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## 23 Terrorist or Freedom Fighter? Tyrant or Guardian?

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A little more than a year after the 9/11 attacks, the University of Paris VII convened a conference called “Terrorism, the Press, and the Social Sciences.” The meeting opened with the keynote speaker announcing, “I am a terrorist.” This was neither a rhetorical flourish nor a statement of solidarity. Some 59 years earlier, nearly to the day, the keynote speaker, Raymond Aubrac, was liberated from a Gestapo prison where Klaus Barbie tortured him. Like his wife, Lucie, who led the commandos that freed him, Aubrac was a member of the French Resistance.<sup>1</sup> Aubrac explained to the conference audience how he and his colleagues plotted the assassinations of government officials, exploded bombs to disrupt truck and train traffic, cut power and communications lines, and conducted missions that sometimes could only be described as suicidal. To the German occupation authorities, to the Vichy government, to the Gestapo and to the Milice (the Vichy government’s secret police), Aubrac was simply a terrorist.<sup>2</sup>

Aubrac’s point was not to suggest that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. Rather his talk was intended to remind the audience that terrorism is a tactic employed in a political context. To understand the motivations behind acts of violence it is important to understand the contexts in which they occur. Armed groups have political agendas. There have been many times when political activists welcomed the moniker “terrorist.” Nineteenth-century Russian anarchists and antimarchists proudly wore the title “terrorist.”<sup>3</sup> It was a testament to their commitment.<sup>4</sup> And more recently, bin Laden said, “every state and every civilization and culture has to resort to terrorism under certain circumstances for the purpose of abolishing tyranny and corruption.”<sup>5</sup> Yet many politicians of late speak of terrorists as a cohesive whole, often referring to “the

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terrorists” as a singular construction implying that they emanate from a single circumstance or that they possess a singular motivation. Presently that motivation is presumed to be a militant or radical form of political Islam. Yet, this is far from correct. There appear to be many different motivations for the use of terrorist tactics in many different contexts that range from struggles for national independence in Palestine to reactions in response to state repression in the Russian Federation. Ted Gurr notes that perpetrators justify their decisions to use terrorism as a tactic through a mix of rational calculation that is driven by revolutionary, ethno-national, or religious ideology.<sup>6</sup> To understand when and why terrorism is used, one must take difference into account.

In the struggle for independence, autonomy, recognition, or access to material resources, terrorism may become one of many tools employed. In fact, existing U.S. law recognizes that terrorism is a political act: “politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets.”<sup>7</sup> Michael Wieviorka suggests that terrorism is a social product. It is an image, or psychological representation or a social conception that marks a particular phase or theater of a conflict, perhaps even substituting for total war or revolution.<sup>8</sup> While the effects of political violence may at times be repugnant, such disgust should not blind scholars, policy analysts, or the public to the fact that there is a logic to terrorism. Martha Crenshaw sees that “terrorism [is] not the result of irrational fanaticism but political calculation; it [is] learned behavior, not the result of primordial forces.”<sup>9</sup> The violence of terrorism should not be seen as an aberration, but rather as a central part of the politics of identity conflict. As Ben Barber notes, violent political Islamist groups are better understood as a reaction to “global systemic disorders,” not fundamentalist zealotry.<sup>10</sup>

Further, terrorism is not born of crisis, but occurs within the context of an evolving conflict. The 9/11 attacks, for example, should be viewed as al Qaeda’s culminating event in a series of attacks that began in the early 1990s. Terrorist groups use different techniques to alter the balance within an unresolved conflict; this may include welcoming foreign fighters or accepting assistance from state sponsors. In these aspects we can discern a common characteristic of terrorist activity: it is a tactic or technique employed in a conflict environment characterized by asymmetrical political engagement. It is necessary to identify the motivations associated with specific groups of actors. The guiding premise articulated by Martha Crenshaw could be just as easily applied here: “terrorism as a general phenomenon cannot be adequately explained without situating it in its particular political, social and economic contexts.”<sup>11</sup> Understanding this goes a long way to differentiate between terrorists and freedom fighters.

