25 Armed Groups through the Lens of Anthropology

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As this volume will attest, the study of armed groups cuts across many disciplines and is of interest to many government agencies, from the State Department to the CIA, and the consultants who assist them. Throughout the government, but especially in the military, there has been a renewed interest in understanding the cultural and religious factors behind the structures and activities of armed groups. While some of these agencies have always hired personnel with social science backgrounds, there has, of late, been an explicit turn to the discipline of cultural anthropology to provide such an understanding.

Anthropology has been called the most humanistic of the sciences and the most scientific of the humanities. In the United States, cultural (or sociocultural) anthropology is one of four subfields, the others being biological (or physical) anthropology, archaeology, and anthropological linguistics. While some anthropological analysis is quantitative, most is not. But qualitative data do yield useful insights and can be used to test hypotheses and construct theories. Such an approach is probably familiar to foreign service officers and intelligence analysts, many of whom come from social science or humanities backgrounds. However, for those who (like many military officers) are educated primarily in the physical sciences and engineering, it may be hard to understand how research that does not yield quantitative results can be useful.

Anthropologists have studied many kinds of armed groups, from indigenous warrior societies to organized-crime “families” to the militaries of various nations. The unique contribution of anthropology to the examination of armed groups is its cultural perspective. I suggest, therefore, that an armed group may be viewed as a social unit (or subsociety) existing within a larger society, with its own subculture shared by its members, yet embedded and subject to the norms of one or more wider cultures. What distinguishes such groups from other social units is their consistent use of violence, and their control mechanisms for the exercise of violence. It is tempting to exclude groups who exercise legitimate force (the military, police, state militias, and so forth) from this definition. However, such an exclusion would be based on the laws and

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political systems of particular nations (or societies) and not on any universally applicable
criteria. Armed groups would include feuding clans, groups of bandits, street gangs,
pirates, crime families and cartels, paramilitary organizations, revolutionary armies, and
the armed forces of a state.

CULTURE AND ARMED GROUPS

If we understand an armed group as a social unit possessing a subculture, and if many
armed groups are motivated by ideologies originating in or shaped by culture and
religion, then anthropological views of culture and religion are useful in understand-
ing the structures, values, and motivations of armed groups. There have been
a number of anthropologically informed studies of such groups, a few of which will be
presented in the next section.

All of these anthropologists, however, share one overall perspective: that human
aggression, from warfare to recurrent feuding to violent crime, is based in culture, rather
than biology. Our nearest living biological relatives, chimpanzees and gorillas, are more
peaceful than humans. As Bronislaw Malinowski noted, “Human beings fight, not
because they are biologically impelled, but because they are culturally induced.”1 Most
anthropologists believe that warfare is also less frequent in simple societies than in com-
plex ones2 and that war is a factor in creating higher levels of social complexity.3 However,
some claim that war and other forms of organized violence have been common in
societies of all levels of sophistication for thousands of years, and that anthropologists
have systematically ignored evidence for war.4

But some societies appear more warlike than others. For instance, more “demo-
cratic” (participatory) societies seem to fight with each other less often than with less par-
ticipatory ones, providing an extension of the “democratic peace hypothesis” applied to
nation-states.5 Anthropologists Melvin and Carol Ember went on to perform a statisti-
cal analysis of warfare using a cross-cultural sample.6 According to their findings, the fol-
lowing factors were predictors of war, two of which were clearly cultural and two
influenced by culture in the form of settlement type and pattern:

1. Resource problems, especially those created by a periodic natural disasters;
2. The threat of natural disasters;
3. Socialization for mistrust; and
4. Socialization with low need-satisfaction.

The importance of natural disasters in predicting war adds a new and pressing
reason for rendering humanitarian assistance to regions struck by natural disasters. The
quick intervention by U.S. forces following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami may well have
headed off future conflict, as well as bolstering positive impressions of the United States
in the mind of aid recipients. Interestingly, some expected predictors of war were not
supported by Ember and Ember’s statistical analysis. For instance, socialization for
aggression was not a predictor for war but more likely to be a consequence of war. Nor
was warfare in band and village societies caused by a shortage of women.

In a completely rational world, an armed group would be organized in such a way as
to maximize its effectiveness against potential enemies and minimize the threat to the
group. This standard is never met in practice, even in the militaries of nation-states.
Rather, other standards are adhered to, and, in most cases, these standards are influenced by culture.

