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13	STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY				
14	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT				
15	EASTERN DISTRICT COURT  EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA				
16	JANICE SCHMIDT, on behalf of herself and				
17	all others similarly situated,	) CASE NO. 1:21-cv-01784-JLT-SAB			
18	Plaintiff,	DEFENDANT STANDARD INSURANCE			
19	VS.	COMPANY'S ANSWER TO AMENDED			
20	STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY,	CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL			
21	erroneously named as STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, PROTECTIVE				
22	LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, and DOES				
23	1 TO 50, inclusive,				
24	Defendants.				
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DEFENDANT STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY'S ANSWER
TO AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

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Defendant Standard Insurance Company ("Standard"), through undersigned counsel, respectfully submits this Answer to the Amended Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Doc. 39-1 (the "Amended Complaint") filed by Plaintiffs Janice Schmidt and Judy A. Vann-Eubanks individually and on behalf of the proposed class ("Plaintiffs"). Unless expressly admitted in this Answer, Standard denies the material allegations of the Amended Complaint and demands strict proof thereof. Subject to these denials and the affirmative defenses set forth herein, Standard responds to the individually numbered allegations of the Amended Complaint as follows:

#### I. NATURE OF THE CASE

- 1. Denied. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way.
- 2. The allegations of paragraph 2 include legal conclusions to which no response is required; to the extent a response is deemed necessary, Standard denies the allegations in paragraph 2. California Insurance Code §§ 10113.71 and 10113.72 (collectively, the "Statutes") speak for themselves. Standard denies each and any characterization of the Statutes that is inconsistent with the Statutes themselves. Standard specifically denies any implied allegation that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 2.
- 3. The allegations of paragraph 3 include legal conclusions to which no response is required; to the extent a response is deemed necessary, Standard denies the allegations in paragraph 3. The Statutes speak for themselves. Standard specifically denies any implied allegation that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 3.
- 4. The allegations of paragraph 4 include legal conclusions to which no response is required; to the extent a response is deemed necessary, Standard lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about whether the "author" of the Statutes actually made the statement listed in paragraph 4, and therefore denies it. The Statutes speak for themselves. Standard denies each and any characterization of the Statutes that is inconsistent with the Statutes themselves. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard denies

any other allegations in paragraph 4.

- 5. The allegations of paragraph 5 include legal conclusions to which no response is required; to the extent a response is deemed necessary, Standard denies the allegations in paragraph 5.
- 6. Denied. Standard specifically denies that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way.
- 7. The allegations of paragraph 7 include legal conclusions to which no response is required; to the extent a response is deemed necessary, Standard denies that the Statutes in their entirety apply to "all policies." The California Supreme Court's decision in *McHugh v. Protective Life Insurance Company*, 12 Cal. 5th 213 (2021), speaks for itself. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 7.
- 8. The allegations of paragraph 8 include legal conclusions to which no response is required; to the extent a response is deemed necessary, Standard denies that the California Supreme Court's decision in *McHugh v. Protective Life Insurance Company*, 12 Cal. 5th 213 (2021), "followed" (except temporally) the decisions cited in paragraph 8. The trial-court decisions cited in paragraph 8 speak for themselves and are not precedential. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 8.
- 9. The allegations of paragraph 9 include legal conclusions to which no response is required; to the extent a response is deemed necessary, Standard denies that the Ninth Circuit's unpublished, non-precedential memorandum in *Thomas v. State Farm Life Insurance Co.*, 20-55231, 2021 WL 4596286 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 2021), "followed" (except temporally) or "expanded" the California Supreme Court's decision in *McHugh v. Protective Life Insurance Company*, 12 Cal. 5th 213 (2021). The Ninth Circuit's unpublished, non-precedential memorandum in *Thomas* speaks for itself. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 9.
- 10. Denied. Standard specifically denies that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way.
- 11. Denied. Standard specifically denies that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard further denies that Plaintiffs, and the other persons that

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27 28 Plaintiffs purport to represent, have suffered any damage whatsoever.