## **THE POLITICS OF TERRORISM**

As Raymond Aubrac’s declaration reminds us, terrorism occurs in a political context. As a label, terrorism immediately qualifies the actions and actors to whom it is applied. The choice to call a political actor a “terrorist” or a political act “terrorism” often has a “prescriptive policy relevance as well as moral connotation.”<sup>12</sup> This is as true with the United States as with Russia or any of the other state parties in conflicts associated with the “global jihad.” By evoking the label “terrorist,” the speaker seeks to combine descriptive and symbolic elements, creating a kind of shorthand for evil.<sup>13</sup> Such a label implies a

preferred policy solution, one which often precludes negotiation. If terrorists “cannot be negotiated with” or their presence cannot be tolerated, the label rules certain political elements to be outside the bounds of political discourse. Further, the state may claim the right to eliminate such political elements because of the threat they pose to stability.

The use of the terrorist label, however, can be dangerous. By ruling that certain political elements are beyond civil discourse, it can become tempting for states to expand the lists of political elements no longer qualifying for civil engagement. States use the terrorist label to identify political opponents. The application of such a label can lead to governments becoming blind to the distinction between violent opposition and nonviolent dissent, or the distinction between rebellion and civil disobedience. It was not that long ago when rightist political elements in many South American countries used the broad application of the label “terrorist” to jail, torture, eliminate, and kill political activists associated with leftist movements. The state security services in the “dirty wars” in Argentina and Chile came to see all of political society as “contaminated” by leftist thought. The only way to remove the contamination was through state violence.

The efforts to eliminate urban guerrilla organizations led counterterrorism and counterinsurgency units to engage in the types of activities associated with terrorist tactics.<sup>14</sup> This broad application of the moniker “terrorist” transforms the body politic into an enemy. Such a situation is exemplified today in Russia when the North Ossetian minister for nationality affairs, Taymuraz Kasaev, suggested that anyone who “actively practices Islam” would be seen as an “enemy”<sup>15</sup> even though Islam is recognized as a “traditional belief” within Russian law.<sup>16</sup> Although Russian patriarch Alexy II reminds his followers that “Russian Christians and Muslims traditionally live in peace,” the association of “Muslim” with “terrorist” may be too deeply fixed in the popular mind of the Russian public. The connection between political oppositions and terrorism in Russia, just as with the connections in South America, serves to justify both continued and escalated state violence. As John Esposito cautioned more than a decade ago, “Islamic movements have been lumped together; conclusions have been drawn, based more on stereotyping or perceived expectations than empirical research.”<sup>17</sup>

The application of state violence in these cases begets still more violence, not necessarily in the form of resistance but in the form of the bureaucratization of state violence. Military, interior ministry, and law enforcement agencies all come to participate in a “war on terrorism.” In fact, the word “terrorism” was initially coined to describe acts of state violence perpetrated during the Reign of Terror following the French Revolution. Resources are allocated according to a given agency’s ability to contribute to this new state endeavor—the elimination of political opposition identified with terrorism. The proclaimed need to suppress these challenging elements may serve as the basis for the extension of state powers. Thus, if one speaks of terrorists and freedom fighters, then one must also consider whether governments inappropriately use the label “terrorist,” calling into question whether leaders behave as tyrants or guardians.

## **TYRANTS AND GUARDIANS**

While acts of terrorism are often depicted as threats to democracy, the real threat to liberal societies may lie in the state’s responses to terrorism. In the names of expediency and

efficiency, state reactions in the immediate aftermath of a traumatic terrorist event often include an alteration in the standing, institutional relations of power. This is particularly true in modern democracies, whereby the response of the state entails an extension of executive power. The delegation of “full powers” allowing the executive to issue and enforce decrees represents a broad alteration of regulatory power, particularly when such an alteration allows for the modification or abrogation by decree of laws previously in force.<sup>18</sup>

The simplest and most immediate examples of temporary arrangements becoming permanent institutions come from decrees converted into law. The laws invoked by French president Jacques Chirac by declaring a “state of emergency” (*l'état d'urgence*) on 8 November 2005 were originally crafted under the René Coty presidency in 1955 in order to quell growing unrest in Algeria. Chirac's application of these powers in response to the November 2005 riots demonstrates the tremendous reach associated with the “guardian” state. These powers include the ability to declare curfews for designated areas, to place individuals under house arrest without arraignments or trials, to censor publications and other news organs, and to engage in searches and police raids without search warrants. Or a 2005 law in Germany allows authorities at the state level to expel legal foreign residents who “endorse or promote terrorist acts” or incite hatred against sections of the population.<sup>19</sup> Or Italy also passed a series of antiterrorism laws making deportations easier. Finally, in August 2005, the British government broadened the grounds for deportation to those persons who “justify or glorify” terrorism.<sup>20</sup> While established democracies in Europe can likely endure challenges to the liberal democratic order, the situation is not so certain in new democracies that face the threat of terrorism.