Armed groups may be structured by laws and customs, kinship, prestige and charisma of various leaders, and the dictates of ideology, including religious beliefs. The People’s Liberation Army under Mao, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the U.S. armed forces are all military groups, but structured quite differently. That difference is ideological. Kin relationships are crucial in the allocation of influence in a traditional Italian American crime family, but not in the Manson family. A charismatic leader such as Napoléon was required to hold the First French Empire together, but not modern France.

Attributes of groups that many laymen take as “givens,” such as race and ethnicity, are actually culturally constructed, a fact now accepted in anthropology. Racial and ethnic divisions are very much in the eye of the beholder. In Northern Ireland, for instance, anthropologist Allen Feldman found that Protestant and Catholic groups have begun to depict each other as separate ethnic groups, and believe that they can “tell” who is who, while a Greek American social scientist who visited there recently had great difficulty identifying the different groups, describing everyone as having blond hair and blue eyes. Consciousness of race and ethnicity is a powerful factor in stereotyping out-groups in ways that compare unfavorably with stereotypes constructed of one’s in-group. It can lead to socialization for mistrust, which has been found to be a predictor of war. Recent examples in which ethnicities were either created or emphasized and played into subsequent conflict are the Rwandan civil war, the Bosnian conflict, and the conflict between the “Aryan” Sinhalese and “Dravidian” Tamils in Sri Lanka.

THE LENSES OF ANTHROPOLOGISTS

Some of the studies of armed groups performed by anthropologists are described below. They are not meant to be complete summaries of the work that was done, but they do provide a feel for the central “lens” each anthropologist used to understand the beliefs, motivation, structure, or behavior of the armed group in question. The groups studied range from paramilitary organizations to criminal syndicates to national militaries.

1. The Lens of Kinship: Portrait of an Italian American Crime Family

From 1969 to 1971, anthropologist Francis Ianni was able to gain the trust of a crime family in New York that he called the “Lupollos” and obtained an astounding level of access to its members. Critics of his work claim that the family members misled Ianni or hid from him criminal activities, such as heroin trafficking and violence. However, even if these objections are valid, they don’t diminish the value of his work as a tool for understanding the crime family as a social unit, and not merely a business. Ianni describes relationships, the central values and motivators of family members, and how power and influence is distributed and maintained through kinship ties. He approached the problem of understanding the structure and activities of the family not as an intelligence analyst or undercover officer but as a field-worker employing classical ethnographic fieldwork techniques. And yet his work is useful to law enforcement agencies, not only because of his description of the family, its legal and illegal activities, its central values, and its kinship structure, but because his approach offers a corrective to the dominant social...
scientific model of organized crime, which likened criminal organizations to businesses or governments.

In fact, Ianni expressly challenged this “formal organization” model, articulated most forcefully and persuasively by sociologist Donald Cressey. This model suggests that crime families are rationally structured in order to create profits, and that they have a system of authority that is based on positions with job titles, endures beyond their existing personnel, and is designed for efficiency. As Ianni notes, however, this view of an Italian American crime family requires a major distortion of the facts on the ground:

Secret criminal organizations like the Italian-American or Sicilian Mafia families are not formal organizations like governments or businesses. They are not rationally structured into statuses and functions in order to “maximize profits” and carry out tasks efficiently. Rather, they are traditional social systems, organized by action and by cultural values that have nothing to do with modern bureaucratic virtues.10

The most interesting aspect of Ianni’s work is that he took the word “family” seriously, and approached the analysis in terms of social relationships. Kinship systems have been central to an understanding of small-scale societies researched by anthropologists. Just as an anthropologist working in a small-scale society has traditionally attempted to understand social organization through an analysis of kin relations, Ianni, through his own developing relationships with family members, came to understand how the Lupollo family likewise used kinship as the basis for its social organization. A significant part of his work was creating kinship charts for the family. He also found six rules regulating social organization:11

1. The family operates as a social unit with social organization and business functions merged.
2. All leadership positions, down to the “middle management” level, are assigned on the basis of kinship.
3. The higher the position in the organization, the closer the kinship relationship.
4. Leadership positions in the family are assigned to a central group of fifteen family members, all of whom have close consanguineal or affinal relationships which are reinforced by fictive godparental relationships, as well.
5. Members of the leadership group are assigned primarily to either legal or illegal enterprises, but not both.
6. Transfer of monies from illegal to legal and back into illegal activities takes place through individuals rather than companies and is part of the close kin-organization of the family.