- 12. Standard lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 12 relating to Arthur James Schmidt's ("Mr. Schmidt") death, and therefore denies them. Standard denies all other allegations in paragraph 12. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard further specifically denies that Plaintiff Janice Schmidt and Mr. Schmidt were married on January 30, 2018. The remaining allegations of this paragraph are not directed to Standard.
- 13. Denied. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard further denies that Plaintiffs, and the other persons that Plaintiffs purport to represent, have suffered any harm whatsoever.

#### II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 14. Standard does not contest that this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to hear Plaintiffs' claims against Standard. Standard denies all other allegations in paragraph 14.
- 15. Standard admits that, upon information and belief, Plaintiff Janice Schmidt was a citizen and domiciliary of the State of California at the time this civil action was filed. Standard lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the remaining allegations in paragraph 15, and therefore denies them.
- 16. Standard admits that it is incorporated under the laws of Oregon with its principal place of business in Portland, Oregon. The remaining allegations of this paragraph are not directed to Standard.
  - 17. Denied.
- 18. Standard does not contest that the amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs.
- 19. Standard does not contest that venue is proper in this Court with respect to the claims against Standard. Standard lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 19 relating to Plaintiff Schmidt's residence, and therefore denies them. Standard denies all other allegations in paragraph 19.
- 20. Standard does not contest that this Court has personal jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs' claims against Standard. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation,

law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard denies all other allegations in paragraph 20.

III. THE PARTIES

- 21. Standard admits only that, prior to policy termination, Plaintiff Schmidt was named a beneficiary of the insurance policy bearing policy no. SD0530951 that was issued by Standard (not "Standard Life Insurance Company") on the life of Mr. Schmidt (the "Policy"). Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way, and Standard further specifically denies that the Policy was in force and effect on the date of the Mr. Schmidt's purported death. Standard lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 21 relating to Ms. Eubanks and the Protective policy on Robert Eubanks, as well as Plaintiff Schmidt's residence, and therefore denies them. Standard denies all other allegations in paragraph 21.
  - 22. Denied.
  - 23. The allegations of this paragraph are not directed to Standard

#### IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

- 24. Admitted. The Statutes speak for themselves.
- 25. The allegations of paragraph 25 include legal conclusions to which no response is required. The Statutes speak for themselves. Standard denies each and any characterization of the Statutes that is inconsistent with the Statutes themselves.
- 26. The allegations of paragraph 26 include legal conclusions to which no response is required; to the extent a response is deemed necessary, Standard denies the allegations in paragraph 26. The Statutes speak for themselves. Standard denies each and any characterization of the Statutes that is inconsistent with the Statutes themselves. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way, and Standard further specifically denies the allegation that only the quoted portions of the Statutes are "pertinent." Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 26.
- 27. Denied. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 27.

- 28. Denied. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 28.
- 29. Denied. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 29.
- 30. Denied. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 30.
- 31. Standard admits that the Policy insured Mr. Schmidt and Plaintiff Schmidt was named as a beneficiary of the Schmidt Policy prior to its termination. "Standard Life Insurance Company" did not issue the Policy. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. The remaining allegations of this paragraph are not directed to Standard. Standard denies any remaining allegations in paragraph 31.
- 32. Denied as written. "Standard Life Insurance Company" did not issue the Schmidt Policy, and Protective did not assume the servicing of policies from "Standard Life Insurance Company." The remaining allegations of this paragraph are not directed to Standard. To the extent that they are, Standard denies them.
- 33. Denied. The Schmidt Policy speaks for itself. Standard denies each and any characterization of the Schmidt Policy that is inconsistent with the Schmidt Policy itself. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way, and Standard further specifically denies that the Policy could "renew" by payment of premiums. The remaining allegations of this paragraph are not directed to Standard. To the extent they are, Standard denies them. Standard denies any remaining allegations in paragraph 33.
  - 34. Denied as written.
- 35. Standard lacks information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 35, and therefore denies them.
  - 36. Denied. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute,

regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 36.