### **PERPETUAL STATES OF EMERGENCY**

Extraordinary powers assumed by the executive branch are linked to a state of emergency that has either been recently declared and lifted, or is legally recognized as the de facto condition, with the state of emergency operating even in the absence of a declaration.<sup>21</sup> In Thailand, a state of emergency was originally imposed in July 2005 in reaction to the extensive violence in the south of the country. The 90-day emergency condition was then extended for another 90 days on two more occasions. As under the terms of the French state of emergency, the Thai executive is allowed to declare curfews, ban public gatherings, confiscate property, monitor telephones, and search homes and offices without warrants. Like many other provisions for the state of emergency in other countries, the Thai provisions grant officials prosecutorial immunity from civil, criminal, or disciplinary penalties. Civil rights advocates claim that the state of emergency is actually making conditions worse in the south of Thailand. Rohan Gunaratna understands that the Thai strategy of treating the insurgency as a military threat is drastically flawed.<sup>22</sup> By privileging the use of force, the Thai approach worsens the problem by further alienating the Muslim communities. Treating these Thai citizens as if they were enemy aliens reduces the incentives for community involvement in conflict amelioration. Those citizens who might otherwise be indifferent or even opposed to the insurgency give their support or at least tolerate the rebel organizations as they are seen as an expression of resistance to Thai state violence. Political repression through the banning of political organizations only has the effect of driving the

most politically active into prohibited groups. Free expression, regional autonomy, and infrastructure support would all signal that the states of southern Thailand are an integral part of the country rather than alienated from it. Ironically, General Sondhi Boonyaratkalin, who came to power in a military coup in September 2006, restored a dialogue with insurgent leaders in an effort to reduce the violence.

In Indonesia, different parts of the country have been under states of emergency, some for considerable periods of time. For example Aceh was placed under martial law in 1959.<sup>23</sup> That condition was changed with the declaration of a “state of civil emergency” in the province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam on 19 May 2003. It was to remain in effect for one year, but was renewed in 2004.<sup>24</sup> In May 2005, the government lifted the declaration but the army has remained in the region to “keep order” and to assist with the cleanup efforts in the aftermath of the December 2004 tsunami.

On the island of Maluka in Indonesia, nearly five thousand people died in clashes between Christians and Muslims in 2000. A state of emergency was declared for the island on 6 June 2000 and remained in effect for three years. During that time there were serious allegations leveled at the Indonesian security services regarding the use of torture, indefinite detentions, and even state-authorized killings.<sup>25</sup> Arabinda Acharya and Rohaiza Ahmad Asi echo Gunaratna by suggesting the best way to quell the violence across the archipelago is to improve infrastructure, especially by creating new schools and reforming the police and the army.<sup>26</sup> One of the biggest problems Acharya and Asi identify is that many Indonesians are so distrustful of the state security services that they turn to political organizations with “muscle” to settle disputes rather than turning to the police. Extremist ideology is communicated in a select number of *pesarten* or religious schools. As with the madrassas in Pakistan, many children attend the *pesarten* because there is no alternative; the state fails to provide public education. While perhaps far too much has been made in the U.S. media of the link between madrassas and terrorism, the situation in Pakistan and Indonesia primarily exists because of a lack of state resources committed for public goods. It is this lack of infrastructure that promotes political violence as an identity of resistance against such state neglect.