An additional value of Ianni’s work (and that of his wife, Elizabeth Reuss-Ianni) is that it examines organized crime in the United States as part of a wider American social system. Indeed, the Iannis have claimed that the emphasis on morality in U.S. culture is at the base of the success of organized crime. This is a viewpoint shared by many who suggest that it is the law that creates criminals.
It was toward the end of the Lupollo study that I became convinced that organized crime was a functional part of the American social system and should be viewed as one end of a continuum of business enterprises with legitimate business at the other end. But if this is so, why then is organized crime universally condemned while it is so widespread and so patently tolerated by the public and protected by the authorities? It seemed obvious that this contradiction is a structural means of resolving some of the conflicts, inconsistencies, and ambiguities that plague us because our desires and morals are so often in opposition. Organized crime, then, could be more than just a way of life; it could be a viable and persistent institution within American society, with its own symbols, its own beliefs, its own logic, and its own means of transmitting these attributes systematically from one generation to the next.12

In their research and writing, the Iannis take an almost neutral position on the activities of the Lupollos and other crime families, one quite common in anthropological studies grounded in a stance of cultural relativism, but one quite at odds with the goals of law enforcement, which is, by definition, emphatically not neutral. Indeed, a law enforcement officer might reasonably conclude that the Iannis’ use of ethnographic practices such as obscuring identities of informants through the use of pseudonyms and changing dates and place-names in order to obtain more reliable information—a kind of reverse witness protection program—aids and abets criminals. However, the American Anthropological Association’s Code of Ethics holds that an anthropologist is ethically bound to protect his informants, even if not officially covered under “human subject” protocols:

Anthropological researchers have primary ethical obligations to the people, species, and materials they study and to the people with whom they work. These obligations can supersede the goal of seeking new knowledge, and can lead to decisions not to undertake or to discontinue a research project when the primary obligation conflicts with other responsibilities, such as those owed to sponsors or clients. . . . Anthropological researchers must determine in advance whether their hosts/providers of information wish to remain anonymous or receive recognition, and make every effort to comply with those wishes.13

This conflict of ethical codes is a problem that will potentially dog relationships between practicing anthropologists and all security-related agencies. In cases in which research concerns an organization that exists to commit crime, the anthropologist faces an acute problem: betray the trust of informants or withhold information that may help prevent or reduce crime.14 Ianni chose to do the latter, reasoning that his major task was to understand the family’s social organization, rather than its criminal activities, so he could justify excluding such data from his book.15 However, two points are worth noting. First, his insight into the family came at a price—a promise not to report or ask questions about criminal activity. Second, Ianni admits that, while his fieldwork experience did not alter his opinion that the Mafia should be destroyed, it softened that opinion somewhat because of the “feelings of closeness and admiration” he had for the “old-style mafioso who was humble, taciturn, scrupulously moral in his living habits, and a man of honor.”16

Ianni’s response is natural: most field-workers come to feel affection for the people they study. The question is, how does such a response affect the data, and decisions regarding its use? And in the case of analyzing crime, does the nature of the anthropologist’s relationship with a criminal organization implicate him or her in its activities? The better the
access, the better the data, and the more useful it is to law enforcement. Whether such access is worth a possible compromise of objectivity is a question every researcher must resolve in his or her own way.

2. The Lens of Cognitive Anthropology: The Khmer Rouge

Alex Hinton took a different approach when seeking to understand the motivations of the Khmer Rouge genocidal soldiers. To understand the attitudes of members of this armed group he decided to perform in-depth interviews of soldiers for the Pol Pot regime who actually participated in the mass murders of “the killing fields.” It is not the stereotypical anthropological approach. For one thing, Hinton could not live among members of a group that had disbanded over two decades before he began his research. His approach was also conditioned by the extreme reluctance of Cambodians to talk about this painful period in their history, a reluctance particularly great on the part of those who carried out the atrocities. Rather than try to discuss these things with a wide range of people, he focused on persuading a few individuals—known as “key informants” in ethnography—to open up to him. These included the perpetrators, witnesses, and victims of genocide.