- 37. Denied. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 37.
- 38. Standard lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the allegations in paragraph 38.
- 39. The allegations of paragraph 39 include legal conclusions to which no response is required; to the extent that a response is deemed necessary, Standard admits that no death benefit is payable under the Policy. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 39.
- 40. Standard admits that the court decisions in *McHugh*, *Bentley*, and *Thomas* are matters of public record. Standard specifically denies any implied allegation that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 40.
- 41. Standard admits Protective Life Insurance Company is the defendant in the *McHugh* matter, and Standard further admits the *Thomas* decision is a matter of public record. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 41.
- 42. Standard admits only that Plaintiffs have not been paid the death benefit under the terminated Policies; no such benefits are payable. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard further denies that Plaintiff, and the other persons that Plaintiffs purport to represent, have suffered any harm or damage whatsoever. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 42.

## V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

43. The description of the proposed class speaks for itself. The definitions of the proposed class speak for themselves. Standard specifically denies that certification of any class is appropriate

under applicable law. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard denies all other allegations in paragraph 43.

- 44. The allegations of paragraph 44 do not require a response. Standard specifically denies that certification of any class is appropriate under applicable law. Standard denies all other allegations in paragraph 44.
- 45. Denied. Standard specifically denies that certification of any class is appropriate under applicable law. Standard denies all other allegations in paragraph 45.
- 46. Denied. Standard specifically denies that certification of any class is appropriate under applicable law. Standard denies all other allegations in paragraph 46.
- 47. Denied. Standard specifically denies that certification of any class is appropriate under applicable law. Standard denies all other allegations in paragraph 47.
- 48. Denied. Standard specifically denies that certification of any class is appropriate under applicable law. Standard denies all other allegations in paragraph 48.
- 49. Denied. Standard specifically denies that certification of any class is appropriate under applicable law. Standard denies all other allegations in paragraph 49.
- 50. Denied. Standard specifically denies that certification of any class is appropriate under applicable law. Standard denies all other allegations in paragraph 50.
- 51. Denied. Standard specifically denies that certification of any class is appropriate under applicable law. Standard denies all other allegations in paragraph 51.
- 52. Denied. Standard specifically denies that certification of any class is appropriate under applicable law. Standard denies all other allegations in paragraph 52.

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VI. CAUSES OF ACTION
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

 BREACH OF CONTRACTUAL DUTY TO PAY A COVERED CLAIM<sup>1</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The First Cause of Action of the Complaint includes a heading (summarizing Plaintiff's legal argument) to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Standard denies the

argument) to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Standard denies the allegations in the heading and denies that Plaintiffs, and those other persons that Plaintiffs purport to

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represent, are entitled to any relief whatsoever.

- 59. The allegations of paragraph 59 include legal conclusions to which no response is required. Standard specifically denies any implied allegation that it has violated any implied duty of good faith and fair dealing to Plaintiffs and those other persons that Plaintiffs purport to represent.
- 60. Denied. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 60.
- 61. Denied. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 61.
  - a. Denied. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 61(a).
  - b. Denied. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 61(b).
  - c. Denied. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 61(c).
  - d. Denied. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 61(d).
  - e. Denied. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 61(e).
- 62. Denied. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard further denies that Plaintiff, and the other persons that Plaintiffs purport to represent, are entitled to any relief whatsoever. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 62.

63. Denied. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard further denies that Plaintiff, and the other persons that Plaintiffs purport to represent, are entitled to any relief whatsoever. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 63.

- 64. Denied. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard further denies that Plaintiff, and the other persons that Plaintiffs purport to represent, are entitled to any relief whatsoever. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 64.
- 65. Denied. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard further denies that Plaintiff, and the other persons that Plaintiffs purport to represent, are entitled to any relief whatsoever. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 65.
- 66. Denied. Standard specifically denies all allegations that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard further denies that Plaintiff, and the other persons that Plaintiffs purport to represent, are entitled to any relief whatsoever. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 66.
- 67. The allegations in paragraph 67 include legal conclusions to which no response is required. Standard lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of the statement quoted in paragraph 67, and therefore denies it. Standard denies any implied allegation that it has violated any statute, regulation, law, or insurance policy provision in any way. Standard denies any other allegations in paragraph 67.

## PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Standard denies that Plaintiffs, and those other persons that Plaintiffs purport to represent, are entitled to any of the relief sought in Paragraphs (A) through (F) of the Prayer for Relief section of the Amended Complaint. Standard further denies that Plaintiff, and those other persons that Plaintiffs purport to represent, are entitled to any relief whatsoever from Standard.

#### **JURY DEMAND**

Plaintiffs' demand for a jury trial does not require a response.

# AFFIRMATIVE AND OTHER DEFENSES

Having answered the individually numbered paragraphs of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, Standard asserts the following defenses. By setting forth these defenses, Standard does not assume the burden of proving any fact, issue, or element of a cause of action where such burden properly belongs to Plaintiffs and those persons Plaintiffs purport to represent. Moreover, nothing stated herein is intended or shall be construed as an admission that any particular issue or subject matter is relevant to Plaintiffs' allegations.

- 1. The Amended Complaint, and each purported claim therein, fails to state a claim against Standard on which relief can be granted.
- 2. Standard asserts that Plaintiffs have failed to join necessary and indispensable parties to this suit.
- 3. Standard denies the material allegations of the Amended Complaint and demands strict proof thereof.
- 4. The so-called "renewal principle" discussed in *Thomas v. State Farm Insurance Co.*, 424 F. Supp. 3d 1018 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (Bashant, J.), and *Bentley v. United of Omaha Life Insurance Co.*, 371 F. Supp. 3d 723 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (Gee, J.), does not apply to the policies at issue here.
- 5. Plaintiffs' interpretation of the Statutes is unconstitutional insofar as the United States and California Constitutions both prohibit the passage of any law impairing the obligation of contracts. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts."); Cal. Const., Art. I, § 9 ("A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed.").
- 6. California Insurance Code §§ 10113.71 and 10113.72 do not create a private right of action for recovery against insurers like Standard.
- 7. Plaintiffs' claims, and those of some or all of the other persons Plaintiffs purport to represent, are barred by the provisions, terms, exclusions, definitions, limitations, and conditions of the insurance policies at issue.
- 8. Plaintiffs' claims, and those of some or all of the other persons Plaintiffs purport to represent, are barred because Standard has fully and/or substantially performed all contractual, statutory,

and other duties that may have been owed to Plaintiffs and the members of the putative class.

- 9. Plaintiffs' claims, and those of some or all of the other persons Plaintiffs purport to represent, are barred by the failure to satisfy necessary conditions precedent.
- 10. Plaintiffs' claims, and those of some or all of the other persons Plaintiffs purport to represent, are barred because they are based on alleged breach of obligations not found in the insurance policies at issue, which are fully integrated agreements.
- 11. Plaintiffs' claims, and those of some or all of the other persons Plaintiffs purport to represent, are barred or limited because Standard complied with all applicable laws, statutes, and regulations at all pertinent times.
- 12. Plaintiffs' claims, and those of some or all of the other persons Plaintiffs purport to represent, are barred or limited because Standard acted reasonably, appropriately, and in good faith at all pertinent times.
- 13. Plaintiffs' claims, and those of some or all of the other persons Plaintiffs purport to represent, are barred because Standard did not engage in any unfair, unlawful, fraudulent, or wrongful conduct.
- 14. Plaintiffs' claims, and those of some or all of the other persons Plaintiffs purport to represent, are barred because Standard did not willfully or intentionally engage in any unfair, unlawful, fraudulent, or wrongful conduct.
- 15. The claims for relief asserted in the Amended Complaint are barred, in whole or in part, by the applicable statutes of limitations, laches, and/or other time bars.
- 16. The acts and omissions of Standard, if any, were excused or justified by the information and facts available to Standard at the time such acts and omissions, if any, occurred.
- 17. Plaintiff, and some or all of the other persons Plaintiffs purport to represent, have sustained no injury in fact or damages caused by Standard or the conduct alleged in the Amended Complaint.
- 18. Plaintiffs, and some or all of the other persons Plaintiffs purport to represent, have failed and neglected to use reasonable care to protect themselves and minimize the alleged loss and damage complained of, if there was any.
  - 19. If Plaintiffs, and all or some of those Plaintiffs purport to represent, have suffered any

injury or harm—which Standard expressly denies—recovery is barred by the failure of Plaintiff, and some or all of those Plaintiffs purport to represent, to mitigate, reduce, or otherwise avoid damages or injuries.