In the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in 1972. Though the condition was lifted in 1981, the president kept extensive emergency powers. Even with the coming of democracy the president has still retained those powers. A state of emergency has been declared five times since 1989. In 2003 alone, an emergency condition was declared twice. On the first occasion President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declared a “state of rebellion” in response to the mutiny of 296 soldiers, 70 of them officers who were top graduates of the Philippine Military Academy. The soldiers said that they were protesting government-sponsored terrorism, including a bombing in Davao, Mindanao, that killed 12 people. The mutineers said that while the government blamed the terrorist organization Abu Sayyef, the sophisticated bombing was the work of military forces. The soldiers also stated that the government launched these attacks in order to appear active in the “global war on terrorism,” to curry favor with the United States, and to obtain more U.S. military aid. At the time the Philippines had already received more than \$100 million in aid.<sup>27</sup> The second occasion in 2003 followed an attempted military coup d’état, whose instigators echoed the claims and concerns of the mutineers. The Philippines’

effort to combat the insurgency in Mindanao has led to the use of extensive investigatory powers, claimed under the state of emergency. In 2005, in an attempt to stifle media criticism of the government's handling of the fighting in the south, President Arroyo called press freedom groups "enemies of the state." She singled out the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, saying that the organization had been "infiltrated by communists."<sup>28</sup> In February 2006, another state of emergency was declared in response to an alleged coup against President Arroyo, which resulted in public protests being banned and several arrests.

Some states of emergency have been in place for many years. The executive had full powers in Sri Lanka from 1983 until 2001, and Israel has had a state of emergency since May 1948. Another long-ruling state of emergency ended when Turkey finally lifted its 15-year-old state of emergency in the provinces of Diyarbakir and Sirnak in 2002.<sup>29</sup> The state of emergency had replaced a declaration of martial law, imposed in March 1984 and then lifted in July 1987. The original application of the state of emergency in 1987 applied to 13 provinces in the south and east of the country as a reaction to violence associated with Kurdish rebels. As in Indonesia, serious allegations of torture, prolonged detention, and physical abuse were leveled at the security forces.

In some regions, a state of emergency is not even declared; rather the executive simply claims the power to deal with some crisis. Without such a declaration, however, there is no suggestion of a limit on this executive privilege. Very quickly these powers become permanent. In the case of Chechnya, numerous states of emergency have been declared since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the first being issued in November 1991. Just prior to the first Russian military campaign, in 1994, President Yeltsin declared a state of emergency for both Chechnya and neighboring Ingushetia. Similarly, just prior to the December 1999, second Russian military campaign, three states of emergency were declared. However, since the invasion, no state of emergency has been declared. President Putin claims that it is not necessary for such a declaration, and the Constitutional Court agreed with him. The court stated in 1995 that the power to quell violence and the means to do so are well established by the constitution in ordinary presidential powers.<sup>30</sup> In Chechnya, since 2000, there has been a *de facto* state of emergency, where security services regularly detain people without charge, search premises without warrants, monitor communications, and regularly use extreme violence against people the security services deem to be potential threats. There have been numerous claims that the security forces kidnap for ransom, traffic in narcotics, and make many Chechen men "disappear." The Russian human rights organization Memorial states that between 3,000 and 5,000 Chechens have "disappeared" since December 1999.<sup>31</sup> Official Russian government statistics acknowledge nearly 2,000 disappearances. Although there have been 1,814 criminal investigations into the enforced "disappearances," not one has resulted in a conviction.<sup>32</sup> When UN commissioner for human rights Mary Robinson called Russia to account for human rights abuses, pointing out that no state of emergency had been declared, Justice Minister Yuri Chaika replied that it was all part of the fight against terrorism.<sup>33</sup>

There is also an undeclared, *de facto* state of emergency in Jammu and Kashmir in India. Similar to the constitutional ruling in Russia, the Indian Supreme Court held in 1997 that the condition of a state of emergency and the exercise of extraordinary powers

by the executive were both legal and constitutional. Although no state of emergency was declared, state security services regularly engage in “preventative detention,” and exercise extraordinary police powers to arrest, detain, and even shoot persons suspected of posing a threat to national security. There are other measures as well that grant special powers to the executive and its security apparatus. The Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act (PSA) of 1978 allows for the detention, for up to 24 months without indictment or trial, of persons suspected of posing a threat to the region. Another ordinance, the National Security Act of 1980, augments the PSA and applies to all of India, allowing for persons anywhere in the country to be detained without trial for 12 months.