One of Hinton’s major goals, in addition to laying out the ideological and social structure of the Khmer Rouge and their state of “Democratic Kampuchea,” was to understand why people kill. He relied heavily on the emerging body of theory on cultural models, found in the subdiscipline of cognitive anthropology, to explain how ordinary people could not only kill but help commit mass murder and even kill in a particularly repugnant way. “Instituted models” are public cultural models, reproduced and reaffirmed by social institutions, while “mental models” are private, representing the individual’s understanding and internalization of institutional models. Hinton’s work revealed that the Khmer Rouge used traditional Cambodian mythological themes of disproportionate revenge; Buddhist conceptions of sin, punishment, and renunciation of attachments (removed from their original context, since Buddhism was banned); and models of “loyalty” and “revolutionary consciousness” not only to legitimize killing but to urge it in the service of the party. Loyalty and revolutionary consciousness became determiners of “face,” or socio-centric self-image determined by the evaluations of others. This concept, always important in Cambodian society and linked to what we call “honor,” assumed enormous influence in Democratic Kampuchea, where every action and thought was made public, and the private sphere, in which face was less directly at stake, radically shrunk. Social evaluation was almost constant.17

The Khmer Rouge also used tactics of “genocidal priming” to crystallize and create differences among people where none existed before. Hinton likens the Khmer Rouge’s use of such tactics to that of the Nazis, who “diagnosed” Germany’s “illness” as caused by “the Jews.”18 In Democratic Kampuchea there were “new people” (urban dwellers forced into the country) and “old people” (peasants), “revolutionaries” and “reactionaries,” “full rights people” and “depositees,” the “worker-peasant class” and the “feudal-capitalist/landowning class.” Some of the terminology of difference derived from Marxist-Leninist and Maoist ideologies, but those ideologies were also transformed by local cultural conditions:
The Khmer Rouge [used] Buddhist terms like “mindfulness,” “renunciation,” and “dependent origination” to translate key Marxist-Leninist concepts to the invocation of Angkar [party organization], a multi-valent symbol with high modernist, Buddhist, and local valences. In particular, I have argued that a number of these ideological models were explicitly formulated to encourage mass violence, as illustrated in . . . the Khmer Rouge call for the destruction of “strings” of traitors, for “cutting off one’s heart,” for demonstrating one’s “true loyalty” by killing “hidden enemies burrowing within,” for carrying out one’s “duty,” and for disproportionate revenge.

By drawing upon preexisting, emotionally salient local knowledge, perpetrator regimes increase the “take” of their ideologies by increasing their comprehensibility and making them more compelling to their followers.

Hinton suggests that the process of “take” creates “channels” that members of the armed group “tune” into when they are killing. Instituted ideological models also become mental models, though they are transformed in the mind of each individual. His harrowing account of how three Khmer Rouge killed one of their own comrades (who had committed the crime of digging up cassava roots) by taking him to the woods, removing his shirt, binding and blindfolding him, disemboweling him, and cooking and eating his liver illustrates in detail how symbols are mobilized and played out in a drama of killing. Nothing in Khmer Rouge (and certainly Marxist-Leninist) ideology required such an action. The victim was taken to a “liminal” space (outside the bounds of social structure), was dehumanized by being treated and thus rendered as an animal, and made animalistic sounds while his liver was removed. His debasement elevates his killers, making it easier to project the image of the “impure” enemy onto this scapegoat. The liver in Cambodian culture represents strength and resolve (something like “heart” does in American culture). Removing the liver of an enemy (who had “burrowed into” the fabric of society) and then cooking it (taking it from the world of the animal/enemy to the “civilized” world) is a ritual of purification. Once the enemy’s strength and resolve is purified, the killers can eat it, and it becomes their strength—and that of their party.

Once killers become accustomed to killing, they become desensitized to the act and accustomed to obedience. Hinton brings in the well-known experiments of Stanley Milgram, in which “teachers” (the real test subjects) were ordered to shock “learners” (really actors) to illustrate this point. But then they make that act of killing their own, as the liver-eating episode demonstrates, using ideological models they have accepted and internalized.