- 20. Plaintiffs' claims, and those of some or all of the other persons Plaintiffs purport to represent, are barred, in whole or in part, because no act or omission by Standard, or by any person or entity for which Standard was responsible, was the proximate cause of any injury or harm alleged.
- 21. Plaintiffs' claims, and those of some or all of the other persons Plaintiffs purport to represent, are barred due to the acts or omissions of third parties who are unrelated to Standard.
- 22. To the extent California Insurance Code §§ 10113.71 and 10113.72 require benefits to be paid even though any policies had lapsed, Standard is entitled to an offset for any premiums that would have been due and owing between the date of the last paid premium and the death of the insured(s).
- 23. To the extent California Insurance Code §§ 10113.71 and 10113.72 require reinstatement even though any policies had lapsed, Standard is entitled to receive any past premiums that would be due and owing since the date of the last paid premium.
- 24. Plaintiff, and some or all of the other persons Plaintiffs purport to represent, fail to state a claim for punitive, exemplary, and/or treble damages against Standard.
- 25. Any demand for punitive or exemplary damages in the Amended Complaint is barred by the Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution and/or the California Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Cal. Const. Art. I, § 7.
- 26. Any demand for punitive or exemplary damages in the Amended Complaint is barred by the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution and/or the California Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Cal. Const. Art. I, § 7.
- 27. Any demand for punitive or exemplary damages in the Amended Complaint is barred by the Contracts Clauses of the United States Constitution and/or the California Constitution. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Cal. Const. Art. I, § 9.
- 28. Any demand for punitive or exemplary damages in the Amended Complaint is barred by the Excessive Fines provisions of the United States Constitution and/or the California Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. VIII; Cal. Const. Art. I, § 17.

29.	Any demand for punitive or exemplary damages in the Amended Complaint does not meet
the tests for	set forth by the United States Supreme Court in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559 (19	996), State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), Philip
Morris USA	v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007), and other cases, and therefore fails to state a cause of
action suppo	orting any punitive or exemplary damages claimed.

- 30. Plaintiffs, and some or all of the other persons Plaintiffs purport to represent, have expressly and/or by conduct waived the right to complain of the conduct alleged in the Amended Complaint and are estopped from pursuing these claims.
- 31. Plaintiffs' claims, and those of some or all of the other persons Plaintiffs purport to represent, are barred by the doctrine of unjust enrichment.
- 32. Plaintiffs' claims, and those of some or all of the other persons Plaintiffs purport to represent, are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands in that the actions of Plaintiff, and some or all of the other persons Plaintiffs purport to represent, have caused some or all of the alleged harm incurred, if any.
- 33. The second cause of action in the Amended Complaint for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is barred by the genuine dispute doctrine.
- 34. This action is not proper for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 because Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
- 35. The Amended Class Action Complaint fails to adequately define any class of persons who could properly maintain this action as a class action.
- 36. This action is not proper for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 because Plaintiffs' purported claims are not typical of the claims of the putative class or sub-class.
- 37. This action is not proper for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 because the putative class defined is not ascertainable.
- 38. This action is not proper for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 because the putative sub-class defined is not ascertainable.
- 39. This action is not proper for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 because there is a lack of commonality of questions of law.