And in places like Iraq where the focus of the U.S. government has been on establishing a liberal democratic order, the imposition of a state of emergency has had significant deleterious effects on the progress of democratic development. Logically, the development of liberal democracy is at times at odds with the necessities of security. Following a 30-day state of emergency declared immediately after the U.S. invasion in March 2003, Iraq has been under a state of emergency more or less since. Throughout the initial 30 days, the security forces under the direct command of the prime minister were authorized to declare curfews wherever and whenever they saw fit. They were authorized to carry out arrests and detentions without warrants or informing detainees of the grounds for their arrests. Detainees could be held incommunicado and property could be seized without compensation during police and military operations. The designation “al Qaeda associate,” “terror suspect,” or “illegal enemy combatant” initiates a whole series of actions that combine to exclude an individual from society and the protections it affords against governments. Beginning with the loss of the right to an attorney, then to access to due process, then to a writ of *habeas corpus*, the “terror suspect” is denied universally accepted human rights.

While the detention of self-admitted al Qaeda leaders responsible for terrorist attacks no doubt makes sense, the detention of hundreds in U.S. custody or thousands in Iraqi custody does have corrosive effects. Two of the most common tools to combat terrorism and insurgencies, the deportation or detention of suspected provocateurs and the declaration of a state of emergency, appear largely to inspire the very groups that pose the greatest danger to democracy. This is not to say that states of emergency are not rightly declared in the face of real crises; they are. Many people have suffered greatly in regionalized sectarian violence. States respond in the most expedient fashion. However, a consequence of this expediency is often that the executive seizes additional powers and the military element of power dominates, which alienates a population already under duress.

In all of these cases, one finds a threat to the practice of democracy as the guardian state exerts itself. The executive stands outside of the normally valid juridical order and yet this is not anarchy or chaos. It is something different. Order remains but the executive subtracts itself from any consideration of law.<sup>34</sup> This is similar to a commissarial dictatorship when power is seized by a political element that has the aim of defending or restoring the existing constitution. Along these lines, it is possible to suggest that the three Turkish military coups d'état (1960, 1971, and 1980) were to “defend” the secular order, just as General Pervez Musharraf claims that his seizure of the Pakistani

government in October 1999 was to defend it against impending collapse. The guardian state is not a dictatorship, but it is a dangerous flirtation with the suspension of the principles of liberal democracy.

## TARGETS AND RESPONSES

Just as not all political violence is directed at the same targets, not all political violence is the same either. Differentiating between the targets and the aims of organized collective political violence gives rise to different state responses. Terrorism should not be treated as a single political movement; it is important to understand the unique political and cultural context in which violence occurs. In *Flashpoints in the War on Terrorism*, our analysis suggests there are a number of similarities across conflicts: political Islam is prominent, but not as a motivator for violence. Rather than demonstrating a “clash of civilizations” or the incompatibility of Islam and Christianity (or Judaism, or Hinduism, or Buddhism, or Nigerian indigenous religions), religion is a marker of identity chosen by Muslim minorities where they are dominated. That violence arises is more a function of state failure than a clash of civilizations.

The most prominent feature common to conflicts associated with “jihad” is the rise of violence as a response to a state failure. In the global war on terrorism, “terrorist” violence is associated with political organizations that either challenge the state in a nationalist or separatist fashion, or resist an authoritarian or heavy-handed application of the state interests, including programs of forced assimilation. While organizations like al Qaeda seek to promote the idea that political violence is associated with an “internationalist” Islamic empire, there is a danger to misunderstanding the motives of terrorist groups or overestimating the threat they pose. As John Mueller put it, even al Qaeda is a bounded problem, whose numbers and “terrorist adjuncts are finite and probably manageable.”<sup>35</sup> Having a fantasy of creating an Islamic empire from Morocco to Indonesia is not the same as having the capability and opportunity to do so. To be sure, Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri seek to tap into socioeconomic frustration and ignite a larger clash of civilizations. However, the people in Morocco to Indonesia have a say in their futures; and they have overwhelmingly embraced their own national identities, unique forms of Islamic worship, and democracy. At the end of 2005, Freedom House notes that core countries of the Middle East in the last four years have seen steady progress toward creating freer societies. And there are many Muslim-majority countries that are now considered democratic—Indonesia, Turkey, Mali, Senegal, and Mauritania. The key U.S. foreign policy approach should be to promote development and the state’s ability to provide public goods.