3. The Lens of Critical Anthropology: Protestant Paramilitary Groups in Northern Ireland

Jeffrey Sluka’s ethnographic work among Catholic populations in Northern Ireland was the stimulus for this study of Protestant death squads in Belfast. He asked the Catholics what he should study and this was their overwhelming choice. Sluka was involved with two Catholic victims groups—Silent No More and Relatives for Justice—whose business is publicizing such crimes. But could such a study be objective? Sluka addresses this question:
While the research reported here represents the victims’ perspective, if the essence of objectivity is gathering the available evidence and letting it lead to conclusions, than [sic] the ethnographic overview of Loyalist death squads in the culture of terror presented here is an objective view with the facts on the ground in Northern Ireland. Nonetheless, I think there is no academic or other dishonor in being prepared to stand with the victims of oppression and state terror.20

Sluka’s response is not exactly reassuring. His use of terms like “death squads,” “culture of terror,” “oppression,” and “state terror” is highly prejudicial. How does he fare with the “facts on the ground”? He takes numbers of deaths from 1969 to 1994, provided by O’Duffy and broken down by victim and perpetrator, and focuses on the 806 Catholic civilians killed by Loyalist and security forces (ignoring the 192 killed by [Catholic] Irish Republican groups), and claims that this represents a war by the Loyalists and security forces (the latter of which killed 144) against the civilian population. A case can certainly be made that Loyalists are targeting Catholic civilians, and from the accounts he presents, that seems to be the case. But it is invalid to include the security forces and not the various Irish Republican Army (IRA) groups. Why is a group that kills 144 civilians making war against them, when another that kills 192 is not? Because 806 Catholic civilians were killed by Protestants, Sluka says this group is most at risk of dying. But he could have ordered the data differently. Since 571 Protestant civilians and 1,045 members of the overwhelmingly Protestant security forces were killed, could he not have said that Protestants were most at risk?

Sluka makes claims that the British government had a deliberate policy of supporting Protestant “death squads” and used “psychological warfare” and “big lie” propaganda tactics to cover it up. His evidence for this is that some members of the security forces were also members of paramilitaries, a fact Britain admits but suggests that such individuals were rogues and not acting on orders. To counter this assertion, Sluka cites sources from a range of partisan Catholic groups, including Sinn Fein—the political arm of the IRA—without explaining why these should be any more worthy of trust than pro-Loyalist and British sources. And he himself also deploys propaganda in his analysis. His use of the terms “death squads” (comparing Protestant paramilitary violence to notorious Central and South American political murder groups) and “killing fields” (evoking the Khmer Rouge genocide) is calculated to provoke outrage on the part of the reader.

Sluka’s bias and reliance on partisan Catholic sources makes it difficult to accept his accusations that Britain has adopted a deliberate policy of “state terror” that targets Catholic civilians. He justifies this bias as “an attempt to write against terror through a critical ‘new anthropology’ combining perspectives from progressive streams in the discipline.”21 The term “progressive” is, itself, a term of propaganda, implying that those who don’t agree with this “new anthropology”—presumably practitioners of “old” anthropology—are somehow thwarting progress. He says that he relied on sources such as Silent Too Long, Relatives for Justice, and Sinn Fein “not only for information, but also for enlightenment and inspiration.”22 But Elena Mastors, a social scientist who recently worked among members of Protestant paramilitaries, notes that the British government had been running operations against the Protestant groups, trying to play one
against the other. While she confirmed that some British officials had aided Protestant groups, she reports that these contacts and channels of assistance were strictly informal and not sanctioned by the British government.23

Sluka declares the source of his bias—he not only performed fieldwork in Catholic neighborhoods but lived in a house that had been attacked by Loyalists three times and was “under constant threat of random sectarian assassination by Loyalist death squads.”24 It is likely that, having lived under such conditions and received, as he says, warnings from Catholic friends not to venture near Protestant neighborhoods for fear of being killed, he developed a sense of solidarity and identification with the Catholic population. One wonders if his analysis would have been radically different had he lived in a Protestant neighborhood and been “under constant threat” of IRA violence.

