(3) is not discretionary and may be granted "at any time," where fraud on the court is established. *Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co*., 322 U.S. 238, 244–46 (1944). Defendants' conduct in this matter is the very essence of fraud upon the court under Rule 60(d)(3) and mandates that the judgment be set aside.

IV. CONCLUSION

Taken individually, each ground for relief—void judgment under Rule 60(b)(4), extraordinary circumstances under Rule 60(b)(6), mistake, newly discovered evidence, and fraud under Rule 60(b)(1)–(3), and fraud upon the court under Rule 60(d)(3)—is sufficient to vacate. Together, they establish a pattern of procedural defects, coordinated misconduct, and intentional manipulation of judicial proceedings that strikes at the heart of the Court's integrity. Vacatur here is not discretionary; it is compelled to restore fairness and preserve public confidence in the judicial process.

V. REQUEST FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court:

i. DECLARE the judgment (Dkt. 279) void due to noncompliance with Rule 58(a),

ii. VACATE the judgment (Dkt. 279) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(4), (b)(6), and 60(d)(1) and (d)(3);

iii. VACATE the filing injunction entered against Plaintiff in this matter;

iv. REOPEN this case for further proceedings;

v. GRANT leave to file an amended complaint;

vi. ENJOIN David George Sweigert from further filings or any communications concerning the Plaintiff with any third party without prior leave of Court;

vii. GRANT such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: New York, New York August 11, 2025

Respectfully submitted
[redacted]
Jason Goodman
Pro Se Plaintiff

EXHIBIT INDEX

Exhibit A. Copy of Judgment entered at Dkt. 279, bearing caption of unrelated case *Abraham I. Juravel v. Samuel Harold Sigal, M.D.*, in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a).

Exhibit B. Second Circuit docket excerpts (Case Nos. 22-40, 23-874, 23-1021) showing premature appeals by David George Sweigert that forced Plaintiff into "cross-appeal" status and created procedural confusion impairing review of the caption defect.

(EXHIBIT A)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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ABRAHAM I. JURAVEL; ROCHELLE L. JURAVEL,

Plaintiff,

21 **CIVIL** 10878(AT)(JLC)

-v-

JUDGMENT

SAMUEL HAROLD SIGAL, MD,

Defendant.

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It is hereby **ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:** That for the reasons stated in the Court's Order dated February 21, 2024, the Court OVERRULES the parties' objections and ADOPTS the R&R in its entirety. Accordingly: 1. The ATAS Defendants' motion, ECF No. 241, to amend the judgment to impose a filing injunction barring any future filings by Goodman against the ATAS Defendants in this District without first obtaining leave of court is GRANTED. 2. The Bouzy Defendants' application, ECF No. 243, to amend the judgment to impose a filing injunction barring any future filings by Goodman against the Bouzy Defendants in this District without first obtaining leave of court is GRANTED. 3. The ATAS Defendants' motion for attorney's fees, ECF No. 248, is DENIED. 4. Defendant David Sweigert's motion for an injunction and other relief, ECF No. 255, is DENIED. Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS Judge Cott's R&R in its entirety. The parties' objections are OVERRULED. Judgment is entered consistent with this order and the R&R.

Dated: New York, New York

February 22, 2024

RUBY J. KRAJICK
Clerk of Court

BY: 

Deputy Clerk

(EXHIBIT B)

MANDATE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
for the
SECOND CIRCUIT

At a Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 14th day of March, two thousand twenty-two,

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Jason Goodman,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

George Webb Sweigert,

Defendant - Appellant,

Christopher Ellis Bouzy, Bot Sentiel, Inc.,

Defendants.

ORDER
Docket Number: 22-40

A notice of appeal was filed on January 07, 2022. The filing fee of $505.00 was due to be paid to the district court by March 01, 2022. The case is deemed in default.

Instructions for moving for in forma pauperis status are provided in the Court's instructions entitled "How to Appeal a Civil Case in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit". The manual and the forms required to file the motion are enclosed with this order. They are also available on the Court's website www.ca2.uscourts.gov.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed effective April 04, 2022 unless by that date appellant either pays the fee in full, moves for in forma pauperis status in district court or, if district court has denied in forma pauperis status, moves in this Court for in forma pauperis status. If appellant has filed the motion in district court and the motion is pending, appellant must so advise this Court in writing by the same date.

For The Court:
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court



A True Copy
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

MANDATE ISSUED ON 04/27/2022

MANDATE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT

At a Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 11th day of April, two thousand twenty-four.

Jason Goodman,

Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant -Appellee,

v.

David George Sweigert,

Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant,

Christopher Ellis Bouzy, Bot Sentiel, Inc., George Webb Sweigert, Benjamin Wittes, Adam Sharp, Nina Jankowicz, Margaret Esquenet, The Academy of Television Arts & Sciences, Seth Berlin, Maxwell Mishkin,

Defendants-Appellees.

ORDER

Docket Nos. 23-874(L), 23-1021(Con)

By order dated February 26, 2024, the Court lifted the stay of these appeals and directed Appellant to pay the filing fee or move for *in forma pauperis* status within 21 days of the order. Appellant has not complied with that order. Upon consideration thereof,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeals are dismissed effective May 2, 2024, if Appellant does not pay the filing fees or move for *in forma pauperis* status by that date.

For the Court:
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court

A True Copy
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

MANDATE ISSUED ON 06/10/2024

MANDATE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT

At a Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 11th day of April, two thousand twenty-four.

Jason Goodman,

Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant -Appellee,

v.

David George Sweigert,

Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant,

Christopher Ellis Bouzy, Bot Sentiel, Inc., George Webb Sweigert, Benjamin Wittes, Adam Sharp, Nina Jankowicz, Margaret Esquenet, The Academy of Television Arts & Sciences, Seth Berlin, Maxwell Mishkin,

Defendants-Appellees.

ORDER

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For the Court:
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court

A True Copy
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

MANDATE ISSUED ON 06/10/2024