In the Kashmir region, for example, a large problem is the state’s failure to develop infrastructure.<sup>36</sup> This failure has many wide-reaching repercussions and is more pronounced than other regions in India. While terrorism may not always be bred in conditions of poverty, it is born of frustration. Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation is instructive here—people become resentful and disposed to political action when they share a collective perception that they are unjustly deprived of economic and political advantages enjoyed by other groups.<sup>37</sup> Life in areas lacking infrastructure can be difficult and trying. Without technical infrastructure, the economy cannot be developed. The

worst consequence in such regions is not only a rise of poverty but also the resulting chronic underemployment. A region without technical infrastructure is stuck in a perpetual depression. No economic sector can grow because no sector takes root; in addition, the population becomes economically dependent upon the state. This tension between dependence on the state for things economic and feeling estranged from the state in things political exacerbates tensions in such regions. The chronic lack of electrical power in Kashmir, or the lack of an industrial base in southeastern Anatolia, gives rise to a sense of being ignored by the state. The population turns to other organizations to fill the security and welfare roles of the state. For example, the Free Aceh Movement provides protection in Indonesia; Hezbollah in southern Lebanon provides social services such as medical care, elder care, and education. While these organizations have a violent component, their popular support and persistence is based on filling a role the state normally fulfills. The organizations are sustained by large numbers of deprived people who are natural recruits for guerrilla and terrorist groups.

### **DANGERS OF WAR IMAGERY**

John Mueller warned that the use of war imagery in “combating terrorism” may raise unreasonable expectations.<sup>38</sup> Wars end. They also have objectives and usually identified purposes guiding the belligerents. The rhetorical attempt to suggest that “the terrorists” are a single entity, who will be “defeated,” makes it difficult to engage in differentiation and setting conflicts into political context. Stephen Walt pointed out that during the cold war, the United States fell into a similar pattern of rhetorical conflation. By viewing all leftist, socialist, or Marxist regimes as “indistinguishable parts of a communist ‘monolith’” U.S. foreign policy was unable to deal with each regime on its own terms and in its own context.<sup>39</sup> This lack of nuance often led to “self-fulfilling spirals of hostility.”<sup>40</sup>

Depicting all struggles that include an element of political Islam as part of a “global jihad” can be very dangerous, too. It is easy to imagine how the labeling of a group as “terrorist,” thereby precluding the possibility of negotiation or intercession by third parties, might drive political actors toward an extremism they might not otherwise approach. In addition, such language may obscure the goals of the political groups in conflict. The repetition of the rhetoric of “global jihad” prevents policy actors from hearing real grievances and seeing available avenues for conflict amelioration. Walt’s warning of the potential of creating a self-fulfilling policy prophecy is an important one that should be heeded.

Much of this is a result of structures of the rhetoric of war in which the enemy is generally highly depersonalized in order to make his elimination more palatable. This act of violent debasement exacerbates the type of alienation associated with the state failures that gave rise to armed groups in the first place. Rather than attempting to identify with the estranged or alienated social group, the discourse of war suggests tension and the necessity to remain separate, often even after victory.

The employment of war rhetoric may make the guardian state more palatable in the near term; it may also help to justify enormous costs associated with the military in both personnel and equipment. For example, the U.S. Defense Department’s *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* states that the way to defeat terrorism “is to continue

to lead an international effort to deny violent extremists the networks and components they need to operate and survive. Once we deny them what they need to survive, we will have won.”<sup>41</sup> However, a declaration of war only distorts the public’s ability to see that terrorism is a tactic and political technique of the weak that will not go away. It is far more beneficial to engage the political elements in areas marred by terrorism, even if those groups may be associated with terrorism. This is particularly true since the organization responsible for the 9/11 attacks is largely defeated and relegated to a symbolic role hoping to inspire nationalist struggles that predate the 9/11 attacks or even Osama bin Laden’s role as self-proclaimed spokesperson for political Islam. By incorporating, not excluding, these political organizations it may be possible to co-opt them into the larger political culture, thereby not only reducing political violence, but also building a more vibrant and varied political society.