Does all this render Sluka’s work valueless in understanding the structure and culture of Protestant paramilitaries? Not entirely. Embedded within his biased analysis are facts that can be used to come to grips with the problem. Certainly he explains who the main groups are, includes photographs of their symbolism and iconography (revealed in wall murals), and documents their activities. Moreover, it also provides a clear picture of Catholic views of and emotional reactions to such groups, the coping strategies employed by a population under threat, and, in his citations of Sinn Fein and other Republican sources, what Protestant paramilitaries want people to know about them. It also demonstrates that the products of this “critical new anthropology,” which eschews a neutral approach to its subject matter, must not be accepted uncritically.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The need for military and government professionals to acquire an understanding of culture and religion has never been more clear—or more pressing—than today. We live in a multipolar world of joint and combined environments, transnational terrorism fueled by appeals to religion, globalized criminal enterprises, sustained counterinsurgency operations, and large-scale humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Senior officials recognize this need and are taking steps to ensure that future leaders and those who advise them will be culturally competent. Anthropology is the discipline most obviously relevant to answering this need. Some have said that anthropology is just as important in winning the war on terror as physics was in winning World War II.

Others are not so convinced. Neither are many—probably most—anthropologists, who have concluded that the discipline should not assist the security establishment at all, citing instances in which the relationship compromised field-workers and implicated anthropology as a tool of U.S. foreign policy and even oppression. Indeed, anthropologists who work in security-related jobs face ostracism from their professional colleagues—a major disincentive for any anthropologist contemplating such employment.

It is naive to imagine that each culture comes with a rule book, that adapting to diverse cultural environments means simply getting the “gouge” on whatever society we find ourselves engaging. Nor should we become excessively focused on specific cultures, to the exclusion of others. It is true that there are cultural and religious rules for behavior (norms), and it is also true that both culture and religion shape how a person sees the world. Culture creates a “taken for granted” reality and so does religion, though that
reality is not always what is codified in creeds and official ideologies. But many other noncultural factors, such as genetics, the influence of family and friends, environmental stresses, and lived experience, play into the formation of beliefs and behaviors.

The lenses anthropologists use in analyzing armed groups and armed conflict are conditioned by concepts and ideas found in their definitions of culture and religion. Culture can be viewed as a “complex whole” of beliefs, behaviors, and artifacts (the holistic perspective), a set of rules (the cognitive perspective), or a constructed social world (the constructivist perspective). If one is interested in treating an armed group as a social unit (such as a family or political entity), one might draw on traditional anthropological definitions of culture, which focus on social systems, such as kinship and political structure. If the goal is examining cultural influences on the individual member of an armed group, one may use a cognitive perspective that speaks of instituted and mental models. If one wants to examine the role of religion (or religious surrogates, such as Khmer Rouge ideology) in the formation of an armed group, it is essential to understand the myths, rituals, and symbolism employed by that group to activate members’ aggressive impulses or even prime them for genocide.

The nature of anthropological work requires, at a minimum, observation and interviewing and, in many cases, participation as well. The ethnographic method of participant observation helps researchers acquire a “feel” for the insider (“emic”) perspective, as opposed to a strictly outside (“etic”) perspective. It can be difficult to balance the need to have a meaningful experience as a participant and the need to record and analyze the experience as an observer. In dealing with an armed group this balance is particularly hard to maintain because the stakes are so high, and so are the emotions engaged. In many cases it is hard to remain neutral—and indeed, some anthropologists who favor a “critical” anthropology claim that neutrality is impossible.

The anthropological lens can bring to bear concepts of culture and religion on armed groups. But the lenses are themselves created and shaped by cultural and psychological processes, and by views on religion, and so have their limitations. The use of anthropological insight in studying armed groups and conflict is beneficial. Naive reliance on those insights is not.

NOTES


7. Pamela Stewart and Andrew Strathern, *Violence: Theory and Ethnography* (London and New York: Continuum Publishing, 2002), 45. As Stewart and Strathern note, the same phenomenon was present in Rwanda and Burundi (ibid.).

8. Ember and Ember, “Cross-cultural Studies of War and Peace.”


11. Ibid., 154.


14. Ianni himself has served as a consultant to law enforcement. It is not clear whether his reluctance to publish “things he was not intended to see” continued while he was in this position.


16. Ibid., 191.


18. Ibid., 29.

19. Ibid., 287.


21. Ibid., 128.

22. Ibid., 130.

23. Author’s interview with Dr. Elena Mastors, whose investigative findings on the Protestant paramilitaries will be published in a forthcoming book.

24. Sluka, “‘For God and Ulster,’” 129.

25. This emic/etic terminology derives from linguistics: phonemic versus phonetic. Phonemics focuses on meaning (a phoneme is defined as the smallest meaningful unit of sound), while phonetics examines the sounds themselves.