- 40. This action is not proper for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 because there is a lack of commonality of questions of fact.
- 41. This action is not proper for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 because questions of law and fact common to the purported class (and/or sub-class) do not predominate over the questions affecting the individual members of the purported class (and/or sub-class).
- 42. This action is not proper for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 because individual questions of fact and law predominate over common questions.
- 43. This action is not proper for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 because Plaintiffs and/or Plaintiffs' counsel are inadequate representatives of the putative class.
- 44. This action is not proper for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 because there are likely to be difficulties in the management of the proposed class action.
- 45. This action is not proper for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 because class-action treatment is inferior to individual resolution of claims.
- 46. This action is not proper for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 because of conflicts of interest between Plaintiffs and the members of the putative class and/or between and among members of the putative class.
- 47. Plaintiffs' claims are barred, in whole or in part, because the Policy terminated as a result of Plaintiffs' admitted failure and inability to repay the required portion(s) of certain loans taken against the Policy.
- 48. Plaintiffs' claims, and those of some or all of the other persons Plaintiffs purport to represent, are barred, in whole or in part, by the following doctrines: res judicata, collateral estoppel, laches, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, duress, failure of consideration, contribution, set-off, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, license, joint and several liability, payment, release, standing, real party in interest, accord and satisfaction, good faith, failure to cooperate, failure to read, and/or release.
- 49. Standard reserves the right to plead any additional affirmative defenses that become available or known as this action proceeds, including, but not limited to, those defenses that become known to Standard through discovery. Standard reserves the right to amend its Answer to add such

1	additional defenses or to delete any affirmative defenses that it determines are not applicable, as well as		
2	any counterclaims and third-party claims, based on information revealed during the discovery process.		
3	WHEREFORE, Defendant Standard Insurance Company prays for relief as follows:		
4	1.	That the Court deny Plaintiffs' request for certification of any class action pursuant to	
5	Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or any other applicable Rules of Procedure;		
6	2.	That the Court deny any and all relief requested by Plaintiff;	
7	3.	That Plaintiffs takes nothing by reason of the Amended Class Action Complaint;	
8	4.	That the Court enter judgment in favor of Defendant Standard Insurance Company and	
9	against Plaintiffs;		
10	5.	That the Court dismiss the Amended Class Action Complaint in its entirety with prejudice	
11	6.	For costs of suit incurred herein, including attorneys' fees; and	
12	7.	For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.	
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14	DATED: Oc	tober 20, 2022 MAYNARD, COOPER & GALE, LLP,	
15		Dev // Civ. L. M. D. al. a.	
16		By: <u>/s/ Cindy M. Rucker</u> CINDY M. RUCKER	
17		Attorneys for Defendant STANDARD	
18		INSURANCE COMPANY	
19			
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1	PROOF OF SERVICE	
1	STATE OF CALIFORNIA )	
2	COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO )	
3	I am employed in the County of San Francisco, State of California. I am over the age of 21 and	
4	am not a party to the within action. My business address is Maynard, Cooper & Gale, LLP, Two	
	Embarcadero Center, Suite 1450, San Francisco, California 94111. On the date indicated below, I served the foregoing document described as:	
5	the folegoing document described as:	
6	DEFENDANT STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY'S ANSWER TO AMENDED CLASS	
7	ACTION COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL	
8	on the interested parties in this action by placing: [] the original document - OR- [X] a true and correct copy thereof enclosed in sealed envelopes addressed as follows:	
9	Christopher Pitoun (SBN 290235)	
10	christopherp@hbsslaw.com	
	HAGENS BERMAN SOBOL SHAPRIO LLP 301 North Lake Avenue, Suite 920	
11	Pasadena, CA 91101	
12	Tel. (213) 330-7150 Fax. (213) 330-7152	
13	1 ax. (213) 330-7132	
14	John P. Bjork (Admitted <i>Pro Hac Vice</i> )	
14	jbjork@sperling-law.com Joseph M. Vanek (Admitted <i>Pro Hac Vice</i> )	
15	jvanek@sperling-law.com	
16	Mitchell H. Macknin (Admitted <i>Pro Hac Vice</i> ) mhmacknin@sperling-law.com	
17	SPERLING & SLATER, P.C.	
	55 West Monroe Street, Ste. 3200 Chicago, IL 60603	
18	Tel. (312) 614-3200	
19	Fax: (312) 614-6492	
20	[x] BY CM/ECF ELECTRONIC SERVICE: The following are registered CM/ECF users with the	
21	Court and have consented to service through the Court's automatic transmission of a notice of	
	electronic filing.	
22	I declare that I am employed in the office of a member who has been admitted to the bar of this	
23	Court at whose direction the service was made. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the	
24	State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.	
25	Executed on October 20, 2022, in San Francisco, California.	
26		
27	Sam Roberson III	
28		