Even as it is still unclear if HAMAS will change to be incorporated into the Middle East peace process, it must be remembered that a number of terrorist organizations laid down their weapons once they were able to join the political process. Al-Fatah and the Palestinian Liberation Organization ceased calling for the destruction of Israel once the Oslo Peace Accords were being realized. It may well be possible that the same will happen with HAMAS. The Muslim Brotherhood, which has largely resisted violence, is now a responsible party within Egyptian politics. The FMLN<sup>42</sup> has become an important and stable political party in El Salvador after fighting a 12-year-long guerrilla campaign during that country’s civil war. Similarly, the Sandinistas remained an important political movement and party in Nicaragua, even after their electoral defeat in 1990 until the reelection of Daniel Ortega in 2006. The African National Congress practiced terrorist tactics for nearly 30 years from the early 1960s until the organization was legalized in 1990. Although it has taken some time since Sinn Fein first accepted the 1998 Good Friday peace accords, the Irish Republican Army apologized in 2002 for harming civilians in its attacks and in 2005 renounced violence as a means to achieving its political ends. This laying down of weapons has been a long time in coming for Western Europe’s oldest active terrorist organization, yet it has come nevertheless. All of these transformations were facilitated by the inclusion of these heretofore declared terrorist organizations into the political process. These conflicts were ameliorated not by “defeating the terrorists” but by including “them.”

If the Department of Defense’s Global War on Terrorism Strategy is to be taken seriously in its plan to create a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists, then it is necessary to engage those segments of the polity that experience estrangement and alienation. Regional autonomy, local self-rule, representation in larger national bodies, and the means for self-expression can be far more useful institutional tools than the guardian state. Each site of terrorist activity must be dealt with on its own terms. Through more democracy, not less; through free speech, not coded speech; and through transparency and honesty, not opacity and secrecy, will these conflicts be ameliorated.

## NOTES

Portions of this chapter have appeared in chapter 15 in *Flashpoints in the War on Terrorism*, edited by Derek S. Reveron and Jeffrey Stevenson Murer (New York: Routledge, 2006).

1. The jailbreak and other events of Aubrac's life are depicted in the 1997 Claude Berri film *Lucie Aubrac*. Having been caught and tortured and his wife having been revealed to also be a Resistance commando, Raymond Aubrac was smuggled to London in 1944 together with Lucie. After D day and the liberation of the south of France, de Gaulle appointed Aubrac commissioner for the republic in Marseille (1944–1945). Later in life Aubrac worked for the United Nations' World Food Program in Rome. Aubrac is also well known for cofounding the underground resistance newspaper *Libération* with Emmanuel d'Astier.
2. Aubrac is a hero in French culture. Out on the street, especially in Paris, people come up to Aubrac in cafés to thank him for his commitment. Not just older people come up to him, but even young people realize the magnitude of his and Lucie's sacrifices for the French Resistance movement.
3. Lindsay Clutterbuck, "The Progenitors of Terrorism: Russian Revolutionaries or Extreme Irish Republicans?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 154–81.
4. Michael Wievioka, "Terrorism in the Context of Academic Research," in *Terrorism in Context*, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995).
5. Osama bin Laden, "Interview with John Miller of ABC," in *Jihad: Bin Laden in His Own Words; Declarations, Interviews, and Speeches*, ed. Brad K. Berner (Booksurge, 2006), 82.
6. Ted Robert Gurr, "Economic Factors," in *The Roots of Terrorism*, ed. Louise Richardson (New York: Routledge, 2006).
7. Section 2656f(d) of U.S. Code Title 22 states, "terrorism is premeditated, *politically motivated violence* perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience." Emphasis is ours.
8. Wievioka, "Terrorism in the Context of Academic Research."
9. Martha Crenshaw, preface to *Terrorism in Context*, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995), xvi.
10. Benjamin R. Barber, *Fear's Empire: War, Terrorism, and Democracy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003).
11. Crenshaw, preface.
12. Martha Crenshaw, "Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Context," in *Terrorism in Context*, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1995).
13. *Ibid.*
14. See Amnesty International, *Chile Briefing: A Decade of New Evidence*, AMR: 22/13/88 (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1988); and Amnesty International, *Argentina: The Attack of the Third Infantry Regiment Barracks at La Tablada—Investigations into Allegations of Torture, "Disappearances" and Extrajudicial Executions*, AMR: 13/01/90 (New York: Amnesty International Publications, 1990).
15. Paul Gobel, "Authorities Seek to Convert Beslan's Muslims," *RFE/RL Newsline*, September 2005.
16. See *On Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associations*, Russian Federation Federal Law 125-FZ, trans. Keston Institute, Center for Studies on New Religions, [www.cesnur.org/testi/Russia.htm](http://www.cesnur.org/testi/Russia.htm); Lev Krichevsky, "Russian House Passes Religion Bill Restricting 'Non-traditional' Faiths," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 26 June 1997.
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